Immigration and Asylum Bill (Eighth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 20, page 18, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) The first and second sets of exceptional circumstances do not apply where a person has been convicted of—

(a) a specified offence within the meaning of section 306 of the Sentencing Code, or

(b) an offence listed in Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 committed against a person under the age of 18.”

This amendment would prevent foreign nationals convicted of specified violent, sexual or terrorism offences, or sexual offences against children, from resisting deportation on the long-residence or “unduly harsh” family grounds, whatever their sentence.

Amendment 109, in clause 20, page 18, line 29, leave out from “is” to end of line 30 and insert

“over and above that which would arise if the circumstances in subsection (4) or (5) applied.”

This amendment would require very compelling circumstances going beyond the long-residence and family exceptions, rather than circumstances merely “at least as strong as” them, restoring the formulation in the current section 117C(6).

Amendment 110, in clause 20, page 18, line 34, after “3(5)(a)” insert “, (5)(b)”

This probing amendment would include family members of a deportee within the definition of a person liable to deportation for the purposes of Part 5A.

Amendment 111, in clause 20, page 18, line 36, leave out “(2) to (4)” and insert “(2) and (3)”

This amendment is related to Amendment 107. It would retain section 117D(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which sets out how a period of imprisonment is calculated for the purposes of Part 5A of that Act.

Clause stand part.

New clause 45—Deportation of foreign offenders—

“(1) The UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 32, for subsections (1) to (3) substitute—

‘(1) In this section “foreign criminal” means a person—

(a) who is not a British or Irish citizen, and

(b) who is—

(i) convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence, or

(ii) charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.’

(3) In section 33, omit subsections (1)(b), (2), (3) and (6A).

(4) In section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, omit all instances of the word ‘knowingly’.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign national who is convicted of an offence or who is charged with an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971.

New clause 66—Automatic deportation: forced-marriage offences—

“(1) Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 is amended as follows

(2) In subsection (1)(c), for ‘Condition 1 or 2’ substitute ‘Condition 1, 2 or 3’.

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) Condition 3 is that the person has been convicted of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (offence of forced marriage: England and Wales).’”

This new clause would amend section 32 of the UK Borders Act to create a separate basis for automatic deportation where a person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence under section 121 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, concerning forced marriage.

New clause 67—Particularly serious crime: National Security Act 2023 offences—

“(1) Section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) After (5ZB) insert—

‘(6) A person is presumed to have been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime if—

(a) the person is convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence listed in the National Security Act 2023; and

(b) the person is not, by virtue of the conviction, a person falling within subsection (2).’”

This new clause would make any conviction of an offence under the National Security Act 2023 an automatic deportation offence, as is currently the case with offences under Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. This morning, we were debating clause 20 and amendments 107, 109 and 111, and I will pick up where I left off.

There will be an assessment of the public interest in every case before an article 8 breach can be found, taking into account not only the seriousness of someone’s offending, but other relevant factors such as their immigration status. The aim of the new article 8 test is to take a broader view of the public interest and move away from the sentence-based or offence-type focus when assessing the severity of offending.

Conservative amendment 109 seeks to elevate the test of “very compelling circumstances” in the third set of exceptional circumstances, requiring circumstances above and beyond what would be demonstrated by meeting either of the other two exceptional circumstances tests. The exceptions in the current article 8 framework are different from the three sets of exceptional circumstances, and it is through that new framework that very compelling circumstances must be viewed.

The third exceptional circumstance does not replace the current “very compelling circumstances” test and does not operate in the same way. The three sets of exceptional circumstances are intended to be exactly that: exceptional. They serve as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Under the current framework, the exceptions operate as exceptions to deportation. If a foreign criminal meets one of the exceptions, or can show very compelling circumstances over and above those exceptions, deportation will be prevented. Under the new framework, the third exceptional circumstance, which refers to very compelling circumstances, simply ensures that a person has a sufficiently strong article 8 claim before the courts consider whether the interference with their article 8 rights outweighs the public interest in deportation.

Meeting that threshold does not mean that deportation is automatically avoided—it is not a pass or a threshold to get over. It acts a filter to ensure that, where a person cannot meet one of the three sets of exceptional circumstances, their article 8 claim will fail without the court proceeding to a proportionality assessment. This is not a watering down of the very compelling circumstances test as it applies under the current framework. Rather, under the new framework, “very compelling circumstances” operates as a gateway to a full consideration of whether the public interest in deportation is outweighed in the individual case.

Amendment 110 would bring those being deported as the family member of a foreign national offender into scope of clause 20. Although the Immigration Act 1971 makes provision for the deportation of family members as a matter of policy, that is not a course that Governments have pursued in practice. Instead, where a family member’s permission to stay in the UK depends on the status of the person being deported, the usual approach is to consider their removal under administrative removal powers. Where a family member raises an article 8 claim, it will be considered under section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The exclusion from clause 20 of section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family member should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than under the deportation framework.

The amendments are unnecessary. Clause 20 already ensures that no foreign criminal will avoid deportation simply by establishing an impact on their private or family life. Instead, every case will require a full assessment of whether any interference with article 8 rights is outweighed by the public interest in deportation, with particular weight given to the seriousness of offending. The clause therefore strengthens the deportation framework while preserving individual assessment in genuinely exceptional cases.

Before I move on, I will come back to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion this morning, as I did not get the chance to respond. In our debate about financial independence and public service pressures, she mentioned discrimination and concerns about vulnerability. I want to be clear that the intention is not to penalise people for hardship. The reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children while making it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight. It is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion also made points about the best interests of children. We are clear that the reforms set out in clause 19 do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making. The reforms ensure that children’s interests are considered along with other important factors, such as compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system. The reforms ensure that all relevant factors are properly weighed and that immigration decisions are fair, proportionate and consistent. Where a decision is taken to remove a child’s parent, it is ultimately for the parents to decide whether to relocate together as a family or to live separately. In every case, the Government will continue to consider fully the best interests of any child involved.

The hon. Member addressed the word “precarious” and questioned whether clause 19 would mean that little weight is given to family life in cases in which a person has anything short of settled status. Let me be clear: the reforms do not penalise people for following our immigration rules. They place greater emphasis on the public interest in fair and controlled immigration systems, with greater weight given to compliance with the rules and with the public interest test. Article 8 rights developed while someone is in the UK without settled status are given less weight, in recognition that the ability to maintain family or private life in a country where the individual does not have permanent status is naturally precarious.

I was also asked what constitutes a serious breach. We expect everyone to comply with the conditions of their permission to stay, but I want to be clear that not every breach is equal. It would not be right to treat a minor or technical breach in the same way as deliberate or repeated non-compliance, or to equate it to illegally entering or staying in the UK. Whether a breach is serious will depend on its circumstances. The nature of the breach, why it occurred, its frequency and duration, and whether the individual disclosed it and engaged with the Home Office will all be taken into consideration. Should someone who knowingly and repeatedly fails to comply with reporting requirements be treated the same as someone who misses a single appointment for a genuine reason and informs the Home Office? I think we know the answer. The distinction allows us to take a firm but proportionate approach, including where multiple breaches taken together amount to serious non-compliance.

On the impermissibility limit and whether the circumstances of offending are taken into account, proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 expressly allows for the

“nature and circumstances of…offending”

to be taken into account. I am grateful to the Committee for allowing me to clarify those points from the earlier discussion.

On new clause 45, the Government are clear that foreign nationals who commit serious crimes should be deported. The automatic deportation provisions already provide a firm statutory framework for foreign criminals who meet the relevant thresholds. They require that a deportation be made wherever the law permits. Outside the automatic deportation regime, there are legal powers to consider the deportation of any non-British citizen whose deportation is conducive to the public good. The new clause is not a proportionate or workable way to strengthen that framework. It would make any conviction, however minor, sufficient to trigger automatic deportation. If a foreign national had resided lawfully in the country for over 40 years but received an absolute discharge on conviction for a minor motor offence, the Home Secretary would be under a duty to deport them unless an exemption applied. Such deportations would likely be unworkable in practice because they would be disallowed on appeal on article 8 grounds under the European convention on human rights.

The new clause would also bring a person within the definition of a “foreign criminal” merely because they had been charged with an immigration offence before a court had determined guilt. That would be fundamentally contrary to our legal system, in which an individual is innocent until proven guilty, and it would represent a substantial expansion of the auto-deport regime. The new clause would also remove statutory exceptions and delete the word “knowingly” throughout section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. Those changes could have consequences well beyond the stated aim of the new clause, including for criminal liability, fairness and the UK’s international obligations.

Decisions to deport must be robust, lawful and capable of withstanding challenge. A measure that is drafted too broadly risks delay, additional litigation and outcomes that cannot be lawfully implemented. For those reasons, I ask Conservative Members not to pursue new clause 45.

I turn to new clause 66. Forced marriage is an appalling crime, as the Committee would agree. The Government are clear that people who commit that offence must face the full force of the criminal law and, where they are foreign nationals, deportation—I want to be absolutely explicit about that in this Committee. However, we do not consider that the new clause is the right way to achieve that aim. Under the UK Borders Act 2007, the Secretary of State is already required to make a deportation order where a qualifying foreign criminal receives a sentence of at least 12 months, subject to the statutory exceptions.

If that threshold is not met, the existing power to deport where conducive to the public good—of which I think this crime would be clear evidence—remains available. The new clause would make a conviction for one specified offence sufficient to trigger automatic deportation, regardless of the sentence imposed. It could therefore apply even when the sentencing court considers that a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. That would cut across the existing structure, which uses the sentence and other statutory criteria as indicators of seriousness.

Although I recognise the intention and understand the purpose of the new clause, it is not feasible to specify on the face of the Bill all the crimes that we would like to carry that result. We use sentences to indicate seriousness, and we would be in danger either of missing out or of diminishing other horrendous offences if we did not also put them in the Bill—I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. The new clause is also confined to the England and Wales offence and does not address equivalent offending across the whole of the UK. Automatic deportation would in any event remain subject to the exceptions in section 33 of the UK Borders Act, including our international obligations. I understand the objective of the new clause, but for those reasons, and although I acknowledge the abhorrence of forced marriage, I ask the Committee to reject it.

I turn to new clause 67. Before considering it in detail, I draw attention to the fact that, despite what is asserted in the explanatory statement provided by the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), the new clause would not achieve her aims. It amends the test for disapplying the prohibition against returning refugees to danger, rather than amending the threshold for auto-deportation. It sets out that convictions for offences under the National Security Act 2023 should be presumed to be particularly serious crimes under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Article 33 of the refugee convention already allows refugees to be returned to their country when they have committed a particularly serious crime and, as a result, constitute a danger to the community. There is no definition of “particularly serious crime” in the convention, and no universal uniformity in the interpretation adopted by other states parties. It is open to the UK to interpret the term in good faith, which requires consideration of the ordinary meaning of the words, and it is clear that national security offences are particularly serious crimes.

Article 33.2 of the refugee convention also allows refugees to be refouled where they are a danger to the security of the UK. That may include individuals who engage in unacceptable behaviours in the UK or abroad, or who undertake or espouse extremist views, as well as those who foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence to further particular beliefs or provoke others to commit terrorist acts. There is no requirement in the convention for a criminal conviction. The new clause would therefore have very little impact in practice; if anything, it would set the threshold too high. It is already Home Office policy in cases involving national security threats, or where there is a conviction for a particularly serious crime and the individual is considered to pose a threat to the community, to refuse refugee status and to seek to remove the individual from the UK.

It is imperative that any asylum seekers and refugees who have been convicted of particularly serious crimes, or who constitute a danger to UK society, do not benefit from protection status. Not only have they failed to respect the laws of the United Kingdom by committing heinous acts, but they have also undermined public confidence in the ability of the state to protect the public. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully request that hon. Members do not pursue their amendments and new clauses, and I commend clause 20 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. Let me set out the test that we will apply to this part of the Bill. Protection should be there for people who genuinely need it, when they need it. When that need ends, they should go home. That is what the public expect, and it is what the Government say they want. The question is whether this part of the Bill delivers it.

First, to give them credit where it is due, the Government now propose to replace clause 21 with new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. Instead of leaving the whole framework to regulations, Ministers propose to put the definition into the Bill itself. That is better. Amendment 132 has not been selected so the question of retaining clause 21 will come through the stand part debate, but there is still a scrutiny problem. New clause 36 keeps a power to change primary legislation with no time limit. The linked Government amendment 134 makes those changes subject to affirmative approval, but other regulations would use the negative procedure. Why should powers to confer rights or impose obligations operate on that basis? What further change does the Minister already have in mind?

I support amendment 137, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before any further leave is granted, it would require consideration of whether removal would still breach our obligations on the convention or humanitarian protection grounds. That means checking the continuing need at every renewal, not just in selected cases. Government new clause 35 would give the Home Secretary a power to revoke protection status, but a power to revoke is not a duty to review. Will the Minister carry the principle of amendment 137 into the replacement framework? When protection is no longer needed, how will departure follow?

That is why we cannot support amendment 53, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. It would require an initial grant of at least five years and eligibility to apply for settlement after five years, but the passing of five years tells us nothing about whether protection is still needed. That need should determine the approach. Nor can we support amendment 54. It would allow partners, children and dependent adult children to apply to join someone with protection status without fees, a health surcharge, an income test or maintenance or accommodation requirements. Who pays when the sponsor cannot support or house the family? What assessment has been made of the numbers and the pressure on housing, schools and GP surgeries?

On amendment 75, how would children’s interests be considered under the replacement framework? Amendment 51 would challenge the power to confer rights and impose obligations, while amendment 52 would challenge a different provision for convention and humanitarian claims. What difference does the Minister intend? On amendment 74, would the commitment not to reduce existing entitlements still apply?

I support amendment 138, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire. Before the first regulations were put to Parliament, it would require the publication of draft regulations and a statement of the proposed immigration rules, covering the length of leave, reviews of protection and the qualifying period for settlement. Those details would tell us how this will actually work. Although the amendment was drafted against clause 21, the need for those answers does not disappear when the Government replace it. Will the Minister publish the equivalent material for the new framework before asking Parliament to approve its implementation?

What happens to existing grants, pending claims and live appeals? Will anyone have to reapply because the label has changed? What staff and resources will be needed to review protection properly without creating another backlog? We support protection for as long as it is needed. Amendments 137 and 138 ask Ministers to explain how they will check that need and show Parliament the rules. Putting definitions in the Bill is welcome, but we still need to know how the system will work.

[Anna Turley]

I really appreciate the contributions from all the hon. Members this afternoon. Before responding directly to the clauses and amendments that we have discussed so far, I hope the Committee will allow me to set out why this approach is being taken.

As part of the wider core protection reforms set out by the Home Secretary last year in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement, the UK’s asylum policy statement published in November 2025 set out the new approach to protection in the UK. That marks a significant change in direction away from an assumption of offering permanent protection towards protection that is granted for the duration of need, which we call “core protection”. Put simply, replacing the two categories of protection—refugee and humanitarian protection status—with one single form of protection status will simplify the asylum decision making process and prevent unnecessary and tenuous appeals.

It is important to reflect on how we got to where we are. Those two protection statuses are essentially a historical relic from separating those in danger on return to their countries of origin from those in need of protection for political or identity reasons. As time has evolved, the two statuses have become functionally identical, except in some small areas such as travel documents. That creates an administrative burden for the Home Office for no good reason. We are therefore proposing to merge those two statuses.

Clause 21 will reconcile those two statuses so that the system is administratively simpler for refugees and decision makers. In order to do that, we are also taking a limited power to deal with the existence of terms such as “refugee”, “refugee protection” and “humanitarian protection”, which exist throughout our extensive immigration and asylum statute book and will need replacing with a single term: “core protection”. Under the current system, those who qualify for refugee or humanitarian protection status are granted similar entitlements—30 months’ permission to stay and the same route to settlement. Where there are differences, such as in relation to travel documents, we are making changes to ensure that all those who are granted core protection are eligible.

One of the points raised in the debate was about whether we are more expansive than other European countries. That is absolutely right; as the Home Secretary set out in “Restoring Order and Control”, our offer to refugees is more expansive than that of other European countries. Once they are granted refugee status, the current system grants leave to remain for five years. At the end of that period, refugees can immediately apply for settlement, giving them an indefinite right to live in the UK. This application is fee-free and essentially automatic, being almost entirely absent of requirements.

When compared with that of some of our European neighbours, this approach to protection is generous. In Denmark—a country that has tightened its asylum system in recent years—residence permits are issued to refugees for just two years, and they are designed to be temporary. Settlement can typically be obtained only after eight years of residence and is subject to multiple conditions, including full-time employment, meeting an earnings threshold, language proficiency and active citizenship.

Clause 21 sets out what constitutes a protection claim and who will qualify for protection status. A person has protection status if they have been granted permission to stay in the UK because removing them would breach our obligations under the refugee convention, or if they would be at real risk of serious harm. The UK is proud to offer sanctuary to those in need, for as long as it is needed, in line with our international obligations. We believe that all those who face persecution for a specified reason, as contained in the 1951 convention, as well as those who fear torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection, and that this country should play its part.

This measure is part of simplifying the current system, which has two forms of protection status that grant similar entitlements, namely refugee status and humanitarian protection. Under the new system, individuals who qualify for protection will be granted core protection status. As such, this change will streamline asylum decision making and reduce unnecessary appeals.

Before I turn to the amendments themselves, I want to draw the Committee’s attention to Government new clauses 35 and 36 and new schedule 1. I will discuss them in detail in a moment, but it is the Government’s intention—quite unusually—that these new clauses will replace clause 21, as we have essentially updated it. I know that this is unusual, so I would just like to explain it to members of the Committee. Having included a limited power in the Bill upon its introduction, we now want to narrow that power with more detail, as we work through the technicalities of how this part will interact with what I know Members will agree is a very large volume of legislation on the statute book.

I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 53 and 54 and amendment 74 respectively, and I will address some of the questions they raised before I go into their specifics. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion suggested that there was the potential here to reduce entitlement, but that is absolutely not the case. If anything, there will be a minor levelling-up of humanitarian entitlement when it comes to travel documents. So there will be no reducing of entitlement.

We do not think that the origin of the claim should matter for the grounds for protection. We believe that there should be consistency across the two, so the entitlement is therefore the same. We want to be clear that, in all the amendments we have made, there is to be absolutely no levelling-down. As we heard, the Home Secretary’s delegated powers memorandum itself was clear that the powers would not be used to reduce entitlement.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned the best interests of children, which builds on a debate we had earlier today. Of course, their interests are absolutely the priority throughout this process. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 places a duty on the Home Office to ensure that its immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children in the UK. The Home Office takes its section 55 duty seriously, and every child matters, as set out in our statutory guidance. We are committed to ensuring that we have regard to this duty in the development and implementation of new policy, including core protection, as well as when decision makers apply these policies to children within the UK.

The hon. Member asked about a sunset clause and why we have removed that in the existing powers. The key consequential amendments to primary legislation will be on the face of the Bill through new schedule 1. However, significant additional changes will still be needed for secondary legislation, which is why that was removed.

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[Siân Berry]

I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.

The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.

[Tom Gordon]

I understand the point the Minister is making about targeting resource efficiently, but can she elaborate on exactly what that looks like in practice? There are lots of nice words about efficiency, but until we know what that entails, it is quite hard to believe.

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[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.

[Siân Berry]

It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.

Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.

I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.

As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.

We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.

[Siân Berry]

For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.

Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.

[Tom Gordon]

I welcome the fact that the Minister says details will be set out in future immigration regulation, but there is no clarity in the Bill for people now. I asked her a number of questions about eligibility, whether the family would move on to that route together and what that actually looks like. Can she say anything about that at this stage?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman will recognise that the provision we are debating gives power to the Secretary of State to make changes to immigration rules. We will make changes to the immigration rules through the usual process, so he will have the opportunity to debate them when they come before the House for affirmative resolution, but this debate is about the power. I am sure that debate will continue in the weeks and months ahead, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Gentleman on it.

For the people who claim asylum and are granted protection in the UK, our new regime providing support for refugees will be entirely in accordance with our international obligations, but it does not exceed them. These are significant reforms. They are designed to ensure that our asylum system is fit for the modern world and, crucially, that public consent for having an asylum system at all remains. Genuine refugees will receive the protection they need. We therefore oppose the amendments.

Amendments 51 and 52, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, set out to limit the power to make regulations about protection status and claims. Due to the drafting of clause 21(3), the amendments would not prevent the Home Secretary from making such regulations about protection status and claims because the power in clause 21(1) is a broad one. However, without this explicit provision, such regulations would be more vulnerable to challenge on grounds that they were ultra vires. Government new clauses 35 and 36 will replace clause 21. They aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give the Secretary of State the power to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation. The amendments are therefore unnecessary.

The Government new clauses ensure that the key consequential amendments to primary legislation are made on the face of the Bill. However, as I am sure hon. Members will agree, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the introduction of the single concept of protection. The narrow power here is considered the most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny because any legal challenges can be debated and authorised by Parliament.

Amendments 74 and 75, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, also seek to limit the power by preventing regulations from restricting the rights and entitlements available to those with protection status and by requiring the Home Secretary to take into account the best interests of children when making regulations. The Government have tabled their own amendments to replace clause 21 and define the single concept of protection on the face of the Bill. The purpose of the single concept of protection is to create a single definition of protection claim and a single form of protection status. It will replace and amalgamate the two separate forms of protection: refugee status and humanitarian protection.

Anyone at risk of persecution or serious harm due to third-party actors on return to their home country will be granted protection status and all the associated entitlements. We recognise that all those who face persecution for a specific reason in the 1951 convention, as well as those who are at risk of torture or indiscriminate violence due to war, should receive protection and the same entitlements. To the extent that we retain a power to make amendments, many references to asylum and humanitarian protection legislation require simplification following the change. The power is the simplest and most efficient way to bring the rest of the statute book in line with that change. Regulations amending primary legislation must be made by affirmative procedure, which allows the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny.

As I have mentioned, the Government have already committed in the delegated powers memorandum that the power will not be used to reduce the entitlements currently held by refugees, and the Home Secretary is already under a duty to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children in the UK under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. The Government consider that there are ample safeguards on the exercise of the power, and the amendments are therefore unnecessary.

