(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 162, in clause 27, page 17, line 5, at end insert—
“(1A) The decision to issue the certificate must be—
(a) approved by a Judicial Commissioner,
(b) laid before Parliament,
(c) published and publicly accessible on the Information Commissioner’s Office website.
(1B) In deciding whether to approve an application under subsection (1), a Judicial Commissioner must review the Minister’s conclusions as to the following matters—
(a) whether the certificate is necessary on relevant grounds,
(b) whether the conduct that would be authorised by the certificate is proportionate to what it sought to be achieved by that conduct, and
(c) whether it is necessary and proportionate to exempt all provisions specified in the certificate.”.
This amendment would ensure that oversight and safeguarding in the application for a National Security Certificate are effective, requiring sufficient detail in the application process.
Amendment 163, in clause 27, page 17, leave out lines 6 to 8 and insert—
“(2) An application for a certificate under subsection (1)—
(a) must identify the personal data to which it applies by means of a detailed description, and”.
This amendment would require a National Security Certificate to identify the personal data to which the Certificate applies by means of a detailed description.
Amendment 164, in clause 27, page 17, line 9, leave out subsection (2)(b).
This amendment would ensure that a National Security Certificate cannot be expressed to have prospective effect.
Amendment 165, in clause 27, page 17, line 9, at end insert—
“(c) must specify each provision of this Act which it seeks to exempt, and
(d) must provide a justification for both (a) and (b).”.
This amendment would ensure effective oversight of exemptions of this Act from the application for a National Security Certificate.
Amendment 166, in clause 27, page 17, line 10, leave out “directly” and insert
“who believes they are directly or indirectly”.
This amendment would broaden the application of subsection (3) so that any person who believes they are directly affected by a National Security Certificate may appeal to the Tribunal against the Certificate.
Amendment 167, in clause 27, page 17, line 12, leave out
“, applying the principles applied by a court on an application for judicial review,”.
This amendment removes the application to the appeal against a National Security Certificate of the principles applied by a court on an application for judicial review.
Amendment 168, in clause 27, page 17, line 13, leave out
“the Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing”
and insert
“it was not necessary or proportionate to issue”.
These amendments would reflect that the Minister would not be the only authority involved in the process of applying for a National Security Certificate.
Amendment 169, in clause 27, page 17, line 16, at end insert—
“(4A) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a Minister’s application for a certificate under this Chapter, the Judicial Commissioner must give the Minister of the Crown reasons in writing for the refusal.
(4B) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a Minister’s application for a certificate under this Chapter, the Minister may apply to the Information Commissioner for a review of the decision.
(4C) It is not permissible for exemptions to be specified in relation to—
(a) Chapter II of the applied GDPR (principles)—
(i) Article 5 (lawful, fair and transparent processing),
(ii) Article 6 (lawfulness of processing),
(iii) Article 9 (processing of special categories of personal data),
(b) Chapter IV of the applied GDPR—
(i) GDPR Articles 24 – 32 inclusive,
(ii) GDPR Articles 35 – 43 inclusive,
(c) Chapter VIII of the applied GDPR (remedies, liabilities and penalties)—
(i) GDPR Article 83 (general conditions for imposing administrative fines),
(ii) GDPR Article 84 (penalties),
(d) Part 5 of this Act, or
(e) Part 7 of this Act.”.
This amendment would require a Judicial Commissioner to intimate in writing to the Minister reasons for refusing the Minister’s application for a National Security Certificate and allows the Minister to apply for a review by the Information Commissioner of such a refusal.
Thank you, Mr Hanson. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again.
I will first provide some context for this part of the Bill. The provisions in the Bill relating to national security exemptions and certificates are wholly in line with the provisions in the Data Protection Act 1998 and its predecessor, the Data Protection Act 1984. What we are doing in the Bill is preserving an arrangement that has been on the statute book for more than 30 years and has been operated by successive Governments.
The national security exemption is no different in principle from the other exemptions provided for in the Bill. If it is right that certain provisions of data protection legislation can be disapplied for reasons of, for example, crime prevention or taxation purposes, or in pursuit of various regulatory functions, without external approval, surely it is difficult to take issue with the need for an exemption on the grounds of national security on the same basis.
The Minister is absolutely right that the provisions mirror those in the DPA. That is exactly why we take issue with them. They mirror unacceptable preventions of rights in the tribunal appeal process, but do not mirror the rights in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Why were safeguards put in place in that Act, but will not apply in this Bill?
If I understand the hon. Lady’s argument correctly, she has presented the judicial commissioners as permitting, for example, warrant to be granted. Having sat through the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill and then the Public Bill Committee, I can tell her that I am afraid that is not how that Act works. What happens is that the Secretary of State grants the warrant and then that decision is overseen by the judicial commissioner. I will come on to the difference between the Investigatory Powers Act and this Bill in due course, because the terminology used draws on that in the Investigatory Powers Act, but that Act is very different from this Bill, which is about the processing of data, in its engagement with people and their rights.
Will the Minister give way on that point?
If I may, I will make some progress. Along with existing provisions in section 28 of the 1998 Act, clause 27 provides for a certificate signed by a Minister of the Crown certifying that exemption from specified data protection requirements is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. There are equivalent provisions in parts 3 and 4 of the Bill. Such a certificate is conclusive evidence of that fact, for example in any legal proceedings. That is the point about the certificates—they only come into play if the exemption or restriction is actually applied.
The certificate provides evidence that the exemption or restriction is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. It therefore has relevance only in the event that, first, the exemption or restriction is applied to the data in question and, secondly, there is a need to rely on the certificate as conclusive evidence in proceedings to establish that the exemption or restriction is required for the statutory purpose.
But what the national security certificate does not require is a statement of what data is being processed or the exemptions under which the Ministry of Defence or the intelligence services require it. That is what our amendments seek to introduce. If the Bill proceeds unamended, national security certificates would require only very broad details and no information on what data was being processed. It would therefore not be very likely that a tribunal would be able to oppose the decision on the basis of a judicial review.
I have a copy of a live certificate granted by the then Secretary of State, David Blunkett, on 10 December 2001. In the certificate, he sets out in summary the reasons why the certificate has been granted, including:
“The work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown requires secrecy.”
I assume hon. Members do not disagree with that. Another reason is:
“The general principle of neither confirming nor denying whether the Security Service processes data about an individual, or whether others are processing personal data for, on behalf of with a view to assist or in relation to the functions of the Security Service, is an essential part of that secrecy.”
Again, I assume that hon. Members do not disagree with that. As I said, this is a live certificate that has been given to the Information Commissioner, and is in the public domain for people to see and to check should they so wish. Those reasons are given in that certificate.
That is wonderful, but the Bill does not require that. It is great that my noble Friend Lord Blunkett put that on his national security application, but the Bill does not require that in law, so I am afraid that it is not a sufficient argument against the amendments that we have tabled.
What we are doing is transposing the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 into the Bill. It is difficult to see a situation in which a national security certificate will be granted on the basis that the work of the security and intelligence agencies of the Crown does not require secrecy.
Is there not a bigger, more general overall point here, which is that we should not be considering doing anything in Committee that risks making it more difficult for the security services to protect us? This week of all weeks, surely that should be uppermost in our minds.
Very much so—indeed, this debate ran through the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which was one of the most scrutinised pieces of legislation. Senior parliamentarians who served on the Committee on that Act during long careers in this House, including the then Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes), said that it was an incredibly well scrutinised Bill. There was constant debate about the battle, or tension, between ensuring the national security of our country in the most transparent way possible, and the fact that by definition there has to be some secrecy and confidentiality about the ways in which the security agencies work.
What was important in the debates on that Act, as it is in those on the current Bill, was making it clear that the idea that rogue civil servants or security agents can run around with people’s information with no checks is very wrong. We are replicating in the Bill the system that has been used for the past 30 years, because we consider that that system has the appropriate and necessary safeguards in the often very fast-moving context of a national security situation.
I will make a little progress, then I will take more interventions.
To be absolutely clear, a national security exemption is applied not by a Minister but by a data controller. Data controllers—be they the intelligence services, the Ministry of Defence or any other body—are well placed to make the determination, given that they will have a detailed understanding of the operational context and the extent to which departure from the requirement of the general data protection regulation—or parts 3 or 4 of the Bill as the case may be—is necessary to safeguard national security. In short, a data controller decides whether the national security exemption should be applied in a particular case, and the certificate is the evidence of the need for such an exemption in the event that someone challenges it.
I will give an example first, because I think it is so important. I fear that a bit of misunderstanding has crept in. Let us take the example of a subject access request. Mr Smith asks an intelligence service whether it is processing personal data concerning him and, if so, for information about that data under clause 94. The intelligence service considers whether it is processing personal data, which it will have obtained under its other statutory powers, such as the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
If the agency determines that it is processing personal data relating to Mr Smith, it then considers whether it is able to disclose the data, or whether a relevant exemption is engaged. For the agency, the key consideration will be whether disclosing the data would damage national security, for example by disclosing sensitive capabilities or alerting Mr Smith to the fact that he is a subject of investigation. If disclosure does not undermine national security and no other exemption is relevant, the intelligence service must disclose the information. However, if national security would be undermined by disclosure, the agency will need to use the national security exemption in relation to processing any personal data relating to Mr Smith.
If the intelligence service does not process any personal data relating to Mr Smith, it will again have to consider whether disclosing that fact would undermine national security, for example by revealing a lack of capability, which could be exploited by subjects of investigation. That is why, on occasion, when such requests are made, a “neither confirm nor deny” response may be necessary, because either confirming or denying may in itself have ramifications, not only in relation to Mr Smith but in relation to other aspects of national security.
Mr Smith may complain to the Information Commissioner about the response to his request for information. The intelligence service may then be required to demonstrate to the commissioner that the processing of personal data complies with the requirements of part four of the Bill, as set out in clause 102, and that it has responded to the request for information appropriately.
If, in legal proceedings, Mr Smith sought to argue that the national security exemption had been improperly relied upon, a national security certificate could be used as conclusive evidence that the national security exemption was required to safeguard national security. Any person who believed they were directly affected by the certificate could of course appeal against it to the upper tribunal, as set out in clause 111.
The Minister is setting out the mechanics of the system with admirable clarity. The point in dispute, though, is not the mechanics of the process but whether the data controller is able—unilaterally, unchecked and unfettered—to seek a national security exemption. Anyone who has worked with the intelligence agencies, either as a Minister or not, knows that they take parliamentary oversight and the defence of parliamentary supremacy extremely seriously.
What we are seeking with this amendment is to ensure that a data controller does not issue a national security certificate unchecked, and that instead there is an element of judicial oversight. The rule of law is important. It should be defended, protected and enhanced, especially when the data collection powers of the intelligence services are so much greater than they were 30 years ago when data protection legislation was first written.
The Government fully accept that national security certificates should be capable of being subject to judicial oversight. Indeed, the current scheme—both under the 1998 Act and this Bill—provides for just that. However, the amendments would radically change the national security certificate regime, because they would replace the existing scheme with one that required a Minister of the Crown to apply to a judicial commissioner for a certificate if an exemption was sought for the purposes of safeguarding national security, and for a decision to issue a certificate to be approved by a judicial commissioner.
This, again, is the debate that we had when we were considering the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. There were some who would have preferred a judicial commissioner to make the decision about warrantry before the Secretary of State. However, Parliament decided that it was not comfortable with that, because it would have meant a great change. For a member of the judiciary to certify on national security issues, rather than a member of the Executive—namely the Prime Minister or a Secretary of State—would have great constitutional implications.
There were great debates about the issue and the House decided, in its wisdom, that it would maintain the constitutional tradition, which is that a member of the Executive has the ultimate responsibility for national security, with, of course, judicial oversight by judicial commissioners and by the various tribunals that all these powers are subject to. The House decided that the decision itself must be a matter for a Minister of the Crown, because in the event—God forbid—that there is a national security incident, the House will rightly and properly demand answers from the Government of the day. With the greatest respect, a judicial commissioner cannot come to the Dispatch Box to explain how the Government and those assisting them in national security matters have responded to that situation. That is why we have this fine constitutional balance, and why we have adopted in the Bill the regime that has been in place for 30 years.
Does the Minister accept that in response to the case of Watson and others against the Government, the Government conceded that additional safeguards, including a far more robust system of independent oversight, were necessary? That test of judicial review is simply not sufficient as oversight. It cannot contest the merits of the case and applies only to the very limited, narrow appeal right of judicial review. It is just not sufficient.
I will come on, if I may, to the judicial review test. I have quite a lot about that.
I am grateful to have more time for my officials to scribble a response.
I am happy to help the Minister. She keeps referring to the framework that has been in place for the last 30 years. That has been a time when we have been a member of the European Union. In reviewing this situation, the House of Lords European Union Committee made the point that under the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, there is absolute jurisdiction for national member states to take decisions on national security. That is not an EU area of jurisdiction. The treaty says that we are protected as a member of the EU, but if we leave the European Union we are not protected by that exemption under the treaty. That is why, for third countries, the European Commission looks at the whole legislative framework. Do we not risk the adequacy decision by taking this approach? In the future, we will not have the answer of saying that it is an issue of exemption from the European Commission.
National security must always be a matter for any member state in the EU, but also once we leave the EU. Sorry, I may have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, but how we deal with national security is, of course, a matter for the state.
I am happy to clarify for the Minister. The status quo is that the European Union will not look at areas of national security because they are the jurisdiction of member states. When we leave the European Union, the Commission will look at the entirety of legislation around data protection and privacy rights, because there are no exemptions that it needs to take into account. The noble Lords made the point that our
“data protection standards would be assessed without the benefit of the protection afforded by the national security exemption”
under the treaty. Do we not risk our adequacy by taking these exemptions?
No, because those who have drafted the Bill have sought, at all times, to comply with the law enforcement directive and with the modernised, draft Council of Europe convention 108. The Bill very much meets those standards, not just on law enforcement but across parts 3 and 4.
I have spoken to the outgoing Council of Europe information commissioner about the issue, and he has put on the record his grave reservations about the regime that we have in place, because we simply do not have the right kind of judicial oversight of the information gathering powers that are now available to our intelligence services. Our intelligence services are very good, and they need to be allowed to do their job, but they will be allowed to do that job more effectively—and without additional risks to our adequacy—if there is some kind of judicial oversight in the right timeframe of the decisions that are taken.
That is where the distinction between obtaining information and processing it is so important. The gathering that the right hon. Gentleman refers to falls under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Retaining it and processing it in the ways that the Bill seeks to provide for is the data protection element. The 2016 Act has all the extra judicial oversights that have been passed by the House.
Quite helpfully, we are coming to the nub of the question. It is now incumbent on the Minister to lay out for the Committee why the oversight regime for obtaining information should be so remarkably different from the regime for processing it.
The obtaining of information is potentially intrusive and often extremely time-sensitive. For the processing of information, particularly in the case of a subject access request, once we have met the criteria for obtaining it, separate judicial oversight through the upper tribunal is set out in the Bill, as well as ministerial oversight. They are two separate regimes.
There is extra oversight in the 2016 Act because obtaining information can be so intrusive. The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I cannot go into the methodology—I am not sure I am security-cleared enough to know, to be honest—but obtaining information has the potential to be particularly intrusive, in a way that processing information gathered by security service officials may not be.
I reassure the Minister that I went through the methodologies during my time at the Home Office. The justification that she still needs to lay out for the Committee—she is perhaps struggling to do so—is why there should be one set of judicial oversight arrangements for obtaining information and another for processing it. Why are they not the same?
There might be many reasons why we process information. The end result of processing might be for national security reasons or law enforcement reasons—my officials are scribbling away furiously, so I do not want to take away their glory when they provide me with the answer.
I have an answer on the Watson case, raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, which dealt with the retention of communications by communications service providers. Again, that is an entirely different scenario from the one we are talking about, where the material is held by the security services.
Amendment 161 goes further than the 2016 Act, because it places the decision to issue a certificate with the judicial commissioner. As I have said, national security certificates come into play only to serve in legal proceedings as conclusive evidence that an exemption from specified data protection requirements is necessary to protect national security—for example, to prevent disclosure of personal data to an individual under investigation, when such disclosure would damage national security. The certificate does not authorise the required use of the national security exemption, which is properly a matter for the data controller to determine.
Amendments 163 and 164 relate to the form of a national security certificate. Amendment 163 would require a detailed rather than general description of the data identified on a national security certificate, but we believe this change to be unnecessary and unhelpful, given that much data can be adequately described in a general way. Amendment 164, which would prevent a certificate from having prospective effect, appears to be dependent on the prior judicial authorisation scheme proposed in amendments 161 and 162, and again contrasts with the prospective nature of certificates currently under the Data Protection Act 1998.
Prospective certificates of the type issued under the 1998 Act are the best way of ensuring that the use of the national security exemption by the intelligence services and others is both sufficiently foreseeable for the purposes of article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and accountable. The accountability is ensured by the power to challenge certificates when they are issued, and that is something that has real teeth. The accountability is strengthened by the provision in clause 130 for the publication of certificates. The documents we are discussing will therefore be in the public domain—indeed, many of them are already. But it will now be set out in statute that they should be in the public domain.
Amendments 166 to 168 relate to the appeals process. Amendment 166 would broaden the scope for appealing a national security certificate from a person “directly affected” by it to someone who
“believes they are directly or indirectly affected”
by it. I wonder whether the Opposition did any work on the scope of the provision when drafting it, because the words “indirectly affected” have the potential to cause an extraordinary number of claims. How on earth could that phrase be defined in a way that does not swamp the security services with applications from people who consider that they might be indirectly affected by a decision relating to a national security matter? I do not see how that can be considered practicable.
As I have already said, the issue is that the judicial review process for appeal is incredibly narrow and limited. Under section 28 of the DPA, where an individual requests to access his or her data that is subject to a certificate, they will merely be informed that they have been given all the information that is required under the Act. They would not be informed that their data is being withheld on the grounds of a national security certificate. That means that it is impossible for them to know whether they even have the right to appeal under a judicial review, and they do not have the information available to allow them to take that judicial review case forward. That is why the amendment is drafted in this way. If the Minister would like, she can suggest some alternative wording that would solve the problem.
We get to the nub of the problem. Is the hon. Lady seriously suggesting that the security services should notify someone who puts in an access request that they are the subject of an investigation? That is the tension facing the security services. That is why we have internationally met standards, with regard to article 108 of the convention, which the Bill complies with. That is why we have to build in all these safeguards, to try to ensure that those people who intend ill will to this country do not benefit from our natural wish to be as transparent as possible when dealing with people’s personal data.
I have already explained that there would of course be an exemption for not informing individuals if they were under surveillance or being processed, but there are not sufficient oversights, safeguards or appeals. In the absence of any of those three, the Minister has to accept that there are absolutely no checks and balances on the exemptions listed under the clause.
There most certainly are: they have the right to appeal to the upper tribunal.
Yes. The upper tribunal reviews the material and applies the judicial review test. Again, we had this debate in relation to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which Parliament passed, in relation to the test that applied in the later appeal stages, following the grant of a warrant. This Bill has been drafted to comply with the modernised convention 108 of the Council of Europe. This is why it is in this way. It reflects the past 30 years’-worth of practice but meets international standards as they exist at the moment, which I hope reassures the hon. Member for Bristol North West.
On the specific narrow point, is it not the case that clause 130 already provides for the publication of certificates, so the amendment is simply not necessary? On the wider point—at the risk of repeating my earlier one—I fear that we are at risk of stumbling into a law of unintended consequences where we will make it more difficult for our security services to do the job that we want them to do. While we have been sitting here, I saw on my phone that the international community has recognised that what happened in Salisbury is the first recorded attack using a nerve agent on a European country since 1945. Let us remember that.
That is a particularly sobering development. I know that we all feel the gravity of our responsibilities when considering the Bill in the context of national security today. I am grateful to my hon. Friend.
The Minister and I served on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill Joint Committee and we had many debates on this subject. It struck me that the House was at its best when we passed the Investigatory Powers Bill on Third Reading, with the support of the Labour party, having had these debates. It is frustrating that today of all days, as my hon. Friend says, we should go over that ground again having already reached a useful consensus.
On the judicial review point, the test was debated at length in the Joint Committee, in the Public Bill Committee and on the Floor of the House. The House passed that Act with cross-party consensus, as my hon. Friend has said, so I do not understand why we are having the same debate.
Anyone who has spent time working with our intelligence agencies knows that they see their mission as the defence of parliamentary democracy. They believe in scrutiny and oversight, which is what we are trying to insert in the Bill. The reason the Investigatory Powers Bill was passed in that way was because we were successful in ensuring that there were stronger safeguards. The Minister has been unable to explain today why the safeguarding regime should be different for the processing of data as opposed to the obtaining of data. We have heard no convincing arguments on that front today. All that we are seeking to do is protect the ability of the intelligence agencies to do their job by ensuring that a guard against the misuse of their much broader powers is subject to effective judicial oversight, and not in public but in a court.
For the security services to have obtained data under the Investigatory Powers Act, they will have passed through the various safeguards that Parliament set out in that Act. Once that data is obtained, it follows that the permission that the judicial commissioner will have reviewed will still flow through to the processing of that information. Our concern here is certain requirements of the data protection regime. The decision to disseminate information under that regime must rest with the intelligence agencies, with oversight. The Bill provides for those decisions to be appealed. That is as it should be. It should not be for a judicial commissioner to take over the decision of the data controller, who is processing applications and information in real time, often in situations that require them to act quickly. Likewise, whether to grant a certificate, which will be in the public domain, must be a decision for a member of the Executive, not the judiciary.
