Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateWednesday 10th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberPolice, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 40-VII(b) Amendments for Committee (supplementary to the Seventh Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2021)
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is to retain simple cautions. The examples he gave illustrate the point I made earlier: that this is a very complex area, with a lot of history of government trying to manage out-of-court disposals in different ways. He gave the example of 27 minor offences which can be dealt with by fixed penalty notices and asked what happens with cannabis and khat warnings. I would be interested to hear the answer.
The noble Lord asked—I think rhetorically—what else a police officer can do other than give a conditional caution. The answer is that they can do nothing. They can give the person they are dealing with a talking to; in my experience, police officers are perfectly capable of doing that. Nevertheless, as I said in an earlier group, this is a very complex area. The Government have tried a number of different out-of-court disposal regimes in recent years; I am not aware that any approach was particularly better than previous ones. Indeed, the noble Lord gave examples of the not obvious success of the pilot schemes for this regime.
Nevertheless, I think that out-of-court disposals are appropriate. They need to be handled in a proportionate way and with the right amount of training for the police officers dealing with them. Clearly, an appropriate level of intervention would, one would hope, be for the benefit of the offenders, given that it is very likely that a large proportion of the offenders will be drug and alcohol users. Having said that, I will be interested to hear why the Minister thinks a simple caution is not appropriate to retain on the statute book.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)
My Lords, it is fair to say that this group of amendments goes to the heart of why reform to out of court disposals was needed and the aims of the new cautions framework. The background is that the public consultation on out of court disposals showed that more than half of respondents did not believe that they deterred offending. As such, it was felt that there should be a framework with more meaningful and proportionate consequences and a move away from “warnings” and “simple cautions” to a system with, on the one hand, repercussions for the offender but, on the other, an opportunity to reduce reoffending and address often complex needs.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has indicated his intention to oppose Clause 97 standing part of the Bill. Removing that clause would allow existing cautions to remain in use. That would undermine the entire reform and change that we are trying to bring about and would continue the current inconsistent approach that we have across police forces. We do not want to stick with the status quo; we want to improve it.
As I understand it, Amendments 187 and 188 are consequential to the removal of Clause 97. Amendment 189 seeks to retain the option to use the simple caution as well as the new diversionary and community cautions. It also means that, if any existing cautions were retained, the giving of these disposals to offenders would then be taken into account in any repeat offending. Clause 96 deals with the provisions of restrictions on multiple use of cautions, so I will not expand further on that point at this stage.
Following the joint government and police review of out of court disposals between 2013 and 2014, it was established that the existing disposals framework needed reform. The National Police Chiefs’ Council developed its own two-tier out of court disposal strategy in 2017, which removed the need for the simple caution, penalty notice for disorder and cannabis and khat warnings. I will come back to the specific point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about. Since then, one-third of forces have moved to the two-tier framework, using conditional cautions along with the non-statutory community resolution. We believe that attaching conditions to the caution means that the recipient must engage in some way with the outcome as well as accepting responsibility. That is a more proactive and robust approach than the simple caution, which requires no further engagement by the offender and is often nothing more than a warning.
Removal of the simple caution does not mean that there is no provision for offenders where conditions requiring higher levels of engagement are considered unsuitable. As I said in response to an earlier group, we want to ensure a wide range of conditions is available, including those that require a low level of engagement on the part of the offender; indeed, it goes down at the bottom end to an expectation not to reoffend, so that such conditions can be selected where appropriate. The critical point is that there should be flexibility in the conditions that may be set in terms of the level of engagement that is required from the offender, so that the authorised person has discretion in this regard when choosing the conditions.
On the specific point of cannabis and khat warnings, which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, also echoed, the community resolution already replaces cannabis and khat warnings. This is NPCC policy. The community resolution will be retained by the police as the only non-statutory option. Police are well practised in using the community resolution for this type of drug possession, and it does not require a formal admission of guilt either.
The final point I make is that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, implied—I think; I may have got this wrong—that removing the simple caution meant that a low-level offence could be dealt with only by means of a diversionary or community caution. Fixed penalty notices do not fall under the reform to out of court disposals and will still be available for use where relevant. The example of littering given by the noble Lord may be dealt with by those means or indeed by community resolution, which is an alternative and non-statutory disposal that police forces will retain. I hope that answers his question on the khat point and also his point on littering.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Does the Minister not agree that good law is about a combination of rules and discretion? I quite understand that he is here to advocate his new scheme and approach, which the Government have considered and think is the way forward, but why not have a little residual discretion for some of the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave? The Minister said that a simple caution is really a bare warning but, occasionally, is not a bare warning better than nothing at all in terms of a police officer, in reality—sometimes underresourced, in difficult times—doing his job in the community?
Why do we have to be so rigid that we make a simple caution—which of course is not ideal and does not have the diversions and other things suggested— impossible to give? In circumstance where there is a student who is annoyingly drunk but has not really harmed anybody—as in the example given—why not allow a bare warning rather than no warning and no action at all?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
Without turning this afternoon into a jurisprudential seminar, I certainly agree with the thrust of the point made by the noble Baroness that good law is often a combination of rules and discretion. At the level of generality, I would agree. However, it is not right to say that this is rigid; the conditions that can be applied are extremely flexible.
There are really two parts to the answer. First, within the new cautions regime, there is a great deal of flexibility as to the conditions that can be set out. If the noble Baroness looks at Clause 80 for diversionary cautions—which is mirrored in Clause 89 for community cautions—subsection (4) sets out the restrictive conditions and goes down to the one I mentioned in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which is
“not to engage in specified conduct”.
That is, essentially, the lowest form of engagement when no other suitable conditions exist. That really creates a condition where the offender is expected not to commit any further offences. That is a very low level of engagement, and when that is suitable will be a matter for the code of practice.
The second part of the answer is to repeat the point I made earlier that other forms of out of court disposal are still available—I mentioned fixed penalty notices and community resolution—so, with respect, I do not agree that we are putting in place a rigid regime. The conditions are flexible and there are some disposals that are outside the cautions structure, even now.
I do not think I did so before, but I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Can the Minister clarify something? I think he said something along the lines that the lowest level of condition is that the offender should not engage in similar activity again. So, if somebody is arrested and cautioned and the police say to them “Don’t do it again”, is that a condition attached to a caution?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
As I said a moment ago, this relates to Clause 80(4) and Clause 89(4), if the noble Lord looks at the last condition in each of those subsections. The code of practice, as I said in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will make further provision for the circumstances in which that would be appropriate. Importantly, and I think differently from the simple caution, the police would still need to monitor conduct to ensure that someone had not reoffended, but that would be less onerous. This is a good example of where the new structure that we are putting in place preserves the best of the old regime but still has it on a more structured basis, focused on preventing reoffending as well as on the rehabilitation of the offender.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Forgive me, but I sense an element of unworldliness about this. If it is appropriate in a given case for there to be just words spoken and a warning, and it would be proportionate, do we really need the constable in question to go through the process of the recording and the monitoring?
