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Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the Minister for explaining the Bill. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, began, I was going to say that I broadly agreed with him on the size and complexity of the Bill. However, I am not sure that adding provision after provision is the best way of dealing with an already over-complex and lengthy Bill. That said, the Bill’s covering such a comprehensive area—anything to do with the four areas mentioned in the Bill’s title will be within scope—simply encourages people to add more and more provisions to it.
Far be it from me to be controversial, but I want to say from the outset that there are aspects of the Bill that deserve our support. But those worthy provisions are few and far between and are overshadowed by a vast number of measures that would undermine fundamental rights, increase existing discrimination or do both. These controversial measures, which have rightly received much publicity, particularly the erosion of the rights to free speech and assembly, mean that other measures that also deserve our attention have slipped through almost unnoticed—but not any more.
This is where this House comes into its own. In Committee, we on these Benches will question and challenge every provision in the Bill that demands scrutiny. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has said, we are severely hampered in our duty by the sheer size of the Bill and the number of provisions it contains. With the best will in the world, and, in my case, having spent most of the Summer Recess going through the Bill, we cannot possibly do justice to the fundamental and far-reaching changes that it seeks to bring about when so much is contained in one piece of legislation. Can the Minister say why, after more than 10 years in government, it was necessary to cram so much into one Bill?
On the specific provisions, we welcome the police covenant but we need to understand how and why it is different from the Armed Forces covenant. Protecting police officers in vehicular pursuit of dangerous criminals is right, but so is protecting innocent members of the public caught up in the chase. Of course we need to do everything that we possibly can to combat serious violence, but how are the new duties different from the existing duties of crime and disorder reduction partnerships? Who is ultimately responsible: those partnerships, or elected mayors and police and crime commissioners? This legislation seems to further blur the lines as far as ultimate responsibility is concerned.
With all the homicide reviews that exist at the moment, what is the cost-benefit analysis of adding offensive weapon homicide reviews to that list? Of course the police may need to extract information from electronic devices such as mobile phones, but should, as the Bill says,
“any responsible person who is aged over 18”
be allowed to authorise such intrusion without the consent of the owner in certain circumstances?
In 2017, we told the Government that their changes to police bail were unworkable. Eighteen clauses of the Policing and Crime Act are now all but reversed, relegated to a schedule to this Bill. What has happened to the reasons why the limits on police bail were imposed in the first place?
Measures to combat child abuse are welcome, but why has it taken so long to bring about these changes and do they go far enough?
I applaud the sentiment behind increasing the maximum penalty for a minor assault, causing no injury, to an emergency worker. It should not be an accepted part of an emergency worker’s role, or that of a shop worker for that matter, to be assaulted. But as with all the many and various provisions in this Bill that seek to increase custodial sentences, where is the evidence that someone will think twice, in the heat of the moment, about assaulting a police officer because the maximum penalty has gone from one year to two years, particularly when this Bill also increases the potential maximum penalty for damaging a bunch of flowers placed on a memorial to 10 years’ imprisonment? What message does that send to our emergency workers?
We on these Benches support provisions where the evidence shows that they are necessary and that they will work. We do not believe in sending messages through legislation that will fall largely on deaf ears. It is the culture in society, and among some of the judiciary, that seems to accept assault as part of the job for emergency workers that needs to change. We need existing penalties imposed, rather than yet more conditional discharges or minor fines that ignore the existing or increased maximum penalties.
As the Minister attempted to do, noble Lords will notice I am going through the Bill systematically. I am only on Clause 46 of 117 clauses, and I have not even got to the most controversial parts of the Bill yet, so let me skip over those aspects that we will not be skipping over in Committee and simply highlight some of the most concerning aspects of the Bill in the home affairs arena.
Imposing conditions on public processions and assemblies not only unreasonably curtails the right to free speech and assembly but would place the police in a position that is likely to undermine the whole basis of British policing—that of policing by consent. Like the provisions on unauthorised encampments, there is little or no evidence that existing provisions are inadequate, and substantial evidence that this will add to further discrimination against minorities. We would also contest the Government’s assertion that the police have called for these changes.
A complex system of police cautions appears to make the police judge and jury in their own court, while removing useful provisions such as on-the-spot fines for minor offences, such as dropping litter, and simple cautions where the salutary effect of being arrested and detained by the police is sufficient to deter vast numbers of otherwise law-abiding citizens from transgressing again.
For reasons of time, I will leave my noble friends to talk about most of the justice provisions, but serious crime reduction orders are yet another provision that undermines fundamental principles of British justice and are likely to impact disproportionately on minority communities. To allow the police to stop and search someone, for a renewable two-year period, on the basis of no information or intelligence whatever that they have anything on them that they should not be in possession of, simply because an accomplice convicted with them had a knife on them, even if it was not used in the course of the offence and even if no evidence was presented during the trial but because subsequently, on the balance of probabilities, the judge thinks that the accomplice, who the defendant was with, may have had a knife, is as unreasonable as it is complicated. The Minister said that this would be applied to those convicted of knife crime. Perhaps she would clarify that this is the case, because that is not my understanding. It is for somebody convicted of any offence where it is believed on the balance of probabilities that one of the defendants had a knife in their possession at the time.
I have been able to touch only the surface of this Bill; goodness knows what Back-Benchers in this debate are going to do with only five minutes. This Bill, quite rightly, is going to take some time, and we on these Benches are not going to let it pass without thorough scrutiny of each and every provision that demands this House’s attention.
My Lords, I am not sure whether the knocking sound behind us has been someone trying to get in or someone trying to get out of the Chamber.
The House recently established a new Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I am lucky enough to chair. We are currently looking at new technologies and their application in the law—wider than the Bill, but very pertinent to it and to crime prevention and reduction, and to policing and sentencing. Artificial insemination—
I hope Hansard does not repeat that.
Artificial intelligence has huge potential benefits and raises huge concerns, and it is not anticipating the work of the committee to refer to them this afternoon. For instance, collaboration between authorities—Part 2 of the Bill—requires the sharing of information. Will this contribute to profiling and predictive policing? Predictive policing algorithms identify likely crime hot spots; officers are deployed there, and so more stop and search takes place and more crime is reported. It is a feedback loop; a self-fulfilling prophecy which can teach the algorithm to alert the user to particular geographical areas, communities and ethnicities. It has been put to the committee that it is important to involve at a very early stage of the process, and in a meaningful way, members of the communities that are likely to be at the sharp end of these algorithms, and not to leave it to people such as the witness or me—a white, middle-class, university-educated person, who is unlikely, one hopes, to be profiled as a future risk—because even with the best will in the world, we might not spot some of these problems and risks. A tick-box exercise is not enough.
Trust in systems translates to trust in authorities and in government itself—or, of course, the converse. The Bill permits the disclosure of data, but who owns it? What consents are required? Who knows about disclosure? We all expect some information—for instance, that between us and our medical professionals—to remain confidential. Transparency is important at an individual level, as well as more broadly. A defendant, or indeed someone questioned, will find it difficult to establish what technology—what combination of facial recognition technology, number plate recognition, predictive techniques—has led to his being identified as a suspect. If he cannot identify it, he cannot challenge it. How are we to ensure governance, regulation, accountability and scrutiny on an ongoing basis in the case of machine learning?
The technology has to be procured, and it will be procured from the private sector, whose interests are not the same as the public sector’s, and it is differently regulated, if at all. How can we be sure that purchasing authorities in the public sector understand what they are procuring? In the US, some police departments accepted a free trial of body-worn cameras, but they came with an obligation to be part of the manufacturer’s data ecosystem, including an obligation to use that company’s software and store data on its servers.
It is said that we need “human override”, but humans can get it wrong too. Human operators need to understand the limitations of particular technology to avoid overreliance on it or misinterpretation; they need to retain their critical factors.
These issues apply to identification, the extraction of information from electronic devices, monitoring and more that is in the Bill. They are the context for the development of policing and sentencing, such as the new cautions; for scrutiny, both general and in particular cases; and for our assessment of ethical considerations. We should be clear that there are clear principles to be applied. The National Audit Office has just reported on the national law enforcement data programme from a value-for-money point of view, of course, but there are other costs. The NAO mentioned, as I have, trust and the cost of damaging it. AI impacts society, communities, democracy and individual rights. We must be clear about what we are doing and why.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I no longer have to declare an interest but some Members here may know that I was until May this year police and crime commissioner in Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. As such, I will make a very brief contribution to this first debate in Committee.
I personally support—I hope from my experience—the early amendments that have been proposed. As has been said already, it is quite clear that anyone who works with the police nowadays, knows them or sees them closely at work, will know that for a long time, I suspect, as in the rest of society, mental health, mental illness and all that follows from it was not given anywhere near the importance it should have been. I am glad to say that it is my experience, certainly in the police force I was close to, and I am sure in others too, that chief officer teams are now giving the issue of mental health due regard. That is why any covenant that left this out would be lacking; I do not want to comment on the covenant— good points have been made on it.
I urge the Minister and the Government to consider seriously these obviously non-partisan suggestions, which are meant to be helpful. That is all I want to say, but my experience tells me that this is becoming a larger and larger issue as year follows year for police forces up and down the country.
My Lords, I start also by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her tireless work in supporting police officers in the many different roles that she has in addition to her work in this House. It was particularly important to hear about the work of police treatment centres, although they clearly do not have the capacity to deal with all officers who are affected. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his opening remarks, talked about only being able to imagine what police officers go through. I hope to enlighten the Committee about some of those experiences.
I have Amendment 4 in this group, but I support all these amendments, though perhaps with a qualification on one of them. My experience in the police service was not, in many respects, very different from that of others who have served or those who continue to serve, except perhaps that I was the most junior officer on my relief or response team, as it would now be known. For 18 months, as the junior officer delegated, I was the one who dealt with all the sudden deaths. My first appearance in court was at the Coroner’s Court, when the husband of an elderly couple had taken an overdose of prescription medication. Having worked night duty until 4 am, I was allowed to “slide off”, as I had to be at the mortuary at 9 am to identify the body. I had not seen a dead body before that night—I was 19 years of age—and I was unprepared for the sight and smell of at least half a dozen other bodies that had been opened up for examination by the pathologist when I arrived at the mortuary. It is an important role for a police officer to identify the body that he or she found as being the same one that the pathologist is about to perform the post-mortem on. I will not go into graphic details, but the Committee needs to get a flavour of the trauma that police officers are exposed to.
Noble Lords might think that the first case is the one that sticks in one’s mind, but whether it is the open-top car that overturned at speed, with no protection for the passengers in the back from the road surface, or the pensioner not seen for weeks in the summer, with swarms of flies on her badly decomposed body that was sticking to the bed when the undertakers tried to remove her, or the charred bodies in a number of fires that I attended, the impact on one’s mental health is considerable and cumulative. I can still picture and smell those scenes; I remember the taste that they left in my mouth.
It is not just the horror of such scenes; it is the emotional impact as well. There was a young man in his early 20s who had hung himself from a coat hook on the back of a door. There was a young mother, whose normal session with her psychiatrist had been cancelled because of Christmas; finding a name and address in her handbag next to her body at the base of a tower block, I went to the address, knocked on the door and was invited by her husband into a room where her young children were playing under the Christmas tree with the toys that the mother had bought them. If that was not bad enough, when I suggested that we ought to go into a different room so that I could tell the husband the tragic news that his wife had committed suicide, he asked me, “How did she do it?”. Experiences like that, as noble Lords can hear, I still vividly remember.
It is not just the deaths. I remember a young man who had a broken glass slammed into his face. We had to take him to hospital in the police van, as there were no ambulances available—some things do not change. I remember the terrified look on his face as he shook uncontrollably from the shock. Another man jumped from the fourth floor and landed on spiked railings. We held him up for what seemed to be an eternity, while the fire brigade cut around the railings; they could not use oxyacetylene torches because the heat would have transmitted to his body. Then we had to hold him in the ambulance between two trolleys, with the railings still through his body.
My Lords, there has been much criticism of the police complaints and misconduct process from the perspective of members of the public being unable to achieve justice, but much less has been said about the impact on the officers under investigation, to which I alluded in the last group. When we come to consider Clause 43 and Schedule 4 to the Bill, I will remind the House of the changes the Government brought about in the Policing and Crime Act 2017 to limit the length of time members of the public could be kept under investigation by the police and on police bail. The Government accepted the unfairness of suspects being kept in suspense for months, even years, with the threat of prosecution still hanging over them. This is something many police officers face, with even graver potential consequences than someone who is accused of a criminal offence—potentially losing their livelihoods through being sacked or required to resign from the police service.
When I was a police inspector in charge of a relief, or shift, of officers, a woman who had been arrested and taken to one of my police stations made an allegation of indecent assault by a police officer during a routine search to ensure that she did not have anything that could cause injury while she was being held in a cell. I heard a commotion in the custody suite and went to see what was happening, only to find her spreadeagled on the floor with one officer on each limb. The situation was explained to me: she had resisted being searched, fighting with the female officer designated to search her, and had to be restrained. I asked the prisoner if she was okay and if she was going to behave herself now, and then ordered two female officers to take her into a cell to be searched, much to the concern of male officers, who I ordered to remain just outside the cell door.
Another prisoner, who was present in the custody suite and subsequently interviewed in prison by officers from the complaints unit, corroborated to some extent the female prisoner’s account—a scuffle and then being held down on the floor—although her allegation was actually of indecent assault by a female officer during the search, out of sight of the witness. When the complaints unit took all the female officers who had been on duty that night away for questioning simultaneously and suspended one from duty, I asked that I be interviewed as I was also a witness who had seen nothing untoward.
As a result, I was interviewed as a suspect under caution in a criminal investigation. Although I had already qualified for a promotion, it was delayed for 18 months, and the local area police commander recommended that I face a full disciplinary hearing for lack of supervision, with a recommendation that I be sacked—perhaps related to having recently separated from my wife and having sought permission to cohabit with a man, or perhaps not.
The day that the local area commander retired from the police service, the headquarters complaints and discipline department responsible for scheduling discipline hearings dropped all proceedings against me, and I was promoted. But in the intervening period, my health suffered, my marriage ended and my career was on hold, even though I had done nothing wrong and, arguably, in coming forward as a witness, everything right.
This is but a relatively minor, albeit personal, example of the impact that prolonged police misconduct investigations can have, which, unlike criminal investigations, have no effective time limits placed upon them.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, set out, this amendment seeks to further improve the timeliness of disciplinary and misconduct proceedings against police officers. It seeks to do this by amending existing regulations governing complaint and misconduct investigations by the IOPC, as well as those conducted by force professional standards departments. In substance, they seek to introduce a new system of separate independent adjudicators with powers to close down investigations which have taken longer than 12 months, where they decide that there is no “good and sufficient” reason for delay.
Again, with this amendment, I agree with the thrust of what the noble Lord and others said, namely that disciplinary and misconduct investigations should be conducted and completed in a timely fashion, for the reasons set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Hogan-Howe. Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when I heard “10 years” I was utterly shocked. However, this amendment comes at a time when investigation timescales are already reducing and when the Government have worked hard to reduce bureaucracy in the system and not add to it.
Under the IOPC’s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, investigations would on average take 11 months. Since 2018, under the IOPC, that has fallen by almost 30% to just eight months. The IOPC has closed more than 90% of its cases in under 12 months and is making strong progress on the number of cases that it closes in under nine months and even in under six months. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, it is in nobody’s interest for investigations to drag on for long periods unnecessarily. We recognise the impact that this can have on everyone concerned.
It might be helpful in terms of explaining the trajectory that the Government introduced a package of reforms in February last year to the police complaints and disciplinary systems. It included new provisions to improve timeliness, with an expectation that investigations will normally be completed within 12 months. If not, the investigating body must provide a written explanation of any delays and steps to bring the investigation to a conclusion. The Government expect the IOPC to go further, and it now has targets in its business plans to complete many of those investigations in under nine and six months, as I said.
There are a number of reasons why cases might take too long, including the complexity of a case, the time- scale being impacted by parallel criminal investigations, and delays in obtaining expert evidence or post-mortem reports. It might be further complicated by delays in obtaining accounts from key police witnesses and subjects. That said, it is not acceptable for investigations to go on for too long, but the trajectory of timescales is certainly downwards.
The noble Lord’s amendment would introduce an additional layer of cost and bureaucracy. It would also risk creating perverse incentives for investigators to rush to meet deadlines at the expense of the quality of an investigation, particularly in those complex cases or if historic matters are at stake.
If an investigation into police wrongdoing was terminated without being concluded and that officer might have had a case to answer for gross misconduct—I can think of very recent cases which are relevant here—this would significantly undermine public confidence and potentially the course of justice. I am sure that is not the intention of noble Lords.
The amendment also risks undermining the independence of the police disciplinary system, blurring the lines between when legally qualified persons are appointed to this role and when the same person is appointed as a legally qualified chair of a misconduct hearing. These individuals would be selected from the same pool. That fundamentally changes the role of a legally qualified chair and jeopardises the independence of their position and the disciplinary system.
In conclusion, the Government have already taken steps to reduce investigation timescales and we will be monitoring the timeliness of investigations, drawing on new data collection requirements that we introduced as part of recent reforms. I hope that, for the reasons I have outlined, the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support for speedy justice. Obviously, this impacts the complainant as well as the officers.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. It seems very strange standing here and talking about a former commissioner in that way, but I am in police mode at the moment, I think. He made a very important point about firearms officers who volunteer to take on this enormous responsibility and are then treated so badly by the system.
The Police Federation—I am grateful for its support of these amendments—accepts that there will be delays if a criminal investigation is involved. However, there are still significant delays even after the criminal matters have been dealt with, as I outlined in the examples I gave.
I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his promise to come back all guns blazing, as it were, if I bring the amendment back on Report.
It is interesting that there is a parallel with the Armed Forces again. I spoke to a former soldier who was resigning from the police service and asked him why. He said that he was leaving because, in the Armed Forces, when something goes wrong, the most senior officer involved takes responsibility and faces a court martial, while in the police service, the responsibility is pushed down to the lowest-possible level, to alleviate the responsibility of senior officers. That is an aspect of the culture of the police service; I agree with that officer’s conclusions.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about public confidence. If there is no confidence in the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the police complaints system, this will be partly due to the undue delays. Complainants are beginning to think “What are they trying to cover up? Why is it taking so long?”. It is essential that these things are dealt with in a timely manner.
I thank the Minister for her support in principle, but the examples I gave were not complex cases; they were simple, but they still took years. They did not involve expert witnesses, yet there were still delays. These are recent cases from last year.
I am sorry but I do not accept the Minister’s assertion that this amendment would result in a rush to complete investigations. These completely independent people would assess whether there were justified reasons for investigations going on as long as they had. Clearly, if these investigations were not being dealt with in a timely manner, they would have something to worry about. This is about picking up those cases in which there is unnecessary and unreasonable delay. Of course, the same chair would not adjudicate over whether an investigation was going on too long and then chair the discipline investigation.
We are on to something here and I am very grateful to the Police Federation for bringing it to my attention. We may well need to discuss this further on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have Amendment 10 in this group. According to the Times newspaper, in an article dated 10 March this year, Chris Philp MP, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Ministry of Justice responsible, according to the article, for sentencing, said that
“detailed research had found that the likelihood of being caught and punished was much more important in discouraging people from committing crime than length of jail sentences.”
Answering a Parliamentary Question about the deterrent effect of longer sentences, he said, again according to the Times:
“The evidence is mixed, although harsher sentencing tends to be associated with limited or no general deterrent effect. Increases in the certainty of apprehension and punishment have consistently been found to have a deterrent effect.”
I subsequently discovered that this was the Answer to a Written Question on 19 February from the Conservative Member for Rother Valley about pet theft—of which more on another day. The Bill certainly is the gift that keeps on giving.
Noble Lords around the Committee will be aware that we on these Benches have consistently said that longer prison sentences do not deter criminals and now, according to the Government, harsher sentences have limited or no deterrent effect. So why do we have Clause 2 in the Bill? Noble Lords may be surprised that, as a former police officer, I am not supportive of this measure. Something needs to be done about assaults on emergency workers, but an increase in the maximum sentence is not what is needed. What is needed is a change in attitude among the general public, in society and in the courts towards assaults on emergency workers in general and on police officers in particular. It appears to me to have become accepted by many that being assaulted is part of the job of a police officer or an emergency worker. But no one should be expected to tolerate abuse or assault because of the work they do, whether they are a Member of Parliament or an emergency worker.
The type of assault covered by this clause is common assault. Anything that causes a significant injury, even if it is not permanent, such as a bruise, can and should result in a charge under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is already five years. We are talking about relatively minor physical harm. Can the Minister tell the Committee how many cases of assault on an emergency worker to date have attracted the current maximum penalty of 12 months in prison—or a sentence of imprisonment at all?
The reason for my amendment, in effect for the Sentencing Council to review its guidance for the existing offence where the existing maximum penalty is 12 months’ imprisonment, is to ensure that the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service reflect the seriousness of this offence in their decision-making, rather than what we see week after week reported on social media, where assaults on emergency workers in general and police officers in particular are treated by the CPS and the courts as part and parcel of the job. That sends a message to criminals and the general public that you can assault emergency workers with impunity, because in court you will be just be given a slap on the wrist—if it even gets that far. What is the point of increasing the maximum penalty for an offence to two years when the Government themselves acknowledge that harsher sentences have little or no deterrent effect and the courts, which can currently send someone to prison for up to 12 months, rarely if ever do so?
The Government may say that in some cases severe penalties can have a deterrent effect—but an increase from one year to two years for an offence often committed in the heat of the moment during the course of a confrontation between a police officer and a member of the public is unlikely to be one of them. Far better that the Government mount a publicity campaign stating that it is completely unacceptable to attack emergency workers who put their lives on the line every day to protect and serve the public, than that they make a minor adjustment to the maximum penalty that is likely to go unnoticed by those it is targeted at, either as a deterrent or in court following conviction, unless there is a significant change in the attitude of judges, prompted by a change in the sentencing guidelines.
On Amendment 11, proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, clearly, prison officers are as vital a uniformed force as police, fire and rescue services, the ambulance service and the coastguard, and they are afforded similar protection. I quite understand how others working in prisons feel that they are more vulnerable and, as the right reverend Prelate said, they feel they have a target on their back because they are excluded. He gave the appalling example of an assault on a prison chaplain that resulted in bruising to the chaplain. But, again, I say that that offence could have been prosecuted under Section 47, where there is an even greater penalty available than for an assault on an emergency worker. So we are not supportive of the increase.
On Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, of course, if such substances are actually thrown at a prison officer or other emergency worker, it would amount to assault and therefore it would be covered by existing legislation around assaults on emergency workers, with a similar penalty to the one the noble Earl is proposing in his amendment. So we feel that there needs to be a change in attitude towards the apparent acceptability of assaults on emergency workers, rather than simply a cosmetic increase in the maximum penalty.
My Lords, I think the noble Lord and I are in agreement that the problem is that we are not prosecuting these offences, rather than the outcome in the courts. Because, for the prisoners, it may be that even another three-month penalty for my new offence would be enough to deter them—or, using the existing penalties, as the noble Lord said, it is the probability of being prosecuted that matters.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Clause 3 enables special constables to be represented by the Police Federation, which is an important and welcome acknowledgment of the role played by specials in police forces—but it does not go far enough. I have been surprised at the lack of knowledge among those I have discussed the amendment with surrounding the role of special constables, who are sworn servants of the Crown with all the powers and responsibilities of a regular police officer. The only difference is that special constables are unpaid volunteers whose only recompense is to be paid expenses. I have also been surprised to learn how widely special constables are now used across a range of policing duties.
When I was a serving police officer, specials were generally treated quite badly by regular officers, who referred to them as “hobby bobbies”. It was almost seen as a punishment for a regular officer to be paired with a special constable on patrol—a liability rather than an asset. Such attitudes were unfair and, in most cases, unjustified. As the devastating cuts to policing continued at the end of the coalition Government, special constables came to be increasingly relied on to perform an extensive range of duties, including being trained in public order to be used in the front line on potentially violent demonstrations. Special constables carry warrant cards, handcuffs and CS spray, can exercise force and make arrests, unlike police community support officers, who are unable to do any of those things. Their uniforms have evolved over time so that today they are barely distinguishable from a regular police officer.
To all intents and purposes, and as far as the law and the public are concerned, special constables are in every way the same as regular police officers, except they are unpaid volunteers. That equivalence has been recognised in Scotland, where they are considered to be members of the police force, but it is not the case in England and Wales. While I welcome the recognition that this Bill proposes to give special constables in allowing them to be represented by the Police Federation, I am at a loss to understand why they are not also to be considered members of police forces to which they belong in England and Wales, as they are in Scotland.
Special constables have a vital and increasingly important role to play. In many places, the visible policing presence on our streets has all but disappeared; specials could help to fill that gap. The nature of policing is changing, with increasingly complex and technical crime being committed, such as online fraud. While police forces cannot compete with tech giants in terms of salaries for those technically qualified and experienced, there are opportunities for those with technical expertise to devote some of their spare time to serving their fellow citizens by becoming special constables dedicated to cybercrime, for example.
If I recall correctly, the Labour Party would seek to recruit significant numbers of special constables, were it to be in government—but that requires more than a statement of intent. Being a special constable has to be an attractive proposition to potential recruits, and recognising them as full members of police forces would send a clear message as to how important and valued they are. Can the Minister explain to the Committee why special constables cannot be members of police forces in England and Wales when they are in Scotland? I beg to move.
My Lords, this amendment, proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick, is one that I wholeheartedly support. Many years ago, when I was a magistrate, it was one of my happiest duties to swear in the new special constables. It was fascinating to hear their reasons for wanting to serve their communities voluntarily and to learn about their day jobs. Whatever motivated them, whatever their background, they shared the same driving commitment to help to keep us safe. They put themselves in as much danger as a full-time officer, and they do it voluntarily.
For many years, as my noble friend Lord Paddick, has said, full-time officers derided them. Fortunately, they began to see their worth and special constables are now, almost, fully integrated into the workforce and finally treated properly. I am delighted that my noble friend has brought forward this amendment and I support it totally.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining his amendment. Before I get on to dealing with this amendment, I want to say that I was very moved by the noble Lord’s earlier comments. In the interests of full disclosure, I should declare that I was an inspector in the Royal Hong Kong Police. That is where I started out; I can confirm that one never forgets the smell of a mortuary.
Amendment 12 effectively seeks to dispense with the need for Clause 3 by ensuring that, for all purposes, special constables are treated in law as members of a police force. Our professional and dedicated special constables increasingly carry out a range of specialised and front-line roles in their mission to keep us and our communities safe, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, noted. He also made some very relevant points about the technical skills that they can bring. They often face the same risks as regular officers while on duty; they deserve the same protection and support as regular officers where appropriate. That is why, through the Bill, we are enabling special constables to become members of the Police Federation, should they wish to do so.
Having been subject to long-standing separate regulation in England and Wales, the distinct nature of special constables is recognised in law with clearly defined benefits that result directly from this separate status. In contrast, legislation in Scotland has long included special constables as “members of police forces” and has been drafted to take this into account. It would not be appropriate for special constables to have access to the same conditions of service, or indeed face the same restrictions, that legislation confers on regular officers. Including special constables in the existing definition of “members of police forces” would have that effect. Legislation on the pay and pensions of “members of police forces”, for example, is not relevant to special constables, who are unpaid volunteers, choosing to give up their free time to help strengthen our police forces. As warranted officers, special constables in England and Wales hold the office of constable and are therefore already included in the term “constable”. This means that, where legislation confers powers on a constable, they will also be exercisable by a special constable.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned how we value special constables, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Harris. I will digress briefly to set out what the Home Office is doing to recognise and support the special constabulary. The Home Office has raised the profile and status of the annual Lord Ferrers Awards, which recognise the outstanding contribution of volunteers in policing. We have consulted on proposals to extend the eligibility of the Queen’s Police Medal to special constables, along with proposals to lower the service threshold for bars to the Special Constabulary Long Service Medal from 10 to five years. Those proposals could support the retention of highly committed volunteers who may, for example, be incentivised by an award that recognises more realistically the length of service volunteers are able to provide and their ongoing commitment to public service. I hope that this also answers something of the question from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, about recruitment.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to John Apter, chair of the Police Federation. I note that he started out as a special constable, which I suppose, by implication, suggests that that is a route into becoming a regular police officer.
For those reasons, we consider that this amendment is not necessary and could cause confusion to the status of special constables, which the law recognises as distinct from regular officers. Further, this amendment could have unwelcome, unintended consequences, for example by applying pay provisions to volunteers. I hope that, in light of my explanation and assurance, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her support and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his inquisitiveness and his recognition of the value of specials. I warmly welcome the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to the Dispatch Box. I am not sure whether this was his first outing, but it was a very, very good one. As he will find out, we work collaboratively in this House and it is good to work with such a wonderful Home Office spokesman—if that is not too over-the-top.
However, I did not actually hear—or if I did, I did not understand—why special constables are included as members of police forces in Scotland, and how all the objections the Minister raised, in terms of why they could not be members in England and Wales, have been got around in Scotland. As this is the Minister’s first outing, I would not press him to give me an answer now if he would prefer to write. But something tells me he may have the answer in his hands, in which case I shall allow him to respond.
I will try. The noble Lord is asking why specials are treated as members of the police force in Scotland but not in England and Wales. Special constables in England and Wales have been subject to long-standing separate regulation for members of police forces, and their distinct nature is recognised in law, with clearly defined benefits that result from this separate status. By contrast, legislation in Scotland has long included special constables as members of police forces, and it has been drafted to take that into account. I hope that goes some way to answering the noble Lord’s question.
It was a good try, but it quite clearly does not answer the question at all. Specials in Scotland have always been considered to be members of police forces; they are not paid, but if that happened in England and Wales, they would have to be paid like regular officers. I would like, if possible, for the noble Lord to write to me with a fuller explanation, rather than just stating what the facts are; an explanation of why the facts are as they are would be extremely helpful. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I have Amendments 14 and 17 in this group. I hope—in fact I am confident—that my noble friend the Minister will give a full explanation of the purpose of these clauses in the Bill, in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson. My concern is the inclusion of staff members in these new tests of dangerous and careless driving. I can understand the need to include civilian police driving instructors, but what I do not understand is the inclusion of other staff members. I hope that the Minister can explain why they need to be included.
My Lords, this is a difficult and contentious part of the Bill. There has been much debate for decades about the police approach to vehicle pursuit in particular, and the ability of emergency service drivers to disregard traffic signs and speed limits in an emergency. There have been tragedies where emergency vehicles on their way to serious and urgent incidents have ignored traffic lights or give way signs, or driven on the wrong side of the road, often in an attempt to save or protect lives, and tragically they have been involved in collisions with innocent members of the public, causing serious injury and sometimes loss of life, as my noble friend Lady Randerson has so graphically illustrated from her own personal experience.
This is perhaps the less contentious of the two areas. But even here, for police control room staff—I am sure the same happens with the fire brigade and the ambulance service—calls are graded as follows: emergencies, with arrival as soon as possible; immediate, with arrival within an hour; or routine. This is to ensure that police vehicles are not driven at speed unnecessarily.
I declare an interest as a former police officer who, although in possession of a full driving licence, attended a six-week, full-time police driving course just to become a standard police driver. I was not authorised to drive high-powered cars designed for use in responding to emergency calls and I was not allowed to become involved in vehicle pursuit of criminals, but simply to be a police driver answering routine calls. Of course, it is possible to become inadvertently involved in a chase, when a car that is asked to pull over refuses to stop, as happened to me on occasion, but as soon as a qualified driver was behind, I dropped out of the pursuit. Being an advanced trained driver involved many more weeks of intensive training; from memory, two six-week courses, with a very high failure rate. The courses were highly sought after and awarded to only the most experienced officers. Police drivers are trained to some of the highest driver standards in the world.
In addition, police control room staff have the authority to direct police vehicles to withdraw from pursuits where the driver of the police vehicle involved is not suitable to conduct the pursuit, where the seriousness of the offence alleged does not justify the risks associated with a high-speed chase, or where the driving conditions —the type of road, the time of the day or any other factor; my noble friend mentioned the presence of pedestrians, for example—present an unreasonable risk to the public and the officers who are involved in the pursuit.
My Lords, with my 30 years’ experience in the police service, I am having some difficulty in understanding some of the Minister’s explanations, for example about when surveillance becomes a pursuit. We are talking about a situation where an officer is potentially facing a prosecution for careless or dangerous driving. In the ordinary course of surveillance, the people who are being followed will not know that they are being followed. That is what surveillance is. It becomes a chase when the people being surveilled recognise that they have a police vehicle behind them and try to escape. It then becomes a pursuit. So, with the greatest respect, I think that the Government need to sharpen their reasoning for dismissing amendments which, if my noble friend Lady Randerson does not pursue them on Report, I am very likely to.
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. I think I gave some other examples, though, of things that do not necessarily qualify as police pursuit but are still none the less covered by this: emergency response, armed vehicle interventions and so on. I thought those would cover most of the noble Lord’s points. I take his point, obviously, that if you are under surveillance, you do not necessarily know that anybody is there—that is the whole point. At some point, that could turn into a pursuit; I suppose it depends on the specific circumstances. But I do take his point.
My Lords, Amendment 19 is supported by my noble friend Lady Randerson and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Amendment 20 is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Bellingham. I asked for these two amendments to be degrouped from the group we have just debated because that group was about the principle of police officers being given dispensation from the usual tests applied in cases of dangerous and careless driving. These amendments are about a separate issue—the consistency of the likelihood of police officers being prosecuted on not.
The changes proposed by the Government in Clauses 4 and 5 are problematic in that they define the threshold for prosecution or conviction for dangerous or careless driving, set against,
“what would be expected of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the prescribed training.”
The Police Federation, which provided a draft of this amendment, has reminded me that, while groups of forces tend to pool their resources in police driver training, none the less, there is no national standard. What would be expected of a competent and careful constable who has undertaken the prescribed training can vary from police force to police force. A tactic, such as physical contact by a police vehicle with a stolen motorbike, or a motorbike being driven by a suspect involved in an armed robbery, causing the driver of the motorcycle to crash, might be trained for and practised in some police forces but not in others. To be clear about what I mean, the police driver knocks the criminal off the motorbike by colliding with it—a tactic used by the Metropolitan Police Service.
This could result in a police driver, who was driving in exactly the same way as another police driver in a different police force, being prosecuted and potentially convicted; while the other officer in almost identical circumstances would not face any sanction, if that police driver had been trained in that technique and it was part of the policy of that officer’s police force. Amendment 19 proposes that a national standard be established to ensure consistency in the application of the law, and certainty for police drivers.
Amendment 20, proposed by the Police Federation and based on its wealth of experience in this area, offers an alternative approach by providing a reasonable excuse defence to an allegation of dangerous or careless driving. Instead of adhering to the standard of a careful and competent driver, a police driver could avoid prosecution or conviction, provided the departure from the standard was necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances. This would take account of the relevant driver policy and training, the split-second decisions faced in real time by the driver and the honestly held belief of the driver at the time. This is similar to the dispensation allowed to armed officers who have to make split-second decisions to use their firearms.
I am not a lawyer and I cannot elaborate on whether such a reasonable cause defence is accepted in other similar scenarios. I beg to move Amendment 19.
My Lords, we are extraordinarily lucky to have the expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I have just one anxiety about a national standard: conditions in the Metropolitan Police area are different from those facing, say, Devon and Cornwall Police. Devon and Cornwall Police might not have to dismount someone riding a motorbike illegally very often, whereas I suspect it is something the Metropolitan Police has to do quite often. On the one hand, I can see the benefit of national police standards, but I have an anxiety that they might not meet the different needs of different types of police force.
I am grateful to the noble Earl for his intervention. I think national standards would say that the tactic of colliding with a stolen motorbike was an acceptable tactic that officers could be compared against whether or not it was actually used by particular forces, bearing in mind the circumstances faced by different forces. So, legally, officers in Devon and Cornwall could use that tactic according to the national standard, but it would be very rare for them to use it—if ever at all.
My noble friend has raised the issue of national standards. I want to approach this issue in a slightly different way. I have added my name to the amendment because I have concerns about clarity. The existing standards are set out in the 1988 Act, and we as drivers are all familiar with them. We passed our driving tests however long ago, but on an almost daily basis we practise following those standards—fairly rigorously, I hope.
According to this legislation, we are now moving to a set of standards based on a format for training of which we, with the exception of my noble friend, have no real concept. We do not understand exactly what is involved in this training and what is expected of police drivers. Indeed, I am sure this debate has been very instructive for us all in finding out a bit more about it.
Add that issue to the fact that standards are different from one part of the country to another and we have a difficult situation for the Government in applying this new approach. Good law has to be easily understandable. Publicising the details of these standards—making sure that the public, as well as police officers, understand them—is essential for acceptance by the general public. That will be essential if cases brought under this legislation are to succeed in court.
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. To my noble friend Lady Randerson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, I say that I have just started cycling in London again and it is terrifying; we need more traffic police.
I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, particularly for the way he absolutely hit the nail on the head with his example of a police van driver who is not an advanced driver who is told by a member of the public that, 100 yards down the road, somebody is being murdered, but who has not received the level of training that they will be judged against. In the debate on the previous group, the Minister said that if they have not had the training, they will be judged like an ordinary driver; he also said that the legislation provides the protection that they need. But the example from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, shows how they will not get protection under the law as proposed and drafted by the Government in the Bill.
The Minister said that these changes have been made in consultation. Dare I suggest that they were not made in consultation with the Police Federation? They have not been made in consultation with the officers who will be directly affected by the legislation, because it was the Police Federation that asked me to propose these amendments to the Bill. Again, I am afraid I must suggest that the Minister has been rather let down by his brief in not being able to address the very real concerns that noble Lords around the House have expressed. We will clearly come back to this on Report, but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I agree very much with the concerns that have been expressed this evening, and I would because I have an interest which I should declare as a trustee of Safer London whose work is directed to deterring young people from becoming involved in crime. Giving young people the tools they need to resist being pulled into crime is a very wide agenda. As is obvious from the name, the work is confined to London, but it is needed all over.
As well as that, I remember the debates during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill on what is meant by “exploitation”. I take the point about people—it is not just children—who may be perceived as criminals but who are actually victims, so I understand the calls for much better understanding of child criminal exploitation. I hope that what I am about to say is understood to be support for, not opposition to, the thrust of what is being proposed.
Amendment 52, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, on training is absolutely to the point. If all agencies and authorities were trained to recognise what they are seeing but not recognising, in a way that would answer all the other points that have been made. If the prevention and reduction of crime, which is what these clauses are about, means anything, surely it must include safeguarding. That is prevention. Safeguarding is not defined, which does not surprise me because it is comprised of an awful lot of component parts and is different in different circumstances. I would be interested to know whether the Minister call tell us what is already on the statute book in this area. Are we talking about bringing together provisions that should be brought together that are scattered, as can be the case, or are we talking about something new in statutory terms?
I do not think that we can leave the issue without referring to resources. If there were the resources to extend the excellent work being done by various organisations far more widely, both in the voluntary sector and to statutory authorities, I do not think we would be talking about all this. But I am quite convinced that it comes back to training to recognise what should really be in front of people’s eyes. I know it is easy for us, standing up in the Chamber, to say that, and I would not like to do the job that some police officers, teachers, health workers and so on do. But the training should support the achievement of everything that noble Lords are seeking this evening.
My Lords, there are a number of general points I need to make about the new legal duties to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence. I will try to make them in the appropriate group of amendments, but I hope the Committee will accept that there is a great deal of overlap.
The overwhelming response of the non-governmental organisations I have met with which have concerns about this part of the Bill is that, as drafted, it is actually about forcing agencies to support a police-led enforcement approach to serious violence—not a public health approach, or even a multiagency approach, to preventing and tackling serious violence. The Government’s own consultation on this issue gave three options: a new legal duty on specific organisations to effectively share information with the police; a new legal duty to revise community safety partnerships, the existing and well-established mechanism where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime, and where the local police chief and local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder; and a voluntary non-legislative approach. There was more support for a legislative approach than a voluntary one, but more respondents favoured enhancing community safety partnerships—40%—compared with a new legal duty to provide information to the police—37%—and, tellingly, the police supported equally options one and two.
Even the police, the sector most likely to benefit from a police-led enforcement approach, were ambivalent as to whether it should be a truly multiagency approach by enhancing community safety partnerships or a police-led enforcement approach. So why did the Government opt for the latter and not the former? A police-led enforcement approach was the Government’s preferred option from the beginning. These amendments, which we support, are the first manifestation of challenging that police-led enforcement approach, in that the legal duty does not sufficiently recognise that many young people, particularly those involved in county lines, are victims of criminal exploitation rather than free-acting criminals. Henry Blake is a former youth worker who draws on his personal experiences of working with at-risk young people in his powerful film, “County Lines”—a drama about one young man who is drawn into county lines drug dealing. I would highly recommend this film to any noble Lord who is unaware of the realities of county lines.
Many young people lacking family support and living in poverty find themselves groomed by adults who appear to show them the love and concern they desperately seek, and who treat them to meals in burger restaurants and buy them new trainers—something their often lone parent cannot afford. They promise them money, not just so they can afford the latest designer clothing that they need if they are not to be bullied by gangs, who see those who do not wear designer labels—even Nike and Adidas—as targets. It is not just so they can go to McDonald’s whenever they want, but so that they can help their mum put food on the table and make sure their younger sister has decent clothes to wear. I hope noble Lords can see how easily vulnerable young people are drawn into criminality, not just for pecuniary advantage but for the sense of belonging and the sense that someone is at last paying them some attention. For many, it is as much an emotional need as a financial one.
Of course, the reality is very different. The adults exploiting these young people take the vast majority of the profits of the drug dealing in which they are involving these young people whom they have groomed, and the youngsters take all the risks, often ending in violence from rival drug dealers. These young people are victims of criminal exploitation, and each one of us is to blame—not them. It is our fault that their single mothers have to do three minimum wage jobs to pay the rent and put food on the table and so, through no fault of their own, can rarely be there for their kids as most wish they could be. It is our fault that too many people do not have a decent place to live, because they cannot afford private rents for an appropriately sized home in a good state of repair, and that there is a shocking shortage of social housing and much of what exists is in an appalling state of repair. It is our fault that, as the cost of living spirals upwards, we take away £20 a week in universal credit from those most in need. The Government’s response is to force other agencies to divulge information that makes it easier for them to prosecute these victims of criminal exploitation.
That is why the Bill needs to radically change from a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence to a truly public health and multiagency approach, starting with—although this is only the beginning of the changes needed—putting the safeguarding of children involved in serious violence in the Bill. That must include, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests in his Amendment 50, and as both Barnardo’s and the Children’s Society have suggested, including a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation in the meaning of exploitation in Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, suggests in her Amendment 52, training for police officers in particular, to ensure that they are aware of child criminal exploitation and actively seeking evidence of such exploitation.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the case for these amendments. I wholeheartedly agree that nothing is more important than safeguarding children at risk of harm. That is why we introduced reforms to safeguarding in 2017, which led to the establishment of multiagency safeguarding arrangements in 2019. The statutory safeguarding partners responsible for safeguarding—that is, local authorities, clinical commissioning groups and chief officers of police—are also named as specified authorities under the serious violence duty, so I would argue that it is truly a multiagency approach. This demonstrates the importance of safeguarding in protecting children and young people from involvement in serious violence. We expect that existing work to safeguard vulnerable children will link very closely with local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence. Therefore, we do not believe that it is necessary to include a separate safeguarding requirement in this part of the Bill, and it would not be possible to do so without duplicating existing safeguarding legislation.
On Amendment 25, which would require specified authorities to prepare and implement an early help strategy, the noble Lord is absolutely right to highlight the importance of prevention and early intervention and this, of course, is the key aim of the serious violence duty. We recognise that early intervention and prevention are essential to reducing serious violence. The duty requires partners to work collaboratively to develop a strategy to reduce serious violence in their local area. We expect partners to work with upstream organisations, such as education providers and children’s social care, when developing this strategy to ensure that it covers actions that relate to early help and considers risks that occur before a young person becomes involved in serious violence. This ensures that any strategy will include early help for this cohort. We believe that it would be less effective to separate this out into an additional strategy.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thought there was no such thing as disorderly interventions in Committee. Everyone is free to speak as many times as they wish at any point in the debate, so I am very pleased that the noble Lord used that opportunity.
In this group we return to the issue, which I raised last Wednesday, of what the new legal duty is really about—a police-led enforcement approach to preventing and tackling serious violence rather than a public health approach. Many and various specified authorities come under this new legal duty, and there are various reasons why these authorities should not be forced to divulge personal information to the police, of which the pre-eminent, and perhaps most readily understood example, is patient confidentiality.
In addition to the excellent points made by my noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Kakkar, I should also mention the joint briefing that noble Lords will have received from mental health professionals represented by the British Psychological Society, the representative body for psychology and psychologists, and the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy. They believe that the Bill as drafted allows the police to override the duty of medical confidentiality, eroding trust and confidence in clinical psychologists, counsellors and psychotherapists with the associated threat to public health, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Patel, who also believes that it will undermine the relationship between him as a doctor and his patients.
Like medical doctors, these health professionals are able to share confidential information on public-interest grounds already, on a case-by-case basis, if that is necessary for the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious crime or where there is an imminent risk of serious harm to an individual. There is already a system in place, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said. As the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, has said, we support what the amendments seek to achieve, which is to prevent the Bill undermining patient confidentiality.
Whether we are talking about doctors in general practice or psychiatrists, psychologists or counsellors, there are already well-established, well-understood policies and procedures, practices and protocols to deal with the balance between patient confidentiality and the police being able to access confidential information in the exceptional circumstances where it is necessary for public safety. Perhaps the duty of confidentiality for those in other fields is less well established and accepted, and we will come to those in another group, but, at least when it comes to patients’ and clients’ health and well-being, surely there can be little argument that the existing provisions are adequate, work well and should not be overridden.
Having said that, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who pointed out that there is a balance to be achieved and that in the past medical practitioners have got that balance wrong where they perhaps should have passed information to the police. Surely, however, that is an argument for enhancing or reviewing the current system rather than arguably going much too far in the other direction and making it a legal duty that doctors breach medical confidentiality.
We on these Benches say that what the Bill tries to do in terms of compelling health professionals, in this case, to divulge information to the police goes too far. What needs to be done is simply going back and looking at any examples that the Government can give, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has done, where current practice does not work effectively.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanations and for the promise of further meetings. It might help those further meetings if I raise the issues I have now. I am concerned at her saying that approaches cannot be made directly to medical practitioners but only through these other bodies. If the result was the same—that confidential medical information about individuals was divulged—that is not much of a reassurance. I am grateful for the information that officials met with the GMC and that it agreed to help with statutory guidance. Perhaps the Minister can meet with the GMC and it can help with amending the Bill.
The Minister said that the issue with some of the amendments is that they weaken the duties in the Bill. That is the whole purpose of the amendments. Regarding the draft guidance and its emphasis on a public health approach, that is not what is on the face of the Bill. The perception of all those I have spoken to—we will come to this issue when considering further groups—is that this is all about providing information to the police. To be fair, the Minister said so in her response. The belief among many authorities is that this is all about providing information to the police and is not a two-way process.
The Minister talked about the Care Act and said that there is already a duty to pass over confidential medical information if there is an overriding public interest. Where in the Bill does it say that there must be an overriding public interest before information is passed over?
The detection and prevention of serious violence would be the relevant part, which also reads across to the Care Act 2014. There would have to be a public interest assessment and as I said, there is no mandation. But the body or doctor in question would, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, have to balance the importance of the prevention, detection, and reduction of serious violence with the disclosure of that information.
My Lords, I support these amendments absolutely; they are practical and in the real world. From my experience as a police and crime commissioner over five years, it is quite clear that serious violence has a huge amount to do with place and a lot to do with housing in those places. If we are to have the partnership that is presumably behind the Government’s proposals on serious violence, it is absolutely essential that housing and those who control it have a vital role; without them, all sorts of disasters will occur.
When I was a police and crime commissioner, I would hear from police officers or citizens day by day about the problems in areas where they lived and the mismatch, sometimes, between those responsible for housing and their ability to talk to the police and get things done, on either side, as quickly as possible. These are very important amendments, and I hope that the Government will listen carefully to them.
My Lords, we support these amendments. It is not just victims of domestic violence who need help and support from housing authorities in escaping serious violence. Young people groomed and exploited by criminal gangs also need and deserve to be urgently rehoused in certain circumstances, as the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, so clearly set out.
Again, this needs to be a truly multiagency approach to reducing serious violence and not a police-led enforcement approach. The police need to provide information to housing authorities where they believe that someone is being coerced into criminal activity and is threatened with serious violence if they do not comply, and that taking that person out of that scenario by rehousing them can reduce the risk of serious violence.
I repeat that option 2 of the Government’s consultation on the serious violence duty is the best option and the one preferred by the greatest proportion of respondents to the Government’s own consultation—that of enhancing existing crime and disorder partnerships. These are the existing and well-established mechanism, where local authorities and police forces work together to prevent and tackle crime and disorder and where the local police chief and the local authority chief executive are equal partners in doing whatever each partner and others can do to reduce crime and disorder.
My Lords, can I ask the Minister to clarify something? I think the noble Baroness said that this additional duty was not necessary, as it was with domestic violence, because the violence does not happen in the home. In the example I gave, where a drug dealer owed money harasses and threatens a family to get their money back, surely you could say that that violence is happening on the doorstep, or perhaps inside the home if the drug dealer breaks the door down. Surely there is a need in those circumstances for that family to be rehoused to reduce serious violence and get them out of the way in a similar way to a victim of domestic violence.
I think what I said to the House was that households containing dependent children have a priority need and that a person may be assessed as having priority need if they were considered to be significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary person would be if they became homeless as a result of ceasing to occupy accommodation by reason of violence from another person or threats of violence that are likely to be carried out. In terms of domestic abuse, it is widely acknowledged that domestic abuse crimes are committed inside the home, out of the view of the public, by household members. The changes made to the Domestic Abuse Act to extend priority need to people who are homeless as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse reflected that.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 28 in my name, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.
Those under the new legal obligation to collaborate with each other to prevent and reduce serious violence are set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill and include clinical commissioning groups and local health boards, but they do not, for example, include hospital trusts. We will come to what should be included in serious violence in a later group, but in that group, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, has an amendment to include violence that results in the victim receiving injury that requires emergency hospital treatment, or where the injury amounts to grievous bodily harm.
Leaving the definition of serious violence to one side until we reach that group, we know from the work of Professor Jonathan Shepherd of Cardiff University how important information about knife crime, for example, is to the police in tackling that type of serious violence. It therefore seems to be a serious omission that not all NHS bodies in the area are listed as bodies that must be consulted as provided for in Clause 7(4), particularly hospital trusts. This omission leads one to question again to what extent this is really a public health approach to tackling and reducing serious violence. I have suggested that hospital trusts, for example, are included as bodies that must be consulted, rather than specified authorities, to avoid hospital trusts being compelled to divulge sensitive personal patient information under the other provisions of this chapter.
Hospital trusts can also play an important role in allowing charities such as Redthread to engage with victims of knife crime at “teachable moments” when victims involved in gangs are at their most receptive to being approached to discuss a way out of their violent lifestyles, particularly when they have been seriously injured or their injuries are life-threatening. I have personally heard powerful testimony from a young father, the mother of whose child had committed suicide, realising when in A&E with a serious knife wound that his child might have to grow up without either of his parents if he did not turn his back on his violent past. This is an example of a truly multiagency, public health approach to serious violence, where those involved in violent gangs are not necessarily imprisoned—where they may be further brutalised—but are supported to turn their lives around.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, suggests that young people’s groups and religious and cultural groups must also be consulted. In these cases, such groups can have a crucial role to play in providing a safe alternative to the sense of belonging that many young people desperately seek and that criminal gangs appear to provide.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly my noble friend Lady Brinton for her support for my Amendment 28 and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and my noble friend Lord Beith for powerfully explaining their amendments calling for the publication of strategies, despite my noble friend’s scepticism about having statutory strategies.
Other parts of the Delegated Powers Committee’s report criticise the fact that there is no indication that guidance issued to the Government will be published. There is also no requirement in the Bill to publish the serious violence reduction strategies; that is the main criticism in this group, as that clearly cannot be right.
The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, talked about drug-related homicides; I was not sure whether he was talking just about drug-fuelled perpetrators or other deaths associated with drug misuse. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, graphically illustrated the alarming increases in serious violence, particularly knife crime—there has been an 88% increase in recent years. He asked a very important question: how will this part of the Bill, and the strategies associated with it, succeed where previous strategies have failed? I am not sure we have heard the answer to that.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that we need to do whatever it takes to make sure that we succeed this time, because we have not succeeded up until now—provided that whatever that is, is effective. Clearly, there is a need for national co-ordination, for the very good reasons she explained.
The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, highlighted the need for smart objectives in strategies—specific, measurable, achievable and realistic objectives which have a timeframe. That is what effective strategies contain, and they do not appear to be present in the Bill. I thank the Minister for her comprehensive answers to the issues raised. She appeared to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, but it is not simply about sharing trends and monitoring; crucially, it is about setting smart objectives.
The Minister talked about clinical commissioning groups and local health boards; I have been told by my noble friend Lady Brinton, our health spokesperson, that these bodies do not include NHS hospital trusts, which at least should be included as bodies that must be consulted in developing these strategies. Accident and emergency hospital data is even mentioned in the guidance referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as a crucial measure of serious violence, yet accident and emergency hospitals are not even required to be consulted, according to the Bill. So we need to have further discussions on these issues.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was absolutely right to introduce this group of amendments by focusing on the full range of public services that will be drawn into the demands by this Government, and by police and other bodies, to have access to the personal information of individuals. As she rightly pointed out, this includes health services. Although I will not repeat the point that I made on the group starting with Amendment 22 earlier today, it sets the picture for the overall complexities and contradictions that other noble Lords have been discussing all evening on this Bill.
The data protection guardian has said that there are concerns that these likely breaches contravene the Data Protection Act. As I mentioned earlier, so have the GMC, the BMA and other health bodies. It is extremely concerning that we now must think about confidentiality in other areas too. I have no doubt at all that there are times when the balance of when information should be passed back is vital. That is what the serious violence strategy is all about. The problem is that there are no safeguards set out and no clear boundaries. I do not understand why that is the case.
While we have been talking about bodies and specific authorities during the course of these amendments, I am equally concerned about whether this debate is happening for the wider public, to tell them that in this Bill their personal data may well not be kept confidential. We do not even have the guidance on the point at which the police will start to get that information. So can the Minister identify any such consultation or debate in the wider media and social media about these rules, which will change citizens’ private data confidentiality for ever? I also echo the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, about this undermining trust in the bodies that have the data.
Amendment 65 makes the wider point that I referred to at length in the first group of amendments about the use of depersonalised information, but it sets out some guidelines and I strongly support this amendment too.
In closing, I say that the worry that many noble Lords have spoken of in various groups this evening is now becoming abundantly clear; it is just not clear where the rules and boundaries are, and I hope that the Minister will be able to help the House in this area.
My Lords, I have Amendments 35, 45, and 47 in this group. This is a very large group of amendments covering a range of issues and I apologise in advance for the length of my comments.
Noble Lords will forgive me for sounding like a broken record, but I go back again to the Government response to the consultation on the new legal duty to support a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence, which supports my own consultation with relevant stakeholders, which revealed universal concern that the Bill as drafted actually facilitates a police-led enforcement approach and not a genuine public health approach—a genuine multiagency approach to these issues.
The Government set out three proposals in that consultation: the one in the Bill, a new duty through legislation to revise community safety partnerships, and a voluntary approach. More responses were in favour of revising crime and disorder partnerships than the Government’s preferred approach set out in this Bill. Can the Minister tell the Committee what the purpose of the consultation was if the Government had already made up their mind?
The revising of crime and disorder partnerships was supported by 40% of respondents, including half of all police responses, compared with 37% in favour of the approach in the Bill. It is not too late to accept the result of the consultation and to revise crime and disorder partnerships. Amendment 35 is a probing amendment giving an example of how this might be done: for example, by adding authorities to existing crime and disorder partnerships.
Amendment 45 raises the concern that sensitive personal information, which this Bill forces public authorities and even doctors and counsellors to disclose, may be disclosed to private sector or third sector organisations that the Home Office, police forces or others may subcontract work to, to tackle or prevent serious violence, whose data security and personnel vetting procedures may not be as good as that of public sector organisations, and that this may result in sensitive personal information leaking into the public domain.
What assurances can the Government provide that such data, if public authorities are forced to share it, will be kept confidential? Cybercrime experts tell us that no database is secure and that data holders need to work on the basis that their security will be breached and that they need to have back-up plans. The more sensitive personal information about individuals is shared, the greater the risk that confidential information will end up in unauthorised hands, potentially used for illegal purposes such as blackmail, and ultimately end up in the public domain. Amendment 47 removes any requirement to disclose information that would breach an obligation of confidentiality.
My Lords, of course I would be glad to be updated, but I think that the Minister will recognise that, as the Bill stands, the position I spelled out would be possible: information could be shared with immigration authorities—and, of course, the Data Protection Act has an exemption in that regard.
I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation. I did not quite understand when she seemed to suggest that this was all facilitation and to enable different authorities to share information—and that there was no compulsion to do so. Could she therefore explain Clause 17, where it says that,
“if the Secretary of State is satisfied that … a specified authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 7, 13(6), 14(3) or 16(4), or … an educational authority, prison authority or youth custody authority has failed to discharge a duty imposed on it by section 14(3), (4) or (5)(b) or 16(4)”,
then
“The Secretary of State may give directions to the authority for the purpose of securing compliance with the duty”
and can enforce that requirement by a mandatory order? In what way is that voluntarily facilitating the exchange of information? Clause 17 is all about the Secretary of State forcing authorities to share information.
My Lords, the hour is late. Might the noble Lord permit me to discuss, perhaps in the next few days, the seeming contradiction between those two things?
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps we should leave the reorganisation of the police to another occasion. The first attraction of Amendment 55 is its utter simplicity and simple, clear language. You have no idea how anybody who has had to spend a lifetime looking at criminal justice legislation greets with acclaim a simple piece of legislation, which this is. There is no misunderstanding about it. It does what it says on the tin. Nobody can reconstruct it afterwards or say Parliament had a different intention—it is there.
More importantly, the argument is irrefutable. I had prepared quite a long speech to make today—long by my standards—but I will not make it. We have heard the arguments. This is a special, national problem—full stop. The best solution to a special, national problem is for it to be dealt with nationally. I therefore support this amendment.
My Lords, first, I have absolutely no doubt about the Minister’s commitment to dealing with the sorts of offences we are talking about today, particularly violence against women and girls. I also have absolutely no doubt about the Government’s commitment to tackling those issues. This makes the Bill even more puzzling. We support all the amendments in this group, but I want to look at this from a slightly different angle.
This group of amendments is intended to ensure that certain categories of crime are always included in the serious violence duty. It raises the wider issue of what this whole chapter of the Bill is about. Crime and disorder partnerships—noble Lords will know from previous debates that I am quite keen on these—have for many years been responsible for a multiagency approach to preventing and tackling crime and disorder in their areas, including serious violence. They have the advantage of being able to assess what local needs are and prioritise the crime and disorder that is a particular problem in their areas.
In light of these well-established existing partnerships, one must ask why there is a need for an additional serious violence duty. There has been much concern about knife crime in recent years and Scotland has demonstrated how successful a public health approach to the problem can be, where police enforcement is just part of a multiagency, multipronged approach to tackling knife crime. There may be characteristics of the knife crime problem in Scotland and solutions tailored to tackle them there that may not be completely transferrable to other parts of the UK, but the general principle is sound: law enforcement is only one of many approaches that need to be brought to bear on a problem.
If the Government were focusing solely on this type of serious violence, one could understand, in the face of the growing public concern, that a public health approach to knife crime might be mandated—but that is not what the Bill says. However, there are clues in other parts of the Bill that that is what the Government were initially thinking. For example, we will shortly come on to offensive weapon homicide reviews and serious violence prevention orders, which are all about knife crime.
The Bill talks about serious violence generally, including threats of serious violence but excluding terrorism. It goes on to talk—in Clause 12(4)—about a list of factors that must be taken into account, such as: the maximum penalty that a court could impose; the impact on the victim; the prevalence of the violence in the area, and the impact on the community. Presumably, other factors could be considered when the local area is considering its own serious violence. This effectively makes any violence serious—for example, hate crime. Hate crime should be considered serious violence because, by definition, it has a serious impact on the victim.
Amendment 55, from the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, says that domestic abuse, domestic homicides and sexual offences should always be included in the serious violence duty. As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, how can any of these offences not be considered serious violence? If the Government do not accept this amendment, can the Minister say what types of domestic abuse, domestic murder or sexual offence are not serious, or in what areas they are not far too prevalent? Amendment 56 also includes stalking, for the reasons that my noble friend Lady Brinton so powerfully argued.
Amendment 57, from the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, includes all violence that results in emergency hospital treatment, or GBH—for very good reasons. As I mentioned in discussion on an earlier group, as the noble Lord did just now, the Cardiff model—that of sharing depersonalised accident and emergency information on knife and gun crime with the police—has proved invaluable. Furthermore, as the definition of serious violence includes threats of serious violence, my noble friend Lady Hamwee is quite right to point out that social media and other electronic communication—the impact of which may go beyond the geographic area for which the authorities that have a serious violence duty have responsibility—require a duty that goes beyond a single area.
In defining serious violence in such a wide way, the Government must either accept that all violence has the potential to be serious, or risk being accused of saying that violence associated with hate crime, violence against women and girls, domestic violence, and almost any other form of violence, is not serious, or should not be treated as serious in every police area.
What the Government should have done, and what they should do now, is go back and look at crime and disorder partnerships, which are already established and responsible for preventing and tackling all forms of crime and disorder—as their consultation on this issue said they should. They should look at where crime and disorder partnerships need to be strengthened —whether, perhaps, to include partners not currently involved—or where legislation needs to be changed to facilitate co-operation and the exchange of information, instead of mandating others to provide information to the police to enable a police-led enforcement approach to tackling serious violence—whatever that means. Of course, we will support all the amendments in this group for as long as the Government continue with such a broad definition of serious violence.
My Lords, like other noble Lords I await with interest the Government’s response to all the amendments in this group. My name also appears on Amendment 55, which, at the beginning of this debate, was so ably and comprehensively moved, as we knew it would be, by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin. This issue was raised by the shadow Minister for Policing in the House of Commons, and I only hope it receives a more enthusiastic hearing from the Government in this House, given that it is being presented with such strong cross-party support across the House.
The serious violence duty introduced by this Bill, as we know, requires local authorities, the police, fire and rescue authorities, specified criminal justice agencies and health authorities to work together to formulate an evidence-based analysis of the problems associated with serious violence in a local area and then produce and implement a strategy detailing how they will respond to those particular issues. Prison, youth custody and education authorities may also need to work with these core partners.
As more than one noble Lord has said, the amendment is clear and straightforward in its intention, which is to make clear in the Bill that the definition of serious violence for the purpose of the serious violence prevention duty includes domestic abuse, domestic homicide and sexual offences. That begs the question of why this amendment is necessary. As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, and he was not the only one, is it not obvious that domestic abuse, homicide and sexual offences must come within the definition of serious violence? Apparently it is not. Despite domestic abuse representing one-third of violent crime recorded by the police and despite 20% of all adult homicides and 50% of adult homicides where the victim is female being domestic homicides, the Government’s serious violence strategy does not recognise domestic abuse and sexual violence as forms of serious violence.
No doubt, that is one explanation why between April 2014 and March 2020 the annual number of domestic abuse-flagged cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service by the police fell by 37%, with similar declines in prosecutions and convictions. No doubt, it is also one explanation why over the same period of time the annual number of prosecutions in rape-flagged cases fell by 55% and the annual number of convictions fell by 44%. No doubt, also, it is one explanation why in the year ended March 2020 only 9% of domestic abuse-related crimes and 1.4% of rape-flagged cases recorded by the police led to a charge or summons.
This Bill’s proposed serious violence prevention duty places a requirement on public authorities to collate and plan to prevent and reduce serious violence. While Clause 12 explicitly includes some named forms of violence, such as violence against property and threats of violence, to ensure that they are regarded as a form of violent crime across the board, violence against women and girls is not put in the same category, even though rates of domestic abuse and sexual violence, as so many other noble Lords have said, are consistent across England and Wales and do not vary greatly from one area to another.
Instead, intended Home Office guidance simply says that local areas can consider violence against women and girls as part of the new duty if they choose to and not that it is expected. Clearly, the Home Office is not too fussed one way or the other what areas decide on this very serious issue. There are attacks on statutes, and the Home Office gets very troubled. There are violent domestic attacks on human beings, particularly women, and the Home Office, however different the reality may be, appears so laid back that it wants to leave it to other people to make their own decisions on whether to regard these attacks as serious violence. It appears to want to leave it to other people to decide whether these dreadful attacks come within the scope of the serious violence prevention duty and the requirement on a range of public bodies, including local statutory agencies and the police, to work together to prevent and tackle serious violence with the aim of reducing the numbers of victims and perpetrators of such dreadful crimes.
Explicitly including domestic abuse, domestic homicide and sexual violence in the sexual violence reduction duty and its multi-agency approach would send a clear message to the police, prosecutors and a range of statutory agencies, including local agencies, that violence against women and girls is just not acceptable and that they all have to play a crucial role in tackling it.
At the moment there appears to be a distinction within the criminal justice system so that violence that takes place in the home or at the hands of an intimate partner is regarded as less serious than violence perpetrated in the public sphere. Only around one-half of police forces, as I understand it, have opted to take up Women’s Aid’s Domestic Abuse Matters specialised training on domestic abuse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, said, only eight of the 18 violence reduction units established in police force areas, which are funded by the Home Office and considered forerunners to the new violence prevention duty, name domestic abuse in their strategies.
My Lords, we on these Benches want to probe whether Clause 13 needs to stand part of the Bill. Can the Minister explain to the Committee why there is a need for legislation to allow a local policing body, presumably a directly elected mayor or a police and crime commissioner, to assist in preventing or tackling serious violence?
I could understand if the clause stated that local policing bodies must assist or monitor what specified responsible authorities were doing and must report their findings to the Home Secretary, but that is not what it says. It says that such assistance, monitoring and reporting are voluntary, in that these bodies “may” assist, “may” monitor and “may” report.
Subsection (4) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision conferring functions on a local policing body”.
Does that mean that, although in primary legislation—the Bill—all this is voluntary, the Secretary of State can by regulation make it compulsory?
Subsection (5) states that the functions contained in regulations
“may include provision ... for a local policing body to arrange for meetings”.
Why does the Secretary of State need to pass regulations for a directly elected mayor to hold a meeting? Can the Minister explain why Clause 13 needs to be part of the Bill at all? We on these Benches are struggling to understand why.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for this stand part debate. If the Committee will forgive me, I will say, as quickly as I can, a word or two about how I perceive the role of police and crime commissioners up until now.
Clause 13 is clearly an important element in establishing, from the Government’s point of view, a serious violence reduction duty on a more statutory basis—if I can put it that way—than exists presently. This obviously involves police and crime commissioners in particular. It is important to remember—I think this is what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was getting at, in part—that police and crime commissioners have, in their nine-year existence, voluntarily worked hard to establish partnership working and commission partnership services. In many cases, they have taken a lead in those partnerships.
There is a fundamental misunderstanding—not, I am sure, in this Committee—that, somehow, the only real role for police and crime commissioners is to hold their police force, and the chief constable in particular, to account. That is a crucial part of their duties, but I point out—the Committee does not need this pointing out—that they are not just police commissioners but crime commissioners as well. At the very least, they should have a significant duty to find ways to prevent crime and its effects on victims and society, working alongside partners, of course.
