Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Blake Stephenson Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I have some further questions to Vicky. In your observations, you do say that efficiency should not be pursued at the expense of “procedural fairness” but also of

“access to protection and successful integration.”

You also warn that the Bill could

“undermine conditions that support successful integration for those ultimately recognised as refugees.”

Could you outline how you think the Bill, in practice, will harm integration?

Vicky Tennant: I would say the key area is the recovery of asylum support. We understand that what is envisaged is potentially up to £10,000 per person to be recovered. Imagine that a refugee has gone through a long and difficult set of experiences before arrival in the UK, and has then gone through the uncertainty of the asylum process, potentially for an extended period of time, where they are unable to work or to start the process of getting back on their feet. Then, just as they are getting into employment and starting to rebuild their lives, the prospect of having to repay a potentially large sum of money could impede that. That was the main element that we felt was relevant to integration.

The article 8 point and the ability to reunite with family members is also relevant. Many times when talking to asylum seekers and refugees, I have seen the anguish, the disruption and the sense of something that is unfinished. Being reunited with family and able to restart family life is an element that is fairly fundamental to integration, from the perspective of not only the refugee, but the UK public and communities. We think that giving refugees the possibility to start afresh and moving them as quickly as possible into the integration journey is important, and we know that that is also one of the Government’s stated objectives.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

Q Given the concerns that you have raised, how likely is it that the Bill will restore confidence in the asylum system? If that is not likely, what else would you like to see in it that would restore confidence?

Vicky Tennant: I go back to what I said: legislation is only part of the answer. There are elements of the Bill—particularly those that focus on trying to ensure the quality, efficiency and sustainability of the appeals process—that, if made to work successfully, could contribute to building public confidence in the system. As I said, UNHCR recognises that public confidence is what underpins the refugee convention; we can all speak about the law and the refugee convention, but what is needed to deliver these things in practice is public support for welcoming refugees and for a well-functioning system.

On what would be needed in addition, there is a lot of work under way, particularly to make the first instance decision-making process quicker and to improve the quality of decision making. UNHCR has been working directly with the Home Office on that front for some time, and we have been encouraged by the progress. As I said, it is also about the ability to remove people who are found not be in need of international protection. One can do that only if there is a well-functioning system and there is confidence that it gets the decisions right.

Safe, regular routes are a big part of a well-functioning, fair system. From the public perspective, what we see consistently in the polling and the various surveys that have been done is that the British people want to welcome refugees. There is support for maintaining the UK as a place of refuge, and the more safe, regular, managed pathways there are to do that, the more it can be delivered and that confidence can be sustained.

That cannot be a replacement for access to territorial asylum, which is where it can sometimes be very challenging. As UNHCR, we recognise the challenges the Government face in addressing the crossings in the channel. Nobody wants to see a situation where people are forced into dangerous journeys and where the business is essentially controlled by smugglers and criminals. What is really essential is that you have a good, functioning system for considering asylum claims quickly and removing people who are not in need of asylum, and that also involves the management of arrivals in a sensible way.

Partnership with international partners is an absolutely critical aspect of that, including with France but also with other international partners. That is about co-operation upstream to make sure people have alternatives and do not feel they have no alternative but to move onwards, but it is also about co-operation around the management of arrivals at UK borders. The international standards, the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights provide that common baseline that enables the UK to work with international partners in trying to find solutions to these common challenges.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q I do not wish to cut you off, but I asked the question to all three panellists. Eleanor, briefly, please.

Eleanor Lyons: Very briefly, touching on part 5 of the Bill in particular, I do not think we will restore confidence in the asylum system by weakening protections for victims of modern slavery. I welcome some parts of the Bill, including better advocacy for child victims of exploitation, devolving decision-making pilots, and work around tackling forced labour in supply chains, but that should go further than it does at the moment.

Fundamentally, the Bill makes it harder for safeguarding professionals to identify victims of exploitation in communities across the country, including child victims and UK national victims, and I do not think that that restores public confidence in the system. Unfortunately, I think it erodes confidence that we are not safeguarding cohorts who need our help and support, who do not get the right to remain even if they are confirmed to be victims of modern slavery.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q The same question, briefly, Will. Do you also have any international experience that it might be worth us hearing about, maybe from Australia and so on?

