Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Naz Shah Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 29th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)]

The motives of those proposing the Bill are grounded in compassion—in the heat of this debate, I want to seriously acknowledge that—particularly the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater), who has conducted herself with great dignity throughout. Neither side has a monopoly on compassion—I will always be affected by watching my mum suffer at her death at the age I am now—so let us not think badly of one another’s motives; let us instead be courteous and let us be curious.

My opposition to the Bill is grounded in compassion. To legalise assisted dying would be to create the space for coercion that would undoubtedly see people die who would not otherwise have chosen to do so. There are no safeguards in the Bill that would prevent that.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (First sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kit Malthouse]

I was going to make exactly the same point. I think my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has fundamentally misunderstood what is happening. He referred to there being a discussion through the usual channels. What the hon. Member for Spen Valley has proposed is that we have that discussion now—she said informally—because we have not had the chance to do so before, and that we then return. Then my hon. Friend is free to say whatever he likes about whatever witnesses and table his own amendments as he wishes. There is no intention to conceal anything. If I might be so bold, I think he has misunderstood the process.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Just following on from the speech of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, I would not read the situation as a misunderstanding by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. I read the motion to sit in private not as an informal discussion, but as a very formal discussion. I am grateful to the lead Member for the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, who before this meeting explained to me what has now been explained here—about the issue of people’s availability, privacy and so on. But I do not suspect that we will be going into those details. If people are not available, we do not have to discuss why they are not. We do not have to discuss their personal lives. I am not sure that that is a good enough reason not to have a discussion in public. I trust colleagues across the Committee to be collegiate enough and big enough to refer to witnesses with respect. I think that is a given, considering the way in which we have conducted the Bill so far. I therefore do not support the motion to sit private.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 January) meet—

(a) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 28 January;

(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Wednesday 29 January;

(c) at 11.30 am and 1.00 pm on Thursday 30 January.

(2) during further proceedings on the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, the Committee do meet on Tuesdays and Wednesdays while the House is sitting at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm.

(3) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

[Naz Shah]

I beg to move manuscript amendment (b), after “General Medical Council”, insert “, Royal College of Psychiatrists”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Manuscript amendment (c), after

“Dr Ryan Spielvogel (Senior Medical Director for Aid in Dying Services, Sutter Health, USA)”,

leave out

“Dr Jessica Kaan (Medical Director, End of Life Washington)”

and insert—

“Dr Ramona Coelho (Family Physician in Ontario Canada, founding member of Physicians Together with vulnerable Canadians)”.

Manuscript amendment (d), after

“Dr Miro Griffiths (University of Leeds)”,

leave out

“Yogi Amin (Partner, Irwin Mitchell)”

and insert—

“Ellen Clifford (Co-ordinator, UK Deaf and Disabled People’s Monitoring Coalition. Author and Visiting Research Fellow within the Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics at Brighton)”.

Manuscript amendment (e), after “Lord Sumption” insert “Karon Monaghan KC”.

Manuscript amendment (f), leave out

“Dr Chloe Furst (Geriatrician and Palliative Care Physician, Adelaide), Alex Greenwich MP (MP for Sydney, Parliament of New South Wales), Professor Meredith Blake (University of Western Australia)”

and insert—

“Dr John Daffy, previously head of infectious diseases at St Vincent’s Hospital in Melbourne, Dr Stephen Parnis, previous Vice-President of the Australian Medical Association, Professor Sinead Donnelly, a Consultant Palliative Medicine Professor in New Zealand”.

Manuscript amendment (g), leave out “Dr Amanda Ward” and insert

“Barbara Rich (Barrister) and Dr Philip Murray (University of Cambridge)”.

Manuscript amendment (i), at end of table, insert—

[Naz Shah]

On amendment (b), given the issue we are considering, I think it is important that the Royal College of Psychiatrists is involved. One thing that is very important to me is the issue of coercion, and the royal college would be able to shed light on that. One of the many reasons advanced for giving the Bill its Second Reading was that we would have further debate, and the royal college would add value to that.

On amendment (c), Dr Ramona Coelho is a physician with well-founded concerns about the operation of the law in Canada. She is a member of the Ontario Medical Assistance in Dying Death Review Committee, and she gave evidence to the Scottish Parliament Committee that considered the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill.

On amendment (d), Ellen Clifford is co-ordinator of the UK Deaf and Disabled People’s Monitoring Coalition, and she has a key role in advocating for people with disabilities.

[Danny Kruger]

I want to speak in support of the proposed addition of Ellen Clifford. Last week, she won a High Court case against the previous Government for their consultation on benefits reform, so she is no friend of my party, but she is a powerful advocate on behalf of disabled people, and she represents the deaf and disabled people’s organisations that are so important in informing the Government on the implementation of policy that affects disabled people. I recognise that the hon. Lady has included some representatives of the disabled community, but I suggest that there would be particular value in hearing from Ms Clifford because of her role as the co-ordinator of the monitoring coalition of all these deaf and disabled people’s organisations across the country. She is the best person to advise the Committee on the operation of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Given what you have just said, Sir Roger, I would be happy not to go through the individual amendments unless anybody wants to comment or wants me to add anything.

[The Chair]

I do not wish to prevent the hon. Lady from speaking to any of the other amendments, because we have grouped them all. She was doing very well. If she works through them, that will tell other Members where she is coming from.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Sir Roger.

By adding Karon Monaghan KC, an eminent equality and human rights law barrister, amendment (e) would add balance among the lawyers in the Committee. I would also like to add James Munby, or someone from His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, because we need someone who can speak to court capacity issues in relation to the Bill. Professor Katherine Sleeman is a great expert on all these matters.

I am going through the list, and I am unclear what the Australian MP would add. If we remove the other two, there are other pro-AD Australian experts who will speak instead. If we replace those three, who are experts from—

[Kim Leadbeater]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. My hon. Friend has just mentioned two names that are not in her amendment, and I find that slightly confusing.

[Naz Shah]

These are replacements of the words in your paper.

[The Chair]

Order. First, they are not mine. Please remember that you are addressing the Chair.

Secondly, the hon. Member for Bradford West has a list of amendments that she has tabled, to add some people and remove others. Patently, she cannot refer to people who are not on that list. If she works through it name by name, I think we will get to where we need to be.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate that, Sir Roger. Adding Richard Robinson—

[Hon. Members]

Not on the list.

[The Chair]

Are we working from the same list? [Interruption.] Order. Continue to work through the list and you will get to where you need to be.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Sir Roger.

[Danny Kruger]

I want to make a general point in support of the hon. Lady’s suggestions.

[The Chair]

No, I am sorry. Please let the hon. Lady finish her speech.

[Naz Shah]

I apologise. I thank everybody for bearing with me on this one.

Amendment (e) would insert Karon Monaghan KC after Lord Sumption. I have said that I would like her added because of her expertise.

Amendment (f) would insert Dr John Daffy, previously head of infectious disease at St Vincent’s hospital in Melbourne, Dr Stephen Parnis, previous vice-president of the Australian Medical Association, and Professor Sinéad Donnelly, a consultant palliative medical professor in New York. That is what I was speaking to when I was talking about having three people from one country and not having an alternative voice. I think it is really important to have an alternative voice, and I am not sure what added value the MP for Sydney would bring to the debate when we have so many people contributing from countries that are pro and delivering, rather than from those that have concerns.

Amendment (g) would remove Dr Amanda Ward and insert Barbara Rich, barrister, and Dr Philip Murray from the University of Cambridge.

[The Chair]

I think you have one more. Would you also like to speak to amendment (i)? It is on the other side of the amendment paper, which we nearly all missed.

Let me assist the hon. Lady: she wishes us to insert, at the end of the table in the sittings motion, a new set of witnesses on Thursday 30 January, to give evidence until no later than 5 pm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

I rise to speak to amendment (b) and to the other amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bradford West. As we discussed in private, I am concerned that the promoter of the Bill, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, has been through an extensive period of trying to collate everybody’s recommendations for the Bill and reach a list that is both manageable within the timeframe and a compromise for all of us on what we would like to see.

The odd adjustment here and there is fine, but we ought to bear in mind that in any one session we need to have sufficient time for people to speak. We have to be careful not to double up because we may or may not think that a particular witness might propose a view with which we are sympathetic, when we already have people who are covering the same subject. On amendment (b), for example, all psychiatrists are regulated by the General Medical Council, as I am sure the hon. Member for Bradford West knows, so effectively the royal college is a doubling up of expertise, which is not necessarily in the interests of time. Similarly, in amendment (c), the hon. Lady is proposing a physician from Canada—

[Naz Shah]

rose—

[Kit Malthouse]

I will just finish, if I may. Our Bill is built on a very different legal framework from Canada’s. Drawing legislative parallels between the two seems like a cul-de-sac, not least because, as the hon. Lady will know, the legal framework in Canada is dictated by the charter of rights and freedoms, effectively a constitution, which has been used there to widen the scope of the law. Canada started from a very different place as well, so I am not totally convinced.