Amendments 137 and 138, taken together, set out to add additional requirements to clarify the powers in clause 21. In order to respond, it may be helpful to set out the purpose of clause 21 and the Government amendments I am introducing at this stage. The Government are introducing amendments to replace clause 21. These new clauses aim to set out on the face of the Bill the provision that would otherwise have been made under the power in clause 21. They also give a power to the Secretary of State to make further consequential and related amendments, including to primary legislation.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison.

The clause addresses a basic question: when someone asks to stay in this country, what does the public interest expect of them? The Government’s answer is one that I suspect most of our constituents would recognise: that the person pays their way, does not rely on the state to put a roof over their head, does not commit crimes, co-operates with the authorities and is of good character. Those are reasonable expectations and we welcome much of the clause.

The clause’s strength, however, comes down to a handful of words. Proposed new subsection 117B(4) of the 2002 Act says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”

that is built up while someone is here unlawfully, on leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions. Think about who that covers—someone who came here illegally, lied to get a visa or broke the conditions on which this country let them in. When the time comes to remove them, that person asks a court to weigh a life built up in that time against their removal.

We agree with the Government that weight should not be given. However, “should” is the language of advice; “must” is the language of law. The Government have already moved from “little weight” to “no weight”, and I welcome that—amendment 105 simply finishes the job. If the Government mean that no weight must be given, let the statute say, “No weight must be given”. In this area of law, a door left ajar is an invitation.

Moreover, the no weight rule applies only where someone is in serious breach of their conditions. What is serious? Is it working beyond the hours that their visa allows? Is it claiming benefits that they are not entitled to? Is it overstaying their visa by a month? The Bill does not say, so a tribunal will decide case by case, which will bring us back to the very weighing exercise that the Government say they want to end. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee what the Home Office understands a “serious breach” to mean, and whether it will be defined in guidance.

Amendment 104 deals with good character. Proposed new subsection 117B(3A) says it is in the public interest that people seeking to stay here are of good character, but clause 19 does not say what good character means. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire that there is already a well-established test in the good character requirement for British citizenship set out in Home Office guidance. Amendment 104 says that the court should apply that test. It would be strange if the bar to stay in this country were lower than the bar to become a citizen of it, and stranger still for every tribunal to invent its own version from scratch.

The clause asks the right questions. Our amendments ensure that the answers carry the force of the law. The Government have chosen “no weight” over “little weight”, and that is welcome; let them finish the job by replacing “should” with “must” and telling us what they mean by “good character” and “serious breach”. I commend our amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Dr Murrison. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on the clause and amendments in this grouping.

Before moving on to the amendments, I will give some background on what the clause will do. The balance between an individual’s family rights and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system has shifted, and it needs to be reset. Without greater clarity from Parliament on how that balance should be struck, the domestic interpretation of article 8 has expanded beyond what our international obligations require, resulting in inconsistent decision making and high volumes of article 8 grants to people who cannot meet the rules to come or to stay in the UK.

More than half of those who stayed in the UK for family reasons last year did not meet our criteria to be able to stay here, instead relying on their article 8 rights. That undermines public confidence in the immigration system and the rules-based international order. It also comes at a significant cost to the UK taxpayer. As has already been mentioned, the average net lifetime fiscal cost for each first-time grant is £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted on the basis of article 8 in 2025 alone.

Colleagues have asked about the evidence base behind those figures, so I will give a bit more information about it. We undertook a deep dive cohort analysis to examine a representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications, in order to support the policy development of these measures in the Bill. Further details are in the impact assessment. I am afraid that the unpublished internal sample that was referred to will not be made available due to the personal data sensitivities involved, but we will obviously keep under review any further analysis that we would be keen to share with the Committee throughout the course of the Bill, for example other statistics that have been mentioned.

This trend has been driven by high volumes of people who have arrived illegally or overstayed in the UK, at 71% of first-time grants, or by people who are unemployed and are making a minimal economic contribution—76% of first-time grants. It is clear that the system is not functioning fairly and effectively. That is why the British public feel exasperated that such exemptions are being abused to enable people to circumvent the system.

Clause 19 will help to restore a fairer balance between an individual’s right to family life and the public interest in maintaining an effective and controlled immigration system. It will provide a clearer statutory framework that places greater emphasis on compliance and contribution, resulting in more consistent and robust outcomes. These reforms will realign UK legislation with Strasbourg, ensuring that our domestic approach to article 8 is within and, crucially, not beyond our international obligations, as it is now.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

Clause 19 introduces some quite fundamental changes, which I fully support, but is the Minister confident that it will still meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights? That is the litmus test.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. That is why the drafting of clause 19 has been very clear and specific, which I will say more about later.

It is important that we comply with our international obligations. We have a proud history of doing so—we helped to devise, draft and create these obligations—but we also have a history of overinterpreting them. It is not a free-for-all, but it is important that we act within the requirements we are obliged to meet and do not go beyond them. That is what the provisions in the Bill seek to achieve.

That includes a clarification that judges must consider the economic impact on the taxpayer of allowing people to remain in the UK, including by considering whether they can support themselves and their family. It is only fair to all those who work hard in this country to be financially independent and to house themselves, and who are not overly reliant on public services, that they do not see others who otherwise have no right to be here imposing avoidable burdens on society and public services.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

Will the financial independence test be individualised, will it be evidence-based in its assessment, and will it recognise barriers such as credit history, references and guarantors? Furthermore, will a survivor’s use of refuge or public funds to escape abuse count against them?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and I will say a lot more about those issues when I respond to the contributions by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. However, we are absolutely clear that we are not going to penalise people for experiencing hardship. These reforms preserve protections for vulnerable people and children, but it is vital that we make it clear that immigration control and the wider public interest should be given proper weight in any consideration. This is about restoring balance, not removing safeguards. That is critical.

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

Having listened to some contributions, particularly from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, I think that most fair-minded people would be concerned that these reforms could have a detrimental impact on children. Can the Minister confirm whether or not these reforms remove protections for children?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend raises a critical issue that is, of course, dear to all of our hearts. Again, I will say more about it later, but these reforms absolutely do not remove protections for children. The best interests of children will continue to remain a primary consideration in immigration decision making, as they should be. The reforms in clause 19 ensure that children’s interests are considered alongside other important factors, including compliance with immigration law and the wider public interest in maintaining an effective immigration system.

[Tom Gordon]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

Forgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.

The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.

The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.

Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.

The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.

Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.

Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.

[Siân Berry]

I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?

[Anna Turley]

The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.

To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

Surely the Minister understands that while “no weight” may be the starting point, the end point is the decision, and that is the issue. A decision maker can have a starting point of “no weight”, but attach weight, and suddenly the decision is not where I think even she might intend in many cases.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but it is important for cases to be considered on a case-by-case basis. We can be as specific as possible, but the reality is that courts and tribunals have to maintain the flexibility to determine cases based on the individual facts and circumstances before them. It is important that our drafting enables that.

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

rose—

[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

[Blake Stephenson]

I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.

[David Smith]

I was going to make the same point that the Minister has just made to some degree. It seems to me that the key terminology in the clause is “no weight”. Can she say more about what that will mean in practise?

[Anna Turley]

As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.

Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.

[Blake Stephenson]

In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.

[Tom Gordon]

The Minister talks about not wanting to include specific definitions in the Bill, but some stakeholder groups are concerned that the Bill does not rule out British children being subject to the child test. Would she not consider including such a provision in the Bill to ensure that it does not end up forcing a British child out of the country?

[Anna Turley]

Again, we have to look at each case on its individual merits, and we cannot bind the court’s hands in such a situation; the family rules will be taken in their entirety.

[Tom Gordon]

Can I press the Minister a little further on that point? To give a direct quote, can the Minister guarantee that no British child will be expected to leave the country of which they are a citizen as a result of this clause?

[Anna Turley]

I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.

In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.

[Siân Berry]

Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)

This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for a very full discussion of the amendments. I have a lot to respond to, so I hope colleagues will bear with me while I try to pick up on all the points and make as much progress as I can.

I think all of us in this room will share a real commitment to the clause and this group of amendments. The clause is a huge priority; it really underlines the issue of the deportation of foreign national offenders and the exemptions through which they have sought to remain in this country. As the hon. Member for Stockton West expressed, the issue causes huge concern, fear, anxiety and outrage. This is such an important clause and such important part of the Bill and of what we are trying to do.

I also put on record the Government’s commitment on this issue; that is not to make a political point, but we have deported more than 60,000 foreign national offenders since we came to power at the 2024 elections—the highest number in a decade, and 41% higher than in the previous two-year period. I say that not to make a political point, because we are in Committee, but to underline our determination and commitment on this issue, should there be any doubt, given some of the concerns raised by Opposition Members, about our absolute determination on this issue. It is extremely important to us.

Clause 20 reforms the application of article 8 in deportation cases, restoring a proper balance between individual rights and the public interest. The current framework contains different, sentence-based tests, which act as exceptions to deportation. Where a person can meet the private and family life exceptions, or the higher test, which applies for the most serious offenders, they will not be deported. That means that, in some cases, deportation can be avoided by meeting the family or private life exceptions, without the court conducting a full consideration of all factors weighing in favour of the public interest in deportation.

The clause addresses that by requiring the courts to conduct a full proportionality assessment before it can find that deportation would be disproportionate. The public interest will therefore be considered in every deportation case before an article 8 breach can be found, rather than only in some categories of case, as at the moment. Judges will be able to block deportation only in certain exceptional circumstances. The clause retains important existing concepts, including “unduly harsh”. I appreciate some of the concerns expressed by Opposition Members, which I will come to, but the concept is well understood by the courts and supported by extensive case law.

Under the new framework, showing that deportation would have an unduly harsh effect is insufficient—without further consideration—to demonstrate a breach of article 8 and will no longer be the point at which an article 8 claim succeeds automatically. That is a fundamental change. The court will now have to go on to consider whether the interference with private or family life can be justified when weighed against the public interest in deportation. The new framework establishes a clear statutory framework for assessing whether deportation will be disproportionate, requiring proper weight to be given to factors such as the nature and seriousness of the offending, the person’s immigration status, the economic impact of allowing them to remain in the UK, and the wider public interest in public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime.

The effect of the reforms is to establish a clearer and more consistent framework, in which deportation may be avoided only in truly exceptional cases. For the record hereafter, I clarify that emphasis in Committee. A person will still receive an individual assessment of their circumstances, but the courts will be required—I emphasise “required”—to give proper weight to Parliament’s view that deportation is strongly in the public interest.

Before I speak to the amendments, I will refer to some of the points made in the debate. I was asked whether the clause weakens provision for more serious offenders. No, it does not; they must still meet the same tests as other offenders, and face a proportionality test. The clause provides that the more serious the offence, the greater the public interest in deportation. Again, I will say more on that when I come to the specific Opposition amendments.

I was asked why sentence thresholds are being removed. We do not need sentence thresholds if we are going to treat all deportation cases the same. The courts can still, and indeed must, take account of sentences and seriousness of offending in considering proportionality. That is required on the face of the Bill by subsection (2) of proposed new section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked, why not cover family deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971? The key point is that the exclusion of section 3(5)(b) is deliberate. Clause 20 is concerned with how article 8 is to be interpreted in cases involving the deportation of a foreign national whose own conduct has made them liable to deportation. A family member liable to deportation under section 3(5)(b) of the 1971 Act is not being deported because of their own criminality or conduct. Even if that power were used, it is appropriate that any article 8 claim made by that family should continue to be assessed under the framework set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, rather than the deportation framework.

The hon. Member for Stockton West made a number of points. On his point about the House of Commons Library briefing, those with a sentence of over four years would previously need to establish that they meet very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions. Now they must establish that they meet an exception and that their deportation cannot be justified. We would expect such cases to fail the proportionality assessment even if they meet the exception. Our provisions enhance those deportation provisions.

I would also like to refer to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. He criticised proposed new section 117C of the 2002 Act. It is important to make it clear that the public interest is in deportation unless it is not justified. That is enhanced in proposed new section 117C(2) by making it clear that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest is. The hon. Gentleman is right that the first exception under proposed new section 117C(4)(a) means the person’s whole life, not just their adult life. That is the same as under existing law. To his points on social and cultural integration, the onus is on the applicant to establish that. Again, that is already covered in existing legislation. Caseworkers are experienced in how to deal with that and familiar with that understanding.

I want to make some more points on the “unduly harsh” test. Again, that is in existing legislation. The Supreme Court has already interpreted it extremely narrowly. On the issue of court latitude, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised, proposed new section 117C makes it clear that deportation is in the public interest and, as I have said, that the more serious the offending, the stronger the public interest will be. It is important that courts have a clear steer on Parliament’s view of public interest, and the process of the Bill will establish that. To resist deportation, someone must meet the exceptions and establish that their deportation cannot be justified in the light of the public interest. Deportation can therefore be resisted only in clearly defined and limited circumstances.

I will move on to the amendments, and I hope to provide a bit more clarity. Amendments 107, 109 and 111 seek to impose a higher threshold for deportation for foreign criminals who receive a custodial sentence of four years or more, or who commit certain more serious offences. The amendments would require such persons to demonstrate something more than meeting the private or family life exceptional circumstances test. There should be no suggestion that we are seeking to lower the threshold for foreign criminals who are given sentences of more than four years. That is misplaced.

Clause 20 amends the current deportation framework by introducing a full proportionality exercise before an article 8 breach can be found. That will ensure that the courts are required to consider and take account of the overall public interest in deportation. All foreign nationals subject to deportation will now have to meet a two-stage test to succeed in their article 8 claim. The first stage of the test requires the person to satisfy one of three exceptional circumstances tests. Where that exceptional circumstances test is met, they must also show that the interference with their private or family life rights—as demonstrated by an exceptional circumstance—cannot be justified. The second stage of the test requires a full proportionality exercise, weighing all the factors in favour of deportation.

As I have said, clause 20 specifically states that the greater the severity of offending, the greater the public interest in deportation. That is clear. It will make it less likely that the interference with article 8 rights will outweigh the public interest in deportation. We expect the courts to give significant weight to the public interest in deporting persons with long custodial sentences and those who have committed serious offences. I also clarify for the record that exceptional circumstances are not exceptions to deportation. Now, when someone demonstrates an interference with their family or private life, they will no longer automatically avoid deportation. There will be an assessment of the public interest test—

11.25 am

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88). 

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

We are trying to define something, and I think it is on us to define it. Adding “normally”—inviting them to look for the exception—is very unhelpful, particularly when proposed new section 117AA(4)(b) actually sets out the exception and gives that bandwidth for people to find exceptional cases. To write “normally” beside all these properties is to open a door, and would mean that we fail to do what we are aiming to do. That is the objective of the Bill. Amendments 99, 101 and 102 would take that word out. If the Government believe that their definition is right, let us say what it means.

Amendment 98 tackles the same problem from another angle. Under the clause, a court deciding whether article 8 was engaged must “have regard to” proposed new section 117AA, but having regard to something is not the same as following it. The court can have regard to the definition, nod politely and decide a case on a different basis altogether. Amendment 98 says that the court

“must determine that question in accordance with section 117AA.”

If Parliament is going to define family life, the court should apply that definition, not merely consider it.

Amendment 100 asks a simple question: what is a partner? The clause does not say. The immigration rules have required unmarried couples to have lived together in a relationship akin to marriage for at least two years. Amendment 100 would put that test into statute so that a relationship formed a few weeks before a removal date could not be used to frustrate it. It is good enough for the rules; it is good enough for the Bill.

Moving on to amendment 103, in proposed new section 117AA, subsection (5) says that financial dependency, illness short of needing constant care, emotional reliance or worry about relatives in a warzone do not, on their own, create family life between adults. Fair enough, but subsection (6) then says that nothing in subsection (5) stops a court considering every one of those factors at the public interest stage. Can the Minister explain what subsection (5) achieves if subsection (6) allows the very same factors to tip the balance a few paragraphs later?

I welcome Government amendment 45. It asks decision makers to look at whether contact between a parent and child has only recently been established or re-established. That goes to a real problem: relationships that come to life only when removal is on the cards. By tabling it, the Government make our point for us. If it is right to be sceptical of a parental relationship that appears just in time, it is right to be sceptical of a partnership that does the same. That is all amendment 100 asks. Clause 18 is a good idea let down by its drafting. The Government have written a definition and then handed every lawyer in the land the words to argue their way around it. Our amendment would make that definition stick.

If the Minister cannot accept our amendments, I hope that the Government will reflect before Report. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.

I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.

[Siân Berry]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.

Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.

It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.

[David Smith]

Does the Minister agree that unless we introduce a definition of a family, the term becomes entirely subjective?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why we have seen the extreme examples of people clearly thwarting the system to try to remain.

The clause makes clear that family life will normally concern the core cohabiting family unit while retaining provision for cases involving genuine parental relationships or additional elements of dependency. This will narrow the circumstances in which a tenuous relationship with a child, or an extended family relationship involving no more than nominal ties, can be used as the basis of a claim. It will support more consistent decision making while retaining the flexibility required. This is key to restoring order and control to the immigration system, ensuring that if someone does not meet the requirements of our rules, they will not have the right to reside here.

Clause 18 makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core cohabiting family unit while preserving flexibility for cases where family life may exist outside of that, aligned with Strasbourg case law. It also clarifies that biological parenthood alone is not enough to constitute family life; there must be evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. For adult relatives outside the core family unit, financial support, illness, emotional support or concern about conditions overseas will not by themselves establish family life; the relationship must involve true elements of dependency.

[Melanie Onn]

Would it be the case that someone who had hitherto been an absent father would not meet the criteria in the Bill?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly what we are seeking to do. We have had evidence of people moving back in with families and dependants purely on the basis of trying to put forward this claim.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

We are talking about the use of the term “normally”, but would the examples the Minister listed not fall into subsection (4)(b) anyway, meaning that the word “normally” is not required to help them get across the line?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that I disagree. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, it does not mean that an individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. Instead, all cases where family life is found to exist will also be considered at the second stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter.

[Joe Robertson]

Will the Minister give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I will just explain a little bit more, and I will hopefully answer the hon. Gentleman’s point. The word “normally” is deliberate and necessary. It allows us to establish a clear and deliberatively restrictive framework in which article 8 family life will ordinarily be confined to the core family while retaining the limited flexibility required for ECHR compliance.

Family relationships, as we have said, do not always fit neatly in formal categories or involve cohabitation. In exceptional cases, a relationship outside the core cohabiting family may, in substance, be akin to one within it. “Normally” enables a court to recognise genuine family life in those limited circumstances, based on the facts of the individual case. Removing it would turn a strong presumption into an inflexible rule, which would risk the exclusion of genuine family relationships and therefore be incompatible with the ECHR, potentially opening us up to even more litigation.

Crucially, this is only a threshold test. Establishing that family life exists does not mean that an article 8 claim succeeds, or that an individual has the right to remain. It simply means that the court moves on to the next stage to consider whether interference with that family life is justified and proportionate, taking account of public interest. Accordingly, the Government do not support the amendments.

Amendment 103, also tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, seeks to remove subsection (6) of this clause, on the basis that it undermines the effect of subsection (5). I do not, however, accept that that is the case. Those two provisions address different questions: subsection (5) clarifies what cannot independently establish family life between adult extended family members, while subsection (6) preserves the fact-sensitive assessment that is required once family life is engaged.

Subsection (5) makes it clear that financial support, emotional reliance, illness and concern for someone living amid war or instability do not, when taken independently, establish the necessary dependency. Those circumstances do not, however, cease to be relevant for every purpose. If family life is established, the court must then undertake the separate public interest and proportionality assessment.

Subsection (6) therefore provides an important safeguard to ensure that, at that stage, the full factual circumstances can be considered when balancing any interference with family life against the public interest. It also protects the Home Office’s freedom to consider those factors when arguing that the public interest requires a refusal of leave.

Turning to the Government amendments, it is right that children are given additional safeguards in article 8 decision making. Given those well-meaning protections, a tenuous relationship with a child can be used by an adult to remain in the UK. The first step to prevent people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 claims is to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under this clause operates as intended.

Government amendment 44 therefore makes it clear that a parent does not normally have family life with a child under the age of 18 for the purposes of article 8 unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. It broadens the application of the test so that it applies consistently to all parent-child relationships involving a child under 18, regardless of whether the parent and child live together. That clarifies what is relevant: the substance of the parental relationship, not simply the living arrangements. The amendment aims to reduce the scope for weak or limited parental relationships to be relied on in article 8 claims, including where cohabitation has been resumed opportunistically for immigration purposes; it does not remove protection for genuine parent-child relationships. Where there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, family life will continue to be recognised.

Government amendment 45 builds on amendment 44 to ensure that the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test under the clause will have its intended effect of preventing people from relying on weak parental links to children in article 8 applications. Government amendment 45 provides additional detail on how courts and tribunals should assess whether a parent has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child for the purposes of article 8. It sets out factors that may be relevant to that assessment, including the nature of the relationship, the duration and frequency of contact, and whether contact has recently been established or re-established. The amendment aims to promote greater consistency in the application of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship test, ensuring that courts and tribunals focus on the substance of the relationship; the amendment does not prevent genuine parent-child relationships from attracting article 8 protection. Courts and tribunals will continue to consider all relevant circumstances in each individual case.

[Joe Robertson]

What would happen if someone were living here, but their child was overseas with the other parent—they were cohabiting there, not with the parent here—but the parent overseas died? What happens to the child? I cannot see a provision by which the child can come here, because there was no core cohabiting family arrangement.

[Anna Turley]

Exactly such a circumstance is why we have provided flexibility within the Bill. The individual case will be assessed under article 8. In such a situation, there is space for that individual case to be assessed. Together with clause 19, Government amendments 44 and 45 provide a clearer and more consistent framework for determining whether removing an individual with a tenuous relationship to a child in the UK is compliant with article 8.

I will just add something on the key principles behind clause 18. The clause establishes clear boundaries for where family life exists, consistent with Strasbourg case law, providing the foundation on which clause 19’s strengthened public interest test is applied. Together, clauses 18 and 19 will ensure that article 8 is not used routinely to circumvent immigration rules, supporting a more ordered and controlled system where those who do not meet the rules are not routinely able to stay in the UK. Members have suggested that the clauses are too expansive and may widen where family life can be found to exist, but that is not correct. A recent Court of Appeal judgment reaffirmed the existing legal framework for assessing family life under article 8. Clause 18 provides greater clarity. The reforms will make clearer how family life and dependency should be assessed, promoting greater consistency in decision making and curtailing expansive interpretation of where family life can be found to exist. I had intended to talk more about the ECHR, but I shall not test the patience of the Committee.

