Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)

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I want to make three brief points. First, I have completely changed by mind on this subject since I entered the House during the last century, because I have sat in my advice surgery with tears pouring down my face listening to constituents who have set out so clearly, speaking with such emotion, about how their mother, brother, father or child had died in great pain and great indignity.

I strongly support the Bill, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) on the excellent way in which she has presented it. I believe that we should give our constituents—our fellow citizens—this choice. I want this choice for my constituents; I want it for those whom I love; and I want it, perhaps one day, for myself.

Mr Mitchell

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I will not, I am afraid. The current law forces people to plan their deaths in secret. Their bodies are found by their loved ones. Often, they die in the most horrific circumstances. They have no chance to say goodbye to their loved ones. It is devastating for their families. The former Health Secretary commissioned the Office for National Statistics to try to find out how many people who committed suicide every year were dying people. The figure was between 300 and 650.

Secondly, in our democracy, the Commons must make this decision. Only we, elected by our constituents, have the legitimacy to do this. It is not the DPP, the Crown Prosecution Service, the police, doctors or even unelected Members of the House of Lords—this House of Commons must make this decision. Let us be clear that all of us on both sides of the debate strongly support an increase in the quality and extent of palliative care. For me, the debate is about extending choice, in very narrow and heavily regulated circumstances under the Bill, as the hon. Lady so clearly set out—the choice not to be forced to end your life in pain and indignity. No element in the Bill talks about intolerable suffering. Many believe that the Bill is too narrowly drawn. I stand by the hon. Lady’s drafting. We should remember that in Oregon there has been no serious attempt to change or amend the law.

I had the privilege of speaking to an NHS consultant last year, the day before she headed to Dignitas. She said, “I love my country, but I object very strongly to my country forcing me to make this choice, and to having to travel unaccompanied to a foreign country to die.” The status quo is cruel and dangerous. People caught up in these circumstances have no transparency; there is no regulation, safeguards or oversight. The Bill contains a whole series of safeguards that are not present at the moment.

Thirdly, we are deciding today on a principle. If the Bill is voted down on Second Reading, that will be the end of the matter for many years, and we will do that in the knowledge that Scotland, the Isle of Man, Jersey and many other countries are likely to bring in legislation like this. There are 300 million people in 30 jurisdictions who have secured this ability to choose. There will be numerous safeguards. There will not be a slippery slope unless this Parliament agrees to there being one. If we agree to a Second Reading today it is, in my judgment, inconceivable that the Government Front Bench will not ensure we have the proper time to scrutinise the Bill.

This Bill goes with the grain of our constituents’ views—about 75%, according to the most recent polling. There is an opportunity and a chance, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley has set out, to consider in detail these matters ahead of Third Reading. As drafted, the Bill seems to me a very modest and controlled proposal. Let us not forget this: Oregon shows us that fewer people take these steps once they know they have this choice as a back-up.

I end with something I have never forgotten. Some years ago, I was listening in a debate to a young man who had recently lost his father. He had visited his father and seen him in great pain and indignity. He had seen him three days before he died. In the end his father put a bag over his head and used his dressing-gown cord to hang himself. That young man said to all of us: “If you are ever in this position, let’s hope that God will help you, because they certainly won’t.” Today, this House has the opportunity to ensure that they will.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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When I was a child, my parents shielded me from death. Centuries of art, literature and religion taught me that death was something noble or even slightly romantic. When I became an adult, I learnt pretty quickly that that was not the case. For far too many, it is anything but and certainly not noble. The deathbed for far too many is a place of misery, torture and degradation, a reign of blood and vomit and tears. I see no compassion and beauty in that, only profound human suffering. In 10 years of campaigning on this issue, I have spent many, many hours with dying and bereaved people, which has, time and again, reinforced my view.

I am a co-sponsor of the Bill and I am the co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group for choice at the end of life. I could give a speech to promote the Bill, but my hon. Friend—and I do call her a friend—the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) has done that remarkably well. In my speech I want to address some of the common issues that have been raised, and that will no doubt be raised during the debate, with which I struggle.

First, we will no doubt hear an awful lot about the overseas experience. I am married to a Canadian, and I can tell the House that they love their children just as much as we do. The idea that the Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Spanish and Austrians care little for their relatives, or indeed for the wider society in which they live, is frankly offensive. We should not pretend that somehow we are special or different. They have thought as profoundly on these issues as we have over the past 10 years. We can learn from them, and design a system for our own sensibilities and culture, as they have done. They all have different laws on abortion, some of which we would not pass in this House, but that does not mean we should not have abortion laws here. We are a 1,000-year-old democracy, and we should be able to design legislation that deals with this issue for ourselves.

The second issue that has been raised with which I have struggled regards the impact on the NHS and on judges. People are already dying; they are already in the national health service and entitled to care. Even if we think there will be an impact, are people seriously telling me that my death, my agony, is too much for the NHS to have time for, or too much hassle? It is even claimed that such matters would overload the judges—that I should drown in my own faecal vomit because it is too much hassle for the judges to deal with. We send things from this House to the NHS and to judges all the time. Is anyone suggesting that we should not create the new offence of spiking, which has come through this week, because judges are overworked? Of course not. They will cope as they have done with all sorts of things that we have sent from this House over the years, and we should not countenance the idea that some logistical problem will get in the way of our giving a good death to our fellow citizens.

I also want to address directly those Members who are considering voting against the Bill, to ensure that they are clear in their minds that a vote against the Bill is not a passive act. There are two states of being on offer today. I have to break some news to Members: whatever happens to the Bill today, people with a terminal illness will still take their lives. If the Bill falls today, we will be consigning those people to taking their lives in brutal, violent ways, as they are at the moment, and will see increasing numbers of our fellow citizens making the trip to Switzerland if they can afford it. We know that between 600 and 700 people a year are killing themselves in violent ways—shooting themselves, throwing themselves in front of trains, taking overdoses in lonely, horrible circumstances. As I said, many are going to Switzerland, but more than that are lying in hospital—I guarantee that there will be somebody over the river in St Thomas’ hospital now who is refusing treatment and starving themselves to death because they cannot face what is in front of them.

Kit Malthouse

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I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and what a surprise it is that the conversation about palliative care has started. We were not having that conversation before this Bill came forward. The evidence from the Health and Care Committee, published only in February this year, shows that palliative care and assisted dying go hand in hand.

Kit Malthouse

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I will not give way.

Improvements also go hand in hand; medics from across the world told us that the two things are complementary. In Australia I discussed this issue with a palliative care doctor who was against the introduction of assisted dying when they were contemplating it. She now finds it an invaluable tool, and she embraces it as something that her patients want and need. My concern is that if the Bill is turned down, as it was in 2015, the conversation about palliative care will wither, as it has done for the past 10 years.

I want to share a story that has particularly affected me. Mark Crampton was a former police chief inspector who was suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. His COPD became too much for him, so he informed his family that he was going to take his own life. He took his oxygen tank and mask and late one night went out and sat on a railway embankment. He wanted a death that was instant and quick, and that he could rely on. He waited until 2 in the morning—heartbreakingly, he had worked out when the last train was going, so he would minimise disruption to the public—and then took his life in lonely circumstances in the middle of the night. By not passing the Bill, we would deny to Mark supervision, conversation, access to doctors, periods of reflection, advice. Even if he had been through all that and decided it was still too much, the Bill would give him a much better end than he actually achieved. Members should be clear, as I say, that whatever happens to the Bill, terminal people will still take their lives.

I have to say to the hon. Member for Brent West (Barry Gardiner), who says that hundreds of people dying in agony every year is a price worth paying for the good of society, that I find that an appalling prospect. A society that looks away from these people —like those in the Public Gallery who are living in terrible fear of what will face them, or who have watched their families die in fear—and says that that is okay for the good of the whole is a terrible, terrible prospect. We have a duty to assist them, as other countries around the world have done, and to find a way to make them comfortable in the end.

Kit Malthouse

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I will not.

Finally, I want to talk briefly about rights. We hear a lot about rights in this debate—quite rightly. We hear about the rights and fears of the disabled community, who are specifically excluded from the Bill; we hear a lot about the rights and fears of the elderly, who are also specifically excluded from the Bill; we are even hearing about the rights of doctors, who are allowed to conscientiously object to participating in this process, if they wish. When are we going to have the conversation about the rights of the dying? Where do we put them in the ranking of rights, as they face their end? When do we grant them the autonomy and choice for which so many of them have campaigned over the years? Surely, as they come towards the end of their life, their rights have to be at the forefront of our mind. The last, best gift we can give them is control over the disease that is destroying them.

If we do not pass the Bill today, we are cornering all those people; we are trapping them, with the law, in their disease, and consigning them to an end of torture and degradation that they do not wish to go through. As I said before, we are a 1,000-year old democracy. It is not beyond us to design legislation that will give those people what they want, while protecting those whom we feel need to be protected. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), I want this choice for my constituents, but profoundly I want it for myself and for the people in the Public Gallery who have worked so hard over the past decade to get us to change our minds.

I ask Members please to be clear that whatever happens today, terminal people will still take their own lives—all we are deciding today is how.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)

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This Second Reading debate on the Bill sponsored by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) provides the House and the country with an opportunity to discuss this complex and sensitive issue. I make it clear that I stand at the Dispatch Box today not as the MP for Pontypridd representing the views of my constituents, although I thank each and every one of them who took the time to contact me with their considered opinions. I stand here today as the Government Minister responsible for the criminal law on this issue in England and Wales, contained in the Suicide Act 1961.