What the hon. Member for Spen Valley has tried to do with the list is to find overseas territories that are analogous to our own and have adopted a model similar to ours. We are therefore trying to learn lessons from the process of debate and legislative procedure that they went through—either to learn from them or to learn from their mistakes. For example, knocking out the Member of Parliament from Australia would be a mistake, not least because Australia has been through a number of iterations with its law. Most of Australia has a bar on doctor initiation of the conversation. The medical profession think that that is a big negative in Australia, as I understand it, so I would like to understand why, politically and in legislation, it was felt that that was needed or helpful, and why it was imposed.

On the other amendments, the hon. Member for Bradford West is making a value judgment about comparative expertise between Amanda Ward and whoever she wants to propose instead—Philip Murray. I do not know why she is making that value judgment, but as far as I can see, the names were properly submitted in the process. The hon. Lady obviously had the chance to submit names during the process. For better or worse, as she may see fit, the hon. Member for Spen Valley has come up with a list that is a compromise. That is not to say that the hon. Member for Bradford West cannot arrange briefings with any of these experts outside the formal process, for Members to attend should they so wish, or that she cannot seek advice from them during the process of the Bill.

My primary concern about the amendments is that we are opening up a whole area of debate where we could all have gone with our suggestions. I would rather stick with the list that we have, because I fear that the hon. Member for Bradford West is doubling up and making value judgments about expertise that are not necessarily warranted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank colleagues for their time this afternoon. It has been an extremely productive session. I am very proud of the tone of the debate: I think we have done a very good job, as we did on Second Reading, of showing this place in a good light.

I reiterate that there are a range of views in this Bill Committee, in the same way that there are a range of views across the House on this significant and deeply emotive issue. There are a range of views among the witnesses we will hear from, and I spent a huge amount of time ensuring that. Colleagues have given me more than 100 names of people they might like to hear from. I had my own list of people I would like to hear from, and many of them are not on the list of those who will give oral evidence.

I have tried to be extremely balanced, so we will hear from people with a range of views and opinions, but most importantly we will hear from people with expertise. That is the purpose of the Committee: to hear from people who can advise us on the detail of the Bill. We will go through this Bill line by line, and we need to hear from people who can help us to do that. We have some fantastic expertise on the Committee, but for many of us there are areas that we need to learn more about. It is important that the witnesses give us the information to enable us to do that, rather than—as numerous colleagues have said—once again going over the fundamental principles around assisted dying, because we did an excellent job of that on Second Reading.

At the end of our endeavours, we will produce a piece of legislation that will be re-presented to the House, and colleagues will again have the opportunity to vote on it however they see fit. There may be people in this room who vote differently from how they voted on Second Reading; there may be colleagues out there who do likewise, one way or the other.

I am very clear about this Committee’s role, which is to work on the Bill together, collegiately and collaboratively, irrespective of our different views, and re-present it to the House so that the House can continue to do its job. It is not just the Commons; the Lords will also have the opportunity to scrutinise the Bill and table amendments. I have always been open about the fact that this is about us working together. Where the Bill needs to be amended to make it more robust and alleviate people’s concerns, whether that is around coercion or capacity, that is now the Committee’s job. I stand ready to serve and to do that.

We have spent a lot of time this afternoon on this, and quite rightly so. As far as I am concerned, we are now in a position to move forward. I am very happy that we will hear from so many witnesses over several days, and I am happy that I have added more time to that so that we can hear from more witnesses, which I think is important. As colleagues have said, our job now is to get on with this really important piece of work.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the promoter of this Bill, because she has been very helpful. She has certainly added one of my key witnesses to her list, and I am grateful for that.

I want to respond to some of the points that have been made. One of the biggest issues for me is amendment (b), which would insert “Royal College of Psychiatrists”. My hon. Friend the Member for Ashford made the point that all psychiatrists come under the GMC, but not every member of the GMC is a psychiatrist. That speaks to the issue of coercion, mental health and capacity. That is the expertise that I am looking for in the line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, and I would really like to hear from the Royal College of Psychiatrists.

I am happy to be guided by you, Sir Roger, because I am new to this process and I have not done a Bill of this nature before, but my only worry with the outside evidence and briefings is that they will not be on the record when we are looking at Hansard and seeing whether they have been taken into account. I would be happy to receive some assurance about that. Yes, we can organise lots of briefings and lots of experts, but does that not defeat the object of having this debate so robustly in the first instance?

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough raised the issue of language, and the point about added value. I think that language is correct, because I do want to add value to this debate. I want value added, because it is important for my constituents that when I vote on the Bill on Report, I do so knowing that I have listened to all sides of the debate.

My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud asked whether this is a for-and-against argument. In particular, he said that we do not need to hear from those who are opposed, because we want to strengthen the Bill so that it can go through the House. Although I appreciate the sentiment, I put it to everyone that it is not about getting the Bill through; it is about getting the right information so we can scrutinise whether it is fit to go through the House. For that reason, it is important to hear from those who are opposed. It is naive to think that we only need to hear from people who are in support.

[Tom Gordon]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Naz Shah]

Sorry—may I just make my point?

I need to know the other side of the argument in order to make a balanced decision. Those who are opposed to the Bill might have very valid concerns, while those who have expertise in support of the Bill might not give me the same arguments. I want to hear a balance. At the moment, I think there is a real discrepancy between the number of people who are for and against the Bill; it is not very close.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, really wants to get this legislation through Parliament. I also value how she has taken part in the debate and been amenable to having discussions both in Committee and in our offices. I have given my reasons for tabling the amendment, and I particularly want the Committee to accept amendment (b), on the Royal College of Psychiatrists; that is my top amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices off or to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make declarations of interest in connection with the Bill? No.

We will now hear oral evidence from Professor Sir Chris Whitty, chief medical officer for England, and Duncan Barton, chief nursing officer for England, NHS England. Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I remind Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill. I also remind Members that time is tight, so please keep your questions to the point. We must stick to the timings in the sittings resolution that the Committee has already agreed. For this session, we have until 10.05 am. Will the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record? If you are to give an opening statement, please keep it short.

Professor Whitty: I am Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer for England, and I am also representing the chief medical officer for Wales. One statement, which is on behalf of Duncan and myself, and all the CMOs, is that we are completely neutral on the principles of the Bill, which we consider are entirely for society and therefore for Parliament. Although we are answering technical questions, we will not be answering questions of principle, because we feel that is a societal question. We have made it clear to the medical profession, however, that individual doctors should be able to make whatever statements they wish. Obviously, doctors have strong views on all sides of this argument, as members of society do.

Duncan Burton: Good morning. I am Duncan Burton, the chief nursing officer for England. For transparency, I will say that I am also a volunteer trustee of a hospice.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Q Sir Chris, I draw your attention to clause 42(3):

“But if any provision of this Act has not been fully brought into force before the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, that provision (so far as not already in force) comes into force at the end of that period.”

My question is: do you believe that it would be safe to implement this legislation if those provisions had not been fully put in place?

Professor Whitty: If this Bill is passed—I want to stress that; I will say it once, but assume it applies for all the answers I subsequently give—we will clearly need both: a period to make sure that there is technical guidance and legislation, via secondary legislation, because obviously the primary legislation is the Bill; and necessary training for people to be able to do this in an appropriate and dignified way, if that is what Parliament chooses.

[Naz Shah]

So would it be safe?

Professor Whitty: We would want to have the time to do that, but you can do things at speed if you need to. My view is that this is something that is best not done at speed if we can avoid it.

[Naz Shah]

Q I am a former NHS commissioner, Sir Chris. In Bradford West, we have stark health inequalities. Dr Jamilla Hussain, as part of John Wright’s team, will be providing evidence this week. She has found huge mistrust among marginalised ethnic groups—even more so since covid. We know that covid brought to light the inequalities in healthcare access that already existed, especially for economically disadvantaged communities. What lessons do we need to learn from covid and its disproportionate impact on ethnic minority communities when it comes to this Bill in particular and its implementation?

