Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

I think I was quoting from the Equality Act, but if I was not—the noble Lord here says I was right, so if one looks at the Equality Act and the protected characteristics, that is one of them. If I am wrong, I apologise in advance.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine, is no longer in her place. Gender is not a protected characteristic under the equality legislation. Gender reassignment is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The following characteristics are protected under the Equality Act: age—something else that we do not need to worry about; gender reassignment; and sex. There are others, but those are the three. Sex being a protected characteristic means that you are entitled not to be discriminated against on the ground of your sex, whether you are a man or a woman. That means that if you are a transgender woman, you will be entitled to be protected on the grounds of sex because you are a woman, and on the grounds of gender reassignment. So, the noble Lord says that gender is not a protected characteristic under the Equality Act, but a person is entitled, as one would expect, not to be discriminated against because of their sex.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for his lesson in equalities law. My Amendment 219A was degrouped from Amendment 219 late last week. While it is drafted more broadly than Amendment 219, I tabled it to address the very same issues covered by Amendment 219. I therefore believe that, for the convenience of the Committee, I should speak to my Amendment 219A now. I hope that the other noble Lords who have added their names—the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Grey-Thompson, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath—will do so as well. On that basis, I will not move Amendment 219A in the next group. I hope that, given all the amendments left still to be debated, the Committee will welcome this.

My Amendment 219A, like Amendment 219, does have cross-party support, so the issues raised by both amendments are not party-political in any sense. Indeed, I find myself in the unusual position of being on the same side of the argument as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford; neither she nor I ever thought that we would be in that position. I have two main problems with Amendment 219, the first of which is directly addressed by my Amendment 219A. Amendment 219 pre-empts the work of the Law Commission, which, as we have heard, has been working on hate crime for some time now. Its consultation document runs to over 500 pages, with over 50 dedicated to sex or gender.

The Law Commission has received many thousands of consultation responses and is now working on its final position. I believe that its work should conclude before we legislate in this area, and my Amendment 219A gives the Government a regulation-making power to amend Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations. That gives the Government, if they agree with and accept the recommendations, the fastest possible implementation route. The Law Commission’s final recommendations may well be controversial and therefore would not qualify for the special procedures for Law Commission Bills that we use in your Lordships’ House, if primary legislation were the route taken. Amendment 219A therefore uses the draft affirmative procedure to enable some additional parliamentary scrutiny.

I believe that it would be wrong for Parliament to anticipate the final views of the Law Commission. There are different views on both the principle and the substance of the extensions to the hate crime laws, and noble Lords would be wise to wait for the Law Commission’s final recommendations, rather than proceed on the basis of its provisional views.

On the extension of hate crimes to sex, the Law Commission was clear that it believed that two of its criteria for amending the hate crime legislation—demonstrable need and additional harm—were met, but it was far less clear that its third criterion of suitability was met. To mitigate that, its consultation includes some very significant potential carve-outs, covering, for example, domestic abuse and sexual offences so that, if hate crime were extended to sex, the very crimes that I know some noble Lords are particularly concerned about might not be included in the Law Commissioner’s final recommendations. This is not an area where there is a settled view about what should be done.

My second problem with Amendment 219 is a substantive one about whether, if hate crime laws are extended to sex, they should be—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness know when the Law Commission might produce its final report and what the timetable thereafter would be—for example, how long there would then be before the Minister has to respond and how long thereafter before there would be some provision in relation to it?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I think that was a trick question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

It is not a trick question; I would have thought that that piece of information might be quite important to evaluating her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I will tell the noble and learned Lord what I know, which is that the Law Commission said that it hopes for a final report by the end of this year. It is then normal to give a period of time for the Government to consider their response and then there is a period after that for deciding on a legislative route.

My amendment offers a fast way through. If the Law Commission makes certain recommendations and the Government decide to accept them, my amendment gives the Government the power by regulations to amend Section 66 of the Act to achieve those recommendations. That is the best I can offer. I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, can give me a long lecture on all those Law Commission studies that have never ended up in law and the length of time taken. But this is another good reason why we should not, I think, proceed in haste on this.

I was about to move on to the second reservation I have with Amendment 219, which is whether, if hate crimes were extended to sex, they should also include gender. Amendment 219 includes the formulation “sex or gender” and that was, indeed, the Law Commission’s provisional view. However, its conclusion was rather more tentative than some of the other conclusions in the consultation document, and I think this is an area where its final views will be particularly important. In its very large consultation document on hate crime, it did not spend very much time on whether gender should be included as an addition to sex, and I suspect there will be a fuller examination on the basis of the responses to its consultation.