As the Government remain neutral on this topic of conscience, and out of respect for my ministerial colleagues who are not able to outline their views in today’s debate, I will not be sharing my personal opinions on this matter. I will, however, be taking part in the vote. With all that in mind, I will keep my response brief and not take any interventions. The Government are of the view that any change to the law in this area is an issue of conscience for individual parliamentarians. It is rightly, in our view, a matter for Parliament rather than the Government to decide. Accordingly, the Government Benches will have a free vote should the views of the House be tested today.

If the will of Parliament is that the law in this area should change, the Government will of course respect their duty to the statute book and ensure that any Bill is effective and its provisions can be enforced. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for bringing this important national conversation to the fore and for conducting her campaign with respect and integrity. I pay tribute to the campaigners on both sides of the debate, including Dame Esther Rantzen, Liz Carr, Nathaniel Dye and Baroness Grey-Thompson. They have all used their voices to advocate for what they believe and have contributed significantly to the important national conversation around death.

Regardless of views, the one thing we have in common is that we will all experience death at some point. Death is a topic that we do not tend to talk about very much, but these discussions have undoubtedly enabled families up and down the country to talk openly about their wishes and how they feel about their own death. That powerful honesty is a tribute to how Members of this House and campaigners have conducted themselves throughout, and I thank them for informing today’s debate.

Kit Malthouse

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claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).

Question agreed to.

Question put accordingly, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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But we will be coming back to public—

Kit Malthouse

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I was going to make exactly the same point. I think my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has fundamentally misunderstood what is happening. He referred to there being a discussion through the usual channels. What the hon. Member for Spen Valley has proposed is that we have that discussion now—she said informally—because we have not had the chance to do so before, and that we then return. Then my hon. Friend is free to say whatever he likes about whatever witnesses and table his own amendments as he wishes. There is no intention to conceal anything. If I might be so bold, I think he has misunderstood the process.

Kit Malthouse

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I rise to speak to amendment (b) and to the other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bradford West. As we discussed in private, I am concerned that the promoter of the Bill, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, has been through an extensive period of trying to collate everybody’s recommendations for the Bill and reach a list that is both manageable within the timeframe and a compromise for all of us on what we would like to see.

The odd adjustment here and there is fine, but we ought to bear in mind that in any one session we need to have sufficient time for people to speak. We have to be careful not to double up because we may or may not think that a particular witness might propose a view with which we are sympathetic, when we already have people who are covering the same subject. On amendment (b), for example, all psychiatrists are regulated by the General Medical Council, as I am sure the hon. Member for Bradford West knows, so effectively the royal college is a doubling up of expertise, which is not necessarily in the interests of time. Similarly, in amendment (c), the hon. Lady is proposing a physician from Canada—

Kit Malthouse

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I will just finish, if I may. Our Bill is built on a very different legal framework from Canada’s. Drawing legislative parallels between the two seems like a cul-de-sac, not least because, as the hon. Lady will know, the legal framework in Canada is dictated by the charter of rights and freedoms, effectively a constitution, which has been used there to widen the scope of the law. Canada started from a very different place as well, so I am not totally convinced.

What the hon. Member for Spen Valley has tried to do with the list is to find overseas territories that are analogous to our own and have adopted a model similar to ours. We are therefore trying to learn lessons from the process of debate and legislative procedure that they went through—either to learn from them or to learn from their mistakes. For example, knocking out the Member of Parliament from Australia would be a mistake, not least because Australia has been through a number of iterations with its law. Most of Australia has a bar on doctor initiation of the conversation. The medical profession think that that is a big negative in Australia, as I understand it, so I would like to understand why, politically and in legislation, it was felt that that was needed or helpful, and why it was imposed.

On the other amendments, the hon. Member for Bradford West is making a value judgment about comparative expertise between Amanda Ward and whoever she wants to propose instead—Philip Murray. I do not know why she is making that value judgment, but as far as I can see, the names were properly submitted in the process. The hon. Lady obviously had the chance to submit names during the process. For better or worse, as she may see fit, the hon. Member for Spen Valley has come up with a list that is a compromise. That is not to say that the hon. Member for Bradford West cannot arrange briefings with any of these experts outside the formal process, for Members to attend should they so wish, or that she cannot seek advice from them during the process of the Bill.

My primary concern about the amendments is that we are opening up a whole area of debate where we could all have gone with our suggestions. I would rather stick with the list that we have, because I fear that the hon. Member for Bradford West is doubling up and making value judgments about expertise that are not necessarily warranted.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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I beg to move,

That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:

(1) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Secretary of State, and

(2) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under or by virtue of any other Act out of money so provided.

The Government are of the view that the Bill is a matter for Parliament rather than the Government to decide. In order for the Public Bill Committee that is now scrutinising the Bill to consider the clause that would have spending implications, the Government must first table this money resolution. This is purely to allow the Bill to be debated in Committee, and the Government have taken the view that tabling this motion does not act against our commitment to remain neutral. Only the Government can table such motions, so tabling it allows further debate to happen. To assist that debate, the Government will also assess the impacts of the Bill, and we expect to publish the impact assessment before MPs consider the Bill on Report.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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I rise to support the money resolution, broadly for two reasons. The first is the significant risk to the reputation of the House. One of the greatest criticisms of this place is that we play games and do not take these issues seriously. We all accept that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) said, a money resolution is normally a technicality for private Members’ Bills. If the Bill fell at this moment, we would not only deny debate to those Members who expressed either soft opposition or soft support for it on Second Reading, but strike a hammer blow to millions of people in the United Kingdom who are looking to us for a sense of leadership and clarity on this issue.

I hope that there will not be a Division today, but if there is, I urge Members to vote in favour of the resolution. Those Members thinking of voting against should bear in mind that the message that would go out from this place would be that a matter of life and death—a matter fundamental to many people, and on which there are profound feelings on both sides of the debate, as we have seen—can be dismissed on the basis of a casual, technical vote on a quiet Wednesday afternoon. That would be a bit of a travesty. I hope that Members realise what is reputationally at risk.

Secondly, there is broad misunderstanding of what the Bill is designed to do. The hon. Member for Ribble Valley (Maya Ellis) said, in effect, that the money resolution offers a blank cheque. Well, the rest of the NHS is already a blank cheque. Over the years, things have evolved in such a way that Parliament gives Government Ministers permission, through estimates, to make judgments about how they prioritise spending on the services for which they are responsible; and the Chancellor makes judgments about spending for Departments. If this House starts micromanaging spending—saying what the Government should spend on particular drugs, treatments, crimes or interventions—we will end up in an unholy mess. I have yet to hear anyone in this House object, for example, to the creation of a new criminal offence on the grounds that it would be more costly for the police. I have yet to hear anyone in this House object to the NHS prescribing a new drug because it will be costly for the health service.

We must remember that the people we are talking about—the dying individuals who may want to make this choice at the end of their life—are already receiving treatment in the national health service. They are already reliant on expensive care services, drugs and so on, as well as social support mechanisms that cost the taxpayer. It is, of course, important that we see the overall impact assessment, but we should not pretend that the status quo is cost-free, because it is costly—not only in monetary terms, but in terms of humanity. We should not forget that we are attempting to put a price on quality of life, and on mercy at the end of life. I urge Members to reflect on that and support this motion.

Finally, let me address the misunderstanding by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). There was no attempt yesterday to create any air of secrecy about consideration of the Bill in Committee. There was a brief period in which we had hoped to have an informal discussion about witnesses, before the public sitting resumed, which is normal for Bill Committees in these circumstances. Unfortunately, that has been misconstrued, but I guarantee that the rest of proceedings will be open for the public to view.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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I thank Members for their continued contribution to the debate. The Government are of the view that the Bill is an issue of conscience for individual parliamentarians and it is rightly a matter for Parliament, not the Government, to decide. The money resolution allows the Bill to be debated in Committee, where its detail will continue to be scrutinised. As I have said, the Government will also be assessing the impact of the Bill and we expect to publish an impact assessment before MPs consider the Bill on Report. I therefore commend the money resolution to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Kit Malthouse

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Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. There was no intent in my remarks to undermine the integrity of the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). I may have misunderstood his remarks, but he implied that the Committee was adopting some kind of veil of secrecy over our affairs and I was pointing out to him that, in my view, that was a misunderstanding of what we were attempting to do yesterday. I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman was offended, as he knows I hold him in great affection and I had no intention to do so.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q I have been searching for parallels in current practice, and one that seemed close to me was if I wanted to donate an organ—say, a kidney—to a relative. As I understand it, a doctor can raise that possibility, even if I have not thought of it at the front end of that family decision, and coercion and capacity are then assessed later via a trained individual. Do you think it would be possible to translate both of those into this situation?

As I understand it, the General Medical Council already has guidance on dealing with assisted dying if it is raised by a patient, and how doctors should handle that. How easy would it be to translate that guidance—the process struck me as something that does not hinder but also does not enable—into something more informative?