Professor Whitty: That is an absolutely critical question, because it is very important that if the Bill is passed, all parts of society, of whatever ethnicity and of whatever background, have equal access to the Bill—or not, as Parliament determines. That will require adjustment in a variety of ways. Some can be done at a macro level—for example, making sure that everything is translated into the major languages spoken in the United Kingdom—but a lot of it will be to do with the individual interactions that doctors, nurses and other healthcare providers have with individual patients, which must take into account their own starting point, their own knowledge and, most importantly, their own beliefs.

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

Q Sir Chris, you mentioned having time to ensure that people are appropriately trained, and the Bill includes provisions for the Secretary of State to make orders around required training. Could you say a little bit more about that? If Parliament decide to pass an Act of this nature, what training would be helpful and required—in particular around skills, and the assessment of capacity and coercion?

Professor Whitty: I will give my view, and it might be useful to get Duncan’s view on the nursing side, because nurses will often be heavily involved in these discussions.

I would divide the kind of training that is needed into two broad groups: training that is essentially normal medical practice but may need some variation, and things that are clearly specific to this Bill. Issues, for example, around mental capacity—as determined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005—are dealt with every day, in every hospital up and down the country; every doctor and nurse above a certain level of seniority should be able to do that normally. It may require some slight adjustment. There is an absolute expectation within the Act, for example, that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. That is already built into the principles of the Act and the way that things are done. I would extend that to the management of end of life, which should be a normal part of medical and nursing practice—we will all die eventually, and that has always been part of medicine, and always should be. That training should be generic, but may need some adaption.

There will then be some specific things that will be necessary for people to understand the legislation, including, in some cases—if this Bill is passed—if they are to take part in the final part of prescribing drugs to patients. It is much more likely that a very large number of doctors and nurses may get involved in the very earliest stages, because someone may raise an issue with their GP, nurse or consultant, who will need to have the basic understanding for that. In my view, the more detailed later stages will require some specific training. I think there will be a gradation of doctors: those who are happy to have the general, initial conversation; those who are happy to have the structured conversation that follows; and a minority who will be happy to go on to take part in the final stages.

It is very important that the wishes of the patient are respected. That is the central point of this. We must start with what is good for someone in their last six months of life, and for their immediate family, but we must also make sure that the wishes of healthcare professionals around this area are absolutely protected, when it comes to conscience and to choice.

Duncan Burton: I am mindful that there are two groups of staff who would potentially be working in this service, if the Bill is passed, but also of the wider workforce. At 2 o’clock in the morning, when a patient wants to have a conversation with somebody about end of life, it is going to be a nurse with them, or a nurse in a care home, or a specialist nurse providing cancer care, so we have to think about the training and support that is required for them, be that around signposting or explaining where they can go to access more information. There is an important part about the entire wider workforce that we need to think about.

Clearly, for those people who are working in such a service, we need to think about the safeguarding elements, and how we make sure there is support through safeguarding training and confidentiality—particularly mindful that some patients may choose not to tell their families about this. We need to think about how we enable and support staff in managing those kinds of circumstances and navigating the legal requirements through the Bill. We need to think ahead about what we need to do in undergraduate training for doctors and nurses, and in the curriculum.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

Q So you would be happy if there was an explicit prohibition on recommendation.

Dr Green: I am reluctant to make a statement on that in this forum. We will go away and discuss it, and come back to you.

[Naz Shah]

Q This question applies to both of you. On there being a first doctor and a second doctor, the first doctor is required to determine that the patient has a terminal illness, that they have capacity, and that they are not being coerced or pressured. Again, it is for the second doctor to make sure that the patient has a terminal illness, that they have capacity and, again, that they are not being coerced or pressured. I appreciate that Sir Chris Whitty talked about doctors, and you talked about everybody, being trained in capacity and coercion issues, but those doctors may never have met in the first instance the person who is seeking assisted dying.

The question that worries me is, to be able to fulfil all those actions in all cases, without fear of mis-determining, the two doctors would have to be specialists in all the relevant diseases. For example, if somebody has a brain tumour, lung cancer, or a different type of cancer, would the doctor have to be an expert in that to determine that the person is terminally ill?

From the GMC’s point of view, would we find ourselves in a situation where doctors are working outside their professional competencies and expertise? From the BMA’s point of view, how do we protect doctors from finding themselves having to diagnose life expectancy for a disease they are not a specialist in, or to determine capacity when they are not a specialist in that, or to determine a lack of coercion when they potentially do not know the patient and do not have experience of that? Finally, when the next step is taken and the court has to rely on the testimony of these doctors to protect the patient, can those testimonies safely be relied on by a court and by a judge, given all those concerns?

Mark Swindells: There are quite a few points there—let me work through them backwards. We have some existing guidance for doctors when they act as a witness—for example, in a court setting or a medical legal situation—that talks in general terms about the importance of being an appropriate witness. Inherent to that is some expertise and understanding of the topic they are assisting the court on. I suppose that those sorts of principles would be ones that, if the Bill is passed in this form—I say again, the GMC does not have a view on what the delivery mechanism or the Bill should look like—are applicable points from the guidance, which would read across.

You heard from the chief medical officer his caution with regards to going with a condition-based assessment for this sort of thing. We would not have a particular view on that, but there is one thing that I want to highlight. The Bill talks about specialism in the context and seeking advice from a psychiatrist. On the specialist register held by the GMC, there are five specialisms connected with psychiatry, so some clarity—whether the Bill is intended to cover any, or a particular one, of those—would be good.

I know that it is not restricted in the “independent doctor” and “coordinating doctor” roles in the Bill either, but we are aware that when doctors pursue a specialty, in the sense that they become accredited and go on to our specialist register, that does not fix in time their individual scope of practice or expertise. Many doctors will go into slightly different fields, or focus on one particular area, so one cannot necessarily rely on the specialist register as a current indication of a doctor’s area of competence in that way. On what the precise delivery mechanism is and the point you make about whether either of those two roles of doctor have seen the person, because we have not taken a view on what the law should be, we have not taken a firm view of any process or eligibility, but I note the point.

Dr Green: If I may, I will clarify my previous answer, having had a little more thought. I do not believe that it is ever appropriate for a doctor to recommend that a patient goes through an assisted dying process. My internal thoughts on whether it should be on the face of the Bill, contained in guidance or contained in good medical practice was the point that I was unsure about.

[Lewis Atkinson]

indicated assent.

Dr Green: With regard to the specific questions, no, I do not believe that a doctor has to be a specialist in the individual disease at stake to advise a patient about prognosis. I can only refer you back to what Dr Whitty said: that in the majority of cases, it is fairly clear—this applies to capacity, too—but in some cases, it is not so clear. What is important is that the doctor has the ability to seek further advice if they need it; it is not always required.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Third sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Members should indicate if they wish to ask a question and who they wish to ask.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Q Thank you very much for those introductions. I have a few questions for each person on the panel. Mr Sanderson, do you think palliative care in this country is fit for purpose?

James Sanderson: There are clearly gaps in the provision of palliative care. However, to start with a positive, I think that the provision of palliative care in this country is exceptional. We are leaders in many ways across the world in the way in which we support people who are facing those challenges in their lives. However, our findings in relation to palliative care show that, although about 90% of the population could benefit from palliative care, only 50% of people are currently able to access it.

One of our concerns is that the provision of palliative care across the country is quite patchy at the moment. I do not think there has been a thorough assessment of the level of palliative care in place—not just the provision of palliative care specifically, but how other services, such as district nursing services, interact with palliative care. In some areas, the provision of district nursing services for general care and support for people who may be at the end of their life is very strong and in other areas it is not so strong.

At Sue Ryder, there is one thing that we are really concerned about. In our survey, 77% of respondents said that they were concerned that the lack of availability of palliative care might enable more people to consider an assisted death than otherwise would. That concern went up to 84% for those who were in favour of assisted dying. We really need to look at the provision of palliative care and the specifics in the Bill that make reference to the fact that people should be offered what is available to them. We need to have a much clearer definition of what “available” means.

[Naz Shah]

Q Dr Ahmedzai, in the evidence you submitted, you said:

“I have studied the reports from, and spoken with medical and nursing clinicians from US and Australian jurisdictions and am satisfied that external coercion has never been reported or led to a prosecution.”

The state of Oregon carried out a survey of people who died under its assisted dying scheme in 2023. Its report stated that 43% of those who chose to die said they did so because they felt they were, and I quote directly from the term used in the survey, a

“Burden on family, friends/caregivers”.

Is that something you are prepared to see happen in the UK?

Dr Ahmedzai: It goes absolutely to the core of being British—we are always saying sorry, aren’t we? We apologise for everything. In everything we do, or everything we might do, we think we might be treading on toes and are always worried about being an imposition. All my professional life, I have come across patients and families in which there clearly is that feeling going on, usually with an older person or even a younger person who is drawing a lot on the emotional and physical resources of the family. It is natural that we feel a burden; it is impossible to take that out of human nature.