Other points made during the debate included whether the clause was relevant or whether the courts would just ignore what we are trying to codify. Successive Governments have recognised concerns about how article 8 operates in the immigration system, but this Government are undertaking the hard work to understand the comprehensive reform required to restore order and control to the system. We are working within our international obligations to reset this balance, and to provide a more comprehensive and consistent framework to article 8 decision making. Clause 18 works alongside clause 19 by establishing the clear basis on which the Home Office can argue that family life does not exist before consideration of whether the public interest warrants a refusal of leave. Together, the clauses provide a clearer framework for how article 8 should be assessed to promote greater consistency in decision making and ensure that when considering article 8 immigration decisions, the courts place appropriate weight on what Parliament considers to be in the public interest.

In response to some of the other points made by hon. Members, the framing of proposed new section 117AA preserves the small degree of flexibility necessary for decision makers and the courts not to be constrained to determine claims made under article 8 that are inconsistent with the article. Reference was made to the definition of an eligible partner. That definition will be set out in rules and guidance; it is not appropriate to have that level of detail in primary legislation. We need to have flexibility to be able to change and respond to patterns of behaviour and abuse. One hon. Member spoke about young adults. The word “normally” in clause 18 is a caveat to preserve flexibility for young adults who have family life with parents.

I was asked for more evidential requirements; here some case studies might be helpful. The family immigration rules are intended to create a fair system that balances the important of protecting family and private life. When 71% of first-time grants are made to applicants who have arrived illegally or who have overstayed the time they are permitted to be here, it is clear that article 8 is not operating effectively. I was also asked about retrospective claims and whether the measures would impact people already in the UK. Clause 52(9) allows part 2 of the Bill to be commenced with retrospective effect; we will set out our plans for how the measures will be commenced in due course.

I was asked how the adjudicators would be able to interpret the complexity of clause 18 without legal training—something the Committee spoke about quite a lot in the first sitting of its scrutiny. Adjudicators will be properly trained, with all the safeguards that we talked about in the Committee sitting last Tuesday, to apply the new framework and immigration law. The authority will have legal support, underpinned by clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about interference. Clause 18 is not about whether interference is proportionate—that is assessed under clause 19. The grounds for interference, such as for the effectiveness of the immigration system, are consistent with ECHR case law.

Nothing in the Bill prevents individualised decision making; we have deliberately kept that ability, and that is a clear requirement of article 8 compliancy in decision making. Hon. Members also spoke about Home Office decision making. As I have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, we will of course continue to work to improve decision making. The reforms in the clause clarify how family life should be assessed and strengthen the role of public interest in maintaining effective immigration control, which will help to improve decision making by providing the courts with greater clarity, consistency and predictability.

On mental illness and whether that is a route, it is correct that under proposed new section 117AA(4), family life can be engaged where a person suffers a mental illness or infirmity. However, they would need to be incapacitated to the extent that they need constant care and support, and there would have to be no other viable care options. Examples in established case law include where an adult or child becomes paraplegic after a serious illness, or where an adult or child suffers from Down syndrome and is fully incapacitated. It is worth remembering that the provision is only about establishing family life, and that the decision makers and the courts will go on to consider the public interest question. I hope I have answered all colleagues’ points, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fifth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch off their electronic devices or put them on silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. The selection list for today’s sittings is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. This shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.

Clause 17

Sponsor claims

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 17, page 13, line 30, leave out from “claim’” to “, at” in line 32.

This amendment and amendment 131 are consequential on the repeal of section 12 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2006 (which was never commenced) by the Schedule inserted by NS1.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendment 131.

Amendment 94, in clause 17, page 14, line 8, at end insert—

“, provided that the Secretary of State may only designate a place by regulations made by statutory instrument and that such a statutory instrument may only be made if a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would require the place at which sponsor human rights claims may be made to be set by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure.

Amendment 112, in clause 17, page 14, line 11, at end insert—

“(e) after subsection (1A) insert—

“(1B) Where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim, the Secretary of State must carry out safeguarding checks in relation to that person before determining the claim.

(1C) The safeguarding checks under subsection (1B) must establish, so far as reasonably practicable, whether the person making the sponsor human rights claim—

(a) has been convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;

(b) is subject to a relevant protective order relating to domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage;

(c) has been the subject of a finding by a court or other competent authority of conduct involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage; or

(d) has previously been the subject of an immigration decision in which concerns relating to forced marriage, abuse or the genuineness of a family relationship were material.

(1D) Where information falling within subsection (1C) is identified, the Secretary of State must take that information into account when determining the sponsor human rights claim and any decision relating to the family member to whom the claim relates.

(1E) The Secretary of State must consider whether the information identified under subsection (1C) indicates that the admission of the family member to the United Kingdom would give rise to a safeguarding risk to—

(a) the family member;

(b) any child affected by the decision; or

(c) any other person who may reasonably be expected to be at risk as a result of the admission.””

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to carry out safeguarding checks where a person makes a sponsor human rights claim under Clause 17.

Amendment 95, in clause 17, page 14, line 15, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the exemption of sponsor human rights claims from the inadmissibility provisions in section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to test why such claims should be treated more favourably than other human rights claims.

Government amendment 96.

Amendment 97, in clause 17, page 15, line 4, at end insert—

“(8) In section 82 (right of appeal to the Tribunal), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) An appeal does not lie under subsection (1)(b) against a decision to refuse a sponsor human rights claim unless the family member to whom the claim relates would, if they lived with the person who made the claim, be a member of that person’s core cohabiting family within the meaning of section 117AA(2).””

This amendment would confine the new sponsor right of appeal to claims relating to a spouse, civil partner, partner or minor child (or, for a child sponsor, a parent), in line with the Government’s own definition of the core cohabiting family in clause 18.

Clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

It is good to see you again this morning, Mr Stuart, and good morning to all colleagues. We start our debate by moving on to part 2 of the Bill, which relates to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Article 8, the right to a family life, is an important protection, but it is a qualified right. That means that it can be balanced against a public interest—such as the safety of the community or the security of our borders—where that outweighs an individual’s personal rights. We will not step away from our belief that the right to family and private life must be respected and upheld. However, we have been clear that we must strike the right balance between the rights of the individual and fairness to the UK public, and, crucially, bear down on abuse of the system.

As set out in our impact assessment, each main applicant granted first time on article 8 grounds carries an estimated lifetime cost to the taxpayer of about £141,000, equating to approximately £4.9 billion for those granted in 2025 alone. Home Office analysis suggests that 71% of first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered illegally and/or overstayed. If the same applied to the estimated 42,000 first-time grants in 2025, this would mean that 30,000 overstayers and illegal entrants would have been allowed to stay last year on the basis of article 8. Between 1 April 2016 and November 2021, of 1,011 foreign national offender deportation appeals allowed on human rights grounds, 70% were solely on article 8 grounds. And with 77,000 applications granted on article 8 grounds last year, this is having a significant effect on our ability to enforce our immigration laws.

Therefore, in this Bill, we are changing how article 8 is applied in the UK immigration system, to restore public confidence and ensure that the UK application of rights is in line with the Strasbourg court. The application of article 8 will be tightened to prevent misuse of the system and ensure that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control carries proper weight in immigration decisions. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, the abuse of human rights law does not just erode the public’s support for our immigration system; it erodes their support for the very idea of having such laws at all. For those who believe that those laws matter, it is essential that we reform them to end their abuse. The reforms will put more emphasis on compliance with our rules and contribution to our economy and to our society.

Clause 17 aims to bring greater clarity and control to entry clearance applications that engage article 8, protecting genuine family relationships while preventing weak or tenuous claims from undermining public confidence. Taken with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, which we will come to in forthcoming groups and which tighten key elements of the article 8 assessment, it strengthens our ability to enforce the immigration rules and create a fairer, more controlled system.

The clause amends the definition of a human rights claim in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to create a “sponsor human rights claim”. This will lay the foundations to allow UK-based sponsors to make an entry clearance application for an overseas family member to join them in the UK if the application relies on the sponsor’s article 8 right to family life. It will also enable the sponsor to appeal to the immigration tribunal if the Home Office refuses their application. I want to be very clear that only individuals with a specified status, including British citizens and those with other lawful residence, will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They need to establish a genuine family life claim and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. These reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement to come to the UK. They simply ensure a correct process that is based on the UK sponsor, not the family abroad.

The clause will affect sponsors who wish to rely on article 8 family life because their family member does not meet the entry clearance requirement under the family routes and immigration rules. Enabling the UK-based sponsor to apply will focus attention on the circumstances and article 8 rights of the sponsor, rather than the overseas family member. This reflects the established legal position that it is the sponsor who is within the UK jurisdiction for the purposes of article 8 decision making. The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK.

Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate interference with the family life of the UK-based sponsor.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

Will clause 17 make it easier for people to come to the UK on an article 8 basis if we do not specify where sponsor human rights claims can be made?

[Anna Turley]

I thank my hon. Friend for asking a really important question, because it is right that we clarify this matter. The clause does not make it easier for overseas family members to enter the UK. Sponsors will still need to meet a very high threshold to argue successfully that it would be a breach of their article 8 rights if the Home Office refused their family member entry to the UK. Strict requirements for the procedure sponsors must follow to make an application, which will be set out in the immigration rules.

The focus on the rights of the UK sponsor is intended to reduce expansive interpretation of where article 8 rights are found to exist, and to prevent article 8 from becoming a route for those with tenuous family links to the UK. Too often, the focus can be on the circumstances of the applicants abroad, whereas the main legal question should be whether there is a disproportionate influence on the family life of the UK-based sponsor.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

As I understand it, the purpose of this new provision is to focus on the rights of the person in the UK, to ensure that their right to a family life is respected according to their circumstances. But their circumstances will be that their other family member is living abroad; that is their family life. I do not understand why that pre-existing situation would suddenly infringe their human rights and give them the right to bring in a family member. Their circumstance, by nature, is people living in two different countries.

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Member makes a really important point. That is why we are trying to narrow the definition to those who are here in the UK, because for far too long it has been on the basis of a very tenuous link that family members can put in a claim from abroad to come to the UK. This measure narrows that definition while still ensuring that we maintain our obligations under article 8 rights.

The recent Court of Appeal judgment in IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department provided helpful clarification around the correct tests to determine where article 8 family life exists, especially between extended family members. However, the judgment addressed an issue with article 8 family life being applied to a broader set of circumstances and relationships, which risked undermining our systems and rules. Despite these helpful findings, there remains a risk of inconsistent decision making, where the primary focus is not on the article 8 rights of the family member in the UK—the person within the UK’s jurisdiction according to ECHR case law.

The clause will add greater weight to the findings of the Court of Appeal and bring more clarity to decision making for entry clearance cases that engage article 8 family life. In IA, the Court of Appeal also reaffirmed the importance of the Government’s immigration policy when striking the right balance between an individual’s rights and the public interest.

In combination with the reforms in clauses 18 and 19, clause 17 makes it clear where the Government’s policy position lies in relation to the application of article 8 and where the Government expect the rules to be enforced. This will create a clearer, fairer and more controlled system. Details of the application process, including forms and evidential requirements, will be set out in immigration rules and supporting guidance.

Given the complexity of the clause, I will give Members an overview of each subsection. Subsection (1) creates a “sponsor human rights claim” in law by adding to the existing definition of a human rights claim at section 113 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This has the effect of permitting a UK-based sponsor to appeal against a decision to refuse a human rights claim for their overseas family member. That is the starting point for future changes to the rules, forms and guidance.

Subsection (2) explains that further amendments are required to the 2002 Act for the clause to operate properly. Those changes are set out in subsections (3) to (7). Subsection (3) makes changes so that a sponsor human rights claim cannot be deemed inadmissible or not suitable to be considered, which is necessary because reforms in the clause mean that the UK sponsor is the applicant, not the overseas individual requiring entry clearance. As I will cover in relation to amendment 95, it would be inappropriate simply to refuse to consider a human rights claim because the UK sponsor is a national of a safe country. Such safeguards are designed to prevent improper protection claims from nationals of those countries.

Subsection (4) makes further changes linked to the fact that the clause makes the sponsor the applicant, not the person overseas. In effect, at appeal, the courts will hear all matters relating to the family member seeking entry to the UK and not include any immigration matters related to the sponsor. Subsection (5) creates an exception so that sponsor human rights claims do not need to have their appeals considered within the timeframe set out in the statute. That is because an individual will not be able to act as a sponsor if they are liable to deportation action.

Subsection (6) prevents a sponsor human rights claim being certified and denied an appeal simply because the UK-based sponsor is entitled to live in a safe state, primarily European countries. That would not be a fair application of the power where a right to family life was being relied on. The clause does not prevent a claim being refused and denied an appeal where the matters under consideration are clearly unfounded, for example because the relationship was a sham. Subsection (7) ensures that sponsor human rights appeals are not treated as abandoned or cancelled because the UK sponsor holds permission to be in the UK. Instead, an appeal is abandoned if the overseas family member is granted leave to enter or remain in the UK.

[Melanie Onn]

The Minister mentioned sham relationships. Will she clarify who will be eligible to act as a sponsor?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Basically, anyone who is a British citizen will be eligible to become a sponsor, I believe. Forgive me, I did not want to mislead her by getting the wrong answer, but yes, I was right: individuals with specified status in the UK, including British citizens, settled persons and those with certain other lawful residence will be able to make a sponsor human rights claim. They will need to establish a genuine family life claim—we will talk about that in more detail in the following clauses—and show that refusal would disproportionately interfere with their article 8 rights. As I said, the reforms do not create a new migration route or entitlement; they simply ensure that human rights claims for those who are settled British citizens, settled persons and those with residence here are raised and considered through the correct process.

I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 94. It would enable the Home Office to designate a place only when a sponsor human rights claim can be made via statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure. The Bill does not require the definition of a designated place to be the subject of regulations, as there are currently no plans to specify the geographical place from where such claims can be made. The focus of article 8 is on whether the individual in the UK making a sponsorship claim has a strong enough claim, not where the family is based. That is because a UK-based sponsor will be expected to make their claim through a paid-for online application. We will use the immigration rules to specify the procedures that applicants must follow to make a sponsor human rights claim. That will allow us to go into the necessary level of technical detail, while retaining flexibility to make changes as we implement the new application process.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

What is interesting about the subsections that the Minister has gone through is that one of the huge problems we face is the judicialisation of British law, where we see interpretation because the law has been too loose. Will she explain how the steps that we are taking will rein those powers back into the sovereignty of Parliament, so that we have more control and can represent our constituents on the issues that they care about the most?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend gets to the exact heart of what we are doing with this legislation. Through the build-up of the legal framework, we have been guilty of over-interpreting Strasbourg law. By codifying what we are doing, through this Bill, we are ensuring that we are not going over and above that but are simply complying with our international obligations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Melanie Onn]

Does the Minister have any thoughts about what the fee structure might look like?

[Anna Turley]

That is an important point. I will be delighted to provide more evidence as we go through due process. We must make sure that they are proportionate and do not push people into poverty, but it is important that we are charging people a fee where they are bringing family members to this country under article 8. For the reasons I have set out, the Government do not support the amendment.

Amendment 112 would require the Home Office to carry out safeguarding checks on individuals who make a sponsor human rights claim and that any information uncovered in these checks is considered when the Home Office determines that claim. I thank the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for raising the importance of safeguarding vulnerable migrants, particularly children and victims of domestic abuse, in this amendment. It is a really important issue and one that will be fully considered in the design and implementation of the application process for sponsor human rights claims. As clause 17 simply paves the way for changing how an entry clearance application relying on article 8 family life can be made, we do not believe this level of detail is required in the primary legislation.

The immigration rules already contain safeguards to protect children coming to the UK to join family members who could put them at risk of harm. However, we will fully consider if additional safeguarding requirements are necessary as we develop the procedural requirements for sponsor human rights claims in the immigration rules, because an important point is made through amendment 112. This is a safeguarding proposal that we would support in principle when the application process is designed. I hope that hon. Members are reassured that our support for the principle is on the record through this Committee.

[Ben Goldsborough]

I would be keen to hear the Minister expand on the issue of safeguarding particularly for victims of domestic abuse and domestic violence. Can she expand on the action the Government will be taking to protect people from that heinous crime?

[Anna Turley]

Absolutely. We will of course come on to talk about modern slavery and so on later in the Bill. Protection for vulnerable people is at the heart of what this Bill is about.

Where a UK-based sponsor is young or vulnerable and unable to complete an application, they can give permission to someone else to enter their details, but for those who are vulnerable overseas, existing safeguarding measures are already in place to identify any indicators of coercion, exploitation or trafficking. We will of course consider how these measures can be further strengthened to enhance the identification and management of risk, but our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system, through ensuring the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.

We feel that a blanket rule to prevent individuals who have been convicted of these criminal behaviours would not be compatible with the EHCR, which necessitates an individualised assessment, but we are keen to make sure that safeguarding requirements are done through the immigration rules to protect anyone at risk of domestic abuse from their sponsor.

[Melanie Onn]

I want to press the Minister on this point. I am quite taken with amendment 112, and some of the issues to do with sponsors it raises are incredibly serious. I hear the Minister’s comment about not being explicit in primary legislation, but will she explain in simple details, for my understanding, how we will ensure that nobody convicted of an offence involving domestic abuse, stalking, sexual offending or forced marriage will be able to be a sponsor for the purposes of article 8 claims?

[Anna Turley]

I share my hon. Friend’s view. When I saw this amendment, I thought the principle was really important. When we come to write the immigration rules, we would absolutely want to make sure that it is at the heart of them. We would not ever want to see someone convicted of domestic violence, anything to do with child protection or any of the issues outlined in the amendment ever being a sponsor to bring anybody into this country. I hope that the Committee is reassured by my placing all of that on record: when the immigration rules come to be written I would hope and expect to see that at the heart of them, with those protections in there.

[Joe Robertson]

The Minister says that her provision on the core cohabiting family member has been restricted by this definition to tackle the issue of people coming into this country. Can she tell us how many people are currently in the UK with a core cohabiting family member outside the UK? What is that figure so we can understand at least the potential pool of applications?

[Anna Turley]

I cannot give the hon. Gentleman the figures that he asked for. I gave some initial examples at the start of my introduction about the volumes that we are dealing with. Some 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. We know that 71% of the first-time grants on the basis of article 8 were to individuals who had entered this country illegally and were overstaying. We are keen that this issue forms a core part of the reforms.

[Joe Robertson]

Could the Minister perhaps provide that figure, either later on this morning or this afternoon, for how many people are in the UK with a cohabiting family member overseas as of today?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I can absolutely undertake to provide as much information as I can to the Committee on that issue. We may not know how many children somebody has in another country. Unless they have put in an article 8 claim, we would not necessarily know about their family members, so it may be a little difficult for us to predict that. However, I can undertake, and give my commitment to the Committee, that we will do our best to get as close to a figure as we can and to provide that to the Committee.

To continue on the rationale for opposing amendment 112, we already have safeguarding measures in place across the immigration system to identify indicators of coercion, exploitation and trafficking. We will consider whether these measures can be further strengthened to improve the identification and mitigation of risk. Our approach ensures that vulnerable individuals are protected while maintaining the integrity of the system by ensuring that the rights of UK-based sponsors are the focus of entry clearance decisions that engage article 8.

Clause 17 does not exempt human rights claims from the general certification power in section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which applies irrespective of whether the claimant can reside in the listed safe countries. That means that we will be able to prevent appeals by certifying human rights claims that are bound to fail. Although it may be relevant to consider whether the UK-based sponsor is able to reside with a family member abroad, that will be done as part of the substantive article 8 assessment.

[Melanie Onn]

Will the Minister confirm whether clause 17 will be the way that people who have refugee status are expected to sponsor family members?

[Anna Turley]

As I set out at the beginning, it will be those who have a settled status. My understanding is that those that have a settled refugee status will be able to apply. Again, I can get confirmation for my hon. Friend on that point.

Amendments 95 and 96 taken together would mean that sponsor human rights claims can be made inadmissible or certified as clearly unfounded in the same way as other human rights claims. Applying section 80A or section 94(3) of the 2002 Act to sponsor human rights claims would preclude, in many cases, a substantive assessment of the claim if the sponsor were a national of, or able to reside in, any of the safe countries listed in the Act. In most cases, it would not be reasonable to refuse to consider a sponsor human rights claim fully, just because the sponsor making it was able to reside in one of those safe countries. For that reason, the Government cannot accept amendment 95.

As the Committee will be aware, I have tabled amendments to part 3 of the Bill to insert a new schedule that provides greater clarity on the Government’s approach to the core protection model. We will debate those amendments and the new schedule later in Committee.

[Dr Zubir Ahmed (Glasgow South West) (Lab)]

As a matter of record, it is important for my right hon. Friend to outline why the amendments and new schedule have been tabled now and why they were not included in the original Bill. I know my constituents take a keen interest in this matter, as my constituency has one of the highest amounts of asylum seeker housing in the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

My understanding is that it was recognised that we want to use this opportunity to ensure that the security in this process is as firm as possible, and we obviously have a fair amount of work to undertake to do that during the swift passage of the Bill. It is about ensuring that this Committee has the opportunity to consider the amendments and new schedule and that they are brought in at the right stage of the Bill. Some of these things take time, but we are keen for the Bill to close as many loopholes as possible.

Without the introduction of new schedule 1 by the Government, amendments 95 and 96 as originally put forward would have the effect of making the nationality of the UK-based sponsor dictate how a sponsor human rights claim was considered. That would also impact British citizens who are dual nationals, even when they were born in the UK and/or are British from birth if they also hold another nationality that is on one of the safe country lists.

Amendment 95 would mean that a British citizen who was born in the UK to British citizen parents but who also has citizenship of an EU member state, for example through their grandparents, would have an application to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK under article 8 declared inadmissible. Ireland is an EU member state and is therefore included within the existing section 80A inadmissibility provisions. That currently means that if an Irish citizen claims asylum in the UK, the claim is declared inadmissible and not substantively considered, but amendment 95 would mean that if an Irish citizen, resident in the UK, sought to sponsor a family member to join them in the UK, relying on article 8, that would be declared inadmissible. In contrast, a British citizen who holds no other nationality, or a citizen of a non-EU country or a country not on the section 80A list who is settled in the UK, would be able to sponsor a family member and rely on article 8 of the ECHR.

