(12 years, 3 months ago)
Written StatementsIn taking forward our work to develop a new operating model for defence in line with the changes recommended in Lord Levene’s defence reform report, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) was established on 1 April 2011, bringing together all aspects of infrastructure asset management and facilities management under one organisation. The two-year DIO transformation programme, initiated in April 2011, will determine over the next 12 months both the future operating model and the most appropriate corporate structure for DIO to deliver best value for money and achieve maximum operating cost savings.
Earlier this year DIO undertook a soft market testing exercise to explore prospective roles for the private sector, test some of the commercial principles being considered by DIO and understand likely levels of interests from industry in partnering with the DIO. The output from this process indicated that industry has a substantial interest in being involved in DIO’s transformation and confirmed that the involvement of a strategic business partner in DIO’s transformation should be pursued. To this end, DIO will now commence a procurement process to assess whether the involvement of a strategic business partner in its transformation offers the best value for money solution for defence.
The competition will shortly be announced through an advertisement in the Official Journal of the European Union. A successful conclusion of this procurement will enable DIO to make a significant contribution to the savings which the Department needs to make as set out in the 2010 strategic defence and security review.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberBefore I make my statement, I know that the House will wish to join me in paying tribute to Corporal Brent McCarthy of the Royal Air Force and Lance Corporal Lee Davies of 1st Battalion the Welsh Guards, who were tragically killed in Lashkar Gah on Saturday. Both servicemen were performing an invaluable role in training and mentoring Afghan police, helping to ensure that Afghans will be able to take responsibility for their own security so that Afghanistan will never again be a place from which international terrorists can launch attacks on us and our allies. Their sacrifice will not be in vain. Our thoughts go out to their friends, families and colleagues.
With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on progress in balancing the defence budget and establishing a sustainable equipment programme as part of the work to deliver the vision set out in the strategic defence and security review—a vision of formidable, adaptable and well-equipped armed forces backed by balanced budgets, disciplined processes and an efficient and effective Department.
The United Kingdom’s armed forces and the Ministry of Defence exist to protect our country and its interests and provide the ultimate guarantee of its security and independence. My overriding priority as Secretary of State for Defence must be achieving success on military operations, but our defence is built on the extraordinary quality and commitment of our people, and ensuring their welfare is close behind. I am clear that when we ask the brave men and women of our armed forces to put themselves in danger to ensure our national security, we owe it to them to make sure that they are properly supported with the very best equipment we can give them to do the job.
The best way I can support our armed forces as they restructure and refocus themselves for the future is to give them the assurance of stable and well-managed budgets and the confidence that the equipment programme is affordable and deliverable. That is because the only way to ensure, in the long-term, the ability to project power, to protect our national security and to ensure that our troops have the equipment they need is to have a defence budget that is in balance. A strong, diverse economy and sound public finances are a prerequisite to being able to sustain the armed forces that our national security requires, and so correcting the disastrous fiscal deficit we inherited and returning the economy to sustainable growth are themselves strategic imperatives. Defence has, rightly, contributed to that fiscal correction, as well as putting its own house in order by dealing with the chaos we inherited in an equipment programme that left a yawning black hole under our armed forces.
Tough decisions have been taken, and I want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to those who have taken them: my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who showed the courage to tackle head on some of the worst and longest-running procurement fiascos and to make agonising choices over capabilities that Britain could not afford; the armed forces chiefs, who have grasped the challenges that the SDSR has presented and embraced the opportunity to create a sustainable foundation on which they can build for the future; and the leadership team in the MOD, who have worked tirelessly to turn this supertanker round—to tear up the old ways of doing things and to embrace a new model that will ensure that the MOD never again gets into the mess it was in by early 2010.
Thanks to all of them, and with the decision I announced to the House last week on carrier strike being the final piece of the jigsaw, I can tell the House today that, after two years’ work, the black hole in the defence budget has finally been eliminated and the budget is now in balance, with a small annual reserve built in as a prudent measure to make sure that we are not blown off course by unforeseen events: a plan endorsed by the chiefs and by the Treasury. We have achieved this by facing up to the fiscal reality and taking the tough decisions that Labour shirked: reluctantly accepting smaller armed forces and redoubling our resolve to invest in the best possible equipment for them; transforming the role of the Territorial Army as the regular army gets smaller, making it an integral part of Future Force 2020; and embarking on a major restructuring of the Department and a reduction of just over a third in the civilian work force.
Those have not been easy decisions, but they have been the right ones. This has been a difficult period for all our people in the armed forces and more widely across defence. Major change, the threat of redundancy and uncertainty about the future all present challenges to confidence and morale. Reaching a balanced budget for the MOD’s “planning round 12”, or PR12, represents a hugely important milestone in the transformation of defence. It is a symbolic break with the failed practices of the past and a solid foundation on which to build. It starts to put the destabilising uncertainty behind us as we move forward with defence transformation.
At the heart of the plan is the defence equipment programme, which by the end of the PR12 period will account for about 45% of the total defence budget. I have seen for myself over the past seven months just how complex defence procurement is. We are developing cutting-edge technology so that our armed forces have a battle-winning edge, with projects that rank alongside the biggest being undertaken in this country today.
Although there have been widely publicised failures, there have been unsung successes, most notably in Afghanistan, where the urgent operational requirements process funded by the Treasury has repeatedly allowed us to deliver the equipment that our armed forces need quickly and efficiently. Brigadier Patrick Sanders, who commanded 20th Armoured Brigade last year in Afghanistan, has described the equipment that his troops had as “second to none” and
“the best that I’ve experienced in 27 years”
in the Army. We need to build on the best elements of the UOR model to achieve that level of performance across defence as a whole. At the same time, we must learn from the failures.
Over the 10 years of PR12, we will spend almost £160 billion on new equipment and data systems, and their support, reflecting the planning assumption agreed with the Treasury of a 1% per annum real increase in the equipment and support budget from 2015. However, poor decision making and poor management have too often meant that the armed forces have not received the full benefit of all their spending.
Under the previous Government, the equipment plan became meaningless because projects were committed to it without the funding to pay for them, creating a fantasy programme. Systematic over-programming was compounded by a “conspiracy of optimism”, with officials, the armed forces and suppliers consistently planning on a best-case scenario, in the full knowledge that once a project had been committed to, they could revise up costs with little consequence. It was an overheated equipment plan, managed on a hand-to-mouth basis and driven by short-term cash, rather than long-term value. There were constant postponements and renegotiations, driving costs into projects in a self-reinforcing spiral of busted budgets and torn-up timetables. Rigid contracting meant that there was no flexibility to respond to changed threat priorities or to alternative technologies becoming available. It is our armed forces and the defence of our country that have ultimately paid the price for that mismanagement. The culture and the practice have to change.
We will move forward with a new financial discipline in the equipment plan. There will be under-programming rather than over-programming, so that we can focus on value rather than on cash management. That will give our armed forces confidence that once a project is in the programme, it is real, funded and will be delivered, so that they can plan with certainty. The core committed equipment programme, which covers investment in new equipment and data systems, and their support, amounts to just under £152 billion over 10 years, against a total planned spend of almost £160 billion. That £152 billion includes, for the first time ever, an effective centrally held contingency reserve, determined by Bernard Gray, the new Chief of Defence Matériel, of more than £4 billion to ensure the robustness of the plan.
The plan includes 14 new Chinooks, Apache life-extension and Puma upgrade; a programme of new armoured fighting vehicles worth about £4.5 billion over 10 years, including the assessment phase of Scout; and a £1 billion upgrade of the Warrior armoured fighting vehicle. It also includes the building of the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, the remainder of the Type 45 destroyers, the new Type 26 frigates and the Astute-class and successor nuclear submarines. It includes investment in new Wildcat helicopters, the Merlin upgrade programme and the assessment phase of Merlin marinisation; the introduction into service of the Voyager air-to-air refueller and troop transporter, the A400M air transporter and the Air Seeker surveillance aircraft; an additional C17 strategic airlifter; continued investment in Typhoon and the joint strike fighter; and £7 billion of investment in “complex weapons”—the smart missiles and torpedoes that give our Navy, Army and Air Force their fighting edge.
Balancing the budget allows me to include within that £152 billion core programme a £4 billion-plus investment in intelligence, surveillance, communications and reconnaissance assets across the Cipher, Solomon, Crowsnest, Defence Core Network Services and Falcon projects; the outright purchase of three offshore patrol vessels that are currently leased; capability enhancements to the Typhoon; and a range of simulators, basing and support equipment for the new helicopters and aircraft that we are introducing.
That programme represents the collective priorities of the armed forces, set out by the armed forces committee on which all the service chiefs sit. They confirm that the committed core equipment programme, together with the £8 billion of available unallocated headroom, will fund the capabilities that they require to deliver Future Force 2020 as set out in the strategic defence and security review. That £8 billion will be allocated to projects not yet in the committed core programme only at the point when they need to be committed in order to be delivered on time, and only in accordance with the military assessment of priority at the time. No project will be allowed to be committed without a 10-year budget line to cover not only its procurement but its support costs. Not rocket science, you might think, Mr Speaker, but quite an innovation in defence procurement none the less, and individuals and contractors can expect to be held to account for the estimates on which decisions to commit to projects are based.
The Government believe that transparency is a driver of performance. I want to be as transparent as possible about the defence budget, because greater transparency will help me to drive the change that we need to see in the Ministry of Defence. However, the House will understand that some elements of the defence budget are security-sensitive and others are commercially sensitive. It is essential that we preserve our negotiating space with defence contractors without announcing all our detailed intentions in advance. So to provide the reassurance that the House will want, while protecting the commercial and security interests of defence, I have agreed with the National Audit Office that it will review the equipment plan and confirm that it is affordable. The NAO will have access to confidential, detailed information on the equipment plan that cannot be published, but once it has completed its work, we will publish its verdict on the plan together with a summary of the plan itself.
Today’s announcement and the work that we are taking forward mean that for the first time in a generation the MOD not only has a balanced budget and an appropriate reserve but is putting in place the behaviour-changing incentives and structures that will keep it in balance. It means that the politicians and civil servants in the MOD can look the armed forces in the eye, in the knowledge that we are delivering them the stable platform that they need to build Future Force 2020. We are delivering them a budget agreed across Government, across the Department and by the service chiefs, and a firm baseline for the transformation that is under way to armed forces that may be smaller, but which will be adaptable, agile, equipped with the very best technology and supported by an MOD that is laser-focused on their needs. We are working alongside a defence industry that can invest with renewed confidence in an equipment plan that is actually deliverable. That represents the start of a new chapter in the long history of UK defence, and I commend this statement to the House.
I join the Secretary of State in offering my condolences to the families of Corporal Brent John McCarthy from the Royal Air Force and Lance Corporal Lee Thomas Davies from 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. They will be for ever missed by those who love them, and their sacrifice should always be honoured by our nation. I agree with the Secretary of State. We continue to support the mission in Afghanistan, and we all wish to see political progress there to match our force’s bravery.
I thank the Secretary of State for advance copy of his statement. He might lack the passion of his predecessor, but he should not mimic his assertions. His predecessor said, about the strategic defence and security review, that defence was back on a stable footing, and at the time of the three-month review, he said:
“For the first time in a generation, the MOD will have brought its plans and budget broadly into balance”.
Today we are hearing the same thing, but we will judge today’s statement not on these reheated claims but on the detail published and on whether the Defence Secretary’s plans provide the right balance between flexible force structures, strategic reach post-Afghanistan, strengthening alliances within NATO, support for our forces and their families, and budgetary stability.
The Defence Secretary has said that there will be no more cuts over and above those he has already announced. Let us not forget, however, that he has announced cuts up until 2020, with thousands of service personnel and civil servants yet to be sacked, £900 million of allowances still to be lost and veterans’ and war widows’ pensions being frozen year-on-year.
Short-term control of defence costs to support careful deficit reduction needs to be coupled with long-term reform, but the Government have been reckless where care has been essential and timid when boldness has been required—reckless because decisions on the Astute class submarines and the Trident and carrier programmes have massively increased costs, and timid because long-promised reform of Defence Equipment and Support has been stalled. Only this Government’s review into speeding up defence delivery could itself be four times postponed. Hundreds of defence workers have lost their jobs, and major projects were last year delayed by a combined 30 months and at a cost of £500 million.
Last week, the Secretary of State stumbled into three different figures on the aircraft carrier U-turn. Let us see whether he is any clearer today. In the interest of the Liberal Democrats, the Government have delayed the biggest procurement decision of them all—Trident replacement. Will he therefore tell the House how much that decision to delay will add to the total projected costs of Trident’s successor? Will he also tell the House whether any cuts have been made since the three-month review and whether any programmes have been delayed to enable today’s announcement?
The Secretary of State talks about balancing the books, but I also want to ask him about the balance of our forces. What will be the precise up-front costs in this Parliament of converting RAF bases to Army bases for those returning from Germany? There is also consternation in Scotland about his plans for historic Scottish regiments. Scotland has a proud history in UK armed forces that simply cannot be cast aside, so will he guarantee that the names, identity and cap badges of Scotland’s regiments will be preserved? Failure to do so will show yet again that the Government are totally out of touch with Scotland.
We welcome the new investment, but will the Secretary of State confirm that the full cost of major projects, including the future tanker, the carrier programme, the Typhoon and the joint strike fighter fleets, have all been factored into the figures he is publishing today, and will he publish—perhaps not today but shortly—details of each programme and their costs? Ministers have committed to publishing a 10-year equipment plan. Without that, his claims today cannot be substantiated. Will he therefore honour his commitment to publish the equipment plan with its projected cost and available resource over the same period, or do his comments today about the National Audit Office override that previous commitment?
The Secretary of State has said that there is now a departmental reserve in each year. Will he guarantee that the contingency will be ring-fenced for defence?
In conclusion, Governments take the gravest decision of all by sending our forces into harm’s way. Today’s statement is about the quantity, quality and cost of the equipment we provide them with. We will hold the Secretary of State to each and every one of his commitments today, because it is in the nation’s interests that he gets it right; and where he does, we will support him.
They still don’t get it. Still they do not understand that a balanced budget is the essential underpinning to effective defence. Still they are in denial about the £38 billion black hole they left, even though we have the internal Labour party documents admitting that the £38 billion black hole is Labour’s biggest weakness in defence. Still they appear to believe, like children in a sweetshop, that it is better to have a big programme that cannot be delivered than a smaller one that our armed forces and defence industry can rely on. Where would we be if the right hon. Gentleman was in charge? We would be right back where we were in May 2010, because he will not make the difficult decisions that support effective defence and will get the MOD back on track.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the process from the SDSR and the three-month exercise. It has been a long and drawn-out process, with savings made at the SDSR, further savings made in the three-month exercise to get to the position announced by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox)—that the defence budget was broadly in balance—and, now, the work that we have done to go the final mile, which has enabled us to say that we have a fully balanced budget.
I must correct the right hon. Gentleman on his point about pensions. Pensions are not frozen, as he very well knows, and using emotive language like that will not help him.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to the £500 million increase in the defence programme projects over the last year. What he forgot to tell the House was that in the last year of his party’s Government there was a £3.3 billion increase in the equipment programme. I can also tell him, in answer to his question, that there is no delay to the Trident programme. The timetable of the Trident programme allows us to include all the critical path items in the PR12 period, and we have done so in the figures that I have announced today.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about regimental structures in Scotland. I can say this to him: I, too, have read in a newspaper that I am determined to introduce a continental-style Army, without a regimental structure. I can say this to the House: I understand absolutely the vital role that the regimental structure plays in the British Army, and as long as I am Secretary of State for Defence, the regimental structure will remain.
The right hon. Gentleman made a fair point when he asked how, when the equipment plan in all its detail cannot be published—as it never has been published in the past—I can substantiate the statement that I have made today. I can do two things. On the one hand, I can ask the armed forces committee and the chiefs of staff to confirm that they can deliver the Future Force 2020 capability within the budget that I have announced, and they have done that. On the other hand, I can ask the National Audit Office to review the statement that I have made—the plan that we have produced—and confirm that it is deliverable within the available budgets. As I said earlier, once the National Audit Office has completed its review, we will publish the equipment plan at the same level of detail as it has been published in the past.
Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked me whether I was confident that managing the Department’s budget prudently, with in-year unallocated provision and contingency provision in the equipment plan, would not lead to a Treasury raid, in an attempt to snatch back the headroom. May I guarantee that it will be retained for use in defence? He might have noticed that my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury is sitting on the Treasury Bench. He gets it—he understands that the only way in which we will be able to manage the defence budget effectively in future is to have an open and transparent relationship between the Treasury and the MOD, where we both understand the boundaries and drive the incentives that will change behaviour in that Department.
As we have taken the painful decisions in the best interests of our armed forces and of Britain’s defence, we have required no lectures from the party that shirked them. As we have tackled the £38 billion black hole, we have asked for no advice from the Labour party, which has yet to take any action to deal with that black hole.
First, may I thank my right hon. Friend for his kind words and extend them to the rest of the ministerial team? The junior Ministers all had their share of the hard work and the difficult decisions that had to be taken to get us out of the mess that we inherited. Will my right hon. Friend reflect on the fact that we inherited from Labour not only a £38 billion black hole but a commitment to the replacement of the Trident programme that had no funding line whatever? Will he also tell us how far he has got in introducing professional procurement skills into the Ministry of Defence to enable us to deal with contracts on an equal basis with industry and thus give taxpayers better value and ensure that the kind of disasters that we faced in the past do not happen again?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to draw attention to one part of Labour’s black hole—the unfunded Trident commitment. He might equally have referred to the 22 Chinook helicopters that the former Prime Minister famously announced but forgot to fund. He asks about professional skills in Defence Equipment and Support, which is a crucial part of the MOD’s operation. The new Chief of Defence Matériel is drawing up a defence matériel strategy that will involve a radical change to the structure of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation. I hope to be able to make an announcement to the House on that matter before the summer recess.