The issue is, does feeling that one is, or might become, a burden something that could influence a decision as major as looking for assisted dying? In that respect, I look to all those jurisdictions that have been offering assisted dying in different ways, and I have never seen a single case ever taken to the police or prosecuted. Evidence I have heard from other jurisdictions shows that, yes, it is possible—we all go through life feeling that we are a burden on someone—but it does not influence people in this particular decision. If anything, I am told that, in other jurisdictions, families are saying, “No, don’t do it.” They are exerting negative coercion—“don’t do it” coercion—but people are saying, “No. It’s my life. I’ve made my mind up.” They have mental capacity, and we respect that.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

Q Coercion is one of the main issues that people who are concerned about the Bill raise in opposition to it. That would include myself. We had many distinguished witnesses this morning, and the view was that coercion is “rare” in healthcare generally. It was almost given across that we did not need to worry about it, because staff are so well trained in safeguarding and so on, and they have such a level of experience. What are the views of the panel on that? Is coercion something that we should really not be so concerned about?

Dr Clarke: Based on my clinical experience, I would push back on that in the strongest terms. I am the kind of doctor who believes there is nothing to be gained from sugar coating reality. We have to be absolutely honest with patients and the public about shortcomings, failings and areas where my profession and the rest of the NHS are getting things wrong.

It is my clinical experience that not only are the majority of doctors not necessarily trained in spotting coercion explicitly, but they are often not trained explicitly in having so-called advance care planning conversations with patients around the topic of death and dying, and how a patient would like the end of their life to proceed. It is almost impossible for me to overstate how much avoidable suffering occurs right now in the NHS not because of a lack of resources for palliative care—although that is an enormous problem—but because of a lack of confidence, skill and expertise among the medical profession writ large with these very difficult conversations.

We are all familiar with the idea of death and dying being a taboo in society. People are scared of it, and they hesitate to bring it up with their friends and family. In my experience, many medical students and doctors also suffer from that anxiety. They are scared, and they find it a taboo subject. What that means is that sometimes coercion occurs because the doctor—the consultant responsible for this person’s care—will not even bring up the fact that they think the patient is dying, because it is an uncomfortable conversation. Conversely, I have worked with senior hospital consultants in the NHS who have deliberately prevented our team from accessing their patients, because they believe that the hospital palliative care team wants to kill the patients, and that if I go and see the patient, I will give them a lethal dose of drugs.

These are the kinds of extraordinary misunderstandings and failures to prioritise patient autonomy that are happening now. That is even before we get started on conversations around whether someone would like to consider assisted dying, so it is a huge problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Q We will now hear oral evidence from Sir Max Hill, former director of public prosecutions, Alex Ruck Keene, a barrister specialising in mental capacity, and Sir Nicholas Mostyn, who is a former High Court and Court of Protection judge. For this session we have until 4.15 pm. We may be interrupted by a Division. Could the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

Sir Max Hill: Good afternoon. I am not sure how much by way of introduction you want, so please stop me. I was the UK independent reviewer of terrorism legislation 2017-18, and the director of public prosecutions 2018 to 2023—so I stopped 15 months ago. I am not a campaigner; I am here to bring any experience of criminal casework that I may have picked up along the way, as that was part of my diet as DPP. I have been quite close to the construction of the Bill, and I am happy to deal with any questions that I can.

Sir Nicholas Mostyn: I am Nicholas Mostyn, and I was a judge of the High Court family division, of the Court of Protection and of the administrative court until 2023, when I retired with the onset of Parkinson’s disease—which is a genuine slippery slope, unfortunately. I am now a podcaster and devoting myself to alleviating the hardships of people living with Parkinson’s.

Alex Ruck Keene: I am Alex Ruck Keene. I am a barrister in independent practice, and I need to emphasise that I am giving my evidence as a self-employed barrister, not on behalf of any organisation I am associated with. You will have seen from my written evidence that I am associated with quite a few different organisations, because my practice and career straddles both advising and appearing in court cases involving mental capacity. I teach law on the end of life as a professor of practice at King’s College London. I am also heavily involved in law reform in different ways; for instance, I was the legal adviser to the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act 1983. I also do an awful lot of training in the context of mental capacity of both healthcare and social care professionals.

[Naz Shah]

Q I have just one question, and it is for Sir Max. You have said that you were very concerned about the CPS, during your time at DPP, having to investigate people who accompanied their loved ones to Switzerland to end their lives. I share that concern. However, my understanding is that around half of those who currently visit Dignitas would not qualify for assisted dying under the Bill, because they do not have a diagnosis of six months to live. Is the Bill the right measure to solve the problem that you are actually worried about?

Sir Max Hill: If the problem is anybody in future going on their own or accompanied by their loved ones to Dignitas, the answer is no—this Bill does not satisfy that. What we have learned from other jurisdictions around the world, where we see broader or multiple groups beyond the terminally ill who are entitled to use new legislation, has not been the model for this legislation, unless you and Parliament were to dramatically change it. The nuanced answer to your question is that this Bill does provide an opportunity for those in the category of being terminally ill, as defined in the Bill, to no longer have to resort, on their own or supported by loved ones, to going to Dignitas. So, yes, it can and will make a positive difference.

I should add, in answering this question, that my often-quoted personal experience is that 27 cases investigated as assisted suicide came across my own desk as the DPP —five to six cases a year. A substantial proportion of those cases did involve Dignitas, because an accompanying relative who had returned alone was then investigated, but a proportion did not involve Dignitas at all, because there had been deaths at home. Of all those 27 cases, I made the decision to prosecute in only one, which was the case of an individual who was 19 years of age encouraging another teenager to end their life. That was a correct and successful prosecution.

I will also add—because until 15 months ago I was a prosecutor, and prosecutors look to bring criminal cases whenever the law is broken—that there was an additional handful of cases in which, although I was not making the personal decision, I supported authorisation of charges for murder or manslaughter where it was clear that an individual’s life had been brought to an end not at the time of their choosing. It is perhaps important to remember that this Bill, as and when passed—that is a matter for Parliament—would not truncate the homicide jurisdiction in this country. It will still be possible to prosecute for murder in those cases when one would expect to be prosecuted for murder. I think it is important to say that, as a very recent former prosecutor.

[Naz Shah]

Q Following up on that, in the cases in which you authorised prosecution for murder or manslaughter, were issues of coercion ever involved? What were the bold points—the top lines—of those prosecutions?

Sir Max Hill: That small handful of cases involved an elderly couple where either he—it was usually a he—or she had chosen to bring to an end the life of their lifelong partner and, once that act had been carried out, claimed that it was an assisted suicide in circumstances where the surviving partner was merely carrying out the wish of the person now dead. There are a handful of cases in which that is clearly wrong and should not be accepted and where murder should be the offence brought before the court.

The point, though, is that throughout the time that I served as DPP—and, indeed, the time served by all my predecessors—we did not have the coercion offences created by the Bill, which I suggest would be a significant advance, and nor did we have a legal system in which the investigation was taking place before the death. It was the other way around. In each of the 27 cases I considered, the deceased individual was already dead, and that is when the scrutiny started. The major advantage of the Bill, if I can put it that way, is that that will be reversed, and scrutiny will be before death. In the case of coercion, where it fits the new potential clauses, prosecutions can—and, I am sure, will—be brought.

[Dr Tidball]

Q It is extremely helpful to understand the opportunity for scrutiny before death. Building on that point, are there any safeguards around those practices that are not currently included in the Bill but should be, particularly around detecting coercion and exploring alternative care options? I also have one follow-up question, if I may.

Sir Max Hill: I think that coercion and the coercion clauses in the Bill should be read alongside the capacity clauses. What we are looking for, as required by clause 1(1) and clause 1(2), is a clear, settled and informed wish, voluntarily made without coercion or pressure. Those aspects were taken, at least in part, from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on 1961 Act cases. Capacity involves understanding information, retaining it, using it and communicating it. If those hallmarks are not there, you may be in a situation where you should be considering coercion. I think you read the two together.

To answer your question directly, the criminal liability clauses—clause 24, and the new offences in clauses 26 and 27—are robust. As a matter for your scrutiny, they are aspects that we do not have in the law at present. There is, of course, the addition of clause 36, under which you cannot be a witness or a proxy to the procedure that is enshrined in the Bill if you are too close to the terminally ill person. That is another hallmark of the Bill that will hedge against coercion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

Q I will just jump straight to my final question. Dr Kaan, you said that you felt that people who felt they might be a burden were exercising their autonomy, and it was a perfectly appropriate reason to seek an assisted death. Is that right, and do you think there is anything more we should do to make it easier for people to access this right? Do you think they should be asserting anything other than their wish to do so?