I say no more on that but, if the Committee will indulge me, I would like to mention that Mr Gareth Dowling, the doorkeeper, is retiring today after some years of service and I hope that the Committee, if not the whole House, will join me in congratulating him and wishing him all the best for the future.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
May I first deal with the caution points? I do not want to run those two topics together. On cautions, there is a fundamental point here. The simple caution is really what it says on the tin: a simple caution. In circumstances where the officer decides that it is appropriate to give a community caution with the lowest level—the one that we are talking about now—importantly, to get there, the officer or the authorised person still has to go through the process of speaking to the victim, thinking about what other options are available and looking at what other conditions are available. That process is valuable in all cases. That is one of the strengths of the new regime. I accept that that requires more consideration, but you end up with a system which is more robust and suitable and which results in a more proportionate response. Quite separately, I join the noble Baroness in what she said about Mr Dowling.
Lord Paddick (LD)
I thank noble Lords who have participated in this short debate and am grateful for the qualified support from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede.
If I heard the Minister right, he referred to public consultation and the proportion of respondents who said that they did not believe that out-of-court disposals reduced offending. Is he really saying that the Government are now legislating on the basis of public opinion rather than on the basis of evidence? There is no evidence that the two-tier system that has been piloted by a third of forces is any more effective, as I have quoted at length and repeatedly—which the Minister ignores. There is no evidence that this will be a better system for reducing offending. With the greatest of respect, just because the Government assert that it will be does not mean that it is.
I am struggling here. If we take the example of somebody who is arrested for being drunk and disorderly and who the police want to caution, they now have to attach conditions. Presumably, the lowest level of condition will be, “You should desist from behaving like this in the future.” Then the Minister says, “But of course the police will have to put measures in place to monitor the accused’s future behaviour.” I am completely at a loss as to what sort of monitoring the Minister has in mind in such circumstances. The more the Committee examines these proposals—perhaps I should say the lack of them, bearing in mind that we will not see whatever is contained in the code of practice until well beyond the Bill receiving Royal Assent—the more the whole thing begins to unravel.
Clearly, I will apologise to the Minister and to the Committee if I have misunderstood the legislation in terms of withdrawing the police’s ability to give fixed penalty notices for disorder. I hope that the Minister will do the same if it turns out that I am right and he is wrong. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling his amendment. As we have seen through this debate, it has inspired many contributions on a wide range of points about whether and when a caution should be spent: after three months or immediately when the caution is given.
I remember sitting on the Michael Sieff Foundation report, and our discussions about whether all youths should effectively have their criminal records expunged unless there were particularly serious matters in there. I also remember debating that point very well, because I was sceptical about it at the time. The argument that I found most convincing was from the lady who was an academic helping us. It was based on the inadequacy of the record-keeping system for having any sort of differentiated approach for expunging a criminal record. It is really much better and more reliable to expunge the lot unless there are extreme reasons not to. That way gave young people the best chance of getting a good job and starting their career.
All noble Lords who spoke in this debate made interesting points. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti made one particular point about the record-keeping of the internet. This is a huge issue; the internet does not forget. Of course, employers make their own checks through the internet, whether or not they have been given permission to. In my experience, young people are conscious of this and spend a certain amount of time editing their internet history to make sure they get any job they are offered. That is a flippant point. Nevertheless, this was an interesting debate and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s reason for why a caution should not be spent at the time it is given, rather than after three months or whatever period it was. I too had the briefing from Transform Justice, which made a good case, so I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, first, I will pick up one point from the last group to make it very clear: if I have made any errors, I am happy to correct them. As far as I am aware, there is no doctrine of ministerial infallibility; I say that with all due respect to my colleagues. Because the Cabinet table is still terra incognita to me, I hope I am on the right side of good behaviour even speaking from this seat.
I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that we are not introducing any changes to the current regime for rehabilitating offenders who receive a caution. The proposed diversionary caution replicates the current system for the conditional caution, with the same spending period. I also point out that the lower-tier community caution being introduced has no spending period, and therefore mirrors the current adult simple caution. In effect, we are maintaining the position that pertains with a spending period for the lower-tier and higher-tier cautions. We think that is a sensible position to take.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act was, to use her phrase, a wonderful thing. It is an important piece of legislation and the principle underpinning it is important. It seeks to strike a balance between protecting the public and rehabilitating offenders, and it does that by requiring that in most cases a criminal record must be disclosed for a period of time but—this is the important “but”—after that period, the offender no longer needs to disclose it for most types of employment. I hear the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham that cautions sometimes have to be disclosed, but it depends for what purposes and when. There is an important spending period.
The real question at the heart of this debate is whether diversionary and community cautions should have the same spending periods. It is at that point that I respectfully diverge from the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because, if a diversionary caution were to be treated as spent at the time a caution is given, it would suggest that there is nothing in favour of public protection that requires the disclosure of that caution, and the offending it relates to, for even a limited time—up to three months—after it has been given. That position is simply not tenable, once we recall what the diversionary caution is all about. Let us remember that the diversionary caution requires the authorised person to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of offending to charge the offender, and the offender themselves must both admit to that offending and consent to the giving of the caution. Public protection therefore continues to be engaged after it is given as, unlike a community caution, criminal proceedings may be instituted if the offender does not comply with the conditions.
Over and above that, again unlike the community caution, the diversionary caution can be given for indictable offences, admittedly in exceptional circumstances and with permission of the Director of Public Prosecutions. That again highlights the importance of placing a time-limited spending period on cautions that relate to more serious offences. Removing, therefore, the spending period for diversionary cautions blurs the important distinction between the two sorts of caution.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
I thank my noble friend Lady Massey for introducing these amendments. She did so comprehensively, and I shall speak very briefly in support of them.
When most young people go into custody, they will serve half their sentence in custody and the other half out on licence or on a training order. The gist of the Bill is to increase the custody element to two-thirds, while the amendments would put that back to half the period. As I have said on other amendments, I have an aversion to sentence inflation, and this is an example of it. There is no evidence that I am aware of that it would reduce reoffending. Rehabilitation is available within both the youth estate and the adult estate, but it is so much better if it can be engaged while outside prison.