Sex is a concept that is easily defined: it is binary, based on biological reality and recorded on everyone’s birth certificate. Sex, as we have been debating, is a protected characteristic in equality legislation. Gender, on the other hand, is a social construct. It has no ready legal definition and is most definitely not a protected characteristic. While gender is sometimes used in legislation, it has in the past genuinely been as a synonym for sex. However, I believe that it is increasingly problematic for the word “gender” to be used in that way because it is being used by those who claim that gender is different from—and sometimes more important than—sex, and it is not binary. Some describe gender as a spectrum, some say that there is a finite number of genders, but there is no consensus on how many genders there are, with claims in excess of 100 genders.

I can illustrate how difficult the use of “gender” is becoming from something I discovered called nominalgender. Nominalgender means,

“a gender where the person’s gender is so much just them that no one else can even experience it. Most nominalgender people will define their gender as a mashup between other genders of a certain kind (like beegender, angelgender, etc) but it’s not a multiple gender, it is one”.

Who knew, my Lords? This new lexicon of gender is part of a gender identity theory. It is a controversial issue and has not hitherto found its way into legislation for very good reason. I believe that legislating for hostility towards gender would make for very uncertain law. The use of the word “gender” has moved well beyond an attempt to achieve drafting neutrality and has started to acquire a very different meaning.

There was discussion earlier about where transgender fits in. I do not believe adding “or gender” is necessary to meet any needs of those in the transgender community. Hostility related to transgender is already included in hate crime legislation. If the term “sex” was added to Section 66, hostility towards, say, a transgender woman would be automatically covered, either because she is transgender or because she is presumed to be of female sex. Therefore, there is no need for the ambiguity of “gender” to be introduced into the definition of the hate crime because there were no people excluded from that.

I have deliberately not addressed the substance of Amendment 219, which is whether misogyny should be added to the list. I am personally not convinced that the case has been made, but I did not table Amendment 219A to oppose the extension of hate crime to sex. Indeed, my amendment would allow a fast-tracked route to legislating for it if that were the outcome of the recommendation from the Law Commission. I believe that Parliament would be negligent if it rushed through a solution without waiting for the Law Commission to report on this difficult subject. I know that many noble Lords feel strongly about misogyny, as I do as a woman, but I entreat noble Lords not to legislate in haste.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Could I ask the noble Baroness a question on her remarks? She said that sex was binary, male and female, as recorded on birth certificates. How does she account for people who have a gender recognition certificate, who are able to change the sex on their birth certificate in those circumstances?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, that is dealt with by the Gender Recognition Act. In that case, the birth certificate is altered and for many purposes, though not for all, that person is treated as a woman.

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 219 and to reinforce all the powerful arguments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. I am not a lawyer, but it seems bizarre that sex and gender have explicitly not been recognised in existing hate crime legislation. Crimes motivated by hostility to disability, transgender identity, race, religion and sexual orientation are all recognised, but not those motivated by sex and gender. Yet, in a report published in January this year by UN Women UK, 71% of the 1,000 women polled had experienced sexual harassment in a public place, rising to a staggering 97% of women under the age of 25.

This is made worse by the sad fact that there is widespread scepticism among women and girls about reporting violence and abuse to the police because they have no confidence that their claims will be acted on or even taken seriously. Violence against women and girls does not occur in a vacuum, of course. Hostility towards women and girls creates a culture in which violence and abuse is tolerated and repeated. That culture has to be changed, so a reform to legislation, which this amendment proposes and which I hope the Government will support, must be accompanied by a transformation of attitudes within the police.

I believe that there are encouraging signs that this is happening, albeit slowly. I was fortunate to attend the briefing that has been mentioned on this amendment given by the former chief superintendent of police for Nottinghamshire, Sue Fish—a pioneer of this approach —and Stuart Henderson, North Yorkshire Police’s hate crime co-ordinator, who is currently delivering this policy. It was absolutely fascinating to learn how much of a difference can be made when the leadership of the force is committed to driving a policy forward. A number of other forces are doing the same, and I commend this approach to the Metropolitan police force as it struggles to respond to the tsunami of criticism on gender-based hate crimes.

Because not all police forces have signed up, there is no consistency of reporting or approach to these crimes. That is why the amendment is necessary: to ensure that every woman and girl right across the country can feel confident that the role of misogyny in what they experience on a daily basis will at last be taken seriously and dealt with appropriately. It is also necessary because it would require police forces to record instances of motivation by hostility to the victim’s sex or gender, enabling them to monitor much more effectively the incidence of these crimes and so address and prevent them. Evaluation of this approach in Nottinghamshire showed improved victim confidence to come forward and report crimes, and benefits to the local police in their efforts to combat these crimes. It is a great tribute to Sue Fish that she persisted in pursuing the need for this change, and to Nottinghamshire Police for embracing it as pioneers.

Finally, I am aware that the Government have asked the Law Commission to look at this, and it is due to report imminently. I hope the Government will not use that as an excuse to kick this into the long grass; even if the Law Commission reports soon, too many of its reports are ignored by the Government and not implemented. In replying today, I hope the Minister will acknowledge the urgency of this issue and commit to concrete measures, as set out in the amendment, to address it speedily.