Dr Kaan: You characterised it correctly in that I think that for people who have capacity, and who are making the decision to have this as an option, a part of their reasoning is that they want to save their family from an onerous caregiving experience. I think that is their right and it is part of their value system.

Of course, if that is the only reason, we are going to be exploring that. As Dr Spielvogel has said, that is a red flag. We are going to be exploring that, and exploring whether acceptable alternatives exist and what are the resources that the person may not be aware of. That is always part of the discussion. These discussions are always broad and multifactorial. But I think it is appropriate and okay for somebody to say, “I do not want my family to experience what I myself had to experience when I was caregiving for my elderly parents with dementia.” I have heard that many, many times. I do think people who have capacity should have their autonomy respected, in terms of the values that are driving them to make this decision.

We always want to work towards improving the social support for caregiving that exists in our society. There is certainly a lack of it here in the US, and probably there in the UK as well. Hand in hand with allowing people to make an informed decision about the option of having an assisted death, you should also be a strong advocate for social support and caregiving services at the end of life, because those really are important and needed.

[Naz Shah]

Q Dr Spielvogel, there is a Bill in California, SB 1196, which was introduced on 24 February 2024. It proposes, first, to remove the six-month terminal illness prognosis and allow requests from those with a “grievous and irremediable” disease causing unbearable suffering; secondly, to allow dementia patients to request assisted suicide if two doctors deem them to have capacity; thirdly, to allow self-administration of lethal drugs via intravenous injection; and, fourthly, to eliminate the sunset clause in the current law. Do you know what the status of that Bill is? Is it still live? It suggests a significant broadening of the law, which would have similarities to that in Canada, and it would seem to reinforce the slippery slope argument.

Dr Spielvogel: That is a good question. I do not know the specific status of the Bill, but I would assume that it has itself undergone an assisted death at this point. That Bill is not really being supported by any of our advocacy groups or, by and large, the physicians who perform assisted dying, because it is, as you mentioned, very broad and not aligned with how we feel standard practice is going and where we would want it to go. That Bill did not receive support from many of us.

[Naz Shah]

Q In California—we are talking specifically about renal failure—they have got a six-month limit, in some cases, because of insurance policies. Is that being broadened out? I understand there is a huge difference in American politics in the laws regarding lobby groups, and so on, and the influence of those insurance companies. We have an NHS to which those restrictions do not apply. Have you done any analysis on that? How would you respond to that?

Dr Spielvogel: Can you clarify what you mean about kidney disease and the six-month prognosis, and the interplay with insurance there?

[Naz Shah]

Q When it comes to renal failure, in particular, there are people who can request assisted dying because their insurance company will not pay for more than six months. Here we have an NHS, in which there is no limit on the kind of interventions you would have to live a longer life.

Dr Spielvogel: That is not factually accurate. When people go on dialysis, they automatically get Medicare, which is our version of the NHS, more or less. That is a national health insurance for people who are 65 and older or who have certain kinds of diseases. When you have end-stage kidney disease and you need dialysis, you automatically get Medicare and you get dialysis for the rest of your life, however long that is. People are often on dialysis for years. It is not that you are on it for six months and then you are off.

[Naz Shah]

Q Does that cover all conditions?

Dr Spielvogel: We were just talking about kidney disease.

[Naz Shah]

Q Yes, but does it cover any conditions that would fall under the scope of a six-month bill?

Dr Spielvogel: If you have a six-month prognosis to live, regardless of the condition, that would fall under this. That would make you eligible. That has nothing to do with insurance coverage for your condition. Insurance coverage is completely separate. It is not tied to this. All that prognosis does is to allow the individual to seek this care.

[Naz Shah]

Q Sorry, but just to clarify, the question was: would the availability of Medicare apply to all those conditions that come under the six-month prognosis? As for kidney failure, would they be entitled to Medicare? Would all the other conditions included also be entitled to Medicare once the insurance ran out?

Dr Spielvogel: No. Insurance does not run out. There is maybe a misunderstanding of how medical insurance works in the US. Medical insurance does not run out. I think we are talking about two different things.

[Naz Shah]

Q But there are cases where insurance companies would stop paying for the treatment of the individual. Am I right?

Dr Spielvogel: No, I actually do not think that you are right. When we are talking about lifesaving interventions such as chemotherapy or dialysis, that is not correct. They are bound by law to cover all things that are medically necessary. They do not say, “You have gotten six months of chemo. We are not paying for any more.” That is not how it works.

[Sean Woodcock]

Q It seems clear from what you are saying that in your view, coercion is rare, or at least it is rare in comparison to familial pressure not to go ahead with assisted dying. It does sound, though, like you are saying that it is more common for people to say that they feel as though they are a burden towards the end. I think Dr Kaan said it was common, or certainly less rare than coercion to go ahead with assisted dying.

We heard from experts earlier about the paucity and lack of provision of care across the country. Certain people can get access to very good care, but too many people struggle to, particularly people of certain ethnic backgrounds, people on low income, and so on. Please correct me if I have misinterpreted your views, but from what you have said so far, it sounds as if you think that exercising the right to assisted dying because there is a paucity of appropriate care in your locality, or because you cannot afford it, is a perfectly legitimate exercise of autonomy, based on the society around you. Would that be a fair assumption of your views?

Dr Kaan: I think that is not an entirely fair representation of what I am saying. Yes, we do need respect for people’s autonomy and the reasons they may come to this choice, but I also think that from what I have heard this morning, it sounds like there is a conception that people choose assisted dying and then they do it. What I see, by and large, is that people want to have this as an option. It is an option among the other options of hospice palliative care or palliative treatments. The availability of this as an option often brings people tremendous relief from their suffering—just from the anxiety over how they might die, or what suffering might be in store.

I had a case of a woman with ALS, or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. She was very afraid of how she might die with that condition, and she felt like she might suffocate to death. She was so focused on having the option of aid in dying because she was terrified of what might be in store for her. We were able to incorporate her into a hospice that offered comprehensive end-of-life care, including the option of aid in dying. We got her through the process, we had the medications available and she told me how much relief she felt from having it as an option, but ultimately she decided not to use it. She decided that she was getting really good care from her palliative care and hospice teams, and that her symptoms were well controlled. Although she was extremely grateful that she knew the medications were available should she decide to use them, she did not end up needing to use them or wanting to use them.

That is the reality of what is happening in a lot of cases where this is an option among other options. The availability of this option is, in and of itself, a palliative care treatment for many people. On whether or not wanting to avoid being “a burden” to a family member or to a caregiving team is a valid reason to pursue this, yes, I think that is a valid reason among many for people who have a value system that highly orders that.

Dr Spielvogel: I just wanted to add something, if I may. I have heard this argument—or rather, this concern—a few different times, and it strikes me as what is called a false dilemma logical fallacy: that there is either/or, when in reality there are many alternatives that people can choose from. Saying “If we don’t have all of these types of care, we shouldn’t offer this option” is like a hospital that does not have sufficient amounts of IV pain medications saying to a labouring woman, “Well, we don’t have enough IV pain medications, so we are not going to offer you a labour epidural, because that is a false choice.” That does not actually make sense.

Look at it from a patient’s perspective. Think about a patient who is dying from terminal cancer, is in lots and lots of pain and does not have any good options for their pain control. Imagine saying to that person, “We don’t have all of this care or this option over here available to you, so we are not going to allow you to have an assisted death”, even if they are telling you, “This is what I want. Why won’t you give this to me?”. It does not make sense to remove this as an option just because all of the options might not be available to everyone all of the time. It is a bit cruel when you think about it from a patient’s perspective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

I beg to move amendment (a), in the list of witnesses set out in the table in the Sittings Motion agreed by the Committee on 21 January 2025, after Mencap (Thursday 30 January, until no later than 5.00 pm), leave out “Representative of Senedd Cymru” and insert—

“Professor Emyr Lewis (Emeritus Professor, Department of Law and Criminology, University of Aberystwyth), Royal College of General Practitioners, Royal College of Psychiatrists.”

These amendments allow additional witnesses to be called to give oral evidence, including representatives from Disability Rights UK, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and an expert in Welsh devolution and constitutional matters.

As the sessions today have shown, hearing from expert witnesses is an extremely important part of this process, so I hope I have the support of the Committee in making these additions. On the motion to call additional witnesses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, I respect the suggestion but I am confident that we have an eminently qualified witness to cover issues of coercion and domestic abuse in Professor Jane Monckton-Smith, who was suggested by my hon. Friend.