This is not about dealing with crime that has taken place, whether it is antisocial behaviour or serious violence. It means dealing with what has become a hackneyed phrase but is crucial here: the causes of crime, going back to early childhood development and early intervention. It is always about poverty and its effect on crime. It is about bad and lousy living conditions, and it always involves looking after the vulnerable, whoever they may be—we are all vulnerable at some stage or other in our lives. Above all, it is about preventing lives being thrown away, whether they are those of victims or perpetrators. I have to confess—noble Lords may have already realised that this is what I am about to say—that this kind of work or duty, as I call it, gave me and many other police and crime commissioners the greatest buzz of all.
It was crucial to achieving anything that one worked with partners, local and national, very much including government. To their credit, the Government set up violence reduction units, changed their support—I do not mean that in any bad way—and became very keen on the public health approach to dealing with these matters. That was a huge and important change, and many of us were convinced by the work that we did and seeing what happened in Scotland that this was the right course to take.
Where I was police and crime commissioner, we have what we call a violence reduction network, rather than a unit. I argue that it has achieved quite a large amount already, with great projects. My predecessor as police and crime commissioner for Leicestershire ran and started an office of the police and crime commissioner-run strategic partnership board, or SPB, which, by the time I left office, included all—I mean all—of the main public services in the area covered by the force, from local government to health, education, the police, fire and ambulance services and more.
The other example I give is that I was the chairman of the East Midlands criminal justice board. Other police and crime commissioners were chairs of their local boards or whatever they chose to call it. Clearly, if Clause 13 and other parts of this chapter pass into law, there will be—I am guessing that this is how the Government will put it—more statutory backing for this way of approaching the serious violence reduction duty. I am not against that in principle, but my one concern is that, in my experience, police and crime commissioners are a little bit like elected mayors: if they are good, they are very good, and they can make a huge difference, but if they are not so good, they can make a huge difference the other way.
I was lucky in that I had a brilliant team working for me in my office. As it happens, it has been decimated by my successor, but that is for another day, certainly not for today. Also, when I was there, other police and crime commissioners, whatever their party politics or lack of it, seemed to me to be able people who wanted to do the right thing and were very committed. As the noble Baroness and the Committee will know, many new police and crime commissioners were elected in May this year, which is no doubt a good thing, and many more of them were women—it is about time, too. It is too early to say whether they will grab these extra opportunities, but I hope that they will.
There are two big issues as far as the future is concerned in the real world. One, of course, is data sharing, which the Bill is very concerned about, and so it should be. So often, people of good will get together on behalf of organisations that are not prepared to share data. That has to change in this area, otherwise there will be no achievement. The second issue—I hate to mention it but it is the usual one—is funding. If we are going to fund all these exciting proposals, it will require government to take a leading step in that.
I am grateful to the Committee for listening to my speech. I thought it might be useful in terms of this clause.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Clause 13 provides a power for a local policing body—namely, a PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, or the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a police authority—to assist authorities in meeting the requirements of the serious violence duty. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was absolutely correct, as was the noble Lord, Lord Bach—as I always say, we are immensely lucky to have Parliament’s only PCC in our place; the benefit of his experience is incredibly useful.
Local policing bodies have an important part to play in convening partner agencies. PCCs and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, as elected local policing bodies, are the voice of the local community in relation to policing and crime. This is reflected in their current functions in relation to community safety partnerships. Local policing bodies are responsible for the totality of policing in their force area—the noble Lord, Lord Bach, pointed out some of the things that they get involved with—as well as for services for victims of crime. They will therefore have shared objectives in relation to the prevention and reduction of serious violence. That is why this clause provides local policing bodies with a discretionary role in supporting specified authorities with the preparation and implementation of their strategies, as well as monitoring their effectiveness and impact on local serious violence levels. I underline that the PCC role is discretionary and that it cannot be mandated through regulations.
The PCC, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, and the Common Council of the City of London will not be subject to the serious violence duty as specified authorities. However, as with the existing functions of these local policing bodies in relation to community safety partnerships, they may choose to collaborate with local partnerships. They may also take a convening role to support effective multiagency working.
Regulations made by the Secretary of State may provide further detail on the ways in which local policing bodies may assist specified authorities, including convening and chairing meetings, requiring certain persons to attend such meetings and providing funding to a specified authority to support the implementation of the local serious violence strategy. They will also have a power to require information for this purpose, as set out in Clause 16. In undertaking their monitoring functions, local policing bodies may report their findings to the Secretary of State to ensure compliance with the duty.
Specified authorities will have a duty to co-operate with local policing bodies when requested to do so. However, we have made clear in the draft support guidance the need for the relevant local policing body to consider the proportionality of additional requests and anticipated costs to specified authorities before making any such requests.
The overall objective is to provide additional support and leadership, if and when required, and not to place additional burdens on those authorities subject to the duty. The approach is very similar to arrangements in place for CSPs. There has been a mutual duty on PCCs and CSPs to reduce offending since the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. I am sure noble Lords will agree that, to engender an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing serious violence, we must ensure that all relevant parts of the system play their part and have sufficient support in place to enable them to do so. We believe that local policing bodies, including PCCs, are best placed to provide that support. I take also the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about funding.
I have just a couple of questions. First, what aspects of Clause 13 are local policing bodies currently not allowed to do that the clause allows them to do? Secondly—and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for articulating what is in the guidance—my understanding is that crime and disorder partnerships could be the mechanism chosen to deliver on the serious violence duties in a particular area, or it could be a different mechanism, and the police and crime commissioner might want to be part of that or might not. That does not appear to provide the clarity of leadership and accountability necessary to deliver a serious violence strategy. Perhaps the Minister can explain how this all works.
My Lords, I shall try to. At the moment, PCCs and other local policing bodies have the powers to work with the specified authorities to support multiagency working. The serious violence duty is a new duty, and the legislation clarifies how it will fit together. PCCs are the elected bodies; they work with local forces. The multiagency working can be through the CSPs, or there is flexibility around how the local partnerships are constituted. Because it is a new duty, it is definitely worth clarifying in legislation how it might work out.
My Lords, I have to support what I have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for reasons we began to articulate on Monday evening. Noble Lords will remember we began to have a discussion about what is to be shared and in what circumstances existing duties of confidence and existing professional duties need to be overtaken in the public interest. But who decides? The Minister kindly gave me a very specific answer at one point in our discussion, when she said that it will be decided by the person who holds the data, but, obviously, that can be subject to challenge. That of course is my traditional understanding of professional confidence.
Way before this, and way before the Crime and Disorder Act, that was the traditional position: if the doctor, the teacher or whoever is not minded to hand over to the police the data about a specific person, or more general data, the police will have to go to the courts and try to get a warrant. That is the place for those hopefully rare disputes between professionals and the police, who are coming at this from different positions, to be decided, rather than being decided by direction from the Secretary of State.
Of course, normally, we want the health professionals, the policing professionals and the educational professionals to be working in discussion and collaboration, but, where there is a rare dispute because of their different professional angles and ethics, it really is for a judge to decide and not for the Secretary of State to trump all those existing ethics and duties. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is nodding at me. That is the concern I hope the Minister can address in her explanation and defence of Clause 17.
My Lords, I rise to support the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, taking us back to very late on Monday night, if the Minister remembers, when we were discussing Clause 15, on the disclosure of information. The Minister—I think, from memory, although it was late—implied that the disclosure of information was voluntary and that the clause was there simply to facilitate the disclosure of information. In challenging the Minister in that, I quoted from Clause 17.
I can be brief. Clause 17 enables the Secretary of State, if satisfied that a specified authority, educational authority or youth custody authority has failed to comply with the duties to collaborate or disclose information—including, presumably, sensitive personal information and information covered by a duty of confidentiality—to direct the authority to comply and enforce her direction through a mandatory order. That is what Clause 17 says.
I have already explained at length why professionals should use their professional judgment—as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, just said—within existing policies, procedures, practices and protocols, rather than being forced to divulge sensitive personal information when it is not, on balance, in the public interest to do so. For example, there will often be a greater good to be derived from maintaining a relationship between, say, a youth worker and a young person at risk of becoming involved in serious violence than from divulging sensitive information to the police. All authorities dealing with these issues are committed to preventing and tackling serious violence. They may, from time to time, have a different perspective on the problem, or a different view on the best way to achieve what we all are desperately seeking to do.
This clause is one of the reasons why so many organisations believe that the Bill is really about a police-led enforcement approach, because it is the Home Secretary who can force them to comply, rather than the public health, multiagency, multifaceted approach that has been so successful in preventing and tackling knife crime in Scotland. Can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is this clause necessary? We believe that Clause 17 should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, this group starts with government Amendment 72, which I will say a brief word about. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to obtain the consent of Welsh Ministers—not just consult them—before giving a direction under Clause 17 to a devolved Welsh authority. I understand that the change was requested by the Welsh Government, and we support it on this side of the House.
I turn to the debate on whether Clause 17 should stand part of the Bill, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who introduced it, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Their explanatory statement says that:
“The purpose of this amendment is to explore the extent of the Secretary of State’s powers to issue directions under this section and the consequences of failure to comply with such a direction.”
A number of very searching questions have been raised, and I have a few questions myself. It would be helpful if the Minister could give some more information on what a “direction” might be and what it might consist of under this clause. The central point made by both the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was about the context of police-led enforcement rather than a more equal arrangement between other agencies such as education and the National Health Service.
In the House of Commons, the Minister said that it is envisaged that this power will be used extremely rarely. Nevertheless, could the Minister give an example of when this power might be used and what checks might be in place when it is used? What would the prior steps be before a direction is considered? How would an authority’s progress in acting upon a direction be measured? Further, can the Minister say something about how the Government see this power working in practice?
I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, raised a particularly interesting question about what the sanction might be if a public servant fails to comply with an order to disclose information. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti also spoke of the rare disputes between professionals and how these may be resolved by direction from the Secretary of State, rather than through the courts. She gave a historical context, if you like, to that status of professionals making their own judgments.
The noble Baroness is absolutely right about data protection but there are exemptions. One is the detection, prevention and reduction of crime.
I am grateful to the Minister. I think I need to read what she said and compare it with what is in other clauses in the Bill because, although it is difficult to hold everything in one’s head, I am not sure that everything she said is consistent with what is in the Bill.
However, there are two specific questions that the Minister did not answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked what the sanction would be for failure to comply. Is it right that a mandatory order is an order of the Administrative Court to comply with a legal duty, and therefore failure to comply with a mandatory order would be in contempt of court? The second question, which I asked, was: can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed the efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is the clause necessary? I do not expect the Minister to have examples at her fingertips but perhaps she could write.
I thank the Minister for her response on Clause 17. However, I wish to express a bit of concern. Although she assured the Committee that an individual doctor or youth worker would not be required to provide information, nevertheless an authority might well provide information, without consulting the individual doctor or youth worker, that would identify individuals who were receiving services in that authority. After the Minister’s response, I am not at all clear that we can be completely sure that this will not happen; I believe that there should be some wording in these clauses to specify that information from authorities about individuals would not be accepted if they provided it. This is an incredibly dangerous situation if individuals find that their authority has been divulging information to the police; it could destroy the efficacy of our public services—it is that serious.
I am not trying to be awkward; I just feel that we need some assurances in these clauses that individuals will not need to be concerned about the disclosure of information about them. Various subsections in Clauses 15 and 16 and so on indicate that, in looking at data protection, you must take account of the regulations in this Act. It is quite complex but it is not reassuring, if I may say so.
My Lords, before the noble Baroness withdraws her objection to the clause standing part, I remind noble Lords that we are in Committee and can speak as many times as we like.
My Lords, it might be helpful to the Committee if I clarify what may be a slight confusion. The group was led by Amendment 72 but noble Lords will recall that Amendment 72 was agreed to in its place. The question that the Committee now has before is that Clause 17, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 73, I will speak also to Amendment 74 in my name.
Clause 18 states that those authorities that are, under this chapter of the Bill, under a duty to prevent and tackle serious violence
“must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State”.
However, in the Bill, the only people the Secretary of State must consult are Welsh Ministers. As we will see in a later group, when it comes to similar guidance in relation to offensive weapons homicide reviews, Clause 31 requires the Secretary of State to consult
“persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent review partners”
and
“such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
That is in addition to Welsh Ministers.
We on these Benches believe that the Secretary of State should also consult representatives of the authorities that will be subject to the guidance, and such other persons as may be appropriate to consult. That is the intention of Amendment 74. We also believe that such guidance should be statutory—that is, contained in regulations—to enable Parliament to scrutinise the guidance before those involved become subject to it, as set out in Amendment 73. I beg to move.
My Lords, we support the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. On Amendment 74, we believe it is vital that the Government should consult front-line organisations on the content of the guidance. They are the ones who know how this will, or will not, work in practice and their expertise is the driving force behind the duty. The Government have of course published draft guidance on this, and I ask the Minister whether this guidance is being consulted on.
My Lords, that was quick for a Committee debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for setting out the case for these amendments, which relate to the power to issue guidance in relation to the serious violence duty. I am sure we all agree that legislation works far better, in practice, when it is implemented alongside clear guidance. In the case of the serious violence duty, we want to ensure that the guidance is clear on the expectations of all specified authorities, that it provides sufficient advice in meeting them and that it highlights best practice from across England and Wales. It is also crucial that such guidance is developed in collaboration with and with input from those who will be subject to the legislation and those who represent them to ensure that it is fit for purpose.
That is why, prior to the implementation of Chapter 1 of Part 2, we will publicly consult on the guidance to support the duty. As a first step, we have published the guidance in draft to assist the scrutiny of these provisions. I have a copy of it here. We welcome feedback on the draft and will take that into account when preparing an updated draft for consultation following Royal Assent to the Bill.
Clause 18 already expressly requires consultation with Welsh Ministers, as the noble Lord said, in so far as the guidance relates to the exercise of functions under this chapter by a devolved Welsh authority. But we are committed to going further and, as part of the public consultation on the statutory guidance, we intend to invite views from key representative bodies and other relevant persons, such as the Children’s Commissioner and the domestic abuse commissioner. Given this commitment, I do not think it would be appropriate, at this point, to include a broader duty to consult in the Bill.
The stated aim of Amendment 73 is to enable the guidance to be scrutinised by Parliament. In principle, I have no difficulty with that at all; it is open to Parliament to scrutinise guidance at any time. However, the effect of this amendment, when read with the provisions in Clause 21, would be to make the guidance subject to the affirmative procedure. I am not persuaded that this level of scrutiny is necessary—and nor, for that matter, was the DPRRC, which recommended that the negative procedure should apply in this case. We are carefully considering that committee’s report and will respond ahead of the next stage. In light of the commitments I have given, would the noble Lord be happy to withdraw his amendment?
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, but it was actually me who proposed these amendments.
I do apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My ventriloquism skills are not so good that the Minister would think I was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. But I am glad that the Minister is going to consider the regulations again. I am not sure that the intention of my amendment was to ensure that guidance would be approved through the affirmative procedure. Any procedure would be better than no procedure at all, and it does not look like there is any provision in the Bill for parliamentary scrutiny of guidance, so I am grateful for that undertaking. I will go back and look again at a later part of the Bill, which includes the need to consult on guidance. I may need to come back on Report and again challenge why, in that part of the Bill, guidance has to be consulted on, but not in this part. Having said that, I withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 75 I will speak also to Amendments 76 and 77 in this group, all in my name. We now come to offensive weapons homicide reviews and there are two points I will make initially. The first is to point to the evidence that the provisions on this in the Bill were probably, quite rightly and properly, about knife crime. Chapter 2 is about offensive weapons homicide reviews and, predominantly if not almost exclusively, homicides involving offensive weapons are knife crime offences.
Secondly, as with Chapter 1, the primary motive of the Government is to produce the illusion of doing something when the changes in the Bill have little practical beneficial effect. As we argued in Chapter 1, the Government’s approach potentially does more harm than good. Amendment 75 is a probing amendment to ask the Government why, just as Chapter 1 should have strengthened existing crime and disorder partnerships, this chapter should not strengthen the already considerable and comprehensive powers of coroners, if this were necessary, rather than creating a new and separate legal duty to conduct offensive weapons reviews—other than the obvious explanation that the Government could point to it and say they had done something about knife crime.
For every death where the cause of death is still unknown, where the person might have died a violent or unnatural death or might have died in prison or police custody, a coroner must hold an inquest. Clearly every qualifying homicide, as identified by Clause 23, and every potential qualifying homicide, even if the Secretary of State changed the definition by regulations, as subsection (7) allows, would be subject to a coroner’s inquest. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides coroners with a duty to make reports to a person, organisation, local authority, or government department or agency, where the coroner believes that action should be taken to prevent future deaths. All reports, formerly known as rule 43 reports, and responses must be sent to the Chief Coroner. In most cases, the Chief Coroner will publish the reports and responses on the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary website. Coroners are very powerful members of the judiciary. Attendance at a coroner’s court takes precedence over an appearance at any other court, if a witness is required to attend more than one court at one time, for example.
Can the Minister tell the Committee what consultation took place with coroners before this chapter was drafted? What was their response? What additional benefit would an offensive weapons homicide review have over a coroner’s report? If benefits were identified, what consideration was given to the coroner, rather than a review partner, being given the power to order a homicide review? Can the Minister also explain what happens if one of the review partners considers that none of the conditions in Clause 23(1) is satisfied, but another review partner considers that the conditions are met? Does the review take place despite the review partner’s objection, and, if it does, does the review partner that objected have to participate if it does not believe the conditions are met? Is there a hierarchy of review partners? So, if the police believe the conditions are met, must the review go ahead? And if a clinical commissioning group believes that a review should go ahead, but the police do not believe the conditions are met, does the review take place and do the police have to participate?
The Government may say that all this will be set out in regulations, but the existing provisions in the Bill are a shell of an idea, where this Committee is left to guess what actually happens in practice; what a qualifying homicide is, because that can be changed by regulation; who the review partners will be, because that will be set out in regulations; and what happens if there is disagreement among review partners about whether the conditions are met.
We already have child death reviews, domestic homicide reviews—on which more in a subsequent group—safeguarding adult reviews, and, now, offensive weapons homicide reviews. With the Bill as drafted, how many of the sadly too many knife crime deaths a year will be subject to a review? According to the Bill, factors that decide whether a review is necessary may include, for example, the circumstances surrounding the death, the circumstances or the history of the person who died, or the circumstances or history of other persons with a connection with the death, or any other condition the Secretary of State sets out in regulations. How many reviews do the Government believe will have to be conducted each year by our overstretched police, local authority and health services? I ask the Minister to not give the answer: “It depends what conditions are contained in the regulations”.
Amendment 76 is intended to ensure, as with the serious violence duty, that professionals, including doctors and counsellors, are not forced to disclose sensitive personal information that is subject to a duty of confidentiality, unless, in exceptional circumstances, it is in the public interest to do so, and in accordance with existing policies and practices, although I accept that these may be less stringent in the case of information regarding the deceased.
As before, Clause 31 says that review partners must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State, but there is no mention of parliamentary scrutiny of such guidance. My Amendment 77 requires the guidance to be laid before Parliament to ensure parliamentary scrutiny. I beg to move Amendment 75.
My Lords, I am glad to support my noble friend in questioning whether the processes outlined in this clause should be altered so that they protect the procedures that we already have and have had for a thousand years, to use the system of coroners to investigate unexplained deaths of a wide variety of types. Instead, we have the offensive weapons homicide review added to the system. It is unclear how this will relate to the coroner’s duties in a situation where such a death has occurred, because the coroner’s duties do not disappear because we have legislated this system into existence. I hope the Minister will clarify this point.
There was a time when the Government might have felt that the system of coroners was not quite up to the job in some areas. We had problems over the years with inconsistencies in standards of coroner, but considerable attention has been given to that in recent years and I think the system now has much more consistency about it. We are not subject to some of the problems of particular localities which existed in the past. The creation of a Chief Coroner, although in a more limited way than originally envisaged, I think has helped in that process.
It seems to me that the Government are not saying that the coroner system cannot handle this, they are simply legislating for an additional mechanism, because that seems to be a good, visible response to a problem that we all acknowledge is a serious one. But serious problems are not solved by creating more structures and processes, particularly in the circumstance where what is a qualified homicide appears to be so uncertain that the Government have to keep to themselves powers to change the meaning of qualified homicide while the legislation remains in force.
I am very unpersuaded about this system and certainly would like to know what coroners are supposed to do when they find themselves presented with the likelihood of such an inquiry taking place and may have their own duties in respect of the death that has taken place.
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. As I understand it, yes it does. I expect I will be corrected by my officials later.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. It cannot possibly be right that a coroner’s inquest is not held if a criminal trial answers the statutory questions. Why is a coroner’s inquest into the Manchester Arena bombing currently taking place after two people have been convicted in criminal trials? I cannot believe that what the Minister just said is true.
I am not in a position to answer that question, I am afraid. I shall have to write to the noble Lord.
I can now confirm that coroners’ inquests will not preclude an offensive weapons homicide review.
In homicide cases where there is an inquest, its purpose would not be to provide the same in-depth review as an offensive weapons homicide review, which will identify points of failure, lessons learned and opportunities to intervene, which will help partners tackle homicide locally and nationally. Due to this, we do not consider that the amendment is necessary. I may have already said that, in which case I apologise. In fact, I have said that; I shall move on to Amendment 76.
Amendment 76 relates to information sharing in relation to confidentiality obligations and data protection in Clause 29. To review the circumstances leading up to a homicide involving an offensive weapon, to identify lessons and produce recommendations that will have a meaningful impact and save lives, the review will undeniably need to be able to access and consider information and material relevant to the homicide. Such information may include information about the victim or the alleged perpetrators or perpetrator. It may relate to their interactions with police forces, social services, health practitioners, educational institutions, employers or third-sector organisations. It may relate to information about their known associates.
It is not for the Government to determine what information is relevant. That will be for the review partners. I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about the High Court proceedings. That issue is dealt with in Clause 29, which sets the terms on which disclosures of information required or authorised by Clauses 26 to 28 may be made. I do not have precise details on the High Court proceedings but I will come back to the noble Lord, if that is all right. Clause 28 includes a power enabling review partners to provide information to another review partner for the purpose of enabling or assisting the review partners to arrange and carry out an offensive weapons homicide review.
I have mentioned review partners a number of times and it is worth digressing briefly to attempt to answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the backstop, effectively—what happens if there is no review partner? That is not possible because in cases where there is no relevant review partner, the regulations also allow for the Secretary of State to be given the power to direct which partners are the relevant ones. I hope that answers his specific question.
Clause 28 also includes a power for review partners to require information from other persons. However, review partners may request information under this power only for the purposes of enabling or assisting review partners to arrange and carry out an offensive weapons homicide review, and the request may be made only to a person whom the review partner considers likely to have such information. The scope of the information that might be requested, and who it might be requested from, is therefore limited.
This power does not, however, affect the availability of any other duties or powers to share information such as existing lawful routes for information to be shared for safeguarding purposes or for the purposes of the detection and prevention of crime. As currently drafted, the provisions in the Bill ensure that relevant information may be disclosed, and such disclosure would not breach existing obligations of confidence, but any disclosure must still abide by the data protection legislation—that is, the Data Protection Act 2018 and regulations made under that Act, the UK General Data Protection Regulation, regulations implementing the GDPR and the law enforcement directive—and must not be prohibited by specified provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act. For example, where personal data is subject to the UK General Data Protection Regulation, that regulation sets out the principles, rights and obligations that apply to the processing of personal data, including exemptions from particular provisions that can apply in certain circumstances, as set out in Schedules 2 to 4 to the Data Protection Act 2018—for example, in the prevention and detection of crime.
Additionally, Clause 29 provides that a person cannot be required by Clause 28 to disclose information that they could not be compelled to disclose in proceedings before the High Court, meaning that information that is subject to legal professional privilege cannot be required to be disclosed. Due to those safeguards, we do not feel that Amendment 76 is necessary.
I should also like to confirm that we have consulted the Information Commissioner’s Office throughout the development of these provisions and will continue to engage with it as we develop guidance and prepare to pilot these reviews. We consider the information-sharing provisions in Chapter 2 of Part 2 necessary to facilitate an effective multiagency approach to preventing and reducing homicide and serious violence.
Amendment 77 would ensure that guidance under Clause 31 is laid before Parliament. The statutory guidance provided for in Clause 31 will assist the review partners in understanding the statutory responsibilities placed on them, as well as providing best practice on how to fulfil those responsibilities. Among other things, the guidance will provide further information on the notification requirements, the conduct of reviews, the content of the final report and information sharing. We intend to publish an outline draft of the guidance document to allow time for further development before consulting on the guidance, as required by Clause 31. The guidance document will be finalised and published ahead of the pilot commencing.
I thank the noble Lord. I thought that I had made it clear, and I apologise for obviously not having done so, but no, OWHRs are not precluded by a coroner’s inquest.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for attempting to answer my questions. I am very grateful for his undertaking to write to me on any questions that were not answered. I just add one question to that.
One of my big regrets in life is not taking shorthand, so I must paraphrase what the Minister said. It was something along the lines of there being no existing legal duty to review the circumstances surrounding an offensive weapon homicide to prevent future deaths. I appreciate that the Minister is behind the curve, as he relies on a brief that is given to him before the contents of what I say immediately beforehand are known. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides coroners with a duty to make reports where the coroner believes that action should be taken to prevent future deaths. How is that not a legal duty to review the circumstances surrounding an offensive weapon homicide to prevent future deaths? If the Minister can add that to the unanswered questions, then, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb signed this amendment but is, unfortunately, unable to be in the House tonight and I speak in her place.
Essentially, I agree with everything the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said. I will add just a couple of points. It is worth noting that the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing produced a report on domestic homicide in August, which described it as
“an entrenched and enduring problem.”
The report makes very disturbing reading. It records that just over half of suspects were previously known to police from domestic abuse cases, and another 10% were known for other offences, while 44% of households not covered by those categories were known to some other agency in some way. There is clearly an issue, therefore, with lessons learned.
It is good to have a report such as this: it is very useful and informative. But what is being proposed here is a register—something ongoing that can be a continual source of information and learning. We should make a couple of comparisons here. One is with air safety, where there is an assumption that whenever anything goes wrong every possible lesson will be learned and every piece of information will be extracted from it. We should be looking at domestic homicides in the same way.
Another parallel is with the Vision Zero approach to road crashes which many nations are increasingly adopting. We should be among them, and we should be looking to have zero serious injuries or deaths on the road. We know from the report that in nearly all cases of domestic homicide there has been an opportunity for someone to intervene. We should be looking towards a Vision Zero for domestic homicides.
My Lords, I listened very carefully to the arguments put forward by the noble and learned lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, but I am not sure that there needs to be a domestic homicide review in every case—or whether that is not already the situation.
In my experience, some cases of domestic homicide are very straightforward, and I remind the Committee of my remarks on the previous group: that coroners—rather than, for example, the Secretary of State—should perhaps have the power to order such a review if they believe it is in the public interest.
We support the need to ensure that lessons are learned from domestic homicide reviews, that they are regularly published, and that these offences are treated with utmost seriousness. Being attacked and killed in your own home, a place where everyone should feel safe, is far more serious than being attacked and killed on the street. That is why it is so important that any lesson that can be learned from any domestic homicide should be learned, and why the courts need to take these offences far more seriously than a random attack or a gang-related attack on the street.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have Amendments 80, 90A, 94, 96, and 97 in this group. I was hoping that this group might be an example of this House at its best, where reasonable and reasoned amendments have been tabled, the Government have seen and responded positively to them and the Bill could be improved as a result. We clearly do not all agree on everything yet, but what all sides of the House—including the Government —appear to agree on is that the Bill as drafted and passed by the other place in respect of Chapter 3 on the extraction of information from electronic devices is not fit for purpose.
I shall take my amendments first. The House of Lords Constitution Committee raised concerns about victims of crime not coming forward or withdrawing from the criminal justice process because they may have to hand over personal and sensitive data, particularly victims and survivors of violence against women and girls, including rape. Although the draft code of practice published by the Government includes guidance that suggests refusal to provide a device or to agree to the extraction of information from it should not automatically result in the closure of any inquiry or complaint—particularly in light of the dramatic reduction in charges and prosecutions for rape over the past five years—the committee recommended that safeguards that protect victims’ rights to privacy and guard against digital extraction as a condition for continuing an investigation or prosecution should appear in the Bill rather than in a non-binding code of practice. Amendment 80 addresses the issue raised by the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in her powerful and compelling contribution.
This issue is partially addressed by government Amendment 93, which states that a person must not have been placed under undue pressure to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it and that a written notice must be provided which states that the person may refuse and that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end merely because of that refusal. As well as being given the information in writing, the person should be told this orally and be reassured by the investigating officer. The government amendment does not go far enough.
I would go further and say that what people store on their electronic devices and share with each other has changed dramatically over the years. In particular, those from older generations may not be aware of the degree of openness with which explicit images, for example, are routinely shared using electronic devices, potentially leading prosecutors and jurors to draw unjustified conclusions about the behaviour of victims of rape or sexual assault in particular, whether they be male or female. Thankfully, most right-minded people no longer think a woman wearing a short skirt is “asking for it”, but there may be a way to go before the sharing of intimate photographs, for example, is dismissed in a similar way. That is why it is essential that victims are reassured in the way these amendments are intended to provide.
Amendment 90A makes a slightly different point and covers a similar area to that provided by Amendment 92 from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in relation to the extraction of information from devices used by children and adults without capacity. In relation to both groups of users, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests that a “registered social worker” give authority for the extraction of information, in the absence of a parent or guardian, whereas, in Clause 37(3)(b), the Government suggest that
“any responsible person who is aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person”
can give authority. Although police constables and members of staff appointed as authorised persons by chief constables would be excluded, police members of staff not authorised would not be excluded.
From my own professional experience, I know that it is often difficult to get hold of parents or guardians or to get them to co-operate, for example by attending a police station when their child is in custody. Equally, it is difficult to get hold of a social worker, particularly outside office hours, where there may be only one or a few social workers on call, dealing with the whole range of social work responsibilities—hence the “appropriate adults” scheme was established to look after the interests of children and vulnerable adults in custody. Appropriate adults are volunteers, recruited through local schemes, who are selected for their ability to act with independence from the police. Schemes take into account volunteers’ attitudes and motivations and any other roles that they may hold. They undergo training in the appropriate adults role and undergo a criminal record—DBS—check, although a criminal record will not necessarily act as an automatic bar.
Amendment 90A seeks to find a compromise between allowing any responsible person aged 18 or over, including potentially those employed by the police, to give authority for the handing over and extraction of data from a child’s or vulnerable adult’s electronic device and the registered social worker who is not always readily available, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 89.
I apologise—this is a long group. Amendment 96 seeks to increase the authority level for the extraction of information to a senior officer—at a rank where someone of that rank is normally on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and readily available—who is independent of the investigation and can objectively assess whether the conditions that allow for the extraction of information have been met. There are precedents across policing: for example, custody officers or those authorising the deployment of covert surveillance, where someone independent of the investigation makes these kinds of decisions.
Amendment 97 is again intended to provide parliamentary scrutiny of guidance, as is Amendment 102, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which I have added my name. I agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Beith’s Amendment 103 that the restrictions on the exercise of power to extract information in relation to confidential information must be in the Bill and not simply contained in regulations. I understand the reasons for wanting to exclude immigration officers from the list of authorised persons who can extract information from electronic devices, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 107.
On immigration officers, we share the belief that there should be a firewall between criminal investigations and immigration enforcement, to the extent that details about the immigration status of victims should not be passed to the immigration authorities but should be dealt with elsewhere. I can envisage circumstances where immigration officers may need to download information from electronic devices—for example, to tackle people smuggling—although I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, which was that that should perhaps be a matter for the police rather than immigration officers.
I also accept the very important point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol about the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers and their lack of knowledge of what the law allows and does not allow immigration officers to do, and how we need many more safeguards for asylum seekers in this provision. We also wholeheartedly agree with Amendment 106A regarding requests for third-party material. If I had not been overwhelmed by the volume of amendments added to the Bill every day, I would have added my name to that amendment.
We all in different ways have attempted to provide a more robust but workable regime around the extraction of information from mobile devices. The best way forward would be for all noble Lords, including the Minister, to withdraw their amendments, for the Minister and officials to meet with us before Report, and for officials to take the best from each of these amendments and those discussions, to produce a single set of amendments to which hopefully we can agree, rather than having to put down amendments on Report to the government amendments agreed in Committee. Taking the debate offline will save time on the Floor of the House on Report, when the agreed amendments could simply be nodded through. However, it appears that the Labour Opposition are content to allow the government amendments to be agreed at this stage, despite the clear differences between what they are proposing and the government amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Hayward, made the important point, as we did on these Benches when this House debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, that these issues also affect men. The noble Lord also praised the police, who are in a very difficult position, which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, alluded to, where they find themselves under pressure from the Crown Prosecution Service to go further than maybe even police officers may be comfortable going in terms of accessing personal information from victims’ phones. I repeat the question asked by the noble Lord: who speaks for the Crown Prosecution Service in this debate?
I studied politics at university, I was a very senior police officer for years, I ran for Mayor of London twice and I have been a member of your Lordships’ House for over eight years, but I still do not understand politics. Suffice it to say that, without Labour support, there is no point in dividing the Committee if the Government move their amendments formally at this stage.
My Lords, I join the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, in apologising to the House for the length of my comments. It might assist the Committee if I begin with a brief overview of the provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Bill. These provisions will establish, for the first time, a clear statutory basis for the extraction of information from digital devices with the agreement of the device user, and introduce safeguards to protect the privacy of victims, witnesses and others. I echo the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that it is a vast intrusion. People’s lives are on their digital devices and I understand the sensitivity of that.
The current approach to the extraction of information from digital devices has been criticised as inconsistent and, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, as being tantamount to a digital strip search, where devices were taken as a matter of course and where, in many cases, all the sensitive personal data belonging to a device user was extracted and processed, even when it was not relevant to the offence under investigation. Clearly, that is unacceptable. This resulted in privacy and victims’ groups opposing this practice, particularly in cases where the device belongs to a victim or witness.
A consistent approach is clearly needed to ensure that requests for information are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that all those agreeing to provide their sensitive personal data have all the information that they need to make that decision, including details on why their information is needed, how it will be used and their right to refuse to share that information without any negative consequences. This lack of consistency is of particular concern where the offences under investigation are those such as rape and serious sexual assault, where the victim is likely to be extremely distressed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and where rates of reporting and conviction are far too low.
My Lords, I will do my damnedest. I will take back the noble and learned Lord’s comments and see what is in the art of the possible. I can do no more than promise that, if he is happy with that—or rather, if he will accept it.
I will move on swiftly to Amendment 107, which seeks to remove immigration officers from Schedule 3, so that they can no longer exercise the powers in this Bill. Immigration officers play a vital role in protecting vulnerable people, in particular those who may be victims of trafficking, and it is important that they are able to obtain information that may be vital to these and other investigations. I therefore do not accept that immigration officers should not have access to these powers, subject to the same safeguards that apply to other authorised persons.
Finally, Amendment 106A relates to third-party material, an issue highlighted not just by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Anderson, this evening, but by the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Vera Baird. The amendment highlights a very important issue around the proportionality of requests for third-party material relevant to a victim. This material can be highly sensitive—for example, medical records. We agree that such material should only ever be sought where there is a reasonable line of inquiry, but we are aware that this is not always the case. There are examples where such requests cannot be justified, and this has a detrimental impact on the confidence of victims.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also talked about written information given to victims. The police forces will use the digital processing notices developed by the NPCC for this purpose. The DPN, in layman’s terms, explains how the police extract the information, which information might be extracted, for how long it might be retained—that question was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and answered in part by my noble friend Lord Hayward—and what happens to irrelevant material found on the device. The DPN makes clear that investigators must respect individual rights to privacy and must not go beyond reasonable lines of inquiry.
The Government wholeheartedly agree that there needs to be a consistent approach to ensure that requests for third-party material are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that the victim is fully informed. This principle is key to a number of actions in the Government’s end-to-end rape review, which we published in June.
Moving on to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on Amendment 106A, our understanding is that the NPCC agrees in principle to the need for legislation but has not taken a view on a particular legislative solution. As I have indicated, this issue requires further examination, so I thank the noble Lord. I understand that the CPS similarly accepts the need for appropriate controls on access to third-party material.
The police and the CPS are working on new guidance for the investigators and victims which can be finalised after the Information Commissioner’s Office publishes its report on data in rape cases, which is due imminently. We will also consider whether a change is required to the Attorney-General’s guidelines. This will give us an opportunity to consider the broader landscape with regards to proportionality in requests for evidence from victims and whether further steps should then be taken. In terms of DPNs and involvement of the Victims’ Commissioner: yes, she has been involved with the development of the digital processing notices.
I apologise again for the length of my remarks to the Committee. The Committee has raised important issues in respect of the privacy of victims and witnesses, and it is very important we get the framework in the Bill right. I hope noble Lords will agree that we have listened to the concerns that additional safeguards should be set out in the Bill and will be content to agree the government amendments in lieu of their own. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, that we will consider further their Amendments 97 and 103, and to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are very alive to the issues around third-party material. For now, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to withdraw Amendment 79.
My Lords, very briefly: I really am grateful to the Minister. It is a very big group, and it is difficult to take in everything she said. But we have to be very careful. People will be reading the record of this debate. I think I heard the Minister say that the authorised person must explain that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end if they refuse to hand over their device. That is not what it says on the face of the Bill. It says the person must be given a written notice.
These might have been many decades ago, but I know of situations where police officers shoved a piece of paper in front of somebody who was either a victim or a suspect—even somebody who could not read—and said something different from what was on the piece of paper. So I think we have to make it absolutely clear in the Bill, not just in the guidance or the codes of practice, that this must be explained, which was the meaning of one of my amendments.
The other thing I think I heard the Minister say—it is late—is that the authorised person must explain to the victim that refusal would have no negative consequences. That cannot possibly be right. For example, in a rape case where consent is an issue—where, perhaps, the defence argued that there were exchanges of messages or some such things that go to the heart of whether consent is an issue—and the victim refuses to hand over their device, there could be negative consequences when it comes to trial. Again, I understand that the Minister wants to be helpful and reassuring to victims, but we have to be absolutely clear what we are promising here, if it is being said on the record in this Committee.
The hour is late. Because these things are so important, I will reiterate them in a letter to the noble Lord.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 110ZA in my name I will speak to my Amendments 110ZB, 110ZC and 110B and to Amendment 110A in the name of my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond in this group.
We now come to pre-charge bail, also known as police bail, where the police need more time to investigate than the time limits for keeping someone in custody without charge allow. In 2017, in response to concerns that people were being kept on pre-charge bail for too long, particularly journalists under investigation as a result of the phone hacking scandal, the Government used 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act to severely curtail the time someone could be held on pre-charge bail.
At the time, briefed by police practitioners, we told the Government that their changes to police bail were unworkable and that they had gone too far the other way. Some 18 clauses of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 are now all but reversed, relegated to Schedule 4 to this Bill. There clearly needs to be a balance between the need for a thorough police investigation, diligently carried out within resource constraints—which, because of the significant cuts in police officer and police support staff numbers since 2010, have been considerable—and the adage that “justice delayed is justice denied”. The irony of telling the police to speed up their investigations while at the same time curtailing their ability to do so will not be lost on the Committee.
It must be necessary and proportionate for the police to release a person on bail, including the imposition of any conditions of that bail. I know from my own professional experience that custody officers tend to record something along the lines of “I am releasing this person on bail because it is necessary and proportionate to do so” or “because it is necessary to ensure that the person surrenders to custody” or whatever Section 30A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 says may be a reason for releasing a person on bail. This is simply copied and pasted into the custody record. I was sitting here earlier reading that and realising that perhaps, as a police inspector reviewing detention, I might have been guilty of a similar act of simply copying generic paragraphs out of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
This is not sufficient and Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB are designed to address this. The police officer should record the case-specific reasons why it is necessary and proportionate to bail the person and the case-specific reasons for imposing the conditions, if any, attached to the bail—not “to ensure the person surrenders to custody” but why the officer thinks this person is unlikely to surrender to custody; for example, because he has absconded in the past, perhaps. If the factors to be taken into account in paragraph 17 of Part 2 of Schedule 4 are included in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in a new Section 30A(1B), so should be the requirement to say what it is about this person that makes release on bail necessary. Later in the Bill, in Clause 132(7), courts remanding children in custody will be required to set out their reasons for doing so in writing. This amendment requires the police to do the same when it comes to police bail decisions.
On Amendment 110ZC, following representations made by the Law Society—from my professional experience I see the merit in some and not others—I agree with it that the if the matter is straightforward, what is called in the legislation a “standard case”, a senior police officer should be able to extend bail only to a maximum of six months before the case is referred to a magistrates’ court for independent adjudication, rather than the nine months suggested in paragraph 29 of Schedule 4 to the Bill.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments bring us to the issue of the reform of pre-charge bail. The intention of the Government with this set of changes is clear: to create a more effective and proportionate pre-charge bail system through “Kay’s law”, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Kay’s law has been so named after Kay Richardson, who tragically lost her life at the hands of her estranged husband while he was released under investigation rather than on bail. It is clear that we need robust decision-making around the use of pre-charge bail in order to ensure that it is used fairly. This is why we have removed the presumption against bail and introduced the risk factors to be considered by the custody officer.
Let me first address the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Amendments 110ZA and 110ZB relate to record-keeping for bail decisions. I certainly agree that there should be a clear audit trail to evidence how these decisions have been made. I do not, however, consider that it is necessary to legislate for this, given that it is an operational process, but it is our expectation that custody officers are already keeping records of how they came to their decisions as part of best practice within each force. I acknowledge that this may not be done with the consistency we would expect, which is why it would be more appropriate to include provision for this in the national statutory guidance on pre-charge bail, which is to be published by the College of Policing.
Amendment 110ZC is concerned with the timescales for the review of pre-charge bail. Again, I fully recognise that we must provide the correct balance here—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, referred to balance in his opening remarks—between the rights of those who may have been victims of crime and those who, at this stage, have yet to be charged with an offence. The new timescales provided for in the Bill, which have been subject to public consultation and engagement with law enforcement, charities and victims’ services, strike a fair balance and will create a system that works better for all involved. That being the case, the Government are satisfied that nine months rather than six is the appropriate point at which decisions around the extension of pre-charge bail in standard cases should be referred to a magistrates’ court. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for sharing his personal experience on this subject. As he said, it will place further pressure on the police, but on the opposite side, it would potentially clog up the courts if referrals were brought forward. Following our consultation, we believe it is equitable for extensions up to nine months to be made by a senior police officer, and only then should the matter be referred to the courts.
Amendment 110B would require police forces to publish data annually on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail and those released under investigation. We heard some powerful arguments from my noble friend Lord Wolfson about data in the previous group, and I am about to reiterate some of those, because we agree that accurate data is crucial in order to monitor the impact of these legislative changes and ensure that they are operating as intended. I am pleased to inform the noble Lord that the information he seeks is already collected by forces and published by the Home Office annually through the Police Powers and Procedures bulletin. Perhaps to anticipate a subsidiary question, statistics on the number of individuals released on pre-charge bail have been published yearly since 2017-18. The Government have recently amended this collection to include the number of people released under investigation. This information has been collected for 2020-21 and will be published later this year.
One might reasonably ask, since it has been four years since the last round of reforms, why we still do not know how many people are released under investigation. There are 43 forces across England and Wales, as the noble Lord well knows, which use different case management systems and data warehousing. We have been collecting data on the number of individuals on pre-charge bail since 2017, first on a voluntary and now on a mandatory basis, and we have also started collecting more data on pre-charge bail in terms of offence, breach, demographic and so on, and on released under investigation and voluntary attendance. This is voluntary collection at the moment, but we are working with police and systems providers where forces have been unable to provide data to enable reporting with the intention of changing to mandatory collection following the reforms as system updates allow.
Turning to quite a different matter, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, has tabled Amendment 110A, and I acknowledge her long association with this subject. This would create a new criminal offence of breaching pre-charge bail conditions where a person is arrested elsewhere than at a police station and where there is no reasonable excuse to do so. It is essential that we keep in mind the safety and welfare of victims at this stage of the criminal justice system, as well as balancing this against the risk of criminalisation of individuals who have not been charged with an offence. Noble Lords will be aware that debate around the consequences of breaching these conditions has been ongoing for a number of years. While I understand those concerns, I cannot agree that such a criminal offence would be a proportionate response to this issue. Pre-charge bail is just that: pre-charge. There has been no charge or conviction against the individual as yet. It would therefore be disproportionate to criminalise the individual at this point, particularly where they may face a harsher sentence for the breach than the one carried by the offence for which they were originally arrested. Bail should not be punitive in nature according to the principle of the presumption of innocence.
On top of this, the Government do not currently have an accurate snapshot of the number of individuals who breach their conditions each year—I fear we are back to data again. Without knowing how many people this would affect, such an amendment could well lead to unintended consequences, criminalising a potentially large group of people and tying up the courts system. I stress that there is obviously no desire on the part of the Government to allow suspects to breach their conditions wantonly. Where there has been a breach, police officers will look to consider whether a substantive offence is established, such as intimidation or harassment in the first instance. In certain circumstances, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, alluded to, there is also the option of a court order, such as a sexual risk order or the new domestic abuse protection order, breach of which is a criminal offence in itself.
The Bill also introduces a three-hour pause on the detention clock where an individual has been arrested for breach of their conditions. This will allow the police further time for progressing the case, either through investigation of the breach or preparing a substantive case for charging. The Government have already made a commitment in the Commons to increase the data collection in this area, which will provide a more detailed understanding of this issue. It is my hope that this may yield a more proportionate, tailored and workable policy solution in the future.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, referred to Sarah Jones’s amendment in the other place and asked about the Minister’s consultation. I fear I do not know the answer to that; I will get back to him on when it may be expected to report. She also acknowledged that the collection of data around breaches of conditions to better understand the scale of the problem was part of the problem we have here. I think the Minister’s response was welcomed by his colleague Sarah Jones in the other place and she was content to withdraw her amendment. It has been helpful to explore these issues, but in the light of my explanations, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond for her support and for so clearly and powerfully explaining her Amendment 110A. Arresting somebody for breaching pre-charge bail where the only thing the police can do if somebody has breached the conditions is simply to re-bail them under the same conditions undermines the whole purpose of police bail—there is no sanction at all. The Minister said, “Well, the person has not been convicted of an offence and they could end up being convicted of breaching the bail but not of the original offence.” I may have been dreaming, but I seem to remember being at Highbury Corner Magistrates’ Court, albeit the stipendiary magistrate concerned was known colloquially as “Shotgun Maclean”, and his saying to an arresting officer that, unfortunately, in a not-guilty offensive weapon trial, the officer had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of possessing an offensive weapon, but for breaching court bail—in that when they first appeared in court the person was released on court bail to reappear for the not guilty hearing—he would go to prison for three months.
There is the whole argument about this being disproportionate for somebody who is not convicted of a criminal offence if they were convicted of breaching bail, but it happens already when people who are innocent breach court bail. This seems to completely undermine the noble Lord’s argument. The point of Kay’s law is to stop dangerous people being released under investigation with no conditions attached. Without a sanction for breaching the conditions that are imposed, the conditions have no weight.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. Regarding the sort of cases he referred to, I would expect—particularly if analysis of computers was involved, for example—that these would not be standard cases and that the Crown Prosecution Service would designate them as such, so the six-month or nine-month limit would not apply. I am not sure that the cases he referred to were relevant to the examples I gave.
I accept that the Government have consulted on this, but I would go back to the Law Society, which is on the other side of the argument—including as it does defence solicitors—and feels that nine months in a standard, straightforward case not involving such things as computer analysis would be a long enough extension for a senior officer. However, we will reflect on what the Minister has said and, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, my task in this debate is easy: all I have to do is to support the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and say that I have rarely heard an amendment moved more comprehensively than he just did.
My Lords, we strongly support my noble friend Lord Beith. He has clearly explained his amendment: persons other than those mentioned in the Bill are in positions of trust. Although there is no evidence of widespread concern about instructors in dance, drama or music abusing their positions of trust, there are examples and fairly recent high-profile cases. My noble friend explains that either we should leave it to the courts to decide whether someone is in a position of trust or a more comprehensive list is required that is not limited, as my noble friend Lady Brinton said, to the examples in the amendments.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to some extent, although one could imagine that children are more vulnerable in certain scenarios and one-to-one situations than in others. But we support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Beith.
My Lords, we too support these amendments, and I too found the introduction from the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to be comprehensive. The brief in front of me asks why some youth activities are included and others are not, which is the point the Minister will have to address when he winds up this brief debate. I will not repeat those points about why certain activities might be included and others might not, and I am sure that everyone who has spoken in this debate wants to achieve the same end, but there are different mechanisms to do that.
I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who, as she said, somewhat unusually found herself in agreement with potentially using Henry VIII powers to amend legislation. While listening to this debate, I remembered the biography of a very famous English composer that I read recently, just a few months ago. He would fall foul of these regulations and would very likely go to jail on the basis of that biography.
I hope this problem is not widespread, but it is something that people are far more alert to these days than they were in the past. It is right that the Government should ensure that the appropriate structures are in place in each of the activities for which young people get support, so that, if things go wrong, the coaches or whoever is involved can be held to account in an appropriate way.
The art lesson may be a good example. With respect, there is a huge gulf between the relationship of somebody to their art teacher, if they go to an art group, and the sort of intimacy that a physical sports coach has with somebody or the sort of power, control and sense of authority that a religious leader has over a young person.
I shall give one example of evidence, picking a made-up country from private international law. Let us say that, in Ruritania, there is a huge number of cases of a particular category. It might well then be said, “We can see there is a problem with this category. It has happened in Ruritania. The circumstances are the same as in the UK. You should add that.” That is just one example. I do not want to limit the evidence that we would rely on but, with respect, we cannot say that, because there has been a case in an art class or a case here and a case there, we will include all these categories. We should not include every circumstance in which adults have close contact with under 18 year-olds. I think the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, wants to come in.
I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the Government’s position but I do not understand the argument that we are surreptitiously changing the age of consent. If a 16 or 17 year-old wants to have a sexual relationship with their music teacher, they had better find another music teacher; the solution is quite simple. They should not continue in a professional relationship and have a sexual relationship at the same time.
With great respect, the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, shows that if we draw this too widely, we are limiting the ability of a 16 or 17 year-old to have a sexual relationship with that person. This the balance that we want to strike. At the moment, there is nothing to prevent a 17 year-old having a consensual relationship with a person with whom they have a tuition relationship or other kind of relationship. The question is: where do you draw the line? We say the line should be drawn at sport and religion. If you draw it too widely, you impact on that person’s ability to have a sexual relationship with other adults.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 113 in my name I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group. I declare an interest as a Liberal Democrat and someone generally against sentence inflation, but I have specific points to make on this clause.
Clause 46 effectively increases the maximum penalty for “destroying or damaging” anything by fire, or for any offence involving damage to a memorial, which means something “erected or installed”, or
“a garden or any other thing planted or grown which has a commemorative purpose”,
whether it is the statue of a national hero or a slave trader, a person’s grave or a pet cemetery. The clause does this by removing the financial limit on when the case can be tried at, or sent to, the Crown Court for sentence. Magistrates’ courts cannot send someone to prison, I believe, for more than a maximum of 12 months, but a Crown Court judge can send someone to prison for criminal damage where there is no threat to life for a maximum of 10 years.
To put this into context, Clause 2 of this Bill, as drafted, increases the maximum penalty for assaulting an emergency worker from one year to two years, while this part of the Bill increases the penalty for damaging a memorial from one year to 10 years. It is clear where the Government’s priorities lie; it is more important to protect a statue of Churchill than it is to protect our brave men and women police officers.
It gets worse. New subsection (11B) of Section 22 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Clause 46, includes
“any moveable thing (such as a bunch of flowers)”
left in or on a memorial, as part of the memorial—so, a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison for damaging a bunch of flowers. Pick up a bunch of flowers placed at the feet of Churchill’s statue and hit a police officer round the face with it, and you can get up to 10 years in prison for damaging the flowers but only two years for assaulting the police officer. Amendment 113 is designed to probe the proportionality of subsection (11B). Amendment 114 is consequential.
In fact, bearing in mind that the limit for a summary-only trial—at least in the original Bill, and I cannot find any amendment to it—is £200-worth of damage, to replace, repair or restore the property damaged, it is unlikely that anything other than minor superficial damage would be below this value. There may well be a case to treat graves as a special case, where it can be deeply distressing if the burial plot is disturbed, but, aside from that, I am yet to be convinced that Clause 46 should stand part of the Bill, at least in its current form.
There is far more merit in protecting the living, as Amendment 115 proposes to do, than in protecting the memorials of the dead. Damaging life-saving equipment is a very serious matter, and there is far more merit in this amendment than in Clause 46.
My Lords, I rise to support these amendments. We are now getting into the stuff that I will fight tooth and nail over. As an archaeologist and activist, I feel that I have a little bit of insight into this whole situation and perhaps into the ridiculous law that the Government are trying to introduce here. Instead of debating and discussing it and coming to a sensible resolution, this is part of a battle in a culture war, which is absolutely ludicrous.
History is important, but it is not fixed. People like to think that we all know what it is and it is in all the books, but, actually, as an archaeologist, I know that we reinterpret it all the time and are constantly making new discoveries. Just in the last week or so, we found Roman statues in a totally unexpected place. This is what happens: we change our minds about history and it gets rewritten.
The problem is that we have some very ugly history, which is littered with powerful and wealthy white men who, behind a thin veneer of toffish respectability, did some quite nasty things and were responsible for atrocities such as the enslavement of millions of people, genocides, war crimes and the grabbing of wealth from some of the many nations that we now call “developing nations”. Our statues ignore this history and pretend that it was benign and that these were good guys, which is simply not true: they were slavers and pillagers, and we ought to recognise that. Having their so-called heroism set in stone is actually quite offensive. There is no hint in many of these statues that they did some evil deeds.
People—many members of the public—do not like this, and they are showing their dissatisfaction with celebrating people who really should not be celebrated. They raped and pillaged, and the fact that they then spent a lot of money on universities, libraries or parks does not really make it all all right. So the question of what we should do with these monuments is important, but not easy. It should force us to confront the evils within our history and reflect on how they carry through to the social and economic conditions of our present.
Instead of leading on this quite important dialogue, the Government simply storm in with a new criminal offence, which I find so ludicrous that I feel I ought to go and speak directly to the Home Secretary about it. They are trying to put their fingers in their ears, sing “Rule Britannia” and pretend that all of this did not happen and that it was all okay—but it was not. Councils all over the country and the Government have to realise that statues are not something that we cannot change or remove. The fact is that some of these statues celebrate evil deeds, and the Government should recognise that.
I have more to say, if noble Lords wish.
The short answer to that is that I did not make my argument on the basis of deterrence. Sentencing encompasses a number of factors: there is deterrence; there is the actual punishment for the offence; there is marking society’s disapproval at what was done. I hope that I made my argument very clearly on the first two. I was not suggesting that people would necessarily be deterred; I hope that they will be, but that is not the main basis of my argument.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for taking part in this short debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her support, albeit coming at the issue from a slightly different angle to the one from which I was coming. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for picking up on what I said, which is that this needs to be more targeted. I specifically said that Clause 46 “as drafted” is not suitable. It needs to be much more accurately targeted; otherwise, it enables people to make the accusation that I did not make, that this is about dramatically increasing the penalty for what could be very minor damage to a statue of a very divisive figure. In fact, I made reference to the fact that doing anything to a grave, for example, could be deeply distressing and it may be that the penalty needs to be increased for that particular purpose. Clause 46, however, goes far too wide and draws those who feel that it is about culture wars into the argument, where that would not be the case if it were more far more tightly drawn; but at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 116 and speak to my Amendments 117 to 121 inclusive in this group.
Clause 48 gives the police the power to compel people to have their photograph taken at a police station without their consent. It includes someone arrested for a recordable offence and released without being charged or otherwise being prosecuted for an offence, if they have not previously been photographed, the previous photograph is unavailable or inadequate, or a constable thinks that another photograph might be useful to assist in the prevention or detection of crime.
We have had concerns for some time about those not convicted of a criminal offence having their photographs retained by the police, but forcing a person to attend a police station and taking their photograph without their consent in such circumstances seems draconian. However, the clause goes further. It includes anyone who has been convicted abroad of an offence which would have been an offence if committed in England or Wales, if the police do not already have a useable photograph of the person so convicted or if a police officer thinks that it might be useful to have another one.
Aside from how the police would know about such a conviction, particularly since the UK has lost access to EU databases that record all convictions in EU countries, some countries are notorious for having legal systems that fall far short of what would be considered acceptable in the UK. Surely, at least in relation to overseas convictions, there should be some judicial safeguard to ensure that such a conviction is safe, rather than a constable being able to force someone to be photographed in such circumstances. My probing Amendment 117 removes the conditions associated with an overseas conviction, and the other amendments are consequential. I beg to move.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his amendment. I have a very brief comment for the Minister. The Explanatory Notes say:
“Section 64A of PACE confers a power on the police to take photographs from a person who has been detained in a police station and/or arrested. If a person is arrested, charged or convicted without a photograph being taken, there is no power to require them to attend a police station later for this to be done, although there is such a ‘recall’ power in … PACE relating to taking of fingerprints and DNA samples.”
There are so many important things in this Bill, and this is yet another. The noble Lord is quite right to point this out. Therefore, why was it thought not to be necessary to include the taking of photographs in the original legislation but now is thought to be necessary? What is the evidence for the change in legislation to include photographs?
Also, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the very important point about the extension of that power to overseas offences. Does that extension of power include not only photographs but fingerprints and DNA samples?
I am saying it was an omission. I am not saying it was a mistake, because I do not know whether it was, but it was an omission. I think there is a difference.
As things stand, opportunities to take photographs are being missed. This means that matches to crimes the person may have committed in the past or may commit in the future are not made. As the noble Lord explained, these amendments specifically intend to probe the necessity and proportionality of the provisions in proposed new subsections (1H) and (1I) of Section 64A of PACE. These provisions cover occasions when the police have been notified of a conviction in another country that has an equivalent offence in England and Wales. Where there is no photograph on file, or it is of poor quality, police will now be able to ask an individual to attend a police station to have one taken for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime. To ensure appropriate oversight, this will require authorisation at the minimum rank of inspector.
As I said at the start, these provisions simply align the police’s ability to take photographs in certain circumstances with provisions that already exist for DNA and fingerprints. In that sense, we are therefore not breaking new ground. We are dealing here with individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offence, albeit in another country. In the interests of protecting people in this country, it is right that the police should be able to take and retain a photograph of a convicted person in these circumstances. I hope that the noble Lord agrees, particularly given the existing precedent in PACE, that this a necessary and proportionate power, and that he will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support. I have to say to the Minister that I am really none the wiser about the questions I asked. There is a catalogue of cases where people are convicted overseas and where it turns out that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory because of the inadequate legal systems that operate abroad. Yet this is a blanket power for the police to summon and photograph anybody on the basis of an overseas conviction. The noble Lord has not addressed how there could be any safeguard against such an unsafe and unsatisfactory conviction overseas.
The Minister talked about where the police have been notified of an overseas conviction, but I do not understand what the mechanism is by which the police would be notified. So my questions remain unanswered by what the Minister said and I hope that, between now and Report, the Government will be able to answer them, otherwise we will be having another debate on Report. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, briefly, I speak in support of Amendments 122 and 275 in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—who has already made an eloquent and erudite contribution, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said—and other noble Lords. I will also echo elements of the noble Lord’s contribution.
Amendment 122 encapsulates and incorporates precisely the advice that I would now want to give to my own two daughters and, in due time, my own grand-daughter, in the light of what we all know happened to Sarah Everard. There has been talk of flagging down buses or otherwise seeking assistance, in the case of a lone arresting officer seeking to require a person subject to arrest to enter a car or, as the amendment says
“premises other than a police station”.
I simply do not find such advice or suggestions helpful or sufficient. These suggestions would not, I am afraid, assuage the well-grounded fears of many women in the wake of recent events and revelations about the behaviour of some police officers. The amendment, however, sets reassuring and necessary parameters, and I am in full support of it. We must use this legislation to afford clarity and safety to women.
With regard to Amendment 275, again, I believe that action taken hitherto by Her Majesty’s Government is insufficient and that a statutory inquiry, for all the reasons advanced already in this debate, is needed. It is needed to learn lessons but also to give a signal that we will now begin to restore the faith and trust in the police which has been so manifestly and extensively damaged.
My Lords, I have to tell the Committee that I find these debates very difficult. I was a police officer for over 30 years and, for part of that time, a senior police officer. Like the overwhelming majority of hard-working, decent and honest police officers in this country, I find it very difficult to hear this sort of debate and to say the sorts of things that I will say now. I do not have the same sympathy for senior police officers who are failing in their leadership. I recall speaking privately to a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and asking that individual, “What on earth is going on at the moment?”. He said, “Well, Brian, I think when the police come under pressure, diversity goes out of the window”. The police have been under a lot of pressure because their resources have been reduced, because knife crime has become an epidemic and because of the horrific situations we find ourselves in.
As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said earlier, it is not just about Sarah Everard. In the last two weeks we have had a Metropolitan Police officer charged with rape and another with indecent images of children. There were a whole series of cases that point to a real issue with the culture in the police service, and in the Metropolitan Police in particular. So I completely understand and support the principles behind the amendments, and I have indicated my support for Amendment 122 by adding my name to it.
I want to bring some real-world practicality to bear on the amendments. Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, suggests that a police officer
“may not require or ask the person under arrest to enter a vehicle or premises other than a police station unless at least one other constable is present in the vehicle or when entering the premises”.
Not only does that go to the heart of the Sarah Everard scenario, but it is entirely consistent with best practice for the protection of the person arrested and the arresting officer. I should explain that in the police a person who has been arrested is called a prisoner, and I will do the same.
First, it does not specify that the provision should apply only to a woman or a child, as Amendment 123 does. The noble Baroness pointed out how there might be legal difficulties with that but, as she said, what if the arresting officer is gay or the person arrested is a gay man? Where would the protection be for the arresting officer against allegations of inappropriate behaviour in those circumstances, or the protection for the arrested person, if we restricted it only to a woman or a child? As the noble Baroness said, a black person may also have fears about getting into a vehicle when there was only one officer present. From my own professional experience, I have lost count of the number of reports of black people who have been beaten up on the way to the police station. The issue that we need to address here is male violence perpetrated by police officers, whether directed at a male or a female prisoner, although women may understandably feel more threatened with a lone male arresting officer than a male prisoner would. Amendment 122 would provide protection for the police officer and for the person arrested, whatever sex or sexuality they may be.
Secondly, it is very dangerous for a lone police officer to drive with a prisoner in the car. The prisoner could attack the officer while driving even if handcuffed, as we saw with the tragic death of police Sergeant Matt Ratana, who was shot in Croydon police station by a handcuffed prisoner. Ideally, police officers should patrol and respond in pairs wherever possible, and at least one of those police officers should be female, but that is not always possible. Ensuring that two police officers are present is an important and almost always adequate safeguard.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and as the Minister said in answer to an Oral Question on Thursday, only about one-third of police officers are female—even fewer, I believe, in the Metropolitan Police—so the practicality of requiring a female officer to be present, as Amendment 123 demands, may not always be possible, and in some cases it would not be appropriate to release the prisoner if a female officer could not attend the scene.
I turn to the other aspects of Amendment 123. Giving the person arrested
“an immediate and reasonable opportunity to contact another person”
could have serious officer-safety implications. I myself have been subject to attempts to rescue a person that I had arrested, albeit that it was in Brixton a few months before the Brixton riots. There is a real danger that the arrested person could summon people to effect her escape from police custody. And, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, alluded to, the problem with the arresting officer providing a telephone number purporting to be the number of a police station or control room, were he to have criminal intent, is that he may have an accomplice on the telephone number given to the prisoner.
Long delays between arrest and arrival at the police station, in my professional experience, expose both the arresting officer and the person arrested to danger. It may not always be possible, for example if the prisoner is violently resisting arrest, either to explain her rights to her or to provide them in writing. Again, in my professional experience, people do not want to be arrested by the police and are unlikely to attend a police station if allowed to go free. I completely understand the sentiments behind both these amendments. I have serious reservations about the practicality of Amendment 123, but I have no hesitation in commending Amendment 122 to the Committee.
I also strongly support Amendment 275, which calls for a Macpherson-type inquiry, under the Inquiries Act 2005, into the Sarah Everard atrocity and all the surrounding issues. This is something akin to the issues of public trust and confidence around racism that came out of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence and that the Macpherson inquiry looked to address. We are facing an equivalent situation here in terms of misogyny and violence against women and girls. It is absolutely appropriate that we have a similar inquiry to the Macpherson inquiry to deal with that. I prefer Amendment 275, for that reason, to Amendment 281.
I also support Amendment 282: mandatory training for all officers, not just recruits, on violence against women and girls. Of course, culture is the most difficult thing to change, but training is an important part of changing that culture. I also support Amendment 283, with the caveat that I believe the vetting procedures used in the recruitment of all police officers need to be urgently reviewed, not just for officers transferring between forces.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about the Sarah Everard vigil. I will refer to this at length when we come to the public order parts of the Bill, but I was an advanced, trained senior police officer in public order. I read the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services report into the Sarah Everard vigil. How HMIC came to the conclusions that the police did everything right, on the basis of what it wrote before it got to that conclusion, I have no idea. The evidence in that report is completely contrary to that conclusion, in my professional judgment. So, there is something seriously wrong here: how can we change the culture if we have that sort of whitewashing by HMIC?
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, raised issues around police leadership and police culture and what I have described before as a culture of cover-up rather than own-up. I have always believed the way to build public trust and confidence is, when there is misconduct, to show you are ruthlessly dealing with it rather than trying to cover it up to protect the reputation of the force. I will say more about that when we come to a later group on the duty of candour. The noble Lord is absolutely right: there is a failure of leadership at the top of the police service. It makes me very uncomfortable to stand here and say that, but it is something I felt when I was in the police service and continue to feel now. I absolutely support these amendments.
My Lords, I realise the hour is late, but there are two things I would like to mention. First, I am very interested in what the Deputy Commissioner Sir Steve House said. I do not know when he said it, but it does not seem to chime with the fact that, two weeks ago, I was challenged by a lone officer in plain clothes. That seems to be completely contrary to what the Minister said he announced.
Secondly, the Minister says there should not be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 because we need to move at speed. I can tell noble Lords that the Metropolitan Police never moved quicker on racism than when it was announced that there would be an inquiry under the Inquiries Act. It was not when the inquiry reported that the Metropolitan Police swung into action to deal with racism. It was absolutely ready with an answer as soon as that inquiry reported, because it knew what the problems were and realising that this was all going to become public in an inquiry galvanised it into action.
I note the noble Lord’s points and I do not disagree with him. I ask the Committee to understand the commitment of the Home Secretary. She is deadly serious about ensuring that the inquiry moves at pace and, if necessary, converting it to a statutory inquiry if it is not meeting its commitments.
I will get the date for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Committee. The announcement from Dame Cressida Dick was on 20 October, some 11 days ago, but I will get the date on which Sir Stephen House made those comments.
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 123A in my name. I apologise to the Committee. If I had had my wits about me, I would have grouped it with the previous police bail amendments. I am grateful to Transform Justice for bringing this issue to my attention and for its help and support in drafting this amendment.
The Government continue to place tighter restrictions on when courts can remand children in custody. Those are much stronger than the restrictions currently placed on the police when they decide whether to remand a child in custody to court. Court criteria, most of which do not apply to the police, include that: the child must be between 12 and 17 years of age and be legally represented, other than in exceptional circumstances; they must have been charged with a violent or sexual offence or have been charged with an offence where an adult would have received a custodial sentence of 14 or more years; or they have a recent history of absconding while remanded; or they have a history of committing imprisonable offences while on bail; and there is a real prospect of a custodial sentence for the offence in question. In addition, remand in custody must be necessary to protect the public from death or personal injury or to prevent the child from committing further imprisonable offences.
