Nationality and Borders Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateHolly Lynch
Main Page: Holly Lynch (Labour - Halifax)Department Debates - View all Holly Lynch's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will go away and consider. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 46, page 42, line 3, at end insert—
“(3A) Any slavery or trafficking information notice must be accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”
This amendment would ensure that potential victims are given information regarding their rights at the same time the notice is served.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. I commend the Minister on having run the London marathon for Justice and Care, which does invaluable work.
We are supportive of the previous Scottish National party amendments to clause 46, which were outlined by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. If we achieve nothing else this afternoon, I did promise the SNP spokesperson that I would work on being able to pronounce his constituency in time for our debates on the Bill, having managed to avoid doing so entirely during the passage of last year’s Immigration Act. I hope he will recognise those efforts.
With your permission, Chair, I will come back to clause 46 more broadly during the stand part debate. Our amendment follows a damning letter sent by 60 charities from across the human trafficking and modern slavery sector. They seeks to mitigate the effects of a Bill that they claim
“will have a disastrous impact on the UK’s response to modern slavery.”
In the light of the series of recommendations in that letter, amendment 184 would require any slavery or trafficking information notice to be
“accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”
We have serious concerns about both clauses 46 and 47, but these trafficking information notices are a new initiative, and should be accompanied by a full explanation of why the questions are being asked and what rights and support a potential victim of trafficking should be entitled to. The Government have placed significant emphasis on the need to reduce the time taken for victims to be identified, and on ensuring they receive the correct support package at the earliest opportunity. We strongly share that objective, so the requirement for information to be provided at the same time as the notice is served seeks to address any uncertainty and anxieties a potential victim may have.
Furthermore, it is critical that a trafficking notice is served with an assessment and awareness of risks and victims’ needs, as they can be incredibly wide-ranging, and that assessment and awareness can be essential for safeguarding purposes. Some victims will not have English as their first language, and some may have limited literacy skills. They will need access to the correct translator and there should be recognition of any special educational needs. That reinforces the need for each case to be evaluated sensitively.
We seek to ensure that the basic entitlement to information is met. It is important to recognise that in cases of modern slavery, many first responders and expert witnesses have found that victims interviewed often have so little knowledge of the national referral mechanism that they do not know if they are, or have been, in the NRM. Victims being unable to self-identify and limited awareness of how to navigate the NRM are consistent issues, and we will return to them under other clauses in part 4. Amendment 184 seeks to mitigate potential restrictions to the NRM, and is a sensible suggestion, and I hope that the Minister sees its merit.
I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate, and for Halifax, for tabling the amendment, and the hon. Member for Halifax for setting out the case for it. Clause 46 forms part of our expansion of the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice.
Amendment 184 is not required, as the Government are providing mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that potential victims are fully aware of their rights and the Secretary of State’s obligations to them, including the right to free legal aid where appropriate. Information on the Secretary of State’s obligations to victims will be provided to individuals when a slavery or trafficking information notice is issued. These measures will ensure that potential victims better understand the national referral mechanism and their support entitlements.
In combination with clause 46, clauses 54 and 55 seek to ensure that individuals are provided with advice on the national referral mechanism when they receive advice on asylum and immigration matters. That will enable more victims of modern slavery to be referred, identified and properly supported.
Primary legislation on the process of providing information to possible victims is not required, and while I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment, it would duplicate what happens through clauses 46, 54 and 55. In the light of that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Halifax is content to withdraw the amendment. We have had a pretty good debate on clause 46, so I hope that it can stand part of the Bill.
I am somewhat reassured by the Minister’s remarks. I hope that he will inform Committee members when the draft notices have been finalised; we will continue to keep a close eye on that matter. We will not push the amendment to a vote, but given what the Minister said about the clause, I might move on now to my speech on clause stand part.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I have some broader remarks on the clause, which we do not intend to support. I thank colleagues right across the human trafficking and modern slavery sector for their professional expertise, and their assistance with our scrutiny of the proposals before us.
As was said in the evidence sessions, and by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, part 4 came as a surprise to many; they had not anticipated its proposals, which were wrapped up in an otherwise very heavily trailed piece of immigration legislation. There are no two ways about it: part 4 is a backward step after the hard-won progress of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Every Child Protected Against Trafficking was scathing about it in its briefing; it said there had been a complete lack of due process when it came to these elements of this primary legislation, and that for that reason, parliamentary scrutiny of them would be even more urgent and important. The Children’s Society has been explicit in saying that part 4 of the Bill should be removed entirely. It has described the Bill as
“an affront to the Government’s own recognition that identifying victims of modern slavery or human trafficking is a safeguarding, not immigration matter. Consequently, not only will this Bill have unjust and dire impacts on children and young people who have fled to this country seeking safety and protection, it will particularly harm children if they are then also trafficked or exploited.”
