Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Nationality and Borders Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Zoe Gardner: I am quite confused about that being the aim of the legislation that we have in front of us. The measures that have been put forward in the Bill, as far as I can tell, will only serve to exacerbate and complicate the repeated legal claims that will be made. For example, the split standard of proof in the Bill would apply a different standard of proof to different parts of a person’s asylum claim. That will be challenged and tested in the courts and will take longer. Obviously, the delays of six months will make the system take longer. On the other side, slapping a priority sign on to somebody’s deportation order does not actually make any difference. Again, as Lucy said, that is a matter for having well-resourced court systems and a fair and efficient system, and the Bill just does not do anything to achieve any of that.
Apologies, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted to ask questions. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee. Many questions were asked and our witnesses gave evidence that Members wanted to listen to.
Examination of Witness
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby gave evidence .
Q
That turns the presumption of innocent until proven guilty on its head. Do you think that that is the most helpful way to go forward and, if so, are there other circumstances in which we should not offer support to people because we do not believe them, before they have had the opportunity to prove otherwise? If you do not think that it is helpful, how would you amend the legislation to be more helpful, while recognising that we do not know whether people are victims of slavery at the point at which they are arrested?
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: There are a few areas there. First, the existing legislation does not apply to a lot of crime types in any event—some of the more serious crime types that you mentioned, such as kidnapping and manslaughter, and lots of offences included in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and firearms legislation, so some of that is there already. I do not think that it is right to say that policing is turning the presumption of innocent until proven guilty on its head. What I would say is that, where we already have information and intelligence in relation to individuals and their place within a criminal hierarchy, at that point it may be appropriate to turn that presumption on its head.
To illustrate, there is a recent case in Derbyshire where an Albanian gang has been dismantled only in the last couple of weeks. There have been 24 arrests, and I think 12 of those people were Albanians, running cannabis growers and other types of criminality in the region. More than one of those people claimed to be victims, but we had a covert investigation behind us that showed their level of control, their ability to communicate, the resources that they had and various things that clearly went against that claim. Absent that information and intelligence, I do not think that we would say, “We don’t believe this person,” in the first instance. An investigator should, and in all investigations does, go into that situation with an open mind. This person could be a victim or could, in fact, be a criminal. They start at that point, not on one side or the other.
The other part of your question was about what we do to make things easier for investigators to understand the true position. I think that, again, that would be some sort of duty to co-operate, because it is quite difficult if somebody claims to be a victim and then, for example, refuses to provide a phone passcode, and so on. Perhaps a duty there would assist us. I mentioned whether a person should have to declare straightaway, because often there are delays, but I think that a lot of genuine victims would suffer that way.
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: Absolutely. I cannot give you names right now. That perhaps would not be appropriate, but in various areas of criminality we have seen that, and again it is for various reasons. One reason that I have alluded to already is to hamper prosecutions, as a tactic. Quite often we can get around that as investigators because we have been looking at the various areas that would prove or disprove a person’s status throughout, but sometimes the defence is raised in order to obtain access, we believe, to other services that we would of course want to provide to genuine victims, such as access to housing and potentially some assistance in securing visas and so on.
We do see those things. I can only say that in some cases we have proved that those people are not victims—for example, through covert activity that was already in place because it was a part of larger operations or because of things such as telecoms investigations and so on, sharing that work. There is a lot of technical detail in how it is done, but we have detected people exploiting the system for those two reasons: benefits and to avoid prosecution.
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: By “sequential”, do you mean repeated?
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: Okay, I am trying to understand where you are going with the question. I am sorry, do you mean if somebody makes a claim and is referred, and then does so again following a criminal justice process? Or have I misunderstood your question?
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: We see victims being referred into the system and then disappearing from it and turning up somewhere else, and then being referred into the system again, and so on. That is an indication, of course, that the control that these criminal gangs have has remained in place and they continue to be controlled, coerced and taken out of that process. Again, in general terms, the speedier the decision that is made in terms of a conclusive grounds decision and the support put in place in a substantive way, the less likely we are to see that because this would be an alternative for people who otherwise are in some sort of a holding pattern, waiting for decisions to be made, perhaps in temporary accommodation and so on. So, for me, the measures that are most effective are those that are going to cement those decisions the quickest and provide real support to those individuals—[Inaudible]—so they can be taken out of that coercive group of organised crime groups.
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: Can you repeat the question? I had an issue with the connection. I apologise.
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: The ability of gangs to bring people across the channel is a really important part of how many of those gangs work, particularly when we talk about foreign national offenders and foreign national organised crime. Again, at the risk of being boring talking about west Balkan criminality, I think it is a good way to illustrate that. West Balkan criminality, Albanian criminality, which is really what we are talking about, has taken more of a foothold since around 2017 in the UK, partly because of a real crackdown in Albania around cannabis cultivation. There needs to be a business model to support that. The gang members themselves do not want to spend long hours in uncomfortable and dangerous cannabis grows, for example, with the risk of being caught. Why would they want to do that? Similarly, if the business model is to exploit people for sexual practices then there need to be people to exploit. The ability to bring people into the country across the channel is hugely important for them.
Of course, there are other rackets such as labour exploitation and so on that have been talked about many times. Focusing on those two, they need people who can be exploited. British citizens form part of that, but people from comparatively poor areas who have comparatively few opportunities are much easier to exploit. In fact, many of those people do not initially believe they are victims—they believe that they are entering into a business deal. “You do this for this long, and then we will fly you back, or there will be some sort of benefit”. Sometimes that is the case. I would suggest that the conditions those people are living in are appalling and that the deal is a terrible one, but for some of them that is a better deal than they had where they came from.
Forgive me, that is a bit of a long answer. The point is that without the ability to bring foreign nationals in-country, those very well-organised criminal gangs—in my experience, many of them are far better organised than our own high-level criminality—would struggle to prosper in the way they currently are.
Q
Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: At the moment, there is a heightened threat from people from those areas. That is what we are seeing most of in terms of foreign national offenders in Derbyshire and the east midlands, and I am fairly confident that is also the pattern elsewhere. To illustrate, we used to see Vietnamese organised criminals involved in cannabis growing, sex trafficking and other issues, but more often than not we now see Albanians in control, potentially exploiting those Vietnamese people, or, if not, working together. Some alleged groups are so well-organised and disciplined that they are able to effectively out-perform other criminal gangs. That is the threat we are seeing most in terms of foreign national criminality.
Q
Councillor Rachael Robathan: Yes, there are certainly some things that we would welcome, although it would be good to see some more detail when the secondary legislation comes forward. Just to back up slightly, a further issue that we have in Westminster, as many of you will be aware, is the significant number of rough sleepers. Our latest count was 171, which is actually fewer than there have been previously. We worked very closely with Government on the Everyone In programme and so on last year, which was very successful, but we still have 70 in a bridging hotel within Westminster, so there is a significant issue around rough sleeping.
Over half of those people have no recourse to public funds. All of the asylum seekers in Westminster have come through the sanctioned route, so they would be in category 1 under this Bill, but one of the concerns for us would be if there is more clarity, if you like, in terms of no recourse to public funds for category 2, whether some of those people who would have no recourse to public funds might slip into rough sleeping. There is always a draw to the centre of Westminster: it is known that an aggressive beggar can make up to £500, or sometimes more, on our streets in Westminster, so if people find themselves on the street, there is an economic pull into the centre. That could lead to increasing numbers within Westminster.
Speaking very specifically about Westminster, the issue is that we then have an issue with tented accommodation, and the point about tented accommodation—I have had a number of meetings with the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice about this—is that there is a very high bar for the police or others to be able to gain entry to the tents. Not only is it difficult to enforce against those who would be illegally there but, much more importantly, it is very difficult to address issues around trafficked women and other people who are on the streets and need support and help, because we are unable to deliver that. That is a concern.
One of the things that we would welcome—I think this has come through in what both Councillor Gough and I have said—is a more organised approach to the way asylum seekers are looked after and accommodated. More planning around the process would help. I think we have also both said that the Afghan resettlement has been much better in terms of being able to have planning and co-ordination with local authorities, so that is something we would welcome.
Also in Westminster, I welcome the measures around modern slavery, but also the greater sanctions to stop people coming back into the country if they have been convicted of criminal activity. Once again, we have people on the streets in Westminster who engage in criminal activity to earn money. That activity is not at a very high level, but they are still things that have a real impact on our residents’ lives. We would welcome the moves around electronic travel authorisation and other measures to make re-entry into the country more difficult for those people who are here to commit criminal activity.
Councillor Roger Gough: I would endorse what Councillor Robathan has said; I agree with all those points. There are a couple of specifics from our side. One slightly begs the question as to how effective the measures will be, ultimately, because others looking at the Bill can judge that better than me. The basic principle of seeking to promote safe and orderly routes at the expense of those that involve things like the small boat routes would be very welcome. There is no doubt, and it has been much emphasised, that that route is very dangerous. It creates a degree of political tension because it is so visible. It is something that we very much wish to avoid. Those issues come home to those of us who are border authorities, particularly in the case of the small boats in areas such as Kent. The measures to try to shift the balance between the two ways in which people get here would in principle be very welcome.
The second area I want to touch on relates to age assessment. Broadly, the direction there seems to me to be a favourable one. The attempt to create a national body, not to carry out or provide support to local authorities, unless it is requested, so much as to provide some consistency and regularity to a very time-consuming process that can wrap up huge amounts of time from very qualified social workers and which often has no very obvious end to it because it is relatively loosely guided, is welcome. Establishing best practice as well as providing support for local authorities, many of which will be less experienced in this area than authorities such as mine, would be very welcome.
Q
Councillor Roger Gough: We are slightly betwixt and between on that. I apologise if I give an answer that may not be quite as definite as you would like. I shall explain why. If we take this year and last year, the very specific pressures that we have been experiencing were rapid increases in the numbers of young people coming into our care, the end result of which was that social work case loads rose far above recommended levels, particularly for the specialist teams dealing with those cases. We also had reception centres that, particularly with the first wave of big pressure last year, were filling rapidly. That was the point at which placing young people in other accommodation was difficult because of the circumstances of the pandemic.
Just to be clear, it is perhaps worth saying that when we talk about unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, historically, these have been adolescent males. Indeed, if you look at last year’s figures, we have very few indeed who were under the age––or stated age––of 16. There was something of a shift in the early part of this year where, from memory, about a fifth of those arriving were of stated age under 16. That tended to push you more towards foster accommodation rather than the semi-independent and other forms of accommodation that we would provide for the 16 and 17-year-olds. That has meant that through the pressures on fostering, and to some extent on other forms of accommodation, we had to place more young people outside the county, and we were certainly heading into that sort of territory at the time when we were closing our doors again in June. That was the biggest area of concern.
One thing that is worth noting, too, and it has a longer lag on it, is care leavers: those who come into our care, or indeed the care of any authority, under the age of 18—they are taken in as children in care—then become care leavers. Councillor Robathan referred to that. Under the changes to legislation that took place three or four years ago, we have a responsibility for them through to the age of 25. While at the moment, we have around 300 under-18s in our care, we have over 1,000 care leavers. In fact, our care leaver service is more ex unaccompanied asylum-seeking children than it is ex Kent children in care. As you can imagine, that generates a number of specific pressures, too. I hope that answers your question. The only reason for my hesitancy at the start was that we have just come out of the period when we were not taking young people into our care, and therefore some of the very large numbers of arrivals that we saw a few weeks ago, of whom typically 10% to 15% would probably be unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, were not having a very direct effect on us at that point. But clearly if those numbers were to continue, we would potentially be in a different situation.
Q
Councillor Roger Gough: First, there is a big variety of views in Kent, as I think there is anywhere. My inbox, my postbag, tells me that about all the issues that are raised, but as I mentioned in my earlier responses, the very visible sense of large numbers of arrivals on the coast has had an effect within the county, and therefore that has made the issue a pressing one. As I say, from a service delivery point of view, for us the most pressing element of it has been to do with the children.
Q
Councillor Roger Gough: On the first question, it is a demand and I cannot quantify it at this moment, but I can give you perhaps some indications. It is a demand on social worker time, so you will tend to see that a typical age assessment involves two experienced social workers, who will carry out interviews. If you just take everything going smoothly, if I could put it that way, that would involve a couple of half-day interviews followed by extensive paperwork, research and then later stages of the process. In practice, and this goes back to my earlier comments about age assessment, there are a number of ways in which the process may well be less smooth running than that. But you need experienced social workers, and one of the areas in which we have worked with the Home Office has been through their support for us in backfilling posts so that experienced social workers can take that role on.
On safeguarding, clearly there is a significant concern—it is quite hard to specify the full details of it—where you have adults in what one would take to be a young person’s space. Clearly, you will have a challenge over those who are, if you like, on the cusp. What happens—this ties in, perhaps, to your third question—is that we have had historically quite large numbers of young people being put through by the Home Office where doubts have been raised by Border Force regarding their age. There are some of whom they would say—interestingly, recent court findings have helped with this process a bit—“Look, this person is definitely, in our view, out of the reasonable range to be considered a child,” and they would be into the adult part of the process.
That can sometimes come back. For instance, where asylum seekers have been placed in hotels elsewhere, disputes about age assessment then come back as an issue for the new local authority. I know of a number of places across the south-east where that has happened, but in our case, there are a number of cases where any local authority, I think, would take the view that, where it is very hard to establish—again, the guidance around this is relatively loose—that a young person is definitely out of that age range, there is precious little point in pursuing that further.
That still leaves you with a material number. At one point, at the height of things, around half the young people who were arriving arrived with doubts raised about them by the Home Office. We would then probably in practice seriously investigate, because it was considered viable to do so, only a portion of those, but they would very often go into cases where the age dispute would be pushed to the point of saying that this was indeed an adult.
Councillor Rachael Robathan: As Councillor Gough said, this is very time consuming. As he stated, almost all of the UASC are late-teen boys, and it can be very difficult at the best of times to tell someone’s age, so it involves a huge amount of time on the part of the local authority. There is a very clear safeguarding issue, because once someone has been accepted as UAS they are put into a child setting—schools and other child settings—where there is a very clear safeguarding issue. That is something that we are all very conscious of, clearly.
The other point, as we said earlier, is that there is an ongoing responsibility to these young people, because the responsibility to support them carries on until they are 25, so if you have someone who presents as a 16-year-old, let us say, that means that you have almost 10 years during which you will support that young person. In terms of ensuring that there is the best use of public funds, which we all know are always very stretched, we need to ensure that the people coming into the system are the ones who really need that support, and who are legitimately there.
Q
Councillor Rachael Robathan: Anything that moves towards a uniform process will greatly help. At the moment, involving the local authorities and putting the responsibility on them is very difficult for what are very often stretched institutions. Having a uniform, joined-up process would be very welcome.
Councillor Roger Gough: Already when you see changes in, for instance, what the courts have found about what is a reasonable basis on which a challenge can be presented by Border Force, as we have seen recently, that has made a huge difference. The proportion of young people coming to us age disputed is significantly lower than it was before that.
When you get changes in the process, it can make a material difference. Authorities like ours are at least experienced in this area, even if we are in the eye of the storm. As dispersal happens, or when, as I mentioned earlier, those who have been placed as adults launch a challenge within their own authority, issues may arise for an authority that is not nearly as well set up to deal with them as we are.
To pick up on the point that Councillor Robathan made, it is worth emphasising what a difference going into the children’s system or the adult system makes. As we have both said, first there are children in care and then there is the care leaver process, all of which, quite properly in their own way, have particular requirements for children’s services departments in authorities. The process around adult dispersal clearly still makes demands on council services, but in the first instance it is a housing-related issue, from which a number of other things follow. It is not quite the same as building in what can be a seven, eight or 10 year process of somebody being part of the children’s services operations of the council.
Q
Councillor Roger Gough: Sorry, could you just run your last point by me again?
Q
Tony Smith: I would dispute those figures. We are probably about fifth in Europe in terms of asylum intake, but you are right that other countries have more asylum applications every year than we have. That is not necessarily because those numbers have been invited by the EU to go and live there. It is because they are unable to control their own external frontier. Because of the Schengen arrangement, asylum seekers can choose where they would like to go. Many drift north to Scandinavia, Germany, Holland or France, where they would rather be than in some of the southern or eastern European states.
The EU has its own difficulties in determining the allocation of asylum seekers across the Schengen zone because they do not agree among themselves about how they should be distributed. The bigger question is not necessarily a European one but a global one. No doubt you will hear evidence from experts on this. The need for international resettlement is a huge problem. We have seen it in Afghanistan; we have climate change; and we have migratory pressures coming up from South America to the US border. People are going to continue to move in great numbers over the next 20 or 30 years. The question is how the western world is going to cope with that.
I am quite a big fan of the refugee resettlement programme. UNHCR has been going out to western countries for some years saying, “We have 80 million people displaced, and 40 million in different countries in our camps already. These are refugees who have already fled war zones whom we would like you to take.” Even though we were taking only about 5,000 or so, we are still third highest in the world, so we are not really getting to grips with the global challenge of resettling refugees through the resettlement route. It has picked up a bit since Afghanistan, and we are doing more. There is certainly evidence that we are trying to do more, and I think we could become global leaders on refugee resettlement programmes, but it is going to be difficult politically for anyone to sell that when we are seeing uncontrolled migration across the English channel.
It is finding the balance. How can we help to contribute to genuine resettlement for genuine refugees, but at the same time take back control of our borders, which is clearly the Government’s stated intent?
Q
Tony Smith: I do think that. It is absolutely important in all this. While I would not defend the turn back strategy, I can understand why the Government are looking at those kinds of measures to stop the boats. It must be extremely frustrating not to be able to do anything about the ever-increasing numbers, particularly when a succession of Home Secretaries have come in saying that that was what they would do. A number of my successors—civil servants—have given evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, saying that they were going to make the route unviable. I am afraid it is not within their gift to make the route unviable within the current frameworks. One would hope that the new legislation would change things. It certainly changes the dynamic. We can now say, “We know that you arrived by this route. We know that you are not immediately fleeing persecution.”
I am not a big fan of the criminal justice system for migrants. It has not really worked. I am a fan of it for smugglers and facilitators, but putting migrants in prison is not necessarily going to be the answer and will lead to more challenges. The question is how we disrupt the smugglers and break that business model. The only way is to start seeing people going back to France. Then people will see that there is no point putting their life at risk in a small dinghy. There will be no point in more and more of them spreading up to Calais because that business model is broken. The big difficulty for the Government is how to persuade the French that we ought to have a policy like that and negotiate an agreement, and how to counterbalance that with the other problem of significant numbers of people around the world seeking resettlement. How are we going to contribute to responding to that?
Q
Tony Smith: Without a doubt. I support the investment of resources in France, and that is something that we have been doing for a long time now. The French could legitimately say, “Actually, why would you not help us to contribute to border security?” Let us not pretend that the French operational arms, including the police aux frontières, the douanes, the various coastal agencies—I used to talk to them regularly when I was in the job—are not supportive of preventing criminality at an operational level.
We can be quite pleased with the work that we have done to at least try to disrupt the smuggling gangs. Quite a few have been prosecuted on the French side, albeit, sadly, more the middle men rather than the big fish who are behind human smuggling gangs. You will hear from other witnesses more qualified than me to tell you about that level 3 criminality, but it is really difficult. How do we disrupt the business model? It is about deterring people from coming. We owe a duty under the 1951 refugee convention to give refugee status to those who are genuinely in need, but I am not sure that it is the same duty for those who are arriving in this way, from a fellow original signatory to that convention, than those coming through evacuation processes such as we have seen recently in Kabul.
Q
Tony Smith: We lived through this before. We had something called the new asylum model when I was in the UK Border Agency, before taking the top job in the Border Force. Previously, I was regional director for UKBA London and the south-east, which meant that my teams were the ones who were processing asylum arrivals coming into the country. I was actually responsible for removals.
Yes, we did have targets in the Home Office in those days for enforcement. It was part of my mission to ensure that those who did not qualify to stay, either because they had arrived under safe third country rules, or they were coming on a manifestly unfounded route, were sent back. The trouble is we have seen a good deal of judicial overreach by the European Court of Justice, and significant interpretations and European directives, which kind of hindered those arrangements on returns. We have now got to a point where we are not really returning anybody who is coming across on these boats, and people notice that. If we do not start returning people, the numbers will continue to rise. We need to find a way of segmenting those applicants who we know have a genuine claim for asylum in this country from those who have probably been in Europe for a long time and may have had applications for asylum rejected—they have had a notice de quitter from Schengen, sometimes two or three notices—who are not genuine asylum seekers but who would just like to come to live here. That is not effective border control.
It is going to be really, really difficult, but I applaud the authors of the Bill, because it finally gets to grips with the difficulty of the way we have interpreted the 1951 refugee convention and put up what I think is the right interpretation of it in not conflating two different arguments, which is human smuggling across the English channel by criminal gangs, putting lives at risk, and the genuine need to resettle refugees from different parts of the world.
Q
Rob Jones: We are, absolutely. We have very positive relationships with those countries. The supply of boats to northern France and of engines in the infrastructure that supports these crossings is something that those partners can help us with.
Q
Rob Jones: We know that that route is more and more attractive to organised crime. That is why we need to break the momentum that is pushing the viability of that route. People who are involved in the facilitation of migrants are also involved in drug trafficking and other serious organised crime. We have seen that polycriminality with HGV companies that will one day smuggle drugs and another day smuggle migrants.
One of the good things about these provisions is that they, to coin a phrase, level up the sentencing for people involved in the facilitation of migrants with that for those who are dealt with for drug trafficking. It cannot be right that, at the moment, if you smuggle 20 kg of class A drugs, you could face a life sentence, but if you conceal 20 people in a false floor in a lorry, which is one of the things that we encounter at the border, it is 14 years. Some of the provisions here, including the life sentence for facilitation, are a useful deterrent that we feel will help with that broader organised crime threat where some of this money is reinvested in other crimes.
Q
Rob Jones: That is another helpful element that has, we hope, a deterrent effect. Criminality linked to the western Balkans, and really determined people who will be deported and then engage in a merry-go-round using false ID cards and clandestine entry to come back to the UK to continue committing crime, is something that we need to deal with. Those provisions would be helpful in that context.
Q
Rob Jones: It is now recognised by organised crime groups as something that can generate a lot of revenue quickly. The previous witness talked about pull and push factors. The UK is a very attractive destination, and people will pay significant amounts of money—thousands of pounds—to smugglers. As we move forward with more pressure—we have seen what has played out with Afghanistan—and with more irregular migrants moving, there is the opportunity for organised crime to capitalise on that. Having a strong deterrent and being able to project our response and deal with organised crime groups upstream is really important to us, because there will be more and more pressure on the system, which inevitably will be exploited by smuggling gangs.
Q
Rob Jones: Absolutely, with the normalisation of clandestine entry, where people are allowed to hide in a crowd. When this problem began, a big day was 100. We are now looking at a big day as being over 700. Within that, you get an increased risk that people will enter the country in a truly clandestine fashion. The more that you can do to offer safe and legal routes, and to disincentivise the business model through deterrents and a range of provisions, the more effective we can be at tackling the organised crime element, because we can then concentrate on the worst groups, which pose the highest risk and will potentially be moving people with a criminal history, whom we are most concerned about.
Q
Rob Jones: There has been some progress. We have been working constantly with the social media companies to get a better response, and to ensure that their platforms are not being used to promote dangerous crossings, and there is progress. We are working in a voluntary environment. We are, in some ways, short of regulation, particularly in relation to this element, but we continue to work with those companies on a day-to-day basis to take material down. That response has improved. It is still not as good as I would like it to be, and we are working to an action plan where we have a common agreement of standards in terms of takedown and our aspiration to prevent adverse outcomes in the English channel, which is ultimately what this is all about. It has got better. It is not as good as it could be. Your point on encryption and some of the closed spaces that we cannot see that are being used to promote these crossings remains an issue for us.
Nationality and Borders Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThere are other Members who wish to ask questions, Mr McDonald. If there is time, I am happy to bring you back in. At present I have Jonathon Gullis, Paul Blomfield and Anne McLaughlin who are waiting to speak. Minister, would you like to come in now or wait?
I am happy to come in later.
Q
Jon Featonby: That is one of the reasons why we are concerned about the clause. We come from a different viewpoint in that we believe that people’s rights and entitlements should be based not on how they entered the UK, but on their protection need. People who go through the asylum system and fall into group 2 in clause 10 are people whom the UK has recognised as being in need of international protection, and they have refugee status.
We work with and have conversations with people who have been through the process. Maybe they arrived in the UK on a small boat or through some other irregular means. They tell us that these changes would not have impacted the decisions they made. It is very unlikely that people have a clear idea about what the UK’s asylum system looks like and what their entitlements will be when they are in it or when they go on to get status. Some people have very little choice in the country they end up in. They may well not have started out being involved in the smuggling networks in France. It could have been much closer to the country from which they have fled. The smugglers have much more control over where people end up.
Where somebody feels safe is subjective to the individual. There are many reasons why people in France may be unable to avail themselves of the protection system there. It might be that, because of how they were living in France, they were not aware of how they could claim asylum or the route to do that. It may be that they were treated in some way along that journey that meant they felt unable to avail themselves of protection in France. It is also important to note that the vast majority of people who do make it to France in search of protection stay in France. France receives, generally, at least three times as many asylum applications as the UK.
We do not believe that the differential treatment will deter people, and there are challenges around the differential treatment in clause 10. Stoke is absolutely one of the places in the country that we work with and pay tribute to. Abi Brown, the leader of the council, speaks very eloquently about how proud she is of the council’s role. However, clause 10 will potentially make it harder for those local authorities who support people. If people continue to come to the UK, go through the asylum process and get status and are then unable to reunite with their family members or have insecurities around the length of time they are going to get status, and, crucially, if they are unable to access public funds, that impacts on their integration prospects and ability to support themselves. That may well increase the pressures on local authorities.
Q
Jon Featonby: It should be, and it is right that it is a priority. There are too many people trying to cross the channel. It is well known that it is the busiest shipping lane in the UK. It is not said enough, but tribute should be paid to Border Force and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution because we have not seen huge numbers of lives lost, especially compared with what we have seen in the Mediterranean.
We would certainly say that although people continue to make those journeys, the primary focus should be on ensuring that people’s lives continue to be saved and that the loss of life stays relatively low. However, it comes back to the fact that we do not think the Bill will deter people from putting their lives in the hands of people smugglers or, as we are increasingly seeing, taking to small boats—relying not on people smugglers but on very small and even less seaworthy crafts.
There is no easy way to tackle the problem. There is no one simple solution. However, some of it will come down to the increased provision of safe routes. The more safe routes there are, the less likely people will need to take dangerous journeys. Something that needs to be a part of the UK’s international co-operation, and something that it can play an increasingly important role in, is making sure that people have access to protection systems outside the UK.
It comes back to the point about understanding why people make those journeys in the first place. People do not get on those boats on the French shores lightly—it is clear what the risks are going to be when they are there. Understanding what leads someone to that point is vitally important, and I am not sure that the Bill reflects what people with that lived experience would tell us. Some of that will require continued work with our European partners, in particular, to make sure that people have access to information, as well as to their protection systems, in order to look at the reasons why somebody may not have claimed asylum in France, for example.
A vital point that came up in the equality impact assessment published earlier this week is that when states such as the UK look to put in extra measures to protect their borders and asylum systems, they must ensure that does not lead to inverse reactions, which will just lead to people making more dangerous journeys. That is certainly what we have seen over the last 10 to 15 years. The harder it has been for people to make journeys when one route is cut off, the more people are generally pushed to make more dangerous journeys. We should be dealing with the root causes of why people make those decisions in the first instance.
Q
Jon Featonby: It is largely about the points I have just raised. The explanatory notes to the Bill talk about breaking the business model, and absolutely there are the enforcement procedures regarding the people smugglers themselves. We agree that that should continue to be a priority. However, we need to look at why people turn to people smugglers, and that is because of a lack of other alternatives, whether that is accessing protection systems or those other safe routes.
Q
Jon Featonby: That is a very good point. We believe that the modern slavery response needs not only to provide protection for people coming out of situations of exploitation, but to enable those people to take part in prosecutions to tackle people who are exploiting others, whether in the UK or abroad.
The challenges that we see people quite often face are, first, at times a lack of trust in the police or whoever else it might be, but also—probably more importantly and more pertinent to the Bill—a lack of security about their immigration status. The people we work with, who predominantly do not have a secure immigration status in the UK, are thinking about where they are going to sleep that night, and how they are going to feed themselves and their family, rather than how they are going to help the police through this, or potentially how they will have to recount quite traumatic experiences to support those prosecutions.
That is why we support the measures in the Bill to try to give more people secure immigration status. We think that will make a big difference, but we absolutely encourage the Government to go slightly further to ensure that more people can avail themselves of that protection, which would have a beneficial impact on prosecutions as well.
Q
Jon Featonby: Potentially. Some of it depends on how it is implemented. We would probably like to see some changes to that provision. I touched earlier on the work that the Red Cross does at reception centres to support people when they first leave those situations of exploitation. At that point, people come out, they are in these centres, the Red Cross may well be there, but it is probably the police, local authorities and increasingly immigration enforcement. There are very few opportunities for people to get legal advice at that point around what the NRM entails for them.
The provisions in the Bill on legal aid are welcome, but they are only for those people who have ongoing protection claims. Most people who come out of those situations of exploitation will not necessarily have an ongoing asylum claim. We would welcome the broadening of the provisions in the Bill to make sure that it covers everybody who may be thinking about entering the NRM, so that they are able to get legal advice, whether or not they have an ongoing human rights or asylum claim alongside it.
Thank you. This will have to be one final question from Mr Anderson and one final answer.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Third sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am sorry. I said that had to be the last question. I have to try and get everybody in and there are a lot of Members. Minister.
Q
Your Excellency, looking back in the Australian context, is it reasonable to think, that if you had stood back and done nothing about this challenge the numbers of people crossing or seeking to cross would have increased, and on less seaworthy vessels?
George Brandis: I think that is an absolutely fair inference to draw, because in the years prior to the introduction of the policy, which was in September 2013, the numbers had escalated, so every year there were more than in the previous year. It almost inevitably follows, given that nothing else would have changed, that the number of those vessels that did not make it and the number of passengers who drowned would have escalated, too.
Q
George Brandis: Well, as I have already said in my evidence, there were three legs, or three elements, to this policy and all of them were essential to it. I do not think you can disaggregate one from another.
Q
George Brandis: It is very difficult to answer that question in a general way. The people-smuggling gangs who were the authors and beneficiaries of this activity were located in Indonesia, primarily. That is not to say that they may not have had connections in Australia, but they were primarily groups that operated within Indonesia, and there were many of them. I am not in a position to generalise from that proposition to what extent they had connections in other countries, including Australia.
Q
George Brandis: As is evident from the statistics I quoted before, we accept an unusually large number of humanitarian and refugee immigration applications for a country of our size. We have an ambitious humanitarian and refugee programme, and we seek to process those applications swiftly and efficiently, but we do say, “You’ve got to come in the front door, and not put yourself in the hands of criminals and put yourself and your children at risk of drowning.”
Q
George Brandis: There were logistical challenges, particularly the turn-back operations. It was very challenging for the maritime authorities to do that while at the same time ensuring that nobody’s safety was put at risk. That was one dimension to this, but it is a bit of a different problem because, as one of your colleagues pointed out, here these people come by dinghy. Almost all the people who were trying to come to Australia were coming in decrepit old timber fishing boats, which were much more fragile. That was the difference.
I am not here to instruct or encourage your Parliament on the right policy choice; I am merely here to respond to the questions you have asked me about how a particular set of measures worked for Australia. I have already observed that there are differences as well as similarities in the profile of the problems. However, I would say that undoubtedly the key to this is to put the people smugglers out of business. The way to put the people smugglers out of business is to demonstrate to their potential clientele that they are wasting their money. The way we did that in Australia, and it was a robust policy, was to persuade the potential clientele that, if they came in through the front door as genuine refugees, they would be embraced; but, if they put themselves in the hands of people smugglers, there was no way they would ever end up in Australia.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
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(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: I will. One of the important elements is that if you have a system, there have to be consequences to that system. It does not make any sense to have a system that determines who is a refugee and who is not, and then the results go nowhere. I know that it is difficult to arrange for returns—there are a number of issues and they need a great deal of partnerships internationally—but it is a fact that if somebody is properly looked at in a proper procedure and then found not in need of international protection, it is a lot easier if that happens closer to the time than after a few years, when they have had time to establish a family and when perhaps the whole question of identification is getting a little more vague. It is a fact that good case management increases the chances of people returning, and it increases the chances of people returning voluntarily, too.
Q
Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Granted, you will never have a silver bullet that solves all of your issues until and unless people no longer feel the need to seek asylum elsewhere. However, as I said, I think that a fast and fair procedure is your best defence, alongside strong agreements with the European Union on the allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers. That is by far the best way of dissuading people who might sometimes be hopping around countries to choose a jurisdiction or who are just giving it a shot—people whom your colleague referred to as illegal immigrants. There are some who could masquerade as asylum seekers; there is no question about that.
Order. I am sorry, but that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Siobhán Mullally and Dame Sara Thornton gave evidence.
Thank you. Ms Mullally?
Siobhán Mullally: The state has very specific obligations to protect victims and potential victims of trafficking, and there are very specific provisions under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with regard to missing children, whether those are foreign nationals or not. Internal trafficking is a very serious concern that is often not recognised sufficiently in many jurisdictions, not exclusively the United Kingdom.
A concern was raised previously by the Council of Europe group of experts on action against trafficking, the treaty monitoring body under the convention on action against trafficking, about children going missing in the UK—particularly unaccompanied, separated asylum-seeking children, but also child victims of trafficking internally. Of course, there are very serious obligations on the state to provide protection to all children without discrimination.
One concern with regard to the trafficking context can be that sometimes the child victims and adult victims go outside of the ordinary protection mechanisms and are not treated with the same urgency that they ought to be, but there are very specific obligations on the state to try to respond effectively and in a timely way to prevent that, and to ensure protection.
Q
Dame Sara Thornton: Thank you, Minister, and I very much welcome the new staff who are being recruited into the single competent authority, because I have raised the need to speed up decision making with your predecessors on many occasions.
The biggest cause of difficulty, I think, is the increased numbers. Although 2020 was similar to 2019, with about 10,600 referrals into the NRM, that number has doubled in three or four years, so there is substantial pressure. The other thing that is happening, as I mentioned earlier on, is child criminal exploitation and the cases of children. Those decisions need to be made quickly, because there are often related proceedings. Having been to the single competent authority and spoken to the staff, what tends to happen is that all those priorities keep going to the top of the pile and then there are an awful lot of cases in the backlog. On the whole, it has been about increased demand, and the resources just have not been able to keep up with it. So I welcome the fact that there are new staff. It will take a while for them to be trained and to be competent, but that is a good thing.
The second thing, which is identified in a report I published last year, is that one of the difficulties for the decision makers in that competent authority is that they do not always have all the information. They have some information, but they are often having to make decisions on partial information. They might have asked local authorities, they might have asked police forces or they might have asked Border Force. They do not always get the replies and therefore they are having to do the best in difficult circumstances. Staff have been under huge pressure and I hope we can begin to bring those averages down and bring the weight down.
Q
Dame Sara Thornton: There are difficulties. Colleagues might be aware that the process is that you have first responders, who are police officers, members of Border Force, immigration enforcement and local authority staff, who have the ability to refer a potential victim into the national referral mechanism. One of the difficulties, and it is constantly reported on, is that the staff who are doing that do not understand how the national referral mechanism works. They do not understand enough to give good advice. So report after report recommends that there needs to be more training of first responders, and the Home Office recently published some more training.
I am getting to the position now where I wonder whether it is a sensible to expect that every police officer should be able to deal with this—every member of Border Force, every member of a local authority—and whether you might want to have specially trained points of contact who deal with it. If you think about it, even though the numbers have been going up, most police officers in the course of a year will never deal with these situations. I do think there is an issue about that, and we need to think very seriously about the model we have for first responders.
Q
Dame Sara Thornton: I think that people who smuggle fellow human beings, or indeed traffic them, are committing a most heinous crime. Think about the 39 people who lost their lives in Essex two years ago. Whether they were smuggled or trafficked is a matter much debated, but the callous way that those criminals treated those victims, in my view, needs the harshest punishment. The only thing I would say is that, as a former police officer, I am on the whole in favour of harsh punishments, but you have life sentence as an option from the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for slavery and trafficking. It has never been used. So there is the point that, I guess, it has a deterrent effect, but there is also an issue about whether, if those powers exist, they really need to be used to be a really effective deterrent.
I see no further questioners. I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Lisa Doyle, Mariam Kemple-Hardy, Priscilla Dudhia and Alphonsine Kabagabo gave evidence.
Q
Adrian Berry: I do not think it provides clarity to take away the ability to properly prepare a protection claim. What you need are proper resources and proper funding in order for that claim to be properly advanced, and then you need a robust determination mechanism to assess it. The difficulties relate to gathering evidence, taking witness statements from people who have been traumatised in their home country and traumatised by their journey, and obtaining other evidence in terms of other witnesses of fact and expert evidence in a case. These things take a little bit of time, and the existing procedure creaks even without accelerating the procedures. So long as people are treated with dignity and the resources are available, determinations will be made that are good and do not require challenge. That alone would foreshorten the procedure.
Q
Adrian Berry: Foreign national offenders are a completely separate issue. We are talking about asylum, and the Bill is focused on protection claims in the section that we are concerned with. It is very important not to confuse foreign national offenders with people who are claiming asylum.
To be clear, I am talking about the Bill as a whole.
Adrian Berry: Yes, and the Bill as a whole contains provisions on asylum, not extra removal provisions, so I was talking about the Bill as a whole as well. You already have everything you need. We are almost returning to the stage where immigration Bills happen every couple of years, attempting to address problems that had apparently been solved by earlier immigration Bills. The Home Office has a vast array of powers at its disposal. What is needed is that it properly uses them.
Are there any other questions? Mr McDonald, I stopped you on a question. Would you like to carry on?
Q
Patricia Cabral: I think that would be preferable, given that we have got a review of the whole of the modern slavery strategy. What we do not want to risk is the progress that has been made, and the good provisions that have been made, through the UK’s modern slavery strategy, potentially getting rolled back. That is the big concern. What we should be doing is improving things. I would support looking at the provisions around modern slavery and trafficking as safeguarding matters, rather than immigration matters. Obviously, there are enforcement matters related, but there is confusion. I draw the Committee’s attention to the Government’s 2014 review, by Jeremy Oppenheim, which led to revisions of the national referral mechanism to separate immigration decisions from matters of modern slavery. The provisions in part 4 are rolling that back quite considerably.
Q
Adrian Berry: I do not know whether the other witnesses have had experience of age assessment trials—I have. This Committee cannot scrutinise that clause in the Bill, because all you have put in it is a placeholder clause, with the detail said to be coming later on. We are not in a position to scrutinise it, and I cannot tell you what it says, because you had not finished the Bill before publishing.
Age assessment trials are trials; although they take place within a judicial review context, they are full trials with witnesses, and over time the courts have developed a system for case managing those trials. The difficulties that arise would arise in any context. In other words, it is very difficult to tell how old someone is. It is a process that requires expert evidence and the gathering of timelines and the chronologies of people’s journeys, and their explanations. That would take time in any context. Until we see the detail of what you propose, the age assessment provision simply cannot be assessed. We hope you bring forward the actual clause by Report.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI will be brief and echo what my hon. Friend has said. I welcome the Minister to his place and wish him well although I am sorry to say not with this Bill. I thank all the multiple organisations that are concerned by the Bill and supported the moves to make the changes that need to be made.
It might be a moot point but, as my hon. Friend said about amendments 29 and 84, we do not want to be in a situation in which parents are treated equally badly. I suspect that that is not what the clause is about and I hope that the Minister will say that it is fine and we will accept that. However, it is important that we acknowledge that mothers were treated unequally and wrongly. That is because, throughout the centuries, women have been treated systemically badly. Yes, of course things have improved—and this is an improvement—but we have to acknowledge it whenever there has been systemic bias against any group of people, and in this case we are talking about women and mothers. I do not think any member of the Committee would disagree that what has happened is extremely unfair but we must acknowledge it so that we can move forward. Acknowledging a problem draws attention to it. Let us not pretend that we have equality of the sexes and genders. We do not. Every time that that is acknowledged it enables us to move forward and think of other situations in which there is inequality.
We have helpfully been provided with photos of members of the Committee and been given their constituency names but when I saw the photo of the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby, I thought he was the right hon. Member for Con, Scarborough and Whitby. I thought, “Where is ‘Con’?” until I realised that it referred to the fact that he is a Conservative. I am learning something new every day.
The right hon. Gentleman was factually correct to say that it is easier for mothers rather than fathers to prove their parentage. That is why I wonder why on earth it was so difficult for women to pass on their nationality to their children. There is no question who the mother is in such cases. I hope the Minister will say that he will change the language to refer to mothers and that the Government will acknowledge the inequalities between men and women and mothers and fathers. Treating parents equally should not mean that they are treated equally badly. I suspect that he does not want to do that and I support most of the provisions in this part of the Bill. That is probably the last time I shall say that today.
I start by thanking Opposition colleagues for their warm welcome to me in my new role. It is welcome that, in the early provisions of the Bill, there is broad agreement across the Committee about the need to correct the injustices and to put things right.
I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, for Halifax, for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for tabling amendments 29 and 84. They both refer to clause 1, which I am pleased to introduce because it corrects a long-standing anomaly in British nationality law. I appreciate hon. Members’ attention to detail in seeking to make sure that the new provision is clear and in line with the parallel provision in the British Nationality Act 1981 for the children of British citizen mothers. However, I do not think an amendment is needed, as the proposed wording here achieves what is intended. In saying that this provision applies to someone who would have been a citizen had their parents been treated equally, we are talking about a situation where the law applied equally to mothers or fathers, women or men.
The term “parents” is consistent with the wording used in section 23 of the 1981 Act, which determined which citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies became British dependent territories citizens on commencement. One of the three conditions that a person needs to meet to qualify for registration under this clause is that they would have become a British dependent territories citizen under section 23(1)(b) or (c) of that Act. That section refers to a person’s “parent”.
I wish to point out that we will further clarify the points that have been made in the underpinning guidance. I trust that will afford greater comfort because it is clear that the Bill is technical, so plain language will be used in the guidance itself to achieve what members of the Committee seek to achieve.
I, too, congratulate the Minister on his new role. If the Minister is saying that this may require further explanation in the guidance, will he agree to review it in more depth before the Bill reaches the Lords if organisations are able to present examples of case studies where the current wording may not meet the Government’s intent?
I will of course be delighted to receive any such examples. I genuinely think that, as with so many cases of immigration law, the underpinning guidance plays an important role in making it clear, in plain English that people can understand, precisely what various aspects of the law entail. I am satisfied with the current wording of the clause.
I understand what the Minister says about the wording doing a job in statute, but will he say whether he thinks that the wording used has any implications for British citizenship as opposed to British overseas territories citizenship? Was a problem with the wording recognised and is that the reason why it was not copied across? Or is this Bill a wee bit different and therefore uses different wording?
The short answer, based on my understanding, is no. The connected provision in the Act talks about parents and not the mother and the father, so that is why we think this is the appropriate route to take for BOTCs. I am satisfied that the current wording does what is required so I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.
I have heard what the Minister has said, but we could avoid going down the path of seeking to clarify the current wording if the same wording that was used in the 1981 Act were used here. We do not see what the problem would be. If the wording in the 1981 Act is adequate, why not just repeat it in the Bill? It would provide clarity and stop problems occurring in the future. Our belief is that everyone should be treated equally, and we should not have a separation, which the amendment tries to correct, between British overseas territory citizens and British citizens. Regrettably, we will press the amendment to a vote.
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for tabling amendments 8 to 12 and new clause 16, which provides the Committee with the opportunity to consider fees charged in respect of applications for British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship.
Before I address the specific points in the proposed new measures, I want to provide some background information. Application fees for immigration and nationality applications have been charged for a number of years under powers set out under clause 68 of the Immigration Act 2014, and they play a vital role in our country’s ability to run a sustainable system, reducing the burden on taxpayers. Sitting beneath the 2014 Act are fees orders and fees regulations, which are scrutinised by both Houses before they come into effect; that is an important point. That ensures that there are checks and balances within the system and maintains the coherence of the fees framework. If we were to remove those fees during the passage of the Bill, as the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark suggests, it would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of the sustainability and fairness to the UK taxpayer.
I will, although I know that you wanted us to make good progress, Sir Roger.
I want to comment on the point about the burden on taxpayers. First, there is a very significant profit margin—86% profit for some of the processes of the Home Office—so there is no burden there. Secondly, it is quite offensive language to those that are living, working and paying tax here to say that they are a burden, even though they are already contributing economically through national insurance and tax contributions. I find the language unhealthy.
Order. The Minister has indicated that we want to make progress, and that is true, but the Minister must not feel under any pressure not to respond to points that have been raised. This is a very important part of the Bill, so please, as a new Minister, feel able to take your time if you need to do so.
Thank you, Sir Roger. I appreciate that. I also appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s strength of feeling on this matter. I was Parliamentary Private Secretary, several years ago, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby who was Immigration Minister, and I learned a lot from him. He got to the nub of the issue of fees. The truth is that there is a level of fee that is set. There is constant parliamentary scrutiny of those fees, as I have described. There is a level of cost associated with that. Any fee level that is incurred over and above that is actually invested into the wider nationality and borders system and helps to pay for the services that are provided.
The Minister refers to the contribution of the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby. That was a challenge to give a commitment that fees should not be set at a level that does other than reflect cost. I hope the Minister will take advantage of that opportunity. As he is beginning to develop his argument, he is suggesting that fees are set at a higher level in order to reinvest in the Home Office. That is what other people have described and The Times reported in 2019 as profit of quite significant proportion.
I will gladly take away the Committee’s feedback on fees. As I have said, fees are kept under constant review and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I have no doubt that members of the Committee, and indeed Members across the House, will want to scrutinise any fees orders and fees regulations that are brought forward, express views on them and, as they see fit, either support them or take issue with them.
To return to the focus of the amendments and the clause, removing these fees during the passage of the Bill would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of sustainability and fairness for the UK taxpayer. It would also reduce clarity in the fees structure by creating an alternative mechanism for controlling fees.
Beginning with amendments 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British overseas territories citizenship, I can reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that I am sympathetic to the view that a fee should not be charged in cases where a person missed out on becoming a British citizen automatically due to historical anomalies. The provisions in the Bill are about righting historical wrongs, and I can give the Committee my assurance that we will look carefully at where fees should be waived via the fees regulations. However, as I have outlined, that is not a matter for this Bill and it should be remedied through secondary legislation, in line with other changes to immigration and nationality fees.
My understanding, from the briefing I was given at the weekend, is that in July the Home Office sent a letter to nationality experts stating that the intention was not to charge a fee, but the Minister seems to be saying something different; that there will be fee waivers, rather than no fees at all. We are talking about historical injustices here, so can he be a little more clear? Is the intention not to charge a fee for the applications to which amendments 8 to 11 refer?
The hon. Member is always on point in asking pertinent questions. I reiterate the point that the Home Office tends not to charge fees in instances where unfairness or injustice have occurred, and it remains our intention to continue to adopt that approach in relation to the provisions that we are enacting through the Bill. I hope that gives him the reassurance he is seeking.
I thank the Minister for giving way. Yesterday we saw Parliament at its finest, and I genuinely think that he is a decent man, but what he is saying today is not what was indicated previously and it does not address what the Court of Appeal has required the Home Office to do. If he is saying that there will be secondary legislation at some point, when is it coming, because we have an opportunity here to address the issue? The Court of Appeal found that the Home Office had failed to assess the best interests of children in setting the fee. To fail to do so again in this legislation will have only one outcome, which is the Government being back in court.
Also, I forgot to mention the case that I was speaking about earlier, so for reference it is R (The Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
I thank the hon. Member for that further intervention. Let me just set out the position on the point about child citizenship fees that he raises. I understand the concerns expressed about child citizenship fees. However, this is currently subject to legal challenge in the Supreme Court and the position will be reviewed after the judgments have been received.
So when the Government said in February that the issue was being reviewed, was it not being reviewed then? It is extraordinary that many months down the line the Minister is telling us that there will be a review only if they lose the case in the Supreme Court, which will incur further costs of millions of pounds for the taxpayer simply to go through the legal process.
The hon. Member would be surprised if we did not want to review the situation and take into account fully the judgment of the Supreme Court in due course. I think that it is entirely proper that we take a view on this and that the situation should be reviewed in the light of any judicial ruling handed down. This exchange has been very useful, as it has allowed me to address many of the points that I would have picked up at the end of my remarks.
I turn now to subsection (1) of new clause 16, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship to the cost to the Secretary of State of processing the application. As I have already outlined, imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill.
Subsection (2) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to register as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen if the child is being looked after by a local authority. It is important to remember that any child, irrespective of nationality, who is looked after by their local authority can apply for both limited and indefinite leave to remain without being required to pay application fees.
The Minister is being generous with his time, but I regret that the Home Office appears to have dusted down the same old briefing and he is making the same points that have been made before. He cannot possibly argue that limited leave is some sort of alternative to British citizenship. None of us would accept that; why should these kids?
We would argue that the provision ensures no child in local authority care is unable to access leave. We remain of the view that citizenship is not necessary for any individual to work, live, study or access services within the UK. Subsection (3) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen that the child or the child’s parent, guardian or carer is unable to afford. That raises similar points to subsection (1) in that imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill. Subsection (4) would require the Secretary of State to take steps to raise awareness of rights under the British Nationality Act 1981.
I have a quick question on the fee waiver. Why is registration for citizenship just about the only thing where there is no fee waiver scheme at all? There is a fee waiver sometimes for the 10-year route to settlement—as ludicrous a system as that is. Why is there no fee waiver system at all even for folk who cannot remotely afford that?
I am conscious that I want to get through my remarks on this. I will write to the hon. Member on that point.
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. Perhaps he will be able to tell us how many applications for a fee waiver were denied by the Home Office in each of the last few years, or perhaps he could furnish us with that detail in another way. My understanding is that it is about 90%.
Again, I do not have the figure to hand, but I will happily take that away and see if I can provide him with a written answer on that point. Information about becoming a British citizen is made available in published guidance on gov.uk and we are committed to ensuring information of this nature is fully accessible for all. I am conscious that we have had quite an extensive debate around fees in general, but I hope what I have said around the provisions in the Bill and the Government’s intentions for handling fees in relation to the nationality measures we are seeking to enact gives comfort to the Committee, and that the hon. Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.
I am grateful to all Members for taking part and the Minister for his response. There have been two separate issues. First, on the new registration provision in the Bill, he has provided some assurance that because it is correcting historic injustices the broad intention will be hopefully to avoid a fee. We will hold the Government to that and watch very carefully.
I hear what the Minister says about the fact there is a system of statutory instruments being laid—we all come here and say our piece and then the Government sets a fee pretty much regardless. In theory, that is fine. However, the lesson we learned about the citizenship registration of kids is that in 1981 the then Government and Parliament as a whole made it absolutely clear that profits should not be made on that registration, and that was fine for 20 or 25 years. But then along came successive Governments that decided to ramp it up.
On a principle as fundamental as this, I still think there is a strong case for putting it in the Bill. If a new Government want to change the approach in the future, they can do so, but they will first have to introduce primary legislation to do that. I do insist on amendment 8. I will insist even more strongly on new clause 16.
The hon. Gentleman asked specifically about fee waivers in relation to nationality, and I have just reflected on that point. My understanding is that, for most people, nationality is a choice and is not needed specifically to live in the UK. That is why we do not tend to offer fee waivers, typically, unless it is to correct a historical injustice. I just wanted to make that point clear.
I have some remarks, which I will try and keep as brief as possible. As outlined in the Committee, opening clauses 1 to 5 seek to close the important loopholes in British nationality law. As we have already heard, British nationality law has discriminated against women and that will be corrected by clause 1 and the Opposition amendments. Clause 2 deals with children born out of wedlock, who have been prevented from deriving nationality from a British father if unmarried. That is another historical injustice and I am glad it is being considered in the Bill.
As Committee members know, before 1 July 2006, children born to British unmarried fathers could not acquire British nationality through their father. Registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify that issue for the children of British citizens through sections 4E and 4I of the British Nationality Act 1981, but that was not changed for children of British overseas territory citizens. Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the impact of the inconsistency: a child has no control over its parents’ choices, yet British overseas territories children, now adults, have been discriminated against because their parents were unmarried. Due to a loophole in British nationality law, those children would not automatically acquire British overseas territory citizenship as the law failed to provide unmarried fathers with the ability to transmit citizenship. Therefore, through no fault of their own and without knowing why, that group of British overseas territories children did not acquire rights as British overseas territories citizens—rights they deserved and should have been entitled to, including, for example, holding a British passport or gaining consular assistance from the UK.
As we know, injustices that relate to nationality and citizenship span generations, and it is right the Government seek through clause 2 to correct the historical inability of unmarried fathers to transmit citizenship. The clause will insert new sections 17B and 17G to the British Nationality Act to provide for registration as British overseas territories citizens for persons born before 1 July 2006 to British overseas territories citizen fathers, where the parents were unmarried at the time of their birth. The provisions provide an entitlement to be registered for those who would have become British overseas territories citizens automatically had their parents been married at the time of their birth and for those who would currently have an entitlement to registration were it not for the fact that their parents were not married at the time of their birth. As the clause creates a registration route for the adult children of unmarried British overseas territories citizen fathers to acquire British overseas territories citizenship, the Opposition welcome and support clause 2. It shows that the adults who have slipped through the cracks in UK nationality law over many years are no longer punished and, instead, are finally placed on an equal footing with mainland UK children born under the same circumstances.
Following clause 1, this clause also seeks to rectify a historical anomaly in British nationality law for people who would have become British overseas territories citizens. The purpose of the clause is to insert a new registration provision for people who, first, would have become BOTCs automatically had their parents been married and, secondly, would currently have an entitlement to registration as a BOTC but for the fact that their parents are not married. That has long been awaited. We are aware of people who would have become British had their parents been married and see citizenship as their birthright.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThere may be a vote in the Chamber this afternoon. If there is a Division, we will suspend for 15 minutes.
Clause 2
Historical inability of unmarried fathers to transmit citizenship
Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I will continue my remarks from the point at which I left off. One of the general criteria is that the person has not previously been a British overseas territories citizen. The registration provisions are intended to cover those who missed out on becoming a citizen by virtue of the fact that their parents were not married; they will not benefit those who acquired BOTC status in some other way and subsequently renounced or were deprived of that status.
The provisions created by this clause are detailed, as we need to cater for changes over time to British nationality legislation. It may help if I summarise who is covered by each provision. Proposed new section 17C of the British Nationality Act 1981 will apply to those who would have been entitled to be registered as a BOTC under the 1981 Act if their mother had been married to their natural father at the time of their birth. It allows the Home Secretary to waive the need for parental consent where that would normally be required. A good character requirement must be met if there is one for the provision that the person could have applied under had their parents been married.
Proposed new section 17D of the 1981 Act will apply to those who would automatically have become a British dependent territories citizen or BOTC at birth under the 1981 Act had their mother been married to their natural father at the time of their birth. Both parents must consent to a child under 18 making an application for registration, but this requirement can be waived where one parent has died, or in special circumstances.
Proposed new section 17E is for those who were citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies immediately before the 1981 Act came into force, and who would automatically have become a British dependent territories citizen, and then a BOTC under the 1981 Act, had their mother been married to their natural father at the time of their birth.
Proposed new section 17F covers three groups. The first is those who were British subjects or citizens of the UK and colonies by virtue of birth in a former colony, and who would not have lost that status on that country’s independence if their parents had been married. The second group is those who were British subjects before 1 January 1949 and would have become citizens of the UK and colonies on that date if their parents had been married. This would affect, for example, a person born in Canada whose father was born in Bermuda, and who would have become a citizen of the UK and colonies by descent if their parents were married. The third group are those who did not acquire British subject status, or citizenship of the UK and colonies, but who would have done if their parents were married. For example, this would affect a person born in the USA to a father born in Montserrat.
Clause 2 also sets out when a person registered under these provisions will acquire BOTC by descent or otherwise than by descent. A person who holds that status by descent will not normally be able to pass it on to a child born outside the territories. Our intention here is to give the person the status they would have received had their parents been married. Home Office officials are working with territories to develop the process for these applications. As was the case with clause 1, we think that registration is the right route, rather than automatic acquisition, to allow people to make a conscious choice about acquiring British nationality.
If a married couple has a child, the assumption is made that the man is the biological father, even though anyone who has seen “The Jeremy Kyle Show” will know that that is not always the case. If a couple is living together when a child is born, will DNA evidence be required in some or any cases, or will it be assumed that the man is the biological father?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that question. I will take it away and write to him on that point.
As I mentioned in relation to clause 1, we will also create a route for people who become BOTCs to additionally become British citizens.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Sections 1 and 2: related British citizenship
I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 3, page 8, line 17, leave out “under this section” and insert “on an application under subsection (1)(a)”.
This amendment means that the requirement in s.4K(3), that a person is registered as a BOTC, only applies to applications under subsection (1)(a). It is not needed for applications under subsection (1)(b), which are made by persons who are already BOTCs, and as previously drafted could have prevented registration of persons naturalised as BOTCs rather than registered.
The amendment remedies a drafting issue. The clause as a whole creates a route to register as a British citizen for people who have registered as a British overseas territories citizen under the new routes introduced by clauses 1 and 2. The British Overseas Territories Act 2002 made BOTCs British citizens as well, so it is right that we allow those who missed out on British overseas territories citizenship to become British citizens as well. However, we also want to cover those who have already taken steps to become a British overseas territories citizen, such as through registration or naturalisation in a territory. The amendment introduces the wording of section 4K(3). As that section is currently worded, it means that only those who have been registered as a BOTC can register as British citizens using this clause. The amendment will mean that people who have naturalised as a BOTC will also qualify.
More broadly, on clause stand part, this is an important change aimed at giving British citizenship to those who become British overseas territories citizens under the provisions introduced by clauses 1 and 2. As we have heard, two groups missed out on becoming BOTCs because of anomalies in British nationality law: people born to BOTC mothers before 1983, and people born to unmarried fathers before 1 July 2006. Clauses 1 and 2 will correct this, giving them the opportunity to acquire the BOTC status that they should have had.
We also recognise, however, that changes to the law in 2002 mean that they should also have become British citizens. Under the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, on 21 May 2002 all British overseas territories citizens who had that citizenship by connection with a “qualifying territory” became British citizens. For children born in a qualifying territory after 21 May 2002, British citizenship is acquired automatically if either parent is a British citizen or settled in that territory. This means that this group have missed out on both BOTC and British citizenship, so we need to create a route for them to acquire both.
We recognise that some people who did not become BOTCs automatically may have already taken steps to acquire that status by applying for registration or naturalisation in a territory. Some may also have applied to become a British citizen under existing provisions, but for those who did not, this clause allows a person who would have become a British citizen, had women and unmarried fathers been able to pass on status at the time of their birth, to register as a British citizen if they are now a BOTC.
Home Office officials are working with territories to develop the process for these applications, including in respect of whether this can be a done as a “one-stop” approach, with a person being able to apply for BOTC and then also opt in to apply to be a British citizen at the same time.
We regularly receive representations on this issue, from individuals and governors, and so understand the strength of feeling. We are aware of families where cousins have different statuses because women and men could not pass on citizenship in the same way, or because a child’s parents did not marry. Those in this position understandably feel that they have been unfairly prevented from holding a status that they should have acquired by birth. It is therefore important that we make this change, and I commend clause 3 to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh.
Opposition Members will not oppose amendment 59, and I will speak primarily to clause 3 stand part. The clause refers to the creation of the new statutory entitlement for British overseas territories citizens who have been affected by the injustices that we have heard about this morning in relation to clauses 1 and 2 to become citizens by registration. While all those with BOTC status additionally became British citizens in 2002, by virtue of section 3 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, we know of the loopholes that have existed due to the fact that women could not pass on citizenship, or because their parents were not married, and as a result many were unable to become British citizens under the 2002 Act. I am pleased that the Government are committing to new routes for adult children of British Overseas Territories Citizen parents to be registered as BOTCs and, in turn, as British citizens.
Clauses 1 to 3 would benefit people born to BOTC mothers and BOTC unmarried fathers who could not pass on citizenship to their child due to nationality laws at the time of the child’s birth, which, as we have heard this morning, is deeply unfair and is rightly being addressed in this legislation. Clause 3 creates a route to becoming a British citizen for people who registered as a BOTC under the new routes introduced by clauses 1 and 2.
However, we must also discuss the implementation of clauses 1 to 3. Accessibility is all-important and while we welcome the changes made to British nationality law outlined earlier today, I have concerns about rights being inaccessible, which we have seen time and again in the UK, with devastating consequences. If we take perhaps the clearest and most heartbreaking example of the Windrush scandal—one of the most shocking and contemptible episodes in the UK Government’s history—I am sure colleagues across the Committee will agree that the Windrush generation were treated shamefully after a lifetime of working hard, paying their taxes, bringing up their families and contributing to our society. They were left facing uncertainty about their legal status in the UK and lost access to their homes, jobs and healthcare, through no fault of their own.
As last year’s “Windrush Lessons Learned Review” highlights, changes made to British nationality law in the 1980s
“progressively impinged on the rights and status of the Windrush generation and their children without many of them realising it.”
Therefore, to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the rights that are to be established for British overseas territories citizenship must be accessible. The Home Office must provide assurances as to when and how these rights will be made public and widely publicised for those affected. I make the point around accessibility now as we discuss clause 3, and I hope we can return to it later on, as I believe it is very important.
Overall, the Opposition none the less support clause 3 as it provides the framework to tidy up inconsistencies in British nationality law and acknowledges those who have suffered under UK law due to loopholes outlined in clauses 1 and 2.
Amendment 59 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 10, in clause 3, page 8, line 18, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee for British citizenship applications by certain British overseas territories citizens.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Question negatived.
Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Period for registration of person born outside the British overseas territories
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We have been clear that the nationality provisions within the Bill seek to tackle historical unfairness and inequality in British nationality law. As with earlier clauses, this legislation gives us the opportunity to amend provisions for British overseas territories citizens to mirror the comparable requirements already in place for British citizens.
Section 17(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 provides a registration route for a child whose parent is a BOTC by descent where that parent had been in a territory for a continuous period of three years at some point before the child’s birth. At present, an application to register a child under this route must be made within 12 months of the child’s birth. However, the parallel provision for British citizens, section 3(2) of the 1981 Act, was amended in 2010, replacing the requirement for an application to register a child to be made within 12 months of the child’s birth, with a requirement for the application to be made while the child is a minor.
Clause 4 seeks to amend the BOTC registration route in the same way. Rather than requiring applications to be lodged within 12 months of the birth, the clause would allow an application to be made at any time before the child’s 18th birthday. Consequently, the provision for the Secretary of State to exercise discretion to extend the registration period from 12 months to six years in section 17(4) will be removed as it is no longer needed.
Entitlement remains limited to children with a particular parental and residential connection to the relevant territory. In line with the British citizenship route, we do not propose extending the route to adults. Other adults seeking to become BOTCs, such as by naturalisation, must demonstrate a personal connection with the territory and cannot rely merely on the residence of their parents, and we want to ensure that this amendment remains consistent with other existing provisions. The aim is to ensure fairness across British nationality law, not to create further discrepancies. Clause 4 will bring the provisions for BOTCs in line with those already in place for British citizens.
Clause 4 also refers to an additional aspect necessary to align British citizenship and British overseas territory citizenship. The clause removes a requirement that applications for registering a child as a BOTC must be made within 12 months of birth, amending section 17(2) of the 1981 Act. As the Committee will know, section 17(2) provides a registration route for a child whose parent is a BOTC by descent and had been in a territory for a continuous period of three years at some point before the child’s birth. At present, an application under this route must be made within 12 months of the child’s birth; however, the same provision for British citizens was extended throughout childhood with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, which replaced the requirement for the application to be made within 12 months of the child’s birth with a requirement for the application to be made while the child is a minor.
Clause 4 amends the BOTC registration route in the same way, so the same extension from within 12 months of the child’s birth to throughout childhood is applied to BOTCs. The Opposition support this clause and would be interested to know how many people will be affected once clauses 1 to 4 have been implemented.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Disapplication of historical registration requirements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This clause seeks to amend British nationality law to remove historical registration requirements and to reflect recent case law. As we have already heard, before 1983 women were unable to pass on British citizenship, and before 1 July 2006 unmarried fathers were unable to pass on citizenship. Under the previous legislation, the British Nationality Act 1948, citizenship could normally only be passed on to one generation of children born outside of the UK and colonies.
However, section 5(1)(b) of the 1948 Act permitted transmission through a father to a further generation if the child was born in a foreign country and their birth was registered within a year at a British consulate. The period could be extended at the Secretary of State’s discretion. An example of this might be where the child’s grandfather was born in the UK and their father was born in the United States of America: the child’s birth could be registered at the British consulate in the United States and they would have become a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies as a result. However, a British mother or unmarried British father could not register their child’s birth at a consulate, because they were unable to pass on citizenship at that time.
There are already measures in place for people to register as a British citizen if they would have been able to acquire that status automatically if women and unmarried fathers had been able to pass on citizenship under the 1948 Act. This clause means that a person will not be prevented from registering under those provisions if the only reason they cannot qualify is that their parent was unable to register their birth at a consulate.
As we move through part 1 of the Bill, we turn to British citizenship in clause 5. This clause again seeks to correct historical problems in British nationality law concerning discrimination against women. The current statutory language has caused significant problems in implementation. Under the 1948 Act, citizenship could normally only be passed on for one generation to children born outside the UK and colonies, but section 5(1)(b) of the Act permitted it to be passed on to a further generation if the child was born in a foreign country and the birth was registered within a year at a British consulate. The child of the British mother or unmarried British father could not be registered because they were unable to pass on citizenship at the time.
British women, therefore, although able to inherit their fathers’ nationality when born abroad, have historically been denied the right to pass it on to their own children in the same circumstances. Although when it came into force on 1 January 1983 the British Nationality Act 1981 equalised the rights of men and women as regards the nationality of their children, it did nothing to remedy the discrimination against women that had persisted up to that point. That discrimination was demonstrated in the Supreme Court on 9 February 2018, in the Advocate General for Scotland v. Romein. Ms Romein was born in the USA in 1978 and her father was a US citizen. Her mother was born in South Africa to a Scottish mother and a Welsh father, from whom she inherited her British national status. Despite her family’s connections to the United Kingdom on both sides, as a result of the discrimination inherent in British nationality law—specifically, at that time, section 5 of the British Nationality Act 1948—she was unable to pass her British national status on to her own child, despite wishing to do so.
Clause 5 therefore amends eligibility requirements for registration under section 4C and 4I of the British Nationality Act 1981, to disapply the requirements for a birth to have been registered at a British consulate within 12 months. In effect, it will tidy up the language of British nationality legislation to make clear the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ms Romein’s case, which confirmed the right of British women to pass their nationality on to their children born abroad. The Opposition support the clause, which creates no new rights, but rather makes clear the existing rights in UK law. We welcome that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Citizenship where mother married to someone other than natural father
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Picking up on the earlier question that the shadow Minister asked, I should say that my understanding when it comes to this amendment is that the clause will affect only a small number of people. But it is an area of law out of touch with modern society, so it is right that we should make this change.
The issue is that in British nationality law the mother’s husband is the child’s father, even if she has been separated from him for years and the child is not biologically related to her husband. That can create difficult cases—for example, when a child’s biological father is a British citizen, but their father for nationality purposes is the mother’s estranged non-British husband. The child misses out on British nationality as a result.
Generally, we think it is right that the mother’s husband should be treated as the child’s father for nationality purposes. The common law presumption is that a child born during a period of marriage is the child of the mother’s husband, unless shown otherwise. For nationality purposes, however, there should be certainty about a child’s status, which should not be subject to change at a later date if paternity is disputed. But we need a solution for the child whose father is not the mother’s husband, so that they do not miss out on becoming British through their natural father.
Until now, we have been registering such children as British citizens using the discretion that the Home Secretary has to register any child under the age of 18 under section 3(1) of the 1981 Act. We recognise that those children would have been British automatically were it not for their mother being married to someone else, so we made that a fee-free route last year.
However, the inconsistency has been highlighted by the courts. In the case of K, the court ruled that, although it was a correct interpretation of the legislation for the child not to be a British citizen automatically, the fact that the only remedy was through discretionary legislation was incompatible with the European convention on human rights.
We must take this opportunity to create a specific route for children in this position to be able to acquire British nationality. That is achievable by removing from existing registration provisions the requirement for children of unmarried fathers to have been born before 1 July 2006. People in this position may not see any practical difference, as they can currently make a fee-free application under section 3(1), but the important point is that the provision gives this group a legal entitlement to registration, rather than their having to rely on the exercise of discretion.
We are also using the clause to allow a child of a non-British member of the British armed forces to make an application to register as a British citizen, despite their mother being married to someone other than their biological father at the time of their birth. That will bring them in line with other children whose parents were serving overseas at the time of the birth.
It is deeply regrettable that British statutory law has long discriminated against children born out of wedlock, preventing British nationality from being derived from a British father if he was not married to the child’s mother. The British Nationality Act 1981, when first passed, did not correct that discrimination relating to British citizenship, but since then there have been various attempts to remove it. Those amendments have created rights to be registered as a British citizen for some of the people affected by that discrimination. However, no corresponding right has been introduced for people who would have become British overseas territory citizens. As we have seen, clause 2 is intended to correct this omission, and the Opposition support it.
However, clause 2 is not sufficient in itself to correct the discrimination relating to British citizenship; indeed, the relevant legislation has led to an anomaly. That anomaly, which is to be corrected by clause 6, which we also support, is that people who would have been born a British citizen but for their father not being married to their mother now have the right to be registered as a British citizen if they were born before 1 July 2006. That applies whether or not the mother was married to someone else at the time of the person’s birth.
However, people born on or after that date, who would similarly have been born a British citizen but were not because their father was not married to their mother, do not have a corresponding right. The courts have declared that discrimination to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. Clause 6 is intended to correct that injustice, and we therefore support it. It does so only for British citizenship. That is because the correction for British overseas territories citizenship is built into clause 2.
As has been said, our primary concern with clauses 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 is not with the text or with the fundamental intentions behind them but with the fact that, when commenced, the rights that are to be established must be accessible. There are too many examples of British nationality rights being inaccessible. The Windrush scandal is but one especially painful relevant example.
The following matters are therefore crucial. We would like the Minister to give assurances as to how these rights will be made public and will be sufficiently widely publicised, not least because many of the beneficiaries will be in other territories or countries.
Ministers must equally give assurances that evidential and procedural obstacles will, to the fullest extent practical, be removed or reduced. Biometric registration and overseas and mandatory citizenship ceremonies, for example, must not be prohibitive to the exercise of these rights, as they have been in the past. Biometric registration must not be prohibitively expensive or inaccessible. Ceremonies can be waived, and that should be done where a person wishes to do that, or where a ceremony cannot be offered without undue cost or delay to the person being registered.
Where relevant information is available and can be confirmed by the Home Office or the Passport Office, that should be done. People must not be obstructed by unreasonable demands for evidence. It must be understood that, for some people, there may be considerable obstacles to securing evidence of their rights so many years after the original injustice—for example, due to age, somebody passing away, or separation, including by reason of abuse or violence. The Home Office or Passport Office must be as helpful as possible to facilitate the exercise of these rights.
In conclusion, we support the clause and the intention behind it, but it is of great importance that the Minister also ensures that these rights are fully accessible.
Let me respond briefly to the point that has understandably and rightly been made. As I said in response to earlier clauses, there is a very constructive working relationship between the Home Office and the various overseas territories for which these provisions are relevant, as well as with the various governors. There is good engagement, and we are keen to see this information cascaded.
The point I would strongly make is that we are seeking through the provisions in the Bill to put right past injustices, and we would want this information to be as readily available as possible to people who may find themselves affected. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate has my undertaking that I will take that point away and monitor it very closely to ensure that that happens.
In the discussion on an earlier clause, my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby showed an interest in relation to proof of paternity. In relation to this clause, regulations will set out what can be accepted as proof of paternity—first, being named before 10 September 2015 as the child’s father on the birth certificate issued within 12 months of the birth and, in all other cases, any evidence such as DNA test reports, court orders or birth certificates considered by the Secretary of State to establish paternity. I know that my right hon. Friend had an interest in that issue in relation to the earlier clause, but I thought that it would be useful to say something about it here as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Citizenship: registration in special cases
I want to speak to amendment 34, which deals with people who would be British overseas citizens today but for historical unfairness in the law, an act or omission of a public authority or other exceptional circumstances. The Opposition welcome the fact that clause 7 attempts to rectify the position for those who would be British citizens or British overseas territories citizens today but for such an error. However, the clause does nothing for people who would be British overseas citizens today, and that is wrong.
Those who would be BOCs but for such an error should not be excluded from the proposed remedy. They have suffered from historical unfairness, just as those who would be British citizens or BOTCs today have done. Prior to 1983, there was one substantive class of British nationals, citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies. When the British Nationality Act 1981 came into force on 1 January 1983, CUKCs were divided and reclassified into three categories: British citizens, connected to the UK; British dependent territories citizens—now BOTCs—connected to the remaining British overseas territories, such as the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar; and BOCs, connected to the former British colonies.
The Home Office acknowledges that past unfairness in British nationality law includes where men and women were unable to pass on citizenship equally, and where unmarried fathers could not pass on citizenship. The Home Office acknowledges that in the case of people who could be British citizens or BOTCs, but many persons who would be overseas citizens today also suffer from such prejudice. As a result of the British overseas expansion and later decolonisation, there are pockets of BOCs around the world—for example, in Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa and anglophone west Africa, including places such as Sierra Leone. The category of BOC was created under the British Nationality Act, and it gave effect to the fact that BOCs were British nationals and should remain so. The newly created status gave no home or right of abode in the UK or any other remaining British territory.
Although BOCs have no right to come to the UK or a remaining British overseas territory, the status still has real value. It enables a person to seek to use the UK BOC passport, and possession of such a passport enables BOCs to seek UK consular assistance in a third country and to seek residence and permission to work in third countries under local laws. It may be useful where the passport of another nationality that those people hold is considered unreliable, and where their children are born stateless, to benefit from UK laws that reduce statelessness.
BOCs around the world make active use of that status. For example, many persons of Somali heritage born in Aden in Yemen when it was a British colony are reliant on BOC status, as they were, and are, shut out from the Yemeni nationality. Their BOC passports enable them to obtain lawful residence and permission to work in Gulf states, and to secure a visa to study in other countries. The Home Office proposal in clause 7 helps those affected by historical unfairness in British nationality law, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances to become British citizens or BOTCs. However, potential BOCs would also have suffered from such historical unfairness in British nationality law, acts or omissions of public authorities, or other exceptional circumstances. All those classes of British nationals were CUKCs prior to the British Nationality Act 1981, and all suffered from these problems. Clause 7 should therefore be supplemented to provide for registration as a BOC on the same basis as it enables registration as a British citizen or BOTC.
I will deal with each of the amendments proposed, and then I will of course pick up on a number of the points, questions and challenges that have been raised throughout the course of this debate.
I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for having tabled amendment 35, which would allow a person to become a British citizen automatically following their adoption in the UK if the order was made after the age of 18 but before the age of 19, but the adoption proceedings started before their 18th birthday. I have noted the unusual situation, highlighted by hon. Members, in which newly adopted young people can find themselves as a result of differences between the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the British Nationality Act 1981. An adopted person can automatically acquire British citizenship, provided they are under 18 on the date the adoption order is made. However, under the 2002 Act, it is possible for an adoption order to be made where someone is already 18 years old but has not yet turned 19.
I am aware of cases in which individuals are affected by those nationality provisions, and I have some sympathy for them. However, I am also conscious that a person aged 18 will normally be capable of making their own life choices. At 18, someone can purchase alcohol, accrue debt, join the Army, or vote in an election. From a legal standpoint, at 18, an individual is fully fledged and can theoretically live independently of other family members. It is therefore consistent that a person aged 18 or over who is seeking to acquire British citizenship should normally do so only on the basis of their personal connections with this country, not those of their new family.
I must consider the wider position of adopted children, and I am satisfied that to extend the nationality rules to cover persons who have attained the majority would move nationality out of step with immigration routes. For example, young people over the age of 18 must meet the requirements of the immigration category they are applying in, and are unable to rely on other family members for a claim to residence. I have sympathy for those young adults who feel that they have lost out, but other routes are available that would allow them to choose whether they wish to naturalise or register as British citizens.
Turning to amendment 13, again I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendment and for drawing attention to clause 7, which we believe is a positive move that will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to those who have missed out on acquiring it, potentially due to reasons beyond their control. Clause 7 will apply to anyone who
“would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen but for—
(a) historical legislative unfairness,
(b) an act or omission of a public authority,”
or their exceptional circumstances. This means that the clause covers not just those who would have become citizens automatically, but those who might have had an entitlement to registration or could have registered or naturalised at the Home Secretary’s discretion. As such, we think it right that the provision remains discretionary, to allow the Home Secretary to take into account the criteria that she might have taken into account at the time.