We have also heard today—and will hear from many witnesses over the next few days—from medical doctors, social workers, nurses, palliative care experts and geriatricians. That is around 50 witnesses in total. While I fully appreciate that a wide range of additional charities and organisations has valuable contributions to make, I would encourage them to submit written evidence so that the Committee has the benefit of their thoughts.

Regarding the start of the line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, given the huge volume of evidence—both oral and written—that we have received and are still receiving, I have consulted with colleagues across the Committee and there is a consensus that having next week to absorb and evaluate the evidence, and to prepare any amendments in light of it, is extremely important. Consequently, we would begin line-by-line scrutiny on Tuesday 11 February, as per the amendment.

I hope that these amendments demonstrate the robust approach that the Committee and I are taking to our work, and I encourage colleagues to support them.

[Naz Shah]

I beg to move an amendment to amendment (a), at end insert—

“Richard Robinson, CEO of Hourglass, Cherry Henry-Leach of STADA, Standing Together Against Domestic Abuse ”.

I completely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley and I am grateful to her for adding Professor Jane Monckton-Smith to the witness list. I also absolutely agree that the evidence we receive is really valuable.

This is an amendment tabled yesterday by the Mother of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) yesterday, to which I have added my name.

The reason for the amendment is that Hourglass focuses on domestic abuse of older people and it has particularly noted that the majority of such victims are female. Hourglass estimates that one in six elderly people are victims of coercion in the UK. This raises serious concerns that such people could be pushed into ending their lives if the Bill is enacted. Hourglass has not published a public opinion on the Bill.

Standing Together Against Domestic Abuse has said that

“We must echo concerns raised by the VAWG sector”—

the violence against women and girls sector—

“and disability activists about the bill’s current safeguards. There is insufficient clarity on what constitutes coercion and limited reflection on carer capacity to support someone terminally ill. Without robust measures, there is a real risk that assisted dying could be exploited as a tool for coercion or even femicide.

Statistics show that over 88% of unlawful ‘mercy killings’ are perpetrated by men towards women, often involving violent means. These troubling realities demand urgent consideration in shaping this legislation.

We also highlight the health sector’s role in identifying domestic abuse. With 80% of victim-survivors having their first or only point of contact in healthcare, it is critical that health professionals are equipped to identify and respond to abuse.

We call on the Government to ensure the proposed bill includes stringent safeguards and that healthcare systems are equipped to recognise and prevent the potential misuse of assisted dying. Femicide is already a crisis in the UK, and no law should inadvertently contribute to its escalation.”

All my adult life, I have had experience of dealing with domestic abuse and coercion, and I draw on that experience to speak to these amendments. Although Professor Jane Monckton-Smith is an expert, she is an academic. These two organisations work with people who have been victims of abuse.

In addition, we had an official meeting with the Clerk to discuss the proposals for Committee sittings. It was said at that meeting that we would only have witnesses who would give evidence, particularly in person, that would contribute to the deliverability and the workability of the Bill. Since then, we have had families added to the list of witnesses. That adds weight to the argument that we should have witnesses who are providing a service to victims directly.

[Dr Tidball]

I, too, support my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley and in particular I want to highlight the helpful addition of Kamran Mallick of Disability Rights UK. That augments an already comprehensive list of expert disabled people, which includes: Professor Tom Shakespeare, an internationally renowned disability rights academic; Dr Miro Griffiths, a Disability Studies scholar at the University of Leeds; and Chelsea Roff, the founder of Eat Breathe Thrive. On the panel, we will also have a representative of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, who will be able to give a good overview on the intersection between protected characteristics. Finally, there will be Jon Sparkes, the representative of Mencap.

I am really pleased that my hon. Friend has worked so hard to ensure that the voices of disabled people are integrated across a number of the panels that we will see over the next two days, and the addition in her amendment is really helpful. I commend her for it.

[Lewis Atkinson]

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Having agreed to extend the time on Thursday to hear devolution issues and from the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Royal College of Psychiatrists, by adding two further witnesses, the amendment to the amendment would reduce the time available on those options. In an ideal world we would like to hear from all sorts of people. The option of written evidence is available. We have got other evidence, and I want to ensure that Thursday’s session is focused on the proposals that my hon. Friend has made.

[Naz Shah]

There is nothing in my amendment that suggests Professor Monckton-Smith is not capable in her expertise. I am asking for other expertise to be brought to the table. Yes, there is the argument that people can submit written evidence—but so could every witness we have heard from today, and that we will hear from tomorrow and the day after. If that is the yardstick, is this just a tokenistic exercise? I would argue that for women in particular, who are the victims of domestic abuse—

[Dr Tidball]

I note that Laura Hoyano, who is giving evidence on Thursday, is a domestic abuse barrister. She has also been involved in inquiries on child sexual abuse, and has a great range of experience in that area. She will bring that to the table as a practising barrister working closely on such cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I welcome my hon. Friend’s intervention and I recognise Laura Hoyano’s expertise. I would respectfully push back that, as a victim of domestic violence—as a person who has experienced it and campaigned on it for all my adult life—there is a difference between an academic who has studied it and people who have worked with victims, in particular elderly women. The expert is a barrister with experience of young people and children and domestic abuse, and Professor Monckton-Smith is also an academic—yes, she has been a police officer—but I would value a witness who has worked with victims of domestic abuse. That is all I have to say on it.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question negatived.

Main Question put and agreed to.

Amendments made: (b), in the list of witnesses set out in the table in the Sittings Motion agreed by the Committee on 21 January 2025, after

“Professor Aneez Esmail (University of Manchester)”

insert “Disability Rights UK”.

Amendment (c), in the list of witnesses set out in the table in the Sittings Motion agreed by the Committee on 21 January 2025, after

“Dr Lewis Graham (University of Cambridge),”

leave out “John Kirkpatrick” and insert “Baroness Falkner”.

Amendment (d), in paragraph (2) of the sittings motion agreed by the Committee on 21 January 2025, after “Wednesdays” insert

“starting on 11 February 2025”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Kit Malthouse.)

5.30 pm

Adjourned till Wednesday 29 January at twenty-five minutes past Nine o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

TIAB 01 Ben Scott

TIAB 02 Michael Vidal

TIAB 03 Compassion in Care

TIAB 03(a) Compassion in Care (further evidence)

TIAB 04 Dr George Gillett, an NHS doctor and psychiatrist

TIAB 05 Dr Stephen Hutchison MD

TIAB 06 Dr Andrew Boorne

TIAB 07 Jess Carrington, Registered Social Worker and Best Interests Assessor

TIAB 08 Greg Lawton MPharm MRPharmS FFRPS MBCS LLM, Barrister and Pharmacist

TIAB 09 Australian Care Alliance

TIAB 10 Dr Peter Knight

TIAB 11 Dr Isky Gordon FRCR, FRCP, Emeritus Professor Paediatric Imaging, UCL, London

TIAB 12 Dr Peter O’Halloran, RN, PhD, Registered Nurse, Senior Lecturer, Queen’s University Belfast, Researcher in chronic illness, palliative and end-of-life care

TIAB 13 Rose

TIAB 14 Dr Rachel Fisher

TIAB 15 Nigel Andrew Gordon Jones, a retired Consultant General Surgeon

TIAB 16 St Gemma’s Hospice

TIAB 17 Sir Nicholas Mostyn

TIAB 18 Leah Locke

TIAB 19 Alison Taylor

TIAB 20 Dr Katharine Crossland

TIAB 21 John Forrester

TIAB 22 Don Stickland

TIAB 23 Christina Blandford-Beards

TIAB 24 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC)

TIAB 25 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales

TIAB 26 British Association of Social Workers

TIAB 27 Plunkett Centre for Ethics: A centre of Australian Catholic University located at St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney

TIAB 28 Dame Sarah Mullally, Bishop of London, Lead Bishop on Health and Social Care for the Church of England and former Chief Nursing Officer for England on behalf of the Bishops of the Church of England and the Archbishops’ Council

TIAB 29 Cicely Saunders International

TIAB 30 Lejeune Clinic for Children with Down Syndrome

TIAB 31 Voice for Justice UK

TIAB 32 Get on Downs - a Down Syndrome Support Group

TIAB 33 British Medical Association (BMA)

TIAB 34 Portsmouth Down Syndrome Association

TIAB 35 Better Way campaign

TIAB 36 Hospice UK

TIAB 37 Association of Catholic Nurses for England and Wales

TIAB 38 East Midlands Palliative Medicine Consultants and Specialty Doctors

TIAB 39 Marie Curie Palliative Care Research Department, University College London (UCL)

