Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

109B: After Clause 55, insert the following new Clause—
“Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidents
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a code of practice about the processing by a relevant person of personal data relating to a hate incident.(2) In this section “hate incident” means an incident or alleged incident which involves or is alleged to involve an act by a person (“the alleged perpetrator”) which is perceived by a person other than the alleged perpetrator to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards persons with a particular characteristic.(3) The provision that may be made by a code of practice under this section includes, in particular, provision about—(a) whether and how personal data relating to a hate incident should be recorded;(b) the persons who are to process such personal data;(c) the circumstances in which a data subject should be notified of the processing of such personal data;(d) the retention of such personal data, including the period for which it should be retained and the circumstances in which and the procedures by which that period might be changed;(e) the consideration by a relevant person of requests by the data subject relating to such personal data.(4) But a code of practice under this section must not make provision about—(a) the processing of personal data for the purposes of a criminal investigation, or (b) the processing of personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident at any time after they have been charged with an offence relating to the hate incident.(5) A code of practice under this section may make different provision for different purposes.(6) A relevant person must have regard to the code of practice that is for the time being in force under this section in processing personal data relating to a hate incident.(7) In this section—“data subject” has the meaning given by section 3(5) of the Data Protection Act 2018;“personal data” has the meaning given by section 3(2) of that Act;“processing” has the meaning given by section 3(4) of that Act.(8) In this section “relevant person” means—(a) a member of a police force in England and Wales,(b) a special constable appointed under section 27 of the Police Act 1996,(c) a member of staff appointed by the chief officer of police of a police force in England and Wales,(d) a person designated as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002,(e) an employee of the Common Council of the City of London who is under the direction and control of a chief officer of police,(f) a constable of the British Transport Police Force,(g) a special constable of the British Transport Police Force appointed under section 25 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003,(h) an employee of the British Transport Police Authority appointed under section 27 of that Act,(i) a person designated as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002 as applied by section 28 of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, or(j) a National Crime Agency officer.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment confers power on the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice about the processing by the police of personal data relating to a hate incident other than for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 109B standing in my name is on the topic of non-crime hate incidents. In my opening remarks, I will also speak to the related government Amendment 109F. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for tabling amendments in Committee that related to ensuring that guidance on the recording of non-crime hate incidents, and the retention of personal data in relation to these incidents, was subject to parliamentary oversight.

The Government understand the strength of feeling of many noble Lords on this matter, and I am grateful to all who expressed their views during the debate on this topic on 1 November. Having listened to the compelling arguments, we have tabled Amendments 109B and 109F, which draw strongly from my noble friend’s amendment in Committee. I am very confident that the government amendments reflect the spirit of his proposals in his original amendment and address the House’s concerns in relation to this matter.

I reiterate that the collection of non-crime hate incident data is a key legacy of the Macpherson inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and is intended to give the police the means to understand tensions within communities before they escalate into serious harm. This data pertains to incidents which are not crimes. It can include location data, to know where repeat incidents of apparent tension and hostility may occur. In this respect, the data is vital for helping the police to build intelligence to understand where they must target resources to prevent serious crimes which may later occur.

The importance of such intelligence has been illustrated where it could have prevented real harm. The tragic case of Fiona Pilkington and her daughter, subjected to persistent abuse and in which the police failed to draw the links to repeated incidents of harassment until she felt forced to take her own life and the life of her daughter, is one such example. Of course, non-crime hate incidents may also include the collection of personal data. Some of these records will include an accusation of hate crime which has been made against a person but was not proven.

To address concerns relating to the collection of this data, the government amendments will ensure that the police’s processing of personal data in non-crime hate incident records is subject to a code of practice issued by the Home Secretary. The code will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, with its first iteration being subject to the affirmative procedure, with the negative procedure applying thereafter.

The College of Policing is currently responsible for producing non-statutory hate crime operational guidance for the police to follow when processing data on hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents. The statutory code of practice, once in effect, will replace the relevant section of this guidance on non-crime hate incidents. The college’s guidance will remain in place until the new code enters into effect.

The code will apply only to incidents which the police have designated to be non-crime hate incidents. Where the police are carrying out investigations with a view to there being a prosecution, or where they assess that a prosecution is likely, the code will not apply. It is vital to ensure that the code will not inhibit the police’s abilities to gather evidence that is fundamental to the role of policing. My noble friend’s original amendment included a similar exception. The code will also not apply to data which contains no personal data at all; for instance, location data would not be in scope.

Amendment 109B provides the Secretary of State with the power to issue the code and prescribes some of the key provisions that will be addressed in it. The amendment provides that the code may cover whether personal data relating to a hate incident should be recorded; the persons who are to process such personal data; the circumstances in which a data subject should be notified of the processing of such personal data; the retention of such personal data, including the period for which it should be retained; the circumstances in which, and the procedures by which, that period might be changed; and the consideration by a relevant person of requests by the data subject relating to such personal data. This is not an exhaustive list and it might be expanded or amended during the formulation of the code of practice or in the future.

The precise content of the code of practice will be decided at a later stage. The Government will work closely with policing partners, including the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council, when drafting the code to ensure that it meets operational requirements. Decisions relating to existing non-crime hate incident data will also be decided in due course as the process of drafting the new code begins.

We will also ensure that the content of the code fully reflects the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Harry Miller v College of Policing case that was handed down on 20 December. The court found that the recording of NCHIs is lawful provided there are robust safeguards in place so that the interference with freedom of expression is proportionate. This is a very important point. The court did not consider that the recording of NCHI data was of itself unlawful; rather, it concluded that extra safeguards were necessary to ensure the protection of rights. The approach that the Government are adopting is absolutely in line with that. I can assure the House that this judgment will be reflected in the code.

As I said at the beginning, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for bringing this important issue to the Government’s attention. I hope that he will see that the Government have taken these issues very seriously. The government amendments will address a significant number of the concerns raised by bringing parliamentary oversight to this process and enabling the production of a code of practice that will respect the operational importance of the police recording non-crime hate incidents to help keep vulnerable people and communities safe, while balancing this with the need to protect freedom of expression.

My noble friends Lord Moylan and Lord Blencathra have various amendments in this group, including to government Amendment 109B. It would be helpful to hear from them and other noble Lords before I respond. For now, I beg to move.

Amendment 109C

Moved by

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[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Without having myself looked at the wording of the amendment, the original wording, which I think is preserved in the current amendment, would have excluded disclosure in relation to individuals but not in relation to groups. In the context of the original amendment, therefore, I think that point would have been covered. The noble Lord makes a very good point, and if I were pressing the amendment or the Government were intending to take it forward in any way, of course it would need to be reviewed to ensure that his point was properly addressed.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends for setting out their amendments. I shall respond to them in turn. Amendment 109C seeks to impose a duty on the Home Secretary to issue a code of practice, while our amendment provides her with the power to do so. My noble friend Lord Moylan has pressed me on this issue. I assure the House that we certainly will issue such a code of practice; indeed, Home Office officials will shortly begin the process of drafting the aforementioned code. The permissible language in Amendment 109C is a common drafting approach but, as I have said, it is our firm intention to prepare and issue a code relating to non-crime hate incidents. As I said earlier, I can assure the House that decisions relating to existing non-crime hate incident data will also be made in due course as the process of drafting the new code begins.

My noble friend asked me if the College of Policing would pause the recording of NCHIs, as they are called, while the guidance was being formulated. The current non-statutory guidance on NCHIs will remain in place until the new code of practice enters into effect.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about the timing of the amendment and when it would come into force. The reason why we have not issued a timescale is that the code will require careful drafting to ensure that it both meets the needs of the police and protects the public. Furthermore, as noble Lords will know, the Court of Appeal has only recently handed down its judgment in the Miller case and the code will have to account for that ruling. We do not wish to impose unduly restrictive timeframes on the process of drafting and publishing a code that will fully align with these objectives.

My noble friend has suggested, previously and again today, that a unit of some description could be set up to provide advice to police forces on whether specific incidents should be investigated by the police force as non-crime hate incidents. That suggestion requires further consideration, and I will try to give it my full consideration in due course.

My noble friend Lord Blencathra raised concerns that the amendments provide that the first iteration of the code is subject to the affirmative procedure, with the negative procedure applying thereafter. This point has been raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which he chairs so ably; I am sorry that he will be stepping down. We take the committee’s views very seriously. I will set out why we have adopted this approach.

As I have already indicated, in framing the code, we need to ensure that we have given effect to the ruling by the Court of Appeal in the Miller case. By ensuring that the first iteration is subject to the affirmative procedure, we are enabling both Houses expressly to approve the code, thus ensuring that this House can confirm that it is content that the code reflects that judgment.

It is appropriate that further iterations of the code are then subject to the negative procedure. We do not think there will be any further major rulings on the topic of non-crime hate incidents. Any further changes will thus simply reflect the routine need periodically to review such guidance. It would be disproportionate to require the affirmative procedure for every dot and comma change in further future iterations; indeed, the fundamental premise of the code will already have been expressly agreed by Parliament. We therefore do not believe that the affirmative procedure for future iterations would be an effective or necessary use of parliamentary time. I also confirm to my noble friend that we will respond to the DPRRC shortly.

Amendment 109E seeks to incorporate a specific reference to the importance of the right to freedom of expression within the list of matters that may be addressed in the code. When discharging her functions, including preparing this new code of practice, the Home Secretary must already act in compatibility with convention rights; a number of noble Lords rightly asked about this. That includes Article 10, which ensures a right to freedom of expression. It is therefore not necessary to include a reference to the importance of the right to freedom of expression, because this is already a given under the Human Rights Act. None the less, I assure noble Lords that the code will address issues around freedom of expression. Indeed, in my opening remarks, I noted that we will ensure that the content of the code fully reflects the recent Court of Appeal judgment in the Miller case.

Finally, Amendment 114E would prohibit the disclosure of non-crime hate incident personal data on an enhanced criminal record certificate. I cannot support such a blanket prohibition. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, illustrated one of the reasons why. First, non-crime hate incidents are simply one form of police intelligence that sit alongside many others—missing persons data, evidence of anti-social behaviour, unproven allegations of sexual assault and perhaps domestic abuse. They exist in line with the police’s common-law powers to prevent crime and keep the Queen’s peace. There are rightfully circumstances in which police non-conviction information of various kinds will be considered for disclosure in enhanced checks which are used in relation to roles involving close working with vulnerable adults or children. Maintaining this regime is essential for safeguarding purposes.