I will have to give some further thought to what the Minister has just said. I take the point about people who would have had to register—therefore, there is still an element of discretion. However, will he look again at the case of those who would have automatically had that citizenship and whether there really should be such broad discretion in cases where people have missed out on citizenship because of historical injustice or exceptional circumstances?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the point that he raises. Broadly speaking, there is a view that the discretionary approach to cases is helpful in ensuring that we can reach the right decision in individual cases and that we are able to take into full account, in general terms, all the relevant factors.
Is it the Minister’s intention that the Government will publish the grounds on which decisions are made with discretionary purposes for each decision, regardless of whether they are successful or not?
I will come back to the point that the hon. Gentleman raises but, as I say, there is a view that taking a discretionary approach to cases is helpful in reaching the correct decisions, and that the circumstances of individual cases are properly taken into account. There is precedent in the British Nationality Act 1981 for applications to be considered on a discretionary basis—for example, naturalisation is a discretionary provision. The law states that the Home Secretary may naturalise a person if she thinks fit and that person meets the statutory requirements. Members will be aware that the Home Office publishes caseworker guidance, which sets out the sorts of circumstances where discretion would normally be exercised, and that is relevant to the point that the hon. Gentleman raises.
It is in part, but publishing the full grounds will help to determine whether people seek to take a case or not.
My further question is about the equality impact assessment. As I touched on this morning, the Government are suggesting that they will extend access to legal aid through the Bill. Is the Government’s intention that legal aid will be extended for this specific purpose, regardless of whether people can make a successful claim or not?
Again, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question. The key point is that through the Bill, we are improving access to justice. Clearly, the improved access to justice offer is very relevant to the one-stop shop proposals that we are taking forward in the Bill and which we will no doubt debate in greater detail when we reach later clauses.
We will no doubt debate this in great detail in due course. As I say, we are putting in place an improved access to justice offer more generally through the Bill.
There is an absolutely fundamental distinction between naturalisation and registration. We are talking about people who would have had an automatic right to citizenship, which is completely different from naturalisation altogether. Again, I am still struggling to understand why there has to be such broad discretion. People have lost their automatic right because of historical injustice, and the danger that has been highlighted by Members is that that will put folk off applying. Will the Minister not even think about some restrictions on the degree of discretion that the Home Secretary has, or at least provide detailed guidance on when she will exercise that in people’s favour?
I want to pick up the points that have been raised by the hon. Members for Bermondsey and for Old Southwark and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. Clearly, the guidance is a very important element of the immigration system, so that people can understand very clearly what is required and precisely how cases will be handled. I am always in favour of trying to make such matters more transparent and to improve guidance wherever we can, and that is always ongoing work. I take on board the point that has been raised, and I will certainly reflect on it.
As I say, Members will be aware that the Home Office publishes caseworker guidance, which sets out the sorts of circumstances where discretion would normally be exercised. This works, and we intend that published guidance will also be available for the new adult registration route. The fact that the Home Secretary is not obliged to naturalise a person does not therefore impact practically on most applicants. However, we want to maintain the ability to refuse applications from people who might meet the requirements, but are nevertheless unsuitable to become British citizens.
Where registration is set out in legislation as an entitlement, it needs to be more tightly set out so that there is no doubt as to who does and does not benefit. Because of the historical nature of citizenship and the fact that issues can crop up that we might not have been aware of, we need the flexibility to be able to consider someone’s circumstances without being overly prescriptive. Equally, we recognise that people can be affected by a number of circumstances, which may be difficult to set out in detail. We are not making this a discretionary provision in order to refuse deserving people, but to allow us to respond to situations that cannot reasonably be foreseen.
I understand that hon. Members may wish to seek assurance that people who have missed out in the past will be granted citizenship, but we think that this can be achieved through a discretionary route, which will allow us to take into account all the circumstances of a case. That is why we are introducing the various provisions in the Bill in the first place: to right those historical wrongs. We want this to work.
On amendment 30, again, I thank the hon. Members for tabling the amendment. The new adult discretionary registration provision will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to anyone who would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen, but for historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or the exceptional circumstances in play. I understand hon. Members’ concerns that that power should be used fairly and consistently, which is right.
Each case will be considered on its own merits, taking into account the particular circumstances of that person, including the reasons they were unable to become a British citizen automatically, through registration or through naturalisation. On that basis it would be unnecessary to have a legislative clause that effectively causes us to treat like cases in a similar way, because applications will be decided in line with the legislation and guidance.
I have already mentioned that we intend to publish caseworker guidance setting out when we expect that this power might be used and the sort of circumstances we will take into account. Of course, that is done very transparently and can be seen by hon. Members and by people out there seeking access to those routes. As I think is my colleagues’ intended purpose in proposing the amendment, that will help to maintain consistency in decision making.
However, I am not convinced that that would be helped by a statutory requirement to produce or amend guidance every time a person with different circumstances is registered. There may be concerns about reflecting an individual’s circumstances in published guidance, even if anonymised. We will reflect the overarching principles in guidance and amend as appropriate. Guidance will continue to be published on the gov.UK website. I can also assure hon. Members that work is done within UK Visas and Immigration to ensure consistency of decision making, particularly when a new route is introduced, and I think that that is right and proper.
I do not think we can commit in statute to publicise any grants of citizenship to people in a similar position. As I have said, we will publish guidance setting out the approach we will take and make it available to potential applicants, but it would not be right to impose a statutory requirement to do so. Indeed, some of those registered will be in unique positions and it would not be possible to identify others who might qualify on the same basis.
The reporting obligation set out in the amendment would require the Home Secretary each year to report any historical legislative unfairness that had been identified in registering a person under clause 7 and say how she intends to correct it. Perhaps it would help to clarify that the thinking behind clause 7 is that it can be used to rectify individual situations that may have been created by historical unfairness, rather than having to create specific provisions to cover each scenario.
I thought the Minister was one of those who believed in Parliament taking back control, not the Executive having more control, but let me have one more attempt at the legal aid question. This is not just about the circumstances of the individuals involved—we have heard some distressing cases today—but about the costs imposed in particular on councils, which are using emergency services to support people who might otherwise qualify for support. If legal aid were immediately available for everyone affected, those cases could be resolved much more quickly. Given the complexity the Bill is imposing, it seems as if it should be an actual requirement that that support be available. Let me try again: will legal aid be extended to everyone facing these circumstances as a result of this legislation?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question and I will visit that in my later remarks, if I may. He is right to say that I think it is right that Parliament took back control. That is a debate we have had on many occasions and no doubt will continue to have in the years ahead. I am a member of the Government, but I still believe very strongly in parliamentary sovereignty and the role of Parliament in decision making.
To clarify, the thinking behind clause 7 is that it can be used to rectify individual situations that may have been created by historical unfairness, rather than having to create specific provisions to cover each scenario, some of which may affect only a very small number of individuals. This is in fact the way we intend to address those situations, and it may not necessarily be appropriate to introduce additional measures to do so. As such, I do not see that specifying such a report in legislation would be helpful. In terms of addressing unfairness, this provision does not give a far-reaching power—it is much narrower than the discretion the Home Secretary has to register a child under section 3(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981. It does, however, reflect our desire to address historical injustices, as is reflected in all of the first eight clauses. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press amendment 30.
I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling amendment 14, which replicates amendment 13 for British overseas territories citizenship. I set out in response to the earlier amendment why we wanted this to be a discretionary provision, rather than creating an obligation to register. The same arguments apply here. Turning to amendment 31, I have set out why we could not accept an earlier amendment, and the same arguments apply here. I hope that hon. Members will not press amendment 31 either. On amendment 34, new clause 12 seeks to create a discretionary adult registration route for a person to become a British overseas citizen.
I am sorry for interrupting, but I am not sure that we are actually debating new clause 12 at the moment. As far as I understand it, we are debating amendment 35 to clause 7 and amendments 13, 30, 14, 31 and 34 and clause 7 stand part.
I was referring in passing to new clause 12, Ms McDonagh. British overseas citizenship, or BOC, was created by the 1981 Act. It was created for people connected with former British territories who did not have a close connection with the UK or one of the remaining British overseas territories. This was usually where they were from or connected to—a country that had become independent, but they did not acquire the citizenship of that country. The intention was to avoid making people stateless due to complex histories of independence or countries ceasing to be British protected territories. The intention of the 1981 Act was that everyone who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies immediately before 1 January 1983 would continue to hold some form of British nationality. The then Government anticipated that many who became BOCs would have an additional citizenship or nationality.
British overseas citizenship was intended to be a transitional status, and it was expected that many who held that status would have acquired the nationality of the place where they were born or were living in the 38 years since that legislation was passed. They are able to hold a BOC passport and rely on consular assistance when outside the country of any other nationality that they hold, but are likely to rely on their other citizenship for rights of residence and local travel. Given the 38 years that have passed, we do not anticipate that there can be many people who have missed out on becoming a BOC and have no other citizenship or nationality.
There were provisions for children of CUKC mothers to register under the British Nationality Act 1964 where they would otherwise have been stateless. Since 1983, there have been measures in place to acquire BOC through discretionary registration as a child or for certain people who are stateless. However, it was not the general intention that further people would acquire British overseas citizenship under the 1981 Act other than in those specific circumstances. People who hold only BOC and do not have, and have not voluntarily lost, another citizenship or nationality are able to apply for British citizenship under existing legislation. If a person believes that they missed out on becoming a BOC because of historical unfairness, and that, as a result, they also missed out on being able to become a British citizen, as they have no other nationality and have not done anything that meant that they lost a nationality, there is nothing to stop them applying for that status under the clause. BOC status was introduced to avoid statelessness due to complex histories of independence or countries ceasing to be British protected territories. We do not intend to create a new route to British overseas citizenship.
If I heard the Minister correctly, he is suggesting that someone should pursue their rights through the Equality and Human Rights Commission, but that process would take years and could cost millions if the Government were opposing what that individual was seeking. Is it not incumbent on the Government, under the Equality Act 2010, to get things right up front? Would that not save a lot of time and money, and prevent a lot of desperate situations from emerging?
The point that I would make is that we keep evolving circumstances and individual cases under review. It is right that we consider cases individually and properly take account of their individual circumstances. That is why we are arguing strongly that the discretionary means of tackling this is the correct way to do so. I am confident that through the provisions, we will right many historical injustices and wrongs, and that is something we should all welcome.
In the light of the debate that we had about fees, whether or not applications will be free under the clause is an important point. That will be an issue for the appropriate fees regulations in due course. As I set out when dealing with earlier clauses, those regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I note the views that have been strongly expressed today. Members will have heard what I have said about this previously, and I would be very happy to engage with them in the development of those regulations that we would then bring forward. With that, I would ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.
I wish to press amendment 35, and all other amendments in my name and in the names of the other Members.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
I think it is fair to say that, with all the Blair and Brown documentaries on television at the moment, it is perfect to be thinking about clause IV, for members of the Opposition.
I do not wish to interrupt the Minister, but he may find that clause IV was not dealt with in the depth that it should have been.
That is me told.
Clause 7 applies to three routes to British nationality: naturalisation as a British citizen, naturalisation as a British overseas territories citizen and registration as a British citizen for other British nationals. All these routes require a person to have been in the UK or an overseas territory for a continuous period immediately before applying. This is known as the residential qualifying period. These residence requirements exist to allow a person to show that they have a close and ongoing connection with the United Kingdom.
The residential qualifying period is five years, or three years for spouses and civil partners of British citizens or British overseas territories citizens who are applying for naturalisation. During the five-year period, the person must not have been outside the UK for more than 450 days, must not be subject to immigration time restrictions in the UK or a relevant territory, and must have been lawfully resident. There is discretion in the legislation to overlook excess absences and unlawful presence, but the requirement to have been in the UK or territory on the first day of the residential qualifying period is mandatory. There is no discretion in the current law to grant citizenship to someone who does not meet that requirement.
This means that, for example, a person who has lived in the UK for 10 years, but who was absent from the UK at the point five years before making an application because of a global pandemic, would not be able to qualify, despite their long-term connection with the UK. Under the current legislation, their only option would be to wait until they could meet the requirement.
I very much agree, because the people we are talking about came here because they were invited. My partner’s family were among them. Thankfully, they were not caught up in this scandal.
We needed people to come here and help rebuild after world war two. People living in the Caribbean were well used to having white people in charge of their country, but what they were not so used to was the racist abuse that would meet them when they reached these shores. They assumed they would be welcome because they were part of the Commonwealth. They fought in our wars. They were invited here. It must have been a huge shock when they got here and somehow that narrative changed.
The narrative is still being used—it is still being used by some people elected to this place—that somehow the gratitude in all of this should be their gratitude to us and that we are somehow doing them some sort of favour. In fact, lots of our wealth was built on the backs of the people we enslaved on those islands. I cannot remember what it is called, but there is such a thing as the collective, inherited trauma that people suffer from. Their descendants were then invited over here to do what we needed done and they were treated the way they were treated, and then they were treated by this Government in the way they were treated in the Windrush scandal.
In the first years, about 5,000 Jamaican nurses came here. We have heard about all of those people from overseas territories who came and supported our health service. Many of them have suffered greatly. Some died during the pandemic, because they put themselves at risk. We needed those 5,000 nurses who came from Jamaica in the first years for our health system, but Jamaica needed them as well. We took them out of the Jamaican health system. We should have been thanking them. We should have been on our knees with gratitude. I do not like the narrative that they are somehow supposed to be grateful to us. So, yes, I would have liked these measures to have gone much further, but I will say that taking away the five-year rule is at least doing something to hold our hands up and say, “We did something wrong, and you don’t deserve to have to wait the five years when you are not the ones at fault.”
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East speaks for the whole House in saying that immigration has made an enormously positive contribution to this country over decades. As elected Members and in our communities across the country, we should continually make mention of that and constantly reflect on it—I am certainly very conscious of it.
Equally, I am conscious of the importance of righting the wrongs of what happened in relation to Windrush. There is an absolute commitment at the Home Office to do just that: follow up on Wendy Williams’s recommendations and make sure that they are delivered. As the SNP spokesman said, the clause has benefit beyond Windrush. I am really pleased that it seems the Committee can come together and support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 9
Citizenship: stateless minors
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause amends the provision for registering a child as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen when the child was born in the UK or a territory and has been stateless since birth. Although it applies to both British citizenship and BOTC, it addresses an issue specific to the UK, so I am going to talk about British citizenship. However, parallel changes will be made in relation to BOTC.
It may help if I put the issue in the context of all children born in the United Kingdom. Since 1983, a child born in the UK will be a British citizen automatically only if one of their parents is a British citizen, is settled in the United Kingdom or, from 13 January 2010, is a member of the armed forces.
“Settled” is defined in the British Nationality Act 1981 as being ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and not subject to an immigration time restriction on their stay. That effectively excludes those whose parents only have limited leave to remain or are here illegally. Those exempt from immigration control because of diplomatic service or as members of visiting forces are also not regarded as settled. Any child born in the United Kingdom after 1 January 1983 who was not a British citizen at birth has an entitlement to register as a British citizen if the parent becomes a British citizen or settled in the UK, if the parent joins the armed forces, or if the child lives here for the first 10 years of their life.
In addition, there is provision for children born in the UK who would otherwise be stateless to acquire citizenship. If a child is born in the UK to a parent who is a British overseas territories citizen, British overseas citizen or British subject and would otherwise be stateless, they will acquire the same nationality as the parent. Alternatively, if a child is born in the UK and is, and has always been, stateless, they can apply to be registered as a British citizen before their 22nd birthday based on a period of five years’ residence. Those provisions enable us to meet our obligations under the convention on the reduction of statelessness. That means that if a child is stateless and has had no other citizenship or nationality from birth, they can effectively be registered on reaching the age of five—rather than after the age of 10, like other children born in the UK.
The UK, like many other countries, allows for citizenship to be acquired by descent by a child born abroad to a parent who holds that status by birth. Under most countries’ citizenship laws that happens automatically, but some countries require the parents to register a child’s birth for the child to access citizenship. That is the case for India and Sri Lanka, where a child’s birth needs to be registered at a high commission if they are to be recognised as a citizen.
We are aware that increasing numbers of non-settled parents in the UK are actively deciding not to register their child’s birth at the embassy or high commission, and thus failing to secure their child’s entitlement to their parents’ nationality by descent.
The explanatory note just says that there have been cases. This is a very serious change. Can the Minister give us examples of analysis that has been done and the types of circumstances in which such decisions are taking place? Tell us about the scale. I see no evidence of a significant problem, whereas I do see that the clause could cause significant harm.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for prompting me on this. I have a fairly lengthy speech on this clause. I will come to those points, and will illustrate them with some specific case studies, which I hope will be of interest to him.
As I was saying, this results in the child remaining stateless from birth and enables them to be registered as a British citizen once they reach the age of five if they meet the other criteria. We have seen a significant increase in applications, from tens per year to thousands. In 2016-17, there were 32 applications to register stateless children on this basis. That increased in 2017-18 to 1,815 applications. This allows individuals, including those who have overstayed or entered illegally, to acquire British citizenship for their child, which can in turn benefit their own immigration status.
We do not think it fair that parents can effectively secure a quicker route to British citizenship by choosing not to register their child’s birth. In doing so, they are depriving their child of a nationality, which is about not only identity and belonging, but being able to acquire a passport or identity document, and the ability to travel overseas, such as to see family. They are also taking advantage of a provision that is intended to protect those who are genuinely stateless.
I will say, for the avoidance of doubt, that the process of birth registration is not impossibly difficult. It is simply a matter of completing a form and supplying supporting information about the parent’s identity, status and residence, and the child’s birth. The fee to register a child’s birth at the Indian high commission in the UK is £19; it is £53 at the Sri Lankan high commission.
In changing this provision, we want to maintain the ability for genuinely stateless children to benefit, but we want to change the registration provisions so that parents cannot effectively choose statelessness for their child and then benefit from these provisions. That is right and proper, and in line with our international obligations.
We think it is right that children who genuinely cannot acquire a nationality should be able to benefit under the stateless provisions of the 1981 Act. This change reflects our expectation that families should take reasonable steps to acquire a nationality for their child. We will set out in guidance the sort of steps that we think are reasonable, and applications will be considered on an individual basis.
The provisions are not intended to negatively impact children of recognised refugees who are unable to approach the authorities of their former country. Hon. Members may argue that it is important for a child to have a nationality. We agree. That is why we are a signatory to, and are committed to, the 1961 convention.
Why are parents choosing not to acquire a nationality for their child when they can, leaving the child without the ability to travel urgently if needed for five years? Let us look at a typical example that addresses the point raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.
The Minister refers to a typical example, but I believe that the question put was about the overall number of cases. Will the Minister provide the House with the overall number of cases involved, and specifically the number of cases in which the Government suggest nationality is being deliberately withheld?
Let me talk through the case studies in the first instance, because I think it is useful to set this in context. Child X was born in the UK, which their Indian parents had entered as students. The student route is not one that leads to settlement, so they could not have assumed they would be granted indefinite permission to stay. The college they were studying at had its sponsorship licence revoked, and the parents remained here illegally.
At the time of X’s birth, both parents were in the UK without lawful leave. Steps were taken to remove X’s parents, who absconded at one point. However, an application was made to register X as a British citizen, under the stateless minor provision, a few days after their fifth birthday. While they had not approached the Indian high commission to register X’s birth, the parents provided letters they had obtained from the Indian authorities stating that there was no record of the birth having been registered, so they clearly had no fear of approaching the Indian authorities.
X was registered as a British citizen, as the current wording of the British Nationality Act 1981 left us no other option. The parents then made an application to remain in the UK on the basis of family life, which was granted because it would have been harsh for the British child to leave the UK. I hope that Members across the House will agree that, while it is not X’s fault that their parents manipulated the system, it is not right that as a result they can acquire citizenship earlier than other children born here, whose parents have remained in the UK lawfully and been fully compliant.
We have heard the comment that parents should be able to choose which nationality their child has, but this is not about French parents living in the UK with settled status, for example, choosing whether to apply for a French or British passport, as the child holds dual nationality. Nor is it about parents who are dual nationals, such as a parent who is a British citizen by birth and citizen of Bangladesh by descent choosing not to register their child’s birth, which would have allowed them to acquire citizenship of Bangladesh in addition to British citizenship. No: this is about parents who are choosing not to acquire their own nationality for their child and leaving them with no nationality for a significant period until they can eventually qualify for British citizenship.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has published a document entitled “Guidelines on Statelessness nr 4: Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a Nationality through Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness”. Those guidelines cover situations where it is possible to acquire the nationality of a parent by registration. They provide that the responsibility to grant nationality to children who would otherwise be stateless is not engaged where a child is born in a state’s territory and is stateless but could acquire a nationality by registration with the state of nationality of a parent, or a similar procedure.
The guidelines go on to say that it is acceptable for contracting states not to grant nationality to children in these circumstances if the child concerned can acquire the nationality of a parent immediately after birth and the state of nationality of the parent does not have any discretion to refuse the grant of nationality. However, that does not apply if a child’s parents are unable to register, or have good reasons for not registering, their child with the state of their own nationality. That must be determined depending on whether an individual could reasonably be expected to take action to acquire the nationality in the circumstances of their particular case. The effect of this clause therefore reflects the approach recommended by the UNHCR.
We understand that parents want the best for their children, and that a future in the UK represents that to them, but it is not right that they choose not to acquire a nationality for their child in order to facilitate that. We want genuinely stateless children to be able to benefit from our stateless child provisions, but we expect those who can easily acquire a nationality for their child to do so.
I will pick up on the point the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made, because I am sure he wants to prompt me on that, but I first wanted to get through those case studies and set out the Government’s rationale. Clearly, in some cases there is a perverse incentive, and it undoubtedly disadvantages those who are acting in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the law. It is right to address that, and that is why we are taking the measures proposed in clause 9 to close that loophole.
Will the Minister provide the overall number of cases that the Government believe fit this category? Will the Government also publish the number of children involved in similar cases where the parents have been trying to regularise their status within the UK? We had examples this morning such as that of my constituent Ade Ronke, who was wrongfully accused by the Home Office of having a prosecution that she did not have—it was a case of mistaken identity. There are cases like that, and hers took seven years to regularise. I mentioned this morning that at least two cases in my constituency took 10 years. There may be many children across the country whose parents have been waiting very many years to sort their status, who could fit into this category, but are being mislabelled by the Government.
The direct answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that we can provide details of the number of applications, but we cannot confirm the specific number of cases in the way he is requesting. We know this is happening, and we believe that there is a perverse incentive for people to choose not to acquire a nationality, so that the family as a whole can jump the queue.
May I confirm that I heard the Minister right? Did he say that the Government and Home Office are clear that this is happening, but they cannot give any indication of the extent?
As I have said, we are aware that this is happening. We think it is right to take steps through the Bill, so that those going through the process are not disadvantaged relative to those who are seeking to make use of this loophole.
We believe that clause 9 will disentitle many stateless children who were born and grew up in the UK from their existing statutory right to British citizenship. I have heard what the Minister said. I think it would require a fair bit of cunning and conniving to conceive a child, wait for five years and not register them before applying for citizenship. This applies not just to children aged five, but to children aged five to 17. There may be many children caught up in those circumstances. We therefore strongly oppose this clause and believe that it should be removed.
Let us be absolutely clear about what the Government are trying to change with this clause. The existing law in section 36 of the British Nationality Act 1981 gives effect to schedule 2 expressly for the “purpose of reducing statelessness”. Paragraph 3 of schedule 2 is designed to prevent children born in the UK from growing up without nationality. As Ministers made clear during the passage of the 1981 Act, the provision was needed to ensure continued compliance with our international obligations under the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, to which the Minister referred. In accordance with that convention, the provision entitles someone under the age of 22 born stateless in the UK who has lived in the UK for five continuous years at the point of application and who has always been stateless to register as a British citizen.
Clause 9 inserts a new paragraph 3A into schedule 2 of the 1981 Act for stateless children aged five to 17, requiring the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the child was unable to acquire another nationality before the child is permitted to register as a British citizen. It considers that a child can acquire a nationality where the nationality is the same as that of one of the parents, the person has been entitled to acquire that nationality since birth, and in all circumstances it is reasonable to expect them, or someone acting on their behalf, to take steps to acquire that nationality.
We oppose clause 9 because it is unethical and puts children’s rights in jeopardy. It unnecessarily restricts a vital safeguard intended to protect the rights and best interests of a small group of marginalised children born in the UK. For those affected, statelessness can mean problems accessing rights and services, denied opportunities, unfulfilled potential and a sense of never quite belonging. As worded, the new provision would give the Secretary of State wide discretion to prevent a stateless child born in the UK from acquiring British citizenship, perpetuating their statelessness. The Opposition believe that clause 9 creates an additional and unjustified hurdle to stateless children’s registration as British citizens and to satisfying the Secretary of State that they cannot secure some other nationality. This is in addition to the child having to show that they were born stateless in the UK, have remained stateless throughout their life and have lived at least five continuous years in the UK at the point of exercising their statutory entitlement to be recognised as a British citizen.
For many years, the existing requirements have together proved a high barrier to stateless children securing citizenship of the UK, which is where they were born, where they live and where they are connected to. Clarification of the relevant law by the High Court in 2017 and awareness raising by the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, the European Network on Statelessness and others have enabled several children to apply to be registered under statutory provisions that are expressly intended to reduce statelessness. Prior to this, applications were so few as to be negligible. That indicates the profound inadequacy of the Home Office’s previous operation of the provision, and the strong likelihood that there have been a growing number of children living stateless in the UK, in contravention of the original parliamentary purpose, and following the UK’s international commitment to reducing statelessness.
The purported justification for the draconian clause 9 bears no relation to any matter over which the child has any control or influence, or for which they have any responsibility. It is suggested that some parents may choose not to exercise a right to register their child with the nationality of another country, and may leave their child stateless for the purpose of securing British citizenship, but no evidence has been presented for the idea that some parents may choose not to exercise the right to register their child with the nationality of another country. In any event, an application for registration of a stateless child’s entitlement to British citizenship is a complex matter, and that itself has been an effective and unjust deterrent to the exercising of the right.
The UK Government have provided no evidence to justify restricting children’s rights in such a way. In fact, the leading organisations in the field have evidence to show that stateless children and young people born in the UK already face significant barriers to acquiring British citizenship under existing law, and that has a significant detrimental impact on their wellbeing. Young people have described how their inability to acquire British citizenship leaves them feeling alienated and excluded.
We have had a very wide ranging debate in relation to these matters, with views expressed that are sincerely and strongly felt. I do not doubt that for a moment. Let me be clear that genuinely stateless children will still be able to benefit from the registration provisions. This change is to prevent people from benefiting by choosing not to acquire their own nationality for their child where they are able to do so.
I thank the Minister for giving way, because it is important that he addresses the question that has been raised successively. The clause goes against the drift of the rest of part 1, which is rectifying anomalies. This potentially creates one, and one that will come to land heavily on the Home Office in the future, as well as those who will be affected by it. It is incumbent on him, before we vote on it, to explain clearly the extent of the problem. He has given only one anecdote as the justification for it. Will he use the opportunity to do that now?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention. As Opposition Members will know, the way that I go about my work is to always try to be as constructive and helpful as possible. With that in mind, I will gladly write to the Committee setting out in greater detail our rationale for taking this approach, and as much information as I can to justify it.
As I say, there is a fairness issue here that we believe needs to be addressed. The MK case was cited, and it is worth recognising that in his conclusion Judge Ockelton made the comment that it opens an obvious route to abuse. We are satisfied that what we are proposing complies with our obligations under the statelessness conventions, and all our obligations that flow from that. I commend that the clause stand part of the Bill, with the very clear undertaking that I will provide the information that I have promised.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area, and for their engaging speeches. I do not doubt for a moment the sincerity of their contributions. Nobody should be in any doubt about the sincerity of the deeply felt views expressed by all Members of this House, who I genuinely believe want to see appropriate action to tackle dangerous channel crossings. I wanted to make that point at the outset, because it is important to remember that in the context of today’s debate.
As hon. Members will know, the clauses that they seek to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In that respect, the clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.
I echo what the Minister says: everybody present wants to see an end to such crossings. He used the word “migrants” a couple of times, but as the Bill reflects we are talking about people who have gone through the refugee process. They are refugees, and it is very important that in this debate we speak about the fact that this is happening to refugees—hence the term “group 2 refugee”.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.
I will take amendments 88 to 95 in one go, as they individually seek to remove key constituent parts of clause 10 in order to prevent the exercise of the powers to differentiate. That is not the effect of the amendments as drafted, but I shall none the less assume that the intent is as I just set out. Hon. Members are no doubt familiar by now with the way in which the policy is proposed to operate. For the avoidance of doubt, though, clause 10 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of where differential treatment may be applied to group 2 refugees—in other words, those who do not meet the requirements set out in clause 10, which are based on criteria set out in article 31 of the refugee convention. That includes in relation to the length of leave issued, requirements to achieve settlement, recourse to public funds and family reunion rights.
As mentioned, the clause is extremely important because it acts on our commitment to do everything that we can to deter people from making dangerous journeys to the UK at the hands of smugglers, when they could claim asylum in a safe third country. I will pick up on a number of important points that were made, as it is right to provide clarification on them.
First, the question was raised of how the Secretary of State intends to use these powers. As we talked about in relation to the earlier provisions in the Bill, this will be set out in the normal way in the immigration rules and guidance in due course.
The Minister is seeking to reintroduce a system that the UK has used before. In the 1930s, German Jews who had reached these shores were, in some cases, sent back if they had been through other countries. Famously, in one case, Jewish brothers who were deported back to Belgium went on to be murdered by the Nazis. Why are the Government seeking to turn back the clock with such potentially disastrous consequences? Why is the Minister not more proud of the British tradition and of the British contribution to creating the refugee convention?
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. What I am proud of is this country’s long-standing tradition of doing right by those fleeing persecution from around the world. That is a proud tradition in this country, and something that I think Members on both sides of this House can agree on. It is something that this Government remain absolutely committed to. We are very clear that people should come here utilising safe and legal routes. That is the right way to come into this country.
Let me just make this point, because I am conscious of the comparisons that the hon. Member sought to draw to the 1930s. We are, again, very clear—I say this for the record—that we do not return people to countries where they would be in danger.
I have not accepted the intervention. I would like to finish the point that I was making. We are very clear that we do not return people to countries where their return would put them in danger. Of course, we also look at cases on a case-by-case basis.
I will give way, but I have made this point, and I am very clear about it.
The Minister can say it as clearly as he wants. The reality is that I have constituents whose casework—correspondence from the Home Office—tells me that it was safe for them to be sent back to Afghanistan in June, when the Taliban were marching across Afghanistan and beginning to take over the country! There is a big difference between the nonsense and rhetoric we get and the reality—the dangers and risk that this Government are putting people in.
In response to the specifics that the hon. Member is raising on Afghanistan, I would make the point that returns to Afghanistan have been ceased, given the current circumstances, given the circumstances there at the moment. That takes into full account the considerations around the circumstances on the ground at any given point in time, and the Government have rightly been responsive to that ever-changing situation. I am not able to comment on the detail of the individual cases that the hon. Member is referencing, but I would ask him to please write to me with that detail so that I can take that away and look at it.
I think Members will be somewhat sceptical of the invitation to write, given that we were writing about hundreds of cases in Afghanistan in emails that were not even opened by the Foreign Office, the Home Office or the Ministry of Defence. I will write. I will take that opportunity. I still have hundreds of cases, including four Brits who are still in Afghanistan because they were abandoned by this Government. The Minister says he is proud of our tradition and proud that we offer safe and legal routes, but where in this Bill do we extend the ability to access safe and legal routes that avoid the need to use human traffickers and people smugglers?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that further contribution. I look forward to receiving the correspondence from him—it was a genuine offer made in the right spirit and I look forward to him taking it up.
As I say, this Government have a strong track record of providing safe and legal routes. This country has a proud record of providing safe and legal routes. It does not escape me that overall since 2015 we have settled more than any EU member state. That is something this country can be incredibly proud of. Various examples of safe and legal routes that people may avail themselves of include the UK resettlement scheme, the mandate resettlement scheme and the community sponsorship scheme. I am keen for communities to participate in that sponsorship scheme.
I welcome the Minister’s generosity and I am grateful for it, as I am sure Afghans will be if he can tell us when the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme will actually open, given that it has been two months since Kabul fell.
The hon. Gentleman will appreciate some of the genuine difficulties for people in trying to leave Afghanistan—[Interruption]—and doing so in the safest way possible—[Interruption.] He keeps interrupting from a sedentary position. Will he let me finish the point that I am trying to make?
The bottom line is that we are firmly committed to that resettlement scheme. We will announce details of it as quickly as possible, having taken proper account of the very real difficulties that exist in getting people safely, as far as that is possible, out of Afghanistan. Ministers and officials are working tirelessly to work that up in an appropriate manner.
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman as well, because I want to be generous and to hear what he has to say.
The Minister is being generous. I want to push things back to some of the questions—
Great, because the purpose of the amendments is to probe exactly how these very broad powers will be used. It will be useful if he could talk about some of what the Government intend.
I am keen to do just that. I have made the point about safe and legal routes. There are many examples in the past and that are still active.
I will give way, but I am keen to move on to answer some of the questions.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He talked again about the UK’s leading role in accepting refugees. Does he not accept that the most recent data from the UNHCR on refugees in Europe—from 2019—has Germany resettling more than three times as many refugees as the UK, or 9,640 compared with 3,507? Also, smaller countries such as Sweden and Norway accepted more than the UK.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to my earlier point.
I want to move on to the points made by various members of the Committee about a number of areas related to the amendments. In answer to the question about section 95 asylum support, those who are already in receipt of such support will not face any condition restricting access to public funds. The power to differentiate in respect of public funds is flexible and there is no obligation to use it in inappropriate cases. Again, detail will be set out in the guidance and rules to follow. The House will have the opportunity to scrutinise those in the normal way.
A number of points were made about family reunion. It is wrong to say that the Bill will remove family reunion rights. Family reunion will be protected in line with article 8 of the European convention on human rights. The Bill will allow us to take steps to disincentivise people from taking risky, life-threatening journeys. There is, I suppose, a philosophical debate about this: I think we all agree that we need to end those dangerous journeys, but how we achieve that is the area of dispute.
The Minister is right to say that we all agree on the objective and that the dispute is about the effectiveness of the Government strategy. Is he not even a little unsettled by the fact that the Government’s own impact assessment states that their strategy is unlikely to work? It states that
“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited.”
It is right that we break the business model of these evil criminal gangs and take steps that help to achieve that endeavour. The point the hon. Gentleman has made, which runs through the Bill, is that people should come here by safe and legal routes and that we should take steps as appropriate to break that business model. I am confident that the steps we are taking in the Bill will achieve exactly that.
So the Minister is saying that the Government’s impact assessment is wrong.
I genuinely believe that the policy we are pursuing through the Bill will make a significant difference in deterring dangerous channel crossings, where people pay evil people smugglers to try and get to the United Kingdom. It is right that we prioritise safe and legal routes and make it very clear that they are the way to arrive in this country, and that we deter people from making those very dangerous, irregular journeys. I am confident that the Bill will make a significant difference in tackling that challenge.
When I was in Nigeria I heard from the Nigerian Home Secretary that the system often contributed to family break-up rather than reunion. The people smugglers perpetuated the lie that people who could get a teenage child to the UK would be able to follow. In fact, it has always been the principle of family reunion that children must travel to where their families are and not the other way round.
In terms of the deceit and the appalling treatment of so many people, I have heard heartbreaking stories of the way that individuals have been treated by these evil people smugglers. That has only redoubled my determination to render their business model redundant.
This point goes to the heart of the intervention a moment ago from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central: the measures in the Bill do not just stand alone—it is not just about these measures. Tackling the problem requires a strong and co-ordinated response that also involves our international partners. For example, the collaboration through the arrangement we have with the French is very important contextually in tackling this issue. Clearly, supporting French law enforcement to try and stop some of the crossings happening in the first place is crucial, and the evidence is clear that that support is having a positive effect in achieving that goal.
Our international diplomacy is also important, because we want to send out a clear message that human rights must be respected and upheld across the world. The measures in the Bill, as important as they are, are not the only element in responding to these huge challenges. That international collaboration is very important as well, as is our diplomatic work.
I thank the Minister for giving way; he has been very generous. It is extraordinary to hear a Minister trash their own department’s equality impact assessment and point out its inadequacies.
That is exactly what the Minister did. However, my question is around family reunion visas, which he mentioned. The number of family reunion visas granted in the UK fell by nearly 10% in the last year for which numbers were available. Will he agree to a review of the system to look at some of the issues around entitlements for those other than dependants or spouses?
I will take that away to look at it. I refer the hon. Gentleman to my previous point in trying to address the matter of family reunion. I am conscious that in his earlier remarks he raised the particular case of an Afghan family. I will also go away and speak about that to the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, who is the Minister responsible for Operation Warm Welcome and our refugee policy in relation to Afghanistan. I undertake to take that point away and ensure that my hon. Friend is aware of it. It is very important and I will do that. It is crucial that that happens. I ask that the hon. Gentleman leave that with me, and that will happen later today.
To finish on this point, the powers under clause 10 enable the Secretary of State to differentiate in respect of family reunion. It is important to recognise that the power is flexible and will not be used where a refusal of family reunion would breach our international obligations. The policy will be set out, again, in guidance and in rules, but I thought it was important to get that point on the record. Suffice it to say that of course this Government will always act in accordance with our international obligations and the law.
With all that in mind, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the amendment.
I am slightly frustrated—actually, pretty frustrated—that we have not managed to tease out more about what the Government intend. We will no doubt come back to the point about article 31 justifying the provision.
We are being asked to hand hugely significant and broad powers to the Home Secretary, and we are being told, “Well, everything will be set out in immigration rules and guidance,” when we all know that scrutiny and opportunities to amend such provisions are incredibly limited. Let me ask the Minister this: what more do I know now about the Government’s intentions than I knew before half-past 11 this morning? Not very much. I am not sure I even understand the answer in relation to no recourse to public funds. I do not see how a person who is a refugee would still be on section 95 support; having been recognised as a refugee, such a person would obviously move on. At least I get the sense that there would be some sort of automatic decision not to put an NRPF condition on them, but I am none the wiser about how some of the other powers will be used.
As I have said previously, I am very keen to be helpful to the Committee, so if I may, I will study Hansard to look back at the questions that the hon. Gentleman posed on this matter. I will gladly write to him to clarify the position and try to provide further detail.
It would be hugely helpful for Members of this House, ahead of Report, and for Members of the other place, who will be wanting to scrutinise the Government’s intentions, to be told more about that support and about precisely how the clauses on family reunion can be consistent with article 8, and the answers to my questions about leave. That was the purpose of tabling the amendments, so if the Minister undertakes to do that, there is no reason to put anything to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 13, line 34, at end insert—
“(7A) An Afghan national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution by the Taliban is not to be treated as a Group 2 refugee and in particular—
(a) must not face a restriction on their leave to enter compared to group 1 refugees;
(b) must have access to indefinite leave to remain on the same basis as group 1 refugees;
(c) must not have no recourse to public funds conditions attached to any leave to enter or remain given to them; and
(d) must have access to family reunion on the same basis as group 1 refugees.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from treating Afghan refugees at risk of persecution by the Taliban as Group 2 refugees.
I can be brief, because a lot of the territory in relation to Afghanistan was covered in the previous debate. Again, Members across this House have been forceful, powerful advocates. Whatever our views on the manner of the withdrawal, its timing and so on, I do not doubt for a minute that every Member of the House intended to ensure the UK did what could be done to assist the people of Afghanistan. The problem with this Bill, as far as I can see, is that that generosity of spirit, that determination to help, seems to come to a shuddering halt should a person from Afghanistan end up claiming asylum in this country.
The amendment confronts hon. Members with, to use a Home Office expression, a face behind the case. We are talking about creating an exemption where the Home Office has assessed a person’s case and accepted that they are at risk of persecution from the Taliban in Afghanistan, such that it will not be permissible for the Secretary of State to discriminate against them—to make them subject to no recourse to public funds, to deny them family reunion, to refuse to give them settlement after five years and to perpetrate all the other discriminations that the clause allows. In a sense, it would be nonsensical to create an exception only for such people, but the amendment is designed simply to confront hon. Members with the fact that that is who we are talking about. Those discriminations will apply to these people, whom we have all been championing, just as they would to any other asylum seeker. I do not need to say any more than that, but I will press the amendment to a Division.
I do not think it would be appropriate for clause 10 to include an exemption from group 2 refugee conditions for Afghan national refugees. Although I have great sympathy for the plight of Afghan citizens who are fleeing the brutal reign of the Taliban, a blanket exemption for Afghan citizens who are recognised as refugees would be inappropriate for two reasons.
First, we cannot exempt any particular nationality, because situations of conflict and repression are fluid. There may come a time when that country is no longer unsafe and those from it who claim asylum are no longer genuinely in need of protection; I am sure that is something that we all wish to see. If there were still an exemption for them in primary legislation, it would serve as a huge pull factor to the UK for migrants seeking to claim asylum in order to work or otherwise make a new life in the UK.
Secondly, any blanket exemption would inevitably lead to people posing as Afghans in an attempt to benefit from the hon. Gentleman’s very principled generosity. That would, perversely, prevent us from protecting Afghans who were genuinely in need. I am sure hon. Members agree that that would be in no one’s interest.
I wonder whether the Minister agrees or disagrees with the Conservative former Immigration Minister, the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), who said in August:
“There are times and places where we should be strict with asylum applications. Afghanistan today is the exact opposite. We should take anyone who can make a case”.
I simply cannot in all conscience support anyone of any nationality putting their lives in the hands of evil people-smuggling gangs, and I think that that would be the unintended consequence of what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve. I do not doubt the generosity of spirit behind the amendment, but I do not think that putting it into the Bill is the right thing to do. It is right that we continue to develop the safe and legal route as quickly as possible, and make sure that people are able to come here. I cannot, in all good conscience, support an amendment that would simply afford opportunity to evil criminal gangs. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw it.
The Afghan resettlement scheme would have a cap of 5,000 per year. If that 5,000 limit had been met, anyone who came here via other routes would be deemed to be in one of the group 2 categories, and they would have fewer protections. On guidance, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark mentioned, the issue around how they would be treated would certainly be in play. They would be treated as group 2, and we must bear in mind that the guidance would say that they could not return to Afghanistan. Does the Minister have any comments on that?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the intervention. I think there is a timing issue here. We are debating this Bill in Committee today and we have several more weeks of Committee, and then Report and Third Reading in the Commons, followed by Lords consideration in full, and consideration of any amendments that those in the other place wish to send to us. As a result, we are some way away from this Bill becoming law. By that time, I fully expect that the safe and legal route will have been established and people will be able to avail themselves of it. The overriding point is that all cases are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into proper account all the relevant considerations.
The Minister says that he hopes that, by the time the Bill is enacted, the safe and legal route will be up and running. We are talking about Afghanistan. Does he mean that, by the time it is enacted, all the safe and legal routes that are required in different parts of the world where people need to flee to seek protection will be and up and running, or just the Afghan route?
Amendment 15 is very specifically about Afghanistan. I would not wish to invoke your wrath, Ms McDonagh, by going wider than that, so I must keep my remarks to Afghanistan. The point that I have made stands, and I reiterate that cases are considered on a case-by-case basis, as the hon. Lady would rightly expect.
The Minister has been very generous in giving way. I am particularly concerned about this. He is suggesting that a safe route is available, when the Government guidance currently says not to make applications for family reunion for Afghanistan cases. Perhaps he can explore that issue in more detail with his hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), who is the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, and get back to us—certainly before Report.
I am very happy to reflect the sentiment in my conversations with my ministerial colleague. As I was about to say before I took the intervention from the shadow spokesperson, I urge SNP Members to withdraw their amendment.
For the reasons given by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central in particular, I do not accept the argument about creating incentives. All we are asking is for Afghan asylum seekers to be treated in a few months’ time precisely in the same way as they are treated now, to be given a fair hearing, and, once they are recognised as refugees, to be treated in the same way as other refugees.
I have a second quick point before I conclude. Towards the end of his speech, the Minister referred a couple of times to things being looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is very important that, when we get to the clause stand part debate, he expands on what exactly he means by that. From what I heard from the Home Secretary, my understanding was that clause 10 would apply to Afghans in precisely the same way as it would to everybody else. The Minister’s reference to a case-by-case basis seems to suggest some sort of discretion, whether between nationalities or between individual cases. He has opened up a whole series of questions about how exactly the scheme is going to operate. Perhaps we can revisit that during the clause stand part debate.
I agree with the Minister that it does not make sense for legislation to carve out a particular nationality. However, what makes even less sense, as I said at the outset, is for all of us to be champions of Afghans so long as they are—
I am keen to clarify that point. The point that I was making was exactly as I alluded to earlier: that, for example, we would not return someone to a country that is fundamentally unsafe.
I am grateful for that clarification. I had thought that the Minister was saying that the powers in clause 10 would be applied on a case-by-case basis depending on individual circumstances, rather than what seems to be suggested by the clause: depending on their mode of arrival. He has clarified that what the Home Secretary said was correct: it will apply to Afghans, Uyghurs and everybody else in the same way.
Amendment 15 is not the most perfect or wonderful amendment, but even less perfect are the provisions in the Bill that would see Afghan asylum seekers stripped of public funds, stripped of family reunion rights and treated, frankly, abysmally. I would therefore like to put amendment 15 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I will take the amendments in reverse order. To go back to part of Tuesday’s debate about Parliament, rather than the Executive, taking back control, nobody—regardless of whether they were for or against anything else I have said this morning— could deny that these are sweeping powers, with next to no limits or constraints on how they may be used. In theory, the Secretary of State could put everyone up in palaces or prisons, expand or restrict family reunion rights, and give 50 years’ leave or 50 days’ leave. Because it can all be done by changes to the immigration rules, there might as well be no oversight at all.
The process is even weaker than the negative procedure that we use for some statutory instruments. Not since 2008 has a statement of changes to the rules been properly debated by MPs. Although the other place has a better record of holding debates, 87 changes to the immigration rules have been made since 2008 without the procedure being fully invoked. Even if either House disapproves the changes within 40 days, all that means is that the Home Secretary has to lay further rules, making any changes that she thinks appropriate. In short, these are massive powers that could fundamentally change the asylum system in the UK. More important, they will have a profound impact on hundreds of thousands of people. The powers need proper oversight, which is essentially what amendment 97 supplies.
Amendment 96 is designed to retrieve a sliver of hope from an otherwise horrendous clause. Even if the Government are hellbent on proceeding down this road, by their own logic they surely cannot apply these changes and disincentives retrospectively to somebody who has already claimed asylum. The Minister says that the Bill is about disincentives to stop people crossing, or coming by other dangerous routes. I do not think that that will work, or that it is right, appropriate or ethical to do that. Although the Government take the opposite view, they cannot possible argue that we can disincentivise someone who is already here.
There are 70,000 people in the asylum system, many of whom claimed for refugee status many months ago. It is a source of stress and anxiety, according to organisations that work with refugees, such as the British Red Cross, that the threat of being put into limbo, and of family separation and destitution—all the things that we have just spoken about—will hang over them if the provisions of the Bill apply to them.
I hope that I can give the hon. Gentleman the reassurance he seeks in relation to amendment 96. It has never been our intention to apply differentiation retrospectively.
That is a hugely welcome assurance, which many people will be very pleased to hear. The Minister can say in his response why he objects to that going in the Bill, but, as I say, it will make a profound difference to 70,000 lives, and to family members further afield.
I reassure the Committee that amendment 96, which seeks to ensure that only asylum claims made after commencement are considered under clause 10, is not needed. For many good reasons, not least for purposes of practicality, we have always intended to apply clause 10 only to asylum claims made after commencement. The position is similar in respect of amendment 97, which seeks to ensure that any regulations required to implement the policy should be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament. Clause 10(8) is not a regulation-making power; rather, it is a power to make immigration rules. In any event, the amendment is not needed since the rules are subject to their own parliamentary procedure, set out in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Parliamentarians may pray against them within a 40-day period. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. After a day and a half of debate, I feel I have achieved one small positive, which is reassurance in relation to retrospective application of clause 10. That is welcome. I have moved millions of amendments to Bills over the years in relation to scrutiny and oversight of immigration legislation, and they have all been rejected, so I am not going to press this to a vote. However, I make the point that if we parliamentarians are serious about scrutinising legislation and profound changes that have an impact on people’s lives, we have to come up with better ways of scrutinising what goes on in the immigration system. I shall leave that debate for another day. Having made my point, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Eighth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate on his comprehensive critique of clause 10. I want to add only a few points on what is clearly at the heart of the Government’s approach in this Bill: seeking to create a hostile environment for refugees and splitting them into the two groups of which my hon. Friend spoke.
I was interested to hear the Minister talk earlier about the Bill as just one part of a multifaceted approach to tackling the problem, of which international diplomacy was at the core. I would welcome his reflections, when he comes to make his remarks, on how far he thinks our position in international diplomacy is strengthened by a Bill that the UNHCR, the guardian of the 1951 convention, denounces in clear terms as
“The creation of an unlawful two-tier system in which most refugees are denied rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and essential to their integration”.
I think that our position in terms of how we play our cards in international diplomacy will be weakened by setting ourselves against the international community. This proposal appals all organisations that have worked with those coming to our country to flee war, terror and persecution, and Labour shares their view. However, I appreciate that this Government, in contrast with previous Conservative Administrations, revel in setting themselves against the international consensus and are happy tearing up treaties to which they have been signatories.
We should examine the clause in the context of the Government’s own objectives. They say it is part of a deterrent to break the business model of people smugglers by dissuading those seeking asylum from taking what the Government consider to be irregular routes. We are all agreed on the objective of breaking the appalling business model of people smuggling and we all agree that we want to end the situation that leads people to take the most desperate journeys across the channel. As I said earlier, and clearly the Minister struggled to respond to that point, even the Government’s own impact assessment says,
“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited.”
I know that he had a problem with evidence when we were talking about clause 9 under part 1.
The hon. Gentleman will get a very nice long letter.
The issue is that we inherited a ruinous backlog from the Labour Government, and we have gone through a multitude of challenges recently—covid, for example, which brought the very challenging situation of working from home. I understand—I am a constituency MP like everyone else. We all do our bit and write to the Home Office. We get frustrated by the time that certain cases can take to process, but ultimately, we are trying to fix the system. That is one strand, and there are other parts of the Bill that we will examine, such as offshoring, which I support. There are other methods to help to deal with the backlog and speed up the processing of asylum claims.
I am more than happy to welcome genuine asylum seekers; what I am unhappy about is the illegal economic migrants continually crossing our channel, coming to our shores and costing millions of pounds to the British taxpayer, and the lawyers obsessed with taking money out of the British purse to stop people being deported. Let us not forget, there are convicted criminals dragged off the plane at the last minute, leaving the UK taxpayer to pick up the tab. They are criminals who should not be here and rightly should be deported. Sadly, I see too many Labour Members celebrating those lawyers’ work to prevent those people from being deported from our country. It is a very sad state of affairs to see those letters written to the Home Secretary. I hope clause 10 will stay as is and will be a part of a wider strategy to deter.
First, I will deal with the two amendments that we have debated. Amendment 87 seeks to make implementation of the differentiated asylum system contingent on issuing a report on its impact on local authorities and devolved Administrations. The report must also be passed by both Houses. Clearly, immigration is a reserved matter, so it is for Westminster to set policy in that regard. Local authorities and devolved Administrations have not only taken part in the public consultation, where they have shared substantive views, but have been included in targeted, ongoing engagement with the Home Office to discuss issues and implementation. I am afraid I do not see what further value such a report could offer, other than to delay the implementation of this important policy.
Amendment 161 seeks to ensure that nothing in the Bill or this particular section authorises any treatment or action that is inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention. This amendment is unnecessary because we are already under an obligation to meet our international obligations and, as I have continually set out, intend to do so in the Bill. Furthermore, section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 prevents us, in implementing this policy, from doing anything in the immigration rules that is contrary to the refugee convention. If we were to include such a provision in the Bill, the effect may be to suggest that in any other legislation where it is not included, the intention is not to comply with such obligations. I am certain hon. Members will agree that is neither desirable nor intended.
The Minister has rather blithely dismissed our concern about the potential illegality of the measure. What is it that the Minister knows that UNHCR, Amnesty International, British Red Cross, UN Refugee Agency, Salvation Army, Refugee Council, Children’s Society, Law Society, RAMP or the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project, We Belong, Families Together Coalition, Refugee Law Initiative, British Overseas Territories Citizenship Campaign, Human Trafficking Foundation, Reprieve, Women for Refugee Women, British Association of Social Workers, Trades Union Congress, Mermaids, Stand with Hong Kong, One Strong Voice, Rights Lab, Public Law Project, Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, Migrant Voice, Every Child Protected Against Trafficking or ECPAT UK, Justice and Peace, Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, Statewatch, Say it Loud Club, Logistics UK, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, European Network on Statelessness, National Justice Project, Asylum Seekers Advocacy Group, Helen Bamber Foundation, Modern Slavery Policy Unit, Centre for Social Justice, and Justice do not? They all say it is unlawful—what do they not know? Why does the Minister think they are all wrong?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for intervening again. I will come on to his point substantively when I speak to clause stand part. Meanwhile, I invite the Opposition Members to withdraw the amendments.
I do not intend to give a long stand part speech, because we have had a wide-ranging and substantive debate on the clause. It is fair to say that many views have been expressed. I do not remotely doubt their sincerity, but I hope that that acknowledgement of sincerity is extended to all Members, regardless of their views on the matter. When Members come to this House, at the forefront of their minds is wanting to do what they believe to be right. Members on the Government side have equally strongly and sincerely held views on the matters that we are debating, and we believe that the approach we are advocating is the right one.
I am quite happy to say that all Members are doing what we think is right, though of course we might think each other misguided. I am concerned that the Minister is not going to go into detail about the issues—
I thought the Minister was suggesting that the debate would no longer go on.
That is precisely the point that I wanted to focus on before concluding deliberation of the clause. Views have been expressed about differentiation in the way that we are proposing and about its compatibility with our international obligations. I do not agree with the assessment expressed by various Opposition Members: I argue that the differentiation policy is in line with our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. Of course, it is for Parliament to determine precisely what is meant by our international obligations, subject only to the principles of treaty interpretation in the Vienna convention. That is precisely what we are doing in the Bill.
I want to say something briefly about people seeking asylum in the first safe country that they reach, the importance of that principle and its relevance in the international context, because there has been a lot of debate on the issue. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country that they reach. That is without question the fastest route to safety. The first-safe-country principle is widely recognised internationally, and has been for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South alluded to in his intervention on the shadow Minister, who slightly surprised me by being so willing to condemn the approach taken by the last Labour Government on that principle. It is a long-established principle, which successive Governments have had at the forefront of their minds when looking at and legislating on such matters.
Where does the Minister find this principle and what is it derived from? The overwhelming majority of refugees do claim asylum in the first safe country that they come to. Where exactly is he deriving the principle from?
One thing that occurred to me throughout the debate was why any Member of this House would feel that it was necessary for anyone to get into a small boat on the French coastline in order to come to the United Kingdom. France is without doubt a safe country, and I like to think that we could recognise that across the House. Those journeys are completely unnecessary against that backdrop. I am staggered that that point is not recognised more widely. Based on some of the remarks we have heard, one might think that that was not the case. In my mind and those of my colleagues, there is absolutely no need for anyone to get into a small boat to try and cross the English channel or to take irregular journeys.
On the point about what this relates to, the principle is fundamental in the common European asylum system. Without enforcement of it, we simply encourage criminal gangs and smugglers to continue to exploit vulnerable people, and I make no apology for my determination, and that of the Home Secretary and the Government as a whole, to bring these evil criminal gangs to justice and to stop the dangerous channel crossings. We have to stop them, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North alluded to. We have a moral obligation to do that, and that is what the measures in the Bill, and the wider package of measures that we talk about very often in the House, are seeking to achieve.
The clause does no such thing. It actually encourages people to make unsafe journeys and to contact criminal gangs, because there are no safe routes. That is the crux of it. If safe routes were available, fewer people would make the journeys, but nothing that the Government have said creates any safe routes. Since Dublin III ended, there are no safe routes for people to come to the UK to claim asylum.
I am afraid that I just do not accept that characterisation. As I have said on several occasions in Committee, we continue to resettle genuine refugees directly from regions of conflict and instability, which has protected 25,000 people in the last six years—more than any other European country. It is central to our policy that we advocate safe and legal routes and put them at the heart of our policy making. I have talked about several of them. Of course, this is something that we keep under constant review as the international situation evolves and as needs require. I have no doubt that that will continue to be the approach that we take—establishing routes that are appropriate to the circumstances that we find ourselves in.
Earlier today, I asked about safe and legal routes. The Minister said that by the time the Bill is enacted, a safe and legal route from Afghanistan will be up and running. I asked him about the other ones. Did he mean just the one route to which he referred, or did he mean routes across all countries where they might be needed? He said he could not answer at that time because the Chair would be annoyed, as we were talking only about the amendment on Afghanistan. Will he now take the opportunity to tell me whether those safe and legal routes will be available to anyone who requires them, to prevent them from making dangerous journeys, before the Bill is enacted?
I respectfully say to the hon. Lady that there are routes in place that people can avail themselves of in order to seek sanctuary in this country.
We have now debated that with some regularity and in some detail. I do not intend to recover that ground, but of course we continue to offer family reunion, which has seen a further 29,000 people come to the UK over the past six years. As I say, the context in which we are debating these matters in Committee is that people are risking and losing their lives by making dangerous crossings of the channel. I argue that we need to do everything in our power to stop the criminal gangs and to break their business model.
Where people seek to join family or work in the UK, they should make an application via the appropriate safe and legal route. We are committed to safe and legal routes, which are the cornerstone of our immigration policy. They are one part of, but very central to, what we seek to achieve through the Bill, through our direct engagement with the French, and in our wider diplomatic programmes. With that in mind, I ask the Committee to agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.
I would like to respond briefly to the debate, which has been wide-ranging. I have to express some frustration, because the Minister said he would address in detail the reasons he thought the provision is in compliance with the refugee convention. I do not think he said anything at all about that. I appreciate that he has already undertaken to write several letters. Could he write another that explains how article 23 of the refugee convention, which requires equal treatment with nationals in access to social security, can possibly be consistent with a clause allowing the Secretary of State to treat people unequally? All the points we have made about the lawfulness of the Bill have not been addressed. I would be grateful if the Minister would do so.
During the debate we lost sight a couple of times of what we are talking about, which is people who are refugees. Sometimes people refer to genuine refugees, and we are talking about genuine refugees, who, by definition, have been assessed by the Home Office as such. The clause enables the Secretary of State to essentially treat them like trash—to withdraw access to public funds, to leave them in limbo and keep them separate from their families. While we support all reasonable measures to stop the crossings, we draw the line at treating the victims of these people smugglers like trash.
In actual fact, the British public are with us. Public opinion polling shows that people are sympathetic to refugees, and I think they will be upset when they find out that this is how refugees will be treated. I ask the Minister to engage with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the legality of the measures. These are hugely important concerns for a number of reasons, so I hope he will engage with him.
I have a meeting coming up with him in which I fully suspect we will talk about these measures.
I have no doubt about it. That is appreciated. On the effectiveness of these measures, reference has been made to how this would disincentivise crossings. Again, there is no Home Office analysis to show that that would be the case. In fact, Home Office analysis is to the contrary. Where is the analysis to show that disincentives will work? We need to see analysis of what the Home Office think the incentives that make people do this are. As we have said, it is things like family, a history with the United Kingdom or speaking the language. None of those will be changed by the Bill. The Secretary of State will not change the incentives that bring people here in the first place.
The numbers are challenging, but in the grand scheme of things the number of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom is tiny. Most folk do not claim asylum here. That is not the issue. Yes, we want to stop them making dangerous journeys, because none of us want to see lives put at risk, but what has been proposed here goes way beyond what is acceptable.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
It is good to see you in the Chair again, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of amendment 98 and the other amendments in this group, but against the clause standing part of the Bill.
Clause 11 brings us to the question of how we accommodate asylum seekers, including, of course, the Uyghur, the persecuted Christian and the Syrian I keep referring to. Precisely how they are accommodated can have a profound impact on them. When I had the pleasure to be co-opted on to the Public Accounts Committee for a day back in October 2020 for an evidence session with the permanent secretary of the Home Office, I asked him whether there was a commitment at the Home Office to return to a reliance on community dispersal and a target to end hotel use by a certain date, and to end the use of military barracks as detention centres. He responded:
“There is not a target date, but we are obviously keen to do those things as soon as possible. Both those measures—the use of hotels and the use of other assets owned by the Government, including by the Ministry of Defence—are temporary, to take account of the surge in demand.”
He went on to outline various measures through which that would happen, including faster decisions and fairer distribution models. When he came before the Home Affairs Committee recently, he maintained that that was still the Department’s intention.
It would be reassuring to hear from the Minister today that he and the Secretary of State intend to commit to that model and that goal. Community dispersal is definitely the best system, although I accept that its current operation is far from ideal, as reports from the Home Affairs Committee have made clear. The system gives local authorities immense responsibilities, but few powers and even less by way of resources with which to fulfil those responsibilities. At the same time, significant problems with inappropriate and poor-quality accommodation have been identified.
We need a Bill that addresses those challenges. If this Bill did so, it would undoubtedly expand the capacity in dispersed accommodation. If it did that, the Bill would have our support and I would stop defending councils that did not participate in dispersal. To that end, amendment 17 calls for the Secretary of State to report each year on the types of institution in which asylum seekers are being housed and the steps that are being taken towards realising the goal of maximising the use of dispersal accommodation, including the financial support being offered to councils. Surely the Minister cannot find anything objectionable in that, if maximising the use of dispersal accommodation is genuinely the Government’s goal.
The problem is that the Bill tends to suggest, as does a lot of other evidence, that the Government are not pursuing that goal and are more interested in taking a different route. The Minister has to explain why this clause exists if the Government want to opt for dispersal accommodation as their central goal. The available evidence tells us that large-scale institutional accommodation centres are, by a distance, a disastrous alternative. That is putting it far too nicely when it comes to what happened at Napier Barracks, and yet correspondence from the Home Secretary to the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and the explanatory memorandum to the special development order that extended Napier’s use, expressly suggests that Napier is supposed to be treated as a model or a pilot for the accommodation centres that feature in the Bill.
That is a truly terrifying path to go down, as the totally inappropriate nature of Napier Barracks is well documented in numerous reports and the High Court judgment, which was described as finding that
“the arrangements and conditions in which asylum seekers were held, posed significant risks that their physical and mental health would be harmed.”
According to the findings, Napier Barracks was overcrowded and felt like a prison. For residents, the environment was reminiscent of previous experiences of detention in places where they were tortured. Dormitory accommodation meant there was no privacy or quiet, and sleep was interrupted repeatedly. Cleaning was poor, and the inadequate shower facilities were frequently broken, unusable, dirty or unsanitary. They were also communal, which was particularly difficult for those with visible scarring from torture.
The all-party parliamentary group on immigration detention has highlighted extensive testimony that backs up the judgment of the High Court. The group has identified problems with poor Home Office identification and safeguarding of vulnerable people, and repeated instances of self-harm and attempted suicide on site —in short,
“profoundly negative impacts…on the mental health of residents, many of whom were already vulnerable.”
That all shows precisely why we should not go down this route, and why this clause should not stand part of the Bill.
Most of the remaining amendments in this group challenge the Minister to outline more about what the Home Office has in mind on how these centres will look and operate. Amendment 98 poses a question to the Minister. Can he tell us who will be placed in these accommodation centres? Will it be women and children? Will it be people with physical disabilities? Will it be individuals who are suspected to be survivors of modern slavery or trafficking? Will it be survivors of torture? Will it be LGBT people?
A Home Office policy document suggests that such groups should not be accommodated at Napier, so I hope it will not be difficult for the Government to agree to such an amendment. However, there is a challenge; as I alluded to earlier, there have been multiple examples of where that policy does not appear to have been appropriately adhered to, and we require reassurance that that will be done properly.
I hope I can provide the hon. Gentleman with some clarification at this early juncture. We have no intention to accommodate children in accommodation centres. More broadly, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, as set out in policy, in relation to other individuals. I hope that gives him the assurance he seeks.
It gives me reassurance that children will not be housed in such accommodation, and I think all hon. Members will welcome that. However, we are again being asked, essentially, to legislate blind. As parliamentarians, we are repeatedly told that all sorts of important information will be set out in guidance and in immigration rules, but before we give the Government the power to go ahead, we must least be told what they intend to put in that guidance and those immigration rules.
All sorts of other questions that I have asked—about people with physical or mental health problems, and survivors of modern slavery and trafficking—have yet to be answered. How soon do the Government want to put these people in such accommodation? I want to hear the answers before the Committee is asked to vote on whether the Bill should contain the protection that we propose.
Amendment 103—it is probably redundant in light of the Minister’s welcome reassurance—enables us to ask how, if there were to be children in accommodation centres, those children would be educated. Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 means that most children in such centres cannot attend state schools. This amendment would remove that restriction, but I am pleased to hear that that question will not arise.
I would like to confirm that that is not relevant, as we are not proposing to accommodate anyone under section 17.
I am grateful, because that clarifies the issue. Amendment 104 is in the name of our Labour colleagues, but it has our full support. It makes the point that it is essential that accommodation centres are not de facto detention centres or prisons, in the way that Napier has been, with basic liberties and freedoms more theoretical than real. It raises a crucial question about how we can ensure that such places have accountability and oversight.
The Government will be using sections of the 2002 Act that are not yet in force to implement many of their policy goals, but there is still dubiety about precisely which ones. Section 33 of the Act would have created advisory groups for each accommodation centre, with powers to hear complaints from residents and report to the Home Office. Is that section to be commenced? If not, what alternatives do the Government propose to ensure that such centres are subject to appropriate oversight? I will leave it to the shadow Minister to flesh out that point.
Amendments 102 and 160 take us back to how the Home Office engages—or, rather, does not engage—with other tiers of Government. The Minister was perhaps asleep at the wheel earlier, because his answer was short on detail about engagement with local authorities, and in particular, the devolved Administrations. I accept that asylum is reserved, but these institutions touch on all sorts of powers and services that are the remit of devolved Governments and Parliaments or local authorities, including planning policy and the provision of health, social or other welfare services and education services. In particular, consistent with our championing of local government autonomy and the idea that local government should be seen as a partner rather than an assistant of the Home Office, amendment 102 demands that these centres not be built in a local authority’s territory without consent from that local authority.
The way in which local councils were treated in relation to both Napier and Penally was disgraceful. The Home Office did not even consult Folkestone & Hythe District Council and Kent County Council about the extension of planning permission at Napier because, it said, of urgency, and yet as the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee notes, it must have known for at least 12 months that planning permission would have expired. It had 12 months in which to carry out consultation, but that was still the excuse.
As I said at the outset, we pose all these questions with a view to ascertaining what precisely the Government intend and why there are not greater constraints in the Bill, but ultimately we believe that this is not the right direction of travel. We support community dispersal—improving that system, making it work better, and involving more councils. We hope that the Government come back to that view and make that system work instead.
That is deeply concerning and shows that the Government have not learned any lessons from Napier.
Before I come to the specifics of the amendment, I will first set out exactly why the Government’s record on Napier barracks, alongside the provisions in clause 11, sets such alarm bells ringing. In doing so, I will demonstrate why the amendment is so necessary.
Organisations from the refugee sector that have worked with people held in Napier have identified and documented the following conditions:
“A pattern of spiralling mental health among people placed at Napier. Many people arrive already struggling with self-harm and/ or suicidal ideation, so this is a profoundly harmful context for them.
Chronic sleep deprivation among residents at Napier.
Conditions that are cold and dirty and afford no opportunity for privacy or social distancing.
An isolated and prison-like setting.
A total lack of mental health support onsite; very minimal healthcare onsite, and problems for residents in accessing healthcare in the community.
A sense among residents, in line with HMIP’s observation, of being trapped on site.
Profound vulnerabilities and histories of trauma among residents at Napier are not always obvious on the surface and can be difficult for individuals to disclose in general. Napier is then a very poor context for disclosure, as the prison-like setting is not conducive to building trust. We are therefore concerned that it is not possible to create a screening mechanism for Napier that would pick up all relevant vulnerabilities.
There is very little communication with residents about their asylum case.
Additionally, it is very difficult for individuals to access adequate legal advice, and they frequently go ahead with asylum interviews without having consulted a legal adviser. Virtually no one placed at Napier is able to access face to face meetings with legal advisers, and this seriously obstructs identification and disclosure of trauma.”
Residents of Napier and Penally who have given evidence to the APPG on immigration detention have described the Napier and Penally sites as feeling “prison-like”. Prison conditions have a traumatising effect on people who are already vulnerable as a result of previous experiences that have forced them to seek protection. Ministers must surely be aware that there are bound to be serious concerns about the potential use of such draconian accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men.
I might be able to help the hon. Gentleman. The accommodation centres that we are proposing are not detention centres. Individuals can leave the centres at any time—they may have obtained accommodation with friends or family, for example.
I welcome the Minister’s comments, but it would have been helpful if that information had been provided beforehand, because we are still in the dark about what the accommodation centres will be like.
May I repeat the point that I made earlier about the policy approach that we intend to adopt in accommodation centres, which is that children will not be accommodated in them?
I was really glad to hear the Minister say that, but then my cynical friend the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark pointed out that this is not about the intention but about making it crystal clear in the legislation—and perhaps the way to do that is to accept amendment 98. I hear what the Minister says, and yet still we have babies accommodated in a mother and baby unit. I have been fighting since January to get them out and have been told, “Okay, we will take them out of there.” There is a fantastic campaign called Freedom to Crawl, which points out that the rooms are so tiny that the development of these tiny babies—some of them becoming toddlers—is stifled because they do not have the freedom or the room to crawl. The Minister can tell me that they are not going to house children in those centres, but that is what is currently happening. If he thinks that is wrong, I would be glad to have his support to put an end to it.
I am talking very specifically about accommodation centres in relation to the clause. If the hon. Lady writes to me with the specifics of the mother and baby unit in her local area, I will take that away and look at it.
I know that we have said “another letter” a number of times today, but I appreciate that offer. I understand that the Minister might not have heard of the unit because it is in Glasgow—although his predecessor might have known about it—but I would be happy for him to look at it.
Along with Alf Dubs—Lord Dubs—I co-chair the all-party parliamentary group on refugees. We recently held a meeting to look at types of accommodation centres. We had a guest, a former politician from Belarus, who told us a story about why such accommodation does not work. He had to leave Belarus for political reasons in 2017. He had no choice. He was in serious fear of his and his wife’s safety. He said, “I am very grateful for the help and support that I have had, and I appreciate Britain taking me in.” He was really appreciative and not complaining, but he said now that he is settled he wants to make this point as much as he can so that other people do not go through what he went through when he initially got here.
They arrived in London and were put in shared accommodation in a hostel called Barry House, a big house full of, as he described it, “people like ourselves” who were seeking asylum. The people who lived in the house were from different backgrounds and cultures with different ideas about lots of issues. He said the staff did their best to make it comfortable, but it was not really possible to be comfortable. During the six months he was there, every day started and ended with some sort of scandal or argument. He described it as a powder keg, and we can understand why, because many of those people had post-traumatic stress disorder, and many of them spoke different languages, so we can imagine how stressful that would be. He said, “We tried to keep ourselves to ourselves—I couldn’t always tell what the arguments were about”, but he could feel the stress coming off other people. He said it was difficult for the staff to look after so many people; one thing he mentioned was everyone’s different dietary requirements, due to a number of things, including culture. He said the staff tried their best to provide a neutral menu, which meant that nobody was happy, but of course they did not feel they could complain, because they were grateful that they were no longer in their previous situation.
We have talked about not housing people with disabilities in that kind of accommodation, as mentioned in amendment 98. This gentleman had diabetes and is also a wheelchair user, and he said his health suffered because of the diabetes and he could not get access to the type of food he needs to maintain his insulin levels. He talked about using the toilets and said there was a limited number he could use, and because there were so many people in there, sometimes he had to wait for hours to use the few toilets he was able to get access to. He said it was like daily torture just trying to use the toilet, and a shower became a luxury for him.
This gentleman needed a specialist bed because of his mobility problems, but of course he could not get one because the rooms were so tiny he could not get one in. He said to me, “I knew I couldn’t go home. It wasn’t possible to go home. I thought I was safe, but I began to have suicidal thoughts at the centre. My life was at risk in Belarus, but it felt like my life was just disappearing in the UK.”
At the time, this gentleman said the stress and pressure was just enormous and that, had it not been for the Refugee Council in England, which provided a psychologist who gave him the belief he could get through it, he would not have survived. He said, “It was really difficult. I was a politician at home. I had what was considered a high standing in society, and I came here and I felt like absolutely nobody.” He said he was not underplaying everybody else’s problems; everybody else had serious problems, and when they are housed in accommodation together, the problems multiply. As I said, he described it as a powder keg and said that everybody had had negative experiences and everybody was scared of different things. Somebody is scared of noises, somebody is scared of something they see—people are all frightened, and that is the legacy of what they have been through. If they are put all together, it is extremely difficult.
I am strongly opposed to that type of accommodation, and the sooner people can get into community dispersal, the better. I know the Minister said he would ensure that the accommodation was not detention—or he said it would not be detention—but my question is whether it will feel like it. In the so-called mother and baby unit in Glasgow, for a time they were not allowed to leave without asking permission, and when they came back they were not allowed a key to the door. They had to wait, standing outside with their babies, until somebody came to let them in, which could be quite a while.
It is well documented how bad detention is for people seeking asylum who have mental health issues, which must be most asylum seekers after what they have been through. A lot of good work has been done by Professor Cornelius Katona and the Helen Bamber Foundation on mental health and detention. I am sure the Minister will be aware of the reports they have done.
I visited Dungavel detention centre in Scotland when I was a Member of the Scottish Parliament. I went in there and I felt like a criminal. They took my fingerprints and they walked about with big bunches of keys. Obviously, I was only there for a visit and I knew I was getting out again. The problem with detention is the indefinite nature of it.
The Minister said it is not indefinite accommodation, and if they can arrange other accommodation themselves they can get out, but I want to share the story of a mother and son I visited. The son was 10 years old. They were in detention, but I cannot help wondering whether we are going to find children in these accommodation centres feeling the same. At the age of 10, he said to his mum, “Mum, let’s not do this anymore. Please can we just find a way to let us die.” That is a 10-year-old boy. He is not dead now; things changed and their lives got a whole lot better, although he is very much impacted by his experience there. I am offering anecdotal evidence not to back up my claim, but to illustrate the detailed research that demonstrates that that child is not an isolated case. I know the Minister is saying that the intention is not for children to be placed in such accommodation—and certainly not in detention—but I want a guarantee that no children will be housed in these circumstances. I am sure he will agree with me that nobody wants to put children through what that child went through.
We have had an extensive and wide-ranging debate covering a host of areas. I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I turn to amendments 16, 17, 98 to 104, 130 and 160.
Amendment 16 seeks to disapply a key part of the clause. As I set out, one of the clause’s aims is to enable wider flexibility so that individuals are supported in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and other on-site support and arrangements are appropriate for their individual circumstances. We need flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre—the current maximum allowed by legislation is nine months—if experience shows it to be too short a period to provide consistent streamlined support. The amendment would prevent that. The Government take seriously our responsibilities to asylum seekers, and I reassure hon. Members that those accommodated in the centres will receive the necessary support to meet their essential living needs.
Will the Government not at least consider a maximum time limit on the duration of stay?
There have been references during the debate to detention. As I set out in an intervention previously, the accommodation centres are not detention. It is very important to establish that again. I want to make the point clear: anyone in one of those accommodation centres is able to leave at any time. It is important to re-establish that.
On the point about transparency and accountability in the centres and all accommodation used by the Home Office, will the Minister tell us whether the Bishop of Durham and other members of RAMP will be able to visit the centres? Perhaps the Minister will encourage them to be more open to visits by parliamentarians. Perhaps he will visit some of the accommodation used in Southwark, where people were told they should be moving and were not provided with interpreters, which has caused problems for them and for the wider community. Furthermore, covid outbreaks at hotel and hostel accommodation have put those people and the wider community at risk and placed the NHS under greater stress.
The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have not been in post for long—for just over a month—and the accommodation element of the Government’s work on immigration does not fall directly within my brief. However, I want to visit Napier, to see the situation myself and to understand the nature of the accommodation, and my officials are in the process of organising that. I might have done it sooner had we not had the Bill Committee proceedings over the next few weeks. I assure hon. Gentleman that that is something I very much want and intend to do, and I will certainly do it.
On the bishop visiting, I am not aware of any restrictions that would prevent that from happening. I hate to do this to the hon. Gentleman again, but if he furnishes me with the details of issues that have arisen, I will gladly ensure that that is looked at. As far as I can see, there is no good reason why those sorts of external visits cannot take place, but I would appreciate a little more detail.
May I push the Minister a little further on the issue? He has been at pains to say that the Government’s plan is not for the centres to be where people are detained. Will he therefore put on the record that people are free to come and go as they wish, and to receive visitors as they wish in the centres?
As I have said repeatedly now, my understanding is that people are under no obligation to remain within the accommodation facilities if they do not wish to do so. Of course, one of the reasons why people may be in an accommodation centre is that they are destitute. In such circumstances, we want to ensure that appropriate accommodation is in place for them to be accommodated and properly cared for in the centres. That is the intention behind the policy.