The Opposition originally introduced amendment 96, which would have meant that the nationality of a sponsor would dictate whether any article 8 claim would be presumed to be clearly unfounded. Instead, the Government have adopted the amendment, which now removes the exemption for human rights claims, but does so because, within the new schedule 1, it has also repealed the reference to human rights claims in section 94(3) altogether. That means that the nationality of a person will continue to dictate whether there is a presumption that any protected claim that they make is clearly unfounded, but nationality will not create any presumption in respect of non-protected human rights claims.

The Government’s position is that the designation of any country as safe should, quite rightly, relate to protection claims and that article 8 claims based on family or private life will always be person-specific rather than place-specific—a very important difference. The test to clarify the refusal of any claim remains that, without substance, it is bound to fail. That test applies to any claim made by a person of any nationality. Government amendment 96, in conjunction with new schedule 1, does not change the test for certification, but merely removes any presumption of certification for article 8 private or family life claims based on nationality. Government amendments 96, 130 and 131 are consequential and will support the model that the Committee will examine shortly.

Amendment 97 would limit appeal rights to the immigration tribunal to sponsors whose article 8 claim relates to a member of their core cohabiting family, as defined in clause 18. The Government do not think that the amendment would be appropriate. ECHR case law is clear that family life is usually confined to, but can exist outside of, the core cohabiting family.

--- Later in debate ---

[Joe Robertson]

I have it right in front of me. I think the wider points have been made. The hon. Member is obviously desperate to make the decisions that a Chair would ordinarily make. Maybe one day she will be elevated to the position of chairing a Committee. If she would like me to repeat everything I have said, I will be happy to do so in this afternoon’s sitting.

I am slightly reluctant to stop now, because it looks like I have wilted in the face of an intervention from the Government Benches, but I had come to the end of my contribution. I hope I have made my point, even if it is not agreed with.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Isle of Wight East for their very thorough comments. For me, this absolutely explains the benefit of line-by-line discussion of a Bill. There have been important challenges and critiques, and I will do my best to answer as many as I can—I think the shadow Minister must have had more than 20 or 25 questions; I will endeavour to write to him and the Committee on any that I accidentally overlook.

I really appreciated the statements from the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East, but I think my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes was right: he did stray into clause 18, which we will come to this afternoon. I took note of his views and look forward to responding to some of those later.

There is a lot to cover, so I will do my best to race through it. We will have a longer conversation this afternoon about the ECHR, so I will not pre-empt my comments on that. I do want to push back on the accusation that the legislation will not make a difference. At the moment, we have a free-for-all. Courts are basically over-interpreting Strasbourg. There is no real codification in this country of what the right to a family life means, and we are seeing a huge number of cases, as we have discussed. The point of the Bill is to ensure that our provisions will be no different to the position under Strasbourg but will realign the domestic position, because we are currently being far more generous than our international obligations require. I think the Committee can agree that it is important that we do not over-interpret what Strasbourg suggests.

I appreciated the challenge from the shadow Minister about the 2014 Act and not reinforcing any previous errors, but the Government provisions reflect more up-to-date case law, which was not captured by that 2014 Act—for example, the weighting provisions, which will apply to all of family life. I hope, and am sure, that we will have more success than the 2014 Act had.

[Melanie Onn]

The Minister refers to the UK having gone above and beyond its requirements in relation to Strasbourg law. In bringing us into line and not overextending ourselves, I wonder whether there are any other countries with which we could compare ourselves, in terms of where we will find that line and alignment. That might assist us in understanding how this process will work in practice.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate my hon. Friend raising that point. We have become a country with pull factors that have encouraged people to this country while asylum claims have been going down across Europe. Ours have not been going down at the same pace, and I think our over-interpretation of some of the Strasbourg laws has been a pull factor. So I appreciate her raising that.

I have quite a lot to plough through, so I apologise if there is not a coherent thread to some of these answers. I will try to respond as quickly as possible to as many of the questions as I can. I remind the Committee that, just because family life is established, that does not necessarily mean that the individual will automatically be able to remain in or enter the UK. All cases where family life is found to exist will be considered at the second-stage test, where the courts will have to consider whether it is in the public interest to refuse leave to remain or enter. We will come to the issues that were referred to about mental illness and so on this afternoon, but I am trying to make the point that the partner will still need to meet those substantive tests.

On the family circumstances that we discussed, the vast majority of people seeking to bring a partner will have to meet the rules. That means minimum income and English language. The example that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East gave almost certainly would not meet the bar of a successful article 8 claim, unless there were extremely exceptional circumstances.

On the hon. Member’s point about volumes and numbers, I am struggling to understand what he is asking me to do. Anyone in this country who has a family member outside the UK could put in an appeal for this. There is absolutely no way we could know whether anyone in this room may have a child, a dependant or anyone in another country; that is simply not evidence or information that this country would keep.

[Joe Robertson]

If the Minister’s position ends up being that there is no data, I will take that. To be clear, I am asking for the data of people residing in the UK who have a family member who is not a British citizen and who has no right to be in the UK, be they a spouse, civil partner or child. If it is the case that we simply do not have that data, obviously I will accept that, but the question remains on the table.

[Anna Turley]

I completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.

I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.

We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.

A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.

Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.

The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.

MOD Bicester and Illegal Migrants

Anna Turley Excerpts

Wednesday 14th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I thank the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Joy Morrissey) for calling this debate. I place on record my thanks to all hon. Members in this House who have engaged with me in the few weeks since I took on this role about asylum accommodation in their constituency. It is really important that we continue that powerful dialogue, including with you, Madam Deputy Speaker; you have engaged with me often on this issue, and I appreciate that engagement.

I particularly thank the shadow Minister because I really do welcome this opportunity to update Members on the Government’s work to fix our country’s broken asylum system. The system was in a state of absolute chaos and disarray when we took office two years ago. We are dealing with the legacy left by the hon. Lady and her team today. I will shortly come on to the action that we are taking to restore fairness, order and control, but it is really important to put any debate on asylum in its proper context, and that means recognising the situation that we inherited. It was this Government who picked up the pieces after the general election, following years of inaction and ineptitude. There has been mud-slinging, finger pointing and blaming from the Opposition today, but we are getting on with fixing the mess, and fixing the flow that the Conservatives allowed. The hon. Lady referred to their 14 years and our two years; I look forward to setting out in my speech the difference between those 14 years and the last two years.

In 2018, about 300 people arrived here by small boat. In the years that followed, an entire criminal industry built up along our borders, on the Conservatives’ watch. Ruthless smugglers sent people on dangerous, unnecessary and—far too often—fatal journeys, making a fortune in the process. The consequences of all this are well known in the House, but they bear repeating. Between January 2021 and June 2024, 110,000 people came here by small boat. Meanwhile, the asylum system ground to a halt. Decision making collapsed, leaving thousands in limbo for years at the taxpayers’ expense, and so did the return of those with no right to be in the UK, while a further 175,000 people claimed asylum by other routes. As the numbers rose, so did the cost to the taxpayer. In just a single year, spending on asylum support under the Conservative party was £4.7 billion. That is an incredible cost to the taxpayer—money that we could and should be spending on the other priorities we debate in this place.

[Chris Murray]

Over the last two years, we on the Home Affairs Committee have looked into the cost of this to the taxpayer. Does the Minister share my outrage that huge amounts of public money have gone to private companies, some of whose owners entered The Sunday Times rich list while our communities suffered? Does she also agree that the author and signer of those contracts was the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham and Waterlooville (Suella Braverman), on the Reform Benches?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely important point. Under the last Government, £9 million a day was spent housing people in 400 asylum hotels. That was costly and inefficient. The evidence has shown that it was part of the draw that people knew they could come here and be put in a nice hotel. It was one of the pull factors that we are trying to deal with and tackle today. As we have heard, all we had in response to this people smuggling on an industrial scale was the farce of the Rwanda scheme, in which £700 million was spent on sending four volunteers to Rwanda.

[Dr Murrison]

The Minister is talking about Rwanda, but she did not give the scheme a chance to generate results. On day one, the previous Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, canned it, without any prospect of it showing demonstrable results. Looking back, does she think that was wise?

[Anna Turley]

I do not know how much good money the right hon. Gentleman wants to throw after bad, but £700 million on four volunteers was an incredible waste of money.

The British people have a natural sense of fairness. We are a nation that has benefited from centuries of facing outwards towards the world, both reaching out across the globe and welcoming people in. There can be barely a Member here who does not have some historical migration in their family, or family ties to other nations. The British people will always accept those who are genuinely fleeing peril. They will welcome those who come here legally and who contribute. They know we are a place where people can come to build their life and aspire to do great things. Even this House, its representatives and their stories reflect that; we have seen that in the last week or so.

However, the British people will not accept chaos at our borders. They will not accept a lack of control over who comes in. They will not accept the unfairness of a broken system, in which those who break the rules are the ones who benefit from our welcome. Nor will they tolerate expensive and often iconic hotels across their communities being used to house asylum seekers at vast expense to the taxpayers.

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I will make a bit of progress, if I may.

The British people will not tolerate illegal migrants placing pressure on our public services, while efforts to remove them are frustrated. There is no quick fix, but the task of ending the chaos and, crucially, of restoring fairness falls to this Government, and we embrace it. It is only a Labour Government who will fix the broken system, restore control at our borders and bring back fairness to our public services. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool) is chuntering from the Opposition Benches, but I am coming to the exact subject of our progress so far, which I hope she will see contrasts nicely with what happened in the previous 14 years.

[Alan Gemmell (Central Ayrshire) (Lab)]

I thank the Opposition spokesperson for this debate today, but can I also say how grateful I am that the Minister for Border Security and Asylum, my right hon. Friend the Member for Redcar (Anna Turley) is in her place? More than 20 years ago, she and I worked in the Home Office, where we inherited another Tory mess on asylum. With a great Home Secretary and a brilliant team, we reduced the backlog, made appeals much more difficult and made the country a much safer place. Will she bring some of her experience from 20 years ago to this job, after the mess the Tories left have us?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate my hon. Friend drawing attention to that. It was a privilege—in, I think, 2003—to work for the now Lord David Blunkett to close the Sangatte refugee centre, put juxtaposed controls on French shores and end the situation of people coming through as clandestines in the back of lorries with the Bill that we took through at that time as civil servants. It was a privilege to play that role. Here we are, yet again, fixing the legacy of the previous Government.

As I said, the British people will not tolerate illegal migrants placing pressure on our public services while efforts to remove them are frustrated. It is only the Labour Government who will fix the broken system, restore control and bring back fairness, but we will do so without performative cruelty, without the deliberate fomenting of grievance and without destroying our international reputation. Thanks to the action the Labour Government are taking, the picture today is improving, with crossings down, removals up and the system now finally on a more stable footing.

Over the last two years, this Government have acted to restore fairness and control to our asylum system, first by taking the fight to the criminal gangs and bearing down on illegal crossings. One of the first steps the then Home Secretary took following the general election was to establish Border Security Command. The command has had a significant impact, especially in its efforts, alongside a strengthened National Crime Agency, to ramp up law enforcement action on organised immigration crime.

[Dr Mullan]

Did the Minister reflect on what the National Crime Agency said about the need for a deterrent? What assessment has she made of how effective the Australian approach to third-country processing has been in bringing down its crossings?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising the point about deterrence. It is extremely important but, as I said, the Rwanda deterrent was not effective. [Interruption.] Millions of pounds and a handful of volunteers. It has been disproven and clearly did not have any impact. I will come on to the deterrent that is actually working.

We have also given our agencies counter-terror style powers via the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. In the last financial year, organised immigration crime was disrupted on over 3,700 occasions, up by 46% over the same period. This includes organised immigration crime arrests, which were up 74%, as we took down the criminals behind this vile trade. For example, just in June, two men became the first to be jailed under the new “endangerment at sea” offence for piloting dangerously overcrowded small boats across the channel—that is a deterrent, that is working. We are also denying gangs the equipment and infrastructure they rely on. In May, an operation involving the National Crime Agency and German, French and other international partners seized more than 30 boats, over 20 engines, 360 pumps and more than 9,000 life jackets. Since entering office, we have seized over a total of 1,100 boats and engines.

[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for setting out her arguments. I am just wondering whether she will actually come on to Piddington and the impact on the residents there—we have people in the Gallery today. This issue is about the impact on women and girls there. I would be interested to know how many Ministers have actually been to Piddington and spoken to the residents themselves directly.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Lady. Of course, I will come on to Piddington—that is the content, the subject and the title of this debate—but it is really important to understand the people we are talking about having to house, how we are having to house them and the issues we are dealing with. I am proud of the steps we have taken to reduce that number so that we can hopefully reduce the number of people dependent on asylum accommodation as we go forward.

In partnership with French law enforcement, we have now stopped more than 50,000 attempted channel crossings. As a result, small boat arrivals are down around 40% on last year and asylum claims are down by 20%—real action, real results.

The task of responding to large-scale movements of people is one that we share with many Governments across the globe. It is, without question, one of the defining challenges of our age and to meet it we must work with source, transit and destination countries alike. That is why the Government have made it a priority to strengthen our co-operation with a range of international partners, striking new agreements and strengthening existing partnerships.

Just last month, the Home Secretary signed an agreement with her Belgian counterpart to intensify UK-Belgium co-operation and tighten the net around criminal gangs behind small boat crossings. We are taking our partnership with France further, following the new deal signed in April. French boots on the ground have already increased by 24% and a further 50 specialist officers will now be deployed on high-risk red days when conditions indicate crossings are likely, doubling the size of the current unit. First, by disrupting the movements of goods and infrastructure, tackling the gangs across borders and working with our international partners, we are reducing the flow of people heading towards our borders. Secondly, as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Dr Mullan) flagged, we are addressing the pull factors that fuel illegal migration, and we are enforcing the laws of this land.

To live in this country is a privilege, but it comes with responsibilities. When people abuse our hospitality, staying for longer than they are entitled to or committing criminal offences in our communities, the public rightly expect every effort to be made to remove them from British soil. That is why the total failure to remove illegal migrants and foreign offenders in the years before the general election was so damaging, and why the Government are putting right the wrongs of the past.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister is of course right that international co-operation matters in terms of dealing with these things, particularly channel crossings, but the point made earlier was that where countries refuse to take back their nationals who have committed crimes here, we should take further action, should we not? Part of that might be cutting aid or dealing with visas, as has been suggested. There are all kinds of other levers that can be used by Government to tell those countries, “You’ve got to take them back, because they’re not our responsibility and we’re not going to pay for them any more.”

[Anna Turley]

I think we are in danger of having a rare moment of cross-party consensus and agreement, because that is something the Government are already taking many steps towards. We are looking at visa enforcements. We have already had a number of successes on that front and will continue to use that, because where we see countries refusing to take people back, we have those levers within our power and we are using them.

[Dr Murrison]

Would the Minister like to look at the way the previous Government dealt with illegal Albanian migrants? It was hugely successful, yet this Government do not appear to have learnt any lessons from that. They are persisting with allowing illegal migrants to remain here indefinitely without any realistic prospect of being returned, and there is no meaningful pressure on Governments, particularly Pakistan, to take people back.

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid that one moment of consensus has already broken down. I disagree. We are undertaking a range of consultation and engagement on measures with those partners. The Albania agreement was important, but the Home Secretary is making a number of arrangements, and we look forward to announcing them. I hope hon. Members will be patient with us, but I look forward to making more announcements in the weeks and months ahead.

[Dr Mullan]

On that point, will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am going to move on. Forgive me.

We have driven up removals to the highest level in a decade—an important point to stop and reflect on—because of the progress we are making, with 80,000 individuals returned since the general election, including immigration offenders, people in the country illegally and foreign criminals. We know, too, that the ability to melt into the illegal economy too often lures people here, so we have raised illegal working enforcement to record levels.

As we rebuild our shattered asylum system, we are also lightening the burden on local communities. The Government committed to ending the use of asylum hotels within this Parliament and we will do so. Two years in, we have already emptied one in three, reducing the hotel population by 50% in the last year and by 71% since the peak under the previous Government. We have cut asylum costs from hotels by £1 billion. That is £1 billion that we can spend on the other priorities of the British people and I think that that should be recognised.

We have made significant progress on the chaos we inherited two years ago, but we know there is more to be done to restore fairness to our asylum system: fairness for genuine refugees, who deserve our sanctuary and wish to contribute to our society; and fairness for British citizens, our constituents, who shoulder the current burden in their taxes and in their communities. That is why we continue to work relentlessly at home and abroad to prevent people from coming here illegally in the first place, dismantle the criminal networks that facilitate dangerous and unnecessary crossings, remove those who break our laws and have no right to be here, and ensure that this country maintains its proud tradition of helping the world’s most vulnerable people where it can, but in a secure and orderly way through new safe and legal routes.

That is why we have introduced the new Immigration and Asylum Bill. It will cut the asylum backlog by making decisions faster and fairer, close loopholes so that those with no right to be here can be rapidly removed, and ask those who have benefited from public support to contribute to their costs where they are able. I thank the Members who are currently scrutinising the Bill in Committee.

I turn now, as the hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury (Aphra Brandreth) implored, to the issues around MOD Bicester. For too long, the way in which we house asylum seekers has not been fair. Billions of pounds have been spent putting them up in hotels, while communities have seen those hotels, often at the centre of their towns or cities, become a symbol of a broken asylum system. Areas where housing costs were low and that already felt left behind were asked to bear more than their fair share, which has been a source of anger and frustration for many people—and understandably so.

As well as reducing the backlog, we are working with local authorities on a fairer distribution of asylum seekers across the country. That means ending the use of costly hotels, and instead, moving asylum seekers into more appropriate accommodation.

[Greg Smith]

Will the Minister give way?

[Anna Turley]

I am going to make some progress, because I have detained the Chamber a little too long.

That appropriate accommodation includes former military sites, which are basic, safe and self-contained by their nature. As I have said, that approach has already saved the taxpayer £1 billion. But, of course, we recognise the concerns of certain communities.

While the Home Office has submitted a planning application to use the MOD Bicester site for asylum accommodation, no final decision has been made. As part of that planning process, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government provided members of the public and local organisations an opportunity to give their views, ensuring we can fully understand the impact on the local community. I want to pay tribute to the campaign in Piddington. It has been an incredibly imaginative and forceful democratic campaign, which I recognise and respect.

There are many facets to the process and a lot of different considerations to take into account, but I am clear that public safety is and always will be at the forefront of our thinking. If the site is taken forward, there would be specialist security onsite 24/7, supported by CCTV. Everyone must sign in and out, and we would work closely with the police, the council and other local organisations to address concerns.

It is important to note that this is not the first proposal of its kind. Similar sites such as Wethersfield have operated for years with no evidence of any significant increase in criminality attributable to the operation of that site. In fact, in September this year, the chief constable of Essex police confirmed that crime linked to the Wethersfield site is very low, and that there is no reason for the public to be concerned about possible criminality in the area associated with the site.

I emphasise that I fully understand the important desire of Members across the House to press for what they see as the best outcome for the areas and people that they represent. That is their democratic duty, and it is right that any Government are held to account for the decisions that they make. At the same, it is the duty of Government to act in a way that reflects the needs of the whole country. The approach we are taking is in the national interest, and it is the fairest way to restore order and control to our asylum system: ending the use of hotels; reducing the numbers in the system by addressing pull factors; removing those with no right to be here; and opening safe and legal routes, underpinned by community sponsorship, so that those with genuine claims can come to this country in an orderly and controlled way.

Finally, I will address the reference in the Opposition motion to the European convention on human rights. As I have set out, removals of those with no right to be in this country are at the highest level in years. That is thanks to the work that this Government have done and continue to do. But there is much more to be done. The idea that leaving the convention is the way forward is not born out by reality. Not only is it unnecessary to restore effective control of the immigration system, but it would be counterproductive given the risk of undermining crucial co-operation with European partners—something we are already dealing with as a consequence of Brexit.

Let us be clear: the convention delivers for people in this country too. It guarantees their right to privacy, a fair trial, free speech—permanent privileges that cannot be chopped and changed. In an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world in which conflict and cross-border crime present shared challenges, a close relationship with our European allies has never been more important. It is for those reasons that we remain committed to the ECHR and those relationships.

Of course, commitment does not mean complacency. This Government have worked hard to listen to the concerns of the public with respect to the ECHR and the immigration system. That is why our focus is on reforming the domestic application of article 6 and restoring the proper balance between individual rights and public interest. The UK is proud of the role that we played in drafting the convention, and now it is our responsibility to ensure that it is strong and relevant for today’s world. That requires honest conversations and continued evolution, not turning our backs when it matters most.

We have ahead of us what I expect will be a wide-ranging debate. I conclude by recounting the central facts about our record. Crossings: down. Asylum hotel use: down. Removals: up. Order and control: returning at last. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) has chuntered from a sedentary position for a while, but I remember that when he was in the Home Office his Government began the use of many similar large sites, such as Wethersfield. [Interruption.] I am just reminding him that Wethersfield was opened under his watch.

Let us remember the “why” as well as the “what.” The reason underlying all that we have done, are doing, and will do in this area is fairness—fairness to those in genuine need of sanctuary from tyranny, conflict and persecution; and fairness for the British public, who rightly expect their Government, not criminal gangs, to determine who can come to this country, and who expect asylum seekers to be fairly housed across the country. Fairness is the principle on which our progress to date has been built, and the work continues relentlessly.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Unfortunately, the Front Bench speeches went on for quite some time, so Back Benchers will begin with a six-minute speaking limit. I call on the Liberal Democrat spokesperson also to respect the amount of time that we have for the debate.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.

Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.

Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?

A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?

The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?

Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.

In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.

Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?

The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.

Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.

The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.

Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.

The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.

We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.

I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.

I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

We support clauses 4 and 5 and schedule 3. We do not oppose the Government amendments and new clause 2. We will oppose amendment 63. The Opposition want rules that deliver fast, final decisions and that stand up in court. A set of rules quashed within a year would set the whole reform back.

[Anna Turley]

I again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn.

Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules.

Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown.

Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with

“regard to the desirability of”

meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act.