Dr Prescott: Building on what the others have said, there are obviously bits in the Bill that are very positive. The expansion of the reporting requirements—again, you have learned a bit from the Australian experience and the Canadian experience—into public sector organisations is obviously very positive. But, to build on the earlier point, the ultimate way to improve confidence is to improve processes in the system. It is about making sure that organisations have a dedicated point of contact so that there is someone who is directly responsible for modern slavery in first responder organisations. It is about improving and standardising training so that people know what signs to look for when they are dealing with potential victims. That is the best way to stop the last-minute claims, which, though small in number—I think Eleanor said they are less than 2%—have a disproportionate psychological effect. That will also be much better for victims. A lot more attention needs to be on improving the processes, improving the training and making sure someone is actually responsible in first responder organisations.

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

Q We have already mentioned the European convention on human rights, and other articles are involved too. Ms Tennant and Ms Lyons, can you comment on the fact that clause 36 would place an additional burden of proof and onus on the victim to self-identify? We know that the state has a duty under the ECHR and other obligations, such as the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. What is the interplay between making it a harder barrier for people to self-identify and realise that they are a victim of modern-day slavery, and the other articles that are engaged?

Eleanor Lyons: Most of the survivors I have spoken to—I have a summit that draws together 15 lived experience advisory panels from across the UK—did not realise they were being exploited; it took them years of help and support to understand what was happening to them and to feel comfortable talking about it. That is why the premise is there that it should be the state’s responsibility to identify victims of modern slavery and offer them support in their recovery journey. That also has a very practical implication in terms of trying to stop re-trafficking and re-exploitation taking place, and to stop harm increasing.

Clause 36, on the credibility assessment, is problematic because it says to safeguarding professionals, and it puts into law, that it is okay to question victims’ credibility if time has passed before they have come forward, if there are inconsistencies in what they have said or if they are exploited in the same way as someone else. That is an issue across all victim cohorts who have gone through horrific experiences. It is completely unacceptable that we are putting that into primary legislation. That part of the Bill should absolutely be removed completely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)]

Q You are right to say that boat crossings are down 43% this year. Do you feel that the NCA has the resources it needs to continue that trend and go further by implementing the proposals in the Bill?

Helen Rance: Yes. We have very much moved our operational capacity towards immigration crime. Of course, like all agencies, we have a finite budget, but we are focusing it on the disruption of the highest-harm organised immigration crime, individuals and networks. I do not think we would ever say that we have enough money, because more money could always be spent on increased intelligence capability and unique capabilities that we utilise, but we have certainly done a major pivot over the last 18 months towards organised immigration crime, and we have had some excellent results with that pivot.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q In answer to Matt Vickers’s question, you said that, as a result of the Bill, exploiting our borders will be less attractive for organised criminals. What specific measures in the Bill does your organisation think contributes to that assessment?

Helen Rance: The strongest deterrence effect will come from sustained law enforcement activity. If we can continue to disrupt facilitators, seize boats and engines, and target criminal finances, it will have an effect on the operation of organised immigration individuals and networks. The Bill makes it harder and less attractive for those networks to operate within the United Kingdom.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q You can do all the things you have described without the Bill, so what in the Bill will make it easier for your organisation to “smash the gangs”?

Helen Rance: Smashing the gangs, to coin a phrase, really comes with a lot of different measures and policies. Target hardening and making the UK less attractive is just one of those measures. I do not think there is anything specific in the Bill, other than making the UK a tougher environment for criminals to operate in and less appealing for them to exploit.

[The Chair]

May I remind Members that “smashing the gangs” is not part of the Bill? The Bill is about people who are already in the country and the processing of asylum claims. I would be grateful if Members stuck to the measures in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brash]

Q Given the explosion in the number of people claiming asylum since 2021, it is fair to say that it is a widely held public view that a huge number of those are not genuine. This Bill aims to make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for protection. Does it, in your view? Which provisions specifically do you think make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for asylum?

Professor Ekins: I am not sure whether the Bill really does make it less attractive for people who fail to qualify. As I have said already, it rightly makes it more difficult for some unlawful migrants, who claimed asylum but whose claim has failed, to stay in the UK by relying on their claimed family connection. There are other grounds on which they may resist removal. The Bill expressly preserves the capacity for foreign criminals to resist deportation on family grounds, for example. The Bill, if enacted and well received, will make it marginally—I do not mean that dismissively—easier to remove some of those people. Major obstacles will remain, though.

The provisions you have in mind are perhaps those that concern the recovery of contributions for asylum support. I apologise if I have misread this, but I thought that that would hold regardless of whether one was a genuine refugee. The point is that the Home Secretary would have a power to recover funds from people who have received asylum support. There are limitations there, clearly: they have to have funds to make a contribution, and they cannot be left destitute as a consequence.