It is worth saying something about future oversight of accommodation centres, which has been alluded to. We will establish advisory groups for each centre. The group will visit the site, hear complaints and report any findings to the Secretary of State. I value the input that the advisory groups will have. It is important that we are responsive to the issues that arise and that where improvements can be made, they are made.
On the point about section 33 of the 2002 Act—the advisory groups—will the Minister tell us why such groups have not been established at other existing centres? It is all very well to make a promise about the future, but that section has not been used for existing examples.
There has been a very clear undertaking in Committee to establish those advisory groups, which is welcome. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that various transparency and accountability measures are in place for accommodation within our immigration system more broadly. That is right and proper but, again, where that can be enhanced and where we can bring greater transparency and improvement, we should do that. That is why I welcome the Government’s commitment with regard to oversight over the accommodation centres to ensure that there is regular engagement and that a clear channel is established through which to raise and take account of any issues.
Who, specifically, will be responsible for bringing forward the advisory group for each centre? Where do the responsibility and duty lie?
We are getting into very granular detail, as we would expect. I will need to take further advice on that specific point, which I will make clear to the Committee. However, our commitment to establish those advisory groups stands; those groups will play an important role in the oversight of the accommodation that we propose to bring about through the measures in the Bill. I give way to the hon. Gentleman again.
The Minister may regret that. He is asking us to accept on good will that the advisory groups will exist in the future, but he cannot tell us who will set them up, who will be on them, or why they have not been used in the past, despite being in the 2002 Act.
The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to know that the people who organise my diary have confirmed that I am set to visit Napier in the not-too-distant future. I have been able to be responsive to that point pretty quickly. I will make some progress on his other point, and I hope to be able to visit it very shortly to provide him with the clarification he requires before concluding my remarks. That is my undertaking to him: I will, for the Committee’s benefit, establish the mechanism that will enact our commitment.
Contrary to what amendment 17 seems to imply, it is not the Government’s intention to maximise the number of supported asylum seekers accommodated in flats and houses in the community. I understand that SNP Members take a different view on the matter, so I appreciate that that will come as a disappointment to them. However, it may be more suitable to house certain cohorts of asylum seekers in accommodation centres, and that is why we are setting them up. Where, for example, their protection claims are likely to be found inadmissible and they can quickly be removed to the appropriate third country, it is likely to be much more efficient to place them in an accommodation centre so that the practical arrangements for facilitating their departure, such as dealing with the necessary travel documentation, can take place at the site. That efficiency benefits the individuals as well as the overall asylum system.
One point that has been overlooked during the debate is that the Government’s whole intention around the policy we are seeking to establish is to deal with cases in a much quicker, speedier and—I would argue—more humane way. I think being able to give people certainty sooner is a good thing, and I would like to think that, whatever the outcome of individual cases, spending less time in any form of temporary accommodation can only be a good thing. It is important to recognise that the whole intention of the policy we are trying to develop is to get on with adjudicating on cases sooner.
It is not the type of accommodation that has led waiting times to spiral out of control. Only three years ago, there was a regular six-month target time—that was all within the dispersal system as well. Putting folk in the accommodation centres has no real impact on decision times. On the contrary, the Minister will know that since January, when the inadmissibility procedures came into place, virtually nobody has ended up being removed. It has just added six months to the waiting time; it has not accelerated anything. It is just a six-month block—that is it—so I do not understand where he is coming from.
In the context of the Bill and in the course of our debates, we will revisit the various challenges in our asylum system many times. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North made the point earlier that the system is broken, and there is a wide acceptance of that. Undoubtedly, that means that people are left in a state of uncertainty around their circumstances for longer than any of us in this House wish to see.
I can provide clarity to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark on his point about the duty to appoint the group. The answer is that section 33 of the 2002 Act requires the Secretary of State to establish advisory groups for accommodation centres. Napier has not been deemed an accommodation centre at the moment. It is contingency accommodation to manage the high demand for housing that we are undoubtably seeing as a result of the pressures in the system that are a direct consequence of the channel crossings. However, he has that certainty on that particular mechanism.
Given the merits of these advisory committees which the Minister has set out, and given that, in relation to Napier and Penally Barracks, the Home Office ignored advice from Public Health England in a pandemic, the weight that the advisory committee would carry really does matter. He said that Napier Barracks is still contingency accommodation rather than an accommodation centre. Would he consider setting up an advisory committee for Napier Barracks?
I will certainly take away the hon. Lady’s suggestion and feed that through to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), who shares responsibility for immigration with me at the Home Office.
At what point is a centre of accommodation such as Napier deemed an accommodation centre by the Home Office in order to get an advisory group set up? How long will Napier be used before it is acknowledged that it is an accommodation centre?
I dispute that interpretation of the situation at Napier, because Napier does not have the same wrap-around services that we envisage for accommodation centres. For example, the accommodation centres that we will seek to deliver will have significant caseworking functions built within them. That is a marked difference to Napier. Again, I am visiting Napier in a few weeks’ time and I will be interested to hear from the people there and to talk to the officials managing the accommodation to listen to their experiences. As I have said, and I think this is an important point, there is always a need to reflect on the appropriateness of the provisions in place and on whether governance and oversight arrangements remain adequate. That is something that we keep under constant review. I note with interest the suggestions that have been alluded to, and I will happily feed them back more broadly at the Home Office.
I want to make some progress, because I am conscious that time is marching on. The numbers of asylum seekers in different types of accommodation—if that is of interest to parliamentarians—can be obtained through existing channels, such as correspondence or parliamentary questions, so an annual report setting this information out is unnecessary. Amendment 98 is also unnecessary because there are no plans to place those with children in accommodation centres, and all other cases will only be placed in a centre following an individual assessment that the centre is suitable for them and that they will be safe.
Whether or not groups with the characteristics listed in the amendment are suitable to be supported at a particular accommodation centre will depend on a number of factors. These include their personal circumstances and vulnerabilities, and the facilities available at the particular site or in the particular area. It is not sensible to rule out large cohorts of cases from ever being placed in an accommodated centre in any circumstance, especially if their asylum case is more likely to be resolved quickly in a centre, which of course is in their best interests. I re-emphasise that our intention remains to get to a place where cases are processed quicker than they are at the moment, and that is something that we all should welcome.
Where is the evidence that doing this in accommodation centres speeds things up? We have had dispersal systems for years and on some recent occasions the waiting times have been absolutely outrageous, but a few years back they were perfectly acceptable. We can have fast decision making and we all support that, but that does not require these terrible accommodation centres to be set up.
The hon. Member and I fundamentally disagree on this point. I think that there is value in having accommodation centres that provide accommodation but also ensure that caseworking facilities are available alongside. That aids in the processing of cases more quickly. That is a sensible step forward, and something that I endorse. I think it is the right thing to do in these circumstances.
Amendment 99 would also undermine a key objective that we are trying to achieve through setting up accommodation centres, which is to resolve asylum cases more quickly by putting casework and other services on site. This speaks to the point that I have been making; there is therefore no rationale for restricting the number of people who will benefit from these improvements to 100 individuals per site.
Additionally, there is no reason why unrelated asylum seekers cannot share sleeping quarters, provided that they are the same sex. This is already allowed for in the asylum accommodation system. Those in flats or houses, for example, may be required to share bedrooms. Some asylum seekers might require their own room—for example, the current policy provides that those receiving treatment from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture should generally not share sleeping quarters with strangers—but that is because of their individual circumstances. I re-emphasise that appropriate decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis and, where circumstances require, appropriate arrangements should be made.
Amendment 100 seems to be based on a misunder-standing—I intervened on the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on this point earlier. We are not proposing to accommodate anyone in the centres under the powers in section 17 of the 2002 Act. Asylum seekers will be accommodated in the centres under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or section 98 of the 1999 Act, pending consideration of an application for section 95 support. If the application is refused, there will be a right of appeal in the normal way.
Amendments 101 and 130 are both similar in theme to amendment 16. I disagree that the normal period of residence in an accommodation centre should be no more than three months. It may be that a three month period is appropriate in some cases, either because of the individual circumstances of the asylum seeker or the nature of the facilities at the site. However, as I have explained, we need the flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre if experience shows this period is too short to provide consistent, streamlined support.
Amendment 102 would effectively give local authorities a veto on any proposals to set up accommodation centres in their areas. That is not appropriate. It is right, of course, that local authorities are fully consulted about such proposals and their views about local impacts and other matters given considerable weight.
I agree that it is right that local authorities are consulted, so the Minister will forgive me for being a little cynical that that will happen. When asylum seekers were put into a hotel in Falkirk a couple of weeks ago, Falkirk Council knew absolutely nothing about it and were not able to support them. He will forgive me for being a bit cynical about that pledge.
I think it is absolutely essential that there is an open dialogue with local authorities about any measures that are proposed in their areas, and that those local views are properly taken into consideration and reflected in the decisions that are reached. That is a commitment that we make, and is already a feature of the current system.
On that point, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East says she is a little cynical. I am afraid that I am a lot cynical. In Southwark’s example, the local authority was given absolutely no notice of a total of—I think—more than 700 asylum seekers being placed in hotel and hostel accommodation. That was just in my constituency. There were others in other parts of Southwark. When I asked the Home Office what resources were being allocated to local authorities to ensure that they could manage such a significant number, it replied that it had provided some small resource to the clinical commissioning group.
I take on board the point that the hon. Gentleman raises. However, as a general principle, I think it is right and proper—as I think all Members of this House would expect—for local authorities to be properly consulted.
Let me reassure the Minister that when the Afghans came to Scarborough recently, not only was the local authority fully engaged with the process, but the local community was too.
The interesting thing is that my right hon. Friend’s experience in Yorkshire accords with the experience that I think the local authorities in Northamptonshire, where I am proud to be a constituency MP, have had.
There has been that consultation in relation to the Afghan scheme and the Government’s intentions around delivery of that important work. Although not required to do so by legislation, our accommodation providers consult local authorities on any proposals to use accommodation that has not previously been used to house supported asylum seekers. But it is not realistic to assume that that consultation will always result in agreement.
Amendment 103 is unnecessary because asylum seekers with children will not be placed in accommodation centres at any stage of the asylum process and unaccompanied children are supported by local authorities under different arrangements. Both groups of children will therefore be educated under normal arrangements in the same way as a British child. As we are not proposing to use the power in section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, there is no need to amend it.
Amendment 104 is unnecessary also. Individuals supported in accommodation centres will be expected to live at the centre as a condition of their support and be subject to a range of other conditions attached to the provision of their support that are set out in writing—for example, that they respect other residents and do not commit antisocial behaviour. This is already part of the normal process and applies whatever accommodation is provided to supported asylum seekers.
Those accommodated in the centres will also be able to receive visitors, to use communications equipment such as telephones or computers and to leave the site for personal reasons or because they have found alternative accommodation. I hope that that gives the hon. Member for Sheffield Central the reassurance that he sought. It builds on the earlier point that I made about the fact that people would be able to leave if that was what they wanted to do.
There is already a complaints procedure administered by Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation that also provides advice on individuals’ entitlements and how the immigration system works. Asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers are currently issued with written information about their bail conditions. They are also issued with an asylum registration card, which is used for identification purposes.
Amendment 160 is also unnecessary. Sections 40 to 42 of the 2002 Act already prevent the Government from making arrangements for the provision of accommodation centres in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, unless they have consulted Ministers in the devolved Administrations. That consultation would include discussion of any financial or other impacts of introducing accommodation centres.
There are a few points that I have picked up in my main remarks but about which I want to say a few words in response to the questions that were put. In relation to Napier specifically, there have been extensive improvements to Napier since the High Court judgment. For example, all residents are offered a covid vaccination. Free travel is in place for them to get to medical appointments. There is a commitment to the availability of sports and recreation. A programme of works to improve the infrastructure is under way; that is along with weekly meetings to identify and act on any concerns that arise. Again, it is important to be responsive to issues that arise and to ensure that improvements are put in place. What I have referred to demonstrates that some of the issues that were raised previously have been taken very seriously and improvements have been made.
The judgment on Napier was reached on the basis of the conditions on the site prior to the significant improvement works that have taken place. The High Court did not make any findings that accommodation centres were not suitable for providing support.
Generally speaking, in the course of the debate on clause 11, we have talked about the difference that we hope accommodation centres will provide. I just want to restate the policy, which is to increase accommodation capacity, to try to get away from using hotels, which has been very, very challenging—I think everybody would accept that—and to achieve casework efficiency, for the reasons that I have previously set out. We think that co-locating services will be helpful in that regard, to try to process cases more quickly and try to give people the certainty that they are seeking. That is particularly beneficial to genuine refugees. Our policy is grounded in that basis.
A question was also asked about conditions in hotels and full-board centres. Full support is provided to meet essential needs, which includes food, toiletries and the means to communicate. Also, asylum seekers in full-board accommodation have access to legal aid, which pays for reasonable travel costs to see their solicitors.
Could the Minister update Members about how many people have been returned to safe third countries since those legal changes came into effect?
I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand, but I will take that request away—very gladly—and I will share that information with the Committee when I have it.
Clause 11 amends section 25 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that these periods of time may be changed, by order, to allow for longer or shorter periods. The clause will also provide the flexibility to ensure that individuals remain in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and the other support and arrangements on site are appropriate to their circumstances. I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.
On this occasion, I certainly cannot complain that I have not had answers; I may absolutely despair about what those answers were, but the Minister has certainly provided the information.
I am genuinely sad that covid and the stress that it has put on the dispersal system means that the Home Office now appears to be abandoning that system altogether when it has not been justified that that is the correct option. I very much fear that in a few years’ time this will come back to cause the Government problems; more importantly, it will be devastating for lots of people who will be placed in this accommodation.
However, I have the answers, so I do not need to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 104, in clause 11, page 14, line 41, at end insert—
“(22B) Accommodation Centres, whether for supported asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers shall not allow for limitations upon a supported person’s right—
(a) to enter or to leave at any time;
(b) to receive visitors of their choice at any time; or
(c) to use communications equipment such as telephones, computers or video equipment.
(22C) Accommodation Centres shall provide supported persons with access to a complaints procedure and procedures for appealing any decisions that may restrict a supported person’s claim to freedoms not limited by their conditions of bail.
(22D) Persons supported in Accommodation Centres shall be informed of the conditions of their bail in writing, and shall be provided with means of identifying themselves are their place of residence.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)
This amendment aims to distinguish Accommodation Centres from places of detention by introducing rights to persons supported at these Centres, and to require persons in Accommodation Centres to be informed of their bail conditions and provided with means of identifying themselves.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Ninth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank hon. Members for tabling their amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward.
Amendments 18 to 26 and amendment 56 seek to amend the Bill provisions relating to the inadmissibility of asylum claimants with a connection to a safe third country. This Government are clear that people should seek asylum in the first safe country they reach rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here. Inadmissibility is a longstanding process designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. The amendments seek to significantly weaken our ability to treat these individuals as inadmissible, and therefore weaken our ability to focus our resources on those most in need of our help. I make no apologies for prioritising the protection of the individuals most in need of help over those who could have claimed asylum elsewhere.
Will the Minister indicate where in international law there is a requirement on an individual to make such a claim in the first safe country they reach? Or is the UK seeking to impose its domestic law on the international community?
It is fair to say that the Committee had an extensive debate about this issue last week in relation to earlier clauses. I would refer the hon. Member to the comments read out in the Committee from a previous Bill Committee under the last Labour Government, where the principles we are talking about here were very firmly established and endorsed. They have underpinned the approach that has been taken on these matters under successive Governments in this country, and we continue to believe that they are applicable.
I wholeheartedly agree with the importance of the UK continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees in the UK. I understand the spirit of amendment 56 in defining a safe third state in a way that ensures that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection and their individual rights as a recognised refugee under the refugee convention. However, the definition of a safe third state as set out in clause 14 already ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.
The term “the principles of the refugee convention” is vague. What do the Government mean by that?
As we have repeatedly made very clear during the passage of the clauses we have already debated, our obligations are being properly upheld through the provisions of this Bill. We believe that the Bill is fully compliant, and I maintain that that remains the case. The approach is not new; it has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe, so I do not agree that the amendment is necessary.
Defining what is safe is very important. It is not adequately set out in the Bill. Does the Minister believe that Afghanistan is a safe country?
I refer the hon. Member to our earlier exchanges during the passage of the clauses we debated previously. In relation to Afghanistan, as that situation has evolved, the approach that we have taken has also evolved, and quite rightly so. No one is being returned to Afghanistan at the moment. That fully reflects the in-country situation in Afghanistan, of which we are incredibly mindful, as the hon. Member and people of this country would quite rightly expect.
The Home Office has published updated guidance that suggests that it is open to question as to whether there continues to be a situation of international or internal armed conflict in Afghanistan, and that should indiscriminate violence be taking place, it is only in some areas and to a far lesser extent following the Taliban takeover. Therefore, the Home Office is saying that Afghanistan is becoming safer because the Taliban are now in control. Does the Minister accept that position?
I will repeat this point again: we are not returning individuals to Afghanistan at the present time. I believe that is the right decision and I believe it fully takes into account the circumstances within the country at the moment. That is an approach that Members across this House can support.
Does the Minister agree that situations in different countries can change? I have a constituent who was granted asylum from Iran, but subsequently has gone on a package holiday to Turkey and visited his family in Iran. As far as he is concerned, the situation in Iran has obviously improved.
It is of course the case that situations in countries change. That is why the approach we take is flexible and means that we keep under constant review the circumstances in individual countries. We then make judgments on the approach that we take in response.
The Government’s resettlement scheme for citizens of Afghanistan is not even open and they are paving the way for Afghanistan to be redetermined as a safe country. Based on the previous example, if an Afghan asylum seeker ever gets to come through the scheme in this country and then goes back to visit Pakistan to see relatives—probably in one of the refugee camps there—they may be deemed to be okay to go back to Afghanistan.
I can only the refer the hon. Gentleman to the point that I have now made several times about Afghanistan.
The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it is not a convincing argument. The bottom line is that we are not removing people to Afghanistan based on the current circumstances. I think that is the right approach.
The ability to return an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country, and not just the safe third country they have a connection to, has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to our immigration rules in December 2020. In seeking to remove that ability, amendment 19 would remove a provision that Parliament has already been provided an opportunity to scrutinise.
We all know that there is no scrutiny with these things in any real sense, but that is not a justification for the change. On what possible grounds can a connection with a country A justify removal to country B? What is the point?
Again, we have had extensive debates in Committee about the approach that the Government are seeking to take on these matters. We have to stop these dangerous, unacceptable crossings of the channel. We believe that the deterrent effect is very important.
Amendments 18 and 22 to 25, taken together, seek to narrow the meaning of whether we consider an individual to have a connection to a safe third country, and therefore whether it is appropriate to consider them inadmissible. If individuals have travelled via or have connections to safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so, rather than making dangerous and unnecessary onward journeys to the UK.
We already have in place a well-established process, should it become clear that an individual cannot be returned to a safe country or if after a reasonable period no return agreement has been possible. Where that is the case, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The Bill provisions will not change that. Therefore, I do not agree that amendments 20 and 21 are required.
Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal arrangement. I believe it is right to also seek returns on a case-by-case basis where appropriate.
Will the Minister set out how many reciprocal arrangements we have at the moment? Will there be more detail in the Bill documents about what those arrangements might be?
As I have said, there are case-by-case agreements that are reached in relation to returns. The Government are ambitious about the approach we want to take through the Bill. We want to try and forge fresh returns agreements with countries. The hon. Gentleman will note that this year we reached a returns agreement with Albania. That is a positive and welcome development. I will not give a running commentary on the negotiations we might be having with countries to forge returns agreements, and he would not expect me to do that.
We certainly have a returns agreement with Nigeria, where we have biometric evidence that the person concerned is indeed the person who came to the UK. I know that because I signed it myself.
It is fair to say that my right hon. Friend was a proactive Immigration Minister. That was a significant achievement during his tenure.
While we are celebrating this one reciprocal arrangement that can be used, and having trashed the Dublin Accord and all that it provided, can I just remind the Minister that Albania provided, in the last full year we have stats, the second highest number of successful asylum claims to the UK? The Albanian Foreign Minister has described the Government’s approach to negotiations on offshoring with Albania as “fake news”.
As I said, I am not going to get into a running commentary about negotiations that the Government may or may not be having with individual countries. What I would say more generally on returns arrangements is that we are seeking to negotiate readmission arrangements with key EU member states. Where we do not have broad return agreements, we will seek returns on a case-by-case basis—a long-established process that we will continue to follow.
I note the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, but is it not the case that Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey are in negotiation with the European Union, under article 49 of the 1992 Maastricht treaty? That means that they will have to meet the 1993 Copenhagen criteria on human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. If they meet those criteria regarding accession to the EU, they must meet the criteria for returns.
The simple reality is that we will not return people to countries where to do so would put them in danger, or where their rights would not be respected and upheld. That is a perfectly correct approach to take, and entirely in line with what people would expect.
I will give way, but I am very conscious that I want to make some progress.
I absolutely accept that that is the Minister’s intention. He is not going to remove people; he is going to do all he can not to remove people to unsafe countries. The problem is: what about the next Minister responsible for immigration? As drafted, this definition of safe third state allows his successor to remove somebody to a place where they are at risk of serious human rights abuses, albeit falling short of a threat to life and liberty—it could be torture or whatever else, just as long as it is not a convention ground. I accept that the Minister is going to do the right thing, but we need a Bill that has proper constraints on the next Minister to come along, and that is not clear.
The provisions, as drafted, define safe countries as states where people would not be at risk of persecution or a breach of their article 3 ECHR rights. The provisions are considered and consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention. An individual will have an opportunity to raise specific ECHR claims against removal under schedule 3 provisions.
I am confident that the measures in place are appropriate and sufficiently robust. We know it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. Any oral or written representations from a claimant about why inadmissibility processes should not be applied in their case, including any connections they may have to the UK, will be considered ahead of any removal to a safe third country. However, if an individual has family in the UK, there are family reunion routes available. These amendments should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions. For those reasons, I do not support the suggested addition of proposed new section 80D in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, under amendment 26, and I invite hon. Members not to press it to a Division.
Turning to the clause overall, an increasing number of people are risking their lives to get to the UK, using unseaworthy vessels, putting at risk not only their lives but those of the UK Border Force and rescue services. Those routes are often facilitated by criminal gangs, seeking to arrange those dangerous journeys for profit. We are determined to make the use of small boats to cross the channel an unviable option for reaching the UK. We are determined to send a clear signal that it is unacceptable for individuals to travel through multiple safe countries to then claim asylum in the UK.
To stop people risking their lives on those dangerous crossings, reduce the unsustainable pressure on the asylum system and protect those most in need, we must be clear that many of those coming to the UK by irregular means will not be admitted into our asylum system. Inadmissibility is a long-standing process, designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. People should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.
What consideration has the Minister given to the impact on the system of international protection for those fleeing conflict and persecution if the entire world adopted that principle, so that the responsibility only ever fell on the countries on the frontline of conflict and persecution?
I have heard the point that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I would make the point that this country has and will continue to make a significant contribution to the global effort to tackle the challenges that we face around displacement. We would argue that that must be achieved through safe and legal routes. That is the cornerstone of our policy, and I think that is the right approach. We must render these dangerous channel crossings unviable.
I thank the Minister for giving way again. I want to press the issue, because it is helpful to have an answer that reflects the question. The question did not ask him to reiterate his belief, but to articulate what the Government feel would be the consequences for the international protection system if every country adopted the same approach.
The point that I would make is that we need to establish a clear principle that people should come to this country through safe and legal routes. We would argue that the best and most effective contribution that we can make as part of the global effort is to establish those safe and legal routes—there are many past and current examples. We think that is the right approach; we cannot in any way support or endorse people making dangerous and unacceptable crossings.
As a result, we strongly believe that the approach that we are taking in the Bill is right and builds on our proud traditions in this country of providing sanctuary to those who require it. That gets to the heart of the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is not about this country refusing to participate in the global effort, but about establishing clear expectations around how we intend to do that. We will continue to build on the proud traditions that we have in this country.
I am finding the Minister’s answers increasingly disappointing. Could he come back to the specific legal question from my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate about article 33 of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement?
Again, I refer back to the point that has been raised, which is that we will not return individuals to countries where they would be unsafe as a consequence. Of course we would look at cases on an individual basis and at the concerns that have been raised. If there are concerns, it is important that they are properly taken into account. I am confident that the approach we are taking addresses that issue.
We know, however, that it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. For example, we will not apply those procedures to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. The introduction of the clauses on inadmissibility aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making those dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Those who fear persecution should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise the measures when they were placed in the immigration rules in December 2020.
I just do not think that the significant legal questions that have been asked have been answered appropriately, and there are all sorts of questions about the safeguards around the description of a safe third state, so I want to press amendment 56 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Before I invite the Minister to respond, I need to clarify something. At the start of his remarks, the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark indicated that there had been a lack of time to consider the Bill. I cannot recall whether he was a member of the Programming Sub-Committee, which I chaired, but the programme motion was agreed by its members, from both sides of the House. The motion was then put to the whole Committee at the start of the first evidence session, and was again agreed without dispute. I am sure that no criticism of the Chair was intended, but I think it is necessary to clarify that.
Let me also make it absolutely plain that this Chair, and I am sure Ms McDonagh, is at the service of the Committee, as are the Officers of the House. It may be unpalatable, inconvenient or undesirable, but if it is necessary for the Committee to sit late into the evening, or even into the night, and that is what the Committee desires, then we are at your disposal. Clearly, we have to expedite the business, and believe me that this Chair, at least, understands the difference between a filibuster and a contribution, and I will say so, but no Member on either side of the Committee should feel constrained by time. We have an important job to do, and it is vital that we do it thoroughly. I hope that is absolutely clear.
Thank you for that clarification, Sir Roger. I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. I will start by addressing amendments 36 and 37.
We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to fully participate in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.
At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clauses 16, 17 and 23 provide for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, as that would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.
Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence. That may be where the evidence was not previously available or there was a lack of availability for an expert report. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.
Rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendments 36 and 37 would exclude claimants from it. They would artificially limit the circumstances in which the evidence notice would apply, favouring certain groups above others, who may have genuinely good reasons for providing late evidence. The amendment could create a perverse outcome, whereby it takes longer for the particulars of a genuine claim to be surfaced and to receive favourable consideration. Furthermore, this would create a situation in which unscrupulous claimants could cynically abuse the process by falsely claiming to be within one of those categories. That would tie the hands of decision makers, who are able to look at the facts of a case in detail and make an appropriate decision based on the facts before them. That would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of genuine claimants.
I did point out earlier that 23% of these applications come from children. Is the Minister suggesting that they are making bogus claims and are cynical? Those are the words he is using. I urge him to distinguish more carefully between children and adults, and would make the case again that children should be exempt, specifically because of their age.
I will develop my remarks a little further. I will come back to some of the points raised in the debate, but to start with I want to get through the rationale behind our thinking on the various amendments before the Committee.
Amendment 37 also fails to fully understand the remit of clause 16. The evidence notice applies solely to evidence in support of protection and human rights claims. The new slavery and trafficking information notice, covered in clause 46, will require a person to provide any information relevant to their status as a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.
On amendment 153, the Government take their responsibility towards those seeking international protection seriously. We recognise that particularly vulnerable claimants and survivors of modern slavery need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable as a result of their age, their health, the experiences they have lived through or a range of other factors. It is because these factors can be so wide ranging that I am resisting this amendment.
Clause 16 and the new evidence notice will require those who make a protection or human rights claim to provide evidence in support of their claim before the date specified in the evidence notice. This clause works in parallel with clauses 17 and 23. Where evidence is provided late, claimants will be required to provide reasons for that. Where there are no good reasons for the late provision of evidence, this should result in damage to the claimant’s credibility, and decision makers must have regard to the principle that little weight should be given to that evidence.
By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, clause 16 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. However, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be as a result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. As I say, what constitutes good reasons has not been defined in the Bill. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.
Nobody is arguing for an exhaustive list, but if we are all agreed that these are examples of good reasons, why not include them as a non-exhaustive list, just to make sure that these people are protected?
Of course, the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.
We tend to think that taking a less prescriptive approach than what the hon. Member is suggesting is the best way to address that, because we want to focus on individual cases and on ensuring proper consideration on a case-by-case basis, which is very difficult to capture in the circumstances being suggested here or by adopting the approach necessary to achieve that. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late.
As per the amendments directly commented on, rather than facilitate engagement in the process, amendment 153 would exclude claimants from it. This would have the perverse impact of some vulnerable claimants facing different evidential requirements simply because their particular vulnerability was not included in the list of exceptions. In addition, the amendment could create a situation where individuals who do not fall into one of the categories identified by the amendment were able to abuse the process by falsely claiming that they did. This would perpetuate the issues these clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness.
I am mindful that a number of detailed points were raised during the debate that I want to come to. The issue of deviation from the Home Office’s existing policy was raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central. I would not accept that depiction. I would say that the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence. Where there are good reasons for late evidence, credibility will not be damaged. There is nothing automatic about this. Credibility is also not by itself determinative.
Building on that point, there are various safeguards in the clauses that mitigate a decision that could lead to removal in breach of the rights afforded by the conventions. First, claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim, as I have already said.
The point was raised, understandably and quite rightly, about how we intend to deal with potential victims of trauma. Of course, how decision makers reach decisions is important in all this, and they should treat claims from vulnerable people in accordance with the guidance that we will set out. Extensive training will of course be put in place alongside that. Decision makers are already accustomed to ensuring that complex factors relating to trauma are properly considered.
How will this training operate in practice, given the points already made about how long it can take for PTSD symptoms and impact to emerge? No training on the planet can force those symptoms to emerge sooner, unless the Home Office is developing a particularly pernicious system.
I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s latter point. I would expect there to be extensive training for decision makers on guidance when it is issued. Again, I make the point that the approach we are adopting is intended to be responsive to individual circumstances, and cases should be considered on a case-by-case basis. That is the entire approach we are taking here.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, raised the issue of refoulement, and I just want to be clear on this point. Again, individuals will not be removed if there is a risk of refoulement, and the provisions are drafted to ensure this.
On the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark about legal aid, it is generally not available to individuals who are seeking advice or assistance with citizenship applications or on nationality matters. That is because it is not an issue within scope of the legal aid scheme—in other words, it is not an issue that Parliament has expressly provided for in statute as something for which legal aid can be provided.
For any issue where legal aid is not available, individuals can apply for exceptional case funding. The test for this is whether, without legal aid, an individual’s human rights might be breached. The only group of people who can routinely receive advice on nationality and citizenship are separated migrant children, as that is provided for in statute. We will come on to later clauses in which the legal aid provisions in this Bill, which relate to priority removal notices, will no doubt be debated as part of our consideration.
The hon. Gentleman also asked me whether a child rights impact assessment has been carried out on clauses 16 to 23. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses, and those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.
Having looked at the amendments, I think amendment 153 is more substantive than my amendments 36 and 37. On the understanding that the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, will be pressing amendment 153 to a vote, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair has no desire to curtail comment, particularly from the Front Benches, but we do have to remain within the scope of the matter under discussion. I am conscious that that is difficult when there are related clauses, but the hon. Gentleman has strayed into referring to clauses 20 and 23. The Chair will bear that in mind when we come to those debates; I would not expect repetition on the subject.
Amendment 39 would render clause 17 inoperable. Clause 17 introduces two new behaviours into section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. Without the consequent amendment to section 8, which amendment 39 seeks to remove, there is no penalty for late evidence or not acting in good faith, which would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and would also render it pointless.
Clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how decision makers, within both the Home Office and the judiciary, determine credibility or the claim itself. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged. Amendment 39 simply seeks to do away with that well established principle.
Let me build on the point about the judiciary and the point that was raised by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He asked, “Aren’t judges best placed to determine the credibility that evidence should have? Why be prescriptive?” The point that I will make in response is that clause 17 is not prescriptive as to how judges determine credibility or the claim itself. It adds two new behaviours to the existing section 8 of the 2004 Act. That section provides that a decision maker shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility, of the behaviour to which the section applies. I think it is important to clarify this. It should be noted that clause 17 applies to all decision makers. That includes Home Office staff who make the initial decision on protection and human rights claims. Clause 17 adds new behaviours to the existing behaviours that should already be taken into account as damaging to credibility under section 8 of the 2004 Act. The concept that certain conduct should be damaging to credibility is nothing new. It has always been the case that decision makers must consider egregious conduct by the claimant. It is then open to the Home Office or the courts to decide the extent to which credibility should subsequently be damaged.
Clause 17 will also not be determinative of a claim. Decision makers will still be required to consider the claimant’s credibility in the round, as they would currently as part of their decision-making processes.
Clause 17 further compounds the damage potentially arising from clause 16. When answering the question about a child rights impact assessment, the Minister seemed to talk about an equality impact assessment. I wonder again whether a child rights impact assessment, as developed by his colleagues in the Department for Education for schools, would benefit the Government, to prevent them from imposing conditions that fall foul of other Government legislation—
Thank you, Sir Roger. I want to pick up on a couple of other points that were raised in responding to amendment 39. I should clarify that clauses 17 and 23 do not apply to consideration of modern slavery referrals. Claims are considered holistically, and credibility is not by itself determinative of a claim. It is important to emphasise that point. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised the case of Gloria. Obviously, I am mindful of talking about individual cases because of the difficulties associated with that, as I am sure that he will appreciate, but clauses 17 and 23 do not prevent someone from providing late evidence. Late evidence will still be considered in full. Where there are good reason for lateness, a person’s credibility will not be damaged and clause 23 will not apply. I wanted to provide clarity on that point. With that, I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 39, and that the Committee agree that clause 17 stand part of the Bill.
As a point of principle, I object to Parliament telling decision makers what to think, but having made my point I am happy to leave it there for now, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That clause 17 stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 18, page 22, line 26, leave out “10(1) or (2)” and insert “10”.
This amendment is consequential on clause 43 of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 61.
Clause stand part.
It is often the case that those facing removal or deportation from the UK raise late protection or human rights claims that could have been provided at an earlier juncture. That causes unnecessary delay and expense to the taxpayer. The clause strengthens the existing one-stop process by establishing a priority removal notice, or PRN, which may be issued to a person who is liable to removal or deportation from the UK. The PRN will require a person to raise any new or additional grounds for why they should remain in the UK before the date specified in the notice. That includes information relevant to whether the person is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking. Any supporting evidence must be provided at the same time. That will ensure that all claims can be considered sufficiently in advance of the person’s removal, reducing the extent to which removal can be frustrated, and allowing those in need of international protection to be identified and supported as early as possible.
Factors that may lead to a person being issued with a priority removal notice will be set out in guidance and will include, for example, where a person has previously made a protection or human rights claim. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the PRN cut-off date and without good reason, it should be damaging to the person’s credibility. Those reforms will drive efficiencies across the system, decreasing the cost of unnecessary litigation and failed removal attempts, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law.
Amendments 60 and 61 are minor amendments to reflect a change to clause 43 and to remove a superfluous paragraph in subsection (7) of the clause that has no material impact.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Tenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendment 61.
Clause stand part.
I was about to conclude by saying that paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (7) suffice to capture every scenario. Removing paragraph (b) does not affect how the clause operates or who it impacts. I commend the amendments and the clause to the Committee.
We intend to oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. The clause is an entirely new provision. Its stated aim is to reduce the extent to which people may frustrate removals through sequential or unmeritorious claims, appeals or legal action. It does so by providing for a priority removal notice, or PRN, to be served on anyone who is liable for removal or for deportation. Factors might include where a person has previously made a human rights or protection claim.
According to the explanatory notes, subsection (3) defines a PRN. It states that the notice imposes a duty on the claimant to provide a statement setting out the reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, any grounds on which they should be permitted to do so, and any grounds on which they should not be removed or required to leave the United Kingdom. The notice also requires them to provide any information relating to being a victim of slavery or human trafficking as defined by clause 46.
The notice also requires them to provide any evidence in support of any reasons, grounds or information. The statement, grounds, information and evidence must be provided before the PRN cut-off date included within the notice. Intended as a warning to the person that they are being prioritised for removal, the notice gives them a period of time—the cut-off period—within which to access legal advice and to inform the Home Office of any grounds or evidence that they want to provide in support of a claim to be allowed to remain in the UK.
The clause and the introduction of priority removal notices are part of wider proposals to fast-track claims and appeals, and to create a one-stop process for claims to asylum to be brought and considered together in a single assessment up front. The consequences of the clauses related to priority removal notices will make it harder for people to bring evidence after making an initial asylum claim and penalise delayed disclosure. Indeed, if anything required by the PRN is provided after the specified cut-off date, a decision maker—when determining a protection or human rights claim, or making a decision as to whether the person is a potential or actual victim of trafficking—will treat it with scepticism and it will be considered damaging to the person’s credibility and their claim.
The requirements related to the PRN are extensive. It requires all manner of claims and evidence to be provided, covering all grounds for resisting removal and all evidence in support. When implemented, that could have incredibly damaging consequences for people seeking asylum, as it requires them to provide extensive supporting evidence by a specified date. For example, it will seriously disadvantage vulnerable people and victims, such as those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or those who have been trafficked, as well as those who are LGBTQ, as I have mentioned previously.
The introduction of priority removal notices fails to acknowledge the reality of situations that people seeking asylum may encounter. There are many reasons that evidence may be provided late but in earnest, as we have explored already, for example with traumatised victims. The ultimate consequence of people not being able properly to present evidence relating to their claim, or being deemed to lack credibility as a result of failing to present such evidence on time, is that claims may be rejected and people may be wrongly subject to removal. The Opposition are very concerned that these measures may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement and will consequently abandon the UK’s obligations under international law.
In short, the proposals are unacceptable. They form a package of measures that seek to create a one-stop process for asylum claims and fail to do so in a fair or humane way. They are widely condemned by the sector. The Opposition are vehemently opposed to the introduction of priority removal notices and, when they are taken in conjunction with the series of clauses in part 2, are incredibly concerned about these measures. Its potentially strict application risks having a severe impact on asylum seekers and refugees, in terms of both procedural fairness and ensuring that people are protected by the refugee convention. We therefore oppose the clause.
Amendment 60 agreed to.
Amendment made: 61, in clause 18, page 22, line 28, leave out paragraph (b).—(Tom Pursglove.)
This amendment removes a superfluous paragraph (any person within paragraph (b) would in any event fall within either paragraph (a) or (c)).
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 62, in clause 19, page 22, line 43, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) the PRN cut-off date, or
(b) if later, the day on which any appeal rights of the PRN recipient in respect of a relevant claim are exhausted.”.
This amendment and Amendments 63 and 64 provide that a priority removal notice will remain in force for 12 months after a PRN recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted in relation to any protection or human rights claim brought while the notice is in force.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 63 to 66.
Clause stand part.
This clause is supplementary to clause 18, which we have just discussed. It makes provision for the validity and effect of a priority removal notice. A priority removal notice imposes requirements to provide any reason and supporting evidence as to why a person should be allowed to remain in the UK. This will reduce the extent to which removal can be frustrated.
Where a priority removal notice has been issued, it will remain in force for a period of 12 months after either the cut-off date specified in the notice or after the recipient has exhausted their appeal rights. A period of 12 months will provide sufficient time for the person’s removal to be enforced. Following the service of a priority removal notice, any previous evidence notice, slavery or trafficking information notice, or notice under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, will cease to take effect. Any appeal right arising from a protection or human rights claim received after the cut-off date will be subject to the expedited process as provided for by clause 21, unless the claimant provides good reasons for late disclosure.
The amendments are minor and technical and are intended to ensure that the new priority removal notice will work as effectively as possible. Amendments 62 to 64 provide for a priority removal notice to remain in force for a period of 12 months after the recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted. Amendments 65 and 66 clarify that a priority removal notice will remain in force where the recipient is no longer liable to removal or deportation from the UK. This makes it clear that where the recipient of a priority removal notice makes an application to the EU settlement scheme that is later refused, they will remain subject to the priority removal notice.
The Opposition will oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. It forms part of the Bill’s new PRN regime, as initially set out in clause 18, and states that the PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or the person’s appeal rights become exhausted, whichever comes last. The Opposition believe that preventing people from being able to bring further evidence for 12 months after they have been issued with a PRN is wrong. It is unfair and it fails to consider the reasons for delayed disclosure, which range from psychological and cultural barriers to the crucial fact that those who are seeking asylum have fled their homes and may not have access to evidence immediately.
When applied narrowly and in conjunction with other clauses in part 2, the proposed provisions potentially risk significant breaches of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement. For those reasons, and reasons discussed in the debate on clause 18, we will be voting against clause 19.
Amendment 62 agreed to.
Amendments made: 63, in clause 19, page 23, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) In subsection (1) ‘relevant claim’ means a protection claim or a human rights claim brought by the PRN recipient while the priority removal notice is in force.”
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.
Amendment 64, in clause 19, page 23, line 4, after “rights” insert
“in respect of a claim”.
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.
Amendment 65, in clause 19, page 23, line 11, at end insert—
“(2A) A priority removal notice remains in force until the end of the period mentioned in subsection (1) even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to removal or deportation from the United Kingdom during that period.”
This amendment clarifies that although a priority removal notice can only be served on a person if they are liable to removal or deportation, the fact that the person ceases to be so liable does not mean that the notice will cease to have effect.
Amendment 66, in clause 19, page 23, line 23, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) Expressions used in this section that are defined for the purposes of section 18 have the same meaning in this section as in that section.”—(Tom Pursglove.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Priority removal notices will apply to all people to whom they apply. If they qualify, they will qualify under that regime. I do not think people can be distinguished on the basis on their offences.
Clause 20 and the wider proposals around priority removal notices will penalise the most vulnerable and those who have been failed by the system by reducing the significance of any evidence submitted after the applicant has been through the one-stop process. That could include independent expert medical evidence, such as medico-legal reports, which often prove determinative in asylum appeals.
Ultimately, the provision around late compliance risks people not being given protection even though they deserve it and are in need of it. For the reasons I have specified, we will oppose clause 20 standing part of the Bill.
By introducing the statutory requirement to provide information or evidence before a specified date, clauses 16 and 18 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, and that the decision maker must consider whether to apply the minimal weight principle, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.
Clauses 20 and 23 both recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process and provide evidence before a specified date. That may be the result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities or the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. Amendment 41 removes the possible credibility implications stemming from late evidence in response to a priority removal notice. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. Where there are good reasons that information or evidence was provided late, the penalties in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply.
Clause 20 recognises that there may be good reasons that evidence was provided late. Where there are good reasons, the associated credibility provisions in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply. Therefore, amendment 41 is unnecessary, as the clause already meets its aim that late evidence should not necessarily be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. As with amendment 39, by removing the possible credibility implications stemming from late provision of evidence, amendment 41 would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and render it pointless. Amendment 154 places a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers and, under amendment 154, the competent authority as well as the judiciary.
This comes back to the point that we were discussing this morning about PTSD. The Minister seems to be saying that if PTSD were on the list and someone could not prove that they had it that would advantage those who could prove that the condition had been diagnosed while disadvantaging those who had not had a diagnosis. However, they would not get a diagnosis within the timeframe specified in the legislation. Perhaps a means to address that anomaly is the Government providing their own list of good reasons that could be used to distinguish between cases—on a case-by-case basis—based on how long someone has been in the process and whether they are undergoing assessment for PTSD. That could be a way to resolve that predicament. As it stands, the Minister seems to be saying that he cannot accept the amendment because it would advantage those whom the Government’s plans disadvantage.
Our intention is to publish guidance to help operationalise the measures in the Bill that will set this out in more detail. We would expect, as I have said in relation to several amendments and clauses, that caseworkers will consider those factors properly when reaching judgments about individual cases.
I am trying to explore the contradiction in what the Minister has just said. He said that the Government intended to produce guidance that set out what good reasons were subsequent to the legislation, but he cautioned against requiring good reasons, because that would exclude some people from justice. Would he square that circle for me?
We think that the appropriate place to be clear about these matters is in the guidance, rather than the Bill. As I say, I would expect decision makers to take into account all the relevant factors at play in an individual case when making decisions relating to it. Rather as we have discussed in relation to other clauses and amendments, there is flexibility in certain circumstances, where good reasons can be shown as to why evidence would not be produced sooner. We recognise that people may be in difficult circumstances and that issues arise in their lives. We want the system to be responsive to that and to take proper account of it, which is why we are proposing to proceed as we are doing.
To return to the point that I was making on amendment 139, it would perpetuate the issues that the clauses are designed to address to the detriment of genuine claimants, undermining their usefulness. Amendment 139 would also introduce a requirement to publish guidance on good reasons within 30 days of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. That is an arbitrary deadline and it is not necessary to include it on the face of the Bill. As I have indicated, good reasons will be set out in published guidance for decision makers and will be made available when the measures come into force.
It is a brief intervention. I am reminded of what the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby said about being cautioned by the police. Will the good reasons clauses cover children specifically? We need to know, given that they represent almost a quarter of asylum claims, and given the issue of age and maturity.
Moreover, what evidence would a gay man trying to escape Iran or another oppressive have to provide in order to prove his circumstances? What would the threshold be, given how hard it has been to provide proof in multiple cases under the existing system?
I can confirm that it will refer to children. To conclude my remarks, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw the amendment.
On clause 20, the unnecessary provision of late evidence, statements and information delays justice for those with genuine claims, and wastes valuable resources. Clause 20 will work in parallel with clauses 18 and 19 to support the new priority removal notice. Its focus is on encouraging persons liable to removal or deportation to provide at the earliest opportunity any information or evidence in support of their protection or human rights claim, or, for potential victims of modern slavery, in relation to a decision by the competent authority. Where information or evidence is provided on or after the cut-off date, as set out in the priority removal notice and without good reason, it is right that that should be taken into account as damaging to the person’s credibility. I hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.
I am afraid that I am unconvinced by the Minister’s response, so I wish to press amendment 139 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 155, in clause 21, page 24, line 21, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State must accept that there are good reasons for P making the claim on or after the cut-off date where—
(a) the PRN recipient’s protection or human rights claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;
(b) the PRN recipient is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;
(c) the PRN recipient has been a victim of torture;
(d) the PRN recipient has been a victim of sexual or gender based violence;
(e) the PRN recipient has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;
(f) the PRN recipient is suffering from a serious physical disability;
(g) the PRN recipient is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”
This amendment defines ”good reasons” for the purposes of section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as inserted by this Bill).
If someone makes a protection claim after the PRN cut-off, then unless the Secretary of State is satisfied there are good reasons, she must certify the appeal right and it will be subjected to an expedited appeal straight to the upper tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules, then, must make provision for this. If it is in the interests of justice for an appeal not to be expedited, the tribunal may order that it is no longer subject to that process. This, too, prevents any onward appeal.
In the next debate I will set out our opposition to the clause as a whole, but amendment 155 sets out a situation where the Secretary of State must accept there has been a reasonable excuse, similar to before. It would surely be wrong to subject survivors of human trafficking, or gender-based violence or torture—to use but three examples—to an accelerated appeal, simply on the grounds that they were late making a claim in response to a PRN. We have heard very powerful reasons already today, including in Home Office guidance, why that can be an incredibly difficult process.
I suspect the Minister will again reject this amendment on the same grounds as before, but it is at least useful for him to state on record that these are the types of claimant that he envisages should not be pushed through any accelerated appeal process. I will listen carefully to what he has to say in that regard.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 155, which seeks to define good reasons for the purposes of proposed new section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I appreciate the concerns this amendment is attempting to address but the Government must oppose it. The amendment would result in all individuals who meet any of the descriptors listed being exempt from the expedited appeal process, even where their reason for lateness may be completely unrelated and make redundant any need to submit a claim by the date specified in the PRN.
I acknowledge that the experiences and circumstances listed in the amendment can inform why a person has made an application late. However, the duty on the Secretary of State will see all and any reasons for lateness being considered. Guidance for decision makers will be published and made available when these measures come into force. For that reason, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 21, page 24, line 27, after “are” insert “brought and”.
This amendment and Amendment 68 clarify that the Tribunal Procedure Rules establishing the new expedited appeals process must aim to ensure that both the bringing of an appeal and its determination are expedited.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 68 and 69.
Amendment 42, in clause 21, page 24, line 37, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would protect the right to an onward appeal from an expedited appeal decision by the Upper Tribunal in certain cases.
Clause stand part.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
The Government propose three amendments to clause 21. Two amendments relate to the timeframe for bringing an expedited appeal. Accordingly, they clarify that the tribunal procedure rules must provide that an expedited appeal is brought more quickly than a standard appeal. That will ensure that individuals bring appeals promptly. The third amendment provides that, where the upper tribunal exercises its discretion to order that an expedited appeal should not be treated as such, the appeal will be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This amendment provides an important clarification about the impact of the upper tribunal’s discretion to remove a case from the expedited appeal route. I therefore urge the hon. Members to support the Government amendments.
I thank the hon. Members for tabling amendment 42, which concerns the finality of decisions by the upper tribunal in expedited appeals. However, the Government oppose the amendment. The expedited appeal process provides effective access to justice while protecting the appeals system from abuse by individuals who deliberately act to prolong their case, thereby delaying a final decision.
We believe that where recipients of a priority removal notice who have received an offer of enhanced legal advice bring a late human rights or protection claim without good reason, any subsequent appeal should be dealt with expeditiously by experienced senior judges, and that their decision should be final. We believe that that strikes a balance, ensuring that appellants have access to justice, while protecting the appeals system from abuse. Section 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides for various upper tribunal decisions to be excluded from onward appeal. It is appropriate that expedited appeals are included within the list of excluded decisions that are not appealable.
Clause 22 provides for legally aided advice to be available to all individuals who have received a priority removal notice. The priority removal notice is designed to give advance notice to individuals who are being prioritised for removal from the UK, and requires them to raise any reasons why they should not be removed. It is essential that individuals have access to free and impartial legal advice upon receipt of a priority removal notice. Those individuals need to understand what the notice is and what it is asking them to do, and they need the opportunity to go through their individual circumstances with a qualified lawyer and confirm whether there are any reasons why they should not be removed from the UK, and how to raise those reasons. Access to this legal advice will be free to the individual, with the only criterion for the advice being receipt of the priority removal notice.
Similarly, I want to ask a couple of questions of the Minister on why the opportunity has not been taken to go beyond the provisions in the clause, because there is a real problem with access to legal aid. Research by Refugee Action has shown that, since the changes introduced in 2012, it has been much more difficult to secure legal aid. There is also a vast difference in provision across the country, with provision concentrated in metropolitan areas such as London and Birmingham, and not in dispersal areas, where it is particularly difficult to access legal aid. Refugee Action’s report recommended that the Government should commit to ensuring that everybody in the asylum system who is eligible for legal aid representation has access to it. What are the Government proposing in respect of that?
If the clause is about ensuring that issues are resolved at the appropriate stage, why are the Government not extending legal aid to all stages of the process? If cases are successfully resolved at an earlier stage, surely it is to everybody’s benefit.
I will try to respond to the various points that have been raised as best as I am able. I will, of course, happily feed through the views that have been expressed to Ministry of Justice colleagues who have direct responsibility for legal aid within their portfolio.
On the initial point about the seven hours, it is worth saying that the power we are proposing will allow the Lord Chancellor to amend the number of hours of advice available under the clause. The Lord Chancellor will have to lay affirmative legislation to ensure that Members of this House and the other place have full sight of the proposed changes. That power is necessary because the priority removal notice is a new process and, as with all new operational processes, it will take time to bed in. We must be able to change the number of hours to ensure that the purpose of the clause works how we intend in practice. Providing individuals with access to free legal advice ahead of their potential removal from the UK is clearly important. That is why we are making that commitment in the Bill.
I was asked what this extension of legal aid will cost. The estimates are in the region of £4 million to £6 million, so it is a significant increase to meet the need resulting from the new measures we are introducing. If, at the end of the seven hours, more advice is needed—and there are circumstances which dictate that—there is legal advice available for asylum claims and appeals.
Is that £4 million to £6 million just for the civil legal services under clause 22 for people under priority removal notices?
Yes. That provision is made precisely for those in receipt of a PRN. I was making a point about the extension. It is worth making the point that, if people find that they require further advice at the end of the seven hours, any individual needing more legal advice on an immigration matter can apply for in-scope legal aid, such as for asylum advice or through the exceptional case funding scheme, subject to passing the relevant means and merits tests. I will make sure that colleagues in the Ministry of Justice are aware of the points raised today on legal aid more generally within the immigration and asylum system.
There was a question about access to justice in dispersal areas. The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark asked where information about legal aid provision is provided. My understanding is that it is published online, so it is readily accessible to people. As hon. Members would expect on the issue of dispersal areas, the MOJ monitors the market capacity and works with the Home Office to ensure supply in dispersal areas. If the hon. Member for Sheffield Central wants to write to me with specific concerns on that matter in his community, I would be glad to look at those and make sure that they are considered by Ministers appropriately.
I will take the Minister up on his offer, but I want to press him on another point. He talks about legal aid being made available for the new provision for a priority removal notice. However, the Home Secretary has the opportunity to issue a priority removal notice, but is not required to do so—it might not be done in all cases. There will potentially be people who are served with a notice of removal who have never received a priority removal notice. They will not have the opportunity to access the seven hours of free legal aid. What is the justification for that?
The hon. Member is seeking to extend the provision we are proposing in the Bill. We are very clear that the clause makes the legal advice available to those who have been served with priority removal notices. We do not propose to extend the offer beyond that. However, I will make sure that his concerns are flagged with ministerial colleagues in the Ministry of Justice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Late provision of evidence in asylum or human rights claim: weight
I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 26, line 38, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the deciding authority must have regard to the fact of the evidence being provided late and any reasons why it was provided late in considering it and determining the claim or appeal.”
This amendment would remove the provision which states that “minimal weight” should be given to any evidence provided late.
I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill-treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to participate fully in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.
At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, because of a lack of trust in the authorities or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, provides for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, because to do so would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.
Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—that may be where the evidence was not previously available, or where an expert report is not available. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.
Amendment 43 would effectively remove the minimal weight principle; it would disapply the requirement for a decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence for two categories of people. The amendments fail to take into account the fact that decision makers will have discretion in how they apply the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence, and that they may choose not to apply the principle in any given case. Clause 23 does not create a provision whereby decision makers are required to give late evidence minimal weight; they are required only to have regard to the principle, which they can choose to disregard.
Amendment 131 would place a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers as well as the judiciary. Compelling a judge to accept good reasons for late evidence based solely on the grounds of the person’s claim raises significant issues and interferes with their fact-finding role. It also ignores the possibility that a claim may fall within a particular category or a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their evidence may be late for unrelated reasons. The amendment would therefore create a blanket acceptance of late evidence in specific prescribed circumstances, and yet a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups might have late evidence and face a different test for whether or not they have good reasons. We feel that is unfair.
On amendment 44, this country has a proud history of welcoming with open arms those who require its protection. That includes circumstances where, as in Afghanistan, a significant change in circumstances means a sudden shift in a country’s security situation. Where evidence is brought late on account of such a change, that is clearly capable of falling within the “good reasons” consideration, so there is no need to make specific provision in relation to a fear of the Taliban.
But what would happen in the hypothetical example I gave, where there was not good reason? The guy was a bit stubborn and did not think he should have to go through this process; he thought he should have had some automatic leave. I am still at a loss to understand what it means for the decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. I do not understand the expression. How does that work in the context of the hypothetical example I gave?
I will come back to that point and try to give the hon. Gentleman some further clarity, which I hope will be helpful. I will make the point again that, in the current circumstances that we find ourselves in regarding Afghanistan, people are not being removed there.
Of course, all the relevant information is taken into consideration when reaching decisions on individual cases. For example, if there is an assessment that a particular country is safe but for a particular individual there are grounds whereby it is not safe for them in their circumstances, that is reflected in the decisions that are taken.
To finish the point about amendment 44, it would create a system where those with a fear of the Taliban were treated differently from all other asylum seekers, no matter the risks they faced or the vulnerabilities of the individuals involved, simply on the basis of where they were from. That is discriminatory and cannot be right.
On the point about how decision makers can be told that they must apply minimal weight to evidence, clause 23 does not create a requirement for Home Office decision makers or the judiciary to give late evidence, following the receipt of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, minimal weight. In protection and human rights claims, decision makers must have regard to the principle that minimal weight will be given to any late evidence, but they can consider the principle and determine that it should not be applied in a particular case.
I have made that point previously and I have reiterated it now for the record. I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I have made the point pretty clear.
The Minister suggests there is clarity where no clarity exists. If the clause is not to reduce the weight that the evidence is given, what exactly is it there for? Is he suggesting that he will withdraw it?
No, that is not for a moment what I am suggesting. The point that I am making is that, as I have alluded to on many occasions in relation to the clauses that we have considered, we want decision makers to have the appropriate discretion within the framework that we are establishing through the Bill. We think that is the right approach to reach the right decisions in individual cases, taking into account all the relevant circumstances and all the relevant information that is provided. We think that is the right way to proceed. More detail will of course be set out in the guidance.
The hon. Gentleman earlier alluded to very difficult circumstances that a particular individual has found challenging to talk about and disclose. I repeat that caseworkers are trained to be sympathetic to circumstances. The burden of proof, as he described it, will be set out in the guidance that follows. Again, I want to see proper discretion and proper consideration of cases on a case-by-case basis. That is the right and proper way to address such matters.
All individuals should be treated with respect by having proper consideration given to their case. As I said, the detail will be established in the guidance. There will also be training for decision makers, but there is already training for decision makers to ensure that they are sympathetic to the sorts of issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised.
With the best will in the world, no amount of training will change the fact that, even if someone has come out in the UK, the Bill makes it harder for gay men in particular from certain countries. What do they need to provide to prove that they would face homophobic persecution if they went back? What do they need to show or do? I want a practical example of how it will work in practice. I cannot believe that one even exists at the moment.
I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand why it is difficult to set out in the Bill all the circumstances that would capture all the situations that individuals face in relation to such matters. It is just not possible to do that, which is why we are saying that we will establish that in the guidance that will be published if and when the Bill becomes law, as I hope it will. The guidance will set out the circumstances and the way that cases will be considered. Again, that discretion, flexibility and consideration will be shown to individual cases.
I am conscious that we are going over this ground repeatedly, but I will give the hon. Gentleman the opportunity to intervene again.
Is the Minister saying that the guidance will set out what a gay man needs to provide in order to prove that they will face persecution? I think and hope that is what he is saying, and I hope that he will say why the Home Office has not published the review it has already undertaken of the existing process and when it will be published.
I am not familiar with the review to which he refers, but the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have been in this role only for the past four weeks. However, I will go away and look into that.
I can only repeat the point that we will set out in guidance the relevant factors that will be taken into consideration when cases are determined. I would expect there to be sympathetic consideration of people’s individual circumstances. I have also made that point at the Dispatch Box when we have talked about the operationalisation of the policy. Of course, it is right that that information is established in full. With that, I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. At points, he did sound almost reassuring, but the problem is that he sounds reassuring when he says, essentially, “This clause will not have any effect,” suggesting that decision makers will be able just to have regard to all the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. That is what decision makers do anyway without the need for this myriad of statute provisions telling them what to think about a, b, c and the weight to be applied to evidence here, there and everywhere. While I take at face value his intention—I think we probably intend the same thing—that my Afghan example would not end up with conclusive evidence being disregarded because the man was stubborn or behaved in a stupid way because he was at risk, I still find the wording in the clause troubling. I hope the Home Office will think again.
In the meantime, we have pressed similar amendments to a vote, so I do not need to do so again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 131, in clause 23, page 26, after line 40, insert—
“(2A) The deciding authority must accept that there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late where—
(a) the claimant’s claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;
(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;
(c) the claimant’s claim is based on gender-based violence;
(d) the claimant has experienced sexual violence;
(e) the claimant is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;
(f) the claimant is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;
(g) the claimant has been a victim of torture;
(h) the claimant is suffering from a serious physical disability;
save-line2(i) the claimant is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)
This amendment sets out the circumstances where the deciding authority must accept that there were good reasons for providing evidence late.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
We oppose the clause. It seeks the return of the detained fast-track system and to recreate it in primary legislation. The clause imposes a duty on the tribunal procedure rules committee to make rules for an accelerated timeframe for certain appeals made from detention that are considered suitable for consideration within that timeframe.
In the explanatory notes, an accelerated detained appeal is defined as being
“an appeal brought by an appellant who…received a refusal of their asylum claim while in detention…remains in detention under a relevant detention provision…is appealing a decision which was certified by the Secretary of State as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal”.
That system previously existed but was found to be illegal by the High Court in a landmark case brought by Detention Action. The system was found to be unfair as asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as
“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.
It also emphasised, perhaps instructively for this Committee, that speed and efficiency must not trump justice and fairness—something of a feature of part 2 of the Bill. Indeed, hundreds if not thousands of cases have had to be reconsidered by the Home Office or the tribunal because they were unfairly rushed through the process that the Government now seek to recreate. Those cases include survivors of trafficking and torture and other individuals who, on the basis of a rushed and unfair procedure, will have been removed to places where they fear persecution or are separated from their families. There was no adequate system for ensuring that such people were removed from the fast track and given a fair opportunity to present their claims.
Despite that background, the Bill aims to create this unjust and ineffective procedure by reintroducing the detained fast-track process through this clause. It will put that same system, which was deemed unlawful in 2015, on a statutory footing, which will insulate it against future legal challenges.
The clause provides for the Secretary of State to certify a decision if she considers that an appeal would be disposed of expeditiously. It requires the tribunal procedure committee to introduce the following time limits: a notice of appeal must be lodged no later than five working days after the decision was received; the tribunal must make a decision no later than 25 days after the appeal date; and an application for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal must be determined by the first-tier tribunal not later than 20 working days after the applicant was given notice of the tribunal’s decision.
The clause would deny access to justice. First, five days is insufficient to prepare an appeal against a negative decision, particularly where the individual is detained and where their access to legal advice is poor and an individual’s wellbeing may be affected by their detention. For those detained in prison, the situation is even worse. For example, in a case in February of this year, the High Court declared the lack of legal aid immigration advice for people held under immigration powers to be unlawful. More widely, Home Office decision making is frequently incorrect or unlawful. As we know, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year leading up to June 2019. It is therefore vital that people are able to effectively challenge decisions through the courts.
The detained fast track is unjust. It is also unnecessary. As the Public Law Project and Justice have pointed out, the tribunal has adequate case management powers to deal with appeals expeditiously in appropriate cases and already prioritises detained cases. The Home Secretary should not be trying to force the hand of the independent tribunal procedures committee to stack the cards in her favour in appeals against her decisions. The Bill does not learn the lessons of the past and seeks to resurrect an unworkable system of accelerated detained appeals. The clause proposes that the appeals process be fast-tracked. I am very worried that provisions in part 2 of the Bill will therefore disadvantage the most vulnerable.
By allowing the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, the clause is clearly unjust. Once again, it also seems to violate the refugee convention. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said on Second Reading:
“It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 769.]
For those reasons, we will oppose that the clause stand part.
I understand the motivation behind amendment 45. However, the Government oppose the amendment, as it is contrary to our policy intention and would undermine the effective working of the accelerated detained appeals process.
The period of five working days strikes the right balance, achieving both speed and fairness. The detained fast-track rules put in place in 2003 and 2005 allowed only two days to appeal. The 2014 rules set the same time limit. The current procedure rules allow a non-detained migrant 14 days to lodge their appeal against a refusal decision.
On amendment 46, I can assure hon. Members that it is not necessary, as the Bill already achieves the objective sought. The Government’s aim is to ensure that cases only remain in the ADA where it is in the interests of justice for them to do so. The consideration of what is in the interests of justice is a matter of judicial discretion. Where a judge decides that it is not in the interests of justice to keep a case in the ADA process, we would expect that they would use their discretion to remove the case. The current wording of the Bill—“may” rather than “must”—is consistent with the drafting of the rules that govern all appeals considered in the immigration and asylum chamber.
For these reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw the amendments. On the detained fast track and wider points about the Government’s intentions, although the courts upheld the principle of an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, we have considered the legal challenges to the detained fast track carefully. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. All Home Office decisions to detain are made in accordance with the adults at risk in detention policy and reviewed by the independent detention gatekeeper. Changes made to the screening process, drawing on lessons learned, will enable us to identify appellants who are unsuitable for the accelerated detained appeals route at the earliest opportunity. Suitability will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and the tribunal will have the power to transfer a case out of the accelerated route if it considers that that is in the interests of justice to do so.
The timescales proposed for the accelerated route are longer than under the previous detained fast track. Appellants will have more time to seek legal advice and prepare their case. We are confident that the new route will provide sufficient opportunity to access legal advice. I am also conscious that Members are interested in what happens in the eventuality that a migrant misses the deadline to appeal a refusal decision. Provided that there are no other barriers to return, removal will be arranged. It is open to a migrant and/or their legal representatives to submit an appeal after the deadline and ask a judge to extend the time and admit the appeal late.
On new clause 7, the Government are committed to making the asylum appeals system faster, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. In particular, it is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with quickly, so that people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than is necessary. New clause 7 sets out a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to make rules for the provision of an accelerated detained appeals route. That will establish a fixed maximum timeframe for determining specific appeals brought while an individual is detained.
Currently, all immigration and asylum appeals are subject to the same procedure rules. Appeals involving detained appellants are prioritised by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service but there are no set timeframes. It often takes months for detained appeals to be determined, resulting in people being released from detention before their appeals are concluded.
Changes to procedure rules are subject to the tribunal procedure committee’s statutory consultation requirements and procedures. However, the Government’s intent is to ensure that straightforward appeals from detention are determined more quickly. Under a detained accelerated process all appellants will benefit from a quicker final determination of their immigration status, spending less time in limbo, and getting the certainty they need to move forward with their lives sooner.
Those whose appeals are successful will have their leave to remain confirmed earlier than if the standard procedure rules had been followed. Meanwhile those with no right to remain will be removed more quickly, as they can be detained throughout the process, which reduces the risk of absconding.
The courts have been clear in upholding the principle that an accelerated process for asylum seekers while detained, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. I made that point earlier. We have considered the legal challenges to the previous detained fast track carefully and we are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. We will ensure, through regulations and guidance, that only suitable cases will be allocated to the accelerated route. Cases will be assessed for whether they are likely to be able to be decided fairly within the shorter timeframe, and individuals will be screened for vulnerability and other factors that may impact their ability to engage fairly with an accelerated process.
As an additional safeguard, the clause makes it clear that the tribunal can decide to remove cases from the accelerated route if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. The new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals are decided for those in immigration detention. It will allow us to swiftly remove from the country people found not to need protection, while those with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I still have serious concerns about the provisions in the clause, particularly the short timeframe of five days to launch an appeal, and particularly when it could be the Secretary of State who has decided somebody has to go through that process. If she gets that decision wrong, by the time there is any ability to apply to the tribunal to move away from the fast-track process, it could be too late. In that case, a removal attempt will have been made, and a vulnerable person who was unable to contact a solicitor in time is completely without any chance of rectifying what the Secretary of State has done.
I maintain my opposition to what is proposed. I think that the safeguards fall way short, but I do not see any point in putting my amendment to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
As Chair, I do not wish to stop you voting as you wish to. I understand that the Government have indicated that they would vote to leave out the clause.
To be clear, we are seeking to remove clause 24 and replace it with new clause 7.
If that is the Government’s intention, far be it from me to tell them what to do.
Clause 24 disagreed to.
Clause 25
Claims certified as clearly unfounded: removal of right of appeal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Protection or human rights claims that are certified as clearly unfounded are those so clearly without substance that they are bound to fail. The refusal of such claims can currently be appealed after the person has left the UK. By contrast, there is no right of appeal against the rejection of further submissions received after a protection or human rights claim has previously been refused, where those submissions do not create a realistic prospect of success. That approach is right: there should be no right of appeal unless there is something of real substance for the tribunal to consider.
The clause removes the out-of-country right of appeal under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 for those whose protection or human rights claims are certified as clearly unfounded and bound to fail, bringing them into line with how we treat further submissions that have no realistic prospect of success. It will apply only to claims that are certified after the clause comes into effect. I would like to be clear that removing the right of appeal for certified claims does not prevent a person from applying for a judicial review to challenge a certification decision. It provides a necessary and effective safeguard in the event that a claim is incorrectly certified as clearly unfounded.
It is ironic that we are debating this clause as the Judicial Review and Courts Bill is receiving its Second Reading. We oppose the clause. We have heard time and again that the Government are aiming to make it harder for a person in the UK to establish their refugee status and entitlement to asylum. Clause 25 further restricts appeal rights for people seeking asylum. This clause removes the in-country and out-of-country rights of appeal for human rights and protection claims certified as clearly unfounded. It is concerning as, once again, it seeks to limit the rights of individuals, while failing to increase efficiency in the system and in turn decreasing fairness, with regrettable consequences for individuals. In respect of articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, it represents a clear breach and will give rise to legal challenge. That was seen in the case of Kiarie and Byndloss v. the Home Secretary in 2017. At present, where the Home Secretary certifies a case as clearly unfounded, any appeal may be brought only after removal from the UK. In cases concerning protection claims or article 3 human rights claims, such appeals are incapable of providing an effective remedy, because the feared harm will have eventuated before the appeal can be heard.
As the explanatory notes to the Bill acknowledge, the right of appeal is rarely exercised; instead, challenges are brought by way of judicial review. This provision therefore contributes to the general trend in immigration and asylum law away from rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and towards unappealable decisions, which are amenable to judicial review.
For the reasons specified in my speech, we will oppose clause 25 standing part of the Bill.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 159, in schedule 3, page 62, line 39, at end insert—
“(2D) Notwithstanding subsection (2A), a person who is particularly vulnerable to harm must not be removed to, or required to leave to go to, a State falling within subsection (2B) or any state to which Part 2, 3 or 4 of Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 for the time being applies.
(2E) For the purposes of subsection (2D), a person is particularly vulnerable to harm if they—
(a) are suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;
(b) have been a victim of torture;
(c) have been a victim of sexual or gender-based violence;
(d) have been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;
(e) are pregnant;
(f) are suffering from a serious physical disability;
(g) are suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses;
(h) are aged under 18 or 70 or over;
(i) are gay, lesbian or bisexual;
(j) are a trans or intersex person.”
This amendment would prevent persons who are particularly vulnerable to harm from being removed to, or required to leave to go to, a state falling within subsection (2B).
That schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.
New clause 18—Removal of asylum seeker to safe country—
“Schedule N makes amendments to section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (no removal while claim for asylum pending).”
This new clause introduces the proposed NS2.
New schedule 2—Removal of asylum seeker to safe country—
“In section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (no removal while claim for asylum pending), after subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) This section does not prevent a person being removed to, or being required to leave to go to, a third State if all of the following conditions are met—
(a) the removal is pursuant to a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement between the United Kingdom and the third State;
(b) the State meets the definition of a safe third State set out at section 14 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2021, as shown by reliable, objective and up-to-date information;
(c) the person has been found inadmissible under section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;
(d) the third State in question is the State with which the person was found to have a connection under Section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;
(e) taking into account the person’s individual circumstances, it is reasonable for them to go to that State; and
(f) the person is not a national of that State.’”
This new schedule modifies the circumstances in which a person can be removed to, or required to leave to go to, a safe third State.
This Government have been clear that claiming asylum in the first safe country reached is the fastest route to safety. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK in order to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and discussing how we could work together in the future.
Clause 26 introduces schedule 3, which aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country, where their claim will then be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks in order to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing.
What my hon. Friend the Minister is saying about deterring these dangerous journeys is even more poignant given the rescue operation that took place today off Harwich, where I understand five Somalis were in a small inflatable boat. As I understand it, two have been rescued, but three are feared drowned. That brings starkly into all our minds the need to deter these dangerous journeys and the desperate people who face these terrible things. I am sure the condolences of the whole Committee go to all those involved—not only those actually in the boat, but the rescue services, which must have had a fairly tough time.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. It is fair to say that I am very mindful of the enormous risks that we are finding people taking in trying to cross the channel at the moment. We have debated the matter extensively in this Committee up to this point, and no doubt that debate will continue. I am very concerned to hear about the situation that he has described. I have asked to be updated, and to be kept updated as to the progress of the operation to try to find the individuals who, it would seem, have been lost at sea. Of course, we send our thoughts and best wishes to those who are caught up in that terrible tragedy, and we hope for the best for them. This absolutely and without question underlines the gravity of the risks that people are taking by getting into small boats and trying to cross the English channel to get to the United Kingdom.
The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. Our aim is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means, facilitated by those criminal smugglers, with a clear message that those who arrive via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to and processed in another safe country not of their choosing.
Is schedule 3 confined to applicants who arrive via irregular and dangerous routes, or could it be applied, in theory, to pretty much anyone who is claiming asylum?
If I may, I will set out the detail that underpins schedule 3 in the course of my remarks.
Clause 26 is designed to be part of a whole-system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative and, in some cases, unfounded article 3 human rights claims.
Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, because of their compliance with obligations under article 3 of the European convention of human rights.
Earlier today, the Minister mentioned that Albania, from where we accept many asylum cases, could be considered a safe country. Can he tell us about other safe countries? Gibraltar, which was touted by the Government, has said categorically that it will not be a safe country for these purposes. Ghana and Rwanda have ruled themselves out, despite being touted by the Government. Morocco and Moldova have appeared in the press as potential examples, but the FCDO has said:
“No north African country, Morocco included, has a fully functioning asylum system”.
The Foreign Office stated that Moldova has “endemic” corruption, and that
“If an asylum centre depended on reliable, transparent, credible cooperation from the host country justice system we would not be able to rely on this”
in Moldova. Can the Minister tell us which safe country he is talking about?
One thing I will say is that the measures are not about opening camps on overseas territories. I will not get into a running commentary about the negotiations or discussions that may or may not be taking place with individual countries.
Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn this presumption to prevent removal. That will support the aim of swiftly removing individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries. Adding to the existing removal power, schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list. That will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate.
Schedule 3 also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded either to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries, or to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.
The Minister says that he does not want to get into a running dialogue—that is fine—but can we have just a rough idea of how many countries are currently in bilateral negotiations with the Home Office? That may be useful. I think it is only right and proper that the Committee has an idea of the costs involved, because they will vary massively depending on the country—or indeed the continent, given some of the ludicrous examples that have been touted by people as high up as the Home Secretary. How many countries are in those negotiations, and how much can the public expect to pay for this particular part of this ridiculous Bill?
The hon. Gentleman is a crafty parliamentarian who will, I have no doubt, try to elicit that information from me, but I am afraid that he will be unsuccessful in that endeavour, however hard he tries. The bottom line is that I am not going to get into a running commentary in this Committee about discussions that may or may not be taking place with countries around the world in relation to this policy.
I will give way, but the hon. Lady will get the same response if she is trying to extract the same information from me.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He might remember that I asked previously whether he had any examples of returns to third countries. He responded in writing with an update this morning. He updates Committee members that
“4,561 ‘notices of intent’ were served to individuals, informing them that inadmissibility action was being considered in their cases.”
So we are not discussing hypotheticals here. The wheels are in motion for individuals. Can he understand that we have got to do our due diligence in pushing for the details, because the consequences for these people who have had notices of intent are very real? That is why we need to put those questions to him.
I would make a few points in response. Obviously, removals and deportations generally have been much more difficult to organise during the last 18 months, as a direct consequence of covid-19. That is not unsurprising, and of course it is reflected in the fact that we have seen fewer removals and deportations than we would have expected. It is not the Government’s intention to apply retrospectively the inadmissability measures we are talking about. That is an important point in providing clarity for the Committee.
We are committed to upholding our international obligations including under the 1951 refugee convention, and that will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of that system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures in the Bill, including those in clause 26 and schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK, and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.
The Minister has scuttled over the idea that the Government are keen to abide by their international obligations. The UNHCR is absolutely clear that the clause rides a coach and horses—I paraphrase slightly—through the convention. Can he say a little bit more about how he possibly believes that this is consistent with what the refugee convention provides?
I am actually meeting the UNHCR tomorrow, and I am obviously looking forward to that meeting. No doubt we will cover a range of topics during that discussion and engagement, which I most certainly value. I repeat to the hon. Gentleman the point that I have now made several times in relation to the provisions in the Bill: we believe that they are compliant with our international obligations. I have made that point previously and will continue to make it.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the principle of a safe country is well established? When we were members of the European Union, removals to EU countries were permitted because of that particular situation. Does he further agree that countries that seek to be candidates to join the European Union will have to bring their standards up to those equivalent to the European Union, so there is a list of countries, particularly in the Balkans and elsewhere, that may well meet those criteria before they join the European Union?
My right hon. Friend raises various points on the back of his experience covering at least part of the role that I now cover. I would build on that by making the point that we do not remove people to countries where they would be unsafe. Of course, we are also talking here about countries that are compliant with the obligations set out under the refugee convention. That is an important point to re-make.
I thank those who drafted amendment 159 for their contribution to the debate thus far. Let me begin by being clear that this Government are wholly committed to ensuring that removals of individuals are done in accordance with our international obligations, and that the safety of those transferred is at the forefront of our actions. However, we simply cannot support any amendment that seeks to limit our ability to remove individuals to safe third countries. I assure the Committee again that we would only ever remove an individual to a country that we are satisfied is safe for them. However, the amendment is overly restrictive and therefore could not be used flexibly to consider the circumstances in the country in question. By way of illustration, the amendment would mean that we could not remove someone who is gay, lesbian or bisexual to France or Italy.