The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must

“aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”

The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister has not justified why the wording is different. She said that members of the board would be expected to comply; my amendment would simply make that even clearer. Why say that they should

“have regard to the desirability of”

instead of using the wording that I suggest in amendment 63?

[Anna Turley]

We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards.

Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants.

The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay.

I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill.

Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of

“the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.”

The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules.

The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process.

These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended.

Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation.

This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time.

Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

I support amendment 68. My concern, which I am sure many people outside this place share, is that in effect it means people marking their own homework. Is there not a basic principle of fairness involved here? If we wish to see a genuine review in which all the information can be summed up and weighed, there might be issues of internal bias if the person who has already made the initial decision is reviewing it.

[Anna Turley]

The ultimate decisions on how this will be set up are for the procedure rules board. I am sure that its members will be watching and listening to these proceedings, and I am sure that they will be very careful to ensure, when they set up the procedures, that there can be no accusations of any duplication or of people marking their own homework in the process. I hope that the safeguards I have set out will ensure that, but it is not for us to propose that in the Bill; it is for the board to do so as it undertakes the whole assessment and development of the procedure rules.

[Tom Gordon]

May I press the Minister a little further on that point? What really concerns me is that a lot of this will be done using the negative procedure, as she has referred to. Our ability to influence and to resolve the issue down the line if the board does get it wrong, which I hope it does not, will be further constrained and our hands will be tied. Does the Minister share that concern?

[Anna Turley]

We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament.

It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process.

On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process.

I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister’s insistence that this is not a watering down of previous rules does not wash. In my opinion, it is a double watering down: clause 4 makes a change to “have regard to”, and clause 1 includes a double use of “aim to” rather than “must”. That is certainly a watering down of the previous duties, and I think we should go along with the wording in amendment 63.

On amendment 68, we have heard a lot of assurances from the Minister that the quality assurance and rule-making processes are unlikely to do the opposite of what this amendment asks. We have heard the Minister say, “They can do this.” If she were prepared to say, “They will do this,” I could potentially withdraw the amendment, but in the absence of that assurance—with only “This is possible” and “We might see this,” and with only the negative procedure—I am afraid I will have to press it to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Power of IIAA to review its own decisions

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 6, page 5, line 12, at end insert—

“(1A) The IIAA may undertake a review of a decision under this section only for the purposes of determining whether the decision contains an error of law.”

This amendment would mean that reviews under clause 6 may only be undertaken on the grounds of an error of law. Errors of fact may be dealt with under IIAA Procedure Rules made under paragraph 17 of Schedule 3.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clause 7 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Clause 6 provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions. This is an important safeguard in the new appeals system. It enables the IIAA, among other things, to identify and correct errors in its decisions without requiring parties to pursue an onward appeal to the upper tribunal. The review power supports the efficient administration of justice. It provides a mechanism for correcting errors at an earlier stage, which can reduce unnecessary litigation and ensure that cases are resolved more quickly where appropriate.

The clause reflects a common practice of decision-making bodies implementing a mechanism to review their own decisions. By enabling the IIAA to review its own decisions, the clause helps to promote fairness, accuracy and public confidence in the appeals system. The review power sits alongside the onward right of appeal to the upper tribunal provided by clause 7. Together, the provisions create a coherent framework through which decisions may be scrutinised and, where necessary, corrected. Clause 7 provides an important safeguard within the new appeals system by preserving a right of appeal from the IIAA to the upper tribunal on a point of law. A party will need permission from either the IIAA or the upper tribunal before an appeal can proceed, which should prevent the onward appeal route from becoming an opportunity to rehear the full case. That broadly mirrors the existing route from the first-tier tribunal to the upper tribunal, therefore maintaining continuity and legal accountability as cases transfer to the new authority. Where the upper tribunal finds an error of law, it will be able to remake the decision itself or remit the case to the IIAA for a fresh decision. The clause is necessary to ensure that the decisions of the new IIAA remain subject to judicial scrutiny at upper tribunal level. The upper tribunal will provide independent oversight of whether the law has been applied correctly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.

That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?

The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?

Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?

I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.

I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.

On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8.

Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement.

The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome.

The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control.

Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended.

Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that.

I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that.

More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly.

Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.

[Siân Berry]

I will not labour the point any further. I will press my amendment to a Division, and I hope the Minister will keep looking at how this kind of consultation can be made more statutorily inclusive.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Expedition of cases on request by Secretary of State

[Anna Turley]

I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) In Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 (immigration bail), in paragraph 3 (exercise of power to grant immigration bail), in sub-paragraph (2), after paragraph (e) insert—

‘(eza) whether any proceedings before the IIAA relating to the person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under section 9 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 2026,’.”

This amendment would mean that, in considering whether to grant immigration bail, the decision-maker must have regard to whether the applicant’s proceedings were being expedited pursuant to clause 9 of the Bill (as well as whether the late claims process applies: see clause 12(3)).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—

(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and

(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”

This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.

Clause stand part.

[Anna Turley]

The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.

Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.

Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.

On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?

Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?

On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?

We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.

Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.

That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.

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[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.

[Blake Stephenson]

You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?

[Anna Turley]

It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.

[Ben Goldsborough]

Does the Minister agree that the problem with amendment 90 is that if we expedite everything, we expedite nothing? Having the clause as drafted—making this a precise move taken by the Secretary of State—ensures that those cases that our constituents know need to be expedited, will be. The broadbrush approach proposed by the Opposition would fail that completely.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend puts that perfectly, succinctly and clearly. I appreciate him saying that. This Government are absolutely clear that foreign national offenders with no right to remain should be removed as swiftly as the law allows. I have every anticipation—the Home Secretary has been clear—that in restoring order and control, they are exactly the kind of cohort that we have in mind. It is important, however, that clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism for setting those time periods for groups of cases, clause 9 allows for individual cases to be expedited, and we continue to allow the Secretary of State to have that flexibility to respond to the public interest, rather than narrowing the measure to one specific cohort in the Bill.

Amendment 37 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 90, in clause 9, page 7, line 21, at end insert—

“(7) The IIAA must expedite any appeal brought by a person who—

(a) is liable to deportation under section 3(5)(a) or (6) of the Immigration Act 1971, and

(b) has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

and subsection (3) applies in relation to such an appeal as if the Secretary of State had made an expedition request.”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This amendment would require the IIAA to expedite appeals brought by foreign criminals liable to deportation rather than leaving expedition to a discretionary request by the Home Secretary.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 1—Enforcement.

[Anna Turley]

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.

Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.

Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.

I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?

Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?

We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.

The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.

The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.

The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:

“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]

That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?

Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?

Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.

Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.

What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?

Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?

New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?

The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims

“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”

The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.

Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?

We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.

On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.

Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.

Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.

Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

The other reason to put the requirement into the Bill is that when I have asked for information—particularly from the Home Office—I have too often been told that it is simply not collected or available. Putting it into the Bill would prevent the design of information systems that simply do not collect the information that we need to see the impact of the Bill. I hope the Minister listens and publishes all the information about the current situation as soon as possible, and will assent to publishing the data quarterly so that we can hold the Government to account from the outside. I know that the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration will review the work of the appeals authority, but it is important that external scrutiny occurs too.

[Anna Turley]

The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters.

Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants.

Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making.

Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes.

The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

The Minister said, “efficiency and effectiveness”. One of the issues that I raised was equalities issues and discrimination. Will that also be in the remit?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.

[Blake Stephenson]

Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 93, in clause 15, page 12, line 32, after “force” insert

“, but no later than three years after the day on which section 1 comes into force,”—(Blake Stephenson.)

This probing amendment would limit the Home Secretary’s power to route appeals to the First-tier Tribunal to the first three years after the IIAA is established, so that the transition cannot run indefinitely.

Government amendment 43.

Clause 15 stand part.

Clause 16 stand part.

[Anna Turley]

Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.

Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.

The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.

Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

[Blake Stephenson]

This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.

Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?

We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?

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We support clauses 14 to 16 and Government amendment 43, but a reorganisation whose cost is unknown and a transition that has absolutely no end date is not yet a reform. If the Minister can answer on the timetable, we will not press amendment 93 to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.

The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.

Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.

Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.

In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.

The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?

[Anna Turley]

Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?

[Blake Stephenson]

The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA

Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Third sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I will speak to Opposition amendment 87 and to two other amendments in the group.

As this is the Committee’s first debate on part 1 of the Bill, let me set out the test that the Opposition will apply to it. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary told the House that more than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal decision and the average wait is well over a year. Every one of those months is a month in which someone whose claim may well fail remains in this country, very often at the taxpayer’s expense. The public have been promised for years that that would be fixed, and we need to see it happen now. Our test for every clause in this part is a simple one: will appeals be decided faster, and will those who lose be removed?

Clause 1(5) is where the Bill tells the new authority what it is for: the authority must aim to be accessible, fair and independent; it must aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently; and it must have regard to the public interest. Amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would remove the words “aim to” from the first paragraph only, so that the authority would be under a firm duty to be “accessible, fair and independent”. I understand the instinct, but that hardens the wrong limb of the measure. If any duty in this subsection needs to be firmer, it is the duty to handle cases “quickly and efficiently”. That is the duty that the authority is being created to discharge, and it is the one that the public will judge it on.

Amendment 64 would remove “aim to” from both limbs, subsection (5)(a) and (b), but it would also remove the public interest duty in paragraph (c) to which I now turn. Amendments 49 and 64 in its second paragraph would go further than amendment 48. They would remove the duty to have regard to the public interest altogether. I respect the concern for independence that lies behind amendments 49 and 64, but I cannot agree. It would be remarkable for Parliament to tell the body that decides who may stay in this country that it need have no regard to the public interest or to public confidence in the system it is part of. An immigration system that does not have the confidence of the British public is a system that will not work.

Amendment 87 takes the opposite approach. It strengthens the public interest duty instead of removing it. In the Bill as drafted, the authority must merely “have regard to” the public interest, and the only content that the Bill gives to that interest is the fact that the authority is part of the immigration and asylum system. That tells an adjudicator nothing. The amendment states what the public interest is:

“the effective enforcement of immigration control, including the prompt removal from the United Kingdom of persons who have no right to remain.”

It would require the authority to give effect to that interest, not simply to have regard to it. The difference between “have regard to” and “give effect to” is not a lawyer’s nicety. A duty to have regard to something can be satisfied by thinking about it and then setting it aside; a duty to give effect to something cannot.

Clause 1(5) reaches well beyond the final decision in each case: it governs the authority in the “exercise of its functions”, which means how it lists cases, handles requests to adjourn and manages its caseload. Under clause 4(5), the Procedure Rules Board must also have regard to those objectives when it writes the rules. Amendment 87 would therefore shape every deadline, every adjournment rule and every listing decision the authority makes. It would put the effective enforcement of immigration control into the DNA of the institution from the start.

The Committee heard in evidence why that matters. Professor Ekins of Oxford University told us that one of the potential advantages of the new authority is that it could make

“the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 22.]

Amendment 87 would make sure that that advantage is actually realised, rather than left to chance. This is not new ground for Parliament. Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 already states that

“the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.”

The Minister may say that amendment 87 would compromise independence, but it would not. Clause 1(4) will still require the authority to

“exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done.”

Clause 1(6) will still require every Minister to uphold the IIAA’s independence. Each case will still be decided on its evidence and on the law. What changes is that the institution is told plainly what it exists to achieve. We are clear that the public interest includes the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the country. That is one of the public’s most pressing concerns, and the new authority should be in no doubt that it is there to serve it.

New clause 12 asks for a report on the cost, timetable and capacity of the authority before part 1 can be commenced. Whatever view the Committee takes of a statutory lock on commencement, the questions are fair, and I will put them directly: what is the full cost of setting up and running the authority over its first five years, and how does that compare with the tribunal it replaces? How many adjudicators will be in post on the first day, and how many appeals will they decide each year? On what date does the Minister expect the authority to hear its first appeal?

We will press amendment 87 to a Division when it is reached.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Murrison. I thank all Members for the constructive debate we have had on the amendments to clause 1 of this Bill, particularly the hon. Members for Brighton Pavilion and for Stockton West, and the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, who tabled amendment 87.

I would like to say up front that it is very clear that consent for our asylum system in the public domain is fraying. The important part of this Bill is to seek to restore control, restore fairness and rebuild the public’s confidence. We have made huge progress on initial decision making; we have cut the backlog in initial decisions by 72% from the 2023 peak. However, as we have done so, the appeals backlog has grown substantially, now with waiting times of more than two years. Some appeals are absolutely genuine, and they of course must be heard fairly. However, it is clear that some claimants are lodging appeals to frustrate their legitimate removal from this country.

As of June 2026, the open caseload in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber was about 156,000. The average time taken to clear appeals across all categories is currently at 65 weeks: 72 weeks for asylum protection, 74 weeks for human rights and 48 weeks for European economic area free movement. The Government have substantially increased both capacity and productivity in the FTT IAC, but demand has risen considerably faster. Receipts increased from around 58,000 in 2023-24 to almost 118,000 in 2025-26, while the outstanding caseload rose from around 50,000 to more than 150,000. We have done our best to try to support the workforce within that existing system. We increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, including 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges who began sitting between January and March this year, and we are continuing further recruitment.

The structural constraint is just how quickly judicial capacity can scale. Judicial recruitment draws on a relatively limited pool of experienced lawyers, and it currently takes around 12 to 18 months from launching an exercise to a judge being able to sit, so that is not feasible. The IIAA therefore broadens the recruitment pool, providing greater flexibility and allowing us to increase capacity while maintaining robust safeguards around training, legal support, quality assurance and professional standards.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Is it not the case that the long backlog of cases for judges is largely driven by the poor quality of original decision making by Home Officials, as shown by the number of successful appeals? I was slightly concerned that senior officials at the evidence session seemed not to be willing to acknowledge that. Will the Minister acknowledge that the quality of some of those first Home Office decisions is not particularly good?

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and all of us, as Members of Parliament, will have had our own cases that challenged some of the standards. However, what we have seen is that, while the number has increased, the decision making quality has not gone up or down. I would also say that, at the moment, the delays in the current system mean that decision making becomes poorer, because evidence is produced later in the system and some of it is not sustainable, and more and more different routes are being attempted to string out appeals. The longer the process goes on, the more complex and difficult the decision making becomes. This is about having swift and fair decision making, but we will always keep the quality of decision making in this process under review in the Department.

To create the swift and fair appeals system that we need, we are scrapping the judge-led asylum and immigration tribunal, which just cannot keep pace with demand, and we are replacing it with a new independent appeals authority to deliver swift and fair decision making. This authority will be staffed by independent adjudicators, who will be ordinary citizens trained like magistrates. To reduce abuse of the system, claimants will be allowed just a single route for appeal, which must be lodged as early as possible. That will remove the scope for bringing multiple appeals, as some claimants do, that are often vexatious and at the very last minute before removal. Late claims will be heard under an expedited process, ensuring that they cannot be used to frustrate a removal. There will be a right for a further appeal to a judge-led tribunal only on a point of law.

The new authority will be independent of Government, with a chair and chief executive officer who are accountable to the Home Secretary and Parliament for delivering an effective and efficient system. All appointments will be based on merit and subject to fair and open appointments principles. All Ministers, including the Home Secretary, will be under a statutory duty to uphold the IIAA’s independence and not to influence its decisions.

[Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)]

It is undeniable that there is an appetite in the country for an asylum system that is robust but fair, and it seems to be the case that people are abusing the system. With the extended period for appeals in the current process, despite the good will in the intentions behind it. This IIAA process will not only speed up the decisions, which is compassionate for people, rather than leaving them lingering in a system for months or years on end, but provide the British public with the necessary confidence and security of knowledge that the system we have employed in this country is fair and robust.

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are really keen to ensure that public confidence is at the heart of this process; it cannot be allowed to operate in a vacuum. The public rightly expect us to have an immigration system that has regard to the public interest, and that is what these amendments and the Bill seek to reinforce.

Clause 1 establishes the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill to overhaul the immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for determinations to be reached. Amendments 64, 48, 49 and 87 concern subsection (5), which sets out the objectives the authority must meet when exercising its functions, namely

“(a) the aim to be accessible, fair and independent,

(b) the aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and”—

crucially, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion mentioned—to

“(c) have regard to the public interest”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Melanie Onn]

The Minister talks about the public interest test. Could she explain how public interest is considered under the current judicial system?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not think many members of the public understand how our appeals process works. They see, particularly in the public domain, many cases that have been strung out with tentative evidence and means to do so, and that has led to a huge crisis of confidence. The Home Secretary set out very clearly that she is keen to restore order and control in our immigration service. That is crucial to the public confidence that we need in this country and for us to have a system that protects people from genuine war and persecution. It is vital that we maintain public confidence. Having regard to public interest is a key part of the system; the public would expect nothing less.

Today, asylum and protection appeals take 72 weeks to be determined on average. As we set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” announcement, that extended period can lead to people bouncing around the systems for years—that is neither fair on them nor, given its cost, acceptable to the public—and, in turn, accruing new, additional reasons for delay. The objectives make it clear not only that justice will be done, but that to have an effective immigration and asylum system, the end-to-end decision making and the enforcement regime must be aligned. Importantly, the decision making is still independent, but it cannot operate in a vacuum. The body must be a key part of the country’s immigration and asylum system; as I say, the public would expect nothing less.

New clause 12 seeks to require the Secretary of State to provide a report on the authority’s operations prior to commencement under clause 52(1). In our view, producing such a report prior to commencement is both unnecessary and, given the requirement on the IIAA to operate independently, inappropriate. Decisions on recruitment and training, which will ultimately inform capacity, timeframes and productivity, are for the authority alone; the Home Office should not pre-empt them in a parliamentary report. The Bill contains plenty of parliamentary reporting and accounting measures, which I am sure we will come to—

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

The Minister mentions other scrutiny measures, but the Bill in its entirety relies heavily on Henry VIII powers. Additionally, the impact assessment repeatedly admits uncertainty, and we do not know the deterrent impact. How does she make the case that there will be better scrutiny and accountability? Does she not agree that having a full understanding of the implementation of the Bill up front would be a good thing?

[Anna Turley]

I hope the hon. Gentleman has seen the revised impact assessment, which now has a green flag.

Let me set out some of the reporting avenues that are already in the Bill. At the end of each financial year, the authority must produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions and any other information as directed by the Secretary of State. The chief inspector of UK Border Agency will also produce a report once a year, and at other times if requested by the Secretary of State. The chief executive of the authority has a statutory duty to respond to that report and to send that response to the Secretary of State, who must lay it before Parliament alongside the report. The chief executive may also lay written representations on matters they consider to be of importance through the Secretary of State. There is a wide range of provisions in the Bill to ensure proper accountability to Parliament.

Let me pick up the questions asked by the hon. Member for Stockton West about the costs of the IIAA. Detailed plans are currently being developed, and full costs and affordability will be developed through the business case; I undertake to keep Parliament completely updated throughout the process. As I say, we will be developing that, and I will make sure that Parliament is able to scrutinise it in the fullness of time, but in terms of operational capacity and productivity, we should not be pre-empting this. A report prior to commencement is not appropriate; it is for the IIAA, once established, to undertake its reporting duties.

Amendment 87 seeks to narrow the scope of the public interest considerations to those that concern just effective immigration control and the “prompt removal” of those with no right to remain in the United Kingdom. While I have some sympathy with the objectives of the amendment, I am afraid that it cannot be accepted because it is far too narrow in its definition. The authority is an independent body—we have established that very clearly in the Bill—and one crucial part of the immigration and asylum system, not just an extended branch of immigration enforcement. The public interest spans the entire spectrum, and could include things that are not included in the amendment, such as public safety, operational impact and value for money. We do not want to lose those other factors by limiting the definition to effective immigration control and removal. It is important that we keep the scope broad.

[Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)]

It is important to consider this—and this is why we must reject the Opposition’s approach—in the same way that we consider the police. We must ensure that the public interest covers a wide range of things; if we said it only concerned crime, we would end up in a situation where our police were not protecting individuals or running an effective constabulary in their area and were, in effect, letting down the rest of the country. Does the Minister agree?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and makes a really good comparison with the police. The police are to some extent accountable to the Home Secretary, but she does not get involved in operational decision making. Our approach to the IIAA is similar: it is vital that we ensure that we have the wider public interest at the heart of it, because it will be a key part of the country’s nationality, immigration and asylum process.

[Tom Gordon]

One of my concerns is that the public interest is quite subjective; we are, in effect, giving a statutory steer on what any Government at any given point decide is in the public interest. Does the Minister not have concerns about how that could be applied by future Governments?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, but we live in a democracy. The Home Secretary of the day will be the Home Secretary of the day, and it is for them to define, legislate and direct the broader immigration system. To me, that is a key feature. It is really important that we have the flexibility to respond to the challenges and changes that our system faces, and that we ensure that we maintain public confidence in this process. At the moment, we have an abstract body that operates in a vacuum, purely with lawyers, and does not become part of the broader immigration process. It is important that public interest is part of this.

[Melanie Onn]

My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point about flexibility. Over recent years, we have seen such an increase in the number of applications and appeals. A system that pays no regard to that finds itself falling behind the times, does it not?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, we know that things ebb and flow in the immigration system, and it is important that the Home Secretary has a system that commands the confidence of the general public, does not operate in a vacuum and considers the wider public interest.

For the reasons that I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the amendments, and I invite hon. Members to withdraw them.

[Tom Gordon]

I want to press the point that I made to the Minister a moment ago about how one defines public interest. It concerns me that the appeals body that will be deciding on these cases of law will end up with a challenge when different Ministers of the day provide a different steer as to what is in the public interest. Stemming from that, how does Parliament hold the relevant Ministers to account when we are introducing subjective terms and concepts around public interest? For that reason, we will be pressing amendments 48 and 49.

Amendment 48 would make the provision about the IIAA’s exercise of its functions affirmative: as amended, the clause would say that the IIAA must be accessible, fair and independent, not just “aim” to be. What really concerns me and my colleagues is that the element of flexibility, as the Minister calls it, might lead to unfair application and due process throughout the entirety of the process. I would like to know more about what is meant by “aim to”, as opposed to it being actually accessible, fair and independent.

I will oppose amendment 87, because the IIAA should be independent. The amendment would require the authority to give effect to prompt removals and turn an independent adjudicator into an arm of enforcement, and I am concerned that the public and courts would have no confidence in its decisions.