Mark Swindells: It is important to note that our guidance on assisted dying is framed in the current law, so it guides doctors to explain that it is not lawful for them to assist their patient to die. It talks about the importance of explaining other available treatment options, including palliative care; making sure that the patient’s needs are met; and dealing with any other safeguarding matters. Oure guidance does follow the law, so if the law were to change, we would obviously attend to that. It is not framed quite as you are suggesting, so I do not think that would lift and shift into what the guidance would need to be for doctors if this were to pass.

Dr Green: I do not have any experience with what you are describing, but it would certainly make sense to look at best practice in other areas.

Kit Malthouse

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Q You are clear, though, that doctors should be free to have an open discussion with their patients about the whole variety of possibilities or paths that may be available to them as they face a terminal disease?

Dr Green: As a general principle, I do not believe that unnecessary barriers should be put in the way of communication. This is such an important area for patients that it is vital that they form a good, trusting relationship with their key medical adviser, who would usually be a doctor. I also have to say that at the end of life, we depend a lot on our specialist nurses— Macmillan or Marie Curie nurses—and it might well be that they are the person whom the patient trusts most. Please do not put barriers in the way of understanding.

Kit Malthouse

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Q In the run-up to Second Reading, we heard from some of the overseas experience that where there was effectively a gag clause on doctors, it was proving to be extremely difficult, and the medical profession felt that that was a big barrier to discharging its duties. Would you recognise that?

Dr Green: Indeed. I believe that in New Zealand—and I think in the state of Victoria, but I would need to check that—there have been official reviews that have identified those concerns, and they are looking to review the legislation.

Kit Malthouse

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Q I just want to clarify the referral issue. As I understand it—I may have it wrong—your 2013 guidance on medical practice and personal beliefs says that doctors should refer, in cases such as those of abortion, to a colleague or service provider rather than a general information source.

Mark Swindells: I do not believe that we use the word “refer”, but I will double-check. The word “referral”—this is part of the BMA’s position—has a particular meaning in the world of medicine. We talk about the importance, from a patient perspective, of not being left with nowhere to go, so there is some professional responsibility on the doctor to guide.

Kit Malthouse

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Q I understand the BMA’s concern, but my concern is about saying, “Here’s a leaflet—you’re on your own,” or “You can get information from this place.” For somebody who is in extremis at that point in their life, that might prove a significant barrier. Would doctors reflect that in their sense of responsibility towards the patient? Should we leave that open rather than having what is currently in the Bill?

Dr Green: We would expect that to be done with sensitivity.

Kit Malthouse

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Right, so professional judgment again—

Kit Malthouse

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Q Professor, I want to test a little further the notion of a separate organisation that you mentioned. I can understand a separate discipline emerging, acquired by training, which is what happens in palliative care at the moment. We heard from previous witnesses that simplicity in safeguards is key, and in particular from the CMO that we have to avoid the last 6 months of someone’s life being a bureaucratic nightmare. At the moment, within palliative care and palliative nursing generally, you are already dealing with patients who are electing to refuse treatment, food and water, or are supporting patients following an advance directive. If you are supporting people in those circumstances as they move towards their death, do you think that it could be absorbed within the current functions, rather than having a separate organisation?

Professor Ranger: It is difficult. If I am honest, we have probably not explored that enough within our thinking as a college. We know what we would not want to see, which is a situation where there is an expectation that it becomes part of a pathway. It has got to be something you actively seek and opt into. I think how that is administered probably requires more thought, if I am honest, but I would not want to see it becoming an expectation of a pathway, because then the pressure on the individual may change. That is something we need to safeguard against.

I am worried that we should not make it so bureaucratic for the individual that it becomes impossible to have their autonomy respected, but how that happens is something that needs further exploration. We would fully support making it as clear and unbureaucratic for the person as humanly possible. But we would not want to see it as a sort of pathway within our current setting, because there could then be a sense that this is something that is externally influenced rather than being something that someone actively seeks for their autonomy.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q I want to pursue that point a little with you, Dr Cox. My understanding is that your profession is already taking these decisions, or supporting patients to take these decisions—for example, the withdrawal of ventilation for an MND patient towards the end, or if I decide to decline treatment or food and water to end my life as quickly as I can. Presumably, you already have guidelines or training about assessing coercion and capacity in those circumstances. I think in some—for example, advance directives—you are legally obliged to comply with a patient’s wishes. Are those guidelines and safeguards broadly translatable across into what, from my point of view, is another choice that a patient may make to end their life?

Dr Cox: There are two differences that I would identify. The examples you give are of somebody who may be naturally dying and is being kept alive, so the difference is that you are withdrawing a treatment; you are not intentionally killing them. This is the first difference with assisted dying.

The second difference, I would say, is that you are absolutely right that we do make those decisions with patients—with their families, if they wish—but in a multi-professional team. I would almost never make those decisions as an individual doctor without the support of my colleagues, for several reasons. First, as I have said already, that makes for much better decisions—they are safer and more robust. Secondly, the moral distress associated with these decisions is much less if you share them. That is also a worry for me—what happens to the moral distress of the co-ordinating doctor and the other assessing doctor? They are carrying a lot of moral distress. My understanding is that a very small percentage of doctors will want to engage with this—maybe 1% or 2% of all doctors will want to be in those assessing positions. They are carrying a lot of that distress because they will be doing a lot of assessing.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Understood. My other question is for all of you, but particularly Dr Clarke. You have mentioned autonomy a number of times. The Bill is trying to pass autonomy to the individual at a particular moment at the end of their life. It feels to me that the picture painted currently is a largely unregulated one. Dr Clarke, I think you said that there are no regulations or guidelines about what is going on. As my colleague Sarah Green said, there is no monitoring or measuring of what is going on. In general terms, given that patient autonomy is at the centre of this, would you welcome a set of rules that is understandable by patients and doctors, rather than what we have at the moment, which is—casual is not the right word—an ad-hoc negotiation at the time, depending on what the patient wants to do?

Dr Clarke: I think that is not quite right, and certainly not what I intended to convey. There are rules. There are very clear legal and professional rules and guidance and protocols around how to have these conversations. However, in practice, the quality of the conversations is contingent on the confidence, expertise, training and background of the individual clinicians having the conversations. There can be a great deal of inter-doctor variability in how conversations are conducted. In terms of addressing that, I would suggest that in an assisted dying scenario the crucial thing is to make the guidance and training as robust as it possibly can be to reduce the inter-practitioner variability.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Sorry to interrupt you, but I am conscious of the time. We heard this morning how vital training is; I think that is broadly accepted from a number of voices. I want to question you about the issue of the choice people face. I understand the point you are making about the variable state of palliative care versus the choices people face, but that is quite macro. Day by day, patients are facing a choice about what is ahead of them in the next few months. I would not want to put words in your mouth, but I presume you are not saying that, for the good of the whole, they should go through an awful death that they do not want to go through while we wait for palliative care to catch up.

Dr Clarke: No, of course not.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)

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Q I want to pick up on your evidence, Sir Nicholas, in relation to the panel that we have just been discussing with Sir Max. I have three questions. First, what do you envisage the panel doing under your model? Will it be ensuring that a lawful process has been followed or doing something more than that?

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: The former.

Sarah Sackman

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Q That is helpful. Secondly, what information do you think the panel will need in order to reach a determination on that question?

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: It will have the statements in schedules 1 to 4, signed by both doctors twice. This is where it gets slightly tricky. Is the panel expected to be a ferret and say, “This does not quite chime for me”? The Committee will have to consider how investigative the panel will be, or whether it will purely sit back, be passive and work on the material it has. Of course, under clause 12, it has to hear orally. That might get the alarm bells going, but I believe that the panel should be entitled to call for further evidence if it has concerns. As I say, I have been trying to find out why 10% of cases were rejected by the panel in Spain. There must have been some kind of procurement of further evidence by the panel in order to do that.

Sarah Sackman

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Q I suppose my third question, then, is how do you envisage such a panel, if at all, interacting with the High Court—with, say, a final right of appeal to the High Court, similar to what is in the Bill?

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: Article 10 of the Spanish law gives an appeal on a point of law to their high court, so I would have the same, with an appeal on a point of law to the High Court, but only on a point of law.

Alex Ruck Keene: Either way—it would have to be either way. It could not just be against a decision not to approve, logically, because the current model is very odd in saying that you can only appeal one way to the High Court.

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: Yes. Spain gives either side the right to appeal, so I agree with that, but it is confined to a point of law.

Sir Max Hill: I would only add that I wonder whether that is the only route through, namely leaving open a judicial review appellate process, or whether, for example, as we imagine with a number of commissioner-led processes already in this jurisdiction, the panel—or frankly, I suspect, panels, which might sit regionally, chaired perhaps by the retired judiciary—would have an appellate route to a national body, which you could call a national commission, instead of a judicial-review route to the Court.

There are a large number of commissioners, some sitting under the Home Office and some sitting under the Ministry of Justice—in a sense, I was a commissioner when I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—with closely defined powers. There are many others who sit in an enhanced regulatory position—highly qualified individuals. You could describe them as national commissioners, if that is an appropriate term, and they would have superintendence over regional panels, and the power to appoint retired judiciary, perhaps with the assistance of the Official Solicitor, to sit on those regional panels, and then to have an internal appellate mechanism.

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: You have to have an appeals process of some type, because otherwise there will be judicial review. If there is no appeal, there is judicial review—so you have to have an appeal of some type or there will be judicial review.

