Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateWednesday 27th October 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberPolice, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 40-III(b) Amendments for Committee (supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (27 Oct 2021)
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendments 80, 90A, 94, 96, and 97 in this group. I was hoping that this group might be an example of this House at its best, where reasonable and reasoned amendments have been tabled, the Government have seen and responded positively to them and the Bill could be improved as a result. We clearly do not all agree on everything yet, but what all sides of the House—including the Government —appear to agree on is that the Bill as drafted and passed by the other place in respect of Chapter 3 on the extraction of information from electronic devices is not fit for purpose.
I shall take my amendments first. The House of Lords Constitution Committee raised concerns about victims of crime not coming forward or withdrawing from the criminal justice process because they may have to hand over personal and sensitive data, particularly victims and survivors of violence against women and girls, including rape. Although the draft code of practice published by the Government includes guidance that suggests refusal to provide a device or to agree to the extraction of information from it should not automatically result in the closure of any inquiry or complaint—particularly in light of the dramatic reduction in charges and prosecutions for rape over the past five years—the committee recommended that safeguards that protect victims’ rights to privacy and guard against digital extraction as a condition for continuing an investigation or prosecution should appear in the Bill rather than in a non-binding code of practice. Amendment 80 addresses the issue raised by the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in her powerful and compelling contribution.
This issue is partially addressed by government Amendment 93, which states that a person must not have been placed under undue pressure to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it and that a written notice must be provided which states that the person may refuse and that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end merely because of that refusal. As well as being given the information in writing, the person should be told this orally and be reassured by the investigating officer. The government amendment does not go far enough.
I would go further and say that what people store on their electronic devices and share with each other has changed dramatically over the years. In particular, those from older generations may not be aware of the degree of openness with which explicit images, for example, are routinely shared using electronic devices, potentially leading prosecutors and jurors to draw unjustified conclusions about the behaviour of victims of rape or sexual assault in particular, whether they be male or female. Thankfully, most right-minded people no longer think a woman wearing a short skirt is “asking for it”, but there may be a way to go before the sharing of intimate photographs, for example, is dismissed in a similar way. That is why it is essential that victims are reassured in the way these amendments are intended to provide.
Amendment 90A makes a slightly different point and covers a similar area to that provided by Amendment 92 from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in relation to the extraction of information from devices used by children and adults without capacity. In relation to both groups of users, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, suggests that a “registered social worker” give authority for the extraction of information, in the absence of a parent or guardian, whereas, in Clause 37(3)(b), the Government suggest that
“any responsible person who is aged 18 or over other than a relevant authorised person”
can give authority. Although police constables and members of staff appointed as authorised persons by chief constables would be excluded, police members of staff not authorised would not be excluded.
From my own professional experience, I know that it is often difficult to get hold of parents or guardians or to get them to co-operate, for example by attending a police station when their child is in custody. Equally, it is difficult to get hold of a social worker, particularly outside office hours, where there may be only one or a few social workers on call, dealing with the whole range of social work responsibilities—hence the “appropriate adults” scheme was established to look after the interests of children and vulnerable adults in custody. Appropriate adults are volunteers, recruited through local schemes, who are selected for their ability to act with independence from the police. Schemes take into account volunteers’ attitudes and motivations and any other roles that they may hold. They undergo training in the appropriate adults role and undergo a criminal record—DBS—check, although a criminal record will not necessarily act as an automatic bar.
Amendment 90A seeks to find a compromise between allowing any responsible person aged 18 or over, including potentially those employed by the police, to give authority for the handing over and extraction of data from a child’s or vulnerable adult’s electronic device and the registered social worker who is not always readily available, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 89.
I apologise—this is a long group. Amendment 96 seeks to increase the authority level for the extraction of information to a senior officer—at a rank where someone of that rank is normally on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and readily available—who is independent of the investigation and can objectively assess whether the conditions that allow for the extraction of information have been met. There are precedents across policing: for example, custody officers or those authorising the deployment of covert surveillance, where someone independent of the investigation makes these kinds of decisions.