The Secretary of State was enormously helpful last Thursday when he told me that procuring an aircraft carrier was slightly more complicated than buying a bottle of milk or a box of eggs. I wonder whether he will be equally helpful today. He keeps referring to the £38 billion black hole. Will he tell us how much of that £38 billion he assesses as being due to contractual commitments and therefore outside the scope of his cuts, and how much of it as being outside those contractual commitments?
As the hon. Lady will know, my predecessor took some difficult decisions to cancel programmes that were contracted, which incurred some costs. One of the changes that we are now making will ensure that we do not commit contractually to projects earlier than we need to, so that if the MOD needs to restructure a programme or introduce flexibility, it will be able to do so without incurring such penalties.
The proof of this pudding will be in the eating, but I would suggest that the House should give it a wary welcome. At least we have now moved away from the position that existed at the end of the last Government, when the then Prime Minister said that there was to be no bad news and no new money. Does my right hon. Friend feel that we are really giving enough priority to defence research? The figure of 1.2% of the defence budget seems pretty low to me.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his comments. Defence research and technology provide vital support to our defence effort and, after years of decline, we have guaranteed that we will not reduce any further the percentage of 1.2% of the defence budget.
Taxpayers in Scotland contribute more than £3.3 billion every year towards the Ministry of Defence, but only £2 billion is spent on defence in Scotland. The Secretary of State’s predecessor said in evidence to the Scottish Affairs Select Committee that, between 2000 and 2010, the total reduction in service jobs was 11.6%, but that the reduction in Scotland was 27.9%. Given the disproportionate personnel cuts and the multibillion pound defence underspend in Scotland, will the Secretary of State take the opportunity today to rule out the prospect of any further amalgamation or disbandment of Scottish raised units?
The hon. Gentleman has clearly got the wrong end of the stick. Defence is about protecting our people. Scottish defence does not happen in Scotland: it happens under the oceans where our nuclear deterrent is on constant patrol and in Afghanistan where our servicemen are taking risks, day-in, day-out, to prevent threats from coming to our own shores. I will tell the hon. Gentleman frankly: we are going to have a smaller Army, and we cannot have a smaller Army without making some structural changes. I will make an announcement as soon as I am able about the structure of Army 2020.
May I tell my right hon. Friend that this Scottish taxpayer welcomes his statement? I hope he will excuse a moment or two of scepticism on my part, however, because those of us with long memories will have heard similar statements made from the Dispatch Box in the past—under the headings, for example, of “Options for Change” and “Frontline First”. The true test of the quality of this statement will be the extent to which it is achieved. I am delighted to hear that he has embraced the concept of fiscal reality. I hope he will keep it firmly in mind when he comes to consider the future of the Royal Air Force at Leuchars in my constituency.
I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend once again on mentioning RAF Leuchars. It is not just about balancing the budget. I entirely accept that he will have heard statements about reductions in expenditure and budgets before. It has to be about changing behaviour. We will not make this change sustainable unless we put in place the structures, the mechanisms and the incentives within the Department to change the way the various players operate. That is what we are determined to do.
I warmly congratulate the Chief Secretary on obtaining the unconditional surrender of the Ministry of Defence across Whitehall. Has the Secretary of State seen today’s Le Monde, which has a whole-page article on how Britain is creating a “zizanie”—I think the English translation would be “omnishambles”—with the U-turn on the F-35s? As China flexes its muscles with the Philippines in the south Pacific sea, why will no British aircraft carrier be able to patrol at this crucial time for world history?
I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman was here last Thursday when I made a statement, which I hope he would regard as good news on carrier strike. I announced that the first carrier will be delivered in 2017 and that the first aircraft will fly off it in 2018. We are embarked on the process of patching up the hole that the previous Administration left us.
I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend, together with his colleagues in the Ministry of Defence—civilian, political and military—on a remarkable achievement. Will he tell us whether, in the light of the decks having been cleared, it is his intention to start work now on the preparatory work for the next strategic defence review, which comes along much quicker than one thinks?
I can tell my right hon. Friend that work is in hand. A body within the Department is already sitting and considering issues that need to be brought to the fore and thought through for the next strategic defence review. The five-yearly cycle will allow us to look at the strategic changes during it, while making tactical decisions within the five-year period to manage the budget and the programme.
Now that the Secretary of State has finally got round to mentioning Trident, will he please say why he cannot give us some news in his statement on the expenditure of £1 billion on long-lead items for the reconstruction of the Trident system and the missiles that go with it, and why we are still contemplating spending £100 billion on a weapon of mass destruction that does not bring any security to this country, but merely a great deal of expenditure and danger?
The hon. Gentleman’s views on this subject are very well known, and I do not share them.
Will the Secretary of State clarify whether the statement can offer any long-term reassurance or will have any long-term impact on the future of the underwater training ranges at Rona and around Kyle of Lochalsh in my area? There has been a long-running uncertainty there, and it would be helpful to know whether this statement settles the matter one way or t’other.
I am afraid that that is a level of detail that, between us, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff) and I are unable to answer from the Dispatch Box, but I will write to the right hon. Gentleman later this afternoon.
How many direct and indirect jobs will be lost as a result of this process?
We have already announced the reductions in the size of the armed forces and a reduction in the size of the MOD civilian service. As a result of what I have announced today, there will be no additional reductions in head count. The downsizing that has already been announced is the limit of the downsizing that we need in order to deliver the programme. I can tell the hon. Gentleman, however, that there are many tens of thousands of jobs in the UK defence industries, and that by introducing a sustainable equipment programme that will give industries the confidence to invest, we will protect those jobs and technologies and help those industries to build their export markets.
I welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement that we are going to balance the defence budget. I am also aware that the Royal Air Force is to have Rivet Joint aircraft, which will replace the Nimrod R1. Is there any intention for us to have a maritime surveillance capability again, given that we are an island nation?
As has been said from the Dispatch Box before, maritime surveillance from conventional aircraft is not currently funded in the programme. That is one of the capability gaps that my predecessor chose to accept, and a risk that we have chosen to manage. A number of different technologies will be available to deal with it as we approach the end of the decade. That is one of the decisions that the armed forces committee will have to make when it considers the prioritisation for the head room in the planned equipment budget.
Will the Secretary of State assure the House that the budget that he has announced today will still meet the NATO requirement for us to spend 2% of our gross domestic product on defence? Given that operations abroad will almost certainly involve allies from other NATO countries, can he tell me whether he has made any progress in persuading countries that spend less than 2% of their GDP on defence to increase their defence spending, to which he has referred in the House previously, and if so, which countries are involved?
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that our defence budget in the spending review period exceeds the 2% of GDP NATO guideline. What I said on the previous occasion, and have said publicly on a number of occasions, is that while in the medium term our NATO partners must increase their contribution to collective defence, in the short term, at a time when there is extreme fiscal pressure on nearly all the European NATO countries, it is not realistic to go around wagging the finger at them about the amount that they spend. I have chosen to focus my pitch to them on the need to render the budgets that they do have more effective by making their forces more deployable and more available to the alliance. That is the thrust of the message that I was trying to deliver in Germany the week before last.
What impact does the Secretary of State expect the measures that he has announced to have on recruitment and retention in our armed forces, not only in respect of regulars but in respect of our challenging targets for the recruitment of reserves?
My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to that issue. Many people have asked me—and I have to say that I asked the question myself when I first entered the Ministry of Defence—why we are making service people redundant but are still recruiting. The answer, of course, is that because the armed forces are a bottom-fed organisation, we need to recruit even when we are reducing the overall size of forces. I hope that the greater confidence and clarity about the future will be an aid to recruitment, and I am sure that the greater role that the reserves will play in our overall force construction will be a great aid to recruitment in the Territorial Army and the air and naval reserves.
The life extension of the Apache helicopters will help while we wait for our aircraft carriers to have planes. How much is being committed to that?
I am not willing to specify a precise budget. I must correct the hon. Gentleman on a point of detail: I think that the Apache was due to go out of service without life extension in 2025—we will have aircraft carrier capability long before that—and this programme will extend its life beyond 2025. However, I cannot give him the individual line item budget.
Will the balanced budget enable the previously agreed total of 25 frigates and destroyers to be maintained in the future, and will it allow the future Trident successor fleet to mount continuous at-sea deterrence, as personally favoured repeatedly by the Prime Minister in this House?
The answer to the second question is yes, the funding for the successor submarine is based on continuous at-sea deterrence. I am not sure about the 25 figure; the figure in the SDSR is 19 frigates and destroyers.
The Secretary of State has mentioned long-term value and a sustainable equipment programme for our vital UK industry, but given the debacle in respect of the Royal Navy fuel tankers, for which not a single British supplier or shipyard was invited to bid for the £500 million contracts, what reassurances can he give on providing real long-term value for the UK defence industry by enhancing our British manufacturing capability as well as our military capability?
We have made it very clear that where there is a sovereign capability that needs to be retained in the UK—such as in complex warship building, aerospace technologies and submarine building—we will enter into agreements with the private companies that have that capacity in order to ensure it is sustained. The hon. Gentleman is completely wrong about the MARS—military afloat reach and sustainability—tankers, however. British companies were invited to tender and were involved in the process. In the end, none chose to submit a bid, and the only bid we received from a European company was far in excess of the winning bid, received from a South Korean company.
Any objective observer would want to congratulate the Secretary of State on the rigour he has brought to his job, but does he accept that balancing the budget may not, on its own, be enough? At other times in our history, we have balanced the budget; we may have done so in the mid-1930s, but we were spending far too little on defence. Is he aware that his greatest task may lie before him: convincing the Treasury, the Cabinet and the people that we simply have to spend a greater proportion of our national wealth on defence in what is a dangerous world?
What I can say to my hon. Friend is that the chiefs of staff sitting on the armed forces committee have written to me to confirm that, with the budget we are making available, they can deliver the force construct set out in the SDSR for Future Force 2020. I agree with him on this, however: balancing the budget in itself does not solve the problem. Anybody can cut a budget. The challenge is to make sure the money that is spent is spent efficiently and effectively, getting through to the sharp end and delivering the military capability we need. That is why we need to change the behaviours and practices in the MOD, not just the budget.
Given the Government’s commitment to the renewal of the Trident programme, can the Secretary of State explain the point of the Liberal Democrats’ review of alternatives to Trident?
As part of the coalition agreement, we made a commitment to such a review, in parallel with committing to the long-lead items on Trident replacement, so it would not slow down the programme—to answer the question of the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy), the shadow Secretary of State. That review of possible alternatives to a submarine-based nuclear deterrent will be completed by the end of this year and submitted to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and a decision will be made then.
Urgent operational requirements have become a permanent fixture in the procurement process. However, while they have delivered excellent kit to our troops on the front line, they are widely regarded as offering poor value for money in the medium term and in respect of the through-life process. Can the Secretary of State assure me that while we have an effective UOR process, it will not be used as a substitute for planned procurement?
Yes, I can reassure my hon. Friend of that. There is a perception that UORs have effectively delivered equipment far more quickly, and often far closer to the original estimated budget, than conventional procurement. We have got to see what we can learn from those processes that will translate across into the main procurement programme.
The Defence Secretary has today made exactly the same claims about having balanced the books as his predecessor did some 12 months ago, yet 12 months ago the ministerial team refused to give the Defence Committee a single strand of evidence. Will the Government give that evidence this time?
First, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said that he had broadly balanced the defence budget and he was correct. What we have done over the past few months is go that last mile, to be able to say that it is fully balanced over the PR12 period. As for information, I have made it clear that once the National Audit Office has completed its review, we will publish its report and a summary-level equipment plan, with the same level of detail in it as has routinely been published about the defence budget. That may not be the level of detail that the hon. Gentleman would like, but it just is not possible, for security reasons and for commercial reasons, to publish a 10-year programme in minute detail without making the situation that the MOD faces impossible.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend and his team on a remarkable effort, which will make a considerable difference to our armed forces over the next decade. While he has the Chief Secretary to the Treasury sitting next to him, may I urge on him two points of detail that used to exist the last time Conservatives were in office? The first is a carry-over facility within the procurement function, so that we do not have the year-end scrabble. The other is an exemption from the burdensome European procurement regulations, which the French still enjoy.
Some defence procurement is not subject to the European procurement directive. As for the carry-over, year-end flexibility on procurement, I have had very constructive discussions with my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary and with the finance director in the MOD, and we are satisfied with the arrangements we have in place.
Britain’s national and international defence interests are not best served by having a smaller Army, a smaller Navy and a smaller Air Force. We are now told that the budget is in balance, so, looking to the home front, can the upgrade and modernisation of the family accommodation be brought forward?
Not without busting the budget again, I am afraid. There is a programme for the modernisation of accommodation, part of which is continuing. Another part of it has been put on hold until 2014-15, and I am afraid that is where it will have to stay for the moment.
On behalf of the regiment in which I had the honour to serve, may I join my right hon. Friend, and indeed the shadow Secretary of State, in paying tribute to Lance Corporal Davies for his sacrifice?
No Government Member doubts the enormity of the £38 billion hole left by the previous Government or that it is, as the shadow Secretary of State has said, the principal weakness of the Labour Government. Will my right hon. Friend tell the House what effect promising much and delivering little has had on the morale of our armed forces?
The Secretary of State has said much today about ensuring the welfare of, and building a stable platform for, our armed forces. One of the best ways of delivering that is by giving them certainty about where they will be based. Unfortunately, that is in short supply in Scotland, particularly in Edinburgh, so when will he deliver it?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about that and I have acknowledged it many times: uncertainties about redundancy, about basing and about unit structures are all debilitating. We will close down those uncertainties as soon as we possibly can but, as I said, it will be towards the end of the year before we can make an announcement about basing.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the £4 billion contingency budget for the equipment programme is particularly welcome for companies such as Chemring, in my constituency, which provides hundreds of jobs and builds fantastic, quality equipment for our armed forces? I say that because businesses require clarity in order to plan for the future, and today’s statement provides that.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. The knowledge that there is a £4 billion contingency budget will be hugely reassuring for the defence industry when it looks at the overall programme and decides how to invest its own money in the technologies and skills needed to deliver it. However, I urge the company in her constituency not to think that the £4 billion is there to accommodate its cost overrun.
In warmly welcoming today’s announcement, may I ask the Secretary of State to go further and assure the House that when he reviews the options for the organisational model that the Chief of Defence Matériel believes will be best for the future of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation, he will challenge them robustly on their capacity to deliver real, radical organisational and cultural change in that organisation so that decisions are made in the right way in the future?
I can give my hon. Friend that assurance, but I do not underestimate the scale of the task. As DE&S is structured at the moment, we are seeking to employ project managers to manage some of the world’s largest and most complex projects and we are seeking to do it on civil service pay. That is challenging.
I thank my right hon. Friend for what he has said and I hope that it will produce greater confidence in his negotiations with the Treasury, as it will understand exactly where the MOD budget is going. May I ask for an assurance that the nuclear deterrent will not be up for negotiation with any of the other political parties in this House?
Let me assure my hon. Friend that relationships with the Treasury have improved dramatically at a working level. My right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary and I have complete transparency on these matters and have worked together very closely to achieve this outcome. The Government are fully committed to the replacement of the Trident nuclear deterrent.
I welcome the Defence Secretary’s decision to require an estimate of 10 years’ worth of support costs before a project is committed. It makes little sense, after all, to go to a cheaper supplier of respirators, for example, only to pay more each year in servicing them. Will that open the door to a more innovative approach from suppliers, so that we might increasingly be procuring not just kit but in-service capability?
I am glad to tell my hon. Friend that that is already happening. We are increasingly entering into availability contracts where the whole-life costs of the project are taken into account and capability is delivered in the most efficient way.
My right hon. Friend’s announcement is good news for the taxpayer and will give certainty to our armed forces personnel. Will he say a little more about how it will build certainty among the lower reaches of the procurement supply chain—the small and medium-sized enterprises—who have suffered historically from budgetary uncertainty and do not have the luxury of waiting around for Government and prime contractor decisions?
We are committed to supporting the role of SMEs in the supply chain. I visited some SMEs involved in defence equipment very recently and they are among the most innovative and flexible parts of the industry. The changes we have already announced will assist them and I have pledged to look at how we can give them greater certainty that when they invest their own money in developing technologies, we can give them the highest possible level of assurance in advance that they will be able to export those technologies and not find that they have developed a white elephant.
I warmly welcome the statement by my right hon. Friend and congratulate him and his team on cleaning up the mess left by the Labour party. With respect to that mess, has he received an apology from that party?
Will my right hon. Friend confirm that the £5 billion-worth of funding for the Atomic Weapons Establishment that has been announced today in a written ministerial statement is not new money and does not represent an increased financial commitment to the Trident successor programme?
I can confirm that the new contract for the Atomic Weapons Establishment, announced today, is in fact a rolling over of the existing contract at a lower price for the next period.
Kuwait compensated this country for the cost of its liberation. Libya is a very wealthy country. Has any similar offer been made?
Does the Secretary of State agree that a balanced defence budget combined with sensible procurement in defence are central to protecting Britain’s national interests and allowing the country to make the difficult strategic choices we need to make in a global world?