TIAB 40 Humanists UK

TIAB 41 Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ (NCOB)

TIAB 42 Marie Curie

TIAB 43 LOROS, the Leicestershire and Rutland Hospice

TIAB 44 Professor Emeritus Sam H Ahmedzai

TIAB 45 Professor Nancy Preston, Professor of the International Observatory on End of Life Care, Lancaster University; and Professor Suzanne Ost, Law School, Lancaster University

TIAB 46 Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC (Hon)

TIAB 47 Anureg Deb and Dr Lewis Graham

TIAB 48 Australian Centre for Health Law Research, Queensland University of Technology, Australia

TIAB 49 The Bios Centre

TIAB 50 The Orders of St John Care Trust

TIAB 51 Living and Dying Well

TIAB 52 Professor Katherine Sleeman, King’s College London

TIAB 53 British Islamic Medical Association (BIMA)

TIAB 54 Joint written evidence submitted by Chelsea Roff (Eat Breathe Thrive, UK), Dr Angela Guarda (Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, US), Dr Philip Mehler (University of Colorado School of Medicine, US), Dr Patricia Westmoreland (University of Colorado, US), Dr Scott Crow (University of Minnesota, US), Dr Catherine Cook-Cottone (University at Buffalo, SUNY, US), Dr Anita Federici (York University, Canada), and Dr Agnes Ayton (Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust, UK)

TIAB 55 Professor Allan House

TIAB 56 National Care Forum (NCF)

TIAB 57 AtaLoss

TIAB 58 Compton Care

TIAB 59 Dr Odette Spruijt, Medical Director, Launceston Specialist Palliative Care Service

TIAB 60 Rachel Pegrum, Independent Social Worker

TIAB 61 Abdul Rahman Badran

TIAB 62 Alan Thomas, Professor of Old Age Psychiatry, Director of Brains for Dementia Research, Translational and Clinical Research Institute, Faculty of Medical Sciences, Newcastle University

TIAB 63 Dr Julian Neal

TIAB 64 Dr Raymond Towey

TIAB 65 Multiple System Atrophy Trust

TIAB 66 Dr Adrian Tookman

TIAB 67 Royal College of Psychiatrists

TIAB 68 UK Medical Freedom Alliance

TIAB 69 Association of Anaesthetists

TIAB 70 Catholic Union of Great Britain

TIAB 71 My Death, My Decision

TIAB 72 Health Advisory and Recovery Team (HART)

TIAB 73 Kyam Maher MLC, the Attorney-General of South Australia, in his capacity as a member of the Legislative Council of South Australia

TIAB 74 Dr Calum MacKellar, Director of Research, Scottish Council on Human Bioethics

TIAB 75 Christian Medical Fellowship

TIAB 76 Christian Medical and Dental Association of Canada

TIAB 77 Christian Legal Centre

TIAB 78 Written evidence submitted on behalf of a group of anorexia nervosa sufferers and carers

TIAB 79 Dr Angelika Reichstein, Associate Professor in Law, University of East Anglia

TIAB 80 Dr David Randall

TIAB 81 Cruse Bereavement Support

TIAB 82 Compassion in Dying

TIAB 83 General Medical Council (GMC)

TIAB 84 Pathfinders Neuromuscular Alliance

TIAB 85 Royal Pharmaceutical Society

TIAB 86 Motor Neurone Disease Association

TIAB 87 Dr Simon Eyre

TIAB 88 Macdonald Amaran

TIAB 89 Patrick Pullicino

TIAB 90 Luis Espericueta, Researcher and lecturer in bioethics at the University of Granada, Spain

TIAB 91 Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying

TIAB 92 PSP Association (PSPA)

TIAB 93 Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland (APM)

TIAB 94 Academy of Medical Royal College's

TIAB 95 Care Not Killing

TIAB 96 Dr Alexandra Mullock, Senior Lecturer in Law

TIAB 97 Rt Hon. Sir Stephen Sedley

TIAB 98 Carole O’Reilly

TIAB 99 Dr Hannah Denno

TIAB 100 Prof B Anthony Bell MD, Neurosurgeon, University of London

TIAB 101 Matthew Hoyle, Barrister

TIAB 102 Royal College of Nursing

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 29th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Do either of the other witnesses want to come in on that?

Dr McLaren: When we started this in Victoria, we saw a bit of a gap with the implementation. A lot of the education was surrounding the legalities of providing an assessment service in a way that conformed with the legislation, rather than that focused on the clinical skills and applications. I am quite proud of the role that we have had in rolling that out, in providing that peer experience, and in focusing more on some of the clinical skills that apply within a VAD context.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Q I have a couple of questions. Dr Fellingham, Victoria is quite a rural state and I imagine there are difficulties reaching all parts of it. Am I right that a state-wide pharmacy service that delivers assisted dying drugs across the whole state has been set up, but there is no comparable service for the delivery of pain reduction?

Dr Fellingham: A point of clarification: I work in Western Australia, rather than Victoria, but I can give you a view for Western Australia, which is significantly larger, so the problem you have alluded to is much more complicated. Would you like me to speak about the Western Australian context?

[Naz Shah]

I was talking about southern Australia, in particular. That is fine; we can move on. Thank you.

Dr McLaren: I can speak to the Victoria question, if you prefer. To answer your question, we have a state-wide service that supplies the medication across the state. Medication for pain relief is available through standard pharmacy access, so there are no barriers to accessing medication for palliative purposes in rural Australia. It is quite hard to get voluntary assisted dying medication dispensed to Mildura, which is many hours away from the single-state pharmacy, so access is more difficult for voluntary assisted dying than for palliative medication.

[Naz Shah]

Q Thank you. The Australian and British media reported the tragic story of Cyril Tooze, an elderly and terminally ill 84-year-old man in southern Australia, who requested voluntary assisted dying. Mr Tooze stated that he was applying for voluntary assisted dying after waiting nearly a year for the state government to implement a care and housing package for him. He died while waiting for the application process to end. How much does social detriment influence requests for voluntary assisted dying? Please speak from your own experience and about published data.

Dr Mewett: From a palliative care perspective, like Cam and Clare, I have been involved in assessing and having discussions with many, many patients who have requested assisted dying. These patients come from a whole range of socioeconomic backgrounds. In fact, if anything, they tend to come from a perhaps slightly higher, more well-educated background. There is no evidence in our jurisdiction of Victoria, where we have had five and a half years’ experience, that people who are underprivileged, less educated or vulnerable in some other way have readier access to or apply more for VAD.

The case you alluded to, like many cases that are reported from Canada, is certainly tragic in its own way, but such cases are an absolute minority compared with patients who are genuinely determined to have a choice about the way they die and when. Those are separate issues: one is a social welfare issue, and the other is a VAD issue. A patient such as that would not be found eligible, unless he was eligible under the strict criteria that apply in the state in which he lived.

Dr McLaren: As Greg touched on there, when that gentleman applied for voluntary assisted dying, that may have been one of his drivers, but it certainly would not have made him eligible. He did not access voluntary assisted dying, so the system worked. We do see higher socioeconomic status patients applying for voluntary assisted dying. That is evidenced in our Voluntary Assisted Dying Review Board reports, which show a greater proportion of people with higher levels of education. That data is freely available through the Victoria Government website.

[The Chair]

Dr Fellingham, you had your hand up.

Dr Fellingham: Ms Shah asked for some evidence, and I have just looked this up. Our Voluntary Assisted Dying Board reports from Western Australia are also freely available, publicly searchable documents. Each year, the board asks the patients’ reasons for accessing voluntary assisted dying. In order of commonality, the only ones over 50% are

“Loss of dignity, or concern about it…Loss of autonomy, or concern about it”,

and

“Less able to engage in activities making life enjoyable, or concern about it”.

What that reflects to me is that the type of people who seek access to assisted dying are those who tend to be, as my colleagues said, more health literate and more socioeconomically advantaged than your average healthcare consumer, and people for whom the existential reasons that upset them about their disease process are the primary drivers for seeking access to voluntary assisted dying. It is very rarely the absence of service provision or because they feel that they do not have any other choice.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I think that is a matter that we may have to pursue elsewhere.

[Naz Shah]

Q I have a quick question for Dr Griffiths and then Chelsea. Dr Griffiths, how does the Bill exacerbate issues for disabled women in particular who might be experiencing abuse or other vulnerabilities?