Amendment 97 is again intended to provide parliamentary scrutiny of guidance, as is Amendment 102, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to which I have added my name. I agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Beith’s Amendment 103 that the restrictions on the exercise of power to extract information in relation to confidential information must be in the Bill and not simply contained in regulations. I understand the reasons for wanting to exclude immigration officers from the list of authorised persons who can extract information from electronic devices, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in his Amendment 107.
On immigration officers, we share the belief that there should be a firewall between criminal investigations and immigration enforcement, to the extent that details about the immigration status of victims should not be passed to the immigration authorities but should be dealt with elsewhere. I can envisage circumstances where immigration officers may need to download information from electronic devices—for example, to tackle people smuggling—although I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said, which was that that should perhaps be a matter for the police rather than immigration officers.
I also accept the very important point made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol about the particular vulnerability of asylum seekers and their lack of knowledge of what the law allows and does not allow immigration officers to do, and how we need many more safeguards for asylum seekers in this provision. We also wholeheartedly agree with Amendment 106A regarding requests for third-party material. If I had not been overwhelmed by the volume of amendments added to the Bill every day, I would have added my name to that amendment.
We all in different ways have attempted to provide a more robust but workable regime around the extraction of information from mobile devices. The best way forward would be for all noble Lords, including the Minister, to withdraw their amendments, for the Minister and officials to meet with us before Report, and for officials to take the best from each of these amendments and those discussions, to produce a single set of amendments to which hopefully we can agree, rather than having to put down amendments on Report to the government amendments agreed in Committee. Taking the debate offline will save time on the Floor of the House on Report, when the agreed amendments could simply be nodded through. However, it appears that the Labour Opposition are content to allow the government amendments to be agreed at this stage, despite the clear differences between what they are proposing and the government amendments.
The noble Lord, Lord Hayward, made the important point, as we did on these Benches when this House debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, that these issues also affect men. The noble Lord also praised the police, who are in a very difficult position, which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, alluded to, where they find themselves under pressure from the Crown Prosecution Service to go further than maybe even police officers may be comfortable going in terms of accessing personal information from victims’ phones. I repeat the question asked by the noble Lord: who speaks for the Crown Prosecution Service in this debate?
I studied politics at university, I was a very senior police officer for years, I ran for Mayor of London twice and I have been a member of your Lordships’ House for over eight years, but I still do not understand politics. Suffice it to say that, without Labour support, there is no point in dividing the Committee if the Government move their amendments formally at this stage.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I join the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, in apologising to the House for the length of my comments. It might assist the Committee if I begin with a brief overview of the provisions in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Bill. These provisions will establish, for the first time, a clear statutory basis for the extraction of information from digital devices with the agreement of the device user, and introduce safeguards to protect the privacy of victims, witnesses and others. I echo the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that it is a vast intrusion. People’s lives are on their digital devices and I understand the sensitivity of that.
The current approach to the extraction of information from digital devices has been criticised as inconsistent and, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, says, as being tantamount to a digital strip search, where devices were taken as a matter of course and where, in many cases, all the sensitive personal data belonging to a device user was extracted and processed, even when it was not relevant to the offence under investigation. Clearly, that is unacceptable. This resulted in privacy and victims’ groups opposing this practice, particularly in cases where the device belongs to a victim or witness.