Secondly, the rules surrounding disclosure of this type of data are already governed by the statutory disclosure guidance produced by the Home Office. The third edition of this guidance came into force on 16 November last year. Non-crime hate incident intelligence is not an exceptional form of police intelligence; it is simply a type of non-crime incident data collected by the police to prevent crime. That is why it is covered in the same statutory guidance. The statutory disclosure guidance has been tested by the courts and assists chief officers of police in making fair, proportionate and consistent decisions in determining when local police information should be included in enhanced criminal record certificates. Singling out this category of police data for non-disclosure would be inconsistent with the principles set out in the statutory guidance and, as such, unnecessary and disproportionate.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, since the guidance was published before the Court of Appeal decision, the guidance on disclosure should at least be reviewed in the light of the court decision and the reference to “chilling effect”, to ensure that it is fully compatible? Since that was so much part of the debate in the Court of Appeal—not simply recording but also disclosure—would it not make sense to review it?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My noble friend has jumped the gun on what I was going to say. We are confident that the statutory disclosure guidance, the latest version of which was published on 16 November, sets out clearly the criteria and principles which chief officers must have regard to in making decisions to disclose non-conviction information.

The safeguards in the statutory disclosure guidance are very robust. Should a chief officer consider that information ought to be disclosed in line with the guidance, the applicant is invited to make representations. Should the decision to disclose be confirmed following any representations given, that information will be included on the certificate that is sent to the applicant only. Importantly, the applicant also has a right to appeal that disclosure through the independent monitor, who considers cases where an individual believes that the information disclosed within an enhanced criminal records certificate is either not relevant to the workforce they are applying for or that it ought not to be disclosed.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

A question was asked earlier about what will happen to people who already have their information—what can we do about that? It is important that drafting takes time; in Committee I spoke about the problem of the drafting of these guidelines and said I wanted good drafting. But I was a bit concerned, as the Minister said that free speech is already protected by the Human Rights Act, but that does not console me because free speech is under attack. We have heard of many instances of where non-crime hate incidents are being used to chill free speech and this—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I did not understand that, and I apologise. The guidelines are reputation destroying and they need to be reviewed.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

On Report, questions and interventions are generally for points of elucidation and the Back-Bencher will have spoken before the Minister. That aside, in terms of what happens to historic cases, I think that will be determined upon the updating of the guidance. I will write to noble Lords as I think it is an important point as there may be many examples of it. I will write to the noble Baroness and put a copy in the Library because it is an important point of clarification.

Getting back to what I was saying about the safeguards, it is important that they balance the rights of job applicants with those of the vulnerable people they might have contact with. This goes back again to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Alongside the existence of this strict statutory disclosure guidance, I can reassure noble Lords further. As I mentioned in the previous debate, DBS records suggest that, in any event, it is rare for non-crime police information of any sort to appear on an enhanced criminal records certificate supplied to a potential employer. This type of information featured in only 0.1% of the 3.9 million enhanced checks issued by the DBS between April 2019 and March 2020.

My noble friend has also, helpfully, raised with me before today whether the government amendment may encompass disclosure within its remit by referring to the processing of data. While the Home Secretary’s code will set out the rules for those who process NCHI data, there is no obligation for the code to address every conceivable act of processing. We have been clear that the Government’s intention is to not include disclosure within the code of practice; as such, the issue of disclosure will not be covered or referenced in any way in the code of practice.

It is imperative that we do not set an unhelpful precedent by legislating in such a way as to undermine the police’s ability to build intelligence on possible offending and risk to life more broadly. I stress again the often vital role that this data plays in helping to safeguard the vulnerable. It is not there to enforce correct opinions—referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—nor is it there to serve a purpose unconnected with policing; rather, it is part of the police’s function to prevent crime.

In conclusion, again, I am most grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for raising these important issues. I hope that he can see that the Government have taken him very seriously; the government amendments, together with the assurances that I have given in response to Amendments 109C and 109E, will, I think, address the concerns raised, by bringing parliamentary oversight to this process while protecting fundamental police functions that are already subject to strong safeguards. I hope, therefore, that he will see fit not to press his amendment—he has indicated that he will not—and that he will support the government amendments as drafted. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend, and for her reassurances, and I look forward to seeing the letter that she is going to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

109F: After Clause 55, insert the following new Clause—
“Further provision about a code of practice under section (Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidents)
(1) The Secretary of State may not issue a code of practice under section (Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidents) unless a draft of the code has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(2) The Secretary of State may from time to time revise and reissue a code of practice under section (Code of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidents).(3) Before reissuing a code of practice the Secretary of State must lay a draft of the code as proposed to be reissued before Parliament.(4) If, within the 40-day period, either House of Parliament resolves not to approve the code of practice laid under subsection (3)—(a) the code is not to be reissued, and(b) the Secretary of State may prepare another code.(5) If no such resolution is passed within the 40-day period, the Secretary of State may reissue the code of practice.(6) In this section “the 40-day period” means—(a) the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft is laid before Parliament, or (b) if the draft is not laid before each House on the same day, the period of 40 days beginning with the later of the days on which it is laid before Parliament.(7) In calculating the 40-day period no account is to be taken of any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses of Parliament are adjourned for more than 4 days.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision about the Parliamentary procedure applying to a code of practice issued by the Secretary of State under the new Clause in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford to be inserted after Clause 55 and dealing with codes of practice relating to non-criminal hate incidents.

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16:26

Division 1

Ayes: 237

Noes: 190

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[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, one of the challenges we faced was that the police were investigating the police—they were marking their own homework. Although Kent Police did a fantastic job, nevertheless there were areas where they could not quite press hard enough. They were very good in what they did, but it was not adequate, and therefore we proposed in the Stephen Lawrence inquiry that, whenever there is an incident, it should be investigated by an independent body.

This amendment would enhance that on the whole question of duty of candour. Again, during that inquiry we were given all the papers. There was no hidden stuff, so for that I must again congratulate the Met. However, this amendment is vital in order to support independent police inquiries, whenever there are areas of great concern. I hope nobody sees this as either intrusive or doubting that most of our police forces really want to do the best for their communities and places. Nevertheless, a duty of candour would impose a very good way of saying what concerns some people about the police, so I support the amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, for affording us this further opportunity to debate the case for a statutory duty of candour. They have rightly highlighted the importance of the police’s openness and transparency, which is a very serious matter. It is at the heart of public confidence in policing and ensures that the police are held to the highest standards; this is crucial to maintaining that confidence.

As I did in Committee, I start by highlighting the extensive work that has already been done and is ongoing to improve integrity and openness in policing. Back in February 2020, we introduced a statutory duty of co-operation for serving police officers as part of wider integrity reforms. This duty forms part of the standards of professional behaviour set out in Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and, in so doing, has the force of law. It is worth quoting in full the relevant paragraph:

“Police officers have a responsibility to give appropriate cooperation during investigations, inquiries and formal proceedings, participating openly and professionally in line with the expectations of a police officer when identified as a witness.”


A failure to co-operate in this way constitutes a breach of the statutory standards of professional behaviour, by which all officers must abide, and could therefore result in a formal disciplinary sanction. I put it to the House at this point that this duty to co-operate puts a greater onus on officers than the duty of candour provided for in this amendment, as they could ultimately be dismissed for a breach.

The duty to co-operate has been introduced since the issues that were highlighted in the Bishop James Jones report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences, and the issues relating to the work of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, which were later highlighted in its report. We are keen that this duty becomes fully embedded within the police workforce. The recently announced inquiry, chaired by the right honourable Dame Elish Angiolini QC, will provide a further test of this duty.

In addition to the standards of professional behaviour, the College of Policing’s code of ethics delivers a set of policing principles and ensures that ethics are at the centre of all policing decisions. The college is currently reviewing the code and intends to further promote a policing culture of openness and accountability. The Government are confident that the work of the college will ensure that candour is directly addressed through this review.

Noble Lords will be aware that a response to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel and Bishop James Jones report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences will provide a government view on a wider duty of candour for all public authorities. Before the Government respond to these reports, it is clearly imperative that the Hillsborough families are given the opportunity to share their views. We hope that this happens as soon as is practicable.

Bishop James’s report also encouraged public bodies to sign the proposed charter for bereaved families. This has now been signed by the NPCC, on behalf of police forces, so that the perspective of the bereaved families is never lost. The charter commits forces to acting with candour, and in an open, honest, and transparent way, when facing public scrutiny, for example through public inquiries.

Regarding the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the decision on disciplinary action is not just for forces. Of course, the IOPC can also call it in.

In conclusion, we believe that the existing legislation requiring officers to co-operate already amounts to a duty of candour, and this is complemented by the further commitments that policing has made to transparency and openness. That being the case—

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

The Minister has described a duty of co-operation, which is not the same as the duty described by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others, in the amendment. It is not fair to explain that they are the same and that a duty of co-operation goes further than a duty of candour. They are two different duties and the obligation to comply with charters and standards is very different from the obligation to comply with the statutory duty.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I was making the point that, in some ways, the duty of co-operation goes further because of the sanctions afforded to it, though I know that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, for whom I have the greatest respect, disagrees with me.

Regarding an officer resigning or retiring, if he or she is found to have committed gross misconduct, the chair of proceedings can decide that they would have been dismissed if they had not already left the force, so leaving the force is no longer a way out, since this automatically places the officer on the College of Policing’s barred list, preventing them from working in policing again.

I know that the noble Baroness does not agree, but I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment, although I am not sure that he will.

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17:01

Division 2

Ayes: 252

Noes: 179

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I join others in paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and his ongoing determination on this subject. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, must also be commended as she not only educated me on the whole subject, way back when, but has shown that same tenacity—ditto the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, who regularly shares her story with us. I join the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, in commending John Clough and others for their untiring campaigning on this. I have met John Clough; he is a truly wonderful man.

I totally get the sentiment of what the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, are saying. He and I spoke earlier; we reflected on the journey we have come on, since I got into your Lordships’ House almost 10 years ago, in terms of the perception and awareness of and attitudes towards domestic violence, domestic abuse and stalking. While domestic abuse was certainly on the radar, there was a clunking attitude towards dealing with it; stalking is one step behind it, but to say we have gone backwards is just not the case—we have made great progress. However, I acknowledge—I think he sees this—that we have further to go, particularly in training on stalking and domestic abuse. It is a most dreadful crime; the impact on victims can be so dreadful.