Committee members can be assured that the amendment is superfluous given the safeguards already in the Bill. Indeed, we will only ever send individuals to countries where we know that their removal will be compliant with the UK’s international legal obligations, including those that pertain to potential victims of modern slavery. Even where we are assured that a particular state is safe, changes made by the Bill make it clear that every individual in scope for removal to that state will be able to rely on the protection of article 3 of the ECHR to demonstrate why that state may not be safe in their unique circumstances. That is to prevent any individual from being transferred to a country where they would genuinely be at risk of inhumane and degrading treatment.
The Minister keeps referring to safeguards in the Bill and consideration of individual applicants’ safety, but none of that is in schedule 3, which does not require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention or offer refugee protection or the chance to secure the full rights that refugees are entitled to. Will he talk us through the safeguards?
I would argue that I have already set out those safeguards.
The Government are clear that we must consider all options to break the business model of people smugglers and prevent people from putting their lives at risk by making perilous journeys from safe countries. Changes in schedule 3 are a key component of the wholescale system reform that we are committed to undertaking to prevent irregular migration. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press amendment 159.
On schedule 3, the Government have been clear that the fastest route to safety is to claim asylum in the first safe country reached. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and are discussing how we could work together in the future.
I have been generous to the hon. Gentleman, but I will give way one more time.
I thank the Minister—he is being generous. On the first safe country, the Government might have more standing and the public more confidence in them had they not abandoned their obligations. Pakistan, for example, is seeing a cut of £62 million in aid from the UK to help manage the refugee crisis spilling over the border from the Taliban. Turkey is seeing a cut of £16 million in aid from the UK, Lebanon is seeing a cut of £71.5 million and Syria is seeing a drop of £105 million. If the Government were serious about people being able to stay nearer to their home country, those cuts, which certainly were not in their manifesto at the last election, would not be happening.
In recent years, UK aid in crisis circumstances has made a significant difference in relation to properly caring for and ensuring—
Let me finish the point. We have regularly made additional aid available in crisis circumstances to help relieve particular pressures that have arisen, and UK aid has been essential as part of the global effort. I have been proud of the crisis measures we have put in place in relation to those circumstances as they have arisen. No doubt we will continue to have a commitment to that going forward.
No, I am going to make some progress because I am conscious that we have still got some way to go.
Schedule 3 aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country where their claim will be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing. The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. We aim to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by these criminal smugglers with a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country not of their choosing to be processed.
I just do not understand why the Minister tries to suggest that the provision will apply only to people who are not in genuine need. The Government do not know that because they are not looking at the cases before removing them to a third country. How is he circumscribing those who will be subject to this procedure, which we utterly oppose? How can he keep on saying that it will apply only to those who do not have genuine need?
Schedule 3 is designed to be part of a whole system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative, and in some cases unfounded, article 3 human rights claims. Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, due to them being compliant with their obligations under article 3 of the ECHR. Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn that presumption to prevent removal. This will support the aim to swiftly remove individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries.
Schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list—that is in addition to the already held removal power. This will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate. The schedule also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries nor to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.
We are committed to upholding our international obligations, including under the 1951 refugee convention. That will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of the asylum system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures contained within this Bill, including those within schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for proposing new clause 18, which introduces new schedule 2. I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of ensuring the safety of those who are removed from the UK to third countries. However, we cannot support the proposals, which seek to limit our ability to remove individuals to a safe country. This Government have made our position clear throughout today’s debate: people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. I would like the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2 in turn.
This comes back to the first safe country. The Minister makes the point that we both agree on—we are proud of the UK’s contribution to humanitarian support and of military interventions that prevented refugees from being created in the past. The Conservative manifesto said that the Army would not be cut and aid would not cut, but voters have been betrayed by the Government’s actions since. They have reneged on those manifesto promises. And asylum seekers have been betrayed by those same cuts. The Bill does nothing but compound that betrayal.
On 3 September, we announced £30 million of life-saving aid to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries to help those who choose to leave Afghanistan. That is part of the Government’s efforts to support regional stability. The hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about resources being made available to help in-region. Yet again, this country has demonstrated that commitment to try to help provide stability as far as possible, and to help to ensure that as much support as possible can be provided in the vicinity of where crises arise. I think that—
I will not take another intervention from the hon. Gentleman on that point.
I have been very generous to the hon. Gentleman. I think that aside was a little bit unfair on his part, given the number of interventions that I have taken. I know that it was not meant in an unpleasant spirit, so I will move on.
I invite the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2. Regarding the form of a transfer arrangement, we are currently in discussions with our international partners to consider the shared challenge of irregular migration. I do not wish to pre-empt the form or content of future arrangements as that could tie the hands of our negotiators, but I can assure the Committee that the Government will act in accordance with our international obligations, considering both the content and form of any arrangement reached. Furthermore, that condition would have the perhaps unintended consequence of preventing the removal of individuals in ad hoc cases, which has been a long-standing process within our asylum system to which I have alluded in response to earlier questions.
The Labour party will oppose clause stand part. Clause 26 opens the door to offshoring by permitting the removal of asylum seekers from the UK while their claim is being determined or while the UK decides whether to take responsibility for the claim.
The clause introduces schedule 3, which allows the Government to remove people who are seeking asylum to countries outside the UK, and hold them in detention there while their asylum claims are being processed—in other words, offshoring. It is our strong belief that the clause should be deleted, and we will vote against clause stand part and against schedule 3. We believe that, through the clause, the Government are seeking to emulate the Australian system as a model. It has been reported that the Home Office is in talks with Denmark to share costs on an offshore detention centre in Rwanda, and a number of other places have also been mentioned.
It is worth examining the available empirical evidence on the ideas underpinning the clause. In 2015, a United Nations report found that Australia’s offshore detention regime was systematically violating the international convention against torture. In addition, in 2020, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court said the regime was “cruel, inhuman or degrading”, and unlawful under international law.
We are deeply concerned that the Government’s plan appears to emulate a failed system that has been widely condemned for its human rights abuses. When we look in more detail at the Australian model that the Government seem to want to emulate, we find more causes for concern. In 1992, the Australian Government introduced mandatory indefinite detention for asylum seekers who arrive by boat—that policy remains in place. In 2001, they introduced the Pacific solution, whereby boats were intercepted by the navy and taken to processing centres on Manus and Nauru. In 2008, the Australian Labour Government ended that practice, branding it an “abject policy failure”, only to reintroduce offshore detention in the early 2010s. Approximately 4,180 people were transferred offshore between 2012 and 2014, at which point the transfers stopped.
Conditions and events inside the centres were secretive; journalists and legal representatives were generally banned from entering. That created the conditions for the systematic abuse of asylum seekers by those running the facilities. In 2016, The Guardian released records of more than 2,000 incident reports from Nauru—known as the Nauru files—documenting widespread abuse and neglect in offshore detention. That included systematic physical and sexual assault on children and adults, the use of blackmail by guards, and attacks and harassment by people on Nauru or Manus Island. At least 12 people are reported to have died in the camps, with the causes of death including medical neglect, suicide and murder by centre guards.
Aside from the immeasurable human cost, this failed system has been dismantled by its own architects. A recent research report by the Kaldor Centre found that there is no evidence that the policy achieved the stated aim of “stopping the boats” and that since 2014 the Government have been trying to distance themselves from the policy. Thanks to the powerful stories of the people affected, it has been increasingly rejected by the Australian public. It has cost billions of Australian dollars. The policy has clearly failed disastrously, and we are deeply concerned that this Government are seeking in this clause to bring the policy to the UK.
The impact of offshore detention on mental health cannot be overstated. In the Australian example, conditions in offshore detention centres have been inhumane and unfit for human habitation. The mental and physical health impact of offshore detention has been colossal. In 2014, the Australian Human Rights Commission found that 34% of children in detention suffered from mental health disorders of a seriousness that would require psychiatric referral if the children were in the Australian population, and paediatricians reported that the children transferred to Nauru were among the most traumatised they had ever seen. Medical experts working with the UNHCR found rates of mental illness in people in offshore detention to be among the highest recorded in any surveyed population. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that the suffering on Nauru was some of the worst that it had ever encountered. There is absolutely no way, in our view, that the UK Government should be risking huge harm against children in terms of their mental health by emulating that failed policy.
Furthermore, the financial cost of the Australian system is astronomical and regularly more than $1 billion a year. The Refugee Council of Australia compiled a detailed breakdown of offshoring costs and found that it had cost the Australian Government $8.3 billion between 2014 and 2020. The annual cost per person of holding someone offshore in Nauru or Papua New Guinea has been estimated to be $3.4 million—per person. Again, we are deeply concerned that the UK Government are seeking to emulate a policy that is extremely likely to have extortionate costs in financial terms. The financial impact of this policy will be huge. That all these increased costs go simply to stopping boats, as a deterrent, which the Minister alluded to, shows that it is a failed policy. This is fiscal incompetence from the Government: in their own prediction of what the policy costs, they have estimated exceeding that every year. It will be a budget impossible to predict, based on the number of people whom they propose to offshore. We have the Budget tomorrow, so I will be interested to see what provision the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made in relation to that and the comprehensive spending review.
Let us look in more detail at what the Government are risking with this policy in terms of the human cost. There are countless stories of the lives destroyed by the policy of offshoring. Loghman Sawari, whose story was covered by The Guardian, is still detained, despite having been accepted by Australia as a refugee in 2014. Eight years after the initial detention, he told The Guardian that the days have begun to run one into another and his memory is failing. The Maghames family arrived in Australia by boat in 2013 and were detained on Christmas Island before being transferred to Nauru in March 2014. Hajar Maghames, along with her parents and younger brother, has been in detention ever since, despite being granted refugee status in 2019. In 2020, they were transferred to Australia so that her father could receive medical care, and they are now in cabins at the back of Darwin airport. They are now the only people held there.
I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether people being processed wherever they are offshored will, if their claim is successful, be brought back to the UK, and what estimate he has made of the cost of that.
To continue with my examples, Reza Barati, who, like the family to whom I just referred, had fled Iran, is one of the 18 people to have died in offshore detention. He was beaten to death by guards and other workers on Manus Island after a protest turned violent and the centre was attacked. He died four days after his 24th birthday. His family are suing the Australian Government and G4S for negligence. During the same incident over two days in February 2014, 70 refugees and asylum seekers were injured. One lost his right eye. Another was shot in the buttocks. One man was attacked from behind by a G4S guard who slashed his neck, causing a 10 to 12 cm horizontal slit across his throat. There have been many others, including the high-profile cases of author Behrouz Boochani or the Tamil family from Biloela, whose harrowing stories have ultimately helped to turn public opinion against this policy.
Offshoring in large accommodation centres poses particular risks to LGBT+ people seeking asylum because of their particular vulnerability. Organisations such as Rainbow Migration and Stonewall have raised concerns that housing people in such centres outside the UK will result in systemic verbal, violent and sexual abuse of LGBT+ people who are in need of protection and who have higher rates of self-harm and suicide.
There is much evidence that LGBT+ people already experience systemic abuse and harassment in the UK’s current accommodation and detention system, led by staff and others with whom they are housed or detained alongside. The problems tend to continue, even when people are moved to a new property. Documented examples provided by organisations that deal with victims have included unwanted sexual advances, threats, invasions of privacy, verbal abuse, being prevented from sleeping, pranks and sexual assault.
It is therefore deeply worrying that offshore processing centres are likely to escalate the homophobic, biphobic and transphobic abuse that LGBT+ people experience in existing asylum accommodation and detention centres. It is even more shocking when one considers that many refugees in the LGBT+ community have fled their home countries specifically because of abuses and persecution that they have experienced there.
Offshoring also presents a significant risk of harm to women who have survived rape and sexual exploitation. It is difficult to see how women who have survived such atrocities would be exempt from offshoring because it is clear that the Government’s key objective for offshore detention is deterrence. According to the Government’s logic, there can be no exceptions to this policy, because otherwise the objective of deterrence is undermined.
This was seen when offshore detention was reintroduced by the Australian Government in 2012. All people seeking asylum who arrived by boat were liable for removal to the islands of Nauru or Manus
“even if they...had characteristics warranting special consideration, such as being an unaccompanied minor, a survivor of torture and trauma, or a victim of trafficking”.
It is clear that the UK Government, by introducing such provision for offshoring, must be willing to subject children, pregnant women, survivors of trafficking and other vulnerable people to offshore detention.
I hope that I can help the hon. Gentleman somewhat by making it very clear that children will not be transferred overseas for their claims to be processed.
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but there are still others with vulnerable characteristics, including pregnant women and survivors of trafficking who will be subject to offshore detention.
I hardly need to outline the inhumanity of this policy as it applies to women victims of rape and sexual violence. I am deeply concerned about the conditions in which women will be held, and particularly the risk to them of further sexual violence and abuse. In detention centres in the UK, where there are a range of safeguarding mechanisms in place, it has not been enough to protect people in detention from abuse. The 2015 Lampard report on Yarl’s Wood, which until last year was the main detention centre for women in the UK, highlighted that between 2007 and 2015, 10 members of staff had been dismissed for incidents involving “sexual impropriety” towards women held there. Such “impropriety” included the repeated sexual harassment and abuse of a 29-year-old woman by a male healthcare worker.
When it comes to offshoring, the UK Government will have even less control over the treatment of detainees in offshore detention centres. The risk to women of sexual violence and abuse in such centres will be increased. The sexual harassment and violence to which women detained offshore by the Australian Government were subjected has been well documented.
There is no empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of offshoring as a deterrent strategy in respect of those fleeing persecution. A recent report by the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law highlights that in the year following the Australian Government’s reintroduction of offshore detention
“more than 24,000 asylum seekers arrived in Australia by boat. This number was considerably more than at any other time since the 1970s, when boats of asylum seekers were first recorded in Australia. Moreover, as the months passed, and news of the policy presumably reached some of those who were contemplating travelling by sea to Australia, there was no noticeable change in the rate of arrivals, with boats of varying numbers of people (from two to more than 200) continuing to arrive on average several times per week.”
That brings us back to the fundamental fact, discussed earlier in reference to other clauses, such as clauses 10 and 11, that policy measures that rely on deterrence assume that people have a choice in the decisions they make. People who are forced to flee their countries because of violence and persecution have no such choice. Therefore, deterrent measures will not stop them making the journey to find safety. The likelihood is that offshoring will be completely ineffective in its aims, as well as deeply inhumane.
I will speak briefly in support of amendment 159, new clause 18 and new schedule 2.
I echo everything the shadow Minister said. This is a terrible clause. I echo in particular all that he said about Australia. I take a tiny crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister, despite the Home Office’s having adduced evidence in relation to the Australian example, did not mention it during his speech. Perhaps the Home Office is learning that it should run a million miles from the Australian offshoring scheme, because it was awful.
I did not recognise the clause from what the Minister said. He kept referring to safeguards and asserting that it was absolutely consistent with our international obligations. My reading of schedule 3 and clause 26 is the polar opposite. Schedule 3 drives a coach and horses through the principle that people cannot be removed while they have a claim outstanding. It allows removal to anywhere if some very basic safeguards are met. The person might have no link to the country to which they are removed—they might have been nowhere near it. It is clearly nothing to do with responsibility sharing between states. Like clause 14, it is just about offloading responsibility.
We are not saying that no one can ever be removed to have a decision made on their claim elsewhere. While not perfect, the Dublin scheme allowed for the transfer of a claim and the removal of a claimant in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. We have set out the criteria that would put in place similar safeguards in new clause 18 and new schedule 2. They include a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement with the state; a requirement that the person has a connection with the country in question; that it is reasonable in the circumstances for the person’s case to be considered there; and that all the requirements and safeguards that we said should have been in place around clause 14 are present, such as the proper implementation of the full refugee convention, protection against harm, access to fair and efficient asylum processes, and so on.
Again, all those protections are informed by the UNHCR’s public commentary on and critique of the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister expressed sympathy for what we are trying to achieve, but I suspect that when he has his discussions with the UNHCR, it will urge him to go further and to adopt some of these safeguards.
There are huge differences between what we propose in new schedule 2 and what appears in schedule 3. The absence of so many crucial safeguards in the latter shows why the clause should not form part of the Bill. Schedule 3 does not even require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention, offer refugee protection, or offer the chance to secure the full rights to which refugees are entitled under the convention.
To use the UNHCR’s own words:
“Transferring asylum-seekers or recognised refugees to territories with which they have no prior connection and without an individualised consideration of safety, access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and to international protection, or reasonableness is at odds with international practice and risks denying them the right to seek and enjoy asylum, exposing them to human rights abuses and other harm, delaying durable solutions to forced displacement, and encouraging onward movement. To transfer asylum-seekers and refugees to countries that are not parties to the Refugee Convention, and without any expectation, let alone commitment, that they will provide a fair asylum procedure and treatment in line with the Refugee Convention would be an abdication of the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under international law towards refugees and asylum-seekers under its jurisdiction.”
That is the UNHCR’s commentary on schedule 3. That is why we have tabled our new schedule, new clause and amendment, and I hope that the Minister will—not today, obviously—give that further thought.
We know that this is essentially about offshoring. We oppose the clause and the schedule because we are completely and utterly opposed to that concept. It is unlawful, unethical and, as the experience in Australia shows, it does not work. As the shadow Minister highlighted, it did not discourage arrivals by boat. The Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law went into great detail on that in its submission to the Committee, which is absolutely spot on. It highlighted the humongous cost and, more than anything else, the humanitarian disgrace that those camps represent. Doctors Without Borders has talked about
“some of the worst mental health suffering we have ever encountered in our 50 years of existence, including in projects that provide care for torture survivors.”
Finally, on amendment 159, it is good that the Minister has said that children would not be subject to that procedure. However, as the shadow Minister said, there are still various categories of vulnerable people who must be removed from the scope of the clause and schedule. If the Home Office insists on taking that terrible step, surely to goodness it will not subject pregnant women, disabled or sick people, torture victims, victims of trafficking or gender-based violence, LGBT people or the young and old to that procedure. Perhaps the Minister could accept that amendment, just to give us a tiny crumb of comfort.
I will briefly pick up on a few points that have been raised during the debate on clause 26. The Government argue that the suite of measures are intended to have a deterrent effect. The measures under the clause are just one part of system-wide reforms that make clear our position that individuals must claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. I recognise that there are fundamental differences of opinion in the Committee about some matters, but we argue that that is the fastest route to safety.
I want to clarify the situation. Although we are, of course, working with our international partners to meet our joint challenges, I assure Committee members that we are not working with Denmark to open an offshore detention centre. It is important to be clear on that point.
I will give way, although I gave quite a bit of clarity in what I just said.
The Minister has given some clarity by saying that the Government are not working with Denmark, but, as he has already said today, he cannot tell us which countries the Government are working with. We know that Albania, Ghana, Rwanda and Gibraltar have all said, “No, thanks”, and that, frankly, we look like we have fewer friends than North Korea on this issue. However, the Minister cannot tell us which countries the Government are negotiating with or how much the measures will cost. When we are supposed to be going through a very costly and controversial set of plans in line- by-line scrutiny, I think that is a dereliction of duty.
I reject the hon. Gentleman’s characterisation of the situation. The truth is that a very particular point was raised about the United Kingdom establishing an offshore detention centre with Denmark, which is not the case. It is important to be clear about that on the record.
A number of issues were raised about vulnerabilities. Again, I want to make it very clear that we will only ever act in line with our international commitments and legal obligations, including the ECHR. Any particular vulnerabilities will be taken into account. Flexibility is already built into the system to ensure that individual circumstances are properly taken into account, and that will continue to be the case.
To conclude, the shadow Minister sought further clarification on the Government’s intentions on clause 26. Changes in the Bill are not about housing people offshore while their asylum claims are considered under the UK’s asylum system. The measures in the Bill support our future objective of removing someone to a safe third country where we intend their claims to be admitted and processed under the third country’s asylum system. I am very happy to provide the clarification he sought.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I am not aware of the evidence of that, so I cannot comment. At the end of the day we are talking about people who are at risk. We are not talking about a road traffic case, a minor bump or the small claims court. We are talking about people whose lives are at risk, or they are at risk of serious harm and persecution. That is why we have to be very, very careful about requiring evidence beyond the standard that is internationally accepted.
Let us say that a decision maker is certain that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country. Even though the decision maker thinks there is a reasonable likelihood that a particular applicant is LGBT, that will not be enough to secure refugee status. The decision maker could be 49% certain that the applicant is LGBT and 100% certain that an LGBT person returned to a particular country will be tortured and killed, but that 1%—that tiny little bit of doubt—means that the balance of probabilities threshold will not be met, and that case will be rejected. The implications are huge.
Amendment 152 seeks to maintain the status quo. Let us not mess with a long-established principle, and let us be very, very careful that we are not denying refugee status to people who we know should be awarded it.
I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I agree about the importance of the UK carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under article 1A(2) of the refugee convention. However, we do not agree with the amendments, which, when considered together, will leave decision makers with a lack of clarity on how to consider whether a claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution.
Clause 29 is currently drafted to introduce a clear, step-by-step process for decision makers considering whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution. Currently, there is no clearly outlined test as such. While there is case law, policy and guidance, the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. The reforms that the Government want to introduce create distinct stages that a decision maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that that will lead to clearer and more consistent decisions. That is desirable for all involved.
The amendments include what is already in subsection (4) of clause 29, and it is unclear how they are proposed to fit with subsections (3) and (5). That therefore creates a lack of clarity and defeats the clarificatory purpose of the clause. As identified by hon. Members, clause 29 also raises the standard of proof for one element of the test to the balance of probabilities. Whether an asylum seeker has a characteristic that causes them to fear persecution, also referred to as a convention reason, will be tested to the balance of probabilities.
There is one further issue that I did not raise earlier. The Minister has spoken about whether an appellant has a convention characteristic. How does the clause deal with imputed characteristics—that is, when a person is not LGBT but is perceived to be, or a person who does not have a political opinion but is treated and thought of as having such an opinion? That is quite an important concept and it seems to be absent.
Obviously, we are clear that our proposal is entirely consistent with our obligations under the convention. However, I will happily write to the hon. Member with further detail on that point. It is important to give clarity, and I am keen to do so.
At the clause’s core, we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and fear what they say they fear, to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts—namely, more likely than not. Surelyit is reasonable that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions.
We have looked carefully at the difficult situations from which many claimants come and the impact on the kinds of tangible evidence they may be able to provide as a result of that. We consider that our holistic approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing as well as referring to expert country guidance, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test. The raising of the standard of proof for this distinct element of the test is appropriate to ensure that only those who qualify for protection under the refugee convention are afforded protection in the United Kingdom.
On the hypothetical example that I gave, if a decision maker is 49% certain that somebody is LGBT or that their membership of a political party meant that they would definitely be persecuted on return, is the Minister not uncomfortable that that small shortfall from 50% would mean that their whole claim would be rejected, given the consequences?
On the concerns around LGBTQ+ individuals, we have acknowledged that it may be more difficult to prove such claims compared with individuals making applications based on other convention reasons. We already have specific asylum policy instruction on considering such claims, which sets out in detail how caseworkers should fully investigate the key issues through a focused, professional and sensitive approach to questioning. As part of the operationalisation of the programme, we will seek to update the training and guidance provided to decision makers. That will concentrate on interviews, to ensure that they are sufficiently detailed to enable claimants to meet the standard. I hope that gives the hon. Member some reassurance. I will of course write to him on his earlier point.
The second element of the test—whether the claimant would be persecuted if returned to their country of origin or their country of former habitual residence—remains at the reasonable degree of likelihood standard of proof. The subjective element—the future fear—is naturally harder for the claimant to demonstrate. Consequently, a lower standard of proof is appropriate.
Responses to the public consultation as well as recent reports from non-governmental organisations have warned of the effects that the clause will have on those with certain protected characteristics, including those with LGBT+ claims. The Committee should be assured that we have considered that carefully, and there are several ways in which we will ensure that such individuals are not disadvantaged by the change. It is worth reflecting on the points I made and the explanation I set out in response to the hon. Member’s intervention. In the light of those points, I hope he will agree to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful for the offer of a letter, but I am not remotely reassured about the new higher standard, which will lead to marginal cases being sent away to persecution, torture and all sorts of terrible consequences. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 30, page 31, line 47, leave out “both” and insert “either”.
This amendment would mean that – in order to be defined as a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention – a group would only have to meet one (not both) of the conditions set out in subsections 3 and 4.
I have a short but important point to make. The clause concerns the definition of a particular social group, which is an important concept in refugee law and has been crucial to its ongoing relevance across many decades. The clause is controversial because it makes an important change to how a particular social group is defined. In the House of Lords case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Fornah, a long-standing argument about whether the tests in subsection (3) of the clause should be cumulative or alternative was addressed and it was decided that there was no need to meet both of those conditions; one or the other would suffice. However, in the Bill, the Government have decided to change that approach. It now demands that both conditions are met, and that seems to contradict established case law in this country. I simply ask the Government to explain why they have taken a more restrictive approach.
Clause 30 aims to clarify an area where there has been a degree of contradiction and confusion. There is a clear mismatch between how the concept of “particular social group” is set out in current legislation, Government policy and in some tribunal judgments, against the interpretation taken in some case law. That is unhelpful for all those working in and engaging with the asylum system, and who most of all want clarity and consistency. Defining how key elements of the convention should be interpreted and applied is vital in creating a robust system that can generate consistency and certainty, which ultimately will drive efficiency. I trust that members of the Committee will agree with that principle. The historical confusion demonstrates perfectly why what we are doing in this clause is so important and is a desirable law reform.
I cannot agree to the change proposed by the hon. Gentleman. First, it is important to state that the conditions set out in the clause reflect current Government policy; it is not a change. The amendment would mean that a group need only meet one of the conditions to be considered as a particular social group. That significantly broadens the scope of who may be covered by the convention. It would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It proposes instead to broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that can perhaps be changed, but that fundamentally misunderstands the very basis of what it means to be a refugee, as envisaged by the refugee convention, and why we have a system to offer protection. I hope my explanation has reassured colleagues across the Committee, and I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
The hon. Gentleman has mentioned established case law on the correct definition of “particular social group”, so I will say something briefly about that. As with many of the key concepts of the refugee convention, case law has developed over the years on how to apply the term “particular social group” for the purpose of considering whether a claimant has a convention reason. Despite significant judicial interest in the interpretation of “particular social group” in case law, there is no established case law on the point. There is, however, conflicting tribunal-level case law and obiter comments by the House of Lords in the case of Fornah. Consequently, the clause seeks to provide clarity on the UK’s interpretation of a particular social group, to ensure that it is applied consistently among decision makers.
I agree with the Minister that we need clarity, but there are two different ways of providing clarity: we can either combine the requirements or use them as alternatives. I say that we should provide clarity by using them as alternatives. That is how the House of Lords interpreted the convention in the case of Fornah, and that is what the tribunal did recently as well, so I wish to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The clause relates to article 31 of the convention, which provides refugees with immunity from certain penalties. It is an important protection that the Government are seeking to limit by, in my view, reinterpreting and undermining article 31, and setting out expectations of where and when individuals should claim that go beyond the letter and spirit of the convention.
The amendments take us back to this morning’s discussion about why it was especially inappropriate to place these requirements and expectations on particular groups, including victims of trafficking, sexual violence and torture. They are designed to pose a question to the Minister: why is he seeking to strip such groups of their immunity from penalties that the refugee convention provides?
Again, I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area and in producing these amendments. As they will know, the provisions they are seeking to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In this respect, these clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure they will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.
Amendments 157 and 158 would apply to clause 34, which is closely related to clause 10 in that it sets out the UK’s interpretation of certain criteria within article 31(1) of the refugee convention. The criteria in article 31 provide the basis for the legal framework we are using to differentiate within clause 10. The intention of the amendments is to seek statutory carve-outs from differentiation for a wide range of cohorts.
I absolutely understand where this is coming from. I would like to reassure hon. Members that the powers in clause 10 do not compel the Secretary of State to act in a certain way, and leave discretion to impose or not impose conditions as appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances. We will of course set out our policy in immigration rules and guidance in due course. The policy will be exercised with full respect to our international obligations and will most certainly be sensitive to certain types, some of which are referenced in the amendment, such as having been trafficked.
I would note that blanket carve-outs are an attractive option to ensure protection of the most vulnerable, but ultimately I do not believe it would appropriate to do this in the way amendments 157 and 158 seek. In reality, blanket carve-outs would simply encourage people coming by small boat to claim they belonged to an exempted cohort. Most importantly, this would of course prevent us from protecting those people who do genuinely have those characteristics. By creating this perverse incentive, it would also undercut the entire purpose of the policy to serve as a deterrent. Indeed, people could then simply continue to make dangerous journeys to the UK and not claim in the first safe country because they know they can avoid group 2 refugee status simply by saying that they are LGBT+ or have a mental health condition.
For all these reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East not to press their amendments.
Obviously, we maintain a fundamental opposition to the whole scheme proposed by this clause and clause 10. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 34, page 34, line 1, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) in subsection (3), after (b), insert—
“(ba) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act”;
(c) in subsection (4), after (c), insert—
“(ca) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act””.
This amendment would mean that individuals who committed these offences (and the other offences set out in section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) would be able to use the defence set out in section 31 of that Act, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK.
Again, I want to prompt the Government—perhaps optimistically—for their thinking on the compatibility of these provisions with the convention. The amendment would mean that individuals charged with certain offences could still rely on defences provided by the convention, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK. It is important that the Government explain clearly why they think that removing that possibility is consistent with the convention. To be honest, I am struggling to understand the Government’s reasoning.
Amendment 50 is extensive. I thank the hon. Member for the considerable thought he has put into the amendment, which would list the illegal entry, arrival without clearance and remaining in the UK without leave offences as subject to the statutory defence against prosecution. However, the express statutory defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 has never applied to the existing offences referred to in amendment 50. We do not consider the new arrivals without entry clearance offence needs to be referred to expressly for the same reason. Where relevant in a particular case, the Crown Prosecution Service will take into account the UK’s obligations under article 31 of the refugee convention.
Another effect of amendment 50 would be to reverse our clause 34(4) and reintroduce a defence from prosecution for those transiting through the UK having entered illegally and intending to go and claim asylum elsewhere, such as Canada or the USA. I disagree that the statutory defence should extend to those who have tried to exit the UK without first seeking asylum, but I reassure hon. Members that that does not mean that every asylum seeker who tries to exit the UK will be prosecuted. We are targeting for prosecution those migrants where there are aggravating factors involved—for example, causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are persons who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers.
We have of course been very clear that people seeking protection must claim in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. In the same way that we will not tolerate smugglers exploiting vulnerable people to come to the UK when a claim could easily be made in another safe country, we will also not tolerate those migrants who transit through the UK, having previously travelled through European countries, to reach other places. They must claim in the first safe country they reach. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
It is useful to have that on the record. I will go away and give it some further thought. We maintain our fundamental opposition to the whole scheme, but, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Article 33(2): particularly serious crime
I am afraid that we simply cannot agree to amendments that would allow individuals to remain in the United Kingdom despite being convicted of offences that are even more serious than those described under the current legislative framework. This Government cannot support provisions that allow dangerous foreign national offenders to remain in the United Kingdom, and if it means putting the public at risk.
This Government are committed to continuing to meet our international obligations, in particular those under the refugee convention and European convention on human rights. A key principle of the refugee convention is non-refoulement, also referred to as removal, of refugees to a place or territory where there is a real risk that their life or freedoms would be threatened. But the convention itself recognises that there have to be exceptions to this. Article 33(2) of the convention allows refugees to be returned when they have committed a particularly serious crime and as a result, constitute a danger to the community, or are a danger to the security of the UK.
The aim of clause 35 is to redefine a “particularly serious crime”. I would like to reassure Committee members that we have looked carefully at the type of offending that may be caught by a new lower threshold. It is that that has contributed to the Government’s position that offences with 12 months’ custody or more should be considered as being particularly serious.
It is worth taking a moment to consider some of those offences for which the Sentencing Council’s guidelines indicate that a year’s custody is the starting point. They include causing a child to watch sexual activity, inciting a child to engage in sexual activity and carrying a firearm in a public place, in certain circumstances. Hon. Members surely agree with me that they and the public would consider those crimes as particularly serious. Clause 35 as drafted, like all clauses in the Bill, is fully compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention.
I turn specifically to amendments 51 and 52. They seek to make the first limb of the article 33(2) assessment, that is whether an individual has committed a particularly serious crime, rebuttable. That would mean that an individual who had been sentenced to 12 months or more in prison could argue that their crime was not in fact serious. That is despite a court of law, based on all the facts in the case, taking into account mitigating and aggravating factors, determining that the offending was so serious that an individual should be deprived of their liberty for 12 months or more.
If we are agreed that a year’s imprisonment means someone has committed a crime that society clearly considers serious, this amendment seemingly gives offenders a second bite of the cherry to disagree with the ruling of the criminal courts in the UK—some of the most respected legal bodies in the world. The Government propose in clause 35 that a crime which has been punished by 12 months or more imprisonment is an appropriate definition, ensuring that all particularly serious crimes are captured. Such a sentence, which limits the freedom of an individual for a considerable period, would be inappropriate if the crime was not particularly serious.
I also stress that there is a safeguard in the process. If an individual commits a particularly serious crime, the bar on refoulement is not automatically lifted. The individual has an opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are a danger to the community in the UK. Only individuals who are unable to rebut the presumption will be considered for removal. I also flag the UK’s other international obligations, in particular those under the European convention on human rights. An individual would not be removed from the UK if doing so would breach our obligations under the convention. Instead, they would be granted shorter, more restricted forms of leave to remain, and would be removed at the earliest opportunity, when it is safe to do so.
Is the Minister aware that in the Representation of the People Act 1981 the same 12-month sentence would disqualify a Member of Parliament—so what is sauce for the goose, I guess?
My right hon. Friend puts the matter in a way that only he can. To raise the definition to a level that captures only crimes that have resulted in a sentence of four years or more imprisonment would be reckless, and would undermine the aims of the new plan for immigration to build a fair but firm immigration system. It would clearly send the wrong, and dangerous, message that the UK welcomes and rewards serious offenders. I do not believe that the people of the UK want that. The amendments would mean that individuals who commit some of the most serious crimes would continue to receive the generous benefits of refugee status in the United Kingdom. Their continued presence in the UK could also lead to avoidable reoffending. The Government would not be upholding their responsibility to protect the public of the United Kingdom by supporting the amendments.
The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate queried the process for a person who has been trafficked. I can confirm that such a person will be tested under the second limb for whether they amount to a danger to the community. With regard to offences committed overseas, section 72(3)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a provision to ensure that any convictions abroad would result in a sentence of 12 months or above in the UK for a similar offence.
In the light of those points, I hope that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw the amendment, and that the Committee agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is useful to have that on the record. I do not think that all the points were addressed, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Interpretation of Part 2
In order to save time—I know that we have had a very long day—I will bear in mind that the wording of amendment 135 is almost identical to that of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He did it justice when speaking to it, and we will support it.
I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward. I agree about the importance of the United Kingdom continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees. The amendments to clause 36 relate to the inadmissibility provisions set out in clause 14. I understand the spirit of the amendments in wishing to define protection in accordance with the refugee convention where we may seek to remove an individual to a safe country. However, clause 14 as drafted ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.
If individuals have travelled via, or have connections to, safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so. They should not make unnecessary and often dangerous onward journeys to the UK; however, if they do, we will seek to remove them to a safe country. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe and where the principles of the refugee convention are met. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendments, and I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 55.
Again, it is useful to have that on the record. The Minister defends the clause as it is by referencing the protection that clause 14 provides on the principles of the refugee convention, but when I asked him what that meant earlier I was not remotely satisfied by the answer. It is another clause that is completely undefined, so I wish to press amendment 55 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Eleventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe usual housekeeping notes: switch off your electronic devices, please, or put them on silent; and no food or drink is allowed in Committee—I do not think there is any, so that is good. Members are encouraged to wear masks, and I remind colleagues that they are worn not for your own protection, but for the protection of others, as a courtesy. Those who have speaking notes, will you please make them available to Hansard at the appropriate time, together with any documents that you are quoting from?
Clause 37
Illegal entry and similar offences
I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 37, page 36, line 4, at end insert—
“(C1A) A person who—
(a) is required under immigration rules not to travel to the United Kingdom without an ETA that is valid for the person’s journey to the United Kingdom, and
(b) knowingly arrives in the United Kingdom without such an ETA,
commits an offence.”
This amendment inserts a new offence into the Immigration Act 1971 of a person knowingly arriving in the United Kingdom without a valid electronic travel authorisation (ETA) in circumstances where they require such an ETA.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 111 to 117.
Amendment 188, in clause 37, page 37, line 17, at end insert—
“(10) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the implications of this section for devolved criminal justice functions and bodies in Northern Ireland and Scotland, including but not restricted to those of—
(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern Ireland;
(b) the Lord Advocate;
(c) the Police Service of Northern Ireland;
(d) Police Scotland;
(e) the Northern Ireland Prison Service;
(f) the Scottish Prison Service;
(g) the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service; and
(h) the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service.
(11) A report under subsection (10) must include the following information—
(a) an assessment of the how the functions and bodies listed in (10) will be affected by this section;
(b) the financial implications for those bodies;
(c) the implications for existing devolved criminal justice and related policies;
(d) details of any consultation and engagement with those bodies; and
(e) the Secretary of State’s findings, conclusions and proposed actions.”
This amendment would require the Government to report on the implications of clause 36 for bodies involved in devolved criminal justice functions and to obtain Parliamentary approval for such a report, before the clause enters into force.
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 125.
Clause 60 stand part.
Government amendment 120.
Government new clause 21—Electronic travel authorisations.
Government new clause 22—Liability of carriers.
Amendment 110 will add to the other offences in the clause the additional offence of knowingly arriving in the UK without an electronic travel authorisation where that is required. The current offence of knowingly entering the UK in breach of a deportation order or without leave dates back to the Immigration Act 1971, and is no longer considered entirely apt, given the changes in ways that people seek to come to the UK through irregular routes, and in particular the use of small boats.
Many of the individuals involved are intercepted in UK territorial seas and brought to the UK. They arrive in, but may not technically enter, the UK. However, we need to deter migrants from risking their lives and those of their families by taking such dangerous routes to the UK, and to take back control of our borders. We are committed to strengthening our border security by ensuring that everyone wishing to travel to the UK, except British and Irish citizens, seeks permission to do so before travelling.
The clause introduces new arrival offences to deal with the issue. I reassure the Committee that we do not seek to criminalise genuine refugees who come to the UK to seek asylum, but safe and legal routes can be used for that purpose, without risking lives.
Government amendments 111 to 117 and 125 are consequential amendments; they ensure that where the clause and schedule 5 cross-reference to the offence of arrival in the UK without the required entry clearance, they also refer to the new offence.
The Minister has slightly skirted over the most fundamental point in all this, which is that lots of refugees who come to seek asylum in this country will be criminalised by the provision—a good 60% or 70%, even according to the Home Office’s explanatory memorandum. How can he possibly feel comfortable about criminalising them through an offence that could see them imprisoned for up to four years?
Clearly, any such cases would be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service or the relevant prosecuting authorities. They must make a judgment as to whether it is in the public interest to pursue such a prosecution. I will say more about that in due course, but it is important to highlight that point.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but he may want to reflect on this now, although he might have been about to do so in due course. He referred to the CPS, but in July the CPS confirmed that, following an agreement made by prosecutors, police, Border Force, the National Crime Agency and the Home Office, it will no longer prosecute illegal entry.
As I said—I will come on to this in more detail—it is for the prosecuting authorities to decide whether it is in the public interest to pursue a particular case.
On amendment 188, I reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that consideration of the issues he has listed is already taking place. I fully recognise that, while immigration offences are a reserved matter, the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland have responsibility for their criminal justice systems, and decisions on prosecutions are independently taken by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland.
My officials have been in contact with the Scottish Government criminal justice division, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the Department of Justice Northern Ireland, and have shared information about potential impacts and costings. The amendment would add an extra and unnecessary layer of parliamentary scrutiny to a process that is under way at official level. It would also have a critical impact on the commencement of the clause; it would add delay, but we need the measures in place to respond to the expected surge in dangerous small boat crossings when the weather improves in spring next year. I urge the hon. Member not to press his amendment.
On clause 37, the UK is experiencing a very serious problem of small boat arrivals; illegal migrants are crossing from the continent in small craft that are often equipped with only an outboard motor. They are unseaworthy and wholly unsuitable for a crossing of a minimum of 21 miles across some of the busiest sea lanes in the world. Many of the vessels break down and are intercepted by UK personnel on the grounds of safety of life at sea. The rescued migrants, including pregnant women and children, are generally brought to Dover.
The maximum sentence of six months does not reflect the seriousness of the offence of entering in breach of a deportation order. Increasing the maximum sentence to five years will disrupt the activities of foreign national offenders involved in criminal networks, including organised immigration crime.
The current offence of knowingly entering the UK without leave is ineffective and does not provide a sufficient deterrent to those wishing to enter the UK illegally by small boat. We accordingly propose increasing the maximum sentence from six months’ to four years’ imprisonment.
We also intend to create a new offence of arriving in the UK without an entry clearance where that is required. While some migrants seek to evade immigration control, for example by landing on a deserted beach, many more now arrive in the UK after being rescued at sea. It would not be right, and would be perverse, to have to let migrants take the risk of completing their journey without assistance, and of landing at a small beach, rather than rescuing them at sea, just because under current legislation, the act of intercepting them and bringing them to the UK could cast doubt on whether the migrants entered unlawfully.
It is worth repeating that we are not seeking to criminalise those who come to the UK genuinely to seek asylum, and who use safe and legal routes to do so. We will be targeting for prosecution those migrants in cases where there are aggravating factors—where they caused danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; where they caused severe disruption to services such as shipping routes, or the closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are criminals who have previously been deported from the UK or persons who have been repeatedly removed as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.
The Minister is at his most reassuring when he tells us, basically, “Don’t worry; we are not really going to apply the full provisions of the clause.” The key point is that none of this is in the Bill. I want to remove these measures altogether, but could we at least put some of the restrictions in the Bill? Otherwise, we are putting in statute a law that criminalises the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers coming into the United Kingdom.
I hope I will be able to provide the hon. Member with further reassurance by going on to say that, of course, the decision on whether prosecution is in the public interest rests with the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland. In many cases, we will continue to seek the illegal migrant’s removal, rather than their prosecution.
The amended and new offences will apply to all types of unlawful entry and arrival, rather than being limited to entry via small boats. We should not limit our response to the evasion of proper immigration procedures and controls depending on the method of entry employed. Doing that would risk causing displacement to another, potentially equally dangerous, route. The offences will therefore also apply equally to other means of evasion, such as concealment in a lorry.
We are also amending the offence of assisting unlawful immigration to the UK in breach of immigration law, known as facilitation, to include arrival in the UK. That will ensure that the offence of facilitation also applies to those assisting the new offence of arriving without a valid entry clearance.
Clause 60 is one of the six clauses drafted as marker clauses at introduction. As indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it was drafted as such in the interest of transparency—to make clear our intention of bringing forward substantive provisions on electronic travel authorisations. New clauses 21 and 22 are intended to replace clause 60.
Amendment 120 ensures the provisions in new clauses 21 and 22 can be extended to the Crown dependencies by Order in Council, should they wish to introduce their own electronic travel authorisation scheme by amending the Bill’s extent provisions in clause 69. As I noted earlier, the Government are committed to strengthening the security of our border by ensuring that everyone who wishes to travel to the UK—except British and Irish citizens—has permission to do so before they travel. The Government will introduce an electronic travel authorisation scheme—the ETA scheme—to close the current gap in advance permissions, and to enhance our ability to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK.
At present, non-visa nationals coming to the UK for up to six months as visitors, and in limited other categories, can travel to the UK solely on the basis of their nationality, evidenced by their passport or other travel document. That information is sent to the Government by the majority of carriers as advance passenger information shortly before the individual embarks on their journey. The ETA scheme will allow security checks to be conducted and more informed decisions to be taken at an earlier stage in advance of travel. The introduction of an ETA scheme is in line with the approach that many of our international partners have taken to border security, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
New clause 21 would insert proposed new section 11C into part 1 of the Immigration Act 1971, which will allow the Secretary of State to make immigration rules to administer an ETA scheme. Those rules will include, but are not limited to, who must apply for an ETA, what that application must contain, how long an ETA will be valid for, and when an ETA should be granted, refused, varied or cancelled.
Additionally, new clause 21 also inserts proposed new section 11D into part 1 of the 1971 Act, allowing the Secretary of State to administer an electronic travel authorisation scheme on behalf of a Crown dependency, if requested to do so, in the event that a Crown dependency chooses to operate its own ETA scheme. It also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to recognise an electronic travel authorisation issued by a Crown dependency as valid for travel to the UK, in line with the UK’s commitment to maintaining the integrity and security of the common travel area.
To enforce the ETA scheme, new clause 22 builds on the existing carriers’ liability scheme by incentivising carriers to check prior to boarding that a traveller holds an ETA—or another form of permission, such as a visa in electronic form—or risk a civil penalty. Such checks are necessary to enforce our requirement for everyone, except British and Irish nationals, to get permission to come to the UK before they travel.
At present, carriers are incentivised to check for the presence of a valid immigration document that satisfactorily establishes identity and nationality or citizenship, and any visa required. New clause 22 incentivises carriers to check that all passengers have the appropriate permission— including by checking with the Home Office, if that permission may be held only in digital form—or risk a penalty. The new clause also provides a statutory excuse against the imposition of a penalty, to cater for circumstances where it has not been possible for the carrier to check for the presence of an ETA, or another form of permission, through no fault of their own.
I will call Mr McDonald first, because he has tabled an amendment that is in this group.
Notwithstanding what I have already said about the prosecution services taking a case-by-case approach, the hon. Member inquired about aggravating factors not being added to the Bill. The factors for prosecution when someone comes to the UK may change depending on the circumstances. We need to be able to react flexibly, so putting the factors in primary legislation would be too restrictive. I return to the point that I would expect prosecution services to look carefully at individual cases and to take all factors into account, so I would not accept his depiction.
I take a small crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister does seem to be evidencing some discomfort about how the clause is drafted. He is trying to reassure us by saying it will not be implemented as it is set out now, but that is not satisfactory. We parliamentarians are concerned with what is in the Bill. It is fine for the Minister to say that; I do not know how long he will be in office—hopefully many years—but there will be other Immigration Ministers to come, and they may take a completely different approach.
It may be challenging to put restrictions or a statutory defence in the Bill, but the Minister has to try. He must try much harder. We cannot leave such a broad criminal offence in the Bill simply on the basis of reassurances. I am absolutely of the view that the measures should be removed—for the reasons relating to the refugee convention, and that is even before we get to the ethical considerations and the impact the measures will have on asylum seekers and trafficking victims.
What the clause actually says will make it infinitely harder for refugees or trafficking survivors who eventually make it all the way through the horrendous new system to integrate, put down roots and rebuild their lives. There are questions about how the measures would operate in practice; they raise the spectre of families being separated on arrival if one member is accused of committing this criminal offence. How much harder will it be for somebody to get a job in due course if they have this criminal conviction and spend years in prison? UK citizenship will essentially be near impossible for them.
As we have heard repeatedly, particularly from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, all of this will achieve absolutely nothing. As Tony Smith, the borders expert, told us in the Committee’s evidence sessions, use of the criminal justice system just has not worked. For smugglers and traffickers, it absolutely has, but not for their victims.
I have a question on scope. Will the Minister clarify whether someone who arrives with an entry clearance that is invalidated because it turns out that it was applied for on a false basis—for example, somebody who has secured a visit visa, when they are arriving to claim asylum—will have committed a criminal offence under the clause, because the leave to enter was obtained fraudulently? From the wording, I guess that they will, but it would be useful to hear the Minister’s clarification.
On amendment 110, we broadly support the ETA regime and encouraging carriers to ensure that the conditions are met, but we are still not absolutely convinced of the need for yet another criminal offence. Why can the remedy for turning up without an ETA not simply be to require that person to leave, or to send them back again? What group of people are being targeted here who are not already impacted by one of the other offences?
Even the wording on the state of knowledge of the person committing the offence raises questions. It says the person must “knowingly” arrive here without the ETA or entry clearance. The required knowledge seems to relate only to knowledge of arrival without the ETA or entry clearance, and not knowledge of whether he required that ETA or entry clearance. If we put that together with the fact that the measure will apply to people arriving in the UK rather than entering it, there is a danger that this will cover people who rock up in ignorance at airport border security, rather than anyone who is trying to do anything sinister. Simple ignorance and a mistake could lead to years in prison. I might be wrong about that; it would be useful to have clarity. Why is a criminal offence necessary?
Our amendment 188 was tabled to prompt discussion about consultation with the devolved criminal justice systems and the personnel in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Again, it gives me some comfort that the Minister has had some of these discussions—at least, the Home Office has—and there has been the important recognition that decisions about public interest will be for devolved prosecutors. It is important to acknowledge that, and it is welcome.
In short, as clause 37 stands, it sets out a framework for arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning several thousand asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims every year. Is there an estimate of what the cost will be, regardless of how it is implemented in practice? What will that do the backlogs in courts struggling to recover from covid, and what would be the impact on prison capacity? Putting all that to one side, the fundamental issue is the impact on asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims. The clause, as drafted, will compound the already slow and needlessly painful process of securing protection and add a criminal sanction. It is going to achieve absolutely nothing except more human misery.
I will pick up on a few points in concluding our deliberations on the clause.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East spoke about costs. We are working with the various UK criminal justice systems and we have shared estimates of costs at official level as part of operationalising the plan. He sought further clarity about that and I hope that has provided reassurance. He also asked about entry clearance invalidation. If the leave is valid on arrival and is subsequently cancelled, no offence would have been committed, but if it is invalidated prior to arrival and the person knows that, the offence would have been committed.
Finally, I reiterate the point about the application of offences in this area. It bears repeating that we are targeting for prosecution those migrants for whom aggravating factors are involved—for example, those causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; those causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or those who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.
Has the Minister done an analysis of whether there are already criminal offences that cover the scenarios he has just outlined?
We believe that this measure is required so that we can take appropriate action to deal with the sorts of circumstances I have just set out. I have made that clear on several occasions, and Members will have heard what I have said. I fully expect that that will continue to be the case, and that will be made clear at every opportunity.
I go back to the point that prosecuting services must judge cases on a case-by-case basis. They must of course take all the factors relevant to the individual case into account in deciding whether to proceed with it. They must also decide whether that is in the public interest. That is a very clear and established position, and will continue to be the case.
I am comfortable that the proposed approach is the right one to take in addressing the issues I have set out, which are particularly egregious and concerning and which require further action.
Amendment 110 agreed to.
Amendments made: 111, in clause 37, page 36, line 5, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 112, in clause 37, page 36, line 19, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 113, in clause 37, page 36, line 29, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 114, in clause 37, page 37, line 2, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 115, in clause 37, page 37, line 4, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 116, in clause 37, page 37, line 12, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Amendment 117, in clause 37, page 37, line 15, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”. —(Tom Pursglove.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.
Question put, That clause 37, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
I wish briefly to associate myself with everything the shadow Minister just said; he covered pretty much all the ground that I would have covered. This ridiculous clause tramples all over our international obligations. I suspect what will happen today, as happened on Second Reading, is that we will be reassured that the clause will be used in a certain way so that the RNLI and others will not be targeted. Maybe I am wrong, which would be good, but the scope of the clause is extraordinary.
If the defence, as it was on Second Reading, is, “We’re not going to go after these people,” that is not good enough. You have to put that on the face of the Bill. We cannot create criminal offences and ask folk to go about breaching those laws and committing crimes in the hope that the Government keep their promise that they will not be prosecuted. It is a fundamental rule of legal principle—[Interruption.] The Minister is shaking his head: if that is not the defence, I look forward to hearing what is.
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for providing the opportunity to explain the difficulties involved in securing convictions for an odious crime that targets and exploits vulnerable people and allows organised criminals to thrive.
Gain can be obtained in many ways, but cannot always be proved to the evidential standard required for a successful prosecution: for example, money transfers made by other family members abroad or made cash in hand, promises of servitude by the asylum seeker or others, or the provision of assistance in the facilitation act, such as by avoiding paying a fee by agreeing to steer a small boat. It is right that all available evidence should be considered and all relevant behaviour taken into account in investigating a serious offence. We are, at present, limited by what is an unrealistic evidential requirement that does not take account of the reality of how international organised crime operates.
In amending the offence, we are mindful of the excellent work of those acting from humanitarian motives both now and in the past. I understand fully hon. Members’ concerns that the wrong people will be drawn into the investigative and judicial process. We are therefore retaining the defence available to organisations whose aim is to assist asylum seekers and who do not charge for their services. I also recognise the bravery of volunteers working for the RNLI and lifeboat crews who undertake vital work in protecting lives at sea.
I will set out my intention to amend this clause on Report to ensure that organisations such as the RNLI, those directed by Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and individuals who fulfil their obligations in rescuing those in distress at sea may continue as they do now. We also intend to ensure that this provision does not prevent those responsible for vessels from complying with their obligations if they discover stowaways on board as they journey to the UK. I understand that some members of the Committee would prefer to have those amendments ready to debate now, but the issues are complex and we must ensure that we do not inadvertently provide loopholes to be exploited by criminal gangs who will look for any means to avoid prosecution.
The effect of amendment 33 is that, by retaining the constraint and having to prove the offence was committed again, we will only rarely be able to respond to and deter those committing the offence and will continue to place an unrealistic burden on our law enforcement officers and prosecutors. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment, although I hope he will be reassured that I intend to table on Report an amendment to address the crux of the issues that he raised. I hope that hon. Members across the House will feel able to support the amendment that I intend to table.
I heard what the Minister said, but Second Reading was back in July and there has been plenty of time to table an amendment. What could be achieved by his amendment can easily be achieved by voting for this one, so I wish to press our amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, of whom I am very fond, for tabling the amendment. When I referred to him in a previous sitting as a crafty parliamentarian, I meant that in the nicest of ways. I am very fond of him, and I know that he is a canny parliamentarian who is passionate about the issues he raises.
Let me touch on various points that the hon. Gentleman made. The RNLI does, rightly, have a proud royal connection, and long may that continue. Of course, the RNLI, Her Majesty’s Coastguard and others provide an invaluable service in saving lives at sea. We as a Government are conscious of that, and that tradition and that vital service must continue to be upheld. The hon. Gentleman mounted a passionate defence of the monarchy, and I think I speak for the whole Government when I say that we are proud monarchists. Perhaps he might have a word with some of his colleagues about the stance they have traditionally taken in relation to the monarchy over the years, but we have proud support for our monarchy in this country.
I also want to say that the behaviour the hon. Gentleman talked about as being exhibited towards members of the RNLI and volunteers is completely unacceptable and despicable. There is a responsibility on Members across the House to speak with one voice in saying that such behaviour is despicable, and we should condemn it in the strongest terms. I think the Committee is united in that, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will take that message back to the RNLI volunteers he is engaging with in his constituency, because we do speak with one voice in that regard.
On that note, I want to mention the incident off the coast of Harwich during the past few days. Two men were rescued, but, unfortunately, an extensive search and rescue operation had to be called off after a man was reported to have entered the water. That incident highlights yet again the extreme danger of crossing the channel in small boats and the callous disregard for life shown by the criminal gangs responsible for facilitating crossings. I want to place on record my thanks to all those who responded to the incident and who continue to work tirelessly to protect lives at sea while securing our border. Their work is invaluable—it is incredibly important—and I know all Members would wish thanks to be expressed to them for the work they do.
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment seeks to protect those who act to save lives at sea, but as I have already set out, it is the Government’s intention to amend the clause on Report to do just that. The only thing I would add—Members have rightly spoken passionately about the importance of the issue—is that I want to be confident that the amendment delivering that is as robust as it needs to be, and that it achieves properly and to the fullest extent the objective I think we all share.
I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to let me take the matter away. What has been said in Committee has been heard. There are already efforts under way to develop this amendment for consideration on Report. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman the confidence to withdraw his amendment. We will make sure that we table an appropriate amendment on Report, which I like to think Members from across the House will feel able to vote for, and that will deliver on the objective that we all share.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 82.
Amendment 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—
“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”
This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.
Government amendment 83.
Amendment 145, in schedule 5, page 75, line 8, at end insert—
“(7A) The Secretary of State must publish a list of States and relevant territories with which agreement has been reached for the purposes of sub-paragraph (7) within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, and the Secretary of State must update that published list from time to time.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish which states or territories she has agreed arrangements with for returning or removing asylum seekers to, within 30 days of Royal Assent.
Amendment 146, in schedule 5, page 76, line 24, at end insert—
“(9) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 148, in schedule 5, page 77, line 18, at end insert—
“(7) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 147, in schedule 5, page 78, line 12, at end insert—
“(10) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 149, in schedule 5, page 78, line 32, at end insert—
“(c) the act was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to only act with regards to the Human Rights Act.
That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
In response to numbers of migrants using dangerous maritime routes to enter the UK illegally, this Government are committed to providing Border Force with the tools and legislation they need to combat this illegal migration threat more effectively. We need to strengthen and broaden our current powers not only to improve the effectiveness and capability of Border Force’s current maritime interception tactics, but to better equip them for future operational developments, which may be enhanced through agreements with our near border partners.
The clause and schedule will also provide new powers allowing Border Force to return vessels and those on board, when appropriate, to non-UK locations. Finally, the Government will use this clause to provide bespoke seizure and disposal powers intended for Border Force use against the small boats threat specifically. It will provide far more flexible options for the seizure and disposal of the vast majority of unflagged, ownerless vessels that are being used to transport illegal migrants.
I turn to Government amendments 82 and 83. We are seeing an unacceptable rise in dangerous and unnecessary small boat crossings. Our primary focus is on preventing people from embarking on dangerous channel crossings to enter the UK illegally, tackling the criminal gangs responsible and protecting lives. We must send a powerful message that people should not leave the safety of countries such as France or Belgium to enter the UK illegally in an unseaworthy boat, and if they do, they could be taken back.
On the question of legality, Government amendment 82 is pretty extraordinary, because it seems to remove a restriction on the power of the Secretary of State so that she is unconstrained by the United Nations convention on the law of the sea; I am just looking at the explanatory note. Is that amendment designed to allow the Secretary of State to break the international law of the sea?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point, and I will come on to it imminently. To finish the point I was making, the Government amendments will remove text from the Bill that is now considered not to be essential to achieving the aim that I have set out.
The UK has ratified, and is therefore fully committed to upholding, the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. The Government are committed to utilising their maritime enforcement tactics in full compliance with international law. The re-statement of that in the clause is therefore unnecessary. It is also unnecessary to state in legislation, where it is already beyond doubt, that Border Force would seek permission from a foreign country before taking a migrant boat back to that country. That statement adds nothing to the powers being created in this part of the Bill.
We want to make it explicit that operating these maritime enforcement powers in UK waters or international waters to simply divert a migrant vessel from UK territorial seas does not require the permission of a foreign state where that vessel may then enter their waters. These amendments will not result in the UK failing to abide by its international obligations, whether that be in the context of the safety of lives at sea or when seeking permission if intending to return migrants to another country, such as France.
I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central for what he will no doubt say about amendments 144 to 149. I will start by addressing amendment 144, which proposes to add an additional requirement to the maritime powers where the options available to officers intercepting a vessel at sea are spelled out. In order for the tactics intended for use in the exercise of these powers to be safe and legal, officers will have to carry out risk assessments before and during any exercise of the powers. That requirement will be laid out in operating procedures to ensure we meet our international obligations on safety of life at sea.
As any deployment of the tactics under the powers will be carried out in full accordance with those obligations, the welfare and safety of those on board vessels will be the priority throughout. With international obligations in this context not being a matter for UK legislation, we do not consider it necessary to add the amendment. I also note that any deployment of maritime tactics will be carried out in full compliance with obligations under the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act.
I turn now to amendment 145. The schedule that it would amend deals with new powers allowing Border Force and others to require vessels to be taken to a non-UK port if necessary. There are a number of reasons why we may wish to have the capability to do this, and they are not all related to the return or removal of asylum seekers. For example, any potential future agreement with partners to patrol waters jointly may require rescued or intercepted migrants to be taken back to the country from which they embarked on their maritime journey. As such, we do not consider that the amendment is needed or appropriate in schedule 5, and we are not prepared to commit to providing a running commentary to update on the progress of sometimes sensitive international negotiations.
I understand that the intention of amendments 146 to 148 is to emphasise the need to ensure that account be taken of human rights obligations by appropriately trained officers exercising these maritime powers. However, the amendments are unnecessary and would have no practical impact on the operation of the powers by Border Force officers and others. All operational officers within Border Force receive, and must have passed, appropriate training in order to exercise their duties. In order to be appointed as an immigration officer, an official must successfully complete and pass a foundation course that includes understanding the European convention on human rights as it relates to the Human Rights Act 1998, and their resulting obligations in the context of exercising powers.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government Amendment 82.
Amendment 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—
“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”
This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.
Government amendment 83.
Amendment 145, in schedule 5, page 75, line 8, at end insert—
“(7A) The Secretary of State must publish a list of States and relevant territories with which agreement has been reached for the purposes of sub-paragraph (7) within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, and the Secretary of State must update that published list from time to time.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish which states or territories she has agreed arrangements with for returning or removing asylum seekers to, within 30 days of Royal Assent.
Amendment 146, in schedule 5, page 76, line 24, at end insert—
“(9) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 148, in schedule 5, page 77, line 18, at end insert—
“(7) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 147, in schedule 5, page 78, line 12, at end insert—
“(10) A relevant officer may only exercise powers under this paragraph if they have passed relevant training, including training on the requirement to exercise powers under this paragraph in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to have passed relevant training before acting under these powers, and only acts with regards to the Human Rights Act.
Amendment 149, in schedule 5, page 78, line 32, at end insert—
“(c) the act was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
This amendment would require the relevant officer to only act with regards to the Human Rights Act.
That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
In terms of schedule 5, let me just say that clause 42 is one of the six drafted as placeholder clauses, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency, to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provisions on working in the territorial seas. The placeholder clause is now to be replaced by new clause 20.
The Government’s clear position has always been that permission to work is needed for all foreign nationals intending to work in the United Kingdom landmass—that includes all UK waters. New clause 20 will bring legislative clarity: migrant workers wishing to work in the territorial seas or internal waters of the UK will need permission to do so. To obtain that permission, they will need to apply for a visa under the points-based system in the same way as when coming to work on the UK landmass.
New clause 20 will clarify the legal framework, but will not change the existing position that migrant workers need permission to work in UK waters. As such, the new clause does not invent a policy change and its effect should be negligible. The new clause does not impact on those engaging in innocent passage or crew who are covered by section 8 of the Immigration Act 1971.
Government amendments 126 to 128 are minor and technical. They are intended to ensure that the regime I have just talked about can be enforced.
Order. Apologies, but I think you have strayed into the debate on schedule 5, which includes Government amendments 126, 127 and 128 and clause 43 stand part. I appreciate that there are a lot of different moving parts.
I apologise if that is so, Ms McDonagh. The groupings on the selection list are not clear, because they are talking about schedule 5. I am happy to leave that there and return to it separately in a moment.
Despite the Minister’s request, I would like to speak to amendments 144 to 149, which seek to address a couple of pretty serious issues: the immorality and the impracticality of the Government’s approach to the policy of pushback.
As regards Australia, the United Nations special rapporteur expressed real concern that the policy could intentionally put lives at risk. We have also seen the reports on those who lost their lives as a result of pushbacks in the Mediterranean. Clearly, the Government do not want to risk death or injury. Ministers have told us repeatedly that the objective of the legislation is to prevent drowning in the channel. Amendment 144 therefore seeks simply to put that commitment in the Bill.
I heard the Minister’s comments earlier, but a constant theme throughout our debate over the past few days has been that we identify real problems with the Bill and the Minister says, “Oh, don’t worry, we’ll sort it out.” We are trying to say, “If we’re in the same place on the issue, let’s sort it out by putting something on the face of the Bill.” Amendment 144 would do that by requiring officers not to act under powers granted by proposed new paragraph B1(2) if they risked the welfare of those on board. It would simply ensure that an officer who wants to stop a ship, board it or require it to be taken elsewhere in the UK or internationally and detained or to leave UK waters must first consider the implications for those on board. Given that we are in the same place in our intentions, I hope the Minister can accept amendment 144.
Amendment 145 addresses the issue of practicality. Clause 41 is disturbing enough in itself, but it also reflects a wider problem with the Bill. The Government are trying to talk tough and grab headlines but with proposals that are actually undeliverable and that will not solve the problem of people smuggling that we all agree needs to be tackled. We have discussed offshoring and third country returns on previous clauses, and here we are again. Amendment 145 seeks to press the Govt on the issue.
In schedule 5, proposed new paragraph B1(7) makes it clear that the Government can proceed with the policy of pushback only where the relevant territory
“is willing to receive the ship.”
So where are the agreements? Amendment 145 would require the Home Secretary simply to publish a list of states with which she has secured agreement under sub-paragraph (7) to send ships with asylum seekers to, and to do so within 30 days of Royal Assent. That is not 30 days from today; that is 30 days from Royal Assent. That is a considerable amount of time. The Government have put a lot of thought into the Bill apparently, although there seem to be a lot of last-minute amendments. The Minister has said repeatedly that he does not want to provide a running commentary on negotiations. Let me reassure him: we do not want a running commentary. We just want some indication that there are agreements, or agreements in the pipeline, but there absolutely do not seem to be any. That is key.
The Government have so far failed to secure any agreements for returning asylum seekers. Instead, they encourage rumours that they are so close to securing an agreement with one country or another, but every country that has been mentioned has slammed those rumours. Rwanda said it had no agreement with Denmark, whose Government have been condemned by the African Union —an entire continent—in the strongest terms possible. The African Union said that offshore processing amounted to “responsibility and burden shifting” and criticised European attempts to extend border control to African shores as “xenophobic and completely unacceptable.” As my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark pointed out, the UK Government were rebuffed by Albania. The Albanian Foreign Minister told the press:
“Albania will proudly host 4,000 Afghan refugees based on its good will, but will never be a hub of anti-immigration policies of bigger and richer countries. We have instructed our Embassy in the UK to demand the retraction of this fake news.”
There are not just no agreements, but the Government are managing to offend countries around the world by implying that they are prepared to enter into agreements when they are clearly not. How many other countries are the Government deciding to burn bridges with over this issue? When will they come clean on this empty rhetoric?
Amendment 145 is intended to be helpful. We want to see transparency and, at the end of this process, to give the Government the opportunity, which they have so far failed to take, to publish the agreements they have secured. I hope that by accepting the amendment the Minister can prove us wrong in our doubts about the Government’s work in this area, and that he will agree that this information should be published well before the Bill takes effect.
Amendments 146 to 149 seek to ensure that officers adhere to the Human Rights Act 1998 and have completed relevant training before searching asylum seekers. These amendments relate to officials carrying out searches of people during maritime enforcement for documents, evidence of crime and other purposes. They seek to ensure that those officials have received training that is relevant to the task, and at all times are adhering to the Human Rights Act 1998.
As we have discussed many times in Committee, those fleeing persecution and danger to build new lives in the UK are likely to be victims of violence and trauma. They are vulnerable, and personal searches in particular could be extremely difficult or upsetting. Schedule 5 allows for officials to search a person, but forbids them to
“remove any clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket or gloves.”
That is welcome as a bare minimum, but there is no stipulation or description of what can be done in searches in private, so this amendment seeks to ensure that the Home Office designs and delivers training to officers to ensure they are sensitive to the needs of the vulnerable people they may search. Additionally, it would ensure that all those searches are conducted with consideration given to the Human Rights Act and the right to a private life, to encourage the use of these powers only in extreme circumstances and when absolutely necessary.
Again, I draw the Minister’s attention to the lived experience of those who have come to our shores. In 2015, Women for Refugee Women published a report, “I Am Human”, which details the impact of searches on those who have experienced sexual violence. The searches triggered mental health problems, flashbacks and traumatic memories because people felt handled and scared by the process. When addressing my earlier amendments, the Minister sought to reassure me on these points too, saying that the Government would of course be compliant with the Human Rights Act and would take account of all the issues I am raising—fine. So why not put that commitment on the face of the Bill?
There are a few points that I briefly want to address in concluding the debate on this clause. The first is the training that immigration officers have to undergo. I clarify again that all immigration officers have to pass the immigration foundation course to be appointed. This includes training on the Human Rights Act. Further specialist training is given to those officers working in the maritime environment, which includes vulnerability assessments in the context of human rights obligations. They will be exercising maritime powers using operational guidance that emphasises the need to take full account of relevant human rights aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Human Rights Act, in the context of safety of life at sea obligations. I know that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is very keen that we include this in the Bill, but I respectfully disagree. There is already an established process in place that is delivering exactly what the hon. Gentleman wants to see. We are very mindful of these obligations on an ongoing basis.
The issue of immunity has also been raised; however, these protections are nothing new. Border Force has existing powers to intercept vessels in UK territorial seas; an officer is not liable in any criminal or civil proceedings if the court is satisfied that the act was done in good faith and there were reasonable grounds for it. This provision is also included in the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and applies in other contexts. This provision follows the same approach as the Immigration Act 1971.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East raised a number of points in relation to search and rescue operations, which we had an extensive debate about during this morning’s session. Again, I make the point that this Government are absolutely committed to search and rescue operations, as would be rightly expected. That is an important function and service, and it is right that it continues to be a strong commitment. We are committed to it and that service must be provided. Again, I will emphasise that this Government will abide by their international obligations at all times.
Can the Minister be absolutely clear that no new powers, or attempts at immunity that arguably do not follow international law, are being sought? This is contrary to some of the Government reports on this issue.
All I can say in response, is that I refer the hon. Member to what I have just said. There is an established position in relation to this; these protections are nothing new.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 126, in schedule 5, page 73, line 23, at end insert “24B,”.
This amendment and Amendments 127 and 128 are consequential on NC20.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 127 and 128.
Clause 42 stand part.
Government amendment 124.
Government new clause 20—Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry.
As you noted, Ms McDonagh, I have spoken to various aspects of the grouping in my earlier remarks, so I do not propose repeating what I said. Amendments 126, 127 and 128 are changes to existing maritime enforcement powers to ensure that these are available in relation to illegal working offences in the UK’s territorial sea. Amendment 124 brings new clause 20 into force automatically two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations.
Amendment 126 agreed to.
Amendments made: 127, in schedule 5, page 73, line 31, after “(S.I. 2020/1309),” insert—
“(ba) an offence under section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006,”.
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 126.
Amendment 128, in schedule 5, page 73, line 37, leave out “paragraph (a) or (b)” and insert “paragraphs (a) to (ba)”.—(Tom Pursglove.)
See the explanatory statement to Amendment 126.
Amendment proposed: 144, in schedule 5, page 74, line 30, at end insert—
“provided that the relevant officer may not do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (2) where they would risk the welfare or safety of persons on board the ship.”—(Paul Blomfield.)
This amendment would require officers to assess welfare risk before stopping or boarding a ship, requiring it to be taken elsewhere or requiring it to leave UK waters, and not act if doing so would exacerbate these risks.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The shadow Minister has raised lots of sensible questions. I have one other brief question for the Minister, on new clause 28. He may not be able to answer it today, but I would like it clarified, if possible.
Proposed new section 10E to the 1999 Act that the new clause would add is supposed to apply when a person has applied for judicial review and the court has made a decision authorising the removal. To be clear, does that decision relate to the judicial review, or could it relate to any prior decision? That point will not affect lots of people, but it will be important. I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer immediately, but I hope we will get clarity on that in due course.
It may be easier if I explain that the power in amendment 137 already exists—albeit for 10 days—in published policy that is available on gov.uk. The purpose of putting the policy into statute is not to introduce a new power, as it already exists. Rather, we want to place it on a statutory basis to enable parliamentary scrutiny.
We can currently rearrange a migrant’s removal on another flight within 10 days of a failed removal without the need to give the migrant a fresh notice period. Clause 43 will increase the period to 21 days. Our recent experience during the pandemic has shown us that organising flights and complying with travel restrictions is difficult—dealing with self-isolation and rebooking escorts, for example. It is therefore entirely reasonable and sensible to allow the flexibility of 21 days to remove the migrant if the removal fails for reasons that are reasonably beyond the Secretary of State’s control.
It may be helpful to provide some examples to illustrate that point. A migrant has already had time to access justice and is due to be removed, but the flight is cancelled because of bad weather. The removal fails, but we manage to book a flight for the next day. We do not want to be in the position of having to wait another five working days before we can remove that migrant. As a second example, if a removal fails because the migrant is deliberately disruptive, that person should not be rewarded with another five working days in which they can try to defer their removal further. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw his amendment.
To pick up on the point about access to legal aid during the notice period, migrants who are detained in immigration removal centres during the notice period will have access to the free legal advice surgery.
New clause 28 replaces clause 43 in its entirety. Our expert drafters have advised that it is better to do it that way because the text flows better and it is easier to navigate.
Unfortunately, migrants subject to enforced removal often wait until the last minute to challenge their removal from the UK. Consequently, flights are cancelled and removals are inevitably delayed at great cost to the taxpayer. We think it right that migrants subject to enforced removal must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to access justice. The sole purpose of the notice period is to give migrants time to seek legal advice. That is the rationale underpinning the clause.
Our current policy is complicated. Some migrants are given a minimum notice period of 72 hours, while others are given five working days. Calculating when the 72 hours start and end is confusing. They must include at least two working days, and the last 24 hours must include a working day. Evidently, there is scope for simplifying the process and making it consistent across the board. New clause 28 will do just that by placing in statute a single statutory minimum notice period of five working days for migrants. The new clause requires us to serve a written notice of intention to remove, setting out the notice period. Before the migrant can be removed, we must serve a written notice of departure details containing the date of removal.
A limited exception to the single statutory notice period relates to port cases. Migrants who are refused entry at the border can be removed within seven days without receiving a notice period. It is unlikely that they would have developed ties to the UK within that week.
The clause will create more clarity for Home Office staff, legal representatives and migrants. Migrants will know how long they have to access justice—in fact, some will have more time to access justice—and will therefore have fewer excuses to frustrate removal.
To be clear, we are not reintroducing removal windows, which were found to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Under the new clause, the migrant cannot be removed during the notice period. If the removal is cancelled or deferred because the migrant raises a fresh or further claim, a fresh notice period must be given before removal can proceed. Individuals will also be given a fresh notice period if there is a change to the previously notified destination or route, unless the place of transit is in a safe country.
The new clause provides that migrants can be removed within 21 days of a failed removal that was caused by their disruption. In such circumstances, a further notice period is not required because the migrant has already had sufficient opportunity to access justice, which is entirely reasonable when there are no significant changes to the migrant’s circumstances. That is in our current published policy but with a timescale of 10 days. Extending the time from 10 to 21 days will give us more time to rearrange removal.
The pandemic has highlighted the fact that organising escorts and rebooking flights cannot always be turned around quickly. Migrants frequently challenge their removal by way of judicial review, and of course that is their right. As per the clause, once a court decides that the migrant can be removed, we can remove them within 21 days without a fresh notice period. The migrant has already had time to access justice, and the removal decision has been subject to judicial scrutiny. There is no justification for further time.
I beg to move amendment 143, in clause 44, page 41, line 7, at end insert—
“(1A) A prisoner who arrived in the United Kingdom before their tenth birthday is not eligible for removal from the United Kingdom under subsection (1).”
This amendment would prevent deportation as an FNO for those who arrived in the UK before their tenth birthday, in line with the age of criminal responsibility.
The amendment is not down in my name; it was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central, who has an urgent constituency engagement. Forgive me if I am not as eloquent as my hon. Friend. I will try to do justice to his amendment.
In recent months and years we have seen a multitude of cases of individuals who have lived in the UK almost all of their lives, and in some cases were even born here, being deported as a result of past convictions. The amendment seeks to prevent that happening if the individual came to the UK before the age of 10, the age at which the UK deems one becomes criminally liable for their actions. Assuming that the age at which criminal liability kicks in is the age at which we believe someone starts to become at least partly responsible for their actions, why should their previous country of residence change how they are dealt with in the criminal justice system years or decades down the line? My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central has provided a case study.
We hear of cases such as that of Sam Trye, who was born within sight of this room, just over the river in St Thomas’ Hospital, where my daughter was born and where perhaps the son of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North will be born. We might not agree on many things, not least a scattergun approach to facts, but I congratulate him on his news, which I hope his wife gave permission for him to share before breaking it to us this morning. I hope our children have better life chances than Sam was afforded because he has since served a prison sentence for a non-violent crime, and the Home Office has been trying to deport him to Sierra Leone, from where his family moved to the UK. Despite Sam being born in the UK, he is treated differently as he lacks birthright citizenship. He has two British children and cares for his mum here in London, so his right to family life is therefore well established.
There is a question here about the UK’s responsibility. When a child is born here and has been through our education system and our support services, and has grown up British in every sense, we have a duty to ensure that if they commit a crime, the British state takes responsibility for that individual. It is nonsensical to deport those who have never known another country, who came to the UK before they were ever criminally liable in UK law, let alone an adult with full independence and responsibility.