Absolutely. Understanding the cost of what we need to procure and ensuring that what we announce we will procure can genuinely be delivered are central to giving our armed forces the certainty to plan for the future.
In reaching this historic milestone—eliminating the £38 billion black hole—did the Secretary of State receive any submissions at all from the Labour party?
That is an interesting question, because the Labour party’s position is to deny that there was a £38 billion black hole. It is rather helpful to us that we have in our possession a letter from the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire to the Leader of the Opposition, setting out his view that the £38 billion black hole was Labour’s greatest weakness and vulnerability when it came to defence.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on the carrier strike programme. The strategic defence and security review considered the carrier strike programme, put in place by the previous Government, as part of a wide-ranging review of options for delivering effective future defence while dealing with the black hole in Labour’s defence budget and the unaffordable “fantasy” equipment plan bequeathed to us by the Labour party. While the review confirmed that carrier strike would be a key capability in delivering Future Force 2020, it also recognised the unsustainability as a whole of the defence equipment plan we inherited.
The strategic decision on carrier strike that emerged from the SDSR process was to convert one carrier with catapults and arrester gear to operate the carrier variant of the joint strike fighter, facilitating greater interoperability with allies, with a decision on the future use or disposal of the second carrier to be taken at the 2015 SDSR. The decision was also taken routinely to embark 12 fast jets while retaining the ability to surge up to the previously planned level of 36 aircraft. As the House would expect for such a complex and high-value project, the strategic decision taken at SDSR was followed by the commissioning of a detailed programme of work to look at the costs, risks and technical feasibility of all aspects of the proposed solution. That study was expected to take 18 months, completing by the end of 2012.
Since I took on the role of Defence Secretary in October last year, my overriding concern, after current operations and the welfare of our armed forces, has been to ensure the deliverability of the MOD’s equipment plan and the achievement of a balanced and sustainable budget. That will give our armed forces the assurance they need to carry out the massive transformation that will deliver Future Force 2020—the concept for our armed forces set out in the SDSR. The carrier project is a large element of the equipment programme, and I have worked closely with the new Chief of Defence Matériel, Bernard Gray, to assess the technical and financial risks involved in it.
It quickly became clear to me that a number of the underlying facts on which the SDSR decision on carriers was based were changing. First, as the programme to convert a carrier to operate with a catapult system has matured, and more detailed analysis has been carried out by suppliers, it has become clear that operational carrier strike capability, using the “cats and traps” system, could not be delivered until late 2023 at the earliest—considerably later than the date envisaged at the time of the SDSR of “around 2020”. Britain’s carriers will have all-electric propulsion, and therefore will not generate steam like nuclear-powered vessels, so the catapult system would need to be the innovative electromagnetic version, EMALS—the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System—being developed for the United States navy. Fitting that new system to a UK carrier has presented greater design challenges than were anticipated.
Secondly, and partly as a result of the delayed timetable, the estimated cost of fitting this equipment to HMS Prince of Wales has more than doubled in the past 17 months, rising from an estimated £950 million to about £2 billion, with no guarantee that it will not rise further. Given the technical complexity involved and given that the cost of retrofitting “cats and traps” to HMS Queen Elizabeth—the first carrier out of build—would be even higher, it is unlikely that she would ever, in practice, be converted in the future.
Thirdly, at the time of the SDSR there was judged to be a very significant technical risk around the STOVL—short take-off, vertical landing—version of the joint strike fighter, and some commentators were speculating that it could even be cancelled. Indeed, the STOVL programme was subsequently placed on probation by the Pentagon However, over the past year, the STOVL programme has made excellent progress and in the past few months has been removed from probation. The aircraft has now completed more than 900 hours of flying, including flights from the USS Wasp, and the US marine corps has a high degree of confidence in the in-service date for the aircraft. The balance of risk has changed, and there is now judged to be no greater risk in STOVL than in other variants of JSF.
Fourthly, further work with our allies on the best approach to collaborative operation has satisfied us that joint maritime task groups involving our carriers, with co-ordinated scheduling of maintenance and refit periods, and an emphasis on carrier availability, rather than cross-deck operations, is the more appropriate route to optimising alliance capabilities.
When the facts change, the responsible thing to do is to examine the decisions you have made and to be willing to change your mind, however inconvenient that may be. It is about doing what is right for Britain, not burying your head in the sand and ploughing on regardless, as the previous Government all too often did. A persistent failure to observe that simple principle is at the root of many of the MOD budget problems that we inherited from the Labour party, and I do not intend to repeat its mistakes.
The decision taken in the SDSR to proceed with a carrier strike capability, despite the massive challenges we faced with the MOD’s budget, was the right decision. The decision to seek to contain costs by going for “cats and traps” on a single carrier, with greater interoperability with allies, and the cheaper carrier variant version of the JSF aircraft was also the right decision, based on the information available at the time. However, the facts have changed, and I am not prepared to accept a delay in regenerating Britain’s carrier strike capability beyond the timetable set out in the SDSR. And I am not prepared to put the equipment plan, which will support Future Force 2020, at risk of a billion-pound-plus increase in the carrier programme and unquantifiable risk of further cost rises.
So, I can announce to the House today that the National Security Council has decided not to proceed with the “cats and traps” conversion, but to complete both carriers in the STOVL configuration. That will give us the ability to use both carriers to provide continuous carrier availability, at a net additional operating cost averaging about £60 million per year. As we set out in the SDSR, a final decision on the use of the second carrier will be taken as part of SDSR 2015. We will switch the order for JSF aircraft from CV to STOVL, which we can do without delaying delivery and, by making this announcement today, we can plan on the basis of the first operational aircraft being delivered with a UK-weapons-fit package.
We expect HMS Queen Elizabeth to be handed over to the Navy in early 2017 for sea trials. We expect to take delivery of our first test aircraft in July of this year, and we expect the first production aircraft to be delivered to us in 2016, with flying from the Queen Elizabeth to begin in 2018, after her sea trials are complete.
We have discussed this decision with the French Government and with the United States. The French confirm that they are satisfied with our commitment to jointly planned carrier operations to enhance European-NATO capability. The United States, on whose support we would rely in regenerating either type of carrier capability, has been highly supportive throughout the review and I would like to record my personal thanks to the Secretary of Defence, the Pentagon, the navy and the marine corps for their high level of engagement with us. I spoke to Secretary Panetta last night and he confirmed the US’s willingness to support our decision and its view that UK carrier strike availability and our commitment to the JSF programme are the key factors. The Chief of the Defence Staff and his fellow chiefs of staff—all of them—endorse this decision as the quickest and most assured way now to deliver carrier strike as part of an overall affordable equipment programme that will support Future Force 2020.
This was not an easy decision to take, but our responsibility is to make the right decision on the basis of the facts available to us. Neither I nor any of my colleagues came into government expecting decisions to be easy or pain-free. I have a responsibility to clear up the financial mess we inherited in the MOD, just as we are clearing up the mess we inherited across Government as a whole, and to set a balanced budget and an affordable, deliverable equipment programme with manageable and bounded risk. This decision addresses one of the last impediments to my announcing the achievement of those objectives to the House, and I hope to be able to do so very soon.
This is not just about balancing budgets, critical as that is. It is about the UK’s defence, secured by an appropriate and sustainable military capability. This announcement delivers an affordable solution to securing that capability and, with two useable carriers, gives us the option of continuous carrier availability. It confirms the expected delivery of the first test aircraft this summer, of the first production aircraft in 2016, of the first carrier into sea trials in 2017 and of the first flight of the JSF from the deck of the carrier in 2018, with an operational military capability in 2020. It confirms the support of our principal allies, the US and France, and that of the defence chiefs. It shows that we, at least, are not afraid to take difficult decisions when they are right for Britain and I commend the statement to the House.
I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. Let me start by saying again that when the Government do the right thing on defence they will have the support of Labour Members. In politics, however, one can often judge what a Government genuinely feel about their own policy not just by what they say but by when they say it. They have told the media that this is positive news and yet they announced it here in the Commons the very first day after the council election defeats. It must be the first ever example of a Government waiting until the polls close to announce good news.
It is worth reminding the Secretary of State how he got here. The Government were elected promising a bigger Army but are delivering the smallest Army since the Boer war, they have curtailed anti-piracy duties owing to Royal Navy cuts and the RAF has lost long-term surveillance capabilities. On the defence budget, decisions this Government have taken have increased costs. Changes to the Astute class submarines added a further £200 million and the carrier U-turn has cost up to £250 million. On top of that, they are failing on reform with the defence procurement plan delayed for two years. Last year, the largest defence programmes were delayed by a combined 30 months adding £500 million to their costs and while hundreds of defence workers across the country are losing their jobs the Government have no defence industrial strategy to speak of whatsoever.
The biggest blow to the Government’s defence credibility is this chaotic carrier programme. Standing at the Dispatch Box, the Prime Minister announced his plans to U-turn on Labour’s carrier strike policy, scrap the Harriers, sell Ark Royal, build two carriers but mothball one, sack trainee pilots and downgrade British sea power. But that U-turn has now come full circle. Nothing has been gained and two years have been wasted. In tough times, £250 million have been squandered while the forces are having their allowances cut. Harriers are being sold to the Americans for a fraction of their value, we are subject to international ridicule and there will be no jets on carriers for a decade. Mr Speaker, you do not have to be a military strategist to know what aircraft carriers are meant to carry—the clue is in the name.
The Government say their policy is cheaper, but it is more expensive. They said there would be interoperability with the French but their chosen jet cannot land on the French carrier. The Prime Minister personally derided a policy that he is now defending. The Government said that Britain did not need jump jets and Ministers scrapped the expertise needed to operate STOVL aircraft only now to decide to buy a new fleet of jump jets. We now need to retrain people and redevelop the skills that were so carelessly cast aside just two years ago. That is as incoherent as it is ludicrous.
The Secretary of State’s defence today is that the facts have changed, but that is not the full story. I know the advice that the Prime Minister received—that the defence review policy was high risk and high cost—but the Prime Minister overruled that. The Public Accounts Committee warned of rising costs, the National Audit Office said that the Government had an “immature understanding” of the costs, and the Select Committee on Defence warned against strategic shrinkage. The Prime Minister’s decisions have cost British time, British money, British talent and British prestige.
I know the Secretary of State always likes to blame someone else, and he has done that again today. He recently accused British families of causing the financial crash, but he cannot scapegoat the former Defence Secretary for this decision. He has to take some responsibility for the Prime Minister’s mistakes. The Secretary of State has carefully nurtured a reputation as a spreadsheet king who is most at home over his paperwork, so he needs to share some of it with us today. Will he publish a full breakdown of the costs of the plans being abandoned? Will he confirm that the cost of the U-turn is greater than the income from the sale of the Harrier jump jets? How many of the new aircraft does he plan to purchase? Will he confirm that Ministers were warned 18 months ago about the risks and costs inherent in this decision? If Britain will have two aircraft carriers, will the Royal Navy have to increase the number of its personnel? Finally, there is another question that the Secretary of State did not cover in his statement: what will now be the total cost of the carrier build programme?
In conclusion, the Secretary of State has said the Government will do the right thing when the facts have changed, but the previous Labour Government got things right whereas this Government’s policy has unravelled. In recent weeks we have seen incompetence piled upon political hubris. Only a Government who started a petrol crisis when trying to avoid one and whose idea of putting more police on the streets is having thousands demonstrating outside Parliament would have a policy of building two carriers, mothballing one immediately, selling the Harriers and having no planes to fly off aircraft carriers for a decade. Describing the Government’s defence strategy as an “omnishambles” would be a compliment. It is time the Prime Minister started to take responsibility. He should be at the Dispatch Box apologising for his and his Government’s incompetence.
Before the right hon. Gentleman climbs too far up his high horse, perhaps we should, to give a bit of context, remind ourselves of the role that his party played in the history of this project. It was Labour’s fiscal incontinence that created the black hole that we are trying to climb out of and Labour’s decisions that left us facing the challenges we faced at the time of the strategic defence and security review. It was Labour that ordered two 65,000 tonnes carriers, three times the size of a typical STOVL carrier, without cats and traps.
It was Labour who let the contracts on a sweetheart deal, which meant that cancelling the second carrier would have cost more than going ahead and building it. It was Labour who ordered the ships without having the money to pay for them, and then drove costs of £1.6 billion into the carrier programme by delaying the build to accommodate a £250 million cash-flow problem—a performance described by the Public Accounts Committee as setting
“a new benchmark in poor corporate decision making.”
Let me turn to the couple of specific questions buried at the end of the shadow Defence Secretary’s rant. He asked me about the timing of the statement. I have come to the House at the earliest possible date after the National Security Council took the decision to make the change. He said that £250 million has been squandered. I tell the House frankly that expenditure has been incurred in appraising the option of building a CV carrier and fitting it with cats and traps, but it has been nowhere near the £250 million that the right hon. Gentleman referred to. He asked me if I would publish details of the costs involved.
The right hon. Gentleman says that I do not know. If he had ever been a Defence Minister, or inside the Ministry of Defence, he would understand why I do not know. These are complex contracts. I can give him an approximate idea. We think the cost of the design work that has been carried out and the appraisal work will be between £40 million and £50 million. There may also be some exit costs payable to the US contractors responsible for the EMAL system. We will be negotiating around those issues, and I give the right hon. Gentleman this commitment: once we have a definitive figure, I will make it available to the House.
The right hon. Gentleman said that we will have no jets on our carriers for a decade. I do not think he was listening to the statement. We will take delivery of the first test aircraft this year. We will receive the first STOVL variant aircraft in 2016 for operation off land. The carrier will go into sea trials in 2017 and, as soon as she has completed them in 2018, flights will begin from the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth. It will take us two years to work up full military operational capability, but it is important that the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who is shaking his head, understands what that means. It is the gap between getting from the point when we fly the jets off the carrier to the point when the military are satisfied that we have full operational capability.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the number of aircraft that we will be purchasing. The plans for deployment of aircraft have not changed as a result of this announcement. We will routinely embark 12 aircraft and we will be able to surge that number to 36. On the purchasing of aircraft in the joint strike fighter programme, I can tell him that there is no requirement for us to go firm with numbers at this early stage of the programme. Where we can retain optionality, we will do so, as part of prudent budget management.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about risks and costs in this project and in the carrier variant project. We are talking about a project with a total cost of around £10 billion. It is hugely complex, probably the second largest industrial project under way in this country today. There will always be risks, and there will always be risks of cost escalation in such a project. The challenge is not to eliminate risks, but to manage them. That is what proper management of the Ministry of Defence is all about.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the operation of two carriers. If at the next strategic defence and security review, the Government and the National Security Council take the decision to operate two carriers in order to give us continuous carrier availability, there will be an additional cost of about £60 million a year on average for additional crewing and maintenance to keep the two carriers in high readiness.
Will the Secretary of State accept that there were two optimal mixes for JSF and carrier? We could either have a 65,000 tonne carrier and use the carrier variant, with a longer range and bigger payload, or, as the American marine corps are doing, choose the jump jet variant and have smaller carriers. Is the position we are in today sub-optimal, and not the result of industrial policy leading military policy? Does he accept that the real difference, and the reason why he has come to this decision, is that the extra time required for the EMAL system to be put in actually breaches the risk that we were willing to take at the SDSR?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that at the SDSR, a view was taken about the amount of risk that was tolerable, about the horizon to which we could accept an absence of carrier capability and, as I have said, I am certainly not prepared to see us go beyond 2020 without the carrier strike capability.
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. This is the question for Opposition Members to answer: why did they order two 65,000 tonne carriers without cats and traps, which anyone involved in naval aviation operations knows is itself an absurdity? [Interruption.]
Order. I appeal to the House to calm down. The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), assisted by his colleagues, is chuntering repetitively from a sedentary position, in breach of the conventions of the House. I ask the hon. Gentleman to exercise what modicum of self-restraint he is able, in the circumstances, to muster.
We inherited this programme, and frankly I am not interested in trading insults with the Opposition about what happened in the past. What I need to do now is take the carriers that are in build and that are being built under a contract that makes it more expensive to cancel them than to complete them, and put them to the best possible military use for the defence of this country.
The Secretary of State has taken, and is announcing, the right decision today, and I understand how difficult it is to perform that kind of U-turn and how uncomfortable it must be. But I cannot go along with him on the excuse—the reason—that both he and the Prime Minister decided to give for that decision. That is that the facts have changed and therefore we are changing the decision.
I reviewed this decision, taken by my predecessors. The fundamental facts were there at the time and have not changed. We have been up an extremely expensive cul-de-sac for the last 18 months as a result of a shambles of an SDSR, and I can only congratulate the Secretary of State on bringing some sanity to it; but he ought to understand the problem that he will give himself in sorting out procurement work—which, yes, is problematic and was in our time—if he cannot find a way of being straight about why the decision is being taken and the fact that the previous decision was taken in the face of clear advice to the contrary.
I refute that last comment absolutely. The right hon. Gentleman is in a better position than many in the House to understand the complexities and the challenges of defence procurement, but to say that the facts have not changed is simply wrong. The risk profile of the STOVL aircraft is dramatically different now from what it was in 2010, when there was a very real risk that the variant would be cancelled. The cost estimates for fitting the EMAL system, and the understanding of the complexity of that task, have matured through the work that we have done since the SDSR. Although I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s endorsement of the substantive decision, he is simply wrong when he says the facts have not changed.