That is a stark warning to us all.
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s broader interpretation of the situation. We want to identify and help genuine victims as quickly as possible. I would expect cases to be looked at appropriately and individually to ensure that is exactly what happens. There was also a question of whether victims will receive a slavery and trafficking information notice before getting a reasonable grounds decision? Yes, we want to identify victims as soon as possible.
The Minister had, and I am eternally grateful to him for giving way.
It does worry me somewhat that, as I understand it, those decision makers at the Home Office would ordinarily make reasonable grounds decisions very quickly in order to facilitate a swift entry into the NRM. If that will no longer be the case and we will be issuing notices, bearing in mind what we have discussed about trauma and victims taking time to disclose it, that could introduce significant delays for a victim entering the NRM. That really worries me. Could the Minister say any more to assure us that we will not be preventing victims from accessing the support they need by introducing that additional process?
I would expect cases to be looked at on an appropriate case-by-case basis that properly takes into account all of the relevant circumstances. It might be advantageous if, in my note to the Committee, I include some commentary on how we expect the process to work, to set that out for Members in more detail and make sure there is no confusion.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 190, in clause 47, page 42, line 19, at end insert—
“(aa) the person was 18 or over at the time of the incident or incidents in respect of which the slavery or trafficking information notice was issued;”.
This amendment seeks to ensure those exploited as children are not penalised for late disclosures.
The amendment seeks to ensure that those who were exploited as children are not penalised for late disclosure, because of their age-related vulnerability and safeguarding concerns. Statutory guidance under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 very clearly states:
“Whatever form it takes, modern slavery and child trafficking is child abuse and relevant child protection procedures…must be followed if modern slavery or trafficking is suspected.”
There is a remarkable lack of distinction between children and adults in the proposals set out in the Bill. That issue was picked up by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who commented in her letter to the Home Secretary in September on the lack of detail on provisions for children.
This is the first in a series of amendments to clauses in part 4 of the Bill that seek to ensure that the worst elements of part 4 do not apply to children. As we know, the Children’s Society has been deeply critical of the Bill and of clause 47 in particular, arguing that the clause will disproportionately and unjustly affect children and young people, who we know are often unable to disclose evidence
“because of the trauma of their experiences, or due to inadequate legal representation.”
Putting the responsibility of disclosure on to a child victim of slavery or trafficking in order to comply with a pre-determined Home Office timeframe, so that they can access the support they need to escape slavery or trafficking, is a perverse barrier. Surely that is not what the Minister intends to achieve. If it is not, I urge him to adopt amendment 190 to make that clear.
In its written evidence, Every Child Protected Against Trafficking points to a 10% increase in the number of children identified as potential victims of trafficking from 2019 to 2020. There were 4,946 referrals last year. That is why we must recognise children within the NRM as requiring a different approach from that required by adults. I return to the point that child protection procedures must be followed as outlined in the modern slavery guidance. Nowhere does that feature in this part of the Bill.
ECPAT makes the point that child trafficking is a form of child abuse and that identifying child victims of trafficking is a safeguarding matter, not an immigration one—not least because so many children in the NRM are British citizens. However, we have a responsibility to any child victim of trafficking to protect them from exploitation, first and foremost. To put the burden of proof on to a traumatised child with trafficking information notices is not right; nor, I suspect, would it comply with various other safeguarding obligations.
I thank the hon. Members for Halifax and for Enfield, Southgate for setting out their case, and for tabling this amendment. I appreciate their consideration of this clause and their concern for a vulnerable group of individuals. Ensuring that clause 47 enables decision makers to take account of individuals’ vulnerabilities is fundamental to our approach. That is why we have included the condition of good reasons, and we will ensure decision makers have the flexibility and discretion to appropriately consider them without prejudicing what that should cover.
What constitutes “good reasons” has purposely not been defined in the Bill. The detail on how to apply good reasons will be set out in guidance for decision makers. This will give decision makers the tools, for instance, to recognise that the age at which traumatic events took place may affect an individual’s ability to accurately recall, share or recognise such events, while maintaining a case-by-case approach. Doing so in guidance will ensure that we also have the flexibility to update and add to the range of considerations undertaken by a decision maker in exercising discretion. To create a carve-out for one group of individuals, as amendment 190 seeks to do, would undermine this approach and create a two-tiered system based on the age at which exploitation may have taken place.