Sir Max Hill: Yes, I agree.

Sarah Sackman

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Thank you.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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Q I want to drill down a bit more on the question of training. Could you say a bit more about how the training works? Is it mandatory for everyone who takes a medical qualification to a certain standard? How many class hours are required? Is there an in-practice shadowing process? Is there an assessment process to verify that the person is qualified as a result of the training? I am just trying to get a better sense of the detail of the training. I will perhaps start with Dr Kaan.

Dr Kaan: That is a really important question, because this is a really important topic in the United States. Our laws are very clear that participation is voluntary, so there is no such mandatory training across medical training in general. It is always voluntary. If a physician or provider wishes to have training, they can seek it out. What is available and the standard of care differ from state to state. Certainly, in the state of Washington, where I am the medical director of the organisation that is most largely involved with this, the bulk of my job is doing training, mentoring and shadowing. There is no exam at the end of that process, but there is certainly shadowing and a feedback process.

I am also heavily involved with the Academy of Aid-in-Dying Medicine, which has been very active in creating professional training. We have a Journal of Aid-in-Dying Medicine, which is a peer-reviewed journal that puts out articles that are relevant to the topic. The Academy of Aid-in-Dying Medicine is now undertaking certification pathways, so each level of provider—social workers, chaplains, physicians and anyone else who might be involved in the aid-in-dying process—will be able to take these certifications. A more uniform education system will be available. We are just at the beginning of creating those, but it is very exciting, and we are very happy to have those out. A lot of resources are out there in the world already, in general, to train providers in how to do this well, and it would be really smart to have something in your Bill that outlines what the training should be, whether you will make it mandatory or voluntary and perhaps some sort of certification pathway.

Stephen Kinnock

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Dr Spielvogel, I do not know whether you have anything new to add to that. If not, that is fine.

Dr Spielvogel: Without repeating anything that Dr Kaan said, I was just going to say that in addition to my assisted dying hat, I am also the programme director for the family medicine residency programme, so my main job is actually training young physicians who are becoming what you would call GPs.

We have instituted curricula as part of our residency programme here to train interested physicians in learning how to do assisted dying. We go through a whole process for that, including lectures, them shadowing me and me shadowing them, listening in on their conversations, giving them pointers and walking them through the steps of the process. They then do this with multiple patients through the course of their residency, so when they graduate, they feel confident in being able to offer this care. As with most medical training, this should be included in that part of the training process. All the other things, such as pathways in continuing medical education, are very important for physicians out there in practice who want to start doing this, but really getting this into medical training at its roots is vital for normalising the practice.

Speaking of which, something else I have heard a lot is that this might be distressing to physicians, or that physicians would not want to offer this care. I would like to say that 80% of our residents on our programme opt to receive this training. When we did a study on this of graduates from our programme who were continuing to offer assisted dying, 70% of the surveyed residents said that their assisted dying work was more rewarding to them than the rest of their primary care work—70% said that it was more rewarding.

I want to come back to the notion that physicians would feel burdened or that this would be some sort of psychological negative to physicians practising it, because it is actually quite rewarding work. It has led me to be a better physician to all my patients because it has helped me with having these difficult end-of-life conversations with them. That was a bit of a twofer, sorry—I added that on there.

Kit Malthouse

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I, too, support the amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, and in particular the addition of Jane Monckton-Smith. I have read her book; it is definitely worth a read and is pretty alarming. I will address why I do not think the Committee should support the amendment to the amendment tabled to add other witnesses.

Jane Monckton-Smith has done a huge amount of research in the area, and as well as being an academic who specialises in coercion and femicide—and the impact that coercion has on femicide—she is a former police officer, so has significant frontline experience. As part of her research she will have spoken with and interacted with many of the groups that the hon. Member for Bradford West is proposing to include—although maybe not specifically. I would prefer it if we stuck with the list that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has put forward, and not add the additional witnesses proposed.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q196 Thank you all for coming. Clause 26 will create a new offence of coercion. In your view, is that offence correctly drawn? Is 14 years long enough as a deterrent?

Professor Esmail: In all honesty, I had not thought about it like that. I cannot say—I do not have the expertise to know—whether it is deterrence. I think that coercion is something that we should be concerned about. My view is that at the moment we do not even know whether it occurs. Currently, what happens? For example, if someone chooses to go to Dignitas, we do not know whether they have been coerced to go or not. If someone chooses to withdraw life-supporting treatment, we do not know whether this happens or not. It is good that it is acknowledged, and it is good that we should try to put in place some safeguards so that we understand it, we monitor it and we have a sanction of some sort.

Richard Robinson: Safeguarding is a significant issue. I think that coercion is underplayed significantly in cases of abuse of older people. The abuse of older people is seen as a minority issue and—we as a charity would argue—that makes much of the difference. We deal with about 75,000 people annually, as I said, and about 2.6 million people are affected by abuse every year.

One of the biggest issues we face is the fact that we have no idea of the levels of training that healthcare professionals and the judiciary receive to understand and recognise coercion. That leaves us in a situation where medical professionals say that coercion in these circumstances is minimal, but people need to understand what coercion is and how to recognise the signs of it in the first place, especially bearing in mind that the vast majority of cases that we see take place in the home and by family, rather than by professionals.

The other point that I would make about coercion is that there is lots of talk about it being limited to victims of abuse. I would argue that what goes on behind closed doors is the big issue. How do we ensure that medical professionals can see what is going on behind closed doors and build up a relationship with that individual? As a charity, we deal with these people every day, and it is difficult enough for us to build up a relationship. A medical professional who sees them in isolation over a short period of time to make these decisions does not have that opportunity. There is an awful lot to do to ensure safeguarding and to put that kind of deterrent in place.

Kit Malthouse

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Q We have heard from earlier witnesses, particularly from other jurisdictions, that training is the key. Is it therefore your view that in guidelines, for example, specific training in this area could be effective?

Richard Robinson: We take calls from professionals all the time, and we give training all the time. Safeguarding older people requires specialist training—it is a specialist issue—and although it may not be a solution, it is certainly on the pathway. We would also like to see refresher training built in. Any kind of amendment that includes training—not just on the medical side, but for anyone involved in decision making, like the judiciary—would be a real step forward.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Lord Sumption, I heard an interview with you on the radio, I think before Christmas, in which you expressed doubts about the third layer at the High Court. We heard evidence earlier that there is an alternative route that might see more of a panel sitting, rather than a High Court judge. Could you expand on your view of what that third layer could and should look like?

Lord Sumption: This is about clause 12, and my own view is that clause 12 is unnecessary and in some respects undesirable. I have seen the proposed amendment relating to a panel. That would resolve the problem of the shortage of capacity in the High Court; it would not, however, resolve the problem of the over-engineering of the procedural provisions of the Bill.

Kit Malthouse

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Q I may be speaking out of turn, but the sentiment of the House generally seems to be that there should be a third layer of supervision over the process. There are other territories have that third layer of supervision, such as Spain and Australia. Have you examined any of those, and is there a model that you think might be effective?

Lord Sumption: I am aware of them. Basically, they fall into two categories. There are those, like Spain, that have a process whereby a tribunal deals with the matter in advance—and, in fact, in the case of Spain in arrears as well—and there are those like the Netherlands, where it is a retrospective process. I have heard it said that a retrospective process is of no use. I am not sure I agree with that. I think there is a case for having a retrospective process to ensure that the practitioners are doing what they are supposed to be doing and that any objectionable tendencies are stamped out at an early stage.

It seems to me that if you are going to have the opinion of two doctors, which is almost universal as a requirement in these cases, I do not think that it is necessary to have a third layer, and in some respects it is undesirable. I appreciate that the House must have concluded that it was in favour of it, but my own view is that I am not.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)

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Q It may flow from what this third layer of a panel or court is doing, but what sort of information would be desirable for the panel to have before it in order to add a meaningful layer of scrutiny?

Lord Sumption: That is really the critical question when you ask yourself how useful this process is. Obviously, they will have the opinions of the two referee doctors—they will have their rather pro forma statements, and possibly statements they will make by way of expansion of those—but if they are going to add something of value in the way of safeguards, it seems to me that they have got to carry out an independent investigation of those same matters. That would involve getting, presumably, a third expert adviser and proactively seeking evidence about, for example, the patient’s state of mind. It seems to me that that is duplicative.

Obviously, there is no system that you cannot have a greater degree of assurance about, but I am struck by the fact that no other jurisdiction has felt it necessary to have a process as elaborate as this for the purpose of duplicating the expert views already required.

Sarah Sackman

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Q Lord Sumption and Dr Graham, you will have seen that clauses 26 and 27 include criminal offences. Do you have any views on the operability of those criminal offences?

Dr Graham: My only contribution here can be that similar offences in other jurisdictions have been held to be perfectly compatible with European human rights law.

Lord Sumption: I have no problem about the criminal-isation of people who abuse or distort the system, which is what those two clauses envisage.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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Q I want to make a brief point of clarification, based on what both Baroness Falkner and Ms Hadi said. In the debate on the motion on the money resolution in Parliament last week, I stood at the Dispatch Box and confirmed that the Government will publish an impact assessment before Report stage. We are obviously working on that with officials.