To make an announcement like this takes real courage and I commend the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister, for making what I agree with the former Secretary of State is the right decision. Is my right hon. Friend able to say how much it would have cost to have converted the second carrier to cats and traps, because was there not a real risk that we would end up with a carrier that we could neither use nor sell?
My right hon. Friend is correct to focus on that point, and I thank him for his comments. As I think I said in my statement, fitting cats and traps retrospectively to the Queen Elizabeth, after her completion, would undoubtedly be significantly more expensive than even the current £2 billion estimate for fitting them to the Prince of Wales in build. It is therefore not unreasonable to think of a likely cost of between £2.5 billion and £3 billion for retrospective fit to the Queen Elizabeth, making that project, as I suggested in my statement, in practice unlikely ever to occur.
Can the Secretary of State confirm that the terms of business agreement signed in 2009 provide that on completion of the carrier build, the UK will be spending perhaps only £230 million a year—0.7% of the MOD budget—to maintain essential shipbuilding skills? More important, will he tell us whether, as a result of the additional costs announced in today’s statement, he envisages that very small figure being reduced further in the future?
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: the terms of business agreement with the shipbuilding consortium commits the MOD to underwriting overhead costs of about £230 million a year to maintain skills. The challenge for the MOD is so to manage the shipbuilding programme as to recover as much of that as possible. After the carrier programme is finished in the shipyards covered by the TOBA, we will move on to the Type 26 programme and recover costs in that way. As far as I am aware, there is no mechanism for reducing that £230 million—it is a contractual figure.
Is it not abundantly clear that any discomfort or embarrassment the Government may feel is more than outweighed by the fact that the decision the Secretary of State has announced today is right both tactically and strategically? When the sound and fury have died down, that is what will concern those members of the Royal Navy who have the responsibility of looking after these ships and the aircraft that fly from them. Is it not important that today’s announcement will help to close earlier the yawning gap in capability left by the decommissioning of the Harrier aircraft and the carriers from which they were deployed? That shows commendable flexibility on the part of the right hon. Gentleman. I hope he will show the same flexibility in respect of other matters, not least, for example, the role of the Royal Air Force at Leuchars in my constituency.
I knew my right hon. and learned Friend would get that in somewhere, but I thank him for his question. In the interest of tri-service harmony, I should make it clear that responsibility for the aircraft will be a combined responsibility of the Royal Navy and the RAF.
My right hon. and learned Friend refers to the Harrier question. Perhaps I need to remind him that it was the previous Government who sealed the fate of the Harrier in 2006, when they scrapped the Navy’s FA2 Sea Harriers, leaving only the ground attack version; and then in 2009 cut the size of that fleet, so that by the time of the SDSR in 2010 the fleet was simply too small to sustain operations in Afghanistan, never mind in Libya as well. We therefore had to take the difficult decision to end the Harrier’s service with the Royal Navy in order to sustain the Tornado, which continues to serve in Afghanistan and which acquitted itself so well in Libya.
I agree that the Secretary of State has made the right decision, particularly given the current financial climate, but I want him to clarify a comment he made. He said that the option of cancelling the carrier programme was not open to him. If it had been open to him, would he have cancelled it?
The SDSR in 2010 considered the possibility of cancelling the second carrier, to deal with the huge budget challenges we inherited, but the terms of business agreement was such that cancelling the carrier at that point would have cost more than delivering it.
I have long argued that if we are going to spend money on carrier strike force, we need to ensure that we have that capability all year round. Can the Secretary of State confirm that, in terms of capability, one advantage of the programme he has announced today is that it puts two operational carriers back on the table?
My hon. Friend is right. I made the precise point, in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), that the cost of converting the second carrier to EMALS cats and traps was likely to be prohibitive; that has emerged from the work that has been going on. Completing the two carriers in STOVL configuration gives us optionality. It means that they can both operate the STOVL aircraft; that the 2015 SDSR can decide whether to bring the second carrier out of extended readiness and deploy it during periods of refit or extended maintenance of the first carrier; and that subsequent SDSRs can decide whether finding the extra crew and meeting the maintenance cost is an appropriate use of naval resources, depending on our assessment of the threat risk.
I am still trying to understand precisely what the new facts are that the Secretary of State so recently discovered. He mentions risk profiles and cost estimates, but surely they were known. Would it not be wise of him either to be more specific or, even better, to publish the advice that would show us what those new facts are?
The hon. Lady will remember that I spent three and a half years in a shadow Treasury brief, during which time I developed a healthily jaundiced view of the Ministry of Defence’s procurement process. Now that I am inside the Department and see the process from the other side, I understand that it is a little bit more complicated than nipping down to the local supermarket to buy a carton of eggs or a bottle of milk. These are immensely complex projects. The way they typically work is that they start with a high-level estimate, informed by the best information available. One then commits funds—this costs money—to do a more detailed appraisal that identifies the technical and financial challenges and risks around the project. That is precisely what we have done. In terms of the appropriate management of a large, complex project, the MOD has followed exactly the right process. It has delivered us the facts to which I referred, and we have drawn the appropriate conclusions from them.
The Opposition should show a little more humility and gloat less on the subject of their responsibility towards the Royal Navy. It was Labour that quibbled over the design for 10 years, and Labour that told the workers to down tools, which cost £1.6 billion. It was Labour that sacked the Sea Harrier—and indeed the Ark Royal—and Labour that cut the number of Type 45s from 12 to six. That is the maritime legacy that this Government have inherited.
We can leave it at that. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), but in future, a question mark would be appreciated.
Will the Secretary of State confirm if he has investigated whether Mr Adam Werritty met any companies or lobbyists involved in the original very bad decision?
I have answered a number of parliamentary questions on the information that the Department holds on meetings held by, and contacts made with, Mr Werritty. As far as I am aware, I have disclosed in parliamentary questions the full extent of the Department’s knowledge.
Amphibious capability is a key part of our defence strategy. I thank my right hon. Friend for making sure that we clarify the timetable, but will he explain what impact the decision will have on amphibious capability, so that we can ensure that our Royal Marines are protected when they go on to land?
The STOVL configuration of the carrier in the carrier-enabled power projection model means that the carrier will embark both fast jets and helicopters—Chinook, Lynx and Merlin. It will also be able to embark Marines. It is a very large ship, as we have mentioned this morning. It will have the capability to carry troops and embark helicopters and fast jets in a way that will facilitate amphibious warfare.
Even a first-week midshipman could tell the Prime Minister that adopting two 180° U-turns takes us back to where we started two years ago. Will the Secretary of State give a commitment that the Government will continue to stand beside the use of Rosyth dockyard for the long-term maintenance of the carriers when they enter service? Will he tell the House what we will achieve, except squandering he knows not how many millions of pounds, by flogging our Harrier fleet for spare parts for a peppercorn, scrapping a generation of fast-jet Harrier pilots, and leaving the nation with—
A first-week midshipman could probably tell the hon. Gentleman that it is not normal to order a 65,000 tonne STOVL carrier without any cats and traps. With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s question on Rosyth, no decision has been taken on where the carriers will be maintained in future.
It is widely alleged by some that the through-life costs of the F-35B could compare unfavourably with those of the F-35C. What rigorous assessment has my right hon. Friend undertaken to ensure that we achieve value for money, having made this decision, and what wider lessons on the defence budget can be drawn for similarly important and large decisions in future?
To answer the last question first, I am drawing some very interesting conclusions about how to manage the defence budget on an ongoing basis and hope to share them with the House shortly. It is precisely because the F-35C variant, on the face of it, has a lower purchase cost and a lower through-life maintenance cost that this option was pursued at the time of the SDSR 2010, but operating the carrier variant will of course require the installation upfront of the catapults and arrester gears, which we now know will cost in the order of £2 billion and rising. On the basis of a properly discounted cash-flow analysis over 30 years, I am clear that the STOVL variant, given the current estimate of the cost of cats and traps, will now be cheaper.
At the Royal Air Force officer training college at Cranwell we were taught that flexibility is the key to air power. I congratulate my right hon. Friend on showing the flexibility to make the right decision for our nation and our future military capability. Will he confirm that his decision has the support of the Chiefs, unlike the previous Government’s decision to scrap the Sea Harriers, which reportedly led to two of the Chiefs standing down?
I am very clear that my job is about supporting the military and our armed forces in defending our country. When I make decisions, I will work with the Chiefs to reach an outcome that works for the military. I can confirm that the Chief of the Defence Staff and all three single service Chiefs support the decision and have confirmed their support in writing to the Prime Minister.
Those on the Labour Front Bench have short memories. The pages of Hansard will show the debate that the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and I had in 2009 on the previous Government’s decision to withdraw the Harrier from Afghanistan prematurely so that it could be subjected to the programme review the following year and potentially cut. Of course, that is now ancient history and they seem to have forgotten it. I commend my right hon. Friend for his brave decision, which is undoubtedly the right one, to minimise the capability gap for carrier strike. Will he confirm that the STOVL version is easily a superior aircraft to the Harrier it replaces and equally comparable to anything it might meet in the air?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising a point that perhaps I should have made before. The STOVL variant—indeed, any variant of the JSF—is a fifth-generation aircraft and represents a step change in capability. It is a stealth aircraft with an autonomous intelligence-gathering capability, and the STOVL variant has significantly greater range than the Harrier had. It is an aircraft with greater capability, greater range than the Harrier and a range of capabilities that previous generations of aircraft simply did not have.
I have received a good deal of correspondence from constituents, both those serving in and those retired from the armed forces, who for a long time have expressed huge concern about the strategy and direction of our procurement. They will be relieved and delighted to hear today that my right hon. Friend has been able to continue to assess the strategy and come up with the right decision and brave enough to announce it to the House. Will he reassure the House that he will never let the woolly thinking and loose purse strings shown by the previous Government undermine our armed forces again?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. Fiscal incontinence undermines the support that we can offer our armed forces. Doing this in a disciplined way is not, as the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) would try to present it in a rather sneering fashion, some sort of obsession with spreadsheets; it is about doing our job as politicians, which is to ensure that the support for our armed forces is there, is sustainable and can actually be delivered to them.
The Ministry of Defence has a long and tawdry history of overspend in procurement, timelines that are well in excess of those originally planned and of ploughing on regardless. Will the Secretary of State confirm that his decision today demonstrates a change of culture that really shows that we are getting to grips with the budget and the timelines to provide guarantees to the armed forces and our nation?
I thank my hon. Friend for his question and assure him that we will take the decisions that need to be taken in the interests of the nation’s defence, however awkward or inconvenient. I will come to the House however many times I need to and make however many announcements I need to make to get the Department back on track. I want the MOD to stand tall among the Departments of State, with a normal relationship with the Treasury and with the centre of government, and with proper contingency arrangements in its budget so that the armed forces can be confident that the promises that are made to them will be delivered, unlike those of the previous Government.
What steps is my right hon. Friend taking on defence procurement to ensure that the Government do not risk repeating the mistakes of the previous Government, who even in their last financial year in office, 2009-10, oversaw a huge increase of £3.3 billion in the cost of the 15 largest defence projects?
I think that the announcement I have made today demonstrates for my hon. Friend and the House that we will put prudent management of defence projects ahead of playing politics. It would have been easy to avoid making this decision today, and politically much less uncomfortable, but this is about making the right decisions for the future of our armed forces and I can assure him that that is what we will continue to do.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Written StatementsI wish to clarify answers that I gave in response to questions from the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) and my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Tony Baldry) as printed in the Official Report, 26 April 2012, columns 1124 and 1130 respectively.
Column 1124
The hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) asked the following:
In 2014 or 2015 when our combat role has ended, who will provide force protection for our trainers?
The final sentences of my response should have been:
The Afghan national officer training academy is being built within the perimeter of an Afghan facility, the perimeter of which will be defended by Afghan troops.
Inside this Afghan National Army perimeter, UK personnel based at the Academy will operate from within a coalition force Operating Base, and will therefore be protected by UK or coalition military personnel.
Column 1130
My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Tony Baldry) asked the following:
Because of the need to balance the Ministry of Defence budget, a number of service personnel will be made redundant later this year, including, I suspect, a number who have recently returned from Afghanistan and a number based in my constituency with the Royal Logistic Corps. However, those people have skills that are much sought after by local employers, so will my right hon. Friend ensure that MOD officials work with the local community to set up a social enterprise to ensure that the skills of the service personnel who are made redundant are made known to local employers as swiftly as possible, and so that as many of those skills and those people can be brought into the local labour market as swiftly and speedily as possible?
The first sentences of my response should have been:
Exemption from redundancy extends to anyone who is within six months of deploying to Afghanistan, is on operations, or is on their Post Operational Leave or any accrued Operational Rest and Recuperation.
Therefore, the majority of service personnel would be exempt from compulsory redundancy for a period of between four and seven weeks after returning from operations in Afghanistan.
I apologise to the House for the errors in my original answers.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons Chamber With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on future force levels in Afghanistan.
Let me begin by paying tribute to the commitment, professionalism and bravery of the men and women of the United Kingdom’s armed forces deployed in Afghanistan. Since UK forces first deployed to Afghanistan in 2001, over 100,000 personnel have served on operations there, many for more than one tour, and many more, military and civilian, have supported the mission. Since the surge in the international commitment to the mission as a whole in 2009, which boosted the forces available to ISAF—the international security assistance force—by 30,000, the United Kingdom has maintained an enduring level of conventional forces in Afghanistan of 9,500, the great majority of whom are now in the UK area of operations in central Helmand.
This has been a critical period for the mission, for UK forces, for ISAF and, significantly, for the Afghan national security forces—ANSF. Our combined efforts have arrested the momentum of the insurgency, diminished its capability, and weakened its strategic position, but it still represents a threat to the people of Afghanistan and to the security of Afghan territory. It retains the ability to launch significant operations, as the attack on Kabul on 15 and 16 April demonstrates. The response of the ANSF to that attack demonstrated just how far they have come in their capability and ability to undertake major operations autonomously. They are justifiably proud of their performance.
Our aim in Afghanistan is to build Afghan governance and security forces to the point where they are resilient in the face of any residual threat from the insurgency, confident in their ability to protect their own citizens and able to deny safe haven to terrorists who seek to use Afghan territory as a base from which to threaten international security. Significant progress is being made across Afghanistan and the monthly progress report for March, published today by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence, sets out more details. Nowhere is that progress more obvious than in Helmand.
There are now 12 district governors in Helmand’s 14 districts, up from just five in 2008. Thirty extra schools have opened since 2010, with another 46 currently being built. Twenty-nine extra health clinics have opened. There are more roads and more bridges, and bazaars re-opening, meaning more commerce and opportunities for ordinary Helmandis. In the past year alone, income levels in Helmand have increased by 20%. Prosperity will be a critical weapon in the battle against the insurgency.
All this social and economic progress has been made possible by the improvements in security across the province. This has been facilitated not just by the surge in ISAF troops, but by the increasing number and quality of Afghan national security forces. The size of the Afghan national army in regional command south-west, which includes Helmand province, has increased by 30% in the past 18 months. Two of the three districts in Task Force Helmand’s area of operations have now entered formal transition. The security situation in those districts is unrecognisable compared with the start of British operations in 2006.
The whole of Lashkar Gah district and the most populous 60% of Nad Ali is now completely under Afghan control. The ANSF has demonstrated repeatedly its ability to provide security in these areas and, as a result, 36 of Task Force Helmand’s checkpoints, patrol bases and military positions have been handed over to the ANSF in the past six months, while a further 16 new posts have been constructed and occupied by Afghan forces.
This has enabled Taskforce Helmand to reduce its basing footprint by 50%. As circumstances allow, UK and ISAF forces are progressively moving towards the support role of training, advising and assisting.
During 20th Armoured Brigade’s recent tour, the campaign moved to being run on an Afghan-formulated campaign plan, written in Dari by the Afghans and executed by them. Seven major operations were carried out in central Helmand over the six-month period of Operation Herrick 15—a pace that, in the words of the UK brigade commander,
“sometimes left us running to catch up with our Afghan colleagues.”
In the recent Operation Now Roz, more than 1,000 members of the ANSF, supported by British forces, cleared insurgents from a key heartland within the Helmand river valley. While UK forces secured the flanks, the Afghans cleared more than 200 compounds, made safe 44 improvised explosive devices, found seven bomb-making factories and confiscated more than 145 kg of home-made explosives. It was the fourth major ANA operation in central Helmand in four months, and the largest and most complex so far. The success of the operation further demonstrated the ANSF’s increasing professionalism and capability.
Helmand remains difficult and challenging and the insurgency remains a constant threat, but the progress we have made demonstrates that we are on target to meet the transition objectives agreed by President Karzai and the international community at Lisbon in November 2010. Maintaining that momentum will be the challenge of the transition process between now and the end of 2014. There is no room at all for complacency and much work needs to be done to maintain the momentum of progress in building ANSF capability, but the reality on the ground is that Afghan forces are increasingly taking the lead. That allows ISAF, including UK forces, gradually to reduce force levels and change their role.
The Prime Minister announced in July last year that we would be drawing down UK forces by 500 to 9,000 by the end of this year. The Chief of the Defence Staff has now provided military advice on how those reductions will be achieved. The House will understand that it would be inappropriate to go into exact operational details or talk about specific capabilities, but I can give a general overview of how the manpower reductions will be achieved.