That issue was raised during the Windrush report, and by Sir Stephen Shaw in his 2016 “Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons” and his 2018 follow-up progress report. Sir Stephen stated:
“I found during my visits across the immigration estate that a significant proportion of those deemed FNOs had grown up in the UK, some having been born here but the majority having arrived in very early childhood. These detainees often had strong UK accents, had been to UK schools, and all of their close family and friends were based in the UK… Many had no command of the language of the country to which they were to be ‘returned’, or any remaining family ties there… The removal of these individuals raises real ethical issues. Not only does their removal break up families in this country, and put them at risk in countries of which they have little or no awareness. It is also questionable how far it is fair to developing countries, without the criminal justice infrastructure of the UK, for one of the richest nations on earth to export those whose only chance of survival may be by way of further crime.”
Sir Stephen’s recommendation 33 was that
“The Home Office should no longer routinely seek to remove those who were born in the UK or have been brought up here from an early age.”
That recommendation has been routinely ignored by Ministers, but we do know that the Government accept that premise in specific circumstances, so there is a precedent. Last year, when there was an outcry over their attempted deportation of people to Jamaica, the Government reached a private agreement with the Jamaican high commission that it would not deport those who came to the UK under the age of 12. When there were further charter flights this year, despite Ministers refusing to answer parliamentary questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central on the subject, as they wanted to hush up the agreement, we know that when the flights departed, no one who came to the UK under the age of 12 was on board. So which other countries does the Minister have other such agreements with, and which other countries are negotiating with him or others in the Government to secure such agreements? If the Minister has an agreement with Jamaica, which we know is sensible, why will he not make it a blanket policy? I invite him to respond if he can.
The amendment reflects British values, in the opinion of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central, and it take steps to enact Sir Stephen Shaw’s recommendations. I urge the Government to accept it.
I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. Amendment 143 aims to prevent the deportation of a foreign national offender where they arrived in the UK before the age of 10. The clause enables the removal of a relevant prisoner at an earlier point in their sentence. The amendment would exempt FNOs who arrived in the UK before the age of 10 from the provision enabling them to be removed at an earlier point in their sentence, but it would not exempt them from deportation. I cannot see a rationale for exempting FNOs who arrived in the UK before the age of 10 from the provision enabling them to be removed at an earlier point in their sentence, given that they will still be liable to deportation at the end of the custodial part of their sentence if they have not been removed earlier.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark stated that the purpose for the amendment is to align the age on arrival in the UK at which an exemption to deportation applies with the age of criminal responsibility. Almost all foreign national offenders that the Government deport from the UK have committed offences since they were adults. It does not make sense to provide an exception based on the age of criminal responsibility. Unlike England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland is 12.
I am keen to explore this on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. Will the Minister tell us more about the arrangement with Jamaica, and those with any other countries? He says that it would not make sense to have such an arrangement, but there is an existing one with a country. Perhaps he can tell us more about that specific arrangement, and any other countries we have entered into similar arrangements with.
I am grateful for that question. The hon. Member for Sheffield Central is not here. I promised earlier to write to Committee members on the RNLI issue. I will make sure that this issue is addressed in that letter, particularly so that the hon. Gentleman can see that information in its full context, given that he is unable to be here because of a constituency commitment.
The amendment is too broad in scope. It does not define what is meant by “arrived in” the UK. This could include anyone who visited the UK for a short period or who arrived here clandestinely, as well as those who have been lawfully resident here since the age of 10. It is technically deficient and, I argue, wrong in principle. I also refer hon. Members to the requirements under the UK Borders Act 2007, passed under the previous Labour Government. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 8—Prisoners liable to removal from the United Kingdom.
Clause 44 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses at the Bill’s introduction. As indicated in the Bill’s explanatory notes and the memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it was drafted as such in the interests of transparency, to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provisions on the early removal scheme. New clause 8 is intended to replace clause 44.
New clause 8 forms part of a package of measures that will enable the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the UK. By expanding the existing early removal scheme and increasing the removal window from nine months to 12 months, we will have greater opportunity to remove as many foreign national offenders from the UK as early as possible. However, to ensure that those sentenced by the courts are not simply let off their sentence, and to maintain public confidence in the justice system, removal under the scheme is subject to at least half of the custodial period of the sentence—the “requisite custodial period”—being served in prison. The knowledge that offenders will serve punishment for their crime in prison and will be removed from prison and the UK before they have an opportunity to be released on licence will provide comfort for victims.
The new clause will also mean that eligible foreign national offenders can be removed at any point in their sentence provided they have served the requisite custodial period and are within 12 months of their earliest release point. Presently, the scheme does not permit removal for those foreign national offenders who are serving a recall—FNOs who have been released into the community after serving their custodial sentence and subsequently recalled to custody for breaching that licence. The new clause brings them into scope.
The new clause also serves to deter foreign national offenders who have already been deported once from returning to the UK through the introduction of a stop-the-clock provision. Should a foreign national offender ever return to the UK after being removed, they will be liable to immediate arrest and return to custody to serve the remainder of the custodial period of their sentence. This is in addition to a maximum 5-year prison sentence that may be imposed for returning in breach of a deportation order.
The Government will disagree to clause 44 and replace it with new clause 8, although I understand that new clause 8 has fundamentally the same principle as the clause. Clause 44 and new clause 8 will extend the length of time a foreign national offender can be considered for early removal from the last nine months to the last 12 months of their sentence if they become eligible for the scheme. The Opposition have concerns that increasing that time limit will lead to unfairness in accessing justice for foreign national offenders as well as leaving them with inadequate time to obtain access to legal representation.
In our already overpopulated and overworked prison system, foreign national offenders have limited access to legal support and resources even when compared with people detained in immigration detention centres. They have no access to mobile phones or the internet. In the limited time that they do have access to a phone, the contacts they can call are vetted by the prison and this process can take many weeks. Thus, acquiring adequate legal representation becomes near impossible. Time is of the essence to these individuals and increasing this early removal widow will only lead to exacerbating these difficulties.
Bail for Immigration Detainees produced a report in 2017 on the lack of legal advice available to prisoners, which found that only five of the 86 prison detainees surveyed had received independent advice about their immigration case. They found that detainees in prison are routinely denied access to basic information that might help their immigration case. Cuts to legal aid have only made this situation worse. The High Court earlier this year held that detainees in prison have suffered discriminatory treatment due to obstacles in getting legal advice—in particular, exemptions from legal aid eligibility.
Despite what high-profile recent Home Office failings might imply, when it comes to deportations the already heavily stacked deck is stacked against the deportee. Not having proper legal representation means that the detainees will almost certainly be denied the fundamental right to a fair hearing. It would mean that they could be deported to countries in which they face persecution, or it would be in breach of their human rights. We should not undermine that right by extending the length of time they have for removal. Charities such as Bail for Immigration Detainees are already stretched to breaking point trying to support these vulnerable individuals. Instead of limiting access to justice, the Government should work on increasing its efficiency so that foreign national offenders who have committed serious crimes are dealt with swiftly and those who have claims to remain are given a fair hearing.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 44 disagreed to.
Clause 45
Matters relevant to decisions relating to immigration bail
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
For too long, individuals with no right to remain in the UK, including foreign criminals, have been gaming the system in order to get released from detention and frustrate their removal. We have seen individuals making asylum claims while in detention, but then delaying the resolution of that claim through their own deliberate actions, such as refusing to be interviewed. The current system incentivises non-compliant behaviour. By creating obstacles, bail is more likely to be granted due to the time it will take to resolve the claim and any subsequent appeals. It is not right that a person’s non-compliance enables their release.
Similarly, an individual may refuse to provide fingerprints for a travel document or may lie about their true nationality, thereby obstructing the returns documentation process. This again makes the prospect of removal more remote and increases the likelihood that bail may be granted. From an operational perspective, non-compliance is difficult to tackle and becomes much harder to counter once individuals are released from detention into the community, where they have the ability to abscond or continue with non-compliance. Therefore, eliminating the risk and impact of non-compliance is a key benefit that arises from the use of immigration detention if appropriate in the individual case.
We must have an immigration system that encourages compliance. The purpose of clause 45 is to ensure that, so far as possible, appropriate weight is given to evidence that a person has not been co-operative with the immigration or returns processes without reasonable excuse when making immigration bail decisions. This is currently not explicitly referenced as one of the specific mandatory criteria for considering whether to grant immigration bail.
The Minister did seem to accept that all those factors can be taken into account already if they are relevant to the question of whether the person is going to be removed in a reasonable time or whether they will abscond. Surely those are the only two questions. This is not necessary at all and seeks to use immigration detention as a form of punishment.
I do not accept that depiction. We are requiring decision makers to take into account co-operation with removal proceedings and immigration processes when considering applications for immigration bail. We are mindful that non-compliance may already be considered, and that the tribunal takes such behaviour into account when deciding whether to grant bail. However, the intention behind the provision is that there be the same focus on evidence of non-compliant behaviour as there is on those factors already particularised and considered in every case. As we have always made clear, we do not detain indefinitely, and the clause will not mean that people will be detained solely due to non-compliance, as there must always be a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable timescale.
We will oppose the clause. It makes it more difficult for individuals to get bail and leaves them stranded in immigration detention indefinitely.
The clause would require decision makers to consider previous failure “to cooperate with” certain immigration processes when considering whether to grant immigration bail. That is extremely vague and broad language. There is a risk of it being misconstrued and used to penalise those who use their legal rights to resist or appeal against immigration decisions made against them.
The Public Law Project has stated that if detainees are given the impression that any resistance to a decision of the Home Office may be held against them, it would increase unfairness and have a significant chilling effect on those bringing legitimate legal challenge. There is already an uneven playing field; the clause risks tipping things still further in the Home Office’s favour. The Home Office is expanding its powers of detention, while preventing independent judicial oversight of its decisions to detain.
Immigration detention is a harsh measure. It has no time limit and little judicial oversight, and should be used only when necessary and for the shortest time possible. The Government hold vulnerable people in prison-like immigration detention centres for periods ranging from days to several years. That includes people who have lived in the UK since childhood, people fleeing war and persecution, torture survivors and victims of human trafficking. Such vulnerabilities cannot be managed in detention and will no doubt be worsened by the prospect of bail being denied.
Since 2000, 49 people have died in immigration detention centres, and incidents of self-harm are now recorded at more than one a day. The Home Office’s immigration detention facilities are not fit for purpose, and narrowing the availability of immigration bail will only make the situation worse.
The uncertainty of indefinite detention is cruel not only for the detainee, but for family members waiting for them at home. Research by Bail for Immigration Detainees, which helps 3,500 detainees to apply for bail every year, shows that children of detainees are often British citizens, and suffer a range of physical and mental effects due to separation from their parent. Those are compounded by further, unexpected separation. For those children, cutting off the prospect of bail will lead to further mental ill health and suffering.
The majority of people in detention do not need to be there. More than 60% of people taken into detention are eventually released, their detention having served no purpose, at a cost of £76 million a year, according to Matrix Evidence research. BID has said that the Home Office repeatedly breaks the law and detains people unlawfully. In the past two years, the Home Office has paid out £15.1 million to 584 people whom it had detained unlawfully.
The clause will make it tougher for people to get bail and leave them trapped in detention for longer. The Government have committed to reducing detention, but this measure is counter to their own rhetoric. It means less justice for detainees, more harm for vulnerable refugees and more wasted costs for the taxpayer. That is why Labour opposes the clause.
Before turning to part 4, which deals with modern slavery, I would like to make a declaration of interest. In October, prior to my appointment as Minister, I ran the London marathon and raised funds for the Mintridge Foundation, which encourages young people to get into sport, and Justice and Care, a charity that works to tackle modern slavery. I make the declaration in the interests of complete transparency and for the information of the Committee.
I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and for Glasgow North East for the amendment. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised important questions about the purpose of the slavery and risk trafficking notice.
The clause forms part of our approach to expanding the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice. We have already debated the one-stop process, so I will not repeat that discussion, but the aim of the process is to identify possible victims as early as possible and ensure they receive the support they need. To best achieve that, we also need to discourage misuse of the system by stating our expectations and stipulating the consequences of non-compliance with the process.
That being said, let me reassure hon. Members that the clause has safeguards built in, and decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. To seek to remove the deadline stipulated by the slavery or trafficking information notice, as suggested by amendment 170, would go against the approach I have outlined. Without a deadline, the Government would be unable to seek the information up front that supports speedier decision making. Equally, changing a “specified” time to
“a reasonable period of time”
would provide less certainty to victims and decision makers on what is required. That would be detrimental to the victim identification process and goes against what we are trying to achieve in the Bill.
The ability to identify victims at the earliest opportunity is fundamental to our ability to support them. The clause is part of a wider process of much-needed change to the system to enable quicker decision making and reduce opportunities for misuse of the system, which takes valuable resources from victims. To deliver on that aim, it is right that we specify the time period in which information should be given, so that there is a connection to the consequences of late provision. As I have already set out, that does not mean that late claims will not be considered; any individual who brings a late claim for a good reason will be treated as if the claim were made in time. That will enable us to strike the right balance between preventing misuse and focusing resources on victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
We share the same goal, which is identifying victims. Unfortunately, every single trafficking organisation that has got in touch with us has said that putting these hard and fast deadlines in the Bill will make that harder, rather than easier. We will probably end up voting against this clause, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 172, in clause 46, page 41, line 42, at end insert—
“(2A) The requirement in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to anything that the slavery or trafficking information notice recipient has previously provided to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.”
This amendment would ensure a recipient of a slavery or trafficking information notice does not need to provide information that has already been submitted to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.
This amendment makes a short and simple, but important, point. Requesting the same information that has already been disclosed could be needlessly re-traumatising for a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, so the simple question is whether the Minister can assure us that that will not be made necessary under clause 46. The clause seems to envisage that trafficking information notices could be served on someone who has already had a positive reasonable grounds decision. Can the Minister confirm whether that is right, and if so, why that would be necessary? As it stands, the clause calls for “any” information that might be relevant for the purposes of making a decision on reasonable or conclusive grounds. Surely there will be no penalty if information already provided is not once again provided in response to the notice being served.
Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment. I reassure Members that the clause already has safeguards built in, and it is clear that decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. I appreciate the consideration given to the provision of information, and the recommendation that the clause should stipulate that information provided previously to the competent authority should not be included. However, the amendment is not needed. Decision makers in the competent authority will consider all information provided to them. Credibility considerations connected to lateness will, by implication, apply only where information has not been provided within a specified time period and without good reasons, which will be made clear in guidance. For that reason, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will go away and consider. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 46, page 42, line 3, at end insert—
“(3A) Any slavery or trafficking information notice must be accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”
This amendment would ensure that potential victims are given information regarding their rights at the same time the notice is served.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. I commend the Minister on having run the London marathon for Justice and Care, which does invaluable work.
We are supportive of the previous Scottish National party amendments to clause 46, which were outlined by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. If we achieve nothing else this afternoon, I did promise the SNP spokesperson that I would work on being able to pronounce his constituency in time for our debates on the Bill, having managed to avoid doing so entirely during the passage of last year’s Immigration Act. I hope he will recognise those efforts.
With your permission, Chair, I will come back to clause 46 more broadly during the stand part debate. Our amendment follows a damning letter sent by 60 charities from across the human trafficking and modern slavery sector. They seeks to mitigate the effects of a Bill that they claim
“will have a disastrous impact on the UK’s response to modern slavery.”
In the light of the series of recommendations in that letter, amendment 184 would require any slavery or trafficking information notice to be
“accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”
We have serious concerns about both clauses 46 and 47, but these trafficking information notices are a new initiative, and should be accompanied by a full explanation of why the questions are being asked and what rights and support a potential victim of trafficking should be entitled to. The Government have placed significant emphasis on the need to reduce the time taken for victims to be identified, and on ensuring they receive the correct support package at the earliest opportunity. We strongly share that objective, so the requirement for information to be provided at the same time as the notice is served seeks to address any uncertainty and anxieties a potential victim may have.
Furthermore, it is critical that a trafficking notice is served with an assessment and awareness of risks and victims’ needs, as they can be incredibly wide-ranging, and that assessment and awareness can be essential for safeguarding purposes. Some victims will not have English as their first language, and some may have limited literacy skills. They will need access to the correct translator and there should be recognition of any special educational needs. That reinforces the need for each case to be evaluated sensitively.
We seek to ensure that the basic entitlement to information is met. It is important to recognise that in cases of modern slavery, many first responders and expert witnesses have found that victims interviewed often have so little knowledge of the national referral mechanism that they do not know if they are, or have been, in the NRM. Victims being unable to self-identify and limited awareness of how to navigate the NRM are consistent issues, and we will return to them under other clauses in part 4. Amendment 184 seeks to mitigate potential restrictions to the NRM, and is a sensible suggestion, and I hope that the Minister sees its merit.
I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, and for Halifax, for tabling the amendment, and the hon. Member for Halifax for setting out the case for it. Clause 46 forms part of our expansion of the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice.
Amendment 184 is not required, as the Government are providing mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that potential victims are fully aware of their rights and the Secretary of State’s obligations to them, including the right to free legal aid where appropriate. Information on the Secretary of State’s obligations to victims will be provided to individuals when a slavery or trafficking information notice is issued. These measures will ensure that potential victims better understand the national referral mechanism and their support entitlements.
In combination with clause 46, clauses 54 and 55 seek to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the national referral mechanism when they receive advice on asylum and immigration matters. That will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and properly supported.
Primary legislation on the process of providing information to possible victims is not required, and while I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment, it would duplicate what happens through clauses 46, 54 and 55. In the light of that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Halifax is content to withdraw the amendment. We have had a pretty good debate on clause 46, so I hope that it can stand part of the Bill.
I am somewhat reassured by the Minister’s remarks. I hope that he will inform Committee members when the draft notices have been finalised; we will continue to keep a close eye on that matter. We will not push the amendment to a vote, but given what the Minister said about the clause, I might move on now to my speech on clause stand part.
I will be brief, given what I said in support of the amendment. All the anti-trafficking organisations that got in touch with us—60 or so—said that this clause could cause huge problems. I am not clear at all what issue the Government think it will resolve. What is the problem they are striving to tackle? It has not been outlined at all. All hon. Members agree that we need to identify more victims, but as the hon. Member for Halifax said, this will do the opposite and make it harder, not easier.
It might assist the Committee if I say a little more. I am not concerned about covering ground that we may have already covered if it helps to clarify matters further and to put beyond any doubt the Government’s undertaking.
The purpose of clause 46 is to ensure that genuine victims of modern slavery are identified at the earliest possible opportunity, so that they can get the support they need to recover from their exploitation. The clause is part of the measures that seek to expand the current one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of the new slavery and trafficking information notice, which can be issued alongside the new evidence notice introduced by clause 16.
Asylum and human rights claimants will need to provide relevant information relating to being a victim of modern slavery or trafficking within a specified period and, if providing information outside that period, set out a statement of their reasons for doing so. The slavery and trafficking notice aims to help identify possible victims at the earliest opportunity, to ensure that they receive appropriate support. It also aims to ensure that those who are not genuine victims are identified at the earliest possible stage.
The clause is underpinned by access to legal advice to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. The clause works in tandem with clause 47, which sets out the impact of not providing information in good time without a good reason, such as the effects of trauma. Individuals will also be made aware from the start that if they fail to disclose information, save for good reason, their credibility may be damaged. We will set out our approach in guidance, giving decision makers the tools to recognise the impact of exploitation and trauma, and ensuring any changes to processes resulting from those measures are designed to take full account of the impact of trauma on victims of modern slavery. We intend to work with the sector to develop the guidance around that. I hope that will give Members confidence that the views and experiences of those groups will be taken into account when developing the guidance.
Perhaps the Minister could name one of the expert organisations that support the inclusion of clause 46 or 47. As it stands, the vast majority of organisations in the sector oppose the inclusion of those measures. It is all very well the Minister saying he will impose a requirement on the sector to work with the Government on that guidance, but they are saying categorically that they do not want the clauses.
I think the hon. Gentleman may have misunderstood my point. I was not saying there was any intention to impose a requirement on the sector to work with Government to develop the guidance, but undoubtedly we would welcome the input of the sector, which has a lot of experience and knowledge. We think there is a genuine issue that we need to address. The point I have made several times is that we want people to access the help they need when they need it as quickly as possible.
The sector would have preferred to have been consulted on the clause. The key problem it has is what happens if someone has gone past that deadline. This scheme puts real pressure on that person not to disclose at all, because they will fear that the regime will lead to their being disbelieved. That is a fundamental problem. Consulting after the clause is already on the statute book will not fix that.
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s broader interpretation of the situation. We want to identify and help genuine victims as quickly as possible. I would expect cases to be looked at appropriately and individually to ensure that is exactly what happens. There was also a question of whether victims will receive a slavery and trafficking information notice before getting a reasonable grounds decision? Yes, we want to identify victims as soon as possible.
The Minister had, and I am eternally grateful to him for giving way.
It does worry me somewhat that, as I understand it, those decision makers at the Home Office would ordinarily make reasonable grounds decisions very quickly in order to facilitate a swift entry into the NRM. If that will no longer be the case and we will be issuing notices, bearing in mind what we have discussed about trauma and victims taking time to disclose it, that could introduce significant delays for a victim entering the NRM. That really worries me. Could the Minister say any more to assure us that we will not be preventing victims from accessing the support they need by introducing that additional process?
I would expect cases to be looked at on an appropriate case-by-case basis that properly takes into account all of the relevant circumstances. It might be advantageous if, in my note to the Committee, I include some commentary on how we expect the process to work, to set that out for Members in more detail and make sure there is no confusion.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank the hon. Members for Halifax and for Enfield, Southgate for setting out their case, and for tabling this amendment. I appreciate their consideration of this clause and their concern for a vulnerable group of individuals. Ensuring that clause 47 enables decision makers to take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. That is why we have included the condition of good reasons, and we will ensure decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider them without prejudicing what that should cover.
What constitutes “good reasons” has purposely not been defined in the Bill. The detail on how to apply good reasons will be set out in guidance for decision makers. This will give decision makers the tools, for instance, to recognise that the age at which traumatic events took place may affect an individual’s ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events, while maintaining a case-by-case approach. Doing so in guidance will ensure that we also have the flexibility to update and add to the range of considerations undertaken by a decision maker in exercising discretion. To create a carve-out for one group of individuals, as amendment 190 seeks to do, would undermine this approach and create a two-tiered system based on the age at which exploitation may have taken place.
I am sure that this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Halifax, but this amendment could also incentivise individuals to put forward falsified referrals regarding the timing of exploitation to delay removal action. Our approach avoids this potential avenue for misuse, but still allows for important considerations regarding the age of the victim to be looked at. Indeed, reasonable grounds decision making already takes account of the specific vulnerabilities of children by, for instance, not requiring there to be any means of exploitation when establishing whether an individual is a victim.
We believe that the right approach is to provide more detail in guidance on the varied and complicated reasons that may constitute good reasons. These will include the age when the exploitation took place, but a wider range of potential reasons and indicators will also be considered to avoid focusing specifically on one victim cohort. This approach will allow decision makers to consider each case on its merits, whilst considering all the information relevant to their case without prejudging it. To do otherwise would not be appropriate or fair to all victims. Again, I hope that the sector will work with Government to shape those guidelines and ensure that they are right. For these reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
I am concerned by some of the Minister’s response. He says that children, and the age of the victim, will be a consideration within good reasons. However, once again we have not got that guidance; it has not been nailed down, so we have no assurances of how the detail will look. He also says that it would not be appropriate to have a different approach for victims based on their age. However, I think that would be entirely responsible and appropriate, and we look to do so throughout a whole range of legislation and legislative approaches. I think it would be a responsible requirement to place on the Government. With that in mind, I will press amendment 190 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 47, page 42, line 21, leave out—
“or a conclusive grounds decision”
This amendment would disapply this section when a conclusive grounds decision is being made (i.e. when a reasonable grounds decision will already have been made).
The amendment is designed to allow us to question how the new process will interplay with the NRM process, and to establish how long the notice period in the new process will be, so it is another short but important point. The amendment would disapply the section on credibility if a reasonable grounds decision is made. It is even less clear what sensible case can be made for the use of a trafficking information notice if sufficient information has already been provided to justify such a reasonable grounds decision.
Depending on how the system operates, and given the huge delays in making conclusive grounds decisions, the following scenario could play out. A person receives a reasonable grounds decision and is referred to the NRM process. That person makes a claim for protection, and the Secretary of State then serves them with a trafficking information notice. Full disclosure takes time because of their circumstances. The person is better placed to disclose much more information after the deadline for the trafficking information notice has passed but before a conclusive grounds decision is reached. It would surely be very strange, then, for the conclusive grounds decision to take account of late provision of information, but the clause appears to envisage that that could happen. Has that all been appropriately thought through? It would be useful to hear an explanation of how those two processes will interact.
I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their amendments. I am pleased to see from the amendments that they acknowledge the benefits of a system that brings forward at the earliest opportunity all information related to modern slavery, enabling us to provide support and protection quickly to those who need it.
To that end, clause 47 covers information raised at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages, which are the two crucial decision-making stages in the national referral mechanism, and which both confer different rights on possible and confirmed victims. Although there are different standards of proof at those two stages, it is critical that the decision maker at both points can review all information to take decisions. Those decisions should include consideration of whether information has been provided late and whether there are good reasons for that. By removing that consideration at the conclusive grounds stage, amendment 173 would remove the consequence of providing late information when the decision-making threshold is higher. That could perversely incentivise misuse of the system at the later stage.
We are clear that that approach should be taken across both decision points to ensure that we meet the clause’s aim of identifying victims as early as possible and reducing opportunities for misuse.
I am confused. I cannot see the benefit of late disclosure if the conclusive grounds process is ongoing. What does the amendment incentivise?
Again, I simply make the point that decisions are made case by case. We maintain that we need all the information at both decision points to reach the right decisions in individual cases. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
We will go away and study what the Minister has said. I am still confused about the interaction between the two processes. The amendment was designed to seek an explanation, and I suspect that we will not be satisfied with it, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 47, page 42, line 23, leave out “or on behalf of”.
This amendment would exclude statements made on behalf of a slavery or trafficking information notice recipient (as opposed to statements made directly by them) from this subsection.
This is a very short point, but another important one. The amendment is designed to try to get further information from the Minister. I am sorry to have to test him on all the detail of the clause, but it is important. What we are asking here is why statements made on behalf of a trafficking information notice recipient should be impacted by the clause because of late provision of evidence. What does this cover? Is a medical report, for example, to be impacted by the clause so that its credibility is doubted because the recipient gave information late? Is analysis of the truth of what a social worker or a counsellor has said on behalf of the trafficking survivor to be impacted by the clause as well? We are really just asking this. What does it mean? What is the scope of the fact that this scheme applies to statements made on behalf of the trafficking information notice recipient and not just by the recipient himself or herself?
Again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for setting out his case for the amendment. We know that, given the nature of modern slavery and human trafficking, many individuals often struggle to provide information relating to their abuse. That is why these measures are supported by the provision of legal aid to support possible victims in understanding the process and the national referral mechanism. It is also for that reason that the clause is specifically drafted to capture information provided by the victim or on their behalf.
All relevant information should be considered, whoever provides it, when decision makers are taking into account the provision of late information. Not to do so would create an artificial divide between different cohorts of individuals, depending on who provides the information for consideration. That could inadvertently encourage misuse of the system by leaving it open for individuals to seek to use others to provide all information late, knowing that its late disclosure will not be part of the consideration of credibility, when they could provide it themselves. That could delay disclosure and therefore our ability to identify and support individuals at the earliest opportunity as well as reducing opportunities for misuse. To give a practical example, I am confident that if someone else failed to press “Send”, the individual affected would not be impacted negatively by that.
For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Again, I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and we will consider it. I am still not absolutely clear on precisely what the scope of the provision is and whether, for example,
“a statement…on behalf of the person”
would include a medical statement—a medical report—so that its credibility would be damaged just because the person who underwent the medical report disclosed information late. We will go away and think about that. I think the Home Office may need to give it some consideration as well, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
We very much support the SNP’s amendment 175, which, as we heard, seeks to strike “as damaging” from the clause and hand that discretion back to the Home Office decision maker, as the Minister has already gone to some lengths to assure Members will be the case.
I will also speak to our amendment 163. We seek to mitigate the Government’s refusal to spell out what, if anything, would constitute a good reason for late disclosure. In Committee on Tuesday, the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, argued for a similar approach during our debates on part 2. The Minister responded that
“the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 333.]
I understand the points that the Minister made, but he will appreciate that for the Opposition, it is feels although he is somewhat putting the cart before the horse. We are being asked to consider the clauses in blind faith without the guidance, and one way he could address that is by including something in the Bill. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said earlier, we can debate only what is in front of us.
I expect one thing we can agree on is that no list can ever be exhaustive. I suspect that, as we have heard, the most convincing reasons for late disclosure are ones that we cannot comprehend. It would be nonsense to think that any list would be exhaustive, but without having in front of us any indication of what good reasons might be, we are being asked to take a leap of faith too far. The reasons in amendment 163 include, but are not limited to, a person’s fear of reprisals against them, experiencing pressures related to bonded debt, and being unable to recognise themselves as a victim.
In discussing part 2, again, the Minister went on to say that
“the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence”,
and that
“claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 26 October 2021; c. 333.]
I felt that the Minister was very much talking up the discretion that the competent authority decision makers would have, in order to offer us assurances, but that is not reflected in the primary legislation in clause 47. I would be grateful if he could confirm that “good reasons” will be set out within the guidance for NRM decision making, as was the commitment for asylum decision making in part 2.
I would be grateful if the Minister also confirmed when that guidance will be published, and when the training, which he described as being necessary in accompanying the guidance, will begin. I hope he will recognise that amendment 163 is measured and sensible and that he will agree to adopt it.
I thank hon. Members for their genuine interest in these matters and for bringing forward their amendments. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date, victims of modern slavery will be identified at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that those who need protection are afforded it quickly. This measure is supported by the provision of legal aid to ensure that possible victims feel able to share information in a safe and supported manner.
It is important to state that the requirement to bring forward information related to being a victim of modern slavery does not mean that referrals brought late will not be considered; all claims of modern slavery will be considered, irrespective of when they are raised. We have purposefully not defined “good reasons” in the Bill, and the detail on how to apply “good reasons” will be set out in guidance for decision makers. That is the appropriate place, giving the Government the flexibility to respond to our ever-increasing understanding of modern slavery victims.
We will of course work carefully with stakeholders as we operationalise guidance to ensure that decision makers have the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share, or recognise such events in some instances, while not seeking to prejudge their decision making by placing this detail in legislation. However, as has been recognised, we cannot legislate for every instance where someone may have “good reasons” for providing late information. To attempt to do so would be impractical. It would also limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers, who are best placed to consider all factors on a case-by-case basis.
Amendment 163 would have the perverse impact of individuals facing different requirements simply because their situation is excluded from the amendment. It also ignores the possibility that a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their information may be late for unrelated reasons. It would therefore create a blanket acceptance for late information in specific prescribed circumstances, while a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified categories would face a different test on whether they had good reason for providing late information. That would be unfair.
As I have set out, it is important that we are clear on the consequence of late disclosure of information in order to provide clarity for decision makers and victims, and to deter possible misuse of the system. Removing the reference to impacting credibility, as amendment 175 seeks to do, would remove our ability to require the provision of information up front. A duty to provide information requires a consequence and I think we are all agreed that seeking information on modern slavery issues up front is of benefit to all. The clause already includes mitigations to the possible consequence of damaged credibility, providing clear safeguards while still addressing the issue of potential misuse. The solution is not to stifle the clause of any robustness.
As I stated, more detail on good reasons and the credibility considerations will be set out in guidance. We will work to ensure that this takes account of vulnerabilities related to an individual’s exploitation. However, as I have outlined, we believe that removing the consideration of credibility as damaging would impede the ability to reduce potential misuse and reduce the impetus to identify victims as early as possible. As a result, that would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of victims.
I am still not sure that the Minister has addressed a fundamental point here. The worry is that if somebody genuinely is a victim of trafficking—I hate even having to describe people in that way—and misses that deadline, the fact that there are possible consequences of that, even if they might have a good reason, means that all they know is that they have missed the deadline. It is a huge disincentive for them to then come forward with other information. That is the whole point, and I still do not think that has been addressed by the Government.
I recognise the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s concern about this. What I would say to him, as I have now said many times, is that I expect appropriate decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances, mitigations and issues that people bring forward in relation to good reasons. I am confident that that process can be properly developed and delivered in a way that is responsive to those sorts of issues. That is why—to address the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax—it is difficult to put a precise time on when that guidance will be put in place, for the simple reason that we want to engage properly with the sector in the way that I have outlined. I want that to be a thorough process and for the guidance to be put in place in an appropriate manner that is as exhaustive as possible, but does not lack common sense and means that proper consideration is given to the many varied reasons that people may have for providing information late, for example.
I have a couple of points to make. My hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made the point that once people get past the deadline, they will be terrified to come forward. What will the Minister do about those people—
I apologise for interrupting the hon. Lady in mid-flow. I just want to provide some clarity on this point. If there are reasonable grounds to believe that someone is a victim, they will get positive identification even if the information is provided late. I want to be clear about that and place it on the record.
But the Government are refusing to accept amendment 163, which would put in the Bill what some of the good reasons could be. The Minister says that he will allow decision makers to have discretion, but what he is actually doing is allowing them to have discretion not to accept some perfectly valid reasons—including trauma, as we have covered. I would love to press the amendment to a vote, but we have to pick our battles in this place, so I reluctantly beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I have always wanted to be a dame—[Laughter.]
I thank Tom Farr of CEASE and Kat Banyard of UK Feminista for assisting in the drafting of the amendments and for their valuable work. Before I address each amendment in turn, I want to quickly highlight the concern that we have seen online in response to today’s discussions about some of the language that the Minister has used, specifically the issue of “genuine cases”. It is my understanding that nine out of 10 “reasonable and conclusive grounds” decisions were positive last year, and I gently urge the Minister to consider the impact of his words, especially when it comes to more people coming forward in the future. He said that he will listen to the sector. I hope that is a genuine offer, given that the sector does not feel that it was listened to. The consultation period was very brief and unexpected and has left the sector very unhappy.
Amendment 181 would help ensure that the credibility of victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation would not be called into question by a late disclosure of being trafficked, which clause 47 would do. If a person discloses that they have been a victim of human trafficking for sexual services, the lateness of the claim should not matter.
As we are all aware, the treatment of trafficked women and children subjected to sexual exploitation is unimaginable. It is widely understood to severely impact on their ability to escape from the situation they find themselves in. For many, it impacts on their ability even to understand or admit what has happened to them, for reasons of denial and other issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax raised in the debate on clause 46.
There is a bureaucracy behind the Government’s plans. Many individuals who have been sexually exploited are wholly unaware of the process of having to declare themselves as a victim of sexual exploitation. Many are likely to be suspicious of any involvement with the authorities. There may be a very good reason why a person feels that way, including that they have not been in control of their activities and are unaware that they have committed specific immigration offences or other criminal offences that they have been forced to engage in under duress, such as soliciting.
Clause 47, in practice, means that if trafficking status is disclosed at a late stage, that will have a devastating impact on credibility. That simply cannot be justified. As my hon. Friend argued, victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation must not be precluded from legal protections simply because they are too frightened or traumatised—we have previously discussed post-traumatic stress disorder—to disclose information as soon as they come to the attention of the authorities. To encourage disclosure can very often take time and sensitivity, something that the Home Office does not always currently allow for, and which the proposals in this Bill will affect to an even greater level. The amendment would make sure some of the most vulnerable people who have been trafficked continue to be protected under the law.
Amendment 187 supports amendment 181. It details how a person making a late disclosure of trafficking for sexual exploitation might better be identified by any relevant authority. A person may be considered a victim of trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation in a number of ways: first, if there is evidence they have been transported from one place to another for the purpose of sexual exploitation; secondly, if a person has signs of physical abuse, including but not limited to branding, bruising, scarring, burns or tattoos; thirdly, if a person has no access to their own earnings—for example, a person who does not have access to a bank account—fourthly, if a person has limited or no English language skills, could not cope on their own and has been managed previously; fifthly, if a person lives at the same address as anyone who meets any of these criteria; and finally, if they sleep in the same place they have been or were exploited.
Although authorities may have the best interests of an exploited individual at heart when investigating any trafficking-related crime, they may not even be aware of how to recognise such an individual, given the distinct and specific treatment that they have been subjected to. Putting these comprehensive but by no means exhaustive guiding factors into the Bill aims to ensure that authorities have a deeper understanding of the factors they should be aware of and how to identify and help victims.
It is important to note that it is often only when the authorities make wider arrests of criminal gangs that exploited individuals are discovered, usually in brothels or closely-controlled transient places of residence. In a situation of criminality, it may be difficult for authorities to discern who may ultimately be responsible for such criminality.
Acknowledging that exploitation often manifests in ways such as physical and mental trauma, as well as a total lack of autonomy over their own lives, will improve the current legal situation in two tangible ways. First, it may deter lengthy and expensive prosecutions of victims of exploitation, who may otherwise fall between the cracks and be prosecuted for an offence they committed under duress. Secondly, it will put into law current Crown Prosecution Service policy, which is to treat these individuals as victims as and where they are discovered. That is not happening now—we see the prosecution rate for sex crimes in this country at a historic and terrible low.
Amendment 187 would allow the UK to further build its status as the world leader it wants to be when it comes to a toolkit to combat human trafficking and sexual exploitation. These individuals must be viewed as victims of crime and not criminals requiring punishment.
Amendment 182 is an alternative probing amendment that would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the specific factors that may indicate that somebody is a victim of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. I hope the Minister will give an indication of whether that is the direction of travel for the Government.
The amendment would also provide greater clarity for the relevant authorities. As already said, it would prevent the prosecution of individuals who may have been compelled to commit offences while being sexually exploited, as well as providing a framework for authorities to refer to when trying to discern exactly the type of exploitation that has taken place. I hope that the aim behind these amendments will be welcomed by the Minister today, even if they are not accepted.
New clause 42 would put into law a specific offence of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The clause makes it an offence to arrange or enable the travel of another person for the purpose of sexual exploitation, regardless of whether the person consented to travel. Arranging or enabling travel can be done in numerous ways: by recruiting a person, by moving or carrying a person, by holding or receiving a person, or by transferring or exchanging control of a person.
Trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation means planning to sexually exploit a person during or after travel to the UK, or knowing another person is planning to sexually exploit a person during or after travel to the United Kingdom. Travel means arriving in the UK or leaving any country outside of the UK if the destination is the United Kingdom. A UK national commits the offence regardless of where the facilitating, arranging or travelling takes place. A non-UK national commits the offence by facilitating, arranging or travelling into and out of the UK. Committing the offence carries up to life in imprisonment if tried in a Crown court and would be a welcome step forward.
New clause 42 is necessary because while the Modern Slavery Act 2015 covers exploitation more broadly, the issue of sexual exploitation, specifically within the commercial sex industry, now merits being recognised as a distinct offence due to the catastrophically high numbers of trafficking victims brought into the commercial sex industry in the UK, organised by serious organised crime outfits.
The link between trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation—industrial-level prostitution—is undeniable, and the problem is getting worse. During the covid pandemic there was a 280% increase in the advertising of sexual services online in the west midlands, with the women being predominantly of eastern European origin. A 2010 report suggested that at least 10,000 women involved in off-street prostitution were victims of trafficking or non-UK nationals who were highly vulnerable. These statistics are shocking. We are not seeing provisions in current legislation to match the scale of the problem in the country.
Introducing new clause 42 would ensure that authorities and the Government recognise these intrinsic links and would aid in all our efforts to combat the scourge that is human trafficking and broader violence against women and girls. The benefits of the clause would include, firstly, requiring authorities to dig deeper to examine whether human trafficking has taken place when investigating any prostitution-related offence. Second, it would protect victims of sexual exploitation who have been trafficked. If an individual is being investigated for a prostitution-related offence, it is wholly unacceptable that they should be prosecuted for acts committed under duress or threat of violence from exploitative traffickers.
Placing this specific offence in law would encourage authorities to think more carefully about whether individuals who may initially be viewed as criminals are, in fact, victims of trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. It would further allow for the specific prosecution of those who traffic people for the purposes of sexual exploitation, and the full scale of what is going on would perhaps become clearer. Amendments 181, 187 and 182 and new clause 42 would ameliorate and offer some specific protection to women trafficked into the UK for sexual exploitation. I hope the Government will look favourably on these probing proposals.
I thank the hon. Members for setting out, through the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, their case and for putting forward their amendments. I appreciate their consideration of these clauses and their concern for a vulnerable group of individuals. They have raised important issues around identifying victims who have faced the most heinous crimes.
Ensuring that clause 47 enables decision makers to take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. That is why we have included the condition of good reasons, and ensured that decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider those without prejudging what that should cover. What constitutes good reasons has purposefully not been defined in the Bill: the detail on how to apply good reasons will be set out in guidance for decision makers, as we have already discussed. That will give decision makers the tools to, for instance, recognise the effect that traumatic events may have on individuals’ ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events, while maintaining a case-by-case approach. Doing so in guidance will also ensure that we have the flexibility to update and add to the range of considerations undertaken by a decision maker in exercising discretion.
To create a carve-out for one group of individuals, as amendments 181 and 187 seek to do, would undermine this approach and create a two-tiered system based on the type of exploitation faced. I am sure this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, but amendment 181 could also incentivise individuals to put forward falsified referrals regarding the specific forms of exploitation, or delay removal action. We believe that the right approach is to provide more detail on the varied and complicated reasons that may constitute good reasons in guidance, where these can be explored in more detail and where we can be more flexible as our understanding of exploitation develops.
The Minister has said that the intention is to address some of the issues and concerns raised by organisations and by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in the guidance. Can I request that the Minister meets those organisations and the hon. Member before Report, to make sure that any guidance plans take those concerns fully into account their concerns?
I have made this point several times now, but it is certainly worth repeating: there is a real willingness and desire to engage thoroughly in relation to the development of the guidance. I would of course be very happy to consider any meeting requests that come in the usual way, but I assure the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark that there is a firm commitment here, which I have made several times. As I have said, the hon. Member is a canny parliamentarian, and will take every possible opportunity to hold Ministers to account on that commitment to engage constructively with the shaping of the guidance.
There is a real test here, because the Minister is saying that he wants to listen to the sector. The sector is saying that it does not feel particularly listened to up to this point. It is a simple request to meet before Report, and the Minister has not quite said yes.
What I would say to the hon. Member is that if he makes contact with my office in the usual way, with information about who he would like me to meet alongside him, I will absolutely consider that appropriately.
Decision makers’ considerations will include the indicators highlighted in the amendment, but they will also consider a wider range of potential reasons and indicators to avoid focusing specifically on one victim cohort. This approach will allow decision makers to consider each case on its merits while considering all the information relevant to that case without prejudice. To do otherwise would not be appropriate or fair to all victims.
Amendment 182 seeks to insert a specific reference to human trafficking for sexual services into clause 48. We are agreed that this provision must enable decision makers to identify the most vulnerable victims, including victims of trafficking for sexual services. However, to set out a particular purpose of trafficking on the face of the Bill would fragment the types of exploitation victims have faced.
Exploitation for the purpose of human trafficking is defined under section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and that definition includes sexual exploitation. This is supported by the modern slavery statutory guidance in section 49 of the Act, which sets out considerations that may indicate that a person is a victim of human trafficking for sexual services. The existing guidance provides detail on indicators of specific types of modern slavery, including indicators that apply specifically to victims who have suffered from sexual exploitation. I am certain that hon. Members agree that there should be no grading of exploitation, and it is correct that exploitation for any one purpose should be considered with the same severity as exploitation for other purposes. We believe that to set out one particular purpose for exploitation on the face of the Bill would create fragmentation. Our guidance already provides detail on indicators of several types of modern slavery.
I will now turn to new clause 42. As I have already stated, I agree with hon. Members that the abhorrent crime of trafficking in individuals for the purposes of sexual exploitation should be treated with the utmost seriousness. That is why section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already accounts for human trafficking offences, and makes specific reference to sexual exploitation in section 3. In fact, the Modern Slavery Act allows for a wider provision of the offence. Section 2 makes human trafficking an offence in any part of the world, which includes trafficking to the UK but also trafficking within the UK, which the amendment does not.
I think the sector has a concern that the proposal in this legislation undermines the Modern Slavery Act and measures to encourage and support victims who have come forward. I hope that the Minister will hold that meeting before Report, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47 sets out the consequence if an individual who has been served with a slavery or trafficking information notice as discussed under clause 46 provides information relating to being a victim of modern slavery after the specified time period. The clause aims to ensure that possible victims are identified as early as possible to receive appropriate support and to reduce potential misuse of the national referral mechanism system from referrals intended to delay removal action. Under clause 47, the decision maker must decide whether information provided through the one-stop process is outside the specified time limit and therefore is late. This consideration will take into account whether there was a good reason for the late information, such as the impact of trauma, but where there are no good reasons, an individual’s credibility is damaged due to the provision of late information.
The Minister referred to abusing the process but he has not said much about what evidence there is for this problem. What is the scale of it? Much like statelessness, perhaps he could write to us with the evidence of what it is that the Government are trying to get at here. The big problem is the three-year delay for making decisions. Is not that the problem rather than anything that the Minister has referred to?
I recognise the invitation to write with more detail around this and I am happy to do that. That would be advantageous to the Committee. Given that time is getting on and we want to continue to make progress, I am very happy to take that request back to the Department. I will provide that information.
The Government will ensure that any changes to processes as a result of these measures are designed in a way that accounts for the impact of trauma. This includes ensuring that individuals working in the system are aware of the factors that can affect the task of obtaining information such as the effects traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall such events. This assessment will be set out in guidance for decision makers and we will engage stakeholders as we develop it. We will continue to consider all referrals on a case-by-case basis to ensure that support is tailored to the needs of genuine victims.
We intend to vote against clause 47. It is closely linked to clause 46 and I will try to avoid repetition as we are returning to elements that have been well discussed under part 2 on Tuesday.
The number of survivors able to receive support through the national referral mechanism will be reduced as a result of clause 47.
As the Human Trafficking Foundation outlined in written evidence:
“Introducing a trafficking information notice and so converging immigration with human trafficking risks creating another layer of bureaucracy and so would likely increase the length of time survivors must wait in the NRM.”
If we are to ensure that victims with complex psychological and physical needs are not punished by the system or left in limbo while their claims are processed, the clause cannot stand part of the Bill.
As other hon. Members have said, the Home Office’s own statutory guidance states:
“Victims’ early accounts may be affected by the impact of trauma. This can result in delayed disclosure, difficulty recalling facts, or symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder… It is also vital for decision makers to have an understanding of the mitigating reasons why a potential victim of modern slavery is incoherent, inconsistent or delays giving details of material facts… Throughout this process it is important to remember that victims of modern slavery have been through trauma”.
The clause runs completely contrary to that guidance.
The VITA Network explained in its consultation response to the new plan for immigration that:
“Psychological trauma causes profound disturbances to normal brain function and memory, including memory loss and inconsistencies”
in recollection. We know that a high proportion of trafficked people experience violence prior to and during trafficking. Long after they have escaped exploitation, many still fear that harm will come to them and their families if they disclose information about their experiences. It is often those who are most in need of protection who will find it the hardest to disclose such information.
In 2015, the PROTECT programme was established. It was an independent piece of research, commissioned and funded by the Department of Health and Social Care’s policy research programme, and led by King’s College London and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The programme aimed to develop evidence to inform the NHS response to human trafficking, and it was comprised of surveys and qualitative research, including interviews with trafficked people and with NHS and non-NHS professionals. It found that psychological distress was highly prevalent: four fifths of women in contact with shelter services screened positive for anxiety, depression or post-traumatic stress disorder at interview.
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister told the harrowing story of Gloria in his contribution on Tuesday, and demonstrated why the clause will be damaging to those who have been subject to trauma. The clause flies in the face of best practice and runs contrary to all we heard from witnesses in oral evidence. Earlier this week, my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made excellent points about how PTSD is just one reason why the approach in the clause will be unworkable and unconscionable for those who really need our help. We do not seek to punish or discredit other victims for late disclosure, so why are the Government seeking to do so in this case? The clause highlights the inconsistencies and the unjust nature of the Government’s approach.
It is also deeply worrying that the Government have offered no clarity in subsection (2) on the timescales within which individuals would have to provide that information. Will it be days, weeks, months? I would be grateful if the Minister gave us an indication of his thinking on that. As things stand, the clause will put barriers between victims and the support that they need to recover and secure prosecutions against the real criminals, who we all want to see brough to justice. On that basis, we cannot support clause 47.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I thank hon. Members for their interest and valuable contributions to the debate. They have raised important issues around identifying victims who have faced the most heinous crimes. Under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—to which the UK is a signatory, certain obligations flow if there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been a victim of trafficking”.
The amendment seeks to leave the reasonable grounds threshold as it stands, which is where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of trafficking.
It is crucial that decision makers are able to quickly and appropriately identify possible victims. That is why we have proposed this minor change to the reasonable grounds threshold to closer align with our international obligations under ECAT and with the devolved Administrations. To not make that change would undermine the clarity on decision making. Additionally, as the amendment relates specifically to the provision of assistance and support to persons, it would create a different threshold from that applied when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. That would create significant ambiguity around the reasonable grounds threshold and create further separation from our international obligations. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw her amendment.
I am not entirely satisfied with that response, so I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGood morning, ladies and gentlemen. We enter the final lap. I have the usual announcements: electronic devices off, please, and no food or drink. Mr Speaker requests that Members wear face coverings as a courtesy to others; they are for the protection of others, not for the protection of yourself. I am not a terribly good example, but I cannot breathe with a mask on. Hon. Members are also asked to take covid lateral flow tests twice a week if coming on to the estate. I do not know whether hon. Members have done that; it might be a good thing to do before we depart for a week. Finally, Hansard would appreciate speaking notes.
New Clause 6
Expedited appeals: joining of related appeals
“(1) For the purposes of this section, an ‘expedited section 82 appeal’ is an expedited appeal within the meaning of section 82A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (expedited appeals for claims brought on or after PRN cut-off date).
(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘related appeal’ is an appeal under any of the following—
(a) section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (appeals in respect of protection and human rights claims), other than one which is an expedited section 82 appeal;
(b) section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 (appeal against deprivation of citizenship);
(c) the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/61) (appeal rights in respect of EU citizens’ rights immigration decisions etc);
(d) regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/1052) (appeals against EEA decisions) as it continues to have effect following its revocation.
(3) If a person brings an expedited section 82 appeal at a time when a related appeal brought by that person is pending, the related appeal is, from that time, to be continued as an appeal to the Upper Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to the Upper Tribunal.
(4) If an expedited section 82 appeal brought by a person is pending, any right that the person would otherwise have to bring a related appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is instead a right to bring it to the Upper Tribunal.
(5) A related appeal within subsection (3) or brought to the Upper Tribunal as mentioned in (4) is referred to in this section as an ‘expedited related appeal’.
(6) Tribunal Procedure Rules must make provision with a view to securing that the Upper Tribunal consolidates an expedited related appeal and the expedited section 82 appeal concerned or hears them together (and see section 82A(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).
(7) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the Upper Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice in the case of a particular expedited related appeal to do so, order that the appeal is to be continued as an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to that Tribunal.
(8) For the purposes of this section, an appeal is ‘pending’—
(a) in the case of an appeal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (including an expedited section 82 appeal), if it is pending within the meaning of section 104 of that Act;
(b) in the case of an appeal under section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981, during the period—
(i) beginning when it is instituted, and
(ii) ending when it is finally determined or withdrawn;
(c) in the case of an appeal under the Immigration Citizens’ Rights Appeals (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, if it is pending within the meaning of regulation 13 of those Regulations;
(d) in the case of an appeal under the regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, if it is pending within the meaning of Part 6 of those Regulations (see regulation 35).
(9) In section 13(8) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (decisions excluded from right to appeal to the Court of Appeal), after paragraph (bza) (inserted by section 21) insert—
‘(bzb) any decision of the Upper Tribunal on an expedited related appeal within the meaning given by section (Expedited appeals: joining of related appeals) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2021 (expedited appeals against refusal of protection claim or human rights claim: joining of related appeals),’.”—(Tom Pursglove.)
This new clause (to be inserted after clause 21) provides that where a person brings an appeal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that is subject to the expedited procedure under the new section 82A of that Act, certain other appeals brought by that person are also to be subject to the expedited procedure.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would be inserted after clause 21. It forms part of a package of measures that will enable the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the UK. It complements clause 21 by ensuring that individuals cannot utilise the appeals system as a tool to delay their removal from the UK.
Frequently, those facing removal or deportation from the UK utilise delay tactics, such as late claims and repeated appeals, to thwart removal action. That leads to unnecessary costs to the taxpayer and an increased burden on the court and tribunals system. Clause 21 addresses that issue by creating a new expedited appeal for late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a priority removal notice, as provided by clause 18. Expedited appeals will be determined quickly, and the decisions of the upper tribunal will be final. Therefore, clause 21 removes the incentive for bringing claims late and protects the appeal system from abuse.
However, there may be additional appeal rights generated by other claims that individuals may seek to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Such additional appeals would usually be heard in the first tier tribunal. Consequently, an expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in the first tier tribunal, which would prevent their removal from the UK.
New clause 6 enables other appeals in the first tier tribunal brought by a person with an expedited appeal to be heard and determined by the upper tribunal alongside the expedited appeal. That will ensure that, following the conclusion of the expedited process, final determination will have been made on the appellant’s right to remain in the UK and, where the upper tribunal decides that they have no right to remain, removal action can take place.
I welcome the Minister back to his place. I do not follow the logic of the new clause at all. If somebody is trying to play the system—and I do not like talking in those terms—surely all they need to do is not make a late claim in terms of the PRN notice; then, their existing appeal would proceed normally, with onward rights of appeal and so on. This proposal just does not make sense, even if we accept the Government’s logic, which I do not.
The point is exactly as I have set out: in the immigration system, we see repeated appeals deliberately designed to frustrate the system, and the new clause is an appropriate way, with appropriate safeguards, to ensure that the tribunal process can handle those appeals appropriately. It makes sense for appeals to be considered together so that attempts to frustrate the removal process cannot happen and cases are determined as quickly as possible. As I say, there are appropriate judicial safeguards in place in the tribunal process to ensure that appeals are heard appropriately and are directed through the appropriate tribunal. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
Briefly, there are two reasons why I do not think this new clause makes any sense at all. First, there is the point that I just alluded to. The danger is that if someone who has a PRN served on them is contemplating disclosing further information or making a claim and the deadline passes, and they are acting in the way that the Minister wants to get at here and trying to “play the system”, they will simply not make that disclosure. Their existing claims will proceed to appeal through the normal channels, to a first tier tribunal with onward appeal rights. So the proposals do not make sense, even by the Government’s own logic. Can the Minister address that?
Secondly, we object to the new clause from a point of principle. The rare occasions when I would accept that an expedited appeals process can be justified are where the justifications relate solely to manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, but that is not what this is about; this is about expediting appeals and rights to appeal, but not because of the substance of the appeal—it has absolutely nothing to do with the merits of the claim or the related appeal at all. So the proposals make no sense from the point of view of principle, as well as being rather illogical.
Again, briefly, I agree with everything the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, has just said. We do not know at what stage the other appeal will be; it may not be ready to be heard. One problem we have in this country is the delay in the appeals processes because of severe underfunding in our court and tribunal systems, so it seems that the new clause will not work.
The new clause will also cause more problems than it solves. I am not sure that there is a huge problem with multiple outstanding appeals in any event, but the new clause could actually make things worse. If the intention in the Bill is to provide fairness, the new clause will not achieve that, because speeding up an appeal could cause unfairness. So for the reasons outlined by the SNP spokesperson we will not support the new clause.
The bottom line is that we simply disagree on this matter. Clause 21 ensures that appeals relating to late human rights or protection claims are dealt with expeditiously, with decisions by the upper tribunal being final. This provides appellants with a swift determination of their claim. It also disincentives late claims and seeks to prevent sequential or multiple appeals from being utilised as a tactic to thwart removal.
However, the Government recognise that in certain circumstances an individual may exercise other appeal rights, in parallel with their expedited appeal. This could give rise to a situation whereby a person has an appeal in a first tier tribunal and an expedited appeal in the upper tribunal. Consequently, the expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in a first tier tribunal. If the appellant was unsuccessful in their expedited appeal, the ongoing appeal in the first tier tribunal would prevent their removal from the UK. This outcome is undesirable and undermines the Government’s intention to disincentivise late claims by ensuring that appeals relating to such claims are determined quickly and conclusively.
The new clause ensures that where a person has an expedited appeal, any related appeal will also be subject to the same expedited process. Therefore, following the conclusion of the expedited process, the appellant’s right to remain in the UK will be determined with finality and, where an individual has no right to remain in the UK, removal action can take place. That is the logical and sensible approach that we propose to take.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
Let me explain the process from now on for about the next 10 minutes. We now come to a sequence of Government new clauses, all of which have been debated already with other clauses or amendments. I shall say to the Minister, “Will the Minister move formally?” The Minister, being obedient, will say, “Moved formally.” The Clerk will then read the title of the clause and I will put the questions that it be read a second time and that it be added to the Bill. I gently suggest to the Opposition that there is not much point in calling a Division on both those questions—you can, but it will take a lot longer. Let us see how we get on.
New Clause 7
Accelerated detained appeals
“(1) In this section ‘accelerated detained appeal’ means a relevant appeal (see subsection (6)) brought—
(a) by a person who—
(i) was detained under a relevant detention provision (see subsection (7)) at the time at which they were given notice of the decision which is the subject of the appeal, and
(ii) remains in detention under a relevant detention provision, and
(b) against a decision that—
(i) is of a description prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State, and
(ii) when made, was certified by the Secretary of State under this section.
(2) The Secretary of State may only certify a decision under this section if the Secretary of State considers that any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision would likely be disposed of expeditiously.
(3) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the following time limits apply in relation to an accelerated detained appeal—
(a) any notice of appeal must be given to the First-tier Tribunal not later than 5 working days after the date on which the appellant was given notice of the decision against which the appeal is brought;
(b) the First-tier Tribunal must make a decision on the appeal, and give notice of that decision to the parties, not later than 25 working days after the date on which the appellant gave notice of appeal to the tribunal;
(c) any application (whether to the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal) for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be determined by the tribunal concerned not later than 20 working days after the date on which the applicant was given notice of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision.
(4) A relevant appeal ceases to be an accelerated detained appeal on the appellant being released from detention under any relevant detention provision.
(5) Tribunal Procedure Rules must secure that the First-tier Tribunal or (as the case may be) the Upper Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice in a particular case to do so, order that a relevant appeal is to cease to be an accelerated detained appeal.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant appeal’ is an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under any of the following—
(a) section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (appeals in respect of protection and human rights claims);
(b) section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981 (appeal against deprivation of citizenship);
(c) the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/61) (appeal rights in respect of EU citizens’ rights immigration decisions etc);
(d) regulation 36 of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/1052) (appeals against EEA decisions) as it continues to have effect following its revocation.
(7) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant detention provision’ is any of the following—
(a) paragraph 16(1), (1A) or (2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);
(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);
(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);
(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).
(8) In this section ‘working day’ means any day except—
(a) a Saturday or Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or 26 to 31 December, and
(b) any day that is a bank holiday under section 1 of the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the part of the United Kingdom where the appellant concerned is detained.
(9) Regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”—(Tom Pursglove.)
This new clause expands the categories of immigration appeals that can be subject to the accelerated detained appeals process that was introduced by clause 24.
Brought up, and read the First and Second time.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for tabling new clause 1 and providing the Committee with this opportunity to consider placing the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme on a statutory footing and lifting the 5,000 person limit for the first year.
The UK has a proud history of supporting those in need of protection, and I understand the concerns that Members of the House have about the plight of people from Afghanistan. During Operation Pitting, the Government and military worked around the clock to airlift about 15,000 people out of Afghanistan—the biggest airlift from a single country for a generation. The Government have relocated thousands of people who loyally served our military in Afghanistan, and we continue to help more.
In addition, the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme is one of the most ambitious resettlement schemes in our country’s history. It will give up to 20,000 people at risk a new life in the UK. Our current schemes are non-legislative, operating outside the immigration rules and on a discretionary basis. Operating in this way has seen us resettle over 25,000 vulnerable people since 2015. Placing the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme on a statutory footing would make it less flexible and less able to respond to changing circumstances internationally.
A huge programme of work, called Operation Warm Welcome, is under way across the whole of Government to ensure that Afghans evacuated to the UK receive the vital support they need. This work, overseen by the Minister for Afghan Resettlement, my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), spans different Government Departments, charities, non-governmental organisations, local authorities and communities. The aim is to ensure that Afghans can be properly supported as they rebuild their lives in the UK, while also ensuring that local services are not put under undue strain. The support being provided is similar to that of the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme in response to the conflict in Syria, to ensure that people get the vital healthcare, education, support into employment and accommodation they need to fully integrate into society.
There are many who need our protection, and the UK plays a leading role as one of the world’s largest refugee resettlement states. However, regrettably the UK is not able to provide protection to everyone, and it is essential that any decisions regarding the number of people we resettle take into consideration our capacity to support people to rebuild their lives in the UK. We are clear that the number of people we can resettle depends on a variety of factors, including local authorities’ capacity.
I just want to pick up on the Minister’ point, which he has made time and again, about the UK leading on resettlement. Does he accept the figures that show that since the start of 2020, the UK has resettled 1,991 refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees? That is less than France, less than half the number for Germany, and about a quarter of the number for Sweden. In what way is that a leading role?
I think it is fair to say that this country historically has had a leading role in resettling refugees, and the hon. Gentleman will recognise that we have debated this many times during the course of this Committee’s proceedings, and I have referred to the figure of 25,000 people on several occasions. I am confident that that proud tradition will continue. I am not privy to the figures that he has just cited, but I make the point that we have also been in a pandemic, which clearly has had knock-on effects across life and society in our country and in the international environment.
It sounded as though the hon. Member for Sheffield Central was asking for unfettered, uncontrolled, open-border access to this country. We have already had 20,000 illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel. I was down in Dover yesterday with Baroness Hoey, the former Labour Member of Parliament, and saw with utter shock the situation regarding the illegal attempts at crossing. Does the Minister agree that the hon. Gentleman’s words show that the Labour party is out of touch with what people want?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and no doubt we will have a conversation about his visit to Dover.
As I mentioned in my speech, the Government chose who came into the UK through the voluntary resettlement scheme and they will do so under this scheme as well. Remarks about giving unfettered or unlimited access to everyone are therefore ludicrous, because the Government will be in control of who can enter the UK from Afghanistan through this scheme. To make such aspersions is clearly wrong and misleading.
The shadow Minister interrupted me while I was responding to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North, and, of course, I was happy to take his intervention. The scheme we intend to bring forward is structured and it should not be seen in isolation in relation to Afghanistan. It is important to consider it in the context of the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, which has been invaluable and plays an important role in our efforts to provide sanctuary to those fleeing Afghanistan. That is very important to consider.
To continue with my point about the participation of civil society in community sponsorship, we have been working around the clock to stand up support with local authorities and to secure accommodation for the scheme. There is a huge effort under way to get families who have already been evacuated to the UK into permanent homes so that they can resettle and rebuild their lives. Clearly, we do not want families to remain in bridging accommodation for long periods, so it is sensible to have a limit on the number of places we offer on the scheme.
The new clause seeks to bring the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme into force within 30 days from the date of Royal Assent. We are working at pace to open the scheme, and the new clause would likely result in significant delays in resettling individuals under the scheme.
During the passage of the Bill, we have had many debates relating to Afghanistan. I said previously that I would ensure that the Minister for Afghan Resettlement was made aware of the Committee’s comments, and I will endeavour to do that again. It is important that all views are heard as we work at pace to shape this scheme and to make sure that we get it right, so that we are able to provide sanctuary to those to whom Members across the Committee and across the House want to provide it.
Previous schemes have not been delivered through legislation. I would argue that it is best to be responsive and flexible, and that not putting the scheme on a statutory basis has that effect. The shadow Minister used the word “rigid”. I would argue that not going down the statutory route ensures we can be flexible as to the evolving situation, and provide proper care and support to people who come here.
We want coming to the UK to be a positive and life-changing experience, and we want to provide sanctuary and care for those individuals. I am confident that that is precisely what we will do in delivering this scheme and that our country will be able to be incredibly proud of it. We owe it to those individuals to provide them with sanctuary, and that is precisely what we will do. With that, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw the new clause.
I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, which clearly amount to a new cap on immigration. I will repeat the number for the benefit of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North: there are 5 million people potentially eligible to come to the country via the British national overseas visa scheme; we are just asking that more than 5,000 people are able to come from Afghanistan. If that limit is rigidly applied, people’s lives could be in danger.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I have said a lot about asylum accommodation in previous years and months. I agree that there are huge problems with the asylum accommodation system, such as over-concentration, too often poor-quality accommodation, a lack of funding for the local authorities that actually step up to the plate and volunteer to undertake the task, and a lack of control and power for those local authorities. Too often they play second fiddle to the companies and organisations contracted to the Government.
I support broadening dispersal, but I am not on board at this stage with mandating it. Repeatedly, local authorities, whether in the west midlands, Glasgow or elsewhere, and other organisations such as the Home Affairs Committee, on which I sit—we have had a couple of reports on this issue—have listed all the things that the Home Office could engage with and undertake to improve the system. I know from speaking to authorities that if the Home Office did those things and increased the powers and financing of local authorities, more would come on board. If the Home Office did that, I do not think that mandation would be required.
If the Home Office fixes its end of the bargain and local authorities are still not getting on board, at that stage I would have no choice but to support mandation, but I do not think that we are at that stage yet. I, too, will quote Abi Brown, who was very measured in her comments when local authorities from the west midlands were writing to the Home Office. She said:
“This is about trying to open up a discussion about how the asylum dispersal system works. So far it’s been very frustrating trying to get the Home Office to engage with us on this issue. We want them to talk to us about how the system can be improved, and we’ve made a number of suggestions in the letter.”
She went on to say:
“This isn’t about party politics, it’s about parity.”
I absolutely agree with that. There is a growing consensus that the Home Office has to up its game on how the dispersal system works. That is what we have to look at, rather than mandating local authorities.
I agree with some of the intention behind new clause 2. It is right that all parts of the UK make a reasonable contribution to ensuring that adequate accommodation is available for asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but it is important to recognise that not every area of the UK has appropriate services or affordable accommodation to appropriately support them. Additionally, some local authorities have very few asylum seekers accommodated by the Home Office in their areas but support large numbers of other migrants. For example, the Home Office does not accommodate many adult asylum seekers and their children in Kent or Croydon, but both local authorities support large numbers of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
It is also important to note that not all asylum seekers are accommodated by the Home Office. The proportion varies over time, but historically around 50% find accommodation with friends or family. That group often live in areas where there are few supported asylum seekers, but they still require access to the same health and education services. It is not therefore sensible to have a rigid set of rules that require destitute asylum seekers to be accommodated in areas in direct proportion to the population of those places. The other factors that I have described must be taken into consideration.
Since the introduction of part 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, successive Governments have employed a policy of seeking the agreement of local authorities prior to placing asylum seekers within an area. However, the legislation does not provide local authorities with a veto on the placement of asylum seekers in their areas. If a local authority objects to proposals by our providers to use accommodation not previously used to house asylum seekers, the Home Office can consider and adjudicate on the matter.
A lot of work has none the less been done on increasing local authority participation in asylum dispersal since 2015. Prior to 2015, there were around only 100 local authorities participating. There are now around 140. We have established the local government chief executive group to bring together senior representatives from local authorities, with the aim of expanding the dispersal system and improving the process for the people who use it. We are planning a wider review of the dispersal process and will be consulting local authorities and others.
The local government chief executive group is working collaboratively to evidence any additional costs to local authorities by the dispersal proposal and to identify the appropriate funding mechanism. In light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate will withdraw the motion.
I am sorry, but I suggest that we vote on the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe that new clause 3 is necessary because of an issue relating to comprehensive sickness insurance, which has been affecting EU citizens and babies born in the UK to EU parents. The issue is preventing naturalisation or automatic access to the right to be registered as British born. We believe that that is unfair and incorrect. Historically, access to the NHS for European economic area and Swiss citizens was free at the point of use, on the same terms as residents who are British citizens, without the need for any further insurance.
The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 included a requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance, but this requirement was not routinely communicated to EEA and Swiss citizens, and was only required at the point of applying to the Home Office. This has led to a situation where individuals have been refused permanent residence documents, naturalisation applications and citizenship at birth, and have lost family reunion rights under the separation agreements following a discretionary grant of naturalisation. Not only was the requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance not made clear prior to applying to the Home Office, but CSI might not have been relevant to EEA or Swiss citizens, such as during periods of study or self-sufficiency.
I will set the issue in a wider context. The UK has set up the EU settlement scheme, which allows EU citizens to acquire settled status, but many want to become British. They want the right to vote and the security of the nationality of their adopted home, the United Kingdom. However, the requirement to have an obscure health insurance policy is putting applications at risk of refusal and is discouraging many from applying. The British Nationality Act 1981 requires applicants to have not been in breach of immigration laws for any period relied on in the application. While a lot of EU citizens need only to have been living in the UK, students and those who are self-sufficient must also be in possession of comprehensive sickness insurance. However, the possession of CSI has never been a requirement for EU citizens to live in the UK or use the NHS, so most people do not and never have had it.
More concerning is the fact that the Home Office never communicated clearly to EU students and self-sufficient people that they would need to have CSI to become British. The Home Office, which is in charge of decisions relating to applications for citizenship, has maintained the policy despite questions from various organisations, including the3million. In May 2020, updated guidance to caseworkers confirmed the policy, changing the application process to ask for CSI and directing caseworkers to check for it. The guidance introduced a vague power of discretion, but no details were provided as to how that discretion should be applied.
In the Opposition’s view, it is clearly unfair that this anomaly relating to CSI has led to historical and ongoing injustices. It is not fair that what appears to be an additional random requirement for one group of citizens—not communicated prior to application—has, in effect, defined people’s ability to naturalise or claim citizenship.
We therefore believe that the new clause is needed to make the law fair. The historical requirement demanding that individuals hold CSI should also be satisfied by them having had free access to the NHS at the point of use without further insurance. The addition of historical access to the NHS as a satisfying condition would be much fairer. I will give some examples to further illustrate the need for this.
Roberto is Portuguese and arrived in the UK in 2006. He did an undergraduate degree in the UK, where he met his wife. During their university years, they studied full time and did not have CSI as they were never made aware of that requirement for full-time EU students in the UK. They had a son in the UK in 2011 and applied for his British passport, believing that he would automatically be born British.
However, when Roberto and his wife contacted the Home Office for information about the passport application, they were told that as they had not had CSI in the five years preceding the birth, he was not considered to be British. This new clause would address this problem, as the parents’ CSI requirement would have been met by their having had access to the NHS. Consequently, the fact that the child should have been born British can now be addressed by registering for British citizenship at no charge.
I would like the Committee to consider another example illustrating the need for this new clause. Lara is a Brazilian-Italian citizen who has been living in the UK since 2014. Between 2014 and 2017, Lara was in work, but she started a full-time degree at the University of Cambridge in September 2017. In July 2019, Lara was granted settled status under the EU settlement scheme and was looking forward to applying for naturalisation as a British citizen in 2020 after holding settled status for a year. Lara has since started working again, and has been made aware that she should have held CSI while she was at university—a requirement she was never made aware of by either her university or her GP.
If Lara applies for naturalisation, she may fail the lawful residence requirements due to the absence of CSI and may have her application refused. Since late 2020, caseworkers have had the discretion to grant citizenship when there are compelling grounds, although those are not clearly defined in any Home Office guidance. Therefore, like many other EU citizens, Lara is afraid of taking the risk of paying the £1,330 naturalisation fee and not obtaining a positive outcome.
Our new clause would mean that the period of residence that led to the grant of settled status would be considered to be lawful residence, and that the good character requirement could not be failed for a lack of CSI. That would give EU citizens like Lara the confidence to apply for naturalisation, knowing that they would meet all the criteria.
It is important to note that if Lara applies for citizenship and is granted it through caseworker discretion, the CSI issue is likely to still affect her in the future. If she then wished to be joined by a family member in the UK, the complex appendix EU immigration rules, which define the EU settlement scheme, mean that she would fall outside the definition of “qualifying British citizen” due to her historical lack of CSI, and therefore lose the scheme’s right to family reunion. If Lara does not become a British citizen, she would have that right through having settled status.
The new clause would mean that for future decisions taken under the immigration rules, the CSI requirement would be met by access to the NHS, meaning that EU citizens like Lara would not unexpectedly lose the rights they had before naturalising. We believe that this new clause is needed to address this unfair anomaly around CSI.
I thank the hon. Members for tabling the new clause, which relates to the requirement, in certain circumstances, for EEA nationals to have had comprehensive sickness insurance to have been residing lawfully in the UK. Regulations set out the requirements that EEA nationals needed to follow if they wished to reside here lawfully on the basis of free movement. In the case of students or the self-sufficient, but not those who were working here, the possession of CSI has always been a requirement.
It is useful that guidance exists, but does the Minister appreciate that if somebody is considering spending more than £1,000 to make an application and there is no clarity—nothing stronger—they almost certainly will not take the risk? Is it not possible to put something firmer into the guidance for caseworkers to say that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the lack of CSI should be ignored?
The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that this matter falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Future Borders and Immigration, so if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I shall take away that suggestion and ask the Minister to consider it. If the hon. Gentleman wants to follow up in writing with the Minister, I am sure my hon. Friend would consider that and come back to him. I will certainly make sure that he is aware of the suggestion the hon. Gentleman raises.
The new clause would amend the naturalisation requirements for EEA nationals who did not have CSI and so had not been in the UK lawfully before they acquired settled status. We cannot accept that, as all applicants are required to meet the same requirements for naturalisation in terms of lawful residence and it would not be right to treat certain nationalities differently.
The third part of the new clause would amend the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 such that a person is treated as having had CSI if they had access to the NHS in practice or held a CSI policy. However, there is no mention of CSI in the rest of that Act, nor is there any mention of CSI in residence scheme immigration rules. The EU settlement scheme does not test for CSI and there is no need to have held it in the past, or to hold it now, in order for EEA nationals to obtain settled or pre-settled status. As such, that part of the new clause would have no practical effect. I therefore ask the hon. Members to withdraw their new clause.
I will press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I appreciate the positive intent behind new clause 4, which seeks to create a means whereby, in the future, British citizens who were born on, or descended from a person born on, the British Indian Ocean Territory will be able to bring their foreign national spouse or partner to the UK, without their being subject to the current financial and English language requirements for family migration.
I remind hon. Members that the minimum income requirement is based on in-depth analysis and advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee. The purpose of the requirement, implemented in July 2012 along with other reforms of the family immigration rules, is to ensure family migrants are supported at a reasonable level so they do not become a burden on the taxpayer and can participate sufficiently in everyday life to facilitate their integration into British society. Family life must not be established here at the taxpayer’s expense and family migrants must be able to integrate if they are to play a full part in British life.
The minimum income requirement was set following advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee, at £18,600 for sponsoring a partner, rising to £22,400 for also sponsoring a non-qualifying child and an additional £2,400 for each further such child. There is no flexibility in the level of the minimum income requirement, which must be met in all cases subject to the requirement; it is right and fair it should be consistently applied in all cases. Expecting family migrants and their sponsors to be financially independent is reasonable, both to them and the taxpayer.
In February 2017, the Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of the minimum income requirement under the family immigration rules. The Court found the minimum income requirement is not a breach of the right to respect for a private and family life under article 8 of the European convention on human rights and is not discriminatory. The Supreme Court endorsed our approach in setting an income requirement for family migration that prevents burdens on the taxpayer and ensures migrant families can integrate into our communities. The Supreme Court agreed that it strikes a fair balance between the interests of those wishing to sponsor a partner to settle in the UK and of the community in general.
Being able to speak English is also fundamental to successful integration into British society.
I would just gently say that the response is slightly tone deaf. First, the Migration Advisory Committee has asked the Government to revisit the financial thresholds the Minister mentions. Secondly, we are talking about Chagossians who were forcibly removed from their islands. Consistency is fine, but these are truly exceptional circumstances. Surely most taxpayers would perfectly understand that different rules have to apply in these outrageous circumstances.
In fairness, the hon. Gentleman has intervened early in my remarks on the new clauses. Let me continue, but I hear the point he raises, and I of course take it on board, in the way I take all comments from hon. Members on the Committee on board.
We expect those coming to the UK on a family visa with only basic English to become more fluent over time, as a means of encouraging better integration into our society, to make it easier for families to access vital public services and to enable parents to support their children’s education.
New clause 4 would undermine the sound basis on which family migration to this country has been placed in recent years. It would circumvent the need for family migration to be on a basis whereby families are financially independent and able to contribute to the UK. It would also remove the English language requirement, which is fundamental to a migrant’s successful integration into British society. There is no justifiable reason to give preferential treatment to family members based solely on their sponsor’s nationality. Without a clear justification for doing so, that would also likely constitute unlawful discrimination.
The immigration rules on family migration, which new clause 4 would undermine, are designed to prevent burdens on the taxpayer, promote integration and tackle abuse, and thereby ensure that family migration to the UK is on a properly sustainable basis that is fair to migrants and the wider community. The rules are helping to ensure public confidence in the immigration system and, well intended as the new clause may be, it has the potential to reverse that.