On principle, I am against sentence inflation. My noble friend has set out with her normal expertise why, when looking at a wider context of international law, this example of sentence inflation is not appropriate. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, these amendments, which I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, for putting down, all relate to custodial sentences for children. There were one or two points that she made that I shall perhaps respond to when we get to group 9, because there is a little bit of an overlap with some of the points there. I hope that she will forgive me if I respond to some of the points then, but I shall seek to respond to the majority now.
As the Committee will be aware, there is a separate and distinct sentencing framework for children. When sentencing children, the courts have to take into account two statutory considerations: the principal aim of the youth justice system, which is to prevent offending by children and young people, and the welfare of the child. I hope that overlaps with some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord German, emanating from the Sentencing Council.
Although, therefore, custody should always be a last resort for children, there will be some cases where it is necessary, and we believe that the court is best placed to determine the appropriate sentence. But those who commit the most serious offences, and who pose a risk to the public, should serve an amount of time in custody which reflects the seriousness of their offending.
Against that background, let me go through the relevant clauses and amendments. Clause 101 relates to—and I underline this point—minimum sentences. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, on a few occasions referred to “mandatory” sentences. The clause is not headed “mandatory sentences”; the words “mandatory sentence” do not appear in this Bill, except in one place, Clause 101(8), which refers back—it is a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is not in his place, because we have a nice piece of parliamentary drafting here—to Section 399(c) of the Sentencing Code “(mandatory sentence requirements)”, but that refers to a minimum sentence where the conditions set out in the clause do not apply.
I have two points to make in this regard. First, minimum sentences are not mandatory in the sense that they must be imposed. They are a mandatory consideration that the court must make before passing a sentence unless the provision in the sentence is met. Secondly, the Bill does not introduce minimum sentences for under-18s for the first time. Offenders aged 16 or 17 are already subject to minimum sentencing provisions if convicted of threatening with a weapon or bladed article, or a repeat offence involving a weapon or bladed article.
The threshold for courts to depart from imposing a minimum sentence is open to them, the question being whether the test is met. This amendment aims to ensure that the change in the threshold will not apply to offenders aged 16 and 17 who are convicted of these two offences. In Clause 101 we seek to ensure that courts depart from the minimum sentence only in exceptional circumstances.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My noble friend clearly is right when he says that this is not a mandatory sentence, but does he accept that the purpose of this clause is to ensure that in the generality of cases, a custodial sentence is imposed?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The purpose of a minimum sentence is that unless the threshold is met—we will debate in another group what that threshold should be—the minimum sentence is imposed. There is nothing between us on how it works; there obviously is on whether it is a good idea. I hope that is fair.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but in sentencing law and in the criminal justice system, minimum sentences are currently referred to as “mandatory minimum sentences”, subject to thresholds and exceptions such as exceptional circumstances. That is a very long tradition. As lawyers we must be fair to lay Members of the Committee as well. It is unfair to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has missed the point. It is very common in the parlance of sentencing law and criminal justice law to refer to minimum sentences as “mandatory minimum sentences”, subject to whatever thresholds and exceptions there are.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
That is exactly what it says in the paperwork we have.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The point I am making is very important and we will get to it in another group. I absolutely accept that people use “mandatory sentence” in a common parlance way, but when we get to a later group, we will discuss what the test should be. I will not delay the Committee now, but the figures for when the minimum sentence is not actually imposed are surprising. People using the phrase “mandatory sentence” would be surprised to hear that in a third and sometimes nearly half of cases, the minimum sentence is not given. If “mandatory” does not apply in a third of cases, I question whether it is the appropriate word. Therefore, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with a minimum sentence with a provision, whether that is “exceptional” or some other test. I certainly do not seek to criticise the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for using the shorthand. I wanted to point out that it is a shorthand which can be misleading when one looks at the facts as to how such sentences are imposed.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
What is the essential difference in my noble friend’s mind between exceptional and particular circumstances? Is not the truth of the matter that he wants the default position to be a custodial sentence, whereas there was greater discretion to the judge when the particular circumstances were what the law was to consider?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
As I say, there is a specific amendment on that point, so I will come to this in more detail then, if I may. The question is about when you depart from the minimum sentence. We are dealing here with the scope of the exception—that might be an unfortunate word, because one of the words we are using to qualify the exception is “exceptional”—and whether the exception is in circumstances which are just in the case, which I think is the gist of one of the amendments in a later group, or exceptional circumstances. I absolutely accept that one has a minimum sentence, which we can call the default, with an exception. It is always for the judge to decide, looking at the offence and the offender, whether the test is met. I will come in a moment to the words “exceptional circumstances” in particular.
What we want to do, to underline the point, is to ensure that courts depart from the minimum sentence only in exceptional circumstances. That reflects the seriousness of the offences and the risks posed to others. We believe that will create greater consistency in the statutory provisions on minimum sentences which apply to other offences. This change does not mean—
Baroness Kingsmill (Lab)
Is the Minister saying therefore that it will be a mandatory sentence unless there are exceptions?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
Unless the exception is met, this is the sentence that will be imposed. I do not want to split hairs with the noble Baroness, but it is not mandatory in that sense. It is a minimum sentence which has to be imposed unless the conditions are met.
Baroness Kingsmill (Lab)
It is awfully important in these kinds of cases that we are very clear and precise in our language. There is a difference between minimum and mandatory. I think what the Minister is actually saying is that this is a mandatory sentence unless there is an exception.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
It is not a mandatory sentence, because you can impose more. Let us be clear: it is a minimum sentence, which has to be imposed unless the exceptions are met. To take it outside this clause, if you have a minimum sentence of two years unless there is an exception, the first question is: is the exception met? If it is not, you have to give at least two years. You do not have to give two years; you could give two and a half years. I am not sure I am saying anything different. Reference has been made to America. In other jurisdictions, when they say mandatory, it can be mandatory without exceptional circumstances or any other provision. I am not sure we are saying anything different. I think we are all clear about what we mean. I would prefer to use the phrase “a minimum sentence”, which is the phrase used in the Bill, unless the exception applies.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am so sorry to elongate this, but it is important. The Minister, sitting in a Government with a massive majority, gets to rewrite the statute book, but he does not get to change terms that are well understood by lawyers and sentencers in this jurisdiction and others. He is proposing a mandatory minimum sentence subject to certain exceptions. The common parlance—perhaps not on the street, but in the profession and on the Bench—is that this is a mandatory minimum sentence. He can argue for it and say that it is good policy, but it is not helpful to the Committee, anyone outside it or anyone reading Hansard for us to suggest that this is something totally different from a mandatory minimum sentence subject to exceptional circumstances.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am really not sure that we are saying anything different. As I said, we will come in a later group to how many offenders do not get the minimum sentence with some sentences. There must come a point at which so many offenders do not get it that using the word “mandatory” to describe it is itself misleading. I suggest we are better off sticking to the terms used in the Bill, which are both accurate and appropriate.