First, I can confirm that the majority of the 500 being withdrawn will be combat troops, reflecting the reduction in the need for ISAF ground-holding capabilities as transition progresses and the Afghans take over positions. Secondly, we will merge the UK forces headquarters in Nahri Sarraj North and Nahri Sarraj South to align better with the increasingly important Afghan administrative boundaries and the civilian control structure, which will deliver efficiencies and manpower savings. Thirdly, there will be a reduction in support personnel and enablers, commensurate with the changes I have set out. Finally, we will withdraw some combat support capabilities for which there is no longer an operational need as a result of the availability of alternative weapons systems in theatre. Those measures will reduce the United Kingdom’s enduring conventional force levels to 9,000 and will be completed by the end of this year.
I can also inform the House that, in addition to the overall reduction in numbers, a further 200 combat troops will be transferred from ground-holding roles to security force assistance teams working with the ANSF. For the avoidance of doubt, I should be clear that whatever role is being fulfilled, including the training of ANSF forces, British forces in Afghanistan will retain combat capability until the end of 2014.
The details I have announced today are consistent with our intention to move out of a combat role by the end of 2014. They demonstrate our commitment to the process of transition and the increasing capacity and capability of the ANSF, reflecting its real achievements on the ground. As the ANSF grows and gradually takes lead responsibility for security across the country, ISAF’s military footprint, including that of the United Kingdom, will reduce further. We will keep the House informed of future plans for further reductions in UK troop numbers as conditions on the ground permit.
Our combat role will end by December 2014, but the United Kingdom’s commitment to Afghanistan is for the long term. That is demonstrated in part by my announcement last week at the NATO ministerial meeting that we will commit £70 million a year to the funding of the ANSF after 2014, and by our commitment to run the Afghan national army officer training academy, which we are building outside Kabul.
Each nation has its own constitutional processes in which to consider its contribution as transition moves forward, but all agree that ISAF cohesion must be maintained. The UK will continue to work and plan closely with our ISAF partners, particularly those operating alongside us in Helmand, including the United States, which provides the bulk of coalition forces. As the Prime Minister told the House yesterday:
“The speed of the reductions between now and the end of 2014 will be in accordance with the conditions on the ground and with what is right in terms of transitioning from allied control to Afghan control—and at all times, of course, paramount in our minds is the safety and security of our brave armed forces”.—[Official Report, 25 April 2012; Vol. 543, c. 943.]
That safety and security will be best assured by working with our allies in a co-ordinated draw-down as responsibilities are handed progressively to the ANSF. That is the way to honour and protect the legacy of our involvement in Afghanistan and the sacrifice made by the 409 servicemen and women who have given their lives and the hundreds more who have suffered life-changing injuries. I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and advance sight of it. My right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State is in Scotland at a family engagement and could not return to the Commons because of the short notice of the statement.
Labour Members have been consistent, both in government and in opposition, in our support for the mission in Afghanistan. We have immense pride in our armed forces, who fight for others’ security and peace in order to protect our own here at home. We will offer the Government our support where they do the right thing, but we will scrutinise their decisions and urge them to make the case for a conflict that we believe remains firmly in our national interest.
We agree with the Secretary of State that there has been progress in Afghanistan. The continued growth in the size of the Afghan national army and the Taliban’s agreement to open an office in Qatar as a place to hold peace talks are notable examples, alongside those he mentioned, but such gains have been overshadowed by recent events. Key allies have unilaterally announced divergent withdrawal dates; instability in the US-Pakistan relationship remains; infiltration of the army by the Taliban remains a serious concern; and, most worrying, we have all recently seen the Taliban’s continued capacity to launch “spectacular” attacks in allied-controlled areas. Any discussion of troop numbers must be held in that context. Although we welcome today’s update, we hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to answer some further questions about long-term Afghan security.
It is the political conditions within and beyond Afghan borders that will ultimately determine whether the conditions that led us to war in the first place never return. Disconcertingly, last month the Prime Minister made clear his view that the handover to Afghan forces could be achieved satisfactorily without a political settlement, but that is contrary to all experience. A power vacuum would encourage neighbouring countries to seek influence, could allow the Taliban to return, and would jeopardise the gains already outlined. A clear political strategy must match military might. Can the Secretary of State assure the House that the Government’s efforts are focused on achieving an inclusive political settlement and give us an assessment of the progress made?
The Secretary of State will know that, painful though the process may be, constructive, proactive and flexible negotiations with the Taliban are necessary if any lasting settlement is to be reached. We must demand a denunciation of violence and an endorsement of the principles of the constitution, but there will be no peace without a settlement reflective of a diverse nation. Will he therefore outline how Britain is supporting the Afghan Government in facilitating that and, indeed, the role of regional partners in that effort?
We agree with the Government that there must not be a cliff-edge withdrawal, and that reductions must take place in areas where Afghan forces have the skill and capacity to take full responsibility. It may worry some that the Secretary of State has talked today of transition as a sign of progress, because recently British fatalities have tragically occurred in Lashkar Gah, an area where transition has been completed. Does he have full confidence in the capacity of those to whom we are transferring responsibility? What assurances can he give the House that, following those events, the scrutiny of Afghan forces assuming lead security responsibility has been strengthened?
Further, will the Secretary of State expand on the nature of the role of British personnel in Afghanistan post-2014? What is involved in the combat support role that they will play, and can he confirm that any British personnel in Afghanistan post-2014 will be non-combat and will rely entirely on Afghan forces for their security? Does he have full confidence in that arrangement and does he believe that changes need to be made to the police and army recruitment processes? That is particularly pertinent to the police, whose quality, by their Government’s own admission, has not yet reached the required standard.
What assessment has been made of the size of the residual British presence in Afghanistan, and what commitments will the Government seek to gain from NATO partners at the Chicago summit next month on their long-term commitment post-2014? The Secretary of State mentioned the recently announced £70 million contribution to a £4 billion international fund for Afghanistan to support Afghan forces, and we support that important investment. Does he expect a greater UK contribution to be announced at the Chicago NATO summit? As we approach the summit, what will the Government’s goals be? Does the Secretary of State agree that they need to include a co-ordinated timetable for the withdrawal of NATO forces, a stable funding package for the Afghan security forces and a status-of-forces agreement on the role of any international forces after 2014? To that list, I hope he will add genuine progress on a stable political settlement in Afghanistan, bringing regional powers into the agreement.
In all these discussions, uppermost in our minds are all those who are still serving in that most difficult environment and all those who have made the ultimate sacrifice. We pay tribute to them and to their families.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support and delighted, as will our armed forces be, that once again the cross-party consensus on a campaign that was entered into for reasons of our national security interest, and continues to be prosecuted for those reasons, has been reasserted by an Opposition Front Bencher.
I am sorry that the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy), who leads for the Opposition on defence, is not able to be here. The hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Brown) says that this was because of the statement’s short notice, but I make it clear that the title of the statement was laid last night before the House rose, as is the proper procedure.
The hon. Gentleman asks about the US-Pakistan relationship. He is absolutely right that good relations between the US and Pakistan are crucial, and recent disruptions to those relations are a matter of concern. Good relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will also be central to ensuring the stability of the region.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the Taliban’s capacity to mount attacks and refers, I think, to the Kabul attack. Yes, that attack caused significant disruption, but we need to be clear that it was a complete failure: the attack itself failed to inflict any casualties or any significant damage. A number of members of the Afghan security forces and some civilians were killed in the clearance operation afterwards, but there is no doubt that the attack was a failure.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the handover of security responsibility to the Afghans potentially creating a power vacuum, but that is definitively not the case. ISAF is very clear that the draw-down needs to be measured and calibrated to match the building capability of the Afghan security forces, so that they can take over the ground-holding and security role, and we ensure that a power vacuum is avoided. I agree that it is not something we would tolerate.
I agree also that we need an inclusive political settlement. All Afghan citizens who are prepared to renounce violence and accept the constitution need to be brought inside the tent, and we need to see diversity in the way Afghanistan is run. I have to say that Helmand is leading the way: we have the significant engagement of female political and community figures in community councils and district councils in the area of operations for which we are responsible, and the Afghan peace and reintegration programme has so far recruited 4,000—admittedly, mainly low-level—Afghan fighters back into mainstream Afghan life. That is a basis on which we will want to build very significantly over the remaining two and a half years of ISAF combat operations.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the scrutiny of Afghan forces, referring, I think, to the very tragic recent “green on blue” incident in Lashkar Gah. There is in fact no evidence that that was an act of infiltration. Of course we have to be constantly alert to infiltration, but we have also to recognise the reality that Afghanistan is a society where people are used to settling personal grievances by resorting to violence, including violence with firearms. I have seen no evidence that the incident was an act of Taliban infiltration.
The hon. Gentleman asks me about the UK’s role and the size of force lay-down post-2014, but no decisions have been taken yet, other than that we will not be there in anything like our current force strength and we will not be there in a combat role. We have made a commitment to run the Afghan national officer training academy, but beyond that we will make our decisions with our allies over the coming months and, probably, years. It is not a decision that we need to make now; the process will start at Chicago but it will certainly not be completed there.
The hon. Gentleman asks me whether the UK contribution that I announced last week of £70 million, or about $110 million, to a fund of $4 billion—not £4 billion, as he said—to fund the future ANSF is likely to be increased at Chicago. That is not the case. That £70 million is the UK’s proposed contribution, and we have decided to make the announcement early to encourage others to make a commitment.
Of course we will co-ordinate with our allies on the timetable, but the timetable for draw-down will be responsive. It will depend on what is happening on the ground and on what our allies are doing, and of course the hon. Gentleman is right to say that any ISAF forces remaining in-country after 2014 will need a stationing-of-forces agreement.
The battalion that I had the honour to command returned from Afghanistan two years ago with 12 men dead and more than 100 wounded, and it returns to the country in October. I am worried about two things. First, we must ensure that as we withdraw we retain our soldiers in sufficient strength so that there is a balance to deter attacks. Secondly, I am concerned that we have had too many instances of rogue Afghan national army soldiers turning their guns on our allies and on our personnel. We have to be very careful, and I ask the Secretary of State to look at that.
I hear what my hon. Friend says, and of course the so-called “green on blue” incidents are particularly tragic. I was in Lashkar Gah two days after the most recent incident, when I was able to speak to Afghan commanders about it. I can tell the House that they feel a deep sense of shame and betrayal about what has happened. They recognise that the future of Afghanistan depends on effective partnering between ISAF forces and Afghan forces, and they recognise the huge damage that those very rare incidents cause.
UK forces are in routine contact with their Afghan counterparts—there are thousands of contacts every day —and we have to see these tragic but very rare incidents in that context. I assure my hon. Friend that commanders on the ground have taken a number of sensible precautionary measures to ensure that UK forces are always in a position to defend themselves if necessary, and the Afghans themselves have taken a number of measures to ensure the more effective vetting and monitoring of their own soldiers.
Is the Secretary of State aware that there will be a mighty sense of relief when Britain’s combat role in Afghanistan comes to an end? There are bound to be different points of view in this House—it would be odd if there were not. However, does he recognise that very many people in this country—I would say a large majority—believe that we have been involved for more than 10 years in an unwinnable war? The sooner British troops come home, the better.
I suspect that there is an almighty sense of relief when any war is over. I am sure that the British people wish for nothing more than to see our troops come home, but that will be a pyrrhic achievement if the territory of Afghanistan again becomes available to international terrorism that attacks us and our allies. We have to bring our troops home, but we have to do the job properly and ensure that the Afghan national security forces can secure the territory, protect their own country and ensure that international terrorism never again takes root in Afghanistan.
For those who have served, for those who have suffered life-changing injuries and for those who have lost loved ones, to honour and protect their involvement, I welcome the confirmation by the Secretary of State that the United Kingdom’s commitment to Afghanistan is for the long term. With that in mind, will he prepare a statement on what has happened to the Kajaki dam project in the four years since 2008, when soldiers from 16 Air Assault Brigade took a turbine through dangerous terrain without losing a single life?
There is good news on the Kajaki dam project. I am trying to find the exact details in rapid time, but I am afraid that I cannot. Further equipment has been installed at Kajaki—I was briefed on the project during my visit to Afghanistan a couple of weeks ago—but I will write to my hon. Friend and place a copy of the letter in the Library.
If the Secretary of State receives advice by 2014 that the security situation has not improved to the extent that is envisaged or has deteriorated, or that the Afghan Government do not believe that their security forces can take on the security role that is envisaged, will the combat role continue after 2014?
We are very clear that United Kingdom forces will not be in a combat role after 2014. We have to bring this engagement to a close. It was a measured decision to fix December 2014 as the end of combat operations. We are highly confident about the level of development of the ANSF.
I say to the hon. Gentleman that there is no example in history of an insurgency being effectively and sustainably defeated by foreign troops. It has to be local forces that sustainably defeat an insurgency. That is the path on which we are embarked in Afghanistan.
I welcome the statement, which stands in marked contrast to the gloom and doom we heard a year or two ago from some elements in the House. I put it to the Secretary of State that for the military success in which our troops have played such an important part to be seen through, a national political settlement is crucial. To that end, the idea that has been floated of bringing the elections forward a year so that the new Government are in place in good time would be a constructive step.
The timing of the Afghan presidential election is a matter for the Afghans, in accordance with the Afghan constitution. Our concern is to ensure that the constitution is upheld, that a democratic process is followed and that there is an orderly transfer of power from President Karzai at the end of his term.
In 2014 or 2015 when our combat role has ended, who will provide force protection for our trainers?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that question, because I have just written myself a note to remind me to respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway. When we talk about not having combat troops in place, that does not mean that the troops who are in Afghanistan will not be permitted to defend themselves should they come under attack. Clearly, when British personnel are deployed in an area where there is danger, they must have the capability to defend themselves. The Afghan national officer training academy is being built within the perimeter of an American facility that will be defended by US troops.
I too pay tribute to our troops, but I continue to have grave doubts about the capability that the Afghan forces will have when ISAF ceases combat operations. What scope is there to drop the preconditions to talks with our enemies, which are unrealistic in many respects, so that we can explore possible common ground, particularly given the fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qaeda? I suggest to the Secretary of State that those of us who served in Northern Ireland showed, I hope, that one can talk and fight at the same time.
I have no doubt about the growing competence, capability and confidence of the Afghan national security forces. They will inevitably fight a different type of campaign after 2014 from that fought by ISAF. I have a high level of confidence in their ability to hold the ground against the insurgents. The UK Government recognise the need for an Afghan-led reconciliation process, but the basis for that must be that the people who are involved renounce the use of violence and agree to pursue their objectives by political means.
Following on from the previous question, we talk about insurgents as though they were a uniform group. Has the Secretary of State made an assessment of whether the pattern of who the insurgents are has changed and of the differentiated response that is therefore required?
The hon. Lady is absolutely right. One striking statistic shows the percentage of the reintegrees—horrible word—who have joined the peace and reconciliation programme whose original gripe with the Afghan Government had nothing to do with ideology, but was a land dispute or some other local dispute that led them to feel disfranchised and disillusioned with Afghan society. Sometimes it was a reaction to the corruption that is still, I am afraid, only too endemic. She is right that there is a hard core of people who are ideologically motivated, but there is also a much softer group of insurgents who are alienated from Afghan society but not ideologically motivated against it. That represents fertile territory for the reconciliation programme.
Does the Secretary of State believe that our troops have the kit and equipment they need to continue to do the job effectively?
I am happy to tell my hon. Friend that when Brigadier Patrick Sanders, who commanded 20th Armoured Brigade during Herrick 15, was in the House on Tuesday evening, he said, as Members who were there will have heard, that the equipment that he had available during his tour was the best that he had known in his 26 years in the Army. The soldiers who are fighting for us have the best personal protection equipment they have ever had and their commanders have the enablers that they need. I have no doubt that, at long last, we have the kit that we need to fight this campaign.
It is not obvious that the political process has made the same progress as the military one. In that context, does President Karzai have the capacity to deal with the issues that the Secretary of State has mentioned today, such as corruption, and allow more people to be reintegrated? In any case, does he have the capacity to have proper dialogue with his previous political opponents? Without a political solution there will be no long-term capacity for peace.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that there is no long-term solution without reconciliation and reintegration, but it would be a mistake to judge Afghan society by our own standards. While I was in Helmand, I was astonished to see an attitude survey suggesting that Afghans object to the level of bribes, not their existence. They accept the existence of bribes as part of everyday lives, but they do not like their reaching extortionate levels. We have to go with the grain of Afghan society, but he is absolutely right that the willingness and ability of the political elite to manage reconciliation to a successful conclusion will ultimately determine whether the process succeeds.
The nation will be very glad that today marks the beginning of the end of combat operations in Afghanistan by our magnificent troops there. Nevertheless, does the Secretary of State acknowledge that the next three or four years will be among the most dangerous and sensitive times that our troops have had to face, as they withdraw, and that any information that he might inadvertently give in the House or elsewhere might endanger that withdrawal? Will he therefore be very cautious indeed about the tactical level of information that he gives out about the withdrawal?
My hon. Friend is of course absolutely right. As we go through the withdrawal, our troops will face new and different challenges, and nothing that we say in the House should place them at any greater risk. I reassure him that my statement was made with the full agreement of the military commanders to the detail that it contained.
Figures suggest that UK arms sales to Afghanistan are doubling, while Transparency International’s corruption index still shows the regime there as one of the most corrupt in the world. In that context, as we bring our brave troops home, how will the end use of the arms that we sell to Afghanistan be monitored?
As the hon. Lady knows, we have one of the most rigorous arms control and monitoring regimes of any nation, but if we want the ANSF to take over the combat role from us, we clearly have to ensure that it is effectively equipped to do so.