The police remand many more children in custody than the courts. In 2019, the year with the most recent data available, over 4,500 children were remanded in police custody compared with 884 children remanded in custody by the courts. Some 60% of children remanded in custody by the police had been charged with non-violent offences and only 12% of those remanded in custody by the police went on to be remanded in custody by the courts. Two-thirds of children remanded in custody by the police do not receive a custodial sentence.
In Clause 132, the Bill suggests further strengthening the restrictions on courts remanding children in custody, including that the history of breaching bail or offending on bail must be “significant”, “relevant” and “recent”. If detention is being considered for the child’s own safety, this would be possible only if the risk cannot be safely managed in the community. It would have to be “very likely” that the child would receive a custodial sentence rather than a “real prospect”. Courts would also be under a statutory duty to record their reasons for imposing custodial remand, including a statement that they have considered the welfare of the child in their decision and that they have considered alternatives.
The Bill as drafted does nothing to tighten the restrictions on the police remanding children in custody, or even to bring them into line with existing court restrictions. Amendment 123A intends to bring the Police and Criminal Evidence Act criteria for police remand of children into closer alignment with the court remand criteria. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving his amendment. As the Committee might be aware, I sit as a youth magistrate, usually at Highbury magistrates’ court. I have to say that I was not aware of the difference in the remand criteria; I should have known but I did not. I also thank Transform Justice for bringing this to my attention. The noble Lord has very thoroughly explored the differences in the number of youths remanded by the police versus those remanded by the courts. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising this important issue of children remanded in custody. I quite agree that police custody is not a suitable environment for children and that they should not be detained there unless it is absolutely necessary.
The provisions introduced by this Bill will amend the “tests” set out by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, also known as LASPO, which must be satisfied before the court remands a child to custody. These are intended to ensure that custodial remand is used only as a last resort, where there are no other options and it is necessary to protect the public.
Before the courts get involved, if a child is charged with an offence, Section 38 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that the police must release them either on bail or without bail pending their appearance at court, unless one or more specified conditions apply. These conditions are that the child’s name or address are not known or are not believed to be genuine; there are reasonable grounds to believe the child will not appear in court to answer bail; the detention is believed to be necessary to prevent the child committing an offence, causing physical injury, loss or damage to property, or interfering with the investigation of offences; or the detention after charge is believed to be necessary for the child’s own protection or in their own interests.
I would like to reassure the Committee that there is already a degree of alignment between police bail and court bail, and the police custody officer must have regard to the same considerations as those that apply when a court is considering whether to grant bail under the Bail Act 1976.
I acknowledge the concern that many more children are remanded post charge by the police than are remanded by the courts while awaiting trial, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, and that this may give rise to consideration of risk-averse decision-making by the police. I do not necessarily believe this to be the case. It is important to remember that post-charge detention by the police serves a different purpose from youth remand in the courts, so it is unrealistic to expect an exact alignment of the conditions required to make decisions.
With this in mind, it is perfectly possible for the police to make a decision to remand a child post charge and for the courts to make a decision not to remand the same child to custody, and for both these decisions to be reasonable based on the evidence and circumstances before each party. In the overwhelming majority of cases, a child remanded by the police will be held for no more than 24 hours.
I also acknowledge the concern that police remand is a driver of custodial remand—that is, for example, that a court is more likely to view a child remanded by the police as dangerous. I am not aware of any data showing a causal link between police remand and custodial remand. A comprehensive evidence base comparing the circumstances whereby police bail after charge decisions are made under Section 38 of PACE would be needed, giving consideration to the threshold for grounds to refuse bail and whether custody officers have access to and apply all relevant information when making a bail decision.
Before I conclude, I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks and the Home Office’s gratitude to Brian Roberts, who was the department’s expert on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Sadly, he died last month after 50 years of public service as a police officer and then an official in the department. He is greatly missed by his colleagues.
On the basis of my remarks, I hope the noble Lord will be happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for his support.
I am afraid that there is a bit of a pattern developing here in the Government’s responses. On the one hand, the Minister said there is “a degree of alignment” between police remand in custody of children and court remand in custody. Some 4,500 children being remanded by the police and only 884 by the courts does not sound to me like alignment.
The Minister also said a child would never be remanded in police custody for more than 24 hours. Do courts sit on a Sunday? What happens to a child arrested on a Saturday afternoon? They are going to be in custody a lot longer than 24 hours.
Unfortunately, as I say, it is becoming a bit of a theme that the Government’s responses to amendments do not appear to be factually accurate. We need to review that. I am afraid I do not find the Minister’s response satisfactory, and no doubt we will return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 129, I will speak also to Amendment 276 in my name. It is unfortunate that these amendments were not grouped with amendments concerning the new violent crime prevention orders, as these, too, relate to police stop and search.
As well as being a police officer rising to the most senior levels in the Metropolitan Police over the course of more than 30 years, I worked in Brixton in south London between 1980 and 1982, in the 1990s, and again in the early 2000s. I was a police sergeant during the Brixton riots, a chief inspector and acting superintendent in the 1990s in Brixton, and I was the police commander in Lambeth, unusually in the rank of commander—the equivalent of assistant chief constable—in the early 2000s. In so saying, I am an expert on police stop and search. I realise that an expert is somebody who knows a little bit more about a subject than other people do, but I think I fall into that category, particularly in areas with high levels of visible minority communities and a poor track record of police community relations.
In 2001, Lambeth, with Brixton at its heart, had the highest street robbery rate in western Europe and high levels of burglary, and criminals were openly dealing crack cocaine and heroin on the streets. We were 100 police officers short of the 1,000 officers we were supposed to have in Lambeth. I recall an incident when I was a sergeant in 1982, the year after the Brixton riots, that clearly demonstrated that the community was concerned about street robbery, and not about possession of small amounts of cannabis for personal use. When we chased a handbag thief into an illegal gambling den, the youth was ejected from the premises into our waiting arms; when we chased someone who we thought had cannabis, the door was slammed in our faces.
In 2001, it was more than just community priorities, and that involved the arrest of one of my officers for allegedly taking cannabis from suspects on the street and keeping it himself. But one of the prime motivations for suggesting on the front page of London Evening Standard that the police should not arrest people for small amounts of cannabis for personal use was that there were far more important things for the police to spend their time on—both far more serious crimes that were at endemic levels and crimes that were a priority for the community. Clearly, possession of small amounts of cannabis was not one of them. When the “no arrest” policy was introduced, a public opinion survey found that well over 80% of people in Lambeth were in favour of the approach—slightly lower among the black community but still over 80%.
Following intense media debate and the submission of detailed data about how long it took officers to process someone arrested for cannabis—two officers over four hours each—plus the administrative work by police support staff and the CPS to prepare the case for court, the court time involved and the usual conditional discharge or small fine on conviction, this all persuaded the then commissioner to agree to a six-month pilot in Lambeth, where no adult was arrested for possession of small amounts of cannabis. These are the sorts of penalties courts are imposing today for possession of small amounts of class A drugs for personal use, if the case gets to court at all—many cases are dealt with by means of a police caution.
Despite false stories in newspapers, an independent assessment by the Metropolitan Police Authority of the pilot, which was extended to 12 months, showed reductions in all forms of serious crime, an increase in the amount of cannabis seized—as officers were able to quickly and easily deal with any that they found by seizing it and warning the person on the street—and an increase in the number of class A drug dealers arrested. Fears of an influx into the borough of those seeking cannabis proved to be the reverse of what actually happened.
Police and community priorities change. Now, in many areas of the country, knife crime is the priority, rather than street robbery. Noble Lords will quite rightly think that properly targeted stop and search is a powerful weapon in taking knives off the street, particularly if third-party information—community intelligence—points to those who are the knife carriers.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has done some number-crunching on stop and search, and I am very grateful to Matt Parr —he might not be thanking me in a moment—who briefed Peers on the issue last week. Some 63% of police stop and search is for drugs; over 80% of those stop and searches are on suspicion of possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use. On average, only 9% of police stop and searches—less than one in 10—are intelligence-led; the proportion varies by police force between 23% in the best performing and 1% in the worst. These are HMICFRS figures. The top five police forces in the UK account for 90% of all stop and search carried out. Policy Exchange, a centre-right think tank, published a report a few weeks ago that found the Metropolitan Police had the highest rate of stop and search of any police force and the lowest rate for apprehending drug dealers.
Tackling knife crime is the Government’s priority, it is our priority, and it is the priority of many communities, but, looking at the facts as presented by HMICFRS, it is not police officers’ priority when it comes to stop and search. My Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search someone on suspicion of personal possession of a small amount of a controlled drug for personal use. The police already cannot search for possession of illegal psychoactive substances that are not covered by the Misuse of Drugs Act; in fact, possession of small amounts of illegal psychoactive substances for personal use is not even an offence.
We are not talking about not tackling drug dealing—that is not covered by this amendment; indeed, there will be more police resources available to tackle drug dealing. We are not even talking about an untried and untested leap of faith. When we did not arrest people for simple possession of cannabis over a 12-month period in Lambeth, the police ended up concentrating on more important offences instead, more serious crimes and crimes that were a priority for the community.
We have too few police officers at this time, as I had in Lambeth when I was the police commander. We have too much serious crime, as I did when I was the police commander in Lambeth. We need to focus scarce police resources on what really matters; whatever that priority is, it is not possession of small amounts of drugs for personal use.
The key to effectively reducing serious violence is the police and communities working together, with communities providing information to the police about who is involved in serious violence, so that the police can concentrate their efforts, particularly stop and search, on those carrying and using knives. Policy Exchange believes that community policing is key. Other metropolitan forces, such as Merseyside, the West Midlands and West Yorkshire, do less stop and search and more community policing than London’s Metropolitan Police, and they are far more effective at arresting those involved in drug dealing.
Nothing is more damaging to police-community relations, trust and confidence in the police than poorly targeted stop and search. From standing in the middle of Brixton, being bombarded with bricks, paving slabs and petrol bombs, as I was in 1981, following a massive poorly targeted stop and search operation, I can tell noble Lords that that is the sort of damage it does. Visible minorities are four times more likely and black people nine times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people, but they are no more likely to have something illegal in their possession than white people. That is when the police have to have reasonable grounds to stop and search people. Amendment 129 would not allow the police to stop and search for small amounts of controlled drugs for personal use, removing the cause of so much hostility between the police and communities, whose support and co-operation are vital in reducing serious violence.
That is not the only disproportionate form of stop and search. In 2010, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, responding to a European Court of Human Rights judgment that suspicionless stop and search under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act was illegal, said:
“The first duty of Government is to protect the public. But that duty must never be used as a reason to ride roughshod over our civil liberties”,
adding that the then Government would not have appealed the judgment, even if they could. She said that the court found that the powers were
“drawn too broadly—at the time of their initial authorisation and when they are used”
and
“contain insufficient safeguards to protect civil liberties.”—[Official Report, Commons, 8/7/10; col. 540.]
That is very similar to the position we are in today with Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, which still allows indiscriminate stop and search.
The purpose for which the police are using Section 60 goes far beyond what Parliament intended it to be used for. When this power was given to the police there was a recurring problem with rival gangs of football supporters arranging to meet at a specific time and place, arming themselves with weapons. Noble Lords will immediately see the point of a Section 60 power to search everyone in the area at the time rival gangs planned to meet, without the need for reasonable suspicion in these particular circumstances. This rarely, if ever, happens today.
Instead, if there has been a stabbing, the police will routinely impose a Section 60 order in the area surrounding the incident. That is not what it was intended for and of limited use in such circumstances. The first thing a knifeman will do after stabbing someone is dispose of the weapon and go to ground. Even if he is in the area, there is usually a description, from witnesses or CCTV, and other powers of stop and search based on reasonable suspicion can be used. I maintain that the Section 60 power is being misused and is ineffective.
The second problem with Section 60 is that indiscriminate stop and search causes untold damage to police-community relations. As I have said, people from minority-ethnic communities are four times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police and black people are nine times more likely. But when it comes to Section 60, where no reasonable suspicion is required, that figure rises to you being 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white. The overwhelming majority of these people have nothing on them to justify such a stop and search. Community intelligence is vital to make stop and search effective in tackling knife crime, but communities are losing trust and confidence in the police because too many innocent members of their communities are being stopped and searched using Section 60.
It is part of that operational independence of the police that they know what is best for their area; therefore, it might be relevant for police forces in a certain area not to have much occasion for the use of Section 60 stop and search.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti, for their support for these amendments. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, that the issue of drugs is very complex: it needs a complex approach and stop and search of this nature is not the way to go. When I suggested to the commissioner that we did not arrest people for cannabis in Lambeth, former MP Ann Widdecombe accused me of usurping the power of Parliament: she cannot accuse me of that now.
Turning to the response of the Minister, almost her whole argument around Amendment 129 was an argument against decriminalisation, yet this amendment does not call for the decriminalisation of personal possession of drugs. It is all about focusing the police on serious crime, rationing scarce police resources by focusing them on what is really important to communities and to the courts. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he rarely saw anybody in front of him for possession, particularly of class B drugs, unless by chance—usually it is when the police find cannabis when they have arrested the person for something else. They are there for the substantive offence and they get charged for the cannabis as well, for example.
The noble Baroness talked about the harm caused by drugs. Why, then, are new psychoactive substances not controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act not an offence? Why is personal possession of psychoactive substances not illegal under the Psychoactive Substances Act, if drugs cause so much harm? Why is alcohol not illegal when we look at the harm that alcohol causes? But we are not talking here about decriminalisation; we are talking about getting the police to focus on what is important. As far as Section 60 is concerned, I support stop and search. I have said how important stop and search—properly focused, acting on community intelligence and focusing on those who are suspected of carrying and using knives—is, and how important Section 60 is.
The Minister talked about the figures between 2019 and 2020 and the number of weapons that stop and search removed. This is not an argument about removing the power of the police to stop and search; it is about focusing intelligence-led stop and search on taking knives off the street to be even more effective. The figures that the noble Baroness gave about the number of weapons taken off the street, I assume, are not weapons found by using Section 60. If Section 60 searches were only 3% of all searches, and only 1%—one in a hundred—of Section 60 searches find a weapon, then the figures that the noble Baroness quoted cannot possibly be about Section 60. Why is she using figures about stop and search generally when the amendment she was addressing is about Section 60? It is a blunt instrument.
The noble Baroness is right; it has to be an inspector who authorises a Section 60. Until a couple of years ago, it was a superintendent who had to authorise a Section 60. That is why there has been a 2,800% increase in the number of times Section 60 orders are issued, and that is why Section 60 is so ineffective, with only one in 100 searches resulting in a weapon, and why it is so damaging to police-community relations, which are essential to tackling serious violence.
The noble Baroness said no one should be stopped and searched based on their race. You are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched under Section 60 if you are black than if you are white. The two things do not add up. Of course nobody should be searched on the basis of their race, but the facts are that you are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black than if you are white. That is why Section 60 is so damaging and so ineffective. That is why I brought this amendment but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 129.
There is no rest for the wicked. I rise to move Amendment 130 in my name and support Amendment 132A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which seeks to achieve similar things.
I must first declare an interest. When I was a deputy assistant commissioner in the Metropolitan Police—the equivalent of a deputy chief constable—I told the truth about a misleading statement made to the News of the World by the then commissioner of the Metropolitan Police about the shooting dead of the innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, by the police in 2005. Another senior officer leaked to the BBC the content of the statement I had made to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was investigating a complaint by the family of the deceased that the police had misled the public. In response, the Metropolitan Police issued a press release saying it knew the officer who had given evidence to the IPCC and what he said—what I said—was not true.
The deputy commissioner at the time tried to bully me into issuing a press statement saying that I was mistaken. Instead, I instructed solicitors to threaten to sue the Metropolitan Police if it did not retract its press statement which effectively called me a liar; I was not the easiest senior officer to manage, as noble Lords can probably work out. The Metropolitan Police withdrew the press release and paid my legal fees. The IPCC subsequently confirmed what I had told it was true, but the die was cast; I was subsequently forced out of the police service for telling the truth. I think it is important for the Committee to know where I am coming from when I talk about this issue.
My amendment is based on the recommendation in the Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel to create
“a statutory duty of candour to be owed by … law enforcement agencies”
to victims and their families. The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel was announced by the former Home Secretary Theresa May on 10 May 2013 to address questions arising from and relating to police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan; the role played by police corruption in preventing those responsible for the murder being brought to justice; the failure to confront that corruption; the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and journalists; and the alleged corruption involved in the links between them.
It is not possible or necessary to go into all the findings of the independent panel, but I want to give two examples. First, the Metropolitan Police admitted on more than one occasion that police corruption had impacted on bringing those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder to justice, but when asked by the independent panel what that corruption was, and what impact it had had, the Metropolitan Police refused to provide an answer. This is even though Tim Godwin, the then acting commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, had made a formal admission of corruption on behalf of the Metropolitan Police at a meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The Metropolitan Police’s response to the panel was, “You’ll have to ask him what he meant.”
Secondly, at every stage following the initial investigation of the murder, the Metropolitan Police maintained that the initial murder investigation had been carried out in accordance with the standards of murder investigation at that time. It was only seven years after the independent panel was formed that the Metropolitan Police made the panel aware of the existence of the London Homicide Manual, which set out the standards expected of murder investigations at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder. This document proved that the initial investigation was not, in fact, carried out in accordance with the standards expected at the time. Such a lack of frankness, candour and honesty is a disgrace that these amendments seek to address.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for reminding us of the resilience and suffering of the Hillsborough victims’ families and of the Morgan family, and to the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Chakrabarti. I too prefer the noble Lord’s amendment; we tabled ours first. We need to address this issue.
The Minister said that this is not the first time that we have had a discussion about the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel report and the duty of candour, but it is the first time that we have had an opportunity to do something about it. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, very disappointing that the Government did not take the opportunity of this Bill, which is so obviously the vehicle that should be used to get a statutory duty of candour on to the statute book. I hope the noble Lord will bring back his amendment on Report, so that we can divide the House on this very important issue, because this needs to happen. Wherever you look, this is urgently needed, whether we talk about Hillsborough, Daniel Morgan or what is happening in the Metropolitan Police at the moment—even yesterday, officers were convicted of offences.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised the very important point about support for officers. I am still regarded as a traitor by some in the police service because I told the truth about what happened after the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke powerfully about the need to protect victims, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gave his own worrying example of the need for better, greater candour on the behalf of the police.
We will come back to this on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 130.
My Lords, the purpose of the amendment in my name is to remove Section 176 from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. With regard to what is affectionately known as shoplifting, it is estimated by the British Retail Consortium that businesses lose £770 million a year to shop theft—and retail theft crimes are rising year on year. According to figures available from the Home Office, there was an overall increase in retail theft of 19.1% between 2014 and 2018, compared with an increase of 4.96% between 2010 and 2014. This is no surprise.
Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 allows anyone accused of shoplifting anything under £200 to plead guilty by post, as if they had been given a parking ticket. Use of this legislation is often cited as a cost-saving exercise, but the truth is that it does not save money. In fact, it does the opposite, as everyone loses, whether it is customers who end up paying higher prices or the retailers who lose their jobs when the business fails. But it is still being used, with Thames Valley Police for example informing local shops that they will not send out officers to deal with shoplifters who steal less than £100-worth of goods. This piece of legislation has, therefore, massively reduced the deterrent to theft and the punishment that an offender can expect, with many savvy criminals exploiting the situation to steal with virtual impunity.
Just one in 20 of all shoplifting offences are now prosecuted, while the number of cautions for such thefts have fallen from 40,000 to just 5,000 in a decade, according to figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. In addition, it is worth noting that it takes an average of 30 offences before an individual is convicted of a shop theft that results in a custodial situation. It is soul destroying for hard-working businesses to have their livelihood literally stolen away from them. The British Independent Retailers Association has come to see me on a number of occasions; its crime survey for 2021, just completed this month, shows that two-thirds of its members see most crimes against businesses valued at less than £200, while two-thirds of members also reported a disproportionate increase in the theft of goods worth less than £200 since this threshold was put in place in 2014. This shows that businesses are losing more and more each year to this type of crime, as it is currently being left unchecked.
John Barlow, a BIRA member in Nottingham, rightly pointed out that the police are basically telling kids, “Help yourselves”. Of course, there are more serious crimes that the police need to solve, but you cannot just give thieves a licence to steal. Shop theft is not a victimless crime; in fact, smaller independent retailers feel the impact of retail crime more acutely than larger retailers, which typically have better security systems, employ guards and security staff, sell larger orders and have better margins and economies of scale. Conversely, a small retailer operating on a typical margin of 8% would need to sell £2,500-worth of goods to make back £200 of stolen goods. In addition, they are often working alone, unable to call in back-up from another staff member, and left literally at the mercy of the perpetrator and the trauma of the event. How can this be right?
The removal of this legislation would send a signal to those who perpetrate shop theft: it is very clear that you will be prosecuted; your actions matter; and you will be held to account. It would show that this Government really hold our retailers, who have kept our country going through the pandemic, in high regard, and that the retailers can have confidence that justice will be served. I beg to move.
My Lords, we support my noble friend Lord Dholakia in wanting to protect small shopkeepers by calling on the police and CPS to take low-level shoplifting more seriously. Repeated low-level theft adds up and, as my noble friend has just said, when the profit margins are typically around only 8%, you need to sell a lot of goods to make up for those losses. This is particularly a problem if perpetrators do not believe that the police and courts will take effective action. I would welcome a response from the Minister to reassure small shopkeepers that the Government take this issue seriously—and that includes what action they will take in response to my noble friend’s amendment.
My Lords, I am not sure that this requires a change in the law; I think the problem lies elsewhere. Section 176 should have been an improvement; low-value shoplifting offences should have been dealt with much more quickly and efficiently.
The Home Office guidance for implementing Section 176 is very clear. It sets out, for example, that repeat offenders, organised criminals and people going equipped should all be referred to the CPS for prosecution, rather than using the simplified procedures. I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts.
Something has gone wrong. I am going to guess that it is a consequence of 11 years of austerity inflicted on police forces. Rather than being a legal problem, it is a simple operational matter of the police not having the resources to deal with the problem—they cannot respond, investigate or prosecute. I think the solution lies in policing and not the law.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness has referred to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, which I chair. It is currently undertaking an inquiry into the use of new technology—I stress new, by which I mean artificial intelligence—and the application of law. I do not wish to pre-empt whatever the committee may recommend. We will certainly look at issues of so-called hard or soft regulation. We will also look at procurement standards, transparency—by which I mean intelligibility both to those who use AI and to those who are the subject of it—and accountability. The list of issues seems to increase with every evidence session. At a recent session, a witness said
“certain things with AI will always be the same. We will always have a data issue, a bias issue and an explainability issue”.
I do not think it appropriate to go into any detail this evening, other than to say, “Watch this space”.
My Lords, we support the principle of the amendment the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has tabled. Picking up a theme here, facial recognition technology is an example of where officials are concerned. For example, the guy who is responsible for the regulation of CCTV has very serious concerns that the technology is running ahead of the regulations and that this needs to be addressed. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, the use of artificial intelligence is another new and developing area where Parliament should at least consider whether these new technologies need to be subject to debate in Parliament and regulation.
However, I am not sure about the example of drones, which are sort of a replacement for police helicopters. I left the police in 2007; 14 years ago, with something not very imaginatively called “heli-tele”, police helicopters could pick out people’s faces from however many thousand feet they were up in the air and transmit those images to officers on the ground who had television monitors in front of them. It was extremely useful to see where crowds were moving in a fast-moving demonstration situation. Clearly, you can have a lot more drones than you can have helicopters, because they are a lot cheaper and so forth. The increased use of drones may be of concern, but the way in which they are being used is no different from what huge helicopters have been doing for years, whether members of the public were aware of it or not.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about the Mayor of London and water cannon. Again, I think it was Theresa May as Home Secretary who refused to allow their deployment. Unfortunately, if the Mayor of London had actually listened to experts in public order policing, they would have told him that they are more or less useless for the sort of things he was hoping to use them for. I think he felt that water cannon would be useful following the widespread riots across the country. In fact, in that scenario they are completely useless. They are lumbering giants of things that cannot possibly keep up with marauding gangs going round and looting and so forth.
I think my noble friend Lady Hamwee has hit the nail on the head—it is new technology that needs to be considered and regulated, or at least debated in Parliament to see whether it needs to be regulated. To that extent, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for that. There is ample criminal law and ample tort law for nuisance. There are ample laws to protect people from burglary, nuisance and so on. This measure, however, is targeted. The euphemism is so thin: “without permission, with vehicles”. I wonder who we are talking about there. The euphemism makes this racial discrimination even more obscene.
My Lords, we strongly support all these amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and my noble friend Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville said, the crucial point here is that if legal sites were provided it is unlikely that these provisions would even be in the Bill. Having adequate sites is likely to be cheaper than the cost of taking legal action against those who have no option other than to trespass. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, said, the Bill’s provisions, whether by accident or design, will very clearly disproportionately impact an already vulnerable minority: the Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities. What would happen if the Government and local authorities made it a criminal offence for motorists to park their cars illegally and then did not provide enough spaces for motorists to park legally? There would be uproar.
My noble friends Lady Brinton and Lady Bakewell told the Committee from their extensive experience about hostility towards Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I have to say to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that when he reads back what he said in Hansard it will be open to interpretation that, for every crime he described where he could not say who the perpetrator was, he implied that all those crimes were committed by Travellers, without any evidence that they were responsible for those particular crimes. That is why there is so much hostility towards these communities because speeches such as that can be misinterpreted as, “The noble Earl is saying that those communities are responsible for all these crimes, even the ones where we do not know who committed them.”
The only difficulty, of course, is that it is the countryside police offer who tells the victims that it was the Travellers.
My Lords, the noble Earl is far more responsible than a police officer because I can take him to police officers in London who will say that all crimes in London are committed by black people.
My noble friend Lady Brinton also reminded the Committee that there are existing laws to deal with these situations. That goes to the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, raised. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that existing laws are adequate. The police say that more laws are not needed for this sort of offence. If the police are saying that, why are the Government bringing forward this legislation?
Rather than go through all these amendments, all I will say is that I agree with what my noble friends and other noble Lords have said. Part 4 should be removed from the Bill in its entirety because existing legislation is more than adequate.
I congratulate my noble friend Lady Whitaker on her powerful and persuasive speech introducing her amendments and opening this debate, as we expected it would be. As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, my noble friend has been a determined campaigner on behalf of the Gypsy and Traveller communities.
As has been said, Part 4 relates to unauthorised encampments, which it criminalises, creating an offence if someone resides or intends to reside on land without consent in or with a vehicle. The Bill also gives landowners a role in criminalising a person who is trespassing, strengthens police powers to deal with unauthorised encampments, prohibits a person re-entering land without a reasonable excuse within 12 months and gives the police the right to seize property, including people’s caravans, which could be a family’s primary residence. The Bill also amends police powers associated with unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act to lower the threshold at which they can be used, allow the police to remove unauthorised encampments on or partly on highways and prohibit unauthorised encampments that are moved from a site returning within 12 months.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wonder whether the interesting amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, might not have some unintended consequences that I, personally, would find very welcome. What if the “unlawful activity” included acts contrary to the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act? What if the landlord was trying to turf out Gypsies and Travellers who had no other home to go to? I believe that he will no doubt have an answer to that question.
More generally, on Clause 63—and I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, said—the openness of the terms, so eloquently laid out by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, amount to a tremendous allowance for prejudice. We should be in no doubt that this is very common. The hate crime reporting organisation, GATE Herts, funded by the then MHCLG, has ample evidence of explicitly Nazi sentiments being used whenever a Traveller or Gypsy community wanted to move on to a site. Stereotyping is the norm in these records. We heard examples in your Lordships’ House last week of whole communities being tarred by one incident. It is the same as somebody saying that white people should be barred from walking on the street at night because of a few incidents of night-time vandalism; it is that kind of remark, and it is prejudice. If such a remark urges violent action—the removal of Gypsies and Travellers—surely it is illegal.
Following the Minister’s remarks last Wednesday on police guidance in this kind of situation, she expressed some surprise at the use of the term “gold-plated”. Is “gold-plated” not a dog-whistle call to opponents of human rights? Most of us are proud of the Human Rights Act 1998, and how it reinforced our position as a leader in establishing a human rights culture after the Second World War. Be that as it may, the Human Rights Act, and behind it the European Convention on Human Rights, is our law—either one complies with the law or not. Gold-plating of human rights is not a term understood in law, and its implications, in this context, are to diminish any putative offence against the Human Rights Act. I think that Clause 63 is not helpful and should go.
My Lords, Clause 63 amends Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 61 addresses the situation that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, alluded to on Wednesday—at Hansard col. 1313—when he told us that, 25 years ago, as a Member of Parliament, he was rung by a very distressed farmer in his constituency, whose land was being trespassed on. I make that 1996, but perhaps it was before the 1994 Act was effective.
As my noble friend Lady Brinton has said, Section 61 of the 1994 Act provides a power to remove trespassers on land. I will quote subsection (1):
“If the senior police officer present at the scene reasonably believes that two or more persons are trespassing on land and are present there with the common purpose of residing there for any period, that reasonable steps have been taken by or on behalf of the occupier to ask them to leave and … that any of those persons has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, a member of his family or an employee or agent of his, or …that those persons have between them six or more vehicles on the land, he may direct those persons, or any of them, to leave the land and to remove any vehicles or other property they have with them on the land.”
Subsection (4) states:
“If a person knowing that a direction under subsection (1) … has been given which applies to him … fails to leave the land as soon as reasonably practicable, or … having left again enters the land as a trespasser within the period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given, he commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.”
That is the law now, unamended by this Bill.
As many noble Lords said on Wednesday, what is the problem that Part 4 is trying to solve, when there are clearly adequate powers already in existence? Clause 63 simply brings Section 61 of the 1994 Act into line with the rest of Part 4 of the Bill. For the reasons so thoroughly and persuasively argued on Wednesday, this clause, like the rest of Part 4, should not stand part of the Bill.
Section 68 of the 1994 Act, as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, is the offence of aggravated trespass, where
“A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect … of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity … of obstructing that activity, or … of disrupting that activity.”
I am getting the sense of hunt saboteurs, HS2 protestors or, perhaps, those protesting against genetically modified crops, rather than Gypsy, Roma and Travellers. Section 68 appears to me to refer to deliberate interference with lawful activity by means of trespass, rather than coincidental interference; for example, ploughing a field that travellers are trespassing on. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I am not a lawyer, but perhaps the Minister can clarify the difference between Section 68 and what we have been talking about up until now.
As far as Amendment 150 is concerned, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained, it attempts to correct an error in existing legislation. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the activity being disrupted should be and needs to be unlawful, rather than the trespasser simply asserting that he believes that it should not be happening. I am not sure that the accused should have to prove that they were not trespassing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said, that seems to be going perhaps a bit too far. We support the amendment in principle, in as far as the activity on the land that is being disrupted needs to be unlawful, rather than just being asserted as being unlawful.
As we leave this part of the Bill, I want to again acknowledge the long and tireless campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, to defend Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I fear that, at Report, we may need to adopt a different approach than simply removing all the clauses in Part 4 from the Bill, in the light of what the Minister said on Wednesday, at Hansard col. 1330, when she quoted from the Conservative Party manifesto:
“We will give the police new powers to arrest and seize the property and vehicles of trespassers who set up unauthorised encampments, in order to protect our communities. We will make intentional trespass a criminal offence.”
That is very interesting wording. New powers do not necessarily mean more draconian powers. I respectfully suggest that on Report this House should bring forward new powers that provide the necessary protections for all our communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. For example—I quote from the manifesto—it could be argued that making
“intentional trespass a criminal offence”
entirely supports Amendment 135 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, providing that, where Travellers have no suitable legal pitch on a relevant caravan site situated in the local authority’s area, the trespass should not be regarded as intentional.
It is absolutely right that we, and many others in this Committee, express our outright opposition to Part 4 as drafted but, when we return to these issues on Report, it will be with more sophisticated amendments to take account of the wording in the Conservative Party manifesto—and the convention of not blocking, at least not entirely, commitments made by the governing party in their manifesto—that protect all communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.
My Lords, I will be relatively brief. We had a lengthy debate on the previous day in Committee about Part 4 on unauthorised encampments, and expressed our strong concerns about what is proposed in Part 4. I will just reiterate a couple of points. Certainly, our understanding is that the police seem to think the existing law adequate; indeed, so do local government officers who have direct involvement with the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, put forward Amendment 150 on the basis that it is putting right a wrong. The obvious concern is that, in so doing, it creates new wrongs or new unfairness, not least in relation to the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma community. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, probably quite rightly said that much of the debate might suggest that this amendment was aimed at others, perhaps those involved in protests over GM crops or HS2. Certainly, it involves a change as far as the onus of proof of the accused is concerned. The noble and learned Lord said that he is not going to press the amendment to a vote in Committee. I hope I am not misrepresenting what he said, but I think he said he would wait for the Minister’s response before deciding how and if to progress the matter further. We have our concerns about Amendment 150 and what exactly it might mean, but at this stage we stand in the same position as him: we will wait to hear what the Minister says on behalf of the Government in response to Amendment 150. At the moment we have fairly strong reservations about its implications, but we will listen to what the Government have to say.
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. With regard to the other examples that she has found over the weekend, showing that the law is not targeted at Gypsy, Roma and Traveller people, is it not the case that under the Equalities Act the law should not disproportionately impact on any particular community, not that they should not be the sole focus? Therefore, if the changes as drafted would disproportionately impact on the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, would that still not be contrary to the Equalities Act?
My Lords, I have said all along, and the proponents of the amendments that we have discussed have underlined, that the absolute majority of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community are law-abiding people, so this is not something that disproportionately impacts on them. It is about people who cause destruction to other people’s land and property.
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, I do not intend to stand here and announce our 100% support for what is proposed. We are interested in the issues raised and certainly look forward to the Government’s reply. To state the obvious, I say that local councils are key partners and innovators in improving road safety and encouraging the use of different modes of transport. What is proposed is quite a major step forward from that.
I will add one point, to which the answer may well be that the solution is obvious. Simply, if we end up with new powers or duties in this area being granted to local authorities, they must be accompanied by funding. The reply may be, “Well, of course they’ll get the money, because they’ll get it from any fines they might impose”, but it may not be quite as straightforward as that. Making such a move might put a bigger burden and workload on local authorities than might be envisaged. If people are thinking of going down this road, they should make sure that, from whatever source it may be coming, the funding is available.
As I recollect, the Government have plans, for which local authorities have been waiting a little while, to increase local authority powers to manage local roads, under the Traffic Management Act 2004. If I am right, will the Minister give us an update on where we stand on that and what kind of issues the Government are considering as part of any such plans? As part of that, have the Government looked at the issue of speeding enforcement—as suggested in these amendments—at local authority level when looking at any planned increases to local authority powers in this area? As I said at the beginning, we are interested in the issues raised by these amendments and look forward to hearing the Government’s response.
I apologise to the Committee: I was not going to say anything, but I could not resist. There is clearly an issue with people receiving endorsements on driving licences and potentially being disqualified from driving not being dealt with in the criminal courts and through the appeal process that they provide. On the issue around lack of enforcement, does the Minister have any information about the potential use of speed cameras in 20 miles per hour zones to increase enforcement and to what extent speed cameras are self-financing, in terms of the money they generate versus the cost of running them?
I thank noble Lords for taking part in this short but very interesting debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Tope, has explained, Amendment 163 would afford local authorities greater powers in managing speed and traffic light offence enforcement on their roads. I take it that Amendment 156 then seeks to extend the National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme so that it also can be operated by local authorities in respect of decriminalised offences.
The most dangerous traffic offences are punishable by either immediate disqualification from driving—as with drink and drug driving—or endorsement. I am sure that noble Lords agree that, because of their seriousness, none of these offences has been decriminalised and nor should they be—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, alluded to. The purpose of endorsements is to disqualify from driving people who show repeated dangerous behaviour and pose a threat to other road users, through the process of totting up penalty points, which of course is a key distinguishing feature of parking fines.
I remind noble Lords that speed offences are one of the types of offence referred to as the fatal four, along with mobile phone use while driving, not wearing a seat belt, and drink and drug-driving. Speed offences share a common feature with these other offences: they are prominent in the causation of fatal and serious collisions. We could not accept a situation where there were some speed limits that the police had no power to enforce.
Likewise, contravening a red traffic light can lead to serious and fatal collisions and that should not be decriminalised either. Traffic lights are provided to manage safety concerns at junctions, and offer safer places for people to cross the road. We have a good compliance record with red traffic lights in this country, and decriminalising enforcement would be likely to undermine that. That would impinge on the safety of all road users, but particularly vulnerable road users, including pedestrians and cyclists.
The Government are concerned that enforcement of civil penalties is not subject to the same rigorous scrutiny as criminal enforcement, and this would affect public confidence and their level of support. In particular, it would be likely to set back the growing public acceptance of speed and red light cameras. The public strongly agree that speed cameras save lives and are not there to make money. That is clearly demonstrated in the findings of the Department for Transport’s 2020 National Travel Attitudes Study, which showed that 59% of respondents agreed with the statement that speed cameras saved lives and only 41% agreed with the statement that they were mostly there to make money. Those figures are an improvement on those of 2011, when the equivalent numbers were 51% and 55% respectively. The Government, therefore, have no intention of decriminalising any of these offences: we believe that doing so would wrongly signal to the public that these dangerous behaviours had become less important.
Furthermore, the police are the primary enforcers of criminal offences, and have so far been responsible for delivering speeding courses. The National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme is run by UK Road Offender Education, a subsidiary of the Road Safety Trust, which is owned by the 43 police forces. This provides central governance, standards and consistency. UK Road Offender Education works with leading experts in road user behaviour to develop, review and deliver high-quality behaviour change courses—and I can personally attest that they work.
The scheme works alongside PentiP, the national Home Office fixed penalty processing system that is used by all police forces in England and Wales. This ensures that a repeat offender is not offered a second course within three years but is instead offered a fixed penalty notice and penalty points, otherwise court proceedings follow. We are not aware of a strong need to allow local or traffic authorities to charge for speeding courses, and there is a lack of evidence for the benefits, or indeed consequences, of doing so.
Unfortunately I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, the update that he seeks, but I will write to him. I am afraid that also goes for the question from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick: I will write to him too. Given my answer, however, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Tope, will see fit to withdraw his amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, very briefly, from my professional experience, there is no safe level of alcohol for a driver. The message should be clear to all drivers that you should not drink and drive. I think that the limit should not be set at zero, because you can still have alcohol in your system the following day and there may be a need for some leeway, but at a level a lot lower than is currently the case. Certainly, the levels that are suggested in this amendment are reasonable. There needs to be a significant reduction in the alcohol limit, but perhaps not set at zero.
The other thing to say—I am sure the Minister will address the Committee on this—is that I am not sure that the second amendment is necessary, as the police are entitled to stop any driver to check their documents. If they then detect alcohol, provided the officer is in uniform, they can administer a breath test. I will leave that for the Minister to confirm.
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 157. I need to say very little following the speakers today, who have greater expertise than I have—and, of course, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has her own tragic experience to bring to this debate.
I spoke about this issue during Oral Questions last week, and I just want to emphasise a couple of points that I made then. The limit we currently have is 54 years old; the science on which it is based has moved on, and it is outdated. We are not leading the world; we are lagging behind the rest of the world. From Australia to Scotland and the whole of the rest of Europe, we are behind.
My Lords, if the Committee will forgive me, I was not quick enough off the mark in the previous group when we were considering exceptional hardship. The Minister said that the Government opposed the amendment because it limited judicial discretion. As we will see in upcoming clauses, clause after clause of this Bill limits judicial discretion by means of primary legislation. I will remind the Government of what the Minister said in relation to that previous amendment when we come to those clauses.
I move Amendment 160 in my name and, in so doing, express my thanks to the Police Federation for raising this issue and for its assistance in drafting the amendment. Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 gives powers to the police to stop vehicles, which goes back to the previous group where we were discussing drink-driving. Section 163(1) says:
“A person driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road must stop the vehicle on being required to do so by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer.”
Section 163(3) says:
“If a person fails to comply with this section he is guilty of an offence.”
Similarly, Section 164 provides the power to require the driver to produce their driving licence. This poses several real dangers and unnecessary risks to our front-line police officers while dealing with such driver checks. The problem with the current legal framework is that an officer has to leave the relative safety of their own vehicle to make any request or to examine the driving licence. The driver of the stopped vehicle is under no obligation to get out of the vehicle or to switch off their engine.
The current law places officers in a vulnerable position in relation to the driver and occupants of the vehicle. They are permitted to remain in the vehicle to either flee when the officer is most vulnerable or even to use the vehicle as a weapon, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said in an earlier amendment. This is a common occurrence, even in my professional experience, where drivers try to flee after you have got out of the police vehicle and spoken to them. The risk to the officer would be minimised by creating an obligation for the driver of the stopped vehicle to leave the vehicle, but it is also important to ensure others who may be present in the vehicle are not able to then drive the vehicle away, or at the officer, after the original driver has got out.
This amendment is intended to highlight this gap in the law, although I accept that it is not suitable as drafted. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Randerson for pointing out that electric cars, for example, do not have an engine that can be switched off in the traditional sense of the words and that other vehicles do not require a set of keys to be in the ignition to start the engine. However, noble Lords will see exactly what the problem is and how, potentially, the risk to police officers could be minimised if, for example, the driver was required to immobilise the vehicle and get out of the car, unless there was a reasonable excuse for not doing so, for example if the driver was disabled. I look forward to a sympathetic response from the Minister, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I am sorry, but I am going to speak on this if the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is not going to.
I feel very strongly about this. It offends my sense of justice that people who do hit and runs never pay for their crime. They are a menace to society, with only six months’ maximum sentence for leaving someone for dead having hit them with a car and, of course, the figures are going up year after year—
I think the noble Baroness may be speaking to the next group rather than this group.
I am. Sorry, ignore that. Strike that from the record. I will come back to that.
My Lords, if I understand the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, correctly, this amendment is aimed at improving the safety of police officers at the roadside. I share his concerns and want to reassure him that the safety of police officers is vitally important to this Government, as is demonstrated by our programme of work on the police covenant. I will not echo the arguments made to the noble Lord by the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, on the defects of his amendment, but I want to say that we are committed to ensuring that the police have the powers that they need to protect people.
The British model of policing is based on consent, and the exercise of police powers, including the Section 163 power, needs to be transparent, fair and legitimate to ensure that the public can remain confident in policing. I am supportive of the intention behind the extension of this power, but more evidence and consultation are needed to demonstrate that it would provide benefits to officers’ safety and build support for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the proposal to extend the power. I can say to the noble Lord that we will work closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the Police Federation to explore these issues further and consider what more can be done to improve officer safety at the roadside. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for his support in principle. I think it would be problematic if the lone female driver was asked to get into the police vehicle, but I am not sure that the female driver would be in danger by getting out on to the roadside.
I am very grateful to the Minister for her support for the intention behind the amendment. As I acknowledged, more consultation is required, and I am very grateful that the Government are prepared to discuss these issues further with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Police Federation. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“RTA section 170(4A) | Failing to stop and give particulars after accident involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury or to report accident | On indictment | 14 years | Obligatory | Obligatory | 6-11” |
My Lords, Amendment 161 is in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—as we already know. I am grateful to Living Streets, British Cycling, RoadPeace, Cycling UK, and the Road Danger Reduction Forum for their joint briefing and suggested amendment on this issue.
Currently, the maximum penalty for the offence of failing to stop to report accidents is a six-month custodial sentence. This may be appropriate in cases where someone has simply driven off after scratching the paintwork of someone else’s parked car, but not when someone has been left for dead by the roadside.
The briefing provided by two noble Lords cites the case of Scott Walker, who was struck and killed by a driver who was driving without insurance, failed to stop at the scene of the collision, failed to report the incident and then tried to conceal his involvement by having his car repaired to cover the damage. The sheriff who heard the case said that the maximum sentence of imprisonment
“would not adequately reflect the gravity of the offence.”
The parliamentary petition calling for tougher laws when someone dies and the driver fails to stop attracted more than 104,000 signatures.
Section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 as amended requires:
“where, owing to the presence of a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place, an accident occurs by which … personal injury is caused to a person other than the driver of that mechanically propelled vehicle … The driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle … If for any reason the driver of the mechanically propelled vehicle does not give his name and address under subsection (2) above, he must report the accident … A person who fails to comply with subsection (2) or (3) above is guilty of an offence.”
The amendment would add a new subsection creating a new offence, where the driver knew or ought reasonably to have realised that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, with a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. As with the previous group, this amendment is intended to highlight the inadequacy of existing legislation.
Again, I accept that the wording may not be right; for example, the Road Traffic Act would need to be amended throughout, as other noble Lords have said, replacing the word “accident” with “collision” or “incident”, as some of these incidents involve deliberate acts, rather than being accidents, and the 14-year term may not be the right one. But the law is inadequate when someone fails to stop after a collision involving death or serious injury. I beg to move.
My Lords, as I said before, I support this amendment very strongly because hit-and-runs are a menace.
One of the problems is that the families who suffer from having somebody killed or injured rarely feel they get justice. That seems completely wrong. This amendment would mean that a judge has available the range of sentences necessary to reflect the severity of the offence. Sometimes the existing six months might be enough, and other times 14 years in custody would be the only option that can punish the wrongdoing and deter others from driving away from a serious collision. I am not big on increasing prison sentences, because I think we have far too many people in prison already, and many of them are there for the wrong reasons. But in this case, when you deliberately harm a person, prison is the place for that sort of violent person.
Judges should have the option of a lifetime ban for people who hit and run. There is no excuse for fleeing the scene—it is trying to escape justice. People should not be back on the road once they have done that. Hit-and-run is a cowardly thing; it is an attempt to escape and to not admit that you have done something wrong. Quite often, it can mean the difference between life and death for the person you have hit. This is a valuable amendment and will mean justice, not only for victims but their families and friends.
My Lords, as noble Lords have explained, Amendments 161 and 166 relate to the offence of drivers failing to stop. We know that in a small number of cases, the failure to stop might be related to an event that leads to the death of, or serious injury to, another person, but in the vast majority of cases, convictions involve low-level traffic incidents. In an extremely small number of cases, there may not be any other evidence to connect the death or serious harm with the driver who fails to stop, meaning the only offence they have committed is that failure to stop. I understand the concerns raised, but these amendments potentially risk providing for a maximum custodial sentence of 14 years for failure-to-stop offences resulting in serious or fatal injuries in circumstances where there would not have had to be evidence of a causal link between the failure to stop and the death or serious injury.
What is more, these amendments cut across the basis for the current offence. I must stress that the offence of failure to stop and report is designed to deal with the behaviour relating to the failure to stop. The offence is not to provide an alternative route to punish an offender for a more serious but unproven offence.
Where there is evidence that the driver caused harm, there are a range of other offences, including causing death or serious injury by dangerous or careless driving, with which the driver can be charged. In these cases, the courts can treat the failure to stop as an aggravating factor that adds to the overall seriousness of the offending. Where there is evidence that the driver knew about the incident and took steps to avoid detection, they may be charged with perverting the course of justice, a common law offence that already carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
Linking death or serious injury with a failure to stop as the cause would risk creating an unnecessary and unfairly severe offence. To take an example, where there was evidence of causing death by careless driving and failure to stop, the offender would face a maximum penalty almost three times higher for failure to stop than they would for causing death by careless driving—14 years compared to five years— even though the causing death offence requires proof of a fault in the standard of driving.
The law already imposes severe penalties for vehicle offences that lead to death or serious injury, but when doing so, a clear causal link must be proved between the driver’s behaviour and the outcome. The proposed amendment would essentially be equating, or in some cases exceeding, the seriousness of failure to stop with actual culpability for causing death or injury. That, as I have said but want to repeat, causes serious anomalies with other offences that could result in potential injustices, and it is why the Government cannot accept the amendment.
In relation to Amendment 166, which also seeks to amend the current offence, we are concerned by the potential impacts on what is a complex area of law. For example, it is unclear what impact replacing the word “accident” with “collision” would have; it might exclude incidents that are currently and rightly within scope of the existing version of this section. We also reiterate our objections set out above to the creation of the offence of failing to report where the collision caused foreseeable serious or fatal injury.
We are of course aware of the traumatic effects of such incidents, however rare. From what I have already said, it should be clear that this is a complex area, and any change to the law has to fit within the current driving offence framework. However, let me assure noble Lords that my ministerial colleagues at the Department for Transport understand the concerns that have been raised. I can assure the Committee that the Department for Transport is exploring options that could be pursued in this area, including but not limited to the available penalties and how the offence operates as part of long-term and wider work on road safety. I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for contributing to this debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who contributed twice. I thank her for her support. I agree in principle with what the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said about sentence inflation; we are not in favour of that. However, the Minister talked about anomalies and this clearly is one—where someone causes death or serious injury and fails to stop after an accident but where no other offences are disclosed.
This is from memory, but in the case of the MP whom the noble Lord referred to, I think the incident in his part of the world in the south-west was a case of somebody who hit something, someone wandering in the road for example, and therefore an offence of careless, reckless or dangerous driving was not appropriate. However, the driver knew that they had hit something or somebody and still failed to stop or call the emergency services.
This is not about punishing the manner of driving that has caused death or serious injury, but about the dishonesty of knowing that you have hit somebody and knowing, from the speed that you were doing, that the person is likely to have received serious injury and, because you have failed to stop, what could have been survivable injuries become fatal injuries, because medical aid is not provided immediately or within a short space of time. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said, almost everybody who has a car has a mobile phone, and with the extensive coverage of mobile phone signals there is no reason why immediate assistance cannot be summoned in most cases. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, said, failing to stop after an accident of this kind can mean the difference between life and death.
In my opening remarks I said that I was not sure that 14 years was the right punishment, that it needs to fit within the framework of punishment. In answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, there could be circumstances, such as the one that I have referred to, where offences other than failing to stop were not present. In those circumstances—for example, if somebody in foggy conditions wearing dark clothing in the middle of the night stumbles on to a roadway and is hit by a car, and the person driving knows that they have hit that individual but fails to stop—the only offence could be the failure to stop, yet it could have fatal consequences for the pedestrian involved.
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that colleagues in the Department for Transport will be looking at this issue, but it goes to the heart of the previous group on how there needs to be an overall look at road traffic offences in the light of changes that have taken place. The Minister also talked about difficulties that might be created because the amendment refers to collision versus accident, whereas other parts of road traffic law refer to accidents, but I did say that throughout road traffic legislation “accident” needs to be changed to “collision”, because some of the incidents are not accidents. However, it is encouraging that the Minister’s colleagues in the Department for Transport have agreed to look at this. On that basis, for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am very glad to hear that. It is the first time in my experience—and I am not complaining, because the officials have worked incredibly hard on this—that the Box is entirely without officials.
To go back to the debate about delegated powers, this is what the Delegated Powers Committee said in general about this:
“We are particularly concerned that the Bill would … allow Ministers—and even a non-statutory body—to influence the exercise of new police powers (including in relation to unauthorised traveller encampments and stop and search) through ‘guidance’ that is not subject to Parliamentary scrutiny; … leave to regulations key aspects of new police powers—to restrict protest and to extract confidential information from electronic devices—that should instead be on the face of the Bill; and …allow the imposition of statutory duties via the novel concept of ‘strategy’ documents that need not even be published … We are disappointed that the inclusion of these types of delegations of power—on flimsy grounds—suggests that the Government have failed when preparing this Bill to give serious consideration to recommendations that we have made in recent reports on other Bills.”
In relation to this group of amendments, the committee makes complaint about three sets of delegations. The first is in relation to what could be suitable for community cautions. As I indicated, community cautions are for less serious offences. The Bill provides that they cannot be given for the most serious, indictable-only offences, but it gives the Secretary of State power to determine by affirmative procedure regulations the other offences for which they cannot be given.
The Government put forward a memorandum to justify this approach which said as follows:
“The list of offences which may not be suitable for”—
a community caution—
“is likely to change regularly”
and
“will be subject to continual updating and changing which makes it more suitable for secondary legislation”.
The Delegated Powers Committee report states:
“The Memorandum acknowledges that excluding offences from a community caution disposal ‘will have a significant impact on offenders, victims and the public’. It states that the affirmative procedure ‘is considered appropriate as it enables Parliament to debate the details of the restrictions [on community cautions]’.”
The Delegated Powers Committee report says that the Government are relying on a comparison with Section 130 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and then establishes, clearly rightly, that comparison with that Act is misguided and wrong. It says that the Government should follow the 2003 Act, but accurately and not inaccurately. What the Sexual Offences Act 2003 does is put in the Bill the excluded offences but gives power for them to be amended from time to time. Our amendments would follow the Delegated Powers Committee’s recommendations. I hope that the Government will feel able to accept that. If the noble Lord could indicate that, it would shorten that bit of it—sadly not.
The next group of problems is the conditions that are attached to a caution. A diversionary caution or a community caution must have one or more conditions attached to it. These can include requirements to carry out unpaid work, to attend a specified place for a specified purpose, and to pay a financial penalty. The complaint that the Delegated Powers Committee makes about this is that you need only the affirmative procedure where you are increasing the penalties but not when you are decreasing them.
The Delegated Powers Committee report says:
“We consider that the Government’s justification for its approach”—
applying only when penalties are increasing and not when they are decreasing—
“is flawed because it focusses solely on the impact of increases or decreases on the rights of offenders and on operational resources and fails to take into account the significant effect that decreases are capable of having on the way in which the policy works—and that making the new cautions less onerous forms of disposal may be something about which stakeholders (including victims of crime) and members of both Houses may have legitimate concerns.”
Again, we agree with that. The committee continues at paragraph 75:
“Accordingly, we consider that both increases and decreases in the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty, that may be attached to a diversionary caution or a community caution merit the same level of scrutiny”.
That is simply to quote what the Delegated Powers Committee says.
The final group relates to Clause 129 and Schedule 13, which gives the courts power
“to review community and suspended sentence orders, and … to commit an offender to custody for breach of”
such orders. The memorandum that the Government presented to the committee says that
“the aim… is to improve offender compliance with community orders and suspended sentence orders and to reduce reoffending. This is achieved through a multi-agency approach with links to wider support services, one element of which is providing for close oversight by a court of particular sentences being served in the community”.
The intention is to pilot for an initial 18-month period, and that may be applied to different cohorts throughout the country.
The committee report points out:
“The Secretary of State is given power to specify, by negative procedure … categories of community orders and suspended sentence orders that qualify for the review process”—
and it sets out certain things they can take into account in relation to it. The report continues:
“Where regulations specify a category for the first time, there must be an initial pilot period of 18 months … Both regulations that specify a category for the purposes of a pilot … are subject to the negative procedure … The Government’s justification for this is that ‘the principle of the provisions is made clear on the face of the legislation, and the power is limited by the legislation such that it may only be used to apply the provisions to different courts and cohorts of offenders … These matters are administrative in nature’.”
That is what the Government said in their memorandum.
The Delegated Powers Committee disagreed with that, saying that
“the categories of persons and the offences to which the review process will apply go to the heart of the underlying policy. The power gives the Secretary of State maximum discretion … but with minimal scrutiny … We therefore consider that regulations that provide for a category of community orders or suspended sentence orders to be subject to the review process on an indefinite basis should be subject to the affirmative procedure.”
That is what our third set of amendments does in relation to that.
I apologise for taking so long to go through this, but these are important issues.
My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord about the importance of this part of the Bill. Although the noble and learned Lord has just apologised for the length of his opening remarks on this group, I must warn the Committee that that was nothing compared with my opening remarks on the next group, if the Government wish to go there this evening.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is right to demand that the list of excluded offences for which the police cannot give a community caution is in the Bill. This is yet another example of why this Bill is a shell, lacking in sufficient detail for noble Lords to give their consent to it. The Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.
He is also right that any changes to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work or attendance, or the maximum financial penalty that may be attached to a diversionary or community caution, should at least be subject to the affirmative resolution. But as the noble and learned Lord has said on previous groups, the House still has no ability to amend such an order. I will have more to say on that issue in a later group. Again, the Delegated Powers Committee agrees, as the noble and learned Lord has said.
Amendment 214B is about community orders and suspended sentence orders, and has, as far as I understand it, nothing to do with police cautions—I look for reassurance. I have no idea why it is in this group of amendments, other than that it is also covered by the Delegated Powers Committee’s report. I have no doubt that the noble and learned Lord is absolutely right about that as well, and the Delegated Power Committee agrees.
We support these amendments, mostly because they are right, and, in the case of Amendment 214B, because the noble and learned Lord is usually right.
My Lords, I recognise that this group of amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has come about because of recommendations from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its sixth report of the Session. It is a pleasure to discuss this matter, even at this hour. As to timing issues, I am sure the noble and learned Lord knows better than me with whom to take that matter up; I am not sure I am the correct post box for that.
I can assure the Committee that, even as the noble and learned Lord was speaking, I received a WhatsApp—I am not waiving privilege on all my WhatsApp messages—from the Bill team: “To reassure, we are here.” The team cannot answer back, but I can. I regret the way that the team’s their work ethic was impugned, unintentionally, I am sure.
If I can adopt a previous role that I had as a police officer and come between the two parties to try to assist, I noticed that earlier this afternoon when the Minister was leading on a group of amendments, there was nobody in the Box. I assumed that that must have been because the officials were working remotely. I have to say that on this occasion I agree with the Minister. Even at—I do not know what time it was, perhaps 4 pm this afternoon—there was nobody in the Box when it was an MoJ issue.
We can move on. We do not need to raise the temperature at 11.30 pm. We have other things to argue about.
Let us get to the substance of this. The committee proposed a number of changes relating to the cautions and problem-solving courts measures in the Bill, as elaborated by the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I shall make the central point that I want to make, because it goes to all the points that have been put down. I can assure the Committee, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, that the Government are looking at all the committee’s recommendations, which underpin these amendments, as part of our wider response to the committee, and we will revert to it in due course. I therefore hope that as time goes on, if I can put it that way, these issues will be highlighted, and I hope resolved to the noble and learned Lord’s satisfaction, but, if not, we can continue to discuss them.
I shall highlight just one matter, because I want to leave time for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to give us his full oration on the next group, if we have time for it. On Amendment 169D, on excluded offences in respect of community cautions, the committee, as the noble and learned Lord explained, recommended that these offences are listed in the Bill rather than set out in regulations. As he explained, regulations would then be made where further amendments became necessary.
With respect to the committee, we maintain the position that the offences that are to be excluded for the purposes of community cautions are to be made by regulations. We point out that this approach of using regulations to identify excluded offences mirrors the approach taken in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which sets out that the simple caution, if I can call it that, may not be used in respect to offences specified by order made by the Secretary of State by secondary legislation. Just as there, so also here we believe that secondary legislation is the appropriate place for setting out the list of excluded offences, as the level of detail required may not be appropriate or suitable for the Bill. We suggest that that approach also allows sufficient time for essential engagement with stakeholders to identify those offences and to enable future changes to be incorporated without primary legislation.
I point out that the secondary legislation that we are talking about here is subject to the affirmative procedure, so the transparency that comes with that procedure will be maintained. I suggest that it would be a little bit clumsy and rare to use primary legislation for what has to be a fairly flexible approach to listing offences that should not be cautioned. We will of course discuss this carefully with stakeholders. The aim will be to bring an SI to Parliament that will be acceptable. I apprehend that I have not responded to the underlying point made by the noble and learned Lord, because I said that we will respond to the committee, but I hope he understands the thrust of my response and that for present purposes he is able to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 171 and 190 in my name. I will then move to Amendment 186A which I support. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who cannot be in his place, has asked me to speak to it on his behalf.
As I have said, I apologise in advance for the length of my remarks. The only consolations I can offer the Committee are that the Government wanted to group these amendments with other groups. Secondly, I do not take responsibility for the length of the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which I have undertaken to read on his behalf.
These amendments are designed to do two things. First, they question the whole new system of police out of court disposals proposed in Part 6 of the Bill. These include, but are not limited to, cautions. Secondly, they attempt to try to make any system of cautions where conditions are attached more effective.
No doubt, the Minister will say that the new system of diversionary and community cautions is based on the existing system of conditional cautions. To some extent, the Minister may be right. Conditional cautions look very similar to diversionary and community cautions, except that, in the case of community cautions, failure to comply with the conditions of the caution cannot result in the prosecution of the offender for the original offence. The only way in which a recalcitrant offender can be punished if they fail to comply with the conditions of a community caution is for a financial penalty to be imposed instead. This can then be enforced through the courts. The Minister will tell me if I have any of this wrong. I look to the Minister for reassurance. Apparently, I am doing all right so far.
First, I cannot find any data on how many conditional cautions have been administered; the proportion of conditional cautions, compared with simple cautions where no conditions are attached; or conditional cautions as a proportion of other types of disposal. Considering the complexity of deciding on, arranging, administering and monitoring compliance with the conditions attached to a conditional caution, I can only imagine that most custody sergeants would avoid them like the plague, particularly when sending the case to court. Simpler, and arguably as effective, out of court disposals are available. Perhaps this is why the proposals in this Bill as drafted attempt to cut off any other form of out of court disposals. If agreed, these proposals would mean that police custody sergeants could avoid administering a diversionary or community caution only by deciding to take no further action or by sending the accused to court, despite an admission of guilt. I can assure the Committee that we would see a significant increase in these alternatives being adopted.
The House of Commons briefing paper 9165 on these proposals is illuminating. I am afraid that I am going to quote it at length, but I assure the Committee that it will be worth it. It states:
“The Government estimates the policy will cost a total of £109.19 million over ten years. It thinks the criminal justice system will incur extra operational costs of around £15.58 million per year. It also thinks the system will cost the police around £13.70 million to implement (over two years) … The actual costs are likely to be higher because some costly features of the proposed system, like proposed restrictions on the use of OOCDs”—
out of court disposals—
“for certain offences, were not present during the pilot.”
It goes on:
“The Government hopes the proposed system will help reduce reoffending. Available data does not suggest short-term reoffending rates are likely to go down. The evaluation of the 2014 pilot … found no statistically significant difference between the short-term re-offending rates of OOCD offenders”
in the pilot areas
“to those in comparable areas not using the framework.”
It continues:
“The Government also hopes the new system will improve victim satisfaction because more victims will be involved in the OOCD process.”
I have already cast doubt on that, because I am convinced that the police will “no further action” a lot more cases as a result. However, the paper states:
“It is true that more victims will be involved in the OOCD process under the new system, but this is unlikely to have a big impact on victim satisfaction rates. This is because the victim satisfaction rate for OOCD cases is already good. In 2019/20 84% of victims whose offender was issued a caution said they were satisfied with the police, a similar rate to victims whose offenders were charged (83%).”
The paper summarises by saying that
“the available evidence suggests the system … may result in a further decline in the use of OOCDs … is likely to cost more … is unlikely to have a major impact on the reoffending rates of offenders; and … may improve victim satisfaction but is unlikely to have a major impact.”
Can the Minister explain to the Committee why the Government are proposing to spend more to achieve nothing?
Turning to Amendments 170 and 171, a 2018 paper by Dr Peter Neyroud—a former chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now a distinguished academic—published by the University of Cambridge and commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, entitled Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of the Evidence, concluded:
“In order to be effective OOCD’s with conditions must be implemented well and three areas require particular attention: the eligibility screening of offenders; the needs assessment to match conditions to the offender; the setting and tracking of conditions”.
More specifically, he said:
“The result … was a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions. Whilst the provision of further training and more guidance improved the situation somewhat, the cost of … an investment within a more general implementation of OOCD’s with conditions would be prohibitive and, in any case, did not completely resolved the problems.”
On the issue of whether out of court disposals were more or less effective when they had conditions attached, he said, bearing in mind that this was a review of all the available evidence:
“Making a direct comparison between OOCD’s with conditions”—
both community cautions and diversionary cautions are OOCDs with conditions—
“and OOCD’s without conditions is difficult: none of the research makes this direct comparison.”
Let me summarise. The provisions in this Bill propose getting rid of all out of court disposals except for cautions, all of which will have to have conditions attached. There is no evidence that cautions with conditions attached are any more effective than cautions without them. Where conditions have been attached to cautions in the past, there was
“a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions.”
Amendments 170 and 171 suggest that only those adequately trained officers who are considered by the prosecuting authority to be suitable to decide on diversionary and community cautions can administer them. Amendment 190 is consequential.
Absolutely. Let me deal with the out of court disposals themselves. I hope I have answered that point. There will, we hope, be a greater consistency of approach, but there will be differences. As for the scrutiny, as I said earlier, the code of practice will, we hope, provide a level of consistency of scrutiny that we also want to make sure is part of this structure. As I said earlier, that will be subject to an affirmative SI.
I am conscious of the time. I think we have drifted into Tuesday, so perhaps I should just conclude by thanking the Committee for contributions and invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment, although I am sure the discussions will continue. I also beg to move that the clauses stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, it is completely unacceptable that the noble Lord has said on numerous occasions that, because of the hour, he is not going to go into detail in answering the issues that I have raised. We either scrutinise this Bill properly or we do not. I do not care what time of night it is; we will scrutinise this Bill effectively. That is the first point to make.
To be clear, the only reason I made that point is because I have a very long answer—I am happy to read it—explaining the different ways particular police forces have responded to the point. Apart from that, I gave exactly the answer I would have done had it been four o’clock in the afternoon. I assure the noble Lord that I have not deleted one sentence from my notes on the answer.
In that case, I point out how completely inadequate the Minister’s answers have been. He completely did not address the research, which shows that there is no evidence that cautions with conditions attached are any more effective than simple cautions—there is no evidence. The noble Lord himself admitted that there cannot be any evidence because the Home Office does not keep any figures. It does not differentiate between conditional cautions and simple cautions; it just aggregates all cautions together. It also keeps no record of what conditions are applied in cases of conditional caution, so the Government have no evidence upon which to base this system, in which all cautions have to have conditions attached. They cannot demonstrate the efficacy of that system, and the research in the pilot forces also shows no impact on reoffending rates, little or no impact on victim satisfaction and significant increases in cost. The Minister has provided no reassurance on those issues at all.
As far as the amendments are concerned, conditional cautions are supposed to be about rehabilitation and reparation. How can an untrained police officer be an expert on what sort of rehabilitation a particular offender should undertake to have maximum impact on their reoffending? As both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, the problem is not only the inconsistency of whether the conditions that different forces attach will have any efficacy at all—the Minister admitted that there would be inconsistency between forces—but a lack of public confidence in the system the Government are proposing. In one force area, someone will have very stringent rehabilitation and reparation conditions attached; for almost exactly the same type of individual and the same sort of offence, a completely different system or set of conditions will be applied. How can that provide the public with any confidence that justice is being done, when completely different conditions are being attached to very similar offenders and offences in different parts of the country, unless the officers who are giving out these conditions have been specifically trained, told what the standard approach is and approved by the Crown Prosecution Service, as my amendments suggest?
The noble Lord said that the safeguards and checks and balances will be included in codes of practice. I will tell the Committee why such an approach is not acceptable. With the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, it turns out that, despite the arguments that we made against the safeguards and checks and balances being relegated to codes of practice, the Government now accept that any police inspector, whether specifically trained in dealing with covert human intelligence sources or not, can authorise a CHIS to commit a crime. That person will be immune from prosecution, even though that inspector is not authorised by their force or trained to give that authority —it is in the codes of practice. But the Government have admitted, in a letter to me from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, that, if an untrained, unauthorised inspector authorised a CHIS to commit a crime, it would not be unlawful. That person would therefore be immune from prosecution. That is the danger of relegating safeguards, checks and balances to codes of practice and not having them in legislation.
The only thing I can take from what the Minister said is that this is really about saving court time and CPS time; I think I quote him accurately. It is not about preventing reoffending because we know that this system does not reduce it. It is about trying to take pressure off the courts, and that is no way to administer justice. We should give the criminal justice system the resources that it needs rather than taking the shoddy short cut to justice proposed in this part of the Bill. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 172, I will also speak to Amendments 173, 177, 179, 180 and 186, to be inserted after Clause 79. These are about victims’ financial losses, which can often arise as a result of an assault on their person, their property or their belongings. The amendments seek to ensure that the authorities and the perpetrators are made available of these costs and that, in turn, where possible, there might be some restitution for these innocent people whose property and goods have been attacked.
