Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public again and the proceedings are being broadcast. Good morning to our witnesses. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill? No. If any interests are particularly relevant to a Member’s questioning or speech, they should declare them at the appropriate time.

We will now hear oral evidence from Eleanor Lyons, the independent anti-slavery commissioner; Dr Will Prescott, head of research at Bright Blue, who will be joining via Zoom; and Vicky Tennant, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative to the UK. We must stick to the timings in the programme order that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 10.10 am. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

Vicky Tennant: I am Vicky Tennant, the representative to the United Kingdom for the UN refugee agency, the UNHCR. We are the body that has responsibility under international law for advancing protection and solutions for refugees.

Eleanor Lyons: Good morning—nice to see you all. I am Eleanor Lyons, the UK’s independent anti-slavery commissioner.

Dr Prescott: I am Will Prescott, head of research at Bright Blue. Thank you for letting me join via Zoom.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Q I have two questions, if I may. Dr Prescott, if the test of the Bill is whether it results in fewer arrivals or more removals, what do you think is missing from it? Secondly, Ms Lyons, the Government say that last-minute modern slavery claims have frustrated removals. Do you accept that that is an abuse of the system? If you do not support the Government’s solution to that issue, what do you think the solution is?

Dr Prescott: Obviously, reducing the number of irregular arrivals would be welcome for all concerned, but I gather that this particular session is looking specifically at the modern slavery components. We have to remember that only a relatively small proportion of small boat arrival modern slavery claimants are actually victims of modern slavery. A lot of victims of modern slavery do come here—sometimes legally, sometimes under false pretences. I am not necessarily sure that tying a reduction in small boat arrivals to modern slavery is necessarily a positive thing; I think you are slightly confusing two different issues.

Eleanor Lyons: I think there are already safeguards in place to stop any misuse of the system. There is a high evidential threshold to be recognised and acknowledged as a victim of modern slavery. There are the reasonable ground and conclusive ground stages, and you cannot self-refer to be a victim—you have to be spotted by a designated first responder organisation. Multiple Select Committees over the years have found no evidence of a widespread misuse of the system. The latest Home Office data that has been provided is only for those on high-risk deportation flights, who represent less than 2% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery identified in this country last year. I do not think you need new legislative solutions to deal with any of those challenges; the Home Office already has the powers it needs if it wants to challenge them and tackle them.

I remind the Committee that the largest group of victims in this country are UK nationals. All the changes in the Bill relating to questioning victims’ credibility if they take a long time to come forward, have inconsistencies in their account due to trauma, or have similar exploitative experiences to others—which they normally do, because organised crime groups exploit people in similar ways—mean they will also have their credibility questioned as UK nationals. For me, that undoes years of work by safeguarding professionals in understanding how victims feel scared to come forward and talk about their exploitation.

[Matt Vickers]

Q To get the result that we want—tackling that abuse—what else should the Home Office be doing in that space? If this is not a solution, what would you put forward as an alternative, if that abuse does exist?

Eleanor Lyons: If you took the premise that there is an issue with the system, I would focus on better training and support for first responder organisations so that they are good at doing referrals in the first place. There is a real mix in terms of how qualified and competent first responder organisations, such as local authorities, police forces and charities, are. I would also look at a higher quality of decision making from the Government. At the moment, about three quarters of negative decisions that are challenged are then accepted as having been the wrong initial decision by the Government, and are overturned. If there were more opportunities for people to be identified, better-quality decisions and a more trauma-informed approach, we would identify victims earlier in the process and there would be fewer challenges on that part. All this legislation will do is to make it very hard for us to identify or support victims who need help.

[The Minister of State, Home Department (Anna Turley)]

Q Thank you all for coming to give evidence to us. More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made. Can you give us some indication of why you think that is and, building on your previous answer, what would help to challenge that?

Eleanor Lyons: Thank you, Minister, for your engagement so far on the Bill. It is very much appreciated. Building on what I was saying, we really need a system that allows for early identification and support of victims of exploitation. That includes all victims of exploitation, UK nationals and non-UK nationals. When I first came into my role three years ago, the big conversation was about what mandatory training would look like for first responder organisations, so that they would know how to spot a potential victim of modern slavery. Many victims themselves do not even recognise that they are being exploited. To introduce early support into the system would make a huge change on that side of things.