I assume that no work has been done to measure the scope of amendment 166, but allowing the clause to cover people indirectly affected could have enormous consequences for the security services, which already face great pressures and responsibilities.
Amendments 167 and 168 would remove the application of judicial review principles by the upper tribunal when considering an appeal against a certificate. They would replace the “reasonable grounds for issuing” test with a requirement to consider whether issuing a certificate was necessary and proportionate. Again, that would be an unnecessary departure from the existing scheme, which applies the judicial review test and has worked very well for the past 30 years.
In applying judicial review principles, the upper tribunal can consider a range of issues, including necessity, proportionality and lawfulness. As we set out in our response to the report of the House of Lords Constitution Committee, that enables the upper tribunal to consider matters such as whether the decision to issue the certificate was reasonable, having regard to the impact on the rights of the data subject and the need to safeguard national security. The Bill makes it clear that the upper tribunal has the power to quash the certificate if it concludes that the decision to issue it was unreasonable.
I hope that I have answered the concerns of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill about how certificates are granted and about the review process when a subject access request is made and the certificate is applied. We must recognise that the Bill does not weaken a data subject’s rights or the requirements that must be met if an exemption is to be relied on; it reflects the past 30 years of law. Perhaps I missed it, but I do not think that any hon. Member has argued that the Data Protection Act 1998 has significant failings.
As the Minister well knows, the debate internationally is a result of the radical transformation of intelligence agencies’ ability to collect and process data. There is an argument, which has been well recognised in the Council of Europe and elsewhere, that where powers are greater, oversight should be stronger.
Yes, and that is precisely why Parliament passed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
Order. I realise that the right hon. Gentleman feels strongly about the issue, but if he wishes to intervene, he must stand. If not, he must remain quiet and take it on the chin.
The Government have listened to the concerns of the House of Lords. We added clause 130 in the Lords to provide for the publication of national security certificates by the Information Commissioner, so that they would be easily accessible to anyone who wished to mount a subject access request, and could be tested accordingly. In her briefing to noble Lords about the Bill, the Information Commissioner said that the clause was
“very welcome as it should improve regulatory scrutiny and foster greater public trust and confidence in the use of national security certificate process.”
It will also ensure that any person who believes that they are directly affected by a certificate will be better placed to exercise their appeal rights.
The Bill’s approach to national security certificates is tried and tested. We rely on those 30 years of experience of the regime being in place. In her written submission to the Committee, the Information Commission has not raised any issues in respect of the provisions in clause 27.
I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley. I suspect from the interventions that she may well press the amendment to a vote, but I invite her to withdraw it. We have scrutinised this matter, and the Government are clear that the Bill reflects the past 30 years of the regime. It has worked and the Information Commissioner has not raised any concerns about clause 27.
I am afraid that the Minister is correct; she has not reassured Opposition Members. The amendment is not about putting obstacles in the way of our intelligence agencies going about their operational capabilities—that is the last thing we want to do—but the Minister has been unable to give us a clear argument as to why there should be stronger safeguards on the collection of data than on processing. That the Home Office would like to have the data is not a sufficient argument.
Please do not trivialise the matter. It is not the case that the Home Office would like the data; this is national security. This is the regime that our security services use at the moment. It is the regime they need. That is why the Government are pressing the issue. Again, I would have thought that this week of all weeks is the week to back our security services, not to put more barriers in their way.
The intelligence agencies, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill has said, take parliamentary oversight and scrutiny seriously. The safeguards and oversights are not built into the Bill in the way they were in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. There is no clear argument why those safeguards should be in place for collection, but not for processing. The Minister has constantly relayed that that decision is based on 30 years’-worth of data but, as has already been said, the scope for the collection and processing of data is so far transformed, even from when the Data Protection Act was written in 1998, that the oversights and safeguards need to be transformed as well. That is why we are proposing these amendments.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has suggested that the exemptions put forward in the Bill are not legal and introduce arbitrary interferences into people’s privacy rights. It is this Committee’s responsibility to ensure that the amendments pass. That is not trivialising the issue, but ensuring that there is a proper debate about security and the individual’s data subject rights. That is why we will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Very briefly, subsection (1) includes the phrase
“must be lawful and fair”.
Could the Minister say a little more about the word “fair”? What definition is she resting on, and who is the judge of it?
“Lawful” means any processing necessary to carry out a particular task, where that task is authorised either by statute or under common law. It would cover, for example, the taking and retention of DNA and fingerprints under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or the police’s common law powers to disclose information required for the operation of the domestic violence disclosure scheme.
The Government recognise the importance of safeguarding sensitive personal information about individuals. Subsections (3) to (5) therefore restrict the processing of sensitive data, the definition of which includes information about an individual’s race or ethnic origin, and biometric data such as their DNA profile and fingerprints.
Further safeguards for the protection of sensitive personal data are set out in clause 42. The processing of sensitive personal data is permitted under two circumstances. The first is where the data subject has given his or her consent. The second is where the processing is strictly necessary for a law enforcement purpose and one or more of the conditions in schedule 8 to the Bill has been met. Those conditions include, for example, that the processing is necessary to protect the individual concerned or another person, or is necessary for the administration of justice. In both cases, the controller is required to have an appropriate policy document in place. We will come on to the content of such policy documents when we debate clause 42.
I am grateful for the Minister’s extensive definition, given in response to a question I did not ask. I did not ask for the definition of “lawful” but for the definition of “fair”.
I am so sorry; I thought it was apparent from my answer. “Fair” is initially a matter for the data controller, but ultimately the Information Commissioner has oversight of these provisions and the commissioner will cover that in her guidance.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Conditions for sensitive processing under Part 3
Amendment made: 116, in schedule 8, page 184, line 32, at end insert—
“Safeguarding of children and of individuals at risk
3A (1) This condition is met if—
(a) the processing is necessary for the purposes of—
(i) protecting an individual from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, or
(ii) protecting the physical, mental or emotional well-being of an individual,
(b) the individual is—
(i) aged under 18, or
(ii) aged 18 or over and at risk,
(c) the processing is carried out without the consent of the data subject for one of the reasons listed in sub-paragraph (2), and
(d) the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The reasons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) are—
(a) in the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing;
(c) the processing must be carried out without the consent of the data subject because obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the provision of the protection mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, an individual aged 18 or over is “at risk” if the controller has reasonable cause to suspect that the individual—
(a) has needs for care and support,
(b) is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and
(c) as a result of those needs is unable to protect himself or herself against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.
(4) In sub-paragraph (1)(a), the reference to the protection of an individual or of the well-being of an individual includes both protection relating to a particular individual and protection relating to a type of individual.”—(Victoria Atkins.)
Schedule 8 makes provision about the circumstances in which the processing of special categories of personal data is permitted. This amendment adds to that Schedule certain processing of personal data which is necessary for the protection of children or of adults at risk. See also Amendments 85 and 117.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 36 to 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Safeguards: archiving
Amendment made: 20, in clause 41, page 23, line 34, leave out “an individual” and insert “a data subject”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Clause 41 makes provision about the processing of personal data for archiving purposes, for scientific or historical research purposes or for statistical purposes. This amendment aligns Clause 41(2)(b) with similar provision in Clause 19(2).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
We had a good debate on what I think was a shared objective across the Committee: to ensure that those running our big national archives—whether they are large or small organisations—should not be jeopardised by frivolous claims or, indeed, a multiplicity of claims from individuals who might seek to change the records held there in one way or another. I mentioned to the Minister in an earlier debate that we were anxious, despite the reassurances she sought to give the Committee, that a number of organisations, including the BBC, were deeply concerned about the Bill’s impact on their work. They were not satisfied that the exemptions and safeguards in the Bill would quite do the job.
My only reason for speaking at this stage is to suggest to Ministers that if they were to have discussions with some of those organisations about possible Government amendments on Report to refine the language, and provide some of the reassurance people want, that would attract our support. We would want to have such conversations, but it would be better if the Government could find a way to come forward with refinements of their own on Report.
I am happy to explore that. The reason for the clause is to enable processing to be done to create an archive for scientific or historical research, or for statistical purposes. The reason law enforcement is mentioned is that it may be necessary where a law enforcement agency needs to review historic offences, such as allegations of child sexual exploitation. I would of course be happy to discuss that with the right hon. Gentleman to see whether there are further avenues down which we should proceed.
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I am happy to write to her with the representations that we have received, and perhaps she could reflect on those and write back.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
Safeguards: sensitive processing
Amendment made: 21, in clause 42, page 24, line 29, leave out “with the day” and insert “when”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 43 to 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Right to erasure or restriction of processing
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 47, page 28, line 20, leave out second “data”.
This amendment changes a reference to a “data controller” into a reference to a “controller” (as defined in Clauses 3 and 32).
I can be brief, because this drafting amendment simply ensures that clause 47, as with the rest of the Bill, refers to a “controller” rather than a “data controller”. For the purposes of part 3, a controller is defined in clause 32(1) so it is not necessary to refer elsewhere to a “data controller”.
Amendment 22 agreed to.
Clause 47, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49
Right not to be subject to automated decision-making
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We had a good debate on possible amendments to the powers of automatic decision making earlier and this is an important clause in that it creates a right not to be subject to automated decision making. Clause 49(1) states:
“A controller may not take a significant decision based solely on automated processing unless that decision is required or authorised by law.”
I hope Ministers recognise that
“required or authorised by law”
is an incredibly broad set of questions. I would like to provoke the Minister into saying a little more about what safeguards she believes will come into place to ensure that decisions are not taken that jeopardise somebody’s human rights and their right to appeal and justice based on those human rights. It could be that the Minister decides to answer those questions in the debate on clause 50, but it would be useful for her to say a little more about her understanding of the phrase “significant decision” and a little more about what kind of safeguards will be needed to ensure that decisions that are cast in such a broad way do not impact on people in a negative way.
Clause 49 establishes the right for individuals not to be subject to a decision based exclusively on automated processing, where that decision has an adverse impact on the individual. It is important to protect that right to enhance confidence in law enforcement processing and safeguard individuals against the risk that a potentially damaging decision is taken without human intervention. The right hon. Gentleman asked about the definition of a significant decision. It is set out in the Bill.
We are not aware of any examples of the police solely using automated decision-making methods, but there may be examples in other competent authorities. The law enforcement directive includes that requirement, so we want to transpose it faithfully into statute, and we believe we have captured the spirit of the requirement.
There is the example of Durham police force—an excellent police force in many regards—using automated decision making to decide who does and does not remain in custody, and when people receive their charge. A human is involved in that decision-making process at the moment, but the Bill would enable that to be taken away and allow it to be done purely on an automated basis. I am sure the Minister understands our concerns about removing humans from that decision-making process.
I have to say that I am not familiar with that example. I look to my officials—
Order. The hon. Lady has on a number of occasions referred to her officials. She should remember at all times that, as far as the Committee is concerned, there are no officials in this room, even though self-evidently there are.
I wonder whether that is captured in the spirit of the Bill. Forgive me, Mr Hanson. This is my first Bill Committee as a Minister and I was not aware of that. Many apologies.
I am not familiar with that example. It would be a very interesting exercise under the PACE custody arrangements. I will look into it in due course. These protections transpose the law enforcement directive, and we are confident that they meet those requirements.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Automated decision-making authorised by law: safeguards
Amendments made: 23, in clause 50, page 30, line 11, leave out “21 days” and insert “1 month”.
Clause 50(2)(b) provides that where a controller notifies a data subject under Clause 50(2)(a) that the controller has taken a “qualifying significant decision” in relation to the data subject based solely on automated processing, the data subject has 21 days to request the controller to reconsider or take a new decision not based solely on automated processing. This amendment extends that period to one month.
Amendment 24, in clause 50, page 30, line 17, leave out “21 days” and insert “1 month”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Clause 50(3) provides that where a data subject makes a request to a controller under Clause 50(2)(b) to reconsider or retake a decision based solely on automated processing, the controller has 21 days to respond. This amendment extends that period to one month.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I remain concerned that the safeguards the Government have proposed to ensure people’s human rights are not jeopardised by the use of automated decision making are, frankly, not worth the paper they are written on. We know that prospective employers and their agents use algorithms and automated systems to analyse very large sets of data and, through the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, make inferences about whether people are appropriate to be considered to be hired or retained by a particular company. We have had a pretty lively debate in this country about the definition of a worker, and we are all very grateful to Matthew Taylor for his work on that question. Some differences emerged, and the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee has put its views on the record.
The challenge is that our current labour laws, which were often drafted decades ago, such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1965, are no longer adequate to protect people in this new world, in which employers are able to use such large and powerful tools for gathering and analysing data, and making decisions.
We know that there are problems. We already know that recruiters use Facebook to seek candidates in a way that routinely discriminates against older workers by targeting job advertisements. That is not a trivial issue; it is being litigated in the United States. In the United Kingdom, research by Slater and Gordon, a group of employment lawyers, found that one in five bosses admits to unlawful discrimination when advertising jobs online. Women and people over 50 are most likely to be stopped from seeing an advert. Around 32% of company executives admitted to discriminating among those over 50; 23% discriminated against women; and 62% of executives who had access to profiling tools admitted to using them to actively seek out people based on criteria such as age, gender and race. Female Uber drivers earn 7% less than men when pay is determined by algorithms. A number of practices in the labour market are disturbing and worrying, and they should trouble all of us.
The challenge is that clause 50 needs to include a much more comprehensive set of rights and safeguards. It should clarify that the Equality Act 2010 and protection from discrimination applies to all new forms of decision making that engage core labour rights around recruitment, terms of work or dismissal. There should be new rights about algorithmic fairness at work to ensure equal treatment where an algorithm or automated system takes a decision that impinges on someone’s rights. There should be a right to explanation where significant decisions are taken based on an algorithm or an automated decision. There is also a strong case to create a duty on employers, if they are a large organisation, to undertake impact assessments to check whether they are, often unwittingly, discriminating against people in a way that we think is wrong.
Over the last couple of weeks, we have seen real progress in the debate about gender inequalities in pay. Many of us will have looked in horror at some of the news that emerged from the BBC and at some of the evidence that emerged from ITV and The Guardian. We have to contend with the reality that automated decision-making processes are under way in the labour market that could make inequality worse rather than better. The safeguards that we have in clause 50 do not seem up to the job.
I hope the Minister will say a bit more about the problems that she sees with future algorithmic decision making. I am slightly troubled that she is unaware of some live examples in the Home Office space in one of our most successful police forces, and there are other examples that we know about. Perhaps the Minister might say more about how she intends to improve the Bill with regard to that issue between now and Report.
I will pick up on the comments by the right hon. Gentleman, if I may.
In the Durham example given by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, I do not understand how a custody sergeant could sign a custody record without there being any human interaction in that decision-making process. A custody sergeant has to sign a custody record and to review the health of the detainee and whether they have had their PACE rights. I did not go into any details about it, because I was surprised that such a situation could emerge. I do not see how a custody sergeant could be discharging their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 if their decision as to custody was based solely on algorithms, because a custody record has to be entered.
I thank the Minister for allowing me to clarify. I did not say that it was solely an algorithmic decision already. Durham is using an algorithm known as the harm assessment risk tool. A human makes a decision based on the algorithm’s recommendations. The point I was making was that law enforcement is using algorithms to make very important decisions that limit an individual’s right to freedom, let alone the right to privacy or anything else, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further. I appreciate what the Minister is saying about PACE and the need for a custody sergeant, but the Bill will enable law enforcement to take that further and to remove the human right—
This has been a moment of genuine misunderstanding. Given how the hon. Lady presented that, to me it sounded as if she was saying that the custody record and the custody arrangements of a suspect—detaining people against their will in a police cell—was being done completely by a computer. That was how it sounded. There was obviously an area of genuine misunderstanding, so I am grateful that she clarified it. She intervened on me when I said that we were not aware of any examples of the police solely using automated decision making—that is when she intervened, but that is not what she has described. A human being, a custody sergeant, still has to sign the record and review the risk assessment to which the hon. Lady referred. The police are using many such examples nowadays, but the fact is that a human being is still involved in the decision-making process, even in the issuing of penalties for speeding. Speeding penalties may be automated processes, but there is a meaningful element of human review and decision making, just as there is with the custody record example she gave.
There was a genuine misunderstanding there, but I am relieved, frankly, given that the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill was making points about my being unaware of what is going on in the Home Office. I am entirely aware of that, but I misunderstood what the hon. Lady meant and I thought she was presenting the custody record as something that is produced by a machine with no human interaction.
Line-by-line scrutiny, but I was acting in good faith on an intervention that the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley made when I was talking about any examples of the police solely using automated decision making.
Ultimately, whether the Minister gives way is a matter for the Minister—that is true for any Member who has the Floor—but it is normal practice to debate aspects of legislation thoroughly. Ultimately, however, it remains the choice of the Minister or any other Member with the Floor whether to give way.
I think it is fair to say that I have given way on interventions, but the right hon. Gentleman seemed to be seeking to argue with me as to my understanding of what his colleague, the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley, had said. Frankly, that is a matter for me to understand.
Order. We are debating clause 50 of the Bill, so may I suggest that in all parts of the Committee we focus our minds on the clause?
I have lost track of which point the right hon. Gentleman wants me to give way on.
Let me remind the Minister. What we are concerned about on the question of law enforcement is whether safeguards that are in place will be removed under the Bill. That is part and parcel of a broader debate that we are having about whether the safeguards that are in the Bill will be adequate. So let me return to the point I made earlier to the Minister, which is that we would like her reflections on what additional safeguards can be drafted into clauses 50 and 51 before Report stage.
Clause 49 is clear that individuals should not be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing if that decision significantly or adversely has an impact on them, legally or otherwise, unless required by law. If that decision is required by law, clause 50 specifies the safeguards that controllers should apply to ensure that the impact on the individual is minimised. Critically, that includes informing the data subject that a decision has been taken and giving that individual 21 days in which to ask the controller to reconsider the decision, or to retake the decision with human intervention.
A point was made about the difference between automated processing and automated decision making. Automated processing is when an operation is carried out on personal data using predetermined fixed parameters that allow for no discretion by the system and do not involve further human intervention in the operation to produce a result or output. Such processing is used regularly in law enforcement to filter large datasets down to manageable amounts for a human operator to use. Automated decision making is a form of automated processing that allows the system to use discretion, potentially based on algorithms, and requires the final decision to be made without human interference. The Bill seeks to clarify that, and the safeguards are set out in clause 50.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Exercise of rights through the Commissioner
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 51, page 31, line 2, leave out from first “the” to end of line 3 and insert
“restriction imposed by the controller was lawful;”.
This amendment changes the nature of the request that a data subject may make to the Commissioner in cases where rights to information are restricted under Clause 44(4) or 45(4). The effect is that a data subject will be able to request the Commissioner to check that the restriction was lawful.
These technical amendments are required to ensure that the provisions in clause 51 do not inadvertently undermine criminal investigations by the police or other competent authorities. Under the Bill, where a person makes a subject access request, it may be necessary for the police or other competent authority to give a “neither confirm nor deny” response, for example in order to avoid tipping someone off that they are under investigation for a criminal offence. In such a case, the data subject may exercise their rights under clause 51 to ask the Information Commissioner to check that the processing of their personal data complies with the provisions in part 3. It would clearly undermine a “neither confirm nor deny” response to a subject access request if a data subject could use the provisions in part 3 to secure confirmation that the police were indeed processing their information.
It is appropriate that the clause focuses on the restriction of a data subject’s rights, not on the underlying processing. The amendments therefore change the nature of the request that a data subject may make to the commissioner in cases where rights to information are restricted under clause 44(4) or clause 45(4). The effect of the amendments is that a data subject will be able to ask the commissioner to check that the restriction was lawful. The commissioner will then be able to respond to the data subject in a way that does not undermine the original “neither confirm nor deny” response.
This is a significant amendment—I understand the ambition behind the clause—so it is worth dwelling on it for a moment. I would like to check my understanding of what the Minister said. In a sense, if an investigation is under way and the individual under investigation makes a subject access request to the police and gets a “neither confirm nor deny” response, the data subject will be able to ask the Information Commissioner to investigate. Will the Minister say a little more about what message will go from the police to the Information Commissioner and the content of the message that will go from the Information Commissioner to the data subject? I have worked on such cases in my constituency. Often, there is an extraordinary spiral of inquiries and the case ultimately ends up in a judicial review in court. Will the Minister confirm that I have understood the mechanics accurately and say a little more about the content of the messages from the police to the Information Commissioner and from the Information Commissioner to the person who files the request?
I can help the right hon. Gentleman in one respect: he has understood the mechanics. I am afraid that I cannot give him examples, because it will depend on the type of criminal offence or the type of investigation that may be under way. I cannot possibly give him examples of the information that may be sent by the police to the Information Commissioner, because that will depend entirely on the case that the police are investigating.
Perhaps I can pose the question in a sharper way. I do not think that is entirely the case. It must be possible for the Minister to be a little more specific, and perhaps a little more knowledgeable, about the content of the message that will go from the Information Commissioner to the data subject. Will that be a standard message? Will it be in any way detailed? Will it reflect in any way on the information that the police provide? Or will it simply be a blank message such as “I, the Information Commissioner, am satisfied that your information has been processed lawfully”? I do not think the Information Commissioner is likely to ask for too much detail about the nature of the offence, but she will obviously ask whether data has been processed lawfully. She will want to make checks in that way. Unless the Information Commissioner is able to provide some kind of satisfactory response to the person who has made the original request, we will end up with an awful administrative muddle that will take of lot of the courts’ time. Perhaps the Minister could put our minds at rest on that.