I bring the issue to the Committee’s attention based on a most unfortunate and regrettable experience of a friend of mine, Mr James McAra, who lives just outside Scunthorpe. He was at home watching television on the evening of 13 September this year in his house at Ashby. He was alone—he is a widower, aged 78 years, who has lived there for 55 years. He has brought up his family; they have all flown the nest and he is left alone. At 10 pm, his life was changed. There was a terrific crash outside the house, then suddenly his windows were smashed in and his front door was crashed down. Five masked, armed men with sledgehammers appeared in the house. He confronted one of them, who then gave him a push and shouted to his accomplices, “Oh fuck, it’s an old man. We’ve got the wrong effing house.” With that, they turned around, ran out and left him in a terrific state of shock. In the event, it turns out that the noise outside had been the smashing of his car with sledgehammers. It was so badly damaged that it has had to be written off.
As noble Lords can imagine, this is a most distressing experience—an attack and assault—for a man of such an age. The police arrived promptly; by all accounts, they were excellent and knew straightaway what had happened. The two houses next door had been raided on numerous occasions over the last two years in relation to drug dealing, and only two months earlier a young man had been found dead in one of them. The police believed that the attack on his property was intended for one of those houses, related to the ongoing drugs problem. This couple of houses, with numerous instances of anti-social behaviour, has made this once peaceful street a nightmare to live in. As a consequence, James is now considering moving because of this sickening experience and attack.
I turn to the amendments. To compound matters, Mr McAra is well out of pocket from this experience. The car insurance in no way covers the cost of the replacement car he has had to get. Then he has had to pay the excesses on the house insurance for new doors and new windows, and he has now been told that his future insurance premiums on his car and his property—the lot—will go up next year. Where is the justice for a victim of this kind?
I suspect that the chance of getting some reparations from the attackers, if they could be found, arrested and convicted, is quite a long shot. However, we have been disturbed to learn that it is not always understood by the authorities what the total cost has been and that there is no formal request for a record of the costs that might arise, in a variety of different ways, when someone is attacked in this way. Obviously, a requirement for conversations with the victims is laid down and victim support is offered, but financial losses are not necessarily recorded. I believe, and I am sure noble Lords share this view, that they should be. They should be taken into account in determining punishments and, if it is possible to get restitution, they should be known factors taken into account for that purpose.
Having heard this story, I am sure that noble Lords, like me, feel that it is time for some changes to try to give further assistance to victims. Mr McAra’s constituency MP is Holly Mumby-Croft, a Conservative MP who knows all about these facts and has been as supportive as she could be in the circumstances. She has been advised that these amendments will be put before the Committee today and, in due course, we are hoping they will be adopted and go back to the Commons. I think she is hoping that she can look for a sympathetic hearing from the Front Bench today. For positive action, in adopting these amendments, which will cost little to implement, we must go some way towards actually making changes. The amendments before us would facilitate such changes. On behalf of victims affected in this way, particularly Mr McAra, I have great pleasure in moving this amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, has relayed to the Committee clearly a very distressing case of mistaken identity and anti-social behaviour generally in that street, apparently to do with drug dealing. If the perpetrators of this terrible crime were found, I am not sure that they would be given a caution, and I thought this part of the Bill was about police cautions—but I accept the general point that victims need to be protected. Although a caution would not be applicable in this case of the break-in at the home and the damage to the car, there might be one in respect of the general anti-social behaviour in the street. It is absolutely essential that the needs of victims are taken into account by the police, including for the financial losses that victims have suffered.
As I said on a previous group, out-of-court settlements have a high victim approval rating already. These amendments, in so far as they apply to police cautions, would ensure that they remain high, and to that extent we support them.
My Lords, I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just made. I also think that Mr McAra should be very grateful to my noble friend Lord Brooke for raising the points about the lack of a formal record of the cost of the incidents. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it seems very unlikely that anyone would get a caution for this sort of offence. Even if it got to court, there would be an obligation on the sentencing court to consider compensation, because one has to consider this whenever one sentences an individual. Nevertheless, my noble friend has raised an interesting question and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.
My Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. The Committee has already considered these issues, so I can be brief. I apologise for not recognising that some of the amendments in a previous group covered similar issues.
In that previous group, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that the maximum number of hours attached to the unpaid work condition and the attendance condition, and the maximum fine that could be attached to a caution, should be set in the case of the fine and varied in all cases by regulations and that those should be amended only by the affirmative resolution procedure. The noble and learned Lord previously said in Committee that this was not an ideal solution, as regulations could not be amended and that this House was reluctant to use the “nuclear option” of praying to annul regulations, which is the only option available if it disagrees with a statutory instrument. Even with the affirmative resolution procedure in place, in practice, if the House disagrees with an increase to the maximum number of hours of unpaid work—or any of the other conditions attached to police cautions—there is little that it can do about it, unless changes are made through primary legislation.
I grant that the value of money is eroded over time by inflation and periodically the maximum fine capable of being attached as a condition to a caution may need to increase accordingly, but surely not the amount of time to be spent in unpaid work or subject to the attendance condition. There is a question of principle. If an offence is so grave that greater punishment is required, that should be a matter for the courts and not for a police officer to decide. There is precedent in our legal system for this principle. If magistrates want to impose a harsher sentence, they must refer eligible cases to the Crown Court, where a more senior judge can make a decision with more serious consequences.
When I joined the police service in the 1970s, the police performed the role of both investigator and prosecutor. Parliament then decided that prosecution decisions should be made by an independent body, the Crown Prosecution Service, for very good reasons that I do not need to rehearse here, while punishment of the individual has primarily been a matter for the courts, supported by reports from experts on the medical, social and criminal antecedents of the accused, in many cases, and considered by highly trained and experienced judges who are obliged to follow sentencing guidelines. In the proposals contained in this part of the Bill, the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. There must be limits on the extent to which they should be allowed to carry out all three functions in relation to a case and those limits should be set out in primary legislation, on the face of the Bill. That is the purpose of these amendments and I beg to move Amendment 174.
My Lords, I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As he says, in this part of the Bill the police are investigators, prosecutors and sentencers. They also decide whether the matter should be sent to the CPS, with the people charged and sent into the court system. Of course, once the case gets into the court system, magistrates are judge, jury and sentencers. There are different roles at different stages of the system. The burden of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is in some way to codify, limit and guide the police when they are doing this pre-court intervention with the type of cautions set out in the Bill. I look forward with interest to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for putting forward this group of amendments. If I can put it this way, the noble Lord realistically recognised that we have covered some of this ground before—not this particular issue but the conceptual underpinning on which it is based. I hope, therefore, that the Committee and the noble Lord will not take it amiss if I reply relatively briefly, because we have covered some of the points before.
Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 relate to the delegated powers contained in Part 6. The amendments propose to remove the clauses that allow the maximum amount of the financial penalty and the maximum number of unpaid work and attendance hours to be specified in regulations and would replace that by putting the details in the Bill. Amendments 175, 183 and 184 set out that the maximum penalty attached to a caution would be fixed at £200 and would make it explicit that an offender’s ability to pay must be taken into account.
The Bill contains powers to set and amend the amount of the maximum financial penalty and to amend the maximum number of unpaid work or attendance hours by regulations via secondary legislation. As I explained on a previous occasion, it was drafted that way to ensure maximum flexibility when responding to the needs of operational practitioners. Any changes to these regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way, but removing the delegated powers in their entirety, which is what Amendments 174, 176, 182 and 185 would do, would mean that there is no flexibility to amend either levels of financial penalty or the number of unpaid work hours. If we have the maximum financial penalty on the face of the Bill, to change it or update it, whether because of inflation or anything else, we would have to have to come back to primary legislation. I respectfully suggest that that is not a great use of parliamentary time.
Finally, as to the matter of whether the offender’s ability to pay should be explicitly set out in statute, of course it is a relevant factor, but we believe that this—alongside a range of other relevant factors around giving a financial penalty, the amount that it is set at and how quickly it is going to be paid—is better set out in detail in a statutory code of practice rather than in the Bill. With apologies for taking that a little shortly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for saying something. The whole point of not allowing it to be in regulations is that it is an important question of principle that once a crime gets to a certain level requiring a certain punishment, it should be for the courts to administer that punishment, in the same way that if a magistrate decides that the punishment they are able to give is not sufficient, they have to refer it to a higher court. These are the people with the experience, training and background properly to assess both the individual and the circumstances, and to apply the penalty. Therefore, it should be dealt with in primary legislation.
This should not be about providing maximum flexibility for operational partners. It should be about consistency and certainty, and citizens knowing that above a certain level of unpaid work, attendance at a training course or a fine imposed by the police, they cannot go without referring the matter to the courts. That is the whole point. I completely accept that the Minister has explained why it is in regulations and not in the Bill. However, he has not addressed at all the argument that it should not be that flexible.
Why is the accused’s ability to pay important? I was talking to my noble friend Lady Randerson about this amendment earlier today; like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, she is an experienced magistrate, now retired. She said, “It is so important to take into account the accused’s ability to pay, because if you impose a fine, say, of £200 on somebody who has little or no income, it will almost guarantee that they commit a crime in order to get the £200 to pay the fine.” That is why that seemingly innocuous addition, which should be in the Bill, is in fact absolutely important. In the light of the Minister failing to engage with the heart of the amendments, we will return to this issue on Report, but in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, by way of a little light relief for the Committee, I rise to move Amendment 178 in my name.
In this part of the Bill, “Part 6—Cautions”, Clause 86 deals with:
“Application of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”
On page 78, at line 17, Clause 86(4) states:
“Section 40 of the 1984 Act (review of police detention) applies to a person in police detention by virtue of section 85 above as it applies to a person in police detention in connection with the investigation of an offence, but with the following modifications—
(a) omit subsections (8) and (8A);
(b) in subsection (9), for the reference to section 37(9) or 37D(5) substitute a reference to the second sentence of section 85(6) above.”
I was going to say “comprehensible” but that is a pretty high test— perhaps “as clear as good legislation can be”. I have to leave at least some space for my former colleagues at the Bar to have a career; if we make it too precise, we will do people out of a job. However, there is a serious point here, and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that legislation should be as clear as possible. I will set out what the words are seeking to do, and if it is thought that there is a better way of putting them to get to the same result, obviously, I will be happy to hear it. However, let me explain what they seek to do.
Clause 86 sets out the provisions of PACE and the modifications required to them that will apply upon arrest for failure to comply with any condition attached to a diversionary caution. The purpose of the clause is to ensure that the diversionary caution operates effectively within the existing framework of police powers; it mirrors the approach taken in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which gives the police powers of arrest for failure to comply with the existing conditional caution.
The subsection of this clause ensures that someone arrested and detained by the police is subject to the same treatment as any detained person, and periodic reviews of their detention are carried out. Obviously, that is important. The same subsection also contains modifications to put specific matters in the Bill: the power to detain those who are unfit to be dealt with at the time of arrest; the power of arrest for detainees bailed for any breach—that is, non-compliance; and the power to search a detainee in police custody following arrest.
The modifications make specific reference to the diversionary caution. For example, the PACE power to search and examine a detainee to ascertain their identity is modified to ensure that the power will still exist where a detainee has failed to comply with any of the conditions attached to the person’s diversionary caution. Therefore, it provides—I was going to say “clarity” but perhaps that might be pushing the point a little—that these powers apply only to the diversionary caution and not also to the community caution, where there is no power of arrest or prosecution for non-compliance. That is why Clause 86(4) is needed. Without the necessary PACE provisions as modified, the powers for police to deal with breaches of a diversionary caution would be limited and that would undermine the effect of non-compliance with the conditions.
I do not know whether what I have said has reassured the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the clause is properly focused. I hope that I have explained what it is trying to do. I am not being flippant and I do appreciate that legislation needs to be as clear as possible and that it is important that people understand what it encompasses. However, when one is legislating against the background of other legislation, it can be quite difficult to do it other than by cross-references back. If there is a better way to achieve the same result without adding pages and pages, I should be very happy to hear it, but I hope that I have explained what the clause is focused on and why it is drafted in the way it is. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment. However, I am happy to discuss this matter between us if there is another way of doing it.
I am very grateful to the Minister. Perhaps I may gently suggest that if something akin to what the noble Lord said was contained even in the Explanatory Notes explaining that part of the Bill, we would not have to spend time in Committee trying to understand what it was about. I know that my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have looked everywhere possible to try and decipher what that meant—to no avail. It may be that to parliamentary draftspeople it is as clear as day—but for us lesser mortals it is not. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, I should say that he is quite right. There are a number of different points at which it is important for people to understand what legislation means. For us looking back at legislation, we can do so online and it is important that the changes go up online as soon as possible, including in the previous legislation. This is quite a serious point that is, of course, much broader than the Bill—but I am going to infuriate the Committee by getting it off my chest. One can spend an awful lot of time trying to understand what a piece of legislation, passed 20 years ago and amended five times, actually amounts to unless what is put online is completely up to date. It wastes an awful lot of noble Lords’ time and must waste Ministers’ time trying to get their heads around it if the Explanatory Notes do not set out those things intelligibly.
My Lords, I am not as well versed in these matters as many noble Lords are, but, in the interest of clarity, could the Minister explain what a “diversionary caution” is?
My Lords, we support this amendment, but, as I have already said, we have our doubts about the whole regime. For the benefit of noble Lords who missed the midnight debate on Monday, I bring you the edited highlights, which are relevant to this group.
I quoted from the House of Commons briefing paper 9165. On the Government’s proposals on diversionary and community cautions, it says:
“the available evidence suggests the system: … may result in a further decline in … OOCDs; … is likely to cost more … is unlikely to have a major impact on the reoffending rates of offenders; and … may improve victim satisfaction but is unlikely to have a major impact.”
I have to say that the high point for me on Monday night—or was it Tuesday morning?—was the Minister’s answer to my question about how effective conditional cautions, which are the existing system of cautions with conditions attached, were, compared with simple cautions that do not have conditions attached. The noble Lord announced with glee, if I may say that in a very respectful way, that:
“As the Committee will know from previous exchanges, I am quite a fan of data.”—[Official Report, 8/11/10; col. 1577.]
The Minister then looked at his phone and a message from his WhatsApp group—it is good to see members of the WhatsApp group in the Box today—saying that, in effect, there was no data. The Government not only keep no record of how many conditional versus simple cautions are administered, just the total number of all cautions, but have no record of what kind of conditions are attached to conditional cautions. On the basis of that data void, they plan to implement a system where all police cautions will need to have conditions attached.
I also quoted from a 2018 paper by Dr Peter Neyroud, former chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now a distinguished academic, published by the University of Cambridge and commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, entitled Out of Court Disposals Managed by the Police: A Review of the Evidence. On the police attaching conditions to cautions, he said:
“The result … was a significant degree of inconsistency and a substantial number of inappropriate and un-evidenced conditions.”
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham gave us an example of, presumably, a youth who was banned from public transport, which meant he could not get to school. I continue to quote from Dr Peter Neyroud:
“Whilst the provision of further training and more guidance improved the situation somewhat, the cost of such an investment within a more general implementation of OOCD’s with conditions”—
exactly what the Government are proposing—
“would be prohibitive and, in any case, did not completely resolve the problems.”
Never mind—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, came up with a better idea: the inspectorates of the constabulary and of the CPS could ensure consistency, so that somebody in a similar situation, committing a similar offence, would have the same conditions attached, no matter where they were in the country. I am afraid not, said the Minister:
“Those two inspectorates are not regulators; they do not have power to enforce compliance.”—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col. 1576.]
Inconsistent, inappropriate and unevidenced conditions will be attached to cautions all over the country, bringing no benefit to offenders, little benefit to victims and increased costs to the criminal justice system. That is what this part of the Bill does.
We support this amendment, which should also apply to diversionary cautions, but the omens are not good that the police will know what they are doing when it comes to applying conditions to support the offender to desist from offending. There is serious doubt that, even when they do, the conditions will have any effect on reducing reoffending.
My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate. When the right reverend Prelate introduced it, he made a general plea in favour of cautions and on why his amendment was appropriate. He spoke of the benefits of cautions and what they need to be effective, and of the revolving door of crisis and crime and of a holistic approach. He particularly gave the example of women offenders, for whom a holistic approach is appropriate to reduce reoffending. Then he went on to give examples of why quite a lot of cautions fail—by giving too many conditions. My experience, through following both cautions and sentences through court, is that the more conditions you put in place, even if they are in place for the best of reasons, the more likely you are to have a breach and to re-enter that cycle, coming back to court or to the police when conditions are breached.
My central point is that out-of-court disposals are a difficult area. The Government and previous Governments have a lot of experience in trying to come up with an appropriate regime for out-of-court disposals. As we have heard on the Bill—I agree with pretty much all the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—we have another cautions regime, which we hope will work in some way. I particularly noted the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, about the need to see draft regulations or a draft code of practice to ensure consistency across the country.
My Lords, I hope it is in order to pick up one point that was put to me at the end of the last group and say a word on it. I hope the Committee will forgive me. It goes to all groups, in some ways, because it is about how legislation is put online. Legislation.gov.uk has a facility to look at the original texts and unscramble the later amendments, so to speak. A point that occurred as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was speaking was whether one could put in hyperlinks to take you through different pieces of legislation. I am happy to look into that, but I now turn to this amendment.
My noble friend Lord Framlingham asked what a diversionary caution is. To try to sum up a large part of the Bill in about three sentences, I say that there is going to be a lower-tier disposal called a community caution and an upper-tier disposal called a diversionary caution. Conditions must be attached to both, aimed at one of three objectives—rehabilitation, reparation or punishment. Restrictive conditions can be set, where they contribute to reparation or rehabilitation. In that regard, there is a similarity to the existing conditional caution regime. I hope that answers the question.
I now turn to the substance of the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester—moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham—alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. It goes to the primary objective of the new two-tier statutory framework, which I have just explained, to provide, as a requirement of the community caution, meaningful court conditions to help an offender stop offending.
I am grateful for the broad support, as a matter of principle, of the right reverend Prelate for the aims of the Bill on out-of-court disposals. I respectfully agree with the point made by the noble and learned Lord on the importance of the caution regime in the criminal justice system. I also agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that cautions must be carefully considered to avoid the syndrome of repeated interventions.
While the amendment is obviously well intentioned, the Bill already makes provision for the purpose that underpins it in Clause 80 on diversionary cautions and Clause 89 on community cautions. The Bill asks the relevant person to focus on the position of the offender. Of course we all agree that one has to look at the position of the victim, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that one must also look at the offender. The Bill already does that.
While I agree with the broad thrust of the purpose of the amendment, I suggest that it is unnecessary. That is because, aside from the punitive option of a financial penalty, the conditions of both the diversionary and the community caution must be aimed at rehabilitation or reparation, thereby addressing the underlying causes of the offending. Importantly, the cautions enable referrals to support services where relevant as conditions of the disposal. Referrals at this pretty early stage of the criminal justice system could include referrals to relevant intervention services such as substance misuse services, mental health treatment providers or gambling addiction, or restorative justice referrals. All those help to address the underlying causes of offending behaviour and so help to reduce reoffending or the escalation of offending behaviour.
As I have said, a code of practice will accompany the legislation. It will be drawn up in collaboration with stakeholders and subject to a formal public consultation and to an affirmative statutory instrument. I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, as he would no doubt expect me to, as to the fundamental importance of the rule of law in this and, indeed, other areas. I wonder whether actually the police are best viewed as being seen as part of the Executive; we could probably have an interesting debate on that. The answer might be that it depends on the purpose for which you are using the principle of the rule of law as to what exactly it would encompass.
To give the noble and learned Lord a bit more information, the way that the code of practice will be put together is that there will be an informal stakeholder engagement exercise with police forces, the National Police Chiefs Council, police and crime commissioners, the CPS and relevant third-sector organisations, which will help with drafting. We will then have a formal public consultation, which will take place next year. Importantly, the power to issue the code and the regulations is contained in the clauses of the Bill, so we will not have the power to do that until the Bill receives Royal Assent and is commenced.
I want to pick up the underlying points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I hope he will not take it amiss if I do not respond to those. There is a clear conceptual gulf between us, if I may put it that way, as to the purpose of the regime and whether it is soundly based. I set out the Government’s position on that earlier. I am not sure it is helpful if I just repeat those words each time because there is that gulf between us and I am not sure it is going to be bridged. I hope the noble Lord will therefore not take it amiss if I do not respond in detail.
It is not a conceptual gulf. It is a question of where the evidence is that cautions with conditions attached are more beneficial than cautions without conditions attached. I can answer that question for the Minister: there is no evidence, because the Government do not collect any. That is coupled with the fact that this House will be asked—this Committee is debating it now—to sign a blank cheque for all this when the detail has not been worked out. There will be public consultation and consultation with stakeholders, but we have no idea what this is going to look like in the end. That is no way for this House to proceed with this legislation.
Well, we did have that exchange. I went through the way that it has been piloted in various police forces, and we had an interesting exchange. I am happy to look again at the record and see whether there is anything else that I can add, but I am not sure that will necessarily persuade the noble Lord in any event. Again, I am not sure it is helpful to go through those fundamental points each and every time we come to one of these amendments.
I hope I have responded substantively—and, I hope, substantially—to the amendments tabled by the right reverend Prelate. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask him to withdraw them.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 187 in my name I will speak to the other amendments in this group. I ask the Committee to forgive the repetition.
I understand the Government’s desire to simplify out-of-court disposals and take the pressure off courts but, as I have said in several previous groups, research has shown that moving to the system suggested by the Bill, as piloted by some police forces, is likely to cost more, do nothing to reduce offending and have little or no impact on victim satisfaction.
I have also suggested that the complexity of having to impose conditions in every case when a police caution is given, whether a diversionary or community caution, is likely to have the unintended consequences of increasing the number of cases dealt with by no further action being taken and the number of cases sent to court—anything to avoid the complicated process of setting, arranging and monitoring compliance with the conditions that must be set whenever anyone is given a police caution. Research already shows a reduction in the number of out-of-court disposals in recent years, and these changes are likely to result in further reductions.
Clause 97 abolishes all other forms of out-of-court disposal. I will give some illustrations of what this means in practice. A young lawyer or medic who, completely out of character, has too much to drink, gets drunk and ends up making a nuisance of himself is arrested and, once sober, is given a simple caution. The salutary effect on such an individual’s future behaviour is dramatic, the impact on his career prospects negligible and the amount of time taken by the police to deal with the case minimal. If the impact of his being stopped and spoken to by a police officer has an immediate sobering effect, he might even be given a fixed penalty notice for disorder and sent on his way. Neither of these out-of-court disposals would be available under the Bill as drafted.
If someone drops litter, is seen by a police officer and refuses to put it in the bin, at the moment, that police officer can issue a fixed penalty notice for disorder. Under the Bill, the only course for the officer would be either not to take any action at all, undermining both the law and the authority of the police, or to arrest the person and take them to a police station so that they can be cautioned with conditions attached. I am at a bit of a loss as to what conditions might be attached to a caution for littering, but perhaps the Minister can enlighten the Committee.
Altogether, there are currently 27 minor offences that can be dealt with by a police officer issuing a fixed penalty notice on the spot, from cycling in a park where cycling is prohibited to possession of khat or cannabis. In all these cases, the only way to proceed, if this Bill passes unamended, would be to make an arrest, so that a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached could be administered.
This is a recipe for an increase in anti-social behaviour that goes unchallenged, because police officers faced with the bureaucracy of arrest and a community or diversionary caution with conditions attached will look the other way. What is unclear—the Committee needs to know this, and if the Minister cannot answer from the Dispatch Box, I ask him to write to me—is what happens to cannabis and khat warnings where people who have cannabis or khat found on them are seized by a police officer and a warning is given to them on the street. I would argue that that is a type of out-of-court disposal. Is this also to be outlawed by the Bill? If it is, it will have serious consequences for police resources.
What is proposed by this clause, with community and diversionary cautions being the only out-of-court disposals allowed, will result in fewer people having any action taken against them for anti-social behaviour and significant police resources being used to deal with minor offences. That is why Clause 97, which abolishes other forms of out-of-court disposals, such as fixed penalties for disorder, should not stand part of the Bill and the simple police caution should be retained. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is to retain simple cautions. The examples he gave illustrate the point I made earlier: that this is a very complex area, with a lot of history of government trying to manage out-of-court disposals in different ways. He gave the example of 27 minor offences which can be dealt with by fixed penalty notices and asked what happens with cannabis and khat warnings. I would be interested to hear the answer.
The noble Lord asked—I think rhetorically—what else a police officer can do other than give a conditional caution. The answer is that they can do nothing. They can give the person they are dealing with a talking to; in my experience, police officers are perfectly capable of doing that. Nevertheless, as I said in an earlier group, this is a very complex area. The Government have tried a number of different out-of-court disposal regimes in recent years; I am not aware that any approach was particularly better than previous ones. Indeed, the noble Lord gave examples of the not obvious success of the pilot schemes for this regime.
Nevertheless, I think that out-of-court disposals are appropriate. They need to be handled in a proportionate way and with the right amount of training for the police officers dealing with them. Clearly, an appropriate level of intervention would, one would hope, be for the benefit of the offenders, given that it is very likely that a large proportion of the offenders will be drug and alcohol users. Having said that, I will be interested to hear why the Minister thinks a simple caution is not appropriate to retain on the statute book.
Without turning this afternoon into a jurisprudential seminar, I certainly agree with the thrust of the point made by the noble Baroness that good law is often a combination of rules and discretion. At the level of generality, I would agree. However, it is not right to say that this is rigid; the conditions that can be applied are extremely flexible.
There are really two parts to the answer. First, within the new cautions regime, there is a great deal of flexibility as to the conditions that can be set out. If the noble Baroness looks at Clause 80 for diversionary cautions—which is mirrored in Clause 89 for community cautions—subsection (4) sets out the restrictive conditions and goes down to the one I mentioned in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which is
“not to engage in specified conduct”.
That is, essentially, the lowest form of engagement when no other suitable conditions exist. That really creates a condition where the offender is expected not to commit any further offences. That is a very low level of engagement, and when that is suitable will be a matter for the code of practice.
The second part of the answer is to repeat the point I made earlier that other forms of out of court disposal are still available—I mentioned fixed penalty notices and community resolution—so, with respect, I do not agree that we are putting in place a rigid regime. The conditions are flexible and there are some disposals that are outside the cautions structure, even now.
I do not think I did so before, but I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Can the Minister clarify something? I think he said something along the lines that the lowest level of condition is that the offender should not engage in similar activity again. So, if somebody is arrested and cautioned and the police say to them “Don’t do it again”, is that a condition attached to a caution?
As I said a moment ago, this relates to Clause 80(4) and Clause 89(4), if the noble Lord looks at the last condition in each of those subsections. The code of practice, as I said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will make further provision for the circumstances in which that would be appropriate. Importantly, and I think differently from the simple caution, the police would still need to monitor conduct to ensure that someone had not reoffended, but that would be less onerous. This is a good example of where the new structure that we are putting in place preserves the best of the old regime but still has it on a more structured basis, focused on preventing reoffending as well as on the rehabilitation of the offender.
May I first deal with the caution points? I do not want to run those two topics together. On cautions, there is a fundamental point here. The simple caution is really what it says on the tin: a simple caution. In circumstances where the officer decides that it is appropriate to give a community caution with the lowest level—the one that we are talking about now—importantly, to get there, the officer or the authorised person still has to go through the process of speaking to the victim, thinking about what other options are available and looking at what other conditions are available. That process is valuable in all cases. That is one of the strengths of the new regime. I accept that that requires more consideration, but you end up with a system which is more robust and suitable and which results in a more proportionate response. Quite separately, I join the noble Baroness in what she said about Mr Dowling.
I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate and am grateful for the qualified support from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.
If I heard the Minister right, he referred to public consultation and the proportion of respondents who said that they did not believe that out-of-court disposals reduced offending. Is he really saying that the Government are now legislating on the basis of public opinion rather than on the basis of evidence? There is no evidence that the two-tier system that has been piloted by a third of forces is any more effective, as I have quoted at length and repeatedly—which the Minister ignores. There is no evidence that this will be a better system for reducing offending. With the greatest of respect, just because the Government assert that it will be does not mean that it is.
I am struggling here. If we take the example of somebody who is arrested for being drunk and disorderly and who the police want to caution, they now have to attach conditions. Presumably, the lowest level of condition will be, “You should desist from behaving like this in the future.” Then the Minister says, “But of course the police will have to put measures in place to monitor the accused’s future behaviour.” I am completely at a loss as to what sort of monitoring the Minister has in mind in such circumstances. The more the Committee examines these proposals—perhaps I should say the lack of them, bearing in mind that we will not see whatever is contained in the code of practice until well beyond the Bill receiving Royal Assent—the more the whole thing begins to unravel.
Clearly, I will apologise to the Minister and to the Committee if I have misunderstood the legislation in terms of withdrawing the police’s ability to give fixed penalty notices for disorder. I hope that the Minister will do the same if it turns out that I am right and he is wrong. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Forgive me for the delay, my Lords—so many amendments, so little time, as it were.
I am grateful to Transform Justice for its briefing on this issue and for its assistance in drafting this amendment. Currently, simple cautions with no conditions attached are considered “spent” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 as soon as they have been given. This means that they do not have to be disclosed to potential employers. The Government propose to abolish simple cautions, so those who would previously have received a simple caution, which do not have to be disclosed, could potentially receive a diversionary caution, which, like conditional cautions currently, have to be disclosed for three months after the caution is given. Given the Government’s commitment to reform rehabilitation periods elsewhere in the Bill, we suggest that the rehabilitation period for diversionary cautions should be removed. In Part 11, Clause 164 already sets out various changes to the rehabilitation periods for different sentences. Removing the diversionary caution rehabilitation period should be added to the list of those changes.
The Government argue that a three-month spending period is required for a diversionary caution to support protection of the public. There is strong evidence that employment is one of the most, if not the most, important factors in enabling people to cease offending behaviour and to move on to crime-free lives as productive members of society. A three-month rehabilitation period is short enough to have little impact on public protection, but its existence will require people in employment or seeking employment to declare the caution and risk losing their job or be refused employment. It will also act as a barrier to those seeking education and volunteering opportunities. Research has found that employers discriminate against people with criminal records and that most do not differentiate between a caution and a conviction. Introducing a spending period for the diversionary caution will therefore hamper people’s efforts to gain employment while doing little for public protection. Diversionary cautions should follow the spending regime for the existing simple caution and end at the point at which the caution is given. I beg to move Amendment 189ZA.
My Lords, I support the noble Lord’s amendment. If I may, I will elasticate the rules of order slightly by referring to some other issues relating to the spending of cautions and of convictions.
In 2013 and 2014, an ad hoc committee of Members of this House and of the other place reported, sponsored by the National Children’s Bureau and the Michael Sieff Foundation, on the youth courts. I was part of that group, as was the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who was very valuable member, and as was a certain Back-Bencher called Robert Buckland, who later became Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor. To be fair to him, despite having gone to the other side of good behaviour by becoming a member of the Cabinet, he always remained personally committed to what we had found. Our second recommendation was this:
“Children who have committed non-serious and non-violent offences, who have stopped offending, should have their criminal record expunged when they turn 18.”
I believe that that is a very important principle for which there is supporting evidence around the world. I am disappointed that the Bill is a touch pusillanimous in not picking up that recommendation—and I am grateful to say to the Minister that a number of our recommendations have been picked up.
If the noble Lord were to speak to Charlie Taylor, who held a very important position in the Ministry of Justice at that time, as chairman of the Youth Justice Board, and who is of course now Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons, he would find that he is also very supportive of that recommendation, with his huge experience of dealing with young people, first as a teacher and then in the criminal justice sphere.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for talking beyond the amendment, in that the Bill’s provisions apply to adults rather than children. He made extremely important points, supported by noble Lords around the House. We support what he was talking about.
The Minister rightly said that a community caution has no spending period, whereas a diversionary caution has a three-month period. He said that that was no change from the existing position. However, there is nothing to stop the police giving someone a diversionary caution in circumstances where, in the past, a simple caution with no spending period would have been given. We have heard many cases, often questionably appropriate, of serious offences being dealt with by the police by means of a simple caution with no spending period attached to it.
The Minister tried to bolster his argument by saying, “The accused must admit the offence and agree to the caution.” That is exactly the same with a simple caution: the police cannot give someone a simple caution unless they admit the offence and agree to the caution.
There is a real danger here that people who currently get a simple caution, which there is no need for them to disclose to, for example, an employer, will have to disclose it in future, with all the negative consequences that that might entail. At this stage, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sure that the fabulous quintet of noble Lords led by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and so on, will be delighted by that endorsement from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, as there has never been a clearer or braver voice for penal reform in my adult lifetime.
I briefly add my own three cheers for these two amendments and for everything that goes with them. They have highlighted the piteous state of provision for prisoners from the moment of their release, quite often into destitution, and a total deficit of support. I hope that that will be taken on board, as well as the precise amendment, by the Minister in his reply. Notwithstanding comments made during the last group that law is not everything and practice is important, sometimes law is very important in itself, particularly release dates because they have to be enshrined in law. So, while there is no doubt that other provision, referred to by my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett and others, needs to be made, this matter requires urgent legislative attention. I think I agree with the noble Earl that, on reflection, something more like Amendment 211 is probably better.
To deal with the concern of my noble friend Lady Lister about Scotland would not take much, would it? Off the top of my head—forgive me, parliamentary counsel will do better—the “may” in Amendment 211 becomes “must” and the words
“at the discretion of the governor of the prison”
are moved to the gap between “on a day” and
“within the previous five working days”.
In other words, the discretionary part is which day within the previous five days. However, there is no discretion; there is a mandatory requirement that the prisoner must not be discharged on a Friday or a weekend. Something of that kind would be delivered very easily—and it really must be delivered. I hope that there will be none of the antics that we heard described in the other place to justify the totally illogical, impractical and unjustifiable status quo.
My Lords, I rise to speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, who is unfortunately unwell and unable to be in her place. She wanted to speak to Amendment 211 in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Bird, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, to which she added her name. She would have spoken about her personal experience, so I shall just read the words that she had hoped to say had she been here.
The routine releasing of prisoners on a Friday, especially before a bank holiday, can cause both services and the prisoners themselves significant problems. Finding accommodation on a Friday afternoon can be extremely difficult. Those who have managed to get clean of substance abuse while in prison find themselves desperate and start using, begin criminal activity again or, in some cases, both. For 10 years, my noble friend was a councillor on South Somerset District Council where there were marvellous officers who worked tirelessly to try to ensure that no one was left with nowhere to stay. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, made a powerful case for the amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, similarly made the case for not releasing prisoners on Fridays or bank holidays. This is a matter that my noble friend feels very strongly about, so I will share two cases sent to her by the officers of South Somerset.
First, prisoner A was released on a Friday from Guys Marsh prison near Shaftesbury. He was given a rail warrant and got on a train to Yeovil. He contacted his family, realised he did not have accommodation to return to and went to see his offender manager at the probation office, who contacted the housing team. By this time, it was 3 pm and they had very little options available for him at that time of day. It was too late for them to find suitable accommodation and although they managed to get him into a hostel in Yeovil, that was not the best place for him, He had left prison clean of drugs and had to stay in a hostel with very easy access to illegal substances. Unfortunately, he used again, the accommodation broke down, he reoffended and was recalled to prison.
Case two was prisoner B, who was released from prison in Bristol on a Friday and got a train back to Yeovil. He then got a bus to Chard, some 17 miles away, to collect his possessions from his old tenancy. He then returned to Yeovil, by which time the offices had closed. He spent the weekend rough sleeping before he could contact the district council again. South Somerset District Council is fortunate to have secured funding to employ a prison release worker who tries to contact prisoners before they are released so they can plan ahead and help them. However, when people are on short sentences, the prisons rarely have time to work with the prisoners, so they get released without the council being informed. My noble friend Lord German has tabled amendments on those serving short sentences.
Other prisoners think they are okay and have homes to return to. These often do not materialise and by the time they realise they are homeless, it is 5 pm on a Friday. Sadly, one of the people in these case studies died over the weekend of 16 and 17 October aged only 45. He was quite a prolific offender and spent a lot of his time in prison. He had been in care from the age of two and did not have the best start in life. The council tried to help him on a number of occasions and sometimes succeeded, but not always. These are just some examples of what happens when prisoners are released on Fridays. This could be avoided by flexibility being used both in the courts and in the prisons. I hope the Minister will agree that this is a very sensible, non-controversial amendment which could prevent reoffending for the want of a roof over the heads of prisoners who have finished their sentences. I fully support Amendment 211 and look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I will add a few words to give some examples of how this actually affects real people. The third sector, the charities in our society, have been very good at helping and supporting people. Given that we now know that a third of prisoners are released on a Friday, one would think that the charity on hand to meet them at the gate and help them through a very difficult period on a Friday would be helped by the prison authorities explaining when the prisoner was going to be released. After all, if you are sitting in a car, possibly round the corner from the prison, waiting for the gate to open and the prisoner to come out, you need to know that you are not going to be waiting there from 8 am or 10 am until 5 pm or 6 pm. Yet, in fact, that is the story I have heard from one charity that helps people in this matter.
The second example was very concerning. A food bank based in Hereford told me that these prisoners—the third who are released without anywhere to live—were given tents and sleeping bags, directed to a farmer’s field and given the address of the food bank. That is the sort of emergency you then place these people in. These are people who have done their sentence but who face no fixed abode, nowhere to live and certainly no money.
The third thing that worries me is how people get their benefit if you now require a bank account. As I understand it—perhaps the Minister will correct me—setting up a bank account while you are in prison is not a possibility; in other words, even if you were to get your benefit paid at the time you left, you would have to have a bank account to pay it into and to provide the necessary ID as well, all of which of course becomes less popular and less possible on a Friday.
These amendments do not seem to be rocket science. They are actually very practical and since that group of one-third of prisoners who are let out on a Friday are the group most likely to reoffend if they cannot find anywhere, there is a societal impact. We all can benefit by giving these people the right helping hand in their very first window of opportunity in real community life.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had not intended to speak, but I would like to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has just said. There are two groups of people who need support. I agree with her that the well-intentioned amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, does not actually meet the problem. These two groups are the women who are women at birth and remain women, and those who were men at birth and become women. Both groups, even in prison, need respect for who they are and what has happened to them. I do not think that the prison system is well adapted at the moment to deal with trans women, and the Minister needs to think with some care whether rather more should be done to help that group of women.
However, the help for that group of women should not be at the expense—I venture into dangerous ground —of those who remain women. This is an extremely tricky area, and we know from areas outside the prison system just how tricky is it. I do not envy the Minister or the Ministry of Justice the situation in which they find themselves because this did not exist—as far as we knew—even 10 or 20 years ago but, my goodness me, it exists now. There are two groups, both of whom need not only respect, but understanding and care, even within a prison.
My Lords, I have been engaged in the debate on trans issues for many years and I have the scars to prove it. I have even been criticised for simply engaging in the debate, by some trans people for even listening to radical feminists, and by feminists because I am not a woman. I have met with, listened to, and talked with many people on all sides of these issues, including radical feminists, gender-critical people, trans people and intersex people. I continue to listen, and I continue to try to understand the views expressed by all sides.
I can feel my blood pressure rising when I hear the comments of many noble Lords around the Chamber. Then I think for a while, and I think to myself that it was not that long ago that I perhaps held similar views until I actually started talking to the people whose lives we are talking about—people who honestly and genuinely believe that they are in the wrong body, if you like, and those who genuinely believe that they are women even though they have male bodies, for example. That is when you begin to understand that these things, which appear completely counterintuitive, make sense for those people. I do not condemn people for what they have said because it was not that long ago that I might have thought along similar lines.
Can I just clarify one thing? Many trans people do not agree with some of the orthodoxies that have become associated with trans activism. The inference was that some people possibly have a particular view because they have not met any trans people. That is not true. Whole swathes of trans people do not go along with a particular political opinion, for example in relation to prisons, as in this instance. I am concerned that it is not seen that those people who argue a gender-critical view are doing it because they are ignorant and have not got out enough.
I hear and understand what the noble Baroness says. However, on this amendment, I am clear. We oppose Amendment 214 from the Front Bench. We do not support the noble Lord’s amendment, but we understand completely the concerns that he and other noble Lords have. However, we feel that the risks that the noble Lord seeks to minimise are already minimal, and that other risks that need to be managed are not covered by this amendment.
The amendment seeks to amend the Gender Recognition Act to reduce the risk that transgender prisoners present to others. This is neither necessary nor desirable for the following reasons. First, there are very few transgender prisoners. In a data collection exercise between March and May 2018, only 44 of 124 public and private prisons said that they had any transgender prisoners at all. The fact that there are so few transgender people in prison is also an indication of the level of offending by transgender people, the seriousness of that offending and the extent of the threat that they pose.
Secondly, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is far greater among the transgender community than it is among those who are not transgender. Clearly, in a prison setting, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is likely to be higher for all inmates; for transgender prisoners, it is likely to be very high indeed. In November 2015, an inmate who said that she would kill herself if she was sent to a male jail was found dead. Vicky Thompson, aged 21, died a week ago at the all-male HMP Leeds. Friends said that Thompson, who was born male but had identified as a woman since she was a teenager, had asked to be sent to a female jail in Wakefield. This is the sort of impact that having an unbalanced amendment, such as the one proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, can have on transgender people.
Thirdly, if the Prison Service thinks that the risk presented by a transgender prisoner is such that they should be housed in a prison contrary to their legal gender, it can allocate them to a part of the estate that does not match their legally recognised gender. The decision must be taken after consultation with experts and at a high level, but it is possible.
A number of noble Lords have referred to the High Court judgment in July 2021, where lawyers for a female inmate in the female prison estate brought a judicial review against the MoJ. The MoJ argued that the policy pursues a legitimate aim, including
“facilitating the rights of transgender people to live in and as their acquired gender (and) protecting transgender people’s mental and physical health.”
It is interesting that I am actually quoting from the same case as other noble Lords have quoted from. Lord Justice Holroyde said:
“It is not possible to argue that the defendant should have excluded from women’s prisons all transgender women”—
as this amendment proposes. He continued:
“To do so would be to ignore, impermissibly, the rights of transgender women to live in their chosen gender.”
The case was not actually about excluding all transgender women; it was about challenging how policies applied to those who had been convicted of serious or violent offences against women—as the noble Lord’s amendment does.
The Lord Justice went on to say that trans women’s offending history was a factor that the existing policies were required to consider. He said:
“the need to assess and manage all risks is repeatedly emphasised”
throughout existing MoJ policies. He continued:
“In an exceptional case, a high risk transgender woman, even with a GRC, can be transferred to the male estate because of the higher level of security which is there available.”
Therefore, there is a mechanism to do exactly what the amendment is seeking to do, but on a risk-assessed basis.
The court also heard that expert panels are also involved in the process when allocating transgender prisoners and are “expressly required” to consider the trans woman’s offending history, her anatomy and her sexual behaviours and relationships. The Lord Justice said:
“They can in my view be expected to be astute to detect any case of a male prisoner who, for sinister reasons, is merely pretending to wish to live in the female gender.”
He concluded:
“the policies require a careful, case-by-case assessment of the risks and of the ways in which the risks should be managed. Properly applied, that assessment has the result that non-transgender prisoners only have contact with transgender prisoners when it is safe for them to do so.”
This is the same case that noble Lords have been quoting from.
Yes, the Lord Justice said:
“I readily accept that a substantial proportion of women prisoners have been the victims of sexual assaults and/or domestic violence.”
He added that some women prisoners,
“may suffer fear and acute anxiety if required to share prison accommodation and facilities with a transgender woman who has male genitalia, and that their fear and anxiety may be increased if that transgender woman has been convicted of sexual or violent offences against women.”
This amendment says nothing about whether the person has had sex-reassignment surgery, and there are trans women with gender recognition certificates who have not undergone gender reassignment surgery. The amendment, therefore, is not fit for purpose.
There are two sorts of risk that need to be managed here. There are the risks to the transgender prisoner, either from themselves, in terms of mental health, self-harm and suicide, or the risk from other prisoners, such as the risk of a transphobic attack or an attack based on their acquired gender if they present as a woman in a prison housing men, for example. There may be risks that the transgender person poses, perhaps because of a previous history of violence or sexual offences, but those falling into this category are few and far between and can be dealt with under the law as it stands. Any attempt to stereotype all transgender women as a threat to women flies in the face of the facts and needs to be robustly challenged.
The implication that transgender women are a threat to children reminds me of the sort of abuse that was directed towards me as a gay man a few decades ago.
The noble Lord is looking at me and implying that I suggested that transgender men were a threat to children. I said no such thing at all. I quoted the case of a male rapist who had raped two children. I was not suggesting that this was endemic in the transgender community, or that they are a threat to children at all. That is not what I said, not what I implied, not what I intended.
I am grateful for the clarification that the noble Lord has given, and I will allow noble Lords to read the official record and draw their own conclusions from what he said.
The noble Lord’s amendment manages only one of these risks—arguably the much lower risk. Each case should be, and is currently, managed on a case-by-case basis, and that should continue. We oppose the amendment.
We, too, oppose the amendment. I think we all accept that transgender women are entitled to live in their chosen gender. The law protects transgender women and transgender men from discrimination because they are transgender men or transgender women. The position that is outlined in this amendment leads all transgender women to be consigned to the male prison estate—a point made very forcibly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The moment one says that, one sees the total unthought-out nature of the amendment.
The way forward was, I believe, charted by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Falkner and Lady Brinton. The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, indicated in a powerful speech that one is dealing, in effect, with rights that may conflict: on the one hand, the right of a transgender woman to be properly protected, including in her choice to be a transgender woman, and on the other, the possibility that certain prisoners, including transgender women, can be a threat to other prisoners in the women’s estate. The way that that is dealt with at the moment was well outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in her excellent and detailed speech. The prison authorities deal with it on a case-by-case basis using a series of detailed processes. Should we continue with that, or should we condemn every gender recognition-certificated transgender woman who is charged—maybe not convicted —of a violent or sexual offence to being in the male estate?
For my own part, it is pretty obvious that one should continue with the current arrangements. I am sure that they could be improved—I am not in a position to detail any improvements that could be given to them—but that case-by-case basis must be a better approach than that adopted by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I would go further and say that I do not suggest to the noble Lord and those who have also supported the amendment that they come back with something else. This is much better dealt with on a case-by-case basis, so we on this side of the House oppose the amendment. We do not think it is appropriate; we do not think it even tries to balance rights, and we would not support it coming back on Report.
That is exactly what the noble Lord said. He said that gender reassignment is a protected characteristic under the Equality Act and gender is not, which is what this amendment addresses.
I thank the noble Lord. If anyone else wants further clarification, I am sure other noble Lords who have read the Equality Act will come in and back me up.
A particular point that I think my noble and learned friend Lord Judge would have made, were he able to be with us, is that he is clear that this amendment and change to the Sentencing Act would be welcomed by the judiciary, who are often asked to make quite difficult judgments. This would make their ability to do so a great deal easier.
There is another important point. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, mentioned how some police forces around the country voluntarily started recording alleged misogynistic acts, primarily against women. We had a briefing last week, which I attended online, in which two of the police forces involved—Nottinghamshire Police and South Yorkshire Police—gave evidence, several years on, about how effective that was. The thing that came out clearly, which they find very frustrating, is that having amassed this information and passed it on to the Crown Prosecution Service, the way in which the CPS deals with the information and data that has been recorded and given to it as additional evidence when considering or making prosecutions is wholly inconsistent between different offices and areas. One of the virtues of inserting this amendment into the Sentencing Act is that it would make it crystal clear to the Crown Prosecution Service that information must be part of any case that is potentially brought before the judiciary, because this data is required to be considered when thinking about sentencing.
I commend this amendment to the Committee. It is simple, unambiguous and protects everybody.
I will tell the noble and learned Lord what I know, which is that the Law Commission said that it hopes for a final report by the end of this year. It is then normal to give a period of time for the Government to consider their response and then there is a period after that for deciding on a legislative route.
My amendment offers a fast way through. If the Law Commission makes certain recommendations and the Government decide to accept them, my amendment gives the Government the power by regulations to amend Section 66 of the Act to achieve those recommendations. That is the best I can offer. I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, can give me a long lecture on all those Law Commission studies that have never ended up in law and the length of time taken. But this is another good reason why we should not, I think, proceed in haste on this.
I was about to move on to the second reservation I have with Amendment 219, which is whether, if hate crimes were extended to sex, they should also include gender. Amendment 219 includes the formulation “sex or gender” and that was, indeed, the Law Commission’s provisional view. However, its conclusion was rather more tentative than some of the other conclusions in the consultation document, and I think this is an area where its final views will be particularly important. In its very large consultation document on hate crime, it did not spend very much time on whether gender should be included as an addition to sex, and I suspect there will be a fuller examination on the basis of the responses to its consultation.
Sex is a concept that is easily defined: it is binary, based on biological reality and recorded on everyone’s birth certificate. Sex, as we have been debating, is a protected characteristic in equality legislation. Gender, on the other hand, is a social construct. It has no ready legal definition and is most definitely not a protected characteristic. While gender is sometimes used in legislation, it has in the past genuinely been as a synonym for sex. However, I believe that it is increasingly problematic for the word “gender” to be used in that way because it is being used by those who claim that gender is different from—and sometimes more important than—sex, and it is not binary. Some describe gender as a spectrum, some say that there is a finite number of genders, but there is no consensus on how many genders there are, with claims in excess of 100 genders.
I can illustrate how difficult the use of “gender” is becoming from something I discovered called nominalgender. Nominalgender means,
“a gender where the person’s gender is so much just them that no one else can even experience it. Most nominalgender people will define their gender as a mashup between other genders of a certain kind (like beegender, angelgender, etc) but it’s not a multiple gender, it is one”.
Who knew, my Lords? This new lexicon of gender is part of a gender identity theory. It is a controversial issue and has not hitherto found its way into legislation for very good reason. I believe that legislating for hostility towards gender would make for very uncertain law. The use of the word “gender” has moved well beyond an attempt to achieve drafting neutrality and has started to acquire a very different meaning.
There was discussion earlier about where transgender fits in. I do not believe adding “or gender” is necessary to meet any needs of those in the transgender community. Hostility related to transgender is already included in hate crime legislation. If the term “sex” was added to Section 66, hostility towards, say, a transgender woman would be automatically covered, either because she is transgender or because she is presumed to be of female sex. Therefore, there is no need for the ambiguity of “gender” to be introduced into the definition of the hate crime because there were no people excluded from that.
I have deliberately not addressed the substance of Amendment 219, which is whether misogyny should be added to the list. I am personally not convinced that the case has been made, but I did not table Amendment 219A to oppose the extension of hate crime to sex. Indeed, my amendment would allow a fast-tracked route to legislating for it if that were the outcome of the recommendation from the Law Commission. I believe that Parliament would be negligent if it rushed through a solution without waiting for the Law Commission to report on this difficult subject. I know that many noble Lords feel strongly about misogyny, as I do as a woman, but I entreat noble Lords not to legislate in haste.
Could I ask the noble Baroness a question on her remarks? She said that sex was binary, male and female, as recorded on birth certificates. How does she account for people who have a gender recognition certificate, who are able to change the sex on their birth certificate in those circumstances?
My Lords, that is dealt with by the Gender Recognition Act. In that case, the birth certificate is altered and for many purposes, though not for all, that person is treated as a woman.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, for so ably and comprehensively introducing her amendment. We return to an issue that we debated during the Domestic Abuse Bill, making misogyny a hate crime. From the Front Bench, we support Amendment 219 and oppose the alternative Amendment 219A.
When we debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, I talked about the appalling kidnap and murder of Sarah Everard by a serving police officer, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has said, many more women have died as a result of male violence since then. As the chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales said a few weeks ago, there is a problem with sexism and misogyny in the police service and in society as a whole. Urgent action is needed. Some changes will take a long time, such as changes to social attitudes and police culture, but some changes can happen now. We have an opportunity with this amendment to make one of those changes now.
I did not support the amendment to the Domestic Abuse Bill because I did not believe that that amendment made misogyny a hate crime. This amendment does. In the Domestic Abuse Bill debate, I suggested, as Amendment 219A does, that we should wait for the Law Commission report on hate crime laws. As the helpful briefing from the office of Stella Creasy MP says:
“Since 2010, more than half of Law Commission reviews have not been implemented at all, including the last review of hate crime legislation in 2014.”
I agree with the briefing’s assertion that this is an area where delay has tangible consequences. The evidence that there is a problem is overwhelming. In the wake of the tragic and horrific murders of Sarah Everard and Sabina Nessa, there is an opportunity to strike while the iron is hot, while public opinion is behind us, and where the issue is high in public consciousness. We need to seize that opportunity with Amendment 219.
I did not support the amendment to the Domestic Abuse Bill because I believed that it was the wrong Bill, where one third of domestic abuse victims are male. I believed that it was the wrong Bill because domestic abuse is one of the worst possible crimes, because if there is only one place where someone can feel safe, it should be in their own home—that domestic abuse could not and should be treated as any more serious than it already is.
I also said:
“If noble Lords or Members of the other place do not think we should wait for the Law Commission’s report, there is an imminent legislative opportunity to make sure that hatred of women is treated in every way as a hate crime. We could work cross-party to amend the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which is being debated in the Commons, to make misogyny a hate crime in every sense of the term. Even if the noble Baroness is not convinced by the Government’s concession, we do not need to rush this amendment through now when the ideal legislative opportunity is at our fingertips.”
The ideal legislative opportunity is at our fingertips—it is here and now, and we should do it.
I have to say that I found the arguments in the briefing that noble Lords have been provided with less convincing on the issue of sex and gender. I refer again to what I said on the Domestic Abuse Bill:
“If the Government only require police forces to record crimes where the victim perceives them to have been motivated by hostility based on the victim’s sex … it does not go far enough. Current hate crime offences are recorded when anyone perceives the offence to have been motivated by hatred, not just the victim. The amendment includes sex and gender, and this is important. If an offender believes the victim is a woman, and anybody perceives that the offence was motivated by hatred of women, it should be recorded as a crime motivated by hatred of women. It makes no difference … whether the victim is a transgender woman.”
There may of course be circumstances where an attack on a transgender woman might be more appropriately recorded as a transphobic hate crime, but:
“Where the victim or a witness believes that they were attacked because they were a woman because they perceive the offender believed the victim was a woman, it should be recorded as such. The use of the term “sex” on its own may exclude some offences”.—[Official Report, 17/3/21; col. 363-64.]
It has been argued that, legally, such offences would not be excluded, but we need to consider the practical implications of excluding gender, as Amendment 219A seeks to do.
There are some who believe that trans women are not women but men. Some of those people are very strident in asserting that view. I want to avoid that debate if possible, but the fact is that people are saying this, and that view may influence victims, witnesses and police officers. Some people may not accurately report crimes motivated by misogyny if they believe that this does not apply to trans women. If we are to protect women and record all crimes motivated by misogyny, gender must be included. A proposal such as Amendment 219A, which makes life more dangerous for some women, makes life more dangerous for all women. From the Front Bench, we support Amendment 219 and oppose Amendment 219A.
My Lords, the Labour Party has been at the forefront of calls to make misogyny a hate crime. Former Nottingham police and crime commissioner Paddy Tipping ensured that it was recorded as a hate crime there, and we have heard from my noble friend Lady Warwick about his work with Chief Constable Sue Fish in that regard. During the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, we secured the piloting of the recording of misogyny as a hate crime among crimes of violence against the person, including stalking, harassment and sexual offences. Police forces recording misogyny as a hate crime is an important step forward, but we want to go further by including sex and gender in the list of protected characteristics in hate crime laws for the first time.
I shall speak only very briefly because of the hour, but I want to conclude by saying that I thought that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti encapsulated the decision before us. We in the Labour Party support Amendment 219 and oppose Amendment 219A. As my noble friend said, first of all, this relates to where an offence has already taken place. Secondly, it is already the case that race and religion are aggravating factors, and they have been for many years. We believe that misogyny should be added as an aggravating factor when sentencing.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI call the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.
My Lords, with the leave of the Committee, I am going to make a slightly unusual request. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, cannot unfortunately be in her place. She was unable to be in the House at very short notice. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, needs to chair a Select Committee at 3 pm, so I wonder if I could formally move Amendment 224 and then allow the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, to make her speech. On that basis, I beg to move Amendment 224.
My Lords, I am enormously grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I am chairing a Select Committee. I will come back for the rest of the debate, but I have to come back from Millbank, and I am not as fast as I used to be.
I want to be brief, but I return to an issue that I have consistently raised with the Minister over several Bills: the position of girls and women who are being sexually exploited, abused and subjected to violence. I want to help the Government to get out of the hole they are digging themselves into, where they are losing what they learned during the passage of the Domestic Abuse Bill about coercive control and about what happens to women who have been traumatised by this sort of behaviour. I want them to think about that in relation to my amendment on these very difficult serious violence reduction orders. I am not going to intervene in the rest, because I will support them if there is a vote at Third Reading, but this is a very specific amendment.
I realise the pressure on the Minister. I hope she has had a chance to look at the very short video that I sent her of a young woman from Newcastle—so the Minister should recognise the accent—telling of her inability to tell anyone of the activity of the perpetrator who was grooming and abusing her until she had been sentenced for something ridiculously small that was technically nothing to do with her abuse. Once she got to see a probation officer, she really felt that she had to say something about why she had been involved in criminal activity, and she was then referred to the charity Changing Lives; I ought to say that I still mentor the person who deals with women in that charity. The young woman from Newcastle was then able to talk about the abuse that she had suffered, the effects of what the perpetrator had done to her, and why this had led her to behave in the way she did.
It does not take much imagination to recognise that women who have been trafficked, groomed and subjected to physical, psychological and sexual abuse are not going to say what they know about the criminal activity of their abusers without themselves being supported and protected by those who understand trauma and what has happened to them. This amendment seeks to remove the “ought to have known” provision that will mean that women and girls who are judged that they “ought to have known” that someone in their company was in possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon could face two years’ imprisonment for a breach of the order’s terms. This simply criminalises women who are already being subjected to appalling criminal abuse. I do not believe that that is what the Government want to do. We know how we can change women’s life chances in these circumstances. We can do it. I work with people who do it, but this is not the way. This will not help them into a more stable and secure life. This will drive them into more criminal behaviour and into entrenching their problems.
I gather that this is seen as an extension of the joint-enterprise laws. The problem the Government have is that these laws have brought women into the criminal justice system when they had no involvement in the alleged offence. Research has found that in 90% of joint-enterprise cases against women, they had engaged in no violence at all, and in half of the cases they were not even present at the scene. We also know from research that more women and girls from BAME backgrounds are likely to be picked up under this sort of provision, and the Government really need to think about that, too.
This provision was not included in the consultation on these orders. I really do think that the Government did not have the opportunity to think the provision through in relation to the women and girls I am talking about. They have the opportunity to quietly drop it now before Report, and I hope and trust that they will.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has said, before the break we moved to the highly controversial area of serious violence reduction orders, and I moved Amendment 224 on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I then gave way to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, who has to chair a Select Committee at this time. Then I sat down. That is why I am now standing.
We have tried to make this group more manageable by restricting it to the considerations for granting SVROs by the courts, and related matters, and moving what happens once an order has been granted to another group. It is still, however, an enormous and complex set of amendments. So, to misquote Captain Lawrence Oates, I may be some time.
This section of the Bill gives the police power to stop and search people without any reasonable suspicion that they may be in possession of anything unlawful. Its origins are in the Conservative party manifesto, which says:
“Police will be empowered to target known knife carriers with a new court order, making it easier for officers to stop and search those known in the past to have carried weapons.”
That statement seems to regard all knives as weapons. On the face of it, chefs and Sikhs, to take but two examples of innocent knife carriers, could be targeted with the new court order. Surely what the public, reading this part of the manifesto, would have been hoping for, is that the police would target criminals who have carried knives intending to use them illegally as weapons, or who have used knives in the commission of an offence, not just anyone “known to be a knife carrier”.
Furthermore, would the public have expected that, if you were with someone when you were caught committing an offence, and the other person—your accomplice—had a knife concealed on them, you too would be regarded as a “known knife carrier”, even though you were not carrying a knife? There may be a convention that we should not stand in the way of provisions set out in a governing party’s manifesto, but when they are as poorly drafted as the few lines the Government are relying on to include serious violence reduction orders in the Bill, perhaps we should make an exception.
These measures are controversial for many reasons, but two fundamental principles are breached here. The first is the use of previous convictions, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames said before the break. When an accused person is before a court that is to decide their guilt or innocence, in almost every case the accused’s previous criminal record is not considered relevant to whether, on the occasion the court is considering, they committed the offence. Convicted criminals have to be given the chance to turn their lives around and to move on.
The provisions in this part of the Bill allow the police to stop and search people because, at some time in the past, on the balance of probabilities, even based on hearsay, they, or someone they were with, may have had a knife on them. Unlike convictions that become spent after a period of time—the Government are making some welcome changes in this regard in another part of the Bill and unwelcome changes when it comes to cautions—these serious violence reduction orders can be renewed indefinitely. The individual could have a stop and search target on their back for the rest of their life.
The second fundamental principle, that could only be breached in very limited circumstances in a limited geographic area for a limited period of time and authorised by a senior police officer—although we think Section 60 should be abolished—is that the police can stop and search someone only if they reasonably believe that the person has something on them at the time of the stop and search that they should not have, whether it is drugs—usually it is, as 63% of stop and searches are for drugs—or something else that it is unlawful for them to have in their possession.
The trouble is that the overwhelming majority of stop and searches result in no further action being taken, but you are nine times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black than if you are white, even when it is supposedly based on reasonable suspicion. As noble Lords heard in answer to an Oral Question earlier, it gets even worse. Only one in 100 Section 60 “no suspicion required” stop and searches results in a weapon being found, while disproportionality increases to 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black compared with if you are white. It might also be useful for the Committee to note that, on stop and search based on suspicion where you are nine times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black, you are no more likely to have anything illegal on you than a white person.
The evidence is irrefutable; stop and search, where no reasonable suspicion that the person you are searching has anything illegal on them is required, is ineffective and damaging to police-community relations. Yet here we are, with the Government are proposing more suspicionless stop and search. It is not just about damaging police-community relations. For those repeatedly stopped and searched by the police, there is a personal impact. It tends to increase offending, is associated with anxiety, the loss of sleep and the ability to study, which further inhibits an individual’s ability to turn their life around and be a productive member of society.
Turning to Amendments 224, 227 and 237, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has said, and as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has just said, for any order that has serious consequences—in terms of a breach of the order resulting in a criminal conviction and potentially a prison sentence—the court should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the conditions necessary for the order to be imposed are satisfied, not, as the Bill proposes, on the balance of probabilities. We have consistently argued this for other such orders, and I do not intend to rehearse those arguments today.
It is obvious to any reasonable person that, before such a serious order can be imposed, the court must be absolutely convinced that the conditions for making the order are satisfied, whether, in the case of Amendment 224, the offender had a knife, or, as in Amendment 227, it is necessary to make the order to protect the public or particular members of the public or to prevent an offence being committed involving a knife, or, in the case of Amendment 237, that the court considers beyond reasonable doubt that it is necessary to renew or lengthen the duration of an SVRO. Amendment 228, in my name, ensures that an SVRO can be imposed only if the court is satisfied that it is a proportionate way to ensure that people are protected or offences involving knives are prevented.
As we can see, these are draconian orders; they are likely to be ineffective based on evidence of other suspicionless stop and searches and to disproportionately impact on ethnic minorities. This amendment is designed to ensure that courts take these unintended negative consequences into account before imposing them.
Carrying a knife is not a criminal offence. The criminal offence is committed only when the knife is carried without reasonable excuse or lawful authority. Amendment 225 would disallow a serious violence reduction order from being applied if a person simply had a knife with them when the offence was committed.
I will illustrate with a fictitious example. Two louts are walking down a road. One of them smashes the window of a car that has been parked and left unattended. They are both arrested and charged with criminal damage. The active participant is found to have had a knife with him because he is an electrician who was on his way home from work, and he uses the knife in the course of his work. He could still have an SVRO made against him, under the Bill as drafted, even though he was lawfully in possession of the knife. Amendment 225 is designed to restrict SVROs to cases where the knife was used as a weapon in the course of the offence.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames have said, the legal concept of “joint enterprise” is already controversial—for example, where members of a gang who are present when one of the gang stabs another can all be guilty of murder. This is taken to another level by these provisions. The court should not be able to give the accomplice an SVRO—to go back to the manifesto, someone who is not a known knife carrier. That is the intention of Amendment 226, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, to which I have added my name.
Not only can an SVRO be given to the electrician’s mate even if the electrician did not use the knife to smash the car window, it can be given if his mate
“knew or ought to have known”
that he had a knife. Well, he knew he was an electrician, so I suppose he should have known he might have had a knife. No. We support Amendments 226A and 226B tabled by the noble Baroness, Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top, seeking to remove the condition that the offender
“ought to have known”
that his accomplice had a knife. The noble Baroness clearly explained the unintended consequences for women and girls who are often coerced into offending.
SVROs can be made not only on the balance of probabilities but on the flimsiest of evidence. For example, even if the evidence that the person had a knife with them when the offence was committed would not have been admissible in the trial for the offence, it could be used in deciding whether to impose an SVRO.
Let us go back to the example of the electrician and his mate who have smashed a car window. Imagine that, for whatever reason—perhaps it was his day off—the electrician did not actually have a knife with him when he smashed the car window, but then his mate says to the police, “He’s an electrician, and he usually has a knife”. This is hearsay evidence and it is not relevant evidence, in that it does not prove or disprove the offence of the smashing of the car window. Therefore, it would be inadmissible during the trial. But, as drafted, it is evidence that could be considered by the court in deciding whether to impose an SVRO. It may not even be true. Amendments 229, 230 and 231 attempt to strengthen the evidentiary requirements prior to an SVRO being made by excluding evidence that would have been inadmissible in the trial for the offence leading to the consideration of imposing an SVRO.
Amendment 240 proposes a far more rigorous examination of the piloting of SVROs—for example, whether they reduce knife carrying and serious violence; the impact on disproportionality; what types of offences led to the making of the order; and requiring the Secretary of State to obtain, record and publish relevant data before SVROs are rolled out.
The nonsense of this monstrous Bill, where the Government have tried to force so much controversial legislation into one Bill, and then tried to force as many provisions of the Bill as possible into each group of amendments, has resulted in my longest ever speech on the Floor of this House in my eight years here. Do not blame me—I am looking at the Minister.
If I am to end my speech here, all I can ask is for noble Lords to read my remarks on this group of amendments in their entirety in the official record and to take them collectively as the reasons why this clause, and serious violence reduction orders in their totality, should not stand part of the Bill.
If the Sikh was going about his business with his knife in his pocket, he would have reasonable excuse. If he then got into a fight and the knife was not used in the commission of the common assault, the knife would be irrelevant to the case. But I must absolutely caveat my comments: the court would decide the facts of the case.
Could I further clarify what the Minister has just said? If the Sikh becomes involved in a fight and does not go for the knife that they are carrying during that offence, the Sikh can still be made subject to an SVRO, because they committed an offence and had a knife with them at the time the offence was committed, even though the weapon was not used.
My Lords, I have just fallen into a trap that I do not like to fall into, which is to take on specific cases. The court would have to determine the facts of the case to decide whether the knife was relevant and, therefore, whether an SVRO could be made.
This is Committee and it is important to get this clear. My clear understanding of the legislation is that it does not matter whether the knife was used in the commission of the offence; it is simply the fact that the person had a knife with them when they committed the offence which means that not only can that person be made subject to an SVRO but any person convicted with them who did not have a knife can also be made the subject of an SVRO by the court. So, without using specific examples, can the Minister please clarify that I am correct?
What I can clarify is that I will not take theoretical cases again. But the court would need to consider whether in the circumstances it is proportionate to make an order. That does not go into the specifics of any given case.
I thank my noble friend—and he is my noble friend because he has come to my rescue time and again. I am not a lawyer and even less of an expert in criminal law.