A consistent approach is clearly needed to ensure that requests for information are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that all those agreeing to provide their sensitive personal data have all the information that they need to make that decision, including details on why their information is needed, how it will be used and their right to refuse to share that information without any negative consequences. This lack of consistency is of particular concern where the offences under investigation are those such as rape and serious sexual assault, where the victim is likely to be extremely distressed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, and where rates of reporting and conviction are far too low.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
To back that up, I point out that Oliver Mears, Samson Makele and Liam Allan were three young men who were nearly the victims of miscarriages of justice in those circumstances. If we say that a victim’s phone will be looked at, we are assuming that they are the victim, but it is an ambivalent point while somebody is innocent until proven guilty. We just have to be a little cautious about the language we use, because in one instance the police suppressed information—they had the phone details but did not put it forward—but in the others, it was on the phone that the proof was found. We just need balance. I do not want digital strip searches, but I do not want miscarriages of justice. People are squeamish about looking for evidence on people’s phones because they are presented as victims.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
Perhaps I should have said “alleged victim”; that goes to my noble friend’s point. Each case is different, but usually the remedy is through the court process and it is established where the perversion of justice might be taking place. But I thank my noble friend for his point about the alleged victim.
Lord Beith (LD)
I hope I am right, but surely there is nothing in the provisions being carried through now that would in any way relieve the prosecution of the obligation to disclose to the defence any material that came from this process and was potentially of assistance to the defence.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
The noble Lord is absolutely right, but I think my noble friend is making a point about where the tables are turned and the alleged victim is not the victim at all.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
In the sort of scenario being described, the suspect—not yet a defendant—will be able to say, “This was consensual and there is a text message that will demonstrate that.” Once that is asserted, that can be sought. It is not a justification for the kind of wholesale retention of mobile phones and trawling of data that people fear. I know that the hour is late and that the Minister wants to make progress, but I just want to put two questions before I sit down and let her finish her response.
First, I noticed while the Minister was speaking that the formulation used in my noble friend Lord Rosser’s Amendment 89 is “strict necessity”, whereas in the government amendments the test is of necessity—
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
If the noble Baroness would bear with me, I am going to get on to that point about the read-across to other things. I hope that I have made it clear that I totally empathise with and get the point that my noble friend is making and that the remedy should be established through the court process.
Amendments 99 to 101 address a further point raised by the Victims’ Commissioner; namely, that she and other like commissioners have a statutory right to be consulted on the code of practice. This will give victims and witnesses further confidence that their concerns and priorities are represented in this code of practice.
Amendment 105 will ensure that the Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice are consulted before regulations are made to add, remove or amend an authority with devolved competence under Schedule 3.
Government Amendments 108 and 109 add to the list of authorised persons in Schedule 3. Amendment 108 will ensure that authorised persons in the Insolvency Service can exercise the Clause 36 power for the purposes of the prevention, detection or investigation of crime in pursuit of their functions, which include tackling financial wrongdoing. This was initially a mystery to me, but the Insolvency Service is an executive agency of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, hence the language used in the amendment, but it is important to note that the reference to an officer of BEIS is qualified because any individual falling within that description may exercise the powers only for the prevention, detection or investigation of crime. Schedule 3 already enables the Independent Office for Police Conduct to exercise the Clause 36 powers. Amendment 109 adds the equivalent bodies in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
As I have said, we believe that the government amendments address many of the points raised in amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, but I will now turn to some of the other amendments in this group. Amendment 79 seeks to provide free independent legal advice to device users before they agree to the extraction of information from their device. Government Amendment 93 will ensure that device users are fully informed of the reasons that the information has been sought and how the information will be used. We do not think that provisions in this chapter are the right place to address what is a broader issue about the provision of legal advice to victims and witnesses given the wider impacts across the criminal justice system as a whole.
As regards Amendment 89, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, highlighted the alternative drafting in respect of the test for the exercise of the Clause 36 powers. As the Bill is drafted, the authorised person must be satisfied that the exercise of the power is necessary and proportionate to achieve the relevant purpose. Under Amendment 89, this necessity test would become one of “strictly necessary”. The matter was also raised by the Victims’ Commissioner in briefings to noble Lords.