I will also add as a point of clarification that both myself and my ministerial colleague are working with the sponsor of the Bill to provide assistance and advice, purely on the workability and operational aspects of the Bill, and impacts of the Bill, should it gain Royal Assent. It is important for the purposes of this discussion that everybody is on the same page on that point. The Government are absolutely remaining neutral on the principle of the Bill, but it is our job to ensure that any Bill that passes through Parliament is workable and implementable as and when it gains Royal Assent.

Baroness Falkner: Will there be a human rights compatibility assessment as well as a delegated powers memorandum? Those are the other things that Government-sponsored legislation would have contained.

Sarah Sackman

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We can take that suggestion away. Thank you.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Thank you all for coming. We have had a lot of discussion over the last day or so about eligibility. I think it was Hospice UK that said, in evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee, that pain in all circumstances could be alleviated. Do you believe that the way in which the Bill is framed captures those people correctly? For those people who are essentially beyond medical help and may be facing a painful end, and who want a different choice, is the eligibility criteria framed correctly? We will start with Mr Porter.

Toby Porter: I would defer to a physician on this point; I am a non-clinical person.

Dr Hussain: For the people I have seen in my end-of-life care practice who want assisted dying and have been persistent with that, even when they have accessed specialist palliative care—I have seen them, and they are a small handful—the decision is not usually related to symptoms. It is related to control being really important. I am not personally, in principle, against assisted dying. I think it is quite distressing, when control is important, to feel that you do not have that.

The other side of it is people much closer to the end of life, and this comes to your point. Perhaps they have had a long trajectory and are in the last few weeks. The symptoms may not be as best controlled as they want them to be, or they are just fed up, and the family have also got to the stage where they are accepting of that. I do not think the Bill is actually fit for purpose, and there are many of those than those who are doing it for control purposes. The length of time that it would take to go through the Bill would mean that they would not be eligible.

Kit Malthouse

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Q How would you seek to improve the Bill in order to make them eligible?

Dr Hussain: I think it is really complex, isn’t it? The very existence of the Bill affects everyone who needs end-of-life care. It opens a Pandora’s box of risk. For those people, absolutely—when I am a physician and I am in front of them, I think, “What is the best palliative care I can provide for them?” However, when I put my population health hat on, I think about how it could impact the whole community. As I said, I work predominantly with an ethnically diverse population. I have gone into those communities and I have spoken to them about this Bill. What they say overwhelmingly to me is, “We’re scared. We’re really fearful that this is going to result in a disproportionate impact on our community. We have seen that through covid and we’re so scared. We already don’t access your services. We’re really worried that we won’t want to access them any more, and we won’t want to access the hospitals.”

That is the conundrum. If I want to open it up for that quite small proportion of people towards the end of life, I risk that much bigger group. That is why the decision is very tricky for me, even as a frontline clinician who is not against assisted dying in principle.

Dr Neerkin: I would like to break it down, thinking about what a terminally ill person is within the Bill. You have heard from quite a lot of people, and sometimes it is very clearcut, such as for cancer patients who have quite a clear trajectory in those last few months of life. It is much clearer for them than, maybe, for somebody with a neurological condition. People with those neurodegenerative disorders can go on for a much longer period of time. When you can recognise that they are already in the last six months of life, invariably by that point they may well have lost capacity to make those decisions. They may well not have the physical ability to take the medication at that time.

That is when you get those potential discrepancies: when you are defining “terminally ill” and whether or not one size fits every disease process for patients. I think that is aside from how much pain they are suffering, and whether or not it is because they want to retain control, it is also about the speed with which people will need to receive assisted dying. When you are rapidly deteriorating from a cancer prognosis, it may be that the two or three-week delay between different doctors, and everybody assessing it, might be too long. We have already heard, over the past couple of days, that people invariably die before they get the chance to take the medication themselves. However, there are also people who have a slower decline, who can actually have that long period of time for reflection, and that is quite important. I am not sure if that approaches the answer to your question in a slightly different way to Dr Hussain’s answer.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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Q I have a specific question about the period between the legislation passing in your Parliament and the commencement of its provisions and the implementation of voluntary assisted dying. Can you say a little more about what had to be done in that period: the institutional arrangements that were needed between the Act’s passage and its commencement, and the training, capacity building and practical measures that you had to put in place? Did you do that from a standing start, so that in that 18-month period you went from having no training and no institutional set-up to being ready to take the system forward?

Dr Fellingham: Our law was passed on 19 December 2019 and came into effect on 1 July 2021. Ostensibly we had an 18-month period, but of course something fairly dramatic in health happened in 2020. Despite that, what happened at Department of Health level began first. The Department of Health set up an implementation leadership team and gathered specialists together from all across Western Australia in various different aspects. They had eight different workstreams looking at the eight different parts of the Act that they had to operationalise—the pharmacology, the substance and what that was going to look like, the doses and how it was going to be administered, the set-up of the pharmacy, and things like that. Each of those eight workstreams worked everything out at a Department of Health level.

Approximately six months before the law was enacted—on reflection, that was probably not long enough, but covid was very much complicating everything at the time—they set up a working group with the clinical leads in the various health service provider organisations. We were then tasked with taking that broad overview and turning it into a service at the point of delivery, on the understanding that we understood the nuances and expectations of the different hospitals and health systems in which we operated.

I will not lie: it was an enormous task. I leant very heavily on our wonderful Victorian colleagues who had gone first. I do not know what I would have done if I had been the first to pave the way. Subsequently, I have been able to offer that level of assistance to each of the other states and territories that have gone after Western Australia, and then of course to the UK, Scotland and Jersey, which I have been working with quite a lot. There is a wonderful international, collaborative sense of information sharing and wanting to get this right, learning from experience and not reinventing the wheel.

The vast majority of the laws that apply across the whole of Australia and New Zealand are quite similar, and they are similar to what you are planning to legislate for in the United Kingdom. A lot of fantastic groundwork has been laid already, and it can be done even in a challenging healthcare context, like covid or our resource limitations.

Stephen Kinnock

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Thank you very much for that very comprehensive answer. Is there anything that our other guests would like to add?

Dr Mewett: As I was on the very first implementation taskforce, running blind, I probably could not add much more, except to say that it can be done. One has to focus on the readiness of practitioners, the readiness of health services, the readiness of the population and a whole range of other issues, including the pharmacy service. We have a state-wide care navigator service, which assists patients and doctors in the space. We had to set up a lot of services, and that gave us the time to do so. It was very successful and very challenging, but fortunately we did not have covid in our way.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q Could you talk us through eligibility with regard to neurodegenerative diseases, and whether you have in place any variations and considerations for things such as Parkinson’s or motor neurone disease? Is the main delivery mechanism for VAD in Australia the mainstream health service, or is it delivered through a separate wing, arm or organisation?

Kit Malthouse

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Sir Roger, can I ask about mainstream delivery?

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q I want to go back to the issue of gag clause/doctor initiation. Alex, could you quickly talk to us about the thought processes? Can you say why some states introduced it and why you did not? How in legislation have you circumscribed the way doctors should approach this with patients? Perhaps our two medical guests could talk about how, in territories where there is not a gag clause, doctors are obliged not to lean towards a particular recommendation, as they might do with other courses of treatment.

Alex Greenwich: Our experience in New South Wales was based on evidence from doctors and people with the lived experience of a terminal illness. It is an extremely confronting thing to be told that you have a terminal illness, to be told that you have six months to live or to be told, if you have advanced bowel cancer, for example, that your end of life will look like you are going to be choking on your own faeces.

In New South Wales, we decided that it is important that that person, who has been told that they have a terminal illness, is able to have a full conversation with their doctor about all their options—one of those options being that they could have a better death than their illness would otherwise provide them with. We decided that being able to really talk through with your doctor all your options—from access to palliative care, to social supports, to what the process of voluntary assisted dying looks like—was so important. We believe that it is working really well in practice. We would be concerned about gagging those conversations, as that would ensure that a patient is not receiving the full information about their end-of-life choices.

Kit Malthouse

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Q But how did you approach that in the legislation? Is it silent as to what doctors should do, or does it have a prescription?

Alex Greenwich: Yes. In our legislation we make it clear that the doctor has to make sure that the patient is aware of their palliative care options, and we have referral pathways for psychosocial support as well. All that is prescribed in the legislation. Obviously, in the training for voluntary assisted dying a lot of that stuff is covered. In the legislation, we also define the things we want to have in that training.

Kit Malthouse

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Doctors?

Professor Blake: In Western Australia, which was the second jurisdiction to introduce voluntary assisted dying—

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Q Professor Hoyano, I am interested to explore your views on the third layer. I understand your view about the Court of Protection, but we have heard in previous evidence, not least from eminent members of your profession, that the Spanish model of a panel of experts might be an option worth examining. In those circumstances, what is your view of the investigatory processes, either for that or for the Court of Protection, or the type of evidence that might need to be adduced? What could be specified in the legislation as a requirement on those people involved in the process?

Professor Hoyano: I have to say that I have real concerns, as a practising barrister, about how the provisions as currently drafted could work in terms of judicial oversight. There are a number of unusual functions, if I can express it that way, being attributed to the court. I need first of all to stress that the High Court’s family division, and the Court of Protection, regularly engage with life and death matters, but they are doing so in the context of an adversarial and not an inquisitorial system. However, since the 19th century we have had the invaluable institution of the Official Solicitor, who has investigatory powers or functions and who serves in court as an amicus curiae—a friend of the court—to assist the court in understanding where the issues lie and in calling witnesses. I do not think that it is feasible at all, in our current system, to have the court call witnesses or question them directly until they have been examined and cross-examined, if appropriate; the court can then put in questions and ask for clarification, as would happen normally now.