The Information Commissioner will get the information but, by definition, she does not give that information to the subject, because law enforcement will have decided that it meets the criteria for giving a “neither confirm nor deny” response from their perspective. The commissioner then looks at the lawfulness of that; if she considers it to be lawful, she will give the same response—that the processing meets part 3 obligations.
Amendment 25 agreed to.
Amendment made: 26, in clause 51, page 31, line 11, leave out from first “the” to end of line 12 and insert “restriction imposed by the controller was lawful;” —(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 25.
Clause 51, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 53
Manifestly unfounded or excessive requests by the data subject
Amendments made: 27, in clause 53, page 31, line 39, leave out “or 47” and insert “,47 or 50”.
Clause 53(1) provides that where a request from a data subject under Clause 45, 46 or 47 is manifestly unfounded or excessive, the controller may charge a reasonable fee for dealing with the request or refuse to act on the request. This amendment applies Clause 53(1) to requests under Clause 50 (automated decision making). See also Amendment 28.
Amendment 28, in clause 53, page 32, line 4, leave out “or 47” and insert “,47 or 50”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
Clause 53(3) provides that where there is an issue as to whether a request under Clause 45, 46 or 47 is manifestly unfounded or excessive, it is for the controller to show that it is. This amendment applies Clause 53(3) to requests under Clause 50 (automated decision making). See also Amendment 27.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
We have just agreed a set of amendments that, on the face of it, look nice and reasonable. We can all recognise the sin that the Government are taking aim at, and that the workload of the Information Commissioner’s Office and of others has to be kept under control, so we all want to deter tons of frivolous and meaningless requests. None the less, a lot of us have noticed that, for example, the introduction of fees for industrial tribunals makes it a lot harder for our constituents to secure justice.
I wonder, having now moved the amendment successfully, whether the Minister might tell us a little more about what will constitute a reasonable fee and what will happen to those fees. Does she see any relationship between the fees being delivered to her Majesty’s Government and the budget that is made available for the Information Commissioner? Many of us are frankly worried, given the new obligations of the Information Commissioner, about the budget she has to operate with and the resources at her disposal. Could she say a little more, to put our minds at rest, and reassure us that these fees will not be extortionate? Where sensible fees are levied, is there some kind of relationship with the budget that the Information Commissioner might enjoy?
Clause 35 establishes the principle that subject access requests should be provided free of charge in most cases. That will be the default position in most cases. In terms of the fees, that will not be a matter to place in statute; certainly, I can write to the right hon. Gentleman with my thoughts on how that may develop. The intention is that in the majority of cases, there will be no charge.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Meaning of “applicable time period”
Amendments made: 29, in clause 54, page 32, line 14, leave out “day” and insert “time”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Amendment 30, in clause 54, page 32, line 15, leave out “day” and insert “time”.—(Victoria Atkins.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 71.
Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 55 to 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Data protection impact assessment
I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 64, page 37, line 2, leave out “is likely to” and insert “may”.
I rise to support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley. I had the pleasure of cross-examining Baroness Williams of Trafford, who is the Minister responsible for some of these issues, on the Select Committee on Science and Technology in our inquiry on the biometric strategy and why there has been such a delay in the Government publishing that document. We had grave concerns about the delay in the strategy, but also about the way in which IT systems and servers in different forces act in different ways, which make things potentially very difficult.
The amendments would add safeguards to legitimate purposes—to prevent them from going too far. They should be welcomed by the Government and included in the Bill. There are a number of situations where, in this developing area of technology, which could be very useful to us as a country, as my hon. Friends have said, we need to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place. On facial recognition, we know from information received by the Science and Technology Committee that there is too high a number of facial records on the police national database and other law enforcement databases, when there is no legitimate reason for them to be there. We understand that it is difficult to delete them, but that is, with respect, not a good enough answer.
The Select Committee also heard—I think I mentioned this in an earlier sitting—that we have to be careful about the data that the Government hold. The majority of the adult population already has their facial data on Government databases, in the form of passport and driving licence imagery. When we start talking about the exemptions to being able to share data between different Government functions and law enforcement functions, and the exemptions on top of that for the ability to use those things, we just need to be careful that it does not get ahead of us. I know it is difficult to legislate perfectly for the future, but these safeguards would help to make it a safer place.
I will mention briefly the IMSI-catchers, because that covers my constituency of Bristol North West. It was the Bristol Cable, a local media co-operative of which I am a proud member—I pay £1 a month, so I declare an interest—that uncovered some of the issues around IMSI-catchers with bulk collection of information. It is really important that when we are having debates, as we have had with algorithms and artificial intelligence, we recognise that human intervention and the understanding of some of these systems is sometimes difficult. There are very few people who understand how algorithms actually work or how the systems actually work. As they become more advanced and learn and make decisions by themselves, the idea of human intervention or a human understanding of that is increasingly difficult.
In a situation where human resource is extremely stretched, such as in the police service, the tendency will understandably be to rely on the decisions of the systems within the frameworks that are provided, because there is not time to do full human intervention properly. That is why the safeguards are so important—to prevent things getting ahead of us. I hope the Government support the amendments, which I think are perfectly sensible.
I have just a small correction. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley said in error that the Home Office were holding on to the photographs. It is not the Home Office. It is individual police forces that hold that.
No, it is on the police national computer. That falls under the responsibility of the Home Office, not individual forces.
That is run by the police. I do not want the misapprehension to be established that there is an office in the Home Office in Marsham Street where these photographs are held on a computer. It is on the police national computer, which is a secure system that people have to have security clearance to get into. It is not completely accurate to say that the Home Office has possession of it.
I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm that all the examples we raised today will fall under the “high risk” category in the Bill.
I will deal with the definition of high risk in a moment. Clause 64 separates out the processing most likely significantly to affect an individual’s rights and freedom, which requires an additional level of assessment to reflect the higher risk. The amendments would water down the importance of those assessments. That is not to say that consideration of the impact on rights and freedoms can be overlooked. It will, of course, remain necessary for the controller to carry out that initial assessment to determine whether a full impact assessment is required. Good data protection is not achieved by putting barriers in the way of processing. It is about considering the risk intelligently and applying appropriate assessments accordingly.
On the question of high risk, officers or data controllers will go through that process when considering whether a data protection impact assessment is correct. I will write to the hon. Lady to clarify whether the bodies and lists she mentioned will be defined as high risk. The fact is that they are none the less regulated by various organisations.
The crucial point—I do not think the Opposition disagree with it—is that, although some things contain an element of risk, there are also huge benefits. Surely nobody wishes to do anything that prevents law enforcement from using hugely advantageous new technology, which will allow it to divert its resources to even more valuable areas.
Indeed. A pertinent example of that is the development of artificial intelligence to help the police categorise images of child sexual exploitation online. That tool will help given the volume of offences now being carried out across the world. It will also help the officers involved in those cases, because having to sit at a computer screen and categorise some of these images is soul-breaking, frankly. If we can use modern technology and artificial intelligence to help categorise those images, that must surely be a good thing.
There is absolutely no argument over that. As a former special constable myself, I have no wish to put obstacles in the way of law enforcement. There is a particular need to develop technology to help digital investigations, and I think the Government have been delaying that. Human failures in those investigations have led to the collapse of several trials over the past couple of months.
The Minister says that the surveillance camera commissioner has a role. The commissioner has said that there needs to be further clarity on regulatory responsibility. It is not clear whether it is the surveillance camera commissioner, the biometrics commissioner or the Information Commissioner who has responsibility for facial recognition software. Does she accept that the Government urgently need to provide clarity, as well as guidance to the National Police Chiefs Council and police forces, about the use of this potentially invasive software?
Specifically on clause 64, which is about the data protection impact assessment, the judgment as to whether the proposed processing is high risk must be a matter for the controller. On the face of it, many of the systems that the hon. Lady described in her speech will involve high risk, but with respect the decision is not for me to make as a Minister on my feet in Committee. We must allow data controllers the freedom and responsibility to make those assessments. They are the ones that make the decisions and what flows from that in terms of processing.
If the hon. Lady will write to me on the more general, wider point about oversight of the surveillance camera commissioner and so on, I would be happy to take that up outside of Committee.
The issue about whether it is high risk is of course a matter for the data controller, but we are scrutinising this Bill, and the Minister is asking us to support a test of high risk. I am sure the whole Committee would agree that all the cases that have been suggested today involve an incredibly high risk. They involve deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy. The idea that we would accept a definition of high risk that does not cover those examples is too much for the Opposition to support. That is why the amendment exists. We need to test exactly what the Government envisage in the definition of high risk.
May I just clarify whether the hon. Lady intends to amend her amendment to list the various categories she listed in her speech? I have been very clear that high risk is defined as including processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. I would be very cautious about listing examples in the Bill through an amendment, because as we have all acknowledged, criminality and other things develop over time. It would be very bold to put those categories in the Bill.
No one is suggesting that such examples should go in the Bill. I appreciate this is the Minister’s first Bill Committee, but the job of the Opposition is to test the definitions in the Bill and ensure that it is fit for purpose. My concern is that the definition of high risk is set too high to cover law enforcement agencies and will allow egregious breaches of individuals’ data rights, privacy rights and right to liberty. It is our job as the Opposition—there is nothing wrong with us exercising this role—to ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose. That is what we are seeking to do.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for clarifying her role. My answer is exactly as I said before. High risk includes processing where there is a particular likelihood of prejudice to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. That must be a matter for the data controller to assess. We cannot assess it here in Committee for the very good reason put forward by members of the Committee: we cannot foresee every eventuality. Time will move on, as will technology. That is why the Bill is worded as it is, to try to future-proof it but also, importantly, because the wording complies with our obligations under the law enforcement directive and under the modernised draft Council of Europe convention 108.
Does the Minister not have some sympathy with the poor individuals who end up being data controllers for our police forces around the country, given the extraordinary task that they have to do? She is asking those individuals to come up with their own frameworks of internal guidance for what is high, medium and low risk. The bureaucracy-manufacturing potential of the process she is proposing will be difficult for police forces. We are trying to help the police to do their job, and she is not making it much easier.
Clause 65(2) states:
“The controller must consult the Commissioner prior to the processing if a data protection impact assessment prepared under section 64 indicates that the processing of the data would result in a high risk”.
There are many complicated cases that the police and others have to deal with. That is why we have guidance rather than putting it in statute—precisely to give those on the frontline the flexibility of understanding, “This situation has arisen, and we need to calibrate the meaning of high risk and take that into account when we look at the prejudices caused to a person or a group of people.” That is precisely what we are trying to encompass. Presumably, that is what the Council of Europe and those involved in drafting the law enforcement directive thought as well.
Of course, there will be guidance from the Information Commissioner to help data controllers on those assessments, to enable us to get a consistent approach across the country. That guidance will be the place to address these concerns, not on the face of the Bill.
Can the Minister confirm that the Metropolitan police consulted the Information Commissioner before trialling facial recognition software? I appreciate that she might not be able to do so on her feet, so I will of course accept it if she wishes to write to me.
I am afraid that I will have to write to the hon. Lady on that.
The intention behind this part of the Bill is not to place unnecessary barriers in the way of legitimate processing. Nor, we all agree, should we place additional burdens on the commissioner without there being a clear benefit. These provisions are in the Bill to address the need for an intelligent application of the data protection safeguards, rather than assuming that a one-size-fits-all approach results in better data protection.
Amendment 149 would insert a new subsection (8) to clause 65, which would permit the commissioner to exercise powers of enforcement if she was not satisfied that the controller or processor had taken sufficient steps to act on her opinion that intended processing would infringe the provisions in part 3. It is worth noting that the purpose of clause 65 is to ensure consultation with the commissioner prior to processing taking place. It is therefore not clear what enforcement the commissioner would be expected to undertake in this instance, as the processing would not have taken place. If, however, the controller sought to process the data contrary to the commissioner’s opinion, it would be open to her to take enforcement action in line with her powers already outlined in part 6.
I do not know, Mr Hanson, whether we have dealt with new clauses 3 and 4.
New clauses 3 and 4 are being considered as part of this group, but would not be voted on until after the consideration of the clauses of the Bill have been completed. If you wish to respond to them, Minister, you can do so now.
I am grateful; I will deal with them now. New clauses 3 and 4 would place additional obligations on the intelligence services. New clause 3 would require the intelligence services to undertake a data protection impact assessment in cases where there is
“a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals”,
whereas new clause 4 would require the intelligence services to have prior consultation with the Information Commissioner when proposing processing. Neither new clause reflects the unique form of processing undertaken by the intelligence services, its sensitive nature and the safeguards that already exist.
I should stress that the “data protection by design” requirements of clause 103 are wholly consistent with draft modernised Council of Europe convention 108, which was designed to apply to the processing of personal data in the national security context, and which therefore imposes proportionate requirements and safeguards. Under clause 103, in advance of proposing particular types of processing, the intelligence services will be obliged to consider the impact of such processing on the rights and freedoms of data subjects. That requirement will be integrated into the design and approval stages of the delivery of IT systems that process personal data, which is the most effective and appropriate way to address the broad aim. Furthermore, clause 102 requires the controller to be able to demonstrate, particularly to the Information Commissioner, that the requirements of chapter 4 of part 4 of the Bill are complied with, including the requirement in clause 103 to consider the impact of processing.
The Committee is looking for some guidance and for tons of reassurance from the Minister about how the clause will bite on data processors who do not happen to base their operations here in the United Kingdom. This morning we debated the several hundred well-known data breaches around the world and highlighted some of the more recent examples, such as Yahoo!—that was probably the biggest—and AOL. More recently, organisations such as Uber have operated their systems with such inadequacy that huge data leaks have occurred, directly infringing the data protection rights of citizens in this country. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I am unaware of any compensation arrangements that Uber has made with its drivers in this country whose data was leaked.
Even one of the companies closest to the Government—Equifax, which signed a joint venture agreement with the Government not too long ago—has had a huge data breach. It took at least two goes to get a full account from Equifax of exactly what had happened, despite the fact that Her Majesty’s Government were its corporate partner and had employed it through the Department for Work and Pensions. All sorts of information sharing happened that never really came to light. I am not sure whether any compensation for Equifax data breaches has been paid to British citizens either.
My point is that most citizens of this country have a large amount of data banked with companies that operate from America under the protection of the first amendment. There is a growing risk that in the years to come, more of the data and information service providers based in the UK will go somewhere safer, such as Ireland, because they are worried about the future of our adequacy agreement with the European Commission. We really need to understand in detail how the Information Commissioner, who is based here, will take action on behalf of British citizens against companies in the event of data breaches. For example, how will she ensure notification within 72 hours? How will she ensure the enforcement of clause 67(4), which sets out the information that customers and citizens must be told about the problem?
This morning we debated the Government’s ludicrous proposals for class action regimes, which are hopelessly inadequate and will not work in practice. We will not have many strong players in the UK who are able to take action in the courts, so we will be wholly reliant on the Information Commissioner to take action. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister reassured the Committee how the commissioner will ensure that clause 67 is enforced if the processor of the data is not on our shores.
The right hon. Gentleman refers to companies not on these shores, about which we had a good deal of discussion this morning. Clause 67 belongs to part 3 of the Bill, which is entitled “Law enforcement processing”, so I am not sure that the companies that he gives as examples would necessarily be considered under it. I suppose a part 3 controller could have a processor overseas, but that would be governed by clause 59. Enforcement action would, of course, be taken by the controller under part 3, but I am not sure that the right hon. Gentleman’s examples are relevant to clause 67.
I am grateful to the Minister for that helpful clarification. Let me phrase the question differently, with different examples. The Home Office and many police forces are outsourcing many of their activities, some of which are bound to involve data collected by global organisations such as G4S. Is she reassuring us that any and all data collected and processed for law enforcement activities will be held within the boundaries of the United Kingdom and therefore subject to easy implementation of clause 67?
The controller will be a law enforcement agency, to which part 3 will apply. I note that clause 200 provides details of the Bill’s territorial application should a processor be located overseas, but under part 3 it will be law enforcement agencies that are involved.
Where G4S, for example, is employed to help with deportations, the Minister is therefore reassuring us that the data controller would never be G4S. However, if there were an activity that was clearly a law enforcement activity, such as voluntary removal, would the data controller always be in Britain and therefore subject to clause 67, even where private sector partners are used? The Minister may outsource the contract, but we want to ensure that she does not outsource the role of data controller so that a law enforcement activity here can have a data controller abroad.
I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment. If the Home Office outsources processing to an overseas company, any enforcement action would be taken against the Home Office as the controller. The right hon. Gentleman has raised the example of G4S in the immigration context, so I will reflect on that overnight and write to him to ensure that the answer I have provided also covers that situation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 68 to 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 72
Overview and interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I want to flag up an issue that we will stumble across in a couple of stand part debates: the safeguards that will be necessary for data sharing between this country and elsewhere. We will come on to the safeguards that will be necessary for the transfer of data between our intelligence agencies and foreign intelligence agencies. Within the context of this clause, which touches on the broad principle of data sharing from here and abroad, I want to rehearse one or two arguments on which Ministers should be well briefed and alert.
Our intelligence agencies do an extraordinary job in keeping this country safe, which sometimes involves the acquisition and use of data that results in the loss of life. All Committee members will be familiar with the drone strike that killed Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin, and many of us will have heard the Prime Minister’s assurances in the Liaison Committee about the robust legal process that was gone through to ensure that the strike was both proportionate and legal.
The challenge—the public policy issue that arises under chapter 5 of the Bill—is that there is a number of new risks. First, there is the legal risk flagged up by the Court of Appeal in 2013, when justices said that it was not clear that UK personnel will be immune from criminal liability for their involvement in a programme that involves the transfer of intelligence from an intelligence service here to an American partner and where that American partner uses that information to conduct drone strikes that involve the loss of life. Confidence levels differ, but we in the Committee are pretty confident about the legal safeguards around those kinds of operations in this country. We can be less sure about the safeguards that some of our partners around the world have in place. The Court of Appeal has expressed its view, which was reinforced in 2016 by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Committee echoed the finding that
“front-line personnel…should be entitled to more legal certainty”
than they have today.
This section of the Bill gives us the opportunity to ensure that our intelligence services are equipped with a much more robust framework than they have today, to ensure that they are not subject to the risks flagged by the Court of Appeal or by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
We are still on part 3, which deals with law enforcement processing. It does not relate to processing by security services. We will come to that when we debate amendment 159 to clause 109, so I reserve the right to respond to those observations on that amendment in due course.
There is no amendment before the Committee. We are on clause 72. The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill made some comments, which I did not rule out of order. The Minister has indicated that she will respond to the wider issue of concerns about drones and national security at a later date. That is a matter for her. If the right hon. Gentleman is happy with that, and if the Minister is content, I will put the question that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 72 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 73 to 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Nigel Adams.)
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing Government amendments 77 to 83 and 87 to 91.
Amendment 76 agreed to.
Amendments made: 77, in schedule 1, page 124, line 24, leave out from “subject” to end of line 25.
In paragraph 8 of Schedule 1, sub-paragraph (3) contains an exception from the condition in sub-paragraph (1). This amendment would remove from the exception the requirement that the processing is carried out without the data subject’s consent.
Amendment 78, in schedule 1, page 124, line 36, at end insert—
“Racial and ethnic diversity at senior levels of organisations
8A (1) This condition is met if the processing—
(a) is of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
(b) is carried out as part of a process of identifying suitable individuals to hold senior positions in a particular organisation, a type of organisation or organisations generally,
(c) is necessary for the purposes of promoting or maintaining diversity in the racial and ethnic origins of individuals who hold senior positions in the organisation or organisations, and
(d) can reasonably be carried out without the consent of the data subject,
subject to the exception in sub-paragraph (3).
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(d), processing can reasonably be carried out without the consent of the data subject only where—
(a) the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject, and
(b) the controller is not aware of the data subject withholding consent.
(3) Processing does not meet the condition in sub-paragraph (1) if it is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to an individual.
(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, an individual holds a senior position in an organisation if the individual—
(a) holds a position listed in sub-paragraph (5), or
(b) does not hold such a position but is a senior manager of the organisation.
(5) Those positions are—
(a) a director, secretary or other similar officer of a body corporate;
(b) a member of a limited liability partnership;
(c) a partner in a partnership within the Partnership Act 1890, a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 or an entity of a similar character formed under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.
(6) In this paragraph, “senior manager”, in relation to an organisation, means a person who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.
(7) The reference in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”.
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data for the purposes of promoting or maintaining diversity in the racial and ethnic origins of individuals who hold senior positions in organisations.
Amendment 79, in schedule 1, page 125, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) If the processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a competent authority, or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met even if, when the processing is carried out, the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place (see paragraph 5 of this Schedule).”.
This amendment, and Amendment 80, provide that where processing falling within paragraph 9 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (preventing or detecting unlawful acts) consists of, or is carried out in preparation for, the disclosure of personal data to a competent authority, the condition in that paragraph is met even if the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place when the processing is carried out.
Amendment 80, in schedule 1, page 125, line 4, at end insert—
““competent authority” has the same meaning as in Part 3 of this Act (see section30).”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 79.
Amendment 81, in schedule 1, page 125, line 16, at end insert—
“Regulatory requirements relating to unlawful acts and dishonesty etc
10A (1) This condition is met if—
(a) the processing is necessary for the purposes of complying with, or assisting other persons to comply with, a regulatory requirement which involves a person taking steps to establish whether another person has—
(i) committed an unlawful act, or
(ii) been involved in dishonesty, malpractice or other seriously improper conduct,
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing, and
(c) the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) In this paragraph—
“act” includes a failure to act;
“regulatory requirement” means—
(a) a requirement imposed by legislation or by a person in exercise of a function conferred by legislation, or
(b) a requirement forming part of generally accepted principles of good practice relating to a type of body or an activity.”.