That may have a modest deterrent effect, but that will hold for failed asylum seekers, including fraudulent asylum seekers—not every failed asylum seeker is fraudulent, of course—and genuine refugees too. But then it is the policy of the Government, rightly so, to deter genuine refugees from attempting to enter the country , certainly by contracting with people smugglers and entering unlawfully across the channel. That provision goes to your question, but I am not sure that it will have much difference in practice. Personally, I do not think that it is objectionable in principle that, if people have funds to make a contribution to the public funds that they have received, they should make it, but I doubt that many people will be in a position to deliver.

There is the other aspect though, which we have touched on: the changes that clause 22 will make in relation to the understanding of article 33 of the convention. Those provisions concern people who are genuine refugees; it just means that those genuine refugees can none the less be expelled, even to a country where their persecutors are waiting, if they are a danger to the community or a threat to national security. With respect, I find that provision quite oddly drafted; I am not sure why it is framed in the way that it is. It seems back to front, in a sense. At least the Government, and Parliament if it supports the Bill, will be addressing that provision. It is an important protection that we will not really be able to rely on, because any attempt to remove a person who is a threat to national security or a danger to the community will be predictably blocked by the ordinary operation of human rights law, which the Bill otherwise does not tame.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins. I do not see the logical connection between the part 2 changes to the application of article 8 and deterring unlawful crossings. As I mentioned, I could see it having a modest to moderate impact, if interpreted according to the spirit of the Bill, on deterring things like overstaying on a visa or breaching a condition of your permission. One of the features of the Bill is that tribunals are directed that a family life formed when your immigration status is precarious or when you are unlawfully present should have little or no weight, respectively. If the courts took that very seriously and that became common knowledge, that might make you think, “Okay, it will be harder to leverage article 8 to stay.” That could have a deterrent effect, but not on unlawful crossings.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q Can we briefly return to clause 1(8), which I think you described, Professor Ekins, as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Would you be able to describe why you think that? If it was better drafted, what would the constitutional and practical benefits be from that clause?

Professor Ekins: We have a long tradition in our country, and in the common law world more broadly, of interpreting ouster clauses—clauses in legislation that would limit the jurisdiction of the court on judicial review—narrowly. The courts take for granted that Parliament is probably not going be excluding their supervisory capacity; if a provision is going to genuinely exclude that capacity, the courts expect it to be spelled out categorically, in black and white. There is a long history of their looking at a clause that you might have thought, especially if you had not really been attending to these clauses and their tradition and reception, did say that, and interpreting it to have a much more limited effect or no effect at all in practice, whereas the point was perhaps to exclude review.

Looking at that clause and knowing what I do about the history of the reception of those clauses, I just do not think it will be understood to mean, “There can be no judicial review of a decision of the adjudicative body that, for example, is procedurally unfair, or that is so unreasonable that no adjudicative body would have reached it.” Now what it might do, and I think this is how it would be read, would be, “No judicial review challenges to that adjudicative decision on grounds of error of law, because, if you think there is an error of law, you appeal to the upper tribunal.” Fine: it would have some limited effect there. But if the point was to categorically exclude judicial review of adjudicative decisions of this body—and I do not know whether that was the policy of the Government or quite what the drafters had in mind—it certainly will not achieve that. I say “certainly”, I think it is probably the case, but I think it is very unlikely.

If you drafted a different ouster clause, then one might have more hope that it would be effective; in a sense, you could specify and categorically exclude the particular grounds of judicial review that you as Parliament do not want this decision of the body to be subject to. Then, in a sense, you are taking full responsibility for what judicial review should look like in relation to this body after the legislation comes into effect.

Parliament has in recent years enacted some more thoroughgoing and careful, if you like, precise, ouster clauses along those lines. These are sometimes called partial ouster clauses, because they do not categorically exclude judicial review, but they very severely limit it. There is one such ouster clause in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which protects some decisions of the upper tribunal from judicial review. That model could be applied here.

I should add there are some drawbacks to so doing, because this new adjudicative body, as our previous discussion may suggest and I think the structure of the Bill shows, is not a court. It will be an adjudicative body with some independence, but it will not be like the upper tribunal, which, frankly, is just like the High Court in a different mode. The constitutional case against doing it is certainly stronger than was the case with the upper tribunal; but, if Parliament takes the view that there should be no judicial review here or it should be only on these specified grounds, then there are other models available for drafting an ouster clause. If I were in your shoes, I would not rest content with clause 1(8) as it stands.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q That is very helpful, thank you. Do you want to add anything, Dr Casey?