We understand that the reason for the concern is the strict necessity requirement in the Data Protection Act 2018. The powers in Clauses 36 and 39 must be read alongside existing obligations under the 2018 Act or the UK GDPR. In every case where authorised persons are extracting sensitive personal information from a device under these powers for a law enforcement purpose, such as preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime, they must continue to meet the strict necessity threshold in the Data Protection Act. It is therefore not necessary to duplicate that existing legal requirement in the Bill; it is there.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I apologise for intervening. The Minister has been very helpful with this comprehensive response, but she said that the Government were not going to respond to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report until “the next stage”. It would be wholly unsatisfactory if they did not respond to that detailed report, which was issued weeks ago, until just before Report, because we have submitted a range of amendments. The House trusts the Minister, so could she do a bit better than “the next stage” and respond before Committee is over?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I will do my damnedest. I will take back the noble and learned Lord’s comments and see what is in the art of the possible. I can do no more than promise that, if he is happy with that—or rather, if he will accept it.
I will move on swiftly to Amendment 107, which seeks to remove immigration officers from Schedule 3, so that they can no longer exercise the powers in this Bill. Immigration officers play a vital role in protecting vulnerable people, in particular those who may be victims of trafficking, and it is important that they are able to obtain information that may be vital to these and other investigations. I therefore do not accept that immigration officers should not have access to these powers, subject to the same safeguards that apply to other authorised persons.
Finally, Amendment 106A relates to third-party material, an issue highlighted not just by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Anderson, this evening, but by the Victims’ Commissioner, Dame Vera Baird. The amendment highlights a very important issue around the proportionality of requests for third-party material relevant to a victim. This material can be highly sensitive—for example, medical records. We agree that such material should only ever be sought where there is a reasonable line of inquiry, but we are aware that this is not always the case. There are examples where such requests cannot be justified, and this has a detrimental impact on the confidence of victims.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also talked about written information given to victims. The police forces will use the digital processing notices developed by the NPCC for this purpose. The DPN, in layman’s terms, explains how the police extract the information, which information might be extracted, for how long it might be retained—that question was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and answered in part by my noble friend Lord Hayward—and what happens to irrelevant material found on the device. The DPN makes clear that investigators must respect individual rights to privacy and must not go beyond reasonable lines of inquiry.
The Government wholeheartedly agree that there needs to be a consistent approach to ensure that requests for third-party material are made with the victim’s right to privacy in mind and to ensure that the victim is fully informed. This principle is key to a number of actions in the Government’s end-to-end rape review, which we published in June.
Moving on to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on Amendment 106A, our understanding is that the NPCC agrees in principle to the need for legislation but has not taken a view on a particular legislative solution. As I have indicated, this issue requires further examination, so I thank the noble Lord. I understand that the CPS similarly accepts the need for appropriate controls on access to third-party material.
The police and the CPS are working on new guidance for the investigators and victims which can be finalised after the Information Commissioner’s Office publishes its report on data in rape cases, which is due imminently. We will also consider whether a change is required to the Attorney-General’s guidelines. This will give us an opportunity to consider the broader landscape with regards to proportionality in requests for evidence from victims and whether further steps should then be taken. In terms of DPNs and involvement of the Victims’ Commissioner: yes, she has been involved with the development of the digital processing notices.
I apologise again for the length of my remarks to the Committee. The Committee has raised important issues in respect of the privacy of victims and witnesses, and it is very important we get the framework in the Bill right. I hope noble Lords will agree that we have listened to the concerns that additional safeguards should be set out in the Bill and will be content to agree the government amendments in lieu of their own. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Beith, that we will consider further their Amendments 97 and 103, and to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are very alive to the issues around third-party material. For now, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to withdraw Amendment 79.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, very briefly: I really am grateful to the Minister. It is a very big group, and it is difficult to take in everything she said. But we have to be very careful. People will be reading the record of this debate. I think I heard the Minister say that the authorised person must explain that the investigation or inquiry will not be brought to an end if they refuse to hand over their device. That is not what it says on the face of the Bill. It says the person must be given a written notice.
These might have been many decades ago, but I know of situations where police officers shoved a piece of paper in front of somebody who was either a victim or a suspect—even somebody who could not read—and said something different from what was on the piece of paper. So I think we have to make it absolutely clear in the Bill, not just in the guidance or the codes of practice, that this must be explained, which was the meaning of one of my amendments.