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data for the purposes of complying with, or assisting others to comply with, a regulatory requirement.
Amendment 82, in schedule 1, page 125, line 35, at end insert—
“( ) The condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met even if, when the processing is carried out, the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place (see paragraph 5 of this Schedule).”.
This amendment provides that the condition in paragraph 11 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (journalism etc in connection with unlawful acts and dishonesty etc) is met even if the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place when the processing is carried out.
Amendment 83, in schedule 1, page 126, line 22, at end insert—
“Support for individuals with a particular disability or medical condition
13A (1) This condition is met if the processing—
(a) is carried out by a not-for-profit body which provides support to individuals with a particular disability or medical condition,
(b) is of a type of personal data falling within sub-paragraph (2) which relates to an individual falling within sub-paragraph (3),
(c) is necessary for the purposes of—
(i) raising awareness of the disability or medical condition, or
(ii) providing support to individuals falling within sub-paragraph (3) or enabling such individuals to provide support to each other,
(d) can reasonably be carried out without the consent of the data subject, and
(e) is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The following types of personal data fall within this sub-paragraph—
(a) personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin;
(b) genetic data or biometric data;
(c) data concerning health;
(d) personal data concerning an individual’s sex life or sexual orientation.
(3) An individual falls within this sub-paragraph if the individual is or has been a member of the body mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a) and—
(a) has the disability or condition mentioned there, has had that disability or condition or has a significant risk of developing that disability or condition, or
(b) is a relative or carer of an individual who satisfies paragraph (a) of this sub-paragraph.
(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(d), processing can reasonably be carried out without the consent of the data subject only where—
(a) the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject, and
(b) the controller is not aware of the data subject withholding consent.
(5) In this paragraph—
“carer” means an individual who provides or intends to provide care for another individual other than—
(a) under or by virtue of a contract, or
(b) as voluntary work;
“disability” has the same meaning as in the Equality Act 2010 (see section 6 of, and Schedule 1 to, that Act).
(6) The reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”.—(Margot James.)
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data by not-for-profit bodies involved in supporting individuals with a particular disability or medical condition.
I beg to move amendment 84, in schedule 1, page 126, line 27, leave out “a reason” and insert “one of the reasons”.
This amendment amends paragraph 14(1)(b) of Schedule 1 for consistency with paragraphs 18(2) and 19(2) of that Schedule.
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 85, 86, 116 and 117.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hanson. I am pleased to introduce this group of amendments, which relate to data processing for safeguarding purposes. The amendments respond to an issue raised in an amendment tabled by Lord Stevenson on Report in the Lords in December. In response to that amendment, Lord Ashton made it clear that the Government are sympathetic to the points Lord Stevenson raised and undertook to consider the matter further. Amendments 85, 116 and 117 are the result of that consideration.
I am grateful to Lord Stevenson for raising this issue, and for his contribution to what is probably the most important new measure that we intend to introduce to the Data Protection Bill. The amendments will ensure that sensitive data can be processed without consent in certain circumstances for legitimate safeguarding activities that are in the substantial public interest. We have been working across government and with stakeholders in the voluntary and private sectors to ensure that the amendments are fit for purpose and cover the safeguarding activities expected of organisations responsible for children and vulnerable adults.
The Government recognise that statutory guidance and regulator expectations place moral, if not legal, obligations on certain organisations to ensure that measures are in place to safeguard children and vulnerable adults. Amendment 85 covers processing that is necessary for protecting children and vulnerable adults from neglect or physical or mental harm. This addresses the gap in relation to expectations on, for example, sports governing bodies.
The Government have produced cross-agency and cross-governmental guidance called “Working Together to Safeguard Children”, which rightly places the responsibility of safeguarding children on all relevant professionals who come into contact with children and families. For example, it creates an expectation that those volunteering at a local sports club will assess the needs of children and, importantly, will take action to protect them from abuse.
Amendment 85 permits the processing of sensitive personal data, which is necessary to safeguard children from physical, emotional, sexual and neglect-based abuse. Amendment 84 makes a consequential drafting change, while amendments 116 and 117 make an analogous change to the regimes in parts 3 and 4 of the Bill. This is aimed at putting beyond doubt a controller’s ability to safeguard children and people at risk.
I thought an example might help the Committee to understand why we place such an emphasis on the amendments. An example provided by a sports governing body is that a person may make an allegation or complaint about a volunteer that prompts an investigation. Such investigations can include witness statements, which reference sensitive personal data, including ethnicity, religious or philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation and health data.
In some instances, the incident may not reach a criminal standard. In those cases, the sports body may have no legal basis for keeping the data. Keeping a record allows sports bodies to monitor any escalation in conduct and to respond appropriately. Forcing an organisation to delete this data from its records could allow individuals that we would expect to be kept away from children to remain under the radar and potentially leave children at risk.
Amendment 86 deals with a related issue where processing health data is necessary to protect an individual’s economic wellbeing, where that individual has been identified as an individual at economic risk. UK banks have a number of regulatory obligations and expectations which are set out in the Financial Conduct Authority’s rules and guidance. In order to meet best practice standards in relation to safeguarding vulnerable customers, banks occasionally need to record health data without the consent of the data subject.
An example was given of a bank which was contacted by a family member who was alerting the bank to an elderly customer suffering from mental health problems who was drawing large sums of money each day from their bank account and giving it away to a young drug addict whom they had befriended. The bank blocked the account while the family sought power of attorney. Again, the amendment seeks to clarify the position and give legal certainty to banks and other organisations where that sort of scenario arises or where, for example, someone suffers from dementia and family members ask banks to take steps to protect that person’s financial wellbeing.
The unfortunate reality is that there still exists a great deal of uncertainty under current law about what personal data can be processed for safeguarding purposes. My brief of crime, vulnerability and safeguarding means that all too often—perhaps in the context of domestic abuse—agencies will gather, sadly, to conduct a domestic homicide review and discover that had certain pieces of information been shared more freely, perhaps more action could have been taken by the various agencies and adults and children could have been safeguarded.
These amendments are aimed at tackling these issues. We want to stop the practice whereby some organisations have withheld information from the police and other law enforcement agencies for fear of breaching data protection law and other organisations have been unclear as to whether consent to processing personal data is required in circumstances where consent would not be reasonable or appropriate. The amendments intend to address the uncertainty by providing relevant organisations with a specific processing condition for processing sensitive personal data for safeguarding purposes. I beg to move.
I rise to put on record my thanks to the Minister for listening carefully to my noble Friend Lord Stevenson. There was strong cross-party consensus on these common-sense reforms.
We all know that in our own constituencies there are extraordinary people doing extraordinary things in local groups. They are the life-blood of our communities. Many of them will be worried about the new obligations that come with the general data protection regulation and many of them will take a least-risk approach to meeting the new regulations. Putting in place some common safeguards to ensure that it is possible to keep data that allow us to spot important patterns of behaviour that can lead to appropriate investigations is very sensible and wise. These amendments will therefore be made with cross-party support.
Amendment 84 agreed to.
Amendments made: 85, in schedule 1, page 126, line 38, at end insert—
“Safeguarding of children and of individuals at risk
14A (1) This condition is met if—
(a) the processing is necessary for the purposes of—
(i) protecting an individual from neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, or
(ii) protecting the physical, mental or emotional well-being of an individual,
(b) the individual is—
(i) aged under 18, or
(ii) aged 18 or over and at risk,
(c) the processing is carried out without the consent of the data subject for one of the reasons listed in sub-paragraph (2), and
(d) the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The reasons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) are—
(a) in the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing;
(c) the processing must be carried out without the consent of the data subject because obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the provision of the protection mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, an individual aged 18 or over is “at risk” if the controller has reasonable cause to suspect that the individual—
(a) has needs for care and support,
(b) is experiencing, or at risk of, neglect or physical, mental or emotional harm, and
(c) as a result of those needs is unable to protect himself or herself against the neglect or harm or the risk of it.
(4) In sub-paragraph (1)(a), the reference to the protection of an individual or of the well-being of an individual includes both protection relating to a particular individual and protection relating to a type of individual.”
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data which is necessary for the protection of children or of adults at risk. See also Amendments 116 and 117.
Amendment 86, in schedule 1, page 126, line 38, at end insert—
“Safeguarding of economic well-being of certain individuals
14B (1) This condition is met if the processing—
(a) is necessary for the purposes of protecting the economic well-being of an individual at economic risk who is aged 18 or over,
(b) is of data concerning health,
(c) is carried out without the consent of the data subject for one of the reasons listed in sub-paragraph (2), and
(d) is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
(2) The reasons mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(c) are—
(a) in the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
(b) in the circumstances, the controller cannot reasonably be expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing;
(c) the processing must be carried out without the consent of the data subject because obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the provision of the protection mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).
(3) In this paragraph, “individual at economic risk” means an individual who is less able to protect his or her economic well-being by reason of physical or mental injury, illness or disability.”—(Victoria Atkins.)
Part 2 of Schedule 1 describes types of processing of special categories of personal data which meet the requirement in Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR (processing necessary for reasons of substantial public interest) for a basis in UK law (see Clause 10(3)). This amendment adds to Part 2 of Schedule 1 certain processing of personal data which is necessary to protect the economic well-being of adults who are less able to protect their economic well-being by reason of a physical or mental injury, illness or disability.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley for affording me the opportunity to update the Committee on our progress in establishing a national register of missing persons, and to touch on the missing children and adults strategy that the Government are currently working on, which I hope will be published shortly. It will address many of the themes that the hon. Lady drew on in her speech, particularly the deliberate targeting of vulnerable children by county lines gangs, children who go missing—usually, sadly, from care homes—and the exploitation that occurs.
As the hon. Lady said, this is an important subject because each year more than 337,000 calls are made to police stations in England and Wales about missing and absent people. Happily, the vast majority are found within 24 hours, but 2% or thereabouts remain missing for more than a week. Anyone who has ever met the parents of children who go missing knows the heartache that those parents face, not just on an annual basis, but on a daily, minute-by-minute basis. They feel that pain constantly.
People who go missing are often the most vulnerable in society, and it is vital that those tasked with investigating their disappearance have the most accurate and up-to-date information available. We accept that the current technology available to frontline staff to deal with missing persons is insufficient. For example, the police national computer identifies only those currently reported as missing, while the National Crime Agency database includes only those missing for more than 72 hours. We know that the search must start the moment that a child or vulnerable person is identified as missing; we cannot wait for 72 hours. There is no national record of the history of missing persons in England and Wales.
The Government’s “Tackling child sexual exploitation: progress report” published in February last year set out our commitment to deliver a national missing persons register. This will enable police officers to access up-to-date data about missing people across force boundaries and take appropriate action when they investigate missing person incidents or encounter a missing person who is away from his or her home force area. The register is being established as part of the national law enforcement data programme, which will replace the police national computer and the police national database with a new national data service. The current timetable, agreed with the police, is to launch the capability for forces to record manually missing and associated found incidents from mid-2019 with releases thereafter, including automation and establishing the ability to share controlled information beyond policing to other agencies.
In terms of the way in which the register and the scheme interplay in the Bill, the processing of the personal data held on the database will take place under either the GDPR or part 3 of the Bill. Processing of the data by the police will often be for a law enforcement purpose, including the prevention, investigation or detection of a criminal offence and any sensitive processing would fall within paragraph 3 of schedule 8, which enables processing where necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or another individual, or under the new safeguarding condition, which we have just debated. Where the processing is undertaken under the GDPR, the conditions in respect of protecting the vital interests of the data subject, or preventing or detecting unlawful acts, may apply. Again, the new safeguarding condition may also be applicable.
Given those provisions and the very clear timetable that the Government and police have for their programme, we are of the view that the amendment is unnecessary, but I am, of course, very appreciative that the hon. Lady has raised this in the Committee. Obviously, I will keep her informed of progress on the new register.
That is fantastic news. It is a very ambitious deadline for a police IT transformation programme. I know that South Yorkshire is going through the transformation on the CONNECT programme at the moment; it is woefully behind the timescale envisaged and over budget, as every IT transformation in the history of any Government, of any colour, has always been. I wonder, therefore, given the urgency of this issue, whether it is possible for this information to be recorded on the PNC for the time being.
I am looking at my officials and they will stop me if I am wrong, I hope. If she prefers, may I write to her? I do not think that the PNC has the capability at the moment. That is why we are having to develop this new programme, but we will write to the hon. Lady in any event. As I say, I will keep her up to date with progress. But I invite her to withdraw the amendment, please.
Given that the Minister asked so nicely, I will. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 87, in schedule 1, page 127, line 30, at end insert—
“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”
This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 15(4) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for an insurance purpose).
Amendment 88, in schedule 1, page 127, line 39, at end insert—
“( ) is of data concerning health which relates to a data subject who is the parent, grandparent, great-grandparent or sibling of a member of the scheme,”.
This amendment provides that the condition in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 (occupational pension schemes) can only be relied on in connection with the processing of data concerning health relating to certain relatives of a member of the scheme.
Amendment 89, in schedule 1, page 128, line 6, at end insert—
“( ) The reference in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to a data subject withholding consent does not include a data subject merely failing to respond to a request for consent.”
This amendment clarifies the intended effect of the safeguard in paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 1 (processing necessary for determinations in connection with occupational pension schemes).
Amendment 90, in schedule 1, page 131, line 14, at end insert—
“( ) If the processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association described in sub-paragraph (1)(a), or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in sub-paragraph (1) is met even if, when the processing is carried out, the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place (see paragraph 5 of this Schedule).”
This amendment provides that when processing consists of the disclosure of personal data to a body or association that is responsible for eliminating doping in sport, or is carried out in preparation for such disclosure, the condition in paragraph 22 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 (anti-doping in sport) is met even if the controller does not have an appropriate policy document in place when the processing is carried out.
Amendment 91, in schedule 1, page 133, line 17, leave out from “interest” to end of line 21.—(Margot James.)
This amendment removes provisions from paragraph 31 of Schedule 1 (extension of conditions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 referring to substantial public interest) which are unnecessary because they impose requirements which are already imposed by paragraph 5 of Schedule 1.
We have already heard three very good speeches in support of the amendment. I will not take too long to support pretty much everything that has been said so far. As a former troublesome immigration lawyer from back in the day—in fact, when the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill was busy making his reforms in the Department—I do not think that I could have lived it down if I had not said a few words in support of the amendment.
We must remember that the context for all this is that we have a Department—the Home Office—where, as the most recent statistics show, half of all immigration decisions that are challenged in a tribunal are overturned, which is a record high. The Home Affairs Committee has recently expressed grave concerns about the poor quality of decision making in far too many areas and the functioning of a hostile environment, for example in the area of bank checks, where there is something like a 10% error rate. We also live in a world where the creeping reach of the Home Office’s information tentacles is almost being seen to put off migrants from accessing necessary public services such as health, creating a public health danger.
To provide a massive and almost unlimited exemption from many of the key protections, as has been described, is not only unjustified but counterproductive, because rather than fixing the fundamental problems with Home Office decision making, it will make them worse by hiding them from view and from scrutiny. The Home Office, not for the first time, is being pretty greedy with the powers that it seeks, because even if we take out the exemption, as this amendment proposes, the Home Office will still have plenty of scope—perhaps too much scope—to do what it wants to do. Recent immigration Acts have created myriad criminal offences in the sphere of immigration law, so the Home Office can already rely on other exemptions within the Bill where necessary. What is absolutely lacking is any explanation of why the exemption is needed. Will the Minister explain what it is about current data protection laws that has unacceptably hindered Home Office operations? I have seen no evidence of that at all.
Another concern is that it is not just the Home Office that will benefit from this exemption but other organisations that are involved in immigration control, such as G4S in its operation of detention centres. There is no justification for that, but there are serious risks, harms and injustices that might be created by the proposed exemption.
As we have heard, subject access requests are regularly a crucial part of representing a migrant caught up in the immigration system. They can be used to establish statuses that have not been communicated or have been lost. They can be used to establish other crucial facts that have not been known to that individual or their representatives. They can, of course, be absolutely crucial in establishing that the Home Office has made errors, as all too many hon. Members will have experienced.
Members of the Committee have been provided with a host of examples by the Law Society, the Bar Council, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and others. Those are real-life examples occurring day in, day out. Quite simply, the failure to allow those individuals access to data protection rights is not only a denial of those rights but a denial of access to justice altogether. This part of the Bill desperately needs reconsideration by the Government.
I feel I should defend all the hardworking people both in the Home Office and Border Force who do their best to do their jobs, day in, day out, to ensure that we have an effective, fair and proportionate immigration system. They have come under a bit of an attack in this debate.
I do not think anybody on the Committee would disagree with the statement that the staff work incredibly hard. Would it not be a show of solidarity with those staff to give them the resources they require to do the job properly?
I didn’t start it. The point is that, when people talk obliquely about the Home Office, it is people working in the Home Office who have to make these decisions day in, day out and who have to apply the law and do their best. I think we need to bear that in mind when we are talking about the Home Office system and how bad it is.
The provision relating to data processing for the purposes of immigration control in paragraph 4 of schedule 2 has been the subject of much debate. I would like to address some of the misunderstandings that have clearly arisen during the course of the Bill around both the purpose and scope of the provision. I hope I can persuade the Committee that this is a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the integrity of our immigration system.
Opposition Members have expressed concern, which I would like to emphasise, that this exemption is too wide. Can the Minister provide an assurance that that is not the case?
Very much so. I will take it slowly because it is complicated and I want to ensure that the points raised today have been addressed. First, I was asked who decides the definition of effective immigration control in the schedule. That is an established term of art. It is used, for example, in the Immigration Act 2014. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 uses a similar term, namely
“the operation of the immigration controls”.
In the context of the schedule, we have adopted a wraparound term such as that, rather than set out a detailed list of specific immigration-related functions to which the exemption might be applied. Given the undoubted complexity of immigration legislation, there is a danger that any such list would be incomplete and would need to be regularly reviewed and updated. The term is either the precise term or similar to those already in law, such as in the Freedom of Information Act, which has been law for 18 years.
The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute seems concerned that once the Home Office system has accessed some of this information, it is lost forever and will not be revealed to the person whom it concerns. I will give case examples later, but I reassure him that the way in which we describe this exemption in the Home Office is that it is a pause on two of the data protection principles. Once the pause is lifted, because the end has been achieved—the person has been found or whatever—all those rights kick back in again, and they are able to make requests for the information that the hon. Gentleman set out. We see it as a pause, not as a long-standing and permanent exemption. It is just for the precise circumstances of enabling the immigration system and its protections.
The Under-Secretary of State will know better than anybody that there are very tight time limits over the windows within which people can ask for entry clearance officer reviews or reconsideration, either by an immigration official or, in extremis, by the Minister. How long will the pause last, and can she guarantee the Committee today that the pause will never jeopardise the kick-in of time limits on an appeal or a reconsideration decision?
The reason for the pause is—I will give case studies of this—to enable the immigration system to operate. If someone has gone missing, requests for data will be required to find that person. Once that person is found, and there is no longer a need to apply the exemption, it will be lifted.
That is not an answer to my question. I am asking for a guarantee to the Committee this afternoon that the pause will never jeopardise somebody’s ability to submit a valid request for a reconsideration or an appeal with the information that they need within the time windows set out by Home Office regulations—yes or no.
I am asked whether this will have an impact on someone’s application, either at appeal or reconsideration. Of course, information is obtained so that a person can be brought in. As I say, I will make it clear with case studies, so perhaps I can answer the right hon. Gentleman in more detail when I give such an example, but the purpose of this is generally to find a person. When the need, as set out under the exemption, no longer exists, the rights kick back in again. This relates only to the first two data protection principles under the GDPR. Again, I will go into more detail in a moment, but this is not the permanent exemption from rights as perhaps has been feared by some; it is simply to enable the process to work. Once a person has been brought into the immigration system, all the protections of the immigration system remain.
The circumstances that the Minister describes for using the exemption are much narrower than the way the exemption is actually drawn. It seems to me that if that is the only way in which the Home Office wants to use the exemption, it could frame it in a much narrower way and possibly gain cross-party support.
I will move on to the case studies in a moment, as I have given way several times. First, I will lay out the titles, then I will come on to article 23. Again, our analysis is that the provision fits within one of the exemptions in article 23. That is precisely the reason that we have drawn it in this way.
We very much welcome the enhanced rights and protections for data subjects afforded by the GDPR. The authors of the GDPR accepted that at times those rights need to be qualified in the general public interest, whether to protect national security, the prevention and detection of crime, the economic interests of the country or, in this case, the maintenance of an effective system of immigration control. Accordingly, a number of articles of the GDPR make express provision for such exemptions, including article 23(1)(e), which enables restrictions to be placed on certain rights of data subjects. Given the extension of data subjects’ rights under the GDPR, it is necessary to include in the Bill an explicit targeted but proportionate exemption in the immigration context.
The exemption would apply to the processing of personal data by the Home Office for the purposes of
“the maintenance of effective immigration control, or…the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control”.
It would also apply to other public authorities required or authorised to share information with the Department for either of those specific purposes.
Let me be clear on what paragraph 4 of schedule 2 does not do. It categorically does not set aside the whole of the GDPR for all processing of personal data for all immigration purposes. It makes it clear that the exemption applies only to certain GDPR articles. The articles that the exemption applies to are set out in paragraph 4(2) of schedule 2. They relate to various rights of data subjects provided for in chapter 3 of the GDPR, such as the rights to information and access to personal data, and to two of the data protection principles—namely the first one, which relates to fair and transparent processes, and the purpose limitation, which is the second one.