I welcome the fact that the impact assessments have been updated, but there are lingering questions about the scale and timing of the benefits, and the costs are unclear. We are being asked in effect to abolish a working tribunal jurisdiction without a price tag at this point. I would appreciate clarity on those issues as we move forward.

[Anna Turley]

A lot of these issues will be addressed during the course of the day’s discussion, so I look forward to responding to the hon. Gentleman further on those points.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

The hon. Member for North Northumberland made a valid point—this is an appeals process. The case has been considered once but can go to appeal for reconsideration and even that decision can be reviewed again—that is a lengthy process. The entire objective of this Bill is to speed up the process so that it is fair to the taxpayers, as well as to those subject to it. Removing a whole tier of appeal would reduce the burden on the taxpayer, as would other amendments the Opposition have tabled. The time limits in clause 8 will not help, because they bind the authority rather than the upper tribunal. The Bill does not shorten the queue; it moves part of it upstairs.

The Government’s case for part 1 is that the new authority will make robust and defensible decisions with trained adjudicators, a chief appeals officer overseeing quality, and a professional standards officer setting standards. If that is right, its decision should be capable of being final. Where a genuine error is made, clause 6 allows it to be corrected and that review should be carried out by a legally qualified senior adjudicator. That is a fair hearing—a check for error and then an end.

Let me be clear about what amendment 85 would leave in place, because the Minister will say it removes any check on the authority. It does not. Every appellant would still have a full hearing before the authority on the facts and the law. Every decision could still be reviewed for an error of law under clause 6. Government amendment 36 will mean that that review is confined to exactly the kind of point the upper tribunal would consider. Amendment 85 would remove the second external tier, and its two separate applications for permission—the listing queue and the power to send a case back to the start. The Government accept that the onward appeal is only on a point of law and not a rehearing. The question is simply who checks the law and how long it takes. Our answer is a legally qualified senior adjudicator, with the authority, and quickly.

There is a further problem with subsection (8) as drafted. Professor Ekins told the Committee that this is not an effective ouster clause, that the courts would read it narrowly and that the Committee should not rest content with it. He pointed to the more precise model that Parliament used in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. If the Government agree that the authority’s decisions should be final, they should draft subsection (8) so that it works, and we would welcome their help in doing so on Report.

Amendment 65, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would take the Bill in the opposite direction. It would delete subsection (8) altogether and reopen the possibility of judicially reviewing every decision the authority makes, adding a third route of challenge to the two already in the Bill. I understand the hon. Lady’s concern for safeguards, but they are already there. Parliament legislated in 2022 to end judicial review of the upper tribunal’s refusals of permission, precisely because that route had become a means of delay. Clause 7(3) rightly carries that rule across. Amendment 65 would reopen at the first tier what Parliament closed at the second. Our position is clear; enough is enough. Years of delay and expense must come to an end, and the legal merry-go-round has to stop. We will seek to divide the Committee on amendment 85 and we will oppose clause 7.

[Anna Turley]

Amendments 65 and 85 concern the routes through which decisions of the authority may be challenged. I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion and the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who tabled the amendments.

Amendment 65 would allow individuals to bring judicial review proceedings against the decisions made by the authority. As we have heard, the Bill already provides clear routes for correcting errors and for onward appeals. The authority can review its own decisions under clause 6 and decisions can be appealed to the upper tribunal on a point of law under clause 7 where permission is granted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry]

On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.

[Anna Turley]

The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.

Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.

Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.

[Ben Goldsborough]

One of the main arguments that the Opposition spokesperson put forward was that the system would be too slow under the Bill. However, one key thing that was not mentioned was clause 9(4), which gives the Secretary of State the ability to expedite individual cases. Is it not the case that the Bill as drafted protects the individual’s legal right while also making sure that, when there are grotesque crimes against this country, we can expedite to give people the certainty they need that the system is fair and swift?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. The hon. Member for Stockton West suggests that any unsuccessful appellant could appeal to the upper tribunal and that it will just create another tier, but that is not the case. An appeal may be brought only on a point of law and permission must be granted first, so those safeguards are in place. Permission acts as an appropriate filter so that only cases raising an arguable legal error can proceed. The upper tribunal’s role is not to rehear the appeal simply because a party disagrees with the outcome. It is important to determine whether the law was applied correctly.

Another point about an error of law has been flagged, and I would like to clarify what that means. An error of law is a mistake about the law or its application, rather than a simple disagreement with the outcome or an administrative error. It may arise, for example, where the wrong legal test has been applied, relevant matters have not been considered, the process has been unfair or the reasons given are legally inadequate. The purpose of the review and appeal framework is to ensure that those legal errors can be identified and corrected. It is important that we allow the process to be clear, legally fair and balanced so that, where there is an error of law, that can be referred onwards.

Taken together, the provisions in the Bill strike the right balance. They support the finality and efficient disposal of cases while ensuring that errors can be corrected through clear and appropriate routes. The Government cannot accept these amendments, and I invite the hon. Members not to press them.

Question proposed, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 22 to 24.

Schedule 1.

[Anna Turley]

I would like to speak to clause 1 in more detail. As we have discussed, clause 1 will establish the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority as a body corporate: a public body that is independent of Government. It is the first step in the Bill towards overhauling the current immigration and asylum appeals system, which has seen unacceptable caseloads and waiting times for a determination to be reached. The clause details the primary function of the authority, which will be to determine immigration and asylum appeals as well as applications for immigration bail. It will give the IIAA the authority to determine the same case types determined by judges in the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber today.

Access to justice is a fundamental common-law principle and a core requirement of the rule of law. Clause 1 will place a statutory duty on the IIAA to uphold that through a statutory objective to be accessible, fair and independent. As set out in the clause, the authority must also aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and have regard to the public interest in the performance of its functions. The clause makes robustly clear that Ministers must uphold the independence of the authority and not influence decisions through any special access to its adjudicators. The clause also states that a decision of the authority in relation to its primary function may be challenged in legal proceedings only in line with the review and appeal framework. Such challenges will be directed to the authority’s review process and onward appeal route to the upper tribunal.

Schedule 1 makes a number of consequential amendments needed to transfer specified immigration and asylum appeal and immigration bail functions from the first-tier tribunal to the authority. Government amendments 22 and 24 make further consequential amendments to the schedule, which I will be detailing in due course. The schedule updates the relevant legislation so that references to the first-tier tribunal, the tribunal and tribunal procedure rules are replaced, where appropriate, with references to the IIAA and its procedure rules. Those amendments apply across the categories of cases that will form the IIAA’s primary function, as set out in clause 1. They are necessary and largely technical amendments, required so that the wider legislative framework operates coherently once the authority begins determining those cases. I commend Government amendments 22 and 24, clause 1 and schedule 1 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Government amendments 22, 23 and 24 make further consequential changes to schedule 1 and appear to be technical. We do not oppose them. Is the Minister confident that the list is now complete? On clause 1 itself, the Opposition and the British public have one main question: how will this new appeals body get decisions made more quickly? What will the authority be able to do that the existing tribunal cannot? What reduction in waiting times do Ministers expect it to deliver, and by when?

Let me put the question plainly. The Government are taking immigration appeals away from the first-tier tribunal and giving them to a new body, but let us look at what stays the same: the same appeals brought by the same people against the same Home Office decisions, with a right of appeal to the same upper tribunal. Unless something fundamental changes in how quickly cases are decided and in how many people are removed at the end of them, this is rearranging the deckchairs. A new name on the door and a new chief executive will not clear a single case. The public will rightly ask what all that upheaval is for.

The Committee has been given very little to go on, and it has not been told what the Government heard before they wrote the Bill. In March, the Home Office opened a call for evidence on how the body should be designed, covering the recruitment and training of adjudicators, timeframes and oversight. It closed on 6 May. The Home Office said the responses would “inform the legislation”. The Bill was introduced seven weeks later and, so far as I can find, no response to that call for evidence has been published, then or since. Why not? What did the respondents say? Where did the Government disagree with them, and why? Will the Minister commit to publishing the response before Report stage?

Next, the backlog. More than 150,000 people are waiting for an appeal. Do those cases move to the new authority? Do they stay with the first-tier tribunal until they are finished? The authority is to take over gradually, so both systems will be running side by side for some time. How will the Government stop that creating more delay, or cases being lost between the two? The Government will be aware, from the difficulties of folding NHS England back into the Department of Health and Social Care, how hard it is to move functions, staff and buildings from one body to another while keeping a service running. What lessons have been learned, and when will any of this actually happen? The Bill does not say.

Part 1 comes into force when Ministers decide. The authority opens its doors when Ministers decide. Under clause 15, the first-tier tribunal carries on hearing immigration appeals for as long as Ministers decide. The Committee is being asked to approve the replacement of the tribunal without being told when it will be replaced. I ask the Minister for three dates. When will the first case be transferred to the authority? When will the last? On what date will the first-tier tribunal hear its final immigration appeal? If the Government do not know, they should say so.

Turning to the breadth of what the authority will decide, subsection (2) goes well beyond asylum. The authority will decide applications for immigration bail, appeals against deprivation of British citizenship and appeals under the EEA citizens’ rights regulations. Those are serious decisions about liberty and nationality. Under clause 2, many of them could be taken by adjudicators with no legal qualification. Will deprivation of citizenship appeals and deportation appeals brought by foreign criminals be reserved for senior adjudicators? Also, how will clause 1(8) operate where the complaint is about a procedural decision taken during a case, rather than about the final outcome?

Finally, on the practicalities, when will the authority start hearing cases? How many cases will it handle in its first year? Are the staff and money in place? Will the Minister publish the staffing, funding and transition plans, including the arrangements for appeals that are already listed for hearing?

The Opposition’s own borders plan would go further than the Bill. It would abolish the immigration tribunal altogether, with decisions instead being made in the Home Office through a quick, internal appeal. However, whichever model is chosen, the test is the same: decisions made quickly, and decisions acted on.

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[Siân Berry]

I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.

Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.

[Anna Turley]

I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.

The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.

I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.

[Tom Gordon]

The Government have already increased the first-tier tribunal sitting days by 19% and set a 24-week target. Is there a reason why the Minister does not want to see those measures work before dismantling the judge-led system? Could she elaborate on that?

[Anna Turley]

We have put in substantial investment. I mentioned at the beginning that we have increased the judicial workforce by 21% to 311 judges, with 61 new fee-paid judges and 25 salaried judges starting between January and March this year, but we cannot continue to increase the judicial workforce at the rate that we need to deal with the ever-burgeoning appeals process—it is simply not sustainable. We need a system in which we can recruit people far more quickly and flexibly to make important decisions. I will come on to this later in our discussions, but we trust all sorts of people with important decisions, whether magistrates or planning inspectorates. We are building a workforce that will be making serious and consequential decisions, and we are doing so in a way that is not reliant on a slow process to increase the judicial workforce, which simply cannot cope with the increase in volumes of appeals.

[Tom Gordon]

I appreciate the Minister being generous with her time. Is she able to rule out this model becoming something that other tribunals, such as benefits or property, might end up seeing, with Departments gaining greater statutory powers over the tribunal hearing appeals against them?

[Anna Turley]

I think we have been clear, and the Bill is clear, about the safeguards—not least the statutory requirement for Ministers to respect the independence of the authority. Those important safeguards are on the face of the Bill, and we are very clear about that.

To continue responding to the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, we are establishing the authority to offer increased and more flexible capacity and an enhanced ability to prioritise cases in the public interest. We expect a significant period of dual running, where the first-tier tribunal will continue to hear the existing appeals. That will run in parallel to the new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, and will ensure continuity and that backlogs are addressed as quickly as possible.

On costs, implementations and benefits, as I mentioned earlier, we will bring forward detailed plans for the new authority, which will include the costs. Work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine those costs and establish comparable current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. Those are not yet agreed or publishable for either comparison, but throughout the business case we will develop the full programme costs, affordability and benefits.

In terms of when we will start to make decisions, the authority will be introduced through a phased transition. The first-tier tribunal will continue to hear existing appeals in parallel, as I said, while the new authority begins to take on specific cohorts of new cases. We know that the new system will be quicker. The current system is taking too long to deliver decisions. The Bill creates a scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness on individual decision making.

I have hopefully answered most of the questions that have been raised so far, so I will conclude by summarising the Government amendments in this group. Although technical, they will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when it begins its important work of determining cases. Therefore, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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If the Government persist in the choice to have some non-qualified adjudicators, they need to consider making amendments to introduce further safeguards, for example to ensure that panels cannot contain non-legal members unless the legally qualified member remains responsible for legal determinations, or perhaps unless the appellant consents to it, or if the case does not raise a protection, article 3, article 8 or non-refoulement issue. I really worry that non-legally qualified adjudicators will fall short on those issues. I thank the Committee for its attention for such a long time. I plan to press amendments 66 and 67 to a vote.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for introducing her amendments. I will address amendments 66 and 67 and respond to some of the points she raised, but I will first give an overview of the measures grouped for consideration, including the Government amendments.

Clause 2 introduces the IIAA’s non-executive and executive members and deals with their recruitment. Those are fundamental roles, needed to enable the authority to recruit more widely and to begin operating, and with the leave of the Committee, I will explain some of them now.

The chair and the professional standards officer are non-executive members. The Secretary of State will be responsible for their appointment in accordance with the existing public appointments process; there is clear guidance from the Cabinet Office for setting up new bodies. The chief executive and chief appeals officer are executive members. The Secretary of State will appoint the first holders of those roles on merit through fair and open recruitment. Subsequent appointments will be made by the chair in consultation with the professional standards officer. Ministers will have no role in subsequent appointments of the executive roles.

The IIAA adjudicators will also be executive members and each will be appointed by the chief executive as an executive adjudicator or senior adjudicator. All IIAA executive members will be employees, meaning they will be subject to the terms and conditions of their role, have employment law protections and could be subject to employment proceedings as appropriate. Such proceedings could be in respect of poor performance, and may even lead to dismissal, enabling the IIAA to take the action it considers necessary.

The IIAA will incorporate experience and expertise as much as possible and certain roles will have statutory appointment criteria. The professional standards officer and chief appeals officer must have practised as legal professionals, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least five years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. Government amendments 25 to 27 will make a small change to that arrangement, in that the chair, rather than the chief executive, will be the individual who decides whether the professional standards officer possesses that suitable experience.

Senior adjudicators must also meet appointment criteria. They will need to have practised as a legal professional, as defined in the clause, in the UK for at least two years or, in the opinion of the chief executive, have suitable experience in law-related activities. The IIAA will thereby be able to recruit from a much wider pool of potential candidates. Enabling those who have suitable experience in law-related activities to become a senior adjudicator will make the authority better able to retain talent and knowledge, as it will allow executive adjudicators with no prior legal background to be appointed as senior adjudicators. Being able to retain a strong pipeline of talent with clear opportunities for career progression will be key to our success.

[Tom Gordon]

The Committee has heard from several stakeholders, including UNHCR, which stated:

“Lowering professional requirements in response to capacity pressures risks undermining the quality of decision-making and may ultimately prove counterproductive.”

Will the Minister address that point?

[Anna Turley]

I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s challenge, but I am not sure how that is lowering standards. Just because they are not legally qualified does not necessarily demean the professional standards by which people will be making these decisions. I will explain more about our expectations of people in those roles.

[Melanie Onn]

Is it not the case that there will be people working in UNHCR who are not lawyers, such as people who have worked in refugee charities or who are experts in migrant work, and who have been doing that for a lifetime more than the time that somebody needs to go to law school in order to practise, or to go through the glad-handing process of becoming a judge? Would such people not be equally well qualified as somebody who has gone through an academic route?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes a crucial point. We have to be really careful to say that having legal qualifications is not a prerequisite for having good judgment. We see all sorts of good judgment by professionals; it is demonstrated every day by magistrates, ombudsman and planning inspectors, for example.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

The Minister mentioned magistrates. Magistrates are the backbone of our court structure, and they are not legally qualified. Does she agree that there is a huge precedent there and that magistrates do a great job?

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is right to pay tribute to our incredible army of magistrates, who are volunteers. We are talking about professionals who will have a whole process of support, qualification and assessment. It is wrong to say that legal qualifications should be the only prerequisite for that kind of judgment.

[Tom Gordon]

I want to press the Minister a little further. While our magistrates do incredible work, they often hear cases concerning relatively low-level crimes. Does she think that is comparable to understanding immigration and asylum claims, which might be really complex, from people fleeing political violence overseas?

[Anna Turley]

I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The decisions that we ask our magistrates to take, which may result in restrictions on liberty, are life-changing. I think they are just as important as the decisions that we are discussing.

[David Smith]

To reiterate the point, as someone who stood to be a magistrate and was accepted, I can say that there was no requirement for legal qualifications, but there are still really important decisions that have to be made. Also, as I understand it, in the current system, first-instance asylum decision makers in the Home Office do not require legal qualifications, so this is not new.

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[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point. As I have set out, there will be senior appointees within the organisation who have legal qualifications, so any concerns on any aspect of law can be immediately referred to seniors. We do not have to have people with those incredibly costly and time-consuming qualifications to enable people to make these decisions. That is a really important point of principle.

Schedule 2 introduces important protections that will enable the authority to operate independently and autonomously. It makes it clear that the IIAA is not to be regarded as a servant or agent of the Crown. The disqualification of IIAA members from serving simultaneously as members of any UK legislatures underlines the expectation that authority members will be impartial in the performance of their functions. To further protect the IIAA from undue influence, all IIAA members, inclusive of senior officers and adjudicators, must be appointed on merit and based on fair and open competition.

The schedule limits the grounds for removal of non-executive members to serious misconduct, conflict of interest or being unable, unwilling or unfit to carry out their functions. Those in these important roles cannot be removed through the involvement of the Secretary of State. Executive members of the IIAA, the chief executive, the chief appeals officer and the adjudicators will be employees. The terms of their employment are to be set by either the Secretary of State, in the case of the first chief appeals officer and chief executive, or the IIAA, in the case of future appointments of senior officers and adjudicators.

The IIAA will be accountable to Parliament as a public body. Schedule 2 places a duty on the IIAA to report annually, providing Parliament with a means to scrutinise the authority on the performance of its functions. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule strikes the right balance between operational autonomy and parliamentary accountability.

Let me move on to the amendments tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. Amendment 66 would give the Judicial Appointments Commission a role in appointing not only adjudicators, but the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members. These are completely different statutory roles from judicial offices, with their own employee arrangements and distinct governance, leadership and adjudicative responsibilities, and it would not be appropriate to apply the single judicial appointments model to them. That is designed for people who are legally trained to be candidates for judicial office. That is not what the adjudicators will be. They are not legal appointments—professionals who will be highly trained, yes, but not legal appointments.

The Bill establishes clear and transparent appointment arrangements appropriate to each role. The non-executive members and the first chief executive and chief appeals officer will be appointed by the Secretary of State. Subsequent appointments of the chief executive and chief appeals officer will be made by the chair, and adjudicators will be appointed by the chief executive. Those appointments must be made following fair and open competition, as set out in paragraph 2 of schedule 2. Ministers will also be under an express duty on the face of the Bill to uphold the independence of the IIAA.

To be clear, there will be no direct involvement of Ministers in the recruitment processes for adjudicators. I therefore do not consider that involving the Judicial Appointments Commission in appointments is necessary or appropriate.

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[Matt Vickers]

I will deal first with the amendments and then with the clause. Amendment 66, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would require every member of the authority, from the chair to each adjudicator, to be appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission. I understand that that is offered as a guarantee of independence; in practice, it could rebuild the very recruitment pipeline that the Government say they are trying to escape. The case made for part 1 is that reliance on judicial availability has left the system without the capacity or the flexibility to meet demand. Routing every appointment through the commission would import that constraint on to the new body on its first day. We cannot support that.

Amendment 67 would require every adjudicator to be legally qualified. It raises an important question, and the Opposition have our own concerns about qualification, which I will come to. What matters is that every adjudicator is properly equipped to make sound decisions quickly and that the authority can recruit enough of them to make a real difference.

Government amendments 25 to 27 provide that where a professional standards officer is appointed on the strength of experience rather than formal qualifications, it will be the chair and not the chief executive who judges whether that experience is sufficient. That seems sensible, since the officer who sets standards for adjudicators should not owe their appointment to the executive they oversee. I would be grateful if the Minister set out the rationale in a little more detail.

Clause 2 states that the Home Secretary is to appoint the chair, the professional standards officer, the first chief executive and the chief appeals officer. After that, the chair will appoint the two chief officers, and the chief executive will appoint the adjudicators who hear cases.

On qualifications, the Bill sets out a test for senior adjudicators: they must have spent two years in practice as a legal professional or have law-related experience that the chief executive considers equivalent. On executive adjudicators, the Bill is silent; clause 3(2) says only that adjudicators must receive “adequate training”. The Committee would benefit from knowing more of what the Government have in mind. What standard will an executive adjudicator be expected to meet before deciding a case, and how will it be tested? Will it be set out in the standards the professional standards officer must publish under clause 3(6), so that Parliament and the public can see it? That matters for speed as much as for fairness. Whoever is recruited, training and assessment must be up to the job. A poor first decision is one that is challenged, set aside and heard again, and every such case is potentially another year in which someone with no right to be here remains.

I have several further questions for the Minister. What criteria will the chief executive use to decide whether law-related experience is equivalent to legal practice? How many adjudicators will be recruited at the outset, and will experienced tribunal judges be encouraged to apply? Which categories of case will be reserved to senior adjudicators, and will the time it takes to recruit and train this new workforce add to the backlog in the meantime? Finally, when will the first appointments be made? Can the recruitment process begin before Royal Assent?

[Anna Turley]

The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.

[Siân Berry]

I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.

There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.

The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—

Contingencies Fund Advance: Independent Immigration Appeals Authority

Anna Turley Excerpts

Tuesday 13th October 2026 Written Statements

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

I would like to notify the House that the Home Office has obtained approval for an advance from the Contingencies Fund of £4,000,000. The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority is being set up in parallel to the passage of the Immigration and Asylum Bill to help ensure that the authority is delivered as quickly as possible once the IIAA is established in law. We have identified the need for targeted spend on delivery activity prior to Royal Assent of the Bill.

Parliamentary approval for additional resource of £4,000,000 for this new service will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Home Office. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £4,000,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.

[HCWS367]

Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Q To get the result that we want—tackling that abuse—what else should the Home Office be doing in that space? If this is not a solution, what would you put forward as an alternative, if that abuse does exist?