I am sure that this is not the intention of the hon. Member for Halifax, but this amendment could also incentivise individuals to put forward falsified referrals regarding the timing of exploitation to delay removal action. Our approach avoids this potential avenue for misuse, but still allows for important considerations regarding the age of the victim to be looked at. Indeed, reasonable grounds decision making already takes account of the specific vulnerabilities of children by, for instance, not requiring there to be any means of exploitation when establishing whether an individual is a victim.
We believe that the right approach is to provide more detail in guidance on the varied and complicated reasons that may constitute good reasons. These will include the age when the exploitation took place, but a wider range of potential reasons and indicators will also be considered to avoid focusing specifically on one victim cohort. This approach will allow decision makers to consider each case on its merits, whilst considering all the information relevant to their case without prejudging it. To do otherwise would not be appropriate or fair to all victims. Again, I hope that the sector will work with Government to shape those guidelines and ensure that they are right. For these reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
I am concerned by some of the Minister’s response. He says that children, and the age of the victim, will be a consideration within good reasons. However, once again we have not got that guidance; it has not been nailed down, so we have no assurances of how the detail will look. He also says that it would not be appropriate to have a different approach for victims based on their age. However, I think that would be entirely responsible and appropriate, and we look to do so throughout a whole range of legislation and legislative approaches. I think it would be a responsible requirement to place on the Government. With that in mind, I will press amendment 190 to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
We very much support the SNP’s amendment 175, which, as we heard, seeks to strike “as damaging” from the clause and hand that discretion back to the Home Office decision maker, as the Minister has already gone to some lengths to assure Members will be the case.
I will also speak to our amendment 163. We seek to mitigate the Government’s refusal to spell out what, if anything, would constitute a good reason for late disclosure. In Committee on Tuesday, the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, argued for a similar approach during our debates on part 2. The Minister responded that
“the situation will be set out clearly in guidance. We think that is the better approach, because it allows greater flexibility on the sorts of factors that might be relevant to the disclosure of late information, and obviously on matters that are relevant to individuals circumstances.”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, 26 October 2021; c. 333.]
I understand the points that the Minister made, but he will appreciate that for the Opposition, it is feels although he is somewhat putting the cart before the horse. We are being asked to consider the clauses in blind faith without the guidance, and one way he could address that is by including something in the Bill. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said earlier, we can debate only what is in front of us.
I expect one thing we can agree on is that no list can ever be exhaustive. I suspect that, as we have heard, the most convincing reasons for late disclosure are ones that we cannot comprehend. It would be nonsense to think that any list would be exhaustive, but without having in front of us any indication of what good reasons might be, we are being asked to take a leap of faith too far. The reasons in amendment 163 include, but are not limited to, a person’s fear of reprisals against them, experiencing pressures related to bonded debt, and being unable to recognise themselves as a victim.
In discussing part 2, again, the Minister went on to say that
“the Home Office will have discretion over who is served an evidence notice and the extent to which credibility is damaged by late evidence”,
and that
“claimants who raise matters late will have the opportunity to provide reasons for that lateness—and where those reasons are good, credibility will not be damaged. Decision makers will have the discretion to determine the extent to which credibility should be damaged, and that determination need not by itself be determinative of a claim”––[Official Report, Nationality and Borders Public Bill Committee, Tuesday 26 October 2021; c. 333.]
I felt that the Minister was very much talking up the discretion that the competent authority decision makers would have, in order to offer us assurances, but that is not reflected in the primary legislation in clause 47. I would be grateful if he could confirm that “good reasons” will be set out within the guidance for NRM decision making, as was the commitment for asylum decision making in part 2.
I would be grateful if the Minister also confirmed when that guidance will be published, and when the training, which he described as being necessary in accompanying the guidance, will begin. I hope he will recognise that amendment 163 is measured and sensible and that he will agree to adopt it.
I thank hon. Members for their genuine interest in these matters and for bringing forward their amendments. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date, victims of modern slavery will be identified at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that those who need protection are afforded it quickly. This measure is supported by the provision of legal aid to ensure that possible victims feel able to share information in a safe and supported manner.
It is important to state that the requirement to bring forward information related to being a victim of modern slavery does not mean that referrals brought late will not be considered; all claims of modern slavery will be considered, irrespective of when they are raised. We have purposefully not defined “good reasons” in the Bill, and the detail on how to apply “good reasons” will be set out in guidance for decision makers. That is the appropriate place, giving the Government the flexibility to respond to our ever-increasing understanding of modern slavery victims.