In the same way, the introduction of a dual family migration system as required by the new clause would not be seen in a uniformly positive way by British citizens and persons settled here. It would lead to an undesirable two-tier system of family migration in which a group of family members whose sponsor is a British citizen with a connection to the British Indian Ocean Territory would be given preferential treatment over other sponsors. Furthermore, the Government have the power under the Immigration Act 1971 to set out the requirements for entry into and stay in the UK in immigration rules, which are laid before Parliament. The rules allow flexibility to amend policy as appropriate, and the Government continue to review them regularly to ensure that they are fair and effective. Work is ongoing on simplification of the rules following the Law Commission’s recommendations. The new clause would have the effect of undermining that process and prescribing the rules in primary legislation for one particular cohort.
I turn to new clause 15. We are already making changes through the Bill to address historic unfairness so that all those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory and their children are either automatically British citizens or have the right to acquire British nationality. The new clause, tabled by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax, seeks to go much further and would address what is seen as the consequences of historic unfairness. Although I am sympathetic with the aim, I am concerned that that is not the correct approach. The new clause would offer British citizenship in perpetuity to those born outside the UK and overseas territories regardless of their connection to the UK as long as they are descendants of someone born on the islands making up the British Indian Ocean Territory.
I am not entirely surprised that the Minister’s first point is about the lack of any limit. Would the new clause be more amenable to him if there was a limit on the degree of relationship there had to be with a Chagossian?
If the hon. Gentleman lets me conclude my remarks, I hope that that will give him a little comfort on that point. The approach proposed by the new clause cannot be right and would undermine the long-standing principle of British nationality law that nationality or entitlements to nationality are not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and territories.
I recognise, however, that the Chagossians present a unique case. My hon. Friend the Member for Crawley, who has long campaigned on behalf of the Chagossian communities both in his constituency and throughout the UK as vice chair of the Chagos islands (British Indian Ocean Territory) all-party parliamentary group, has indicated his intention to table an amendment on this issue on Report. I would like to reflect further on the complex issues faced by Chagossian communities in the UK and those in Mauritius and the Seychelles that have been raised by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee—I am mindful of the cross-party view—before making any significant changes to nationality law.
Hon. Members from different parties have expressed views, and I have taken on board the points raised. I say to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that there is a willingness to look closely at the Chagossian issue. With that, I hope that hon. Members will be willing not to move their new clauses.
As the Minister said, we will consider what has been said before we revisit this issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
Former British-Hong Kong service personnel: right of abode
‘(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.
(2) At the end of section 2(1) insert—
“(c) that person is a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service, or
(d) that person is the spouse or dependent of a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service.’—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would mean that all former British-Hong Kong service personnel, plus their spouses and dependents, would have right of abode in the UK.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateTom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for tabling new clause 5, which provides the Committee with the opportunity to consider granting the right of abode in the United Kingdom to former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants.
The Government remain extremely grateful to former British-Hong Kong service personnel. Under the British nationality selection scheme, a limited number of personnel who were settled in Hong Kong could apply to register as British citizens. All veterans would have been eligible to acquire British national overseas status between 1986 and 1997. Therefore, many should hold BNO status. Those who hold BNO status may be eligible for the BNO visa that was launched in January this year and which provides a route to settlement in the UK, meaning that many former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants will already have, or be on the path to having, settlement and subsequently British citizenship, which would confer on them a right of abode in the UK.
We must consider the impact on public services both of increased usage generated by the right of access granted by expanded citizenship, and of the additional costs in granting such rights, such as casework resource and resettlement resulting in lost income that is not budgeted for and is therefore not affordable. Additionally, although I recognise the significant contribution made by this group, it may be difficult to justify why this specific cohort should be granted the right of abode when others from former colonial garrisons are not. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I do think there are very specific reasons why this cohort should indeed be granted what this new clause is looking for, and I suspect we will be looking at this again on Report. In the meantime, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Reporting to Parliament in relation to the prevention of death
“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of the commencement of this section, and thereafter within each successive 12 months’ period, lay before Parliament a report concerning the deaths of people subject to asylum and immigration powers.
(2) A report required by this section must state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—
(a) state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—
(i) the commencement of this section (in the case of the first report laid under this section); or
(ii) the previous report laid under this section (in all other cases); and
(b) set out the support arrangements that the Secretary of State has implemented in that year to assist those directly affected by the deaths, and what changes in these arrangements are planned for the next year.
(3) Subject to subsection (5), the report required by this section must—
(a) in relation to each death to which subsection (2) refers, identify—
(i) whether the deceased was at the time of death detained under immigration powers,
(ii) whether the deceased had an asylum claim outstanding,
(iii) whether the deceased was in receipt of accommodation or support from the Secretary of State,
(iv) whether the deceased was a relevant child or young person,
(v) whether the deceased was under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State,
(vi) the age, nationality and gender of the deceased,
(vii) any protected characteristic of the deceased,
(viii) the steps taken by the Secretary of State to support any family member of, or other person directly affected, by the death,
(ix) such further information as the Secretary of State shall consider relevant; and
(b) include a statement by the Secretary of State in relation to each such death concerning the impact, if any, of any relevant function, power, decision or discretion upon the circumstances causally connected to that death; and
(c) set out any changes to legislation, policy or practice that the Secretary of State proposes or has made to prevent the occurrence or continuation of circumstances creating a risk of death or to eliminate or reduce that risk in those circumstances; and
(d) describe the Secretary of State’s policy and practice in providing assistance to or receiving assistance from statutory bodies with responsibilities relating to the investigation or prevention of death.
(4) In making any statement to which subsection (3)(b) refers, the Secretary of State shall take into consideration both acts and omissions in relation to the exercise of any function, power or discretion and the making of any decision (including any omission to make a decision).
(5) Where the Secretary of State is unable to fulfil the requirements of subsection (3) in relation to any particular death by reason of there being insufficient time to compile and consider the relevant circumstances relating to the person who has died, the Secretary of State shall state this in the report and shall fulfil those requirements in the next report required by this section.
(6) In this section—
a person is “subject to asylum or immigration powers” if that person—
(a) is detained under immigration powers;
(b) has made an asylum claim that remains outstanding (including where it is being treated as inadmissible but the person remains in the UK);
(c) is in receipt of accommodation or support provided or arranged by the Secretary of State;
(d) is a relevant child or young person; or
(e) is under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State in pursuance of asylum or immigration functions;
“relevant function, power, decision or discretion” refers to functions, powers, decisions or discretion in relation to asylum or immigration functions that are exercised or may be exercised by the Secretary of State, an immigration officer or a person to whom the Secretary of State has delegated that exercise;
“protected characteristic” has the same meaning as in the Equality Act 2010;
a “relevant child or young person” means a person who is subject to immigration control and—
(a) is in the care of a local authority; or
(b) is receiving support from a local authority as a result of having been in such care;
a person (P) is “under the control” of another person (A) where—
(a) P is being escorted by A within or from the UK,
(b) P in the custody of A,
(c) P is reporting (including remotely) to a designated place (including remotely) in compliance with a requirement imposed by A, or
(d) P is residing at a designated place in compliance with a requirement imposed by A;
“young person” means a person below the age of 25 years.” —(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would seek to ensure there was transparency and accountability about the deaths of people subject to certain asylum and immigration powers, and policies designed to prevent them.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Everyone in this Committee has expressed concern at the loss of life in the channel when people make dangerous journeys to seek asylum here. This new clause brings us to loss of life among people already in the immigration and asylum systems. It asks: what do we know about such deaths, what do we do in response to prevent other deaths from happening, and what do we do to ensure dignity in death? I am grateful to Amnesty International, Migrant Voice, Bail for Immigration Detainees, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates for all their work on this.
I particularly want to mention the Da’aro Youth Project, which was established in 2018 by members of the Eritrean community in London in response to the suicides of several unaccompanied teenage Eritreans who came to the UK to seek asylum, and supports the wellbeing of young people in the UK asylum system from countries in the horn of Africa. Its research found that at least 12 teenagers who arrived in the UK as unaccompanied children seeking asylum have died by suicide in the past five years, most of them Eritrean, including several in recent months. All had either been children in the care of local authorities or care leavers, while one was subject to an age dispute, one had been denied family reunion, and several had been waiting for significant periods for an asylum decision or had in fact been refused asylum.
More recently, Scottish Refugee Council freedom of information requests initially identified 51 deaths in asylum accommodation between April 2016 and June 2021. A slightly different set of FOIs from Liberty Investigates received a different number from the Home Office: 95 in the period to August 2021. Alarmingly, 69 of those deaths—about three quarters—were in the period from 2020, so there has been a significant increase. By August this year, nearly as many people had died in the asylum system as in the whole of last year.
The first issue is why it is only through the work of Da’aro Youth Project, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates that we know this. Surely the Home Office should be reporting regularly on the deaths of those in its system. Can lessons be learned from these deaths, what could be done to prevent further deaths, and do the deaths have implications for broader policy? For example, there has been a significant increase in deaths over the past couple of years, suggesting that moving to institutional accommodation is a dangerous policy, but are there other reasons? What about new policies, including those in this Bill? What impact might they have on deaths in the asylum and immigration system? We cannot do very much of that analysis because it does not seem that the Home Office gathers information never mind publishes it. Which other Government Department would get away with it if deaths of those in its care and caught up in its processes were not being thoroughly investigated and responded to? It should be absolutely no different here.
The second issue is: what happens in response to every individual death? I am not even sure whether there is in existence a proper Home Office policy on this. Is any effort made to find and contact family members, or even to return the body to the family? What is done to support friends and family here in the UK, particularly those who are in the asylum system or local authority care?
Since Windrush, we have been told repeatedly that the Home Office is undergoing a culture change to see “the face behind the case”. I suggest that a vital starting place could be taking much greater interest in those who have lost their life while within the Home Office’s own asylum and immigration systems and being transparent and accountable about what has happened. The new clause simply asks for what really should have been happening for years. It is a simple matter of human decency and proper accountability.
I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. I note his concerns around transparency and accountability in relation to deaths of people subject to immigration powers. I can assure him that transparency and accountability remain a key priority for the Department. We currently publish data every year on the number of deaths of people under our care in immigration detention. I recognise the importance of transparency in these circumstances to ensure that there is accountability and that we can develop effective policies and processes to prevent such instances from occurring in future. One death of a person in our care in one death too many. We must do everything in our power to ensure that these do not occur. Thankfully, deaths in detention are rare. There were no deaths in detention in 2020 and just one in 2019, where the individual died of natural causes.
We regularly review the statistics that we publish as a Department and, where it is clearly in the public interest to do so, it is our duty to consider the feasibility of publishing new statistics. We must weigh that up against other considerations. While we have a duty of care to all of those in our remit, there are many people in the asylum and immigration system who are either not required to, or choose not to, maintain regular contact with us. Some may even leave the UK without informing us while they have an open immigration claim. That means that there may be instances where we are not informed of the person’s death or we do not have all the relevant facts.
Additionally, it can take months and even years for inquests to reach conclusions. It is important that we know the facts before we publish the information. This highlights the kind of practical and deliverability challenges that we face and which affect the scope and accuracy of any information in this space. However, I acknowledge the importance of transparency. We regularly review the information that is published by the Department on the context of transparency, but also in line with the changes that the Bill will bring about. I note the interest of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in this particular area and will ensure that it is considered in line with the wider and ongoing review of statistics published by the Department. I trust that that addresses his concerns and I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.
I appreciate the Minister’s answer and the sentiments that he expresses. I am concerned that what he says does not always necessarily reflect exactly how things are operating on the ground. On the gathering and publishing of information, that is something that we will watch very closely. What he has not done is set out anything in relation to how the Home Office responds and whether there is a policy in relation to individual deaths—for example, those issues around returning the body, trying to approach family and friends, and the duty of care that we have to those individuals as well. That is something I will need to return to and raise with him again. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 14
Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers
‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 38, insert—
“38A Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers
(1) A charge under section 38 may not be imposed on persons who have leave to enter, or to remain in, the United Kingdom through a visa to work voluntarily for a period of no more than 12 months, or for such period as may be prescribed by regulations, for a registered UK charity advancing the charity’s primary purpose.
(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section must not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.’ . —(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would ensure that international volunteers, including those working in health and social care, will be exempt from paying the immigration health surcharge.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move that the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would introduce an immigration health surcharge exemption for international volunteers. On this occasion, I am particularly indebted to Camphill Scotland, which does fantastic work to support around 600 people with learning disabilities and other support needs, ranging from children to older people. It has built a formidable alliance of almost 50 organisations across the UK that support this new clause, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, the Wales Council for Voluntary Action and many, many more which, unfortunately, I do not have time to mention. All members of the Committee will have received briefings and representations directly on this issue, and I urge them to consider it carefully.
My party objects to the immigration health surcharge altogether, but that debate is for another day. What we do welcome, as do the organisations behind this new clause, is the Government’s decision to exempt health and social care workers from other countries from paying it. The new clause seeks to ensure that those who want to come to work as volunteers in the charitable sector, including in health and social care, are also exempt. We believe that charging this surcharge to volunteers working in health and social care in charitable settings is unfair, inequitable and counterproductive. Volunteers from the EU and beyond make a significant contribution to the work of charities across the UK; Camphill Scotland currently has about 215 international volunteers, helping it to support people with learning disabilities and other support needs.
These young people have chosen to stay in the UK to provide social care to UK citizens during a national health emergency, displaying considerable dedication to and compassion for the people they support. It would be an injustice if the immigration health surcharge exemption was not extended to international volunteers working in the charitable sector. It is all the more essential that this change is made post Brexit, with volunteers from the EU and Switzerland now being caught by visa fees and other expenses. If we cannot continue to attract volunteers, the people who will suffer will be those who benefit from their care, including those with learning disabilities and support needs in the care of Camphill Scotland. The logic of the Government’s immigration health surcharge is that everyone should contribute but, just like the health and social care workforce, the volunteers are already doing just that, so surely the same logic applies. Given that such volunteers cannot have a salary here and will receive a subsistence allowance at most, there is even more reason to exempt them altogether. They are already facing considerable costs to take up these posts. It cannot be right that we also charge them a surcharge to support the very system that they are currently voluntarily supporting. I therefore ask the Minister to consider the representations made by the almost 50 organisations that have contacted him, to consider meeting them and to look carefully at these proposals.
The Government recognise the important contribution that international volunteers make to our communities, and are committed to attracting people from overseas who wish to gain experience of our voluntary sector. The temporary work-charity worker visa is available to those who wish to undertake unpaid voluntary fieldwork for up to 12 months, where the work contributes directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor’s charitable purpose. The route offers volunteers the chance to experience life in the UK while making a valuable contribution to the aims of their chosen charity. At the same time, the involvement and contribution of these individuals has benefits for the UK charity sector and the wider community, and the UK Government welcome this involvement.
This is not an economic route and it should not be used to fill gaps in the labour market. Volunteers using the charity worker visa must not receive any payment beyond being reimbursed for expenses incurred during their duties. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect costs to be considered and planned for before they apply for a visa. As this is a temporary work category, the cost of a visa is already significantly less than any other work and study routes, at a rate of £244, and sponsors pay a lower licence fee, which reflects their own charity status. The immigration health charge, which applies to this route, ensures that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a direct contribution to the comprehensive range of NHS services available to them during their stay. Income from the charge is shared between the health administrations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, using the formula devised by Lord Barnett. The charge is an essential part of income for the NHS and has raised almost £2 billion in much-needed income since it was introduced in 2015.
Those who make an application to come to the UK for six months or less do not pay the charge, and we know that a sizeable number of volunteers come for less than the 12 months the route allows. If they opt to stay longer than six months, however, it is right that they pay the charge, as is consistent with others who base themselves in the UK for extended periods. I understand that there are concerns about the financial impact of the charge on volunteer workers, alongside visa fees and other payments that a person may make when they choose to come to the UK. However, the Government are clear that the charge is great value, considering the wide range of NHS services, free at the point of use, for charge payers. From the moment they arrive in the UK, charge payers can use the NHS in broadly the same manner as a permanent resident, without having made any prior tax or national insurance contributions. They may access health services as often as they need, including treatment for pre-existing health conditions, and do not need to worry about unexpected health charges or obtaining appropriate health insurance.
The Minister knows that I do not support the idea of an additional surcharge but, even if we accept his logic, the Government have exempted health and social care workers from the surcharge because they contribute to the healthcare system. Should that same logic not apply even more so to volunteers who are working in the health and social care system?
In relation to the approach taken for health and social workers, the view widely felt across the House, which was subsequently reflected in policy, was that, given the enormous contribution made by those working directly in this sector during the pandemic, it was appropriate to try and put in place a form of recognition of that work, as well as other measures we have talked about, for example the pay rises that have quite rightly been afforded to NHS workers. It was seen as one means of recognising the enormous contribution that some of those who had come from overseas to work in our health and social care settings had made and rewarding them for that. There were particular circumstances that meant that it was felt that that was appropriate.
Charge payers pay only those charges a UK resident would pay, such as prescription charges in England. They may, however, be charged for assisted conception services in England, should they wish to use them. We welcome talented individuals to the UK and are immensely grateful to them for the important contributions they make, but if a person chooses to come to the UK as a worker, student, family member or volunteer, it is fair and reasonable to expect them to contribute to the high-quality NHS services available to them.
It is vital, particularly given the challenges posed by the pandemic, for the NHS to continue to be properly funded. The immigration health charge directly benefits the NHS and plays an important role in supporting its long-term sustainability. The Government are confident that the charity worker visa provides an attractive offer to voluntary workers. Individuals on some other routes can also volunteer their time to help others, and, depending on the route, they either pay the immigration health charge or may be charged by the NHS for their healthcare.
The youth mobility scheme, for example, is subject to the charge. Those on this route are free to take up work in any sector, paid or unpaid. The standard visitor visa allows people to volunteer for up to 30 days with a registered charity. The visit rules allow visitors to stay for a maximum of six months, which means that they are not subject to the immigration health charge but may instead be charged for NHS care, in line with the rules set by the relevant, devolved health administration.
The Government believe that it is right for the health charge to apply to the charity worker visa. Many nations expect newly arrived individuals to contribute, in some form, to the cost of healthcare. It is right we do the same. For the reasons I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the new clause, but I take on board the passion with which he made his case in relation to this issue and the various representations he referred to that have been made to me as Minister with responsibility for this Bill. I will certainly ensure that they are shared with the Minister with responsibility for this area of policy in the Department as part of their consideration of these matters.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and those assurances. He is quite right about the reasons for the recognition that was given to health and social care staff. We are just calling for the same recognition for volunteers as well. I would be interested to know more. I get the impression that this would be a tiny hit for the Treasury, but it could have real benefit for charities. Before we think about that and make the case again before we reach Report stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Duty regarding rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship
“(1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship among persons possessing these rights.
(2) In fulfilment of that duty, the Secretary of State—
(a) must take all reasonable steps to ensure that all persons with rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship are able to exercise those rights;
(b) must make arrangements, including with local authorities, to ensure that all children in a local authority area are aware of their rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship and of the means by which to exercise those rights;
(c) must, when considering any application for confirmation or registration of British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship, have regard to information held by or available to the Secretary of State that would demonstrate the applicant to be a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen or entitled to that citizenship; and
(d) shall have, and where reasonably necessary to ensure that all persons are able to exercise those rights shall exercise, the power to waive any requirement to attend a ceremony or in connection with biometric information.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“rights to British citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981;
“rights to British overseas territories citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British overseas territories citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981; and
“to exercise those rights” means to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen on the making of an application under the British Nationality Act 1981 or to obtain documentation from the Secretary of State confirming British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship (including by receipt of a passport) on the making of an application to the Secretary of State.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new Clause would require the Government to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would place on the Government an obligation and a duty to undertake promotion of British citizenship rights and British overseas territories citizenship rights.
If there is one thing that members of the Committee can all agree on, it is that nationality law is complicated, and British nationality law is particularly complicated. As I have said, nationality law is also absolutely fundamental to people’s identity, and their ability to fulfil their potential and to exercise so many other rights. That is why it is enshrined in the UN convention itself. It is much superior to any form of immigration leave, which is no form of substitute for holding nationality. The very need for the Bill indicates, however, that lots of people miss out on their entitlements. That is terrible for them as individuals, and it is terrible for the country as a whole—bad for social cohesion—if people are missing out on rights of citizenship that they could have and that are set out in law.
An example is looked-after children. During the registration process for the EU settlement scheme, it was clear that a number of local authorities might have been signing children up for EU settled status when in actual fact they were probably entitled to register as British citizens. The new clause therefore simply calls for the Government to take a more proactive approach and to work with organisations such as local authorities and others to ensure that as many people as possible are aware of and know about their right to register or to access citizenship in other ways, so empowering them to do so.
One welcome thing about the EU settlement scheme was that the Home Office caseworkers did not say, “This or that is missing, so I am going to refuse the application.” There was a concerted attempt to work with people to ensure that all the necessary evidence was found. A lot of the time, the Government took it on themselves—by liaising between Departments—to track down the necessary evidence to allow that person to achieve the status to which they were entitled. We call for the same approach on the more fundamental right to nationality.
That is the reasoning behind the new clause. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their new clause. I understand their thinking behind it: people who are entitled to citizenship should be able to find the information that they need and that the process should be simple and straightforward. That is a sentiment I would echo.
The measures the new clause proposes represent best practice, much of which already exists in the nationality and passport processes. For example, both UK Visas and Immigration and Her Majesty’s Passport Office publish information and guidance on gov.uk, and use information that is already available on their systems when processing applications. As part of considering Windrush applications in particular, UKVI caseworkers have demonstrated a proactive approach, helping people to locate the information needed and consulting internal sources.
The existing legislation already contains discretion to excuse or exempt a person from attending a citizenship ceremony or to enrol their biometrics. The Home Secretary can disapply the requirement to attend a ceremony in the special circumstances of a case and, if it would be too difficult for an applicant to enrol their biometrics in the form of a facial image and fingerprints, an authorised person such as an official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State can defer or waive the requirement to enrol some or all of the biometrics. I am happy to listen to the thoughts of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about the areas where we could do more.
I do not think that we can accept the new clause, however. It would impose a statutory requirement that I am not sure is measurable. For example, while we could take steps to ensure that local authorities have information about citizenship and are encouraged to pass on that information to children in their area, I do not see that we could fulfil a statutory requirement to ensure an awareness for every child—that would be outside our control.
Similarly, the new clause is not specific about the steps that the Home Secretary would be expected to take—the lengths she would be expected to go to, for example, to obtain “available” information when considering an application, without being in breach of such a statutory duty. I take on board the sentiment of what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve, but I ask him to withdraw his new clause.
I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and for his constructive approach to the issue. Perhaps we may continue the conversation in the weeks and months ahead. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 23
Safe and legal routes
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act and annually thereafter, publish a report on—
(a) all current safe and legal asylum routes to the United Kingdom,
(b) the eligibility criteria for legal entry into the United Kingdom, and
(c) details of the application process.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report on its resettlement target of refugees per year, and report on this every year.”— (Paul Blomfield.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK each year, alongside their eligibility criteria and application process. It would also commit the UK and Secretary of State to publishing its resettlement targets, and reporting on this annually.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The hon. Member endorses my comments, I am pleased to hear.
If the Government are serious about their words, they need to be honest about where our ambition lies in this area and how we will provide sanctuary for those who need it. As I say, that leadership and transparency on resettlement targets would not only allow safe and legal routes to ensure that those in great need can come to the UK for protection; it would also, taken alongside the discussion we had earlier about more equitable arrangements for distribution, inform local councils, our healthcare system, schools and social services how they can plan effectively to receive and welcome and integrate into our country those seeking refuge. I hope that the Government will accept the new clause.
I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central for tabling new clause 23, which would require the Government to publish an annual summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK, including eligibility criteria and application process, and to report on their resettlement targets for each year. The UK has a long history of supporting refugees in need of protection and we are a global leader in resettlement.
I am curious to know how the Minister sustains that line about the UK’s being a global leader when all the statistics published by the Home Office and others demonstrate that we are not—we are a laggard.
I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman and I simply do not concur on this point. The simple truth is that this country is generous in the opportunities that it provides for people seeking sanctuary, and that will continue to be the case. We have had many debates on that point in this Committee, and I personally believe that that is beyond any doubt whatever.
Our resettlement schemes have provided safe and legal routes for tens of thousands of people to start new lives in the UK. Overall, since 2015, we have resettled more than 25,000 refugees direct from regions of conflict and instability, more than any EU member state. We can be proud as a country of our ambitious commitments and achievements.
On 25 February 2021, we completed our commitment to resettle 20,000 refugees under the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme. That achievement was made possible because of the outstanding commitment of local authorities, the devolved Administrations, non-governmental organisations, our international partners, community and faith groups, and individual members of the public.
The UK continues to welcome refugees through the global UK resettlement scheme, as well as through the community sponsorship and mandate resettlement schemes. That commitment, alongside a fair and firm asylum system, will ensure that we continue to offer safe and legal routes to the UK for vulnerable refugees in need of protection.
Through the new plan for immigration, we have been clear that this Government will continue to provide safe refuge to those in need, ensuring that our resettlement schemes are accessible, fair and responsive to international crises. This has been evident with the Home Office being at the heart of the UK’s response to the Afghanistan crisis, including supporting, under intense pressure, the biggest humanitarian airlift in the history of this country.
On 18 August, the Prime Minister announced a new and bespoke resettlement scheme to relocate 5,000 people at risk in its first year, rising to up to 20,000 over the long term—one of the most generous schemes in our history. Ultimately, the number of refugees that we resettle every year depends on a variety of factors, including local authorities’ capacity for supporting refugees, the extent to which the community sponsorship approach continues to thrive, and funding. We work closely with our partners to assess the capacity for resettlement and will continue to welcome those in need of protection in the years to come. Committing to an annual public target would remove the flexibility that this approach provides.
Additionally, we have announced plans for a pilot to support access to work visas for highly-skilled displaced people that will run in addition to existing safe and legal routes. Furthermore, the Government also provide a safe and legal route to bring families together through the family reunion policy, which allows a partner and children aged under 18 of those granted protection in the UK to join them here, if they formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country, and can demonstrate a genuine and subsisting relationship.
Does the Minister agree that in many cases under the Dublin regulation, children were placed with quite distant relatives here in the UK who they had never met, when their families and parents were in the country from whence they had fled because it was they who had paid the people traffickers to get the children to the UK?
As I have said, it is very important that those established relationships exist. As we have debated on many occasions in the course of this Committee, we do not want anybody to place themselves in the hands of evil people smugglers and criminal gangs. We should all be very concerned about that particular issue, as I know colleagues on the Government Benches are.
It is welcome for the Minister to reference the importance of family reunion visas, as they are clearly a vital safe route. He will be aware that more than 90% of visas are given to women and children. Will he, then, explain why in clause 10 the Government are taking away reunion rights from the majority of refugees?
On the issue of safe routes for children, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in Europe with family members in the UK are able to apply to join eligible sponsors, such as those with refugee leave or British settled status. The immigration rules make provision for children to be reunited with their parents. Paragraphs 319 and 297 of the immigration rules are extremely flexible and allow for children to apply to join adult family members if requirements are met, and if there are serious or compelling reasons that make the exclusion of a child undesirable and suitable arrangements are needed for a child’s care. Again, these matters are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances at play.
Let me finish the point that I was making before I took the interventions. Under the family reunion policy, we have granted reunion to over 37,000 partners and children of those granted protection in the UK since 2015; that is more than 5,000 a year. Our policy makes it clear that there is discretion to grant visas outside the immigration rules that caters for extended family members in exceptional and compassionate circumstances—for example, young adult sons or daughters who are dependent on family here and who are living in dangerous situations. Refugees can also sponsor adult dependent relatives living overseas to join them, when, due to age, illness or disability, that person requires long-term personal care that can only be provided by relatives in the UK.
I suggest the Minister goes away and does some investigations into just how frequently these types of application are granted. My recollection is that some of the thresholds are so high—exceptional and compassionate circumstances, and so on—that in reality, it is almost impossible for some of these applications to be successful. I do not think it is an answer at all to what the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is advocating.
I hear the hon Member’s point, which again I will take away and reflect on with colleagues in the Department.
In the light of the Government’s track record and commitment to safe and legal routes, I hope that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central agrees that the new clause is unnecessary. In particular, I highlight that information on our safe and legal routes is readily available on gov.uk including, where relevant, details about eligibility and the referral or application process.
The Home Office is committed to publishing data on arrivals in an orderly and transparent way as part of the regular quarterly immigration statistics, in line with the code of practice for official statistics. We already publish statistics on the numbers arriving through safe and legal routes. A statutory requirement to publish targets would therefore be unnecessary and unhelpfully limit the flexibility of future Governments in responding to emerging situations.
For all those reasons, I invite the hon. Member not to move the new clause. Given what has been said on family reunion, it might be helpful if I write to the Committee with more information to address some of those points, having reflected on Hansard.
I would certainly welcome a letter on family reunion. However, I must disappoint the Minister, because he has failed to convince me about the balance in the Bill, which is central, on the Government’s commitment to develop safe and legal routes as an alternative to dangerous channel crossings. I must therefore press the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark for tabling his new clause. In simple terms, the longer successful asylum-seekers remain in asylum accommodation, the fewer the beds available for those newly entering the asylum support system, including those temporarily accommodated in hotels at great expense to the taxpayer. We are aware of reports that some refugees do not access universal credit or other benefits, or adequate housing, within 28 days. The reasons for that are complex, but the available evidence to date does not show that the problem can be solved by increasing the 28-day “move on” period.
I also reassure the hon. Member that we have implemented several initiatives with the aim of securing better outcomes for refugees in the 28 day “move on” period. These include ensuring that the 28-day period does not start until refugees have been issued with a biometric residence permit—the document that they need to prove that they can take employment and apply for universal credit—and that the national insurance number is printed on the permit, which speeds up the process of deciding a universal credit application.
We also fund Migrant Help, a voluntary sector organisation, to contact the refugees at the start of the 28-day period and offer practical “move on” assistance, including advice on how to claim universal credit; advice on the importance of an early asylum claim and the other types of support that might be available; booking an early appointment at their nearest Department for Work and Pensions jobcentre, if needed; and advice on how to contact their local authority for assistance in finding alternative housing.
We evaluated the success of the scheme that books an early appointment with the local jobcentre for those who want one. That showed that all applicants for universal credit in the survey received their first payment on time—that is, 35 days from the date of their application—and that those who asked for an earlier advance payment received one.
Asylum accommodation providers are also under a contractual duty to notify the local authority of the potential need to provide housing where a person in their accommodation is granted refugee status. Refugees can also apply for integration loans, which can be used, for example, to pay a rent deposit or for essential domestic items, work equipment or training.
The UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, and I reassure the hon. Member that the Government are committed to ensuring that all refugees can take positive steps towards integration and realising their potential. Although we keep the “move on” period under review, we must also consider the strong countervailing factors that make increasing that period difficult. I therefore invite him not to press his new clause.
I am almost sorry, but the Minister’s answer ignores the reality and the situation in which people find themselves. He does not have an answer about the anomaly in housing or social security policy, and he has not even tried to explain why the Government are ignoring the potential savings to the public purse. I will press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 25 proposes a humanitarian visa route, and new clause 26 grants a right of appeal—something that made Tory MPs very excitable yesterday. I do not intend to push the new clauses to a vote; they are aimed at opening dialogue, and they link back to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central.
If the Government are serious about finding solutions to people smuggling and trafficking, they should consider providing practical routes for people seeking sanctuary, in the way that they do for Syria and Afghanistan, and undertake to review humanitarian routes and how they could work. I thank Bella Sankey of Detention Action for her work on these clauses. There are some fantastic people working on these issues.
The purpose of the new clauses is to offer the Government a constructive solution for safe routes. They would have the benefit of cutting smuggling and potentially saving money in the long term. If they are serious about safe and regular routes, the humanitarian visa option would create them. The new clauses also make use of the border anomaly in Calais.
The Government should commit to exploring safe routes if they are serious about preventing dangerous options. The example from Detention Action is of Dylan Footohi, an Iranian refugee who says,
“I came to the UK seeking asylum. I came irregularly simply because there was no legal way for me to do so. My journey to the UK took two years; two years of exploitation and abuse and life-threatening experiences.”
He felt that that way was the only option. If there had been an alternative, he would have taken it. These new clauses offer that alternative.
The new clauses provide for certain persons in France to be granted entry clearance to allow them to claim asylum in the UK. The new clauses set out who qualifies: they have to be in France; they cannot be an EU national or a national of Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway or Switzerland; they have to intend to make a protection claim in the UK; their protection claim, if made in the UK, must have a realistic prospect of success; and there must be good reasons why their protection claim should be considered in the UK.
The first three criteria are self-explanatory. The fourth criterion—the realistic prospect of success—is a well-established test in UK immigration law. It is used in paragraph 353 of the immigration rules, which deals with a person who has been refused asylum and has later made further submissions on asylum grounds and says that they have a fresh right of appeal against the refusal of their further submissions. Home Office officials, courts and tribunals are well used to applying that test. The leading case on the realistic prospect of success is WM (DRC) [2006] EWCA Civ 1495.
To give an example of how the criterion could work in practice, applicant X applies for a France asylum visa. She is from country A and claims that she is wanted by the authorities of country A for a political offence. The applicable country guidance accepts that if a person is detained for political offence in country A, they are likely to be subjected to serious ill-treatment, so if applicant X’s claim is found to be credible she would be entitled to asylum. The appropriate decision maker believes that applicant X is credible. Applicant X’s claim is likely to have realistic prospect of success, so the criterion is likely to be satisfied. I will keep examples brief in the interest of time.
The fifth criterion is about good reasons and is intentionally open-ended. It allows the appropriate decision maker to make a fact-sensitive evaluation of the merits of the case. In considering whether there are good reasons, the decision maker will take into account the relative strength of their family or other ties to the UK and France; their mental and physical health and any particular vulnerabilities; and any other matter the decision maker thinks is relevant.
To give a brief example, applicant X applies for a France asylum visa. She is street homeless in France due to a shortage of available accommodation. She has PTSD and depression as a result of being tortured and has not been able to seek treatment due to her insecure living situation. She has no family and friends in France but has a brother in the UK with whom she has a close relationship and who could support her if she were here. She speaks good English but does not speak French. There are likely to be good reasons for her claim to be dealt with in the UK, so the criterion is likely to be satisfied. That is an illustrative example, but decision makers would make up their minds on the facts of each individual case, having regard to all relevant factors.
The procedure for making the application would be to the appropriate decision maker—an entry clearance officer authorised by the Secretary of State—and they would be required to waive biometric and other procedural requirements if satisfied that the applicant could not be reasonably expected to comply. There would be no fee for the application.
The successful applicant would be given leave to enter for a period of not less than six months, prescribed by the Secretary of State, who would also prescribe the conditions of such leave. On arrival, they would be deemed to have made a protection claim in the UK and go through the normal asylum process. They would have access to legal aid and there would be a right of appeal in the first-tier tribunal against the refusal of a France asylum visa application. That would be a full merits appeal and would not be limited to a review of the original decision-maker’s decision. The tribunal will decide for itself whether the criteria are met.
That appeal process utilises the existing machinery of immigration appeals under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There would be onward rights of appeal to the upper tribunal and Court of Appeal under sections 11 and 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, as with other types of immigration appeal.
I ask that the Government consider those practical solutions that could take the power away from people smugglers and traffickers, who the Minister routinely calls evil, with which I agree, while honouring our commitment to the refugee convention. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for tabling the new clauses; it is fair to say that during the course of the Committee we have had many debates around many aspects of what they refer to. The Government’s position is clear: we are trying to stop dangerous journeys wholesale—in relation not just to the channel, but to the Mediterranean. We believe in upholding the long-standing principle that people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. Of course, people should also avail themselves of our safe and legal routes. With that, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I thank the British Red Cross for its help with the new clause, which is very simple and is line with what the Government have said they are committed to elsewhere. It would simply entail publishing a strategy to cover Home Office accommodation, and it aims to ensure an equitable distribution of people across England, Scotland and Wales, that financial support is provided to local authorities in areas where people are seeking asylum in Home Office accommodation, and other elements.
Although the Committee has heard that the Government’s intention is to move towards the use of reception centres, it is fundamentally unclear where accommodation is aimed to be and what the Government consider accommodation to be. I intend to table an amendment on the specific issue of what is and is not an accommodation centre on Report, especially with some of the sites being used as contingency accommodation, including a hostel in my constituency that Public Health England suggested should not be used for accommodation for the Everyone In scheme. The Home Office chose to override that advice and use it for refugee and asylum seeker accommodation. The Government now seem to think that dispersal is broken, and they want to open a parallel system of accommodation, but they want to use what they refer to as “reception centres”. I hope the Minister can provide some clarity on that and on whether the Government feel that they need to use the 2002 Act. Perhaps the Minister can clear up this messy situation.
Napier barracks has become synonymous with this issue. Its use has just been extended for five years, with the Home Office using a special development order to do so. In his letter to the Committee on 21 October, the Minister said Napier is not classified as an accommodation centre. I think that is a mistake, and I hope the Minister can explain why the Home Office is using a special development order, when the High Court has ruled that the standards and operational systems at Napier barracks are unlawful.
As things stand, we do not know what is and is not accommodation according to the Home Office. We have reports and court rulings on unlawful and unfit accommodation. We do not know where reception centres will be or the types of accommodation that the Government intend to provide while seeking to move away from dispersal in communities where service providers have argued that it is better for integration. That is why a strategy is required, and I hope the Government accept that they need to move towards a more co-ordinated approach.
On dispersal, the British Red Cross has said there is currently nothing in legislation that says people supported under sections 95, 98 and 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 have to be accommodated in any particular way. Dispersal is not underpinned in the current legislation, so a strategy would help clarify the situation for the Home Office and the rest of us.
Like hotels, Napier and Penally barracks were seen as contingency accommodation—temporary measures because of a lack of suitable dispersal. The Government need to get the dispersal system in place. We do not know what the Government reception centres would look like or where they would be located, nor have the Government said whether people would be accommodated for the entirety of their asylum process. It is proposed that the centres would “provide basic accommodation” and
“allow for decisions and any appeals following substantive rejection of an asylum claim to be processed”,
but we are conscious of the delays in the asylum system, and it is possible that people could be living in the centres for several months, potentially in remote locations. I hope that the Minister will outline whether children are intended to be placed in those centres.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to my comments on earlier clauses, when I confirmed that children would not be placed in those accommodation centres.
That is helpful, but it has been brought to my attention this week that a 16-year-old is in a Home Office accommodation hotel in my constituency. I do not know whether that is an age-disputed case for the Home Office, but there is clearly a mismatch between the Government’s intent and what is actually happening.
Rewan has been living with his two sons, aged 11 and 18, in a hotel room for 10 months. His sons cannot study, and although he is desperate to get work, their living circumstances do not allow for that. Umar was told in October 2020 when he moved into a hostel with his wife and four children—aged 7, 9, 13, and 14—that they would be there for a matter of weeks. They are still there. That is what is happening on the ground and why a strategy on dispersal is required. Dispersal is better in the local community: through work with the local community, and by using dispersal accommodation, people are better able to make connections and start feeling part of a city. As Asylum Matters states:
“Providing support for people seeking asylum, including finding suitable accommodation, should be carried out in partnership with local government and local community groups.”
That is not what we are seeing.
For the almost 700 recent arrivals in Southwark, there was absolutely no in-advance co-ordination with the council; the Home Office alerted the council only after opening accommodation. Bearing in mind that accommodation would have been commissioned and procured in advance, there was ample opportunity for discussions to ensure that support was in place, but the Home Office failed to engage. In fact, when I asked the Home Office what resources the council would receive to support the hundreds of new people, it wrote back saying, “We have given some money to the clinical commissioning group.” That is not part of the council.
I had a really useful discussion with the Local Government Association, which said that it would welcome a dispersal strategy and that it wants people to be able to work. There are workplaces that are desperate to take people on, but they cannot get them in. A proper dispersal strategy should look at employment levels in certain areas. Moving people into areas with high levels of employment, rather than into the cheapest accommodation across the country, would actually benefit the workforce and the economy. That strategy would be adopted by any sensible Government, so I do not hold high hopes.
I will give some background stats: in December 2020, around one in five people in Home Office accommodation were living in a hostel, B&B or hotel—triple the December 2019 figures. In Southwark, there were 1,022 people in dispersal accommodation in June, but, as I have just said, hundreds have arrived since then. The Red Cross suggested:
“The Home Office should, as a matter of urgency, address the supply of suitable asylum accommodation, and work with local authorities, devolved governments”,
and it pointed out an increase in the demand for asylum accommodation and a rise in the number of people living in inappropriate places. The increase in decision-making delays since 2018—prior to the pandemic—has resulted in people staying in asylum accommodation for far longer, which is something the Minister has just said he is determined to tackle, so a strategy should be welcome. The situation is unsustainable and only a strategy to build out of it will address the problem.
In April, we had a Backbench Business debate on accommodation, focusing on the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee reports into asylum accommodation. The NAO reported last July that the system the Government have adopted caused costs to escalate by 28%, and saw a 96% increase in short-term and more expensive accommodation. In November 2020, the Public Accounts Committee warned of a system in crisis, and it recommended:
“The Home Office should, within three months, set out a clear plan for how it will quickly and safely reduce the use of hotels and ensure that asylum seekers’ accommodation meets their individual needs.”
It would be great to hear from the Minister on how that clear plan is being developed. The new clause would help to address the problem that the Government have created.
The time involved comes with escalating costs to the Home Office and the taxpayer. Will the Minister update us on average times and what he is doing to tackle them? I have two examples from Bermondsey and Old Southwark. I have raised the cases of an Eritrean woman and a Mongolian man who have both been seeking asylum since 2017. Not only do they not have decisions four years later, but the Home Office cannot even give a timeframe for when their cases will be concluded. Perhaps the Minister can tell us today when and how the Home Office will cut the horrific backlog that his Government have created.
At the end of September 2020, there were 3,621 Sudanese, Syrian and Eritrean nationals who had been waiting longer than six months for a decision on their application. The grant rate across those countries was 94% in the most recent stats. That is an incredibly expensive waste. A strategy, as outlined in the new clause, would help address the underlying costs and focus Ministers’ and civil servants’ minds on cutting delays and lowering the cost to the public purse.
Earlier this year the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) asked the Home Office what the Government were doing to engage with local authorities to understand why offers for dispersal were not matching demand, and to ensure that there was true collaboration. He received a letter in response from the Home Office that stated:
“We remain fully committed to working towards the agreed change plan once we have been able to move people out of hotels and into more appropriate Dispersal Accommodation.”
I hope the new clause helps the Minister with that aim. I commend it to the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I want to pick up on a few of the points that he raised. In relation to Napier, as I have said previously, we have seen several improvements recently: offering all residents covid vaccinations and personal cleaning kits, the introduction of NGOs on the site to provide assistance and advice, free travel to medical appointments and dentistry services or for meetings, sports and recreation. Those significant improvements have been made since the court judgment was handed down.
Hotels are provided as a contingency because of the lack of availability of other accommodation, but it is important to make the point that those are not accommodation centres. On the unaccompanied asylum-seeking children situation, it is difficult to comment on individual cases and a hotel in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency—I do not have the specifics to hand—but I can say that, broadly, the UASC, but not other children, would be accommodated in a hotel. That is my understanding of the situation.
On a broader point, we had a significant debate on new clause 2 and dispersal accommodation, where I set out the steps that the Government are taking to try to address that. That is being considered, and I refer Members to what I said before.
The Minister says that things have improved since the court judgment and that, for example, NGOs now have more routine access. The hostel accommodation in Bermondsey and Old Southwark was open for three months before the first visit of Migrant Help on site. I am just not convinced that the Minister has given an accurate portrayal of the current picture and the real situation in a real building affecting hundreds of people in my own constituency.
Before I start, I draw hon. Members’ attention to the Red Box article written by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, and published in The Times today. Entitled “Rushed borders bill will fail victims of modern slavery”, it is damning. Against that backdrop, I will have another go at mitigating the worst elements of part 4 with new clause 43. I start by paying tribute to ECPAT UK and the Children’s Society, which have shared their insight and invaluable expertise in helping us to shape these new clauses.
New clause 43 would amend section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, to ensure that an independent guardian was provided for all child victims of trafficking and separated children. For clarity, I point out that when I refer to “separated children”, I am referring to migrant children who are unaccompanied. The independent guardian would be a central part of a child’s life, acting as a connection to all the support services that they required, having the ability to instruct solicitors on their behalf and representing their best interests throughout. These guardians would be experts on trafficking and modern slavery, whose purpose was to safeguard and improve the wellbeing of trafficked children, as well as ensuring that statutory services could function more effectively, securing a route both to recovery and to prosecution of those ultimately responsible for their abuse. As specified in the functions laid out in the new clause, an independent guardian would ensure that the child was informed of any relevant legal proceedings, clearly communicate the views of the child and promote the future welfare of the child based on what was in the child’s best interest.
I have cited the numbers previously, but I will remind the Committee. In 2020, 47% of referrals to the national referral mechanism were children, and of the referrals for UK-based exploitation only, 57% were children. It was the case that 51% of the referrals of children were for child criminal exploitation. According to the National Crime Agency, the increase in referrals to the NRM of British children has been driven largely by so-called county lines criminality.
A great deal of the provision in new clause 43 should already be happening and be provided for between international laws, including the UN convention on the rights of the child, the EU trafficking directive of 2011 and the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, as well as domestic provisions. However, the measure has been only partially adopted across the UK. The Children’s Society has supported calls for it to be enshrined in statute, stating that a guardian’s role should be independent from the state, have legal authority and have adequate legal powers to represent the child’s best interests, as well as being respected by an existing regulatory body.
As the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner highlighted in her annual report for 2020-21, despite clear evidence of good practice she remains extremely disappointed that six years on from the Modern Slavery Act 2015 the independent child trafficking guardian service is not yet a national provision.
There has been very much a staggered approach to roll-out, with the service still not in operation across around a third of all local authorities, several years after it was adopted in three early adopter areas in Greater Manchester, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. That shows a real lack of urgency on the Government’s part and we echo the statement by the anti-slavery commissioner that
“access to this specialist support for children should not be a postcode lottery”.
In the year ending June 2021, the UK received 2,756 applications for asylum from unaccompanied children. The majority of unaccompanied children are cared for on a voluntary agreement under section 20 of the Children’s Act 1989, rather than under a section 31 care order, whereby the local authority has full parental responsibility for the child.
Although I pay tribute to the dedicated social workers up and down the country, in reality many social workers will not have received training on the asylum and immigration system, and may lack the skills to aid children with their immigration applications. Therefore, the new clause will provide much needed consistency and security for children who have had some of the worst possible starts in life, supporting them towards recovery and through their relationship with the relevant agencies, in the hope that we can secure child victims a degree of restorative justice, which would be a service for both migrants to the UK and UK nationals.
The report conducted by the Home Office evaluating independent child trafficking guardians supported the argument that they provide a sense of stability and continuity:
“Investing time in trafficked children’s lives by a single trusted, well-informed, reliable adult became a distinct early feature of the ways child trafficking guardians stood out from other professions.”
This is demonstrated by one young person who responded to the evaluation. Speaking about their guardian, they said:
“She is so amazing... I don’t know if they’re all like that, but for me it was different, because I told her things that I haven’t told my social worker and that was beneficial. I think that’s because of her personality...she seems really open, I can talk to her about anything.”
Police offers working to combat exploitation and help young people told me recently that they were becoming aware that the drive to keep young people out of police cells for all the right reasons had led to instances where children were arrested in possession of, say, drugs and cash. Rightly, the police would have taken those items from the children before they were released, pending further inquiries, but before proper consideration of their circumstances could be made.
Officers identified that children and young people were having to go back to serious criminals to inform them that they no longer had their drugs or cash, without any of the risks to them having been identified and without safeguarding support having been wrapped around them. Thankfully, those officers were working through the best practice alternatives, but those are the types of scenarios where guardians would be able to play an invaluable role.
It is notable that the devolved nations have been far more proactive in this area, with Scotland having made greater progress and Northern Ireland introducing a comprehensive independent guardians model, which provides an individualised service for all separated children. If we are to consider the UK a world-leader in combating modern slavery, I ask the Minister to put into primary legislation what should already be happening, as a means of addressing the gaps in provision, which will help us to do what is right for these children as well as assisting the authorities in identifying and apprehending perpetrators of some of the most heinous crimes.
New clause 44 would ensure that the provision of independent child trafficking advocates is subject to an inspectorate regime. As colleagues may be aware, the measure is currently not subject to an inspection framework, which is applied to other services for children under the Education and Inspections Act 2006. We believe than an inspection framework is necessary to ensure that Ofsted can inspect the quality and effectiveness of the service.
In conclusion, I find it hard to believe that any colleagues do not support the aims and objectives of the new clause, which builds upon the commitments in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. As the campaign group Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK has highlighted, those who are eligible under new clause 43 may have had to flee their country due to conflict and may have faced exploited en route to the UK. Others may be British children in the care system, who have been let down by the adults around them. There is a breadth of vulnerability here and we believe that the new clauses better acknowledge and cater to all child victims’ physical and psychological needs. I hope that the Minister shares the ambition behind the new clauses and understands the need for all trafficked and separated children to be recognised and supported within primary legislation.
I thank hon. Members for tabling their new clauses. They have raised important issues about the support available for child victims who have faced the most heinous crimes. Independent child trafficking guardians are an independent source of advice and support for potentially trafficked children, irrespective of nationality, and somebody who can advocate on a child’s behalf. Provision for the independent child trafficking guardian already exists in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, as does the requirement to make regulations.
The Government have developed detailed policy for the provision of this service, which is set out in the interim independent child trafficking guardians guidance, published under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. This guidance is kept under review through consultation with stakeholders. The correct place for the detail regarding the function of the service is in guidance, rather than, as new clause 43 suggests, the legislation itself. That enables the Government to respond flexibly to best practice and victims’ needs. The guidance is clear that acting in the child’s best interests must always be a primary consideration for the service.
New clause 43 would also ensure that an independent child trafficking guardian can continue to provide support to a child until the age of 25, to the extent that their welfare and best interests require such an appointment. Following a recommendation from the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, the Government are currently trialling the provision of support, when appropriate, to individuals beyond the age of 18 in London, West Yorkshire and Warwickshire. An independent evaluation will look at the added value of implementing that change and consider appropriate next steps. The new clause would expand the scope of the independent child trafficking guardian service to all separated children when there are already existing provisions for separated children to receive support and assistance through other means.
I assure the Committee that the Government take their responsibility for the welfare of unaccompanied children extremely seriously. We have comprehensive statutory and policy safeguards in place for caring for and safeguarding unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in the UK, including those who are victims of trafficking. When an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child becomes looked after by a local authority, they are entitled to the same level of support and care from their local authority as all looked-after children. Under these arrangements, a looked-after child must be provided with access to education, healthcare, legal support and accommodation. They will be allocated a social worker who will assess their individual needs and draw up a care plan that sets out how the local authority intends to respond to the full range of those needs. Our record demonstrates the Government’s determination to ensure that unaccompanied children and child victims of modern slavery are appropriately safeguarded and have the support they need.
I am conscious that we need to make progress, but I will take a quick intervention.
I am grateful. I do not dispute that the provision already exists in legislation for independent child trafficking guardians; my dispute is that, as we have heard, they are not available in reality for a third of the country. If the Minister is saying that we do not need a requirement in legislation to do this, how does he plan to ensure that those guardians are available right across the country?
If I may, I will write to the Committee. I have undertaken to write to the Committee with more information in relation to another matter we discussed earlier, and I am very happy to provide more information to the Committee in answer to that question.
Turning to new clause 44, I appreciate that appropriate methods of assessing the effectiveness of independent child trafficking guardians are required. The current independent child trafficking guardian service model is informed by the findings of the evaluation of early adopter sites, published in July 2019, and the evaluation of the regional practice co-ordinator role, published in October 2020. The provision of independent child trafficking guardians in section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides the Secretary of State with a duty to make such arrangements considered reasonable to ensure that specialist independent child trafficking advocates are
“available to represent and support children who there are reasonable grounds to believe may be victims of human trafficking.”
Section 48(6) places a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about independent child trafficking advocates, which must include the circumstances and conditions under which a person may act as an independent child trafficking advocate, arrangements for the approval of the appointment of such advocates, the timing of appointment and the advocates’ functions. As mentioned earlier, the roll-out of the independent child trafficking guardian service is being informed by the findings of the evaluation of early adopter sites. As such, regulations will be brought forward in due course.
Independent child trafficking guardians are now operating in two thirds of all local authorities in England and Wales, as the hon. Lady said. It is important that the provision is able to support those vulnerable children appropriately, and it is precisely for this reason that a staggered approach has been adopted, with built-in evaluations along the way. We will continue to monitor closely the independent child trafficking guardian service to ensure practitioners are acting in the child’s best interests and that resource is being allocated appropriately. We will adjust guidance as needed to ensure that these vulnerable victims are protected and supported to recover from their exploitation. For the reasons I have outlined, I invite the hon. Lady not to press her new clauses.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point and I hope beyond hope that hon. Members will support our new clause.
In December 2018, the then Home Secretary stated that a Home Office review of the policy would be taking place. Subsequent contributions in 2019 from the Prime Minister and Home Office Ministers confirmed that the review would continue under the new Government, but to date no detail has been provided regarding the content or methodology of that review. The Government have appeared divided in their own ranks on the issue. In recent months, senior Cabinet Ministers have expressed disquiet about the Government’s position. Surely, it is therefore time that the Government listen to voices from across the political spectrum on this issue and do the right thing by adopting our clause on lifting the ban on work for people seeking asylum.
I should start by noting that, as hon. Members know, the Government’s current policy does allow asylum seekers to work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months, where the delay was caused through no fault of their own. Those permitted to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list, which is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee.
I should like to set out the rationale for that policy position. The policy is designed to protect the resident labour market by prioritising access to employment for British citizens and others who are lawfully resident, including those granted refugee status, who are given full access to the labour market. That is in line with wider changes we have made through the points-based immigration system. We consider it crucial to distinguish between those who need protection and those seeking to come here to work, who can apply for a work visa under the immigration rules. Our wider immigration policy would be undermined if individuals could bypass the work visa rules by lodging unfounded asylum claims in the UK.
I have been very generous throughout the duration of the Committee, but I am afraid I need to make some progress at this point.
It is also the case that unrestricted access to employment opportunities may act as an incentive for more migrants to choose to come here illegally, rather than claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. While pull factors are complex, we cannot ignore that access to the UK labour market is among the reasons that an unprecedented number of people are taking extremely dangerous journeys by small boat to the UK. I trust that hon. Members would agree with me that the UK cannot have a policy that raises those risks, and that we must do everything in our power to put a stop to those journeys.
Relaxing our asylum seeker right-to-work policy is not the right approach in this respect. Indeed, in an article earlier this month, the French newspaper Le Figaro noted the perspective in France that the “economic attractiveness” of the UK is a reason migrants attempt to cross the channel in small boats. In addition, removing restrictions on work for asylum seekers could increase the number of unfounded claims for asylum, reducing our capacity to take decisions quickly and support genuine refugees.
I would like to take this opportunity to make it clear that I do acknowledge the concerns of hon. Members. The Government are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay to ensure that individuals who need protection are granted asylum as soon as possible and can start to integrate and rebuild their lives. It is important to note that those granted asylum are given immediate and unrestricted access to the labour market.
I absolutely agree with hon. Members that asylum seekers should be allowed to volunteer. That is why we strongly encourage all asylum seekers to consider volunteering, so long as it does not amount to unpaid work. Volunteering provides a valuable contribution to their local community and may help them to integrate into society if they ultimately qualify for protection.
We have been clear that asylum seekers who wish to come to the UK must do so through safe and legal routes. Where reasons for coming to the UK include family or economic considerations, applications should be made via the relevant route: either the new points-based immigration system or the refugee family reunion rules. We absolutely must discourage those risking their lives and coming here illegally.
The Nationality and Borders Bill will deliver the most comprehensive reform in decades to fix the broken asylum and illegal migration system, and our asylum seeker right-to-work policy must uphold that wider approach. There is, of course, a review of the 2018 report currently under way and I reassure hon. Members that the findings of the updated recent report will be built into this. For all those reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax to withdraw the new clause.
I am not convinced by the Minister’s response, so I will be pushing this to a vote. Hopefully, we will be joined by other Members across the Committee.
Question put,
That the clause be read a Second time.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is imperative that we think carefully about the issue. Expanding our family reunion policy as proposed by the new clause would significantly increase the number of people who would qualify to come here and to seek protection. Indeed, the new clause is global in scope, meaning that any asylum seeker in the world with extended family in the UK could qualify to claim asylum. That could easily run to the hundreds of thousands.
To give just one example of how that could have challenging consequences, foreign nationals already illegally present in the UK could potentially be incentivised to claim asylum to circumvent immigration rules in order to bring their family over. We need to ensure that our limited resources are focused on helping refugees who are in the UK to reunite and integrate with immediate pre-flight family. We have a proud record of helping those facing persecution, oppression and tyranny, and we stand by our moral and legal obligations to help innocent civilians fleeing cruelty from around the world, but we cannot help all the people displaced worldwide and who want to come to the UK.
Allowing extended family members to come to the UK for the purpose of claiming protection under new clause 47 might simply create further incentives for more adults and children to be encouraged—even forced—to leave their family and risk hazardous journeys to the UK in order to later sponsor qualifying extended family. That plays into the hands of criminal gangs who exploit vulnerable people and goes against the main intention of the Bill. We must do everything in our power to stop that dangerous trend. The new clause would also result in chain migration, where granting entry to each family member has the potential to bring in even greater numbers of their family members to claim protection under the rules. That is simply not sustainable.
We recognise, however, that families can become fragmented because of the nature of conflict and persecution, as well as the speed and manner in which those seeking protection are often forced to flee their own country. That is why the Government strongly support the principle of family unity. We already have a comprehensive framework for families to be reunited here safely. I will add, because this will be of interest to both Government and Opposition Members, that we are committed to reviewing the family refugee reunion rules, as we set out in the new plan for immigration. At all times, as the Committee would expect, we will be fully compliant with our international obligations.
Given that and the issues raised in Committee, everything will be taken into account when looking at the policy.
First, that was not a fair interpretation of the new clause: it was certainly not advocating for an unlimited number of people to have access to that route. Nevertheless, it is surprising that we are expected to be encouraged about family reunion at a time when this very Bill is proposing to strip the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers and refugees of those family reunion rights. At the end of the day, the issue is one we will have to revisit on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 48
Six month time limit for determining asylum applications
“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations providing for—
(a) a six month time limit for determining applications for asylum; and
(b) an officer of Director level or above to be required to write to the Home Secretary a letter of explanation on a quarterly basis in the event of any failure to meet the six month time limit.
(2) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament any failure to meet the six month time limit.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
There is so much to respond to in that. I question the hon. Gentleman’s facts first of all, but clearly we are talking about the situation as it is now, which has been built up over the past decade, and not as he would like it to be. In any event, I disagree about what this Bill does. It does not solve the problem; it keeps people here for longer.
As I was saying, what is masked by these numbers are the hundreds of people who have waited nearly 10 years or more for a decision on their asylum claims, left in limbo while they wait for an answer. In August, a freedom of information request from The Independent newspaper revealed that there were more than 1,200 asylum seekers in the system who had been waiting more than five years for a decision, with 399 people who had been waiting more than a decade. Separate figures obtained by the Refugee Council through an FOI request earlier this year revealed that the number of applicants waiting for more than a year for an initial decision, not including appeals, increased almost tenfold between 2010 and 2020, from 3,588 to 33,016. More than 250 people had been waiting for five years or more for an initial decision on their case, with dozens of children among them. As of December 2020, 36,725 asylum seekers had been waiting more than a year for a decision.
Those kinds of figures just smack of a broken system. Having tens of thousands of people waiting for more than a year for an initial decision is just totally unacceptable. I am sure that most MPs can think of asylum cases they have been dealing with that have stretched on and on, sometimes for years. I can cite the case of a constituent—I shall call them F—who came to the UK from Afghanistan as a child and applied for asylum in August 2013. It took seven and a half years, and my involvement as his MP, for the matter to be resolved in February this year. It really should not take an MP’s involvement to reach such a conclusion.
The human cost to people’s mental health and the cost to the taxpayer of these endemic delays in the system is high. We know that people in the asylum system become increasingly mentally unwell as the years of uncertainty, trauma and demonisation erode their mental and physical health. The Refugee Council reported earlier this year that this has led to an increase in the numbers of individuals self-harming and reporting suicidal thoughts. The Children’s Society report “Distress Signals” also outlined serious concerns about the damage done to children’s mental health in those conditions— this is damage done at a formative age that will last a lifetime.
Beyond the human cost of these delays is the financial cost. The backlog adds considerably to the overall cost of the asylum process. The Refugee Council has calculated that for every month of delay the additional cost to the Home Office per person is at least £730.41, equating to £8,765 per year. The delays make absolutely no financial sense. Not only that, but on the Home Office’s own figures more people are being employed but they are processing fewer cases. Paying more for less productivity is not acceptable. If this was a business, it would go bust.
A commitment to a six-month target as set out in the new clause would therefore save a huge amount of money to the Treasury and taxpayers, improve the mental health of those caught in the system, and help with integration.
I have been clear throughout Committee proceedings that the Government are committed to overhauling the current asylum system, which is obviously broken and in critical need of reform. The number of non-straightforward cases awaiting a decision has grown rapidly, meaning that in October 2018 it became clear to us that the service standard of six months from the date of claim no longer best served those who used our services. For those reasons, former Ministers agreed that we should move away from the service standard.
Although I cannot accept the new clause, as we consider it too restrictive, Members will have detected from what I have said throughout the proceedings that we want to see the faster processing of cases. I entirely recognise the shadow Minister’s point on the financial costs of delay, and the impact on individuals of delay. That is why I and my ministerial colleagues want cases to be dealt with more speedily. That is, of course, the right objective to be working towards. We are working to reintroduce a service standard that will align with changes brought about by the new plan for immigration. I encourage the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.
I will push the clause to a vote; we are not convinced by the Minister’s response.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I reiterate that, having gone down to Dover to meet the Kent intake unit in Dover docks, having met in the joint control room with deputy director Dave Butler of the clandestine threat command, and having been to Tug Haven and western Jetfoil on a cross-party parliamentary visit, it was fantastic to learn and understand. I share concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate about the use of this money by the French, and I have been quite open in my view that the French are simply not doing enough, but it was great to hear from Dave and others in the control room that what the French are doing inland is quite substantive. Dave was very happy to share the details.
I can only implore the hon. Gentleman, rather than pressing this new clause, to go on down and visit, and have a chat with Dave and the gang down there to hear what is going on in France. They were trying to say to us that the French are operating inland and trying to stop people from coming over to France and travelling through. The local Parisian community, for example, were getting very angry about being a path route towards Calais. That was a fascinating conversation.
That is why the new clause is unnecessary; we saw, after the threat of no payment was made, that suddenly we could not stop being inundated with video footage and photography of what was being done. I thought it was absolutely brilliant. The one thing the French are not doing is their job at sea. They need to step up and support the British Border Force and other British services in stopping boats once they have already launched into the English channel—not just by tracking them, as they currently do, but by tugging them back to France. They are simply not doing their job.
While I absolutely share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about money, ultimately I believe the Home Secretary has a firm grip of this, and as we are seeing, the results are starting to pay dividends. However, I agree that more can be done, and the Bill goes a long way to achieving that.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his proposed new clause. He will appreciate that there is always a balance to be struck in these matters, and I should add that we have published joint statements that set out the nature of our work with France following arrangements made in July 2021 and November 2020. The content of the Sandhurst treaty, which underpins our illegal migration relationship with France, is also published.
Those arrangements are underpinned by additional administrative and operational documentation. However, it is not possible to publish that material where it includes sensitive details relating to the UK and our international partners. To disclose that information would hinder our operational response and our ability to target criminals driving illegal migration and ultimately protect the public. We must do nothing that aids their evil work—we simply must not entertain that, and that is something I am exceptionally mindful of in responding to the proposed new clause.
If the Minister is concerned to see that we do nothing to aid the evil work of people smugglers, what consideration has he given to the impact assessment by his own Department, which said:
“There is a risk that increased security and deterrence could encourage these cohorts to attempt riskier means of entering the UK.”?
According to his own Department, these proposals are counterproductive.
What is being sought is further detail on the relationship that we have with France in particular to tackle these dangerous channel crossings. As I say, we must put nothing in the public domain that risks undermining that constructive collaboration through the arrangement that we have with the French, which is vital to stopping these dangerous crossings and protecting lives at sea. To do so would also result in a betrayal of trust with our international partners, who own some of this information, and could prevent us from reaching future agreements with international partners, impacting our ability to prevent illegal migration and small boat crossings. That is why the Government feel unable to support the new clause and I encourage the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw it.
There is not enough scrutiny, so we wish to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would shorten the route to settlement from 10 years to five years for children and young people who have grown up in the UK and know no other home. This issue has a big impact on a relatively small number of people. These are bright young people who want to contribute to society but face a long, uncertain and financially demanding journey before their futures in the country they call home are secure.
I pay tribute to the brilliant charity We Belong, which is led by young people who themselves have been impacted by the unforgiving immigration rules. The Greater London Authority estimates that more than 330,000 children and young people who came to the UK as children have precarious immigration status. The young people who face this predicament are mainly Commonwealth citizens who are bright and want to contribute, but they have to wait 10 years before they reach settlement, at a cost of £12,771, through applications for leave to remain every 30 months.
Costs for leave to remain applications have risen astronomically in recent years, increasing by 331% since 2014. Often, more than one family member will be going through the process at the same time, so there are multiple fees to pay. That means that in many families, for at least a decade, earnings that could otherwise go towards securing a decent home or be invested in a child’s education instead have to be funnelled out of the family and paid to the Home Office. Before we even start to consider legal fees, we are asking families and young people to save more than £1,200 per year per person just to remain in the UK, when 30% of people in the UK have less than £1,000 in total savings and the average low-income family has just £95 in savings.
Each time they have to apply for leave, we raise the bar for these young people, asking far more of them than we ever would of those fortunate enough to be born with a British passport. Each time, they meet these almost impossible hurdles, often working several jobs to keep themselves and their families on this long and narrow 10-year path to security. These are clearly exceptional individuals, but it is not fair that we keep asking this of them.
For Arkam, who came to the UK aged 10, the 10-year route has meant being stuck in unsuitable accommodation. His family has lived in a one-bedroom house for 10 years because, he says
“the rent is so low and it has to be low because the Home Office fees are so high and our quality of life was non-existent.”
For Andrew, it has been the trigger for a string of evictions. His family were left without enough money to pay their rent and lost their home several times.
My own constituent, Tashi, arrived in the UK when she was seven and has since lawfully resided in the UK for almost two decades. When Tashi was just 10 years old, she was held unlawfully in immigration detention, and that experience has traumatised her ever since. Each limited leave renewal ignites the uncertainty and precarious nature of her status. If she makes a mistake on an application form, she could be back in detention and face deportation, even though she knows no other home. Living with limited leave to remain means decades of living with unrelenting uncertainty.
The more times that young people go through the LLR application process, the more they have to lose. If applicants are unable to afford the fee or fail to renew on time, they will have to begin the 10-year process from the very beginning.
That happened to Natasha, who came to the UK from Nigeria at the age of seven. Natasha was granted limited leave to remain when she was 18. When it came to renewing her visa, her family could not afford to renew due to the high fees and Natasha fell out of legal status. Unable to work, Natasha became homeless. Living in the shadows of society, it was only when she was 26 that she was able to raise enough money from family and friends to apply for LLR again and restart the 10-year route. She must renew this status every 30 months over a 10-year period. She will be 36 before she can apply for settlement and 37 years old when she can finally apply for citizenship.
How is this fair? For all this Government’s rhetoric about the importance of social integration, they continue to preside over an immigration system that isolates and stigmatises young migrants who have no other home but the UK. As highlighted by We Belong, many young people will undoubtedly be driven into poverty or lose their lawful status as a result of these high costs.
Speaking in July 2019, during his campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party, the Prime Minister said:
“I want everybody who comes here and makes their lives here to be, and to feel, British—that’s the most important thing”.
Across this Committee, I think we all agree with that sentiment. We should be proud of our country and encourage our residents to seek British citizenship, so why are we putting every hurdle in the way of ambitious young people who are already integrated into the fabric of our society? We Belong’s experience with young people on the 10-year route reveals how the demands of this process can reverse years, even decades, of integration.
The unforgiving 10-year route sows division and fear among young people, damages mental health, limits life chances and condemns even the hardest-working families to at least a decade of intense financial strain. The instability and onerous demands created by the limited leave to remain route serve nobody, and certainly not employers, educators or communities.
The financial and other constraints imposed by the 10-year process mean that many young migrants reaching early adulthood are denied the opportunity to realise their ambitions, causing prolonged financial and emotional stress. Ten years of multiple applications and multiple fees only increase the likelihood that young people will inadvertently fall out of status and have their lives ruined as a result. A five-year LLR path to settlement would be fairer and give them parity with other migrant groups, which is what this new clause aims to do.
We welcome the Home Office’s recent published guidance to case officers, which opens up a narrow discretionary five-year route for some young people. It shows that the Home Office acknowledges that there is a problem here. However the guidance is limited to those between 18 and 25, among other limitations. Many of the people in the case studies I mentioned, and many others who came to the UK as young children, are now over the age limit and will not be able to benefit from this scheme. Can the Minister tell me when the Home Office plans to rectify this anomaly?
I hope I might be able to satisfy the Committee by saying that both this proposed new clause and the related proposed new clause 45 are commendable, but we are already doing what they seek. We will consolidate our actions in the immigration rules as part of the simplification of the rules in the next 12 months. Home Office officials have discussed the proposed changes with the We Belong group of young migrants, who have indicated that they are supportive of the way the changes will be implemented. With that, I hope the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw this proposed new clause.
I very much welcome the Minister’s comments, and I look forward to having more information. Based on what he has told me, I am willing to withdraw the new clause, and I look forward to progress being made in this area. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Safety plan for child victims of human trafficking
“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 22, after subsection (3C) insert—
“(3D) In respect of a suspected child victim of trafficking who is looked after by the local authority, the duty of a local authority under subsection (3)(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child shall include in particular a duty to consider and take all reasonable steps to ensure that arrangements of accommodation and support to meet the child’s needs and takes account of and addresses the child’s safety with a view to preventing the risk of re-trafficking.”
(3) In section 22, after subsection (4)(d) insert—
“(e) independent guardians (within the meaning of Section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015) as a relevant person who the local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, consult with before making any decision with respect of a child who they are looking after and who is entitled to an independent guardian.”
(4) In section 22C, after subsection (7)(c) insert—
“(d) where accommodation is arranged for a suspected or identified child victim of trafficking, due regard shall be paid to the potential risks of harm and re-trafficking and the child’s safety shall be a primary consideration.””—(Holly Lynch.)
This new clause seeks to provide child victims with a safety plan to prevent retrafficking.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
In the same spirit as new clauses 43 and 44, new clause 51 sets out the duty for local authorities to make arrangements for child victims of modern slavery, with a view to prevent their retrafficking, by amending section 22 of the Children Act 1989. As things stand, an unaccompanied child will become looked after by the local authority if they have been accommodated by the local authority for 24 hours under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. This will mean that they will be entitled to the same local authority provision as any other looked-after child. The Care Leavers (England) Regulations 2010 set out duties regarding care leavers and require that those duties are fulfilled with regards to the child’s circumstances and needs as an unaccompanied or trafficked child. The regulations apply to all children, regardless of their immigration status, nationality or documentation.
As we have heard previously, child victims of modern slavery are at increased risk of going missing and being retrafficked. In 2017, as many as one in four identified trafficked children were reported as having gone missing. The average missing incidents for each trafficked child have increased from an average of 2.4 times to 7.4 times between 2014-15 and 2017. The new clause therefore seeks to bring clarity to the duty on local authorities to protect victims, particularly those at risk of retrafficking. Subsection (2) highlights that there is a need to ensure that accommodation is a serious consideration for child victims. We know that concerns have been raised about the lack of agreed safety standards for accommodating child victims of trafficking, which can include the use of residential homes, shared flats and houses, bed-and-breakfast emergency housing and foster care.
In 2017, the Home Office and the Department for Education commissioned a report that found that there was
“limited availability of specialist provision”
and
“a lack of resources and specialist knowledge within local authorities and partner services.”
The report identified the placement of non-EEA migrant children in “semi-independent accommodation”, such as
“supported accommodation and/or shared housing”,
as being a cause for concern. Since the report was published, the Government have outlawed the provision of accommodation without care and supervision for under-16s, but they have continued to allow such provision for 16 and 17-year-olds.
A recent serious case review has further highlighted the problems of local authorities arranging inappropriate placements for children, and the impact of failing to conduct full risk assessments for both the needs of the child and the accommodation itself. Sarah was a looked-after child in the care of Worcestershire social services, and she died in independent accommodation away from her home borough in June 2019, at the age of 17. From an early age, Sarah had suffered from epilepsy, which had been managed by medication. In 2017, Sarah became a looked-after child under a voluntary agreement between the local authority and her parents, which meant that both Sarah’s parents maintained parental responsibility. Sarah became looked after and was accommodated with foster carers, but when these placements broke down, she resided in residential accommodation and then had semi-independent living arrangements.
Over a period of time, there were numerous occasions where Sarah was reported as missing from the placements. There were concerns regarding Sarah’s vulnerability and the effect of her medical condition. There were also concerns regarding Sarah’s relationships with older men, particularly her relationship with one man. Sarah was considered to be at risk of being criminally and sexually exploited. Sarah tragically died, having suffered a seizure at the home address of the older male in question in 2019, aged just 17. It is an incredibly sad case study and serves as an example of what can happen if the needs of vulnerable victims are not thoroughly assessed.
Currently, there is statutory guidance that outlines a local authority’s duties, such as the Department for Education’s guidance for local authorities, which was updated in 2017, entitled “Care of unaccompanied migrant children and child victims of modern slavery.” It states that:
“Local authorities have a duty to protect and support these highly vulnerable children. Because of the circumstances they have faced, unaccompanied migrant children and child victims of modern slavery, including trafficking, often have complex needs in addition to those faced by looked after children more generally. The support required to address these needs must begin as soon as the child is referred to the local authority or is found in the local authority area. It will be most effective where this support is provided through a stable, continuous relationship with the child.”
We unequivocally support the sentiments and measures incorporated in the guidance, but it should be strengthened through the adoption of the new clause, which would create a duty for local authorities to consider the risk of retrafficking and safeguard against children going missing. I have already made the case for the need, highlighted in subsection (3), for local authorities to work closely and consult independent guardians before making decisions on behalf of the child.
There is a clear, urgent need for the new clause, given the vulnerability of such children. There is also a practical requirement, given that, for multiple local authorities, missing, trafficked or unaccompanied children account for a significant proportion of the children they look after—in the case of one local authority it was as high as 15%. The new clause seeks not only to raise awareness of the needs of child victims but to provide greater definition on the role of local authorities in meeting such needs.
As this is likely to be the last time that I will be on my feet in the Committee, with your permission, Ms McDonagh, may I put on record my sincere thanks to the Children’s Society, ECPAT UK, the British Red Cross, the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, and all the hard-working, dedicated frontline police officers disrupting modern slavery? I am eternally grateful for all their expertise. Finally, I thank Isabelle Bull from my team, who has worked like a trojan in preparation for the Bill, as well as the incredible Clerks of the House.
I, too, am grateful to the hon. Lady for the constructive way in which she has gone about her work on the Committee. I know how passionate she is about these issues.
Support for potential victims, including children, is a fundamental pillar of our approach to assisting those impacted by the horrendous crime of trafficking and modern slavery and reducing the risk of such victims being retrafficked. As the Committee may be aware, independent child trafficking guardians are an independent source of advice and support for potentially trafficked children, irrespective of nationality, and they can advocate on a child’s behalf. So far, the Government have rolled out the service to two thirds of local authorities across England and Wales. We have developed detailed policy for the provision of the service, which is set out in the interim independent child trafficking guardians guidance published under section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The guidance is kept under review through consultation with stakeholders.
Within the guidance, the Government are already clear that acting in the child’s best interests must always be a primary consideration for the independent child trafficking guardian service. We are also clear that independent child trafficking guardians must be invited and provided with the opportunity to take part in all agency meetings and discussions that relate to and impact on the children that they are supporting. That is the correct place for detail on the function of the independent child trafficking guardian service. By keeping that detail in guidance—rather than putting it in legislation, as the new clause would—the Government can respond flexibly to best practice and victims’ needs.
Local authorities are responsible for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of all children in their area, including child victims of modern slavery. The “Working Together to Safeguard Children” statutory guidance is clear that the individual needs of children, including the risk of re-trafficking, should be taken into account when determining their recovery needs. That is to ensure that safeguarding processes and multi-agency support can be put in place to protect and prevent harm to children at risk of a range of exploitation harms and abuse. The approach enables us to focus on a range of exploitation harms, whereas the new clause would stipulate that we focus specifically on the risk of retrafficking. Although I am sure that that was not the new clause’s intention, prioritising safeguarding against the risk of retrafficking could consequentially lead to the prioritisation of action against specifically the risk of retrafficking in place of other risks, which would inherently pose a risk to individuals whose risk of retrafficking may not be the primary consideration. With that, I encourage the hon. Lady not to press her new clause.