I talked at length in Committee about the many actions to address stalking that we are taking through the tackling violence against women and girls strategy. I will not go through them all again, but the Government are totally committed to protecting and supporting the victims of stalking. We are determined to do everything we can to stop perpetrators at the earliest opportunity. On the point of the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that the VAWG strategy does not deal with male victims, I say that it makes it clear that, while the term “violence against women and girls” is used throughout the document, it refers to all victims of the relevant offences, including stalking. I am glad he raised that, as it allows me to clarify it.

The noble Lord also brought up the point that stalking is not only an awful crime but a very complex and multifaceted one. We talked about that earlier as well—the resentful stalker who may go after politicians, the intimacy-seeking stalker, the incompetent stalker and the predatory stalker. They come in all forms. As he said, many are not former partners of their victims, including so-called intimacy seekers and predatory stalkers. Within each category, there is a wide range of different types of stalking behaviour. Therefore, the Government totally acknowledge that the police need to be well informed about the many characteristics of stalking and the stalker to effectively investigate stalking cases. He can rest assured—I know he does—that it is a priority for the Government. I empathise with the aim of this amendment, but it is important to acknowledge the progress that is being made in the work we are doing.

It is vital that the police are provided with the correct materials and training to deal with stalking cases appropriately. That is why, in 2019, the College of Policing released a set of new advice products on stalking for police first responders, call handlers and investigators. These make clear, for example—I say this in response to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the key differences between stalking and harassment. A range of advice and guidance products has been published by the College of Policing for forces to deliver locally to help responders to investigate stalking effectively, understand risks and respond appropriately to stalking cases. I know that training is also available to the police from providers in the charitable and private sectors. The noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and I talked earlier about the work of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, which runs the National Stalking Helpline and has been piloting a new training course for police called “Stalking Matters”.

Within Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, all new probation staff and prison offender managers are required to complete mandatory domestic abuse awareness online learning, which includes a specific module on stalking. The module has recently been updated and rewritten, based on current research, by subject matter and academic experts within HM Prison and Probation Service. A process map has been developed to set out a consistent approach to working with stalking in the probation service, which provides links to relevant support and guidance documents, as well as learning that staff can complete. Furthermore, the stalking practitioner guidance is being finalised; this aims to raise awareness of the nature of, and various risks associated with, stalking. It will also direct practitioners to the support that is available within HM Prison and Probation Service when working with perpetrators of stalking.

When we had an opportunity to speak earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and I talked about the complexity involved; while the report from Maggie Blyth was excellent, there is complexity in practitioner understanding. I will take that away and we can perhaps discuss it further; there is no point having these things if they are not readily and easily understandable.

I now come to training within the CPS. E-learning modules are available to prosecutors; these cover the stalking and harassment offences, with emphasis on building a strong case, working closely with the police and engaging with victims throughout the legal process. Alongside the online course, elements of stalking and harassment are also covered in tutor-led mandatory training on proactive disclosure and hate crime. This training supports the Crown Prosecution Service’s legal guidance on stalking and harassment and restraining orders, the joint stalking and harassment protocol, and the associated checklist that must be used by police and prosecutors to ensure that they are taking the correct action in stalking cases.

The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, talked about police resources. She will know that we have a substantial police settlement for 2022-23 but her underlying point, I think, is that we have to put it to good use, and that the Government’s priorities need to be reflected in the work that the police do. She and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, also talked about the importance of data, the monitoring of ongoing work and Parliament’s duty to hold the Government to account on the policies that they make.

Of course, the police, the CPS and the probation service are operationally independent of government. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, and I discussed earlier the issue of mandating what training they should receive, especially, as I have just set out, when there is so much good work happening already. There is always more to do, but I do not think that the mandating of training is the best way of doing this, given the good work that is going on. There is also a very real risk that, if we were to legislate for one crime type, it might then suggest to law enforcement agencies that it should be prioritised over others. I know that that is not what the noble Lord and the noble Baroness seek. Appropriate training for criminal justice system professionals on tackling stalking is vital, but so too is training on tackling domestic abuse, sexual offences and other crime types. We do not regard these as less important; neither, I know, do the noble Lord or the noble Baroness.

In acknowledging and empathising with the sentiment behind the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, I assure him that the training provided to professionals working with the criminal justice system on stalking is robust and helps to address issues such as early identification of stalking cases—but I also acknowledge that there is more work to be done. I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment in the knowledge that I have addressed his concerns as far as I can, and acknowledging the work that has been done. I know that we will come back to these matters at a future occasion.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister very much for what she said. As usual, she has been thorough and comprehensive. She said what I would have expected her to say, and I thank her for that. I understand that there is a certain point beyond which she is unable to go; I will come back to that in a minute.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for reminding us—and me—that stalking affects a very large number of men, as well as women. It is easy to forget that, as there has been so much focus on violence against women and girls. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, reminded us that we are at about our 10-year anniversary of trying to get Her Majesty’s Government to focus on this and acknowledge that it will not go away. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, it ain’t getting better, it is getting worse, and we do not completely understand why this is so badly the case.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was able to remind us from his own experience that guidance is not enough, in and of itself. The noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, reminded us of the role of champions such as Laura Richards, and others, who have been speaking up very effectively for the many victims—giving them a voice, trying to make us understand how they feel and what they have gone through. As she said, stalking is insidious. I suspect that, by the law of averages, we all probably know somebody who has been stalked, albeit that it is probably not a subject that we would readily raise around the dinner table. I suspect that, if we spoke to such people who we know—if they were prepared to open up about what their experience was like—and listened to them and watched the look in their eyes as they spoke about it, it would be pretty wrenching; that is the reality of it.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made a very good point about the judiciary, with which I absolutely agree; the judiciary needs training just as much as the rest of us. However, for the judiciary to be able to exercise its duties properly, it is incredibly important that among all the different bodies charged with identifying when a case of stalking is serious enough to become the subject of a prosecution, the way that this is pursued and the case is put together, by people who know what they are doing, is as watertight as it is humanly possible to be. However well intended and well trained, if a judge is faced with a prosecution case that, frankly, is not watertight, then, however strongly he or she may feel that an injustice is being done, if the case being put forward is inadequate, the law must follow its duty, possibly deciding not in favour of the victim—and it would not be the victim’s fault. That is the essence of what we are trying to avoid; it is going on and it will continue to go on until we really grasp it.

I will not detain your Lordships. I had hoped that we would do this in 30 minutes, but we will do it in under 45 minutes. I thank the Minister again for what she said, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. There is a huge focus on the inputs in many of these interactions from the Front Bench: there is a long list of money for this, an initiative for that, this service having this and that service having that. To come back to the issue of data, in the future I would like to hear less about inputs and more about outputs. We need the evidence that these input are actually working and making a difference. I know we will come back to this subject, but I genuinely believe that, until and unless all the different bodies dealing with these distraught victims, who come to the police perhaps after 100 instances of insidious stalking, are equipped with the knowledge and experience they need to really grab hold of it and give victims some justice, it will continue to haunt us and, indeed, stalk us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we strongly support the amendment in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. We strongly support the amendment because, as my noble friend Lady Kennedy pointed out, misogyny sits behind much harassment and intimidating behaviour that, unfortunately, many women experience as a reality every day in our communities. It fuels behaviour that, far too often, escalates into serious offences. We have to repeat, again and again, that violence against women and girls does not occur in a vacuum.

I agree very much with what the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, was alluding to and am proud of my own local police in Nottinghamshire, who have been leaders in this area, as the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, pointed out. It was the first force, in 2016, to record misogyny as a hate crime. I can tell the Chamber that it made a very real difference in Nottinghamshire when the chief constable, Sue Fish, stood up and said she was going to make it a priority for her officers. It spoke to her officers in terms of how they dealt with it, but it also spoke to the women and girls, and indeed the men of Nottinghamshire, about the priority that was going to be given. It made a very real difference and continues to do so. Sue Fish should be congratulated on being the leader that she was and is.

This campaign to recognise misogyny as an aggravating factor in the same way that we recognise hostility against a person due to disability, race or other characteristics has been running for years. Now is the time for all of us to show some leadership, to close the gap in our law and to state clearly that we do not accept the status quo and that things must change. There is much support for this change and the Government should take this opportunity, an opportunity that exists for us now and that we should take.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I was quite pleased to hear noble Lords saying that your Lordships’ House should curtail debate this evening: I have never experienced it in all my time as a Minister.

I start by thanking my noble friend Lady Newlove and the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Ponsonby, for this amendment. It speaks to their continued commitment to tackling violence against women and girls and I know they have campaigned tirelessly on this issue. Given their sincerity and their deep and obvious desire to do what is best in this sphere, I am saddened that I am not going to give them much comfort on this amendment, and I shall explain why.

As noble Lords may be aware, last month the Law Commission published its final report, Hate Crime Laws. It is a weighty tome—some 545 pages—and, as always with the Law Commission, it is a thoughtful and well-argued document that warrants very close reading. On behalf of the Government, I thank the Law Commission for the thorough and intelligent way in which it approached the task that it was given. I assure noble Lords that the Government will give all the recommendations, of which there are 34, very detailed consideration. As is customary, a full government response will be published in due course; it will address each of the recommendations and I do not want to pre-empt that process.

However, ahead of that I should just draw noble Lords’ attention to what the Law Commission said on the specific issue which Amendment 114F addresses; namely, adding sex and gender to hate crime laws or, in common parlance, “making misogyny a hate crime”. In its report, the Law Commission was unequivocal that the course of action represented by this amendment would not be appropriate, as it would potentially prove detrimental to women and girls. Indeed, it noted that to add these characteristics to the hate crime legislative framework

“may prove more harmful than helpful”

and would be

“the wrong solution to a very real problem.”

I add that transgender identity is already covered in hate crime laws.

In coming to the conclusion it did, the Law Commission applied its usual rigour, dedicating almost three years of thought and careful deliberation to its work. It did so by examining, in exhaustive fashion, whether any legal models would be appropriate to making misogyny a hate crime. It did so on the premise that

“violence against women and girls is extremely prevalent and harmful”,

as noble Lords have said—eliminating all doubt, if there was any, that it did not in good faith stretch every sinew to find an appropriate solution through the hate crime framework. Finally, it did so while listening to and acknowledging the voices of many practitioners who are dedicated to tackling violence against women and girls before making its recommendations, independent of government or political considerations. In this regard, there are few greater examples of what might be called evidence-based policy-making.