We will of course work carefully with stakeholders as we operationalise guidance to ensure that decision makers have the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share, or recognise such events in some instances, while not seeking to prejudge their decision making by placing this detail in legislation. However, as has been recognised, we cannot legislate for every instance where someone may have “good reasons” for providing late information. To attempt to do so would be impractical. It would also limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers, who are best placed to consider all factors on a case-by-case basis.
Amendment 163 would have the perverse impact of individuals facing different requirements simply because their situation is excluded from the amendment. It also ignores the possibility that a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their information may be late for unrelated reasons. It would therefore create a blanket acceptance for late information in specific prescribed circumstances, while a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified categories would face a different test on whether they had good reason for providing late information. That would be unfair.
As I have set out, it is important that we are clear on the consequence of late disclosure of information in order to provide clarity for decision makers and victims, and to deter possible misuse of the system. Removing the reference to impacting credibility, as amendment 175 seeks to do, would remove our ability to require the provision of information up front. A duty to provide information requires a consequence and I think we are all agreed that seeking information on modern slavery issues up front is of benefit to all. The clause already includes mitigations to the possible consequence of damaged credibility, providing clear safeguards while still addressing the issue of potential misuse. The solution is not to stifle the clause of any robustness.
As I stated, more detail on good reasons and the credibility considerations will be set out in guidance. We will work to ensure that this takes account of vulnerabilities related to an individual’s exploitation. However, as I have outlined, we believe that removing the consideration of credibility as damaging would impede the ability to reduce potential misuse and reduce the impetus to identify victims as early as possible. As a result, that would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of victims.
Amendment 163 has already been debated. Do the Opposition wish to move it formally?
The Minister has heard my comments, and we anticipated his response. We will follow the issue closely, but at this stage we will not press it to a Division.
I recognise the invitation to write with more detail around this and I am happy to do that. That would be advantageous to the Committee. Given that time is getting on and we want to continue to make progress, I am very happy to take that request back to the Department. I will provide that information.
The Government will ensure that any changes to processes as a result of these measures are designed in a way that accounts for the impact of trauma. This includes ensuring that individuals working in the system are aware of the factors that can affect the task of obtaining information such as the effects traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall such events. This assessment will be set out in guidance for decision makers and we will engage stakeholders as we develop it. We will continue to consider all referrals on a case-by-case basis to ensure that support is tailored to the needs of genuine victims.
We intend to vote against clause 47. It is closely linked to clause 46 and I will try to avoid repetition as we are returning to elements that have been well discussed under part 2 on Tuesday.
The number of survivors able to receive support through the national referral mechanism will be reduced as a result of clause 47.
As the Human Trafficking Foundation outlined in written evidence:
“Introducing a trafficking information notice and so converging immigration with human trafficking risks creating another layer of bureaucracy and so would likely increase the length of time survivors must wait in the NRM.”
If we are to ensure that victims with complex psychological and physical needs are not punished by the system or left in limbo while their claims are processed, the clause cannot stand part of the Bill.
As other hon. Members have said, the Home Office’s own statutory guidance states:
“Victims’ early accounts may be affected by the impact of trauma. This can result in delayed disclosure, difficulty recalling facts, or symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder… It is also vital for decision makers to have an understanding of the mitigating reasons why a potential victim of modern slavery is incoherent, inconsistent or delays giving details of material facts… Throughout this process it is important to remember that victims of modern slavery have been through trauma”.
The clause runs completely contrary to that guidance.
The VITA Network explained in its consultation response to the new plan for immigration that:
“Psychological trauma causes profound disturbances to normal brain function and memory, including memory loss and inconsistencies”
in recollection. We know that a high proportion of trafficked people experience violence prior to and during trafficking. Long after they have escaped exploitation, many still fear that harm will come to them and their families if they disclose information about their experiences. It is often those who are most in need of protection who will find it the hardest to disclose such information.
In 2015, the PROTECT programme was established. It was an independent piece of research, commissioned and funded by the Department of Health and Social Care’s policy research programme, and led by King’s College London and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The programme aimed to develop evidence to inform the NHS response to human trafficking, and it was comprised of surveys and qualitative research, including interviews with trafficked people and with NHS and non-NHS professionals. It found that psychological distress was highly prevalent: four fifths of women in contact with shelter services screened positive for anxiety, depression or post-traumatic stress disorder at interview.