I think I followed what the Minister said and that he heard my concerns about some of the gaps in the provision. I will look to that statutory guidance for further detail. I will not press the new clause, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 52
Effect of British National (Overseas) visas
‘(1) Within six months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission and lay before Parliament an independent assessment of the effect of British National (Overseas) visas and the Government’s implementation.
(2) The Secretary of State must appoint an Independent Chair to conduct the assessment.
(3) The assessment must consider such matters as are deemed appropriate by the said Independent Chair.’—(Bambos Charalambous.)
This new clause would require the Government to publish an independent assessment of the effect of the British National (Overseas) visa scheme.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Hong Kong British national overseas route was launched on 31 January 2021, and the route has already been a success. As of 30 June, approximately 64,900 applications to the route have been made by BNO status holders and their family members who have chosen to make the UK their home. An impact assessment was published on 22 October 2020, setting out the projected impacts of the BNO route on the UK. As well as the direct impacts for the Government of operating the route, the impact assessment sets out the expected net benefit to the UK of between £2.4 billion and £2.9 billion over five years.
We believe that a review is not necessary. The policy is generous and barriers have been minimised. As the shadow Minister said, the Home Affairs Committee recently published a report on the route, and we have responded in full. I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.
I will not press new clause 52 to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will keep monitoring the system and provide the protection for young Hongkongers that I outlined. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 53
Electronic monitoring: conditions and use of data
“(1) Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(a), leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
(3) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(b), leave out ‘by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) or (7)’.
(4) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
‘(3A) If immigration bail is granted to a person subject to an electronic monitoring condition, the electronic monitoring condition shall cease to apply on the day six months after the day on which immigration bail was granted to the person, unless sub-paragraph (3B) applies.
(3B) This sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be), when granting immigration bail to the person, has directed that the electronic monitoring condition shall not cease to apply in accordance with sub-paragraph (3A).
(3C) But the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) shall not make a direction under sub-paragraph (3B) unless the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) is satisfied that there are very exceptional circumstances which make the continued application of the electronic monitoring condition necessary in the interests of—
(a) public protection; or
(b) national security.’
(5) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (7) insert—
‘(7A) Sub-paragraph (3)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal if the Tribunal considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—
(a) impractical, or
(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.
(7B) Where sub-paragraph (7) or (7A) applies, the First-tier Tribunal must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.’
(6) In paragraph 4, after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
‘(2A) The Secretary of State must not process any data collected by a device within the meaning of sub-paragraph (2) which relates to the matters in sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (c) except for the purpose of, and to the minimum extent reasonably necessary for, determining whether P has breached a condition of his bail.
(2B) In sub-paragraph (2A), “processing” has the same meaning as in section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.’”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would place certain safeguards and restrictions on use of electronic monitoring.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 53 is really just to probe the Government on a new issue that has started to arise this year: the significant increase in the use of the GPS monitoring of certain people on bail for immigration purposes, largely foreign national offenders awaiting deportation. I am not for a moment suggesting that such monitoring does not have its role. It absolutely does; indeed, there would be occasions on which I would be upset with the Home Office if it did not use it. There is a genuine concern, however, about the lack of safeguards and limits on its use, and on how data from GPS tracking is being used. Indeed, even compared to the criminal justice system, it seems that the safeguards and limits are somewhat light touch. Cases have arisen where it seems that use was totally inappropriate.
New clause 53 suggests putting in place some appropriate safeguards and restrictions. It is designed to prompt the Minister, if not today then in due course, to answer certain questions. First and foremost, how will data be used in practice and in what circumstances will it be used in relation to somebody’s article 8 claim? That is an area of controversy, in that the use of tracking goes way beyond the original intention in previous relevant legislation, which was to prevent people from absconding.
Secondly, the criminal justice system imposes strict limits and safeguards on how long electronic monitoring is used for and in what circumstances, with limits on collection, processing, storage and use of data. Why, therefore, are those electronic monitoring safeguards absent in the immigration system?
Thirdly, why have the Government not made the data protection and equality impact assessment for such an intrusive scheme available to the public? Fourthly, what guarantee can the Government give that they will not expand their use of this technology and use it on people who have come to the United Kingdom to seek asylum? Can the Minister give us assurances on that today?
Finally, the Government’s own data suggests that absconding rates are exceptionally low. A recent FOI response found that of people granted bail between February 2020 and March 2021, there were 43 cases of absconding out of 7,000, so what evidence does the Home Office have that this intrusive measure is really necessary on anything other than a very limited scale?
Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Electronic monitoring of foreign national offenders using satellite tracking devices was a Government manifesto commitment, which the public voted for, and the measure which enacts it was passed into primary legislation under the Immigration Act 2016. It has already been subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate during the passage of the 2016 Act.
Electronic monitoring is a condition of immigration bail. During the debate on the Immigration Act 2016, it was open to Parliament to set a limit on how long a person can be made subject to electronic monitoring, but it chose not to do so. However, I want to be clear that a person’s electronic monitoring conditions are already automatically reviewed on a quarterly basis as a minimum. Compliance with bail conditions, including electronic monitoring, will be a major factor in deciding whether it will remain a condition of that person’s bail. Any representations regarding the person’s electronic monitoring conditions or a breach of those conditions will also generate a review.
Prior to being placed on electronic monitoring when released, a person is given an opportunity to advise the Department as to why electronic monitoring may not be appropriate for them. That includes where there is strong evidence to suggest that an electronic monitoring condition would cause serious harm to the person’s health. A person can also make representations at any point while wearing a tag and those representations will be considered promptly.
Currently, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider electronic monitoring for those who are subject to a deportation order or deportation proceedings, known as “the duty”. The proposed clause makes the consideration of imposing an electronic monitoring condition discretionary. However, there is already a caveat within current legislation that electronic monitoring will not be applied to a person who is subject to the duty where its imposition would be impractical or contrary to the person’s convention rights. The proposal to remove the compulsory consideration of electronic monitoring for all those subject to the duty could lead to a scenario where serious offenders who should be electronically monitored are not considered for electronic monitoring and are granted bail without that condition.
I turn to the new clause’s reference to the use of data. Any data that is gathered from the devices will be processed automatically and will not be routinely monitored by the Department. We have undertaken a data protection impact assessment in relation to the introduction of GPS tagging, which sets out the specific permitted circumstances where data can be accessed, and any access outside those circumstances is considered a data breach. Those who are subject to electronic monitoring are made aware of the circumstances as to when their data can be accessed during the induction process.
Restricting the data in the way the new clause sets out will impact on the ability to use data to try to locate a person after it has been identified that they have breached their immigration bail conditions and are viewed as an absconder. The inability to share data with other law enforcement agencies where a lawful request had been made would be out of alignment with the agreement on sharing data for the purposes of preventing or solving crime. In the broadest terms, only knowing that a person had breached their bail conditions and not being able to use the data for any other purpose would greatly limit the efficacy of electronic monitoring.
I do not consider that the new clause would have the effect that hon. Members intend. Rather, it would impair our ability to monitor and deport those who had committed crimes and were not entitled to remain in the UK. Foreign criminals should be in no doubt of our determination to deport them. We make no apology for keeping the public safe and clamping down on those who have no right to be in the UK.
In summary, the restriction of the use of electronic monitoring as proposed in new clause 53 would significantly impair our ability efficiently to remove foreign national offenders who have no right to be here. I am conscious that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised a number of questions at the outset. I have covered quite a lot of ground, but if there are any matters that he feels I have not addressed and he would like to follow up, I of course invite him to please do so.
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I will have a look through everything that has been said and consider whether any follow-up is necessary. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 54
Instructions to the Migration Advisory Committee
“Within two months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must instruct the Migration Advisory Committee to undertake the following work—
(a) a review of the minimum income requirements for leave to enter and remain as a family member of persons who are British citizens or settled in the United Kingdom;
(b) a report making detailed recommendations on the design of a work visa for remote areas.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to seek further advice in order to take forward certain recommendations made by the Migration Advisory Committee in recent reports.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has gone about his work during the course of proceedings, and for pursuing a number of angles with great tenacity and vigour.
The Migration Advisory Committee is an independent, non-statutory, non-time limited, non-departmental public body that advises the Government on migration issues. The minimum income requirement was implemented in July 2012, following advice from the MAC and has not changed since its introduction. We will consider whether to commission the MAC to review the minimum income requirement within the next three months.
In addition, the MAC considered the issue of work visas for remote areas in is January 2020 report, “A Points-Based System and Salary Thresholds for Immigration”. The MAC recommended a pilot for remote visas, but the Government did not accept this. The UK has a single, flexible immigration system that works for the entirety of the UK. Applying different immigration rules to different parts of the UK would overly complicate the immigration system and would cause significant difficulties for employers who need the flexibility to deploy their staff across the UK. As the MAC itself has said, when considering sustaining remote communities we need to consider why people leave these areas. This is more important than bolstering local communities with migration. I therefore do not consider re-reviewing this issue to be a good use of the MAC’s time or public money.
It is not appropriate to put an amendment such as new clause 54 into primary legislation, as the commissioning of the MAC is done on a priority basis. The Secretary of State retains the power to change the topics, which the MAC reviews at short notice, if a more pressing matter becomes a priority. The Secretary of State should be able to respond flexibly to any new priorities. For those reasons, I encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
I am grateful to the Minister for his answers. He is certainly candid, as he has been throughout Committee proceedings. I am bitterly disappointed about the answer in relation to the remote areas pilot scheme. Those areas are really suffering, not just in terms of labour shortages and the accompanying economic challenges, but even with depopulation.
I will hang on and finish on an optimistic note in that there is a possibility that the Government will commission a review of the salary threshold for family visas. I very much hope that that does happen and they look at how that route operates all together. I cling to that little bit of silver lining. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Schedule 1
Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Criminal Justice Act 2003
‘This is the Schedule to be inserted after Schedule 19A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003—
“Schedule 19B
Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Chapter 6 of Part 12
Modification of dates for referral to the Board
1 Paragraph 2 applies where section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (when read with section 260(4A)) would require the Secretary of State to refer a person’s case to the Board on a day falling before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.
2 The applicable provision is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board at any time up to the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.
3 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.
Person removed after Board had directed release but before being released
4 Paragraphs 5 and 6 apply where, before a person’s removal from the United Kingdom—
(a) the Board had directed their release under section 244ZC, 244A or 246A, but
(b) they had not been released on licence.
5 The direction of the Board is to be treated as having no effect.
6 The person is to be treated as if—
(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and
(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).
Person removed after referral to the Board but before disposal of the reference
7 Paragraph 8 applies where—
(a) before a person’s removal from prison their case had been referred to the Board under section 244ZB(3), 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4), and
(b) the reference lapsed under section 260(4B) because the person was removed from the United Kingdom before the Board had disposed of the reference.
8 Section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (as applicable) is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.
9 For the purposes of paragraph 8, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.
Person removed after having been recalled to prison
10 Paragraphs 11 and 12 apply where, at the time of a person’s removal from prison under section 260, the person was in prison following recall under section 254.
11 Any direction of the Board made in relation to the person under section 255C or 256A before their return to the United Kingdom is to be treated as having no effect.
12 The person is to be treated as if—
(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and
(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).”’—(Tom Pursglove.)
This new schedule inserts a new Schedule 19B into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make modifications of that Act in relation to prisoners who have returned to the UK after their removal from prison. It is introduced by section 261 of that Act, which is amended by NC12.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 3
Working in United Kingdom waters: consequential and related amendments
‘Immigration Act 1971
1 The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.
2 In section 8 (exceptions for seamen etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a member of the crew of a ship who is an offshore worker within the meaning of section 11A.”
3 In section 11 (references to entry etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1ZA) See also section 11A (additional means by which persons arriving in United Kingdom waters for work can enter the UK).”
4 In section 28 (proceedings for offences)—
(a) before subsection (1) insert—
“(A1) Proceedings for an offence under this Part that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.”;
(b) in subsection (2A), for “section 25 or 25A” substitute “this Part”.
5 In section 28L (interpretation of Part 3) —
(a) in subsection (1), at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (1A)”;
(b) after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) In this Part ‘premises’ also includes any artificial island, installation or structure (including one in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom).”
6 In section 28M (enforcement powers in relation to ships: England and Wales), in subsection (2)(a)—
(a) for “section” substitute—
“(i) section 24B,”;
(b) for “, and” substitute “, or
(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.
7 In section 28N (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Scotland), in subsection (2)(a)—
(a) for “section” substitute—
“(i) section 24B,”;
(b) for “, and” substitute “, or
(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.
8 In section 28O (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Northern Ireland), in subsection (2)(a)—
(a) for “section” substitute—
“(i) section 24B,”;
(b) for “, and” substitute “, or
(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.
9 (1) Schedule 2 (administrative provision as to control on entry etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 2—
(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “who have” to “United Kingdom)” substitute “within sub-paragraph (1A)”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) The persons are—
(a) any person who has arrived in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft (including transit passengers, members of the crew and others not seeking to enter the United Kingdom);
(b) any person who has arrived in United Kingdom waters by ship or aircraft who the immigration officer has reason to believe is an offshore worker.
(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”
(3) In paragraph 27—
(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) Sub-paragraph (1) also applies to the captain of a ship or aircraft arriving in United Kingdom waters if—
(a) there are offshore workers on board, or
(b) an immigration officer has informed the captain that they wish to examine any person on board in the exercise of the power under paragraph 2.
(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”
(4) In paragraph 27B—
(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) This paragraph also applies to ships or aircraft—
(a) which have offshore workers on board, and
(b) which—
(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or
(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters.”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (9A) insert—
“(9B) ‘Offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning in this paragraph as in section 11A.”
(5) In paragraph 27BA—
(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—
“(1A) The Secretary of State may also make regulations requiring responsible persons in respect of ships or aircraft—
(a) which have offshore workers on board, and
(b) which—
(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or
(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters,
to supply information to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer.”;
(b) in sub-paragraph (2), after (1) insert “or (1A)”;
(c) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—
“(5A) For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘offshore workers’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”
10 (1) Schedule 4A (maritime enforcement powers) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1(2), after the opening words insert—
“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.
(3) In paragraph (2)(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(4) In paragraph (3)(1)(a), for “25, 25A and 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(5) In paragraph 4(1), for “25, 25A or 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(6) In paragraph 12(2), after the opening words insert—
“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.
(7) In paragraph 13(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(8) In paragraph 14(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(9) In paragraph 15(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(10) In paragraph 23(2), after the opening words insert—
“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.
(11) In paragraph 24(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(12) In paragraph 25(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
(13) In paragraph 26(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
11 In section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (offence of employing a person who is disqualified from employment by their immigration status), after subsection (3) insert—
“(3A) Proceedings for an offence under this section that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.
(3B) Section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (consent of Secretary of State for certain prosecutions) does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this section.”’—(Tom Pursglove.)
This new schedule makes consequential and related amendments in NC20.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
I want to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks, in particular Sarah Thatcher and Rob Page, for their amazing work in getting our new clauses and amendments into some form of legible parliamentary-type wording. I also thank the other staff, those in the room in particular, the Doorkeepers and those keeping a record of our sometimes very long speeches. I also thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for the excellent way in which you chaired proceedings of the Committee.
I thank the members of the Committee—the Minister and all members, but in particular my friends and colleagues in the Opposition for their support and for helping us get to where we are today. I put on the record my thanks to my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, and my hon. Friends the Members for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, for Sheffield Central and for Coventry North West, and to the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for—I will attempt to say the name—Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.
Finally, I thank my staff, Katherine Chibah, Giulia Monasterio, Cian Fox, Charlotte Butterick and Tashi Tahir, for all their hard work on the research and the speeches, and for their general support. It has been a challenging Bill Committee and I am pleased that we have got to the end of it in one piece.
Before you adjourn the Committee for the final time, Ms McDonagh, I also take the opportunity to thank everyone who has been involved, in particular the Opposition spokesmen of both parties, who have put an awful lot of work into their preparations. I know that it is not just them involved in their work, but their teams, who go to extraordinary lengths and really look at the detail of the measures that the Government are proposing to draw up suggested new clauses. It is a herculean effort, so I thank the spokesmen and those working with them.
I thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for your firm but fair chairing of the proceedings. That is always much appreciated, and you have done a brilliant job at keeping us all in order in—I think it is fair to say—a controversial Bill, which Members come at with very strong opinions on all sides.
I also thank my colleagues and in particular our departmental Whip, who as ever has done a fantastic job and stood in at very short notice for my absence on Tuesday. It was extraordinary.
He did very well. I was concerned that I would not be wanted back. I also thank our standing departmental Parliamentary Private Secretary.
I also thank my officials, without whom it simply would not be possible to do this, for all the work they put in behind the scenes. I thank the Clerks of the House, too, who do a fantastic job in structuring the proceedings and ensuring that everything runs in an orderly fashion.
To finish, Sir Roger’s comments as he departed the Chair this morning put it rather well. These are controversial matters that people feel strongly about. Passions run high, but it is fair to say that the Committee has considered the matters in great detail and, I would argue, has done consideration of the Bill great justice.
I thank the Minister, because everyone else has been thanked. He had not been long in his position when the Committee started, and he has shown tremendous skill and adeptness. I am pleased indeed that he recovered from the dodgy prawn he had the other week, which caused the Whip to have to stand in. The Minister started his career as my PPS, and I like to say that I taught him everything he knows, but not everything I know.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Tom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 1—Prescribed period under section 94(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999—
‘(1) The Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000/704) are amended as follows.
(2) In regulation 2(2) (interpretation) for “28” substitute “56”.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), this section does not prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the powers conferred by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to prescribe by regulations a different period for the purposes of section 94(3) (day on which a claim for asylum is determined) of that Act.
(4) The Secretary of State may not prescribe a period less than 56 days where regulation 2(2A) of the Asylum Support Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000/704) applies.’
When an individual is granted refugee status, their eligibility to Home Office financial support and accommodation currently ends after a further 28 days. This new clause would extend that period to 56 days or allow the Secretary of State to set a longer period.
New clause 9—Settled and pre-settled status under EU settlement scheme: certification—
‘(1) Within granting a person settled status or pre-settled status under the EU settlement scheme, the Secretary of State must require the provision of a physical certificate to that person.
(2) The certificate mentioned in subsection (1) must confirm that the relevant person has the relevant status (settled status or pre-settled status).’
This new clause would require the Government to issue a physical certificate when granting settled status or pre-settled status under the EU settlement scheme, allowing all those with such status to provide documentary proof.
New clause 10—Asylum visa for persons in France—
‘(1) On an application by a person (“P“) to the appropriate decision-maker for entry clearance, the appropriate decision-maker must grant P entry clearance if he is satisfied that P is a relevant person.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), P is a relevant person if—
(a) P is in France on the date of application;
(b) P is not a national of a member State of the European Union or a national of Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway or Switzerland;
(c) P intends to make a protection claim in the United Kingdom;
(d) P‘s protection claim, if made in the United Kingdom, would have a realistic prospect of success; and
(e) there are good reasons why P’s protection claim should be considered in the United Kingdom.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(e), in deciding whether there are good reasons why P‘s protection claim should be considered in the United Kingdom, the appropriate decision-maker shall take into account—
(a) the relative strength of P‘s family and other ties to the United Kingdom;
(b) the relative strength of P‘s family and other ties to France;
(c) P‘s mental and physical health and any particular vulnerabilities that P has; and
(d) any other matter that the appropriate decision-maker thinks relevant.
(4) For the purposes of an application under paragraph (1), the appropriate decision-maker must waive any of the requirements in paragraph (5) if satisfied that P cannot reasonably be expected to comply with them.
(5) The requirements in this paragraph are—
(a) any requirement prescribed (whether by immigration rules or otherwise) under section 50 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; and
(b) any requirement prescribed by regulations made under sections 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (biometric registration).
(6) No fee may be charged for the making of an application under paragraph (1).
(7) An entry clearance granted pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have effect as leave to enter for such period, being not less than six months, and on such conditions as the Secretary of State may prescribe by order.
(8) Upon a person entering the United Kingdom (within the meaning of section 11 of the Immigration Act 1971) pursuant to leave to enter given under paragraph (7), that person shall be deemed to have made a protection claim in the United Kingdom.
(9) The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 is amended as follows.
(10) After paragraph 30(1)(b) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 insert— “; or
(c) are conferred by or under sections [Asylum visa for persons in France] and [Right of appeal against France asylum visa refusal] of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.”
(11) In this section and in section [Right of appeal against France asylum visa refusal]—
“appropriate decision-maker” means a person authorised by the Secretary of State by rules made under section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971 to grant an entry clearance under paragraph (1);
“entry clearance” has the same meaning as in section 33(1) of the Immigration Act 1971;
“protection claim”, in relation to a person, means a claim that to remove him from or require him to leave the United Kingdom would be inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s obligations—
(a) under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and the Protocol to that Convention;
(b) in relation to persons entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection; or
(c) under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950.’
This new clause would provide for a person in France to be granted entry clearance to allow them to claim asylum in the UK in certain circumstances.
New clause 11—Right of appeal against France asylum visa refusal—
‘(1) If an application by a person (“P“) for entry clearance under clause [Asylum visa for persons in France] is refused by the appropriate decision-maker, P may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal.
(2) The following provisions of, or made under, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 have effect in relation to an appeal under these Regulations to the First-tier Tribunal as if it were an appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State under section 82(1) of that Act (right of appeal to the Tribunal)—
(a) section 84 (grounds of appeal), as though the sole permitted ground of appeal was that the appropriate decision-maker was wrong to conclude that P was not a relevant person;
(b) section 85(1) to (4) (matters to be considered);
(c) section 86 (determination of appeal);
(d) section 105 and any regulations made under that section; and
(e) section 106 and any rules made pursuant to that section.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the First-tier Tribunal—
(a) shall allow the appeal if it is satisfied that P is a relevant person; and
(b) shall otherwise dismiss the appeal.
(4) In an appeal under this section, in deciding whether there are good reasons why P‘s protection claim should be considered in the United Kingdom, the First-tier Tribunal shall apply section [Asylum visa for persons in France] (3) as though for the words “appropriate decision-maker” there were substituted the words “First-tier Tribunal”.’
This new clause would allow a person whose application for entry clearance under clause [Asylum visa for persons in France] has been rejected to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
New clause 12—Residence permits: recourse to public funds—
‘Within two months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must by regulations ensure that anyone holding a valid UK residence permit has recourse to public funds.’
Under this new clause, everyone holding a UK residence permit (many of whom currently have no recourse to public funds) would have recourse to public funds.
New clause 13—Undocumented migrants: access to work and services—
‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit sections 20 to 47.
(3) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.
(4) Omit sections 1 to 45.’
This new clause would repeal the sections of the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts which sought to further restrict undocumented migrants’ access to work and services.
New clause 14—Immigration health surcharge: abolition—
‘Within two months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must amend the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015 in such a way as to abolish the immigration health surcharge.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to abolish the immigration health surcharge.
New clause 15—Time limit on immigration detention—
‘(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) who is liable to detention under a relevant detention power.
(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 28 days from the relevant time.
(3) If P remains detained under a relevant detention power at the expiry of the period of 28 days then—
(a) P shall be released forthwith; and
(b) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power thereafter, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that there has been a material change of circumstances since P’s release and that the criteria in section [Initial detention: criteria and duration](1) are met.
(4) In this section, “relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—
(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);
(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);
(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal); or
(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).
(5) In this section, “relevant time” means the time at which P is first detained under a relevant detention power.
(6) This section does not apply to a person in respect of whom the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain is or was taken in the interests of national security.’
This new clause would prevent people who are liable to detention under a relevant power from being detained for longer than 28 days.
New clause 16—Initial detention: criteria and duration—
‘(1) A person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power other than for the purposes of examination, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that—
(a) P can be shortly removed from the United Kingdom;
(b) detention is strictly necessary to effect P’s deportation or removal from the United Kingdom; and
(c) the detention of P is in all the circumstances proportionate.
(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 96 hours from the relevant time, unless—
(a) P has been refused bail at an initial bail hearing in accordance with subsection (5)(b) of section [Bail hearings]; or
(b) the Secretary of State has arranged a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P in accordance with subsection (2)(c) of section [Bail hearings] and that hearing has not yet taken place.
(3) Nothing in subsections (1) or (2) authorises the Secretary of State to detain P under a relevant detention power if such detention would, apart from this section, be unlawful.
(4) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.
(5) In this section, “relevant detention power” and “relevant time” have the meanings given in section [Time limit on immigration detention].’
This new clause sets out the circumstances in which a person to whom NC15 applies may be held in initial detention, and the maximum duration of such detention.
New clause 17—Bail hearings—
‘(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies and who is detained under a relevant detention power.
(2) Before the expiry of a period of 96 hours from the relevant time, the Secretary of State must—
(a) release P;
(b) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or
(c) arrange a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), when the Secretary of State arranges a reference to the Tribunal under subsection (2)(c), the Tribunal must hold an oral hearing (“an initial bail hearing”) which must commence within 24 hours of the time at which the reference is made.
(4) If the period of 24 hours in subsection (3) ends on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank holiday, the Tribunal must hold an initial bail hearing on the next working day.
(5) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal must—
(a) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or
(b) refuse to grant immigration bail to P.
(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Tribunal must grant immigration bail to P at a bail hearing unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] are met and that, in addition—
(a) directions have been given for P’s removal from the United Kingdom and such removal is to take place within 14 days;
(b) a travel document is available for the purposes of P’s removal or deportation; and
(c) there are no outstanding legal barriers to removal.
(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] above are met and that there are very exceptional circumstances which justify maintaining detention.
(8) In subsection (6), “a bail hearing” includes—
(a) an initial bail hearing under subsection (2); and
(b) the hearing of an application for immigration bail under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016.
(9) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.
(10) The Secretary of State shall provide to P or to P’s legal representative, not more than 24 hours after the relevant time, copies of all documents in the Secretary of State’s possession which are relevant to the decision to detain.
(11) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal shall not consider any documents relied upon by the Secretary of State which were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10), unless—
(a) P consents to the documents being considered; or
(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal there is a good reason why the documents were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10).
(12) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows—
(a) After paragraph 12(4) of schedule 10 insert—
“(4A) Sub-paragraph (2) above does not apply if the refusal of bail by the First tier Tribunal took place at an initial bail hearing within the meaning of section [Bail hearings] of the Sovereign Borders Act 2021.”.’
In respect of people to whom NC15 applies, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to either release them, grant immigration bail or arrange a reference to the Tribunal within 96 hours.
New clause 18—Illegal immigration: offences—
‘(1) Any person who is present in the United Kingdom without legal authority shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Any person who enters or attempts to enter the United Kingdom without legal authority shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine (or both);
(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).’
This new clause would create offences in respect of persons who have entered the UK illegally or who have remained in the UK without legal authority.
New clause 19—Illegal immigration offences: deportation orders—
‘(1) Any person who is convicted of an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 shall be subject to a deportation order unless the Secretary of State deems such a deportation order to be against the public interest.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, a deportation order shall be deemed to be in the public interest unless a certificate to the contrary has been submitted by the Secretary of State to the Court.’
New clause 21—Nation of Sanctuary—
‘(1) The Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers must jointly produce guidance setting out how measures under this Act may be exercised in a way that secures compliance with—
(a) the Welsh Government’s commitment to be a “Nation of Sanctuary”; and
(b) the plan published by the Welsh Government in January 2019 entitled “Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan”.
(2) Before issuing the guidance, the Secretary of State must—
(a) in collaboration with the Welsh Minister, prepare and consult on a draft; and
(b) publish a response to the consultation.
(3) In preparing the guidance, consideration must be given to the following matters as far as they relate to refugees and asylum seekers—
(a) conditions in asylum accommodation;
(b) access to public services;
(c) access to language support;
(d) access to education and training;
(e) employment opportunities; and
(f) access to health and social services.
(4) No guidance may be published under this section unless a draft of the guidance has been laid before and approved by Senedd Cymru.’
This new clause would require the UK and Welsh Governments to jointly produce guidance setting out how measures under this Act can be exercised in a way which is consistent with the Welsh Government’s commitment of being a Nation of Sanctuary. No guidance can be published unless it has been approved by the Senedd.
New clause 23—Illegal immigration: offences and deportation—
‘(1) Any person who travels to the United Kingdom from a safe third country and attempts to remain in the United Kingdom without lawful authority shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable–
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine (or both);
(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).
(3) A person prosecuted for an offence under this section must be held in secure accommodation until the trial and any subsequent appeal have concluded.
(4) Following conviction for an offence under this section—
(a) a person sentenced to a fine must remain in secure accommodation until the person consents to leave the United Kingdom or until execution of a deportation order relating to the person;
(b) a person sentenced to imprisonment must be returned to secure accommodation immediately following the person’s release from prison, and must remain in secure accommodation until the person consents to leave the United Kingdom or until execution of a deportation order relating to the person.’
New clause 24—Indefinite leave to remain payments by Commonwealth, Hong Kong and Gurkha members of armed forces—
‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 68(10), after “regulations” insert “must make exceptions in respect of any person with citizenship of a Commonwealth country (other than the United Kingdom) who has served at least four years in the armed forces of the United Kingdom, or any person who has served at least four years in the Royal Navy Hong Kong Squadron, the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Brigade of Gurkhas, such exceptions to include capping the fee for any such person applying for indefinite leave to remain at no more than the actual administrative cost of processing that application, and”.’
This new clause will ensure that Commonwealth, Hong Kong and Gurkha veterans applying for Indefinite Leave to Remain following four years of service will only pay the unit cost of an application.
New clause 26—Age assessments: restrictions—
‘(1) Age assessments under section 49 or 50 must only be undertaken if there is significant reason to doubt the age of the age-disputed person.
(2) A person conducting age assessments under section 49 or 50 must be a social worker.
(3) Age assessments must be undertaken in accordance with the Association of Directors of Children’s Services Age Assessment Guidance or equivalent guidance in the devolved jurisdictions.
(4) When an age assessment is conducted, a process must be used that allows for an impartial multi-agency approach, drawing on a range of expertise, including from—
(a) health professionals;
(b) psychologists;
(c) teachers;
(d) foster parents;
(e) youth workers;
(f) advocates;
(g) guardians; and
(h) social workers.
(5) When making regulations under section 51, the Secretary of State must not specify scientific methods unless the Secretary of State receives written approval from the relevant medical, dental and scientific professional bodies that the method is both ethical and accurate beyond reasonable doubt for assessing a person’s age.
(6) Any organisation developed to oversee age assessments must be independent of the Home Office.’
This new clause would place various restrictions on the use of age assessments.
New clause 27—Unaccompanied refugee children: relocation and support—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, make arrangements to relocate to the United Kingdom and support a specified number of unaccompanied refugee children from other countries in the European Union.
(2) The number of children to be resettled under subsection (1) shall be determined by the Government in consultation with local authorities.
(3) The relocation of children under subsection (1) shall be in addition to the resettlement of children under any other resettlement scheme.’
This new clause introduces a safe route for unaccompanied children from countries in the European Union to come to the UK.
New clause 28—Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers—
‘(1) Part 3 of the Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 38, insert—
“38A Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers
(1) A charge under section 38 may not be imposed on persons who have leave to enter, or to remain in, the United Kingdom through a visa to work voluntarily for a period of no more than 12 months, or for such period as may be prescribed by regulations, for a registered UK charity advancing the charity’s primary purpose.
(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section must not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”’
This new clause would ensure that international volunteers, including those working in health and social care, will be exempt from paying the immigration health surcharge.
New clause 29—Immigration Rules: entry to seek asylum and join family—
‘(1) Within six months of this Act being passed, under the power in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament rules making provision for the admission of persons coming for the purpose of seeking asylum.
(2) These rules shall make provision for admitting persons who have a family member in the United Kingdom who is ordinarily and lawfully resident in the United Kingdom.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a “family member” means a grandchild, child, parent, grandparent, sibling, uncle or aunt.’
This new clause would require the Government to make provision within the Immigration Rules for people to be admitted to the UK for the purposes of seeking asylum where they have a family member in the UK.
New clause 31—Route to settlement for children and young people who arrived in the UK as minors—
‘(1) Within twelve months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must amend the Immigration Rules so that – for persons to whom this section applies – the requirements to be met for the grant of indefinite leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK are that—
(a) the applicant has been in the UK with continuous leave on the grounds of private life for a period of at least 60 months;
(b) the applicant meets the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1) of the Immigration Rules or, in respect of the requirements in paragraph 276ADE(1)(iv) and (v) of those Rules, the applicant met the requirements in a previous application which led to a grant of limited leave to remain under paragraph 276BE(1) of those Rules.
(2) This section applies to—
(a) persons who have been granted limited leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK because at the time of their application—
(i) they were under the age of 18 years and had lived continuously in the UK for at least 7 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) and it would not have been reasonable to expect them to leave the UK;
(ii) they were agreed 18 years or above and under 25 years and had spent over half their life living continuously in the UK (discounting any period of imprisonment).
(b) persons—
(i) who were granted leave to remain outside the rules on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and
(ii) who arrived in the UK as a minor.
(c) any dependants of a person to whom paragraph (a) or (b) applies.’
Under this new clause, the route to settlement would be shortened from ten years to five years for children and young people who arrived in the UK as minors and have leave to remain on the basis of having grown up in the UK.
New clause 32—Compatibility of Part 2 with the Refugee Convention—
‘(1) The provisions in Part 2 of this Act and any subordinate legislation made under Part 2 are, so far as it is possible to do so, to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Refugee Convention.
(2) Where a court is required to determine whether a provision of this part, or any subordinate legislation made under it, is compatible with the Refugee Convention, and is satisfied that it is not, then it must make a declaration to this effect.
(3) In this section, “court” has the same meaning as in section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’
This new clause would ensure provisions of Part 2 were read as far as possible in a manner consistent with the Refugee Convention, and where that was not possible, this was declared by the Courts.
New clause 35—Refugee Family Reunion—
‘(1) Within six months of this Act coming into force, rules must be laid down by the Secretary of State under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 to allow any person (“P”) who has been recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom to sponsor—
(a) any child of P under the age of 25, who was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time P left the country of P’s habitual residence in order to seek asylum;
(b) any parent of P;
(c) any sibling of P under the age of 25, who was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time P left the country of P’s habitual residence in order to seek asylum; to join them in the UK.’
This new clause would expand the range of family members who can apply to be reunited with a refugee in the United Kingdom.
New clause 36—Asylum dispersal – analysis of costs to dispersal authorities—
‘(1) Within six months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament a report analysing of the costs incurred by local authorities for undertaking the role of asylum dispersal authorities.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must include a summary of submissions made by—
(a) local authorities who act as asylum dispersal authorities, and
(b) organisations acting on behalf of the local authorities.
(3) The report under subsection (1) must set out the Secretary of State’s proposals for reimbursing the costs incurred by asylum dispersal authorities.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament an analysis of the costs incurred by local authorities who host dispersed asylum seekers, and proposals for reimbursing them.
New clause 37—Independent Asylum Agency—
‘Within 12 months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament proposals for an independent asylum agency with responsibility for deciding applications for refugee status, and related protection claims.’
New clause 38—Instructions to the Migration Advisory Committee—
‘Within two months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must instruct the Migration Advisory Committee to undertake the following work—
(a) a review of the minimum income requirements for leave to enter and remain as a family member of persons who are British citizens or settled in the United Kingdom; and
(b) a report making detailed recommendations on the design of a work visa for remote areas.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to instruct the MAC to undertake work reviewing the minimum income requirements for family visas; and on the design of a remote areas visa scheme.
New clause 40—Immigration Rules since December 2020: report on effects—
‘(1) Before this Act comes into force, the Secretary of State must commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the effects of its Immigration Rules on the UK economy and public services since December 2020.
(2) The areas to be covered by the report must include but are not limited to—
(a) food supply;
(b) fuel supply;
(c) hospitality and tourism;
(d) NHS;
(e) social care; and
(f) construction.’
This new clause would require the Government to commission and publish an independent report on the effects of its Immigration Rules on the UK economy and public services since December 2020.
New clause 41—Asylum seekers’ right to work—
‘The Secretary of State must make regulations providing that adults applying for asylum in the United Kingdom may apply to the Secretary of State for permission to take up employment if a decision at first instance has not been taken on the applicant’s asylum application within 3 months of the date on which it was recorded.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations enabling asylum seekers to work once they have been waiting for a decision on their claim for 3 months or more.
New clause 42—Refugee family reunion—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, lay before Parliament a statement of changes in the rules (the “immigration rules”) under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (general provisions for regulation and control) to make provision for refugee family reunion, in accordance with this section, to come into effect after 21 days.
(2) Before a statement of changes is laid under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with persons he or she deems appropriate.
(3) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules providing for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for family members of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.
(4) In this section, “refugee status” and “humanitarian protection” have the same meaning as in the immigration rules.
(5) In this section, “family members” include a person’s—
(a) parent, including adoptive parent;
(b) spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner;
(c) child, including adopted child, who is either—
(i) under the age of 18, or
(ii) under the age of 25 but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum;
(d) sibling, including adoptive sibling, who is either—
(i) under the age of 18, or
(ii) under the age of 25, but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum; and
(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State may determine, having regard to—
(i) the importance of maintaining family unity,
(ii) the best interests of a child,
(iii) the physical, emotional, psychological or financial dependency between a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection and another person,
(iv) any risk to the physical, emotional or psychological wellbeing of a person who was granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, including from the circumstances in which the person is living in the United Kingdom, or
(v) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(6) For the purpose of subsection (5)—
(a) “adopted” and “adoptive” refer to a relationship resulting from adoption, including de facto adoption, as set out in the immigration rules;
(b) “best interests” of a child shall be read in accordance with Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.’
This new clause would make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection.
New clause 44—Safe and legal routes—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act and annually thereafter, publish a report on—
(a) all current safe and legal asylum routes to the United Kingdom,
(b) the eligibility criteria for legal entry into the United Kingdom, and
(c) details of the application process.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report on its resettlement target of refugees per year, and report on this every year.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK each year, alongside their eligibility criteria and application process. It would also commit the UK and Secretary of State to publishing its resettlement targets, and reporting on this annually.
New clause 45—Asylum seekers: employment—
‘(1) The Immigration Rules, as laid before Parliament under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, are amended as follows.
(2) In paragraphs 360 and 360C (right to request permission to take up employment) for “one year” substitute “six months”.
(3) Omit paragraphs 360A and 360D (which place restrictions on the employment that may be taken up).
(4) After paragraph 360E insert—
360F (none) In paragraphs 360 to 360E, the terms “asylum applicant” and “individual” mean—
(a) a principal applicant, or
(b) an adult dependant of a principal applicant in accordance with paragraph 349.”’
This new clause would permit asylum seekers waiting for more than six months for a decision on their claim to take up employment.
New clause 46—Shortage Occupation List—
‘(1) Before a Minister of the Crown makes any changes to the Immigration Rules Appendix Shortage Occupation List as provided for by the Immigration Rules, the Secretary of State must—
(a) consult each devolved authority on proposed changes, and seek their consent; and
(b) lay before Parliament an independent impact assessment of the proposed changes including, but not limited to, the submissions received from the devolved authorities under paragraph (a).
(2) If a devolved authority does not provide the consent sought under subsection (1)(a), the Minister of the Crown may not proceed with the changes.
(3) In this section “devolved authority” means the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers or a Northern Ireland department.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult and receive the consent of the devolved governments before making changes to the Shortage Occupation List in order to ensure that it allows additional flexibility and reflects the different needs of each nation.
New clause 48—Family reunion and resettlement: unaccompanied minors—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within a period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, amend the Immigration Rules in order to ensure that an unaccompanied minor seeking asylum in the EEA who has a family member present in the United Kingdom is entitled to claim asylum in the United Kingdom.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “family member” includes—
(a) a parent or guardian of the applicant;
(b) an aunt, uncle or grandparent of the applicant;
(c) a sibling of the applicant;
(d) the spouse of the applicant;
(e) an unmarried partner with whom the applicant is in a stable relationship; or
(f) any children of the applicant.’
This new clause would allow unaccompanied children to have access to family reunion with close relatives in the UK.
New clause 49—Co-operation with European Union on family reunion arrivals and safe returns—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within a period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, produce a report setting out a negotiating mandate for an agreement with the European Union setting out protocols for identifying the state responsible for determining an asylum application using a hierarchy of criteria, including but not limited to—
(a) family unity,
(b) possession of residence documents or visas,
(c) irregular entry or stay, and
(d) visa-waived entry.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay the report before each House of Parliament.’
This new clause would require the Government to produce a negotiating mandate setting out a proposed reciprocal arrangement with the European Union for safe returns and safe legal routes, to cover the issues previously covered by the Dublin III agreement which has now ended.
New clause 50—Advertising assistance for unlawful immigration to the United Kingdom—
‘(1) It is an offence to advertise by any means, including using social media, services designed to facilitate the commission of an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, to a fine or to both, or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.’
New clause 51—Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations setting out the terms of a resettlement scheme for Afghan citizens known as the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme (“ACRS”).
(2) There must be provisions within the ACRS to allow those who are fleeing persecution and have family members in the UK to apply for the Scheme.
(3) For the purposes of this section, “family member” includes—
(a) the spouse of the applicant;
(b) an unmarried partner with whom the applicant is in a stable relationship;
(c) any children of the applicant;
(d) a parent or guardian of the applicant;
(e) an aunt, uncle or grandparent of the applicant; or
(f) a sibling of the applicant.
(4) Regulations under this section must be made and the ACRS must come into force within 30 days from the date of Royal Assent to this Act.’
This new clause will place the Afghan Citizens Resettlement Scheme on a statutory footing and ensure that it includes provisions for a family reunion route within it.
New clause 52—Non-UK service personnel: waiver of fees—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, make regulations exempting relevant persons from the payment of fees in respect of the exercise of functions in connection with immigration or nationality under section 68 of the Immigration Act 2014.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “relevant persons” are persons who—
(a) do not hold British citizenship and are serving or have in the past served in the UK armed forces for a minimum period of five years; or
(b) are dependents of persons identified in paragraph (a).’
Amendment 8, page 14, line 4leave out clause 11.
This amendment would remove clause 11, which provides for the differential treatment of refugees depending on their method of arrival in the UK.
Amendment 114, in clause 11, page 15, line 2, at end insert—
‘(7A) Notwithstanding subsections (5) and (6), a person listed in subsection (7B) must not be treated differently from a Group 1 refugee and in particular—
(a) must not face a restriction on their leave to enter compared to any Group 1 refugee;
(b) must have access to indefinite leave to remain on the same basis as any Group 1 refugee;
(c) must not have no recourse to public funds conditions attached to any leave to enter or remain given to them; and
(d) must have access to family reunion on the same basis as Group 1 refugees.
(7B) Subsection (7A) applies to—
(a) an Afghan national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in Afghanistan;
(b) a Syrian national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in Syria;
(c) a Uighur who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in China;
(d) a Christian convert who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in their country of nationality; or
(e) other persons who are refugees because they are outside of their country of nationality for fear of persecution for a Convention reason as set out in article 1 of the Refugee Convention.’
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from treating Afghans, Syrians, Uighurs and Christian converts and other people who are refugees at risk of persecution, differently from Group 1 refugees.
Government amendments 19 to 25.
Amendment 132, in clause 15, page 18, leave out lines 27 to 39 and insert—
“(a) there are in law and in practice—
(i) appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers;
(ii) sufficient protection against serious harm and violations of fundamental rights;
(iii) protection against refoulement and removal in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
(iv) access to fair and efficient State asylum procedures, or to a previously afforded refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention;
(v) the legal right to remain during the State asylum procedure;
(vi) a refugee status granted to those who are recognised as refugees that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention for those found to be in need of international protection; and
(b) it is safe for the particular claimant, taking into account their individual circumstances.”
This amendment modifies the definition of a “safe third State” to limit it to States that are in fact safe, in law and practice, for the particular claimant.
Amendment 133, in clause 15, page 18, line 41, leave out “5” and insert “3”.
This amendment is consequential on a later amendment about the definition of “connection”.
Amendment 134, in clause 15, page 18, leave out lines 43 to 46.
This amendment removes subsection (6), which states that a claimant whose asylum claim has been denied by virtue of their connection to a particular safe third State may be removed to any other safe third State.
Amendment 135, in clause 15, page 19, line 2, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would clarify that under specific circumstances, an asylum claim that would otherwise be considered inadmissible must be considered under the immigration rules.
Government amendment 26.
Amendment 136, in clause 15, page 19, leave out lines 3 to 10 and insert—
“(a) in the absence of a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement between the United Kingdom and the State to which the person has a connection;
(b) as soon as the proposed State of readmission refuses to accept the person’s return or if the person’s readmission has not been agreed within three months of the registration of their asylum claim, whichever is sooner;
(c) if, taking into account the claimant’s personal circumstances, including their family ties to the United Kingdom and the best interests of any children affected by the decision, it is more appropriate that the claim be considered in the United Kingdom; or
(d) in such other cases as may be provided for in the immigration rules.”
This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must consider an asylum application, despite a declaration of inadmissibility.
Amendment 137, in clause 15, page 19, leave out line 21 and insert—
“(a) has been granted refugee status or another protective status in the safe third state that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention.”
This amendment would strengthen the safeguards in place before a “connection” can be relied on for the purposes of inadmissibility, so as to ensure that the right to seek and enjoy asylum is protected.
Amendment 138, in clause 15, page 19, leave out lines 24 to 32.
This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State by deleting the possibility of finding someone inadmissible on the basis of having been granted nothing more than protection against removal in a third State.
Amendment 139, in clause 15, page 19, line 33, leave out “3” and insert “2”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 138.
Amendment 140, in clause 15, page 19, line 37, leave out “4” and insert “3”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 138.
Amendment 141, in clause 15, page 19, leave out lines 43 to 45.
This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State so as to prevent a person being found inadmissible on the basis of a connection to a State to which they have never been.
Amendment 142, in clause 15, page 20, leave out lines 1 to 4 and insert—
“for refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention.”
This amendment changes the definition of a “relevant claim” to a safe third State to ensure that inadmissibility is based on access to a protective status consistent with the Refugee Convention.
Amendment 14, in clause 17, page 21, line 16, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Secretary of State may not serve an evidence notice on a person who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom.’
This amendment would remove the ability to serve an evidence notice on children and young people who arrived in the UK before the age of 18.
Government amendment 27.
Amendment 118, page 21, line 27, leave out clause 18.
Government amendments 28 to 30.
Amendment 119, page 24, line 30, leave out clause 21.
Government amendments 31 to 38.
Amendment 145, page 25, line 11, leave out clause 22.
Government amendments 39 and 40.
Amendment 146, page 26, line 7, leave out clause 23.
Government amendments 41 to 43.
Amendment 120, page 29, line 2, leave out clause 25.
Amendment 15, in clause 25, page 29, line 13, at end insert—
‘(2A) For the purposes of subsection (2), “good reasons” include, but are not limited to, the claimant having been under the age of 18 years at the time of their arrival in the UK.’
Under this amendment, a claimant who was under the age of 18 at the time of their arrival in the UK would be regarded as having good reasons for providing evidence late.
Government amendments 44 and 45.
Amendment 121, page 30, line 2, leave out clause 26.
Government amendments 46 and 47.
Amendment 11, in clause 28, page 32, line 1, leave out paragraph (a).
This is a paving amendment for Amendment 9.
Amendment 150, in clause 28, page 32, line 4, at end insert—
‘(2) This section and Schedule 3 will have effect notwithstanding—
(a) the Human Rights Act 1998;
(b) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms agreed by the Council of Europe at Rome on 4th November 1950 as it has effect for the time being in relation to the United Kingdom, including any Protocol to that Convention;
(c) EU derived law and case law retained under sections 2 to 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018; and
(d) the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and its Protocol.
(3) No law or requirement identified in subsection (2) shall affect the interpretation or application of any provision of this section, including restrictions on the actions or policies of public authorities.’
This amendment is to ensure that the provisions in clause 28 and Schedule 3 are not open to judicial interpretation or disapplication under the measures listed in subsection (2).
Amendment 144, page 33, line 21, leave out clause 31.
Amendment 147, in clause 32, page 34, line 24, leave out subsections (2) to (4).
Government amendments 48 to 50.
Amendment 115, in clause 39, page 38, leave out lines 15 to 23.
This amendment would remove certain criminal offences relating to entering and arriving in the UK.
Government amendment 51.
Amendment 102, in clause 39, page 38, leave out lines 19 to 23.
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to prevent ‘arrival’ in the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, rather than ‘entry’ into the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, becoming an offence.
Government amendments 52 and 53.
Amendment 116, in clause 39, page 39, line 9, at end insert—
‘(F2) No criminal offence is committed under subsections (B1) to (D1) where a person enters or arrives in the United Kingdom for the purposes of making a claim for asylum or humanitarian protection, if the person is one of the following—
(a) an Afghan national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in Afghanistan; a Syrian national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in Syria; a Uighur who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in China;
(b) a Christian convert who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution in their country of nationality; or
(c) other persons who are in need of international protection; or who are refugees because they are outside of their country of nationality for fear of persecution for a Convention reason as set out in article 1 of the Refugee Convention.’
Clause 39 as drafted would involve the criminalisation of the arrival and entry of asylum seekers and refugees with an offence subject to up to four years imprisonment. This amendment would prevent this from happening.
Government amendments 54 and 55.
Amendment 103, in clause 39, page 39, line 30, leave out subsection (4).
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to prevent the offence of facilitating a breach of immigration law being extended to include facilitating ‘arrival’ in the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance in addition to facilitating ‘entry’ into the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance.
Government amendments 56 to 59.
Amendment 104, in clause 39, page 40, line 2, at end insert—
‘(10) In section 31(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (defences based on Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention), after paragraph (aa) insert—
“(ab) section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 (illegal entry and similar offences)”.’
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to extend the statutory defence based on Article 31 of the Refugee Convention to offences of illegal entry under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.
Government amendments 60 and 61.
Amendment 105, in clause 40, page 40, line 7, leave out subsection (2).
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to maintain the current position that the offence of helping an asylum seeker to enter the United Kingdom can only be committed if it is carried out “for gain”.
Government amendments 62 and 63.
Amendment 1, in clause 40, page 40, line 8, at end insert—
‘(3) In section 25A(3) of the Immigration Act 1971 (helping asylum seeker to enter United Kingdom), for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) aims to—
(i) protect lives at sea, or
(ii) assist asylum-seekers; and”’.
This amendment would add people working on behalf of organisations that aim to protect lives at sea to those who are exempt for prosecution for helping someone seeking asylum to enter the UK, as long as those organisations do not charge for their service.
Amendment 106, in clause 45, page 43, line 12, at end insert—
‘(6B) Nothing in this section, or in sections 10A to 10E, permits a person to be removed from the United Kingdom if that removal would violate their common law right to access justice.’
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to make clear that the regime for providing notice to persons liable to removal remains subject to the common law right to access justice, which in the asylum context is mirrored by Article 13 ECHR.
Amendment 107, page 49, line 3, leave out clause 47.
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to prevent it being compulsory for decision makers and tribunals to take into account whether a person has failed to cooperate with any immigration process when making decisions on immigration bail.
Amendment 122, in clause 48, page 49, line 34, leave out
“has insufficient evidence to be sure of their age”
and insert
“has reason to doubt that the claimant is the age they claim”.
This amendment to Clause 48(1) would align primary legislation to current practice as set out in statutory guidance to ensure children are not subjected to age assessments if there is no significant reason to doubt their age.
Amendment 123, in clause 49, page 51, line 9, leave out “must” and replace with “may”.
Amendment 124, in clause 49, page 51, line 17, leave out subsections (4) to (8).
Amendment 125, page 52, line 1, leave out clause 50.
Amendment 126, page 52, line 22, leave out clause 51.
Amendment 13, in clause 71, page 69, line 38, at end insert—
“(c) the individual is travelling to Northern Ireland on a local journey from the Republic of Ireland.”
Under this amendment, persons who are neither British nor Irish would nevertheless be able to make local journeys from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland without the need for an Electronic Travel Authorisation.
Government amendments 91 to 93.
Amendment 9, in schedule 3, page 82, line 36, leave out paragraphs 1 and 2.
This amendment leaves out paragraphs 1 and 2 of Schedule 3 to the Bill, which would amend section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (no removal while claim for asylum pending).
Amendment 10, in schedule 3, page 84, line 2, leave out paragraph 4.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 9.
Government amendments 94 and 95.
Amendment 96, in schedule 6, page 95, line 25, at end insert—
‘(4) Authority for the purposes of subsection (3) may be given in relation to a foreign ship only if the Convention permits the exercise of Part A1 powers in relation to the ship.’
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to follow the drafting in the equivalent paragraphs of sections 28M, 28N and 28O of the Immigration Act, and ensure that enforcement action complies with international maritime law, similar to other enforcement action under Schedule 4A to the Immigration Act 11.
Amendment 97, in schedule 6, page 98, leave out lines 6 to 11 and insert—
“(a) every description of vessel (including a hovercraft) used in navigation, but
(b) does not include any vessel that is not seaworthy or where there could otherwise be a risk to the safety of life and well-being of those onboard.”
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure that enforcement action such as pushbacks could not be taken against unseaworthy vessels such as dinghies.
Amendment 98, in schedule 6, page 98, line 20, at end insert—
‘(1A) The powers set out in this Part of this Schedule must not be used in a manner or in circumstances that could endanger life at sea.’
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure the maritime enforcement powers cannot be used in a manner that would endanger lives at sea.
Amendment 113, in schedule 6, page 99, line 37, at end insert—
‘(13) Nothing within this Act or this paragraph B1 authorises any action or measure which is inconsistent with the United Kingdom’s international legal obligations.’
This amendment seeks to ensure the consistency of Part A1 paragraph B1 (power to stop, board, divert and detain) with the United Kingdom’s international obligations, including under international refugee law, international human rights law and international maritime law.
Amendment 99, in schedule 6, page 102, line 31, at end insert—
‘(2) Force must not be used in a manner or in circumstances that could endanger life at sea.’
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure that the use of force in maritime enforcement powers cannot be used in a manner that would endanger lives at sea.
Amendment 4, in schedule 6, page 102, leave out lines 35 to 40.
This amendment would remove the provision granting immigration and enforcement officers immunity from civil or criminal liability for anything done in the performance of their functions.
Amendment 100, in schedule 6, page 102, line 36, leave out “criminal or”.
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to remove the immunity from criminal proceedings for “relevant officers” for criminal offences committed whilst undertaking pushbacks or other maritime enforcement operations.
Amendment 101, in schedule 6, page 102, line 36, leave out lines 36 to 40 and insert—
“J1 The Home Office, rather than an individual officer, is liable in civil proceedings for anything done in the purported performance of functions under this Part of this Schedule.”
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to ensure that the Home Office is liable, rather than immigration officers and enforcement officers being personally liable for civil wrongs that may occur whilst undertaking pushbacks or other maritime enforcement operations.
I am conscious of the wide interest in a significant number of these amendments, so I will predominantly focus my remarks on the Government amendments in this first instance and address other matters in the wind-up.
Our asylum system must not reward those who enter the UK illegally from manifestly safe countries where they cannot possibly still be fleeing persecution and fear. People must claim asylum in the first safe country they come to, and making a secondary and unnecessary move to the UK puts lives needlessly in danger while pushing aside other vulnerable people, including women and children.
We must break the criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration and exploit people. People who come to our shores illegally will be treated differently. Although we cannot resettle everyone who needs sanctuary, the large numbers we resettle in the UK will be made very welcome. We will be fair but firm in how we continue to embark on this landmark reform of our asylum system.
New clause 20 is a minor, technical amendment that will ensure a small number of references to justices of the peace in immigration legislation in the context of obtaining entry and search warrants in Northern Ireland instead become references to lay magistrates. This is a simple measure that tidies up the statute book.
The Minister makes a critical point about claiming asylum in the first safe country. People traffickers rely on the idea of selling a destination, regardless of where the person starts. The measures my hon. Friend describes will frustrate the people traffickers and do a great service both to this country and to their many victims.
Not for the first time, I find myself agreeing with my right hon. Friend wholeheartedly. It is fair to say that nobody needs to get into a small boat to reach safety. France is a safe country with a fully functioning asylum system, and the same applies to Belgium, Germany and countries across the European Union.
All people do by getting into a small boat is hand over significant sums of money to evil individuals who treat people as cargo and have no regard for human life. We have to bring it to an end, which is precisely what we seek to do with this Bill. I look forward to my right hon. Friend’s support in the Lobby, as we have had throughout the Bill’s passage.
Government amendments 19 to 25 to clause 12 make small technical amendments to apply the provisions in the clause to asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers who are supported under existing legislation if and when uncommenced provisions come into force.
What my hon. Friend just stated is not unique to him but was stated by the former Labour Home Secretary Charles Clarke, who said:
“It is simply not acceptable to destroy identity documents, use false passports, lie about your personal history, refuse to say how you reached this country or any of the other devices which the people-smuggling gangs employ to make their money. Asylum seekers who knowingly commit such acts should lose their right of asylum in this country and be returned as soon as possible to their country of origin.”
He was right, wasn’t he?
Any right-minded or fair-minded person would think it was entirely appropriate for people to engage with the immigration system in this country in an appropriate manner that complies with our evidential requirements. People should comply in the spirit of good will, because inevitably we want to provide sanctuary to those in need of sanctuary at the earliest opportunity possible. That is entirely what our reforms seek to achieve. We also think it is right and proper—as do, I think, the British people—to remove those who have no right to be here.
If the legislation is carried in the way the Minister wishes, what impact will it have on the awful, vile trade through small boats? Will it stop it? Is there a danger that the UK courts will overturn the intent?
The measures in the Bill are significant. We have recognised—the Home Secretary has consistently recognised this and I recognise it as the Minister responsible for tackling illegal immigration—that the asylum system in this country is currently broken. The length of time it takes to process claims is unacceptable and we need to improve the situation. The Government’s intention is clearly stated: to improve the way we process claims. We expect individuals who seek to claim asylum in this country to comply with the requirements, but of course safety nets are in place, for good reasons, so that it will be taken appropriately into account if people cannot meet the deadlines. We believe that progressing on the basis of processing claims more quickly and removing those with no right to be here will make quite a significant difference. Importantly, it is also about the work that we do not just with our nearest neighbours in, for example, France and Belgium—that collaboration is important and is delivering results, and we want to secure a returns agreement that will help to build on that—but further upstream in removing those with no right to be here back to source countries.
Yesterday, in a scathing attack on this Bill, Welsh Government Cabinet Ministers issued a statement saying that the Bill undermines Wales’s desire to be a nation of sanctuary, and will exacerbate inequality and harm. In their words:
“Wales is a welcoming nation and we will always stand with those who need us the most.”
Yes, Minister, we do keep a welcome in the hillsides and valleys of Wales. Will he scrap this inhumane Bill, end the hostile environment, put in place safe and legal routes, and stop undermining the responsibilities and aspirations of the devolved nations?
The short answer to that rather long intervention is no. It is not the first time that I find myself disagreeing with Labour politicians, and I am afraid that I disagree with the Welsh Government on this point. All parts of this United Kingdom have a proud record of welcoming to this country people from around the world who are fleeing persecution and conflict; that tradition will continue, as I am sure the hon. Lady knows.
This country has to have a system that is fair but firm, and that brings to an end the abuses in the system previously and to date. Those who are not acting in the spirit that I think all of us would like to see are actually making it more difficult for genuine asylum seekers who are seeking sanctuary, and there are inevitably considerable associated resource implications.
Would the Minister just think for a moment what it is like to get into a small dinghy and try to cross the channel, and imagine what sense of desperation people must have to risk their own lives to try to get to what they believe to be a place of safety? I am not defending people traffickers or criminal gangs. I am just saying that we have created a situation, in this country and across Europe, where we leave desperate people with no alternative but to turn to ruthless people to try to get to a place of safety and contribute to our society. I ask him: has he got any humanity?
I am afraid that the intervention is a disappointing one, in the sense that I would not for a moment suggest that the right hon. Gentleman is doing anything that supports people traffickers—of course not. However, I think he is giving credence to their business model, and that is highly unacceptable and disappointing. He should reflect on his position on these matters. As I have set out, nobody needs to get into a small boat to seek to cross the channel to reach safety. The idea that anybody is in danger in France is utterly farcical. The bottom line is that France is a safe country with a fully functioning asylum system. That is a fact and he needs to reflect on it.
Of course, what the former leader of the Labour party was trying to say was that the French are failing to look after the people in their own country. In that regard, he is right, isn’t he?
It is probably fair to say that those on the Benches of the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) quite regularly try to reinterpret his comments. In the end, it is highly unacceptable for anybody to get into a small boat for this purpose. I think it is fair to say that this House speaks with one voice in saying that people should not be making dangerous crossings, and we perhaps just disagree about how to render the route unviable.
The Government have brought forward a comprehensive Bill as part of the wider package of measures that we are seeking to introduce to address this issue. It is disappointing that some of us in the House seem to have quite a lot to say in complaining about our approach, but do not actually have a viable alternative to our policy.
I have sat through hours of this debate and have been shocked—although I should not be surprised—by some of the smearing and scaremongering that we have heard. Is it any wonder that we receive some of the communications that we do? There is much to support in the Bill. As the Minister says, the immigration system is clearly not working. I am struggling on one point around resettlement, on which we may be able to take more people with us. The Government have rightly promised that the Bill will provide new, safer routes that can help to address the channel crossings. Will the Minister tell us whether the Home Office now has plans, and can provide more detail on those plans, for more resettlement schemes through safe routes?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. One of the things we have been very clear about is that we want to expand community sponsorship in particular, but a number of schemes that are already being delivered are making a considerable difference. We should not forget that 15,000 people were airlifted out of Afghanistan over the summer. Nor should we forget that the BNO route in relation to Hong Kong is a valuable and important route that is helping to provide sanctuary to many individuals. That is an ambitious offer that we have made.
Is not the reality that there are people who come to France fleeing their country of origin with the desire to come to the United Kingdom? Will the Minister look at new clause 10, in the name of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle), of which I am a co-sponsor and which puts forward a humanitarian visa scheme to enable people who are in France to start their application process off in France to come to the United Kingdom? We spoke about this in the Joint Committee on Human Rights last week and the Minister said he was going to go away and verify whether that suggestion had ever been put to the French. Has he been able to verify that for me?
The hon. and learned Lady comes to this debate with ideas and suggestions about how we tackle this issue, but I disagree with her in terms of the suggestion she makes. In order to have a system like that in place, the French would have to agree to it. I think it is fair to say that there is considerable concern about the number of movements across France as things stand already. That is where, I am afraid, her suggestion, while offered in a spirit of co-operation and trying to be constructive, falls down.
I would like to make some progress, if I may.
Amendments 39, 40 to 43, 46 and 47 clarify the Government’s intention that appeals should remain in the expedited appeal process wherever possible. The revised text, which reflects wording in the primary legislation that sets the statutory framework for tribunal rules, specifies that judges should only remove an appeal from the accelerated or expedited process where there is no other way to secure that justice be done.
Amendments 48 to 50 are minor and technical amendments to clause 34 on internal relocation. They clarify the ambiguity in the current drafting that has the potential to be interpreted in an unintended way, where an individual could only be internally relocated within a country where they had previously been in that part of the country.
The purpose of amendments 51 to 59 is to increase the maximum penalty for the existing statutory offence of overstaying, which is currently six months’ imprisonment. That maximum penalty dates back to the original legislation—the Immigration Act 1971—and is no longer considered sufficient for the present day. Given how much the world has changed over the past 50 years, the existing penalty hinders our ability to deter overstayers, and we consider that raising it would encourage better compliance. Clause 39 introduces a new maximum penalty of four years to align with illegal entry and other similar offences that have already been amended during the passage of the Bill.
In Committee, I promised to bring forward amendments to protect Royal National Lifeboat Institution individuals rescuing persons at sea and those in charge of vessels who find stowaways on board. I am pleased to say that this is now set out in amendments 60 to 63. I am grateful to Members across the House who have raised concerns in relation to this matter, and I am delighted to be able to put it beyond doubt this afternoon.
My constituency may be landlocked but I grew up on the Kent coast, where many of those who cross the channel land, and I continue to donate to the RNLI, as do many of my constituents. We all know that those who volunteer to serve do so selflessly and often leave their place of work in order to go to sea or to provide support from the land. Will my hon. Friend join me in thanking those who volunteer for the RNLI from the Dungeness, Littlestone, Dover, Walmer and Ramsgate stations?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes the case so eloquently for the RNLI, and sets out the incredible work that its volunteers and others do to protect life at sea, along with many other agencies, such as Her Majesty’s Coastguard, which works tirelessly around the clock, often in very difficult circumstances. I certainly join her in placing on record the Government’s thanks and appreciation for everything they do, and for the individuals in her area who do this tireless work, day in, day out, and week in, week out.
My right hon. Friend speaks with great passion on this issue, and I am grateful for the constructive way in which she has gone about raising concerns in this policy area. I wish to emphasise that we will always act in accordance with our international obligations, and to be very clear that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children will not be subject to inadmissibility or transferred for offshore processing. It is also important to say that we will not split family units, because that would be contrary to our international obligations.
I hope my hon. Friend the Minister will not mind my instantly picking up on the fact that he very specifically said that “unaccompanied” asylum-seeking children would not be sent offshore, and that we would not split families. I also seek his assurance that we will not send whole families to have their claims decided offshore, and a further assurance that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who have been accepted into the asylum process will not fall out of it again once they turn 18. To me, it is absolutely imperative that if somebody’s claim is to be decided here, it should be decided here, not diverted midway through the process because they pass an arbitrary age.
I have real concerns about the creation of two tiers of asylum seeker. I tend to use this illustration. We saw horrific scenes in Afghanistan when female judges and female Members of Parliament sought to flee that country. We have put in place some schemes—it is important to emphasise that they are not yet up and running—around the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme. Let me draw for the House the image of one female judge who comes to this country under that scheme when it is up and running. She is accepted into our country and is promptly given indefinite leave to remain and the right to work. A second female judge arrives on a small boat, but otherwise the circumstances are the same, in that she would be at risk if she returned to Afghanistan. We seek to offshore her. It causes me real concern that we will create a two-tier system in which people with identical claims to safety—at identical risk from the Taliban—are treated very differently.
I wish to raise concerns about where we might send people. I do not presume to know which countries the Home Office is in discussions with, but they might include Albania, which is in mainland Europe and not part of the European Union. There is already a well-established route from Albania to this country in the back of a van. We could be in a situation where we pay a third country a significant amount of money to accept someone into their asylum system—this is different from the model outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden—but they are then refused. At that point, what is there to stop that person seeking to come back to this country immediately? There could be some sort of circular trade, in which people end up back on our shores, whether in the back of a van or a small boat, and so the cycle goes round and round.
I have some experience as a former Immigration Minister, so I know full well that at this time of year, there is a very popular journey using the return flight to Tirana. [Interruption.] I can see that you want me to hurry up, Madam Deputy Speaker, so I will. There is the question of whether people might see an opportunity to head off to a different country, and then end up back here, whether their claim was accepted or denied in that third country.
We must get the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme up and running, and make it effective. We should also fulfil the commitment we made to vulnerable people when the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme and the vulnerable children’s resettlement scheme came to their conclusion. We cannot talk about safe and legal routes unless we actually have some, and it is imperative that we have them.
I am now stretching your patience, Madam Deputy Speaker, but let me finally address the comments of the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) about push-back. I was the Immigration Minister who rejected that idea because I thought that it was too dangerous to do in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the country, with vulnerable and overladen boats carrying women and children, in choppy seas. We should think very carefully before going down that route, because no Minister at all wishes to be responsible for more loss of life in the channel.
Order. I will now call the Minister, but I am sure he is aware that there may be people who might like to intervene.
I thank hon. Members for their contributions to the debate and for the way in which most of those contributions were expressed. We are dealing with difficult matters, on which Members have strongly and deeply held convictions.
As I have said, it is vital that we do everything in our power to break the business model of evil criminal gangs and reform the broken asylum system. I am conscious of the time constraints, but I will address a number of amendments that have sparked a lot of today’s debate.
Let me start by addressing amendment 150 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) on removal to safe third countries. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) also raised that, and I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) has been following it. My right hon. and hon. Friends are absolutely right in the sentiments that they have expressed in the amendment. I thank them for their full support on the policy intention, including on third country processing of asylum applications.
There is a recognition that certain existing laws may prevent the Government from achieving our aim to remove those with no legal basis to remain in the country. The legal barriers associated with the removal of failed asylum seekers and foreign national offenders are well known. That is why there is work under way across the Government to look at the further legal barriers to removal.
I therefore reassure my right hon. and hon. Friends, and colleagues more widely, that there are no insurmountable domestic legal barriers to transferring eligible individuals overseas under an asylum processing arrangement. Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 allows the Secretary of State to remove an individual with a pending asylum claim from the UK to a safe third state if a relevant certificate is issued. The Bill amends section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make it easier to remove someone to a safe third country without having to issue a certificate.
Obviously, the Bill complies fully with our international obligations, but the Home Secretary fully agrees with the sentiment that is expressed through amendment 150 about the challenges that frustrate the will of the British people in terms of our ability to remove people with no right to be in the UK. I can therefore confirm that the Government have imminent plans to consult on substantial reform of the Human Rights Act, which will be announced imminently in Parliament.
The Home Secretary also recognises my right hon. and hon. Friends’ concerns about aspects of the ECHR and other international agreements. I can therefore confirm that we are committed to reviewing and resolving these issues with the urgency that the situation warrants.
I am listening carefully to my hon. Friend. He says that the Government are committed to resolving these difficulties. Can he confirm that by “resolving” these difficulties, he means that the Government will be legislating so to do?
I refer my right hon. Friend back to the point that I have already made. We intend to consult on substantial reform of the Human Rights Act and will set out our plans imminently in that regard.
Work is under way to develop a new phase of measures to ensure that the clauses in the Bill are not undermined and that legal processes cannot be instrumentalised to circumvent the will of the British people. As we have said, the Government have imminent plans to consult on reform to the Human Rights Act, which are under consideration as we speak. Likewise, work is under way in relation to resolving the question of retained EU law.
It sounds like the Minister is announcing something a bit more radical than perhaps we had anticipated in relation to the Human Rights Act. Can he confirm that the Government are still committed to remaining a signatory—a full signatory—to the European convention on human rights?
The point that I would make is that the Government will set out their intentions in due course. I think it is right not to pre-empt. It is important to make sure that this House is kept updated as to that work, and we will be very clear in our intentions.
It is extremely encouraging news that the Government are going to—at last, I have to say—consider the Blair legacy of the Human Rights Act, but to substantially reform it will require legislation. That much is implicit, is it not?
As I say, Ministers will come to the House with further details in due course.
Work is under way in relation to resolving the question of retained EU law, led by Lord Frost, with input from the Attorney General and the Ministry of Justice. For these reasons, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends to withdraw their amendment 150.
I turn to new clauses 18 and 19 on illegal immigration offences, tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) and for Kettering (Mr Hollobone). I hope that they and other hon. Friends supporting the new clauses will recognise that, as part of our groundbreaking new plan for immigration, the Government have sought robust changes to the law around illegal entry and similar offences through the very Bill we are discussing today. The Bill, which my hon. Friends seek to amend, already addresses and indeed exceeds the changes proposed in new clause 18.
Let me turn now to new clauses 24 and 52, tabled by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) and for Halifax (Holly Lynch), my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer), my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). As both new clauses regard settlement fees for non-UK members of our armed forces, I would like to debate them together. It is a fact that our Government and our nation highly value the service of all members of the armed forces, including Commonwealth nationals and Gurkhas from Nepal.
I am pleased to hear how valued members of our service community are. This is a good opportunity for the Government to give way on new clause 52, tabled by myself and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer). Can the Minister give an assurance that the Government will support it?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for making his case in the eloquent way the House is so used to. Members will be aware of the measures that the Home Secretary and the Defence Secretary announced in the summer for Gurkhas from Nepal, who have a long and distinguished history of service to the UK, both here and overseas. We also remain extremely grateful for the contribution made by former British Hong Kong service personnel. That is why the Ministry of Defence, together with the Home Office, ran a public consultation between 26 May and 7 July 2021 regarding a policy proposal to waive settlement fees for non-UK service personnel in Her Majesty’s armed forces. A response to that consultation is coming out shortly, but I recognise the strength of the hon. Gentleman’s feelings and those of the Royal British Legion on this issue. To that end, I thank him and other colleagues for raising these matters, and I invite him and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View to meet Ministers and the legion next week to make sure that the concerns and realities of non-UK service personnel dealing with the immigration system are fully understood. I am under no illusions about how strongly my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View, in particular, feels about this issue, along with colleagues on both sides of the House.
Many Ministers before my hon. Friend—many Defence Secretaries and many Prime Ministers—have said, “We feel”, “We value” and “We are adamant that we are proud of our armed forces.” However, a Fijian family in Plymouth is still being split up because the visa fees have not been sorted out. Tonight is an opportunity to go beyond meetings and words and to actually waive visa fees, which everybody, irrespective of party, knows is the right thing to do. Whether the Government will do that will test their character.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and note the conviction with which he speaks about these matters, and I reiterate the offer that we have made to meet next week to discuss them. He will appreciate that the consultation has been ongoing and that we would expect to hear more on that in short order.
I would like to pick up on the proposals tabled by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) presented to the House—I would like to say how sorry I was to hear that she will be standing down from the House at the next general election. It is fair to say that the Committee has raised important matters, and I would respond by saying that we have always acted in accordance with our international obligations in relation to matters at sea. On the international convention for the safety of life at sea and search-and-rescue operations, that has consistently been, and will continue to be, the position in the work that we do.
I want to conclude by again thanking hon. Members for their proposals and the lively debate we have had today. Following the tragic events in the channel over the last few weeks, I know that all Members take this debate with the seriousness and concern it deserves. However, the only way we will solve these long-term problems is by delivering a long-term solution. Ultimately, that is exactly what this Bill delivers.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 20 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 50
Advertising assistance for unlawful immigration to the United Kingdom
“(1) It is an offence to advertise by any means, including using social media, services designed to facilitate the commission of an offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years, to a fine or to both, or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Tom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu of Lords amendment 1.
Lords amendment 4, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (f) in lieu.
Lords amendment 5, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 6, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 7, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 8, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 9, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 52, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 53, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 10, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 11, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 12, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 13, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 14, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 15, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 16, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 17, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 18, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 19, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 20, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 54, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 2, 3, 43 to 51 and 21.
Mr Speaker, may I begin by joining in, on behalf of the Home Office, your tribute to PC Keith Palmer, who lost his life five years ago today? All of us who were in the House will never forget that day. It was an enormous tragedy; he died in the line of service, protecting our democracy and the people in this place. We will be forever grateful to him and his family, and our thoughts are very much with them today, and with everybody caught up in that terrible tragedy on Westminster bridge.
This country has a long and proud tradition of providing sanctuary to those in need. The British people are generous and compassionate, and we only have to look around us to see that compassion in action right now. I think I speak for the whole House in thanking everyone stepping up to support people fleeing the conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine.
This Bill is about delivering a long-term solution to the long-term problems that have beset the asylum system over decades. It has three central objectives: to make the system fairer and more effective so we can better protect and support those in genuine need; to deter illegal entry, breaking the business model of evil criminal trafficking; and to make it easier to remove those with no right to be here.
The reforms we are introducing through this Bill have been debated at length both in this House and the other place, and I want to put on record my thanks to all Members for the rigour with which they have scrutinised the measures we have proposed. I also want to say that as the Bill has progressed through Parliament, this Government have been listening carefully to the questions and concerns raised not only by Members but by the many organisations, communities and individuals who have been carefully following its progress.
We have amended the Bill to clarify that new measures to tackle people smugglers will not criminalise those acting under the direction of Her Majesty’s Coastguard. We have also introduced an amendment to resolve the lawful residence issue that has troubled many individuals with indefinite leave to remain under the EU settlement scheme and who wish to naturalise but have not previously held comprehensive sickness insurance.
In response to the appalling situation in Ukraine, we have added new powers to enable us to impose visa penalties on countries posing a threat to international peace and security or whose actions lead, or are likely to lead, to armed conflict or a breach of humanitarian law. We have also announced an expansion of the Hong Kong British national overseas route, which will enable individuals aged 18 or over who were born on or after 1 July 1997 and have at least one BNO parent to apply to the route independently.
Before going further, I would like to say something more about the situation in Ukraine, in particular the calls we have heard in respect of unaccompanied children. We of course recognise the deeply troubling circumstances faced by all Ukrainians who are caught up in this conflict, and we of course acknowledge calls for support to Ukrainian orphans and unaccompanied children. However, the UK cannot act unilaterally on such matters, and the views of affected Governments must be taken into account. The Ukrainian Government have been clear that children must not be taken into care without the prior agreement of their authorities; we cannot simply transfer unaccompanied minors to the UK without first securing their authorisation. It may be in the best interests of many children to remain in the region given that it is common for those labelled as orphans by the media who are in the Ukrainian care system to have living parents, and ultimately their Government, whom they are not fleeing, should have the final say on these matters.
We are working urgently, however, with the authorities in Ukraine and Poland to secure the final agreements needed to bring to the UK a group of over 50 Ukrainian children, known as the Dnipro kids, who have escaped the brutal war and are currently in Poland. I recognise that many Members are following that issue closely and have a keen interest in it, and Home Office Ministers will keep the House updated. This is a complex case, and it is absolutely right that we wait for the appropriate checks and written permissions before bringing these children to the UK. The Home Secretary and her counterparts in the Ukrainian, Polish and Scottish Governments are united in their determination to ensure these children get the right support and the care they need.