If we are to have a judicial oversight function as opposed to a panel of experts—to be honest, I think we already have the panel of experts: the doctors who are already involved in the different stages leading up to the final stage—the easiest approach would be for the investigatory function to be assigned to the office of the Official Solicitor, preferably with an individual who has expertise in this field and will be able to get experience by dealing with these cases. I point out that Lord Justice Munby himself—Sir James Munby, as he now is—represented the Official Solicitor in the seminal case on termination of life support, the Tony Bland case. We have a lot of experience in that area, in dealing with end-of-life decision making with the Official Solicitor, but I think that that role needs to be built into the legislation with very specific tasks set out, including an investigatory function.

The other current difficulty is that it is not clear at all what the procedure would be. With great respect to the drafters of the Bill, I have never before seen such a delegation of the most essential procedural structures entirely to rules of court in terms of practice directions or rules of practice; we do not do it in the family division and we do not do it in the Court of Protection. Exactly what has to happen needs to be set out.

It strikes me that the intention may be for the court to, in effect, certify that all the procedures have been correctly followed at the preliminary stages. What is not entirely clear is whether the court itself is required to investigate whether the criteria are satisfied. It reads like that, but I am not sure whether it is supposed to be a review function or a primary decision-making function.

This becomes even more difficult because of the way in which the Court of Appeal’s functions are ascribed. The Court of Appeal does not have power to summon witnesses; the Court of Appeal does not have power to question witnesses. In the criminal division, which is where I am primarily practising now, the court can hear expert evidence de bene esse in order to determine whether it should send a case back for a retrial on the basis of newly discovered evidence that was not originally available, but that evidence will be called by the defence. The defence will be putting the evidence in, the Crown will cross-examine and the court will ask any additional questions it wants to, but to have an original jurisdiction —in effect, what we call a trial de novo: a trial all over again—in the Court of Appeal is wholly inappropriate to an appellate jurisdiction. That needs to be completely rethought.

There is also a difficulty in that the right to appeal is very lopsided: only a patient can appeal a denial, not anyone else. If anyone has concerns about the probity and thoroughness of the preliminary stages, or thinks that the High Court judge sitting in the Court of Protection has made an error of law or has failed to follow the procedures, that needs to be reviewed by the Court of Appeal. We need an even-handed approach.

I can understand the motivation of not wanting busybody people, as happened in one case in Canada in which a wife had a religious objection to assisted dying, and yet there was no doubt that the husband had satisfied all the criteria. She went all the way to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal because of her religious objections; it turned out that religion was a source of great dissension in the marriage anyway, but her church was egging her on. I know that you do not want that kind of situation, but I believe that this legislation has to be completely even-handed for it to work and for the system to acquire public respect.

Kit Malthouse

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Q My question is to Dr Richards. Obviously health service medics are dealing with end-of-life situations at the moment—they are withdrawing treatment or declining to give treatment if they think it is futile. In those circumstances there are a set of safeguards. How do those safeguards compare with the safeguards in the Bill? From your research, do you think there is any adjustment required to the safeguards we have at the moment?

Dr Richards: Assisted dying is quite categorically different from the end-of-life scenarios you are talking about there, so you would expect a very different set of safeguards. It is a misunderstanding to think that assisted dying is of a piece with other life-ending decisions. It is really something quite different and requires a different framework.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Thanks very much, Mrs Harris, and welcome, everyone. Liz, you and I have met before. I am very conscious that during the last couple of days of evidence, we have heard from all sorts of people but not actually from anybody with a terminal illness or somebody who has been through the experience that you have been through—so, welcome. Over the last two or three days, we have heard quite a lot about the complexity of the issue that we are dealing with, but we also heard right at the start that we have to balance that with simplicity, access and speed. From your experience of the two methods in Australia and Switzerland, do you think that there is something to be learned from those systems about that balance?

Pat Malone: I am not familiar with the situation in Australia. The two suicides in my family were outwith the law, and the third death I was going to talk about was a natural death—we would call it a natural death—so I am sorry but I cannot make a comparison.

Liz Reed: The system in Australia is, as I said, quite similar to what is being proposed here. It felt like throughout that process for my brother, Rob, it was really caring and respectful. He was able to change his mind, which he did, in terms of dates and when it would happen. His views and the views of his family were also taken into account and, through the process, he was treated like a person with autonomy whose choices were being respected.

Kit Malthouse

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Q We have heard a lot in evidence over the last two or three days about how the doctor should approach the initial conversation and whether doctors should be allowed to initiate a conversation about assisted dying. I realise that each of you has experienced this at second hand, but could you talk a bit about how those conversations were handled? Do you have a view about the ability of doctors, if this Bill should pass, to raise assisted dying as an option for people facing this kind of decision? Liz, could you talk about the experience in Australia?

Liz Reed: Rob’s experience was that this law only came in in Queensland in January 2023, post his diagnosis. But it was an issue that had been in the press; he knew it was coming in and from diagnosis he thought it was something he might consider, and so he approached his doctor with that.

In terms of my view on whether doctors should bring this up—we are coming from a position of privilege where we have access to media; he knew this was going on, and I am sure there will be plenty of people who do not know. I do not really know, to be honest, where I sit on that. For our family and for my brother, it was absolutely the right thing to do. I cannot really answer.

Pat Malone: Some regulation and some guidance would not go amiss. My sister had fantastic support from her GP. She did a lot of extra work to meet the requirements of Dignitas, and my brother had exactly the opposite. When he went to his GP, for a long time he was told, “Oh, it’s just indigestion. Try Gaviscon.” Even when he went to his GP, in the light of his understanding of my father’s death, to say, “I think I’ve got pancreatic cancer,” his GP said, “No, it’s not—it’s just indigestion,” and so forth. It would not have mattered; an early diagnosis would have made no difference at all. But the GP was not very helpful and did not want to get involved.

When my brother died, my sister-in-law called the GP and the GP called the police. Before my brother was cold, the investigation started. If there was some way you could say to doctors, “This is what you can do, and this is what you can’t do. If you do not want to get involved, leave it to somebody who does because there are plenty of people who will”, and if that could be quantified somehow by a code of conduct—perhaps among the doctors, rather than in the Bill—that would be very useful.

Kit Malthouse

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Q Julie, you said that you got to a point where Guy said to you that he had made his mind up. Had he made his mind up after conversations with doctors about what his options were?

Julie Thienpont: No. He made up his mind long before he was even sick. He felt that his mother had quite a traumatic passing, and said that she expressed a view that, had it been an option, she would have taken it. He had said from then, “That is the way I want to die. I want to die that way. I don’t want to be lingering in a bed, whether I am in pain or not. I don’t want that to happen.” That may not be something that I would choose, but that was his absolute choice—I have no doubt whatsoever. He said that to the team who had been looking after him when he first broached the subject, and I think they first of all thought he was not terribly serious. Then, when they realised he was, he said, “It’s my life, it’s my death—I want to choose.” I think that is what it is all about: allowing people that option to choose.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)

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Q To be clear, I am here as a Government Minister on this Committee, and the Government are entirely neutral on the Bill, so we do not take a position on the substance of the issues you have raised. Clearly, the draft Bill is intended to apply in both England and Wales, as you say, and your note is extremely helpful in highlighting some of those issues that will need to be worked out. As a Government, we will work closely with the Welsh Government to assess the legalities and practicalities of any potential changes to the law.

You have highlighted in particular the distinctions between health law, which is a devolved matter, and the law on suicide, which currently is not devolved. On the first page of your written evidence, you draw out clauses 32, 31, 33 and 34 in particular as issues that we should focus on in ironing out those legalities. Is there anything else you want to add to that that you think that we as a Government should focus on in our work consulting with the Senedd?

Professor Lewis: I think it is important that both Governments understand how the implementation of what will be a pretty radical change in the law will happen on the ground within the health service and among those who are responsible for delivering social services. I am thinking of issues such as adult safeguarding, which in Wales has its own specific law and is slightly different from the arrangements in England. There are those kinds of nuances between the two territories, and I think it would be prudent to focus on them.

I also think it is wise to bear in mind that Wales has certain statutory bodies whose interests might extend to the Bill. For example, there is the Older People’s Commissioner for Wales, in particular; there is the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales as well. I think it is important that there is some forum, some scope, for those people also to be involved in how this is shaped.

Kit Malthouse

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Q I also want to explore this issue of capacity a little further with Dr Price, because I share my colleague’s slight confusion.

You talked about a percentage who wish to hasten death. The people we are talking about are facing death in any event within a foreseeable period, and they may be contemplating a death that is not pleasant. Some of the characteristics you talked about are presumably to be expected and may not necessarily interfere with their ability to make rational decisions in what they believe is their own best interest. In those circumstances, I do not understand why the Mental Capacity Act would not apply. I understand that you may be coming at it from a practitioner point of view, but if I make a decision to decline treatment to hasten my own death, I am not sure I would necessarily see that as qualitatively different, from the point of view of my own capacity, from saying, “I know I am going to die in three months’ time and I would like you to assist me to die slightly earlier.” Why are the two qualitatively different, from an MCA point of view? At the moment, one would be dealt with through the MCA, but you are saying the second would not necessarily be.