I am concerned about the Home Office data on already high-risk flights. Less than 2% of the total number in the national referral mechanism are on those flights. The Home Office has five days to make a “reasonable grounds” decision. It only protects a victim of modern slavery for five days if they are referred into the national referral mechanism. If the Government decide that, actually, they do not think that there are grounds for those people being a victim of modern slavery, after that point they do not get any extra enhancements for indefinite leave to remain, so I do not think that that provides extra protection for victims. All we try to do in that period is to provide them with the support and care they need in their recovery period, if they need it.

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[The Chair]

Q We will now hear from Helen Rance, director of threat leadership at the National Crime Agency. Again, we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. We have until 10.35 am. Ms Rance, please introduce yourself.

Helen Rance: Good morning, everybody. My name is Helen Rance. I am a director at the National Crime Agency on threat leadership.

[Matt Vickers]

Q From your operational experience, what is the single biggest thing missing from the Bill that would help the NCA to tackle the crime gangs behind the crossings? Has the NCA specifically asked the Government for anything that does not feature in the Bill?

Helen Rance: Sorry, could you say the first part of the question again?

[Matt Vickers]

Q What is the biggest thing missing from the Bill in helping you to tackle the crime gangs? Did you ask the Government for any specific things that have not come to be?

Helen Rance: In answer to the second part, no—nothing specific has been omitted from the Bill. Obviously, the Bill has more direct focus on modern slavery and human trafficking—which I will call MSHT from now onwards—but in terms of the biggest thing that will help with organised immigration crime, which is a major focus of ours at the National Crime Agency, nothing specific in the Bill will fundamentally change how we investigate serious and organised criminals entering the country. What it will do is make our borders less attractive to criminals entering. That is our overarching opinion on that.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Is there a particular feature that you would have liked to see in the Bill to aid you in that objective?

Helen Rance: No.

[Anna Turley]

Q I pass on my thanks to everyone at the NCA for their excellent work. We know how important it is for disrupting the organised, industrial crime that is taking place across borders. It is critical that we intervene and prevent dangerous crossings as early as possible. I wanted to put my thanks on the record for everything that the agency does.

You mentioned the importance of deterrence. That is critical, and it is one of the key things that we want to achieve in the Bill. Could you say a little more about how you think the measures in the Bill will help to deter people and make interventions earlier in the process of illegal immigration?

Helen Rance: In terms of deterrence, we are obviously a law enforcement agency, and we would not make specific definitive judgments on the different effects that the measures will have on deterring crossings or immigration. We very much think that deterrence is about a combination of factors, and is, ultimately, a matter for Government policy. However, we believe that the measures contribute to a system that is seen as firm, fair and less susceptible to exploitation by organised crime groups. It is likely that that will help the overall deterrent effect. The changes to appeals, protection status, asylum arrangements and the removal process might contribute to making the UK a less attractive target for the criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We now hear from Dr Conor Casey, senior lecturer in public law and legal theory at the University of Surrey and senior fellow at Policy Exchange, Judicial Power Project. We also hear from Professor Richard Ekins KC, professor of law and constitutional government at the University of Oxford and head of Policy Exchange at the Judicial Power Project. Both will be joining us via Zoom. We have until five past 11 for this session. Gentlemen, you are very welcome. Let us start with an introduction from Professor Ekins.

Professor Ekins: You have done so already, Chair, and I thank you for it. I am a professor at the University of Oxford, and I lead Policy Exchange’s work on judicial power. I have written a great deal on migration and asylum law, including the problems, as I see it, of the application of the European convention on human rights in that context and also how successive Governments and, with respect, some parliamentarians have misunderstood the refugee convention and its protections.

Dr Casey: Thank you very much for the invitation to speak today. My name is Conor Casey. I am a senior lecturer at the University of Surrey School of Law and a senior fellow at Policy Exchange. My area of expertise includes public law, administrative law, the law of the European convention on human rights and how the convention is interpreted in the UK domestic courts.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Is there any risk that the article 8 provisions in the Bill could move litigation on to different questions, rather than increasing the Government’s ability to remove those with no right to be here? If Parliament wanted to go further in restricting the circumstances in which article 8 can prevent removals, what could it do beyond what is proposed in the Bill?

Professor Ekins: Litigation will certainly arise in consequence of these new provisions, if they are enacted; they will not end the controversy in this space. The litigation may turn on different questions, such as whether something counts as “normally”. There is a great deal of uncertainty about how the changes made by the relevant provision, clause 18, will be received by the courts.