However, I remind the House that our Ukraine family scheme also provides an immediate pathway for those Ukrainians, including unaccompanied children subject to safeguarding checks, with family already settled in the UK to come to our country. We would expect most children to apply in family groups, such as a parent with a child, but I can assure colleagues that this scheme is designed to allow as many people as possible to come to the UK and to give them immediate access to the support they need. We must do nothing less.
Returning to the Bill, Members will have seen that many amendments were proposed and agreed to during its passage through the other place, including some proposed by the Government. The Government have carefully considered each of the non-Government amendments, and I would like to explain what we have concluded and why. But before doing so, I would like to offer an apology to the House for the late publication of the updated explanatory notes. Manuscript copies of the updated notes have been distributed, but I accept that they should have been published online on Friday, and I am sorry that this did not happen—for that discourtesy I genuinely am apologetic, Mr Speaker.
On amendment 1, relating to access to British overseas territories citizenship and British citizenship for Chagossians, I again place on record my sympathy with the Chagossians for how they were treated in the 1960s and 1970s. I also want to place on record my admiration for the way in which Members from across the House have championed their cause, in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Henry Smith), who has been a consistent and tireless advocate on this issue for many years; he has run an exceptional campaign. We have listened carefully to the concerns raised in both Houses and in the Chagossian community on the difficulties faced by Chagossians in accessing British nationality. These difficulties have arisen from the unique historical treatment of those who were removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s and 1970s and the limited recognition of those circumstances in British nationality law. Given that, the Government have concluded it would be appropriate to take action in this Bill, consistent with our other measures designed to correct historical unfairness in nationality law, and will put forward an amendment as such. This will mean there is a new route to British nationality for direct descendants of the Chagossians removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory. In doing that, we are satisfied that the Chagossian diaspora is unique and we are not setting a precedent that would undermine the general principles governing the acquisition of British citizenship by descent. Further details will follow in due course, and I want again to say a huge “Well done and congratulations” to my hon. Friend for helping us to bring about this important change.
This is, I think, at least one small point of agreement, but can the Minister explain why the amendment passed in the House of Lords is not acceptable in that form to the Government, and in particular whether the provision in the amendment that no charge will be made for Chagossians applying for citizenship will be retained somehow?
The direct answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that we judged that the amendment tabled in the House of Lords is technically deficient. I can confirm, however, that this route is free and there will be no good character requirement associated with it. We think the way this is presented in response to the Lords amendment is the correct way to progress and that it recognises the broad agreement for this, delivering on precisely what this House and the other place wish to see. I think we can all come together and be very pleased about that.
Amendment 4 removes the clause from the Bill that contains our proposals regarding notification requirements for those who are subject to a deprivation of citizenship decision. Deprivation is necessary to protect the public from those seeking to do serious harm, such as terrorists, or those who acquired their citizenship by fraudulent means. I again emphasise that the underlying deprivation of citizenship power is a century old, is only used in a small number of cases, is never used to target people because of their ethnic or religious background, and always comes with a right of appeal. The changes we want to make do not change any of that. This measure is simply about how we notify someone of the intention to remove their citizenship. It is necessary in order to ensure that we are able to use this power where we cannot contact a person; for example, because they are in a warzone. When contact is made, that person will be able to appeal the deprivation decision as usual.
We have considered very carefully amendments to the deprivation of citizenship clause tabled by Lord Anderson of Ipswich and agreed to in the other place. Lord Anderson’s amendments provide more clarity on the reasons for not giving notice of a deprivation decision, as well as introducing a degree of judicial oversight of the decision not to give notice. We are content that the original intention of the clause is not altered by these amendments, and we are satisfied that the amendments will enable us to protect the rights of the individual while delivering on our security objectives.
I thank the Minister for taking the time to meet me and other colleagues with large ethnic minority communities in their constituencies, such as the Pakistani Kashmiri community that I am proud to have in Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, and for giving that clarification and accepting the Lords amendments. They will help to ensure that it is made clear to people in that community that they should not fear, despite some of the misinformation produced by certain Members of the House outside the Chamber.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point and for the engagement I have had with him on these matters throughout the passage of the Bill. I genuinely hope that the amendments in lieu we propose today, which draw on the sensible and reasonable suggestions made by Lord Anderson in the other place, will help to provide reassurance about oversight and the nature of the mechanisms. The way in which some individuals have sought to present the issue in the public narrative is regrettable, but I hope that people will recognise that it is about protecting the British people from high-harm individuals, some of whom are in a war zone and have no regard whatsoever for the harm that they would cause on the streets of our country. We are exceptionally mindful of that. The first responsibility of any British Government is to keep the British people safe. The amendments will help us to do just that.
I entirely support what the Minister is saying. Does he agree that citizenship of this country not only accrues rights but demands responsibilities? When people shy away from those responsibilities and ally themselves with a cultural value set so alien to ours that we cannot even recognise it, that must have consequences.
I agree with my hon. Friend’s assessment that citizenship of this country comes with rights and responsibilities, and with recognition and acceptance of important constitutional principles including the rule of law. Those are all fundamental and central to the way in which our society has developed and is crafted and on which it stands. They are important principles that we all accept are crucial.
For the record, just so that we are all absolutely clear, we on the Government Benches, as elsewhere, strongly support the full integration of every community and British passport holder. The Government amendment will make it absolutely clear above all to Muslims of all places of origin and above all those born and bred in the UK that there is no threat to them whatsoever.
My hon. Friend puts it better than I could. He has stated with crystal clarity the nature of the change, which I believe is enhanced and improved by accepting the sensible and pragmatic amendments tabled by Lord Anderson. It is also worth saying for the benefit of the House that taking out of the equation the issue of citizenship being obtained by fraud, the provision relates to 19 cases a year on average, and the changes we are making through the Bill do not alter the qualification, so no additional individuals will be brought into scope. The changes relate purely to the matter of notification.
On a procedural note, I should say that although Lord Anderson’s amendments were agreed in the other place, they were deleted when peers agreed to remove the substantive deprivation of citizenship clause from the Bill. The Government are therefore retabling the substantive clause, as amended by peers to include Lord Anderson’s amendments. I hope that meets with the favour of the House. It acts on and reflects the desire expressed for greater safeguards and greater clarity on these measures.
Amendment 5 inserts a clause specifying that nothing in the part of the Bill to which it applies authorises any policies or decisions that are incompatible with the 1951 refugee convention or the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees. It is the clear position of this Government that everything we are doing is compatible with all our obligations under international law. We do not think it is necessary to set that out on the face of the Bill. The Government therefore do not agree to the amendment.
The Minister will be aware that there is a massive range of legal opinion and that the opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is that that is not the case at all when a lot of what is going on in part two of the Bill is in flagrant breach of the refugee convention. If the Minister is so certain that the powers do not breach the refugee convention, what is the harm to him of accepting the amendment?
We do not see a need to augment the Bill in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests. A plethora of opinions are expressed in the House and more generally when we debate the nature of what is proposed and whether people think it is the right thing to do. We are clear as a Government that we think that the package of measures we are introducing through the Bill is a proportionate response to the issues we face and will fix the broken asylum system in particular. We are also clear—and I have been clear on many occasions in this House and through the various iterations of the Bill—that we will at all times live up to our international obligations.
History suggests that the day will come when the hon. Gentleman’s party is not in government, and it is eminently possible that there will one day be a Government who wish to depart from our obligations under the 1951 convention. Is that not why it is a good idea to have such a provision on the face of the Bill?
Any Government in such circumstances could amend the primary legislation to remove that requirement. I also make the crucial point that we have an independent judiciary in this country, and it is open to people to bring points of challenge where they believe that there are grounds for doing so. It is fair to say that that is a regular occurrence in our society and a cornerstone of how our government, politics and society have evolved over centuries. No doubt that will continue to be the case, but let me again be very clear that the Government have acted and will continue to act in accordance with our international obligations. I must be very clear on that point.
Lords amendment 6 removes the clause from the Bill that establishes our differentiated approach to those who are recognised as refugees. That is an essential and fundamental part of our plan to deter people from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK. We therefore cannot agree to the amendment, which will simply encourage people to continue to risk their lives at sea.
Does the Minister agree that amendment 6 is a huge slap in the face for all those people who play by the rules and engage in proper legal processes to get to this country, whether they are a refugee or not?
My hon. Friend and I have had many conversations about this topic over recent months and he makes a genuine point that individuals coming to this country illegally makes it more difficult for us to help genuine refugees in the way that we all want to. We see that reflected in the generosity of spirit shown across the country as people offered help in response to the Afghan crisis and to what we are seeing unfold so tragically in Ukraine. There is an outpouring of emotion and wanting to help, but there is also genuine concern about people putting their lives in the hands of evil criminal gangs, and paying significant sums of money to those gangs, which have no regard for human life and are willing in effect to play roulette with the safety of the people they are transporting.
The Minister may be aware that at present Opposition Members, especially Labour Members, are struggling to tell the difference between a man and a woman, so it is no surprise that they are struggling to tell the difference between a genuine refugee and an economic migrant. Would it not be wise of the Minister to remind those on the Labour Front Bench what the difference is?
I certainly think that my hon. Friend’s constituents and mine, and people across the country, feel strongly—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) is chuntering from a sedentary position, but I will make the point that, no matter where they are in the country, people feel very strongly that individuals should not put their lives in the hands of evil criminal gangs, whose only motivation is to turn a profit by taking greater and greater risks with the lives of the individuals they are putting in small boats. I would argue that we, as a Government and in this House, have a duty to stop that happening. That is precisely what the measures in the Bill are designed to do, while at the same time providing safe and legal passage for people who require sanctuary to come to this country, and enabling us to care for them properly when they are here. That is an absolutely humane and decent stance to take, and one that I will continue to passionately defend.
Amendment 7 would change our approach to allowing people who are claiming asylum to work by reducing the period in which claimants may not work from 12 months to six months, as well as removing the condition restricting jobs for those who are allowed to work to those on the shortage occupation list.
It seems that amendment 7 goes to the heart of what we are talking about today. Does the Minister agree that the Bill, taken as a whole, is a package, and that if we start amending it in this way to facilitate economic migration, we will end any chance we have of stopping cross-channel migration, stopping the evil criminal gangs and taking back control of our borders? This is a package, and I am afraid we have to vote down all the amendments.
I am very grateful to my right hon. Friend, who is a passionate advocate of taking action to address those concerns. I argue that this is a package of measures that come together. There is no one single intervention that will solve this problem. We must have a robust and proportionate approach to tackling, for example, very dangerous channel crossings—in November, we saw a tragic loss of life that none of us wants to be repeated—while also ensuring we have safe and legal routes by which people can come to this country to get the sanctuary they need when they find themselves in desperate circumstances. That is what I believe the Government are delivering.
The right to work, while well meaning, would undermine our economic migration scheme and allow people to bypass it over and above those who follow the proper process by applying for visas and paying relevant fees to work in the UK. We cannot allow that to happen. I must therefore advise the House that we cannot accept the amendment.
Amendment 8 prevents third country inadmissibility measures from coming into force until formal returns agreements are in place. We expect to work with our international partners to tackle the shared challenges of illegal migration. We continue to seek effective returns agreements to ensure that people can be removed from our country when they have no right to be here. In the meantime, we want to continue resolve cases where we can on a case-by-case basis.
As I have said many times before, those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. The first safe country principle is widely recognised internationally.
Will the Minister explain to me how the United Kingdom can ever be the first safe country of arrival for someone fleeing a war zone or a natural disaster. If you leave without all your paperwork, how can you ever get to the United Kingdom before anywhere else when we are surrounded by water?
We have many resettlement routes whereby people can come to this country. I have said this several times in the House, and it bears repeating now, that people getting in small boats to come to the United Kingdom are coming from perfectly safe countries at great risk, and they are lining the pockets of evil criminal gangs, which funds wider criminality, when there are fully functional and appropriate asylum systems, where people can gain help and support, that they are leaving to make those perilous journeys. It is also important to point out—I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is a particularly keen advocate of the European Union and wishes we were a member of it—that it is a fundamental feature of the common European asylum system that people should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Without any enforcement of that, we simply encourage criminal smugglers to continue to exploit vulnerable migrants and leave flows of migrants across Europe, which culminate in the dangerous channel crossings. The Bill’s inadmissibility measures are an essential part of our approach to enforcing the safe first country principle, and for that reason we cannot agree to the amendment.
I am conscious that I need to make some progress, so I will continue for now. I have been quite generous, and I will see how I get on in the next few minutes.
Amendments 9, 52 and 53 would delete from the Bill provisions that would make it easier to remove an individual from the UK while their asylum claim is pending. We have said repeatedly that while people are dying making dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK, we must consider every option to discourage people from funding criminal gangs and putting their lives at risk by crossing the channel. That includes the option of processing of asylum claims overseas. We must ensure we have the flexibility to do everything we can to disincentivise people from putting themselves and others at risk and lining the pockets of people smugglers. That is the clear rationale for this policy. I want to make it absolutely clear again that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children will not have their claims processed overseas.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He talked about unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, but that means he is not ruling out other children being placed in awful offshore detention facilities. Will he publish an economic impact assessment on how many billions of pounds this will cost the taxpayer? It has been promised for months.
I am not going to get drawn into listing all other possible exemptions to removal in that way, but I set out on Report that, for example, family groups would not be separated, because that would clearly not be in accordance with our international obligations. Clearly, much will depend on the particular circumstances of the countries we are working with. We always work in the asylum system and in the immigration space on a case-by-case basis, but I want to assure hon. Members that we will continue to uphold our international obligations and ensure that any removal is compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention and article 3 of the European convention on human rights, which protects against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
I am aware that there has been speculation recently about the potential costs of, and possible locations for, overseas asylum claim processing. I cannot give a running commentary on negotiations, nor share information that could tie the hands of the negotiators. I only say again that the provisions are an essential part of the suite of measures that we are introducing to deliver our objective of discouraging unwanted behaviours, such as making unnecessary and dangerous journeys, and we therefore cannot agree to the amendments.
Amendment 10 creates a more generous approach on family reunion for those who are already in Europe, which we do not consider fair. There is already generous provision in our rules for family reunion, under which more than 40,000 people have been reunited with family members in the UK since 2015. This is a single global approach to family reunion, which does not encourage what are often dangerous journeys into Europe, facilitated by smugglers and traffickers. We therefore cannot support the amendment. Similarly, amendment 11 would commit the UK to resettling at least 10,000 refugees each year.
Our view has long been that the number of refugees and people in need of protection that we resettle each year must be based on our capacity, our assessment of the international situation and our ability to care for people properly when they come to the UK. I understand that hon. Members are seeking assurances that our doors will remain open to those in need, but I respectfully suggest that what is really needed to deliver refugee resettlement is not a number but an approach—an approach that is compassionate and flexible. That is exactly what the Government are delivering through our new plan for immigration.
Coming back to amendment 10, which the Minister is grouping together, he just said that we already have a very generous family reunion scheme, but is it not the case that our current family reunion scheme is considerably less generous than the Dublin III arrangements we had pre-Brexit? If we are genuinely to accommodate a lot of children who have lost their parents and for whom their last surviving relative may be an aunt, uncle, brother or sister who has made it legally to the UK, we need to expand the scheme.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. This is an area that he is very passionate about and has a considerable knowledge of. He will recognise that we have a global approach to family reunion, which is an important distinction when compared with Dublin III. It would be useful for us as Ministers to meet him, as a former Children’s Minister, to discuss his ideas. As I say, I know he takes a passionate and keen interest in these matters. Family reunion is something we continue to be committed to. As I said in my opening remarks on the situation in Ukraine, it is an area where, for example in response to that crisis, we are constantly reviewing what we can do to assist with that issue and challenge. The Dnipro Kids situation illustrates the work we are doing in that space. Of course, there has to be agreement with the Ukrainian Government and the Polish Government to progress on that, but it shows the pragmatic approach we are willing to take on these matters to be responsive to crises as they arise and to ensure that we do our bit to try to support those children wherever we can.
I do not wish to detain the House for longer than necessary, but I think it would be helpful for me to set out the safe and legal routes that we have to the UK. The UK resettlement scheme, which was launched in February 2021, prioritises the resettlement of refugees, including children, in regions of conflict and instability. The number of refugees we resettle each year depends on a variety of factors, including local authorities’ capacity to support refugees and the number of community groups willing to take part. There were 1,131 refugees resettled in the UK through that scheme in the year ending December 2021.
I have given way to my hon. Friend already and I am keen to make some progress, because I am conscious that a lot of Members want to speak.
The community sponsorship scheme enables local community groups to welcome refugees to the UK and provide housing and support. In the year ending December 2021, there were 144 refugees resettled through that scheme.
The mandate resettlement scheme was launched in 1995. That global scheme resettles refugees with a close family member in the UK who is willing to accommodate them. Since published statistics began in 2008, there have been 435 refugees resettled through that route, as of September 2021.
Refugee family reunion allows a spouse or partner and children under 18 of those granted protection in the UK to join them here, if they formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled the country. There is discretion to grant leave outside of the immigration rules for extended family members in exceptional circumstances. We have granted over 40,000 refugee family reunion visas since 2015, of which more than half were granted to children. In 2021, there were 6,134 family reunion visas issued, which was an increase of 28% on the previous year. Again, more than half were issued to children.
In August 2021, we announced the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme, one of the most generous schemes in our country’s history. That scheme will give up to 20,000 people at risk a new life in the UK, including women and girls, members of ethnic or religious minorities and people who are LGBT+.
In addition, under the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, current or former locally employed staff who are assessed to be under serious threat to life are offered priority relocation to the UK. Through that route, we have relocated more than 7,000 locally employed staff and their family members since April 2021, in addition to 1,400 former staff and families who were relocated under the previous ex gratia scheme for Afghan interpreters.
The Ukraine family scheme, which was launched on 4 March, allows British nationals and people settled in the UK to bring family members to the UK. That covers immediate family members as well as parents, grandparents, children over 18 and siblings, aunts, uncles, nephews, nieces, cousins and in-laws. Individuals will be granted leave for three years and will be able to work and access public services and benefits. As of 20 March, 61,100 applications had been started, 31,500 had been submitted and 10,200 visas had been issued.
The Homes for Ukraine scheme, which was launched on 14 March, will allow individuals, charities, community groups and businesses in the UK to bring Ukrainians to safety, including those with no family ties to the UK. There will be no limit on arrivals and, again, those who come here will have access to public services and benefits.
May I clarify a point on the two-tier system to which the Minister is asking the House to agree? If a Ukrainian who has relatives in the UK comes here, we will accept them. If a refugee from Ukraine comes here on a sponsorship scheme, we will accept them. What if somebody from Ukraine just turns up? Will they be removed to a safe country that they have come from? Will they be removed to a third country that they can apply from? What will we do for those Ukrainians who flee from the murderous despot Putin and come here by an irregular route? Do they have to come on an inflatable?
Let me be very clear: there is absolutely no reason why any Ukrainian should pay an evil people smuggler to come to be safe in the United Kingdom. I have set out the detail of our two generous schemes, which are uncapped and wide in capturing people’s many and varied circumstances. I would not want anybody—this applies to any group—to put their life in the hands of evil criminal gangs who have only one regard, which is to turn a profit, putting those individuals in great danger. We have had many debates about the nature and construction of the Ukrainian scheme and I am confident that there is no reason why people should resort to that means of travelling to the United Kingdom. Nobody should encourage Ukrainians, or anybody else for that matter, to make those perilous journeys.
I have given way to the hon. Gentleman a few times and I want to conclude my remarks.
The Minister is being very generous. He gave detailed numbers on how many visas had been granted in all the schemes that he read out. I note that he did not include the number of visas granted under the Homes for Ukraine scheme. Will he update the House on how many visas the Home Office has issued under that scheme as of today?
I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand, but we hope to be able to say more on that very soon. It is the early days of that scheme but we have seen an overwhelmingly generous response from people offering sanctuary in their homes, and we want to take up those offers. I look forward to being able to say more about the figures on early implementation as soon as we can.
I understand the concerns raised by right hon. and hon. Members, but I hope that those schemes speak of our willingness to respond to international crises with compassion and to support higher numbers of refugees and people in need of protection when necessary. That is our approach, so we do not think that it is necessary to put a number in statute.
I understand the rationale behind Lords amendment 12, which relates to grants of asylum connected with cases of genocide. We, of course, stand by victims of genocide. Whether or not a determination of genocide is made, the UK is committed to seeking an end to serious violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. We are also committed to preventing the escalation of any such violations and alleviating the suffering of those affected, but it is not practical for us to be bound to consider asylum claims in British missions from the very large number of individuals overseas who might like to come here. Even with a cap on the number of individuals, we can expect many thousands of applications, which UK caseworkers would need to assess individually to determine whether each individual belongs to the specific group found to be at risk. We do not think that is practical.
To clarify the Minister’s point, is he saying that the opposition to Lords amendment 12 is on an administrative rather than a humanitarian basis? He seems to suggest that there may be too many people coming for the British embassies to handle. Surely that is no basis to turn our backs on people who are victims of genocide.
I do not accept the hon. Member’s characterisation of those remarks for a minute. My primary concern is twofold: to ensure that staff, for example, in British missions are safe and not put at risk; and to ensure that individuals turning up at British missions are also not put at undue risk, considering the sorts of circumstances that we are talking about in such debates and the lengths to which some countries will go to persecute individuals when genocide is relevant. Our approach is better: to develop bespoke schemes as circumstances arise with similar accessibility to the schemes that I described. We would argue that that is the right approach.
I do not understand the rationale behind Lords amendments 13 to 19. They would delete the new offence of knowingly arriving in the UK without a valid entry clearance, and that could make it impossible to take enforcement action against someone who has arrived in, but not technically “entered”, the UK without clearance. That would compromise our plans to enhance the security of our borders, so we cannot accept those amendments.
Similarly, I cannot say that I understand the rationale behind Lords amendment 20, which would compromise our plans to enhance our ability to prosecute people smugglers. It would do that by preserving the status quo in legislation, which means that prosecutors have to prove that people smugglers are acting for gain. Time and again, however, that requirement has been found to have significant operational limitations. We need to remove it to ensure that the lives of vulnerable people are not put at risk by the actions of people smugglers and that traffickers are brought to justice for the misery that they inflict.
I have already taken one intervention from the hon. Gentleman and I want to conclude my speech quickly.
Lords amendment 54 would mean that powers set out in the part of the Bill to which it applies
“must not be used in a manner or in circumstances that could endanger life at sea.”
I take this opportunity to again place on record my admiration for the incredibly brave individuals who engage in rescue work. I also want to make it absolutely clear that our priority is always to save and preserve lives. We are proud of our heritage as a great seafaring nation and will always lead the way globally in complying with our relevant domestic and international obligations, including those under the UN convention on the law of the sea. We do not think it necessary to put those commitments in the Bill and we therefore do not support the amendment.
I wish to speak in favour of Government amendments 2 and 3, together with amendments 42 to 51. The amendments will resolve the lawful residence issue for individuals with indefinite leave to remain under the EU settlement scheme who wish to naturalise, but have not previously held comprehensive sickness insurance.
The problem is that those who wish to become British citizens based on a period of residence in the UK need to have been in the UK lawfully—for five years, for most people—before making their application. Unfortunately, a number of European economic area nationals or their family members do not currently meet that requirement because they did not hold comprehensive sickness insurance, which was a legal requirement for those who were in the UK as students or as self-sufficient persons. They could still be granted indefinite leave to remain, also known as settled status, under the EU settlement scheme, which did not have a lawful residence requirement, but they would not technically meet the requirements for citizenship.
May I make it clear, for the benefit of the House, that the suggestion about Ascension Island is untrue?
I thank the Minister for that intervention.
Offshoring in Australia costs roughly $1 billion a year, for about 300 people. Experts in Australia have also said that it is not effective as a deterrent, and that the vast majority of those offshored are now back in Australia as a result of mental and physical suffering.
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron), even though, as is sadly often the case, he ruined some respectable points with absurd hyperbole. This Bill is not the living embodiment of meanness. It is actually a reasonable and proper attempt to try to deal with a system that has evolved to become very complex. It now has distinctions that are out of date because of our departure from the EU. Having worked with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on aspects of this Bill, I can say that it is in direct fulfilment of our manifesto commitment. There is no doubt in my mind about its importance and about the need for it to be passed.
There is, however, reasonable question to ask about the position of asylum seekers being able to undertake work after six months. I have long regarded as unnecessary the waste of not just lives but expenditure when asylum seekers have to stay in a state of limbo, often for years, before knowing whether their claim is to be accepted. It is unnecessary because people who are in this position have a contribution to make to our society. That is not particularly controversial or a view confined to political parties. It is supported by a broad coalition of people of all colours and none. Indeed, a YouGov poll showed that 81% of people who were asked agreed with the principle of allowing asylum seekers the right to work. As we reset the system through this Bill, we have an opportunity to do something that has the merit of being both practical and right. We are conferring the right to work on our friends from Ukraine who are arriving in our country after fleeing war and persecution, so why not do the same for others who are and fleeing persecution and seeking asylum?
After the Government did whatever it took to save millions of jobs during the covid pandemic, we now face a significant undersupply of workers. Allowing access to gainful economic activity for some asylum seekers achieves several things. It helps in some measure to answer that question about labour shortage. It will bring in revenue to the Exchequer—the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) mentioned a figure of £200 million, and the potential revenue is certainly in the hundreds of millions. When we put on the other side of the balance the fact that asylum accommodation costs £350 million a year, we can start to see why the numbers add up.
In my constituency, working with The Harbour Project in Swindon, which helps people in my dispersal centre to deal with the effects of the wait for resolution, I have seen for myself the effects on their mental health of having nothing to do. Even volunteering is different.
I am grateful for the constructive way my right hon. and learned Friend is making his case. If he is agreeable, I would be keen to meet him to discuss the issue and the arguments he makes, and to set out some of the work we are doing on transforming the speed at which asylum cases are processed, which I hope will also help to allay some of his concerns.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that offer, which I accept with alacrity. I would like to bring colleagues such as the noble Baroness Stroud, who did so much work on this issue, to meet him and officials to look into the detail of the volunteering question in particular. While we encourage asylum seekers to volunteer and they get reasonable expenses, even payments in kind for the volunteering they do are prohibited. There is a real issue there that is preventing many people from making a contribution to the local community, as I have seen for myself in Swindon.
We know the reality that many people under that pressure go off the radar. They end up being exploited, or even bound into modern-day slavery, and we lose them from the entire system. The effect of creating a right to work could deal a hammer blow to that type of exploitation.
I therefore welcome the comments of my hon. Friend the Minister and urge the Government, in the spirit of co-operation, to look carefully at how we can do what other countries such as Denmark have started to do in allowing some asylum seekers the right to work. The Migration Advisory Committee has said there is no meaningful evidence to suggest that doing so would create a pull factor. The question is begged: if that is a pull factor, why do we have small boats now?
I must say to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Jonathan Gullis) that Glasgow is far more diverse and far more welcoming of refugees than he will ever be. We in Glasgow are proud to welcome refugees. We are proud of our diversity I have been inundated with emails from my constituents about this anti-refugee Bill, and not one of those emails has been in support of the Government’s position, or of this anti-refugee Bill which will punish people who are fleeing from war, persecution and female genital mutilation in countries around the world.
In the past seven years I have dealt with 1,853 immigration cases, and all of them have been riddled with Home Office incompetence and Home Office indifference to the plight of my constituents, whom I value and whom I want to be welcome in Glasgow. That indifference and that incompetence are deliberate. They are meant to make people feel unwelcome, and they run absolutely contrary to everything that my constituents stand for. I am very proud that those in Kenmure Street in Pollokshields came out of their houses when they saw the attempts to take people away in Home Office vans and said, “These are our neighbours—let them go.” Glasgow welcomes refugees, and we want nothing to do with this vicious Bill.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker. Let me begin by thanking Members for their contributions to today’s debate. We have heard thought-provoking speeches from Members in all parts of the House. There can be no doubt about the strength of feeling on these important issues; there can also be no doubt that as a House, we stand united in our desire to support vulnerable people, in accordance with our long-standing tradition of welcoming those in need of protection. We perhaps just disagree on how that can best be achieved. Nevertheless, it is frustrating that criticism is often not matched by a credible alternative plan.
Let me touch on some of the issues that have been raised. The hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) mentioned the plight of the Yazidis. I can confirm that we have resettled over 40 Yazidi people through both the United Kingdom resettlement scheme and, previously, the vulnerable persons resettlement scheme. The UK is firmly committed to protecting ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq. We raise this issue regularly with the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and continue to monitor the situation of Yazidis and other minority groups in Iraq.
I also want to clarify the position with regard to illegal entry offences. I think it worth restating the position that I have consistently maintained in the House. This is not an attempt to prosecute every illegal entrant. Instead, prosecutions will focus on egregious cases: for example, cases in which an individual has entered in breach of a deportation order, or was previously removed as an illegal entrant or overstayer. We intend to take a firm stance in such cases, in order not to inadvertently reward such individuals with a grant of leave rather than punishing their abuse of the system. We are working closely with the police and our internal investigation teams to ensure that this policy is properly enforced, but is also proportionate.
It is misleading to say that genuine humanitarian rescues will be criminalised. We need to be clear about this to ensure that people are not concerned when undertaking those important activities. Individuals and organisations will be able to continue to rescue people in danger or in distress at sea, as they do now. It may be perfectly reasonable for people to be taken to the UK, depending on the circumstances—for example, the weather conditions, or a commercial ferry continuing its scheduled route. Decisions on whether to prosecute are taken by the relevant prosecution authorities in the UK, taking into account evidential and public interest tests. That is a well established process that applies to the law in this land in many areas. Before prosecutors make such a decision, a referral by investigators is required. To make that, investigators must believe that there is sufficient evidence to prove that the person concerned was not actually carrying out a rescue of someone in danger or distress. I cannot be clearer about this.
On the issue of the right to work, a number of colleagues have raised concerns and suggestions. One clear distinction I would like to make is on the point about Ukrainians and Afghans being in a position to work. Those individuals have come through safe and legal routes—bespoke routes—that the UK Government established to provide sanctuary. That is an important distinction. I refer Members to my earlier observations on the policy more generally, but I very much look forward to the meeting with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) to ensure that we explore this and discuss thoroughly the concerns and views that colleagues are expressing.
On Lords amendment 11 and the 10,000 resettlement figure, I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green), who so eloquently set out his case. We genuinely believe that flexibility is important in developing schemes and guidance. That is a position that I have maintained throughout the Bill’s passage. It will mean that we are able to develop bespoke schemes that take account of circumstances at any given time in the world, and that we are properly able to care for people in a responsible and managed manner. That is important, as is taking proper account of the capacity of local services at any given point in time. I would argue that the response to the Afghanistan and Ukraine crises demonstrates what can be achieved and why that approach makes sense and is better than having prescriptive schemes set down in legislation that are difficult to alter or remove should circumstances mean that they are no longer required. It is right to identify what routes are needed at any given point in time and then to resource them appropriately. We are of course looking at what more can be done, particularly around community sponsorship and global resettlement schemes, and I hope that that provides some reassurance about our intentions. I hear the observation that colleagues have raised today about generosity and ensuring that our schemes are comprehensive and meet the needs that exist—
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 24, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 23, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 25, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 26, and Government motion to disagree, and amendments (a) and (b) in lieu.
Lords amendment 27, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 40, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 28 to 39, 42 and 41.
We now turn to the remaining amendments. Amendment 22 relates to our plans for conducting assessments of age-disputed people. Scientific methods of age assessment are already in use by many European countries, and the Bill will bring us into line with them. Failure to ensure proper assessments creates obvious safeguarding concerns and, of course, can create a plethora of risks to the most vulnerable when we get it wrong. I know those concerns are shared across the House. This amendment creates numerous restrictions on our ability to use age assessments in practice.
First, I want to make it very clear there is no appetite to start conducting comprehensive age assessments where there is no doubt about someone’s claimed age. Such an approach would serve no purpose whatsoever and would take significant resources away from the main task of seeking to establish the age of those involved where age is in doubt. However, there is no question but that the system is being abused, and we need to put a stop to that.
Secondly, the amendment would require that only local authority social workers could undertake age assessments under the Bill. There is significant variation in the experience and capacity of local authorities to undertake these age assessments, which are a significant resource burden on them. The Home Office already leads on other vulnerability areas, with responsibility for making complex and significant decisions such as claims for asylum. For these reasons, we are seeking to establish a national age assessment board comprising qualified social workers employed by the Home Office who may undertake age assessments upon referral by a local authority. Local authorities will retain the ability to conduct these assessments if they wish to do so.
Thirdly, the amendment would ensure that scientific methods of age assessment are specified only if they are considered ethical and accurate beyond reasonable doubt and approved by relevant professional bodies.
The British Dental Association has highlighted specific concerns, on ethical, health and accuracy grounds, about using X-rays to assess the age of asylum applicants. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for listening to these worries, but I would be grateful if my hon. Friend the Minister confirmed that the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee that has been set up to look at this process could include a practising dentist.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that suggestion. I know that he has discussed this issue with the Home Secretary separately. I am not in a position to give him a firm undertaking today, but we will certainly take away and consider that particular point, and perhaps we could remain in contact on it. I am grateful for his input in relation to this aspect of the policy.
No one method of age assessment is likely to be accurate beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, this amendment sets an unrealistic expectation on what scientific methods could achieve. The expertise required spans a number of areas, and the independent Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee has been set up to advise on this complex topic.
Does the Minister agree that the burden imposed by some of the risks inherent in uncertain age is quite a significant concern for local authorities? Does he recognise, as I do, that the current Merton-compliant age assessment process, which is considered the gold standard, is the result of a number of judicial reviews over the years that have included consideration of scientific method? Beyond that, does he welcome, as I do, the additional clarity that the Government will in future be able to use scientific methods that do meet the required ethical standards in order to assist local authorities and address some of the remaining uncertainty?
My hon. Friend, who speaks with real experience given his time as a distinguished local authority leader, raises an important point. Of course these ethical considerations are very important in relation to all this. I am acutely mindful of the enormous burden that age assessment has placed on local authorities over a number of years. Some local authorities do this work very well, but the situation is patchy. The capacity that exists, and the speed, thoroughness and ease with which this work is done, depends on where you are in the country. It is important that we are developing this national resource to help with some of this work so as to relieve some of the burdens. One thing I will certainly want the national age assessment board to do is reflect on the best practice that exists in local authorities around the country and bring together that model of best practice to make sure that we get this right.
Finally, the amendment would lower the current standard of proof for social worker age assessments from the “balance of probabilities”, which is long established in case law, to a “reasonable degree of likelihood”. Lowering this standard would require social workers to accept individuals as children whom on balance they believe to be adults. For the House’s benefit, it is important to note that there are safeguarding considerations that flow in either direction. Children being placed in adult settings is clearly not acceptable, and it is not good for adults to be placed in children’s settings either. For those reasons, we cannot accept the amendment.
I will turn to consider the amendments relating to modern slavery, beginning with amendments 23 and 24, which would omit from the Bill the clause that deals with late compliance with a slavery or trafficking information notice. I understand the motivations behind the concerns expressed by the noble Lords who tabled these amendments. This Government are completely committed to supporting victims of modern slavery and tackling perpetrators, but removing the clause would mean that we were unable to clearly set out the consequences of not complying with the slavery or trafficking information notice, which would not help decision makers or individuals involved in the process. It would also create a lack of transparency and certainty.
It is clear on the face of the Bill that where there is good reason for late compliance, there will be no damage to credibility. We have given repeated assurances that, in keeping with the approach taken in our current statutory guidance, “good reasons” will allow for things such as individual vulnerabilities or the effect traumatic events and coercive control can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share, or recognise such events. I expect that work to be carried out through a trauma-informed approach, which will ensure that decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider “good reasons” without prejudging what that should cover. We therefore cannot agree to the amendments.
Amendment 25 would remove from the Bill the clause that deals with disqualification from modern slavery protections where an individual is a threat to public order or has claimed to be a victim in bad faith. It would replace the clause with a new clause that does not provide a definition for public order and, as a result, the Government would remain unable to operationalise the public order disqualification. That would mean we were unable to remove individuals who had committed serious criminal offences or who posed a risk to national security, despite it being in line with our international obligations to do so.
The Government have been clear that the disqualification will not be applied in a blanket manner. Rather, following a referral to the national referral mechanism, where an individual meets the public order definition or has claimed in bad faith, the specific circumstances and vulnerabilities of each case will be carefully considered. It is our view that amendment 25 does not fulfil the aims of the original clause and would not protect the modern slavery system from those who act in bad faith, nor protect our communities from those who present a threat to public order or a risk to national security.
The Minister said that in those cases, there would be an assessment of the risk to public order. Has he made an assessment of what proportion of the cases, say in 2020, would have had these individual assessments based on the criteria presented in the Bill? He may not have that information to hand, but if he could reply to the House on that later, it would be helpful.
I recognise entirely the interest that my hon. Friend shows in these matters. If I may, I will take that point away, ponder it and then comment on it specifically when I wind up the debate. I am grateful for the question, and I am happy to revisit that point.
For the reasons I have outlined, we cannot agree to amendment 25. Amendment 26 would remove the clause that provides leave to remain for victims of modern slavery or human trafficking and replace it with a new clause. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and to Lord McColl for their work in this area. We agree that confirmed victims should be granted leave where necessary to assist them in their physical and psychological recovery from harm caused by exploitation, to seek compensation in respect of their exploitation or to assist the authorities with investigations or prosecutions in respect of that exploitation.
The Government have already committed to providing all those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and are in need of specific support with appropriate tailored support for a minimum of 12 months, where necessary. That will be set out in guidance, but the amendment does not make the critical link between relevant exploitation and the grant of leave. That means that someone could be granted leave to remain on the basis of personal circumstances unconnected to their exploitation, or to pursue an unrelated compensation claim or to assist an unrelated investigation. For those reasons, we are not able to support the amendment.
My hon. Friend will recall that last time we debated these provisions, we had an agreement that the Government in principle accepted the 12-month process. We expected to see it put in the Bill in the other place, but the truth is that the Bill has arrived back here after being amended by the Lords rather than the Government. I accept that Lords amendment 26, to replace clause 64, has a lot of other things in it.
The point of my amendment (a), which I know that I cannot vote on tonight because of ping-pong, is that we need to get that in the Bill. The key thing, after all, is that those who come through the NRM should get up to a minimum of 12 months, which would allow them to pursue prosecutions against the traffickers. They will lose that if the Minister does get it into the Bill, so will he now give me an understanding that that will be the case?
My right hon. Friend is passionate in raising the issue and has done so constructively throughout the process. We are all cognisant of the need to ensure that we bring the evil individuals responsible for that criminality to justice. I refer him to the commitment that was made from the Dispatch Box by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean), on Report. Future legislation on modern slavery more generally is very likely to be in the offing. We are also happy to meet him—I know that the Home Secretary has spoken to him—to discuss his point in greater detail. We want to work through it carefully to ensure that we get it right.
The key thing is whether the Minister is prepared to consider tabling an amendment in the other place that puts the 12-month minimum into the Bill. If he does that, it will send a huge signal that we are on the side of those who are most beaten up and traduced by the system of slavery, and it will put us back on the right course. I ask him to please give me that sort of commitment.
My recollection of the earlier proceedings relates to putting the matter firmly in guidance, but as I say, we are happy to meet to discuss it. We want to get it right, and we are willing to consider the position with him following this debate. That is an undertaking to him on which we will certainly follow through.
I support the points made by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), which we discussed on Report. He is right that 12 months is an absolute minimum for a victim to pursue the prosecution of a case. I hope that the Government will reconsider that and go for a much longer period, so that the norm will be that those people get a permanent right to remain and live in this country. After all, they are victims of appalling behaviour by some brutal people. We should support them and not put artificial hurdles in their way.
The right hon. Gentleman definitely gets the tone right in highlighting the severity of the criminality perpetrated by individuals who, as I say, we all want to bring to justice.
Another point that I would make, because it is useful in the context of the debate, is that such matters are considered on a case-by-case basis and people are often awarded a period of leave that is longer than 12 months, which is beneficial for them. We would not want to see an adverse situation where people received less time than perhaps they would have done, given that individuals are receiving more after a case-by-case consideration that takes into account all the relevant factors. As I say, we are very willing to take the issue away and to engage with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green. We will have those discussions and conclude them accordingly. He should leave that with us and we will get that meeting organised as quickly as possible.
Lords amendment 27 inserts a new clause that relates to victims of slavery aged under 18. It would mean that victims under 18 could not be issued with a slavery and human trafficking notice. It would exclude that group from the new disqualifications from modern slavery protections, provide a blanket grant of leave to remain, and legislate for a specific reasonable grounds test for those whose exploitation took place under the age of 18 —yet not for other victims.
Before issuing a slavery or trafficking information notice, decision makers would not have information about an individual or their exploitation, including, crucially, their age when the relevant exploitation took place. Similarly, the reasonable grounds evidence gathering process is when information regarding the person’s exploitation is often identified, so only at that stage could decision makers know that the person’s exploitation had occurred before they turned 18. In practice, therefore, it would become unworkable to differentiate on the basis of the timings of exploitation. We know that children who have been trafficked need support, but what concerns us about this Lords amendment is that it would move us away from taking a case-by-case approach and could incentivise adults to claim that they are children. We therefore cannot support it.
I turn to Lords amendment 40, which concerns the operation of the electronic travel authorisation scheme in respect of individuals travelling to Northern Ireland on a local journey from the Republic of Ireland. We have been very clear in emphasising our continuing commitment to the Good Friday agreement and the protocol, and we would like to take the opportunity to reassure colleagues again that there will be no controls on the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
However, this amendment could result in an unacceptable gap in UK border security that would allow persons of interest or risk who would be otherwise refused an electronic travel authorisation to enter the UK legally, undermining the very purpose of the ETA scheme, which is to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK. It is important that, as now, all individuals—except British and Irish citizens—arriving in the UK, including those crossing the land border into Northern Ireland, continue to enter in line with the UK’s immigration framework to protect both the UK immigration system and the common travel area from abuse. This is a well-established principle of the operation of the common travel area and applies when travelling in all directions. The UK is entitled to introduce and change its own requirements in the interest of securing the UK border, and we will continue to liaise with the Irish authorities on matters of border security in relation to the common travel area. We therefore cannot support this amendment.
First, would the Minister accept that great concern has been expressed by all parties in the Oireachtas—the Irish Parliament—and representatives from the Irish Government, who are very concerned about the impact the Bill will have on what are often daily movements on the island of Ireland by non-Irish nationals? Would he also accept that this is very damaging for the tourism trade on the island of Ireland, which is very much an integrated market, with people often landing in Dublin and then wishing to travel into Northern Ireland, and will prove to be a major obstacle in the way of those natural journeys?
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), was whispering in my ear at the same time, making the point that he has already had a meeting with the Irish Government to discuss this, and I know that that engagement is ongoing. He is also very willing to meet the hon. Gentleman to discuss this in greater detail, and we will get that meeting organised for him as quickly as possible to progress that.
I turn now to Lords amendments 28 to 39 and 42, which the Government have introduced in response to the crisis in Ukraine. They strengthen our visa penalty powers, meaning that we can impose penalties where a country poses a risk to international peace and security or when its actions lead or are likely to lead to armed conflict or a breach of humanitarian law. Lords amendment 42 means that these powers will come into effect as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent, rather than two months after Royal Assent as we had originally been planning, so that we will be able to use them much sooner. I commend those amendments to the House, and I would like to think that they will be broadly welcomed.
I understand the thought process behind these amendments, and I do not have any problem with that, but could the Minister assure the House that people wanting to come to this country from Russia or Belarus who have been taking part in peaceful activities to oppose the war and call for peace, and who need to get somewhere else, will not be prevented from coming to this country?
The direct answer to the right hon. Gentleman’s question is that people will still be able to apply for visas in the normal way, so I hope that provides him with assurance.
Lords amendment 41 is a minor drafting amendment in relation to costs orders. It does not change the underlying policy, which requires tribunal procedure rules to be made setting out that the tribunal must consider whether to impose a charge or to make an order where prescribed conduct that is to be treated as improper, unreasonable or negligent has occurred. It simply clarifies that this requirement applies only in relation to the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal and of the upper tribunal. This will prevent any uncertainty from arising about the jurisdictions in which clause 77 should be applied, and I hope this clarification meets with the approval of the House.
With that, I conclude my remarks, and I will gladly pick up any points in the wind-up.
Again, I am very grateful to Members from across the House for their many and varied contributions during the course of this debate. In responding, there are a few points on which I wish to touch.
First, I wish to deal directly with the point raised by the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), as well as by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). On the position around individuals and their ability to lodge visa applications in the circumstances that the right hon. Gentleman described, that would, to be clear, depend on the visa penalty applied, and such applications may not be considered on the back of that. We will, however, carefully consider the right hon. Gentleman’s point about peaceful protesters, which is an understandable and legitimate point, before taking any decisions on applying visa penalties. The key point here is that, in any case, we will ensure that the most vulnerable individuals—those with compelling, compassionate grounds for travelling—are exempted from the application of visa penalties. I hope that that gives him the reassurance that he was seeking.
My hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) raised an issue in relation to the treatment of children. Although I am unable to provide specific figures on the number of cases owing to the nature of the offences, national security considerations and also because the individual circumstances are taken into account, it is essential that amendment 25 is rejected in favour of the original drafting of the public order disqualification, so that dangerous individuals can be removed. This is about providing a clear definition in line with our international obligations, so that we can withhold support from individuals on grounds of public order, potentially where they relate to national security or involve serious criminality.
However, I hope that I can provide greater reassurance more generally around victims of modern slavery aged under 18 by saying that ensuring decision makers take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. We will make it clear in guidance how children, or those who were children at the time of their exploitation, should be considered, taking into account their particular vulnerabilities and specific needs. This includes making it clear in guidance how the damage to credibility measure is to be applied in the case of children. I also emphasise that decisions to withhold protections from the national referral mechanism on public order grounds from children and adults will be made on a case-by-case basis, as I have set out previously.
The fact is that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may have been convicted of serious criminal offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity, which does include children in some instances. It is right that the Government should be able to withhold protections from those individuals who pose a threat to public order, but this is not a blanket disqualification. The guidance underpinning these measures and the decision making around them will be made by trained decision makers and will consider the needs of children and specific safeguarding vulnerabilities.
I hope that I can also reassure the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) in saying that it remains our firm intention to engage properly and thoroughly with the sector in designing that guidance to make sure that we get this right. Indeed, our existing modern slavery statutory guidance provides for the specific vulnerabilities of children, and all decision makers in the competent authorities receive specific training on children as potential victims, including distinct training—
Tom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 4G.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 5B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 6B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 7B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 7C, and Government motion to disagree,
Lords amendment 8B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 8C, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 53B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 53C, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 53D, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 10B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 11B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 13B, and Government motion to disagree and to insist on disagreement with Lords amendment 15.
Lords amendment 20B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 24B.
Lords amendment 25B, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 26B, and Government motion to disagree.
Before I call the Minister to speak to the Lords amendments, I must inform the House that there will be a three-minute speaking limit from the outset. That will not apply to Ministers, but they will want to be brief anyway, because they will want to be popular with Back Benchers on both sides of the House.
I will be as brief as I can, Mr Deputy Speaker.
These are amendments that we have already debated, voted on and sent back to the other place, expressing our dissatisfaction with them.
The world is facing a crisis of migration. An estimated 80 million people are displaced by conflicts and instability around the world. Others seek to move in search of improved economic opportunities. Managing migration and welcoming and effectively supporting those most in need, while protecting borders and closing down the dangerous business of people smuggling is one of the difficult public policy challenges faced by any Government. That is why we have developed the new plan for immigration and this Bill, which is its legislative framework.
Amendments 8B and 8C require one or more returns agreements to be in place with a safe third country before the inadmissibility provisions in clause 15 can be brought into force. As I have said many times before, those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country they reach. The first safe country principle is widely recognised internationally.
Under international law, anyone can claim asylum in any country that has signed the 1951 UN refugee convention. That convention makes it clear that people fleeing persecution can reach a country by irregular means if they are unable to use a valid visa. So, given that there is no legal way to come to the UK for the purpose of seeking asylum, does the Minister accept that the Government risk breaking international law?
The point that I have consistently made is that the British Government act at all times in accordance with their international obligations, both under the European convention on human rights and the refugee convention. Again I make the point, because it bears repeating, that nobody needs to get into a small boat to reach safety. Everybody who is doing so is leaving what are inherently safe countries with fully functioning asylum systems. If people want to come to this country—we have a proud record of providing sanctuary here—they should do so through safe and legal routes. We have a proud record as a Government of providing safe and legal routes, reflecting the fact that there are conflicts and instability in the world and we respond to that.
The 1951 UN refugee convention is quite clear, and I do not think that the Minister has answered my hon. Friend’s question. What advice has he had that the UK Government, under this legislation, will not be breaking the UN convention on the rights of refugees?
I can only reiterate the point that, at all times, the United Kingdom Government act in accordance with their international obligations, and that is of course something that we will continue to do. Nobody in this House or elsewhere should be encouraging people to put their lives in the hands of evil criminal gangs or to make these dangerous channel crossings. We saw in November the consequences when that happens.
Could my hon. Friend set out for the House what the safe and legal routes are, apart from the now closed route from Syria, the route under the scheme from Afghanistan and the current Ukraine scheme?
In terms of various schemes, as I say, we have a rich and proud history in this country of providing sanctuary to people from around the world who require it. That has included 40,000 people being sorted out through the family reunion route, 20,000 Syrians and 100,000 Hong Kongers. Also, 20,000 Afghans are eligible to come and 60,000 Ukrainians so far have had visas granted. I think that is a record that we can be very proud of as a Government, and it is one we will continue to build on in the years ahead.
The first safe country principle is a fundamental feature of the common European asylum system. I have already set out the issue of inadmissibility. By enforcing this part of the Bill, we are taking the battle to the people smugglers and showing them that their horrible business will be made unviable. For that important reason, we cannot agree to this amendment. Hon. Members have already voted against the amendment, prompting the Lords to bring a further amendment adding a time limit of five years to get agreements in place. That does not address the issues we have with this—namely, it is right to allow for removals to be sought on a case-by-case basis where appropriate.
I am conscious that I need to make some progress and that time is short, but I will give way to my hon. Friend, and then to the hon. Gentleman.
A safe route would kill the evil traffic of people smuggling at a stroke. That is one way of dealing with it. I fail to see how moving people to Rwanda will in any way disrupt these people traffickers’ money-making schemes. They will just use different routes to land people on our shores. I am just not getting it, I am afraid.
I am always grateful to my hon. Friend for his considered interventions and for the thought and care that he takes in making his arguments. I respectfully disagree with him on this point. I will come on to say more about this later in my remarks, when I will be able to set out precisely why that is the case.
Further to the points that have been made, will the Minister outline what, for example, a Kurdish Syrian who is stuck in Turkey would do? Britain recognises that Turkey is oppressive to Kurds. It is further bombing Kurdish camps, as we speak, in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The majority of people on boat crossings in recent months have been Kurdish and, in particular, they have had the highest number of deaths on those dangerous boat crossings. Will he explain how those people, who often have links to the UK, provide a positive contribution to the UK and have often fought alongside British forces in Syria, can seek asylum here in Britain without the Government opening up proper, safe and legal routes in embassies and visa-processing centres across Europe? Surely that would be the answer to stopping boat crossings, not this other nonsense.
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s suggestion about allowing people to claim asylum at embassies and consulates around the world. We would find that very considerable numbers of people arrive at embassies and consulates to do so and, of course, individuals who are not granted asylum would, in all likelihood, still seek to come to the United Kingdom through small boat crossings, so I do not think that that would actually solve the issue, as he believes it would.
We also have the global resettlement scheme. We continue to look at what more we can do in that space to provide sanctuary and opportunities for people. Many views are expressed in this House about our departure from the European Union. One of the biggest safe and legal routes—the biggest, in fact—is the skills-based immigration system that we now have in this country, whereby people from around the world can apply to come to the United Kingdom. That broad eligibility is very welcome, and people from across the globe can come to the UK through that route.
I will make some progress but I will gladly give way later. The Government continue to work with international partners to ensure removals of people with no right to be in our country.
To turn to Lords amendment 4G, although the Government have accepted Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s amendments that introduced further safeguards to the deprivation of citizenship power, a further amendment was tabled by Baroness D’Souza that removed the provisions protecting the validity of deprivation orders made before the Bill’s commencement and alleging that they offered individuals no right of redress. That is simply not the case. These provisions explicitly ensured that anyone affected by the retrospective provision would still have a right of appeal, but removing them from the clause could cast doubt on the validity of deprivation orders already made before the provisions come into effect. That poses an unacceptable threat to the UK’s safety and security, as it could enable dangerous individuals to regain their British citizenship and thus the freedom to come and go as they please in the UK. Our position on that has not changed. I make it absolutely clear that we cannot allow that unnecessary security risk to happen.
Will the Minister explain a bit more about why he thinks that that proposal poses such a danger? All the Home Office has to do is make the same decisions again. I think we are talking about 50 or 60 decisions, but this will mean that the proper safeguards are in place.
I would argue that the safeguards that we have accepted, which Lord Anderson proposed with real sincerity, a real interest, expertise and experience in these matters, strike the right balance between keeping our people in this country safe from harm—that is, of course, the first duty of any Government and a responsibility that we take incredibly seriously—while making sure that there is judicial oversight of the process and that, as part of the Home Office’s work, we have internal checks to ensure that the powers will be used appropriately.
Lords amendment 5B relates to the compliance of part 2 of the Bill with the refugee convention. The Bill—I insist on this in the strongest terms—is compatible with all of our obligations under international law. Our position has not changed and we do not consider it necessary to put this on the face of this Bill.
Will the Minister give way?
I am very grateful—I am not optimistic about getting three minutes to speak, so I thought that I would intervene now.
The Minister knows that I will support the Government on the tough measures to clamp down on this vile trade across the channel, but he also knows that I think they should be tempered with the greater availability of safe and legal routes, particularly along the lines of family reunion. He kindly offered a meeting to me at the Dispatch Box the last time that we debated that. I hope that we will get that in time, before the legislation goes through. He knows that I will support again the Dubs amendment—Lords amendment 10B—because Lord Dubs has now changed it to focus exclusively on providing a safe route for unaccompanied children in Europe seeking protection and reunification with family in the UK. What more does Lord Dubs have to do to make that acceptable to the Government? I think it should be acceptable now.
As I said last time we debated these matters, my hon. Friend cares passionately about this issue. I look forward to our meeting tomorrow, and I am keen to hear his suggestions and ideas. I will, of course, address his substantive point later in my remarks.
Amendment 6B would make the Government’s plan of differentiation unworkable, and it goes against one of the fundamental points of the Bill, which is to deter people from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys. I am sure I speak for all hon. Members when I say that we want to see a stop to all such journeys to the UK, and therefore we cannot support the amendment.
Will my hon. Friend give way?
I must make some progress, as I am conscious that quite a lot of hon. Members want to speak in this debate. I will try to take my hon. Friend’s intervention later if I can.
Amendments 7B and 7C would allow people claiming asylum, and their adult dependants, the right to work in six months, rather than the current 12 months, and would remove the condition restricting jobs, for those allowed to work, to those on the shortage occupation list. These amendments would allow people to undermine the economic migration scheme by lodging an asylum claim, and they could also encourage channel crossings.
The Government want to see claims settled within six months so that people can get on with rebuilding their life, which includes working. We are making every effort to ensure this is a reality under the wider new plan for immigration. I therefore advise the House that we cannot accept the amendments.
Does my hon. Friend accept that Lords amendments 7B and 7C have been qualified to make the proper concession that people seeking asylum should not be given preferential treatment to those who already have refugee status and that there is a built-in review period? I and others have said on many occasions that there is simply no evidence to suggest that a limited right to work is a pull factor. We are following what Denmark does with regard to Rwanda, so why do we not do the same with regard to a limited right to work?
I am concerned that the evil criminal gangs miss no opportunity to try to market a vision of coming to the United Kingdom, and I think there is a powerful dynamic to the issue of work in the conversations between the people smugglers and the individuals whose trade they seek to engage. I will, of course, continue to engage with my right hon. and learned Friend on this issue.
I recognise that colleagues both in this House and in the other place have strong views on these matters, which must always be considered very carefully. Again, I do not want to do anything that encourages people to make these dangerous crossings of the channel. I think the best way to resolve this issue is to transform the casework to get it right so that this is not an issue in the first place.
Amendment 10B would create a new Dubs-style immigration rule to allow unaccompanied children in Europe who have UK family links to be admitted to the UK to claim asylum. This amendment creates a more favourable approach to refugee family reunion for those who are already in Europe, which is clearly unfair. Beyond that, these children would enter the asylum system upon arrival, which costs money to process, when our current family reunion rules are more generous and grant leave.
This is a single global approach to family reunion that does not encourage what are often dangerous journeys into Europe. If relationships break down, as does happen, these children would enter the care system as looked-after children, adding additional cost to the taxpayer when we currently have children in hotels awaiting care placements.
Additionally, subsection (1) could be interpreted more broadly, creating a risk that it would apply to a much broader group—at its broadest, requiring us to make provision for people of all ages to come to the UK to claim asylum. This is probably not the intention of the noble Lord Dubs, but it would be very undesirable for such an ambiguous provision to make its way on to the statute book. The cost of such global provision, most broadly interpreted, would be staggering.
I will make some progress, as it is important that hon. Members have the opportunity to speak in this debate.
Lords amendment 11B focuses on setting a target for the number of refugees the UK would resettle each year. Our view has long been that the number of refugees and people in need of protection we resettle each year must be based on our capacity and our assessment of the international situation. That has not changed. As such, we do not think the Lords amendment is necessary. On Lords amendment 13B, I thank the other place for understanding that there is a need to be able to prosecute criminals who seek to evade immigration controls and return to the UK, but the amendment is too narrow in its scope, to the point where it would not allow for the prosecution of someone attempting to arrive in the UK who has previously been excluded from the UK on national security grounds. Limiting the amended offence to cover only those who arrive in breach of a deportation order would also prevent the prosecution of arriving passengers in egregious cases when there are aggravating factors that show that prosecution is in the public interest. As such, the amendment would still compromise our plans to enhance the security of our borders and so we cannot accept it. I also appreciate those in the other place for their detailed consideration of clause 40. However, by proposing Lords amendment 20B and replacing “for gain” with a statutory defence of “without reasonable excuse”, they would compromise our plans to enhance our ability to prosecute people smugglers. The amendment would simply add a new barrier to successful prosecutions and create uncertainty, as appropriate defences are already provided in common law, such as “acting under duress”.
I turn next to the modern slavery amendments. Lords amendment 25B is too narrow and does not fulfil the aims of the original clause; it will not protect the system for tackling modern slavery from those who present a threat to public order or risk to national security. The amended definition does not include individuals who have been served with terrorism notices, who have been involved in terrorism-related activity or who otherwise pose a risk to national security, nor does it include individuals who have been convicted of serious criminal offences such as manslaughter, murder, violent acts and sexual offences. Having listened to concerns raised, we have provided further detail in the House of Lords about the proportionate approach we will take to implement this measure and clarity on the mitigating factors that will be taken into account as part of the case-by-case approach, but we cannot agree to the amendment.
On Lords amendment 26, the Government’s unshakeable position is that support should be provided on the basis of need, tailored to the individual and their personal circumstances. During the passage of the Bill, we have committed that, where necessary, all those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and are in need of specific support will receive appropriate tailored support for a minimum of 12 months. What still concerns us about this amendment is that it moves us away from taking an individualised, needs-based approach to the provision of support, so we cannot support it.
I recognise my hon. Friend’s concerns about this, but the main point to be taken from it—I hope to speak about this later—is the reality that right now this minimum period is interrupted constantly by reviews and inquiries and so they destabilise the ones we need to help. Will he look at this again before we go any further and discuss it with me, so that we may look at something stronger?
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention and long-standing interest in this issue. He and I, along with other Ministers, share a common goal in wanting to bring to justice the individuals responsible for this heinous criminality of people trafficking. We are very willing to engage on this. One thing we have discussed in meetings is an openness and willingness to engage on the guidance in place on these matters. As I have said before in this House, there are further opportunities coming on the issue of modern slavery and we are keen to ensure that he is involved in that discussion and dialogue, along with the charitable organisations he works with, to make sure that we get this right, because there is a moral imperative to bring these people to justice. We all want to make sure that individuals are getting the care and support they need to help facilitate that important process.
Does the Minister agree that any legislation touching on modern slavery must recognise that it takes human beings time to process trauma and gain an ability to talk about it? By imposing arbitrary deadlines for victims to declare that they are victims, which many may not really understand themselves, the Government are punishing and further victimising, where they should be supporting. That is particularly true in respect of children or survivors of sexual trauma.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to raise this point. I can give her the reassurance that at all times a trauma-based approach is taken when dealing with these matters, and rightly so, because the horrendous experiences that people have had are unthinkable and unimaginable. We have only to speak to survivors to realise the enormous impact that these events have on them. It is right that we respond in a way that is appropriate and sensitive to people’s circumstances. That principle will continue to underpin all the work we do. On the late provision of information, good reasons will apply at all times and proper account will be taken of individual circumstances and the reasons why individuals have not been able to provide timely information.
Let me conclude by addressing Lords amendments 53B, 53C and 53D. As colleagues will be aware, last week my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced a world-first deal with Rwanda. The UK and Rwanda migration and economic development partnership addresses the shared international challenge of illegal migration and will help to break the business model of evil people-smuggling gangs. Those who make dangerous, illegal or unnecessary journeys to claim asylum in the UK may now be relocated to Rwanda, which will take responsibility for processing their claims and, if they are recognised as refugees, building their lives there.
The Minister says the proposal is to break the business model of people smugglers; he will know that his Department’s own impact assessment said that
“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited”,
and went on to say that it was potentially counterproductive. Where is his evidence for the policy?
I profoundly disagree with the hon. Gentleman. He and I debated these matters many times in Committee and it is fair to say that the approach he advocates is in essence a charter to do nothing. I do not think it is acceptable to stand back, throw our hands in the air and say that this is all too difficult. We have to take action. The new plan for immigration is delivering meaningful change and I genuinely believe it will make a difference. Of course, such considerations often require consideration of the number of people who come here, the flow and all the pertinent and relevant issues. It is difficult to predict the number of people who will come at any given point in time. I believe we are introducing meaningful changes that will dramatically shift the dial and, ultimately, help to preserve lives.
The Minister knows, because we have discussed the matter several times since the announcement, that a lot of my constituents are very concerned about the Rwanda partnership deal, as am I, but the truth is that how we will operate the scheme is as yet unknown. Many have conflated the issue in respect of last week’s announcement with this Bill. Will the Minister assure me that the legislation that enables the partnership predates this Bill and this Government? Will he also reassure me and my constituents in respect of the screening programme and specifically how LGBTQ people will interact with it? There are many concerns about that and our friends in Rwanda.
My hon. Friend always raises pertinent issues on behalf of his constituents in Winchester. As the Home Secretary set out yesterday, the legal basis for the policy is the new Labour—I know it is not fashionable to talk about new Labour on the Opposition Benches—policies of 1999, 2002 and 2004, when the Labour party had a genuine and thorough position on these matters that I am afraid is not in place today, when we hear a lot of criticism but no meaningful alternative is brought forward to address the issues. For the reasons I have set out, I argue that we have to take action to address the terrible criminality that puts lives at risk. That argument underpins the legislation.
My hon. Friend asks whether there is an alternative to the Rwanda scheme, which I accept is not directly part of this legislation. The salary of an immigration tribunal judge—a first-tier tribunal judge—is £117,000. If we put on oncosts, even most generously we get £200,000. So far, £120 million has been committed to the Rwanda scheme; around 600 first-tier tribunal judges could be bought for that, or any number of hundreds of Home Office caseworkers. Given that the Cart legislation is now quite rightly being restricted, surely a constructive alternative would be to invest in the current system.
I agree with my hon. Friend in the sense that that is one intervention we need to make to improve matters considerably. We all want to see cases considered more quickly and to give people certainty either way as soon as possible. We are delivering that objective through the new plan for immigration—it is front and centre—but in itself it will not solve the issues. I genuinely believe that the approach that we are taking, through the comprehensive plan, will shift the dial, change the dynamic, and, ultimately, help us to shut down these evil criminal networks.
Going back to the point raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) about the evidence for this policy working, does he, as a member of the Bill Committee, recall hearing evidence from the Australian Government about how offshoring worked as a system to get down the irregular migration numbers?
My hon. Friend is right to say that the evidence that we heard from the Australian representatives advocated the policy approach that was taken in that country. I would argue that the approach that we are taking in relation to these matters is important, too, and will help us to tackle this issue head on and help to disrupt the work of these evil criminal gangs.
On the reference to the screening process, I must go back to the fundamental point, which is that people will be relocated only if it is safe for them. That consideration will be taken in relation to every case, taking proper account of people’s circumstances. At all times, we will act in accordance with our obligations, through both the European Court of Human Rights and the refugee convention, and those obligations apply on the other side as well.
Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?
I will give way to my right hon. Friend, but I am very conscious of the time.
I will make this point quickly. Yesterday, the erstwhile Prime Minister made the point to the Home Secretary that any group identified as protected will then become incentivised to cross the channel, so, for example, if we say that families are protected, then that will create an incentive for families to cross the channel. How will my hon. Friend square that particular conundrum?
I will not say any more over and above that which I have already set out this afternoon. Moreover, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary provided further detail on this yesterday, and I refer the House to the points that she made.
This bespoke international agreement is in full compliance with domestic and international law. Rwanda is a state party to the 1951 refugee convention and the seven core UN human rights conventions, with a strong history of supporting refugees. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made it clear yesterday that this partnership is the type of international co-operation that we need to make the global immigration system fairer, keep people safe, and give them opportunities to flourish. This is just one part of the system-wide reform that we promised to deliver in the new plan for immigration.
The objective of the Rwanda partnership announced last week is to create a mechanism for the relocation of individuals whose claims are not being considered by the UK—the inadmissible—to Rwanda, which will then process their claims. However, in future, we may wish to extend eligibility for overseas processing to those who have otherwise abused the UK’s asylum system, beyond undertaking dangerous or unnecessary journeys. That is the intention of this measure, which will make it easier for us to remove those who have pending asylum claims to another country for their claims to be processed.
Let me remind the House—I have set this out already, but it bears repeating—that the powers set out in clause 28 via schedule 3 are not new. For nearly 20 years, it has been possible under UK law to remove individuals from the UK while their asylum claim is pending if a certificate is issued under schedule 3 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. The measure in the Bill amends existing legal frameworks to make it easier to remove such individuals without going through a certification process, provided the country to which they are being removed meets the safety criteria that we have set out in the Bill. It is important to bear in mind that the asylum system is already very expensive. At an annual cost of around £1.5 billion, it is the highest in more than two decades. Every day, the cost of the broken system on hotels alone is nearly £5 million. We therefore cannot accept these amendments.
I thank hon. Members from both sides of the House for their attendance at this important debate today. I urge them to consider that this Bill is what the British people have given us a mandate to deliver and to vote with the Government to send a message to the other place that what has been proposed is not accepted by this House. The Bill secures our borders, ensures that those who need our help will receive it and, as each of us here sincerely want, will save countless lives being risked crossing the channel each and every day when people traffickers realise that this is not a viable occupation for them any more.
Multiple votes will begin no later than 5.48 pm.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I shall be quick and focus on Lords amendment 7. The question whether asylum seekers are able to undertake work after six months was raised in March, when the Bill was last debated in this House. Replying to our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), spoke about getting casework right. Will he confirm that the measures in the Bill, together with the UK and Rwanda economic development partnership, will mean that there should be no asylum seekers still in a state of limbo, waiting for their asylum status to be determined, after six months, and that such an amendment is therefore not needed?
I thank Members across the House for their contributions to this afternoon’s debate on issues that are of the utmost importance. I would argue that there is a moral imperative to act that underpins the Government’s approach in addressing the challenges. It simply is not good enough for people to say what they do not want and what they do not like: when criticising and arguing that something is wrong, they have to present a credible alternative plan, particularly if they have ambitions to govern. This Bill delivers our comprehensive plan—the only credible plan—to address these issues. Now is the time to get on and deliver it.
I have to give some information before putting the Question. I have been given an indication that there is likely to be in the order of 11 Divisions this evening. Ten minutes will be allowed for the first and eight minutes for every one following, so I advise people to stay near the Lobbies. Hopefully, we will get through this as quickly as possible.
Tom Pursglove
Main Page: Tom Pursglove (Conservative - Corby)Department Debates - View all Tom Pursglove's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 5D.
With this it will be convenient to consider:
Lords amendments 6D, 6E and 6F, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 7F and 7G, and Government motion to disagree.
I hope that this will be the final time in these proceedings around the Nationality and Borders Bill. I will first turn to compliance with the refugee convention. All measures in this Bill are compatible with our obligations under international law. We therefore cannot accept this amendment, which would put our duty to comply with the refugee convention on the face of the Bill.
Does the Minister agree that the amendments on the Order Paper are very similar to the amendments that we debated only a few days ago? Will he therefore join me in saying to the other place that this elected House was given a mandate in the 2019 general election, as we were in the 2016 EU referendum, to take back control of our borders, and that it should allow this Bill to pass so that we do not have to continue this ping-pong?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The time has now come to get on, to pass this Bill and to make the changes that we so desperately need to shift the dynamic, to end these dangerous channel crossings and to put together an asylum system that is fit for the future and able to cope with the demand.
I do not want to detain the House too long but, with all this talk of taking back control of our borders, why are we outsourcing that control to Rwanda?
The hon. Gentleman’s remarks are effectively a charter for doing nothing. What is unacceptable is for people to continue putting their life in the hands of evil criminal gangs whose only regard is for turning a profit—they do not care whether people get here safely. We have a moral responsibility to stop this, and we have a moral responsibility to act, which is precisely what we will do through this Bill.
Will my hon. Friend accept my congratulations on the Patel-Pursglove plan vis-à-vis Rwanda? And will he ensure that, when people arrive here, they are on a plane as quickly as possible before some dodgy activist or fat-cat human rights lawyer can get their hands on them?
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary should rightly take a lot of credit for getting this new world-leading partnership over the line. My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) has been a passionate advocate for this approach, and I am pleased we are delivering it. I think it will make a genuine difference in acting as a deterrent and ensuring that we have global solutions to a global challenge.
In that sense, I welcome the steps that have been taken in the last few days. I hope my right hon. Friend will be reassured to know that we are working hard to make sure this is operationalised without delay and that, of course, people are on flights as quickly as possible. What we do not want at any stage—this goes back to why we need fundamental reform of the asylum system—is delay in the system. We want people to have certainty either way.
I warmly join my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) in congratulating the Home Secretary and the Minister on this fantastic legislation. On the amendments we are disagreeing with, does the Minister agree that this is part of a wider package, with offshoring, push-backs and deterring people by saying there will be differential treatment, that will be brought together? It is sad that the Labour party is happy to accept the status quo, allow people to risk their life, or die in the English channel, and put money in the hands of smuggling gangs.
I am afraid that we often hear long and convoluted explanations of why we should just accept the status quo, why we should do nothing and why all the interventions are wrong. We hear no credible alternative for putting right the problems in the system. Reform is required and is overdue. That is why we are determined to get on with delivering it.
The Minister will recognise that, when we last debated the Bill, the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), pointed out that one alternative for dealing with the asylum backlog is investing in the current system.
The central premise of this Bill is that, as an alternative to irregular routes, there should be safe and legal routes. Aside from the specific programmes for Ukraine, Afghanistan and Hong Kong, will the Minister spell out clearly to the House what legal routes are available to asylum seekers?
I will not repeat the many, many occasions on which I have set out on the Floor of the House and in Committee during the Bill’s passage the many and varied safe and legal routes that exist. My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, has rightly touched on the need to reform the casework situation, which is precisely what we are doing through the new plan for immigration. I encourage him to be in the right Lobby this evening to help us get on with delivering on that priority, which is one priority among a number as we reform the system.
It is simply unnecessary, inappropriate and unconstitutional for the courts to have a duty to make declarations of incompatibility in circumstances where questions of compliance have already been determined by Parliament, so we cannot accept Lords amendment 5D.
On differentiation, Lords amendments 6D to 6F would make it harder to differentiate by placing significant evidential burdens on the Secretary of State. They would also set out our existing legal obligations on the face of the Bill, such as our duties under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights, especially the article 8 right to family life. All of this is either unnecessary or unacceptable. We therefore do not accept these amendments.
Finally, the arguments on the right to work have been well rehearsed at several points in the passage of the Bill. In principle, we are concerned about the way in which this would undercut the points-based system, which we believe is the right system for facilitating lawful migration into our country—that skills-based approach, exactly as the British people voted for in the referendum in 2016. I go back to this point: our objective is to speed up caseworking, which then, of itself, ensures that we do not need to go down the route—
Does the excellent Minister know the majorities the other place had for sending these amendments back to us? Given the large built-in anti-Government majority in the Lords, it seems to me that they must have been quite large.
My hon. Friend probes me on this with good reason. Off the top of my head, I believe that one of them was won by one vote, one was won by eight votes and one was won by 25 votes. So they are not particularly hefty majorities. The time has come to get on and pass this Bill. This Government’s new plan for immigration will tackle illegal migration and reform the asylum system.
The Minister was talking about delays in casework, but those are nothing new. My seven years as an MP have been marked with delays in Home Office casework. Some constituents have been waiting now for two years—not for a decision, but for an interview. Can he explain exactly when they will get interviewed under this system because I have seen no difference at all?
I refer the hon. Lady to the new plan for immigration and the steps we have consistently set out that we will be taking to improve the situation on caseworking. It is imperative that we do that, for two reasons.
The hon. Lady can shout from a sedentary position, but perhaps she will listen to the answer, which is that we believe not only that it is very important that those who require sanctuary get it as quickly as possible, but that it is right that those with no right to be here are removed as soon as possible and without needless delay. That is why we are reforming the broken system. We have a Home Secretary and a ministerial team who are committed to doing just that. Again, I encourage the hon. Lady to be in the Division Lobby to support our measures tonight.
The Bill is an essential element of the plan, and the sooner it passes, the sooner we will be able to deliver the longer-term solutions we need to protect vulnerable people. I note again the lack of alternative being offered from other parts of the House. I therefore commend our Bill to the House.
Last week, the Home Secretary told the House that our asylum system is “broken”. Yesterday, her Minister, who is sitting before us today, again stated clearly that our asylum system is “broken”. We on the Labour Benches completely agree, but what Conservative Members seem to continually miss is the fact that the Conservative party has been in power for 12 years. The problem is that they never stand up and take responsibility; they always try to blame others—the civil service, the courts and even the media. It was revealed this week that the Home Secretary banned the Financial Times, The Guardian and the Mirror from the press delegation accompanying her to Rwanda. That was a truly Orwellian move—cancel culture at its worst.
The truth is that, with every decision this Government make and every ill-conceived scheme they put in place, they make fixing our broken asylum system ever harder. The first of these failures is on the asylum waiting lists. Under this Home Secretary, the Home Office is processing 50% fewer cases than five years ago—the result: 37,000 asylum seekers languishing in expensive hotels, costing the taxpayer an eye-watering £4.7 million per day. Labour would invest to save by increasing the number of caseworkers and decision makers so that processing times and hotel bills are radically reduced. [Interruption.]
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As we know, the Australia scheme ended up costing approximately £1 million per person. The Israel scheme on which the Rwanda scheme is based failed completely, with just about every single person who was sent to Rwanda leaving the country within days and many of them trying to come back to the place from which they were sent. It is an absolute farce.
It would be useful, for the benefit of the House and of the country more generally, if the hon. Gentleman could confirm whether an incoming Labour Government—in the eventuality that there were to be one—would cancel the Rwanda plan?
What I would contend—[Interruption.] I am going to tell him. What I would contend is that with the Rwanda plan the wheels are going to fall off the bus very soon, so we will not need to answer that question. It will completely fail. Rather than chasing headlines, the Minister should be doing the nitty-gritty work of negotiating a returns agreement, giving resources to caseworkers and sorting out safe and legal routes. It is about not the razzle-dazzle of Daily Mail headlines but getting the job done.
At Home Office oral questions yesterday, the Minister could not answer a single question that I asked him about the cost of the Rwanda plan. I asked him: how many refugees does he expect to send to Rwanda each year? The Prime Minister says “tens of thousands”; is that correct? What will the cost be per single refugee going to Rwanda? What will the £120 million sweetener being paid by the UK to Rwanda actually be spent on? How many asylum seekers can Rwanda’s detention centres house at any given time? Finally, given that the top civil servant at the Home Office refused to sign off on the Rwanda plan, citing concerns over value for money, when will the Minister publish a full forecast of the costs?
With the leave of the House, I will conclude by observing that we have long debated these issues. The other place asked us to reflect, and we have, repeatedly. This House has been crystal clear. What is also crystal clear is that unlike all the other parties in this House, we have a credible plan. We stand with the vulnerable. We stand against evil people smugglers. There must be no more delay. It is now time to act, and I call on all Members of this House to back the Bill and on the other place to let it pass.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 5D.