Will the Secretary of State confirm that our American allies are seriously considering the retention of one or more strategic bases in Afghanistan after 2014 as the best way, and indeed probably the only way, of ensuring that the military gains and any political settlement do not unravel after that date?
My hon. Friend will know that that has been widely reported as a US objective, but my understanding is that nothing has been agreed or finalised between the Afghans and the US on post-2014 lay-down at this stage.
May I offer my heartfelt condolences and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden) to the family of Sapper Connor Ray? Sapper Ray came from the city that we both represent and was the 409th fatality from Britain. He was among the bravest of the brave.
The Secretary of State’s statement contained, as always, excessive optimism about the situation in Afghanistan. Will he admit, and tell us about, the growing strength of the Taliban outside Helmand and the growing area that they control? Is there not a real possibility that after going into Afghanistan to get rid of a Taliban Government, when we leave we might find a new Taliban Government in control?
No. I am sorry, but I have to disagree with the hon. Gentleman on the last part of his question. Of course, I wholeheartedly agree with his condolences to the family and friends of Sapper Connor Ray. I am sure the whole House join him in that.
It seems to me that the hon. Gentleman has a fixed agenda and just keeps reiterating it. The reality is that the Taliban are significantly weakened and do not have the ground-holding capability that they did before. Yes, there are areas in the east of the country, along the border with Pakistan, where there is still significant Taliban activity. However, an Afghanistan in which Helmand province, the main highway and the big cities are under the Afghan Government’s control will be a viable Afghanistan that can contain an insurgency in the mountains along the Pakistani border. The key to the battle is in the big cities of the south and south-west and on highway 1, and it is about ensuring freedom of movement and control of the big population areas.
I wish the hon. Gentleman could find it in his heart to share our aspiration for Afghanistan and take it from me that the military gains on the ground and the growth in the capability of the Afghan national security forces are real. This is a good news story, but I agree with him that it is not irreversible.
I welcome the statement and the intent that it contained, but does my right hon. Friend recognise the remarks that General John Allen made in evidence to the Senate armed services committee last month? He said that he was having what he described as a “strategic conversation” with his political masters about the US draw-down towards the end of the year, in advance of a report on the subject that he intended to deliver later this year. To what extent is the announcement that my right hon. Friend has made today provisional on that report?
The announcement that I have made is not in any way provisional on that report. The United States will recall its surge troops during the course of this year, bringing its force level in Afghanistan back down to 68,000. The discussion that General Allen referred to is about the trajectory of US force levels beyond that figure. We have no definitive read-out of that discussion yet, and we have as yet made no definitive plan for our own draw-down beyond the end of 2012.
Understandably, much of the focus has been on the role of the British Army, but may I press the Secretary of State to say a little about what role, if any, the Royal Air Force may provide post-2014 either in direct combat operations or in combat-enabling operations?
I should first say that members of all the armed forces will be involved in the Afghan national officer training academy, so there will definitely be a tri-service presence in Afghanistan after 2014 in that capacity. Beyond that, we have made no decisions about the nature or scale of any continuing support that we may provide. As I said earlier, the conversation about that will begin in Chicago, but I do not expect it to be concluded quickly.
Will the Secretary of State assure the House that no UK forces will be required to backfill any areas that are left as US forces withdraw from Helmand?
Yes, I can give that assurance. The UK’s area of operations—the three districts of Nad Ali, Lashkar Gah and Nahri Sarraj in central Helmand—will remain the focus of UK operations. We do not intend to extend our area of operations, and US forces drawing down elsewhere in regional command south-west will be replaced by Afghan national security forces.
How easy it is to start a war, and how difficult to finish one. The Secretary of State has announced another 32 months of our soldiers being Taliban target practice. President Hollande, if he wins next week, will pull French troops out this year, and I believe that if President Romney is elected in November, there may be some big political rethinking in the United States. Having listened to six Secretaries of State make the same statement—we are defeating the enemy, we are making political progress—I ask the Secretary of State at least to ask our military to ensure that as few of our soldiers as possible are killed in the remaining 32 months. We do not honour the sacrifice of those who have died by adding more corpses to the funeral pile.
The right hon. Gentleman is a real dyed-in-the-wool glass-half-empty man. I have not announced that we will commit our forces for another 32 months. The Prime Minister announced early last year that we would have them out of a combat role by the end of 2014. That is a good news story, as is the fact that in the interim, all the ISAF nations are focused on creating an ANSF that can take over our role and maintain security in Afghanistan.
In the meantime, everybody in the House ought to be extremely proud of the social and economic development in central Helmand. There are significantly more schools, hospitals, clinics, bazaars, and bridges. Over the past six months, the British Army has built the biggest bridge that it has constructed since the second world war. All those things allow ordinary people in Helmand province to resume their normal life, grow their income and make mainstream Afghan society more and more attractive to those who have previously been attracted by the insurgency.
My concern is that the current residual threat is not a reliable indicator of what precisely will happen post-2014. What assurance can the Secretary of State give the House that the likely change or intensification of threats from without Afghanistan in 2015 are being properly examined and acknowledged in the training being received now by the ANSF?
The strategic threats are acknowledged in, and form a core part of, ISAF’s thinking. I do not know whether my hon. Friend had a particular aspect in mind, but it is clear to us that building a sustainable and reliable relationship with Pakistan and ensuring the security of the border with Pakistan will be fundamental to the future of Afghanistan.
The UN assistance mission in Afghanistan recently confirmed that there were 3,000 civilian deaths in 2010, that 25% of Afghan children die before they are five and that 70% of people live in poverty. Is not that the real legacy of a decade of war?
No, it absolutely is not. The number of civilian casualties is of course a matter of extreme regret, but more than 76% of civilian casualties are caused by Taliban activity, not by ISAF or ANSF activity. Health care, literacy and poverty have all taken great strides forward since 2006. The Taliban banned girls from schools. There were no girls in school—
Virtually no girls were in school in Afghanistan in 2006, but now large numbers of girls are being educated. Schools, clinics and hospitals are springing up all over the place: 90% of the population of Helmand is within one hour’s walk of a health facility. That state of affairs could not even have been imagined in 2006. I therefore tell the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) not to talk the place down. It is making significant socio-economic progress.
Next week sees the funerals of my constituents Corporal Jake Hartley, Private Anthony Frampton and Private Danny Wilford of the Yorkshire Regiment. Will my right hon. Friend continue to state the progress made in Afghanistan, as he has today, and describe the orderly way in which we will withdraw from the country, so that we continue to demonstrate to their loved ones that their sacrifices have not been in vain?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. We owe it to those who have made the ultimate sacrifice to conclude this operation in good order and to secure our legacy—their legacy—for the future.
In paying tribute to our troops and recognising their hard work, I seek a reassurance from the Secretary of State. Although we recognise the development of the ANSF, is he getting reassurances from our ISAF partners that they understand the need to maintain resources on the ground during transition so that there can be a flexible response to the assistance role?
Yes. I attended last week the NATO Defence Ministers conference in Brussels, where speaker after speaker asserted the principles of “in together, out together” and reaffirmed their commitment to the Lisbon 2010 declaration principles. We all understand that we are now in the last stretch of this campaign, but we have to do it properly in order to secure the legacy.
Because of the need to balance the Ministry of Defence budget, a number of service personnel will be made redundant later this year, including, I suspect, a number who have recently returned from Afghanistan and a number based in my constituency with the Royal Logistic Corps. However, those people have skills that are much sought after by local employers, so will my right hon. Friend ensure that MOD officials work with the local community to set up a social enterprise to ensure that the skills of the service personnel who are made redundant are made known to local employers as swiftly as possible, and so that as many of those skills and those people can be brought into the local labour market as swiftly and speedily as possible?
I should say first of all that nobody who is on operations in Afghanistan nor anyone who is recuperating in the six-month period after returning from Afghanistan is eligible for redundancy, but my hon. Friend is right. As we balance the MOD budget and reduce the size of the Army to around 82,000, there will be a series of redundancies. Many of the people being made redundant will fortunately have skills that are of value in the civilian economy. I am not sure I agree with him on the need to create a social enterprise, but I can assure him that very robust arrangements are in place to ensure that local jobcentres are alerted in advance to the availability of the skills that those people have.
I thank my right hon. Friend very much for his announcement, which I am sure will go down well in my constituency, where, as hon. Members may know, 3 Commando Brigade, which served so valiantly last year out in Afghanistan, is based. What impact will today’s statement have on the reservists? Will he also explain what support his Department is giving to reservists’ families, who can on occasion feel somewhat isolated from the support given to their regular counterparts?
My hon. Friend makes a good point. A significant number of reservists contribute to the campaign in Afghanistan. They tend to serve as individual augmentees—people with specific skills who are called up to reinforce other units—and as such, their families do not benefit from the group support that tends to help the families of personnel in Regular Army units. As we move forward with our plans to strengthen the reserves, we hope there will be more opportunity to deploy reserve units as formed units, which will in itself help to address the problem my hon. Friend highlights.
Last but not least, I call Guy Opperman.
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I shall try to be good value.
I welcome the ongoing withdrawal and support the troops from my constituency from 39 Regiment Royal Artillery who have recently returned from a successful tour of Afghanistan. Does the Secretary of State agree that a political deal with the Taliban must be a vital precondition of continuing the social and economic progress in Afghanistan that we would all seek as we continue our withdrawal?
Yes, Taliban is a loose term. As I have already sought to suggest, a significant proportion of people who have supported the insurgency are not obviously ideologically motivated. The key challenge for the Government of Afghanistan is to negotiate with the political leaders of the Taliban and seek to reintegrate those who are supportive of the insurgency at the moment but who are not necessarily ideologically motivated—those who can be brought back on side by simply dealing with the grievances that put them off side in the first place.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsLord Levene published his independent recommendations on the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence in his report on Defence Reform on 27 June 2011. Since then, substantial progress has been made in implementing these recommendations. One of the most significant is the creation of a new Joint Forces Command.
The Joint Forces Command will be established on Monday 2 April 2012. It will be led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, whose appointment was announced on 15 September 2011, Official Report, column 52WS, and who took up post as the first commander Joint Forces Command on 1 December 2011. The establishment of the new command at its initial operating capability follows just nine months after the publication of Lord Levene’s report. The Joint Forces Command will manage, deliver and champion joint capabilities to support the success of current and future military operations, and will reach full operating capability by April 2013.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons Chamber15. What plans he has to co-operate with the authorities in the United Arab Emirates on defence issues.
I am sure that the whole House will wish to join me in paying tribute to the two British service personnel who were killed today in Afghanistan. Their next of kin are being informed. Our thoughts, as ever, are with their families, for whom this will be a deeply personal tragedy. Details of the incident are still emerging, but it appears that a member of the Afghan national army opened fire at the entrance gate of the British headquarters in Lashkar Gah city, killing the two British service personnel. The assailant was killed by return fire. The Ministry of Defence will issue further statements as the details of the incident become clearer. I am sure that the House will also wish to join me in paying tribute to Captain Rupert Bowers from 2nd Battalion the Mercian Regiment, who was killed in Afghanistan on 21 March.
The United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates enjoy a strong relationship, as is enshrined in the defence co-operation accord signed in 1996, which sets a wide scope for security co-operation, including in planning. I visited the UAE two weeks ago for meetings with UAE Ministers and defence chiefs. We discussed ways to further enhance our co-operation, including through equipment sales and associated industrial collaboration and technology transfer. I look forward to maintaining a productive dialogue as we take those proposals forward with the UAE over the coming months.
May I associate myself with my right hon. Friend’s tribute to the brave service personnel who lost their lives today and previously?
The UAE is a key strategic ally and has been for a very long time. Given the tensions in the region, notably with Iran, what is my right hon. Friend doing to ensure that our Eurofighters and other key arms are provided to the UAE so that it is defended properly?
As I said, I visited the UAE two weeks ago. It has indicated that it requires fighters. However, it rightly looks to set its requirements for military equipment in the context of a wider collaboration with its friends and allies. The UK is looking to put together an attractive package of industrial, technological and defence support with the UAE. We hope that the Typhoon will be part of that.
May I associate myself with the comments of the Secretary of State about the recent deaths of the three brave soldiers? They do what they do not only to keep our country safe, but to defend those who cannot defend themselves in Afghanistan.
Our relationship with the United Arab Emirates is incredibly important, as the Secretary of State said. After the importance of the Typhoon jet in Libya, will he ensure that the UAE understands that it is a superior aircraft to the Rafale, the French model? Will he do everything that he can to support the Typhoon in the fighter modernisation programme of the UAE?
I assure my hon. Friend that it is clear from the discussions that I have had in the UAE that the UAE air force chiefs are well aware of the capabilities of the Typhoon. I am sure that they are also well aware of the capabilities of the Rafale. We have had Typhoons in the UAE twice over the past few months. There will be further work with the UAE so that it can understand the capabilities of the Typhoon in detail as part of their evaluation of the options open to them.
The Secretary of State spoke for the whole House in extending condolences to the families of those who fell in the service of their country in Afghanistan. We are grateful to him.
Should we be increasing our arms sales to any part of the Arab world, when people are crying out for democracy and we are critical of arms sales to Syria? It is shaming that as Bahrainis are tortured, killed and repressed, we have resumed arms sales to that country. Should we not try exporting a bit more democracy and a bit less weaponry?
The right hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. The United Kingdom’s intention is always to get that balance right. The UAE is a strong and reliable ally and partner. It fought alongside us in Libya and is working alongside us in Afghanistan. In an increasingly fragile security situation in the Gulf, it is a significant ally of the United Kingdom. We always seek to balance the concerns that he has set out against the United Kingdom’s security concerns when making such judgments.
3. How much he plans to invest in improving the welfare of families of service personnel in the next year.
6. What recent progress he has made on the carrier programme; and if he will make a statement.
My aim is to announce a balanced budget for defence and a properly funded equipment programme for the first time in a generation, and to deal with the £38 billion black hole we inherited from our predecessors.
As part of that process, we are reviewing all programmes and I will announce the outcome of this work when it is complete, but as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said last week, we will be guided by the facts and be realistic about costs and risks. If the facts change, we will, if necessary, change our plans and not plough on regardless, as the previous Government did.
Does the Secretary of State not agree that it is essential that we continue with the carrier programme to ensure that our troops in conflict far from our shores can at least have air supremacy and to bring much-needed jobs to our shipyards around Britain, including on the Clyde, where many of my constituents work?
The hon. Gentleman will know that the strategic defence and security review committed us to a regeneration of carrier strike capability, and the building of the carriers is well advanced. I can reassure him on that front. There is no intention to revisit the decision to build the carriers. The review is about how we operate them, use them and ensure that they remain affordable into the future.
My right hon. Friend is rumoured to be considering reverting to the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the joint strike fighter. Is he aware that were he to do so, his decision would be applauded by many because it would mean not having to find £2 billion per carrier—money not readily available—and because it might mean having two carriers instead of one?
I can assure my right hon. Friend that I have spent a great deal of time looking at this project over the past few months, and I believe that I am aware of all the arguments on both sides.
The Government have just placed great emphasis on co-operation between the UK and our French NATO partners. Does the Secretary of State believe that this is helped by the reports that they are chopping and changing their plans about which aircraft will go on the new carriers?
The collaboration that we have discussed and intend to progress with the French essentially concerns carrier deployment—working together to ensure deployments that make sense and which are coherent when looked at together. It is not about interoperability of aircraft as such. We expect that whatever decision we come to, the co-operation and collaboration that we have been discussing with the French will go ahead and will be an important part of our posture in operating our carrier strike force.
On 19 December, I asked in Defence questions about the state of the carrier fleet and the aircraft to fly from it. Rather to my surprise, I got the old ministerial brush-off. If I say I have heard echoes of that so far today in the Secretary of State’s answers, perhaps I will not be criticised. It has been known for months that the F-35 programme, so far as it relates to the aircraft the United Kingdom was to procure, has been in trouble. When will the Government come to the House of Commons and make a full, clear and detailed statement about the carriers and the aircraft to fly from them? Does anyone in the Ministry of Defence now admit to regretting the fact that we disposed of the present generation of carriers and sold off the Harrier aircraft to the United States marine corps?
My right hon. and learned Friend is conflating two issues. I have already said that we are looking at the carrier programme along with the rest of the equipment programme, and as soon as I am in a position to do so, which I expect to be shortly, I will come and update the House fully. The disposal of the Harriers was a separate decision taken because of the cost pressures facing the Government and taken consciously to save the Tornado, which proved to be an invaluable aircraft in the Libya campaign. It was the right decision.
May I associate myself with the Secretary of State’s words about the tragic loss of life of two serving personnel and, obviously, Captain Rupert Bowers, last week?
In responding to the initial question, the Secretary of State referred to the Prime Minister’s words last week. I remind him that in introducing the SDSR, the Prime Minister said that the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the F-35 was an error. He has obviously seen fit to change his mind. Does the Secretary of State agree with that position, and will he confirm that the Government will deliver continuous carrier strike capability by 2020, as outlined and pledged in the SDSR?
I can only say what I have already said. We are looking at all the issues around the carrier strike programme, and I will make a statement to the House shortly. I have to say to the hon. Gentleman, however, that I will not take any lectures on the carrier programme from him. He supported a Government who delayed the programme by two years and drove £1.6 billion of costs into it, and whose management of the programme was described by the Public Accounts Committee as
“a new benchmark in poor corporate decision making.”
Can the Secretary of State confirm that if he decided to go for the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the F-35, this would enable continuous carrier strike capability to be maintained, as it could be deployed from both carriers, which is impossible to do with a single carrier?