As I understand it, the derogations that are sought effectively remove the right to information in article 13; the right to information where data is obtained from a third party in article 14; the right of subjects’ access in article 15; the right to erasure in article 17; the right to restriction of processing in article 18; the right to object in article 21(1); the principle of lawful, fair and transparent processing in article 5; the principle of purpose limitation in article 5(1)(b); and the data protection principles in article 5 of lawfulness, fairness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity, confidentiality and accountability to the extent that they correspond to the rights above. That is a pretty broad set of rights to be cast out.
Those are not the data protection principles. If one continues to read on to paragraph 4(2)(b) of schedule 2, it sets out the two data protection principles that I have just highlighted. The provisions set out in sub-paragraph (2)(a) relate to the data protection principles of fair and transparent processing and the purpose limitation. As I say, this is not a permanent removal. This is, as we describe it, a pause. There is not a free hand to invoke the permitted exception as a matter of routine.
All of the data protection principles, including those relating to data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation and integrity and confidentiality, will continue to apply to everyone. So, too, will all the obligations on data controllers and processors, all the safeguards around cross-border transfers, and all the oversight and enforcement powers of the Information Commissioner. The latter is particularly relevant here, as it is open to any data subject affected by the provisions in paragraph 4 of schedule 2 to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner that the commissioner is then under a duty to investigate. Again, I hope that that addresses some of the concerns that the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute raised.
Contrary to the impression that has perhaps been given or understood, paragraph 4 does not give the Home Office a free hand to invoke the permitted exceptions as a matter of routine. The Bill is clear that the exceptions may be applied only to the extent that the application of the rights of data subjects, or the two relevant data protection principles, would be likely to prejudice
“the maintenance of effective immigration control, or…the investigation or detection of activities that would undermine the maintenance of effective immigration control”.
That is an important caveat.
The Minister will know that in paragraph 2(1)(a) we already have a set of exemptions that relate to the prevention or detection of a crime, including, presumably, all of the crimes that fall into the bucket of organising or perpetrating illegal immigration. Despite constant pressing during the debate in the other place and here, we have not yet had a clear answer as to why additional powers and exemptions are needed, over and above the powers expressly granted and agreed in paragraph 2(1)(a).
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising that issue, because it allows me to get to the nub of how we approach the immigration system. We do not see the immigration system as some form of criminality or as only being open to the principles of criminal law. He will know that we deal with immigration in both the civil law and criminal law contexts. The exemption he has raised in terms of paragraph 2 of the schedule deals with the criminal law context, but we must also address those instances where the matter is perhaps for civil law.
We know that in the vast majority of immigration cases, people are dealt with through immigration tribunals or through civil law. They are not dealt with through criminal law. That is the point; we must please keep open the ability to deal with people through the civil law system, rather than rushing immediately to criminalise them. If, for example, they have overstayed, sometimes it is appropriate for the criminal law to become involved, but a great number of times it is for the civil law to be applied to deal with that person’s case either by way of civil penalty or by finding an arrangement whereby they can be given discretion to leave or the right to remain. We have the exemption in paragraph 4 so that we do not just focus on the criminal aspects that there may be in some immigration cases. We must ensure that we also focus on the much wider and much more widely used civil law context.
It is important to recognise that the exemptions will not and cannot be targeted at whole classes of vulnerable individuals, be they victims of domestic abuse or human trafficking, undocumented children or asylum seekers. The enhanced data rights afforded by the GDPR will benefit all those who are here lawfully in the United Kingdom, including EU citizens. The relevant rights will be restricted only on a case-by-case basis where there is evidence that the prejudice I have mentioned is likely to occur.
The Minister specifically mentioned EU citizens. There have been concerns that the exemption will impact those EU nationals who are already here and who, as we have already heard, are contributing hugely to the UK. Can she assure us that the exemption is not targeted at them?
Absolutely. The exemption will not be enacted on the basis of nationality. It is enacted on a case-by-case basis to uphold the integrity of the immigration system. There will be no question of EU nationals being in any way targeted by it. Indeed, we know the great effect that EU nationals and other people from other countries have had in this country, and we certainly would not be looking to target them on the basis of nationality.
Is it not right to say that EU citizens will be part of the immigration system? They will be immigrants with immigration rights as part of the Brexit process. These rules could therefore apply to them, could they not? Secondly—
I will answer the first one—yes. The hon. Gentleman asked whether EU citizens would be targeted. Once we leave the European Union, we will have our own immigration policy. There will clearly be no distinction between EU and non-EU, because everyone will be outside of the UK, if I may put it that way, very inelegantly.
But they would still be subject to the right to exempt them from their data protection rights. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the time-limited nature of the intention of using the rules, but can she point me to the section of the Bill that defines that time limit, because I am struggling to find it?
If I may, I will come back to that point in a moment. In the case of subject access requests, each request would need to be considered on its own merits. For example, we could not limit the information given to visa applicants on how their personal data would be processed as part of that application. Rather, the restrictions would be applied only where there was a real likelihood of prejudice to immigration controls as a result of disclosing the information concerned.
If someone has overstayed, they have committed a crime. Therefore, paragraph 2(1)(a) absolutely bites. We are seeking to prevent that crime. Someone who has overstayed their visa has committed a crime. It is kind of as simple as that.
In that scenario, we may well effect their removal administratively. It does not mean that it is going through the criminal courts.
By way of a second example, take a case where the Home Office is considering an application for an extension of leave to remain in the UK. It may be that we have evidence that the applicant has provided false information to support his or her claim. In such cases, we may need to contact third parties to substantiate the veracity of the information provided in support of the application. If we are then obliged to inform the claimant that we are taking such steps, they may abscond and evade detection.
If someone has submitted false information in support of an application to the Government, and signed it, as they must, that is called fraud. That is also a crime, and is covered by paragraph 2(1)(a).
I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point, particularly in relation to the overstayer, but as the purpose of processing personal data in many immigration areas is not generally the pursuit of criminal enforcement action, it is not clear that it would be appropriate in all cases to rely on crime-related exemptions, where the real prejudice lies in our ability to take administrative enforcement action. It may well be that in some cases a crime has been committed, but that will not always be the case.
Criminal sanctions are not always the correct and proportionate response to people who are in the UK without lawful authority. It is often better to use administrative means to remove such a person and prevent re-entry, rather than to deploy the fully panoply of the criminal justice system, which is designed to rehabilitate members of our communities. As the purpose of processing personal data in such cases is not generally the pursuit of a prosecution, it is not clear that we could, in all cases, rely on that exemption relating to crime.
So far we have had some hypothetical examples about what might happen in the future, but given that we have a data protection regime in place already, it would be useful to know whether the Minister can give us examples of situations that have arisen in which the Home Office has been hindered by the current data protection regime. We have not heard anything like that so far.
If I may, I will continue with my speech, because I have more information to give. Perhaps at the end I can deal with the hon. Gentleman’s point.
I just want to dissolve one confusion in the Minister’s remarks. The nature of the Home Office response, whether it is a prosecution through a civil court, a civil sanction or a civil whatever else, does not affect the nature of the offence that is committed. The Home Office has a range of sanctions and choices in responding to an offence, but that does not stop the offence being an offence. The offence is still a crime, and is therefore covered by paragraph 2(1)(a).
The right hon. Gentleman is assuming that each and every immigration case that will be covered by these provisions necessitates the commission of a crime.
I would not make that assumption. The vast majority of immigration cases are dealt with in a civil context.
No, forgive me. I have been very generous with interventions. I am going to make some progress, and then no doubt others will intervene on me in due course.
I turn to the charge that the exemption has no basis in EU law. Article 23 of the GDPR allows member states to restrict the application of certain provisions of the regulation to safeguard important objectives of general public interest. Immigration control constitutes one such objective. We see immigration as an important matter of public interest, and the GDPR allows member states to exempt rights where that is the case. We are not alone in our belief that immigration is an important matter of general public interest. The Irish Government clearly stated that in their own Data Protection Bill. Clause 54 of the Irish Bill gives powers to make regulations restricting certain rights and obligations under the GDPR to safeguard important objectives of general public interest. The list of such objectives in the Bill includes matter relating to immigration.
Opposition Members have talked about their concerns about the fact that these provisions may be covered by paragraph 2 of the schedule. I want to reflect on the outcome of the debate on this provision in the House of Lords, which contains many noble Lords who are extremely learned in the law, have much experience of campaigning on immigration rights and so on. We listened very carefully to the concerns raised at Lords Committee stage, and as a result the Government tabled amendments at Lords Report stage to narrow the scope of the exemption so that it no longer covers the right to rectification and data portability. In response to those amendments, Lord Kennedy of Southwark said:
“The amendments tabled by the Government provide important clarification on what is exempt, limit the power in Bill and seek to address the concerns highlighted during the previous debate and today…I am happy to support their amendments.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 December 2017; Vol. 787, c. 1590.]
Furthermore, in a Division on a Liberal Democrat amendment to strike out the immigration exemption, the official Opposition abstained. I wonder what has changed between their abstaining on that amendment and accepting that the Government’s amendments were sufficient, and today. Nothing has changed since the Bill left the Lords, so perhaps the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill can help us with why their position has changed.
I hope I have been able to satisfy the Committee that this provision is necessary and important.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hanson. Will the Minister give a tangible example, as she has done in other cases, of where an immigration case may require exemption under paragraph 4—in other words, a case in which a crime has not been committed and therefore would not be covered under paragraph 2(2)? The cases she has mentioned so far would, on the face of it, be covered by paragraph 2(2), because a criminal act had taken place or was about to take place.
There may be occasions when there is a person we have lost track of whose status is irregular. If we know they have a child, we will seek from the Department for Education assistance to find the whereabouts of the child. That child has not committed a criminal offence, so I would be very concerned to ensure that the Home Office, Border Force or whoever else acted lawfully when seeking that data in order to enable them to find the parent or whoever is the responsible adult, as part of the immigration system.
In that example, would the exemption not be covered under the safeguarding exemption, as brought by the Government amendment to schedule 1?
No—the child is not missing, but the parent is; so we seek advice from the Department for Education about where the child is. It may be that cleverer lawyers than me in the Home Office will find an exemption for that, but the point of this exemption of paragraph 4 is to cover the lawfulness of the Home Office in seeking such information in order to find parents or responsible adults who may have responsibility, and either to regularise their stay or to remove them.
I encourage the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill to withdraw his amendment, as we believe that it is not the wholesale disapplication of data subjects’ rights, and it is a targeted provision wholly in accordance with the discretion afforded to member states by the GDPR and is vital to maintaining the integrity and effectiveness of our immigration system.
Anyone who was not alarmed by this provision certainly will leave this Committee Room thoroughly alarmed by the Minister’s explanations.
First, we were invited to believe that we could safeguard due process and the rights of newcomers to this country by suspending those rights and pursuing people through civil court. We were then asked to believe that the Home Office’s ambition to deal with these cases with civil response rendered inoperable the powers set out in paragraph 2(1)(a), confusing the response from the Home Office and the nature of the offence committed up front. Then, we were invited to believe that this was not a permanent provision—even though that safeguard is not written into the Bill—but a temporary provision. What is not clear is when those temporary provisions would be activated and, crucially, when they would be suspended.
I am happy to give way in a moment. Most of us here who have done our fair share of immigration cases—I have done several thousand over the last 14 years—know that on some occasions, the Home Office interpretation of time is somewhat different from a broadly understood interpretation of time. I have cases in which a judge has ordered the issue of a visa, and six months later we are still chasing the Home Office for the issue of the visa. I will not be alone in offering these examples.
Perhaps when the Minister intervenes, she could set out what “temporary” means, where it is defined and where are the limits, and she still has not answered my question whether she will guarantee that the implementation of this pause will not jeopardise someone’s ability to submit either a request for an entry clearance officer review or an appeal within the legally binding time windows set out in Home Office regulations.
The key to this is the purpose for which we are processing the data. Even if there are criminal sanctions, that does not mean that we are processing for that purpose, particularly where we are not likely to pursue a prosecution. The primary purpose is often immigration control—that does not fit under paragraph 2 as he has described it—rather than enforcing the criminal justice system. That is the point. It is for the purpose of processing the data. The crime-related provisions in the Bill refer to the importance of identifying the purposes of the processing. Where the primary purpose is immigration related, it is not clear that we could rely on the crime-related exemptions. That is why paragraph 4 is in the schedule.
I am really sorry to have to say this, but that is utter nonsense. The idea that the Home Office will seek to regularise someone’s immigration status by denying them access to information that might support their case is, frankly, fanciful.
This is not a new debate; we last had it in 1983. The Home Office tried to sketch this exemption into legislation then, it failed, and we should not allow the exemption to go into the Bill, especially given that all the explanations we have heard this afternoon are about cases where paragraph 2(1)(a), or the safeguarding provisions drafted by the Government, would provide the necessary exemptions and safeguards in the contingencies that the Minister is concerned about.
My hon. Friend is bang on the money, but perhaps the Under-Secretary can enlighten us.
All rights are reinstated once the risk to prejudice is removed. The wording is in line 35 of paragraph 4:
“to the extent that the application of those provisions would be likely to prejudice any of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).”
To reassure the hon. Member for Bristol North West, that is the end point.
I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for clarifying a point that was not at issue. No one is concerned about what rights kick back in at the end of a process. We are worried about how long the process will last, who will govern it, what rights newcomers to this country or courts will have to enforce some kind of constraint on the process and how we will stop the Home Office embarking on unending processes in a Jarndyce v. Jarndyce-like way, which we know is the way these cases are sometimes prosecuted. The Home Office is full of some of the most amazing civil servants on earth, but perhaps, a little like the Under-Secretary, they are sometimes good people trapped in bad systems and, dare I say it, bad arguments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
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(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department if she will make a statement on hate crime in light of the inflammatory letters inciting a “Punish a Muslim day” on 3 April.
Mr Speaker, as you will appreciate, the letters described in the question are part of an ongoing investigation, and as such I am not in a position to comment on them. However, the Government condemn the content of the letters as clearly abhorrent, with no place in decent society. This Government take hate crime and Islamophobia extremely seriously, and the UK has a robust legislative framework to respond to it.
Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the rule of law, and equal rights define us as a society. The Government are determined to promote those values actively, working in partnership and alongside Muslim and, indeed, all faith communities to demonstrate that what we have in common is the best defence against extremists who would seek to divide us.
Our hate crime action plan, published in 2016, sets out our comprehensive approach to tackling hate crime. We have a strong legislative framework to tackle hate crime, including offences of inciting racial and religious hatred, and racial and religiously aggravated offences. The legislation provides equal protection under the law for all ethnic and religious groups. We have sources of expert advice on the nature and causes of hate crime through the anti-Muslim hatred working group and the independent advisory group on hate crime.
We have committed £2.4 million over three years to help to protect places of worship that have been the subject of or are vulnerable to a hate crime attack. We also committed a further £1 million following the terrible Finsbury Park terror attack in June last year, to help to protect places of worship and associated community centres that are vulnerable to attack on racial, religious or ideological grounds. So far, we have funded 45 mosques under both schemes. We have also funded Tell MAMA to record anti-Muslim hatred incidents and to support victims. From this year, we have made it mandatory for police forces to disaggregate religious hate crime data held by the police to reveal the true scale and nature of the problem, which we are determined to tackle.
Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. The letter calling for an attack on Muslims on 3 April offers attackers rewards, ranging from 10 points for verbal abuse, 50 points for throwing acid and 1,000 points for bombing a mosque to 2,500 points for nuking Mecca. May I remind the House that millions of Muslims fought for us in the two world wars, including members of my family? Figures show that the number of Islamophobia hate crimes has increased by 40%, with 1,678 anti-Muslim hate crimes reported in London in the year up to January 2018. Can the Minister therefore explain why no Minister in the past eight years has made a speech on the rise of anti-Muslim hatred?
Recent surveys have shown that 50% of the British population believe that Islam is a threat to western democracy and more than 30% of young children believe that Muslims are taking over England. Given that such anti-Muslim views have gained such traction, what are the Government going to do to help to prevent the growth of such extreme views, which appear to have come from parts of the print, broadcast and social media? What concrete steps are the Government going to take to tackle this growth in hate crimes and hatred against Muslims? Will the Minister set out the amount of funding provided by the Home Office to tackle each form of bigotry?
I think every Member in this House will accept that there has been a sharp rise in the far right movement in Europe and beyond, with the USA’s President retweeting far right material. This is a really urgent situation and it needs to be urgently tackled. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as to what concrete steps are going to be taken to deal with it.
I thank the hon. Lady for her urgent question. May I make it clear that this Government want to give a strong message of support to Muslim people across the UK that we are committed to their safety and security? I say to anyone who has received this letter, or a similar communication, please contact the police, where you will be treated with utmost seriousness and action will be taken.
I now move on to the points the hon. Lady made. The issue of anti-Muslim and far right extremism is of course a focus for the Government. As she knows, the Prevent strategy tackles extremism. It does not tackle Muslim extremism in and of itself; it tackles extremism, full stop. Sadly, more than a quarter of referrals in the Prevent strategy in 2015-16 concerned far right extremism. So this Government, and in particular this Prime Minister, with all the experience she brings to her position following her time in the Home Office, are focused on tackling extremism and radicalisation and how they affect any part of our community. That is precisely why we are refreshing the hate crime action plan this year.
I just want to put on the record the fact that the mayor of Broxtowe, Halimah Khaled, just happens to be a Muslim. She happens to be the first person of colour to be mayor of Broxtowe and she is its first Muslim mayor. She also happens to be a Tory. She has completed nearly one year in office, during which time she has had a warm welcome wherever she has gone in my borough, and rightly so. People are sick and tired of hate crime and Islamophobia. This is absolutely no longer to be tolerated. I commend the Minister for everything she has said in her statement, and I do believe this Government take this very seriously. We are not really talking about a hate crime here; it is actually an act of blatant incitement to terrorism. In any event, I am looking over at the co-chair of the all-party group on British Muslims, the hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting). We have worked together on this, and I am sure he will agree when I say that the time has now come for a proper legal definition of Islamophobia. Does the Minister agree?
I thank my right hon. Friend for her impassioned plea for recognition throughout the country of the role not only of her local mayor, but of many other people in public life who happen to practise the Muslim religion as part of their way of life and who contribute so very much to our community. I put on record my thanks to her local mayor.
There are many definitions of Islamophobia, but most people tend to adhere to the one used by the Runnymede Trust. We do not accept the need for a definitive definition, but we know that Islamophobia is clearly recognised and that we have very effective monitoring of race-hate crimes. Considerable work is done on these matters by Tell MAMA and the anti-Muslim hatred working group.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) on securing it.
The despicable sentiments behind these sickening letters has caused revulsion throughout our communities. Although we can be confident that, thanks to the tireless dedication of community leaders, charities, faith groups and civil society, such deliberate attempts to divide us will not succeed, this act will have struck fear into the heart of communities—indeed, that was the intention. It is absolutely an incitement to violence and it cannot go unpunished.
As we have heard, hate crimes are rising nationwide. In London alone, there has been a fivefold increase in attacks on Muslims in the past year. As the outgoing counter-terror chief Mark Rowley has said, the threat from the extreme right wing is significant and requires urgent attention. We have seen the murder of our colleague and friend Jo Cox, the attack at Finsbury Park mosque, the proscription of National Action, the jailing of the leaders of Britain First, and the reports from the Anderson review, which suggested that the extreme right wing is engaged in credible attack planning, including bomb making. There is now overwhelming evidence that the threat from the extreme right is growing increasingly violent. We have to be clear that by threatening members of our diverse communities, these people are also a threat to our national security through their anti-democratic, dehumanising and murderous beliefs.
Given the overwhelming evidence, it is clear that so-called domestic extremism needs to be dealt with as a first-order threat, so will the Minister reassure us that, in line with the Anderson review recommendations, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre will start to produce national threat assessments of domestic extremism? Will she increase the role for MI5, JTAC and the counter-terrorism network in the monitoring and handling of investigations of domestic extremism? Is it not time to update the Contest strategy to reflect the growing threat from the extreme right?
More broadly, can the Minister assure us that counter-terrorism policing has the resources it needs? The Government’s funding settlement last month gave only half what the police requested for counter-terror purposes, while the police and our intelligence services are facing an unprecedented threat from terrorism in all its forms.
We all deplore these despicable letters. They are an attempt to divide us; in that, they will not succeed. We must be united as a House and as a country in bearing down on the insidious beliefs contained within these letters and be absolutely clear on how we are going to bring together the police, schools, colleges and all authorities to stand up to hate crime and terrorism in every single one of their forms. Finally, we must ensure that all of us, as elected politicians, are at all times responsible in our language and rhetoric and never seek to embolden those who hold such insidious and extremist views.
I am sure that everyone in the House agrees with the hon. Lady, particularly on that last point about the importance of using language very carefully. She asked me about police resources; of course, we have increased them and, as she will know, the Home Secretary reviews those resources constantly. We ask the police whether they have the resources that they need, and the Home Secretary acts accordingly. May I undertake to write to the hon. Lady specifically on JTAC and her other queries? Finally, let me say that it is gratifying to see so many Members present, unified in condemning these dreadful letters and their sentiments and in our determination to tackle them.
Hate crime in all its forms is to be condemned, as is this letter. Another group that is affected by growing hate crime is the Jewish community, and the Community Security Trust is having to go to ever greater lengths to protect local Jewish community centres. Can we ensure that all these forms of hate crime are combated as far as possible?