Dr Casey: Yes, I agree. I will just say that I think that, because the Independent Immigration Appeal Authority will not be a judicial body, the courts might be more anxious in scrutinising whether a clause ousts judicial review. At the moment, the way it is drafted, as a public lawyer you read a clause trying to oust and you think how a court would read it. I can imagine a court looking at that at the minute and inserting brackets and making it “A (rational and reasonable) decision of the IIAA”, and interpreting it in that respect.

[Anna Turley]

Q I am keen to come back to some of your comments on article 8. What is your analysis of how it has, slowly over time, come to protect those it was never originally intended to cover, and how can we safeguard against that in the future? Picking up on your point about the potential knock-on effect to article 3, Dr Casey, what mechanisms can we use to prevent article 3 being abused, essentially, on the back of our changes to article 8?

Professor Ekins: On the article 8 point, my own view, which is substantiated in quite some detail in the 2021 Policy Exchange paper with the support of Lord Hoffman that I referred to is that, for a long time in the history of the ECHR, article 8 had nothing to do with immigration and asylum. It was not a provision that was understood to impose limits on the enforcement of migration law or on the deportation and removal of non-citizens, especially foreign criminals and so on. There was no connection there.

A connection has been established in the case law by reading article 8 very expansively and then effectively requiring each particular decision to enforce the migration law of a member state to involve an individuated proportionality assessment about the impact on the particular person being removed—or, in relation to article 8, quite often on his or her family or maybe his or her extended family—and for that to pass judicial muster.

As I say, I think that is an innovation in the case law of the Strasbourg court. I do not want to overstate its novelty—it is an innovation that has been going on for several decades—but it is not part of what the UK and other member states agreed when they agreed the terms of the convention, and I think it should be viewed as a misinterpretation of the convention.

In a sense, the joint declaration of the member states earlier this year recognises that something has gone wrong in the case law of the Court; that it has read article 8—we will come to article 3—to establish a kind of Europe-wide migration and asylum law, beyond the terms agreed by the member states. That needs to be addressed and wound back.

The thought that, in a sense, you are wronging a foreign criminal when you remove him or her from the UK so that he or she cannot maintain a connection with family is just fundamentally misconceived. In the same way, we are not wronging the offender by incarcerating him, which makes it very much more difficult to maintain a flourishing family life; the consequence is a side effect of the wrongful choice made by the offender. Something similar holds, I think, with the wrongful choice made by a person who violates our migration law.

There are harsh consequences in many of these cases, of course, but they are not harsh consequences whereby the UK sets out to wrong someone’s family. That structure has to be more fully recognised. We should see that something has gone badly wrong in thinking that the right to respect for private and family life entails, at least in some cases, a de facto immunity to the application of migration law.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins entirely. The extension of article 8 into the domain of immigration law was a very conspicuous act of judicial lawmaking through the living instrument approach.

As recently as 1985 in the Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom case, you had the UK Government—Sir Peter Rawlinson, the Attorney General—arguing tooth and nail that article 8 did not apply to questions about entry into the UK or removal and that it was just outside the scope. They lost that case, and that has been the EHCR’s position for several decades since then, but it was not understood as part of the original compact when the convention was ratified.

Professor Ekins: You asked us about article 3 as well, I think.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Ahmed]

Q Mr Featonby, thank you, and your counterparts at the Scottish Refugee Council, for the work you do to look after the vulnerable; we are very grateful. Of course, that work can go on only if there is public confidence in the system. As you know, applications have risen steadily since 2021. From your perspective, what is the urgency for a change in the legislation to return the trust and confidence in the system that have been eroded over the last few years?

Jon Featonby: There are definitely some positive signs that the Government should be quite proud of. Around the time of the election, we published a report that looked at the state of the asylum system. We described it as a “system in meltdown”, largely caused by the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which had seen productivity in the Home Office drop to its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic. Since then, the Home Office has done a much better job of being able to make decisions quickly. The latest statistics we have show that about 75% of initial decisions are made within six months of somebody making an application. That is a good thing.