Eleanor Lyons: If you took the premise that there is an issue with the system, I would focus on better training and support for first responder organisations so that they are good at doing referrals in the first place. There is a real mix in terms of how qualified and competent first responder organisations, such as local authorities, police forces and charities, are. I would also look at a higher quality of decision making from the Government. At the moment, about three quarters of negative decisions that are challenged are then accepted as having been the wrong initial decision by the Government, and are overturned. If there were more opportunities for people to be identified, better-quality decisions and a more trauma-informed approach, we would identify victims earlier in the process and there would be fewer challenges on that part. All this legislation will do is to make it very hard for us to identify or support victims who need help.

[The Minister of State, Home Department (Anna Turley)]

Q Thank you all for coming to give evidence to us. More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made. Can you give us some indication of why you think that is and, building on your previous answer, what would help to challenge that?

Eleanor Lyons: Thank you, Minister, for your engagement so far on the Bill. It is very much appreciated. Building on what I was saying, we really need a system that allows for early identification and support of victims of exploitation. That includes all victims of exploitation, UK nationals and non-UK nationals. When I first came into my role three years ago, the big conversation was about what mandatory training would look like for first responder organisations, so that they would know how to spot a potential victim of modern slavery. Many victims themselves do not even recognise that they are being exploited. To introduce early support into the system would make a huge change on that side of things.

I am concerned about the Home Office data on already high-risk flights. Less than 2% of the total number in the national referral mechanism are on those flights. The Home Office has five days to make a “reasonable grounds” decision. It only protects a victim of modern slavery for five days if they are referred into the national referral mechanism. If the Government decide that, actually, they do not think that there are grounds for those people being a victim of modern slavery, after that point they do not get any extra enhancements for indefinite leave to remain, so I do not think that that provides extra protection for victims. All we try to do in that period is to provide them with the support and care they need in their recovery period, if they need it.

[Mr Paul Kohler (Wimbledon) (LD)]

Q Would you reject the view that the referral system is exploited?

Eleanor Lyons: I would say that, from the evidence that we have seen—this has been looked at across the years by different Select Committees and academics—there is no evidence of widespread misuse of the system. Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year. As I mentioned, if you make these sweeping changes in the legislation, you will also have a negative impact on all victims of modern slavery, in particular cases where we have taken too long to identify them. For example, the survivors of al-Fayed have reached out to me, and they have serious concerns, because we failed them; we did not identify them when we should have done. The Bill would have a negative impact on them, too.

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[Matt Vickers]

Q Is there a particular feature that you would have liked to see in the Bill to aid you in that objective?

Helen Rance: No.

[Anna Turley]

Q I pass on my thanks to everyone at the NCA for their excellent work. We know how important it is for disrupting the organised, industrial crime that is taking place across borders. It is critical that we intervene and prevent dangerous crossings as early as possible. I wanted to put my thanks on the record for everything that the agency does.

You mentioned the importance of deterrence. That is critical, and it is one of the key things that we want to achieve in the Bill. Could you say a little more about how you think the measures in the Bill will help to deter people and make interventions earlier in the process of illegal immigration?

Helen Rance: In terms of deterrence, we are obviously a law enforcement agency, and we would not make specific definitive judgments on the different effects that the measures will have on deterring crossings or immigration. We very much think that deterrence is about a combination of factors, and is, ultimately, a matter for Government policy. However, we believe that the measures contribute to a system that is seen as firm, fair and less susceptible to exploitation by organised crime groups. It is likely that that will help the overall deterrent effect. The changes to appeals, protection status, asylum arrangements and the removal process might contribute to making the UK a less attractive target for the criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration.

[Mr Kohler]

Q I sit on the Home Affairs Committee and have spoken to your colleagues about smashing the gangs. The NCA has been trying to smash the drug gangs for half a century. Is there anything missing from the Bill that would help you to smash the gangs? What is your view on how far the NCA has progressed in smashing the gangs?

Helen Rance: If “smashing the gangs” means reducing small boat crossings, crossings are down this year compared with last year, and the number—

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[Matt Vickers]

Q Is there any risk that the article 8 provisions in the Bill could move litigation on to different questions, rather than increasing the Government’s ability to remove those with no right to be here? If Parliament wanted to go further in restricting the circumstances in which article 8 can prevent removals, what could it do beyond what is proposed in the Bill?

Professor Ekins: Litigation will certainly arise in consequence of these new provisions, if they are enacted; they will not end the controversy in this space. The litigation may turn on different questions, such as whether something counts as “normally”. There is a great deal of uncertainty about how the changes made by the relevant provision, clause 18, will be received by the courts.

In a sense, the legislation leaves untouched the fundamental structure of article 8 in this context, which is individuated proportionality assessment. It tries to clarify, or maybe streamline, some aspects of the way in which article 8 is understood and applied—those changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go—but it is unclear whether, and to what extent, that will restrain the courts in applying article 8.

The legislation takes for granted continuing individuated assessment. The legislation does not purport to be an exclusive code for article 8, does not displace article 8 under the Human Rights Act, and does not direct the courts to focus only on the terms of this legislation and close their eyes to the Strasbourg case law. The way in which article 8 will be understood and applied will be informed to some extent by this new legislation, but there will be arguments about precisely what it means and whether there are conditionals in the legislation at play.

It will always be open to unlawful migrants and asylum seekers who are making arguments by reference to article 8 to invite the court to go back to the Strasbourg Court’s case law and to take this legislation as, in a sense, advisory. I know that that may sound somewhat strange, but that is effectively the structure we have. Parliament is not clearly telling the courts, “Focus only on this legislation, and close your eyes to the other body of case law.” It could attempt to do so: it could go further, by disapplying article 8 under the Human Rights Act and making this an exclusive code for the relevance of family life. That would require some recasting.

To my mind, the more fundamental problem is that we are maintaining individuated proportionality assessment as the test for the lawfulness of removal. That will inevitably be somewhat—“ad hoc” is perhaps the wrong term, but it will be particular and unpredictable. A great deal will turn on the persons who are making the adjudicative decisions. The Bill obviously has something to say about that, but how it will play out is quite unpredictable.

That is a complicated answer to your question. There will certainly be litigation, and it would be a mistake to think that this new legislation will authoritatively determine how article 8 will be understood. It will make some difference, but much turns on how it is received, which you simply cannot tell from where you sit now.

Dr Casey: I agree. There are two different ways, broadly speaking, that this Bill could be received by courts and tribunals. One way—which, so far as the Home Secretary is concerned, would be the positive scenario—is that the tribunal takes very seriously the clear intent behind the Bill, which is to tighten and narrow the circumstances in which article 8 can be invoked and successfully relied on to resist a removal or deportation.

However, as my colleague Richard pointed out, a lot of the wording in the Bill gives leeway for more flexible or generous interpretations for applicants. For example, the Bill says that article 8 applies “normally” only to a nuclear family—partners residing together, or a parent and a child residing together. That “normally” suggests that judges might take a broader understanding of other types of family arrangements. With the standards throughout the Bill—unreasonable impact, “adverse” impact or “unduly harsh”—there is, again, scope to give these a much more generous interpretation, such that, for some judges, it might be hard not to find an instance where deportation could not be considered harsh or as having an adverse impact on a child, because it separates a family unit.

I can imagine some judges—not all, but some—reading these standards in a generous way that would capture a large sweep of cases and defeat removals and deportations. There is a scenario where the reception of the Bill is such that judges retain quite a lot of discretion to come up with their own understanding of the right balance between the public interest and individuals’ family life and, plausibly within the text of the Bill, to reach conclusions that are in tension with the clear policy intent behind the Bill.

I think that that is an unavoidable situation if one accepts the strictures imposed by the ECHR and its jurisprudence because a sine qua non of article 8 law, as articulated by the Court, is that the tribunal must reach its own assessment—it must reach its own assessment of proportionality. At best, Parliament may give indications of where it wants weighting to go but, to stay within the strictures of the ECHR, the courts must have the final say.

Also, in response to the question about whether, if article 8 claims are less attractive, other claims might be made under the ECHR: absolutely. I imagine that article 3 claims will probably increase. The difference between article 3 and article 8, as the Committee will know, is that article 3 is categorical—there is no qualification if the threshold is met. The threshold sometimes includes things like whether removal will lead to substandard medical care, compared with the NHS; that is ill treatment. We could see a spike in such invocations, and the Bill does not touch article 3 claims whatever.

Professor Ekins: I should add that this legislation, as the Committee knows, builds on the Immigration Act 2014, which also attempted to tighten the understanding and application of article 8; that is largely viewed as having been much less effective than Parliament intended in 2014. This legislation will go further and that is to be welcomed, but the earlier Act should be a cautionary tale about the risks of failure.

[Anna Turley]

Q Thank you very much; I appreciate your responses. May I step back from just the article 8 measures and talk about the Bill in the round? What is your view on whether it strikes the right balance when it comes to honouring our obligations to refugees under the conventions? Are we balancing that with taking stronger action to deal with the challenges that we face internationally on illegal immigration? Is the Bill striking the right balance, or can we go further?

Professor Ekins: In my view, the legislation does not strike the right balance, because it fails—as have successive Bills, I think—to take sufficiently robust measures in relation to the problem of illegal migration and people smuggling; I am thinking of the small boats crisis in particular. That is somewhat distinct from the broader problem of unlawful migration, which is clearly a problem—people overstaying, foreign criminals and so on—but the small boats crisis has particular features that warrant a particular response.

To my mind, unfortunately, although the legislation tinkers with aspects of how the refugee convention should be understood in our law—perhaps we will come to that later—it seems, silently at least, to take for granted that persons who have contracted with people smugglers and made it across the channel are entitled to asylum and to remain in the UK. I think that that is a misunderstanding of the terms of the refugee convention, which do entitle us to expel persons from the UK, even when they are genuine refugees under the meaning of the refugee convention. That is a protection that all member states enjoy. It entitles us to expel them to other states, because they have entered in violation of our migration law. It would be different had they entered directly from a state where their lives were in danger, but no one coming from France is in that position. That makes that a structurally different position to other contexts, when people flee danger.

The legislation simply does not address that feature of the problem. The measures it takes—which, as I say, I welcome as far as they go—simply tinker with the edges and do not address the central problem. Genuine refugees will cross the channel but, so long as contracting with people smugglers is a viable route to enter and thus to settle in the UK, that will persist. It is a logical and rational expenditure of funds, and it is a flourishing business so long as you do not care about the lives of people crossing a dangerous water.

There is a failure to recognise the protections that we have as a country under the refugee convention. We may take action that would not place persons in danger—they can be removed to safe third states. As far as I can see, the Bill is focused on increasing administrative adjudicative capacity to process appeal claims more speedily. That is admirable, but it leaves untouched the central structural problem, which I and others writing for Policy Exchange have tried to draw attention to over the years.

Dr Casey: I agree. I do not see anything in the Bill that would deter unlawful channel crossings. But, as has been mentioned, , depending on how the Bill is received in the courts, it might deter overstaying on visas and the breaching of conditions of your permission to reside. That could be valuable, as those are significant numbers, but I do not see anything that would deter unlawful channel crossings in any way.

You could go further in the Bill and, for example, take advantage of provisions in the refugee convention that allow states to return those convicted of serious criminal offences or of threats to national security to their home countries, even if there was a risk of ill treatment. The refugee convention allows that, but it would not be possible within the confines of the ECHR. Article 3 puts a categorical prohibition on those kinds of returns even if the person being returned poses an enormous threat to the United Kingdom itself. So even if you did take full advantage of everything that the refugee convention permitted you to do to protect your own immigration system, the ECHR would pose even more stringent restrictions in many respects.

Professor Ekins: I agree with everything that Dr Casey has said, but I would add that that is article 3 as—in my view—misinterpreted by the Strasbourg Court. Article 3 does provide a categorical prohibition on torture and subjecting people to inhumane treatment; as I say, that has been misinterpreted in recent decades to establish a much more far-reaching bar on taking action that exposes someone to a risk of such action from third parties.

In 2021, we published a paper that addressed in close detail the misinterpretation of the ECHR and its far-reaching impact for immigration and asylum law. That Policy Exchange paper is backed by Lord Hoffmann, former judge of the House of Lords. It makes clear the problem in the Strasbourg Court’s reading of article 3—as well as its reading of article 8, I should add.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

Q That is very helpful, thank you. Do you want to add anything, Dr Casey?

Dr Casey: Yes, I agree. I will just say that I think that, because the Independent Immigration Appeal Authority will not be a judicial body, the courts might be more anxious in scrutinising whether a clause ousts judicial review. At the moment, the way it is drafted, as a public lawyer you read a clause trying to oust and you think how a court would read it. I can imagine a court looking at that at the minute and inserting brackets and making it “A (rational and reasonable) decision of the IIAA”, and interpreting it in that respect.

[Anna Turley]

Q I am keen to come back to some of your comments on article 8. What is your analysis of how it has, slowly over time, come to protect those it was never originally intended to cover, and how can we safeguard against that in the future? Picking up on your point about the potential knock-on effect to article 3, Dr Casey, what mechanisms can we use to prevent article 3 being abused, essentially, on the back of our changes to article 8?

Professor Ekins: On the article 8 point, my own view, which is substantiated in quite some detail in the 2021 Policy Exchange paper with the support of Lord Hoffman that I referred to is that, for a long time in the history of the ECHR, article 8 had nothing to do with immigration and asylum. It was not a provision that was understood to impose limits on the enforcement of migration law or on the deportation and removal of non-citizens, especially foreign criminals and so on. There was no connection there.

A connection has been established in the case law by reading article 8 very expansively and then effectively requiring each particular decision to enforce the migration law of a member state to involve an individuated proportionality assessment about the impact on the particular person being removed—or, in relation to article 8, quite often on his or her family or maybe his or her extended family—and for that to pass judicial muster.

As I say, I think that is an innovation in the case law of the Strasbourg court. I do not want to overstate its novelty—it is an innovation that has been going on for several decades—but it is not part of what the UK and other member states agreed when they agreed the terms of the convention, and I think it should be viewed as a misinterpretation of the convention.

In a sense, the joint declaration of the member states earlier this year recognises that something has gone wrong in the case law of the Court; that it has read article 8—we will come to article 3—to establish a kind of Europe-wide migration and asylum law, beyond the terms agreed by the member states. That needs to be addressed and wound back.

The thought that, in a sense, you are wronging a foreign criminal when you remove him or her from the UK so that he or she cannot maintain a connection with family is just fundamentally misconceived. In the same way, we are not wronging the offender by incarcerating him, which makes it very much more difficult to maintain a flourishing family life; the consequence is a side effect of the wrongful choice made by the offender. Something similar holds, I think, with the wrongful choice made by a person who violates our migration law.

There are harsh consequences in many of these cases, of course, but they are not harsh consequences whereby the UK sets out to wrong someone’s family. That structure has to be more fully recognised. We should see that something has gone badly wrong in thinking that the right to respect for private and family life entails, at least in some cases, a de facto immunity to the application of migration law.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins entirely. The extension of article 8 into the domain of immigration law was a very conspicuous act of judicial lawmaking through the living instrument approach.

As recently as 1985 in the Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom case, you had the UK Government—Sir Peter Rawlinson, the Attorney General—arguing tooth and nail that article 8 did not apply to questions about entry into the UK or removal and that it was just outside the scope. They lost that case, and that has been the EHCR’s position for several decades since then, but it was not understood as part of the original compact when the convention was ratified.

Professor Ekins: You asked us about article 3 as well, I think.

[Anna Turley]

Yes, I did.

[The Chair]

We have an absolute hard stop at 11.05 am, so please be very succinct.

Professor Ekins: The 2021 paper I referred to chronicles the misinterpretation of article 3 as well. The categorical prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment has been wrongly extended to require the UK to avoid consequences that are not within the UK’s responsibility, such as the consequence of moving to a country with a much less developed health system, which really cannot be reasonably understood to involve a violation of article 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q If you think that the outcome of entering illegally should be the same as the outcome of entering legally, is there any other deterrent in that space? If the immigration consequence is not used as a deterrent, is there anything that the Refugee Council might accept?

Jon Featonby: For the people who are refugees, it is about having an asylum system that first and foremost does what it should do, which is making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time. I think making sure that that happens has been a bit of a challenge under successive Governments now. For the people who are genuinely seeking protection and who need it, the system needs to make sure that they are able to access that protection when they do.

What we have also seen is the challenge at the other end. For the people who are found not to have that protection need, there needs to be a firm and fair system in place to make sure they are removed from the UK as quickly, and hopefully as humanely, as possible. That is probably where there have been challenges. Some of them are legal challenges, but some of it comes down to basic good caseworking in the Home Office.

[Anna Turley]

Q We share your commitment to safe and legal routes; they are an important way to fulfil our obligations. However, as you see, we have large numbers of people who are coming here through irregular means. What proportion of those arriving by irregular means does the Refugee Council think are genuinely fleeing war and persecution? Do you have a view on that?

Jon Featonby: The easiest way to look at some of this is through the immigration statistics published by the Home Office. Since small boats really started in around 2019, the top nationalities have largely stayed the same. There have been people from Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea and Iran, and the reasons why people would seek safety from those places are quite well known. Within that time, there have also been spikes from other countries. Quite famously, there was a lot of attention in 2022 on Albanians, but those numbers dropped quite quickly. That was probably a slightly different route from some of the other countries.

The Refugee Council has done some analysis in the past on what you would expect the asylum outcomes to be for those nationalities. Historically, you would expect around two thirds of the people crossing in small boats to go on and get protection. That has dropped slightly in the last year because the overall grant rate has dropped, although one caveat is that because the Home Office has not published appeals outcome statistics for the last three years, it is quite hard to work out exactly what happens once some of those cases go through the appeals process.

[Anna Turley]

Q What are your views on article 8 specifically? We know that the majority of our article 8 grantees have a history of immigration breaches. How can we best protect the immigration system while safeguarding family rights?

Jon Featonby: There is only so much that I can say on this, with my particular focus being on the people we support at the Refugee Council. The previous panel mentioned that, with article 8 rights, there has to be a balance between having a controlled immigration system and a focus on individual cases. From the Refugee Council’s point of view, we will continue to support the individual application interpretation of article 8. We see that in our work with refugee families: for a family that has been forced to displace, it is very much not one size fits all; these families can look like all sorts of different things.

One area where we focus a bit more on article 8, particularly around how the UK defines the core family, is the future system for refugee families to be able to safely reunite. We have shared our concerns around the suspension of that route. By our estimate, there are probably 20,000 people who have not been able to apply to be reunited safely through that route since it was suspended just over a year ago. For us, the important thing to remember about that route is that, for many years, nine in 10 of the visas granted to people on it were for women and children. In terms of family reunion in the future, we see it as important that some of the most vulnerable people who have been displaced from their homes and who are in danger have access to that safe route.

[Dr Ahmed]

Q Mr Featonby, thank you, and your counterparts at the Scottish Refugee Council, for the work you do to look after the vulnerable; we are very grateful. Of course, that work can go on only if there is public confidence in the system. As you know, applications have risen steadily since 2021. From your perspective, what is the urgency for a change in the legislation to return the trust and confidence in the system that have been eroded over the last few years?

Jon Featonby: There are definitely some positive signs that the Government should be quite proud of. Around the time of the election, we published a report that looked at the state of the asylum system. We described it as a “system in meltdown”, largely caused by the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which had seen productivity in the Home Office drop to its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic. Since then, the Home Office has done a much better job of being able to make decisions quickly. The latest statistics we have show that about 75% of initial decisions are made within six months of somebody making an application. That is a good thing.

We think some Government priority should be given to how you make sure that people have confidence in the asylum system. That system needs to be doing its basics right: making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time; supporting refugees who are found to be in need of protection to get on with their lives, rebuild their lives and contribute fully to UK communities; and providing a way for people who are found to be not in need of protection to be removed safely and humanely. That is where we see some challenges in the Bill. We do not think it addresses some of that context.

The previous panels touched on how the backlog in the asylum system is now at the appeals stage, which is an almost inevitable consequence of dealing with the initial decision backlog. There will be more decisions and therefore more refusals, and therefore more people will go into that appeals process. There are probably three times as many people in the appeals backlog as in the asylum backlog itself. Some of that will work its way through the system as the Government get more on top of the asylum system—what officials refer to as having friction within the asylum system—where the number of decisions they are making is roughly the same as the number of people entering the system.

As a result of the speeding-up of decision making in recent years, we have also seen a reduction in the quality of some decisions, which we think has put unnecessary pressure on the tribunal and left people stuck in the asylum system, and in accommodation, for longer than they should be, at cost to the taxpayer and to those individuals. That is borne out by the appeals statistics that we now get from the first-tier tribunal, which show that in the last year, in two thirds of appeals that were disposed of, either the tribunal granted the appeal or—as is increasingly the case—the initial decision was withdrawn by the Home Office, because once the appeal got towards the tribunal hearing the Home Office found that it was not going to be able to defend the decision. That is why we think there should be a laser focus on initial decision making and on what else can be done to reduce the appeals backlog.

One of our concerns around the IIAA is that the appeals backlog is an urgent problem that needs to be dealt with now, but the best case scenario is probably that the IIAA starts to hear some cases at the back end of next year. It may well be the next election before the IIAA is really up and running. We think that more urgent things could be done without having to rip up the entire tribunal system as it currently is.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

Anna Turley Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister of State, Home Department (Anna Turley)]

Q Thank you both for coming to give evidence to us today. You both emphasise the importance of evidence and evaluation. Can you give us some idea of what metrics you think we should use to judge whether our reforms have been successful?

Dr Sumption: Obviously, there are several different goals of the Bill, and the metric used would depend on that. For the deterrence stuff that we have just been discussing, small boat arrivals and asylum applications are the most relevant ones. Some things that cannot be tracked now—at least, not in the published data—could potentially be tracked in future.

For example, we actually have remarkably few statistics on human rights grants, including how many people are granted and what happens to refusals over time, or how many refusals are overturned in court. All those things could be tracked, but the data does not currently exist. My understanding is that it does not exist internally either, because the impact assessment used a sample of around 3,000 cases, rather than just using full statistics for many of them. I think there is probably some statistical work that could be done to try to track the impacts of the human rights measures a bit more.