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. Of course, any group of people who are the victims of hate crime as a result of their religious beliefs deserve our sympathy and also our action. I, like him, condemn any form of anti-Semitism. I know that the police are as focused on that form of crime as they are on any other form of religious hate crime.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) on securing this urgent question, and reassure her, and the rest of the House, that the Scottish National party joins in the condemnation of Islamophobia in the strongest possible terms? We believe that there is no excuse for any sort of hate crime, and we were as concerned as everyone else in this House to see the significant rise in hate crime statistics in England and Wales last year. We note that that followed a spike in hate crime figures around the time of the EU referendum, and as others have said, this is happening alongside a significant rise in right-wing extremism.
In Scotland, the police are committed to making victims, witnesses and partner agencies feel more confident in reporting hate crime, and they do so through a variety of methods, including a network of third party reporting centres. In Scotland, a senior judge has been appointed to lead an independent review of hate crime legislation, and he will be reporting to the Scottish Government later this year. What reassurance can the Minister give us that similar steps are being taken in the rest of the UK, where hate crime is rising, and in particular that similar steps are being taken to tackle the specific problem at issue here, which is Islamophobia?
I thank the hon. and learned Lady for her question and, indeed, for her contribution in relation to what is happening in Scotland. We very much look at how we tackle hate crime, particularly through our hate crime action plan, which was published in 2016 and will be refreshed this year. Its range of actions include: funding for security for places of worship; the disaggregation of religion-based hate crime data; taking further action in relation to education so that teachers can have sometimes difficult conversations with their students about beliefs and words; and funding programmes through the Anne Frank Trust and Streetwise. We are determined to ensure that our action in relation to hate crime is up to date and current.
As someone who visited a Syrian refugee camp in Malatya in Turkey over the weekend, I find it a little offensive that a Labour Member has said that no Conservative Minister had ever actually condemned any kind of anti-Muslim extremism. Is the Minister aware that her equivalent at the Department for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi), publicly rebuked the President of the United States for retweeting certain comments and invited him to visit Muslim communities in the United Kingdom?
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend. I must say that I was not sure whether I had heard the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) correctly. As I have said, the record of both the Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers on the issue of tackling anti-Muslim sentiments is pretty clear. It may be that the hon. Lady can clarify her remarks at a later stage.
I do not think that the previous question represented the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) was making. I hope that we can address this issue as a united Parliament, and not in a way that is divided. We should all stand together against this kind of vile threat and this illegal incitement to violence. Our whole Parliament, the police and our communities across the country should want to stand firm with Muslim families and Muslim communities against this kind of vile Islamophobia, because we know from history that an attack on some of us is an attack on all of us. That is why we stand firm.
What has the Home Office done since I raised last week the prevalence of National Action illegal propaganda videos on YouTube—still—and also, I discover, on Twitter and on Facebook? We know that the former counter-terror chief has warned of online radicalisation and the rise of far right extremism, and our Select Committee has heard in our inquiry about the serious issues around Islamophobia and hate crime. The Minister will know that we are allowing social media companies to collude with these far right extremists if action is not taken to take down this kind of vile illegal propaganda.
The right hon. Lady knows the work that the Home Secretary is doing with the large technology companies to improve their reaction. I think that pretty much everyone in this place—and certainly everyone outside—agrees that technology companies need to do more to remove these hateful pieces of incitement from their platforms much more quickly and working with police. I am sure that we have agreement on that.
Will my hon. Friend reassure the House that those spreading this fear and hatred, in whatever forum, should be investigated by the police and, where appropriate, dealt with severely by the courts?
Yes, of course. As I said, I must not comment on this case because it is a live police investigation. The principle is that if there is an incident of hate crime, the victim must—please—report it to the police, so that they can do all they can to bring the perpetrators to justice.
These letters are abhorrent and are causing immense distress across communities around the country. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has indicated, this hate crime is being amplified via the internet. Social media companies are still taking too little action. I attended a roundtable co-ordinated by two Departments just before Christmas, but we are still to see action. I can tell the Minister about a case that went to court and a man was jailed for two years for the far right material that he put online. But that material is still online, as remains the case in many examples across the country. What action are the Government taking to ensure that we do not enflame the tensions in our communities by what is seen online?
I know that the hon. Lady has sadly been the victim of much hatred online, as have other Members. We are very clear that it is our expectation that technology companies will, in accordance with the law, remove such material as and when it is brought to their attention. We have had some progress, as the technology companies are getting better at this, but I do not for a moment pretend that we have the full response that we would like, which is to see these posts taken down as quickly as possible. That is the Home Secretary’s expectation when she meets the technology companies.
Has a national unit been established to check on hate crime, identify the people who are dealing in it and bring them to justice?
We take the view that hate crime is a matter for the whole community, given that it can take so many forms. It is not restricted to one’s religion; the five characteristics are set out clearly in the hate crime legislation. We ensure that the police and others are trained to spot this crime when it occurs and to deal with it seriously and, I hope, sensitively.
These letters are nothing short of a sick and cowardly attempt to divide our communities. We are proud of our communities living side by side in harmony. A clear message must be sent from across this House that we will never cower before any form of extremism and we will never allow it to threaten the very fabric of our society. May I urge the Minister to ensure that this Government do not sit idly by and let it happen? In this great time of need, allowing the propagation of such awful hatred would send the worst message of all.
I would hope that the hon. Lady has understood from my reaction that the Government are not sitting idly by. We are this year refreshing the hate crime action plan because it has to keep up to date with the new threats faced by all different types of people and communities. I can assure her that we take these allegations very seriously—as, indeed, we take very seriously the allegations of anti-Semitism, online hatred and so on that we have heard about in the Chamber today—and that the police do as well.
The rising tide of creeping Islamophobia and anti-Jewish sentiment should concern us all. How is improving the recording of this hate crime helping us to track what is going on in our society and how we can tackle it?
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for that question. Of course, increasing the amount of data helps to give us answers and helps to direct our resources in the right way. We very much hope that disaggregating the different types of hate crime that exist will help individual constabularies to work out how better to prioritise their resources to deal with them.
The level of hate and violence against Muslims has become utterly intolerable. For years, many of our constituencies have faced the onslaught of threats from the English Defence League, Britain First and others. What action will the Minister take, first, to provide protection for the communities who feel particularly under threat on 3 April and in the run-up to 3 April and, secondly, to proscribe groups that are actively seeking to incite violence and hatred across our communities?
Again, the hon. Lady will understand that I must not comment on the investigation going on at the moment, given that it is, by definition, a live investigation. Communities that may be affected by any such communication will be uppermost in the police’s mind with regard to protection and their vulnerability. Tackling far right extremism more generally is part of a cross-Government programme that also supports victims of such behaviour. This is where the Prevent strategy, which is a safeguarding programme for people who may be vulnerable to radicalisation, has such an impact, because, sadly, a quarter of the referrals to it in 2015-16 involved far right extremism. The strategy is about trying to lead people away from the path of radicalisation, so that they do not commit these terrible acts.
This House is at its best when it comes together to condemn evil action and we are not trying to score political points against one another. I think that we can all unite on this letter. We do not yet know who wrote it. For all we know, it is some sad individual in a bedsit playing with his computer, or perhaps it is something far more serious, but we are all right to condemn it as an incitement to violence, especially when it calls on people to throw acid in people’s faces.
May I ask the House to think of the office of the hon. Member for Bedford (Mohammad Yasin)? Earlier today, there was an incident in Norman Shaw North that involved him and his staff which may or may not be connected—but we think it might be—with this letter. We must pull together to ensure that this does not happen, not only here but throughout the country.
I thank my hon. Friend for raising this. I am sure that the thoughts of the whole House are with the Member of Parliament concerned and his members of staff, although I have received a note—I hope that it is accurate—saying that the package found in Norman Shaw North was not hazardous. That must be of significant relief to all those concerned. As ever, we give our sincere thanks to the police and others who went to the rescue of those members of staff when they found the package.
It was Friday night when I started to receive reports from residents in Walthamstow that they had received one of these letters, with the fear and the terror that that caused, at the very point when I was helping other residents to report anti-Semitic graffiti that they had found in our community. Will the Minister join me in welcoming the work that Tell MAMA and the Community Security Trust are doing to support these groups? Does she agree that we have to do more than condemn these individual instances? When we see Steve Bannon come to Europe and tell people that they should be proud to be called a racist, we in this House must speak up for the communities that we represent and the power of diversity and immigration to enrich all our lives. I tell the Minister: the people in Walthamstow need and demand nothing less from this Government.
They are getting it. I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for setting out the concerns of her constituents; she has highlighted the fear that people must have felt when they received those letters. She is absolutely right to say that Tell MAMA is an organisation that is universally recognised as playing a very important role in this field. I am told that from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015, 2,622 anti-Muslim hate incidents were reported to Tell MAMA by victims, witnesses, third parties or the police. That shows us the scale—certainly three years ago—of these worrying incidents of hate crime that we are facing in this country. We support Tell MAMA to the tune of £1.9 million, and its work is highly valued.
I, too, condemn the despicable letters that have been sent out. Following a recent incident in my constituency that I would classify as racial abuse, will my hon. Friend reassure my constituent and the whole House that that crime will be classified correctly and not just washed away and classified as a public order offence?
Any such issue will be an operational matter for my hon. Friend’s local police force, but I know that she is a good advocate for her local community and I am sure that she will be asking searching questions of the police and the police and crime commissioner to ensure that that alleged offence receives the attention it deserves.
The Government are right to say that this is a hate crime that has no place in our modern society. I want to pay tribute to our communities in Hounslow, which have a track record of working together to build understanding between all our communities. Will the Minister confirm that the police will have the resources they need to work together effectively and fast across the country to track where these horrific letters are coming from, who is disseminating them and who is behind them, and will she ensure that our schools and communities have the resources they need to stop this activity in its tracks and to support those communities that will rightly feel at risk and under threat?
The hon. Lady has identified the fact that this has an impact not just on the people who receive these letters in their homes but also on the wider neighbourhood. I again ask anyone who has received any of these sorts of communications to please report them to the police. The Home Office is in constant communication with the police to ensure that they have the resources they need to tackle this.
I join my hon. Friend the Minister in condemning these letters. In view of the similarities between anti-Muslim hate crime and the anti-Semitism that we have seen, will she reassure me that the action plan proposed by the Government will be adequate?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. He has a long and established record of supporting our Jewish communities. Yes, the hate crime action plan covers all forms of hatred, as defined by the legislation, and of course, sadly, anti-Semitism forms part of that.
These appalling letters have to be seen in the context of the flames of prejudice being fanned in mainstream newspapers and in the comments made by mainstream politicians against their Muslim opponents, as well as by bystanders, who are just as complicit when they see prejudice, either in person or online on Facebook or other social media platforms, and instead of tackling it, they choose to look the other way. Will the Minister make a commitment to the House that the Government will not only take action on online publishers of this kind of extremism, but, in the weeks leading up to the first week of April, ensure that every mosque and Muslim community centre in the country receives a visit from their police to give them adequate security advice, to ensure that the Muslim community know that the authorities are 100% with them and on their side?
The anti-Muslim hatred working group brings together all parties from across Government and further afield to try to tackle this specific form of hate crime. One of its initial achievements was to work with the Society of Editors to tackle anti-Muslim hatred and, more recently, with the Independent Press Standards Organisation to develop training for editors and journalists to tackle the negative portrayal of Muslims in the media.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point about ensuring that mosques are visited in the run-up to the date mentioned in the letter, we will happily send letters to each chief constable to ensure they are aware of this. It is a matter for chief constables, but we expect that mosques will be protected.
I join my hon. Friend in condemning these letters and welcome the £2.4 million that the Government have devoted to protecting places of worship from hate crime. Can she expand on how that will work and give assurances that it will be given all the back-up it needs?
I am happy to do that, and it follows on well from the previous question. The Government have committed £2.4 million over three years to help protect places of worship that have been subject to or are vulnerable to a hate crime attack. We hope that that money will help local communities to feel safe in their places of worship.
You do not have to have taught media studies or be a Muslim to have noticed that anti-Muslim sentiment is becoming quite common in much of our tabloid printed press. As well as dealing with the online platforms that spread this kind of hatred, will the Minister also have a word with her friends in the Tory press? These things feed people like those in Britain First and the English Defence League, one of whom has even made a video calling for my head.
I hope that everyone in the House knows that, as the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability, I am of course against language that leads to the incitement of violence or hate crime. I hope that this debate has sent a clear message to the people with whom the hon. Lady is concerned.
As one House, we all find these letters abhorrent, and our constituents will feel exactly the same. Can my hon. Friend assure the House that police forces work collaboratively to tackle such hate crime?
I thank my hon. Friend, who, as always, shows an interest in policing matters. We expect police forces to work collaboratively, particularly in the online field. Of course, online extremism and radicalisation know no geographical boundary, so the police are well versed, sadly, in working together to tackle this form of hatred.
There has been horror and revulsion at these letters in Cardiff South and Penarth, not just from the Muslim community but across the community. I am very proud of our record in standing up against hate crime across the faiths and across communities in the diverse community in which we live. Does the Minister agree that words from social media companies are now simply not enough? Does she share my deep concern that representatives of Twitter, Google and Facebook attended the Home Affairs Committee and said to me that they were not routinely searching for proscribed organisations? That is a basic thing they should be doing. What is she saying to the social media companies?
The Home Secretary is absolutely focused on the conduct of technology companies and the assistance they can give to the police both nationally and locally in taking down this abhorrent material. Sadly, this goes across the line with not just hate crime but online child sexual exploitation, terrorism and so on. A great piece of work is going on at the moment between the Home Secretary and those companies to ensure that their reactions are as speedy as the public expect.
What these letters show more than anything is the gross ignorance, instability, bile and prejudice of the perpetrators, who hide behind the cloak of anonymity. As the Home Affairs Committee report has shown, that anonymity is even more damaging online. Is it not time not just to do more to take this material down once it has been posted but to stop it being posted in the first place and make sure that the identity of the people doing the posting has to be revealed before they have these accounts?
The Home Secretary was in California recently to discuss these matters with the online technology companies. We are looking at the issue of anonymity in terms of the internet safety strategy, because we are very clear that we want the United Kingdom to be the safest place in the world online.
The vile, abhorrent letters received by individuals across the country, including in my constituency, are just the latest addition in a long line of Islamophobic hate crimes. Sadly, the number of such crimes has been growing for several years, encouraged by the undeniable rise of the far right and endorsed directly and indirectly by leaders and powerful figures across the globe. Muslims are often the targets of hate crimes, but the targets can just as easily be those of another religion or another race. With an increase in religious hate crime of 267% since 2011, why has the Government’s record on tackling the root causes of hate crime been so poor?
Again, reflecting on the overall tone of this urgent question, I will not rise to the bait, as it were, in that question. Frankly, I think we can all work together to call out hate crime when it happens. We have already today, sadly, heard the forms it can take, including anti-Semitism. Last week, the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Melanie Onn) spoke about the experience of misogyny; it is not yet a hate crime, but was the cause of much debate last week. We are very clear, and I think the House has been very clear today, that these letters and their sentiments are wholly abhorrent and are to be condemned.
What practical support is being provided to help the targets and victims of hate crime?
First, we of course want victims to report their experience to the police. The police are sadly aware of these events. I hope the police are trusted by the groups of people concerned, who will receive a concerned and sensitive welcome from the police when reporting these crimes. As I have said already, there is much that we are doing in the hate crime action plan, and in trying to tackle the root of radicalisation so that these awful sentiments are not expressed in the first place.
With the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes and anti-Semitic hate crimes rising at such a shocking rate, these anonymous letters can really strike fear into whole communities. Is it not also the case, however, that anonymous social media is a similar problem on a daily basis? Do we not now have to confront the question of anonymity in spreading such bile? Will the Minister at least address this?
I have very much heard what the House has said. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the internet safety strategy was published last year. I will ensure that the sentiments of the House on anonymity are very much heard by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
What makes you British is not what you look like, where your parents were from or how you worship, but the contribution that you make to our country. Nowhere has the contribution made by British Muslims been greater than in the west midlands, which is why I will be spending 3 April—it has been identified as a day of hate—visiting as many mosques and community centres across the region as possible to ensure that Muslims in the west midlands have my support and solidarity and to show them that I am on their side. I hope other Members of the House will be doing the same.
The hon. Gentleman has set out beautifully the values that bind this House and our country together. I wish him luck on his visits across his constituency to the many mosques in the west midlands.
I welcome the funding that the Minister has promised for safeguarding mosques, but Muslims do not gather only at places of worship. What reassurance can she give the many Muslim community groups, schools and places where children gather—as well as places that are not specifically Muslim, but where there are groups of Muslims—that they will have funding for extra security, should that be needed, in Bristol West?
As I have said, the Government have not only pledged or, indeed, spent up to £2.4 million over three years, but have funded Tell MAMA, which is a very important intelligence tool, as it were, to help the police to understand where they should best focus their resources. If there are particular areas in the hon. Lady’s constituency about which she has concerns, I ask her to ensure that her chief constable and her police and crime commissioner know, because they are the ones who must make the operational decisions.
My constituents are very worried about the rise in hate crime. Is the Minister satisfied that, in light of the significant cuts, Dewsbury and, indeed, West Yorkshire and further afield have the necessary police resources to investigate and apprehend those responsible for this abhorrent crime?
It is about how resources are spent, which is particularly pertinent to the question of West Yorkshire. I cannot recall the figure off the top of my head, but I seem to recall that West Yorkshire has several million pounds of reserves in savings. Of course, how that money is spent is a matter for the elected police and crime commissioner. I very much hope he will take up the Home Office’s funding settlement suggestion of increasing council tax to ensure more money to deal with the resourcing issue.
I have been approached by many in my constituency who are deeply concerned about these letters. As with last year’s Muslim ban, they feel unfairly targeted and under siege. Although this is an obvious opportunity to target internet companies, social media websites and so on, this was snail mail. May I press the Minister to pick up on the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra)? Will she update us on who sent these letters and what is going on to find out how to stop them? Will she reassure my constituents that once those people are apprehended, they will feel the full weight of the law?
I must not and cannot go into more detail on the specifics of the ongoing police investigation, because the hon. Lady will not want me or anyone else to inadvertently endanger any future prosecution. I can reassure her, however, that the case is being investigated very carefully and that the full force of the law is being applied.
That anti-Semitic and Islamophobic hate crime is on the rise is well documented, but we also know that there is significant under-reporting—often by women, in my experience. Hijab-wearing Muslim women are often most vulnerable because of their visibility. On the need to reach women in communities and, as my Friend the Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire) has said, not just in mosques, what assurances can the Minister give that the Government are doing what they can to get out into those communities the message about the need to report all incidents of hate crime?
The hon. Lady has hit on a very important point. We must all do what we can to encourage victims of hate crime—whether it is to do with race, religion, disability or gender identity—to report it. Under-reporting is a real issue and I hope that the work of organisations such as Tell MAMA will help people find the wherewithal to report such incidents to the police so that they can be dealt with.
I welcome the fact that we are all united in condemning this despicable attempt to divide our communities. Since 2016, national rhetoric and language have led to a big increase in hate crime. Will the Government lead by example and encourage everybody to tone down their national language and rhetoric?
The Minister has referred several times to the £2.4 million of funding under the Government’s anti-hate scheme. She has also said that just 45 places of worship have received funding. Are there any plans to increase the amount of funding and the number of places of worship that will attract funding this year?
May I write to the hon. Lady, because I confess that I am unclear as to whether applications are in train and would not wish in any way to inadvertently answer incorrectly?
The best way to build belonging, tolerance and relationships is to invest in opportunities for people to come together and learn understanding. Oldham, which does that pretty well, was completely undermined by the Government snatching away the area-based grant in 2010, with no assessment made of the impact that would have on local cohesion in communities. Will the Government take seriously the need to invest at a community level in order to bring people together?
Of course we recognise the importance of bringing communities together, and there are many ways in which to do that. My constituency may enjoy being brought together in a very different way from another constituency elsewhere in the country. I am not clear about the direct impact asserted by the hon. Gentleman in relation to that project, but I will happily write to him about it.
May I, along with everybody else, condemn this absolutely abhorrent letter? It has been reported that since the EU referendum there has been a spike in hate crime, both in Islamophobia and in anti-Semitism, coming from the hard right and the hard left. It has also been reported by the Crown Prosecution Service that, against that increase in incidents, there was a drop by more than 1,000 in the number of prosecutions in 2016-17. What is the Minister doing with the CPS and the police to ensure that that is reversed?
The drop in referrals, recorded last year, has had an impact on the number of completed prosecutions in 2016 and 2017. The Crown Prosecution Service is working with the police at local and national level to understand the reasons for the overall fall in referrals in the past two years. The message to spread around our constituencies to people who have been a victim of hate crime is please report it, because that way we can try to do something about it.
Police forces such as Greater Manchester that have long targeted hate crime, and who work hard with the CST on anti-Semitism and with the Muslim community on Islamophobia, recognise that community policing is central to challenging hate crime. Will the Minister take that message back? Community policing is about trust, and trust is fundamental. We need our community police.
Of course local policing is important, but we also have to recognise that we cannot just rely on policing alone to reach into communities and build relationships. That is why organisations such as Tell MAMA and others are such an important part of the overall picture in ensuring that when people feel they have been victims of crime they know what to do, know where to go, and feel they will be listened to and their experiences acted upon.