I underline the point that the change we are proposing does not mean that all 16 and 17 year-olds will receive the minimum sentence. The courts will retain the discretion not to apply the minimum where there are exceptional circumstances which relate to either the offender or the offence and which would justify doing so.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
That is out of the ordinary. It is a high threshold.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
I will come in a moment to the word “exceptional” as I think that was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German. I have been a little diverted on the way, but we will get there.
What the courts will therefore do is to continue to take the child’s welfare needs into consideration. I also point out, of course, that the actual minimum sentence for 16 and 17 year-olds, when given, is shorter than that for over-18s when given: four months as opposed to six months. Applying minimum sentences to 16 and 17 year-olds—the older cohort of under-18s—recognises the increased maturity and development of this age group compared with younger children. Any custodial sentence is given as a last resort, but we believe that for older children who commit these particular offences, it should be mandatory for the court to consider carefully whether a custodial sentence is appropriate.
Lord Beith (LD)
I wonder if the Minister could be a little clearer. A moment ago he cited figures for the number of cases under existing law in which, apparently, mandatory sentences are not passed because judges took the circumstances into account. When you couple his description of those figures with the phraseology that he is using now about the merits of the Bill, the impression is very clear that the Government are not happy with the judges citing exceptional circumstances in failing to deliver the kind of sentence that the Bill would impose. Am I right to understand that he is, in fact, critical of the number of exceptions that are made at present and wants fewer of these in future?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am certainly not critical of any particular sentence passed in any particular case. What I do think the figures show is that we need a test that more clearly balances the minimum sentence on the one hand with the exception on the other. We think the test of exceptional circumstances—I know that the noble Lord, Lord German, is waiting patiently—meets that test.
I turn now to Clause 104 and 105, which both relate to children who have committed murder and will therefore receive the mandatory life sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. I hear in this regard the words read to us on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby. When giving a life sentence, the judge sets a minimum amount of time that must be spent in custody before the offender may be considered for release by the Parole Board. This is known colloquially as the tariff. Judges use starting points to determine that tariff. They can set a minimum term higher or lower than the starting point by taking into account aggravating or mitigating factors. Currently, there is a 12-year starting point for all children who commit murder.
In this Bill, we are replacing the fixed 12-year starting point for all children—what might be called the mandatory starting point—with a range of starting points that take into account the child’s age at the time of the offence and the seriousness of the murder. The age groups are to reflect the different stages of development that a child goes through and that, although both in law are children, a 10 year-old is very different from a child of 17 years and 10 months. The different levels of murder, if I can put it that way, are based on the more nuanced system used for adults, which takes the seriousness of a murder into consideration. Therefore, the twin factors of age and the seriousness of the murder are then brought together. The higher the age and the more serious the murder, the higher the starting point, and the converse is also the case.
This amendment retains a range of starting points for children based on three age groups, but it does not distinguish between the levels of seriousness of a murder. Because murder can vary in seriousness in the criminal sense, we believe it is right that the starting points should reflect this as well. We do not agree that starting points should only be based on the age of the child; they should also reflect the seriousness of the murder. Moreover, the amendment does not address the gap in starting points between older children and adults. A child of 17 years and 10 months is very close to becoming an adult. The amendment would mean that the same category of murder would have a 12-year starting point for a 17 year-old, but a 30-year starting point for an 18 year-old. However, I underline the same point that I made about minimum sentences. The judiciary will continue to take the individual circumstances of a case into consideration and can give a minimum term higher or lower than any given starting point.
Let me address the review amendments. Children who are sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure are eligible to apply for a review of their minimum term. In this Bill, we are placing the minimum term review process in legislation. It allows children who are aged under 18 when sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure to apply for a minimum term review at the halfway point. We are restricting eligibility for further reviews to be available only to those who still aged under 18 at the time of the further review. By contrast, this amendment would allow those sentenced as an adult to apply for a review at the halfway point and continue to apply every two years. It would also allow adults who were sentenced as children, who have already had one review, to continue to apply for a review every two years. This amendment is neither necessary nor in line with case law. That is because, under the measures in the Bill, children who are sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s Pleasure will continue to be eligible for a review at the halfway point of their minimum term.
That right has developed through case law. It recognises the unique rights of children and the fact that they develop and mature at a faster rate than adults. The review is an important part of confirming that the minimum term remains appropriate or determining if a reduction should be made. However, they should be eligible for a further review only if they are still a child at the time of that further review. This is because, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby, children have the greatest capacity to demonstrate the significant changes to maturity and outlook that the review considers. Therefore, the opportunity for multiple reviews would be available only to younger children at the initial time of offending, as they are more likely to be under the age of 18 at the time of any further review.
Those who commit murder as a child but are sentenced as an adult have already had their age and maturity taken into consideration. Adults who commit murder are not entitled to reviews and so this Bill ensures that all offenders who are an adult at the time of sentencing are treated equally. It is important to remember that we are talking about the most serious offence, that of murder. The minimum term set by the judge takes into consideration a child’s age and maturity at the time of the offence and reflects the seriousness of the offence. That minimum period should therefore be served, except in exceptional circumstances.
That brings me to the question of the definition of exceptional circumstances, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord German, for his patience. “Exceptional circumstances” is a phrase used all over the law and the criminal law. It is a matter that judges are well used to interpreting. It is a phrase in plain English. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, it does not need, or would benefit from, a gloss from the Dispatch Box. The phrase means what it says on the tin. It is for the individual judge in the individual case, having heard the evidence, to decide whether the exception is made out.
Lord German (LD)
Can the noble Lord tell me the difference, then, between the current words, which are “particular circumstances”, and those that the Bill is proposing—“exceptional circumstances”? What is the difference between “particular” and “exceptional” to the fraternity of judges and lawyers who do not need it written down because they all understand it? For those of us who are non-lawyers, some definition would be helpful.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I hear the words, “higher bar”. I do not disagree that “exceptional circumstances” is a stricter test. There is case law on that, although the name of the case has slipped my mind, but I am happy to write to the noble Lord, Lord German. I see that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who may remember, is here. I am sorry to give him exam questions. “Exceptional” is a word that has been passed and interpreted by the courts at a high level. It is proper to leave it to them to decide what “exceptional circumstances” means. However, I will write to the noble Lord with the case law, once my memory comes back to me.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, these amendments seek to ensure that the courts depart from imposing a minimum sentence, to use the words of the amendment, only where it would be
“contrary to the interests of justice”
to do so, “having regard”—and then it refers to the particular requirements in the Bill on the offender and on offending. “Interests of justice” is not defined. I do not complain about that, because the phrase is used elsewhere and the courts know what it means. I do not want to go over old ground.