Perhaps I could just say that those examples should include, if they are right, non-violent offences where a weapon is not used in the commission of the offence in any way, where the person only has the weapon on them, and they have an accomplice who did not have a knife on them but should have known that the person had one concealed on their person when they committed a non-violent offence without using the weapon.
I think I need to reflect further on what noble Lords have said. I will try to answer the noble Lord’s question in a letter before we start talking about examples. We are, after all, in Committee, and I am learning, like other noble Lords, as we go along.
Amendments 226, 226A and 226B would remove the provisions that enable a court to issue the SVRO if two or more people commit an offence but not all of them used or were in possession of the weapon—that is slightly going back on what we were discussing. When a knife offence or offensive weapon-related offence is committed, it is not always the case that all the offenders had the weapon in their hands—as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out—during the commission of the offence. But if the court is satisfied that a person knew or ought to have known that another person committing the offence had a knife or an offensive weapon during the commission of the offence, and this person committed an offence arising out of the same facts, we think it would be appropriate for an SVRO to be available. Again, I will put the various permutations and combinations to noble Lords in a theoretical way. This would allow SVROs to be made in relation to all the individuals who were involved and were convicted of such an offence, should the court consider an SVRO to be necessary in respect of those individuals.
This provision intends to cover situations such as a robbery or a fight where a weapon was used by one individual, but where other individuals convicted of offences related to the same facts knew, or ought to have known, that a weapon was being used or carried by another person involved in the offence, even if they themselves were not carrying the weapon. This is very similar to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, except that that individual was brandishing the weapon.
I am sorry, but that is not what the proposed law says. It does not talk about when there is a fight and somebody uses a weapon, and a person who was with them should have known they had a weapon. What the Bill as drafted says is that anybody who commits any offence—such as, for example, smashing a car window—who has a knife in their pocket can be given an SVRO. It may be that that is what was intended, but it is not what the legislation says.
What I am saying, and what I said earlier, is that it will be up to the courts to decide whether it is appropriate, bearing in mind the facts of the case, and whether the court thinks an SVRO in respect of an individual is necessary to protect the public or any particular members of the public in England and Wales.
I completely understand that point it in the context of the previous debate. One of the things that we will be testing as part of the pilot is the impact of SVROs on the individuals subject to them, and how to ensure that vulnerable offenders—because sometimes people are caught up in these things completely unwittingly—are directed to local intervention schemes to help steer them away from crime. But SVROs used as part of a wider crime prevention approach will send a clear message that, if people are vulnerable and want to move away from crime, and in particular if they are being coerced into carrying things, or coerced generally, we will of course support them.
Amendment 228 seeks to increase the requirements for SVROs to be made. It would require that an order can be imposed only if the SVRO is proportionate to one or more of the relevant aims of the order. It is already a requirement for the court to consider the making of the order necessary to protect the public, or any particular member of the public, including the offender, from the risk of harm, and to prevent the offender committing an offence. It would be for the court to decide the seriousness of any offence, based on the individual facts of the case, and to decide whether it is necessary and proportionate for an order to be made in respect of an individual. Any order made will be at the court’s discretion.
An individual convicted of an offence involving a bladed article or offensive weapon could cause harm to any member of the public, including particular individuals. The provisions in the Bill allow a wide range of considerations to be made, so that an SVRO will have the greatest impact and protect members of the public, including the offender themselves, from the risk of harm.
Amendments 229, 230 and 231 seek to amend the evidentiary requirements for an SVRO to be made. They would provide that the court may consider only evidence led by the prosecution and by the offender and would remove provisions that allow courts to consider evidence that would have been inadmissible in the proceedings in which the offender was convicted. We think it appropriate that the court can consider a wider range of evidence about the offender that may not have been admissible in the proceedings. This goes in some sense to the heart of what we have just been discussing. For example, in answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the offender may have a history of knife carrying that would be relevant to whether an SVRO would be necessary to protect the public.
Amendment 239 would make the guidance to be issued under Clause 140 subject to the affirmative procedure, as recommended by the DPRRC in its report on the Bill. As I have indicated in response to other amendments, we are considering carefully the arguments put forward by the DPRRC and will also reflect on today’s debate before responding to the committee’s report ahead of the next stage of the Bill.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher—through the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—has tabled Amendment 240 to Clause 141, which makes provision for the piloting of SVROs. I talked about this earlier. I can assure noble Lords that we will take the matters set out in Amendment 240 into consideration as we progress the design work for the pilot and agree the terms of the evaluation. That said, the general point is that it is not necessary to include such a list in the Bill. The approach adopted in Clause 141 is consistent, for example, with the piloting provisions in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 in respect of knife crime prevention orders.
Working with the four pilot forces our aims are: to monitor and gather data on a number of different measures—including, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the impact of SVROs on serious violence; to build evidence on reoffending and the outcomes for offenders who are subject to SVROs; to understand and learn how we ensure that vulnerable people are directed to local intervention schemes; and to understand community responses to the orders.
I think we can conclude by agreeing on the need to do all we can to tackle the scourge of knife crime, which is wrecking far too many lives. I hope that I have been able to persuade noble Lords of the case for the new orders as part of our wider work to prevent and reduce serious violence, and that I have reassured the Committee—although not on certain things, on which I will have to write—that many of the issues raised will be considered as part of the piloting of SVROs in advance of any national rollout. I reiterate my commitment to consider further the DPRRC’s recommendation in relation to parliamentary scrutiny of the guidance. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, will be happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this group, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Coaker.
The Minister asked what works. The centre-right think tank Policy Exchange recently produced a report saying that, in reducing serious violence, the emphasis should be on community policing and not on stop and search. That summarises what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was saying. The Minister, in earlier proceedings in the House this afternoon, talked about how trust in the police had been seriously damaged recently. Despite that, the Government are giving the police more and more powers that are likely to further damage trust in the police.
The Minister talked about communities—particularly black communities—wanting this sort of thing in order to stop their young people dying on the streets. After I left the police, I went to a pupil referral unit, and students from the unit took me to a local council estate where a young mother holding a baby had been stabbed to death. As we looked at the scene, they said to me, “Yes, we want the police to take knives off the street, but we want them to target stop and search at the people who have got the knives.” To do that, and to target stop and search at those people who are carrying knives, the police need community intelligence, and these sorts of provisions are likely to push the community away, rather than encourage people to come forward with information. Do not get me wrong: targeted, intelligence-led stop and search based on community information can be effective in taking weapons off the street, but quite clearly, as I said on Section 60, with suspicionless stop and search, only one in 100 stop and searches results in a weapon being recovered.
The noble Baroness said that these provisions are very similar to domestic violence prevention orders on the balance of probabilities versus reasonable doubt. Throughout the course of that Bill, we persistently said that that was not acceptable, so the noble Baroness should not be surprised that we are saying it about these orders. However, we need to do all we can to reduce serious violence on our streets. The difficulty is where you have provisions such as this that prove to be counterproductive.
We will come back to this at Report—I can guarantee that. But at this stage, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I move Amendment 231A in my name and speak to the other amendments in this group. These amendments relate to what happens after a serious violence reduction order has been granted.
Amendments 231A and 231B remove the requirements for the offender to give, and update the police on, information about where they are living, including the home address on the day the order is given—which will be given to the court in any event and is therefore not necessary—any other place they regularly reside, and any place they move to or intend to spend more than a month living at. Noble Lords should ask themselves what the purpose of this power is. Is it so that the police can trace the offender, track their every move and then wait outside the place where they live, to stop and search them as soon as they leave? Create a power to stop and search someone who may or may not have carried a knife in the past if you must, whether you suspect them of having a knife on them at the time or not, but to enable, or even encourage, harassment of these individuals by supplying the police with continually updated information about their whereabouts smacks of stalking by the state.
As I will point out in a moment, SVROs can be renewed indefinitely. One of the most important ways a young criminal can turn their life around is to move away from the area where they were involved in a gang, for example, to start a new life. These provisions mean that their reputation follows them, making it even more difficult for them to be rehabilitated. They may have moved on, but the police will continue to stop and search them at will, without any reasonable cause to suspect that the individual is doing anything wrong. The offender would be justified in thinking, “What is the point? May as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb.” On the previous group, the Minister said that if an offender wants to move away from offending the Government will support them. Updating the police continually about where this young person has moved to, and enabling them to target that individual through stop and search, even though they are trying to turn their lives around, does not sound to me like supporting them in trying to move on from offending.
For similar reasons, the proposed power to give a chief constable for the area where the offender lives, and the area where the police believe the offender is or intends to come to, to apply to a court to extend or renew the SVRO should also be removed, as proposed by Amendments 235 and 236. The chief constable for the area where the offence was committed should be able to apply to have the SVRO varied, renewed or discharged—that is fair enough—but this should not be the case for any chief constable, anywhere in the country, who knows or even just thinks that the offender might be coming to their area. Offenders who genuinely want to turn their lives around should be able to move on with their lives. If they move home and fall into their old ways, the police in the area where they have come to notice can ask the chief constable in the area where the original offence was committed to make an application on their behalf. These provisions are unnecessary and potentially counterproductive in reducing serious violence.
Amendment 238 limits the number of times an SVRO can be imposed. Although each SVRO is restricted to a maximum duration of two years, SVROs can be renewed indefinitely. This means that our electrician’s mate could potentially be stopped and searched by the police, without any reasonable suspicion that he has anything unlawful on him, for the rest of his life. There are very few offences where there is not a spent period, after which the conviction no longer has to be declared. Yet the provisions in this Bill mean that, on the balance of probabilities, someone for whom there is no evidence of their ever having carried a knife could be targeted by the police for suspicionless stop and search for the rest of their life.
My Lords, I am again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support on the duration of SVROs, about which I did not hear an explanation from the Minister. I presume that the Committee can assume that we are right that SVROs can be renewed indefinitely and that there is no legal restriction on that. That is clearly unacceptable, and we will return to it on Report.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also made an important point about the blank cheque nature of the prohibitions that can be imposed when somebody is subject to an SVRO. They will be decided only by regulation, which on all accounts the House will not see until after the Bill has received Royal Assent.
I also thank my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames for covering my omission in not talking about the reasonable excuse defence amendment.
The Minister said that we are not breaking any new ground. With respect, allowing the police to stop and search somebody purely on the basis of previous conduct without any reason to suspect that they have something on them at the time of the stop and search is breaking new ground. Therefore, different rules should apply.
I understand the provisions in the Bill about various chief constables in various parts of the country being given the power to vary or extend these orders, but, again, the Minister did not answer the question why the chief constable in that area cannot simply ask the chief constable where the original order was made to vary, revoke or extend.
The Minister seems to place a lot of reliance on the pilot schemes. I am reminded of my lengthy service in the Metropolitan Police, where I was told that there was no such thing as an unsuccessful pilot. It was rather telling that the Minister said that account would be taken of what happens during the pilots before the SVROs are rolled out to the whole of England and Wales, but not “if” the pilots prove to be effective, they will be rolled out to the rest of England and Wales.
However, we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I was not going to speak in this debate but, very briefly, as the police have been mentioned, I should mention a meeting I had fairly recently with a police superintendent in London, who worryingly told me that the police were being made aware that there were a large number of solvable crimes, where people could be prosecuted, and the police no longer had the resources to pursue those offences. From what has been said in the debate, and from the briefing from USDAW, it is extremely worrying if offences are being committed against retail staff, where there is often closed circuit television of the perpetrator, yet the police still do not have the resources to prosecute those offences. As we all know, if somebody feels they can get away with a crime, or word gets around that you can go to a particular store and get away with it because the police will not do anything, it encourages more people to engage in the offence.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his clear outline of the problem at the beginning of the debate. That was really helpful. I support the amendments creating the offences for assaulting a retail worker.
I look at this problem from a completely different perspective. Apart from the four years I was at university, I have spent all my life in really rural settings, so I identify with the weekly trip to the supermarket. We have a village shop which doubles up as the post office, but I cannot walk there because the roads are too narrow so I have to drive. It is a different sort of world. I identify with this from when I was at university in Leeds too; the corner shops at the end of terraces were exactly the same sort of set-up as a rural shop. But they had their problems. CCTV has now appeared in these shops, which was never there before. There was a level of trust, which is slightly eroded when people move into the village and behave in a different way. This sounds like the 1950s, and sometimes it is.
Whether we are talking about cities or villages, there are many small shops still, and a lot of them have post offices which keep them open. We should not forget that, because they serve a lot of people: where I live, a lot of people do not have cars, and older people really prefer going to the small village shop and still collect their pension there. But a single-handed shop with limited security and often no cameras is a danger, and these shop workers are vulnerable to assault, even in areas where you think everybody knows everybody else’s business. Will the Minister tell us, when she sums up, what sort of recommendations or advice are given to such small shops by the local police? Is there any government guidance to ensure that their safety and that of their workers are protected?
I thank the ACS for its really helpful background briefing. The two amendments are really interesting: one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is about the offence of assaulting a retail worker, and the other, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is much the same. Something should come back: whether it comes back from the Government or from amendments tabled by Members, we really need to put a marker down before the Bill finishes on the issue of assaulting shopworkers. It might be quite sensible if those who have added their names to Amendments 263 and 264 could sit down together to craft an amendment that would fit with all the points that were made in this short but really quite informative and well-informed debate, and then bring something back for Report.
My Lords, again, I was not going to speak in this debate, but it is important for me to share my professional experience of this. I once worked with Professor Larry Sherman, who was a leading academic on restorative justice at the time, on a pilot scheme in the Metropolitan Police. In support of what the noble Viscount has just said, two major things came out of that pilot.
One was about victim satisfaction. Obviously, the process was voluntary—victims were not made to confront their attacker if they did not want to—but many felt so much safer, for example if they had been mugged in the street, having met their attacker face to face than victims who were attacked by some anonymous person. They understood more about their attacker from that face-to-face meeting, so it is good in terms of victim satisfaction. This may be counterintuitive to members of the Government who feel that the public might see it as a soft option, but victims really benefit from this.
The other thing was the impact on perpetrators. Larry Sherman rightly pointed out that many offenders, particularly young ones, appear in front of a court but they never say anything. They plead guilty. They have a solicitor or a barrister representing them. They sit at the back, disengaged from the whole process, which happens without them participating in it at all. It has no real impact on them—apart from the custodial sentence at the end of it, perhaps. They do not quite understand why they end up in custody because they have not participated in the process at all. On the contrary, with restorative justice, they sit opposite the victim and the victim tells the perpetrator how that offender made them feel. This has a salutary effect on the perpetrator and their future offending behaviour.
I just wanted to tell the Committee about that experience because other noble Lords have not mentioned those two aspects of restorative justice.
My Lords, we have already had an extensive debate so I will be brief. I must note that I have heard my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb talk about this issue often; it is something that she is extremely passionate about. I have no doubt that she would have attached her name to this amendment had space been available under our systems.
We have heard some terribly powerful contributions, particularly from the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond. I really hope that the Government were listening. I am not sure that the point has been made that restorative justice should be the foundation of our justice system. It should be fundamental to what it is all about. At the moment, by contrast, it seems to be an afterthought added on at the end. This means that we have seen a loss of funding for some really practical things, such as restorative justice training for all prosecutors, including the independent Bar, so that they can better identify opportunities for restorative justice when handling cases. We also need to see restorative justice training for magistrates and judges so that they can be fully involved in facilitating it. Just as judges have a central role in enabling alternative dispute resolution in the civil courts, in the criminal courts, they should promote and encourage a restorative approach all the way from the initial arraignment right through to sentencing.
What we are talking about here is coming out after the awful event of a crime and repairing, restoring and making things better. We know well from our criminal justice system—a system at the end of which everyone comes out feeling worse about it—that what we have at the moment is not working for the people involved. It is not working for victims. It is not working to provide change for perpetrators. It is not working for the entire community.
My Lords, I rise to briefly and extremely humbly speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who signed Amendment 266. I am greatly honoured to follow two such champions of this matter of undoing great injustices of the past.
I want to record our support for this and also to ask the Minister a question—to which I do not expect an answer now. These clauses provide for people to apply. Why can we not have a situation where we go through, find and identify these case and wipe them clean? That is the question I was asked to ask, and I am asking it. I do not necessarily expect an answer now, but I am putting it on the record.
My Lords, we support these amendments, so ably proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden. I also pay tribute to the Minister for her sympathetic approach to these issues over the years. These offences should never have been offences in the first place. It therefore makes complete sense that, if people were convicted of such an offence and they apply to have a conviction or caution disregarded, and if that application is successful, they should be pardoned. Of course, deceased persons falling into this category cannot apply to have a conviction or caution disregarded, but they should be able to receive a posthumous pardon if the offence qualifies. It has taken 500 years to get to this stage and the Government have been making progress on these issues. These are the final pieces of the jigsaw and we support them.
My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer also added his name to this amendment. We clearly support the amendments. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, who I understand campaigned for decades on this issue. I thought it was quite moving, if I may use that word, to hear the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, saying he earnestly hoped that he was coming towards the end of his campaign. I hope he is right and that the Minister may be able to give him some comfort in that respect. Everybody who has contributed to the debate thinks this is a thoroughly appropriate amendment and, even though it has been a very truncated debate, the passion and the sense of finality have come through, and I very much hope that the Minister will give a suitable response.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Scotland Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have given evidence at numerous criminal trials, in the magistrates’ court and the Crown Court, but the most vicious, adversarial cross-examination was at the inquest into the death of Jean Charles de Menezes, an innocent Brazilian shot and killed by the police following the 7 July 2005 bombings. There is no way that process could have been described as inquisitorial. Indeed, part way through that proceeding, the coroner had to advise the barrister representing the police not to proceed in the way that he had up until that point. While in some cases it may be simply a neutral, inquisitorial search for the truth, that is not how a lot of inquests turn out.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving the Committee the benefit of his experience. Perhaps it is that experience which informed, or helped to inform, the remarks of the Chief Coroner, his honour Justice Thomas Teague, who has said publicly that one of his key objectives in his role is to ensure that the inquisitorial ethos of the inquest process is maintained. I hope that demonstrates a resolve within the system to address the failings or, at best, the over-eagerness, of counsel whose conduct the noble Lord described.
The amendment to increase the scope of legal aid at inquests would run counter to the approach of retaining their inquisitorial character. There is a risk that additional lawyers present at an inquest would not provide an overall improvement for the bereaved, that being something which ought to be a primary consideration, for the reasons expressed by my noble friend Lady Newlove. It is foreseeable—I think this is the point raised by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst—that the presence of additional lawyers could have the unintended consequence of turning an inquisitorial process into a complex exercise—
My Lords, I also rise to speak particularly about Amendment 292D. I support the noble Lord, Lord Bach, with all his experience of being an excellent police and crime commissioner.
There are many other examples. The noble Lord gave two. I shall just give one. A 59 year-old senior civil servant who worked for the Ministry of Justice in a responsible position connected with the criminal justice system, wished to retire and stand to be a police and crime commissioner. He was disqualified because, at the age of 13, he had been fined £5 for each of two minor juvenile offences. It is completely disproportionate and absurd that such people should be disqualified.
I seek to compare those disqualification rules with the rules applying to Members of another place. The last figures I saw produced by IPSA, the standards authority for Members of the other place, revealed that, in recent years, 43% of the Members of the other place had convictions of one kind or another. Maybe that tells you a lot about the other place. Nevertheless, this distinction makes its own point.
In passing on to the other issues, I agree very much with my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe. Fundamental to this problem is the fact that we have 43 territorial police forces. This number ought to be at least quartered. If so, the structure—including police and crime commissioners—would be much more coherent. There would be far greater consistency and police forces which currently struggle to deal with very complex inquiries would be able to deal with them because they would have the critical mass of staff.
I turn next to police authorities. I hesitate to disagree with those noble Lords who tabled the first amendment in this group because I respect them all. Part of my experience as a Queen’s Counsel has been to advise police authorities when they have got into difficulties. I recall one case from the north of England in which the police authority concerned was institutionally corrupt and in the pockets of a small group of senior police officers. It had got itself into a hopeless mess and at least one criminal prosecution ensued. To describe it as an example of democratic effectiveness was an insult to both democracy and effectiveness.
I accept, of course, that some police commissioners are better than others. So are some Cabinet Ministers. So are some head teachers. So are some doctors. So are some Members of Parliament. This is inevitable. Some of the commissioners are very good, such as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and Dame Vera Baird, who was referred to earlier. Where police and crime commissioners are effective, they are very effective indeed.
Just think about it territorially. If one of these referendums took place and there was a police and crime commissioner in Cheshire but not in Lancashire, or one in north Wales but not in Dyfed-Powys, people in the areas that did not have a police and crime commissioner would be unlikely to say, “Oh, how wonderful; this is going to be run by our local council.” In the modern world, they will say, “Our democratic rights have been diluted.”
Other noble Lords remember, as I do, when the Welsh Assembly was created. In many parts of Wales, people said, “Nobody will know who their Assembly Members are. It’s all a waste of time. It will be completely ineffective.” It is true that, for a time, people tended not to know who their Welsh Assembly Members were. Today, however, if you look at the evolution of the Welsh Government during the last 20 years or so, it has become remarkably effective. It has brought people much closer to government.
I believe that police and crime commissioners are still evolving. They have a valuable role to play, particularly, as I said earlier, if the Government have the courage to reform the territorial policing services in this country.
As to the deposits, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The £5,000 deposit is not reasonable. I would not oppose a much lower deposit of the kind that has to be put down by somebody standing to be elected as a Member of Parliament. The election process is expensive. Some kind of gatekeeping requirement of this kind is helpful.
My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, when he started talking about amalgamating police forces again and the Welsh Assembly, I wondered whether this was turning into a filibuster. However, we move on.
The issue raised by Amendment 292D that we all agree on is that it is ridiculous that somebody convicted of a very minor offence at a very young age should be disqualified. The other side of the coin is that there is no process for the recall of a police and crime commissioner who commits an offence in office or is guilty of misconduct. Because they are democratically elected, the only way to get rid of them is by another election. Compare this to MPs, for whom there is now a process by which a by-election can be triggered. I agree with Amendment 292D, but there is another side to the same coin which also needs to be addressed.
We on these Benches have always been opposed to police and crime commissioners, notwithstanding, as everybody has said, that there are some outstanding ones, as the noble Lord, Lord Bach, was. Not just because he used to be my boss—this is the House of Peers now—I agree with almost everything the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe has said.
Would the noble Lord forgive me for a moment? I know his view has always been consistent on this, but the truth of the matter is that the Bill got through only because of the support of both parties in the coalition; one of those parties was the Liberal Democrats. It is very easy to say now that you are not in favour of it as a party, but you clearly were in favour of it because you passed it into legislation. I am sorry if it is a crude point, but it happens to be true.
Yes, and, as the noble Lord will very well know, in a coalition there have to be compromises on both sides. You cannot get through the things you think are absolutely important unless you give way on others. However, the policy of this party now is to oppose police and crime commissioners. I am very grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to clarify the position of the party on that.
It is very difficult for one person to represent both rural and urban areas in policing, or perhaps an area where there is a large African or Caribbean community and another where there is a large south Asian or Chinese community, or even an LGBT community. These could and do exist within the same police area—as in London, for example. Therefore, with one police and crime commissioner for that whole area, it is difficult for that one person to represent all those communities. It is important to be represented when it comes to accountability around policing, particularly for minority communities, where trust and confidence in the police are not as strong as they are with others.
As others have said, the majority of police and crime commissioners are party political. Therefore, there is a danger that a small “p” political difference between a police and crime commissioner and a chief constable, or even a commissioner—without pointing at any particular examples of that—could result in a good chief constable or commissioner having to resign over that small “p” political difference, or even a personality difference with the police and crime commissioner
As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has said, we are in a position where, because it is one person hiring and firing the chief constable, we are not getting a range of candidates applying for the chief constable post. The assumption is that the incumbent deputy will have a good relationship with that police and crime commissioner and have a natural advantage over any outside candidate, and therefore it is not worth applying. For all these reasons, we feel that having a range of people holding the police to account—particularly if they are democratically elected councillors —as opposed to one person, would be preferable. But I agree with other noble Lords that the suggested way to replace the system is probably not through a series of referenda that could result in different mechanisms in different parts of the country.
As far as the abolition of deposits in elections is concerned, that is perhaps slightly wider than this Bill should be considering. Of course, as Liberal Democrats, we would have to declare an interest as far as that is concerned. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, about potentially reducing the size of the deposit, rather than getting rid of it completely.
Were police authorities better? In some places, I think they were. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has said, the Metropolitan Police Authority was certainly very effective. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who experienced both, said there was not much to choose between the two on accountability.
For the reasons that I have explained, we agree that there should certainly be an examination of how effective police and crime commissioners are.
My Lords, I agree with the comments of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and other noble Lords, that we have had mixed experiences of police and crime commissioners—some have been very good, and some not so good. I will not go further than that, though, in relation to Amendment 278.
I wish to talk in particular about the amendment in the names of my noble friends Lord Bach and Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. They have drawn attention to the consequences we have witnessed as result of potential candidates for police and crime commissioner being debarred if they have been convicted of any offence, however many years ago, for which they could have received a custodial sentence, irrespective of whether they did actually receive such a sentence. I do not wish to pursue any individual cases but rather the general point, as others have done, of whether there should be another look at the reasons, in respect of previous convictions, for which a potential candidate for the office of police and crime commissioner can be disqualified.
When the issue has been raised previously, the Government have argued that it should not be reviewed because there was cross-party support for this requirement to be included in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. If that argument was followed through to its logical conclusion, there could never be any change to any legislation that originally had cross-party support, which is a bit of a nonsense.
The other argument advanced was that people must have complete confidence in the probity and integrity of whoever it is they elect as a police and crime commissioner because of their responsibilities and powers in relation to their police force, including the chief constable. Clearly, that is true, but whether an offence committed decades ago that could have resulted in a custodial sentence but did not—because it was not considered of a sufficiently serious nature to justify such a sentence—should automatically still be regarded as calling into question the probity and integrity of a potential candidate for police and crime commissioner, and thus disqualify them from holding such an office, is questionable, to say the least. It is certainly questionable when one looks at other positions that have powers and responsibilities in relation to the police and the criminal justice system but have no such similar restrictions on being able to stand for office or be appointed to an office.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, changing the subject, the Data Protection Act 2018, reflecting the GDPR, in Section 14 provides that “decisions based solely”— solely—“on automated processing” are “subject to safeguards.” Such a decision
“produces legal effects concerning the data subject, or … similarly significantly affects the data subject.”
The decisions are subject to safeguards under the Act, notification of the data subject and the right of the data subject to request reconsideration or, importantly, a new decision not based on automated processing. Noble Lords will appreciate the potential importance of decisions affecting liberty and that the use of artificial intelligence may well involve profiling, which does not have an unblemished record.
This amendment would alter the term “solely,” because “solely” could mean one click on a programme. The term “significantly”, proposed in the amendment, is not the best, but I think it will serve the purpose for this evening. I do not claim that this is the best way to achieve my objective, but I did not want to let the moment pass. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee —I am not speaking as its chair—has had this issue raised a number of times. The Information Commissioner is one who has raised the issue. Elizabeth Denham, before she left the office, said it should not just be a matter of box-ticking. The guidance of the Information Commissioner’s Office provides that there should be the following three considerations:
“Human reviewers must be involved in checking the system’s recommendation and should not just apply the automated recommendation to an individual in a routine fashion; reviewers’ involvement must be active and not just a token gesture. They should have actual ‘meaningful’ influence on the decision, including the ‘authority and competence’ to go against the recommendation; and reviewers must ‘weigh-up’ and ‘interpret’ the recommendation, consider all available input data, and also take into account other additional factors.”
The Minister will, I am sure, refer to the current government consultation on data, Data: A New Direction, published in September. We dealt with this issue by putting the amendment down before then but, even so, the consultation questions the operation and efficacy of the Article 22 of the GDPR, which, as I said, is the basis for Section 14. I appreciate that the consultation will have to run its course but, looking at it, the Government seem very focused on the economic benefits of the use of data and supportive of innovation.
Of course, I do not take issue with either of those things, but it is important not to lose sight of how the use of data may disadvantage or damage an individual. Its use in policing and criminal justice can affect an individual who may well not understand how it is being used, or even that it has been used. I was going to say that whether those who use it understand it is another matter but, actually, it is fundamental. Training is a big issue in this, as is, in the case of the police, the seniority and experience of the officer who needs to be able to interpret and challenge what comes out of an algorithm. There is a human tendency to think that a machine must be right. It may be, but meaningful decisions require human thought more than an automatic, routine confirmation of what a machine tells us.
The government consultation makes it clear that the Government are seeking evidence on the potential need for legislative reform. I think that reform of Section 14 is needed. AI is so often black-box and impenetrable; even if it can be interrogated on how a decision has been arrived at, the practicalities and costs of that are substantial. For instance, it should be straightforward for someone accused of something to understand how the accusation came to be made. It is a matter of both the individual’s rights and trust and confidence in policing and criminal justice on the part of the public. The amendment would extend the information to be provided to the data subject to include
“information … regarding the operation of the automated processing and the basis of the decision”.
It also states that this should not be “limited by commercial confidentiality”; I think noble Lords will be familiar with how openness can run up against this.
Recently, the Home Secretary told the Justice and Home Affairs Committee twice that
“decisions about people will always be made by people.”
The legislation should reflect and require the spirit of that. A click of a button on a screen may technically mean that the decision has a human element, but it is not what most people would understand or expect. I beg to move.
My Lords, with the leave of the Committee, I will speak briefly. In my comments on the previous group on which I spoke—the one beginning with Amendment 278—I did not mean to suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, was filibustering. I tried to inject a little humour into proceedings, bearing in mind the wide range of issues that we discussed in the debate on that group and the length of that debate. I joked that it was beginning to look like a filibuster. I have apologised to the noble Lord but I wanted to include that apology in the official record.
We support this important amendment. As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, Section 14 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides some safeguards against important decisions being taken by automated processing. It allows a human review on appeal with the subject having been told, but only if the decision was “solely” taken automatically, rather than “significantly”, as my noble friend’s amendment suggests. Experience in the American criminal justice system of using algorithms shows that bias in historical decisions is replicated, even enhanced, by algorithms. We therefore support this amendment.
As has been said, Article 22 of the general data protection regulation provides that a person has
“the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”
It also provides that there is an exemption to this if the automated decision-making is explicitly provided in law. Section 14 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides, as has been said, some safeguards based on Article 22 for cases where the law allows automated decision-making on things that may have a significant effect on a person. It provides that where a significant decision is made by automated means, the subject may request that the decision is retaken with human oversight. The section currently provides protections for a decision taken, as has once again been said, “solely” by automated means. The amendment would extend this provision to decisions taken solely “or significantly” by automated means.
The issue of automated decision-making will become, and indeed is becoming, increasingly prevalent in our lives—a point made by all sides during the passage of the 2018 Act, when we tried to add far stronger safeguards to the then Bill to prevent decisions that engaged an individual’s human rights being decided by automated means. On that basis, I am certainly interested in the points raised to extend the right of appeal to decisions that are based “significantly” on automated processing.
Finally, it is potentially concerning that the Government are currently consulting on removing Article 22 of the GDPR and the associated protections from UK law altogether. I believe that consultation closed last week. Can the Government give an indication of when we can expect their response?
My Lords, that was one of the most powerful statements I have heard in this House, coming from someone who knows what it is like to suffer. It is a horrible tragedy that the Amess family have suffered. I echo the noble Baroness who introduced the amendment in saying that our thoughts and prayers are with them tonight, and for the repose of Sir David’s soul.
I was not sure that I could add much to this debate, but I gave it some thought and would like to share some personal observations. Thinking about the amendment, I recalled the singing of the hymn, “Abide With Me”. I have heard it sung twice recently: first, when I tuned into a vigil mass celebrated by Canon Pat Browne, the Roman Catholic priest in Parliament, on the eve of Armistice Day, and, again, when I watched the Festival of Remembrance at the Albert Hall on television. What kept coming into my mind was a line in that hymn:
“Hold Thou Thy cross before my closing eyes.”
Those words express what I believe many people of the Christian faith hope for at the end of life. They emphasise how important it is to receive spiritual comfort.
For Catholics like me, the last rites are an important and spiritual passage, a sacrament, an opportunity for reflection on past failings and for seeking forgiveness and reconciliation. I bear witness from within my own family of the peace experienced by loved ones when they were supported in their faith by a priest administering the last rites.
People of faith, whether Jews, Muslims, Christians or indeed of any other faith belief, desire the spiritual support that their faith can give them at the end of life. More widely, I think that many of my friends who have no faith would always wish to be surrounded by family and friends at the end of that life. Let us ask ourselves: who among us would not hope to leave this life comforted by family and friends or, as in the case promoted in this amendment, by a priest?
I strongly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, who made it clear that this is a probing amendment and the matter does not require legislation. Rather, it requires a little bit of common sense, perhaps education, training and research, so that the blue-light services, especially the police, recognise this matter and treat a request such as the one that has prompted the tabling of this amendment in a way that will allow a minister of religion to be with a dying person at the end.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell of Beeston, for bringing this amendment to the Committee, particularly in such a selfless way in that she said that she was neither a Catholic nor particularly religious. Seeing the arrival of Sir David Amess’s body at the House this evening was very moving, and our thoughts are with his family. I thank the noble Baroness for saying that she was not second-guessing the police officers at the scene of that terrible tragedy, but, as she said, there was a local priest who was not allowed to give the last rites.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds gave a very moving and sensitive speech, and I agree with much of what he said. I should declare an interest both as a Christian but not a Roman Catholic and as a police officer who served for more than 30 years. Religious faith is important to people, but so is bringing offenders to justice, particularly those responsible for offences where fatal injuries or injuries expected to be fatal are inflicted. The contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, was extremely powerful in giving first-hand experience of that tension between the need to preserve evidence in order to convict those responsible and wanting to address the needs of the dying person and their family.
Securing forensic evidence is often vital to the identification and prosecution of offenders, as in the case of Sir David Amess. I agree that there needs to be a meeting of police and religious leaders—not just Roman Catholics—to ensure that both sides understand the needs of the other. Police officers should have a real understanding of the religious needs of people and the religious leaders should understand the needs of the police in these circumstances. As I said this afternoon in Oral Questions, surely there must be a role for government in bringing these two sides together, in facilitating this understanding and in ensuring that, after this understanding has been reached, operational police officers share it and know how to respond in these very difficult situations.
Interestingly, in groups of amendments that are to come, I refer to the valuable lessons from Northern Ireland to which I do not think we are paying enough attention. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, for her remarks.
My Lords, what a moving and powerful debate we have had this evening. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and her noble friend will have been moved by it as well. The real challenge that has been presented to the Minister and the Government is how to capture what has been said in this Chamber tonight in relation to the practice that takes place in very difficult and challenging circumstances.
I am not going to rush this, and I am pleased that noble Lords have not rushed this either, as this is too important a debate to be rushed. In speaking to their amendment, the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Masham, spoke in such a way that gave respect to the awfulness of what happened with David Amess. I pay tribute to the noble Baronesses. Out of the horror of that situation, they are trying to make something positive happen in future. We have all been moved by that. The challenge for the Government is how to do something about it.
I say gently to the Minister that the system will respond in a bureaucratic, almost insensitive way, by saying, “It’s really difficult, Minister. It’s very tough to do something about this.” This is one of those situations that requires the system to respond. Human needs to speak to system and make it work, and that is not easy—it really is not.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, brought her perspective from Northern Ireland. She did incredible work there in trying to ensure that, among the terrorist atrocities, somehow or other there was comfort for the dying and bereaved, as well as the pursuit of justice. That was a beacon in that situation, and they made it happen there. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, talked about the situation in his own family. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, made a very moving, personal statement about the horror of what happened to her and the tension between trying to comfort the dying while ensuring that the police were allowed to do their work.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made a brilliant speech. I am not a lawyer so, when I spoke just now, I spoke as a politician who demands that the system works. There are brilliant lawyers on both sides of this Chamber who can dissect the law; that is not me. I say to those with legal expertise, like the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that I may not have that legal expertise, but I know what the public would expect the system and the law to do. I know how they would expect the legal system, the courts and the police to respond, and how they would expect the system to work.
The phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, used was, “Who owns the death?” Who owns it? I will talk about myself because that is easier to do. Maybe I have got this wrong, but my sense is that, if I were attacked in the street and stabbed—God forbid that this happens to any of us, but if it happened to me and I was dying—I would not want a police officer ensuring that the crime scene was not compromised. If my wife, or my children, or my grandparents were nearby, that is who I would want to come. I would not care if the crime scene was compromised; I would not.
I know that that is difficult for the police because the police will want—as, of course, in generality, we would all want—the perpetrator to be caught, put before the courts and dealt with. I am just saying what Vernon Coaker, a human being, would want: I would want my family or my friend, if they were nearby, to be allowed to come and see me and talk to me, in the way that no doubt the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds has had to do on many occasions. I would want them to give me comfort, and to give me a sense that I could say goodbye properly to my loved ones.
I do not know what that means for the law, to be honest, or what it means for the guidance, but I do not believe that it is impossible to learn, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, laid out, from other countries or jurisdictions, or from what is done elsewhere, to find a means of balancing those two priorities in a more sensitive way than perhaps we see at the moment. That is all that this Chamber is asking for—and that is what the Minister needs to demand from the system. The system will say, “It’s tough, it’s difficult. We need to do that, but we have also got to preserve the crime scene.” The Chamber is saying, “Yes, preserve the crime scene; yes, let’s catch the perpetrators, but not at the expense of everything else.” Let it not be at the expense of human beings knowing what is best for themselves—of individuals at the point of death being able to choose who they want to see.
I suggest that the majority of us would want our family with us, even if it meant some compromise to the crime scene. That is what I think and what I believe this Chamber is saying and demanding. The debate has been incredibly moving; people have laid out their souls. They have done it with a sense of purpose, to say to the law and the system: it needs to change; this cannot happen again. If this had happened to somebody else, I believe, as somebody else said, that David Amess would be saying the same as the rest of us. Maybe that is a fitting tribute to him as well.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, for raising the important issue of cuckooing. This is when criminals, mainly drug dealers, take over the homes of vulnerable people. It is a very serious and not uncommon problem, as the figures cited by the noble Lord gave witness to. I look forward to the Minister explaining why this amendment is not necessary or what alternative the Government propose.
I note the work that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has done on modern slavery over many years, and thank him for it. It is right for us to acknowledge that in speaking to this amendment.
I want to draw particular attention to the section of the noble Lord’s amendment that covers something that is often not recognised to the degree it should be when it comes to county lines gangs’ operations and the way cuckooing works. Proposed new sub-paragraph (ii) talks about when a person
“is unable to give free and informed consent”.
That is the crucial bit. Too often, people are asked, “Why have you allowed this to happen? Why have you let them take over your property?” It is almost as though they have given their consent. But they are sometimes so frightened that they give their consent because, if they do not, the consequences will be such that they live in fear. Somehow, the law does not seem to recognise that.
Proposed new paragraph (c)(ii) refers to someone being unable to give “free and informed consent”. This is absolutely crucial to stopping the offence of cuckooing. People sometimes appear almost as though they have left a property of their own free will, saying, “Here you are. Come into my property. Use it for drugs and county lines operations.” Then, sometimes—not always, but sometimes—the police say, “Well, what did you do about it? Why didn’t you stop it?” That does not reflect the real world. People are terrified; they are frightened. They are told, “If you don’t let us use your property and get out of it, or if you tell anyone about it, we are going to do X, Y or Z to you or to your family.” That is sometimes not recognised, but it is the crucial part of what the noble Lord’s amendment gets at. If we want to stop cuckooing, we must understand that people are coerced into giving their consent; often, the law seems to treat them as though they have given their consent willingly. If we are to stop cuckooing, we must understand the context in which it occurs. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to reflect on that.
My Lords, I will speak briefly. I thank all noble Lords who spoke to this. It is a controversial amendment, but I think it has been spoken to quite sensitively, all things considered; maybe it is the lateness of the hour—maybe that was a good move.
I agree with the previous speaker that difficulties in the drafting of an amendment cannot just be dismissed as modalities because when we put forward draft amendments to legislation and say “must” we need to examine what that means. If, as the amendment suggests:
“Police forces in England and Wales must keep a record of the sex registered at birth of each person”,
how is that going to be executed and what will the consequences be? One has to imagine that one is a younger version of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in the police station back in the day. People turn up to record whatever it is—a theft, shoplifting, burglary, or a violent offence. How is this recording of the birth sex as well as the subsequently declared gender going to happen and what is the sanction for the “must”? That is not a modality, it is what law requires; there have to be consequences to a “must” being breached. Whatever is really going on, I know there are really sensitive issues in our society at the moment of sex and gender which we will not, I suspect, resolve tonight—we might, but maybe not.
I agreed with my noble friend about the value of data. Whether in the health service or criminal justice system, data is great, but there is another side too, which I think my noble friend acknowledged: that data will put some people off. There are other jurisdictions not far from here where people are really nervous even about declaring their race because of obvious historic reasons for being sensitive about declaring your race at the police station—let alone declaring your birth sex.
We need to see the yin and yang of this particular debate. On the one hand is the brilliant research and analysis of crime we could do if we had more and more data. But on the other hand—and this is not completely different from the previous debate—what we want is victims to come forward and criminal justice to be done. We do not want to do anything that discourages victims from coming forward and reporting crime. That includes people who feel anxious about certain sensitive pieces of information about themselves. We would never want them to put off going to the police station for fear that they say too much. For instance, a person who has been burgled thinking “Was I burgled just because I was burgled, or because I am a trans person? Do I really want to draw more attention to myself because I am an anxious victim of crime?” We need to think about that, let alone the poor old practicalities for a younger version of the very youthful-looking noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for introducing my speech. This amendment is designed to compel police forces to
“keep a record of the sex registered at birth”
of anyone who is a crime victim or who is arrested by the police for a crime. It also forces the police to
“keep a record of the acquired gender of each person with a gender recognition certificate”
who is a crime victim of crime or is arrested for a crime.
It also says that providing this data to the Secretary of State will not be an offence under the Gender Recognition Act. Again, I want to try to focus on the amendment and not get drawn into the wider debate, as far as I can. As the noble Baroness pointed out, I was a police officer for over 30 years, so I want to look at this from the perspective of the police.
How will a police officer know what the sex registered at birth is—thumbscrews, or a chromosome test—even without the consent of the victim? Maybe they could force victims to give their fingerprints, in the hope that they may have had their fingerprints taken before they transitioned and that will prove it—except they may have had them taken after they transitioned, and that will then show their acquired gender, so that will not work. Will victims have to produce their birth certificates before they are even allowed to report a crime? Of course, if someone has acquired a gender recognition certificate and used it to have their birth certificate changed, as they are legally allowed to do, the birth certificate will show their acquired gender, so that will not work either. How exactly will police forces keep a record of something they do not know and have no reasonable way of finding out unless the victim or perpetrator volunteers the information?
If the victim or the perpetrator is a trans person, they are legally protected from having to disclose that information. “Well, it’s obvious,” some people will say, “you can tell, can’t you?” I have met trans men who you would never believe were assigned female sex at birth and trans women who you would never believe were assigned male sex at birth. I have also, embarrassingly, been with a lesbian friend of mine, assigned female sex at birth and who has always identified as a woman, who was stopped going into a women’s toilet in a top London restaurant because they wrongly thought that she was a man.
The supporters of this amendment may say that if they do find out, maybe the police can record it—that maybe the victim is reporting a transphobic hate crime or for some other reason volunteers that information.
The second part of the amendment is totally unnecessary. Section 22(4) of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 already states:
“But it is not an offence under this section to disclose protected information relating to a person if … (b) that person has agreed to the disclosure of the information”—
for example, if they are the victim of a trans hate crime—or, as stated later in the same section, at paragraph (f),
“the disclosure is for the purpose of preventing or investigating crime”.
So the police can use that information already, without fear of being prosecuted. The amendment is not necessary if the victim or perpetrator volunteers the information.
My noble friend Lady Brinton asked if she would have to declare every time she becomes a victim of crime, even if it is a burglary, that she has a disability? What about me? Will the next step be that I have to tell the police that I am gay before I can report that my flat has been broken into? For what purpose should victims have to out themselves? What if I get caught stealing a bottle of Marks & Spencer Prosecco?
It is very good, actually; I had some on Saturday. I have not tried to do that but if I did, will I have to admit being gay, as well as being a shoplifter?
In 2018, the Government tentatively estimated that there were between 200,000 and 500,000 trans people in the UK. Noble Lords have said they like data; I am going to give them lots of data. Between the Gender Recognition Act coming into force and 2018, 4,910 trans people have been issued with a gender recognition certificate. If we take the top of the range of the estimate, I make that 0.75% of the population identifying as trans and 0.0076% of the overall population having a gender recognition certificate, or less than one in 10,000 people.
Even if a victim went through the whole criminal justice process without disclosing, and without the police establishing the sex assigned to them at birth, if they were a trans woman, it would increase the number of woman victims, and if they were a trans man, it would diminish the number of woman victims, and taken together, and taking account of the total number of trans people, it would even out. Taking into account that only a fraction of them will become victims of crime who report it to the police, any difference to the crime statistics will be statistically insignificant.
The police arrest, on average, 12 in 1,000 people each year—three in 1,000 women. I do not know how many of the estimated 7.5 in 1,000 trans people are trans women and how many are trans men. Of course, if trans women are counted in the female offender figures, they will also be counted in the female population figures, boosting both the numerator and the denominator. I was never any good at mathematics—I left that to my twin brother—but it is quite clear to me that trans people are not going to make any statistically significant difference to the crime figures unless we assume, and there is no factual or statistical basis to think otherwise, that trans people are more likely to commit crime or to commit particular types of crime.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, before my noble friend Lady Blake comes to move her Amendment 292H, everybody will have seen what the plans are for today by looking at the groupings. They basically involve five groups dealing with things that have stood over from the pre-protest section of the Bill, and then three or four groups dealing with all the protest sections in the Bill, including one group, I think, dealing with all the proposed new clauses that have been added.
On any basis, the grouping is inappropriate. The proposed new clauses have the additional feature that they have not been debated at all in the Commons, from where this Bill originated. They have had no Second Reading of any sort in this House and now, to have Committee stage with them all crammed in effect into one or two groups means that there will be no proper scrutiny in this House.
Can I make a suggestion and ask a question? In relation to the new clauses, could we treat, without any additional formality, the proceedings today as a Second Reading in effect and then have an additional day in Committee so that there is proper consideration? In addition to that, could one have more time to deal with these very important clauses?
My concern is that this marginalises the House of Lords in relation to considering these provisions in detail—although I am sure that was not deliberate on the part of the Whips. It may well be that these provisions are needed; our role is to look at them line by line. The effect of the way in which this has been done is that now that is not possible. The House as a whole was entitled to look for protection in that respect from the Leader of the House and the Government Chief Whip. Instead, they have just gone along with the Government, like so many institutions, in pushing the institution to one side—and it is not right.
I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in what he has just said. I have heard two rumours—one, that the Government Chief Whip is urging people to keep their comments on the Bill today short. I wish to declare to the Government Chief Whip that that is not possible, bearing in mind the number and complexity of issues that we are supposed to debate today. The other rumour that I have heard is that, if the House is still debating at 2 am, only then will the debate be adjourned. If that is right, looking at the timetable, that means that the most contentious parts of the Bill—the new amendments, as the noble and learned Lord said, which have not even been considered by the House of Commons—will be debated either side of midnight. That is no way for this House to be treated.
My Lords, I have not heard the rumour about keeping comments short. We are about to begin the 11th day in Committee of this Bill. In total, this House has sat for 60 hours in Committee, including starting early and going beyond 10 pm, as well as allowing three extra days. By the time when we finish today—and we intend to do so—we will have considered and debated more than 450 amendments.
As for the new clauses, they have been agreed with the usual channels and with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I would say to noble Lords who have spoken that we intend to finish Committee today.
Can the Minister then confirm, if the Government accept that it is unreasonable to force through these new amendments—these eighteen and a half pages of new offences and police powers— and that therefore they are going to withdraw those amendments, they also undertake to have the accepted gap between Committee and Report, which is 14 days, rather than the shortened period that has appeared in Forthcoming Business?
If the Committee will allow, I can answer some of these questions. We intend to have an Order of Consideration Motion so that, on Report, items will be taken as much as they can be in the same order as they are in Committee—so there will be plenty of time to consider these matters. We have discussed, in the usual channels, how the arrangements for this Bill should take place. I completely accept that it might go quite late tonight. We have spent a lot of time on this Bill—I accept that. But this is the Committee stage, and it cannot go on for ever because, if it goes on and on, the House of Lords looks as if it is preventing the Bills that have been passed by the House of Commons from going ahead.
The noble Lord shakes his head. As my noble friend the Minister has said, there has been ample time to talk about this Bill—and all we are saying is that, after three extra days, we have to draw this to a conclusion at some stage. This is not an unreasonable number of amendments to deal with—we have often done this in the past. The key, of course, is that we actually get on with it and that noble Lords have a view to the rest of the Members of this House. None of us wants to stay up too late. It is perfectly doable to have this number of groups—we have done it before—if noble Lords are able to be brief and succinct and make their point.
On the government amendments, the idea of having them in Committee is that we can debate them today. My noble friend has said that she will withdraw them, and that allows Report to go ahead—and, if necessary, noble Lords can vote on them.
But they will be scrutinised, at the Committee stage and then at the Report stage.
My Lords, just because you cram 58 amendments, most of which are government amendments, into two groups does not shorten the debate.
Amendment 292H
Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.
What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Thornhill has spoken comprehensively on these amendments, so I can be brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, for introducing the amendment. She rightly points to the failure of the current legislation to adequately deal with this problem on the basis of the facts that she presented. Something clearly needs to be done to ensure that the police play their part. If South Yorkshire Police can do it, why cannot every force? We support this amendment.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his Amendment 292J. Noble Lords may have seen the ITV “News at Ten” last night on how young people are increasingly being exploited, particularly by drug dealers. That is in addition to a 6% increase in reported domestic violence during lockdown, when many more children would have become vulnerable. There is too much emphasis on the criminal justice system as a way to deal with these vulnerable young people, rather than there being a statutory duty on local authorities, the NHS and the police, as this amendment suggests. We support it.
The noble Lord, Lord Best, introduced Amendments 320 and 328. I remember being told as a young constable about the antiquated legislation—the Vagrancy Act 1824—introduced to deal with soldiers returning from the Napoleonic wars. That was in 1976—not the Napoleonic wars, when I was a young constable; they were a bit earlier. People should not be criminalised simply for begging and sleeping rough. There is adequate alternative legislation to deal with anti-social behaviour and the Vagrancy Act is now redundant. As the explanatory note says, these amendments would require police officers
“to balance protection of the community with sensitivity to the problems that cause people to engage in begging or sleeping rough and ensure that general public order enforcement powers should not in general be used in relation to people sleeping rough, and should be used in relation to people begging only where no other approach is reasonably available.”
On that basis, we support these amendments as well.
My Lords, perhaps I may begin by saying that I have great sympathy with the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, to firmly stamp out the illegal eviction of tenants. This distressing activity has no place in our society and it is an unacceptable practice carried out by rogue landlords, perpetrated on tenants.
I totally agree that the police and local authorities need to work together to tackle that. Many noble Lords have spoken in today’s Committee who have experience of this type of multiagency working. It is essential in terms of supporting the vulnerable, and there are many examples of that. I always talk about the troubled families programme, which is one such intervention but it is such an important one because some people have multiple problems. It is a fantastic way for agencies to sort them out together. Local authorities and the police also have mechanisms in place to work collaboratively to tackle criminal landlords. The police are also able to establish protocols for information sharing, which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, spoke about. We expect them to use those protocols to their full extent to aid investigations into illegal evictions and enforce the law.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, has examples that suggest a lack of effective co-operation, I should be very happy to pass them on to my colleagues in DLUHC. As has been pointed out, there are lots of good examples of how interventions have worked well, particularly in Westminster. If there is an issue, the solution here is not more legislation. The existing powers we have are sufficient. But I accept that it is incumbent on the police and local authorities to work collaboratively to tackle crime in their areas, including on illegal eviction investigations. As regards the point about police saying that issues are a civil matter, which the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of Cradley and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, mentioned, the police have powers of arrest and it is important that those powers are used appropriately, including on illegal eviction investigations.
What I was trying to say was that legislation is in place but, if it is not always followed in practice, it would be very helpful to know about it. However, I accept the final point that the noble Baroness makes.
I turn to the issues that the noble Lord raises in his amendment. If you consider first children impacted by domestic abuse, it is totally unacceptable that some children have to witness abuse carried out in their home by those whom they should trust the most. This Government have demonstrated their absolute resolve to tackle domestic abuse and its impact on children, both in legislation earlier this year—the Domestic Abuse Act—and through the upcoming domestic abuse strategy.
As part of the landmark Domestic Abuse Act, children are recognised as victims of domestic abuse in their own right where they see, hear or experience the effects of domestic abuse. This is an important step which will help ensure that locally commissioned services continue to consider and address the needs of children. Further, the Act created the role of the domestic abuse commissioner in statute to provide public leadership on domestic abuse issues and to oversee and monitor the provision of services for victims, including children. The provisions of the Act came into force on 1 November.
It is really important that young victims receive the right support at the right time—which was precisely the wording that the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, used—to help them cope and recover and to mitigate the long-term impact of their experiences. We are determined to continue to improve the standard of support for victims of crime. This year the Government will provide £150 million to victim support services, which includes an extra £51 million to increase support for rape and domestic abuse victims. That includes support for children and young people.
Through the children affected by domestic abuse fund we have provided £3 million this year for specialist services for children who have been affected by domestic abuse. This funding is enabling a range of therapeutic interventions for children, such as one-to-one or group support. In addition, the Home Office is this year providing £169,000-worth of funding to Operation Encompass, a scheme which connects the police to schools through a specialist support helpline for teachers concerned about children experiencing domestic abuse. The helpline was established during the Covid-19 pandemic, as noble Lords might recall, and we are continuing to fund it this year.
Turning to the matter of child criminal exploitation, the Government are investing in specialist support for under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in the three largest exporting force areas—London, the West Midlands and Merseyside. The Government are also funding the Children’s Society’s Prevention Programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. This has included supporting the #LookCloser public awareness campaign, which focuses on increasing awareness and encouraging reporting of the signs and indicators of child exploitation. We also fund Missing People’s SafeCall service, which is a national confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation.
Through cross-government efforts we are working to identify areas of learning with regard to child criminal exploitation and improving our response to it. The Home Office and the Department for Education are currently testing the effectiveness of how multi-agency safeguarding partnerships respond to serious violence and county lines through a series of deep dives. We have recently received the findings from those reviews and are considering the best way to share the learning and practice with local areas.
In the wider landscape, the noble Lord will be aware that the Government will be consulting on a victims’ Bill. As part of that consultation, we will seek views on the provision of community-based support services for victims, including children. The consultation will carefully look at how local bodies collaborate to support victims and will consider the evidence to determine where legislation could be used more effectively. Therefore, although I am very sympathetic to the aims of the noble Lord’s amendment, I hope that he is sufficiently reassured by the extensive ongoing efforts to tackle these two issues, the existing arrangements in place and, indeed, our plans to consider the duty to collaborate further as part of the victims’ Bill.
Finally, in relation to Amendments 320 and 328, I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Best, that the time has come—
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. Before we get on to the Vagrancy Act and the other amendments, she talked about treating children as victims of domestic violence if they witness it, and about child criminal exploitation. There is a third group: children who witness violence, particularly in the home, and suffer adverse childhood experiences as a result which lead them into committing crime. I remember attending a juvenile detention facility in Scotland, where almost every child in custody had experienced violence in the home as a cause. The Minister talked about two issues, but there is this third issue of adverse childhood experiences leading to offending behaviour, which I believe the noble Lord’s amendment addresses in a way that the Minister has not.
My intention was not to leave out that issue; we could have a whole debate on the effect of childhood abuse, trauma and witnessing violence on the future prospects of a person when they become an adult and their increased likelihood of going on to abuse, but my intention was not to dismiss it. I apologise that I did not mention it, but the intention certainly was not to dismiss it at all.
Finally, I move to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best. As I said, the time has come to reconsider the Vagrancy Act—some of the language that was used is so antiquated that it would perhaps be alien to some of this generation. I agree that nobody should be criminalised just because they have nowhere to live. Back in 2018, we committed to review the legislation following mixed views among stakeholders regarding the continued relevance of the Act, given that it is, as noble Lords have said, nearly 200 years old. I am sure that noble Lords can understand that announcing the outcome of this review has been delayed by several factors. One noble Lord mentioned the dedicated response for vulnerable individuals who are sleeping rough during the pandemic, which was outstanding.
It has been imperative to understand the full picture of how and why the Vagrancy Act is used, and what impact any change to or repeal of the Act will have. Rough sleeping and begging are complex issues, and the Act continues to be used. The review considered a range of factors and at its heart has been the experiences and perceptions of relevant stakeholders, including local authorities and the police. The Act continues to be used to tackle begging, and, if repealed, a legislative gap would be left that might impact on the police’s ability to respond to it.
The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is not an alternative in this context. The powers in the Act are available to police and local authorities to tackle specific forms of behaviour that meet the legal tests in that legislation—for example, behaviour that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to a victim or community. As I have said, begging is complex, but plainly it does not always come with these forms of accompanying behaviours.
My Lords, Amendments 292K and 292L in my name seek to create a criminal offence of desecration of a corpse and concealment of a corpse. At present, there are only common-law offences of preventing a lawful burial and obstructing a coroner by concealing a body.
Marie McCourt, the mother of Helen McCourt, still does not know what happened to her daughter who disappeared on 9 February 1988, or where her body was hidden or disposed of. Marie is one of those extraordinary women who absolutely refused to stop looking for her daughter, even though Helen’s murderer, who was convicted on clear DNA evidence, has not only served his term in prison but been released on licence. Despite being pressed repeatedly by the authorities over the years, he has refused to say where Helen’s body was left or what happened to it.
Marie has been arguing for decades that the desecration and concealment of a corpse is an extra-heavy sentence on the victim’s loved ones. She has supported the families of many other victims who have seen their loved ones murdered but have no remains to bury, or have heard of unspeakable desecration of their bodies.
In 2015 Marie started to campaign for a change in the law for these killers, seeking to require them to reveal where their victims’ remains were before being considered for parole. In July 2019, she was successful in getting that law changed—but not in time for her daughter’s killer. Marie was not doing it just for her, her family or Helen’s friends. She does not want anyone else to go through the agony they have faced for over three decades.
Others have also spoken out: Coral Jones, Tony Cox and Lesley Rees are the parents and family members of April Jones, Lorraine Cox and Michael O’Leary, who were also not just murdered but had their bodies desecrated by their murderers. Some remains were dismembered and some were burned. These families have had the extra distress of not knowing what happened to part or all their loved ones’ bodies. For these families there is no closure. More recently, Sarah Everard’s remains were burned by her murderer—although in her case police were able to find her remains.
At present, with the common-law offence of preventing a lawful burial, and these days with excellent forensic skills such as those used by police and forensic staff in the Sarah Everard case, it is possible to identify not just remains but also links with the murderer. The common-law offence of obstructing the coroner by concealing a body is rarely used, and there are no consequences for a convicted killer who continues to conceal the whereabouts of a body. Some killers enjoy having this last part of control over their appalling acts. They know that most families will never have a day without reliving the distress of their loved one being murdered. Refusing to disclose what they have done with the body, or where they have concealed a corpse or partial remains, is a form of control.
I thank Marie McCourt, Fiona Duffy and Claire Waxman, the London victims’ commissioner, and her office, for helping to brief me this. There can be few things worse for a family than hearing that a loved one has been murdered. To then learn that their remains have been further abused or have never been found causes unimaginable distress. The current laws are inadequate and mostly not used by prosecutors. These amendments say that these two offences should become criminal offences where an offender has done an intentional act of disrespect towards the deceased person’s remains. The second amendment makes it a criminal offence for an offender to refuse to co-operate in the recovery of their victim’s remains. These offences will punish an offender who has committed these unspeakable acts beyond murder, and also perhaps begin to bring closure to grieving families. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Brinton for introducing these amendments, which we support. The “Helen’s Law” campaign has achieved a great deal by persisting in campaigning for victims and their families by ensuring that failure to disclose the whereabouts of a victim’s body can increase the killer’s time in custody. These amendments go further, as my noble friend has explained. She has worked with Helen’s mother, Marie McCourt, and others on these amendments, proposing to create specific offences of desecration of a corpse and concealment of a body.
These amendments address serious and real human suffering caused by preventing a victim’s family from recovering the body of their loved one, whose life has already been cruelly snatched from them. The proposed offences would respond to that cruelty in a way that may be inadequate in reducing the hurt, but at least they reflect the justified anger we all feel when killers compound their inhuman actions with further callousness and inhumanity. As my noble friend explained, the existing legislation is not only inadequate but rarely used. We support her amendments.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for the clarity with which she has put this forward. The driving force behind this amendment is Marie McCourt whose daughter Helen McCourt was murdered by Ian Simms, and the body was never found. Ian Simms never indicated where the body was, refused to acknowledge what had happened, and was eventually released on parole. Prior to him being released on parole, Marie had campaigned successfully for a change in the law, which said in effect that if you did not indicate where the body was, parole should normally be refused.
Now, very effectively and with great understanding, Marie McCourt has pressed for a change in the law to make sure that there is, in effect, a crime of desecrating the body of somebody you have murdered. This is a greater problem than previously. In recent times, 54 murder trials have taken place without a body. We on this side of the Committee strongly support this offence. It might be asked whether this matters if you are being charged with murder. It matters to the victims’ families and therefore it should matter to the law. That is why we support this amendment.
My Lords, I believe the case for this amendment has already overwhelmingly been made from all sides of this Committee. The Green group would have attached our name to it to make it even more cross-party, had there been space.
I go to the words of one victim that, I believe, sum this up. They are taken from an article in the popular mainstream magazine Vogue, published this week. They are from a single victim whom it called “Chloe”, whose stalker was jailed after breaching protective orders more than a dozen times, even though he had never been convicted of stalking. Chloe told Vogue:
“The system designed to protect us is broken and reactive. It waits for harm … I will live in fear until the day he dies.”
Those are the words of lived experience. The system is broken. I believe the case for this amendment and for a strategy has been overwhelmingly made.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for moving Amendment 292N on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove; I wish her well.
Victims of stalking, including female Members of Parliament, are being failed, as the noble Baroness has just said. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, set out in his opening speech, there were 892,000 victims of stalking in the year to March 2020, according to the crime survey. The noble Lord pointed out the findings of the HMICFRS report on violence against women and girls regarding the inconsistent approach across different police forces to stalking protection orders; that the majority of orders had no positive obligation on the perpetrator; and that officers in force areas were unaware that the perpetrators were even subject to the orders, so there was no enforcement of the orders.
There is clearly a need to address perpetrator behaviour, in addition to protecting victims. My noble friend Lady Brinton said—and I agree—that stalking is not being taken seriously enough. That is as much a cultural issue for the police and courts as it is for society as a whole. There is clearly a need for a stalking strategy to ensure a consistent and effective response from all the authorities involved, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, just said—not just the criminal justice system but charities and others that offer services to address the behaviour of offenders. We support this amendment.
I will be very brief as the case for this amendment has been so eloquently put by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and other noble Lords who have spoken. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, who unfortunately cannot be in her place tonight, and to the other noble Lords who are signatories to the amendment, for their tireless work on this issue. In that context, I also pay particular tribute to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, who cannot be in the Committee today, for her dedication and years of leadership on this issue.
I know the Minister is also passionate about this issue, but for years the House has found itself returning to this debate, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, and each time the answer from the Government is largely that the current system is adequate although improvements are needed in how it is delivered. Yet each time we come back to it, more women have been killed and more lives devastated. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope we can now look forward to a clear and encouraging response from the Government.
In response to that and in support of the broad thrust of my noble friend Lord Coaker’s probing amendment—I think it is fair to call it that—I have long had concerns about public space protection orders in general, and I defer to no one as a civil libertarian, but there is a great tradition in human rights thinking for child protection. So my instinctive response to the noble Baroness is that it is not because the protesters are anti-vaxxers and I disagree with them, it is that it is at school. They are young and potentially vulnerable people, and it does not seem proportionate or fair to me that we as grown-up legislators in this place take greater protection for our immediate vicinity than we give to even primary school children up and down the country, regardless of the nature of the protest.
The point about free speech and freedom to protest being a two-way street is incredibly important, and I suspect that we will return to it in a forthcoming group, but on this issue, for me, at least, the principle is not that I think that this is dangerous speech or disinformation—it is out there anyway online, et cetera—it is that no young person, particularly a very young person, should be subject to an aggressive demonstration, whether or not it is one that I would approve of, on their way to or from school.
Some of us remember the Holy Cross school dispute in Northern Ireland some years ago. The reason why Her Majesty’s Government had to intervene with soldiers, and so on—it was tragic—was not to take sides in the dispute, it was to protect young children, who do not have the same robustness as an older person and should not feel scared on their way to or back from school. I would take that view whether or not the protest by adults from outside the school community was one with which I agreed—about the climate catastrophe or whatever else it happened to be.
It is so important at this stage in the evening, before we get to the next group, to introduce the concept of the two-way street in relation to free speech. So I support my noble friend Lord Coaker in the thrust of his amendment, about schools being special—particularly primary schools, but possibly also secondary schools; that will be up for more detailed discussion—and needing some level of protection from whatever kind of protest by people from outside the school community.
I add that caveat because I think children should be able to protest themselves if they want to. I would not want inadvertently to do anything that caused criminal sanction for children and young people who chose to launch their own protest about whatever it was.
I see this very much as a probing amendment, but the status quo, whereby we have these protections as legislators in the vicinity around the Palace of Westminster —and companies have greater protections from pickets than primary school children have from aggressive demonstrations from whatever quarter—does not seem right. Human rights principles are: always protect children first, and any interference then has to be necessary and proportionate. But equal treatment and the two-way street, particularly in relation to freedom of speech and the right to protest, are crucial.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who moved the amendment, which is about the need for fast-track exclusion zones around schools to prevent, in particular, anti-vaccination protests in the vicinity of schools.
If she will allow me, I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I think after we finished on Monday night, how important it is to have her voice in the Chamber to test these sorts of issues. All I would say to her on this occasion is that the amendment talks about “activities carried on” that have
“a detrimental effect on the quality of life for pupils and staff”.
So it is not simply a question of banning any demonstration in the vicinity of a school. It would have to have that detrimental effect. I understand that that is a subjective judgment, but at least there is something there, rather than just a blanket ban on anybody protesting about anything at all.
Noble Lords will not need me to tell them that this is not about protecting children, perhaps older school-age children, from not being vaccinated. It is about protecting the whole community because, as we know from previous times in the pandemic, there is a risk of schoolchildren infecting vulnerable parents and grandparents. We also know from the health data that being double-vaccinated does not necessarily protect you completely from the worst effects of Covid, and in particular long Covid, although it gives you much better protection. On the news yesterday, an expert was talking about the fact that, although Covid has mild effects on children, it is not known how much they could be affected by long Covid. So this is not simply about a demonstration outside a school; this is a wider public health issue. However, I understand that, although that is what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is aiming at here, the amendment, if passed, would have wider implications than just for anti-vaccination protests.
Amendment 292S, from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, relates to online racism against footballers and enabling football banning orders to be made against those guilty of online racial hatred directed at a member of a football team. He is probably the best-qualified noble Lord to talk on this issue, bearing in mind his experience on the Front Bench in the Home Office under the Labour Government who introduced the banning orders in the first place, and the beneficial effect that they have had in rooting out racism in football. It is a serious problem.
Talking about a hierarchy of diversity is fraught with danger. But, as a gay man, I have always considered racism to be a far more serious issue than, say, homophobia. Some people might argue against this; but I could conceal my sexuality if people from a different planet did not know who I was or what my background was. But you cannot hide your colour; you cannot avoid racism in the way that some gay people, at least, could avoid homophobia; it would not be obvious to people.