Also, the data on returns could be linked to the data on what happens to people before that return. For example, one of the potentially very important outcomes that the impact assessment looks at is how many people are refused as a result of the changes, but never actually removed from the country. I think most people would qualify that as an undesirable outcome in the sense that you have people who are still in the UK. and there may be costs associated with them. If they are destitute, the local authority will have to support them, and it increases the unauthorised population. Using the current statistics, we would never know to what extent that is happening, but in theory it would be possible to track all that stuff using the data.

The other major metric on the impact of the changes to the appeals system would be how the backlog changes over time. Of course, you can then look at the numbers of onward appeals to the extent that that becomes a problem, which I am sure other witnesses here will discuss. It is about having data on people’s journeys through the asylum system and appeals system. How long does it take? What are the metrics on the accuracy of the decisions? How many decisions are overturned? I think all those would be important metrics.

[The Chair]

Did you want to add something to that, Mr Mehmet?

Alp Mehmet: Forgive me; my hearing is not what it ought to be. I am not listening to cricket or something; I need to ensure that I can hear what you are saying.

[Anna Turley]

Q I was asking for your view on potential metrics we could use in future, after the Bill has been implemented, to measure whether it has successfully achieved its aims.

Alp Mehmet: I suppose the principal metric will be the extent to which it has sped up how long it actually takes to deal with someone who arrives, claims asylum, goes through the system and then has a decision made. It will also be the extent to which, having made that decision, appropriate action can then be taken—that is, the person is either removed or permitted to stay.

It is going to take a couple of years, which is another problem I find with the Bill. Here we are again, proposing fresh measures, and however welcome or not they are, the fact is that it will be three years down the road before we know what their impact is. I do not think that matches the urgency the problem requires. If it does indeed discourage people from coming and from making repeat appeals, one after the other, I think that is a metric that can also be used to determine whether or not what was intended is being achieved, but it is going to be at least a couple of years, if not longer, before we know.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

Q Good afternoon and thank you for joining us. A question to both of you: given that you have mentioned the urgency of addressing the challenge the country faces, and remembering the strict international legal frameworks that constrain some of the legislation we can enter into, which single policy would you like to see in the Bill that is not there now, but that you would think would have the biggest impact on reducing illegal migration? I know it is a difficult question, it is the golden question, but I would be interested to know from two experts, given the urgency and the legal frameworks we are working within, what you think would have the biggest impact on preventing the illegal migration we are being challenged with.

Dr Sumption: If your goal is to reduce unauthorised arrivals, I think most of the measures for which there is evidence that they are effective do not actually require legislation. There is evidence from other countries that physical enforcement—measures like intercepting boats, where it can be done safely—can have a large impact. There is also evidence that a lower grant rate, which the UK already has, will have an impact in reducing the number of people who apply, and that returns agreements—a much larger version of the one in, one out deal with France, for example—would have an impact. Those things are difficult for their own reasons, but none of them would require legislation.

Alp Mehmet: Needless to say, I agree with all that. I start by saying that I believe that the biggest flaw in the Bill is the further opening up of the border, effectively, with the safe and legal routes, which will allow approved organisations, institutions and employers to act as sponsors. That, if it actually works, may attract some of those who would otherwise have crossed in boats or got into the backs of lorries or crossed by other means, but I do not think it will do that. I suspect that if the number of boats coming across slows down, it will not be because of the Bill; none the less, it might have the effect of making fewer people attempt the crossing. You could argue that in itself is a success because it means that fewer people are putting their lives at risk. Nevertheless, opening up in the way that is being proposed, so that universities, employers, non-governmental organisations, and communities can act as sponsors, potentially gives an opportunity to some 120 million people around the world.

Some figures I saw from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees suggested that at the end of 2025 something like 118 million people were displaced globally. Potentially, any one of them can take advantage of this new route the Bill opens up—in effect, anyone who has a friend who can persuade an employer to take them on. Employers go out looking for these people, or universities; presumably somebody will pay for those who are going to be studying there.

My fear is that this will put the Boriswave in the shade. The numbers the measure attracts may become a serious problem, in the same way that those who arrived over the preceding five years became a problem. It is probably too late to do anything about that, but I have a feeling that, three years down the road, we will be talking about legislation to end that process. That is unfortunate, to say the least.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q What is the single biggest border control measure missing from the Bill?

Tony Smith: It is more what it does not do, which is exclude people coming from safe third countries, such as France, from claiming protection. That was the intention of the Illegal Migration Act. There is also provision in the 2002 legislation where someone has come from a safe country and, under article 31 of the convention relating to the status of refugees, they are not in immediate fear of persecution. We interpreted that as saying, “If you come from France on a small boat, you could have claimed asylum there—you did not have to—ergo you will not be granted asylum in this country.” The previous Government relied on that for the Rwanda plan, and this Government rely on it for the one in, one out scheme. There is now provision to exclude people from claiming asylum if they come via that route. There is no provision to exclude them from claiming protection under human rights or modern slavery.

There are some things in the Bill that I applaud. There are attempts to tighten up on article 8 of the ECHR to stop some claims under human rights and under modern slavery provisions as well, which is to be applauded. But while you continue to run a system where somebody simply needs to get within the 12-mile zone and then make a claim for protection, and you bring them ashore and process that claim in the UK, I am afraid that that is always going to send a message back, particularly to the high-intake nationalities we are talking about, from Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Iran, that all you need to do is get within the 12-mile zone and claim protection, and it is very unlikely—only about 4% have ever been removed—that you will be removed. I am afraid that that still creates a factor for migrants who are unsettled in the Schengen zone, who do not want to stay in France and who are determined to come here. It also still fuels the smugglers’ business model—there is profit in this; this is international organised crime—and they will continue to exploit that market.

[Anna Turley]

Q I would like to focus on the measures in the Bill—you made some reference to the ones on modern slavery. Could you expand on how those provisions might make it harder for individuals who have fictitious claims to stop themselves being removed?

Tony Smith: The Bill is really about the asylum process, rather than law enforcement. I think the Bill last year was more about the law enforcement; this is about the asylum process. There are some good things in here. As I say, I applaud the article 8 reforms, because article 8 is often used as a lever quite late in the process. After someone has been here for quite a while and has been through the process, you suddenly get an article 8 claim because they have developed a connection in the UK. So I think that that reform is right and will help to reduce the pull factor.

I like the idea of the tighter protection arrangements—the 30 months at a time. My only counsel against that is that the Home Office, in my experience, tends to automatically grant and grant and grant, because it is a lot easier than refusing, and that might just become an automatic turnover of grants for however long you allow people to stay.

I think you ought to look at who is going home. If people go back to their own country on holiday when they have a claim for refugee status, we can establish that. We have the passenger information and can cross-match that to their asylum records. If people go back to their own country once they have been given some kind of protection status here, they should not be allowed back in, because they are clearly not in fear of persecution.

The faster appeals process is absolutely essential. The problem with the appeals process is that it went over to the Ministry of Justice years ago, when the Home Office and MOJ were split up. The MOJ does not seem to have been really bothered about it—it has other things on its plate. The backlog is over a year now, so you have to try and get a grip of that. I do not know how you get that in the Home Office and how you persuade them, but I think it is a good idea. You really have to get that end-to-end process going right.

I like the idea of recouping public funds from people, a bit like in the student loan scheme. If people have come here and been a draw on public funds, and they then get into the workplace, why would you not claw back some of that money into the public purse?

I think that all those things might reduce pull factors. They are really good reforms. I am not saying they are not good measures; what I am saying is that, in my opinion, they are not good enough to stop the boats.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

Q As we have just heard, you were director general of Border Force. You talk about the importance of stopping people coming in the first place. But Border Force has only five ocean-going cutters and six coastal patrol vessels. Is there a fundamental issue here of not having the assets for agencies of the state to do their job? Is that something that is not addressed in the Bill, but that would make a meaningful difference?

Tony Smith: The Border Force will enact whatever its operational instructions are, and its operational instructions are drawn from legislation, powers and authorities, so it does not matter how many boats you have out there in the channel. Currently, if someone comes within the 12-mile zone, under the law of the sea you are obliged—quite rightly, because saving lives is paramount—to bring them on board your vessel. The problem is that once they are within the jurisdiction, they accrue all of these rights to asylum applications, ECHR and modern slavery applications. I do not think it is a question of resource. I am a bit worried about resources, given what we saw in Portsmouth last week, because I do not think we have the bandwidth to cover the entire coastline any more. We have been focusing what resources we have on the short straits. Clearly, the smugglers are moving along the coast, so we need to be adaptable to be able to deal with that.

They would always take more resources if they were on offer, but for me it is more about how you get the people coming off the boats properly screened, not cleared within 24 or 48 hours—that is not long enough. Whatever your views on immigration, you have to properly and thoroughly screen people. A passport tells a story—it will tell you all sorts of things. We do not know their dates of birth or their nationalities; the biometric checks are pretty useless. All I am saying is that I think we need to be detaining people for at least longer than 24 hours at Manston if we are going to reduce the risk in any case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q If you could make one amendment to the Bill to increase the distinction between people coming to Britain legally and those entering illegally, what would that be?

Guy Dampier: That is a very difficult one, because one of the big problems that the Bill does not tackle is the fact that an increased number of people are coming legally and then claiming asylum. Since 2019, I think, the number of those coming on the study route has gone up by four times and the number of those coming on the work route has gone up by 22 times. A lot of people are abusing the legal way of getting into the country and then claiming asylum, often suspiciously close to the end of their visa. Nothing in the Bill would really tackle that; that area is really missing.

[Anna Turley]

Q Could you say a little more about the article 8 provisions and how you think they might affect strung-out appeals and deterrence?

Guy Dampier: On the strung-out appeals, the new immigration appeal authority is supposed to help tackle that. The difficulty there, which will touch on article 8, is that potentially the people being used will not be fully legally trained as adjudicators. There are examples of countries that have such a system, including Denmark, Canada and, I think, Norway, but all those have relatively high bars for people to become adjudicators—and in a lot of cases, I think that they end up being lawyers anyway.

The Australians had a similar system. I believe that they cancelled it precisely because the paperwork was being done so badly that they had to redo things or the wrong decisions were being made. Although bad decisions are being made now, the new authority could potentially lead to worse decisions, depending on the quality of the people who come in. We cannot know that quality, but at the moment the lack of qualifications in the legislation is a potential danger.

On article 8, we are seeing restrictions and a narrowing down of things, which is good and will reduce the number of people able to use it. But that will apply only to a minority of cases—even when we are dealing with people who have come here illegally. The majority of people claiming under article 8 now will not be affected. I believe that the Home Office estimates that something like 50% of those who will be refused if this legislation passes will remain in the country illegally; obviously, that is something of a problem.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for his evidence and we will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witness

Angela Afzal gave evidence.

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[Matt Vickers]

Q Is there any evidence that expanding safe and legal routes would reduce the number of small boat crossings, rather than simply increase the overall number of people coming to the UK?

Angela Afzal: To reduce small boat crossings, there will be a range of interventions. Our position would be that the safe routes need to be part of that, because if refugees do not have an alternative, they will use people smugglers. Under the Biden Administration in the US, for example, there was a mixture of a change of internal policy on the border and an extensive offer of safe routes for people. The evidence showed that when there was an alternative, people chose it, and it reduced irregular arrivals significantly.

[Anna Turley]

Q Thank you for joining us this afternoon. You mentioned in your earlier answer that there are not sufficient routes to claim asylum, but a lot of the people who come here, particularly on small boats, have come through another safe country. I think your organisation has said that individuals bypassing safe routes is a secondary issue. How do you think that that enables us to support a fair, rules-based international framework?

Angela Afzal: Sorry; I did not catch the second part of your question.

[Anna Turley]

Do you think it is fair for people to be able to circumvent an international rules-based framework by going through a safe country already before coming to claim asylum in the UK, or do you think that should have no effect at all on their asylum claim here?

Angela Afzal: We have to acknowledge that the majority of refugees claim asylum and receive protection in countries neighbouring where they had to flee. Secondly, we need to acknowledge that the UK is about 14th in the ranking of EU-plus countries in how many asylum applications we have per capita—we are quite far down the list.

The nature of our geography means that people need to be able to cross the channel in some way to reach the UK for protection. At the moment, there are not significant safe routes for people to get to the UK; we are talking about hundreds of them at the moment. In the absence of safe routes for people to get here, people who arrive here and have their claims processed should be granted the full entitlement to refugee status, so that the UK plays its part according to the obligations of the UN refugee convention.

Ideally, we would want people to have the opportunity to travel here on a safe route from the region of displacement, so that they would not have to make the dangerous journeys to Europe in the first place. As things are at the moment, there is little alternative.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q In the view of the International Rescue Committee, what safe routes should be opened up today to deal with the issue that you have just described?

Angela Afzal: We welcome the safe routes that the Home Secretary has recently announced. We think that they are a positive development. There has been a wide consultation with communities and stakeholders, and the approach has allowed communities to offer consent for the refugees who come to them. There can be planning for people arriving so that services are ready. Our experience shows that that is when you get good refugee integration and good social cohesion.

We welcome the offer of complementary safe routes, so that people who want to come here to study and work, but are not able to access the usual immigration rules—

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[Matt Vickers]

Q In your experience, how often does article 8 make the decisive difference between somebody being allowed to remain or being removed? Do you think that the provisions in the Bill will materially and effectively change that situation?

Jacqui McKenzie: We are worried about the provisions in the Bill around article 8, particularly as they relate to the best interests of children and the redefinition of the family, at a time when we are recognising that families come in all different types and colours—I do not mean colours in terms of race; that is probably not the best word. There is not a straightforward definition of a family. The Bill seeks almost to narrow it down to who lives in the house and who does not. That is the sort of language we are getting from the Home Office in trying to describe what it means, because we do not know yet. All we have is a template of an idea.

We have section 55 on the best interests of the child, which most of us base our work on. That enables families using article 8 to remain together in the country. In the impact assessment accompanying the Bill, I saw that fewer than 12,000 families were likely to be refused. We are going for such a draconian measure to deal with a very small number of people. It almost reminds me of Rwanda again. We spent £700 million and we got four volunteers out. Even if we had got some people out through enforcement, it would have been a very small number.

I cannot quite understand why we are targeting families. A lot of those families are actually the third and fourth generation of people who settled here and then brought over their children. In Windrush families, south Asian families and west African families, we have this concept of leaving children behind. The first came when they were over the age of 18, and now large numbers of their children are the ones caught up in the system and using article 8 to remain. Those are the sorts of people we would be targeting. This is their home. They are settled here. The numbers are small. It is not yet clear to me why we need to be doing this.

[Anna Turley]

Q Thank you both for joining us. I want to refer back to the example you gave of the online case that you joined by mistake, where something had got to a judge that was a result of poor decision making. Does that not make the case for the IIAA, in that it was a waste of a judge’s time to have gone through that process? Having a quicker appeals process would have enabled that to be seen quickly and dealt with much more effectively. Building on that point, we have seen a 21% increase in the amount of investment and judges dealing with tribunal appeals, yet the rate of appeals and the waiting time are still going up. Surely, you must admit that there is an issue with the backlog, the time it takes and the small pool of people we have to draw from.

Jacqui McKenzie: I think I might have confused the point. There are two separate things. The point I was making about the man from Iraq was about the lack of representation. That lack of representation, and people coming unprepared to do their appeals, causes judges’ time and the entire tribunal’s time to be wasted. That goes out of the system and it comes back in. The poor decision making is a separate thing. I do not know whether the refusal of that man, which brought him into the appellate system, was a good decision or not. We did not get round to that bit, but we see considerable poor decision making.

I work quite a lot with the Windrush community. We keep seeing in the news, “They’re waiting for the Windrush generation to die.” I do not think that is true at all—I do not think the Home Office is that sinister—but we are seeing very straightforward cases taking two or three years to come to conclusion. The whole reason for that is the poor decision making. You get cases where the first decision is a zero, and then it goes up to six figures after two or three reviews. We are dealing with an elderly cohort, and these reviews go on for years and retraumatise the victims.

I see the same sort of thing across my practice: poor decision making on a number of things, including human rights applications and asylum claims. I do not know how, unless things are improved in the first instance, we will reduce the backlog in either the existing tribunal system or the new appellate authority.

Professor Singer: Just to clarify, that is bad quality initial Home Office decision making, as opposed to adjudicator decisions.

Jacqui McKenzie: Home Office decisions, yes, absolutely.

[Anna Turley]

Q My point was, would it not be better to go to an intermediate tier, rather than take up the time of the courts? That is where we are seeing the backlog—the delay—because of the lack of available judges we have—

Jacqui McKenzie: We have that; we have a review mechanism. The Home Office is meant to review; once you load something up on the tribunal portal, the Home Office is meant to review the decision. That is why we are getting costs in these cases, which is almost unheard of. I have been doing this work as a lawyer for 18 years—it is two years for training—and I have never seen anything like it. We are getting costs in these cases because of the poor decision making at the Home Office, even when there is a built-in review mechanism. A formal part of the process is that things go back to the Home Office for it to review.

Professor Singer: I would add that if the problem this new mechanism is seeking to address is the lack of sufficient capacity among decision makers, the way that that could be most expediently addressed is simply by expanding the eligibility criteria for the existing tribunal system, to increase the pool of decision makers, rather than by having to staff an entirely new body, which the impact assessment itself says would be incredibly challenging.

[Joe Robertson]

Q I will address my question to Professor Singer. We heard in previous evidence about some of the novel or unusual drafting and wording in the Bill. For example clause 19(4) says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”,

rather than that those issues should be “disregarded”, which I think is the normal phrase you would find in law, rather than “no weight”—it is hard to understand what “no weight” means. Also, the ouster provision in clause 1(8) seeking to try to oust the jurisdiction of the court in certain circumstances is drafted in a very loose way, when we know from case law that courts want very specific ousters if they are going to accept them. Does that not run the risk that this entire Bill is actually going to increase litigation just so that the courts can try to define and understand what some of this novel and peculiar wording actually means?

Professor Singer: I have to say that I have questions about the drafting of the Bill in its entirety. I do not think that the Committee can appropriately scrutinise the Bill, because there is a significant lack of detail in so many of the provisions, in addition to very odd drafting. With due respect, a lot of it is back-of-the-envelope-type stuff, which has clearly been rushed through the legislative drafting process.

For example, in the previous panel, I heard the Committee questioning the clause on the introduction of a core protection status. The clause does not actually set out the eligibility or content, in terms of what a core protection status is; it gives the Secretary of State significant powers to make regulations in respect of what eligibility for a protection status would be and what the content of that status would be.

Similarly, in the provision on asylum support, we do not have any details about the actual operation or functioning of that system. The provision gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations in respect of this scheme. In relation to the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, we do not have the rules of procedure to scrutinise, to be able to ascertain whether there will be due process, which will be appropriately followed, and fairness.

I agree with you that there are strange inconsistencies in the drafting, but, additionally, I think the whole content of the Bill is quite lacking in many respects.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q What impact do you expect the financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with the reporting requirements to have on company compliance?

Dr Buttle: As I say, we have been evaluating companies’ modern slavery statements for three or four years now. There is also another investor coalition that we are part of, which is Rathbones’ Votes Against Slavery initiative. That has identified 194 instances of companies in the FTSE 350 not complying with section 54 over the past six years. That is quite widespread and companies are not actually complying. In our benchmarking work, we have identified some of the largest companies in the world that have exposure to modern slavery. They operate in high-risk geographies. They have supply chains that reach into high-risk geographies and they are in sectors that we deem high risk that are not currently complying with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. So we do think there is a risk at the moment, and we think that financial penalties would mean there is a risk of not complying with the legislation. On the way that the Bill introduces penalties of £1 million or up to 1% of turnover, that should be sufficient to make businesses consider this more seriously.

[Anna Turley]

Q That was the question I wanted to ask: will this have the intended effect? Where businesses are not complying with transparency in supply chains, do you think the financial penalty will encourage greater compliance?

Dr Buttle: I think it will, but the other thing to note is that there has not been very much enforcement by the Home Office of the Modern Slavery Act in the past. In addition to the penalties, we need some enforcement by a body; we would consider that in future that may not be the Home Office, and that the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade might be a better place to enforce this. If there is no enforcement, companies may still consider not complying with the regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you think there will be any significant effect from the proposed article 8 changes, or do you think we will just see everything coming back on different legal grounds?

Stephen Webb: You obviously have a combination of both the article 8 definitions and the decision-making body, with a new appeals structure. The appeals structure could be very helpful. There is a significant problem of public confidence in the immigration tribunals as they stand, so I welcome the Government’s measures essentially to phase that out.

It is very hard to say how decision makers and people on appeal are going to interpret this. There clearly is a toughening-up here, certainly on article 8. There is nothing at the moment that does much on article 3 claims, which, as the Committee knows, have been broadened very widely by the courts over the last 20 years into things like whether there is an equivalent health system in the host country and the receiving country, and into areas that are really quite surprising for something that is supposed to be an unqualified right.

[Anna Turley]

Q Could you say a little more about where you think the IIAA will have an impact on improving public confidence in the appeals process?

Stephen Webb: The problem with the immigration tribunals at the moment is that the reporting on judgments, in some cases, has been pretty shocking. The judiciary have not helped themselves in the way that most first-tier judgments are not routinely available. The only time you really hear about them is when they go up on appeal and are quite often turned down. The point about the famous chicken nuggets case is that it was not actually upheld on appeal. It was turned down, but it gave people a taste of the sort of things that might be happening in the tribunals. Obviously, there are recorded cases of tribunal judges coming from quite an activist background, which again seems very odd—I think the public would not expect that.

From that point of view, there is an opportunity to reset and to have clear rules about impartiality. There is also considerable scope to speed things up, which will definitely be helpful. Certainly, a lot of cases are lost because of the time it takes to get to a hearing, so people can build a case. Maybe they will get involved, rightly or wrongly, genuinely or not, in making a political case. Maybe they will create it. They might start developing religious reasons or, indeed, article 8 reasons related to relationships formed in the country. The quicker a decision is made, the more likely it is that it will be rapidly upheld at that first stage. Those are all positives. It is going to be a big process to find these people—identifying them, training them and getting them ready—but in principle, I think it is a good idea.

[The Chair]

If Members have no further questions, I thank the witness for his evidence and move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witnesses

Rt Hon Anna Turley MP, Dan Hobbs and Bas Javid gave evidence.