It is already the case that a court has the discretion not to impose the minimum sentence where there are particular circumstances relating to the offender, the nature of the offence or, in the case of repeat offending, the nature of the previous offence that would make it unjust to do so. I underline the point that whether that exception, however phrased, is met is for the judge to decide, based on the particular facts of the case. It is for Parliament to set the minimum sentence, if it wants to, and to set the “exceptional” provision—whether that is exceptional circumstances or however else it is defined. It is then for the judge to apply what Parliament has said.
As I said on the previous group, concerns have certainly been raised that offenders too often receive sentences below the minimum term. That both fails to provide an appropriate level of punishment that reflects the severity of the offence and undermines any sensible use of the word “mandatory” in this context. Let me give a couple of examples. Among adult offenders in 2020, at least—and I will explain my “at least” in a moment—50% received a sentence below the minimum term for third-strike domestic burglary. I said “at least” because the figures do not indicate whether these cases include early guilty pleas, for which they could get a reduction of up to 20%. Even allowing for that, at least 50% received a sentence below the minimum term. Of adults convicted of repeat possession of a weapon or bladed article, at least 21%—over a fifth—received a sentence below the minimum term.
I heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said and I am not going to beat about the bush, either. I am trying to be clear. There may well be a difference of opinion around the Committee, but at least let us identify it clearly. With this provision, we seek to ensure that courts depart from the minimum sentence only in exceptional circumstances. Those are clear words, and they mean what they say.
We believe that the test of exceptional circumstances is both suitable and important. Not only does it help to address problems that have been escalating in our communities for some years, especially with regard to knife crime, but it will create greater consistency in the statutory provisions on minimum sentences. The change is therefore intended to reduce the circumstances in which the court will depart from the minimum term, ensuring that this important safeguard is used only where the court considers that there are exceptional circumstances, pertaining to the offender or the offence, that would make the minimum sentence unjust.
The changes align the criteria used for these offences with the criteria for passing a sentence below the minimum term in relation to offences involving firearms, where the proviso of exceptional circumstances is already in the law. However, I underline that the judicial discretion for the court to fully consider the facts of the case before it and decide on the appropriate sentence in line with the statutory framework is therefore retained.
I listened carefully, as I know the noble and learned Lord would expect me to, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I think we may stray into almost philosophical areas, albeit very important ones, as to what a sentencer ought to do and perhaps even what we mean by “unjust” and where justice lies.
Parliament sets out the statutory framework. If the Bill is passed, Parliament will say that the minimum sentence is X years and that the proviso is exceptional circumstances. It is then for the judge to apply what Parliament has set out. That is the way our system operates. We can have an interesting debate about whether, if a judge does that, the judge can be doing something that is “unjust”. I fully understand where the noble and learned Lord is coming from, looking at “unjust” in a broader sense, but there is a basic justice in Parliament, which is ultimately where power resides, setting out what the minimum sentence and the exception should be and then leaving it for the judge to apply that exception on the facts of the case.
I heard very clearly the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about whether longer sentences actually help. Again, that takes us into a whole different area. I mean no disrespect by not replying to him at length but we believe the sentences here are appropriate and suitable.
When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, concluded by saying, “Are we not to require our judges to do justice?”, I do not know whether he was intentionally paraphrasing the famous argument of Abraham to the Almighty. When the Almighty is going to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah even though there are some righteous people there, Abraham says to the Almighty, “Will the judge of all the earth not do justice?” I hear very strongly that the ultimate requirement is to do justice, but I emphasise that in our system we start with the parliamentary legislation. That is why we collectively, here and in the other place, bear such a heavy burden. It is for us to set out the statutory framework and then for our judges and courts to apply that framework. That is ultimately the way, I suggest, that justice is done in our system.
I do not want to lecture the Committee any further on jurisprudential matters. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful for the speeches that we have heard in this interesting debate, particularly by those who have the most sentencing experience, the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Thomas. I am also grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his indication of the Labour Party’s support.
While I will withdraw the amendment at this stage, I will return to it on Report. My concern is that the Minister, and I am grateful for the care that he gave to his response, failed to appreciate quite how loyal judges are to the law. Where the law requires a judge to find that exceptional circumstances exist before making a departure from the minimum sentence, he will do so loyally.
The point that both noble and learned Lords made is that it is simply wrong for the law to require judges, where they might have found that the circumstances of an offence or an offender dictate that the just sentence is less than the minimum, to be in the position that they have to say, “I cannot here find that the circumstances are exceptional—that is, completely out of the ordinary—and although I believe that the sentence I am constrained to pass is unjust in the sense that it is the wrong sentence, I nevertheless have to do it.” That is the result of the loyalty judges feel to the law—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned the judicial oath—and is a weakness of this proposed provision, which puts political dogma above the need to do justice. Although I will withdraw my amendment now, I hope that, given the speeches we have heard, in the next few weeks or months, before Report—depending on when that is—we can talk to the Minister, take this matter further, and see if we can get some movement. Saying that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, this is obviously an important set of amendments. I thank all those who spoke on the arguments put forward. We agree across the Committee that sexual violence is a devastating crime that can have lifelong impacts on victims and survivors. The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on Thames, used the word, “scourge”. I do not disagree with that. He was also right to say that a change in culture is part of the solution here but also that these crimes have to be punished with sentences that match the severity of the offence.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the group of amendments encompasses a number of such crimes. Let me take each one in turn. I will start with the Amendment 195, which would require the court to impose a minimum custodial sentence of at least seven years for a rape offence committed under Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 unless, as stated in subsection (2), there are exceptional circumstances that justify not doing so. I respectfully agree with the noble and learned Lord that there is an important point here. He was making, it is fair to say, substantially the same point that I was making to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, about the roles of Parliament and the courts. Just as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has nothing but respect for the courts and judges, so do I. I should also say that my wife is a judge but she does not come anywhere near to sentencing anybody, so perhaps I do not have to make that declaration.
We agree on the principle that there are some cases in which it is right for Parliament to set out a minimum sentence with an exception, and other cases where it is appropriate to have greater judicial discretion. The real question is how we respond to each case, bearing in mind the scope of the sentences available to the sentencing judge.
Against that background, we have to remember that the maximum penalty for rape is life imprisonment. Quite rightly, rape offenders already receive significant sentences. I remind the Committee that in 2020, the average—I underline “average”—custodial sentence given to adult offenders for a Section 1 rape offence, where the victim was 13 or over, was almost 10 years. That represents an increase of almost 15% over the past decade. Also in 2020, over two-thirds of those offenders received a custodial sentence of over seven years.