My hon. Friend is pointing out that there are complex capability traits to be looked at in considering the question of carrier strike—the capabilities of the two aircraft, but also the availability of carriers from which they can fly. All those things are being evaluated. When we have come to a clear conclusion, we will come back to the House.
7. What steps his Department is taking to improve service accommodation; and if he will make a statement.
9. What recent assessment he has made of the security situation in the Middle East; and if he will make a statement.
Demands for greater political, social and economic participation continue in the middle east and north Africa, particularly in Syria where the situation is of grave concern. The UK remains concerned over Iran’s nuclear programme and its continued attempts to develop nuclear weapons. The UK continues to work with other countries to achieve a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. We want a negotiated solution, not a military one, but we are clear that all options should be kept on the table. We assess that the regional security situation will remain fragile.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s appraisal of the Iranian nuclear programme; no options should be left off the table. Will he ensure that the Iranians are under no illusions and state that, if necessary, the United Kingdom has the capability to act—and act decisively?
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has already made the situation abundantly clear. The UK, together with the United States, seeks a peaceful solution to the Iranian crisis, but we are very clear that a combination of engagement and continued pressure is the way to deliver that. We look forward to the resumed E3 plus 3 talks, and we are also very clear that no option should be taken off the table.
Can the Secretary of State tell us on what British forces are engaged in the Gulf region at the present time, and what the rules of engagement are for naval vessels in the strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters?
I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we have naval vessels in the Gulf. I am not able to tell him from this Dispatch Box the details of the rules of engagement, for reasons that will be obvious to him.
Given the recent deployment of some of Britain’s minesweepers to the strait of Hormuz, does the Secretary of State agree that the clearing of mines in international waterways is a necessary but passive action, which should not be seen as a hostile act by Iran or any other country?
To be clear, there has not been a recent deployment. The UK has minesweepers deployed in the Gulf—they have been there for some time, and I expect them to remain there. The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. Keeping the strait of Hormuz open is a passive action in the interests of the international community, and should not be regarded as a war-like action by anybody.
10. What recent assessment he has made of the level of morale in the armed forces.
11. What recent discussions he has had with his NATO counterparts on defence policy on Iran.
I regularly discuss a wide range of security issues with my NATO counterparts. The UK continues to work with other countries to achieve a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. We want a negotiated solution, not a military one, but we are clear that all options should be kept on the table.
I thank the Secretary of State for that answer. Most of the people I speak to on this subject are very concerned about any prospect of military action against Iran. Can the Secretary of State reassure them that everything that can be done through diplomatic means is being done, and what steps is he taking with his US counterparts to move that forward?
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that everything possible is being done. The UK has been in the forefront of the effort progressively to tighten sanctions against Iran. All the evidence suggests that they are beginning to have an impact on the Iranian economy and the Iranian regime. We are also leading supporters of the E3 plus 3 talks, and we are moderately encouraged by Iran’s commitment to resume talking next month, but, of course, the proof will be in the pudding, as we have heard all this before. We hope this is a genuine re-engagement by Iran, but, as I said earlier, we should leave all options on the table.
In the absence of the appropriate UN Security Council authorisation and the justification of self-defence, does the Secretary of State agree that any attack on Iran, whether by Israel or not, would be an act of aggression and in breach of international law?
That would depend on the circumstances. For the United Kingdom, a pre-emptive attack would certainly be regarded as illegal.
13. What recent progress his Department has made on implementation of the provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2011.
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
My departmental responsibilities are to ensure: that our country is properly defended, now and in the future, through the delivery of the military tasks for which the MOD is mandated; that our service personnel have the right equipment and training to allow them to succeed in those military tasks; and that we honour our armed forces covenant. In order to discharge those duties, I have a clear responsibility to ensure that the Department has a properly balanced budget, and a force generation strategy and defence equipment programme that are affordable and sustainable in the medium to long term.
I am sorry but the hon. Gentleman is displaying a deep misunderstanding of what has happened today. We have announced today the signing of the contract for the long period overhaul of the last of the four Vanguard-class submarines, HMS Vengeance. HMS Vigilant will sail tomorrow, having completed her refit. This will extend the life of the Vanguard-class submarines into the 2030s, which will allow the nuclear successor submarine to be introduced in the late 2020s while maintaining the UK’s continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent.
T5. Given that 30% of all Vietnam veterans suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and given the 13 to 14 year average before our veterans display PTSD symptoms, what is the Minister doing to ensure that servicemen and women receive support not just soon after their discharge, but in the decades that follow?
I wish to return to the question posed by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) about one of the most controversial decisions of the Government—the decision to sell the Harriers, leaving the UK with carriers but no aeroplanes to fly from them. I have in my hand an internal MOD document that reveals that the Government sold the Harriers for much less than they were worth—in fact for a sixth of the cost of a recent upgrade. The document shows that there is a fear about viable capability being thrown away and points out that at the point of sale the aircraft should be moved in secret to avoid media attention. May I ask the Secretary of State why, when money is so tight, the Government sold the Harriers so cheaply to the US?
I think the right hon. Gentleman perhaps spends too much time reading the Sunday newspapers. I too read an article yesterday that said we had spent £500 million refurbishing the Harriers shortly before selling them to the United States. In fact, the programme in question was instigated by the previous Government in 2002 and sustained the Harrier through to the end of its service with UK forces. Far from sneaking the Harriers to the US in secret, when the deal was signed the MOD issued a press release announcing the sale price, $180 million, which was nearly twice the figure that I was told when I arrived at the MOD had been pencilled in as the receipt. It was a success, although the right hon. Gentleman would hate to admit it.
Order. May I just remind the House that there is a lot to get through so from now on we need shorter questions and shorter answers?
T2. The recent London-Somali conference reflected the commitment of successive Governments to that region, but the communiqué spoke of co-ordinated ground action, and air strikes were also mooted. Will the Secretary of State rule out British military action in Somalia, including ground troops and air strikes?
I do not think it would be sensible for me to rule out anything in the long term, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we have no plans to deploy any troops at the moment. As he will know, the African Union provides the troops for this operation; our involvement is limited to a very small number of staff advisers, largely advising the Kenyan forces.
T7. Concerns about the provision of mental health care for veterans have been widely reported in the media. Does the Minister have any plans to implement the community veterans mental health project following the success of a pilot scheme in Wales?
T8. Does the Secretary of State agree that the tempo of our military withdrawal from Afghanistan should be dictated by real measures of military success on the ground, so that the British lives lost in Afghanistan will not have been in vain?
I agree absolutely that we must secure our legacy in Afghanistan for the sake of all those who have made the ultimate sacrifice. The tempo of our withdrawal will depend on the situation on the ground and on decisions that our allies take: we have to go in lockstep with our major allies.
T4. Will the Secretary of State update the House on the planned cuts of almost 50% to the Ministry of Defence police budget and explain further how such a massive reduction can have anything other than a detrimental impact on national security?
The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), tells me there is to be a written ministerial statement on that subject tomorrow, but let me say this to the hon. Gentleman: if he is concerned about cuts, perhaps he should be aware of a passage in a letter written by his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition to his party’s defence spokesman, in which the right hon. Gentleman says that there is no easy future for defence expenditure, and clearly a Labour Government can expect to have to make further savings after the next election. The hon. Gentleman might want to talk to the Leader of the Opposition about the matter.
Following on from that question and the Secretary of State’s reply, may I draw his attention to my Question 17 on the Order Paper and ask when the Ministry of Defence is going to come clean about the future of the Ministry of Defence police? The Labour Government cut the number of MOD police posts in my constituency from 33 to three, and now Question 17 indicates further cuts.
Have the Scottish Government recently sought any discussions with the Minister and, if so, what have they focused on?
That is a rather widely targeted question. I believe the Scottish Government have recently engaged with us on the safety of nuclear materials moving by road, but I do not recall any other engagement in the past couple of months.
I represent a constituency with a proud heritage of support for the Royal Navy. Will the Secretary of State assure my constituents that any decision on the future of the carriers will be based on considerations of long-term costs and long-term interoperability, not of short-term savings?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is our intention and it is what the previous Government signally failed to do.
Earlier, we heard about morale in the armed forces. I regret to report that, apparently, morale is low in the Royal Marines Reserve detachment in my constituency, because of uncertainty about its future. I wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence in January, raised the matter in Prime Minister’s questions in February and today I am raising it for the third month in succession. What does the future hold for the RMR detachment in Dundee?
I was with service families 10 days ago. They told me that, at the moment, what they are most worried about is redundancy. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we ought to get redundancy done as soon as possible, so that morale can improve?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right: uncertainty saps morale. That is why the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have completed the announcements of redundancies required. Because of the rebasing, the drawdown from Afghanistan and the return from Germany, it has not been possible for the Army to complete that process, but we will make announcements as soon as we can to provide as much certainty as possible.
The treatment of veterans, including those in ongoing conflicts, such as Afghanistan, is a key part of the military covenant. To that end the Westminster Government repeatedly send Ministers and Members of Parliament to understand circumstances there to inform decision-making on the treatment of veterans in medical policy and support provision. Given that veterans issues are largely devolved in Scotland, why has the MOD refused to arrange a visit to service personnel in Afghanistan for Scottish veterans affairs Minister, Keith Brown?
Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that our support to the Afghan Government will continue long after 2014 so that Afghanistan does not once again become an ungoverned space that can be exploited by terrorists?
I can reassure my hon. Friend that that is precisely our intention. At the Chicago NATO summit in May we expect to put together a package of ongoing financial support to the Afghan national security forces to allow them to take control of their own security in Afghanistan and maintain it as properly governed space.
Sixty-nine years ago tomorrow, HMS Dasher sank off the coast of North Ayrshire and 379 crewmen lost their lives. The survivors and families have been asking for access to the Ministry of Defence files to find out what happened. Will the Minister meet me, any of the seven living survivors who wish to come, and the families to discuss the matter?
In the welcome building stability overseas strategy on conflict prevention, is the MOD contributing anything to seek to bring down the pressure in the middle east, and in Syria in particular?
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsI wish to inform the House that the Ministry of Defence has signed a contract valued at £350 million with Babcock Marine Ltd for the long overhaul period (Refuelling) (LOP(R)) for HMS Vengeance, to take place at Devonport dockyard, Plymouth. HMS Vengeance is one of the four Vanguard class submarines carrying Trident missiles which provide the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent.
The LOP(R) is essential to enable HMS Vengeance to remain operational. The Work programme, which is scheduled to last approximately three and a half years, will involve the installation of a new reactor core, the energy source that powers the 15,000 tonne vessel. The new core will provide the submarine with sufficient fuel for the remainder of her planned service life. The LOP(R) will also include the installation of improved strategic weapons system equipment and the integration of a tactical weapons submarine command system. The LOP(R) will also enable Vengeance to achieve safety re-certification.
The awarding of the £350 million contract will secure around 1,300 jobs in Devonport dockyard, with a further 700 in the supply chain. It will ensure that Devonport remains a centre of engineering excellence, preserving the UK’s sovereign capability and many highly skilled jobs for years to come. The contract has been awarded using an improved performance-based contracting strategy agreed as part of the Babcock marine terms of business agreement, which aims to return significant savings of several hundred million pounds to the MOD over the 15-year duration of the agreement.
This is the last time the Royal Navy’s submarines will require refuelling, as newer classes of submarines are designed with sufficient fuel for their entire service life. Extended maintenance periods, however, will still be required to ensure safe and effective operation of submarines, so the unique capability at Devonport to carry out deep maintenance will remain vital in the future.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement about the attempted rescue of Chris McManus and his colleague, the Italian national Franco Lamolinara, who were, very sadly, killed by their kidnappers during the operation on Thursday 8 March. I will give the House as much information as I can on the background, the events leading up to the rescue attempt and the operation itself. However, the House will understand that I will not be able to say anything that might compromise intelligence sources or jeopardise future operations. I should also inform the House that there will be a coroner’s inquest into the cause of death of Christopher McManus, and my statement today must not in any way prejudice the course of the coroner’s inquiries.
But first, Mr Speaker, I am sure the whole House would wish to join me in expressing utter condemnation of the murder of these two innocent people, and in offering my heartfelt condolences to the families of both Christopher McManus and Franco Lamolinara.
Chris McManus and his colleague were kidnapped by armed men from Birnin Kebbi, in north-west Nigeria, on the night of 12 May 2011. In the early days of the kidnap, it was not clear who had taken them or what their motives were, but as the days passed and no demands were received, and as the tempo of terrorist activity in Nigeria increased, we concluded that, unlike other kidnap cases in Nigeria, this was not a straightforward criminal kidnap, and that Chris and Franco had most probably been abducted by terrorist extremists linked to Boko Haram and calling themselves AQ in Nigeria.
Boko Haram was founded in the early 2000s. From 2010, the group launched an increasingly aggressive campaign of violent attacks. The House will be aware of the appalling toll that the group has inflicted on Nigeria over the past year or so—through attacks against churches on Christmas day 2010, with over 30 deaths, to the co-ordinated attacks in Kano on 20 January 2011 that resulted in nearly 200 deaths. Boko Haram has murdered hundreds of Nigerians over the past two years. Attacks have also been launched against international targets. In an attack on the UN building in Abuja on 26 August 2010, 23 people were killed. Sadly, the violence continues. Attacks against a church in Jos and police stations in Kano and Maiduguri over the weekend have added to the terrible toll.
Following the kidnap, cross-Government crisis management teams were established in our high commission in Abuja and in London. They began work to identify who had taken Chris and Franco, and to locate them. The Nigerian Government have supported our efforts throughout and worked closely with us. We also worked closely with the Italian Government throughout the period through intelligence and diplomatic channels in order to keep them abreast of developments and informed of our efforts.
From the outset of the effort to find Chris and Franco, our objectives were clear and focused: to secure their safe release while continuing the long-standing policy of successive British Governments not to make concessions to hostage takers or to pay ransoms to terrorists. To do otherwise would serve only to increase the threat to UK nationals. Where terrorists are involved in kidnapping, payment of ransoms is illegal under UK law.
During Chris and Franco’s captivity the Government’s emergency committee, Cobra, met regularly to review progress and discuss steps to secure their safe release. During their captivity the kidnappers made threats, through a video and by direct contact with Chris’s family, that they intended to kill Chris and Franco, but at no time during their captivity did the kidnappers make any coherent demands.
Throughout the 10 months of Chris and Franco’s captivity, we worked very closely with the Nigerian Government to track down their kidnappers and identify the location where they were being held. The close working over that period included preparation for the possibility of a hostage rescue. The Prime Minister discussed the case with President Jonathan during his visit to Nigeria in July 2011, and as a result agreed a package of UK support for Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts. As part of that package, a sustained operation was conducted to identify members of the group responsible for the kidnapping. Earlier last week a number of them were apprehended, and during debriefing late on 7 March, credible intelligence was obtained identifying the probable location of the hostages at a house or compound in Sokoto, northern Nigeria.
The Foreign Secretary briefed the Prime Minister that evening, and at his request chaired a meeting of Cobra at 8.15 on the morning of 8 March to assess the situation. Following that meeting, the Prime Minister received a full briefing. In the hour or so that followed, the location was confirmed, although we still did not know if the kidnappers and their victims were inside. On the ground, the Nigerian army had secured a cordon some distance around the property and an assault group, including UK support, was in place.
The assessment on the ground was that there was a significant possibility that the kidnappers, if present, were already aware that their security had been compromised, and if not, that the level of military activity in the town meant that there was a real risk of them developing that awareness. The military judgment was that the hostages were facing an imminent and escalating threat and that, although an immediate rescue attempt would inevitably involve risk, it represented the best chance of securing the release of Chris and Franco alive. The Prime Minister was briefed by military and national security advisers, and gave his authorisation for an operation to release the hostages to go ahead with UK support. As soon as possible afterwards, our ambassador in Rome informed the Italian authorities that an operation was getting under way.
The Nigerian security forces, with UK support, launched the assault on the compound last Thursday at 10.58 am London time. UK personnel encountered and killed one armed kidnapper almost immediately on entering the compound. As the assault teams moved into the compound, UK personnel found the bodies of Chris and Franco, already dead, in a room at the rear of the compound. Early indications are clear that both men were murdered by their captors with automatic gunfire before they could be rescued. Three further guards of the hostages were killed by Nigerian forces during an operation that lasted approximately an hour and a half in total. None were taken alive.
Following the operation the Prime Minister called the McManus family to tell them how sorry he was that we had not been able to bring Chris home safely. He also spoke to Prime Minister Monti to pass on his condolences, and to President Jonathan to express his thanks for Nigerian support. This was a difficult operation that it was judged had to be carried out at speed, in view of the risk to the lives of Chris and Franco. One Nigerian soldier was wounded in the rescue attempt. I wish him a speedy recovery from his injuries, and I want to express our gratitude again to the members of the Nigerian forces, along with our UK personnel, who risked their lives in the attempt to rescue Chris and Franco.
The deaths of Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara were a terrible tragedy. But let us be clear that the responsibility for their deaths lies squarely with the people who kidnapped them, held them, threatened them and then murdered them in cold blood. Terrorism and kidnapping can never be justified. Many of the group responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Chris and Franco, including its senior leaders, are either dead or have been detained—an important achievement in reducing the threat of future kidnapping. However, violent extremist Islamist groups remain active in Nigeria, and so long as they do, we will work with the Nigerians and other allies to fight the scourge of terrorism wherever it manifests itself.
