Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateRebecca Paul
Main Page: Rebecca Paul (Conservative - Reigate)Department Debates - View all Rebecca Paul's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is absolutely the hon. Member’s prerogative to press the amendment to a vote if he so wishes. As things stand, because of the baseline, which is the GMC guidance that I have just read out, we constantly go back to the Government’s position that the current corpus of guidance, regulations, advice, training, expertise and professional judgment is, in essence, satisfactory to the Department. We believe in and rely on the professional judgment of the experts in the field. That remains our fundamental position.
The effect of amendment 320 would be that the safeguards in clause 4(4) in respect of the preliminary discussion apply only where the person seeking assistance is aged 18 or over. The amendment would not prevent a discussion with a person under 18. As the Committee will be aware, there is already a requirement that, to be eligible for the provision of assistance under the Bill, a person must be 18 or over when they make their first declaration under clause 1(1)(b).
Amendment 270 would make it a requirement for a registered medical practitioner to ensure that there are no remediable suicide risk factors before proceeding to the initial discussion about assisted dying. The amendment does not state what is to happen if the practitioner considers that there are remediable suicide risk factors. As the Committee will be aware, we rely on medical practitioners to make judgments in relation to their patients that draw on their training, experience and expertise. We would expect the judgment and skill of a medical professional to be brought to bear where there are remediable suicide risk factors.
Amendment 276 would mean that a person is unable to have a preliminary discussion or make a first declaration to be provided with assistance to end their own life until 28 days after receiving a terminal diagnosis. The amendment would add an additional pause into the process for a person who has received a terminal diagnosis in the preceding 28 days. The 28-day pause would apply regardless of the patient’s prognosis, even if they had only one month left to live, for example.
New clause 6 would ensure that an advance decision to refuse treatment under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 cannot be used to seek assisted dying. Our analysis suggests that the new clause is not necessary, because an assisted death is available only to those with capacity, whereas advance decisions provide for a person to be able to refuse treatment at a future time when they have lost capacity. If a person still has capacity, they may be eligible for an assisted death. If they do not have capacity, they will not be eligible, irrespective of whether they have made an advance decision.
That concludes my remarks on this group of amendments. As I say, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could change. However, I hope my comments and observations are helpful to Committee members in considering the Bill.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak briefly, Mr Efford. Many other speakers have already made excellent points in support of the amendments, so I will not repeat them, but I would like to put on record one pertinent point.
During these proceedings, there has been a tendency by some to speak as though assisted dying were another type of treatment or healthcare option being offered by medical practitioners, rather than a completely different and separate offering. I have grave concerns about that. The legal norm, and GMC guidance, is that patients should be offered all reasonable medical treatments. A medical treatment can be defined as something that combats disease or disorder. It is fundamentally about healing, relief of symptoms, recovery and cure. Straightaway, we have a conflict. Assisted dying ends the life of a person. It is not a treatment in the normal sense—
We are talking about what a medical practitioner can and cannot say. During the debate, there was a lot of talk about whether it was a medical treatment or not. If so, guidance indicates how it should be treated, so whether it is a medical treatment or not is relevant and pertinent to the clause. I have an important point that I would like to put on the record; I am happy to raise it at a different point, but I honestly believe that clause 4 is the right place.
The problem is that this is not a general debate on clause 4; it is a debate about a specific group of amendments. We may come later to a general debate on clause 4.
If there is a stand part debate, that will be the right time to make a contribution about the general principles of clause 4.
Okay. I will just put it on the record that whether or not something is a medical treatment is vital. It is possible to give medical treatments without consent, so we need to have that debate.