I do not know of any professional footballers who have been open about their sexuality, because of their concerns about being open about it. Hopefully, as years go by and social attitudes change, some professional footballers will be open about their sexuality. They should be able to benefit from similar protection, so this legislation should not exclusively provide protection for racism, which is the major issue at the moment, while professional footballers’ sexuality is not. This is a good idea, and hopefully the Government will discuss how this can be taken forward.
This group is diverse—not in the sense of “diversity,” but in terms of the different subjects covered. Amendment 292U, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, highlights a loophole in the law. My understanding—although I am not sure as there was no explanatory note—is that it is unlawful for scrap metal dealers to pay cash for scrap metal, but it is not against the law to sell it on for cash. That is the loophole. A scrap metal dealer who surreptitiously acquires stolen metal could sell it on for cash, and the noble Lord’s amendment would disallow that. The payment would have to be made by a traceable means, thus clamping down in the other side of the transaction, which makes sense.
We have debated the issue of scrap metal and the impact on the railway system and churches, for example, and the problem with catalytic converters. As shortages of resources are exacerbated by countries coming out of lockdown and the demand for raw materials grows, scrap metal will become an increasingly important issue. Therefore, closing this loophole regarding the other side of the transaction seems sensible, and we support it.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for taking part in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker asked if I could shed any light on the grouping methodology. No, I cannot, but I salute the collegiate nature of the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for explaining what he describes as a probing amendment to tackle the issue of disruptive anti-vaccination protests outside schools. Like him, I stand by people’s right to protest, but as I am sure we will debate when we get to Part 3 of the Bill, this is not an unqualified right, and there is a line to be drawn. When crossed, it is right that the police or, in this case, local authorities should be able to take appropriate and proportionate action to protect schoolchildren and their parents, as well as teachers and other school staff.
The police and local authorities have a range of powers which can be used to manage protest activity affecting schools. This includes powers in the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests, measures in the Education Act 1996 to prevent nuisance and disturbances on school premises, and measures in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014—as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—targeted at anti-social behaviour. The police also have their common law powers to prevent a breach of the peace.
Despite prominent media reporting, the scale of the issue is quite small. I concur with the noble Lord’s statistics, which I have seen. The issue has affected 68 schools in the various geographies he talked about, and the number of protesters ranges from one to about 20. But the statistics do not add any colour to the human experience people are suffering, so I take the noble Lord’s point.
These people typically hand out leaflets and display placards, with some serving “liability notices” or “cease and desist” letters to head teachers. The Government continue to closely monitor anti-vaccination activity occurring at schools. There is close working between the vaccine programme, the police, local authorities and other partners to gather intelligence and provide proportionate mitigations to keep people safe.
My Lords, we are now on to arguably the most controversial aspect of the Bill—the public order measures. The debate began at 8.30 pm and is made even more controversial by the Government tabling more than 18 pages of new amendments last week, creating new offences and draconian new powers for the police that the other place was not even aware of when it passed the Bill. Not only that, but debate has been concertinaed into one day, on both the existing and the new measures, and, with the collusion of the Official Opposition, the vital two-week gap between Committee and Report is being shortened, further curtailing proper scrutiny. This Government are behaving unacceptably and Labour are letting them get away with it. Of course, I make no criticism of my hard-working and conscientious comrades on the Labour Front Bench, nor indeed of the government Ministers on the Bill, who will no doubt say they are just following orders; the criticism is of the usual channels.
I am speaking on every group today, bar one, so I have been unable to eat or have a proper break; it is a bit like being back on the Job—with a capital J, for the benefit of Hansard. No wonder observers think I look knackered, to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.
As other noble Lords have said, this legislation should be a separate Bill because of the many fundamental issues around people’s human rights. I said last week that my comments on serious violence reduction orders were the longest I had made in eight years in the House. I am going to exceed that, and I will explain why—it will become clear.
It was gone midnight on another day of Committee when the Minister said four times that he would keep his remarks short because of the lateness of the hour. My response was that the Bill needs to be properly scrutinised and I do not care what time of night it is. I promise not to speak for more than two minutes on each amendment in this group, so, if noble Lords will give me 54 minutes, that should be enough.
For the information of the Committee, I was involved in public order policing throughout my policing career. I was deployed at Notting Hill Carnival in various roles for seven consecutive years—I can still hear—and at the Grunwick trade dispute, and the Lewisham, Southall and Brixton riots, as a senior officer, as the officer in overall command, and as gold commander at numerous events, having been selected and trained and regularly retrained to maintain my position in the small cadre of advanced trained senior officers in public order policing. This involved practical exercises, in riot gear, with commanding officers, and involved missiles and petrol bombs, as well as weekend table-top exercises with people from the media and community groups, looking at the practical consequences of banning or imposing conditions on protests.
I was, however, fortunate to spend time away from operational policing, being sponsored to undertake a full-time degree course during the miners’ strike, in which I took no part, other than to give money to support miners’ families. I think it is important that the House understands where I am coming from. I am also grateful to Liberty for its briefing.
I start with Amendment 293, in the name of the noble Lord, Lords Dubs, which I have signed. Not only is the right to protest a human right enshrined in the Human Rights Act but it is a right that British people have had for centuries. The police have recent history that is relevant here. Up to and including the early 2000s, the police had been taking an increasingly hard line with protestors, frequently using techniques such as kettling—which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, mentioned—where protestors, and many innocent bystanders, were contained in a small area and not allowed to leave except in groups of two of three, sometimes requiring those leaving to be photographed and to give their names and addresses.
As a result of violent incidents in 2009 at the G20 London summit protests, the Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded that the Metropolitan Police should review its crowd-control methods, including kettling. As a result, the Metropolitan Police, for a while at least, changed emphasis, stating that the police role was to facilitate peaceful protest, and, interestingly, putting women senior officers in charge of some of the most controversial protests. This amendment is an important reminder of the recent history of policing protest in this country, and the dangers of the emphasis being placed on controlling protest rather than facilitating protest.
It is also important to comment on the origins of this legislation in connection with this amendment. The Home Secretary asked Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to look specifically at whether new legislation, further offences and stronger police powers were necessary. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, Matt Parr, a retired Royal Navy rear admiral, conducted the review.
I read the report with interest because, as the Guardian reported on 31 March this year:
“The official policing inspectorate showed repeated bias in favour of the police and against peaceful protesters as it compiled a report which backed a government clampdown, a whistleblower has alleged.”
The allegations were that HMICFRS wrote to the Home Secretary five months before the report was published, saying that it backed the need to change the laws. The Home Secretary replied—again, I quote the Guardian:
“Protests have proved a significant challenge over the last year and I am keen to ensure that the police have the powers and capabilities they need to help address the disruption they face. Your findings will help me to do that.”
The whistleblower, who had worked for HMIC for more than five years, said:
“The purpose of the report was not to collect evidence and then make a decision, but rather to collect evidence to support the decision that had already been made”.
I have read that report. I have also read the report into the Sarah Everard Clapham Common vigil by the same author. I agree with the whistleblower that the contents of both reports do not match the conclusions.
Almost all police forces outside London said that the limiting factor on policing protest was the number of police officers available to enforce existing laws, not a lack of legislation. Indeed, as we will see—yes, I am only just getting started—despite what the Government say, these proposals are based on a false premise. The Police Federation, which represents 130,00 front-line police officers, was not even consulted about these proposals. In my discussions with the federation, it is, to say the least—and to use a word that has been popular this evening—uneasy about them.
Amendments 294, 295, 299, 300, 303, 305 and 306 refer to new powers to control protests on the basis of them being too noisy, marking a significant expansion of police powers. As other noble Lords have said, protests are by their nature noisy, and threatening to curtail or close down protests because they are noisy is threatening to close down protest full stop. HMICFRS did not comment on the noise proposals in its report. Again, noble Lords are being asked to sign off on open-ended legislation because these half-baked proposals have to relegate important aspects of the proposed legislation to regulations that this House will not see until after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
Amendments 297 and 307 from my noble friend Lord Beith probe what “unease” means. The Joint Committee on Human Rights goes further, saying that it places too much into the hands of the police officer at the scene and that
“What one person considers to be noise sufficiently ‘intense’ to be likely to cause ‘serious unease, alarm or distress’ may be very different to what another person would believe meets this threshold.”
Amendment 302 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, rightly seeks to limit the conditions that can be imposed on an assembly for the reasons why they were restricted when the original legislation was debated. On 13 January 1986, in the House of Commons, the then Conservative Home Secretary said:
“We stopped short of a power to ban because we believed that that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. For this reason, clause 14 does not permit the police to impose conditions changing the date and time of an assembly.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/1986; col. 797.]
We think that Lord Hurd of Westwell was right.
We support all the amendments in this group but, to continue, Amendments 309 to 312 refer to disobeying conditions imposed on protests by the police. Not for the first time in the Bill, the hideous phrases “ought to know” and “ought to have known” appear. I understand that in the past some protesters have put their fingers in their ears or made a lot of noise so that they could not hear what conditions the police were imposing on them, but Amendments 309, 310 and 312 contain the much-preferred wording
“deliberately or recklessly avoided gaining knowledge that the condition has been imposed”.
Amendment 311 removes the increased penalties for disobeying conditions; we agree that non-violent civil disobedience should not face harsher penalties.
I stand alone with Amendment 318, requiring the most senior police officer present at a one-person protest who wants to close it down to hold at least the rank of inspector. It is a rank of officer who is on duty and available in every police area 24/7. It is a serious claim to make, that the decision on the level of noise or disruption caused by a solitary individual peacefully protesting should not be made by a police officer, no matter how junior. In fact, we do not believe that one-person protests should be subject to any conditions and we oppose Clause 61 standing part of the Bill.
I will talk now about the impact of these proposals on the police, in terms of both resources and public trust and confidence in them. In so doing, I will address my Amendments 296 and 301. The first thing to say, from my professional experience, is that the more conditions the police impose on a protest, the more police officers are needed and the more likely those conditions are to be resisted. Taking the point of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, it is not right that lots of police resources should be taken from the suburbs of London, for example, to police protests in central London, but the more conditions you impose, the more police officers you will have to take from the suburbs to police that demonstration.
I think the noble Lord will agree that the number of officers put into an event is usually down to intelligence about the nature of the event, which leads to the conditions, which then leads to the numbers. I am not sure it is down to the conditions; in my view, the conditions are always subject to the character of the protest.
I understand what the noble Lord is saying, and I shall develop my argument further.
I have referred to away-weekend table-top exercises that I attended as part of keeping my “certificate to practise”, if you will, my continuing professional development as an advanced trained public order senior officer. We were told the maximum number of police officers, horses and so forth that were available to us and we were often presented with scenarios where the level of disorder anticipated led one to contemplate banning the protest entirely or imposing severe conditions. We were divided into syndicates which separately presented their proposals for dealing with the scenario. Invariably, syndicates that advocated an outright ban or severe conditions found that they ran out of resources to implement the plan. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has benefited from this sort of advanced public order training, but that is my experience. He has his experience, and I have mine.
I am not quite sure of the noble Lord’s point. I go back to my original point: the nature of the intelligence tells you what the event is going to be, which drives the conditions and the number of officers. Nothing he has said has changed my view.
My Lords, a peaceful protest with no anticipated violent infiltrators and an agreed route, however large, can be policed with a minimum number of police officers, a lot of traffic cones and miles of white tape. Imposing conditions that the organisers are resisting is likely to require double to five times as many police officers, as confrontation must be anticipated and the conditions imposed by force if required, such as a march wanting to take a different route.
The noble and learned Lord is exactly right about this constitutional problem, but there is a further point to be made. In this context, it is not just the usual problem of allegedly unclear legislation that is then going to be sorted out by regulation later, and the relationship between the Executive and the legislature not as it should be. It is also in danger of interfering with police operational independence. To be explicit about this, my fear is that the police will take whatever view they take of what this legislation means in certain circumstances and do their best—and if a Home Secretary of the day, even well into the future, thinks that the police are being too lenient towards protesters, or perhaps there is a commotion in the media, regulations will be used further to define what “serious” and “disruption” mean so as to mandate the police effectively to be more heavy-handed than the natural meaning of the words would suggest.
My Lords, I can be relatively brief. Do not worry—it is a temporary blip.
Amendments 298, 308 and 319 question “serious disruption” being decided by the Secretary of State rather than being either defined in the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Beith proposes, or simply left to its natural meaning, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, suggests in his Amendment 308.
My Lords, as we have heard, this group contains two completely different issues: protection of the routes around Parliament and potential places where Parliament may sit while renovation work is undertaken; and the new statutory offence of public nuisance. How putting these two issues into one group is supposed to save time, I have no idea.
Clause 58 is about the obstruction of vehicular access to Parliament. Noble Lords, particularly those with mobility issues, have had difficulty accessing Parliament, particularly during Extinction Rebellion demonstrations, although I would not describe the Prime Minister being hindered from attending Prime Minister’s Questions in September 2020 as someone with mobility issues, unless you are talking about levelling up. It is a bit late for subtle jokes like that.
These provisions go much further. They expand obstruction to include
“making the passage of a vehicle more difficult.”
Presumably, any delay caused, even slow-moving traffic, would be covered by such an offence, and this could potentially criminalise any protest within the expanded controlled zone outlined in these proposals. Protests that have resulted in Members of Parliament being prevented from accessing Parliament have been few and far between, which suggests that the existing provisions are adequate. Clause 58 is unnecessary.
Clause 59 allows the Secretary of State to move the controlled area in the event of either House of Parliament being relocated because of building works under the restoration and renewal programme. This enables the Secretary of State to impose restrictions on protest to whatever area she thinks fit, however wide, by regulations. Parliament has no chance to question or vary the extent of the controlled area; it must either accept or reject the proposal made by the Secretary of State. The clause also gives the Secretary of State power to
“make provision for any other enactment, or any instrument made under an enactment, to have effect with modifications in consequence of regulations”
under this provision. This is too much power given in regulations to the Secretary of State, who could effectively ban protest almost anywhere within a wide area around any place where Parliament may be relocated to. Clause 59 is too broad and should not stand part of the Bill in its current form.
Parliament is at the heart of democracy in this country, but what about other institutions and organisations that are also important to the democratic process? What about news broadcasters or print journalists who hold politicians generally, and the Government in particular, to account? Where is the protection from protests aimed at disrupting a free media, such as the blockading or invading of television news and radio studios and newspaper printworks? This looks very much like protecting the Government and Government Ministers while doing nothing to protect those who hold the Government and Government Ministers to account.
Clause 60 creates a new statutory offence of public nuisance, as recommended by the Law Commission, but the provision appears to be far too wide and could potentially impact on all protests. Liberty’s briefing quotes Lord Justice Laws, who said in the case of Tabernacle v the Secretary of State for Defence in 2009:
“Rights worth having are unruly things. Demonstrations and protests are liable to be a nuisance. They are liable to be inconvenient and tiresome, or at least perceived as such by others who are out of sympathy with them.”
If someone is seriously annoyed or inconvenienced, or is put at risk of being seriously annoyed or inconvenienced, by someone doing something, that person commits an offence if they intend to seriously annoy or inconvenience the public or a section of the public.
Almost every protest could be criminalised by this provision, and not just public protests on the streets, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said. Are the Government a “section of the public”? If they are, take me away now. As a minority party in this House, we are, very often, unable to change what the Government plan to do, but we can seriously annoy the Government by pointing out the error of their ways and by holding them to account for their actions. Even if we do not have the intention of doing the Government serious harm—maybe—we may be at least reckless as to what harm it causes. Are we too to be criminalised by this provision, however much some noble Lords might like us to be?
The Government will point to the “reasonable excuse” defence contained in the provisions, but that applies only once a person has been charged with an offence under these provisions. The provisions do not say that a person commits an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the person does an act. Therefore, the police would be justified in arresting and charging people who believed that they had a reasonable excuse because the reasonable excuse provision applies only once a person has been charged.
We oppose in its entirety this provision as drafted, but we have Amendment 314, which removes the obstruction of
“a section of the public in their exercise of a right that may be exercised or enjoyed by the public at large”
from these provisions, to at least narrow the extent of this proposed new offence. A counterdemonstration against a far-right group, for example, would be caught by the provisions of this new offence as drafted, but not as we suggest that it should be amended. We support Amendment 315, as far as it goes, in attempting to ensure that the serious harm applies not just to one person but must be caused to the public, further limiting the extent of the offence.
We also support Amendment 315A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, to leave out serious harm to a person if, as a result, the person suffers disease. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has said, we saw during the coronavirus pandemic, particularly with the attempt the ban the vigil for Sarah Everard on Clapham Common, restrictions on protest on public health grounds. That is why the police intervened in the Sarah Everard vigil. They felt that there was a public health risk. Although the provisions under which the Sarah Everard vigil was done have been repealed, this appears to be an attempt to reintroduce them. As drafted, it matters not whether the protesters intend to spread disease. They must only be reckless as to whether it would have such a consequence.
We also support Amendment 316—again, as far as it goes—but we would prefer there to be a reasonable excuse provision added to the offence itself, as I have said before, rather than protesters, for example, having to raise their reasonable excuse in court. People such as protesters, who have a reasonable excuse, should not be arrested in the first place. They should not be charged, and they should not have to appear in court. With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I am sure that his amendment is right, but I am not sure that it is necessary. However, I am sure that the Minister will enlighten us.
This clause needs to be withdrawn and thought through again.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on Clauses 58 to 60. These three clauses will help ensure unimpeded vehicular access to Parliament and implement the Law Commission’s recommendation to codify in statute the common-law offence of public nuisance.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned pressure from “wherever” regarding Clause 58. In fact, the clause gives effect to a recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which Harriet Harman is chair, to protect the right of access to the Parliamentary Estate for those with business there, including, of course, Members of your Lordships’ House. The clause amends the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to allow a police officer to direct an individual to cease, or not begin, obstructing vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate. If a person does not comply with a direction, they will be committing an offence and may be arrested. Currently, parliamentarians and others conducting business in the Palace can face delays in entering and leaving Parliament via vehicular entrances, both impeding the functioning of our democracy and creating a security risk, with vehicles held stationary while police clear the way.
I should stress at this point that this power does not stop people protesting in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster. Those who want to protest outside Parliament can continue to do so but, if asked by a police officer, must allow the passage of vehicles through the Palace’s gates or face the consequences.
Should Parliament need to relocate for any reason, such as the ongoing restoration and renewal works, Clause 59 provides the Home Secretary with the power to designate a new controlled area around Parliament’s new temporary location. This would ensure that the protections afforded by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, as amended by this Bill, applied wherever Parliament relocated to.
Clause 60 implements the Law Commission’s recommendation that the common-law offence of public nuisance should be codified in statute. We heard last week calls for the Government to be more diligent in implementing Law Commission recommendations, so I hope noble Lords will support and welcome this measure. Putting the long-standing common-law offence of public nuisance into statute will provide clarity to the police and potential offenders, giving clear notice of what conduct is forbidden.
We have followed the Law Commission’s recommendation as closely as possible. In doing so, we are narrowing the scope of the existing common-law offence. That is being achieved by retaining the use of the terms “distress”, “annoyance”, “inconvenience” and “loss of amenity” within scope of the offence but by requiring that these harms be “serious”. We are also increasing the fault element of the offence. Currently, a person would be guilty through negligence; under the new offence, that is raised to intent or recklessness. Finally, we have made it a defence for a person to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for their act or omission that caused a public nuisance.
The Law Commission’s report stated that as the offence is intended to address serious cases for which other offences are not adequate, if a maximum sentence is set then it should be high enough to cover these cases. We have therefore set the maximum custodial sentence at 10 years. It is worth noting that that is lower than the current unlimited maximum sentence available under the common-law offence.
I turn to the amendments tabled to Clause 60, beginning with Amendment 314 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. As the clause is currently drafted, the offence is committed if a person’s act or omission causes serious harm to the public or a section of the public, or obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of their rights. The amendment would limit the scope of the offence to only where serious harm is caused to the public. That would significantly narrow the scope of the offence. Most forms of public nuisance will, by their nature, impact on only a section of the public rather than the public generally.
However, I believe it is right that the offence be committed if it affects a section of the public. It is a fundamental part of the common-law offence of public nuisance that not every member of the public need be affected but a section of the public must be. Similarly, the offence should include where the rights of the public are infringed; the Law Commission concluded it is right to do so. For example, the effect of excessive and persistent noise or the release of a foul-smelling substance or gas in a public place may affect only a small number of local residents but potentially affects any member of the public who enters the relevant area.
Amendment 315 flows from a JCHR recommendation that aims to clarify that this offence is not committed if serious harm is caused to a person. That would be achieved by removing the word “person” from the definition of “serious harm”. I understand that the noble Lord is trying to clear up ambiguity as to whether an offence of public nuisance can be committed to a person, but I remain to be persuaded that the amendment is strictly necessary. Subsection (1) of the clause already sets out that the offence of public nuisance can be committed only against the public or a section of the public, with the references to persons in the definition of “serious harm” being an interpretive provision that does not affect the scope of the offence. That said, I am ready to consider this point further ahead of the next stage.
The amendment would also raise the threshold at which the offence is committed where an individual put the public at risk of serious harm. The amendment would raise that to “serious” risk of serious harm. We have followed the Law Commission’s recommendations in setting the scope of the offence and the thresholds at which it will be committed. The commission conducted a rigorous consultation on the offence, and it is right that, in this instance, we follow the recommendations set out in the report.
My Lords, we now come to the most controversial part of the Bill: the Government’s new public order amendments. They have not been debated before in either House—and this debate started at 11.49 pm. Is this any way to conduct legislation?
I have amendments 319AA, 319AB, 319AC, 319BA, 319BB, 319BC, 319DA, 319DB, 319DC, 319L, 319M, 319N, 319P, 319Q, 319R, 319S, 319T and 319U in this group, all of which are, of course, amendments to the Government’s amendments. If I took just two minutes for each of those amendments, that would be 36 minutes. I will speak to each of the government amendments in turn; I will then add what Liberty has said to noble Lords in its excellent briefing on each amendment. I will then outline our proposed amendments to each government amendment in turn. We oppose all the Government’s amendments.
Government Amendment 319A concerns locking on. I have to ask: how much of a problem is this? Yes, it is inconvenient and annoying but it is temporary, and the police are becoming quite accomplished at unsticking. The amendment includes the phrase
“causes, or capable of causing, serious disruption”
so there does not even need to be serious disruption for this offence to be committed. It refers to serious disruption to two or more people or an organisation. Is a counterdemonstration to stop Holocaust deniers marching past a synagogue, or an Islamophobic organisation marching past a mosque, causing serious disruption to two or more people or an organisation? What does “capable of causing” mean? If it were on a different road or at a different time, it would be capable of causing serious disruption. But if it is 3 am on a Sunday, is that still capable of causing serious disruption? It is difficult to say because “serious disruption” will be defined by the Secretary of State in regulations only after the Bill has received Royal Assent.
Amnesty has talked about case law having established that protestors have a right to choose the manner of conduct of their protest. That is an important aspect of freedom of assembly. I too will quote from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, which said that “most interviewees”—junior police officers—
“did not wish to criminalise protest actions through the creation of a specific offence concerning locking-on.”
Can the Minister explain why the Government have gone against what the police want where this is concerned?
Our Amendment 319AA would leave out “is capable of causing” so that the offence applies only if there actually is serious disruption. Amendment 319AB leaves out
“or are reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence”,
so that there must be an intent to cause serious disruption, while Amendment 319AC’s insertion of
“not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale”
is to probe whether an unlimited fine is proportionate to this offence.
Government Amendment 319B concerns going equipped to lock on. “Going equipped” offences have always been difficult as they often involve innocent articles where the intent has to be proved. You could buy a tube of superglue to repair a broken chair at home, then get caught up in a protest and be accused of going equipped for locking on, for example. Amnesty’s briefing asks, in relation to
“in the course of or in connection with”,
whether having a megaphone that might be used to shout encouragement to those intending to lock on is going equipped with something for use “in connection with” locking on. How broad is this offence?
Our Amendment 319BA would leave out “in connection with” to probe how broad that phrase is. I hope the Minister will be able to explain. Our Amendment 319BB would
“leave out ‘any person’ and insert ‘them’”
so that the offence applies only if the person carrying the equipment intends to lock on, while our Amendment 319BC is to probe whether an unlimited fine is proportionate.
Government Amendment 319C contains an increased penalty for highway obstruction. As the Minister mentioned, it does not matter if the road is already blocked. This is sentence inflation again—more people in prison for non-violent offences. The current offence involves only a fine. I can understand that the Government might want to lock people up, but sit-down protests are an important part of freedom of expression and assembly. The chilling effect if people fear being sent to prison will be considerable.
Government Amendment 319D is about the obstruction of major transport works. This is a blatant and direct attack on climate change protesters, covering such projects as HS2, with its impact on biodiversity; new roads, which will create more traffic; and new airport runways, such as the third runway at Heathrow. So when the Prime Minister carries out his promise to lay down in front of the bulldozers, he will be committing this offence. Amnesty questions whether construction workers picketing such sites would be committing an offence. Could the noble Baroness say whether this would apply to them?
Our Amendment 319DA would remove an undertaker
“taking … steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating, or in connection with, the construction or maintenance of any major transport works”,
because we feel that this is far too broad. Amendment 319DB would remove interfering with or moving apparatus, again because we think this offence is far too broad. Our Amendment 319DC probes whether an unlimited fine is proportionate for such an offence.
Government Amendment 319E provides the police the power to stop and search for anything made, adapted or intended for use in the course of or in connection with highway obstruction, public nuisance, locking on or the transport infrastructure offence. This is a massive expansion of an already contentious power—the power of the police to stop and search—at a time when trust and confidence in the police is low. It would apply the power to a whole range of new offences, providing the police with a whole new range of excuses to stop and search people. This power would allegedly be on the basis of reasonable suspicion, but other stop and search powers exercised on this basis result in the police allegedly “reasonably suspecting” black people eight times more than white people. The police did not ask for this power, and some do not want it, so why are the Government doing this?
Amnesty quotes the report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, which says:
“Some of the most intrusive and contentious … powers are those that allow the police to use force and to stop and search people.”
Police suggested 19 new powers they wanted in connection with policing protests, and this was not one of them. One police officer told HMICFRS that
“a little inconvenience is more acceptable than a police state”,
and HMIC agreed with the sentiment. This amendment could result in black and other minority ethnic people being deterred from protesting, and police could seize banners, placards and all sorts of legitimate props used in protests.
Government Amendment 319F would provide the power to stop and search without suspicion. We have already proposed the removal of the last remaining stop and search power without suspicion, Section 60 of the Public Order Act. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act, another suspicionless stop and search power, has already been repealed, and Section 60 needs to follow. When we debated an amendment to a previous part of the Bill, we set out comprehensively why stop and search without suspicion should not be exercised for anything, as it is hugely damaging to police-community relations and ineffective. Disproportionality increases—from being eight times to 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are black—and only one in 100 searches under Section 60 resulted in a weapon being found, the purpose for which it is now being used by the police. Objects can be seized, retained and disposed of, as set out in regulations. We have only just seen the proposed primary legislation, let alone the regulations. We cannot think of any useful amendments to this provision; we simply oppose these powers being included in the Bill.
My Lords, I apologise. I forgot to speak to five more amendments: Amendments 319Q, 319R, 319S, 319T and 319U, which remove the ability for SDPOs to be renewed.
My Lords, I will be brief and not repeat the valid and chilling points that have already been made. I just say this: for me to even attempt a line-by-line examination of this whole suite of new amendments would result in not just the Leader coming in to censor me again, but me probably being arrested. I am not going to do that, but I will try to say two things that noble Lords have not said yet.
On locking on and in particular going equipped for locking on, and stop and search with or without suspicion of locking on, I am worried not about the glue referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but about people with bicycle locks. I am worried about young people going about their business, sometimes riding to a demonstration or being in the vicinity of potential demonstrations, carrying bicycle locks. I cannot see how they are not potentially in jeopardy, en masse, of both the stop and search powers, and going equipped.
Secondly, as a former Home Office lawyer and a director of Liberty, to me, this suite of measures, which could be a Bill in itself, looks, smells and tastes a lot like anti-terror legislation of the kind that I have always opposed as being disproportionate and counterproductive. Whether it is the new orders, the stop and search powers, including suspicion, or offences including thought crimes, this new Bill within a Bill looks like some of the anti-terror powers that, when they were introduced, noble Lords opposite and elsewhere, and I and some of my noble friends—forgive me, I hope—looked the other way. Those powers have inspired what we see here, but this time they are not for terrorists but protesters.
They are civil orders; they are preventive measures.
If I can assist the House, the first amendment moved in the group was that of the noble Baroness, not mine.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not a lawyer, I am very pleased to say—I am just a simple sailor. However, it seems from the complexity of the debate that this is quite a significant amendment that was brought in quite late. I find that rather worrying, because the feeling around the House is that if there were a vote on this, it might well not pass; I think it would fail. That is a worrying position to be in and I do not know how we can resolve that. It is not really very satisfactory.
I was not going to say anything, but I am, I think, the only former police officer in the Chamber. Is the Minister saying that he would be satisfied if somebody were sent to prison for four years for killing a police officer on duty in these circumstances? That seems to be what the noble and learned Lord is saying. In which case, what is the point?
I know it is bad form, but perhaps I can answer in reverse order. I certainly was not saying that. Indeed, the point that I was trying to make was that I was not going to get into what an appropriate tariff would be in any case; I regard that as absolutely a matter for the trial judge. It is not helpful for trial judges or indeed anybody else for Ministers on their feet to hypothesise as to what they might think an appropriate tariff would be in a particular case. The tariff is entirely a matter for the trial judge, who will decide it in the way in which they decide tariffs in other cases of life sentences as well.
To the noble and gallant Lord—forgive me, I am not sure whether I have that right; he is proud not to be a lawyer, a point with which I sympathise—I say that we brought in this amendment as soon as we had thought about the policy and, we think, got it right. When we were thinking about this issue, there were there were a number of points in the policy that required very careful consideration. That took time and that is why it is happening now. I cannot say any more than that.
I was going to acknowledge another point made, but I think I have already responded.
As I said, I am very alive to the IPP issues, as the noble Lord knows; but the IPP issue and the IPP sentence was a novel sentence which did things that other sentences did not do. Indeed, that is why it was brought in. The shape of this sentence, however, is not novel. It is the application to this particular offence that is new. With the greatest of respect, therefore, I disagree with the comparison to IPP sentences, which were themselves novel.
I hope that I have set out the government position clearly and fairly—
My Lords, the noble Lord started his contribution to this debate by saying that he was listening. Surely, he has heard from the House that the House is not content to allow this amendment to pass at this stage. Surely, the only reasonable thing to do in these circumstances—because nobody wants to divide on this issue here and now—is for the Minister to say that he will take it away and bring it back at Third Reading once noble Lords have had a chance to discuss the issue with him between now and Third Reading.
As I hope the House knows from this Bill and plenty of other Bills, I am very happy to discuss issues with anyone at any time. However, points of principle have been made, and points of principle have been answered by me as clearly and cogently as I am able to do. I think that the appropriate thing to do—relative newcomer as I am to this House—is that the Question on the amendment should be put. If people want to—
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, just illustrated the value of his service as chairman of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which the House should thank him for—but in the knowledge that his successor is unlikely to give the Government peace because this is an area where all Governments need to be brought up to the mark. His more wide-ranging report last week illustrates this, and I will refer to it briefly in a moment.
It is good to be in the part of the Bill where the Government have listened, both to the Delegated Powers Committee and to the House itself, where voices were raised, particularly on the issue of the publication of the strategy on serious violence for which provision is made in the Bill. It really does not make sense for a strategy to exist which is not published and which therefore cannot be the subject of accountability. That was quickly recognised by Ministers at the Dispatch Box here. They have acted in accordance with that and I very much welcome that. They have met the objections to publication by specifying areas in which there must be a bit more care about what should not be published because of adverse consequences for the public interest, over things such as custodial institutions and other ways in which material could be released in a way which would be damaging to the general public interest.
That is one area where I am pleased that the Government have listened. I am also pleased that in a number of respects, if not quite all, the Government have responded on issues of laying guidance before Parliament and on providing a parliamentary procedure, either negative or affirmative, for some of the instruments. I will say in passing, however, that laying guidance before Parliament is a bit of a formality. Unless Members of one House or the other find a way of debating it—it is a little easier in this House than the other—laying it before Parliament does not achieve anything practical, whereas having a procedure in the House, defective though the negative procedure is, is much more useful. In most respects that request has been met.
Producing a list of previous legislation which was deficient in this respect is not a persuasive answer to the challenging issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Statutory Instruments Committee. It is generally recognised that there is a serious deficiency which has been allowed to grow as the scope of legislations has extended. Things which have the practical effect of legislation have become more numerous, but Parliament has not developed effective procedures to ensure good scrutiny and to ensure that the neo-legislation is in workable and legally sound form.
As the committee said in its wider report, if, because of modern conditions, Parliament is being asked to accept new ways of legislating, it is surely right that the Government must stand ready to accept new methods of scrutiny and of being held to account. So, like others, we take the view that there is now an urgent need to take stock and rebalance their relationship. This Bill has arrived at the beginning of that very important process, but it is encouraging that Ministers have at least responded in a number of key respects, and I welcome that.
My Lords, noble Lords have already comprehensively covered the ground, and I am especially grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and his Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and to the Government for listening to that committee, and to the concerns that were expressed in Committee, and by the Constitution Committee and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.
We are concerned that simply laying guidance before Parliament is not sufficient. It should be by regulations, as the noble Lord has said. However, we are pleased that the Government have listened to some extent and we support these amendments.
My Lords, I too will be brief. As has been said, this group includes government amendments relating to recommendations from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the Government have accepted. It includes the requirement that strategies under the serious violence reduction duty are published, and that guidance on the series violence duty, police powers under Part 4 and serious violence reduction orders must be laid before Parliament. However, the Government have not accepted every recommendation of the DPRRC, and on some they have gone only half way. For example, the DPRRC recommended that guidance on serious violence reduction orders should be subject to the affirmative procedure, but the Government have made it subject only to the negative.
Like other noble Lords, I extend our thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for the invaluable work that they do and no doubt will continue to do. We welcome the amendments in this group that go some way towards accepting a number of recommendations from the DPRRC, but it is interesting to note that, in its report on the powers in the Bill to introduce unpublished strategies and guidance without parliamentary scrutiny, the DPRRC said:
“We are disappointed that the inclusion of these types of delegations of power—on flimsy grounds—suggests that the Government have failed when preparing this Bill to give serious consideration to recommendations that we have made in recent reports on other Bills.”
This group of amendments introduces some improvements into the Bill, which we welcome. On that basis, we hope that the Government will be in listening mode over the next few days of debate on Report. Perhaps the next Bill that appears before us will not have such powers in it to begin with.
My Lords, I rise to support the amendments in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I draw your Lordships’ attention to my interests in policing ethics and my work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, as set out in the register. I trust that those interests assure your Lordships that I am a strong supporter of effective policing, not its adversary.
As an occasional statistician, I am also well aware of the power and utility of data. Good data, including on the risks of serious violence, can provide the evidence that allows the limited resources of our police forces to be directed to the particular challenges faced in different contexts and localities. Perhaps it is because I trained not as a lawyer but as a mathematician that I hold firmly to the maxim that, before one can begin to find the right solution, one has to have clearly defined the problem. I am not sure that these clauses, as presently drafted, fully pass that test.
If the problem is that there are occasions when the sharing of personal data will be necessary in order to detect or prevent serious violence, such powers already exist. Indeed, they go further than simply applying to certain public bodies. Like all of my right reverend and most reverend friends on these Benches, I am a data controller—a fancy title—handling often very sensitive personal information regarding clergy, church officers and children who are in the care of churches. I know my general duties regarding when I ought to disclose such data to police or others. When I need specific advice, I have access to my legal secretary, my diocesan safeguarding adviser and others. It is difficult to see what a new duty on some public bodies to share identifiable personal information will add to this.
Alternatively, if the problem is the need to collect and process data sets that allow the setting of more general policing priorities and interventions, it is difficult to see why that cannot be done in ways that remove all identifiable personal details and hence are entirely compliant with the GDPR and other data protection law. I struggle to see why there is a need to create an opt-out for the anonymised data that can drive better policing.
The amendments that I and others have put our names to would, I believe, strengthen the Bill, making it clear that it is seeking not to set aside data protection law but to allow anonymised data to be shared where this will produce better policing outcomes. They would reassure children, vulnerable people, victims of crime and others that their personal data will not be shared, beyond that which is already shared under existing legislation. They would allow youth workers, whether they are employed by the Church, local authorities or whomever, to continue to be trusted by those who come to them.
As has been alluded to, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—who, were it not for the particular protocols of this place, I would be proud to refer to as my noble friend—has already accepted the principle that health bodies should not be compelled to share patient data. It is not a huge leap to extend that to other authorities.
My Lords, I have Amendments 24 and 32 to 35 in this group, and I have signed Amendments 11, 22, 25 and 30, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester.
I start with the government amendments that effectively protect patient confidentiality on the basis that, if patients do not trust their doctors to keep sensitive personal information confidential, they will not seek healthcare when they need to. There are already protocols to deal with situations where there is a serious risk of harm to the patient or others which allow the sharing of information. In moving these amendments, the Government have accepted the principle that professionals need to keep sensitive personal information confidential in order to maintain the trust of those whom they are working with. I will return to this shortly.
Amendments 11, 22 and 30 do the bare minimum in maintaining the protection provided by data protection legislation. This is putting down a marker that specified authorities should not simply allow the duty to share information under the serious violence duty to override everything else. We will support these amendments if the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, divides the House.
But we do not believe these amendments go far enough, in that they do not address the Secretary of State’s enforcement powers. Despite government protestations to the contrary, the almost unanimous view among NGOs is that the new serious violence duty is actually a duty on specified authorities to give information to the police, so that the police can try to arrest our way out of the problem of serious violence—an enforcement-led approach, which even the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police says is not the solution. What we really need is a truly multiagency public health approach, which has worked so well in Scotland, where enforcement is only one part of the solution .
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young, to which I am pleased to have added my name; and I would like to take this opportunity to commend him for continuing to pursue the important issues raised and for the clarity in his exposition of the points in front of us. Given the lateness of the hour and how much pressure we know we are under with this Bill, I hope I will not repeat too often some of the points that have been raised already.
In speaking to this amendment, I would like to emphasise that we are aiming to protect some of the most vulnerable children and young people in our communities. I would like to highlight the comments the noble Lord made, knowing of the increased risk to a young person of exploitation and abuse that comes from vulnerability around their housing situation. We know, in the communities where young people are targets of gangs in particular, just how difficult it is to protect them if they are not given the full support from all the agencies that could be involved to help them—and we know that a safe and stable home is a key element in preventing and reducing youth violence.
There surely cannot be anyone in this Chamber who does not want to see an end to the sickening violence that is cutting short the lives of so many young people in the most harrowing of circumstances. The question is, as always: what further steps can we take to prevent such tragedies occurring? For the sake of brevity, I do not want to go over again all the arguments I made at Second Reading, and I will focus my comments on subsections (c) and (d) of the amendment at the end.
I must admit that I find the argument that changes are not necessary because local authorities already have “discretion” to grant priority in the area of rehousing to be far wide of the mark. Unfortunately, we know that local authority interpretation varies and often leaves the onus on immensely vulnerable families to provide evidence at what can be the most traumatic time of their lives. When asked, three in four local authorities have no specific policy governing how they treat people applying for a priority need because of serious violence. In effect, a postcode lottery has been created.
We need to be completely focused on coming up with practical solutions to what I believe are solvable problems. This new clause would ensure that families with members at risk of gang violence are given the support they need, rather than placing it on a legislative footing. This amendment seeks to update the guidance issued by the Government to ensure that all agencies are adequately protecting those at risk of serious violence—in effect, ensuring that all agencies are working together to protect those at risk and that, in this particular case, housing providers are automatically included. There are areas in the country where that relationship exists, and the results speak for themselves.
This new clause seeks to specify in law what the Government say is often happening anyway. Instead of people at risk of serious violence being forced to gather extensive evidence and demonstrate unique vulnerability—something not easily done when you are under threat or in a crisis—this would make the process automatic, as we rightly recognise should be the case for those threatened by domestic abuse.
Subsections (c) and (d) would ensure that housing providers are included in any collaboration around the reduction of serious violence. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill sets out the Government’s ambition to reduce violent crime and address the root causes of serious violence across England and Wales, by making sure that public bodies work together to stop serious violence. However, at present the Bill does not include housing as a partner agency.
The new collaboration duties can play an important role. Given the role which housing often plays in serious violence, whether because of the location of specific threats or criminal activity around particular locations, it is vital that these providers are not locked out of discussions because they are not specified in legislation. By ensuring the guidance specifically includes them, the Government can guarantee that the all the expertise of this sector will not be ignored.
I conclude by repeating the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Young, on bringing in the costs situation. This is about young people’s lives. I hope the Minister can provide further clarity and more progress, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, asked for.
My Lords, we support this amendment. As I said in Committee, it is not just victims of domestic violence that need help and support from housing authorities to escape serious violence; young people groomed and exploited by criminal gangs, for example, also need and deserve to be urgently rehoused in certain circumstances. The police need to provide information to housing authorities where they believe that someone is being coerced into criminal activity, where they are being threatened with serious violence if they do not comply, and where the police believe that taking the person out of that scenario by rehousing them can reduce the risk of serious violence. Many of the young people involved in county lines drug dealing have been groomed into criminality and been the victims of child criminal exploitation. They and their families are often terrorised by those higher up the drug-dealing network. In this sort of scenario, the police need to work with social housing agencies to provide a route out of serious violence. We support the amendment.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham for setting out the case for his amendment. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I fully agree that local authorities can and do make a significant contribution to local efforts to prevent and reduce serious violence, and it is vitally important that all victims of serious violence who need to leave their home to escape violence are supported to access alternative safe and secure accommodation. As my noble friend has already outlined, the statutory homelessness code of guidance provides guidance on local authorities’ duties under Part 7 of the Housing Act. The amendment seeks to place a requirement on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice under Section 214A of the Housing Act 1996.
The implementation of the serious violence duty will bring additional guidance to which local authorities will have a statutory duty to have regard. The guidance accompanying the duty, to be issued under Clause 18 of the Bill, will reinforce and complement the existing guidance issued under housing and homelessness legislation. Taken together, I hope there will be sufficient guidance in place to ensure local authorities are clear on how the legislation applies in addressing the housing needs of victims of serious violence.
I hope my noble friend agrees—and I think he would—that to introduce another code of practice in addition to the existing homelessness code of guidance and the serious violence duty guidance would lead to unnecessary confusion and duplication. I hope to assure my noble friend this evening that the points his amendment is seeking to address are already covered, and are what we are planning to do in future.
Paragraph (a) of my noble friend’s new clause would require the code of practice to provide guidance on the operation of Section 177 of the Housing Act 1996 in relation to people who are at risk of serious violence.
The Housing Act 1996, as amended by the Homelessness Reduction Act 2017, puts prevention at the heart of the local authorities’ response to homelessness and places duties on local housing authorities to take reasonable steps to try to prevent and relieve a person’s homelessness. When assessing if an applicant is homeless, local authorities should consider any evidence of violence and harassment. Section 177 already provides that someone is considered homeless if it would not be reasonable for them to continue to occupy the accommodation and it is probable that this would lead to violence against them, their family or their household.
Paragraph (b) of the new clause seeks to update the homelessness code of guidance to include a chapter on the duties of local authorities. We are committed to supporting victims of serious violence and know the important role that local authorities play in making sure that such victims get support when they are in housing need.
As noble Lords will know, we published a draft of the statutory guidance for the serious violence duty in May. The debates in both Houses have helped to identify areas which need further development prior to publishing a revised draft, which will be subject to a formal consultation following Royal Assent of the Bill. Officials will work closely with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities and representatives from the housing sector to strengthen the statutory guidance for the serious violence duty. This will point to the legislation and guidance that is already set out in the homelessness code of guidance and the allocation of accommodation guidance, and showcase examples of good practice in this area which local partners can draw on to raise awareness across public authorities of the legislation which protects this cohort.
I can also give a commitment this evening that we will expand the homelessness code of guidance to include a new chapter on supporting victims of serious violence, which I hope gives my noble friend the assurance he seeks in this regard.
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of the new clause concern the role of the police in timely collaboration with housing providers on reducing the risk of serious violence to individuals, and guidance on the disclosure of information. Of course, we must do all that we can to identify and provide support to the individuals most at risk of involvement in serious violence, including those who might be at risk of homelessness.
As noble Lords have stated, many housing authorities already work with the police and other key partners to reduce the risk of serious violence, including through the provision of alternative accommodation. Where this works well, it is clear that it is vital that services such as youth offending teams, educational authorities and national probation services work together locally to provide support for the household and victim of violence. Housing alone without support, I think noble Lords will agree, is not a sustainable option.
As part of the work to prevent and reduce serious violence, specified authorities in a local area will be required to work together to identify the kinds and causes of serious violence and, in doing so, to establish the groups of individuals who are most at risk in local areas.
The new serious violence duty will facilitate this and is intended to generate better partnership working locally to further protect this cohort. The draft guidance is clear that local authorities are responsible for the delivery of a range of vital services for people and businesses in a local area, including—but not limited to—children’s and adult’s social care, schools, housing and planning, youth services and community safety, so they will have an essential role to play in partnership arrangements. The inclusion of this detail in the guidance for the new duty, alongside the existing homelessness legislation and guidance, is the most effective way of supporting these victims of serious and gang-related violence to relocate and start afresh.
To support the collaboration, Clause 9 provides that regulations can also be made to authorise the disclosure of information, which we talked about earlier, between authorities and prescribed persons, which might be external bodies for this purpose, so long as it would not contravene existing data protection legislation or be prohibited under provisions of the IPA 2016. This of course would be a permissive gateway, permitting but not requiring the sharing of information.
I hope that, in the light of the assurances and commitment I have given in relation to the statutory guidance and the relevant existing legislation on this matter, my noble friend will be content to withdraw his amendment—and I apologise for the lateness of the arrival of the letter.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I indicated on Wednesday that I would divide the House on leaving out Clause 17, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, if domestic abuse is now included in the serious violence duty—and there is no more serious violence than murder—can the Minister say how the Government can resist this amendment, which we support?
My Lords, if I may just say a few words in support of this amendment, which was moved with such clarity by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, two points seem to me to arise. The first is that if the reviews are held in a centralised way, they will be more efficient. There will be less of a postcode lottery when it comes to the review taking place. Secondly, and most importantly, if social services, medical services, the police and others know that there will be a review in every case in which there is murder as a result of a domestic situation, they will take greater care. We know that that has not, unfortunately, always been the case, whatever their good intentions.
My Lords, especially following the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I am conscious that I have no conception of what the world looks like through the eyes of my grandchildren. When I was their age there were three channels on television, which began at 4.40 in the afternoon with “Jackanory”. The world has changed considerably and, although I have tried to keep up with technology, professionally and personally, I am aware that I cannot see the world into which we are moving. We are not ahead of the game.
With the greatest respect, I look around this House and conclude that we are not the generation to be looking ahead and anticipating the world of communication, particularly through phones and so on. I am told by industry experts that what we have now is probably a couple of generations back from what we will have. I have lost track of Elon Musk and all the stuff going on in relation to space travel but, in framing such legislation, are we consulting the younger generations, who are well ahead of the rest of us on technology and communication potential? It is a simple question. I would not want to hand my phone over now, but I am sure that my grandchildren will have stuff on their phones which I would not even begin to understand. We need to be very careful.
My Lords, we support all the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and if I had been on the ball I would have signed them. I also have Amendment 50 in this group.
The user of the device from which data is being extracted should be able to see what is happening whenever that is practical, and be reassured that only relevant data is being downloaded, as suggested in Amendment 43. As has just been discussed, many people’s lives are on their phone and their lives are run by what is on their phone, so to be separated from it can have major consequences. That is why Amendment 44 suggests that the device should be taken only if absolutely necessary; an explanation given as to why it must be taken, if it is; and that it is returned as soon as practical, and in any event, within 30 days.
Amendment 45, adding “strictly” to “necessary”, narrows the circumstances in which data can be extracted. Digital downloads should not be used if there are other means of obtaining the information—whether “reasonably practicable” or not. Anything that deters survivors from coming forward or progressing their complaint should be avoided at all costs. “Not reasonably practical” sounds as if digital downloading could be used if it were easier than the alternative in Amendment 46. Amendment 48 provides for an independent review of the need for digital downloading, carried out by a senior police officer at the request of the user, who may be concerned that it is not strictly necessary and proportionate. Amendment 51 requires that an explanation is provided as to why it is necessary, how long it will take and the availability of a review.
As I pointed out in Committee, the Bill requires the authorised person to give notice only in writing to the user as to what, why and how the information will be extracted, the user’s right to refuse and the consequences of such a refusal. This is only to the extent that the investigation or inquiry will not end merely because the user refuses. Will the Minister state on the record that this is different from such a refusal having no consequences? For example, the defence in a rape case—where consent is an issue—may claim that withholding such information has implications which the jury might be asked to consider.
Akin to the rights of a detained person at a police station, it is not sufficient simply to wave a piece of paper under the nose of the user, who may be unable to read or be too traumatised to take in what she is reading. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee have said, the authorised person should explain orally to the user and enter into a conversation to test her understanding to ensure that consent is informed and voluntary.
The government amendments attempt to address the concerns of my noble friend Lord Beith about confidential information. My noble friend Lady Hamwee was right: this should include confidential journalistic material and material subject to legal privilege, which was going to be dealt with by regulations. With the government amendments in this group, we appear to be inching forward on this, but concerns remain, as my noble friend explained. We support all the amendments in this group.
My Lords, I thank all those noble Lords who have taken part on this group. The key issue which we need the Minister to take away is that there is more to be done in this area. We are grateful to her and her Bill team for their engagement with us and for the extra protections which the Government brought forward in Committee. I particularly pay tribute to the Victims’ Commissioner and her office for their leadership on these protections and the changes for victims which we need.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, both raised crucial issues, particularly about the need for strict necessity and the importance of making sure that victims—who may be going through this process at a point of shock or extreme vulnerability—genuinely understand their rights.
Amendment 52A in the name of my noble friend Lord Rosser returns to the issue of material held by third parties. It applies to material such as a victim’s school report or mental health records. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, for their support on this issue in Committee.
The Government have accepted on the face of the Bill that extra protections are needed for victims where data are extracted from their phones. The next step is that the exact same protections must also apply where a victim’s privacy is being raided in any other area of their life.
These changes are being championed by the Victims’ Commissioner, with the support of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. They are vital for victims, for culture change and for the system as a whole. We need to get it right to give victims confidence, to stop unnecessary requests for information and to reduce the huge delays in investigations. I know the Minister recognises this issue. Will she commit to take it away and consult on the issue of third-party material with a view to bringing in protections?
My Lords, there is a lot of force in what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about reasonable excuse. There is a problem, however, in that one would not know that one had a reasonable excuse until one had been charged with the offence. The advantage of the amendment spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and others is that it achieves certainty and intercepts the risk of being brought to court to have one’s reasonable excuse determined. Although I tend to agree with what the noble Lord said, it comes too late in the process, and the safest and most secure way of dealing with it is to intercept the process at the beginning, which is exactly what the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, seeks to do.
My Lords, there are two problems here. Because of the behaviour of the lawless few, all Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities are being stereotyped as troublemakers. The new law creates offences when people trespass on land with vehicles where, among other things,
“it is likely that significant damage or significant disruption would be caused”,
and, again, where
“significant distress … is likely to be caused”.
All GRT people are likely to be criminalised by these new offences because people’s prejudices will result in them anticipating damage, disruption or distress, despite no previous experience of the GRT people concerned, or any other evidence—just their own prejudice. The second problem is that there is no option for many GRT people other than to trespass on land because local authorities do not, and do not want to, provide authorised pitches. Imagine the reaction of motorists if there were no local car parks and double-yellow lines on every road? That is the equivalent of what GRT people face.
That is the reason for these amendments. In the absence of removing the whole of Part 4 from the Bill, we will vote with the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, should she divide the House. At the very least, the police should not be allowed to seize caravans when they are peoples’ homes and the statutory duty on local authorities to provide authorised sites should be reinstated. That is the purpose of my Amendments 55ZC and 55AA. These may be planning issues, but the clerks have ruled that these amendments are within scope.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when the Bill seeks to put the cautions regime on to a statutory basis, it is plainly a very important step forward. Although I welcome it, it is unfortunate that this is being done largely by secondary legislation—an issue obviously addressed in many other contexts, about which I do not wish to speak today.
However, it is clear that even in this skeletal Bill, one critical issue is omitted—addressing the issue of lack of adherence to practice and lack of consistency. I outlined the powerful evidence of this in earlier debates and suggested a solution. That is needed because of the significant evidence that cautions can blight the lives of others and, as cautions are in effect part of the sentencing system, they must reflect transparency and command public confidence.
It was, however, evident from the speech of the Minister in Committee that the need to deal with this is recognised as an issue. He said that
“scrutiny and monitoring of out-of-court disposals is vital to successful implementation, accountability and public perception.—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col.1576.]
The Government did not like the way in which I suggested that this be done in the amendment that was before the Committee, but the Minister has very helpfully discussed the issue. The amendment now before the House very much leaves the means to ensure consistency and adherence to the code to the Secretary of State but reflects the principle of the necessity of scrutiny for consistency and adherence to principle. I look forward to the Minister explaining what Her Majesty’s Government intend to do in relation to consistency and how, in due course, the House can review the details of that.
My Lords, I have Amendments 66C and 66D in this group and will speak to Amendment 66B, but I will take them in reverse order if noble Lords will bear with me.
Currently, first-time offenders can be given a fixed penalty notice—an on-the-spot fine—by the police for a range of offences of disorder including dropping litter, being drunk and disorderly, and the possession of cannabis or khat. This Bill removes fixed penalties for disorder, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have either to arrest those responsible, taking up valuable police resources that should be spent on more serious crimes, or to take no action, leading to an increase in anti-social behaviour. Amendment 66D would retain fixed penalties for disorder.
Currently, first-time offenders can be given a simple caution, where the salutary effect of being found out, arrested and taken to a police station is, in most cases, enough to ensure that they behave themselves in future. It is quick, simple and effective. This Bill removes simple cautions, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have to impose conditions on everyone they caution, including considering whether to impose restrictive conditions, unpaid work conditions, attendance conditions and/or a fine. The police must also consider the views of any victim, including imposing any conditions that the victim or victims suggest. Compliance with conditions must then be monitored and action taken for any breach.
There is no evidence that the existing system of conditional cautions is any more effective than simple cautions, and conditional cautions, of which diversionary and community cautions are a more complex and complicated version, take far more police and other agencies’ time. Can the Minister explain why the Government are getting rid of simple cautions? If the answer is that, given the choice between the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions and a simple caution, the police choose the latter, I have to tell the Minister that, faced with the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions, the police will either release the accused with no further action being taken, allowing the accused to get away with it, or argue that the accused should be charged and sent to court. In fact, I wholeheartedly recommend to the police that, in every case where a diversionary or community caution is being considered, they refer the case to the CPS so that independent prosecutors can advise, not least on the sentence—or, as the Bill calls them, the conditions—the police intend to impose on the accused.
The police want to retain simple cautions. We want to retain simple cautions. Amendment 66C would retain simple cautions. I must say, the Minster has his work cut out to convince me not to divide the House on this issue.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, ably explained, the amendment in his name aims to try to ensure compliance with the code of practice and consistency of application of the code. Academic research into the existing system of conditional cautions is of mainly inappropriate and inconsistent conditions being imposed. I referred to this in detail in Committee. It was not challenged; the House can therefore take it as fact.
My Lords, that is a very encouraging note on which to rise. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for bringing back matters that we discussed in Committee.
I say respectfully that Amendment 66B, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, commendably deals with the need for consistency in both the use of, and compliance with, the code of practice that will guide the use of diversionary and community cautions under Part 6 of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making time to discuss this matter with me.
For the record—it may have been in the mêlée that occurred when people were leaving—I thought I heard the noble and learned Lord refer to cautions as part of the sentencing framework. Without wishing to split hairs, we see this as separate from the sentencing framework and as an out-of-court disposal, but if the noble and learned Lord did say that, I understood that he was talking in broad terms. I am keen to reassure him and, indeed, the House that a fundamental aim of reforming the out-of-court disposal options currently in use was to improve consistency by reducing the number of disposals and creating two clear and statutory options.
Some attention was paid in Committee to the lack of data currently recorded and available on the use of cautions, whether conditional or simple, and the types of conditions attached to the former. We are keen to address that and believe that the proposals in Part 6 of the Bill, along with the code of practice that will accompany it, will do so. We are currently engaging with the Home Office regarding the outcomes framework so that police can accurately report the number of cautions given, and we will also explore the practicalities of gathering qualitative data from police on the types of conditions used.
We want to preserve the balance between a national framework for decision-making on the one hand and, on the other, operational decision-making that rests on the facts of the case and can be independently and locally scrutinised. We believe that working to develop more effective and consistent scrutiny panels in forces, thereby ensuring independent representation and transparency of findings, would be the most effective course of action. For that reason, we are currently engaging with stakeholders on precisely this issue, including a range of questions on transparency and scrutiny regarding the use and monitoring of the new cautions. It will only be possible to find the balance we seek once we have that feedback. I can assure the noble and learned Lord and the House that this will subsequently be included in the code of practice accompanying this legislation, which will itself be brought before Parliament for scrutiny in due course.
Amendments 66C and 66D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relate to the essence of the reform that the Bill makes to the out-of-court disposals framework. As I noted in Committee, this reform has its roots in the work led by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, whose strategy in 2017 removed the need for the simple caution, penalty notice for disorder, and cannabis and khat warnings. The Government have listened to the NPCC and are now taking steps to ensure national consistency in the framework that it has helped to develop. The current position is that one-third of police forces have already moved to using only conditional cautions and community resolutions, and many more, including the Metropolitan Police, are currently in the process of moving over to this two-tier framework.
With Amendment 66D, the noble Lord seeks to retain penalty notices for disorder. We have already seen a marked decline in their use by police. The most recent CJS statistics show that the use of penalty notices for disorder has fallen 28% from the previous year. These are distinct from the fixed penalty notices, which are unaffected by Part 6 of the Bill.
I should also make reference to an important matter that was raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester in Committee, speaking through—if I can put it in these terms—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. This was in regard to the intention behind the use of conditional cautions. The point she made was that they should have the aim of rehabilitation or restoration. The purpose of this is both to address the causes of the offending in order to support the offender to desist from reoffending and to put a welcome emphasis on the wishes of the victim, allowing for appropriate restoration to be made, where appropriate. The fact is that simple cautions and penalty notices do not allow for this victim-centred approach that mandates rehabilitative and restorative actions. I therefore do disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this gives rise to what he called—if I heard him correctly—a bureaucratic nightmare.
Retaining the use of penalty notices and simple cautions would undermine these aims entirely and indeed the reform itself. They are inconsistent with it. I heard the noble Lord say, somewhat in stereo as it was repeated behind me by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that I have my work cut out to persuade him not to divide the House. But I hope I have set out the principles that underly the new approach: the conditions support rehabilitation and encourage the offender to desist from reoffending. You simply do not get that with a simple caution or notice. I therefore hope that, having listened to what I have said, both he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, will not press their amendments.
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just confirm that these changes—not allowing fixed penalties or simple cautions—are being made on the basis of no evidence whatever of the efficacy of conditional cautions versus simple cautions? He has just admitted from the Dispatch Box that the Government do not retain any data on the number of conditional cautions versus the number of simple cautions, or about the sorts of conditions imposed, but retain data only on the total number of cautions.
My Lords, I think we might now be in double figures for the times I have been asked that question. I have set out in my remarks, fairly I hope, what lies behind it. The work from the National Police Chiefs’ Council lies behind this; a third of police forces have gone there; and many more are considering it. Whether one calls that evidence or not, that is the basis on which these reforms are predicated. I have answered this question before, and I answered it in Committee. I appreciate my answers may not satisfy the noble Lord, but that is the basis on which we think this is a good idea; and quite a number of police forces already think this is a good idea.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
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(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendments 89 and 90. I endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. Thompson and Venables, the murderers of Jamie Bulger, although 10 at the time, had a developmental age of only four, which makes their High Court trial obscene. The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, is to be praised for persistently trying to raise the age of criminal responsibility through a succession of Private Members’ Bills.
My Lords, prompted by the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I was reminded of a visit I made to the only young offender institution in Scotland, where we had the opportunity to speak to young people in custody there, the staff and the governor. They talked about how, without exception, those in custody had been subjected to a range of adverse childhood experiences. What came across from both the young people and the staff was that, even though those young people were aged 16 and over, it was not their fault that they found themselves in those situations; it was the adults and support mechanisms that had let them down. Moving the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 is a move in the right direction and the minimum that should be done at this time, which is why I wholeheartedly support the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Baroness in Amendment 89, for the reasons she has outlined. I think the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in this Report stage seems to get the short straw every time. I have a question for my noble friend the Minister about the role of the CPS when deciding to prosecute. It has to apply the test of public interest. Is the very young age of a defendant a proper consideration for the CPS when making that public interest test?
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
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(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 90G in my name, and to speak to some of the other amendments in the group—but, with the leave of the House, I shall not speak to all 23 of them. We now come to what the Government optimistically call “serious violence reduction orders”. These would allow the police to stop and search people without any suspicion that those targeted have anything on them that they should not legally have in their possession.
This is yet another form of stop and search without suspicion, which is notorious for three things. First, understandably, it is notoriously ineffective, even compared with stop and search based on suspicion. Secondly, it is, notoriously, disproportionately focused on black people, even compared with stop and search based on suspicion; and, as a consequence, it is notorious for the damage it causes to the relationship between the police and the communities they are supposed to help.
The Minister cited in Committee the fact that young black people are 24 times more likely to be victims of homicide than young white people. That is exactly why the police need to work together with those communities to build trust and confidence, and to demonstrate that they are on their side, and not using powers disproportionately against them, as these new powers, by the Government’s own admission, will continue to do.
It is not just me saying that disproportionate use of powers against certain communities—the very communities that need to work together with the police to tackle knife crime—is “undermining police legitimacy”. Those are the words of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Serious violence reduction orders are likely to make serious violence worse, as they further alienate the very communities that the police need to co-operate with them to identify the perpetrators.
I was a sergeant in Brixton at the time of the Brixton riots in 1981; I was a chief inspector in Brixton 10 years later; and I was then the police commander in charge of Brixton 20 years later in 2001. In my professional judgment, serious violence reduction orders—in fact, any form of suspicionless stop and search—are counterproductive. That is why Amendment 101 would repeal Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Only one in 100 Section 60 searches results in a weapon being found, and black people are 18 times more likely to be targeted by the police than white people—compared with nine times in the case of stop and search, where the police must justify their decision. I remind the House of what I said in Committee: Section 60 is not used at all in Northern Ireland for fear of the damage it would cause to police-community relations. It should not be used anywhere in the UK and should be repealed.
Amendments 90G and 90M follow the well-worn path that we on these Benches have consistently trodden, and where previous Governments have agreed with us. They realise the injustice, as we do, of allowing the breach of an order made on the balance of probabilities to be a criminal offence. When it was realised that ASBOs—the first of this kind of civil order with criminal sanctions—led to large numbers of people being criminalised, the then-Government changed course and replaced them with wholly civil orders and sanctions. The Minister in Committee cynically cited precedent for this approach, but it is an approach that we on these Benches have opposed every single time it has been proposed. Amendment 91C would also apply the higher standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—to renewals of SVROs. Amendment 90H, which I have signed, would disallow an SVRO being applied on the grounds that someone simply had a knife on them when an offence was committed.
The Minister’s quite extraordinary letter of 6 January tragically fails to answer my criticism, made in Committee, that someone who was carrying a knife lawfully and who did not use the knife in the commission of any offence could still be made the subject of an SVRO. The letter says:
“Whilst you are correct … this could include… where a person is caught unlawfully carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon.”
If they are caught unlawfully in possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon, they can be charged with that offence and then be made subject to an SVRO. Referring to the examples I gave—of a chef, an electrician or a Sikh in lawful possession of a knife—the letter goes on:
“In the examples outlined in the debate it would be difficult to see how a court might consider that an SVRO is necessary to protect the public.”
Is the Minster not aware of the Metropolitan Police gang matrix, where even innocent bystanders at a shooting were characterised as gang members? Any evidence, whether normally admissible in a criminal court or not—hearsay, gossip or rumour—can be given in support of an SVRO.
As the Minister has recently admitted, public trust in the police has been seriously undermined and distrust is even worse among the communities most seriously affected by knife crime. Allowing the police free rein to say whatever they want in support of an SVRO will make a rapidly deteriorating crisis of confidence in the police service even worse. Hence, Amendments 90N, 90P and 90Q would restore the standard of evidence used in the granting of SVROs to that which would have been admissible in the proceedings for the substantive offence. We also strongly support Amendments 90J, 90K and 90L but I will leave others to speak to them.
We have tabled Amendment 91A for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames gave in Committee. There needs to be a reasonable excuse defence for wrongly telling a police officer that they were not subject to an SVRO—something that the police officer could immediately check in any event. Amendment 91B removes the new offence of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty in relation to SVROs as this is already covered by existing legislation. Amendment 91D limits the renewal of SVROs to a maximum of four years, allowing those subject to them to move on with their lives rather than being targeted and harassed by the police indefinitely, even if they commit no further offences.
Amendments 95A and 95B, to which I have added my name, would prevent SVROs being introduced beyond the pilot phase until a report on the pilot had been laid before Parliament and both Houses had agreed to its rollout. We need to be sure that these orders will not be counterproductive. Amendment 95C would strengthen the pilot; I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, will explain this further.
If the Government insist on proceeding with this dreadful measure, they should at least limit the damage until they are sure that it will not make matters worse. We support all the amendments in this group.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 90H and 90J, as well as 95A, 95B and 95C, but, before going into the arguments for those amendments, I express my strong support for Amendments 90G and, indeed, all the amendments in this group. I have such considerable concerns about the detrimental impact of these serious violence reduction orders that I believe that any way in which we can limit their detrimental consequence should be supported.
I begin by addressing why I hope the Government will make adjustments to the Bill in view of those considerable concerns—expressed not just by those of us in this House but by many organisations in the community, including Amnesty International—about the severe consequences of SVROs for so many innocent young people and the need to restrict these provisions appropriately.
As Ministers know, SVROs would expand stop and search powers to enable the police to stop and search someone whenever they are in a public place, without any suspicion of current wrongdoing, simply on the basis of a past conviction that may or may not be a knife offence. The purpose of Amendments 90H and 90J is to put right this apparently unintended wrong.
The Minister repeatedly stated in Committee that
“at the point at which … someone is issued with an SVRO, they will have been convicted by the court of a knife or offensive weapon offence”.—[Official Report, 17/11/21; cols. 310-311.]
However, the legislation as it stands makes it clear that an SVRO can be issued to individuals who have not been convicted of a knife or offensive weapon offence. New Clause 324A(3) clearly allows for an SVRO to be issued if the offender had
“a bladed article or offensive weapon with them”
or, under subsection (4)—this is in many ways much worse—if the offender
“knew or ought to have known”
that someone else had a knife. This could include someone convicted of shoplifting who happened to have a penknife in their pocket. It could also—this is really important, and I hope that the Minister will respond—include people in abusive and coercive relationships, who may have known or, according to the Bill, should have known that their abuser had a knife.
Will the Minister say whether she believes that individuals involved in these ways should be regarded as having committed a knife crime and therefore liable to have an SVRO imposed? I feel quite certain—because I know the Minister and know that she has great integrity—that she will not want these people to find themselves caught up with an SVRO.