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19:08

Division 3

Ayes: 242

Noes: 185

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I remind noble Lords that this group includes 26 amendments, and that noble Lords are entitled to speak only once on each group, in case people were thinking of having another go. I cannot possibly speak on all 26 amendments; if I spent only one minute on each, I would be here for 26 minutes. But we on these Benches oppose all the measures in Part 3 of the Bill, including the new government amendments introduced late at night in Committee. We will come to those in a later group.

I am a former senior police officer and part of a small, specially selected group of senior police officers trained in the policing of protests. My view, and the view of the majority of police officers interviewed by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, contrary to what the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has just said, is that the limiting factor in the policing of protests on the police’s ability to control protests is the number of suitably trained police officers available, not a lack of police powers or legislation.

Not only are new powers and new offences unnecessary but there is a very real danger of dragging the police into political decisions on which protests should go ahead and which should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has just said. There is a very real danger of more scenes like those we saw at the Sarah Everard vigil on Clapham Common happening with greater frequency. There is a real danger of more and more police officers being drawn into policing protests to enforce more and more restrictions and bans, taking them away from policing their communities and, as a result, further undermining trust and confidence in the police and their ability to enforce the law.

I spoke at length in Committee and do not intend to repeat myself. I refer noble Lords to the Official Report. We support all the non-government amendments in this group. Particularly, we do not agree that protests should be banned because the police think they might be too noisy—so we will be voting in support of Amendment 115.

We agree with the former Conservative Home Secretary who led on the original public order legislation in 1986 that the police should not be able to dictate where and when public meetings or assemblies should take place or to ban them completely. To quote Lord Hurd of Westwell,

“that would be an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/1986; col. 797.]

The Minister may say that the provisions simply bring limitations on assemblies into line with the limitations on processions, but I ask what has changed. It is still an excessive limit on the right of assembly and freedom of speech. I will therefore be testing the opinion of the House on Amendment 132. These measures are an outrageous limitation of people’s fundamental right in a democracy, and we oppose them.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I start by quoting the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol, who said that good debate relies on good listening. I hope that noble Lords will listen, as they did in the previous group, to what I have to say.

My noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Coaker, were all in agreement that many of them would have been in breach of these provisions in protests that they took part in. No. I disagree with that; the police rarely impose conditions on a protest, and we expect that to continue to be the case.

I thought the noble Lord, Lord Walney, made some compelling arguments about how lucky we are to live in a democracy and how much we value protest—we can hear the drumbeats outside, which no one is going to stop. To answer the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, the provisions are not new today; they have been in the Bill from the start.

The government amendments give effect to the recommendations made by both the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee. Under the Public Order Act 1986 as amended by the Bill, the police may attach certain conditions to a public procession, public assembly or one-person protest, including where that is necessary to prevent serious disruption. The Bill enables the Secretary of State to define the meaning of “serious disruption” in regulations, and we have published an indicative draft of such regulations.

However, both the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee argued that definitions should be in the Bill, although the DPRRC agreed that there should be a power to amend the definition by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure. The government amendments therefore take the definitions as set out in the draft regulations and write them into the Public Order Act. Again, I express my thanks to my noble friend Lord Blencathra—although I do not see him in his place—the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the other members of the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee for their scrutiny of the Bill. I trust that the amendments will be acceptable to them and indeed to the House as a whole. The word “significant” is lifted from the draft regulations that the Constitution Committee said were not unreasonable.

Amendment 115, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, would remove the new noise triggers for the police to impose conditions on public processions. Amendments 123, 124, 125 and 147 would collectively do the same for public assemblies and single-person protests. In response to those amendments, I reiterate to the House that noise generated by protesters can have a significant and detrimental impact on the wider public. It is unacceptable, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham says, that certain protests can seriously disrupt the lives of ordinary people.

It is absolutely right that the Government give the police the tools that they require to tackle disruptive protests. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, stated during the debate in Committee on these measures,

“noise can be more than an irritant.”—[Official Report, 24/11/21; col. 944.]

In some contexts, it can be tortuous, and it is important to contextualise the different situations in which it can happen, such as the time of day or where it takes place. Is it outside an old people’s home, or is it in Parliament Square? Is it anti-vaxxers outside a school, or in St Ann’s Square in Manchester?

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20:23

Division 4

Ayes: 261

Noes: 166

Amendments 116 to 121

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

116: In place of the words last left out insert “(2) After subsection (2) insert—“(2ZA) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where—(a) it may result in a significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or(b) it may result in a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to—(i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,(ii) a system of communication,(iii) a place of worship,(iv) a transport facility,(v) an educational institution, or(vi) a service relating to health.(2ZB) In subsection (2ZA)(a) “time-sensitive product” means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.(2ZC) For the purposes of subsection (1)(aa), the cases in which the noise generated by persons taking part in a public procession may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the procession include, in particular, where it may result in persons connected with the organisation not being reasonably able, for a prolonged period of time, to carry on in that vicinity the activities or any one of them.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the meaning of serious disruption for the purposes of section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 with provisions on the face of the Bill, subject to a power to amend these provisions.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

126: Clause 57, page 50, line 32, at end insert—
“(2ZA) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where—(a) it may result in a significant delay to the supply of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or(b) it may result in a prolonged disruption of access to any essential goods or any essential service, including, in particular, access to— (i) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,(ii) a system of communication,(iii) a place of worship,(iv) a transport facility,(v) an educational institution, or(vi) a service relating to health.(2ZB) In subsection (2ZA)(a) “time-sensitive product” means a product whose value or use to its consumers may be significantly reduced by a delay in the supply of the product to them.(2ZC) For the purposes of subsection (1)(aa), the cases in which the noise generated by persons taking part in a public assembly may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the assembly include, in particular, where it may result in persons connected with the organisation not being reasonably able, for a prolonged period of time, to carry on in that vicinity the activities or any one of them.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the meaning of serious disruption for the purposes of section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 with provisions on the face of the Bill, subject to a power to amend these provisions.

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20:37

Division 5

Ayes: 238

Noes: 171

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[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, my name is also added to the amendment in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, which he moved so eloquently and comprehensively. I really do not want to take up any more of the House’s time, but simply say that we support this amendment and what was said by him, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. If the noble Viscount is not happy with the response he gets and decides to test the opinion of the House, we will support him in the vote.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments relate to Clauses 59 and 60, which ensure—as was originally proposed by the right honourable Harriet Harman, as chair of the JCHR, to whom we send our deepest sympathies—that vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate is not prevented by protests or other activity; and Clause 61, which restates the common-law offence of public nuisance in statute.

I begin with Amendments 133A and 133B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, which I was able to discuss with him and Dominic Grieve last week. They seek to avoid a perceived outcome of Clause 59 that the Greater London Authority will no longer authorise large-scale assemblies on Parliament Square, due to the risk that such assemblies could obstruct vehicles entering or exiting the controlled area around Parliament.

I am most grateful to the noble Viscount for meeting me last week to raise his concerns about Clause 59. I understand that he is concerned that this clause may have the unintended consequences that the Greater London Authority, which is responsible for Parliament Square Garden, would no longer be able to authorise assemblies in the garden if they risk blocking vehicular access to the Parliamentary Estate. I reassure him tonight, as I did the other day, that this is not the case.

The GLA’s by-laws for Parliament Square Garden require that written permission is granted for certain acts to be conducted in the garden; organising or taking part in an assembly is one of those acts. It is important to note that this by-law applies to the garden itself and does not extend to Carriage Gates, nor the road around the garden. The by-laws state that permission will not be given in respect of any matter defined as a “prohibited activity” under Section 143 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. Clause 59 amends this section to include obstructing the passage of a vehicle into or out of an entrance or exit to the Parliamentary Estate as a prohibited activity.

In practice, this means that the GLA could not permit an assembly in Parliament Square Garden if its stated and primary aim is to obstruct vehicular passage in and out of Parliament. However, nothing in Clause 59 means that permission could not still be granted for any other assembly, even if that risks some individuals in attendance obstructing vehicles entering and exiting Parliament. This is the point I was trying to impress the other day.

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21:35

Division 6

Ayes: 236

Noes: 158

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

136: Clause 61, page 55, line 33, leave out “causes” and insert “creates a risk of, or causes,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendment in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford at page 53, line 40 make it clear that one element of the new offence of public nuisance requires a person’s act or omission to create a risk of, or to cause, serious harm as defined in clause 60(2) to the public or a section of the public.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

138: Clause 61, page 56, line 23, leave out “any act or omission within subsection (1)” and insert “the tort of public nuisance”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends Clause 60 to clarify that the Clause does not affect the civil liability of any person for the tort of public nuisance. The tort currently tracks the common law offence and this amendment makes it clear that the replacement of the offence does not affect the tort.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

141: Clause 62, page 57, line 22, at end insert—
“(5A) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), the cases in which the noise generated by a person taking part in a one-person protest may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the protest include, in particular, where it may result in persons connected with the organisation not being reasonably able, for a prolonged period of time, to carry on in that vicinity the activities or any one of them.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the meaning of serious disruption for the purposes of section 14ZA of the Public Order Act 1986 with provisions on the face of the Bill, subject to a power to amend these provisions.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

148: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Offence of locking on
(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they intentionally—(i) attach themselves to another person, to an object or to land,(ii) attach a person to another person, to an object or to land, or(iii) attach an object to another object or to land,(b) that act causes, or is capable of causing, serious disruption to—(i) two or more individuals, or(ii) an organisation,in a place other than in a dwelling, and(c) they intend that act to have a consequence mentioned in paragraph (b) or are reckless as to whether it will have such a consequence.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for the act mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection.(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, to a fine or to both.(4) In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales), the reference in subsection (3) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to 6 months.(5) In this section “dwelling” means—(a) a building or structure which is used as a dwelling, or(b) a part of a building or structure, if the part is used as a dwelling,and includes any yard, garden, grounds, garage or outhouse belonging to and used with a dwelling.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment creates a new offence of “locking on”, involving the attachment of an individual to another individual, to an object or to land, or an object to another object or to land. It is a requirement of the offence that the act causes or is capable of causing serious disruption to two or more individuals or an organisation and that the accused intends that to occur or is reckless as to whether it will occur.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

This group of amendments brings us back to the new public order measures which the Government initially put forward in Committee. I will not repeat the detailed explanation of each of the new clauses but will instead reiterate the Government’s overall case for these additional measures and highlight the significant changes to the package as compared to the amendments tabled in Committee.