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister told the harrowing story of Gloria in his contribution on Tuesday, and demonstrated why the clause will be damaging to those who have been subject to trauma. The clause flies in the face of best practice and runs contrary to all we heard from witnesses in oral evidence. Earlier this week, my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made excellent points about how PTSD is just one reason why the approach in the clause will be unworkable and unconscionable for those who really need our help. We do not seek to punish or discredit other victims for late disclosure, so why are the Government seeking to do so in this case? The clause highlights the inconsistencies and the unjust nature of the Government’s approach.
It is also deeply worrying that the Government have offered no clarity in subsection (2) on the timescales within which individuals would have to provide that information. Will it be days, weeks, months? I would be grateful if the Minister gave us an indication of his thinking on that. As things stand, the clause will put barriers between victims and the support that they need to recover and secure prosecutions against the real criminals, who we all want to see brough to justice. On that basis, we cannot support clause 47.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 183, in clause 48, page 42, leave out line 38.
This amendment would ensure that the threshold applied (in the Modern Slavery Act 2015) when determining whether a person should be considered a potential victim of trafficking remains at its present level.
The amendment would leave out line 38 in clause 48, which moves the threshold from someone “may be” a potential victim of trafficking to someone “is” a potential victim of trafficking, to ensure that the threshold applied in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 when determining whether a person should be considered a potential victim of trafficking remains at its present level. It is our view that we should seek to build on the commitments in the Act, not undermine the hard-fought progress that it achieved. As I have raised already, the Government are seeking to tear up what were at one time world-leading principles in the Act, and to do so via an immigration Bill, conflating two very different processes.
The reception that clause 48 has had from across the sector should have stopped the Government in their tracks. The amendment is essential to ensure that we can identify victims effectively, rather than creating additional barriers to the national referral mechanism. Currently, around nine in 10 of all reasonable and conclusive grounds decisions are positive. In 2020, the Single Competent Authority made 10,608 reasonable grounds decisions and 3,454 conclusive grounds decisions. Of those, 92% of reasonable grounds decisions and 89% of conclusive grounds decisions were positive. Additionally, in 2020, 81% of all challenged negative reasonable grounds decisions were overturned.
Judging by the Home Office’s own data, we can conclude that the current threshold is set at an appropriate level, so why are the Government seeking to raise it? Referral into the NRM is possible only when made by a designated first responder who has identified someone as a potential victim of trafficking and secured their informed consent to make a referral. That means that there should already be a very high level of positive reasonable grounds decisions at the threshold of “suspect but cannot prove”, as the referral should not have been made if that threshold had not been reached.
It is important to remember that currently we are identifying only a small fraction of the estimated number of victims of trafficking. The Centre for Social Justice has estimated that the number of people trapped in modern slavery in the UK might be in excess of 100,000. Furthermore, there is still no pre-NRM specialist support available in the UK, despite the Government recognising the need for it to facilitate disclosure through having time in a safe space to receive information and advice in their 2017 announcement of places of safety. I would be grateful if the Minister told us why there is no mention of places of safety in the Bill—a point that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made earlier.
With the Government failing to deliver on their own promises, initial identification is therefore an even bigger priority. Every Child Protected Against Trafficking made the valid point that for someone to just fall short of the new threshold will make certain victims vulnerable to being re-trafficked. Would we not all be more satisfied knowing that professionals have had a proper look at a situation that gives first responders cause for concern by staying with a “may be” rather than an “is” threshold, when the data speaks for itself on that? The amendment is therefore essential in maintaining the threshold at a level where victims who have built up the courage to seek help are identified and admitted to the NRM.
I thank hon. Members for their interest and valuable contributions to the debate. They have raised important issues around identifying victims who have faced the most heinous crimes. Under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—to which the UK is a signatory, certain obligations flow if there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been a victim of trafficking”.
The amendment seeks to leave the reasonable grounds threshold as it stands, which is where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be a victim of trafficking.
It is crucial that decision makers are able to quickly and appropriately identify possible victims. That is why we have proposed this minor change to the reasonable grounds threshold to closer align with our international obligations under ECAT and with the devolved Administrations. To not make that change would undermine the clarity on decision making. Additionally, as the amendment relates specifically to the provision of assistance and support to persons, it would create a different threshold from that applied when determining whether a person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking. That would create significant ambiguity around the reasonable grounds threshold and create further separation from our international obligations. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw her amendment.
I am not entirely satisfied with that response, so I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.