There are many reasons to amend the Bill as proposed in Amendments 90H and 90J. First, as Agenda has said, the proposed terms of an SVRO render invisible the impact of coercion in relationships experienced by many young women drawn into the criminal justice system or at risk of criminal exploitation. Ministers need to take account of a study by Metropolitan University and JENGbA which examined 109 joint enterprise cases involving women and girls, the majority of whom had convictions for serious violent offences. The study found that none of the women involved had used a deadly weapon and in 90% of cases they did not engage in violence at all. In half the cases, the women were not even present at the scene. Perhaps the Minister can comment on this study and its implications for Amendments 90H and 90J. We are simply asking the Government to adjust the Bill to bring it into line with the Conservative Party manifesto, which makes clear the aim to make
“it easier for officers to stop and search those convicted of knife crime.”
The removal of new Clause 342A (3)(b) and (4) would achieve this alignment, and I hope the Government may be willing to do that. As Minister knows, the College of Policing has expressed its concerns that the use of stop and search without an intelligence-led approach is unlikely to reduce crime.
In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that SVROs will be effective in reducing knife crime. This point brings me on to the other amendments I have tabled in this group—Amendments 95A, 95B and 95C— which focus on the need for the pilot of SVROs to be comprehensive and meaningful. Amendments 95A and 95B require a vote by both Houses. It is crucial to have this democratic control before these SVROs are introduced. This must happen under these amendments before SVROs can be commenced.
Amendment 95C strengthens the pilot to ensure that key issues are examined. A key reason why these amendments are vital is the experience of a pilot into the relaxation of the best use of stop and search safeguards. The rollout of these changes was announced by the May Government prior to the publication of the evidence arising from the pilot. The Government were forced into a U-turn by a legal action, but they have continued to refuse to publish the evidence on the grounds that they need a safe place in which to discuss changes. Are we going to be up against this sort of argument in this context? Amendments 95A and 95B would ensure publication of the evidence and parliamentary scrutiny before SVROs could be rolled out.
We know that the proposed new measures pose significant human rights impacts, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out. Black people are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. They do not commit these crimes 18 times more than white people. Also, only 4% of stops find a weapon. The pilot will need to show that SVROs meet their stated aims of breaking the cycle of offending and protecting our communities from harm. The pilot also needs to analyse the effect upon others who will be severely affected by SVROs as the Bill stands—for example, exploited women. It is for them, in particular, that SVROs must not be applicable to people who knew or ought to have known that someone else had a knife. I am sure the Government do not wish to bring these women into the criminal justice system, as others have already said.
Amendments 95A and 95B are hugely important because they ensure that SVROs can be introduced only if Parliament is satisfied on the basis of the evidence from the pilot that they will reduce serious violent crime and that the consequences for the human rights of individuals and communities are proportionate and justified.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this important debate. I particularly thank the right reverend Prelates and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their contributions. Unfortunately, I did not hear the Minister adequately address their points or the issues that I raised. I asked specific questions about the Minister’s letter of 6 January, but she appeared just to stand at the Dispatch Box and repeat what was in that letter.
As far as I am concerned, I would not be satisfied about the pilots, but that is a decision for the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to take shortly. My understanding is that noble Lords are coalescing around a vote on Amendments 95A, 95B and 95C, so I think we should get on with it. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I beg to move the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford.
These amendments give effect to a commitment made by the Prime Minister in the immediate aftermath of the final of Euro 2020. The whole of England was disappointed by the outcome, and that is understandable. What was not excusable or acceptable was the racist abuse directed at certain England players. Your Lordships will also be aware of the ubiquitous slow drip of hateful online abuse many high-profile footballers are subjected to. In the light of that behaviour, the Prime Minister announced that we would legislate to extend the football banning order regime to cover online abuse, and that is the purpose of these amendments. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, tabled an amendment directed to the same end. In response, I said that the Government would look to legislate as soon as possible, and that is what we are doing. I hope the noble Lord will feel that his objectives have now been met and will welcome these amendments.
Football banning orders were first introduced in 1989. The intention of these new clauses is to amend the operation of the football banning order regime to enable a court to impose a football banning order against persons convicted of online hate offences connected to football. The amendments will also enable a court to impose a football banning order for other race, religious or sexual orientation hate offences against persons with a prescribed connection to a football organisation where the incident would not fall under the existing coverage. This will prevent such offenders propagating their criminal, hateful views at football matches. I sincerely hope that this measure will also deter others from engaging in similar behaviour that is so harmful to the victims and our national game.
Amendment 96B will amend the Football Spectators Act 1989 to enable the list of relevant offences in Schedule 1 to that Act to be amended by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. A person can receive a football banning order following conviction for a relevant offence. There is no intention to use the new regulation-making power to add to the schedule offences that do not involve violence, disorderly behaviour or harm to others, or a risk or threat of such, nor to add offences which are not football-related. Rather, this will enable the Secretary of State to ensure that the list of relevant offences for the purposes of football banning order proceedings can be kept up to date and relevant in the event of amendment to the Acts listed in the schedule or developing trends of harm or disorder relating to football, such as online hate offences.
Finally, Amendment 96C will amend the consideration that a court undertakes in deciding whether to impose a football banning order against a person convicted of a football-related offence under the 1989 Act. It will remove the requirement that the convicted person must pose an identifiable risk of violence or disorder at or in connection with football matches. I must again reference the vile online racist abuse of England players after the Euro 2020 final. Under the current test, courts may not be convinced that offenders convicted of racist online offences pose an identifiable risk of violence and disorder at matches. However, I believe that it is imperative to ensure that such offenders can be prevented from spreading their hateful words at football matches. Courts will retain their powers of discretion if there are particular circumstances relating to the offence or the offender which would make it unjust to impose a football banning order, with a requirement that they state in open court their reasons for not doing so.
We can all agree that there is no place for racist abuse in football—or more widely—and it is right that we should send a strong signal that those convicted of racist abuse or other unconscionable hatred connected to football should not be allowed to attend football matches to spread their poisonous prejudices. This is a sensible and much-needed change to the legislation governing football and I ask your Lordships to endorse it.
My Lords, can the Minister confirm the impact these amendments will have on homophobic abuse of soccer players? I think he mentioned it once. Tom Daley on Channel 4’s “Alternative Christmas Message” talked about the fact that no professional footballers in the UK have publicly said they are gay: fear of public reaction is probably a big part of the reason why. In fact, globally, it is my understanding that only one professional soccer player has come out as gay, and he plays in Australia.
People have shied away from a hierarchy of diversity, but I have always believed that racism is a bigger problem than homophobia: some people can hide their sexuality, but few people of colour can hide their race. Having said that, people can hide their religious beliefs; there are many white Muslims, for example. These amendments cover religion but not, at least immediately obviously, sexuality. Racism is still a huge problem, and these amendments are welcome, but where is the clear and unambiguous message in these amendments that homophobic abuse directed at football players is just as unacceptable as racism and Islamophobia? It is not clear to me.
Even the Government’s explanatory statement for these amendments refers to
“certain offences relating to race or religion and certain online hate offences.”
If I am having to search the many and various pieces of legislation mentioned in these amendments to satisfy myself that people like me are covered, then these amendments do not send a clear and unambiguous message that homophobic abuse is as unacceptable as racism and Islamophobia. The Law Commission in its recent report on hate crime identifies the need to place sexual and gender diversity hatred on the same footing as race hatred, so what assurances can the Minister give in this case? I do not want perfection to be the enemy of the good, and there will still be an opportunity to provide clarification at Third Reading, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, it would be remiss of me not to thank the Government for bringing forward these amendments. They very much fulfil the objectives that I set out in moving my amendments in Committee. Imagine my slight surprise when I received an email shortly before Christmas from one of the officials telling me about this, though it had been suggested to me, and that the announcement was going to be made on Boxing Day—not a day traditionally used for parliamentary consideration. But I was pleased to hear that the Government were going to bring forward the amendments. I offered at one stage to co-sign them, but that seems to have got lost in the mists.
I am not entirely convinced that we would have seen these amendments if we had not brought them forward in Committee and threatened the Government with, I suspect, the possibility of a defeat on them. It has taken the Government too long to get to this point. Boris Johnson himself mentioned it back in July, but we have been campaigning on this issue for some years, and these amendments are long overdue.
Turning to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I too would like to see some clarification as to whether these amendments will cover homophobic abuse. It is fair to say that many of the football clubs are well ahead of the Government on this already. I know that my own football club, Brighton & Hove Albion, has long taken the view that homophobic abuse is unacceptable and made that very clear, not just in its programmes and publicity but in its action. That is to be welcomed. Many clubs have adopted that approach and now take pride in supporting gay footballers and ensuring that people do not get abused in that way at games. That is to be welcomed, but we need some legislative clarity.
I have one further point that I wish to pursue with the Government. The Bill is an opportunity to cover online abuse wherever it manifests. Although football understandably is a natural focus for this because, let us face it, that is where a lot of racist abuse has been channelled over the last few years, particularly last summer, I challenge the Government to bring forward a further amendment which covers other sports. We are all very conscious and aware of the racism that is there in other sports and sporting activities, and the abuse that many black and minority-ethnic cricketers, in particular, have suffered.
We should try to deal with the whole package, and it would be a good challenge for the Government to meet to bring forward amendments that we and, I am sure, other Members of your Lordships’ House would support at Third Reading. We would be more than happy to use our drafting talents to make sure it happened. It would clarify once and for all the position for all sports men and women across the UK, and it would send a strong and important message that this is just not acceptable behaviour in any shape or form in any sporting arena or in any sport.
I support the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in seeking clarity about homophobic abuse; that is really important. I would like the Government to bring forward further amendments to cover other sports at Third Reading. I do not think that it is beyond the wit of the Government they have clever and cunning draftspeople at their beck and call and there are plenty of us in this House who would want to support that and sign up to that agenda.
I place on record my thanks to the Minister and Ministers generally, to the Home Office staff who have supported them, and to our own staff in our Labour Lords team who did the original drafting, because this is an important step forward and we should recognise that.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Bassam and Lord Pannick, I can happily clarify that this includes homophobic and misogynistic hate speech, and all other forms of hate speech. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is absolutely right: it is under Section 3A of the Public Order Act 1986. I am afraid I do not have the Sentencing Code so I will have to look into that for him.
The core amendments apply to online hate speech where the court has found on sentencing that the offence was aggravated by racial or religious hostility, or hostility related to disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity. This reflects the five types of hate crime recognised by the law, which I think is the Sentencing Code.
I agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, about other sports. I have heard the DCMS Minister answer questions on this, and there will of course be other opportunities in other Bills coming up, which I suspect will also have something to say on the subject, but I will take it back to both departments.
Before the Minister sits down, could I clarify what he just said? It threw another confusion at me. He said it covers misogynistic hate speech. I am not sure misogyny is a hate crime. Therefore, I am not sure the Minister is correct on that point. Perhaps he could clarify.
I am afraid I will have to write to him to clarify that point.
My Lords, it will not be, because this woman disagrees with this amendment. I speak as a woman who cares deeply about the physical safety of women. One of the things I find most objectionable about the campaign which has been run in the media for the past couple of years is the assumption that those of us who are women and who stand as allies with trans people do not care, because I do not believe that is the case at all.
It would be very tempting at this stage to answer some of the wide-ranging points which have been made about, for example, polls with leading questions, misinterpretations and mis-statements of the law, but I shall not do that. I shall simply stick to the facts that this House should look at when it comes to a decision on this matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, spoke about an entitlement of prisoners to go to an estate. There is no such entitlement. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about instances where self-identifying male prisoners had predated on women. That has happened, but my understanding is that it has not happened since the implementation of the policy which has been operational in the Prison Service since 2016 and was updated in 2019.
There are historical cases, which are trotted out all the time by people who wish to disparage trans people. Let us be absolutely clear what the current policy that is operated in our prisons is:
“A proper assessment of risk is paramount in the management of all individuals subject to custodial and community sentences. The management of individuals who are transgender, particularly in custodial and AP settings, must seek to protect both the welfare and rights of the individual, and the welfare and rights of others in custody around them. These two risks must be considered fully and balanced against each other … Decisions must be informed by all available evidence and intelligence in order to achieve an outcome that balances risks and promotes the safety of all individuals in custody”.
My understanding, from talking to prison officials, is that not only is there no entitlement for a prisoner to be held in an estate, but that the risk assessment includes an assessment of whether somebody is attempting to be transferred into an estate in order to perpetrate further crimes. If they are, it is held as a contra-indication.
I agree absolutely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What we have now is a policy, as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, said, that does protect to the full the human rights of individuals, but also balances them with the safety of everybody—that includes the staff in prisons as well; let us not forget them. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is therefore putting to us an amendment that is not based on evidence and is a retrograde step. I urge noble Lords to reject it.
My Lords, I do not intend to repeat the arguments that other noble Lords have made and those that I made in Committee; they are in the official record. Existing legislation and procedures, properly applied, are sufficient to ensure the safety and well-being of all prisoners and staff in our prisons in relation to transgender prisoners. I am sure that the noble Lord the Minister will confirm that.
Because I have said, in answer to a suggestion on Twitter, that I felt that the existing risk-based approach was best, I was sent a direct message on Facebook from somebody I have never heard from before saying, “Leave women’s rights alone you nasty little misogynist. We see you loud and clear. Trans rights simply means male rights. Enjoy your irrelevance MRA bigot”. Whatever MRA stands for, I have no idea. Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has said, we need to consider the rights of women—of course we do—but transgender people also have rights, and their rights need to be balanced. The best way to do so is on a case-by-case basis.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, and the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Farmer, talked extensively about transgender people who had not undergone gender reassignment surgery, or transgender women who are still physically men. There is nothing at all in this amendment about the physical state of transgender people; it applies in a blanket manner to every single transgender person. The fact is that every prisoner entering the prison estate is risk-assessed to ensure that they are not a threat to themselves or others, and they are then housed or segregated on that basis. If that assessment has been wrong on rare occasions in the past, the problem was not with the system, let alone with the law; it was a problem with implementation. I understand, however—and I am sure that the Minister will confirm—that that is no longer a problem. This amendment is not necessary and we oppose it.
My Lords, I too will be relatively brief. This debate is about balancing rights and balancing vulnerabilities, and I have been following it over months if not years. Unfortunately, I did not go to the teach-in organised by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. However, I have been to other events on Zoom where I have spoken to prison officers and the people involved in managing the situations discussed here. It is apparent to me that there has been an evolution in the prison officers’ and governors’ approaches. I have spoken to a number of them several times. I spoke to one women’s prison where transgender units operated for a period, and the way they were operated was later changed. I have to say the governors I spoke to seemed—I do not want to use the word “relaxed”—to think that they could manage the situation. That is what I was told, and I have every reason to believe in their professionalism in dealing with an evolving situation—as we have heard from noble Lords, there is an increase in trans prisoners; the figure of 20% since 2019 was mentioned.
I have visited quite a few prisons over the last 10 years and I am always impressed by the quality of the prison staff, the governors and the prison officers. The basis of my view is that I trust them to make the right decisions. I think they are dealing with very difficult circumstances and I think that they can manage risk. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, they have policies which have evolved over a period, which include the safety of the prisoners and the staff. I was pleased to hear that during the teach-in the Minister said that he is willing to support further research into this matter. It is an evolving situation, but for my part I am content that the current complex case boards that make these difficult decisions should continue to do their work.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise as I did in Committee to speak briefly and humbly on behalf of my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who signed the matching amendments in Committee. I can only pay very strong tributes to the noble Lords, Lord Cashman and Lord Lexden, for all their long work on these issues. The Green group, of course, welcomes these amendments. I would like to thank the Minister for her helpful letter that addressed the questions I raised in Committee about why it is not possible to automatically get rid of these offences to clear people of them.
In the light of that, I would simply like to prompt the Minister—though I realise it is early—for whatever information she might be able to give us both about what plans there are to publicise this legal change to make sure people are able to easily and simply apply and about what kind of timeframe for the process she sees going forwards. As has been said, many people affected by this may be of an older age group, and it is really important this is available to people as soon as possible.
My Lords, at last, much credit must go to the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Cashman, and to Professor Paul Johnson, but also to the Minister, who accepted the challenge from the noble Lords and ran with it. I understand the right honourable Priti Patel took little persuasion. Whether that is the Minister being modest or not, I have nothing but thanks and praise for all those involved.
My Lords, I feel privileged to come in at the tail-end of this six-year campaign. I have to say I found it very moving listening to my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, who does me the privilege of taking an interest in my family history. I have followed his campaign on this matter as well. I also note the points he made about the position in Northern Ireland. It has been a six-year campaign—to use the words of my noble friend—to wipe away the stain on history. It seems to me these amendments are doing this. I also join in the praises from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of the Minister, who appears to me, as a latecomer to this, to have been with the campaigners every step of the way.
My Lords, Amendment 99, is in my name and those of the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Paddick: I am grateful for their support. We return to the issue of potting—that is to say, a disgusting assault using materials mentioned in subparagraph (1) of the new clause and which usually occurs in a custodial setting. In the light of a constructive meeting I had with the Minister last week, I do not propose to detain the House very long on this matter, and I do not believe the House or, indeed, my Chief Whip, is keen to do so either.
Since we debated the matter in Committee, the Government have published a White Paper on the prison system which, inter alia, proposes zero tolerance for bad behaviour in prisons. I have taken on board some of the defects of my original amendment, identified in Committee: the amendment now deals only with the preparatory act of intercepting the relevant substance. It is not necessary to have a new offence for the actual potting, since that is covered by existing offences, and it is not good practice to place a duty to provide spit kits in a clause that seeks to create a new offence.
In Committee, I thought the Minister was a bit optimistic when he said he was not aware of any problems with the issuing of spit kits to prison officers. A subsequent Written Answer revealed that none of the several prisons that I asked about appeared to be issuing spit kits. I accept that spit kits are particularly useful when the offender is not known to the victim—say, a ticket inspector—and when the offender may abscond but probably has a record. However, my underlying concern is to ensure that these disgusting offences do not go unpunished and, as a result, become more frequent and insidious. I hope my noble friend will take this opportunity to flesh out the proposals in the Prisons Strategy White Paper to have zero tolerance of bad behaviour within prison.
We all owe a great debt of gratitude to prison officers and prison governors, who we charge with looking after and protecting us from some of the most dangerous, wicked and obnoxious members of our society. We owe it to them to make sure that, if they are assaulted doing their duty, we will back them up and ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. If we fail to do so, there will be at least two serious consequences: first, we will experience difficulties in retaining the best possible prison officers; secondly, the remaining prison officers will be demotivated, less willing to ensure full compliance and less willing to ensure that prisons are the safe and humane establishments that we all want them to be. I am pleased to say that I have detected that Ministers have taken all this on board.
Finally, I remind the House that I am not a founder member of the “hang ‘em, flog ‘em and throw away the key brigade”; the House will recall my proposals outlined in my Committee stage Amendment 241, which proposed drastic reform in respect of prolific minor offenders, and I am grateful for the positive response that I received. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very pleased to support the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his amendment, to the extent that I have added my name. We had discussions between Committee and Report; we agreed that the actual assault was covered by existing legislation, but the preparatory acts in preparing these disgusting attacks on prison staff needed to be addressed. That is how we arrived at the revised amendment, and I am very happy to support it.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Earl: he has been dogged in his pursuance of this and I understand he has had constructive discussions with the Minister. I look forward to what the Minister is going to say to, in the noble’s Earl words, flesh out the proposals in the White Paper, and how these may lead to greater support for prison officers. One specific question for the Minister is how they propose to monitor potting and whether it is done by somebody acting in extreme distress or whether it is part of a planned tactic, if you like, within the prison.
In conclusion, I repeat my tribute to the noble Earl—it appears to me that his time in the TA may have led to his having some empathy with prison officers. I do not know, but nevertheless I support his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for very effectively introducing the amendments. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove and Lady O’Loan, for their powerful contributions, in their different ways. I will have much more to say about the College of Policing code of ethics and the culture in the police service when we debate the amendments on the duty of candour.
I agree with other noble Lords that debating this issue at this time of night is not appropriate. I do not believe there was a conspiracy to make this debate happen late in the evening, but it was open to the Government Chief Whip not to begin this group at this time of night, but to debate it the next day—and I believe he should have done that.
On the substance of the amendment, the last non-statutory inquiry into the police—by the Daniel Morgan independent panel—took, as the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said, more than eight years to complete, because it did not have the powers of a statutory inquiry under the Inquiries Act, and because, as we have heard, it faced obstruction by the police, leaving important questions still unanswered. The Macpherson report—the inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence—took less than two years, and had a fundamental impact on policing. If the Government do not accept Amendment 102, we must assume that they want an inquiry that drags on for years and does not answer the fundamental questions. It is as simple as that.
For the protection of police officers and members of the public, those arrested should not be placed into a vehicle or taken into premises unless there are at least two officers present. Not only would Amendment 108 reassure women and girls, but it is also basic common sense. Similarly, Amendment 109, requiring the Secretary of State to issue codes of practice in relation to the transportation, as well as the detention, of people by the police under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, is necessary. What could the Government’s objections possibly be? Perhaps we are about to find out.
My Lords, I congratulate all noble Lords and noble Baronesses who have spoken so far in the debate. I shall focus on Amendment 102, which is incredibly important. The speeches by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove, Lady O’Loan and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have all, in their own ways, made important points to the Government.
The question for the Government is whether they will listen and respond to that, or whether they will just say, “This is the decision we have made, and whatever arguments are put to us, we’re not going to change”. This is one of those moments when they do need to respond. They need to change, and to listen to the arguments that have been made right across this Chamber and beyond—and, no doubt, by many of the people who will be listening. The reason I say that is that the statutory inquiry called for in Amendment 102, moved by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, has at its heart the need for the restoration of public confidence and trust.
There are seismic moments in our country: events that demand a response that goes beyond normal politics, beyond the normal debate between parties—events that demand a response from this country’s Parliament, its representatives both in this Chamber and in the other place, that meets the significance of what has happened. It cannot be that we simply say that we will have a Home Office-led inquiry, and that is okay. How will the public see that? How will individuals see that? How will the people who have responded to the horror, as we all have, of what happened to Sarah Everard, see it? This touched the nation’s conscience, the nation’s inner being. It wants us to respond to that and surely, at the very least, we should say that we will undertake a statutory inquiry, because that is the way the confidence of the public can be restored. It is the way we can ensure that, as we move forward, the public can be reassured that that confidence and trust can be restored in the state, in its broadest sense—not just Parliament but the organs of the state: the justice system, the police, and all those who have responsibility because of what we legislate for here.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made what I thought was the crucial point—the one that an ordinary member of the public, frankly, from whatever part of the country, whatever their occupation, would make. What happens to that inquiry if a witness says, “I am not coming” and that inquiry is obstructed? What happens if the Home Secretary says, “It is a very important document but we cannot release it because it is sensitive”? What would the Government’s Home Office-led review be able to do if a witness refuses to attend, if the release of a document is refused, if the police, for example, refuse to co-operate? Answer from the Government there is none, other than a vague platitude: “We expect that co-operation to happen; we expect that to take place; we expect all the documents to be released.” A statutory inquiry, however, would have no such problem. There could be no obstruction, no documents withheld, because that is the point of a statutory inquiry. In the court of public opinion, let alone any other court, people will say, “Why are they not doing that? What possible reason is there for the Government not to respond in that way?” I do not understand it.
I am a Labour Peer, a Labour politician. That does not mean that I think everything the Conservative Government do is terrible; but sometimes, it does not matter where you are on the political spectrum—you have this sense of incredulity, of disbelief. Why is the system refusing to do the obvious? Why is the system not responding in the way that anybody would expect it to, in the face of the horror of what happened to Sarah Everard? We cannot undo the past, but we can make the future. I think that people would expect nothing less from us, nothing less from this Chamber, than that we say in response to the horror of what happened that the public demand a statutory inquiry that compels co-operation, documents and witnesses. There are all the other arguments that go round and round, all the other arguments that can be made, but that is the nub of it.
I say to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that this is one of the most fundamentally important amendments we have discussed on this Bill. Of course, there will be women—daughters, young women, girls—who want this, but there will also be a lot of men, if not the vast majority, who will be demanding that statutory inquiry for the women and the girls of this country. We all want it.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, perhaps I may make three quick points in support of this important amendment. First, we all accept that short sentences are extremely expensive to manage and expensive to our society, and we ought to do our best to provide alternatives to them. They are also expensive in other ways because they introduce often naive offenders to much more serious crime. Secondly, short sentences are extremely disruptive to the individual concerned. They often lose whatever jobs they have and a whole range of things that are important in their life. Thirdly, restorative justice is a learning experience. Would that there were other parts of the criminal justice system that I could say with confidence were a learning experience.
Restorative justice is the opportunity for an offender to reflect carefully on what has happened as a result of their behaviour and on why it is important that they learn from that experience and change their way of life. This is an important amendment that I hope the Government will take seriously.
My Lords, I remind the House that at one stage in my police career I was the lead for the Metropolitan Police on restorative justice, working with Professor Larry Sherman. The evidence from that experience and other academic studies shows that the benefits to victims, in terms of allaying fear and victim satisfaction, and to perpetrators, in terms of engagement with the criminal justice process, and by being confronted, as the noble Lord, Lord Laming, has just said, by their offending behaviour, and in terms of reducing recidivism, are unequivocal.
The only objection to the amendment would be political, because restorative justice is wrongly perceived by those who do not understand the process as going soft on offenders; it is the opposite. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Laming, about short sentences. However, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, it does not necessarily have to be an alternative to prison in very serious cases. The important outcomes are victim satisfaction and the offender having to confront their offending behaviour.
The Minister may argue that people get a long time in prison in which to reflect on their wrongdoing. However, a colleague of mine did some research on street robbery and went to a young offenders’ institution to interview those who had been convicted and incarcerated for that offence. Many of those he spoke to did not understand why they were in the young offenders’ institution. The process was so detached from them—they just sat at the back of the court while other people spoke and dealt with the case, without their involvement at all. They genuinely did not understand why they were in prison. That is why restorative justice is important.
The question is: are the Government going to be led by the evidence and support this amendment, or are they going to object to it, based on misconceptions?
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. It is modest and worth while, and is another step down the road.
I remember that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, introduced the phrase restorative justice into the statute book. I cannot remember which piece of legislation it was but at that point he spoke perceptively when he said that it was going to be a long road to get restorative justice embedded within the criminal justice system, whether in terms of probation, YOTs or prison. He was right and the necessity for the amendment proves that because the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, gave a number of examples, including where the funding or initiatives have stalled and the momentum with restorative justice has been lost. From memory, the initial introduction of restorative justice was through a separate funding stream for YOTs to use these programmes. So I very much support the amendment. It needs constant activity and oversight by a Minister to get the restorative justice programmes embedded in the system as a whole.
One reason why what I am saying is perhaps more relevant than what some noble Lords have said is that I have some scepticism on the issue. I am happy to have a cup of tea with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to express my scepticism. While I support the amendment, it requires a long-term programme, and it is for the Government to make sure that that programme is implemented.
My Lords, the Minister seemed to suggest that, in any form of restorative justice, a victim might be compelled or forced to engage in the process. I think that is what he said. Can he reassure me that it was not?
I was saying absolutely the opposite and, if it came out wrong, it came out wrong. The whole point of restorative justice is that the offender and the victim have to consent. That is the point which I was making about crimes of sexual violence. The victim there should not feel under any compulsion or pressure to engage in restorative justice if they do not want to. Victim choice and free-will participation is at the heart of restorative justice. I hope that I have made that very clear.
My Lords, I speak in place of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Derby, who sadly cannot be here today. She and I support this amendment, to which she has added her name. I declare her interest as vice-chair of the Children’s Society. These are her words.
In Committee, my right reverend friend the Bishop of Durham spoke in the place of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester. I will not repeat all that was said, but I will reiterate a few fundamental points as we consider this amendment. As a Church living and working in every corner of this nation, we support families and children, often in the most vulnerable of contexts. We have seen the devastating consequences when children are coerced and exploited, including through serious violence. Those consequences have ripple effects through not only the life of that child but the wider community. Visiting young offender institutions, I am struck by how many of these children and young people are victims first. Their stories could have been very different if intervention had occurred earlier. They have been groomed and coerced in the same way as children groomed for sexual exploitation; as such, they should be treated as victims. They need support rather than the further trauma of being charged and prosecuted.
I share with noble Lords the story of a young person supported by the Children’s Society which illustrates how many victims of child criminal exploitation are not recognised as such. Bobby—not his real name—aged 15, was picked up with class A drugs in a trap-house raid by the police. Bobby had been groomed, exploited and trafficked across the country to sell drugs. After his arrest, he was driven back to his home by police officers, who had questioned him alone in the car and used that information to submit a referral through the national referral mechanism, which did not highlight Bobby’s vulnerability—instead, it read like a crime report. Bobby had subsequently been to court in Wales and, because his referral to the NRM failed and his barrister did not understand the process, he was advised to plead guilty, which he did.
At this time, he was referred to the Children’s Society’s “Disrupting Exploitation” programme. With its help, Bobby challenged the NRM decision and worked to ensure that he was recognised as a victim instead of an offender, enabling him to retract his plea of guilty. The Children’s Society was able to work with Bobby, his family and the professionals around him to ensure that they recognised the signs of exploitation and how it can manifest.
But for many young people who are criminally exploited, that is not the case. Many will be prosecuted and convicted as offenders, while those who groomed and exploited them walk free. Agencies that come into contact with these children are not working to the same statutory definition of what constitutes child criminal exploitation.
What this amendment hopes to achieve is for statutory services to recognise that these children have not made a choice to get involved in criminal activity. I whole- heartedly agree that local multiagency safeguarding arrangements are key to responding to child exploitation. However, we need a clear, national definition and understanding of the types of child exploitation that they must safeguard against. Front-line agencies all agree: there is no evidence that the system as it stands is working consistently to protect these children from exploitation.
We are committed to the flourishing of all people. That includes children and young people from the most marginalised and disadvantaged circumstances—those for whom real choice is out of their grasp. We must do all within our power to give hope to victims and dare to dream of a different future for these children.
My Lords, in Committee I recalled my own experience of visiting the only young offender institution in Scotland, where the governor told us that every young person in her institution had suffered multiple adverse childhood experiences, or ACEs. These are potentially traumatic events that occur in childhood and include experiencing violence, abuse or neglect, particularly head trauma; witnessing violence in the home or community, something that is becoming all too common; and having a family member attempt or die by suicide. Also included are aspects of the child’s environment that can undermine their sense of safety, stability and bonding, such as growing up in a household with substance use problems, mental health problems or instability due to parental separation or household members being in prison.
ACEs also make children particularly vulnerable to criminal exploitation and it is important that this is recognised in statute to ensure that a trauma-informed approach is taken to child victims of criminal exploitation, rather than a criminalising, punitive approach. This amendment provides that statutory definition and we strongly support it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for setting out the case for the amendment and to all noble Lords who took part in this short debate. I wholly agree that the targeting, grooming and exploitation of children who are often the most vulnerable in our society for criminal purposes is deplorable. This Government are committed to tackling it.
Before I start, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the Government are not complicit in crime. I remember CHIS being debated quite extensively in your Lordships’ House. They are subject to significant and stringent safeguards, so I think that we can leave that there.
This amendment seeks to establish a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation. As I indicated in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Field of Birkenhead, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and Maria Miller MP undertook an independent review into the Modern Slavery Act 2015, the findings of which were published in May 2019. The definition of exploitation in Section 3 of the Act was explored as part of this review in response to calls that it should be amended to explicitly reflect new and emerging forms of exploitation, such as county lines.
The review heard evidence from the CPS, which warned against expanding the scope of the meaning of exploitation or defining exploitation so precisely that it would lack flexibility when applying the legislation to a changing profile of criminal conduct. The authors of the review agreed and recommended that the definition should not be amended, as it is sufficiently flexible to cover a range of circumstances, including new and emerging forms of modern slavery.
We agree that front-line practitioners need to have a clear understanding of child exploitation; the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made these points very well. That is why child exploitation is already defined in statutory guidance, including the Keeping Children Safe in Education and Working Together to Safeguard Children statutory guidance. It is also set out in non-statutory practice documents for those working with young people, such as the Home Office Child Exploitation Disruption Toolkit and the county lines guidance.
We recognise that the vast majority of child criminal exploitation cases occur in the context of county lines. That is why the Home Office is providing up to £1 million this financial year to the St Giles Trust to provide specialist support for under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation. The project is operating in London, the West Midlands and Merseyside, which are the three largest exporting county lines areas. We also continue to fund the Missing People’s SafeCall service. This is a national confidential helpline service for young people, families and carers who are experiencing county lines exploitation.
I listened carefully to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who made some powerful points. She mentioned the Children’s Society. I should point out that the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. This has included a public awareness campaign called “Look Closer”, which started in September. It focuses on increasing awareness of the signs and indicators of child exploitation and encourages the public and service, retail and transport sector workers to report concerns to the police quickly.
Back to county lines and drugs. They devastate lives, ruin families and damage communities. That is why this Government have recently introduced a 10-year strategy to combat illicit drugs using a whole-system approach to cut off the supply of drugs by criminal gangs and give people with a drug addiction a route to a productive and drug-free life. Through the strategy, we will bolster our flagship county lines programme, investing up to £145 million to tackle the most violent and exploitative distribution model yet seen.
Clearly, we are all in agreement that tackling child criminal exploitation must be a priority. I have set out some of the steps that the Government are taking to do just that. However, the Government remain unpersuaded that defining child criminal exploitation in statute would aid understanding of the issue or help such exploitation. As I have indicated, we should pay heed to the conclusions of the independent review of the Modern Slavery Act, which commended the flexibility afforded by the current definition of exploitation. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I reassure noble Lords that I will not be speaking on every amendment today, but I regret that all those that we have discussed so far, including this one, will not go to a vote. That is a real shame, because they are so sensible.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on tabling the amendment to which I have put my name. I support all the amendments in this group, not just Amendment 104C. The criminal justice system is hugely distrusted by survivors of sexual violence, based on the way they are treated when they come forward to make a complaint. There have been some important steps forward over the years, but trust is still far lower than it needs to be for survivors to come forward, go through the whole criminal justice system and have their lives pored over. Granting the right to complainants to be represented by a lawyer in an appeal to adduce evidence on questions of sexual conduct would be an important leap forward. The complainant is seen as a neutral third party with no particular legal rights, rather than someone deserving legal protection and representation, and this really has to change.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is leading for us on this group, but I want to speak on Amendment 107C. I was commissioned by the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, now the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, to conduct a review of rape investigation in the Metropolitan Police, working together with Professor Betsy Stanko OBE.
At that time, the Metropolitan Police had specialist rape investigation units. Their performance was mixed, but they were considerably better than the experiment in community policing that was being conducted in one part of London. Small teams of detectives were allocated to each part of the borough to investigate all crime there, including rape and serious sexual offences. In addition to being overwhelmed by large numbers of more minor criminal investigations, they lacked the experience and expertise of officers who specialise in rape and other sexual offences.
I know from practical experience on the ground within the police service that specialist rape and serious sexual offences units provide much better outcomes for the victims and survivors of these types of crime. I doubt that legislation such as this amendment can override the operational independence of chief constables, but the principle is right and the Home Secretary, the College of Policing Limited—we will come to that in an upcoming group—HMICFRS and police and crime commissioners should all exert pressure on chief constables to ensure that they are established.
My Lords, we support all the amendments in this group. First, I will consider Amendment 104B. As explained by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, this amendment would authorise a special measures direction to enable videorecording of cross-examination of complainants in criminal proceedings for sexual offences or modern slavery offences, in order to enable their evidence to be given remotely.
This is a sensible measure for the protection of witnesses not only from alleged perpetrators but from the trauma of giving evidence in these difficult and painful cases. We have heard many times in debates on this Bill and on the Domestic Abuse Act how painful an ordeal giving evidence is likely to be. In the absence of a special measures direction, complainants who are witnesses have to give evidence before strangers, often in the presence of their assailants or exploiters and often under hostile questioning, to relive some of the most painful experiences of their lives. Nor should we forget how, in these cases, recording the evidence of complainants might well be the very best way of securing truthful and accurate evidence so that courts might be better placed to do justice than if they had to rely on the live oral evidence of very frightened and intimidated witnesses.
We also support Amendment 104C in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, because we have heard that Section 41 applications, if granted, permit the most intrusive and personal questioning of complainants about their previous sexual history. Such questioning might sometimes legitimately be regarded by a court as necessary in the interests of justice, but even when that is the case it nevertheless involves a gross invasion of the privacy, the sense of decency and the perceived rights of the complainant. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness are entirely right to seek the protections for the complainant that the amendment involves: the right to take part in the application or not at her choice, because it is generally a woman’s choice; to be legally represented; and to have a right of appeal against a direction admitting questioning or evidence of previous sexual conduct.
These Section 41 applications and the fear of the questioning they involve have been a reason for the large numbers of sexual offences going unreported or unprosecuted, as complainants are not prepared to go through the hell of facing such cross-examination and they pull out of cases for fear of it. They should be entitled to significant legal protection, just as if they were parties, when such an important issue for their personal integrity is considered by the courts. The protections proposed in the amendment are fully justified.
Finally, we support Amendment 107C on rape and serious sexual offences units—the so-called RASSO units—for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and by my noble friend Lord Paddick. I will try not to repeat the points he made.
Historically, there has been a problem, which we should not seek to deny, in ensuring that police forces treat rape and serious sexual assault with the importance these offences merit. It might be that the situation has improved, and I have no doubt it has. In most forces, victims are treated sympathetically, with tact and care, and derive support from the officers handling their case. However, the public, and women in particular, still lack confidence in the treatment they are likely to and do receive from the police if they are victims of sexual assault. This is one of the factors again driving the low rate of reporting and prosecutions, and the high rate of the withdrawal of complaints. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, gave us the figures, with which we have become familiar.
Specialist units are likely to concentrate expertise and experience of dealing with rape and serious sexual offences in the hands of those who really know about them. This amendment concentrates on the specialist training of the staff in such units. That is critical. Such units have the potential to improve the evidence-gathering process and ultimately, one would hope, the reporting and the prosecutions of offences and the conviction rates, which, as we know, are appallingly low.
All the amendments in this group identify serious issues and propose practical, worthwhile and achievable solutions. In respect of each of them, I suggest it would be helpful for the Government simply to accept them or to come back with alternatives to similar effect at Third Reading.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, talked about demonising protest—I bet she is looking forward to Monday. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, talked about exclusion zones around Parliament; there are significant powers to protect Parliament from this sort of thing.
As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has explained, this amendment is a significantly improved version of the one considered in Committee, with numerous safeguards. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I am “glass half full” man: I think that the safeguards here are actually quite significant, in that it requires the consent of the leadership of any school affected or of the NHS body responsible for any vaccination centre affected and, in addition, of the local police chief. Generally speaking, the police are very averse to making political decisions and siding with one particular protest group against another, so that is a significant safeguard. It also requires the consent of the local authority leader, which is another significant safeguard. The potential for selective protection orders based on the issue being protested about—the one the noble Baroness raised in Committee—is therefore significantly reduced.
In addition, contrary to what the noble Baroness said, the statutory duty to consult the public on the order is not waived at all but can take place concurrently with the order taking effect, if the matter is urgent. It also cannot last more than 12 months; the initial grant is for six months, and it can be extended only once. If only the Government were to take such a reasonable approach to the renewal of orders in other aspect of the Bill.
In the light of recent events such as the invasion of the test and trace centre in Milton Keynes last month, we have seen the importance of such orders and the need for the police to secure intelligence and take action to prevent such interference with the vaccination effort, which does not seem to be going away any time soon. There is ample recent evidence of the need for this amendment, and we support it.
My Lords, I start by joining the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in deploring the anti-vaxxers who stood outside my right honourable friend Sajid Javid’s house. I deplore it every time they disrupt our public services such as schools and hospitals. More recently, they have taken part in some very disruptive and abusive activity. On the point about Parliament made by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, we will of course debate that on Monday.
I actually share the aims of this amendment, and I am grateful for the further opportunity to debate the policing of anti-vax protests and consider the merits of fast-track public space protection orders, or PSPOs. The amendment is very similar to one debated in Committee that sought to provide the fast-track PSPOs to protect schools from harmful protests, but it goes further, also allowing for fast-track PSPOs outside premises providing NHS vaccination services. It also removes the need for a consultation in advance of a PSPO outside these premises being implemented.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, I set out in Committee the powers of the police to protect pupils, teachers and staff from disruptive protest activity outside schools, as well as the benefits that some of the new measures in the Bill will bring. Many of these existing or new powers apply also to disruptive protests at vaccination sites. I sympathise with the noble Lord’s intention to protect schools and vaccination sites from harmful protests, but this amendment will not help to achieve that aim. It removes the need for a consultation prior to a PSPO being put in place, instead requiring consent from the relevant school or NHS body, the chief of police, and the leader of the local authority. This is unlikely to materially speed up the process in which a PSPO can be implemented as there is currently no minimum consultation period required before a PSPO can be put in place. I struggle to understand how we can implement the PSPO and run a consultation concurrently.
It is also important to note that in making a PSPO under this amendment a local authority would still be accountable, potentially in legal proceedings, for demonstrating that the order is compliant with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. Consultations can provide supporting evidence to demonstrate this compliance, meaning that a local authority could find itself subject to increased legal risks if it does not perform a consultation prior to implementing a PSPO, even if legislation states that it is not necessary. I share the unease of the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it would, at the hands of a very few people, allow local areas to pick and choose which protests were politically acceptable.
Although I support the underlying aims of the amendment, in the sense that no one working at a school, hospital or other vaccination site should be subject to abusive or highly disruptive protests, powers are in place, which we are strengthening through the Bill, to assist the police and others to tackle such protests. We will be discussing many of them on Monday. The powers already include the ability for local authorities to make, at speed, a PSPO. Given this, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Blencathra. He and I have been chasing down issues with secondary and, tonight, tertiary legislation for some months and have produced reports to that effect that I think have found favour in your Lordships’ House, bearing mind the number of noble Lords who wished to speak in the debate tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish, last Thursday.
Government by Diktat, the title of a report by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which I chair, is alive and well and living with the situation that my noble friend wishes to remedy. The issues of regulation and guidance, of who provides the guidance and of how enforceable it is are questions with which the SLSC has been struggling. However, if we have been struggling with that, when it comes to this latest idea the guidance will not even touch the sides of the regulatory process of your Lordships’ House. We as a House will be presented with a series of faits accomplish, and unless somebody is able to persuade the usual channels to find time to debate something, we will just be told, “There it is and off we go”.
That is not a satisfactory situation. It is part of a much wider issue of how we deal with secondary and, in this case, tertiary legislation, but my noble friend Lord Blencathra has done a valuable service by bringing this case to the surface. We will make progress in this area only if every time we see this sort of thing emerging we raise it, talk about it and try to deal with it. That is why I support the amendment and put my name to it.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, in December 2011 the then Home Secretary announced the establishment of the College of Policing and the Government said that as soon as parliamentary time allowed, the College of Policing would be established as a statutory body, independent of government.
Now it is 10 years later. In addition to supporting what other noble Lords have said, I say that the College of Policing being a limited company undermines its credibility, which is not strong among operational police officers in any event. There is an anti-intellectual culture in the police service and the very name gets operational cops’ backs up. To then see documentation that the college produces marked as copyright of the College of Policing Ltd, an organisation headed by someone called a chief executive rather than a chief constable, further undermines its status and credibility in the eyes of operational police officers.
For these reasons, we support bringing forward legislation this calendar year that would go further than re-establishing the professional body for policing under an Act of Parliament. The college should be renamed and the head of the organisation should have the title “Chief Constable”.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to this short debate and the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It will be interesting to hear what the Minister has to say about placing the College of Policing on a statutory basis. I also listened to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and it would be interesting if there were a long debate about pre-charge bail.
However, it is important to say something about the schedule that is mentioned in the amendment. We strongly support the provisions in the Bill on pre-charge bail. The House is aware that the changes that have been brought forward are known as Kay’s law, after Kay Richardson, who was murdered by an abusive ex-partner after he was released when he was under investigation, rather than placed on pre-charge bail. Our concern, picking up the point rightly made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is that the guidance under Part 6 of Schedule 4 should be clear and effective and should accurately reflect the necessary changes made to the use of pre-charge bail under the Bill.
We understand that this was brought forward as Kay’s law, and all of us will have abhorred the horror of what happened. Notwithstanding that, it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to all of that.
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I seek to bring music, drama and dance within provisions that the Government have included in the Bill in respect of sport and religion. The Bill takes the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and imports the position of trust of someone who is training in sport or religion into the mechanism of the Sexual Offences Act. That makes the concept of positions of trust apply not simply in institutions such as schools but to individuals carrying out training on a private basis or as part of a community organisation and in any number of other ways.
It has puzzled me from the beginning how the Government have identified sport and religion alone as fields in which abuse can take place—when people who have close personal charge in a training role of a young individual can have undue influence that could be put to the wrong use, as a means of sexual abuse or a route into sexual abuse. I do not know anybody who believes that this problem exists only in the areas of religion and sport and not in other areas where very close contact is involved in training, instruction and development. The Government concede one small part of my amendment by taking the view that dance is already included, which must be true, in the wording of the legislation, if the dance is preparation for “competition or display”. I can imagine that an Irish or Scottish dancing group for which individual training was taking place might well be covered. I am less convinced that professional ballet might be covered; that is an area in which we have seen very serious abuse of people undergoing training by a professional ballet instructor.
It is very difficult to understand why the Government have alighted on those two areas alone and not others, because the characteristics of the situation are very similar in all these different areas of activity. There are some distinctive features but so many similar characteristics: being alone with someone quite a lot; a competitive situation in which the person being trained is desperate to be included in the display or team; a desire to please; and the developing of a close personal relationship. They are all elements that we find in a number of other areas, so I wonder what the Government’s argument is.
I have had very helpful discussions with the Minister, who has been generous with his time and his staff’s attention to this matter. However, despite all his efforts, he has not succeeded in convincing me that the Government have a logical case at all. The argument that the Government resort to is that extending these provisions to music and drama would have the effect of raising the age of consent, so relationships that would not be unlawful at present would become unlawful if we extended them into music and drama. That is a very odd argument because that is precisely what the Government are doing for sport and religion: they say that the danger of predatory sexual activity is so serious that we must protect people aged 16 to 18 from this being done in a training situation, but only if their training is in sport or religion.
I simply do not understand that argument or why, if the Government think it is such a serious objection, they are prepared to do exactly that for sport and religion but not in other areas. If it is because of abuse by sexual predators that such provisions are being considered and provided for those two areas, it makes no sense that these other areas are excluded. However, they can be included subsequently because the Government have given themselves the power by affirmative order in this legislation to add other activities, or indeed to remove either of the two activities currently included.
As I thought about this, I wondered what the circumstances were in which the Government would decide to add one of the areas that I have identified—music teaching or drama teaching—to the condition where people are regarded as having a position of trust when they are engaging in training. What would lead the Government to make that change? It would probably be cases coming to light. Such cases will come to light, because in all these areas we know that, despite many thousands of people conscientiously providing this kind of training, there are those who get into these roles with predatory intent, and others who might be regarded as having done so where perhaps it has arisen more innocently between two relatively young people but in a situation that we cannot simply ignore.
When those cases arise, the question will be asked: why is the perpetrator not being charged as someone in a position of trust would be? The answer will be that the Government decided that we did not need this provision in respect of music or drama, even though we need it for sport and religion. I think future Ministers will find that a very uncomfortable question to deal with from the Dispatch Box when we then point out that cases have arisen that could have been pursued under the kind of provisions that they see as necessary for sport and religion.
The Government are in an illogical position, and their only way out of it is at some point to decide to add other areas to the list. That may come at a time when more bad cases have arisen, and then they will have a difficult case to answer. I invite the Minister to think further about this matter, but for the time being I beg to move.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Beith explained, the amendment would extend the position of trust to include people who coach, teach, train or instruct on a regular basis in dance, drama and music.
I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I seem to remember him saying in Committee that the Government wanted evidence that these amendments were necessary before they were able to accept them. On 20 October 2021, the Guardian reported that a former ballet teacher and principal dancer at the English National Ballet had been sentenced to nine years in prison for more than a dozen counts of sexual assault against his students—I think that is dance. On 30 September last year the Sun reported that a drama teacher had been convicted of sexually abusing girls as young as 15 over five years, abusing his position of power and targeting teens who wanted to become actresses by sexually assaulting them at the theatre group he had set up in Northamptonshire—I think that is drama. The Edinburgh Evening News reported on 22 December, just last month, that a retired music teacher in Scotland had been sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for raping and sexually abusing former pupils—I think that is music.
There is the evidence. What is stopping the Government now? We strongly support my noble friend’s amendments.
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Paddick, make a very strong case. Clause 46 addresses a serious mischief: abuse of trust to gain sexual advantage. Like them, I cannot understand why this is to be addressed only in the context of sport and religion and not in the context of dance, drama and music.
I have one other question for the Minister. I also cannot understand why sport is only to be covered in relation to games in which physical skill is the predominant factor. What if there is an abuse of trust by someone who is training young people in chess or bridge? Why is it not equally objectionable if they take sexual advantage of those young people? Why should that not be included within the scope of the offence?
As I say, we discussed this with a wide range of people, and it seemed to us from looking at all the material that sport and religion are the particular areas where law at the moment should intervene. I was coming to this point. The noble Lord presented the amendment saying, “Abuse can take place in other relationships too”, and of course he is absolutely right. However, abuse can take place where there is no relationship at all, and I am afraid it can take place in lots of different relationships. The question here is when the law should intervene to prohibit automatically, regardless of the particular 17 or 19 year-old and whether any abuse is taking place, to prevent any sexual contact. For those reasons, we consider that at the moment, we should intervene—I will come to the delegated power—in sport and religion only. Those settings involve high levels of trust, influence, community recognition, power and authority, and these figures are often well-established, trusted and respected in the community.
The report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse found that religious organisations
“may have a significant or even dominant influence on the lives of millions of children”
and that
“what marks religious organisations out from other institutions is the explicit purpose they have in teaching right from wrong.”
Also, both sport and religion can provide a young person with a strong sense of belonging, whether in a team, a squad, a community or a faith. Such deep feelings held by the young can provide unique opportunities for predators to exploit or manipulate and can make it more difficult for the young person or concerned relatives to report abuse.
With respect to sport specifically, the physical nature of the activities means that coaches often ostensibly have legitimate reason physically to touch the children and young persons they are coaching. A sports coach will often have opportunities for closer and more prolonged physical contact compared with other roles, and this can be manipulated by abusers. That is why, to respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the 18 and a half year-old tennis coach would be prohibited from having a relationship with a 17 and a half year-old tennis student, but the 18 and a half year-old chess coach could have such a relationship —assuming for these purposes that chess is not a sport; I do not need to decide that because it is a physical definition that is in the Act—because there is not that scope, ostensibly, for a physical relationship.
The noble Lord’s amendment addresses dance specifically. Again, let me reassure him that the definition of “sport” in Clause 46 includes types of physical recreation engaged in
“for purposes of competition or display”.
We consider that this includes dance.
On the delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend new Section 22A, we accept that new evidence may emerge that may justify legislating further. Let me reassure the House and put it on record that this power will not be used lightly, but nor will we wait until instances of abuse are brought to our attention. We will proactively monitor data on child sexual abuse to ensure that we have the evidence needed to inform policy and act decisively where required, including evidence relating to the nature of roles and the institutional or organisational context, the level of power and control, other factors which we have seen contribute to abuse including opportunities for extensive unsupervised contact, and any inherent risks posed to young people as well as any data on incidents of concern. We are establishing channels through which partners such as the police, the CPS and local authorities can share emerging evidence and highlight patterns of behaviour.
Some of the behaviour that has been mentioned this evening and in Committee is already covered under other offences within the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Let us be clear: sexual activity with someone under the age of 16 is a crime. Non-consensual sexual activity such as rape is obviously a crime. I certainly heard the word “rape” in at least one example mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We are not talking about that—that is the point—because rape is already a crime. We are talking about sexual activity which would otherwise be lawful and consensual. I did not quite catch all the examples, but one cited was from a newspaper in Scotland where somebody had done something. How old was the person? If they were under 16, it is already caught. Was there consent? If there was not, it is already caught. One has to be careful when one is talking about evidence. We will be proactive in looking for that evidence and, for the avoidance of any doubt, we will of course re-read the examples that he gave us.
I accept that Clause 46 does not represent everybody’s preferred approach, but we believe that, on the material that we have at the moment, our approach strikes the appropriate balance between the protection of young people and the sexual freedoms and rights otherwise granted to 16 and 17 year-olds, while still allowing for rapid responses to emerging patterns of abuse in the future. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, can he clarify two points? First, is he saying that those people who teach drama, music and dance should be allowed to exploit their positions up until the point that they rape or indecently assault somebody, or does he agree with my noble friend that action should be taken to prevent that in the first place? Secondly, what is to stop a teacher of a young person who wants to engage in sexual activity with them distancing themselves from their teaching role to enable that to take place? How on earth does this amendment change the age of consent?
I am struggling with that second point, but let me try to answer the first. On whether I am saying that anybody should be allowed to exploit a young person, the answer is no. Frankly, I do not understand how the noble Lord has reached that conclusion. There is nothing in the provisions about justifying exploitation or abuse up to the point of rape and assault. Maybe this is the confusion that he is under in relation to the second question. At the moment, if someone is caught in a position of trust—let us say, for example, a minister of religion who is 18 and a half—that person is prevented from having any sexual contact with, say, a 17 and a half year-old congregant. Before that person was ordained or appointed to the position as a minister of religion, that person could have had a sexual relationship with a 17 and a half year-old. That is why I am talking about changing the age of consent, because that 17 and a half year-old is able to sleep with an 18 and a half year-old but not if that 18 and a half year-old is, for example, her minister of religion. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s second question, although I confess I did not quite understand it because, if I may say so, it seemed to proceed from a fundamental misapprehension of what we are talking about.
My Lords, I am delighted to be able to support this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, whose knowledge on this subject is extensive. He has set out his case, and I agree with his arguments.
As has been demonstrated throughout the passage of the Bill, the police are overworked and stretched to their limit. Food crime is not at the top of their list of priorities. A couple of years ago, I went out with the district council’s environmental health officer. Although most of the premises that we visited were providing good-quality catering facilities to both residents in homes and the general public, we visited one that had been closed due to the intervention of the police and the council, in a successful prosecution, for providing food that was unfit for human consumption. This was a very minor case, but it took several attempts before the police were eventually brought on board.
Given the increase in serious crime that the police are now facing, it is not surprising that they are unable to support the National Food Crime Unit in the way that the FSA would like. As the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, indicated, the available information shows that, in 2020, more than 30 operations were opened, while 40 were already running. This is clearly more than the police can deal with, given their current resources.
Organised crime has long tentacles, and that includes food crime. Surely it is better for the FCU to be able to apply directly to the courts than for the public to be put at risk by food crime. The FCU has to wait for the police to support it. Delays will occur, and some crimes will go unpunished. The Food Standards Agency supports this amendment. I hope that the Minister will be able to offer his support to it and allow the National Food Crime Unit to get on with its job unhindered.
My Lords, as other noble Lords have just said, serious and organised food crime can have very serious consequences. To free up scarce police resources by giving the National Food Crime Unit the powers that it needs seems sensible. According to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, the National Police Chiefs’ Council supports this change, so I am looking forward to hearing from the Minister what I am missing, because I cannot immediately see any reason why this amendment should not be accepted.
As has been said, this amendment raises the issue of food-related crime and the powers and resources available to tackle it. I will make just one or two comments that may seem almost irrelevant, in view of the very strong case that my noble friend Lord Rooker has already made, as we anticipated he would.
As my noble friend said, the National Food Crime Unit, which is part of the Food Standards Agency, works to tackle serious organised cases of food-related crime. My noble friend Lord Rooker powerfully and persuasively made the case that there are blocks on the powers that the unit can access and that it is often reliant on the police, who are overstretched across competing priorities, to be able to use certain powers or apply for warrants, for example. The amendment that my noble friend has moved would allow the unit to access powers directly, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, rather than waiting for police support to become available.
I will spell out exactly the Oral Question that my noble friend asked in February last year:
“My Lords, does the Minister accept that the National Food Crime Unit is operating against organised crime with its hands tied? Investigations are being hampered. Does the Minister agree that investigation powers should be strengthened to include powers to collect the necessary evidence to a higher standard? In other words, will the Government agree that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers should be granted to the National Food Crime Unit? The National Police Chiefs’ Council agrees to this to remove the burden from local police forces, which actually agree that food crime is not a high priority.”
As my noble friend said, the Minister replied:
“The noble Lord entirely has a point. I completely agree with him that the National Food Crime Unit has a formidable task ahead of it and that its investigatory powers could be enhanced and its impact improved. That is the view of the Government, industry and the police, and that is why we are committed to the dialogue”.—[Official Report, 22/2/21; col. 614.]
That is what the Government said in reply.
We welcome this commitment and would have given appropriate support to a resulting legislative process, which is why we are supportive of what my noble friend Lord Rooker seeks to achieve with this amendment. The Government have thus previously recognised that this is a problem, but what action has been taken so far since that clear recognition, which was repeated last February? Will the Government now accept the amendment my noble friend has moved? If not, why not?
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 109D to remove the negative procedure for all subsequent revisions of this guidance. I shall do that in my capacity as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, but first I want to make some brief comments in a personal capacity on this whole, in my view, iniquitous concept of innocent people being put on a criminal records database.
As other noble Lords have said, it seems that there are 120,000 people who have not committed any crime, have not been found guilty by a court of any description and yet are held on a database with other people who have been convicted of terrorism, paedophilia, rape, murder, armed robbery and every crime on our statute book. Some may argue that it is not really a criminal record, but if an employer asks for an enhanced criminal record check, the police hand over the names of innocent people whom the police have tried and convicted. I am not convinced that their system of control is as accurate as they claim it is.
If someone complains that they have encountered a hate incident—and we see a growing mountain of these bogus claims—the police investigate. Even when no crime has been committed, the police may decide that the person should be convicted of having done a non-crime hate incident—no magistrate, no proper judge, no jury, just the police.
I will now return to the amendment in front of us in my capacity as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee —your Lordships will be relieved to know that I am being relieved of that position on Wednesday of this week when a new chair is appointed. I welcome the Home Office taking responsibility for these guidelines. If we are going to put innocent people on a criminal records list, it must be done under regulations which have proper parliamentary scrutiny every time—as these will have, at least the first time they are made.
When the Court of Appeal in the Miller case announced that the College of Policing—not a statutory body but a private limited company, as we discussed last week—had produced and implemented partly unlawful guidance, the comment from an assistant chief constable at the college was:
“We will listen to, reflect on, and review this judgment carefully and make any changes that are necessary.”
That is all right then. There is no need to bother 650 MPs or 800 Peers; this assistant chief constable will write our laws. Thank goodness the Home Office realised that it is completely wrong for the liberty and reputation of the individual to be subject to rules written by a private limited company. Thus, I partly welcome—no, largely welcome—the Home Office amendment before us today, but I am afraid it adopts the usual ploy that the Delegated Powers Committee sees in so many Bills, namely the first-time affirmative ploy. This means that the Bill says that the first set of regulations will be made by the affirmative procedure but subsequent revisions will inevitably be minor and technical. Therefore, we need not worry our pretty little parliamentary heads about them and the negative procedure will suffice.
We have seen no evidence to suggest that any subsequent revisions to this guidance will be minor or technical. Indeed, they could be substantial. Suppose, in a hypothetical instance, that the first set of regulations stipulates that these records for non-crime shall be retained for two years. A year later the Home Office issues a revised set with just one word changed: delete “two years” and substitute “10 years” or “25 years”.
The Minister may say—we get this a lot from all departments—that Ministers have no intention whatever of doing that and in the Delegated Powers Committee we always say that the intention of the current Minister is irrelevant and what the law permits them to do is the only thing that matters.
This business of recording non-crimes is such a contentious matter that we suggest that the affirmative procedure must be used on every occasion. The net result of that will be that any time the guidance is revised a Minister—usually a Lords Minister as the Commons will probably bounce it through on the nod—may have to do a 90-minute debate in your Lordships’ House. It is not a very heavy burden to impose on the Government.
The Court of Appeal said:
“The net for ‘non-crime hate speech’ is an exceptionally wide one which is designed to capture speech which is perceived to be motivated by hostility ... regardless of whether there is evidence that the speech is motivated by such hostility … There is nothing in the guidance about excluding irrational complaints, including those where there is no evidence of hostility and little, if anything, to address the chilling effect which this may have on the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.”
I simply say that so long as these rules remain, Parliament must approve all regulations on this matter, whether it is the first set of regulations, the second, the 10th or the 50th iteration of them.
My Lords, as other noble Lords have said, this is a contentious issue. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, may recall from his time in a previous role a report from the probation service called From Murmur to Murder—the noble Lord is nodding—when those in the probation service decided that they would engage with racist clients to challenge their abhorrent views, because of where it might lead.
From stalking to domestic violence, to murder motivated by hatred, including terrorism, we know that non-crime activity can provide indications of individuals’ journeys towards serious violence, but the recording of such intelligence must be subject to a statutory code of practice. I have sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in insisting on the affirmative procedure for any changes once the original guidance is issued. We welcome the government amendments and thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for raising the issue.
My Lords, I welcome that the opposition is united in support of this amendment.
The police have failed to own up to many of their mistakes. I personally have experienced police evasion, police spying and police deceit. It beggars belief that there is no duty of candour on our police force already. It actually imposes their own idea of what the law says and this is completely wrong, so I very much support this amendment.
My Lords, as a former police officer, I must tell the House that leaving the failure to abide by such a duty of candour to the police misconduct process, as the Government are asking us to do, is inadequate, as the decision on whether to investigate or take misconduct proceedings will be left in the hands of the police themselves.
If it is in the interest of the police that something is covered up, they will not investigate and they will not take action against the officers responsible. As the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has just explained, her experience of the inquiry into the Daniel Morgan murder demonstrates beyond reasonable doubt the need for this amendment, and we support it.
My Lords, I have not thought an awful lot about this, but the principle, which seems unarguable, is that police officers should have a duty of candour. They are not the only ones who should; many other groups might want to adopt a similar approach, but so far as the police service is concerned, which is what this amendment is about, it is rather unarguable. How it works ought to be clearly thought through, which I guess is why the Government are consulting on it. The only question I had, which I have just discussed briefly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, is how this would work with the criminal disclosure process and how that would impact on any ongoing prosecution or, obviously, any separate public inquiry. However, that is a matter of implementation rather than of principle. In general terms, I see no reason why it should not be implemented for the police; perhaps others may consider it too.
My Lords, I am proud to have added my name to this amendment, which I believe is vital. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for his kind words but, most importantly, for giving the stalking facts and figures, which are truly startling. The scale is huge and the complexity daunting, and he gave a brilliant and well-informed exposé of the problem.
It is true, as noble Lords have said, that great progress has been made in the last 10 years since stalking was first recognised as an offence. I am grateful to the Minister for her work and to noble Lords on all sides of the Chamber who have pursued this issue. I must also mention the indefatigable work and campaigning of Laura Richards, our mutual friend John Clough, the families of victims, and courageous survivors. My work at Oxford, for which I refer noble Lords to my interests as set out in the register, brings me into contact daily with staff and students who suffer from the insidious crime of non-domestic violence-related stalking. They live in constant fear alongside the 1.5 million other victims.
Among the progress that has been made, I am of course delighted that there is now a national strategy for the policing of violence against women and girls but, as has been said, that does not cover the vast number of people who are being stalked where the stalking does not relate to domestic violence. However, it is brilliant that violence against women and girls must now be a strategic priority for all police forces and that they will be assisted by a new local duty to tackle it as part of any work in partnership with other parts of the criminal justice system and all parts of the policing landscape. I celebrate that at last there is a truly national approach that should lead to the identification of the most dangerous and serial perpetrators of violence, more focused investigations, an increase in prosecutions and a reduction in the murder of women, serious harm and repeat victimisation.
Of course, there is a “but”, hence the amendment. We desperately need a strategy for all categories of stalking, and I endorse the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell. When are we going to have a more global strategy in relation to stalking?
Strategies are crucial and welcome but, like legislation, they have to be implemented in order to have their desired, much-needed effect. That requires systematic specialist training. As noble Lords will be only too aware, my long-standing concern has been about stalking in all its forms, not just that which involves domestic stalking. Training must be provided relating to all forms of stalking. There must be a national approach so that no matter where a victim seeks help and reports an incident, and wherever a perpetrator is apprehended, those who answer the phone and take whatever steps are necessary to support the victim and investigate a case must have similar experience.
As we know from the excellent inspections by HMICFRS, reports by experts and the evidence of survivors and the friends and families of victims, to date that has not been the case. These women, and sometimes men, have been utterly failed by the piecemeal approach to training. It is no exaggeration to say that countless women, such as Hollie Gazzard, would be still alive if there had been appropriate training, if their calls had been responded to in the proper manner and if the people answering the calls had understood what stalking was. Helen Pearson called the police 144 times over five years. If they had understood that she was a victim and was not wasting the police’s time, her situation could have been properly dealt with.
My strong preference would be to have a regulation in the Bill to provide for mandatory training, but I know from long experience that that would not be accepted by the Government. I first spoke about this in moving an amendment in February 2012, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, when we secured agreement to create the offence of stalking. I have been told on countless occasions since then that the appropriate place for training requirements is in guidance—but guidance has ensured that only a few police forces have taken the need for training seriously and most have not, and women have been murdered and others have had their own lives and those of their families destroyed. Over the years it has been cruelly apparent that guidance is not enough.
With the ever-increasing focus on and understanding of the extent of the appalling violence against women and girls, including stalking, and with the appointment of Maggie Blyth to spearhead the policing strategy, I hope that the need for quality nationwide training will be understood and that it will be implemented. However, I would like an assurance from the Minister that the Secretary of State really will seek to ensure that the training takes place and, vitally, that there will be the necessary funding to enable it. I would also be grateful if she could explain what mechanism is or will be in place for that to be monitored, and how we as a Parliament can hold the Government to account on this vital issue.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the tireless work over many years of all three noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. Stalking remains widely misunderstood by many in the criminal justice system—specifically, how serious and complex it can be and how widespread it is, as noble Lords have explained. The amendment aims to remedy that situation, and we support it.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for tabling this amendment. I praise the tireless work of the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, in this area. I am delighted to put my name to the amendment because of the work of Laura Richards, who has also worked tirelessly. Even though she is not in the UK, she still works tirelessly on podcasts, which I suggest that everyone listens to; they are brilliant in the stories that they cover, but it is very sad to hear the journeys that some women go through.
I will not add much more to what my colleagues have said. Stalking, on its own, is horrific. I really welcome what we now have on domestic abuse stalking and I thank the Minister for the conversations we have had. However, it scares me that this piece of legislation has been left to wander in the fields again. I feel we have taken 10 steps forward and 50 back. Listening to victims of this horrendous crime in my former role as Victims’ Commissioner—victims I am still listening to—I know that the problem with stalking is that you cannot see it. If you had a scab on your hand and we could see it, we could then do something tangible. Stalking is horrific and coercive, both mentally and physically.
When we look at amending and putting this legislation into place, the default is that we must train better. Now we are asking that we have a standard of training for non-domestic abuse stalking. I believe that every word from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Royall, adds to the quality of what this training should be. Unfortunately, if a stalking victim phones up, it will not be the first time; they will be at the end of their tether. In society and under Governments past and present, we have waited until somebody is murdered brutally—taken. That should not be the case, as the horse has already bolted.
I ask the Government to look at this again: please put this national strategy for non-domestic abuse stalking right next to domestic abuse stalking. Then it will not be piecemeal and all these agencies will fully get what happens to victims of stalking.
My Lords, I rise to support the original amendment, moved so ably by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and to oppose the amendment to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which she moved just now. I hope she will forgive me for saying that her introduction of her amendment displayed a great deal of confusion, which is being much magnified in debate, about the differences, in so far as they exist, between the words “sex” and “gender”.