The other thing I think I heard the Minister say—it is late—is that the authorised person must explain to the victim that refusal would have no negative consequences. That cannot possibly be right. For example, in a rape case where consent is an issue—where, perhaps, the defence argued that there were exchanges of messages or some such things that go to the heart of whether consent is an issue—and the victim refuses to hand over their device, there could be negative consequences when it comes to trial. Again, I understand that the Minister wants to be helpful and reassuring to victims, but we have to be absolutely clear what we are promising here, if it is being said on the record in this Committee.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
The hour is late. Because these things are so important, I will reiterate them in a letter to the noble Lord.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
First, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also thank the Minister for her detailed response. I do not think she need apologise in any way for the length of it, since I am sure noble Lords would rather have a full response to the points that have been made than a shortened response. Like other noble Lords, I will read carefully in Hansard everything she had to say in reply to my amendments, as I am sure other noble Lords will in relation to their amendments. This part of the Bill has certainly been improved by the government amendments, which we welcome. But, equally, it can and should be further strengthened and improved.
There are a number of outstanding issues of concern, which I and other noble Lords have raised this evening and which I know Minister is aware of. I hope that she will agree to further discussions between now and Report on those issues of concern that have been raised in this debate. I know that the Minister is usually very open to holding such discussions—I see she is nodding—and will agree to that, as I say, between now and Report.
“(za) in a case where the authorised person proposes to exercise the power for a purpose within subsection (2)(a), the authorised person reasonably believes that information stored on the electronic device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be, pursued by an authorised person,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment has the effect that, to exercise the power in Clause 36(1) for the purposes of preventing etc crime, an authorised person must reasonably believe that information stored on an electronic device is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford at page 30, line 8.
“(12) This section is subject to section (Requirements for voluntary provision and agreement)(requirements for voluntary provision and agreement).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Baroness Williams of Trafford to insert a new Clause after Clause 37.
“Requirements for voluntary provision and agreement
(1) A person (“P”) is to be treated for the purposes of section 36 or 37 as having—(a) voluntarily provided an electronic device to an authorised person, and(b) agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person,only if the requirements of this section have been met.(2) An authorised person must not have placed undue pressure on P to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.(3) An authorised person must have given P notice in writing—(a) specifying or describing the information that is sought,(b) specifying the reason why the information is sought,(c) specifying how the information will be dealt with once it has been extracted,(d) stating that P may refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it, and(e) stating that the investigation or enquiry for the purposes of which the information is sought will not be brought to an end merely because P refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it.(4) Subject to subsection (5), P must have confirmed in writing that P has—(a) voluntarily provided the device to an authorised person, and(b) agreed to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person.(5) If P was unable to provide that confirmation in writing as a result of P’s physical impairment or lack of literacy skills—(a) P must have given that confirmation orally, and(b) an authorised person must have recorded P’s confirmation in writing.(6) If P’s confirmation was given in writing and in hard copy form, the authorised person must have given P a copy of that confirmation (in hard copy or electronic form).(7) If P’s confirmation was given orally, the authorised person must have given P a copy of the record of that confirmation (in hard copy or electronic form).” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment sets out the requirements which must be met before a person is treated as having voluntarily provided an electronic device, and having agreed to the extraction of information from the device, for the purposes of Clauses 36 or 37.
“(1A) The code may make different provision for different purposes or areas.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment enables a code of practice under Clause 40 to make different provision for different purposes or areas.
“(5A) The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before making regulations under subsection (4) if and so far as the regulations make provision that would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament. (5B) The Secretary of State must consult the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under subsection (4) if and so far as the regulations make provision that, if it were contained in an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly—(a) would be within the legislative competence of that Assembly, and(b) would not require the consent of the Secretary of State.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult the Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under Clause 42(4) which would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.