Also, in certain circumstances, where offenders are convicted of a repeat serious sexual offence, including rape, the law already provides for a minimum sentence of life imprisonment. I should underline that the original offence, when we are talking about the repeat offence category, may not necessarily have been rape but one of a number of serious sexual and violent offences. In addition, in this Bill, and through legislation in the past year, the Government are ensuring that rape offenders sentenced to over four years must spend two-thirds of their sentence in prison, as opposed to being released at the halfway point.
However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, recognised in his Second Reading speech, it is important that we maintain judicial discretion for the court to consider the facts of the case before it and decide on the appropriate sentence. Perhaps I can provide some support on this point —or perhaps the noble Viscount may give me some support. It is important that, given the complex nature of this offence and the wide range of circumstances the court may need to take into account, we maintain that role for judicial discretion. We may both lack the appellation “learned” but I hope that that does not detract from the strength of the point we are making.
Although the sentence lengths for rape have increased, we have a serious problem. We have long recognised that the decline in the number of effective trials for rape and serious sexual offences is a cause for serious concern. I have said that from the Dispatch Box before. Let me take the opportunity to mention briefly some of the wider action we are therefore taking to support rape victims and improve the way rape cases are handled by all criminal justice partners.
We published the End-to-End rape review on 18 June. This sets out our ambitious plans to improve numbers of rape cases being referred by the police, charged by the Crown Prosecution Service and reaching the court. On 21 July, we published the cross-government Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy, to help better target perpetrators and support victims of crimes which disproportionately affect women and girls. As to sentencing, the maximum penalty for rape is life imprisonment, and it is already the case that the courts impose significant sentences. For the reasons that I have set out, we believe it is proper that the courts retain discretion to ensure that they can impose the appropriate sentence based on the facts of the individual case.
Turning now to Amendment 197 on the abduction, sexual assault and murder of a person, I read it as the noble and learned Lord intended, that it is all three. The amendment would expand the circumstances where a whole-life order would be the starting point to include cases of murder involving the abduction and sexual assault of a single person. While this Government obviously greatly sympathise and understand the concerns that underpin this amendment, I respectfully disagree with what is proposed. All those convicted of murder already receive a mandatory life sentence. For murders involving sexual or sadistic conduct, the starting point for the minimum term in prison is 30 years. Judges are able to increase or decrease a minimum term from this starting point according to the circumstances and relevant aggravating or sometimes mitigating factors. In addition, and as was demonstrated by the sentencing of Wayne Couzens for the horrific abduction, assault and murder of Sarah Everard, there is also an existing discretion to impose a whole- life order if the seriousness of the individual case is exceptionally high.
We are committed to ensuring that serious sexual and violent offenders serve sentences that reflect the severity of their crime. However, I believe that our current sentencing framework, a crucial component of which is judicial discretion, responds correctly at present to these horrendous cases. The courts can, and indeed do, impose extremely robust sentences where appropriate that fully reflect the gravity of this offending and the appalling—often lifelong—harm that it causes.
As I am on the topic of whole-life orders, I will go slightly out of turn chronologically to address the notice given by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby that they oppose Clause 103 standing part of the Bill. Clause 103 makes it possible for people aged 18 to 20 to receive a whole-life order where the crime committed is extremely serious. Clause 103 has to be read together with Clause 102, which expands the range of circumstances where a whole-life order must be the starting point to include the premeditated murder of a child. The current position is that whole-life orders can be imposed only on offenders aged 21 and over. This acknowledges the utmost seriousness of this punishment and its overwhelming effect on an offender’s future. We recognise, however, that there may be some rare cases where it may be appropriate to impose a whole-life order on offenders aged 18 to 20. We propose, therefore, to give judges the discretion to impose a whole-life order on an offender aged 18 or over, but under 21, in those cases.
We have set out an important clarification or criterion for when that sentence would be available. Clause 103(2)(b)(3C) makes it clear that the sentence will be warranted for offenders in the 18 to 20 year-old cohort only where the crime was extremely serious even by the standards of the crimes which would normally attract a whole-life order. We anticipate that this discretion would be exercised rarely. The expectation is still very much that offenders aged under 21 would not receive a whole-life order, but the change will allow judges to impose these sentences for these younger offenders, who are of course still adults, where that is necessary.
Let me turn finally to Amendment 196 which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, set out. As was stated in the other place, we are sympathetic to the objective of this amendment. The unlawful naming of people whose identity is protected by law ought to be appropriately punished. It is a crime which can have serious consequences and cause serious upset, concern and more.
However, with respect, our view is that the amendment does not go far enough. It is limited to breaches of Section 5 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. That Act applies where an allegation of a sexual offence is made, and it imposes an automatic prohibition on publishing any material likely to lead to the identification of the complainant. It also covers alleged victims of human trafficking. This amendment would cover those types of victims, but there are many others whose identity is also legally protected, where the existing penalty for breach would be unaffected.
Sometimes the protection is automatic, for example for victims of female genital mutilation and forced marriage, where the breach offence is the same as that in the 1992 Act, or victims, witnesses and defendants under the age of 18 in youth court proceedings, something which I know the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will be familiar with. In addition, reporting restrictions can be imposed at the discretion of a court, for example in relation to underage participants in a Crown Court trial or vulnerable adult witnesses. Since one reason for imposing these discretionary restrictions may be to protect the subject from injury, one should not assume that the discretionary imposition of restrictions is any less serious than the automatic ones.
Contempt of court may overlap with specific breach offences in circumstances where there is a potential impact on the justice process; that would have a two-year maximum. Therefore, we believe there is a strong case for examining this area of law as a whole, rather than amending legislation piecemeal. My right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General has invited the Law Commission to undertake a review of the law of contempt of court, with particular reference to the interface between that and the criminal law, including the specific breach offences under discussion today. If the Law Commission takes on that task, it would provide a sound basis to look at this area properly and provide some real improvements in the protection the law offers to participants in the criminal justice process.
For the reasons I have set out, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment and invite the Committee to allow Clause 103 to stand part of the Bill.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I am obliged to everybody who took part in the debate. There was widespread support around the Committee for the increase in the penalties for the naming of an anonymous complainant. I thought the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, was cruel, because it appeared to support it and then talked about the Law Commission. That is years away, so I think we will come back to this on Report. If the Minister would be willing to help me, we could expand the range if he thinks that is appropriate.