First, may I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman for what turned out to be the non-delivery of my statement prior to my standing up to deliver it? I knew that he was going to get it late, but I did not know that it was not going to arrive at all. I apologise to him for that. I am also extremely grateful to him for his support. He and most of his colleagues on the Front Bench have been in government, and they understand the difficulty involved in making these fine judgments and decisions, often under extreme time pressure constraints.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the information that had been given to the Italians, and about the nature of the contact with them. He will understand that the contact was not conducted by me; it was conducted through the Foreign Office. Throughout the process, a regular dialogue was maintained between the security services and their Italian counterparts, on a day-to-day, business-as-usual basis. Last Thursday morning, Her Majesty’s ambassador in Rome visited the Italian authorities as soon as he was able to do so after the completion of the Cobra meeting to pass to the Italians the information about the operation that was getting under way.
The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we had agreed that the Italians would essentially have a power of veto over such an operation. I find that question slightly strange, in view of his earlier remarks about the importance of retaining the sovereign capability of our forces. I have to tell him that we did not agree that the Italians would have any power of veto over a rescue operation involving a British citizen, but of course we consulted them throughout the 10-month period. They were well aware of the direction in which the operation was moving.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the rules of engagement. Of course this was a Nigerian-led operation on Nigerian soil; the area was secured by Nigerian forces, and was under the overall command of a Nigerian commander. Appropriate arrangements had been agreed with the Nigerian authorities to ensure that any UK personnel involved in lethal activity would be protected from any redress under Nigerian law. I am happy to be able to reassure the right hon. Gentleman on that front.
I, too, have read the reports of ransom payments, to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. The UK’s policy is clear: we do not pay ransoms to terrorists; no UK officials or Ministers were involved in any discussions about the payment of ransoms to terrorists; and we are not aware of any ransom having been paid or indeed any ransom having been demanded.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the importance of Nigeria as a country. When the defence engagement strategy is published—it will not be too far in the future —he will see that Nigeria plays a very prominent part in that document and in the agenda going forward. We have a strong relationship with Nigeria—a strong military to military relationship—and we provide ongoing counter-terrorism support to the Nigerians; and we have one of the largest bilateral aid programmes with Nigeria, precisely to address the underlying causes of discontent in the poverty to which the right hon. Gentleman referred.
The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, right to be concerned about Boko Haram and its links to al-Qaeda. Our understanding is that it is not directly linked to AQ in the Islamic Maghreb, but that factions of Boko Haram have started to refer to themselves as AQ in Nigeria. The linkages between the organisations are somewhat tenuous and not well understood by us, but it is absolutely clear that we should be concerned about this development.
To answer the right hon. Gentleman’s other questions, Cobra—not the National Security Council—met 33 times during the period of captivity to discuss this particular kidnapping. As for the threat to UK nationals, of course there is a threat to them and others from the ongoing extremist terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. I would say this to the right hon. Gentleman, however. While the action taken last Thursday did not, sadly, have the outcome we all hoped for in the safe return of Chris and Franco, it has undoubtedly reduced the threat to UK nationals by demonstrating to would-be kidnappers that the UK is willing and able to react robustly when our nationals are put at risk.
It is the case, is it not, that the difference between success and failure in these operations is often a very narrow one? While it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that those who may be asked to carry out such operations are properly trained and equipped, it is necessarily the case that when Government authority is sought for these operations, the Government have to rely on the advice, judgment and experience of those on the ground.
My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. Throughout the critical period last week, we were being advised by UK personnel on the ground and UK senior military personnel here in London. The Prime Minister quite rightly challenged and questioned the advice he was given, but was of course strongly guided by the professional judgments.
Having, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), had to make similar difficult and urgent decisions in such dire circumstances—sometimes with equally unhappy consequences—may I fully endorse the decisions that the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister had to make in this situation? May I just press the right hon. Gentleman a little more on the position of President Giorgio Napolitano? I happen to know him, and have done since he was the Interior Minister when I was Home Secretary 15 years ago. He is extraordinarily cautious and measured in his language. It is plain that he felt blind-sided. Will the Foreign Secretary say what high-level efforts are being made to assuage his concerns at this stage?
I am sure that the Foreign Secretary could, but as he is not here, I will have a go instead. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that there have been extensive contacts with the Italian Government and authorities since the expressions of unhappiness that we heard on Thursday and Friday, and I think it fair to say that the situation has been clarified to the satisfaction of all parties.
In these very difficult operations, surprise is vital. I have not yet seen the statement because it has not been distributed, but I believe that the operation began at 10.58 am, and that the area was secured by the Nigerian army. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend is allowed to answer this question, but was the timing of the operation precipitated by the fact that security had been breached and we were forced to go in? Will he confirm that the timing was not of our choice?
My hon. Friend is right. The judgment was that, first because of the apprehension of members of the group earlier in the week and secondly because of the presence of significant numbers of Nigerian troops not very far from the compound in question, it would be taking too great a risk to defer the operation. The military judgment was that despite the risks involved, there was a greater chance of rescuing the hostages alive by acting immediately.
These are always the most difficult decisions to take. Our condolences must go to the families of the two men, and our profound thanks must go to our special forces, who acquire and are then prepared to use skill and bravery to carry out operations of this kind. We must be enormously grateful to them for doing so.
May I return to the issue of the unfortunate discord between us and the Italian Government? Is the Secretary of State able or prepared to say anything that would explain some of the complexities that would arise from a nation’s attempts to embed another in the kind of decisions that would be necessary to keep them completely and absolutely as one in such circumstances?
I think it fair to say that throughout the long months of captivity there were very good and full discussions and exchanges of views with the Italians, and that they understood very clearly our direction of travel and the way in which we sought to advance our understanding of the situation and then bring it to a close. The circumstances that arose on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning represented an accelerated closing of a time window which simply made it impossible to consult as fully as one might ideally have liked. I am assured that information was continually being transmitted between intelligence agencies, as is the norm between allied agencies, but that there was not enough time for the discussions at Government-to-Government level that we might have had if a further day, or even 12 hours, had been available to us.
As my right hon. Friend and others have said, this was an extremely difficult operation, and one in which the odds were increasingly stacked against us. Does my right hon. Friend agree that while we commend the courage and professionalism of our special forces, it is extremely important that any examination of the details of what took place does not in any way compromise the necessary secrecy of the methods that they employ?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The operational security of our special forces remains paramount at all times, which is why we never comment on their operations and, indeed, never confirm or deny their involvement in any particular operation.
Christopher McManus was one of my constituents. I have been in touch with his family regularly both before and after his untimely death, and I want to pay a very real tribute to their unceasing efforts to secure his release—in conjunction with the Foreign Office, which was extremely helpful—not just in the most recent period, but throughout nine or 10 nerve-racking months.
I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, but may I ask him to say a little more about the exact nature of the intelligence that was collected in the raid on Boko Haram in Kaduna, which indicated that precipitate action was necessary to save the hostages’ lives? May I also ask why such expressly urgent action was needed that the Italian Government could not be consulted before a final decision was made, because the life of one of their citizens, as well as of Chris McManus, was at risk?
First, may I join the right hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the McManus family? I attended a significant number of the Cobra meetings that have been held on this subject since October last year, and whenever there were reported contacts with the family, comment was made on how engaged they had been with the process and how focused they were on getting the result we all wanted. They were under tremendous pressure, but they conducted themselves with remarkable dignity and co-operated very well with the authorities throughout the process.
The right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot go into the details of the intelligence that was available, but what he has to understand is that there was a fast-evolving situation. On Tuesday evening, some people were arrested. During the course of their debriefing on Wednesday, several of them provided information that gave us a credible fix on where the hostages might be being held. Later, additional intelligence was available to corroborate that. So the level of knowledge and understanding was ratcheting up, and at the same time the deployment of Nigerian forces into the area in question raised a significant risk that the hostage-takers would become aware that the operation was under way.
As chair of the British-Italian parliamentary group, I have been closely following reports in the Italian press. Saturday’s La Stampa stated that the Italian secret services had been informed in the morning, and Saturday’s Corriere della Sera reported that the two countries’ secret services spoke to each other at 10.15 am on Thursday, when the operation was imminent. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we, and all our counterparts and friends in the Italian Parliament, should stand in solidarity in facing threats from terrorism, hostage taking and piracy, and that rather than allowing critics to divide us, we should continue to work together against terrorism and hostage taking?
I very much agree with my hon. Friend’s sentiment, and I can assure him that that has been the nature of the relationship between the UK authorities and the Italians throughout this process. We have worked closely together and it has been a relationship of close collaboration and close understanding. On the question of communication, I can only repeat what I have already said: my understanding is that there was regular, day-to-day communication between the intelligence agencies, including on the morning of last Thursday.
Mario Monti and his Government are doing a tremendous and very difficult job in repairing the damage done by the Berlusconi regime, and they are our natural allies on many issues, not least in the European Union, so can the Secretary of State assure the House that he, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister will make every effort to address the apparent grievance felt at the highest level in the Italian Government about some elements of the way in which this operation was handled?
I echo the right hon. Gentleman’s sentiments. We have extremely good relationships with the Italians, including on military and defence matters. I repeat what I said earlier: I believe that the conversations that have taken place over the weekend have very substantially defused the situation. On Thursday, there will be an operational visit to brief the Italians on military and intel channels, and I am told that the Foreign Secretary intends to visit Italy later in March.
For the reasons outlined by the Secretary of State, there can be no doubt in my mind that the Prime Minister took the right decision—the only question is whether that decision was communicated quickly enough to the Italians. According to what my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Tony Baldry) cited from the Italian press, it would appear that the decision was communicated quickly but that it perhaps did not then reach up into the Government in Italy as quickly as it should have done. Will the Secretary of State confirm that we did convey the information about the decision as quickly as we could, and that there was no question of our deciding not to do that because of doubts about the information leaking, the Italians wanting to pay ransoms or anything of that sort?
I can absolutely assure my hon. Friend that there was no question of information being withheld. There were two clear, separate channels of information. The intelligence agencies were communicating on a regular basis, and the British ambassador in Rome went as soon as he practically could to deliver the information to the Italian Government, once the operation had got under way.
As the Secretary of State will know, a number of foreign nationals are still being held as kidnap victims in Nigeria and many British citizens work in Nigeria. I hope that this is not seen as the end of support for the Nigerian Government. Will he confirm that if President Jonathan asks for more support to help with counter-terrorism, it will be forthcoming from us?
I thought that I had already said that the package of counter-terrorism support that we put in place after the Prime Minister’s visit this year will continue. So long as the Nigerians are facing a threat from extremist Islamist terrorists, we will support them, as we support other allies in the fight against terrorists.
Members of this House who serve on the all-party group on global education for all spent half-term week in Nigeria, and the spectre of the burnt-out United Nations building in Abuja will stay in our minds for a long time. The question raised by the Chair of the Select Committee on Home Affairs is crucial, not least because we have so many excellent Department for International Development officials and people from the voluntary sector working in the sensitive area of education, particularly in the volatile northern states. What hope can the Secretary of State give those officials that sufficiently robust security arrangements are in place for those important workers?
The Under-Secretary of State for International Development, my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Mr O'Brien) tells me that we have taken all necessary steps to protect UK personnel in Nigeria who are working on aid programmes, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) tells me that we have taken the appropriate steps to protect Foreign Office personnel, too.
The right hon. Gentleman has talked about the security support being provided to President Jonathan and the Government of Nigeria. Does he or the Foreign Secretary have any plans to visit Nigeria to cement that relationship further and offer any further support that the Nigerian Government may require?
The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk has just informed me that he will be in Nigeria next week. I am not aware of the Foreign Secretary’s forward travel plans, but, as I said to the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr Murphy) a few moments ago, when we publish our defence engagement strategy shortly, Members will see that we are placing very great importance on the defence relationship with Nigeria. Defence Ministers will be responding to that document by pursuing the deepening and strengthening of those relationships.
I join colleagues in paying tribute to not only our special forces, but our intelligence services, for their professionalism and dedication, and for the unique global security reach they give our country. In particular, I welcome the message that this operation sends—tragic though the final outcome was—which is that in such a situation, the UK leaves no one behind and leaves no stone unturned in looking after the interests of our citizens abroad.
I welcome my hon. Friend’s comments. That is absolutely our position: when a UK citizen is deprived of their liberty, wherever in the world, we will deploy all the resources available to us to seek their safe return.
I worked as an engineer in Nigeria for several years, and I can only pay tribute to the courage of Mr McManus and his colleague in facing captivity for so long. I welcome the assurances about working with Nigeria to address the challenge of terrorism, but many British engineers do go abroad to work, partly because of a lack of opportunities in this country, so will the Secretary of State work with his colleagues across government to ensure that these people are well informed about the threats they may face, and that we are well informed of the numbers working abroad and the work they do? We must properly value their contribution.
The Foreign Office maintains travel advice to UK travellers in respect of all countries and will, of course, update it, but I take on board the hon. Lady’s comments about engineers and people working in similar professions, who of course play a very important ambassadorial role for the UK as they go about their daily business. We seek to understand where people are although, of course, we do not have formal registration requirements in any sense.
My right hon. Friend suggested that the heightened level of military activity in Sokoto might have alerted the kidnappers that their security had been compromised. Was there any way in which that military activity could have been reduced or was it absolutely essential to the conduct of the operation?
The control of the wider area was under the command of the Nigerian military authorities and the approach that they determined was appropriate—they, after all, are in the best position to judge—was that a cordon at some distance needed to be placed around the area. Our concern was that a number of events, starting with the arrest of members of the group on Tuesday evening through to the movements of Nigerian military into the area overnight on Wednesday, could have given the kidnappers an increasing awareness of what was going on and therefore put at increasing risk the lives of the hostages.
May I associate myself with what the Defence Secretary and the shadow Defence Secretary said about the operation itself? The Secretary of State gave us some detail about the timeline of events, but he did not give us the exact time at which our ambassador in Rome informed the Italian authorities that an operation was getting under way. What was that time?
I cannot tell the hon. Gentleman the exact time, but the Cobra meeting broke up just before 9 am and the responsible officials undertook to go away and contact the British ambassador in Rome immediately and to ask him to go as soon as was practicable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome to provide the information to them.
Having established the absence of a power of veto in this case, what could Mr Monti possibly have said had he been consulted in advance, as apparently he wished to have been, that would materially have impacted on the decision matrix and, ultimately, the course of events?
I do not think that the course of events would have been changed in any way. In fairness, if the boot was on the other foot, UK Ministers would undoubtedly feel the need to know what was going on with an operation that would impact on the life of a UK citizen. I do not think that the Italians’ concern is in any way unreasonable, I just think they need to understand—I believe that they do, now—that, as regards the pace at which the operation developed, they were informed as expeditiously as possible. As I have said many times already this afternoon, the lines of communication between the intelligence agencies were pretty much continuously open.
The House will recall the tragic cases of Kenneth Bigley and Margaret Hassan, who were killed by their captors in Iraq some years ago, as well as the steps taken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) to ensure that the families received adequate ongoing support. May I press the Secretary of State to say what ongoing support will be given to the family of Mr McManus?
The Foreign Office has a well-established way of dealing with those issues after such an event. I know that Foreign Office officials have been in continuous contact with the family and will continue to provide support to them.
Last year, the Economic Community of West African States warned the international community about the amount of former Libyan weaponry that was crossing the border straight into the hands of Boko Haram, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. Given our financial interests in the area, what pressure are the Government putting on the international community to address that in order to prevent further UK kidnappings?
I am not sure that I see a direct link. There are two separate issues here. First, there is the lawlessness in Nigeria and the threat it represents in terms of the kidnapping of UK citizens, and I have outlined the support we are giving to the Nigerians to maintain their counter-terrorism effort. Secondly, there is a real and serious concern about unaccounted-for weapons, which tend to be heavier weapons such as shoulder-launched ground-to-air missiles. The UK has been involved with the US in a major operation in Libya since the end of the conflict there to try to identify, track down and secure weapons that have become unaccounted for.
I want to associate myself with hon. Members’ comments sending sympathies to the families of Christopher McManus and Franco Lamolinara. I also thank our British forces for their sterling efforts out on the field. Boko Haram is a ruthless, murderous terrorist organisation that kills at will—some 200 people have been killed, 400 churches have been burned down and thousands have been displaced. It is trying to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. What military and financial assistance does the Minister feel that the British Government and their allies could give to Nigerian authorities to rid Nigeria of Boko Haram once and for all and to enable Nigeria to be a stable influence in Africa?
As I have said, DFID is providing one of our largest packages of bilateral aid to the Nigerian Government. Following the Prime Minister’s visit last year, we are providing a counter-terrorism support package and will continue to provide that support to the Government of Nigeria in their struggle against Islamist extremism in northern Nigeria.
(12 years, 5 months ago)
Written StatementsThe 2012 report of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body (AFPRB) has now been published. I wish to express my thanks to the chairman and members of the review body for their report. I am pleased to confirm that the AFPRB’s recommendations are to be accepted in full.
In line with the Government’s 2010 emergency Budget, which announced a two-year pay freeze for all public sector employees, the AFPRB basic military salary recommendations are only for those personnel earning £21,000 or less where the recommendation is for an increase of £250. The AFPRB also recommended a reduction in the qualifying interval between levels of longer separation allowance. There is also an increase to food and accommodation charges. These recommendations will be effective from 1 April 2012. The Government have also accepted the AFPRB recommendation to harmonise the pay for graduate and non-graduate officers and this will be effective from
Copies of the Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body report are available in the Vote Office.