It is clear that the whole House condemns the cowards who are sending out this letter. However, it is not just those sending this letter who are causing hate and it is not just groups like Britain First. At the end of last month, my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) and I received a letter from the British National party, which included a racist poem. On the back of the letter it said that unless action was taken today
“Rebecca will be in an ethnic minority group when she grows up”
Will the Minister condemn the actions of the BNP and say there should be no place in British society for political parties that peddle such hate?
I am absolutely clear that the BNP and all the other far right organisations described today have no place in our society. Frankly, their showing at the ballot box, when they dare to stand for election, shows how little truck the British public have with them.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a genuine pleasure to be here for today’s debate, and may I follow in the excellent footsteps of my shadow number by wishing everybody a very happy International Women’s Day? If I may say so, that was a very good speech from the Dispatch Box, and I am now worried that she is my shadow—that’s all I’m saying! I would like to thank everyone who has attended the debate and contributed. We are fortunate to have so many great advocates for gender equality in the Chamber. They have all done so much, in their own ways, to improve the lives of women and girls.
This debate has, of course, had its serious—indeed, its heartbreaking—moments, and I will address those in due course, but before I do let us reflect on the reasons to celebrate. Many Members highlighted the notable women and women’s charities in their constituencies both today and in history. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) gave a fascinating and detailed speech on the history of women protesting to improve working conditions and mentioned Lily Bilocca as someone who had been named only once before in this House—well, I have now named her at the Dispatch Box, which I hope goes some way to addressing that inequality.
This year being the centenary of women’s suffrage, many Members focused on the women in the House before them and on other political role models. My hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Maria Caulfield) told us that her political hero was Mo Mowlam because of the valuable work that great lady did to bring Protestants and Catholics together in the cause of peace. The hon. Member for Coventry North East (Colleen Fletcher) told us about her mother, who swept to power on Coventry Council in 1979. Then we had a little competition. The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Catherine West) told us that her constituency had been represented by women for 21 years, but I am sorry to say that my hon. Friend the Member for Erewash (Maggie Throup) was able to boast that her constituency had been represented by women for 26 years. The more of these competitions that go on, the better.
We have also heard from many Members about the role that the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) has played in inspiring so many women to stand for Parliament. In her role as the Mother of the House, she will this year be celebrating many moments in the history of women’s suffrage. It will be a joy to celebrate those with her.
I would also like to add to the list, however, because I am not the first female Member of Parliament for Louth and Horncastle. I was preceded by a lady called Margaret Wintringham, who was elected in 1921. She was the second-ever female Member of Parliament and the first-ever female MP born in this country. I feel privileged to follow her, albeit many, many decades later. In 1921, she was talking about equal pay, and of course, depressingly, several decades later we are still talking about equal pay. There is, though, one way in which we have moved forward since Mrs Wintringham campaigned to become a Member of Parliament, and that is in the way we conduct general election campaigns: apparently, Mrs Wintringham did not utter a word on the election trail in 1921. I must say that I have taken a very different approach to running my campaigns.
I have been really impressed by the determination in all parts of the House of Commons to encourage women to stand for Parliament and in local council elections. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mary Robinson) highlighted the fact that only 17% of council leaders are female. We must improve that figure, because we know how valuable female councillors can be throughout the country.
The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Rushanara Ali) used a phrase that very much caught my attention when she talked about “having the audacity to stand”. We should all be more audacious in that regard.
This morning, I was asked by a journalist about challenges I have faced in politics. I had to tell him about one occasion in 2015 when I was canvassing on the doorstep. I knocked on the door and said to the lady, “May I count on your support?”, and she said, “No.” I said, “Why’s that?”, and she said, “Because you’re a woman.” I did not really know what I could do to change that, so quickly moved on.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lewes set out her ambitions for the next 100 years; they are ambitions to which I am sure we can all subscribe.
Of course, no discussion of a determination to improve equality in this place could pass without my mentioning the contribution of my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller). Not only as a Member of Parliament, but as a Cabinet Minister and now as Chairman of the Women and Equalities Committee, she has done an incredible amount to ensure equality, and not just for women but for same-sex couples, too. I hope I am correct in paraphrasing her speech as, “Being a Member of Parliament is the best job in the world.” I hope that this year we will all encourage women to think about standing for Parliament.
The award for avoiding mansplaining must go to the only man who made a speech in this debate, as opposed to intervening: my hon. Friend and constituency neighbour the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman). I must say, echoing the comments made by others from all parties, that we are lucky to have male colleagues like him in the House, supporting our cause.
Let me turn to the serious aspects of the debate. Of course, I must start with the contribution of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips), who, as she has in years past, read out the names of women who have been killed since last year’s International Women’s Day. I join others in wishing fervently that we will be able to have a day of celebrating women when the hon. Lady does not have to read out that list.
Home should of course be a place of love, support and safety. No one should have to suffer violence or abuse, which is why we have today launched the consultation on domestic abuse. We are seeking to transform the country’s approach to domestic abuse. We are widening the definition so that we understand that abuse is not confined to physical violence, but can include psychological violence and economic abuse. We are addressing at every stage, where we can, the fact that we need to intervene earlier, to support the women and children who are victims of this terrible abuse and, where possible, to break the cycle of violence with the offender. In short, we want the question to change from, “Why doesn’t she leave him?” to “Why doesn’t he stop?”
I very much hope that Members from all parties will contribute to the consultation and use their networks to encourage others to contribute, too, so that we can ensure that the Bill that follows, and all the non-legislative measures, are as ambitious and brave as we can make them.
We have heard much discussion about women in work. The stand-out statistic for me today was the one put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Putney (Justine Greening) who, with all her considerable experience in the Cabinet, has done so much to further the cause of equality, not least as the preceding Minister for Women and Equalities. The fact is that, if we were to encourage gender equality and achieve it across the world, it would add £28 trillion to our global GDP, which is a startling fact.
We, the United Kingdom, are doing our bit, because we have the highest rate of employment of women ever, and we are working hard to support women in work so that they can fulfil their potential and achieve their ambition. We are taking strong action in this area. I hope that 4 April is ingrained in every chief executive’s mind, because that is the deadline when every large employer will have to tell us their gender pay gap. Contrary to the suggestions that may have been made, we are doing that not just because we like collecting figures, but because we want to establish where there are pay gaps and then work towards closing them down.
We have also heard about flexible working, and we are very much working towards normalising that practice. Indeed, 97% of UK workplaces now offer flexible working, but of course there is more to do. We know that there are schemes for shared parental leave and for encouraging people who have taken time out for caring to return to work. In fact, we are investing a great deal of money to increase opportunities and support for those who are returning to work, but we cannot do this alone. We need employers to take bold action to ensure that women are just as able as men to fulfil their potential and use their talents and skills. This country cannot succeed fully if one half of its population is held back.
Flowing from work is, of course, education. Several colleagues have emphasised the importance that education plays in setting up girls to flourish in the workplace and to having equal access with their male counterparts to more productive and higher paying sectors. We have invested in programmes to encourage take-up in STEM-related subjects and courses, including maths and computer science. We are also raising awareness of the range of careers that STEM qualifications offer, through initiatives such as STEM ambassadors, and we continue to deliver high-quality apprenticeships, which provide choice for young women and men as they consider their future careers. We heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) about Ada Lovelace, which was absolutely fascinating. We even heard about the scientist behind Mr Whippy ice cream—a certain Margaret Thatcher. I have to say that I have learned something new today.
We must of course reflect on the fact that this is not national women’s day, but International Women’s Day. Several Members spoke about that, mentioning the Rohingya and Bangladesh in particular. It is not only at home where this Government have made real progress to improve the lives of women and girls. We are respected globally for our world-leading legislation and policy, and we continue to play a key role on the international stage to press for change. We are committed to ensuring that all women have the same opportunities and choices, no matter where they live.
UK aid has a huge impact on the lives of millions. It has supported more than 6,000 communities across 16 countries and made public commitments to end female genital mutilation. That represents 18 million people—more than twice the population of London—and it has enabled 8.5 million women to access modern methods of family planning over five years, empowering women to make choices about their own bodies.
We want to build on those achievements. As we have heard, the Secretary of State for International Development launched her strategic vision for gender equality yesterday. This recognises that gender equality cannot be treated as an isolated issue, but must be embedded in everything that we do. It sets out how we plan to continue our global leadership role. I am proud of this Government’s ambition to improve the rights of women and girls globally; we need to be ambitious if we are to continue making progress in areas such as education, economic empowerment and violence, and if we are to create a world in which all women and girls can have equal rights, opportunities and freedoms, as described by the hon. Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire).
In conclusion, today’s debate has highlighted what we all already knew: that we have achieved some things, but there is still a way to go. There is much more to be done before we achieve gender equality in the UK and around the world. I want to end the debate on a positive note, because this is the one day of the year on which we get to celebrate women. I want to highlight brilliant women and the social, economic, political and cultural contributions that they make.
We have heard from the Home Secretary that the United Kingdom has its second female Prime Minister—that is particularly apt given that we are celebrating the centenary of suffrage—and that we sit in the most diverse Parliament that we have ever had. In the past year, we have seen women breaking barriers in public life and industry. Last year, Cressida Dick became the first ever female Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and Dany Cotton became the first ever female commissioner of the London fire brigade. Already this year, Sarah Clarke has made history as the first female Black Rod, and the Royal Mint has appointed Anne Jessopp, who is its first female chief executive in its more than 1,000 years of existence. I have no doubt that the first female President of the Supreme Court, Baroness Hale, will be doing all she can to improve equality in the judiciary.
We must not forget that three of the four medals that team GB took home from the winter Olympics were won by women. Lizzy Yarnold became Britain’s most decorated winter Olympian, taking a second gold in the women’s skeleton. Anyone who hurtles down ice chutes at 80 miles an hour on what I can only describe as a tea tray deserves all our respect.
We want the celebration to continue beyond International Women’s Day. This year, we are celebrating our history, but I hope that we also see this year as the start of the century of women. I urge every Member of this House to take part in any way they can, whether it is by supporting women’s organisations, speaking at events, going into schools to speak, or asking women whether they will stand. We will have a whole package of celebrations during the year, and they will be revealed as the year goes on. One example of how we are going to celebrate is with the holding of EqualiTeas in June and July across the country, to share, debate and celebrate our right to vote over a cup of tea and a slice of cake. They are often the answer to many problems in life, and I am delighted that we are celebrating our suffrage in that way.
When my grandmother was born, no woman had the right to vote. Fast forward two generations, and I am here at the Dispatch Box and a female Prime Minister is leading the celebrations. I leave the House with this question: what more can we achieve in another two generations? That is our challenge.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered Vote 100 and International Women’s Day.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I thank the hon. Member for Great Grimsby (Melanie Onn) for calling the debate, particularly as tomorrow we celebrate International Women’s Day, when I hope the House will have a long, thorough debate on the issues facing women—not just in this country, but across the world. One thing that, sadly, too few women across the world have is the right to participate in democratic processes. Today, we have seen how valuable the democratic processes of our country are. I hope very much that Back Benchers and those of us on the Front Benches do everything we can to safeguard the principles of democracy in this great country. [Interruption.] It appears that I am in stereo as well.
I am also feeling a little bit rebellious. Pretty much for the first time on Sunday, I went on a march—I am not a frequent participant: the March4Women. We were joined by up to 10,000 supporters, and we took over the streets, perhaps in a way that the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) would have liked. It was an incredible experience to feel that energy and positivity, but sadly some of the women and men on the march also felt anger about some of the issues we have been discussing today. Against that backdrop, I congratulate the hon. Member for Great Grimsby on securing this debate, and other hon. Members on participating. I hope that this will lead to a continuation of such debates over the year—this year of all years.
The hon. Lady used one phrase that very much stuck in my mind: she described the abuse faced by girls and women in the street or workplace as “the wallpaper of their lives”. I hope that we will get to a stage—sooner, rather than later—when that is no longer the case. The Government are clear that any crimes that target women, whether sexual offences, domestic abuse, or any other forms of abuse, are completely unacceptable and out of step with where we are as a society in 2018.
Since 2010 the Government have done more than ever to tackle these crimes, pledging £100 million over four years to support our ending violence against women and girls strategy, and committing to publish a landmark draft domestic abuse Bill. I hope that Members will use their networks to ensure a good response to the consultation when it is launched, and I am sure some of these issues will be raised during it. We play a leading role in the world in our response to violence against women and girls. We have introduced new offences for coercive and controlling behaviour, stalking, forced marriage and female genital mutilation. We have banned revenge porn, and only last month the Sentencing Council announced increased sentences for domestic abuse, in recognition of the seriousness of such crimes.
Sadly, we know that women and girls face harassment and abuse all too often, and understandably people are calling for action. This involves not just women and girls, but men as well: I feel obliged to remind Members, in the heat of this issue and debate, that most men behave with decency, propriety and respect towards women. However, they are not the men we are worrying about in this debate, and today we want to focus on those who fall outside the majority and treat women in a disrespectful or abusive way.
I entirely support what the Minister is saying, and I feel strongly that men have a critical role in setting a positive example for young men who are growing up. I went running with my son, and someone in a van decided to beep as they drove past and shout something out of the window. My son was confused by that, and wanted to know what it was all about. I did not know where to start—I do not want to introduce the idea that such things are a common form of behaviour. The Minister is right in what she says, and I applaud her for setting it out so clearly.
Indeed, and sometimes men can be the best feminists of all. My little boy is growing up thinking that of course women are Members of Parliament, and of course they are Prime Ministers, because that is what he understands at the moment. The value of men in this debate is important and we all have supportive male colleagues. If we are honest, none of us—or very few of us—could do the amazing job of representing our constituencies in the House of Commons without support networks. Those networks could be male, female or whatever, but we need people behind us—our family and friends—to support us in this role. Men have a vital role in this debate.
Let me turn to current hate crime provisions; if I may, I will be quite detailed in my response on the law because we must take this issue step by step. Currently, specific hate crime provisions, including aggravated and incitement offences, and aggravated sentence uplift, are for offences that target race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. Hate crimes are motivated by hostility or prejudice against a person on the basis of one or more of those five strands. It is a fundamental aspect of the legislation that those motivations can be proven to demonstrate the hate element, including where that leads to sentences being increased.
At the moment we have no clear evidence to show the extent to which the range of crimes committed against women and girls are specifically motivated by misogyny, which is defined as
“the dislike of, contempt for, or ingrained prejudice against women.”
The police pilots that have been mentioned in this debate are of great interest to the Government. As the hon. Member for Great Grimsby said, there are pilot areas across the country, including in Nottinghamshire, where it has been led by Sue Fish, the former chief constable of Nottinghamshire police. That approach has been used to help give women confidence to come forward to the police to report incidents, and to raise the priority of investigations and enhance support offered to women and girls. There has been positive early feedback from women and girls, and those who support them, which is why the National Police Chiefs’ Council is gathering more data on those local initiatives. We will ask the police to feed back on the results of any pilots such as that in Nottinghamshire in recording misogyny as a hate crime.
However, we must be careful about creating laws that would inadvertently conflict with principles of equality. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) is no longer in his place, but he raised a point about misandry. Under the Equalities Act 2010, certainly in the workplace we must balance the issue of equality. For example, our laws on religious hate crime provide equal protection for people of all faiths and of none. Equality of protection is a crucial element of ensuring public support for hate crime legislation. In other words, if we were to have hate crime in relation to gender, we would have to think carefully about whether that would apply to the entire population or just to half of it.
Rather than considering the barriers, I strongly request that the route to overcoming potential obstacles requires the intent of securing misogyny as an extension to the categorisations as its ultimate aim. Although issues may present themselves, I am sure the Minister has flexed her intellectual muscles on more complex issues than this, and I hope she will apply similar rigour to achieving something that fundamentally could be really positive for our society.
Very much so. I am setting out these points because one’s instinctive reaction might be, “Yeah, let’s go for it”. But we must be mindful of unintended and inadvertent consequences. I wonder whether hate crime legislation is definitively the best way to treat these crimes. Women are not a minority, and I would be hesitant to put us forward as one.
Perhaps I am a little more robust in the way that I would like this abuse and harassment to be treated. Within equalities legislation, it is being a minority covered by the five strands that causes something to fall under hate crime legislation. [Interruption.] I see that the hon. Member for Walthamstow is perched on her seat.
We must be very careful when we talk about being “robust”, because we are putting this back on to women and how they manage these experiences, rather than challenging the behaviour. The Minister says that this is about being a minority, but the disproportionate balance of power in our society means that one “minority”—men—have disproportionate power over women.
These incidents are about the abuse of that power, just as we see the abuse of people on the basis of their religious characteristics or ethnic identity. I do not think the Minister’s minority/majority point is robust enough to defend not looking at whether, if we were to categorise misogyny as a hate crime, that would recognise fully the protected characteristic that we are seeking to include.
I am so glad that the hon. Lady clarified that. I was not for a moment suggesting that women themselves must be more robust in the way they deal with such things. That is not my intention. I am saying that we as a society should be more robust.
It comes down to attitudes—something that has been raised a great deal in the debate. I am treading carefully at the moment with respect to equalities legislation because, as far as inserting anything into the current hate crime provisions is concerned, there are legal wrangles that we have to consider. We want to ensure that any changes that we make in the law to reflect the abuse in question would not have any impact on the five protected strands—of religion, and so on.
I thank the Minister for being generous in taking interventions. Does her concern about including misogyny in the legislative framework call into question the existing extensions, and what police forces are doing?
No. At the moment we do not have any clear evidence and, as I have said, we welcome the evidence from the pilot projects. However, the practical legislative steps are what we must put our mind to—as we are doing. I am flagging them up as issues that we shall have to settle one way or another.
For example, there are high rates of under-reporting of the existing five strands of hate crime. We would not want to remove the focus from them, because we want to encourage more people to report that they have been abused racially or because of their religion. Perhaps the best way I can sum up our position is to say that the Government are listening.
There have been calls from both sides of the Chamber for a change in attitudes. When I practised at the criminal Bar, I used to say that by the time things have got to court the harm has been done, and it would be much better if they did not happen in the first place. We all need to challenge the attitudes that normalise or excuse the abuse and harassment of women. We have had examples today of the abuse that colleagues have, sadly, faced in their professional lives. I commend their calling out those instances of abuse. Perhaps I may say that I constantly admire the hon. Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) for the beautiful necklaces that she always wears, and I do not understand why anyone would feel they had reason to make any criticism about that.
The Government Equalities Office is taking forward a programme of work to identify and challenge harmful social norms, ensuring that men and boys are included in the conversation as well as women. We need to ensure that all children grow up understanding that we should all be treated with respect, and not abused on the basis of gender, race or religion, and so on. Working with the Advertising Association, we have provided teachers and parents with resources to improve primary school children’s resilience with respect to harmful gender stereotypes. In addition, following on from the successful “This is abuse” campaign—and it was successful in teaching people about what constitutes an abusive relationship and what should be normal and acceptable in a loving relationship—the Home Office and the Government Equalities Office have provided £3 million in the past year to develop and run a new “Disrespect NoBody” campaign, to tackle abuse within teenage relationships and encourage teens to rethink their views on violence, controlling behaviour and the meaning of consent in relationships.
Modern life can impinge on those matters as well, in the form of sexting and so on. We are also engaging with young people on questions of respect and equality to prevent such behaviour in the first place. That is why we have committed to making relationships education mandatory in all primary schools, and relationships and sex education mandatory in all primary schools from September next year.
I completely agree about the importance of getting sex and relationships education into every school. It is age-appropriate and sensitively done, so does the Minister share my concern that parental withdrawal might undermine the principle of giving every young person the best start in life and the best values about how we should treat each other?
I must admit I am naturally cautious about the state interfering—or rather, because “interfering” is too pejorative a term, about the reach of the state into family life. Of course it is justified on occasion, but at the moment I do not have enough evidence to suggest that the rate of withdrawal would be very high; we simply do not know at the moment. Also, we should try to take parents with us. There is a lack of understanding about the education intended for primary school children about relationships and respect. We need to explain that more, so that when children start to receive that education people understand the boundaries of what their seven, eight or nine-year-old will hear in school. I would naturally just pause before setting out such legislation to make it mandatory, before we have evidence about how many families are going to withdraw.
To move on to the legal framework, there are of course criminal laws that prohibit sexual harassment, assault and rape. They include the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which could cover sexual harassment, as well as the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Public Order Act 1986. We want women to know that those protections are there for them in law. It is also vital that when women and girls report their experiences they feel that they are treated with dignity and respect. We have recognised in our violence against women and girls strategy the gendered nature of crimes such as domestic abuse, sexual violence, so-called honour-based violence and stalking. As I have said, we have committed more than £100 million over this spending review period for critical services for victims of those crimes. We are committed to ensuring that victims of sexual assault have access to the specialist support that they need. We are also ensuring that the police and Crown Prosecution Service use the powers that they have to charge and prosecute for the abhorrent practice of upskirting. We are reviewing those powers to ensure that they are still fit for purpose.
Laws need to keep pace with modern life—and upskirting is, indeed, an example of that. We are determined that the internet should not be a safe place for those who carry out threatening or abusive behaviour online, whoever is being targeted. The Government are clear that what is illegal offline is illegal online.
The Minister is being generous in giving way. I apologise for not being here earlier, as I was in Committee. She will be aware of Amnesty International’s research into abuse of female MPs, which was published last year when I, along with the Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary, were listed among the most abused UK female MPs. A lot of that abuse is misogynistic. What are the Government doing to address the abuse that is directed towards female MPs? We all know that the shadow Home Secretary gets by far the worst of it, but as the second most abused female MP in the UK I find the degree of homophobia, misogyny and anti-Catholic abuse that I must tolerate online quite shocking.