In relation to the question of a minimum sentence for rape, as far as the Government are concerned, there is already a minimum sentence of seven years for third Class A drug trafficking offences, a minimum of three years for third domestic burglary and a minimum sentence for offences of threatening with weapons or bladed articles. I am broadly in agreement with the proposition that minimum sentences should be exceptional, but if they are to apply to any case, rape must be the appropriate case.
Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]
My Lords, I am pleased to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on Amendments 196A to 196D, and I thank him for so ably and eloquently presenting the importance of these changes. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, has been unexpectedly called away, but, as your Lordships’ House knows, she was the Victims’ Commissioner, and, through her work with victims, she has asked me to say that she is extremely supportive of this group.
I think that most people are aware of the fundamental right in our justice system to appeal a sentence handed down by a judge. Following a sentence hearing, a convicted offender will meet with their lawyer to discuss what comes next and what their rights are with regard to an appeal. This is a fundamental and correct part of our process, and we should hold it in high regard. But what many are not aware of—and this leads me to the necessity of these amendments—is the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which provides the right for anyone to appeal a sentence. This right is of particular importance to the victims of crime and bereaved family members, and the scheme is recognised as a key entitlement in the victims’ code of practice. Operated by the Attorney General’s Office, it provides this fundamental right, which is an important process for victims and bereaved families and can bring comfort and increased confidence in the justice system.
However, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, these rights are not equal in policy or practice, and many victims find themselves learning of their rights by chance, too late or not at all, all of which can have a devastating impact on a victim’s recovery. The scheme, like an offender’s right of appeal, has a time limit of 28 days. This limit provides some assurance for those involved, which we think is important. However, this is where the parity between victim and offender ends, and the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, would rectify the problem. While offenders are told of their right to appeal almost immediately following the sentencing, we know that many victims are never informed of their rights at all.
I will briefly tell you about someone who has been denied her rights under this scheme. Claire, a loving mother to a young daughter, was stabbed repeatedly and had her throat slashed by her ex-partner. Thankfully, Claire survived this most horrific of attacks, which was carried out in the presence of her daughter. The offender in the case was arrested and charged, and plead guilty to attempted murder earlier this year. He was handed a life sentence but with a minimum term of just eight years. No justice agency told her of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, and it was only while speaking to Tracey Hanson, whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred to, that she became aware of it. She spoke to the police about it, and they incorrectly told her that she could not appeal due to the offender having received a life sentence.
The problem is the lack of clarity about this scheme, and the lack of responsibility for telling a victim meant that Claire was unable to request that the sentence be appealed within the 28 days. And so the man who slashed her throat her in front of her young daughter may be released in as little as eight years. We must stop failing victims who bravely come forward to bring offenders to justice and whom we repay with this appalling treatment and injustice.
The revised victims’ code of practice, which came into force in April and codifies the rights and entitlements of victims of crime, assigns this responsibility for informing victims to witness care units. While this is useful and important, it fails to realise that many victims and bereaved family members will have no contact at all with witness care units, leaving many still unaware of their rights. So we must ensure that victims and bereaved families are informed in good time after sentencing, because it is absolutely vital that they are able to use their right to appeal if they so want.
These amendments also seek that the Secretary of State conduct a review of eligibility under the scheme, opening up the possibility of including further serious offences, with the aim of delivering this vital right to more people. Gareth Johnson, MP for Dartford, speaking in the other place, talked passionately of the experience of his constituents: the family of Gemma Robinson, who was brutally beaten by her partner, who was the subject of a restraining order following a previous assault against her. Following this, her partner was arrested and charged with Section 18—grievous bodily harm—an offence recognised under this scheme. Tragically, Ms Robinson took her own life prior to his appearance in court and the charge was reduced to Section 20, malicious wounding. This offence, as it stands, is ineligible for the unduly lenient sentence scheme, so Ms Robinson’s family could do nothing as a sentence of just 3.5 years was handed down.
I thank the London victims’ commissioner, Claire Waxman, and her office for their tireless work in pushing for reform to the unduly lenient sentence scheme. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for tabling these amendments and making the possibility of reform a reality. I urge the Minister to support this amendment, not just for those whom the system has failed but for those whom it can stand to benefit in future—those victims and families who feel that in their case justice was not done.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, the amendments all refer to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, which is set out in Sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It allows anyone to ask for certain sentences imposed by the Crown Court to be considered by the law officers where the sentence is felt to be unduly lenient. The law officers—it is ultimately their decision, for reasons I will come back to—may then decide to refer the case to the Court of Appeal. Once it gets there, it is a matter for the Court of Appeal to decide whether the sentence should be increased.
I should underline that it is not a right available to anyone to ask the court to reconsider the sentence. The way the system works is that the request is made to the law officers; their role is to ask the court to increase the sentence. That was set out deliberately and rightly in the scheme. We prosecute in this country in the name of the Crown; we do not have, with very few exceptions, private criminal prosecutions. The instances of the scheme going wrong or people not knowing about it, as we have just heard in the cases of Tracey Hanson and the appalling murder of her son Josh, and the terrible attack on Claire in front of her young daughter, are terrible to hear about. One can only imagine the consequences for those families.
I therefore understand the motivation behind Amendment 196A. It is critical that victims, prosecuting authorities and members of the public are aware of the ULS scheme. I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, talk about a lack of clarity. She quite rightly referred to the revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, or the victims’ code—I am grateful to her for doing so—which came into force on 1 April this year. It provides victims with the right to be informed about the existence of the scheme and includes, as we heard, a requirement for the witness care unit to inform victims about the scheme promptly when sentencing takes place. In addition, the Crown Prosecution Service references the scheme in its leaflet entitled Information for Victims. There is provision in place to ensure that victims and their families are informed of the scheme.
It is not the case that it is left to victims or bereaved families to contact the law officers. The Crown Prosecution Service can and does make requests directly to the Attorney-General for cases to be referred to the Court of Appeal in instances where the prosecuting authority considers the sentence to be unduly lenient. Those requests are considered by my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General in the way that she considers all such requests. While I understand the motivation behind Amendment 196A, I suggest that it is not required.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This provides that the longer period before release for sentences within new section 244ZA(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will apply only in relation to offences that were punishable with life imprisonment at the time of sentencing (not offences that are later made so punishable).
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, this is a drafting amendment to Clause 107. Its purpose, as I hope has been explained, is to prevent a prisoner who is serving a sentence for an offence which, at the time it was imposed, did not carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, having their release date changed retrospectively from the half-way to the two-thirds point.