Gender is causing no confusion in the law, but I would urge the noble Baroness and others to take the trouble to have a look at the first legal textbook written on this subject, called A Practical Guide to Transsexual Law; it is authored by Robin White of Old Square Chambers in London, who is a trans woman herself and extremely expert in cases arising from trans issues, and her colleague in the same chambers, Nicola Newbegin. If noble Lords are suspicious about a lawyer in your Lordships’ number recommending the reading of a legal textbook, I reassure them that it is not because I want to make them go to sleep while doing their reading before they go to bed at night; it is actually one of the most fascinating textbooks written in recent years—and it has the virtue of being short as well.
The issues described in that book, which have interested me since I introduced the first transsexual rights Bill in the other place when I was a Member there, have evolved greatly over the years. I would say to those who are suspicious or uncomfortable about these issues that young people—people born after 1995, to date at random—they do not understand the problem. To them, trans people are included among their friends, and it is “just a thing, not an issue”, to quote one of my own daughters on the subject. It is becoming increasingly common for young people to move in circles where trans men and women, and, for that matter, gender diverse men and women, are absolutely standard parts of the community.
The Equality Act, which has been in existence for a considerable time, says that you must not be discriminated against because of your gender reassignment as a transsexual and that you may prefer the description “transgender person” or “trans male” or “female”. There is much more I could read out to your Lordships that illustrates that the law has been in place and has been well understood for a long time.
Let us just consider what the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, is trying to achieve in subsection (3) of her proposed new clause. I need to confess a sort of interest at this point, in that I am married to a circuit judge who tries criminal cases only. So perhaps I have a little bit more evidence in my mind—she certainly does not agree with everything I say, by any means— on how judges behave not just from my own practice but from a lot of discussion about these issues. The amendment provides:
“A court considering the seriousness of an offence … must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by hostility or prejudice towards sex or gender as an aggravating factor when determining a sentence.”
Can one seriously suggest that a circuit judge, or a magistrate for that matter, does not understand what that means? If the judge understands what that means, surely it is as just as any other aggravating factor.
Let us look at it down the other end of the telescope. Five or six young women go out for a night out, and during the course of that night out an offence takes place in which there is hostility or prejudice towards the one of them who is a trans woman. Would it really be right for the other five to have an aggravated sentence brought upon the offender, if the hostility was towards them as women on the grounds of sex, but not that trans woman, if the hostility was shown to them on the grounds of gender? It is a nonsensical suggestion, and what is in the noble Baroness’s proposed new subsection (3) is just common sense—the sort of common sense that judges apply in the courts every day. So I would urge your Lordships to take the view that the use of the phrase “sex or gender” in this amendment is just good 2022 common sense and, if one is minded to support the amendment, one should support it in its original form.
My Lords, I want to take a slightly different view of this. We support misogyny being treated as a hate crime and, personally, I do not understand the arguments of the Law Commission in relation to domestic violence and sexual offences. The same objections could be made to existing hate crimes such as homophobia, but they exist alongside these serious offences without difficulty. I wonder whether proposed new subsection (4) in the amendment is necessary.
May I suggest an alternative way out of the gender debate? I wonder whether, in line with the Law Commission’s report on hate crime in relation to other aspects of hate crime, the words in brackets—“or perceived sex”—should be added to the word “sex” at the end of new subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) proposed by the amendment. I am thinking of the following hypothetical example. A man who shouts demeaning and derogatory terms for a woman, indicating a hatred of women, and who without provocation attacks a stranger in the street, indicating that the attack is motivated by a hatred of women, should be charged with the aggravated misogyny offence, whether the assailant is mistaken in identifying the victim as a woman or not. It should not matter whether the victim is a woman or not; it is the motivation of the attacker that is important. If that motivation is hatred of women, it should be an aggravating factor.
However, despite my concerns about the wording of the amendment, we have waited long enough for this important and necessary change in the law. Any defect in the wording of the amendment can be addressed in the other place, and if the noble Baroness divides the House, we will support her.
My Lords, I also believe in freedom and in common sense. There are a number of provisions in this group, including the list we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. Now as I understand it, the Government are responding to the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s concerns. The council feels that, in the new world that has been described by others, public order legislation is not any longer appropriate and does not allow them to respond to the sort of disruptive protest tactics being used by some groups today that perhaps would not have been used in the past. I look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly on the issue of noise, which people have highlighted.
I have two questions to add. First, how will these provisions help against Insulate Britain and what its members have been doing? How will the new arrangements work, particularly the developments as regards juries that others have mentioned? Secondly, I know that there have been concerns about the overuse of delegated powers in this part of the Bill. Indeed, there was an excellent debate in the House last week on that very issue, which some noble Lords were present for. What were the recommendations from the DPRRC and Constitution Committee in this area, and can my noble friend explain how they have been met? My understanding is that definitions of “serious disruption” have now been added to the face of the Bill, which was a concern. But does that meet the concern expressed by our committees?
My Lords, I remind noble Lords that this group includes 26 amendments, and that noble Lords are entitled to speak only once on each group, in case people were thinking of having another go. I cannot possibly speak on all 26 amendments; if I spent only one minute on each, I would be here for 26 minutes. But we on these Benches oppose all the measures in Part 3 of the Bill, including the new government amendments introduced late at night in Committee. We will come to those in a later group.
I am a former senior police officer and part of a small, specially selected group of senior police officers trained in the policing of protests. My view, and the view of the majority of police officers interviewed by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, contrary to what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has just said, is that the limiting factor in the policing of protests on the police’s ability to control protests is the number of suitably trained police officers available, not a lack of police powers or legislation.
Not only are new powers and new offences unnecessary but there is a very real danger of dragging the police into political decisions on which protests should go ahead and which should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has just said. There is a very real danger of more scenes like those we saw at the Sarah Everard vigil on Clapham Common happening with greater frequency. There is a real danger of more and more police officers being drawn into policing protests to enforce more and more restrictions and bans, taking them away from policing their communities and, as a result, further undermining trust and confidence in the police and their ability to enforce the law.
I spoke at length in Committee and do not intend to repeat myself. I refer noble Lords to the Official Report. We support all the non-government amendments in this group. Particularly, we do not agree that protests should be banned because the police think they might be too noisy—so we will be voting in support of Amendment 115.
We agree with the former Conservative Home Secretary who led on the original public order legislation in 1986 that the police should not be able to dictate where and when public meetings or assemblies should take place or to ban them completely. To quote Lord Hurd of Westwell,
“that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/1986; col. 797.]
The Minister may say that the provisions simply bring limitations on assemblies into line with the limitations on processions, but I ask what has changed. It is still an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. I will therefore be testing the opinion of the House on Amendment 132. These measures are an outrageous limitation of people’s fundamental right in a democracy, and we oppose them.
My Lords, I start by quoting the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol, who said that good debate relies on good listening. I hope that noble Lords will listen, as they did in the previous group, to what I have to say.
My noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Coaker, were all in agreement that many of them would have been in breach of these provisions in protests that they took part in. No. I disagree with that; the police rarely impose conditions on a protest, and we expect that to continue to be the case.
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Walney, made some compelling arguments about how lucky we are to live in a democracy and how much we value protest—we can hear the drumbeats outside, which no one is going to stop. To answer the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, the provisions are not new today; they have been in the Bill from the start.
The government amendments give effect to the recommendations made by both the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee. Under the Public Order Act 1986 as amended by the Bill, the police may attach certain conditions to a public procession, public assembly or one-person protest, including where that is necessary to prevent serious disruption. The Bill enables the Secretary of State to define the meaning of “serious disruption” in regulations, and we have published an indicative draft of such regulations.
However, both the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee argued that definitions should be in the Bill, although the DPRRC agreed that there should be a power to amend the definition by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. The government amendments therefore take the definitions as set out in the draft regulations and write them into the Public Order Act. Again, I express my thanks to my noble friend Lord Blencathra—although I do not see him in his place—the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the other members of the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee for their scrutiny of the Bill. I trust that the amendments will be acceptable to them and indeed to the House as a whole. The word “significant” is lifted from the draft regulations that the Constitution Committee said were not unreasonable.
Amendment 115, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, would remove the new noise triggers for the police to impose conditions on public processions. Amendments 123, 124, 125 and 147 would collectively do the same for public assemblies and single-person protests. In response to those amendments, I reiterate to the House that noise generated by protesters can have a significant and detrimental impact on the wider public. It is unacceptable, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham says, that certain protests can seriously disrupt the lives of ordinary people.
It is absolutely right that the Government give the police the tools that they require to tackle disruptive protests. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, stated during the debate in Committee on these measures,
“noise can be more than an irritant.”—[Official Report, 24/11/21; col. 944.]
In some contexts, it can be tortuous, and it is important to contextualise the different situations in which it can happen, such as the time of day or where it takes place. Is it outside an old people’s home, or is it in Parliament Square? Is it anti-vaxxers outside a school, or in St Ann’s Square in Manchester?
My Lords, I hope we are all refreshed after that break, particularly the Minister. I thank her for giving the time and energy to meet me last week to consider my objections to Clause 59.
I have brought Amendments 133A and 133B before the House because Clause 59 has been too tightly drawn. It will prohibit large, peaceful and well-organised demonstrations taking place in Parliament Square at any time, even at the weekend, if there was any danger that the weight of numbers would obstruct a vehicle going into Parliament or even, in the words of the clause, make
“the passage of a vehicle more difficult”.
Parliament Square is the temple of protest. It is where the people of this country have gathered for centuries to voice their opposition to government policies, hoping their concerns will penetrate the walls of Parliament. In 2002, more than 400,000 people attended the countryside march. In 2018 and 2019, millions came to the People’s Vote and Brexit day celebration marches, and the women’s march drew thousands to support women’s rights. All ended with massed but organised protests in Parliament Square, all of which, by dint of huge numbers, will have obstructed the vehicle entrances to Parliament. I ask your Lordships to imagine the fury on all sides of the country if these were banned in future.
This is the mother of parliaments, outside which voters should gather to speak truth to power and where we, the parliamentarians who make the law, should hear them loud and clear. At this time, when politicians are seen to be out of touch with the feelings of the people, it is unconscionable that the House should pass a law shielding us from hearing what they have to say. A new poll shows that 79% of people disapprove of a ban, and 75% of them are Conservative voters.
The problem is that Clause 59, as with so much of Part 3 on public order, has been drafted to deal with the headlines about Extinction Rebellion and Insulate Britain deliberately blocking roads and bridges across the country and deliberately obstructing access to Parliament. The drafters have not considered the effect of the clause on large, peaceful protests outside Parliament.
I feel sure that many noble Lords have held protests outside Parliament and understand that permission first needs to be obtained from the GLA and the police. As it stands, the clause will make it impossible for the GLA, which controls the garden at the centre of Parliament Square, to give permission for any protest to take place if there is a danger of obstruction to Parliament by large numbers of protesters. The clause expands the controlled area beyond the garden to the roads and pavements of Parliament Square and half way up Whitehall, to the entrance of Downing Street. When granting permission, the GLA will now have to consider whether numbers of protesters will spill off the garden on to the road. The GLA considers 5,000 people to be the capacity of the garden. Any more will block the roads around Parliament Square.
These amendments are aimed purely at the permissions process between the GLA, other responsible bodies and the organisers of a protest. They are based on the existing wording granting the use of amplifying equipment in the square. They will ensure that large, peaceful protests continue to take place outside Parliament. I know that noble Lords will be worried that the wording of my amendments appears to give permission to protesters to obstruct vehicles; this is not the case. The police will still be involved in the consent process, requiring protesters to move on if they are deliberately blocking entrances to Parliament. Proposed new subsection (6) in Amendment 133B reinforces this by allowing the responsible person to withdraw an authorisation for a protest if the conditions are not being observed.
The Government and the Joint Committee on Human Rights are concerned that the police do not have powers to move on demonstrators who deliberately block access to Parliament. Even if these amendments are accepted, the powers granted in Clause 59 will still be available for the police to exercise. I urge the Minister to accept my amendments to ensure that Clause 59 does not cause an unintended ban on protests in Parliament Square. I know from talking to her that she does not want to become the Minister who bans protests outside Parliament. I beg to move.
My Lords, we support all the non-government amendments in this group. In particular, we agree that, just as protesters can be given permission to use amplification equipment in the vicinity of Parliament under existing legislation, large demonstrations should be able to block roads temporarily, given the necessary permission. We will vote for Amendments 133A and 133B should the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, divide the House.
In Committee, I spoke at length on why we oppose this clause and support Amendment 137A. I refer noble Lords to the Official Report.
My Lords, I have added my name to these amendments. I congratulate the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, on his excellent introduction. This is the first time I have spoken this evening but my remarks apply to many other aspects of this Bill and many of the other areas that we are voting on.
There are some excellent and important measures in this Bill. I agree that banning dangerous or violent protestors is important; I am pleased that my noble friend the Minister said in an earlier debate that the law must protect the public and prevent extremist protests such as those by Extinction Rebellion and Insulate Britain. However, I respectfully suggest that the measures in Clause 59 are like using not a hammer but dynamite to crack a nut.
The Conservative Party has always championed law and order but also freedom of speech and expression, most importantly around Parliament Square—the very heart of our democracy. Amendments 133A and 133B would protect the public’s right to demonstrate and express views in Parliament Square, which is so important. I hope that colleagues on these Benches will consider supporting these important changes to the Bill.
I do not believe that the Government really intend to ban peaceful protest. My noble friend the Minister will assure the House that such protests can still proceed, and I have no doubt that she is sincere in that assurance. But I respectfully point out that, without these amendments, this legislation could prove a Trojan horse, allowing future Governments to introduce the shadow of repression into our country, and could represent a potential attack on the most fundamental freedoms of our democracy. We could allow this and any future Government to ban large demonstrations around Parliament Square on the basis of a ministerial diktat and police connivance. Indeed, the grounds on which such protests can be criminalised are quite flimsy. One example, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, mentioned, is proposed new subsection (4A)—to be inserted by Clause 59(3)(c)—which states that
“obstructing the passage of a vehicle includes making the passage of a vehicle more difficult.”
What does that mean? Is it a 30-second delay? Every large protest would be banned, which would effectively change the way our democracy has worked for centuries.
This country has a proud record of standing up to despots, authoritarian rulers and corrupt dictatorships. We have offered sanctuary to those fleeing repression, for which I will be eternally grateful. The most recent example is of Hong Kong residents fleeing Chinese repression, who witnessed their Government recently tearing down the statue memorialising the Tiananmen Square massacre. When those Hong Kong exiles arrive here and learn that this mother of all parliaments no longer allows large protests outside its door, at any time, what will they think?
Democratic Governments must not surround themselves only with yea-sayers, hearing only what they want or choose to hear and squashing dissent. I believe it is important for noble Lords to stand up for our cherished freedoms, prevent any descent into authoritarian rule and support these wholly reasonable amendments to this Bill.
If someone is stopped and searched without good cause, either maliciously or for any other reason, I do not care whether they were a criminal in the past or a good person; it is a bad thing. Regardless of their background, there has to be a good cause for that stop and search unless the law says that it should be done without cause.
As I was saying about prevention orders, the reason that they were considered was that the rate at which people were being released from bail to return to the protest was overwhelming the ability of the police to deal with the disruption. That is what is being looked at, to see whether there is a possibility of exerting some inhibiting behaviour on the protesters. It would still not be easy. If protesters turn out in sufficient numbers, they will always overwhelm the police—that is the nature of a democracy—but in these disruptions, quite often relatively small numbers have disrupted many people and, frankly, put their lives at risk. So in fact it is a serious matter and the Government’s proposals are fairly reasonable. There may be things that people can argue at the edges, but I do not object to this and I support the Government’s proposals.
My Lords, perhaps I could deal with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to begin with. My recollection is that the report on public order from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services showed that many officers did not want additional powers to deal with locking on. That is in the report. My experience is that the police are getting better and better at dealing with locking on, particularly people supergluing themselves to roadways—people are not now glued to the roadway for very long.
On hospitals that are on minor roads, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made it quite clear that he wanted the increased penalty of imprisonment for highway obstruction on the strategic road network where there is no realistic way around a blockage that has been put in. A hospital may be on a minor road, but there are other ways of getting to it, and I do not feel that that argument holds water. I will come to the noble Lord’s comments about the serious disruption orders shortly.
The Minister said that these amendments were debated in Committee. That debate started at 11.50 pm. The Minister stood up to make her closing remarks at 1 am. Does she really think that that is serious consideration and debate of these measures?
These government amendments were a hurried response to the Home Secretary’s knee-jerk, populist reaction to Insulate Britain protests at the Conservative Party conference. Consideration of this part of the Bill had to be taken out of order, to give civil servants time to cobble together these last-minute, ill-conceived, badly thought-through acts of desperation, introduced into this House late at night on the last day of Committee without any consideration by the other place. If the Government are determined to bring in these draconian, antidemocratic laws, reminiscent of Cold War Eastern bloc police states, they should withdraw them now and introduce them as a separate Bill to allow the democratically elected House time to consider them properly.
We oppose all these government amendments, for the reasons I set out in Committee—albeit in the early hours of the morning—and I refer noble Lords to the Official Report. Given the hour, we will vote against the most egregious measures: Amendment 151, which is clearly targeted at climate protesters; Amendment 155, which gives police the power to stop and search anyone and everyone in the vicinity of a protest, including innocent passers-by; and Amendment 159, by which the police can apply for an order to ban people from their democratic right to protest, even when they have never been to a protest in their life, let alone been convicted of any offence in connection with a protest. That is the power in these measures—you do not even have to have been to a protest to be banned from future ones. You do not even have to be convicted of an offence in connection with a protest before you can be banned from going to protests.
If the Official Opposition decide to vote on Amendment 148, on locking on, we will support them. We will also vote in favour of Amendment 150A, to restrict imprisonment for highway obstruction to blocking motorways and other parts of the strategic road network.
The anti-protest measures in the original Bill were dreadful. These measures, and the way they have been introduced, are outrageous.
My Lords, I am not sure whether noble Lords want more time to debate or me to hurry up. If noble Lords will indulge me for a minute, I will thank them for the support for the new measures that has come from one area of the House, but it is clear that a number of other noble Lords are less enamoured of the government amendments. As I said in opening the debate, I think the British public will fully support these reasonable and proportionate measures to ensure that their daily lives are not disrupted by the sorts of tactics we saw from Insulate Britain last autumn. This is not an argument for or against climate change; it is about the disruption caused to the lives of the working British public.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI say to my noble friends behind me that I will resist the temptation to make political comments on the Bill. After all the days we have had in Committee and on Report, I am sure they will understand why I do not wish to go down that road.
I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for all the work that they have so obviously done on this Bill. I also thank them for the meetings we have held and the changes that have been secured through government amendments or government support for amendments.
I also thank my noble friends Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lady Chapman of Darlington. As the Minister reminded us, my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark has also been involved, as has been my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. We seem to have had a fairly large Front Bench on this side of the House, and I am extremely grateful to all of them for the work that they have done.
I too thank the Bill team. Everything that the Minister said about them we would certainly endorse and wish to be associated with. They have been extremely helpful, and we have appreciated that. I also thank the many outside organisations with an interest in the terms of this Bill for the briefings that they have given us, both written and verbal. That has been extremely helpful too.
Talking of help, I would like to thank for the vital and invaluable work they do colleagues in our office here in the Lords, particularly Grace Wright, who has been a key figure and has certainly kept me on the straight and narrow. I am quite sure that any mistakes I have made have been nothing to do with her; she has prevented me making an awful lot as it is.
The Bill has been improved by amendments that this House has made and, in some cases, by resisting amendments to which this House has not agreed. As the Minister said, it now goes back to the Commons. Like her, I too wait to see what the Commons will now make of this Bill as amended by your Lordships.
I again thank everybody whom I have mentioned, and I am quite sure that there are others whom I should have mentioned but have not done so. For that, I apologise.
My Lords, I remember looking at this 307-page Bill—or at least it was 307 pages to begin with—in August and wondering how on earth to tackle it. I was reminded that the way to eat an elephant is one piece at a time, which is the approach we took. This was about five Bills stapled together, except the PPO could not staple them together because it was too big. The Bill returns to the other place considerably improved, although you cannot make a silk purse out a sow’s ear—these are separate metaphors; I am not mixing them—or should I say a boar’s ear in these days?
I shall not resist what the Minister has said about the Bill. As far as we on these Benches are concerned, the existing legislation to control protest was adequate, and the measures that we have removed from the Bill were not necessary in the first place. The majority of the police consider that a lack of police officers is the limiting factor when it comes to policing of protests rather than a lack of legislation.
I would normally thank the Minister and the Bill team for their engagement, but, certainly, I am not alone on these Benches, at least as far as the home affairs side of things is concerned, in feeling that the Government have not reached out to us as much as they could or should have done. None the less, we have all been in this together over a considerable period, and I am grateful for the time that the Government have given in allowing us to debate these issues.
I thank the Official Opposition, both the leadership and Back-Benchers, the Cross- Benchers, non-affiliated Peers and the Greens for their support and co-operation. In particular, I thank Elizabeth Plummer and Grace Wright for their invaluable help on the Bill, as well as all the outside organisations which helpfully provided us with briefings. We would not have done any of this without that help, and we hope that the Government will see the improvements that we have made to the Bill as improvements when it is considered by the other place.
My Lords, as other noble Lords have said, the Bill has been much improved. I pay particular thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for working over six years with me and my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, in widening the pardons and the disregards for historical homosexual offences, including in the Armed Forces. It is truly historic when a state apologises for what it has done and reaches back over 500 years. It is the end of a six-year campaign that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, has been an active part of. I cannot thank her and the Bill team enough, and indeed colleagues and the team in the Armed Forces. I also put on record our thanks to Professor Paul Johnson, the country’s leading expert on this. Finally, it might have been a six-year campaign, but some of us have campaigned for more than 33 years, not for ourselves but so that injustices can at last be put right.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly to Motion A1. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on his introduction and support his amendment. Organised food crime costs billions and the police have far more urgent priorities to deal with. Food-borne illnesses cost money in lost earnings and even in some cases result in death. In the current food shortage scenario, it is open season for the unscrupulous to take advantage and exploit the public by producing and selling adulterated food that is not fit for human consumption. They avoid prosecution while the police are completely overstretched. This amendment would assist the FSA to act to prevent future food scandals. I fully support the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and urge the Government to accept this very sensible amendment.
My Lords, we support Motion A1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Compared with other important issues that the House is considering today, it is a relatively minor one. None the less, it will save no time if we abstain, so if the noble Lord divides the House, we will support him.
On Motion J, although the repeal of the Vagrancy Act is very welcome and something for which Liberal Democrats have been campaigning for many years, it is unfortunate that the Government are still insisting on delaying the repeal of the outdated and unnecessary Act until replacement legislation is in place, as we believe that existing alternative legislation is sufficient. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, I heard the Minister say that the Government will commence, not conclude, repeal in 18 months—I wrote it down. If I am right and the noble Lord is wrong, can the Minister tell us how long it will take to repeal the Act in its entirety?
On Motion L, serious violence reduction orders will allow the police to stop and search people without any suspicion that those targeted have anything on them at the time they are stopped and searched that they should not have in their possession. It is another form of stop and search without suspicion, which is notorious for being ineffective. It is even less effective at finding weapons than stop and search based on suspicion and it is disproportionately focused on black people, even compared with stop and search based on suspicion. As a consequence, it is notorious for the damage that it causes to the relationships between the police and the communities they are supposed to help. The Government’s own impact assessment shows that these measures will disproportionately impact black communities and fly in the face of the Government’s response to the report by the independent Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities.
The police need to work together with communities suffering serious violence to build trust and confidence and to demonstrate that they are on the side of the community—not using powers disproportionately against it, as these new powers, by the Government’s own admission, will continue to do. Even Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services says that the disproportionate use of powers against certain communities is “undermining police legitimacy”.
Like the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, we have concerns. We believe that serious violence reduction orders are likely to make serious violence worse, as they further alienate the very communities the police need to co-operate with to identify the perpetrators. However, we have reluctantly agreed to see how SVROs, arguably a manifesto commitment, work in practice in a limited number of pilot areas. We supported an amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, on Report that would have strengthened the proposed pilot evaluation and prevented SVROs from being introduced beyond the pilot phase until a report on the pilot had been laid before Parliament and both Houses had agreed to the rollout.
The Minister has given assurances that the pilot will be independently evaluated and that the Government will not continue with the scheme if it proves, as we suspect, to be ineffective or counterproductive. The evaluation must include crime reduction outcomes and community impact assessments. Given those reassurances and the Government’s strengthening of the pilot evaluation, we have agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, not to insist on her amendments, but we will be watching the pilots very carefully and listening to the communities affected, whose trust and confidence in the police is essential if knife crime is to be tackled effectively.
There are three issues in this group and I wish to say something about all of them. Starting with Motion A1, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for sending me a copy of his letter of 22 February to my noble friend Lord Rooker on Lords Amendment 58, which relates to the Food Standards Agency. As the letter says, the amendment gives powers available to the police under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the National Food Crime Unit of the Food Standards Agency. However, the Commons disagreed with the amendment, giving this reason:
“Because it is premature to confer new search and seizure powers on the Food Standards Agency until the accompanying accountability arrangements, including in respect of the handling of complaints about the exercise of such powers, have been determined.”
Yet Lords Amendment 58 does not lay down a specific date or timescale by which powers available to the police under PACE have to be given to the National Food Crime Unit. It simply says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations apply any provisions of this Act to investigation of offences conducted by officers of the National Food Crime Unit in respect of search and seizure.”
If I am right, the Commons reason suggests that the Commons and the Government never actually read the terms of Lords Amendment 58. That is surprising, since the letter from the Minister to my noble friend Lord Rooker states that
“the Government agrees in principle that these powers should be conferred upon NFCU officers in order to support their vital work tackling food crime.”
There is no argument about whether the powers should be given, but simply over when they should be given. Lords Amendment 58 would give the statutory authority to the Secretary of State to give those powers but leaves it up to the Secretary of State to decide when the time is right. So what is the problem with the amendment?
The letter from the Minister goes on to say:
“Food crime is a very serious issue and empowering the NFCU to investigate these offences independently will ensure that their specialist knowledge is put to best use and that the burden on police forces is reduced”.
Yet the Commons and the Government have disagreed the amendment. The Minister goes on to say that
“further work is required to fully work through the implications of these proposals to ensure that any exercise of police powers by a non-police body is necessary, proportionate and legitimate and that suitable governance and accountability arrangements will be in place”,
and:
“For these reasons we have tabled a motion to disagree with Lords amendment 58”.
But Lords Amendment 58 does not say that the Secretary of State has to do it; it would simply give the Secretary of State the necessary statutory power to do it if and when the Secretary of State so wishes, which is the point being made by my noble friend Lord Rooker. Frankly, the Government really are struggling to think of a credible argument why Lords Amendment 58 should not be accepted.
The powers currently available to the Food Standards Agency under food law relate to the enforcement of regulatory matters. The NFCU investigates cases of serious crime, often involving offences such as fraud. However, the FSA’s existing powers do not sufficiently equip the NFCU to investigate these crimes fully and lawfully, and to collect evidence to the higher standard needed to prove criminal intent, without the support of partners in the hard-pressed environments of policing or local authorities.
As part of the FSA, the NFCU already has access to sensitive law enforcement powers around directed surveillance, securing communications data and the management of convert human intelligence sources. But NFCU officers have not yet been given essential investigatory powers, including the power to apply to courts for warrants to search premises and seize evidence, or to interview suspects without police officers present. The unit has to rely on the support of partners, including the police forces, to carry out these activities. This means that the courts are not hearing from the experts familiar with the cases, which can increase the likelihood that warrants are not authorised.
As I understand it, competing demands on police time have led to delays in several NFCU investigations. At present, the NFCU needs the police to go to court and swear warrants on its behalf, so investigations are delayed if the police decline or take time to do so, or if the court refuses to authorise the warrant, which is more likely if the person swearing it cannot answer questions about the case. The NFCU also needs the police to be present when warrants are executed, which can lead to delays in the unit being able to carry out searches or seize critical evidence if the police have other priorities. As I understand it, the evidence seized then needs to be taken into police custody before it can be transferred to the NFCU. These issues can and do create delay, which is a problem in running a live investigation and trying to gather evidence before it is moved or destroyed.
I understand that NFCU investigations have been impacted by all the issues to which I have referred. I am also advised that the FSA’s view is that these additional powers are essential to enable the National Food Crime Unit to properly investigate and pursue complex food crime cases. As has been said, this was also identified as a gap in its systems to keep food safe in the independent review by Professor Elliott in I think 2014 following the horsemeat scandal.
In the Commons debate on this Lords amendment, the Minister said that the chairman of the Food Standards Agency had written to the Minister for Crime and Policing on 11 August 2021, expressing concern that the existing powers of the National Food Crime Unit were insufficient for their purpose. The Minister responded in October by expressing support for the request and indicating the Home Office’s intent to work with the NFCU to find a suitable legislative vehicle.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for his comments and to all noble Lords who participated in this short debate. I will try to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that we fully recognise the need to make quick progress with the consultation on extending Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers to the Food Standards Agency and then to introduce the necessary legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.
The noble Lord very properly pushed me on a credible argument for this. I refer back to one of the paragraphs in my opening remarks: we specifically need to work with the National Food Crime Unit, the Independent Office for Police Conduct and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on establishing a formal independent oversight framework for the NFCU’s exercise of these powers and the potential for the NFCU to be brought under their respective jurisdictions. The noble Lord referred to gangmasters; that is what happened with the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority. That is likely to require other legislative changes in addition to those provided for in Amendment 58. The issue is one of linked legislation. I have no doubt that the noble Lord will monitor this closely and I will ensure that he is kept informed of all developments. I hope that, on that basis, he will not press his Motion A1.
My noble friend Lord Young of Cookham asked about our commitment to commencing the repeal of the Vagrancy Act just as soon as we have consulted on and legislated for replacement legislation. The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, asked me precisely when. Perhaps it would help to clarify this if I read out what the Minister said in the Commons:
“On the undertaking that I was asked to give about the Vagrancy Act, let me say that 18 months is a maximum. If we can act faster, we will, but intensive work will obviously be required to get us there.”—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/22; col. 855.]
My noble friend Lord Young asked about the consultation. All I can say is that it will take place this spring.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quite rightly asked why the House will not necessarily have a debate on the SVRO pilot. We have done this because, subject to the Bill receiving Royal Assent, we expect the pilot to take two years, having started in early 2023. It will then take some two or three months to complete the evaluation. That timetable firmly takes us beyond the life of this Parliament. I hope that the noble Lord understands that it would not be right for me to commit a future Government or Chief Whip to provide parliamentary time to a debate on the report of the pilot. That is not within my gift or anyone’s gift. But we have said that in principle we endorse the case that has been made for such a debate and we understand the concerns. Therefore, we commit to sending all noble Lords the terms of reference for the independent evaluation of the pilot once they have been finalised and to lay a copy of those in the Library of the House.
In conclusion, I hope that, in the light of the Commons amendments in lieu providing clarity in the Bill on the matters to be addressed through the pilot and the observations about affording this House the opportunity to debate the pilot report, the noble Lord, and indeed the whole House, will support Motion L when we come to it.
I am still confused, despite what the noble Lord read from Commons Hansard. There will be consultation and replacement legislation, but will the repeal start in 18 months’ time or will the Vagrancy Act in its entirety be repealed in a maximum of 18 months? I am still not sure.
I go back to the statement that I just read: 18 months is a maximum for this issue to be resolved.
My Lords, in moving Motion B, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Motion M. Amendment 70, originally tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and passed by this House on Report, would require the Secretary of State to
“establish a review into the prevalence of, and the response of the criminal justice system to, the offence of administering a substance with intent under section 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003”.
As I have made clear previously, the Government share that concern about spiking, whether it is spiking of drinks or by needles, which has prompted this amendment and we are taking the issue very seriously.
In September last year, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary asked the National Police Chiefs’ Council to review urgently the extent and scale of the issue of needle spiking. We still have much to learn, as the noble Lord acknowledged at the time, but it is clear from what the police have told us that the behaviour is not exclusively carried out with the intention of perpetrating a sexual assault. Sometimes, financial crime might be a motivation. Indeed, many reported incidents do not appear to be linked to any secondary offending at all. It seems that sometimes the act might be an end in itself, yet all examples of this behaviour are serious in their impact on the victim and in the fear and anxiety felt more widely by those seeking simply to enjoy a night out.
It is also clear that we need a response that goes beyond the criminal justice system and encompasses health, education and the night-time economy. In the Commons, therefore, the Government tabled Amendment 70A in lieu, which is drafted more broadly. It requires the Home Secretary to prepare a report on the nature and prevalence of “spiking”—which, for these purposes, we are defining as
“intentionally administering a substance to someone without their consent and with the intention of causing them harm.”
The report will also set out the steps that the Government have taken or intend to take to address it. The Home Secretary will be required to publish the report, and lay it before Parliament, within 12 months of Royal Assent.
I hope that this addresses the concerns that underpinned the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, but in a way that enables the Government to consider the issue in the round. In addition, the Government are looking at whether creating a new offence specifically of spiking would help the police and courts to tackle the issue. If we need to take action to do this, we will not hesitate to do so.
Amendments 141 and 142 provide for bespoke new offences to tackle so-called sex for rent. We are very clear that exploitation through sex for rent has no place in society and we understand the motivation behind the amendments. However, as I previously explained, there are two existing offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 that can be, and have been, used to successfully prosecute this practice, including the Section 52 offence of causing or inciting prostitution for gain. We recognise the need to stamp out this terrible practice and support those at risk of exploitation. Again, on Report I set out some of the actions that we have already taken, including producing updated guidance for prosecutors and measures in the forthcoming online safety Bill to tackle harmful content on the internet.
We recognise that we need to go further. We are determined to act on the concerns that have been raised on this issue, both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place. Accordingly, we will launch a public consultation before the summer to invite views on the issue of sex for rent and, as part of this, we will look at the effectiveness of existing legislation and whether there is a case for a bespoke criminal offence. Following our commitment to undertake a consultation on this issue, the Commons disagreed with the Lords amendment by a majority of over 100.
All sides of the House share the heartfelt desire of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, to do more to tackle spiking and sex for rent. We are fully committed to doing so. We will publish a report on the nature and prevalence of spiking and the actions that we are taking in response, including consideration of the case for a bespoke offence, and we will be consulting before the summer on the issue of sex for rent. In the light of these clear commitments, I invite the House to agree Motions B and M. I beg to move.
My Lords, the amendments in this group were introduced by the Official Opposition and we supported them. We welcome the Government’s undertakings in Amendment 70A in Motion B to prepare and publish a report on spiking, for example of drinks, intentionally and without a person’s consent and with the intention of causing harm, so as to establish the extent of the problem and therefore to inform what measures need to be taken to address it.
We also welcome the Government’s commitment to undertake a consultation on whether the existing law in respect of requiring or arranging sexual relations as a condition of accommodation—so-called sex for rent—needs to be strengthened. The prevalence of the phenomenon and the lack of prosecutions under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which the Government believe covers these scenarios, indicate that such action is likely to be necessary. We are grateful to the Official Opposition, particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for raising these important issues and securing government action to address them.
My Lords, in relation to Motion C, one of the main recommendations of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, led by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, was for the police to be subject to a statutory duty of candour, as has been introduced into the National Health Service, and Lords Amendment 71 sought to establish that. The Government with their Amendment 71A, in Motion C, claim that police officers are already under a duty to co-operate during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings and that it would be premature to add such a provision pending further consideration by the Government.
The provision to which the Minister referred makes a lack of candour a matter for police misconduct proceedings, except in the most serious cases where a complaint is made by someone who is not a member of a police force and who is directly affected by the conduct. Whether a police misconduct investigation is held, or misconduct proceedings are brought, is a matter for the relevant chief constable of the police force concerned.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has today published a report in which it describes the Metropolitan Police’s approach to tackling corruption as “not fit for purpose”. Publishing the report, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, Matt Parr, said:
“It is unacceptable that 35 years after Daniel Morgan’s murder, the Metropolitan Police has not done enough to ensure its failings from that investigation cannot be repeated. In fact, we found no evidence that someone, somewhere, had adopted the view that this must never happen again.”
That is why we need a statutory duty of candour. In the case of the issues covered by the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, there was systemic and institutional withholding of information by the police sanctioned at the highest level. Arguably, the current Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who as an assistant commissioner decided to withhold essential information from the panel, would have had to order an investigation into herself under the provisions that the Minister is relying on.
The provision that the Government are relying on is not fit for purpose in the circumstances of police cover-ups, even when there is a member of a police force who is a whistleblower, because the whistleblower is a member of the police force and cannot bring a complaint against his or her own force. However, work is ongoing by the families of the victims of the Hillsborough disaster and the family of Daniel Morgan to ensure that a comprehensive, effective and legally binding duty of candour is imposed on all public institutions. Therefore, we have reluctantly decided not to insist on Lords Amendment 71.
In relation to Motion K, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for clarifying that there is no legal barrier to local authorities setting up and running academies and for the Government’s acknowledgement of the important role that local authorities have played in the past in running secure accommodation for young offenders.
There are, as has been said, two issues here, the duty of candour and secure academies. I note what the Minister said on the duty of candour and must say that our views are rather more in line with those just expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. One might think it rather odd, particularly at the present time when trust in the police appears to be at such a low level, that the Government and the Commons decided to disagree with such an amendment, but it is their prerogative to do so.
As the Minister said, this issue is not going to be dropped. There are people within Parliament, including ourselves, and people outside Parliament, to whom reference has been made, who intend to pursue the issue of a duty of candour. I think I am right in saying that the Minister referred to the fact that the Government would further consider the position—indeed, that is given as a reason for disagreeing—and that they would come up with conclusions later this year. While indicating that we intend to pursue the issue, we will, with some reluctance, leave this in that context. It is certainly not going to be pushed to one side now. It will be pursued and we will wait to see what conclusions the Government come up with later this year. The issue of trust in the police is a serious matter and I know the Government agree. We need to make sure that the mechanism is in place to improve the levels of trust that currently seem to exist.
On secure academies, the Government and the Commons have disagreed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German, which would put explicitly in the Bill that local authorities can establish and maintain secure academies. The aim of the amendment was to put beyond doubt that applications from local authorities to run secure academies would be welcomed and would be considered on their merit, on a level playing field with other providers.
The Government’s response has been that there is no legal barrier to local authorities setting up an entity that could enter into an academy arrangement with the Secretary of State, so there is not a legal barrier to them establishing a secure academy. The Government said that the Ministry of Justice
“will assess in detail the potential role of local authorities in running this new form of provision, before we invite applications to run any future secure schools.”—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/22; col. 803.]
The Minister also made that point.
Our response in the Commons was that this does not go far enough. We argued that local authorities have the expertise needed to run services and provide care for vulnerable children with a high level of need in a secure environment and that the Government should widen the pool of expertise that providers bring and ensure that local authorities are explicitly brought into the fold when planning for secure academies.
We recognise that the Government have committed to look at the involvement of local authorities in providing secure academies before any new applications are invited, so we will now deal with and pursue this issue outside of the Bill. However, we strongly support the noble Lord, Lord German, in saying that what is needed, and what we will keep calling on Ministers to deliver, is, frankly, not vague statements that a local authority could provide a secure academy but a proactive change to bring the expertise that local authorities have into that pool of providers.
My Lords, I support the amendment and thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for all his support on this issue. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws: “What a powerful speech”.
I particularly want to reiterate the points made about police recording. I am really quite depressed that this amendment has had to be laid—depressed as a Conservative Peer, because I have been so heartened by the commitment that this Government have shown on the issue of violence against women and girls. But at the moment, on the issue of misogyny—it exists, it is there and is corrosive; it is huge, if you ask me—there is a lack of grip. There has also been a lack of leadership and accountability, in particular on the issue of recording, and that really matters.
It matters because we should not make promises at the Dispatch Box and not keep them. That picks away at the faith and trust we have in our democracy. I do not wish to make too big a point out of this, but it is important and we do notice it. It also matters because it helps victims to have much more faith in the system; it gives them confidence. We have heard that from chief constables who have voluntarily taken this approach on board. It matters because it helps them do their job as well. It helps them target their resources, understand where the repeat perpetrators are, and target the culture within their own police forces—which, as we know, is a huge problem.
I hope that noble Lords will support the amendment, as I will. It really matters. Misogyny exists, it is corrosive and it needs to be tackled, and this is a very thoughtful and reasonable approach.
My Lords, I rise with some trepidation as the first man to speak in the debate—sorry, after the noble Lord, Lord Russell, of course, the proposer of the Motion. Something seriously needs to be done about misogyny in society, as the noble Baronesses said. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who said that misogyny is not hatred of women. My understanding is that it is hatred of women who are not subservient to men and who do not allow men to do what they want because they can, because they are stronger or because they think they can get away with it.
I have to say that I do not understand the Law Commission’s assessment that having misogyny as an aggravating factor would undermine the investigation and prosecution of things such as domestic abuse and sexual violence. Racism is treated as an aggravating factor by the courts, yet black victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence are not disadvantaged by having racism as an aggravating factor. So why should women be disadvantaged were misogyny to be an aggravating factor? Perhaps the Minister can answer that question.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, that we must deal with misogyny in terms of the actions that have a detrimental impact on women—not the thought but the deed, not the prejudice but the discrimination against women.
Amendment 72B in Motion D1 would create a new offence of harassment or intimidation aggravated by hostility towards sex or gender, where the maximum penalty for the new offence is the same as the offence, under Section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, of intentional harassment, alarm or distress without any aggravating factor. So there is an issue there.
There is a crisis of misogyny in society in general and in the police service in particular. Urgent, decisive action needs to be taken, notwithstanding the Law Commission’s findings. Creating a new offence, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in the form and with the penalties suggested might not be the right answer, but it is a vehicle to allow the Government to come forward with a better alternative using the Bill. We do not know when the next legislative opportunity will arise and we need to force the Government to take action now.
This urgency is reinforced by the fact that, as the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, the undertakings given by the Government when we last debated this issue during the passage of the Domestic Abuse Bill—now an Act—to ensure that all police forces flag offences aggravated by hostility towards sex or gender do not appear to be happening. Even if the Government are not convinced that legislative change is needed, surely they must deliver on their commitment to ensure that the nature and extent of the problem of misogyny in society is measured by the recording of such offences by the police. Surely the Government must understand why police forces might be reluctant to record misogyny as a hate crime when there is clear evidence of a culture of misogyny in police forces. That is why they should be compelled to do so by the Government.
I am concerned that the Government, encouraged by the Law Commission, are going into reverse on the issue of misogyny, betraying women who suffer every day from male violence. If for no other reason, we should support Motion D1 and Amendment 72B.
My Lords, this has been an extraordinary debate in many ways. It has really gone to the heart of the issue. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, in the way he moved his amendment.
I will start by addressing a specific point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about the way sentencing is done in courts. I speak as a magistrate who sits in London. When I sentence on a matter where there is racism as part of the sentence, I explicitly have to say in court what the uplift is because of the racist element. However, when there are other aggravating factors, be they misogyny or any other factor, such as the fact that the victim works in a public-facing way, I am not required to do that, but I can if I wish to. That is a very specific example of the difference in the way sentences deal with particular different types of aggravating factors.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to my Motion F2 and the other amendments in this group. I start by joining the Minister in paying tribute to the selfless actions of PC Keith Palmer, who tragically died five years ago today.
I apologise for the length of my remarks, but there are numerous important issues contained in this group. I promise not to spend an average of more than two minutes on each Motion. There are few subjects on which I am an expert, but the policing of public order is one. I was one of a small cadre of advanced trained public order senior officers, and I have extensive experience of policing events. I remind the House that the majority of police forces outside London told HMICFRS that they did not need new public order legislation, and that the limiting factor in policing protests was the number of public-order-trained police officers they had to police protests. A whistleblower who worked for HMICFRS said that the conclusions in its review of public order policing did not reflect the evidence that the inspectorate had gathered. Having read the report in full, I agree. There is no justification for more public order legislation.
In relation to Motion E, the police already have powers to impose any conditions necessary—including an outright ban—on public processions, if a senior police officer reasonably believes that it will result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or if the purpose is to intimidate others. Adding a noise trigger to those powers will do more harm than good. As I said in Committee, from my experience, the more conditions you impose on a procession, the more likely those conditions are to be resisted and, therefore, the more police officers you will need to enforce them. As I have said, police forces already say that they do not have enough public-order-trained police officers.
A peaceful protest with no anticipated violent infiltrators and an agreed route—however large—can be policed with a minimum number of police officers and a lot of traffic cones and miles of white tape. Imposing conditions which the organisers are resisting is likely to require between double and five times the number of police officers. This is because confrontation must be anticipated, and the conditions may have to be imposed by force—such as a march wanting to take a different route. An outright ban on a protest, as well as being unlikely to be successful—as we saw with the Sarah Everard vigil on Clapham Common—requires about 10 times as many police officers as are required for a compliant, peaceful demonstration. How many police officers would it have taken to police the Sarah Everard vigil, in the middle of a common, if there had been agreement between the police and the organisers? The more conditions which can be imposed, and the more draconian those conditions, the bigger the drain will be on already overstretched police resources.
The second issue is the impact on trust and confidence in the police, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, has just said. The impact of the policing of the Sarah Everard vigil was hugely negative, and the government proposals will simply increase the potential for, and frequency of, such scenes. By banning some demonstrations on the basis of anticipated noise, and not others, the police will be subjected to accusations that they are being political rather than practical. They will be accused of being selective about which protests can take place for political reasons—such as banning demonstrations against war, as they are likely to be enormous and noisy, but allowing demonstrations in favour of war to go ahead, as they are not likely to be very well supported, to take a Russian example. Such a change in the law is likely to draw the police reputation into even more disrepute. In addition, I ask how many times the business of this House or the other place has been disrupted because of noise by protestors. I suggest none —and I do not believe that the House has double glazing. In any event, the police can always divert disruptive demonstrations away from sensitive areas. This change—the noise trigger—is unnecessary and damaging, and we will be voting to support the Labour amendments.
Motion F is about maintaining the current position, where the police can impose conditions on those holding an assembly, a static protest or a meeting but cannot ban it altogether. The Government argue that their proposals simply bring assemblies into line with the powers that the police have in relation to processions, but there are very good reasons why the two should be treated differently.
As I said in Committee, on 13 January 1986 in the House of Commons, the then Conservative Home Secretary, later Lord Hurd of Westwell, explained why processions were being treated differently from assemblies:
“We stopped short of a power to ban”
assemblies
“because we believed that that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. For this reason, clause 14 does not permit the police to impose conditions changing the date and time of an assembly.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/1986; col. 797.]
We agree, and the effect of my amendment is to achieve the same result.
Already, if a senior police officer reasonably believes that an assembly may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of a community, or that the purpose of the assembly is to intimidate others, he or she can, under existing legislation, impose conditions on where the assembly takes place; tell an existing assembly to move somewhere else; limit how long it goes on for; and/or limit the numbers attending. The wording of my Amendment 80G in Motion F2 is different from simply insisting on the amendment we made to remove the new provision proposed by the Government on Report —as Motion F1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, does—but the effect is the same.
The only thing the police cannot do under existing legislation is to ban a static protest altogether. The police already have all the tools they need to deal with unlawful assemblies, but to give the police the power to stop people protesting at all smacks of Putin’s Russia, not the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I will seek the opinion of the House on Amendment 80G in Motion F2.
On Motion G, we share the concerns of others that all large demonstrations that have the potential to spill over into the road and, either by accident or design, impede vehicular access to Parliament could be banned even when Parliament is not sitting. We believe that this is legislative overreach, relying as it does on the discretion of the police to enforce it or not. However, we do not agree that the police should be able to give permission to allow entrances to Parliament to be blocked when Parliament is in session, so we do not insist on Lords Amendment 82.
On Motion H, we share the concerns of others that those who engage in peaceful sit-down protests, however short the duration, should face the potential penalty of imprisonment for highway obstruction where previously they could have been only fined. As we saw with the Insulate Britain protests, existing legislation, including the application for and enforcement of injunctions, can be successfully used to deal with persistent offenders, including imprisonment for those who breach injunctions. However, with the undertaking given by the Minister at the Dispatch Box that imprisonment is intended to be used only in the most egregious cases, we hope that this increased penalty does not have the chilling effect it may otherwise have done on peaceful protest.
On Motion N, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for raising the issue and for the Government’s response.
My Lords, I regret that we heard the Home Secretary and now the Minister accept the principle of the Opposition’s fast-track public space protection orders in relation to Motion H and use that to justify broader anti-protest amendments as a balance in protecting non-protesters. I regret it but I am not surprised. The danger of advocating any measures that strengthen anti-protest measures is that it sets a tone that suggests that some protesters are good and some are bad, which politicises a general and universal right that I think we should defend. Putting that to one side, I want to oppose the Government’s doubling-down on a noise trigger and follow on particularly from the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others who have expressed their opposition so well.
I want to nod to the democratic dilemma of this ping-pong and whether we are actually blocking democracy. When summing up the rejection of the second tranche of anti-protest amendments on Report, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, chided all of us who opposed them for ignoring the public’s demand that authorities deal with new forms of protest activities such as those we have seen used by Extinction Rebellion and its offspring, such as Insulate Britain.
I disagreed that those amendments would have dealt with those new forms of protest. I thought they were so broad as to sweep up all and any protests, including anyone who might have wanted to protest against net zero, to take an example of a different political side. The state also already has huge powers, whether the Emergency Workers (Obstruction) Act or the Public Order Act, as we have heard, that could have been used to deal with these forms of protest which are a particular nuisance, as the public would have it. Despite that, I felt the Government were at least responding to a particular form of protest about which there has been some public agitation and concern. Therefore, that chiding was listened to.
But now, here we are with government amendments on protest that bear absolutely no relation to the Home Office’s motivation on new forms of protest. I do not think the Government have a democratic mandate for these amendments. Fundamental and foundational democratic rights, such as the right to assemble or protest or the right to free speech, should be protected by an iron curtain. If there is any attempt to undermine them, the presumption must rest with the Government to justify in absolutely clear terms, with a sense of the absolutely exceptional reasons for the proposed changes, any more draconian measures being brought in.
It just does not add up. As I have noticed before, even these new types of protest that apparently upset the public are often silent, so the noise trigger does not apply to them in any way whatever. The authorities should consider proposing accruing further power when limiting the right to assembly, and ultimately the right to free speech, only ever in exceptional circumstances. In this instance, those exceptional circumstances are just not there.
Even more galling is the smoke and mirrors of posing these proposals as protecting the public from the consequences of protest. The public are described as “non-protesters”; as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out, this turns the public into two different groups of people, but actually the public are the people who go on protests. They might not go on all of them all the time, but it is their right as the public that we are talking about. There is an Alice in Wonderland approach here that gets the issues upside-down and implies that the Government are far removed from the reality that free protests have been crucial for the public over centuries. The denial of that right, whether in Putin’s Russia or China’s Hong Kong, should be a visceral reminder to us here of why protest —warts and all—matters.
Of course not all protests are popular. Many of the modern protests I have mentioned, such as those by Extinction Rebellion, I do not support and they irritate me but, as with all fundamental democratic rights—free speech, free association and so on—it does not matter whether they are annoying, unpleasant or objectionable, or even if those demonstrations are directed in a hostile way against what you believe to be true.
We cannot pick and choose which speech or which protest we agree with and then endorse only the ones that we like. We have to make sure that we do not let those kinds of political prejudices get in the way. We are bound to feel uncomfortable at times when people protest for things that we disagree with, but that is freedom for you. It has never been claimed that living in a free society is safe and cosy. It is designed to make you, on occasion, feel uncomfortable. But there are principles here. As the Court of Appeal notes:
“The right to protest becomes effectively worthless if the protesters’ choice of ‘when and where’ to protest is not respected as far as possible”,
and I stand by that.
Moved by
Leave out from “House” and insert “do insist on its Amendment 80, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 80A, 80B, 80C, 80D, 80E and 80F, and do propose Amendment 80G instead of the words so left out of the Bill—
80G: After Clause 55, insert the following new Clause—
“Imposing conditions on public assemblies
(1) Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public assemblies) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where—
(a) it may result in a significant delay to the supply of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(b) it may result in a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—
(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(ii) a system of communication,
(iii) a place of worship,
(iv) a transport facility,
(v) an educational institution, or
(vi) a service relating to health.
(2B) In subsection (2A)(a) “time-sensitive product” means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.”
(3) After subsection (10A) (as inserted by section 57(11)) insert—
“(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsection (2A) or (2B) for the purposes of making provision about the meaning for the purposes of this section of serious disruption to the life of the community.
(12) Regulations under subsection (11) may, in particular, amend either of those subsections for the purposes of—
(a) defining any aspect of that expression for the purposes of this section;
(b) giving examples of cases in which a public assembly is or is not to be treated as resulting in serious disruption to the life of the community.
(13) Regulations under subsection (11)—
(a) are to be made by statutory instrument;
(b) may apply only in relation to public assemblies in England and Wales;
(c) may make incidental, supplementary, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provision, including provision which makes consequential amendments to this Part.
(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (11) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.””
My Lords, because the police will otherwise have the powers to ban assemblies, I beg to move Motion F2.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to a couple of the other Motions before I speak to Motion C1 in my name. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Rooker on securing the government amendment and moving the Government away from their position and coming forward with an amendment. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Rooker’s work: he has been an example to us all about how to change legislation. But, to be fair to the Government as well, it was good to see them responding sensibly to the points that my noble friend made; they deserve some credit for seeing sense.
On the important work that the noble Lord, Lord Russell, has done with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and many others on misogyny and other associated issues, I say that he is another example to us all of how to give bring about change. The Minister’s comments at the Dispatch Box today show real progress with respect to that. All of us will want to see the progress that is made, and I was particularly struck by the way that the Minister said that she would keep the House updated. That is particularly important, and I thank her for that.
This is a hugely important issue. Many promises have been made over a number of years and perhaps now, given the horror of some of the things that have happened over recent times, maybe this is a sea-change moment when we will see real progress made—so I again pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and many others.
We support Motion D1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is crucial in opposing the Government’s noise provisions as it removes the proposed noise trigger for public assemblies. On the wider question of police powers to put conditions on static protests, this new version of the clause proposed by the noble Lord responds to the concerns raised by Ministers and proposes a compromise in line with the JCHR—but I will leave the noble Lord to say more about his own Motion D1 and I look forward to hearing it.
My Motion C1 maintains our previous position that the noise trigger should be removed in full. Our Amendments 73 and 87 remove the Government’s proposed noise trigger, which would allow the police to put conditions on marches or one-person protests which get not “noisy” but “too noisy”. The Government have still not made the case that the power is proportionate, and the more we ask, the less they seem to know about how it could possibly work in practice. For example, the government Amendments 73C and 87H on “serious unease” show that the Government are still in a hole and still digging in recognising that there are problems with the definition of what “too noisy” means.
To indulge noble Lords for just a few minutes, the new subsection inserted by Clause 56(5) has the wording that
“it may cause such persons to suffer serious unease, alarm or distress.”
The Government propose to take out “serious unease”: that is the compromise. We welcome the word “unease” going, but, of course the Government have also taken out “serious”, so we now have a situation where they have lowered the threshold as a compromise—which is a ridiculous point to arrive at and just the shows the confusion.
As noble Lords know, it is really important to read the background notes to all of this. I thought that I must be reading an old version, but it is dated 28 February 2022, so it is updated. The policy paper is entitled Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill 2021: Protest Powers Factsheet. The Minister in the other place said that it did not matter that “serious” was missed out, because actually everyone knows that it still means serious, even though it has been taken out of the Bill. So I refer to the background. The policy paper was published by the Government on 28 February. I will use it as an example of the hole that the Government are in in trying to define “too noisy”. They cannot do it. There are breaches of the peace as it stands already—but anyway, let me read this:
“This power can only be used when the police reasonably believe that the noise from the protest may cause serious disruption to the activities of an organisation or cause a significant impact on people in the vicinity of the protest. ‘Impact’ is defined as intimidation, harassment, serious unease”—
which will be taken out, which is fine, but the Government’s own background paper says
“serious alarm, or serious distress with the police then having to consider whether the impact is significant.”
So the background policy paper published by the Home Office is now out of step with the amendment that the Government propose to the Bill. “Serious” is no longer there, so, instead of having “serious unease” and in the same sentence “alarm or distress”—in other words, “serious unease, serious alarm or serious distress”—that has been taken out.
Now I am not an expert on these things, but I would say to noble Lords that I would expect in court that serious distress would be more serious than just distress. Now I am not a genius, but I am also sure that if I were in a court and said that it is serious alarm, that would be a higher threshold than alarm. I may be wrong: I leave that to others to judge. But that is the compromise that the Government have come forward with.
In other words, to come forward with me saying all the things that I will come on to in a minute about other things, they are saying, “We’ve got to say something else, Coaker will be off again”. Well, I am, because it does not make sense. I am using humour to demonstrate a really serious point. By legislating in this way the Government show that they do not know what they are doing on “too noisy”. Instead of retreating in a managed, orderly way, they are panicking—“What do we do? How do we do something? We’ve got to say something”—and they come up with this in such haste that they do not think it through properly and they take the word “serious” out, as well as “unease”. I just say to noble Lords, “It just goes on”.
Of course, we then had the famous double-glazing incident, which many noble Lords said to me afterwards could not be true. I just referred them to the guidance. They went away and read it and said, “Goodness me, it does say double-glazing.” I thought the Government might retreat on double-glazing. For those noble Lords who were not here, for it to be too noisy, there are certain thresholds the Government have laid out, so we can understand what “too noisy” may be. So, for example, it says
“A noisy protest outside an office with double glazing may not meet the threshold”.
So, I posed the question that, therefore, what you would need to do if you were having a demonstration and were going to make a lot of noise would be to look at the street, or the area you were going to be in, and look for double-glazing. You could make sure, because if you were demonstrating in a street with double-glazing, you would be fine, even if you made too much noise. However, if you went down an older street that did not have double-glazing, then you would be in trouble.
I had to read it a few times. I actually read it to my wife and said, “Have I misread this?” She said no. But it is such a serious point: this is what we are asking the police to use. In demonstrations in future, the police will be asked to consider whether a demonstration is too noisy on the basis of the number of houses that have double-glazing. Unbelievable.
I thought the Government would retreat, and then it somehow got into the Times, and it must have been a great headline for the Government—they must have been really pleased—
“Police and crime bill: Noisy protests to be silenced by double glazing inspections.”
That was the headline in the Times of 25 March, if noble Lords missed it. That must have made interesting reading in the Home Office. I would have liked to have been the Minister going to report to the Home Secretary on that. “Who signed it off?” was the question I always asked. I thought the Home Office would retreat, but no. So that is the headline for the article: the double- glazing.
I stress again that I am trying, through humour, to make a really serious point about how noisy is too noisy. So, here we go again. I do not know about noble Lords, but I would have retreated. I am sure the Minister would have retreated as well, had it been up to her—I will leave her to answer that—but instead, listen to this, from the Times.
“The Home Office defended the guidance, insisting that it was one of many considerations that the police may have to take into account … ‘It is perfectly reasonable to suggest the type and construction of a building targeted would impact on the level of outside noise that penetrates through’.”
So we are now getting into the thickness of walls—old buildings, sound-proofed or not—and so it goes on. We have gone from double-glazing to the thickness of walls as to where we can demonstrate.
I highlight again that definition bedevils legislation—I accept that—but we have to be really careful with “too noisy”. Where will it apply? This is something that needs proper investigation. Other hypothetical situations where the “too noisy” provisions would not apply, as well as where there is a lot of double-glazing, would be where a protest
“only lasts a short amount of time”.
You can make as much noise as you want as long as it only lasts a short amount of time. The guidance says that
“the same amount of noise over several days”
might be an issue. So, if you do it for six days, you are all right, but if you do it for several days, you have a problem.
Then listen to this:
“A noisy protest in a town centre may not meet the threshold”.
So the towns are going to be excluded from the “too noisy” provisions. Again, how are the police going to decide what a town centre is? It does not include London, presumably, because that is a city, but does it include a suburb of a city? If it goes into the suburbs of London, is that a town centre? In Nottingham, we call lots of the suburbs “towns”. What is a town centre? It does not apply there. Somebody said to me, “I thought the Government’s levelling-up agenda was about including towns”, but a noisy protest in a town centre may not meet the threshold.
I have given those examples of the guidance the Minister has had to show that the Government are in real trouble on “too noisy”. What the Government are asking us to do is to pass a piece of legislation that has a provision in it that is unworkable, ill-defined, illogical and will not work. That is not the job of legislators. There is controversy, there is difficulty, there is difference of opinion, but silliness and ridiculous legislation is not acceptable.
I just say to finish, before I move to Motion C1, that I know and accept that the Government do not want to ban protest—it is ridiculous to suggest that the Government are against any protest; I do not believe that. Nor do I believe that the Government really want to undermine the ability of people to protest, but I do say this: we should erode that right, even with the application of certain conditions, only with very serious care.
Many people, including me, have protested time and time again, and conditions have been put on those marches. A number of noble Lords have been in Governments that have been the victims of massive demonstrations—I am talking about legal ones. No Government in the past have ever sought to restrict demonstrations on the basis that they make too much noise. Margaret Thatcher did not do it; John Major did not do it; David Cameron did not do it; Theresa May did not do it; why on earth are we doing it now? It will not work; this condition is anti-democratic and it sends a signal to people that is unacceptable. It is an infringement of people’s democratic right to protest and we should reject it again.
My Lords, Motion D1 is in my name, but I shall take the Motions in order. On Motion A, we are pleased the Government have decided to give the Food Standards Agency the Police and Criminal Evidence Act powers that it is seeking.
On Motion B, we do not see the Government’s amendments in lieu, Amendments 72C and 72D, to be any kind of concession, in that the Government are duty-bound to respond to the Law Commission report on hate crimes in any event. We support the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in his Motion B1, Amendments 72E and 72F, that police forces should be forced to record or flag offences aggravated by sex or gender by means of primary legislation set out in the Bill as this is the only practical way to ensure 43 autonomous chief constables comply.
I am not quite sure about the Minister’s arguments about the complexity around sex and gender: in relation to hate crime, it matters not whether the victim is somebody born a woman or is a trans woman, only whether the assailant believed that the victim was a woman and was motivated by hatred of women. I fear the Government are just looking for excuses. Having said that, misogyny is a problem in the police and in society as a whole, and we do need urgent action. With the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and Stella Creasy MP on the case, progress may be slow, but it is inevitable.
On Motion C, the so-called noise trigger in relation to processions, it is very difficult to follow the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on that issue, but we agree with his Motion C1 that the noise trigger should not be part of the Bill in relation to processions or static protests, as I will come to in a moment in relation to Motion D. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said when we last considered it, these measures are not sensible or practical. I may be incorrect, but it seems to me that the larger the protest, the more popular the cause, the more likely the protest is to be noisy and therefore the more likely it is to be banned. Only a very unpopular cause, which is not going to be as noisy, will go ahead, if we are not careful.
As Liberty has pointed out in its useful briefing, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the body whose report is relied on by the Government to justify the measures in Part 3, did not examine or support the establishment of a noise trigger. In evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for public order did not reference or advocate for a new power based on the noise that protests generate. I repeat, outside London—where the chief police officer and her deputy are appointed by the Home Secretary—the majority of police forces said police officer numbers were the limiting factor in effectively policing protests, not a lack of legislation.
On my Motion D1, Amendments 80J and 80G, we continue to be concerned about what the then Conservative Home Secretary said about the difference between processions and assemblies when the original public order legislation was debated in the other place. He believed that giving the police the power to ban an assembly would be an excessive limit on the human rights of assembly and freedom of speech.
Leave out from “House” and insert “do insist on its Amendment 80 and on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments 80A, 80B, 80C, 80D, 80E and 80F, do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 80H, and do not insist on its Amendment 80G but do propose Amendment 80J instead of the words left out of the Bill by Amendment 80—
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Home Office
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo. As an aside, I googled double-gazing companies, just in case the Minister wanted a hand with that. However, I thought that was not taking this, or dealing with this, with the seriousness it needs. I get criticised for using humour but the reason I do so is not to trivialise an important point of principle; all I am doing is saying that I am quoting from a government document on the website, available and updated for the benefit of this deliberation. The Government have got their way on a whole range of different issues; it is the right of the Commons, as the Minister pointed out, to have its way as the elected House. We have an absolute right, though, as the House of Lords, to push right until the last minute on things that are nonsensical. The “too noisy” provision is a nonsense. Protests are about noise.
The police have perfectly adequate powers; they arrest people for making noise, using breaches of the peace and so on. The government document says that the trouble with a breach of the peace is that it does not have very much power, except that the police can arrest you. I would have thought that being able to arrest was adequate. I do not know about other noble Lords but I have never been arrested. I suggest to this House that for the vast majority of people, believing that they were going to be arrested would be a pretty serious threat to them. For the vast majority of people, that would stop them. The Government’s document says that it is not an adequate power. My view is that the power of arrest is a pretty important power that the police can use.
The right to protest is a fundamental right of democracy—a fundamental right that all of us, including me, have used—and one that involves making noise. The Government have got their way in respect of place and conditions, not only on processions but on assembly. We pushed back and the Government have now made a further concession to have a review after two years as to whether this “too noisy” provision has worked. It is time for us to push back again and say that the provision is a nonsense; it is ridiculous. It does not work, it will not work and it is not needed. I hope that when it comes to a Division, noble Lords will consider this a step too far in allowing the police to act to control protests, processions and marches. I beg to move.
My Lords, for all the reasons explained by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, we support Motions A1 and B2 on the noise trigger. Specifically, asking the police to anticipate what noise levels a protest that has yet to take place might result in is likely to bring the police into unnecessary and avoidable conflict with the public, further undermining the trust and confidence that the police rely on to be effective. The more popular the protest, the more likely it is to be noisy and the more likely it is to be banned.
I cannot play the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, at his own game, but he did ask me a specific question about the rank of officer who should be judging whether a protest is too noisy. Perhaps an additional condition should be for that officer to have a hearing test, because we cannot possibly have hearing-impaired senior officers making such important judgments.
On Motions B and B1, we insist on the amendment passed by this House the last time this issue was considered. That amendment allows the police to impose conditions on the start and end time of an assembly, meeting or political rally, in addition to the existing powers they have to set or move where the assembly takes place and to limit the numbers attending and its duration, but not to ban an assembly, meeting or political rally completely. In particular, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others.
Of course, it may be necessary, in exceptional circumstances, to place restrictions on this right, and existing legislation and Motion B1 allow that, but when it comes to taking away the right to freedom of peaceful assembly completely, by allowing the police to ban people meeting together, we agree with the then Conservative Home Secretary in the other place when the original legislation was passed that that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. Allowing the police to prevent people peacefully meeting together—to ban political rallies, for example—surely puts us on the slippery slope of the erosion of fundamental human rights and the imposition of a police state. I ask noble Lords to support Motion B1.
My Lords, I rise briefly to offer the Green group’s support for Motions A1 and B1. Another thought the police might have to consider is the historical place: how their judgment might be judged, both at that moment and later in history.
I have on my office wall a cartoon from Punch about the suffragettes. It has a whole series of episodes from a Minister’s day. It starts with the Minister in his bath. The suffragettes shout “Votes for women” through his window and he jumps up in horror. He then goes on the golf course. The suffragettes leap out of a bunker and shout “Votes for women”. He then breathes a sigh of relief when he gets to the House. The suffragettes appear through his window, shouting “Votes for women”.
I do not know whether the Minister knows “The March of the Women”, one of the suffragettes’ anthems. It starts:
“Shout, shout, up with your song! Cry with the wind for the dawn is breaking … Loud and louder it swells, Thunder of freedom”.
Noisy protest has been, and is, a central part of our democracy. It has been a central part of creating our democracy. Protest—having your voice heard—is not and must not be a crime.
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 80, do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments 80A, 80B, 80C, 80D, 80E, 80F and 80H to the words restored to the Bill by their disagreement with that Amendment, do insist on its Amendment 80J instead of the words left out of the Bill by that Amendment and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 80K to the words restored to the Bill by their disagreement with Lords Amendment 80.”
I should inform the House that if Motion B1 is agreed to, I will not be able to call Motion B2 for reasons of pre-emption.