These new measures bolster the police’s powers to respond to the disruptive, dangerous and disproportionately costly tactics employed recently by some groups of protesters. For example, the Metropolitan Police spent over £4 million and deployed over 6,000 officers and staff to police the Insulate Britain protests between 13 September and 20 November last year. Injunctions have their place, but they can be slow to implement. Therefore, it is completely right that the Government are introducing these measures to the Bill to give police the right powers to respond immediately to such protests.

It is against this backdrop that we need to build on the measures already in Part 3 of the Bill. We need to ensure that the criminal law is fit for purpose by ensuring that there are appropriate, targeted offences to prosecute those who engage in actions which endanger others and cause wholly unacceptable disruption, and that the penalties are commensurate with the harm caused. But we also need to ensure that the police have the necessary powers to take effective preventive action. These amendments are directed to that end.

Amendments 148, 149 and 150 reintroduce the offences of locking on and going equipped to lock on, and amend the offence of obstructing the highway, all of which were discussed at Committee. Amendment 151 reintroduces the new offence of obstruction of major transport works.

In response to the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, in Committee, we have added a defence for this offence relating to trade disputes. Alongside the defence of reasonable excuse, it will be a defence for individuals to prove that their actions were performed in contemplation or furtherance of a lawful trade dispute. This is to make it clear that this new offence does not interfere with the rights of workers to engage in lawful trade disputes.

Amendment 152 introduces a new offence of interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure. By targeting key transport infrastructure and printing presses, protesters have been able to inflict disruption and misery on the daily lives of the working public and to undermine press freedom. This Government take such acts extremely seriously. The introduction of this offence, which carries a maximum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment, reflects that.

“Interference” is defined here as an act that prevents the infrastructure in question being operated to any extent for any of its intended purposes. Acts which significantly delay the operation of key national infrastructure are included within the definition. As with the offence relating to the obstruction of major transport works, Amendment 152 includes a reasonable excuse defence and a defence for those engaged in a trade dispute.

Amendments 154 to 158 reintroduce both the suspicion-based and suspicion-less stop and search powers, which were introduced in Committee. The list of offences to which these powers will apply has been extended to include the new offence of interfering with the operation of key national infrastructure. The police need to be able to respond to a seriously disruptive protest—for example, one blocking a motorway. The public, however, would far rather the police take preventive action, such as seizing locking on equipment, to avoid the disruption happening in the first place, so that they can get to work on time and ambulances can quickly get patients to hospital.

Finally, Amendments 159 and 163 reintroduce serious disruption prevention orders, or SDPOs. As I set out in Committee, these court orders address the acts of a small number of prolific and disruptive protesters who repeatedly trample on the rights of the public to go about their daily business. These amendments are largely unchanged from a similar amendment tabled earlier, but we have included express provision to enable a court to adjourn proceedings to hear an application for an SDPO once it has sentenced the offender in question.

It will be for the courts to determine whether it is necessary and proportionate to make an order for the purposes set out in new Sections 342L and 342M of the Sentencing Code. In reaching such a decision, the courts are well versed in balancing the rights of the individual who may be made the subject of an SDPO and the rights and freedoms of the public who may be significantly adversely affected by the protest-related activities of that individual.

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[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, perhaps I could deal with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to begin with. My recollection is that the report on public order from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services showed that many officers did not want additional powers to deal with locking on. That is in the report. My experience is that the police are getting better and better at dealing with locking on, particularly people supergluing themselves to roadways—people are not now glued to the roadway for very long.

On hospitals that are on minor roads, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made it quite clear that he wanted the increased penalty of imprisonment for highway obstruction on the strategic road network where there is no realistic way around a blockage that has been put in. A hospital may be on a minor road, but there are other ways of getting to it, and I do not feel that that argument holds water. I will come to the noble Lord’s comments about the serious disruption orders shortly.

The Minister said that these amendments were debated in Committee. That debate started at 11.50 pm. The Minister stood up to make her closing remarks at 1 am. Does she really think that that is serious consideration and debate of these measures?

These government amendments were a hurried response to the Home Secretary’s knee-jerk, populist reaction to Insulate Britain protests at the Conservative Party conference. Consideration of this part of the Bill had to be taken out of order, to give civil servants time to cobble together these last-minute, ill-conceived, badly thought-through acts of desperation, introduced into this House late at night on the last day of Committee without any consideration by the other place. If the Government are determined to bring in these draconian, antidemocratic laws, reminiscent of Cold War Eastern bloc police states, they should withdraw them now and introduce them as a separate Bill to allow the democratically elected House time to consider them properly.

We oppose all these government amendments, for the reasons I set out in Committee—albeit in the early hours of the morning—and I refer noble Lords to the Official Report. Given the hour, we will vote against the most egregious measures: Amendment 151, which is clearly targeted at climate protesters; Amendment 155, which gives police the power to stop and search anyone and everyone in the vicinity of a protest, including innocent passers-by; and Amendment 159, by which the police can apply for an order to ban people from their democratic right to protest, even when they have never been to a protest in their life, let alone been convicted of any offence in connection with a protest. That is the power in these measures—you do not even have to have been to a protest to be banned from future ones. You do not even have to be convicted of an offence in connection with a protest before you can be banned from going to protests.

If the Official Opposition decide to vote on Amendment 148, on locking on, we will support them. We will also vote in favour of Amendment 150A, to restrict imprisonment for highway obstruction to blocking motorways and other parts of the strategic road network.

The anti-protest measures in the original Bill were dreadful. These measures, and the way they have been introduced, are outrageous.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether noble Lords want more time to debate or me to hurry up. If noble Lords will indulge me for a minute, I will thank them for the support for the new measures that has come from one area of the House, but it is clear that a number of other noble Lords are less enamoured of the government amendments. As I said in opening the debate, I think the British public will fully support these reasonable and proportionate measures to ensure that their daily lives are not disrupted by the sorts of tactics we saw from Insulate Britain last autumn. This is not an argument for or against climate change; it is about the disruption caused to the lives of the working British public.

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22:35

Division 7

Ayes: 163

Noes: 216

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

150: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Wilful obstruction of highway
(1) Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (penalty for wilful obstruction) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1)—(a) after “liable to” insert “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or”;(b) for “not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale” substitute “or both”.(3) After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales), the reference in subsection (1) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to 6 months.(1B) For the purposes of this section it does not matter whether free passage along the highway in question has already been temporarily restricted or temporarily prohibited (whether by a constable, a traffic authority or otherwise).(1C) In subsection (1B), “traffic authority” has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (see section 121A of that Act).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the penalty for the offence of wilfully obstructing a highway. It also clarifies that for the purposes of the offence it does not matter whether free passage along the highway in question has already been temporarily restricted or prohibited.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I beg to move.

Amendment 150A (to Amendment 150)

Moved by

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22:53

Division 8

Ayes: 216

Noes: 160

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

151: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Obstruction etc of major transport works
(1) A person commits an offence if the person—(a) obstructs the undertaker or a person acting under the authority of the undertaker—(i) in setting out the lines of any major transport works,(ii) in constructing or maintaining any major transport works, or (iii) in taking any steps that are reasonably necessary for the purposes of facilitating, or in connection with, the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, or(b) interferes with, moves or removes any apparatus which—(i) relates to the construction or maintenance of any major transport works, and(ii) belongs to the undertaker, to a person acting under the authority of the undertaker, to a statutory undertaker or to a person acting under the authority of a statutory undertaker.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) they had a reasonable excuse for the act mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection, or(b) the act mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, to a fine or to both.(4) In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales), the reference in subsection (3) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to 6 months.(5) In this section “major transport works” means—(a) works in England and Wales—(i) relating to transport infrastructure, and(ii) the construction of which is authorised directly by an Act of Parliament, or(b) works the construction of which comprises development within subsection (6) that has been granted development consent by an order under section 114 of the Planning Act 2008.(6) Development is within this subsection if—(a) it is or forms part of a nationally significant infrastructure project within any of paragraphs (h) to (l) of section 14(1) of the Planning Act 2008,(b) it is or forms part of a project (or proposed project) in the field of transport in relation to which a direction has been given under section 35(1) of that Act (directions in relation to projects of national significance) by the Secretary of State, or(c) it is associated development in relation to development within paragraph (a) or (b).(7) In this section “undertaker”—(a) in relation to major transport works within subsection (5)(a), means a person who is authorised by or under the Act (whether as a result of being appointed the nominated undertaker for the purposes of the Act or otherwise) to construct or maintain any of the works;(b) in relation to major transport works within subsection (5)(b), means a person who is constructing or maintaining any of the works (whether as a result of being the undertaker for the purposes of the order granting development consent or otherwise).(8) In this section—“associated development” has the same meaning as in the Planning Act 2008 (see section 115 of that Act);“development” has the same meaning as in the Planning Act 2008 (see section 32 of that Act);“development consent” has the same meaning as in the Planning Act 2008 (see section 31 of that Act); “England” includes the English inshore region within the meaning of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (see section 322 of that Act);“maintain” includes inspect, repair, adjust, alter, remove, reconstruct and replace, and “maintenance” is to be construed accordingly;“nationally significant infrastructure project” has the same meaning as in the Planning Act 2008 (see section 14(1) of that Act);“statutory undertaker” means a person who is, or who is deemed to be, a statutory undertaker for the purposes of any provision of Part 11 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990;“trade dispute” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, except that section 218 of that Act is to be read as if—(a) it made provision corresponding to section 244(4) of that Act, and(b) in subsection (5), the definition of worker included any person falling within paragraph (b) of the definition of worker in section 244(5) of that Act;“Wales” includes the Welsh inshore region within the meaning of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (see section 322 of that Act).(9) In section 14 of the Planning Act 2008 (nationally significant infrastructure projects), after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) An order under subsection (3)(a) may also amend section (Obstruction etc of major transport works) (6)(a) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021 (obstruction etc of major transport works).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment contains a new offence of obstructing the construction or maintenance of major transport works. These are transport works that are authorised directly by an Act of Parliament or by certain development consent orders under the Planning Act 2008.