In a sense, the legislation leaves untouched the fundamental structure of article 8 in this context, which is individuated proportionality assessment. It tries to clarify, or maybe streamline, some aspects of the way in which article 8 is understood and applied—those changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go—but it is unclear whether, and to what extent, that will restrain the courts in applying article 8.

The legislation takes for granted continuing individuated assessment. The legislation does not purport to be an exclusive code for article 8, does not displace article 8 under the Human Rights Act, and does not direct the courts to focus only on the terms of this legislation and close their eyes to the Strasbourg case law. The way in which article 8 will be understood and applied will be informed to some extent by this new legislation, but there will be arguments about precisely what it means and whether there are conditionals in the legislation at play.

It will always be open to unlawful migrants and asylum seekers who are making arguments by reference to article 8 to invite the court to go back to the Strasbourg Court’s case law and to take this legislation as, in a sense, advisory. I know that that may sound somewhat strange, but that is effectively the structure we have. Parliament is not clearly telling the courts, “Focus only on this legislation, and close your eyes to the other body of case law.” It could attempt to do so: it could go further, by disapplying article 8 under the Human Rights Act and making this an exclusive code for the relevance of family life. That would require some recasting.

To my mind, the more fundamental problem is that we are maintaining individuated proportionality assessment as the test for the lawfulness of removal. That will inevitably be somewhat—“ad hoc” is perhaps the wrong term, but it will be particular and unpredictable. A great deal will turn on the persons who are making the adjudicative decisions. The Bill obviously has something to say about that, but how it will play out is quite unpredictable.

That is a complicated answer to your question. There will certainly be litigation, and it would be a mistake to think that this new legislation will authoritatively determine how article 8 will be understood. It will make some difference, but much turns on how it is received, which you simply cannot tell from where you sit now.

Dr Casey: I agree. There are two different ways, broadly speaking, that this Bill could be received by courts and tribunals. One way—which, so far as the Home Secretary is concerned, would be the positive scenario—is that the tribunal takes very seriously the clear intent behind the Bill, which is to tighten and narrow the circumstances in which article 8 can be invoked and successfully relied on to resist a removal or deportation.

However, as my colleague Richard pointed out, a lot of the wording in the Bill gives leeway for more flexible or generous interpretations for applicants. For example, the Bill says that article 8 applies “normally” only to a nuclear family—partners residing together, or a parent and a child residing together. That “normally” suggests that judges might take a broader understanding of other types of family arrangements. With the standards throughout the Bill—unreasonable impact, “adverse” impact or “unduly harsh”—there is, again, scope to give these a much more generous interpretation, such that, for some judges, it might be hard not to find an instance where deportation could not be considered harsh or as having an adverse impact on a child, because it separates a family unit.

I can imagine some judges—not all, but some—reading these standards in a generous way that would capture a large sweep of cases and defeat removals and deportations. There is a scenario where the reception of the Bill is such that judges retain quite a lot of discretion to come up with their own understanding of the right balance between the public interest and individuals’ family life and, plausibly within the text of the Bill, to reach conclusions that are in tension with the clear policy intent behind the Bill.

I think that that is an unavoidable situation if one accepts the strictures imposed by the ECHR and its jurisprudence because a sine qua non of article 8 law, as articulated by the Court, is that the tribunal must reach its own assessment—it must reach its own assessment of proportionality. At best, Parliament may give indications of where it wants weighting to go but, to stay within the strictures of the ECHR, the courts must have the final say.

Also, in response to the question about whether, if article 8 claims are less attractive, other claims might be made under the ECHR: absolutely. I imagine that article 3 claims will probably increase. The difference between article 3 and article 8, as the Committee will know, is that article 3 is categorical—there is no qualification if the threshold is met. The threshold sometimes includes things like whether removal will lead to substandard medical care, compared with the NHS; that is ill treatment. We could see a spike in such invocations, and the Bill does not touch article 3 claims whatever.

Professor Ekins: I should add that this legislation, as the Committee knows, builds on the Immigration Act 2014, which also attempted to tighten the understanding and application of article 8; that is largely viewed as having been much less effective than Parliament intended in 2014. This legislation will go further and that is to be welcomed, but the earlier Act should be a cautionary tale about the risks of failure.