Dr Price: You are equating a refusal of treatment, in capacity terms, to hastening death by assisted dying. If those two things are equated, in terms of the gravity and the quality of the decision, the Mental Capacity Act may well be sufficient, but there are differences. There are differences in the information that the person would need and what they would need to understand. They would need to be able to understand the impact of the substance they are taking and what the likely positives and negatives of that are—all of those things.

The informed consent process is different from a refusal of treatment, and the informed consent process feeds into the capacity assessment. This is an area where we need to think carefully about whether the processes of the Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, map neatly enough on to that decision to make it workable.

Sarah Sackman

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Further to that point of order, Mrs Harris. I want to clarify the Government’s position. As the Committee knows, the Government are neutral on the Bill, but once the Committee has concluded its work and prior to Report, we are committed to publishing the ECHR memorandum, a delegated powers memorandum, the economic impact assessment that was committed to during the money resolution debate, and an assessment of the equalities impact of the Bill. In terms of the timing, it is necessary that the impacts that are assessed be of the Bill as it is brought forward. If the Bill is liable to change via amendments proposed by members of this Committee, it is important that we know what it is that we are assessing the impact of. That is why the proposed timing is to publish the impact assessment at that stage. The point is that before Members of the House come to a vote on Report and Third Reading, they will all have before them the impact assessment in respect of equalities and all those other aspects of the Bill.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. First of all, it is worth saying that the amendments tabled by the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, are in response to evidence that has been heard by this Committee—oral and written. Certainly the Bill Committees that I have been on have had repeated information coming in as the Bill has evolved. That is an actual process.

It is worth also pointing out to Members that the Bill Committee is not the end of the process, and written evidence that will arrive throughout will be pertinent on Report, when the whole House will have that information available. Then members of the Committee can lead the debate and reflect on information or written evidence that has emerged even after Committee stage, once the completed Bill from that process is seen. It is perfectly possible for this to evolve as we get to Report and Third Reading in the light of evidence that arrives. That is the normal process through which all legislation goes.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for her introductory comments. The Government will continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not hold a position on assisted dying. I want to make it clear that I, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, are speaking in Committee not as Members of Parliament, but as Government Ministers responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable.

To that end, we have been working closely with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and, where changes have been mutually agreed on by herself and the Government, we will offer a technical, factual explanation for the amendments. Therefore, I will not be offering up a Government view on the merits of any proposed changes put forward by other Members, but I will make brief remarks on an amendment’s legal and practical impact to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.

Stephen Kinnock

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I am on the Committee as a Member of Parliament and I vote as such. When I speak on the Committee, I speak as a Government Minister in order to provide factual and technical explanations. As the Bill is a matter of conscience, I will be voting with my conscience on all the amendments as they come forward.

The amendments that we are now debating have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in consultation with the Government. They relate to the location of the person seeking assistance under the Bill and are designed to ensure that the service can only be accessed by an individual present in England and Wales, with a view to preventing medical tourism.

I will take the amendments in turn. Amendments 178 and 193 would ensure that only a terminally ill person in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further to that, a requirement is placed on the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales as part of their first assessment. Amendment 179 would limit the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales only. Amendment 180 would require the steps taken under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 that relate to both declarations and both doctors’ assessments to be taken by persons in England or Wales.

Amendment 182 would limit the provision of clause 4(3), where a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life, to cases where the person is physically present in England or Wales. It would prevent people who are outside of England or Wales from accessing assistance in accordance with the Act—for example, by online consultations from abroad.

As I said earlier, the Government will continue to remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. That is, as I have made clear, a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to Members in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

Amendment 178 agreed to.

Kit Malthouse

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I have to confess that I am a little confused by the evidence to which my hon. Friend refers. Can he confirm that it is perfectly possible for me to be diagnosed with a terminal disease and make an advance directive, which may apply in three months’ time, that in those circumstances I would decline treatment and would wish to die at that point? The Mental Capacity Act is used to assess me in making that advance directive, having had my terminal diagnosis. If it is good for that decision, I struggle to understand why it would not be good for a similar decision to end my life in similar circumstances.

Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)

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My hon. Friend will recall the evidence from Professor Hoyano, who said she could not legally see the distinction between a doctor handing the pills to somebody to take themselves and the doctor pulling the plug out of the wall to turn off the ventilator or whatever machine might be keeping the person alive. Both of them are an act by a doctor at the request of the patient to foreshorten their death and avoid whatever they contemplate at the end.

I realise we are dealing with semantics here. We might have an irreconcilable difference about such an act, but I have to say that from the point of view of a patient—the person approaching their death—those two acts seem to be broadly the same. In both circumstances I am requesting that a doctor do something to hasten my death, because I do not wish to continue living in the circumstances presented to me.

Kit Malthouse

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Forgive me, but surely the whole point of what we are trying to do here is to give people the opportunity to avoid the natural death that is presented to them. We hear again and again, and we heard it from the families who gave evidence, that people profoundly wished to avoid their natural end because it was going to be degrading, unpleasant and profoundly painful on every level. That is the whole purpose of the act. To say that we should avoid that issue seems to me to negate our whole reason for being here.

Kit Malthouse

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I want to clarify what the Royal College of Psychiatrists actually said, because I realise that the hon. Member is relying a lot on that evidence. In an exchange with me in their oral evidence, the doctor from the royal college said that if I were to equate the decision to refuse treatment with the decision to request a hastening of my death in extremis as qualitatively the same, and of the same seriousness and outcome, then the Mental Capacity Act may well be appropriate for the decision. The difference was information. We would be relying on the notion of informed consent, and therefore on the information that the person was being given about the consequences of that decision.

We will be debating later in Committee the information that is given to a person to form that decision, but I do not think it is quite the case that the psychiatrist said that it could not be or was not fit for purpose. Actually, they said that it may well be sufficient if we equate those two decisions—and many of us do.

Kit Malthouse

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If the hon. Lady goes to column 277 of Hansard from that oral evidence session, Dr Price said:

“You are equating a refusal of treatment, in capacity terms, to hastening death by assisted dying. If those two things are equated, in terms of the gravity and the quality of the decision, the Mental Capacity Act may well be sufficient, but there are differences. There are differences in the information that the person would need and what they would need to understand.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 277, Q361.]

It is clear what Dr Price said. To be honest, the question was partly prompted as we had become a little confused, because the whole practice of psychiatry in the UK is founded on the Act at the moment. She seemed to be implying that somehow the entire practice of psychiatry in the UK was on unstable ground—and I do not think anybody is claiming that.

The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)

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It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. As was noted earlier, the Government remain neutral. My role here is not to offer a Government view on the merits of the amendments but to provide a factual explanation of their technical and practical effect, to assist the Committee in its scrutiny. This group of amendments focuses on the concept of mental capacity. As drafted, the Bill, in clause 3, states that

“references to a person having capacity are to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005”,

with sections 1 to 3 of that Act establishing the principles and criteria for assessing a person’s capacity to make decisions. New clause 1, which would replace clause 3, and amendments 34 to 47, would collectively introduce the concept of an individual having the ability to make the decision to request assistance to end their life. A person’s ability would be determined by whether they could

“fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

That is intended to replace the term “capacity”, used in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which provides a very specific definition of what it means to lack capacity in relation to a particular decision. A lack of capacity under this framework means that a person must be unable to understand, use and weigh information relevant to the decision, and that that must be directly caused by

“an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.”

The “ability” proposal, as drafted, deals only with the use and weight of information.

Stephen Kinnock

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The fundamental position of the Government is that the Mental Capacity Act as it stands is a known quantity. It provides the legal base for a whole range of measures and interventions, and the Government’s view is that it would be an adequate legal base to operationalise the Bill should it receive Royal Assent. Our position on it goes no further than that; it is simply a matter of fact that there is a piece of legislation that is a known quantity.

Stephen Kinnock

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As I set out from the Dispatch Box when we had the money resolution, the Government will publish an impact assessment before Report. Given that this is a highly dynamic Bill, with a whole range of amendments having been tabled, and that it is not really possible to publish an impact assessment on the basis of a Bill that has not cleared a Bill Committee, there is a simple point of sequencing. That is why we are going to publish the impact assessment after the Bill Committee has completed.

Stephen Kinnock

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I thank the right hon. Member for her intervention. We have had a conversation about the need to ensure that the impact assessment has a clear and specific focus on the impact in Wales. I can absolutely assure her that either there will be a separate impact assessment for Wales, or we will ensure that the impact assessment that we produce is absolutely clear in terms of the impact that it will have in Wales; it will be one of those two.

Personally, I am agnostic as to which of those it is. It is simply a question of what works best given the highly integrated nature of the conversation because the criminal justice aspects of it are a reserved competence, while health and care are a devolved competence. What is the best way to present that—having a single document or two separate documents? I am not entirely clear, but I have undertaken to check the matter with officials. I will get back to the right hon. Lady as soon as possible on that point.

Stephen Kinnock

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The Government choose when to bring forward an impact assessment based on the passage of the Bill through the House. We have had reports today about a very substantial amendment to clause 12 that may well be brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, for example. It is not possible for the Government to conduct and publish an impact assessment when quite significant changes are being made.