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23:07

Division 9

Ayes: 154

Noes: 208

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

152: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure
(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) they do an act which interferes with the use or operation of any key national infrastructure in England and Wales, and(b) they intend that act to interfere with the use or operation of such infrastructure or are reckless as to whether it will do so.(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to prove that—(a) they had a reasonable excuse for the act mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection, or(b) the act mentioned in paragraph (a) of that subsection was done wholly or mainly in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute.(3) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, to a fine or to both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, to a fine, or to both.(4) In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020, the reference in subsection (3)(a) to 12 months is to be read as a reference to 6 months.(5) For the purposes of subsection (1) a person’s act interferes with the use or operation of key national infrastructure if it prevents the infrastructure from being used or operated to any extent for any of its intended purposes.(6) The cases in which infrastructure is prevented from being used or operated for any of its intended purposes include where its use or operation for any of those purposes is significantly delayed.(7) In this section “key national infrastructure” means—(a) road transport infrastructure,(b) rail infrastructure,(c) air transport infrastructure,(d) harbour infrastructure,(e) downstream oil infrastructure, or(f) newspaper printing infrastructure.Section (Key national infrastructure) makes further provision about these kinds of infrastructure.(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument— (a) amend subsection (7) to add a new kind of infrastructure or to vary or remove an existing kind of infrastructure;(b) amend section (Key national infrastructure) to add, amend or remove provision about a kind of infrastructure which is in, or is to be added to, subsection (7) or is to be removed from that subsection.(9) Regulations under subsection (8)—(a) may make different provision for different purposes;(b) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision.(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (8) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(11) In this section—“England” includes the English inshore region within the meaning of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (see section 322 of that Act);“trade dispute” has the same meaning as in Part 4 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, except that section 218 of that Act is to be read as if—(a) it made provision corresponding to section 244(4) of that Act, and(b) in subsection (5), the definition of worker included any person falling within paragraph (b) of the definition of worker in section 244(5) of that Act;“Wales” includes the Welsh inshore region within the meaning of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (see section 322 of that Act).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes it an offence for a person to do an act which interferes with the use or operation of key national infrastructure where the person intends the act to have that effect or is reckless as to whether it will do so. This is subject to a defence of reasonable excuse and a defence applying to industrial action.

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23:20

Division 10

Ayes: 153

Noes: 198

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

153: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Key national infrastructure
(1) This section has effect for the purposes of section (Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure).(2) “Road transport infrastructure” means—(a) a special road within the meaning of the Highways Act 1980 (see section 329(1) of that Act), or(b) a road which, under the system for assigning identification numbers to roads administered by the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers, has for the time being been assigned a number prefixed by A or B.(3) “Rail infrastructure” means infrastructure used for the purposes of railway services within the meaning of Part 1 of the Railways Act 1993 (see section 82 of that Act).(4) In the application of section 82 of the Railways Act 1993 for the purposes of subsection (3) “railway” has the wider meaning given in section 81(2) of that Act.(5) “Air transport infrastructure” means—(a) an airport within the meaning of the Airports Act 1986 (see section 82(1) of that Act), or(b) any infrastructure which—(i) does not form part of an airport within the meaning of that Act, and(ii) is used for the provision of air traffic services within the meaning of Part 1 of the Transport Act 2000 (see section 98 of that Act).(6) “Harbour infrastructure” means a harbour within the meaning of the Harbours Act 1964 (see section 57(1) of that Act) which provides facilities for or in connection with—(a) the embarking or disembarking of passengers who are carried in the course of a business, or(b) the loading or unloading of cargo which is carried in the course of a business.(7) “Downstream oil infrastructure” means infrastructure used for or in connection with any of the following activities—(a) the refinement or other processing of crude oil or oil feedstocks;(b) the storage of crude oil or crude oil-based fuel for onward distribution, other than storage by a person who supplies crude oil-based fuel to the public where the storage is for the purposes of such supply;(c) the loading or unloading of crude oil or crude oil-based fuel for onward distribution, other than unloading to a person who supplies crude oil-based fuel to the public where the unloading is for the purposes of such supply; (d) the carriage, by road, rail, sea or inland waterway, of crude oil or crude oil-based fuel for the purposes of onward distribution;(e) the conveyance of crude oil or crude oil-based fuel by means of a pipe-line within the meaning of the Pipe-lines Act 1962 (see section 65 of that Act).(8) “Newspaper printing infrastructure” means infrastructure the primary purpose of which is the printing of one or more national or local newspapers.(9) In this section—“local newspaper” means a newspaper which is published at least fortnightly and is in circulation in a part of England and Wales;“national newspaper” means a newspaper which is published at least fortnightly and is in circulation in England, in Wales or in both;“newspaper” includes a periodical or magazine.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment defines the different types of key national infrastructure for the purposes of the new Clause in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford to be inserted after Clause 62 and creating the offence of interfering with the use or operation of such infrastructure.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

154: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Powers to stop and search on suspicion
In section 1(8) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (offences in relation to which stop and search power applies)—(a) omit the “and” at the end of paragraph (d), and(b) after paragraph (e) insert—“(f) an offence under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (wilful obstruction) involving activity which causes or is capable of causing serious disruption to two or more individuals or to an organisation;(g) an offence under section 61 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021 (intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance);(h) an offence under section (Offence of locking on) of that Act (offence of locking on);(i) an offence under section (Obstruction etc of major transport works) of that Act (obstruction etc of major transport works); and(j) an offence under section (Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure) of that Act (interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment amends section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to allow a constable to stop and search a person or vehicle if they have reasonable grounds for suspecting that they will find an article made, adapted or intended for use in the course of or in connection with an offence listed in the amendment.

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23:33

Division 11

Ayes: 141

Noes: 205

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

155: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Powers to stop and search without suspicion
(1) This section applies if a police officer of or above the rank of inspector reasonably believes—(a) that any of the following offences may be committed in any locality within the officer’s police area—(i) an offence under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 (wilful obstruction) involving activity which causes or is capable of causing serious disruption to two or more individuals or to an organisation;(ii) an offence under section 61 (intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance);(iii) an offence under section (Offence of locking on) (offence of locking on);(iv) an offence under section (Obstruction etc of major transport works) (obstruction etc of major transport works);(v) an offence under section (Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure) (interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure), or(b) that persons are carrying prohibited objects in any locality within the officer’s police area.(2) In this section “prohibited object” means an object which—(a) is made or adapted for use in the course of or in connection with an offence within subsection (1)(a), or(b) is intended by the person having it with them for such use by them or by some other person,and for the purposes of this section a person carries a prohibited object if they have it in their possession.(3) If the further condition in subsection (4) is met, the police officer may give an authorisation that the powers conferred by this section are to be exercisable— (a) anywhere within a specified locality within the officer’s police area, and(b) for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours.(4) The further condition is that the police officer reasonably believes that—(a) the authorisation is necessary to prevent the commission of offences within subsection (1)(a) or the carrying of prohibited objects (as the case may be),(b) the specified locality is no greater than is necessary to prevent such activity, and(c) the specified period is no longer than is necessary to prevent such activity.(5) If it appears to a police officer of or above the rank of superintendent that it is necessary to do so to prevent the commission of offences within subsection (1)(a) or the carrying of prohibited objects, the officer may direct that the authorisation is to continue in force for a further period not exceeding 24 hours.(6) This section confers on any constable in uniform power—(a) to stop any person and search them or anything carried by them for a prohibited object;(b) to stop any vehicle and search the vehicle, its driver and any passenger for a prohibited object.(7) A constable may, in the exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (6), stop any person or vehicle and make any search the constable thinks fit whether or not the constable has any grounds for suspecting that the person or vehicle is carrying a prohibited object.(8) If in the course of a search under this section a constable discovers an object which the constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a prohibited object, the constable may seize it.(9) This section and sections (Further provisions about authorisations and directions under section (Powers to stop and search without suspicion)) (further provisions about authorisations and directions under this section), (Further provisions about searches under section (Powers to stop and search without suspicion)) (further provisions about searches under this section) and (Offence relating to section (Powers to stop and search without suspicion)) (offence relating to this section) apply (with the necessary modifications) to ships, aircraft and hovercraft as they apply to vehicles.(10) In this section and the sections mentioned in subsection (9)—“specified” means specified in an authorisation under this section;“vehicle” includes a caravan as defined in section 29(1) of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960.(11) The powers conferred by this section and the sections mentioned in subsection (9) do not affect any power conferred otherwise than by this section or those sections.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision for a senior police officer to give an authorisation applying to a specified locality for a specified period and allowing a constable to stop and search a person or vehicle for an object made, adapted or intended for use in the course of or in connection with an offence listed in the amendment. While the authorisation is in force the constable may exercise the power whether or not they have any grounds for suspecting the person or vehicle is carrying such an object.