[Anna Turley]

Q Thank you very much; I appreciate your responses. May I step back from just the article 8 measures and talk about the Bill in the round? What is your view on whether it strikes the right balance when it comes to honouring our obligations to refugees under the conventions? Are we balancing that with taking stronger action to deal with the challenges that we face internationally on illegal immigration? Is the Bill striking the right balance, or can we go further?

Professor Ekins: In my view, the legislation does not strike the right balance, because it fails—as have successive Bills, I think—to take sufficiently robust measures in relation to the problem of illegal migration and people smuggling; I am thinking of the small boats crisis in particular. That is somewhat distinct from the broader problem of unlawful migration, which is clearly a problem—people overstaying, foreign criminals and so on—but the small boats crisis has particular features that warrant a particular response.

To my mind, unfortunately, although the legislation tinkers with aspects of how the refugee convention should be understood in our law—perhaps we will come to that later—it seems, silently at least, to take for granted that persons who have contracted with people smugglers and made it across the channel are entitled to asylum and to remain in the UK. I think that that is a misunderstanding of the terms of the refugee convention, which do entitle us to expel persons from the UK, even when they are genuine refugees under the meaning of the refugee convention. That is a protection that all member states enjoy. It entitles us to expel them to other states, because they have entered in violation of our migration law. It would be different had they entered directly from a state where their lives were in danger, but no one coming from France is in that position. That makes that a structurally different position to other contexts, when people flee danger.

The legislation simply does not address that feature of the problem. The measures it takes—which, as I say, I welcome as far as they go—simply tinker with the edges and do not address the central problem. Genuine refugees will cross the channel but, so long as contracting with people smugglers is a viable route to enter and thus to settle in the UK, that will persist. It is a logical and rational expenditure of funds, and it is a flourishing business so long as you do not care about the lives of people crossing a dangerous water.

There is a failure to recognise the protections that we have as a country under the refugee convention. We may take action that would not place persons in danger—they can be removed to safe third states. As far as I can see, the Bill is focused on increasing administrative adjudicative capacity to process appeal claims more speedily. That is admirable, but it leaves untouched the central structural problem, which I and others writing for Policy Exchange have tried to draw attention to over the years.

Dr Casey: I agree. I do not see anything in the Bill that would deter unlawful channel crossings. But, as has been mentioned, , depending on how the Bill is received in the courts, it might deter overstaying on visas and the breaching of conditions of your permission to reside. That could be valuable, as those are significant numbers, but I do not see anything that would deter unlawful channel crossings in any way.

You could go further in the Bill and, for example, take advantage of provisions in the refugee convention that allow states to return those convicted of serious criminal offences or of threats to national security to their home countries, even if there was a risk of ill treatment. The refugee convention allows that, but it would not be possible within the confines of the ECHR. Article 3 puts a categorical prohibition on those kinds of returns even if the person being returned poses an enormous threat to the United Kingdom itself. So even if you did take full advantage of everything that the refugee convention permitted you to do to protect your own immigration system, the ECHR would pose even more stringent restrictions in many respects.

Professor Ekins: I agree with everything that Dr Casey has said, but I would add that that is article 3 as—in my view—misinterpreted by the Strasbourg Court. Article 3 does provide a categorical prohibition on torture and subjecting people to inhumane treatment; as I say, that has been misinterpreted in recent decades to establish a much more far-reaching bar on taking action that exposes someone to a risk of such action from third parties.

In 2021, we published a paper that addressed in close detail the misinterpretation of the ECHR and its far-reaching impact for immigration and asylum law. That Policy Exchange paper is backed by Lord Hoffmann, former judge of the House of Lords. It makes clear the problem in the Strasbourg Court’s reading of article 3—as well as its reading of article 8, I should add.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear from Jon Featonby, chief policy analyst for the Refugee Council. For this session, we have until 11.25 am. Mr Featonby, could I ask you to briefly introduce yourself?

Jon Featonby: Thank you very much. On behalf of the Refugee Council, I really welcome this opportunity. I am Jon Featonby, the chief policy analyst at the Refugee Council. As an organisation, we support around 15,000 refugees and people seeking asylum each year, from when they first enter the UK right through to when they get refugee status and are on their integration journey after that.