We think some Government priority should be given to how you make sure that people have confidence in the asylum system. That system needs to be doing its basics right: making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time; supporting refugees who are found to be in need of protection to get on with their lives, rebuild their lives and contribute fully to UK communities; and providing a way for people who are found to be not in need of protection to be removed safely and humanely. That is where we see some challenges in the Bill. We do not think it addresses some of that context.

The previous panels touched on how the backlog in the asylum system is now at the appeals stage, which is an almost inevitable consequence of dealing with the initial decision backlog. There will be more decisions and therefore more refusals, and therefore more people will go into that appeals process. There are probably three times as many people in the appeals backlog as in the asylum backlog itself. Some of that will work its way through the system as the Government get more on top of the asylum system—what officials refer to as having friction within the asylum system—where the number of decisions they are making is roughly the same as the number of people entering the system.

As a result of the speeding-up of decision making in recent years, we have also seen a reduction in the quality of some decisions, which we think has put unnecessary pressure on the tribunal and left people stuck in the asylum system, and in accommodation, for longer than they should be, at cost to the taxpayer and to those individuals. That is borne out by the appeals statistics that we now get from the first-tier tribunal, which show that in the last year, in two thirds of appeals that were disposed of, either the tribunal granted the appeal or—as is increasingly the case—the initial decision was withdrawn by the Home Office, because once the appeal got towards the tribunal hearing the Home Office found that it was not going to be able to defend the decision. That is why we think there should be a laser focus on initial decision making and on what else can be done to reduce the appeals backlog.

One of our concerns around the IIAA is that the appeals backlog is an urgent problem that needs to be dealt with now, but the best case scenario is probably that the IIAA starts to hear some cases at the back end of next year. It may well be the next election before the IIAA is really up and running. We think that more urgent things could be done without having to rip up the entire tribunal system as it currently is.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q Clause 23 would empower the Secretary of State to require successful asylum seekers to pay costs for the support that they had during their passage through the system. To what extent might asylum seekers factor that into their decision making?

Jon Featonby: I will take that decision making in a few stages. In terms of whether that measure will deter people from coming to the UK, I do not think it will have any real impact at all. A previous panel touched on how complicated this body of law is. For those who have engaged with successive immigration Bills, it is quite complex. To expect somebody who is seeking protection to follow it, and to expect Parliament or even organisations such as the Refugee Council to be the main place that those people get their information, does not reflect reality.

We are concerned about the potential impact on decision making because it is important to remember that asylum support is available only to those asylum applicants who would otherwise be destitute. The Home Office puts in place quite a high bar for someone to even access support. Our concern is that if people are aware that they may be faced with debts of around £10,000, that will prevent them from accessing support. Their alternative then is to remain destitute. That is obviously very bad for those individuals and families, but it is also well established that putting people in destitution has negative consequences from a public health point of view and for wider communities.

We are also concerned by that provision because, although it applies to anybody who receives asylum support, with some minor exemptions, the majority of people who will ever be in a position to even start to pay back that money are people who are going to go on to get protection. We are concerned that that will take money away from people who probably have very little in the first place and that, because not having paid back that money could be a bar on settlement in the future, it could lead to people looking to borrow the money from quite dangerous moneylenders, putting people at risk of exploitation at that point.

It is quite hard to work out exactly what this will look like because there is not much detail in the Bill, but there are potentially disincentives for refugees to work. In our work at the Refugee Council, we see that people want to be able to work—they want to contribute—and the people who we support into employment, including employment in the NHS, are contributing. We think a far better use of time and resources would be to help refugees to overcome some of the barriers that they face, particularly in employment. That would allow them to contribute far more to the UK, including from tax receipts.

[Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for your answers so far. We heard some interesting evidence before you came in, and I am particularly interested in your perception of the increase in the application of article 8 to some immigration claims. The European Court of Human Rights has told me that even the Court has been surprised at some of the cases in the UK to which it has been applied. Do you have a position on that? Similarly, it was said earlier in evidence that there could be a counter-effect: that the reduced number of article 8 claims could lead to an increase in article 3 claims. Do you have a position on that as well?

Jon Featonby: From the Refugee Council perspective, it is not something that we have focused on. It is not part and parcel of our day-to-day work, as it were. We certainly have not done the research into this that people on the previous panels have done. From our point of view, what is important is that those people arriving in the UK seeking protection are able to seek that protection and have their cases heard fairly and in a timely way, so that the people who need protection, as I said previously, are able to get it and people who do not qualify can be returned and removed from the UK safely and humanely. It is not part of our work to have the evidence on how particular articles of the European convention have been applied.