I also gently point out to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that this is not a Government Bill; it is a private Member’s Bill. It is also worth noting that it is unprecedented, as far as I know, to have oral evidence sessions for a private Member’s Bill, so we are already on relatively uncharted territory. It is also relatively uncharted territory to have, on a Bill Committee, Ministers who are neutral because the position of the Government is neutral. But that reflects the fact that this is indeed uncharted territory, so that is where we stand.

The hon. Gentleman made a point about our own positions on the subject; I speak also for the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green. It is a matter of public record that I supported the Bill on Second Reading. It is also the case that we vote, as members of the Committee, on the basis of our conscience because this is a matter of conscience; that is why the Government are neutral on it. There is no whipping from the usual channels.

At the same time, we are articulating the position of the Government. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire asked how we come to that position. It is through the usual process of engaging with officials and experts in the field, and through taking into account all the considerations that the Government need to take into account for the operationalisation of the Bill. The Government then come to a view, and that is the view that I express when I am on the Committee.

Stephen Kinnock

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The hon. Member makes an interesting point. I simply reiterate that this is a very dynamic Bill Committee; I believe that 362 amendments have been tabled. Given the Government’s focus on establishing the Bill’s implementability, the coherence of the statute, the legal dimensions and the complexity of what we are dealing with, we took the position that it was better to wait for the Bill to clear Committee stage before producing an impact assessment. To do otherwise could have involved a large amount of second-guessing based on radical changes that might well have come out of the Bill Committee. I reiterate the logic of that sequencing.

On the point about the established legal framework, which clinicians have been applying since 2007, “capacity” would still be used for other decisions about care and treatment.

I turn to amendment 202, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the advice of the Government. It ensures that the assessment of “capacity” is utilised by the assessing doctor, and corrects a typographical error in clause 9 to ensure that an assessment of capacity will apply consistently throughout the Bill. As I said earlier, how and whether the law on assisted dying should change is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee when considering potential changes put forward.

Stephen Kinnock

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Further to that point of order, Sir Roger. I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for his question. Let us take this back to first principles.

This is a private Member’s Bill. A Bill Committee had to be formed. The Committee was formed in discussions between the Member sponsoring the Bill, the Whips and the House authorities. The principle of formulating the Committee was based in large part on the steer given by the debate and the vote on Second Reading, which delivered a majority of 55 in the House. The numerical composition of this Committee was therefore based on that majority of 55, broadly speaking. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley needed to put together a Committee that reflected that.

The position was also taken that there should be Government Ministers on the Committee who had to speak for the Government with neutrality. It is with those two factors in mind that the Committee was put together. The two functions that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green and I have reflect the two purposes that were in mind when the Committee was put together.

Stephen Kinnock

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My apologies, Sir Roger. It was just a point of clarification.

Kit Malthouse

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rose—

Kit Malthouse

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indicated dissent.

Kit Malthouse

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I was just going to say that it is not unprecedented: it has happened before, in the Tobacco and Vapes Bill.

Kit Malthouse

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I should start by recognising that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, who is my constituency neighbour, has devoted much of his adult life to public service. He should know that I have always admired him for that, and particularly for his work with the vulnerable and underprivileged in prisons. As he knows, I have spent much of my time in politics working with a similar population, so, like him, I understand their particular vulnerabilities. However, I oppose his amendments, and I hope he will bear with me while I enumerate why.

I believe that there are some definitional problems with the amendments, as well as some quite serious moral and ethical problems, and they compound into a practical difficulty. The first definitional one is who exactly my hon. Friend means by “prisoners”. As he knows, not all prisoners are the same. Would he seek to deny assisted dying to prisoners on remand who have yet to be found guilty of a crime but are being held in advance of the criminal justice process? Would he deny assisted dying—which will be available to everybody else if the Bill passes—to people who are held in prison for not paying their council tax, for example, or for contempt of court? There is a variety of vulnerability in the criminal justice system, and prisoners are inside for different lengths of time and in different institutions. Quite a lot of white-collar criminals go to open prisons, for example. Would he seek to deny them?

To me, if my hon. Friend’s objective is to protect vulnerable prisoners, the definition that he is using is far too wide. There are many people who may well find themselves in extremis while they are in prison and are likely to be released at some point, after a short sentence or because of the nature of their sentence, who would therefore have their ability to access assisted dying foreshortened.

Similarly, when my hon. Friend speaks of homeless people and uses the definition in the Housing Act 1996, I think he actually means rough sleepers. The definition of homelessness that he referred to includes people who are staying with friends, people who are moving between homes and people who are likely to become homeless at some point in the future. It is a very wide definition, which covers a large number of people, some of whom would not necessarily be classified as vulnerable and may well be assessed as perfectly capable and have the capacity to make this decision. So my first point is that there is a definitional problem with the broad terms that my hon. Friend has chosen.

Kit Malthouse

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I was about to come on to the fact that those questions would indeed be asked through the assessment that takes place. As my hon. Friend knows—we have had a long discussion about it—the Mental Capacity Act relies to a certain extent on context to assess capacity.

Turning to my hon. Friend’s point on prisoners, this may come as a surprise to him, but some people who are held on remand are found innocent and are released from prison. During their period on remand, which could be quite lengthy, they would be denied access to something they would not otherwise be denied access to.

Kit Malthouse

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I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but we are talking about people who do not have much time. We have to remember throughout this debate that we are talking about people who have limited time; they have been diagnosed, and their prognosis is six months or less. In fact, the experience from overseas is that quite a lot of people come to assisted dying beyond six months. We are operating on the basis that suddenly everybody at six months decides they are going to apply for it. Quite a lot apply with just days or weeks to go; time is therefore important to them, and so it should be to us. I am concerned that the definitions interfere with that.

Secondly, there is a distinct moral issue about the denial of services, particularly medical services, to groups of individuals based on their circumstances. We do not currently do that. We do not deny medical services to prisoners because they are prisoners. We believe it is a sign of a civilised society that they access the same healthcare as everybody else through our national health service. The same is true of those homeless groups. That includes allowing them to make the kind of decisions that we have talked about in the previous debate: decisions about life-threatening surgery and about the continuation of their life. It is certainly the case, as my hon. Friend will know from his work in prisons, that a number of prisons have developed hospice facilities within the prison to deal with end-of-life issues. Indeed those that do not have hospice care work closely with NHS palliative care outside and very often bring in specialists to deal with end-of-life issues in the prison.

Kit Malthouse

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I would certainly concede that; absolutely, I agree. The whole purpose of the safeguards in the Bill is to protect those who would be vulnerable, to ensure they have the capacity to make the decisions they want to make, and to ensure that they are making them for the right reasons. However, I think a lot of people would find it unfair and immoral that they were excluded not because of their own sense of themselves and their ability and capacity but simply because of their circumstances. As I am trying to point out, those who are homeless or prisoners in the widest definition of those words can find their circumstances changing quite significantly within the timeframe of six months. Given that they have only got six months under this Bill, we should not interfere with that and say, “Well, you are in; you are out.”

This may seem like a narrow example, but imagine that somebody diagnosed with a progressive disease were to commit a criminal act and end up going to prison, and during their time in prison, they reach the six-month period. Are they to be denied assisted dying if it is available to everybody else in the population? To me, that would not seem morally right, particularly given that we have a duty to deliver, and we do deliver, end-of-life services to them in the prison to help them cope with those circumstances. As my hon. Friend will know, there are charities which provide end-of-life care in prison as well.

Kit Malthouse

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They would, yes.

Kit Malthouse

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I am very pleased my hon. Friend raised that issue, because I was about to come to the practical difficulties that this presents, for exactly that reason. As he rightly pointed out, for a large number of prisoners, subject to assessment of the safety of the public, if they contract a terminal disease in prison, as they reach the end of their life, they qualify for compassionate early release. Often, that is within weeks of their death—naturally, as one would expect. It is carefully reviewed by prison governors and, I think, has to be signed off by the Secretary of State, as a final control. The problem with denying them the services while they are in prison is that if they are eventually compassionately released, they may have only a matter of weeks or days to go through what will be quite an onerous process to avoid a horrible death.

Kit Malthouse

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The hon. Lady is feeling towards the point I was trying to make, perhaps slightly incoherently. The point is that in my view, whether or not those people have access to this service, it should be based on an assessment of them as themselves, including their mental capacity, particular characteristics and their settled will, just as it would be for everyone else under the Bill. The fact that they are, at that point, a prisoner impacts on the context in which their capacity is assessed, which must be the critical factor. Having a blanket ban on all prisoners, capable or otherwise, seems cruel, if I am honest.

We know that prisons have to assess capacity in difficult circumstances. There are prisoners who decide to decline food and water and starve themselves to death. They are assessed as having capacity, if that is not the case, and in certain circumstances they are force fed, if it is seen that they do not have the capacity to take that decision themselves. In fact, the reason why prisons have created hospices within prisons is to deal with exactly such end of life decisions.

If we are doing it for non-assisted dying, why would we deny people the choice and autonomy, having been assessed as capable of making the decision, to do it in prison? Worse than that, if we are going to release them on compassionate grounds, why would we give them a shorter period to access the service than anybody else?