[Matt Vickers]

Q Do you believe that someone who deliberately enters the UK illegally from a safe country should face a different immigration consequence from someone who enters using a legal route? If not, what alternative deterrents would the Refugee Council support to discourage people from making those dangerous crossings?

Jon Featonby: I am going to focus on the people who enter the UK for the purpose of seeking asylum within the international protection regime. For us, this comes down to how the refugee convention has been interpreted and operationalised since it first came in in 1951. That has been based around countries like the UK requiring somebody to be present in the UK, in their own territory, before they can access the protection systems. By its nature, that means that people have to undertake some of those dangerous journeys to get there.

It is important to recognise that the convention talks about somebody being a refugee once they have been forced to leave a country because of war and persecution, and it is then blind to where that person is. There are obviously benefits if those people do not need to undertake dangerous journeys to get somewhere. There are benefits for the individuals who do not need to put their lives at risk—we see the really deadly consequences that has across the world—and benefits for the host countries themselves if people are able to arrive in an orderly manner and do not have to resort to the types of journeys that they have to now.

It is also part of this important international context that most refugees—most people displaced from their countries—stay in the countries that border the ones they have fled from. Some people move on, and sometimes that can be because the countries neighbouring the place they have fled are no longer safe for them and no longer allow them to try to fulfil their lives, particularly as we see refugee situations becoming increasingly protracted across the globe. That is one of the things that we see lacking in the UK’s response at the moment. It is not just the UK’s response; we have seen the deterrence measures that you mentioned being adopted by successive Governments. We have seen some impact of that, particularly this year in terms of the drop in small boat arrivals.

From the Refugee Council’s point of view, we would argue that the bit that has largely been missing from this is about how you continue to undermine the business model of the people smugglers and the people who take advantage of the people seeking safety. That is where we would talk about the importance of safe and legal routes. The previous Government opened up new routes, and we think that the Afghan and Ukraine schemes are great successes.

One of the challenges that we see at the moment is that those safe routes available to people have dropped over the last year; the number of people arriving on safe routes in the last 12 months is down by about 50%. Refugee family reunion has been temporarily suspended for over a year now, and we have seen the closure of the Afghan schemes. We have been promised that new safe and legal routes will open in the new few months, with arrivals next year, but it seems that those numbers will be quite small.

If we look at what worked in somewhere like the US under President Biden, it was having two sides to the approach: yes, the enforcement approach, but on the other side of that, quite generous, open, safe and legal routes, so that the people who genuinely need safety are able to get to somewhere like the UK without having to put their lives at risk.

[Matt Vickers]

Q If you think that the outcome of entering illegally should be the same as the outcome of entering legally, is there any other deterrent in that space? If the immigration consequence is not used as a deterrent, is there anything that the Refugee Council might accept?

Jon Featonby: For the people who are refugees, it is about having an asylum system that first and foremost does what it should do, which is making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time. I think making sure that that happens has been a bit of a challenge under successive Governments now. For the people who are genuinely seeking protection and who need it, the system needs to make sure that they are able to access that protection when they do.

What we have also seen is the challenge at the other end. For the people who are found not to have that protection need, there needs to be a firm and fair system in place to make sure they are removed from the UK as quickly, and hopefully as humanely, as possible. That is probably where there have been challenges. Some of them are legal challenges, but some of it comes down to basic good caseworking in the Home Office.

[Anna Turley]

Q We share your commitment to safe and legal routes; they are an important way to fulfil our obligations. However, as you see, we have large numbers of people who are coming here through irregular means. What proportion of those arriving by irregular means does the Refugee Council think are genuinely fleeing war and persecution? Do you have a view on that?

Jon Featonby: The easiest way to look at some of this is through the immigration statistics published by the Home Office. Since small boats really started in around 2019, the top nationalities have largely stayed the same. There have been people from Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea and Iran, and the reasons why people would seek safety from those places are quite well known. Within that time, there have also been spikes from other countries. Quite famously, there was a lot of attention in 2022 on Albanians, but those numbers dropped quite quickly. That was probably a slightly different route from some of the other countries.

The Refugee Council has done some analysis in the past on what you would expect the asylum outcomes to be for those nationalities. Historically, you would expect around two thirds of the people crossing in small boats to go on and get protection. That has dropped slightly in the last year because the overall grant rate has dropped, although one caveat is that because the Home Office has not published appeals outcome statistics for the last three years, it is quite hard to work out exactly what happens once some of those cases go through the appeals process.