Such an offender should not be made subject to the two-thirds release provisions of Clause 107 should the maximum penalty for their offence be increased to life at a later date, after they were sentenced. Let me give an example that I hope the Committee will find helpful. An offender is sentenced for an offence that currently carries a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. They receive an eight-year determinate sentence. That sentence is not caught by the two-thirds release requirements because the offence does not carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, so the offender is given a half-way release point. Now let us assume that, three years later, the Government increase the maximum penalty for that offence to life imprisonment. Without this amendment, the offender would have their release point retrospectively amended from the half-way to the two-thirds point of the sentence.
That was not the intention of Clause 107, and it is important that we correct this now. With this amendment, Clause 107 is future-proofed appropriately and as intended. It applies to those sentenced for offences that are increased to a life maximum in the future, but applies only to those sentenced after that increase in the maximum sentence becomes law. The amendment will ensure a fair and consistent approach to such offences. For those reasons, I beg to move this amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we support these amendments. It is obviously right to remove the retrospection and we congratulate whoever spotted the anomaly and brought the amendments to the Committee.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
Member’s explanatory statement
This provides that the longer period before release for sentences within new section 244ZA(5) and (6) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will apply only in relation to sexual offences that were punishable with life imprisonment at the time of sentencing (not offences that are later made so punishable).
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, this is a very interesting proposal. I think we all agree, across the House, that where somebody is entitled to automatic release at half or two-thirds of their sentence, if there is proper material from which the conclusion can be reached that the defendant poses a significant danger to the public, then the automatic release date should not apply, and presumably the defendant should then be kept in prison until the end of the nominal sentence. As the Bill is currently drafted—putting it shortly—if there are reasonable grounds for the Secretary of State to believe that the defendant might pose such a risk, the Secretary of State can refer it to the Parole Board to decide.
What the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, wants is that, if the Secretary of State forms that view, he or she should refer the decision to the High Court. The High Court would then make a determination on the substance of the issue: whether the prisoner constitutes a danger. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, called it a drafting point, but as I understand the drafting here, if the High Court forms the view that the prisoner does constitute such a danger, the High Court does not determine whether or not the prisoner is released but refers the matter to the Parole Board. In his opening speech on the amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said he believes that the operative decision should be made by the Parole Board, not the High Court.
Necessarily, that ends up with a situation where what the High Court is deciding, one way or another, is whether there are proper grounds for the Secretary of State’s belief that the prisoner may pose a risk. It would be necessary to amend the amendment to say that, because otherwise the operative decision is plainly being taken by the High Court, not the Parole Board—and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, wants the decision to be taken by the Parole Board, which I understand. Once you get to that point—namely. whether there are proper grounds for the Secretary of State’s belief—then it is judicial review, so I am not sure what is added by this proposal.
I do not wish to give away any secrets, but I am sure there are Secretaries of State who, under press or political pressure, would refer such a decision to a body with the power to determine whether or not somebody should be released at the automatic release date. Whether the reference is to the Parole Board or to the High Court, honestly, Secretaries of State will still be guided by political considerations. As far as the Secretary of State is concerned in the notional example given, if they want to make a political point they will refer it to whoever the statute says they should, irrespective of their precise state of knowledge, for political reasons. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, are saying that they will be pushed into it by politics. Well, under his amendment, they will be pushed into referring it to the High Court, and under the Minister’s position they will be pushed into referring it to the Parole Board, which is where the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, wants it to end up anyway.
I am not sure that this amendment achieves much, as it pushes you back into judicial review, which is where we are already. I am sympathetic to the position adopted, but—I put this advisedly—if the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, was willing to put his money where his mouth is, surely the end point should be that the High Court decides. That would provide a much more effective safeguard. This does not quite get there.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, we have had a very interesting debate. The last few speeches have highlighted the problems with the approach that I was going to set out. In short, where we end up on this amendment is, in effect, the High Court taking the decision and not the Parole Board. I shall come back to the “would” point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, which I was going to make as well and is absolutely right.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State first to refer high-risk offenders to the High Court. They could then be referred to the Parole Board only with the court’s approval. That is the structure that we are dealing with. The structure in our clause is that the Secretary of State refers directly to the Parole Board. If referral to the High Court is put in as an intermediate process, it would mean two things. First, the High Court may reject the referral from the Secretary of State if it did not agree that the offender would pose a risk of serious harm. My concern is secondly that, if the High Court did consider that the offender would pose a risk of serious harm, it would roll the pitch in a very serious way for the Parole Board.
I therefore have concerns about both the necessity and the benefit of involving the High Court in this process, but nothing I am going to say is intended to undermine two points on which I agree with the noble Lord, Lord German; first, on the importance of due process and, secondly, that we should limit arbitrary power. I suggest that the court does set out due process and limits arbitrary power.
The important point to bear in mind is that the new power is not a re-sentencing exercise. It is not the Secretary of State extending the detention of the prisoner. I fully accept the point made by the noble Lord as to the important boundary between Secretary of State and judge, between Executive and judiciary. I also want to have a strong and independent judiciary; I believe we do. That principle is not contravened by this clause, because it is the independent Parole Board that will make the final decision as to whether an offender is safe to be released early. The Secretary of State has the power to make a referral, but he or she must have a sound basis for doing so and must give the prisoner notice, which must include the grounds for making the referral and give the prisoner the opportunity to make representations to the Secretary of State.
As for the criteria in play, we will closely monitor and record how the power is used. We will publish a policy which clearly outlines the threshold that must be met and the principles which will underpin the Secretary of State’s decision-making procedure in determining whether to refer a case to the Parole Board.
Lord German (LD)
That was a good statement of intent. When do the Government expect to be able to produce that? Would it be before we have concluded this Bill, so we will know where we are going with it?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I do not want to give an incorrect answer to the noble Lord. I know that there are different codes of practice and different sets of procedures in various parts of the Bill. Can I get back to him in writing on that point, so that the Committee knows where it is before Report?
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
On a related point—the obligation on the Secretary of State to give reasons—how detailed should those reasons be? Will there be some published code which ensures that the Secretary of State complies?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I have said that we will publish the principles which underpin the Secretary of State’s decision. The other point that I make in this regard, which goes to the adequacy of reasons point—it was touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, with his experience—is that judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision would be available. My noble friend will be aware from the case law as to the relevance of reasons in a case where the decision can be challenged by way of judicial review.
In light of what I have said, I hope that the Committee will appreciate that this mechanism, which we expect to be used only in rare instances, will prevent the automatic release of offenders whose risk becomes apparent only after they have been sentenced.
Let me make one point. I apprehended at certain points in the discussion that there was perhaps a misapprehension, which I should clear up: that one could detain the prisoner beyond the end of the sentence as handed down by the court. We are not talking about that. To be clear, we are talking about the period between the automatic release point and the end of the sentence.