That is disgraceful to hear. It comes to something, does it not, when colleagues have a league table of the people who receive the most abuse? It is a sorry sign, and the Prime Minister is absolutely committed to tackling the problem. The hon. and learned Lady may recall that on the day of the centenary of women’s suffrage, the Prime Minister announced that we have commissioned the Law Commission to launch a review of the current legislation on offensive online communications to ensure that laws are up to date with technology. We have tackled the question of the treatment of women in public life—it is not just women Members in this place; we know that women who have any sort of high profile, whether through business, television or whatever, sadly get their share of abuse.
I was rather surprised when I gave an interview on that day and the person interviewing me asked me why I was not on Twitter. I said, very matter-of-factly, “I came off it because I got fed up with the abuse.” I thought no more of it; I did it quite some time ago. That seemed to attract attention. The reason I raise it is that I would like to emphasise to anyone who may be thinking of standing for public life that they do not have to be on Twitter if they do not want to be. If they want to be, fine, but equally it is not mandatory to be on Twitter if they do not want that side of things. There are other social media platforms, all of which I am sure everyone is very aware of.
I take the Minister’s point that nobody has to be on Twitter, but does she agree with me that women in all walks of life should not feel forced off Twitter because they are abused simply for having the effrontery to hold a view and to articulate it?
I would not describe myself as feeling forced to leave Twitter; I just took the decision. That is the point I am trying to get across. We are all trying, on a cross-party basis, to attract more women into politics. There is a great campaign called 50:50 Parliament, which is encouraging more women to stand, not just in national Parliament but in local councils and so on. I am just saying that there are many ways of doing this job, and it is one’s own choice.
I completely appreciate the point the Minister is making, and I have done the same thing; I have been on Twitter and said, “Oh, I can’t be bothered with that,” and I have put my phone away and not looked at it for a couple of weeks. That is fine, but the reality is that all the views are still there, whether or not I am online and looking at them. Whether or not we use Twitter, the vast majority of the public do. As long as they are in a sphere where that kind of stuff is acceptable and completely without consequences, our coming off Twitter does not solve anything.
Of course. Social media and the tech companies are coming under a lot of attention at the moment for the way in which they are reacting not just to abuse online, but to the fact that criminals are using social media networks for horrific crimes such as child sexual exploitation and terrorist offences. As I see it, if we are not on the cusp of revolution, it feels as though we are perhaps beginning the beginning of the cusp of a revolution, in that we have got to a stage where we expect more from the people who run those great big companies and have such a sway over our day-to-day lives.
Is that not where Government step in and we lead by example? If we are able to say to the tech companies that we think they should be doing more to clamp down on such views, and if we, as the leaders of society, are looking at this cultural and structural problem and seeing that our society is poisoned with this stuff just now, it is on us to do something about it. It is not just for the Twitter and Facebook giants; it is on us.
The hon. Lady will know that the Government are taking the issue seriously, particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism and the sexual exploitation not just of children, but of women. We are taking it very seriously. Indeed, I was at a conference of the global partnership to end violence against children last month in Sweden. I was there to explain what the United Kingdom is doing to support the WePROTECT global alliance. That is an extraordinary, groundbreaking global alliance of Governments to tackle online child sexual exploitation; as we know, there are no geographical boundaries to it. I think I am right in saying that we are the highest contributor to the scheme, with £50 million, and we are doing some groundbreaking stuff on programmes that are creeping through the net and getting to the sites that are sharing the most appalling images.
Will the Minister give way?
Will the hon. Lady forgive me? I am conscious that the hon. Member for Great Grimsby will want to respond, and I have two more pages, which may take me a couple of minutes.
On the issue of the internet, we have also published the internet safety strategy Green Paper to look at ways of tackling online abuse and harassment where they fall short of a criminal offence, such as, in some cases, trolling. That includes a commitment to introduce a voluntary social media code of practice. In addition, since 2015 we have introduced strong legislation to address revenge pornography—another way in which women can be humiliated online and have their lives affected by relationships that have since ended—and the helpline we funded has received more than 6,000 calls since 2015.
I thank the hon. Member for Great Grimsby for calling this debate. I will end on a positive note: this is the centenary of women’s suffrage, and I have promised friends and family that by the end of the year they will be thoroughly fed up with me using the phrase “Ask her to stand”. We have seen today in the Chamber the impact that women standing up and speaking on issues that matter to them and to their constituents can have. I am sure I am not alone in hoping that through this debate and our cross-party activities this year, we will encourage more women to stand not just for the House of Commons but for local government, local councils and devolved Assemblies and Parliaments. If more women stand for elected office to talk about and campaign on issues that they care about, they will make a difference. I will end with my hashtag, #askhertostand.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe 2016 annual report from the Independent Monitor is being published today on www.gov.uk. A copy of the report will also be placed in the House Library.
[HCWS507]
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government have consulted on a proposal to make a Licensing Hours Extension Order under section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003 to relax licensing hours nationally to celebrate the wedding of HRH Prince Henry and Ms Meghan Markle on 19 May 2018. Following this consultation, the Government have decided to extend licensing hours on the nights of Friday 18 and Saturday 19 May until 1 am the following mornings to mark this occasion of national celebration.
The order will apply to the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises and the provision of late-night refreshment in premises already licensed to sell alcohol for consumption on the premises in England and Wales.
The Government response to the consultation and an accompanying impact assessment were published yesterday on the Home Office website, available at:
www.gov.uk/government/consultations/relaxation-of-licensing-hours-for-the-royal-wedding.
Copies will also be placed in the House Library.
[HCWS506]
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Under-Secretary of State for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Nadhim Zahawi) and I have today published the Government’s response to the consultation exercise on reporting and acting on child abuse and neglect.
The consultation, which ran from 21 July 2016 to 13 October 2016, sought views on key issues relating to the child protection system and on the possible introduction of one of two new statutory measures, namely:
a mandatory reporting duty, which would require certain practitioners or organisations to report child abuse or neglect if they knew, or had reasonable cause to suspect, it was taking place; or
a duty to act, which would require certain practitioners or organisations to take appropriate action in relation to child abuse or neglect if they knew, or had reasonable cause to suspect, it was taking place.
All children have the right to be safe from harm. Keeping children safe is the responsibility of everyone who comes into contact with children and families, and we all have a role to play in protecting children and young people from child abuse and neglect.
The legal duties the Government consulted on would involve a particular focus on practitioners: across children’s social care, the police, health, education, and other sectors. The vast majority of such practitioners are committed to doing all they can to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, through recognising children’s needs early and taking action so that children receive the right support at the right time.
We are absolutely clear that practitioners should make an immediate referral to local authority children’s social care if they believe that a child has suffered harm or is likely to do so, as set out in statutory guidance already. We know, however, that despite the best efforts of practitioners working with children and families, some abuse and neglect continues to go undetected by statutory agencies. This can happen for a variety of reasons, including failures to report or share information properly, and failure to perceive abuse or understand the nature and level of the risk of harm faced by children.
In circumstances where professionals fail to identify or fail to report the signs of abuse and neglect, the consequences can be catastrophic. However, triennial analysis of serious case reviews demonstrates that in most cases the significant harm or death of children occurs despite their being known to children’s social care. So the issues are complex and challenging and introducing a new statutory duty is not a simple, straightforward solution, as some argue.
We received 768 responses to the consultation exercise, from a wide range of interests including practitioners and others in the education, health, social care and local government sectors, children’s charities, survivors’ groups, the police and members of the public. We have considered all the responses and relevant issues carefully.
The majority of respondents (63%) were in favour of allowing the Government’s existing programme of reforms time to be implemented before considering additional statutory measures. Only a quarter (25%) of respondents favoured introducing a duty to act, with less than half of that number (12%) favouring the introduction of a mandatory reporting duty.
Given the consultation outcome and after careful consideration, we have concluded that the case for the introduction of a mandatory reporting duty or a duty to act has not been made, and would not, against the landscape of our current arrangements, deliver better protection for children. Therefore, neither of these proposals will be taken forward at this time. We will implement the reforms set out in the Government’s response and evaluate whether this is having the intended impact once these are embedded, in addition to continuing to assess any new or different evidence supporting the need for further changes.
We remain committed to examining all options to improve further the children’s social care system and tackle abuse in all its forms. In addition to our already wide-ranging programme of reforms, we will therefore focus on taking steps to address the key issues raised by respondents to the consultation. This action includes:
improving multi-agency working, in particular through strengthening information sharing for safeguarding purposes, including better local arrangements;
publishing our revised “Working Together to Safeguard Children” statutory guidance and launching a further phase of the communications campaign, “Together, we can tackle child abuse” ahead of its publication;
looking at the current legislative framework to assess whether it is able to deal appropriately with concerns about concealment of child abuse and neglect; and
continuing our work to improve the training, accreditation and regulation of practitioners, so that they can better safeguard and promote the welfare of children.
To repeat, every child deserves to and must be protected from abuse and neglect. We are determined to do all that we can to strengthen our child protection system in ways which we expect will bring real benefits to children.
Copies of the Government’s response have been placed in the House Library and are available on the Government’s website: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reporting-and-acting-on-child-abuse-and-neglect.
[HCWS508]
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend, who is standing up for his constituents in Sutton by asking this question. The Government have drawn up a comprehensive action plan with the police, motorcycle and insurance industry leaders, local councils, charities and representatives of the motorcycle riding community to focus on the causes of moped-enabled crime, and on what works and what needs to be done to prevent these crimes.
I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. Does she agree that the police already have the necessary legal powers to tackle this issue, and that what is important for the Londoners across the 32 London boroughs who are increasingly becoming victims of this crime is that the Government should continue to work with the Met police and the Mayor of London to ensure that those existing powers are used more effectively to tackle this scourge?
I agree that the police have the powers they need, but those powers need to be used in conjunction with charities, local authorities and so on to ensure that we have a thorough response to the problem. We are reviewing the law, guidance and practice around pursuits, because there are concerns about the policy and because we want to be sure that the current arrangements provide the right legal protections for officers who pursue offenders. We will publish the outcome of the review shortly.
I represent a relatively low-crime area that has seen a big increase in moped crime, so what are the Government doing to support the campaign among petrol station owners to stop serving masked riders?
One of my first meetings shortly after my appointment was with the Petrol Retailers Association. Of course, we have to consider all sorts of measures to see what will work, which is why it is so key that our action plan involves not just law enforcement and councils, but those who ride their motorbikes quite legitimately.
This is not just about mopeds; scrambler bikes and quad bikes are terrorising parts of my constituency. In Maesteg and Caerau, riders on these bikes are chasing people and blocking them from gaining access to public rights of way. What more can the Minister do to try to tackle the scourge not just of mopeds, but of the other types of off-road bikes that can access footpaths and pavements?
We are keen that police forces collaborate on crimes enabled by mopeds and other smaller vehicles. For example, the Metropolitan police is now using DNA sprays, and we have great hopes that that will help to catch offenders. Such measures should be shared around constabularies to ensure that offenders are brought to justice.
I must say that I feel considerably better informed about the moped situation now than I was five minutes ago. I hope that colleagues feel the same.
Prisoners’ illegal use of mobile phones enables their continued offending, threatens the safety and security of our prisons, and harms our communities. The Government have introduced legislation to disconnect mobile phones in prisons remotely; they have invested £2 million in mobile phone detection equipment; and the Ministry of Justice is working closely with mobile network operators to deliver cutting-edge technology to prevent mobile phones from being smuggled into prisons and then working.
I thank the Minister for her answer, but I have recently been dealing with two cases where violent partners have been running a campaign of threats and intimidation from within prison against their former partners, yet they are still up for parole. It does not seem that the police locally, who are investigating these crimes, are contacting the MOJ and the Prison Service to ensure that this is taken into account when these people are considered for parole.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. He will appreciate that I am not able to comment specifically on those cases, but I ask him to write to me about them so that we can see what further can be done. I want to emphasise that it is getting harder and harder for prisoners to get mobile phones into prisons and to then use them. Indeed, at least 150 phones have been disconnected since the telecommunications restriction regulations came into force.
We know that in December some 79 illegal mobile phones were seized as a result of joint operations between police and the Prison Service at HMP Hewell. What steps are being taken by the Home Office, police and crime commissioners and the Prison Service to set up proper protocols and systems for joint working between the police and the Prison Service? Obviously, illegal activity is taking place on the outside in order to get these phones in, as well as within the prisons.
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. Of course, as Chair of the Justice Committee he knows a great deal about this. More than 23,000 handsets and SIM cards were seized from prisons last year. The Government are investing £25 million to create a new security directorate in prisons and £14 million to transform our intelligence, search and disruption capabilities in prisons at the national, regional and local levels. That includes more than £3 million to establish serious organised crime units to deny offenders space to operate in prisons.
As a proportion of overall violence, alcohol-related violent crime climbed steadily from 41% in 1995 to 55% in 2009-10. More recently, it has fallen back to 40% of all violent crime in 2016-17. The cost of alcohol misuse to society is estimated to be around £21 billion a year, with alcohol-related crime estimated to account for around £11 billion a year. We continue to work with the police to equip them with the right powers to take effective action.
The Minister is obviously aware of the terrible damage that alcohol does, but is she aware of a recent report implicating alcohol as a major factor in child abuse among other things? When are the Government going to take serious, comprehensive and effective action to reduce alcohol abuse, and the suffering and cost that it still inflicts across our society?
Both the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care take this issue very seriously. The hon. Gentleman will know that the Secretary of State for Health recently announced a report on helping children of alcoholic parents. Violent crime is down and alcohol consumption overall is down, particularly among young people, but of course it is very important to look at this issue, particularly in relation to domestic abuse. We will be looking at how we can deal with it, in combination with the Department of Health, as part of our modern crime prevention strategy.
It has just been confirmed that all alcoholic drinks in Scotland must cost at least 50p per unit from May this year. Will the Minister now review our alcohol strategy to allow us to take up this evidence-based policy that will do so much to tackle the scourge of cheap, high-strength alcohol and reduce pressure on our emergency services?
We are of course aware of the Scottish Parliament’s policy on this, and we are looking at it with interest. We set out our alcohol strategy in the 2016 strategy on dealing with modern crime, but we keep the issue under review.
I was one of those who was persuaded years back that we needed to reform our late-night drinking laws. The reality is that this has been a failure. Will the Government seriously consider talking to our police forces and local authorities about how we can ensure a more rational way of dealing with late-night drinking, so that we do not see the problems that it currently causes?
Very much so. This is obviously a matter for review and for police and crime commissioners and local police forces to look at in their own local areas. We have changed the late-night levy to try to make it more flexible and targeted, so that district councils and others can use it for the areas that present the most harm in terms of the night-time economy.
On Saturday night I was out with Inspector Simon Jenkinson and his team seeing how they police Torquay’s night-time economy. Does the Minister agree that it is important that councils work with their local policing teams? Will she agree to meet to discuss how we can review some of the more outdated provisions, such as the Vagrancy Acts, which have a real impact on our night-time economy?
Local councils and local policing teams know where the hotspots of trouble can be in their local areas. That is why it is essential that councils and police work together. Of course I would be delighted to meet my hon. Friend to discuss this important issue.
I thank the hon. Lady for her question and for the meeting that she asked me to attend with leaders of Rotherham Council and the police. There has been and continues to be significant Government investment in response to child sexual exploitation in Rotherham, including £5.17 million to fund transformational change there, funding for police forces to meet the costs of unexpected events and up to £2 million for children’s social care in recognition of social workers’ increased workload resulting from the investigation of CSE. We have previously provided approximately £5.6 million for Operation Stovewood in the last two years, and we are considering an application for funding for the costs of investigation in 2017-18.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies.
First, I congratulate the hon. Member for Chesterfield (Toby Perkins) on raising this important issue and on doing so in a very thoughtful way. Obviously, this issue affects him and his family, given his experience of adopting children. I pay tribute to him and to everyone across the country who finds the time and space in their families to give love and support to looked-after children, and the opportunities that those children deserve.
Last week, I attended an international conference on tackling violence against children. The Swedish Prime Minister spoke very movingly of his own experience of foster care. He had been looked after by foster parents and he talked about the opportunities that they had given him, which enabled him to become Prime Minister of his country. It was the most incredible story of love, support, opportunity and ambition. Perhaps in due course the hon. Gentleman’s children will follow in the footsteps of the Swedish Prime Minister.
I am responding to this debate on behalf of the Home Office. As the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out, this is an issue for which several Government Departments have responsibility. I hope that he will forgive me if I respond from a Home Office perspective, and of course I will ensure that my ministerial colleagues in the Department for Education and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government respond to the specific points that relate to them.
The reason the Home Office is responding to this debate is that while of course we have responsibility for crime, we are also very conscious that child-to-parent violence is an issue that is often neglected, even though it can have a devastating impact on the families concerned. Currently there is no legal definition of child-to-parent violence, but it is increasingly recognised as a form of domestic abuse. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman spoke very thoughtfully about the impact of babies and children witnessing domestic abuse in their homes, including the impact it can have on them developmentally, not only in childhood but in adulthood.
That is precisely why the Government hope to include in the draft domestic violence and abuse Bill, which we will seek to introduce in this Session, a measure that reflects the impact that domestic abuse has on children. That will be one of the most important measures in that Bill. We want to make it an aggravating feature of any domestic abuse offence if there are children present in the home when that abuse is carried out, to try to draw out and show the terrible effect that it has on young people.
It is very important to understand that, as with other forms of domestic abuse, child-to-parent violence is not only about physical violence. It is also likely to involve a pattern of behaviour that can encompass, but is in no way limited to, psychological, emotional, economic and physical abuse. It is an incredibly complex problem that presents a number of challenges to families who experience it. Family members may feel isolated and stigmatised, and they may even feel shame for being the victims of violence at the hands of their children. They may not know where to go for help and, as the hon. Gentleman has articulated, they may worry that if they do reach out for help, judgments will be made about their parenting skills and the children may be removed from them.
That is why the Government commissioned a 2015 report, “Information guide: adolescent to parent violence and abuse”, which provides materials and advice to support professionals in the police, the health system, the justice system, the education system, youth services and so on, when someone comes to them for help. I hasten to add that although the title refers to adolescent violence, the advice does not just apply to adolescents; it can of course apply to children under the age of 16 as well.
There are also at least two charities that can offer help and support to family members who are suffering from this kind of violence, including the free and confidential helplines that are run by Family Lives and the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Child-to-parent violence includes not only violence by young people living in the family home, but adult children’s violence towards their parents. Sadly, that issue is similarly hidden and equally poorly understood.
Because of issues such as stigma and the worries that people may have about reaching out for help, there are no specific national statistics on child-to-parent abuse. However, we know that there are approximately 2 million victims of domestic abuse every year. Family Lives, a national charity, reported that over a two-year period its helpline received more than 22,500 calls from parents reporting aggression from their children. Also, the Office for National Statistics has shown that in the year ending March 2017 there were 11 recorded parricides, which gives an indication of how serious these cases can become and the number of families who are torn apart by this type of abuse.
Such abuse can affect all levels of society. There may be a history of domestic abuse within the house, but equally there may be other factors that exist alongside the abuse, including substance misuse, behavioural problems, learning difficulties and mental health issues. There is no single explanation for the abuse to which some parents are subjected.
In terms of the complexity, it is important to break the silence on this abuse, which is why I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising the issue. Also, we know that exercises such as the recent storyline in the soap opera “Hollyoaks” have helped draw the issue to the public’s attention.
What have we done? The hon. Gentleman rightly and understandably asked for action. We have committed £920 million towards the troubled families programme, which aims to achieve significant and sustained progress for 400,000 families with complex needs by 2020. I fully appreciate that the adopted families he spoke to may not fall into that category, but none the less we have invested that significant sum of money to help families who are troubled. The programme works to support families through a dedicated key worker who works with them to draw up an action plan. It can include support for families where there is child-to-parent violence.
The hon. Gentleman asked about social care. In addition to the troubled families programme, the Government have identified that we need to support councils to identify improvements to children’s social care. We have made £200 billion available for local services, including children’s social care, up to 2020. In addition, the Department for Education has funded a number of projects with a specific focus on tackling domestic abuse as part of our children’s social care innovation programme, which is backed by £200 million. As part of the Government’s domestic violence and abuse Bill agenda this year, there will I hope be lots of national conversations about domestic abuse in its various forms. I would welcome the hon. Gentleman’s help in raising this issue so that we can see whether there are other measures we should be employing.
We are conscious that domestic abuse is not just about physical violence. It can be about emotional and mental abuse as well. That is why we introduced the new domestic abuse offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship in the Serious Crime Act 2015. We know that safeguarding is critical to helping families where there is child-to-parent abuse, rather than necessarily criminalising the child, with all the repercussions that has for their future career prospects and so on. We want to help and support professionals in identifying and dealing with the earliest signs of abuse, to stop violence before it happens and to prevent abusive behaviour from becoming entrenched. Critically, we want to provide victims and their families with support before a crisis point is reached. That is why we have the information guide I mentioned. I encourage Members to read it if the issue has come to them through their constituency casework. It provides guidance for practitioners.
In conclusion, we must and will do more to tackle the tyranny of domestic abuse and, in doing so, promote greater awareness of the different forms it takes. Our forthcoming consultation on the domestic violence and abuse Bill, which will be launched shortly, and the package of non-legislative measures that will sit alongside that Bill provide an opportunity to transform agencies’ responses to domestic abuse, to make tackling it everyone’s business and to promote a national conversation to bring this abuse out of the shadows. I hope I have reassured the hon. Gentleman of the Government’s commitment to tackling this terrible form of abuse, and I thank him very much for raising the issue.
Question put and agreed to.