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23:47

Division 12

Ayes: 128

Noes: 212

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

159: After Clause 62, insert the following new Clause—
“Serious disruption prevention orders
(1) In Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (behaviour orders), after Chapter 1A (as inserted by section 141) insert—“CHAPTER 1BSERIOUS DISRUPTION PREVENTION ORDERSSerious disruption prevention orders made on conviction342L Serious disruption prevention order made on conviction(1) This section applies where—(a) a person aged 18 or over (“P”) is convicted of an offence (“the current offence”) which was committed on or after the day on which this section comes into force, and(b) the prosecution applies for a serious disruption prevention order to be made in respect of P.(2) The court dealing with P in respect of the current offence may make a serious disruption prevention order in respect of P if—(a) the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the current offence is a protest-related offence,(b) the earlier offence condition is met, and(c) the court considers it necessary to make the order for a purpose mentioned in subsection (5).(3) The earlier offence condition is that— (a) within the relevant period, P has been convicted of an offence (“the earlier offence”),(b) the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the earlier offence was a protest-related offence, and(c) the current offence and the earlier offence—(i) relate to different protests, or(ii) were committed on different days.(4) In subsection (3) “the relevant period” means the period of 5 years ending with the day on which P is convicted of the current offence; but an offence may be taken into account for the purposes of this section only if it was committed—(a) on or after the day on which this section comes into force, and(b) when P was aged 16 or over.(5) The purposes are—(a) to prevent P from committing a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction;(b) to prevent P from carrying out activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales;(c) to prevent P from causing or contributing to—(i) the commission by any other person of a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(ii) the carrying out by any other person of activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales;(d) to protect two or more individuals, or an organisation, in England and Wales from the risk of serious disruption arising from—(i) a protest-related offence,(ii) a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(iii) activities related to a protest.(6) A serious disruption prevention order under this section is an order which, for a purpose mentioned in subsection (5)—(a) requires P to do anything described in the order;(b) prohibits P from doing anything described in the order.(7) The court may make a serious disruption prevention order in respect of P only if it is made in addition to—(a) a sentence imposed in respect of the current offence, or(b) an order discharging P conditionally.(8) For the purpose of deciding whether to make a serious disruption prevention order the court may consider evidence led by the prosecution or P.(9) It does not matter whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings for the current offence.(10) The court may adjourn any proceedings on an application for a serious disruption prevention order even after sentencing P.(11) If P does not appear for any adjourned proceedings the court may—(a) further adjourn the proceedings,(b) issue a warrant for P’s arrest, or(c) hear the proceedings in P’s absence. (12) The court may not act under subsection (11)(b) unless it is satisfied that P has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings.(13) The court may not act under subsection (11)(c) unless it is satisfied that P—(a) has had adequate notice of the time and place of the adjourned proceedings, and(b) has been informed that if P does not appear for those proceedings the court may hear the proceedings in P’s absence.(14) On making a serious disruption prevention order the court must in ordinary language explain to P the effects of the order.(15) Where an offence is found to have been committed over a period of 2 or more days, or at some time during a period of 2 or more days, it must be taken for the purposes of this section to have been committed on the last of those days.Serious disruption prevention orders made otherwise than on conviction342M Serious disruption prevention order made otherwise than on conviction(1) A magistrates’ court may make a serious disruption prevention order in respect of a person (“P”) where—(a) a person within subsection (7) applies by complaint to the court for a serious disruption prevention order to be made in respect of P,(b) P is aged 18 or over when the application is made,(c) the condition in subsection (2) is met, and(d) the court considers it necessary to make the order for a purpose mentioned in subsection (4).(2) This condition in this subsection is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that—(a) on at least two occasions in the relevant period, P has—(i) been convicted of a protest-related offence,(ii) been found in contempt of court for a protest-related breach of an injunction,(iii) carried out activities related to a protest that resulted in, or were likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales,(iv) caused or contributed to the commission by any other person of a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(v) caused or contributed to the carrying out by any other person of activities related to a protest that resulted in, or were likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales, and(b) each event mentioned in paragraph (a)—(i) relates to a different protest, or(ii) took place on a different day.(3) In subsection (2) “the relevant period” means the period of 5 years ending with the day on which the order is made; but an event may be taken into account for the purposes of this section only if it occurred—(a) on or after the day on which this section comes into force, and(b) when P was aged 16 or over.(4) The purposes are—(a) to prevent P from committing a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction; (b) to prevent P from carrying out activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales;(c) to prevent P from causing or contributing to—(i) the commission by any other person of a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(ii) the carrying out by any other person of activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales;(d) to protect two or more individuals, or an organisation, in England and Wales from the risk of serious disruption arising from—(i) a protest-related offence,(ii) a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(iii) activities related to a protest.(5) A serious disruption prevention order under this section is an order which, for a purpose mentioned in subsection (4)—(a) requires P to do anything described in the order;(b) prohibits P from doing anything described in the order.(6) On making a serious disruption prevention order the court must in ordinary language explain to P the effects of the order.(7) The following persons are within this subsection—(a) a relevant chief officer of police;(b) the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force;(c) the chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;(d) the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police.(8) For the purposes of subsection (7)(a) a chief officer of police is a relevant chief officer of police in relation to an application for a serious disruption prevention order in respect of P if—(a) P lives in the chief officer’s police area, or(b) the chief officer believes that P is in, or is intending to come to, the chief officer’s police area.(9) An application for a serious disruption prevention order made by a chief officer of police for a police area may be made only to a court acting for a local justice area that includes any part of that police area.(10) Where an offence is found to have been committed over a period of 2 or more days, or at some time during a period of 2 or more days, it must be taken for the purposes of this section to have been committed on the last of those days.(11) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limits) does not apply to a complaint under this section.Provisions of serious disruption prevention orders342N Provisions of serious disruption prevention order(1) The requirements imposed on a person (“P”) by a serious disruption prevention order may, in particular, have the effect of requiring P to present themselves to a particular person at a particular place at, or between, particular times on particular days.(2) Sections 342O and 342P make further provision about the inclusion of requirements (including notification requirements) in a serious disruption prevention order. (3) The prohibitions imposed on a person (“P”) by a serious disruption prevention order may, in particular, have the effect of prohibiting P from—(a) being at a particular place;(b) being at a particular place between particular times on particular days;(c) being at a particular place between particular times on any day;(d) being with particular persons;(e) participating in particular activities;(f) having particular articles with them;(g) using the internet to facilitate or encourage persons to—(i) commit a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(ii) carry out activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales.(4) References in this section to a particular place or particular persons, activities or articles include a place, persons, activities or articles of a particular description.(5) A serious disruption prevention order which imposes prohibitions on a person may include exceptions from those prohibitions.(6) Nothing in this section affects the generality of sections 342L(6) and 342M(5).(7) The requirements or prohibitions which are imposed on a person by a serious disruption prevention order must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—(a) any conflict with the person’s religious beliefs, and(b) any interference with the times, if any, at which the person normally works or attends any educational establishment.342O Requirements in serious disruption prevention order(1) A serious disruption prevention order which imposes on a person (“P”) a requirement, other than a notification requirement under section 342P, must specify a person who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement.(2) That person may be an individual or an organisation.(3) Before including such a requirement, the court must receive evidence about its suitability and enforceability from—(a) the individual to be specified under subsection (1), if an individual is to be specified;(b) an individual representing the organisation to be specified under subsection (1), if an organisation is to be specified.(4) Before including two or more such requirements, the court must consider their compatibility with each other.(5) It is the duty of a person specified under subsection (1)—(a) to make any necessary arrangements in connection with the requirements for which the person has responsibility (the “relevant requirements”);(b) to promote P’s compliance with the relevant requirements;(c) if the person considers that P—(i) has complied with all of the relevant requirements, or(ii) has failed to comply with a relevant requirement,to inform the appropriate chief officer of police. (6) In subsection (5)(c) “the appropriate chief officer of police” means—(a) the chief officer of police for the police area in which it appears to the person specified under subsection (1) that P lives, or(b) if it appears to that person that P lives in more than one police area, whichever of the chief officers of police of those areas the person thinks it is most appropriate to inform.(7) Where P is subject to a requirement in a serious disruption prevention order, other than a notification requirement under section 342P, P must—(a) keep in touch with the person specified under subsection (1) in relation to that requirement, in accordance with any instructions given by that person from time to time, and(b) notify that person of any change of P’s home address.(8) The obligations mentioned in subsection (7) have effect as if they were requirements imposed on P by the order.342P Notification requirements in serious disruption prevention order(1) A serious disruption prevention order made in respect of a person (“P”) must impose on P the notification requirements in subsections (2) and (4).(2) P must be required to notify the information in subsection (3) to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the day on which the order takes effect.(3) That information is—(a) P’s name on the day that the notification is given and, where P uses one or more other names on that day, each of those names,(b) P’s home address on that day, and(c) the address of any other premises at which, on that day, P regularly resides or stays.(4) P must be required to notify the information mentioned in subsection (5) to the police within the period of 3 days beginning with the day on which P—(a) uses a name which has not been previously notified to the police in accordance with the order,(b) changes their home address, or(c) decides to live for a period of one month or more at any premises the address of which has not been previously notified to the police in accordance with the order.(5) That information is—(a) in a case within subsection (4)(a), the name which has not previously been notified,(b) in a case within subsection (4)(b), the new home address, and(c) in a case within subsection (4)(c), the address of the premises at which P has decided to live.(6) A serious disruption prevention order must provide that P gives a notification of the kind mentioned in subsection (2) or (4) by—(a) attending at a police station in a police area in which P lives, and(b) giving an oral notification to a police officer, or to any person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.342Q Duration of serious disruption prevention order(1) A serious disruption prevention order takes effect on the day it is made, subject to subsections (3) and (4). (2) A serious disruption prevention order must specify the period for which it has effect, which must be a fixed period of not less than 1 week and not more than 2 years.(3) Subsection (4) applies in relation to a serious disruption prevention order made in respect of a person (“P”) if—(a) P has been remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court,(b) a custodial sentence has been imposed on P or P is serving or otherwise subject to a such a sentence, or(c) P is on licence for part of the term of a custodial sentence.(4) The order may provide that it does not take effect until—(a) P is released from custody,(b) P ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence, or(c) P ceases to be on licence.(5) A serious disruption prevention order may specify periods for which particular requirements or prohibitions have effect.(6) Where a court makes a serious disruption prevention order in respect of a person and the person is already subject to such an order, the earlier order ceases to have effect.(7) In this section “custodial sentence” includes a pre-Code custodial sentence (see section 222(4)).342R Other information to be included in serious disruption prevention orderA serious disruption prevention order made in respect of a person must specify—(a) the reasons for making the order, and(b) the penalties which may be imposed on the person for breaching the order.Offences342S Offences relating to a serious disruption prevention order(1) Where a serious disruption prevention order has effect in respect of a person (“P”), P commits an offence if P—(a) fails without reasonable excuse to do anything P is required to do by the order,(b) without reasonable excuse does anything P is prohibited from doing by the order, or(c) notifies to the police, in purported compliance with the order, any information which P knows to be false.(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine or both.(3) In relation to an offence committed before the coming into force of section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (alteration of penalties for certain summary offences: England and Wales), the reference in subsection (2) to 51 weeks is to be read as a reference to 6 months.Variation, renewal or discharge of serious disruption prevention order342T Variation, renewal or discharge of serious disruption prevention order(1) Where a serious disruption prevention order has been made in respect of a person (“P”), a person within subsection (2) may apply to the appropriate court for an order varying, renewing or discharging the order.(2) Those persons are—(a) P; (b) the chief officer of police for the police area in which P lives;(c) a chief officer of police who believes that P is in, or is intending to come to, the chief officer’s police area;(d) if the application for the order was made by a chief officer of police other than one within paragraph (b) or (c), the chief officer by whom the application was made;(e) the chief officer of police for a police area in which P committed an offence on the basis of which the order was made;(f) where the order was made following an application by a constable within subsection (3), that constable.(3) Those constables are—(a) the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force;(b) the chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;(c) the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police.(4) An application under this section must be made—(a) where the appropriate court is a magistrates’ court, by complaint;(b) in any other case, in accordance with rules of court.(5) Before making a decision on an application under this section, the court must hear—(a) the person making the application, and(b) any other person within subsection (2) who wishes to be heard.(6) Subject to subsection (7), on an application under this section the court may make such order varying, renewing or discharging the serious disruption prevention order as it thinks appropriate.(7) The court may renew a serious disruption prevention order, or vary such an order so as to lengthen its duration or to impose an additional prohibition or requirement on P, only if it considers that to do so is necessary—(a) to prevent P from committing a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction,(b) to prevent P from carrying out activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales,(c) to prevent P from causing or contributing to—(i) the commission by any other person of a protest-related offence or a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(ii) the carrying out by any other person of activities related to a protest that result in, or are likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales, or(d) to protect two or more individuals, or an organisation, in England and Wales from the risk of serious disruption arising from—(i) a protest-related offence,(ii) a protest-related breach of an injunction, or(iii) activities related to a protest.(8) Sections 342N, 342O, 342P (other than subsections (2) and (3)), 342Q and 342R have effect in relation to the renewal of a serious disruption prevention order, or the variation of such an order so as to lengthen its duration or to impose a new requirement or prohibition, as they have effect in relation to the making of such an order. (9) On making an order under this section varying or renewing a serious disruption prevention order, the court must in ordinary language explain to P the effects of the serious disruption prevention order (as varied or renewed).(10) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 does not apply to a complaint under this section.(11) In this section “the appropriate court” means—(a) where the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal made the order, the Crown Court;(b) where a magistrates’ court made the order and the application is made by P or a constable within subsection (3)—(i) that magistrates’ court, or(ii) a magistrates’ court for the area in which P lives;(c) where a magistrates’ court made the order and the application is made by a chief officer of police—(i) that magistrates’ court,(ii) a magistrates’ court for the area in which P lives, or(iii) a magistrates’ court acting for a local justice area that includes any part of the chief officer’s police area.Appeals342U Appeal against serious disruption prevention order(1) Where a serious disruption prevention order is made under section 342L (order on conviction) in respect of a person (“P”), P may appeal against the making of the order as if the order were a sentence passed on P for the offence.(2) Where a serious disruption prevention order is made under section 342M (order otherwise than on conviction) in respect of a person (“P”), P may appeal to the appropriate court against the making of the order.(3) A person who applied under section 342M (order otherwise than on conviction) for a serious disruption prevention order to be imposed in respect of a person may appeal to the appropriate court against a refusal to make the order.(4) Where an application is made under section 342T for an order varying, renewing or discharging a serious disruption prevention order made in respect of a person (“P”)—(a) the person who made the application may appeal to the appropriate court against a refusal to make an order under that section;(b) P may appeal to the appropriate court against the making of an order under that section which was made on the application of a person other than P;(c) a person within subsection (2) of that section (other than P) may appeal to the appropriate court against the making of an order under that section which was made on the application of P.(5) In this section “the appropriate court” means—(a) in relation to an appeal under subsection (2), the Crown Court;(b) in relation to an appeal under subsection (3) or (4)—(i) where the application in question was made to a magistrates’ court, the Crown Court;(ii) where the application in question was made to the Crown Court, the Court of Appeal.(6) On an appeal under this section to the Crown Court, the court may make—(a) such orders as may be necessary to give effect to its determination of the appeal, and (b) such incidental and consequential orders as appear to it to be appropriate.General342V Guidance(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to—(a) chief officers of police,(b) the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force,(c) the chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, and(d) the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,in relation to serious disruption prevention orders.(2) The guidance may in particular include—(a) guidance about the exercise by chief officers of police and the chief constables mentioned in subsection (1) of their functions under this Chapter,(b) guidance about identifying persons in respect of whom it may be appropriate for applications for serious disruption prevention orders to be made, and(c) guidance about providing assistance to prosecutors in connection with applications for serious disruption prevention orders.(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.(4) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued under this section to be published.(5) A chief officer of police or a chief constable mentioned in subsection (1) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section.342W Guidance: Parliamentary procedure(1) Before issuing guidance under section 342V, the Secretary of State must lay a draft of the guidance before Parliament.(2) If, within the 40-day period, either House of Parliament resolves not to approve the draft guidance, the guidance may not be issued.(3) If no such resolution is made within that period, the Secretary of State may issue the guidance.(4) In this section “the 40-day period”, in relation to draft guidance, means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft is laid before Parliament (or, if it is not laid before each House on the same day, the later of the days on which it is laid).(5) In calculating the 40-day period, no account is to be taken of any period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) both Houses are adjourned for more than 4 days.342X Interpretation of ChapterIn this Chapter—“home address”, in relation to a person (“P”), means—(a) the address of P’s sole or main residence, or(b) if P has no such residence, the address or location of a place where P can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as P may select;“injunction” means an injunction granted by the High Court, the county court or a youth court;“protest-related breach”, in relation to an injunction, means a breach which is directly related to a protest; “protest-related offence” means an offence which is directly related to a protest.”(2) In section 3(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions), before paragraph (g) insert—“(fi) to have the conduct of applications for orders under section 342L(1)(b) of the Sentencing Code (serious disruption prevention orders on conviction);”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment contains provisions about serious disruption prevention orders. These are orders which can be imposed on a person who has committed two protest-related offences or who has, on at least two occasions, committed protest-related breaches of injunctions or caused or contributed to the commission of such offences or breaches or to activity related to a protest that resulted in serious disruption to two or more individuals or to an organisation.

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00:00

Division 13

Ayes: 124

Noes: 199

Amendment 160

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we will be supporting the noble Lord, Lord Best, if he chooses to press his amendment to a vote. If I may refer briefly to my experiences as a magistrate, it is indeed true that we do not actually see this charge brought very often—of course, we do see beggars, but it really is not that often. It seems to me that there is widespread cross-party support for repealing the Act. A compromise has been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Best, and I will be interested in hearing the Minister’s response. If the noble Lord does choose to press his amendment, we will support him.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I will join other noble Lords in trying to be brief, given the lateness of the hour. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Best, my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for their commitment on this issue. I can only apologise that the letter was so late in returning to them.

I assured noble Lords in Committee, and I do so again now, that the Government firmly agree that no one should be criminalised simply for having nowhere to live or for sleeping rough. The Government’s dedication to supporting this group has been at the centre of our response to the pandemic, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, has said. We have also recently provided £28 million to local authorities to support them to promote vaccination among people sleeping rough and to provide emergency accommodation to get people off the streets. That builds on the success of the Everyone In programme.

The Government are fully committed to reviewing the Vagrancy Act, but the review has been delayed by the pandemic and by our resulting endeavours to protect vulnerable individuals. In Committee, I explained that rough sleeping and begging were complex issues, and that we therefore must give due consideration to how and why the Vagrancy Act was still used to tackle begging and what impact any changes to the Act will have. This includes consideration of any legislative gap left by repeal that may impact the police’s moves to deal with begging.

The noble Lord spoke about the way the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 can be used to deal with certain types of begging, but that Act is not always a suitable alternative. Begging is complex and does not always meet the legal tests in the 2014 legislation to allow the police or local authorities to tackle specific forms of begging where intervention may still be useful, specifically passive begging, where there is no associated anti-social behaviour but where, none the less, there might be an impact on communities as well as the individual. For example, someone who is sleeping rough might engage in passive begging and might use that money to survive on the street. They might be resistant to taking up offers of support, and this might have an indirect impact on communities or businesses. In such circumstances, there would be nothing the police could do to help compel the individual to take up support.

There are also international examples of different approaches taken to tackle begging, including passive begging, that we should consider. For example, should the police be able to intervene if begging affects businesses or, as in some countries, if begging is opportunistic, for example near an ATM, or fraudulent, such as feigning injury or illness?

The Government think that enforcement, when coupled with meaningful offers of support and close work with other agencies, can form an important part of moving people away from the streets. It is vital that the police can play their part here and that they have effective legislation at their fingertips, but this position does not negate the Government’s firm view that rough sleeping should not be criminalised and, where an individual is truly destitute, it is paramount that a multiagency approach is taken to provide that necessary support. To ensure that the response is effective, we need legislation that complements the delivery of services and allows for constructive engagement with vulnerable individuals. I recently wrote to the noble Lord with more information on the detail of our position.

As it stands, an outright repeal of the Vagrancy Act might leave a gap. That is why, as I explained when I met with the noble Lord, once the necessary work has been concluded, the Government are committed to repealing the outdated Act and replacing it with much more modern, fit-for-purpose legislation when parliamentary time allows. Until we have completed this work, it would be a bit premature to repeal the Act. In the light of the commitment that I have outlined, confirming that the Government will consult on what the appropriate legislation should look like, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Best (CB)]

My Lords, I am sincerely grateful to noble Lords who supported the case for repeal of the Vagrancy Act. I thank the Minister for her comments, but I confess to being very disappointed that she has not been able to commit to a Third Reading amendment covering the repeal of just the rough sleeping part of the Vagrancy Act. Even though she made it clear that this will happen sometime one day, she has not been able to announce that this step will be taken at Third Reading. I really see no reason why we could not come to an agreement on this amendment, which is limited but repeals the most egregious aspect of the old Vagrancy Act.

However, the Minister has rejected our proposals, which means that people who are homeless will remain subject to being criminalised rather than being supported out of their predicament into the indefinite future. My only course of action is to hope that this can be resolved in the Commons. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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00:28

Division 14

Ayes: 144

Noes: 101

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Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

161: Schedule 20, page 293, line 13, at end insert—
“10A_ In Schedule 24, omit paragraph 154(f).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment repeals an amendment of section 38(4)(j) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which has been repealed.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, I know this is the business that most people have been waiting for. Amendments 161 and 162 have both arisen following the consolidation of sentencing procedural law into the Sentencing Code by the Sentencing Act 2020.

These amendments, as eagle-eyed noble Lords will have realised, omit provisions in Schedule 24 to the Sentencing Act 2020 and Schedule 13 to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 respectively. Those provisions are redundant, as they make amendments to provisions which have already been omitted or repealed. Omitting them will avoid any potential confusion regarding their operation. I beg to move.

Amendment 161 agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

162: Schedule 20, page 293, line 22, at end insert—
“Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 (c. 11)
12_ In Schedule 13 to the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, omit paragraph 44.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment repeals an amendment in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 of section 106A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, which was repealed by the Sentencing Act 2020.

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Moved by

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

166: Clause 178, page 198, line 27, at end insert—
“(sa) section (Knife crime prevention order on conviction: adjournment of proceedings) (2) to (4);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford to be inserted after Clause 142 and relating to adjournment of proceedings on an application for a knife crime prevention order.

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Moved by

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar]

167: Clause 178, page 198, line 34, at end insert—
“(aa) section (Required life sentence for manslaughter of emergency worker);”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 2 and relating to a required life sentence for the manslaughter of an emergency worker.