Dr Griffiths: There is no indication of how you would place the infrastructure for support for people whose discrimination or injustice is exacerbated through an intersectional lens—for example, the cross-cutting of different experiences—and how that can be attested for within the Bill. For example, if an individual comes forward to discuss with their doctor their concerns, there is no infrastructure for how that would be acknowledged with an intersectional critique.

There is also a concern that many within disabled people’s communities from particular backgrounds, such as women, are pre-exposed to further levels of injustice that are not accounted for, and their experiences of trying to access support for certain aspects of their life are compounded by inequalities. These issues are not addressed by the Bill. In my view, if this mechanism becomes available, the issues that some individuals face in terms of injustice will play into the consciousness of their decision to go forward with this. I cannot think of any clause or amendment that would address that issue in its totality.

[Naz Shah]

Q Before I move on to Chelsea, I want to point out that Professor Shakespeare said that most disabled people’s organisations support the Bill, but that only one deaf and disabled people’s organisation that opposes it is giving evidence. I just wanted that point noted for the Committee.

Chelsea, thank you for your evidence. Eating disorders are classified as mental disorders under the Mental Health Act. The Bill explicitly states that a person cannot be considered terminally ill only because of a mental disorder. You have also talked about the withdrawal of insulin. Could you respond to both of these? Why do you believe that eating disorders would still meet the criteria under the Bill, and likewise for the issue of stopping insulin?

Chelsea Roff: There is a false distinction being made in the Bill between a mental disorder and its somatic or physical manifestations. Mental disorders, especially eating disorders—not just anorexia—impact the body, and have life-threatening consequences. We had 20,000 acute hospitalisations for eating disorders in this country last year, and we have massive gaps in care. Those are individuals who, if they were to choose to forgo treatment or could not access treatment because they were on a wait list for a long period of time, would qualify under this Bill.

I draw your attention to the evidence I submitted with Dr Agnes Ayton from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and Dr Angela Guarda, a leading physician from John Hopkins University. I also draw you to our own case law in the Court of Protection where we have had physicians represent eating disorders as terminal conditions, as in the end stage of their illness.

I am grateful that you have drawn the connection to diabetes, because it is not just about eating disorders. Substance use disorders would have the same effect. Outside of mental disorders, HIV/AIDS is a progressive condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. Are you okay with a 19-year-old young man who decides to discontinue treatment qualifying under this Bill? Those are the questions you have to ask. I am not, in principle, against the Bill, but you have to look at the letters on the page, because they will be interpreted after the Bill is passed. Your constituents are depending on you.

[The Chair]

I am sorry, but we still have more Members and questions than we have time, so I am going to come down to one question per Member.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Opher]

Q Just to confirm—you have not had any failures of treatment, as far as you are aware?

Dr Furst: There have been no failures of treatment in South Australia, as far as I am aware. I am not aware of any other particular ones around the country that have been heavily broadcast to us.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Q To follow up on that, there is no requirement that the doctor is present when the person self-administers the substance that leads to assisted dying. Am I correct? If that is the case, why does the law not make it necessary for the doctor to remain present until death, because at that point, the doctor would pick up any complications, would they not?

Dr Furst: Every legislation within Australia is slightly different. For South Australia and Victoria, you are correct—well, there is pretty much no obligation all around Australia for a doctor to be present for self-administration. The reason for that is to give individuals autonomy over their death, and over the time and place of their choosing. We in South Australia do touch base with what we call the individual’s contact person to understand if there have been any complications and to check in after the death. A large number of our patients, though, will seek out support from a voluntary assisted dying nurse navigator, who is often present in the house just as a support person. We do also have a lot of feedback from them as to any complications, but the doctor often, or a nurse, will come at a later time to declare life extinct.

The reasoning was that we did not think that there would be complications and we wanted to give people autonomy. We work on a permit system in a lot of jurisdictions in Australia, so people have a permit; they get given their substance and they can take their substance at a time of their choosing. They might have the substance in their house for weeks or months, potentially. Again, there is no obligation to follow through with taking that substance, which we also think is quite important. We know that in Australia, about 30% of patients who have a permit or who are approved for voluntary assisted dying actually decide that they do not want to consume the substance, but it is about giving them that choice and autonomy, and the strength to maybe pursue other lines of therapy.

[Naz Shah]

Q We have had lots of witnesses testifying about gaps in palliative care and end-of-life care provision here in the UK. What is the current state of palliative care and end-of-life care provision in Western Australia, please?

Dr Furst: I am in South Australia, but a recent survey by Palliative Care Australia surveyed over 900 palliative care specialists, and more than 80% of patients receiving voluntary assisted dying are actually getting combined palliative care and voluntary assisted dying. In our legislation in South Australia, there are key provisions for the monitoring of the funding to palliative care to ensure that no palliative care funding is diverted to voluntary assisted dying, but we feel very strongly that palliative care and voluntary assisted dying should go hand in hand. That is a feeling that is being seen around the country now. Palliative care physicians who are finishing off training now see voluntary assisted dying as part of their core business. It is no longer seen as something that should be provided by separate practitioners. It is really becoming quite integrated.

Professor Blake: I am coming in from Western Australia. We were the second jurisdiction in Australia to introduce voluntary assisted dying laws. Ours have been operative since July 2021, so we have had the opportunity to collect quite a lot of data. Year on year, the number of people utilising voluntary assisted dying in Western Australia is increasing. In the year 2023-24, there were 292 deaths by voluntary assisted dying, which represented 1.6% of WA deaths. I agree with Chloe and confirm her view around the palliative care side of things: 83.8% of those persons who accessed voluntary assisted dying were also accessing palliative care.

[Sarah Green (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)]

Q On that point about palliative care, I will direct my question to Dr Furst. What has been the response from palliative care professionals to the introduction of assisted dying in Australia? We have heard evidence from people working in the sector in the UK, but I am keen to hear about your experience in Australia. I understand that Palliative Care Australia’s national workforce survey explicitly looked at this, so I am keen to hear what its findings were.

Dr Furst: It has been a journey, certainly. Victoria started their voluntary assisted dying in 2019. I would be lying if I said that the palliative care community were completely on board with it at that point, but over the last five to six years there has been a real shift in mentality. We have seen that they can go hand in hand. Palliative care is about end-of-life choices. Voluntary assisted dying is about end-of-life choices. It is about putting the patient and the individual front and centre, and working with them. That is fundamental to palliative care. We have realised that voluntary assisted dying is a promotion of palliative care and it gives back choices.

Probably some of the older palliative care clinicians have not embraced voluntary assisted dying quite as much. That is probably very generalised, but certainly new consultants and new doctors that are coming through really see this as something that they want to do. I do not think that there is any animosity any more between the practitioners that choose to work in this space and those that do not. I get huge amounts of support from other palliative care physicians that do not necessarily act as practitioners. There is no real divide. It has been embraced, to be honest. In another five years, I think there will probably be very few palliative care practitioners who do not support this, unless they are true conscientious objectors for their own reasons—I guess, probably religious reasons. Palliative Care Australia and the peak medical bodies in Australia have generally shifted to see this as part of patient choice.

Alex Greenwich: The journey to voluntary assisted dying in New South Wales, and indeed across every Australian state, has benefited palliative care access and funding. In New South Wales, 85% of people who have accessed voluntary assisted dying are receiving palliative care. As part of the process, the co-ordinating and consulting practitioners also advise them on palliative care. The doctors are trained on the latest advances in palliative care. Baked into the principles of our legislation is access to palliative care for all citizens of New South Wales. Importantly, throughout our debate, whether Members supported or opposed the reform, our entire Parliament came together to ensure palliative care received an increase in funding and any access issues were addressed. The Australian experience with voluntary assisted dying is that it benefits and strengthens the palliative care system.

Professor Blake: Can I can I add to that? The Voluntary Assisted Dying Board in WA, as in all the other jurisdictions, produces a report. The very strong sentiment of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Board, and indeed within the Western Australia community, is that voluntary assisted dying is seen as part of the end-of-life journey. The board’s report states that the statistics and experience of Western Australians

“confirms…that voluntary assisted dying is an established and enduring end of life choice”.

For that reason, there has been quite a significant awareness that practitioners should be able to bring up voluntary assisted dying with the patient as part of that suite of end-of-life choices. That has been something that the evidence has suggested is very important, because if the practitioners are feeling that they cannot raise it in that context, that is having a detrimental effect on the patients who would like information on it. That has been our experience in Western Australia.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 30th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)]

Q Dr Ward, I think the point about a holistic and evidence-based approach is critical. In the work that you did in the Scottish example you gave, how was the terminal illness definition arrived at? How are you capturing those people who are vulnerable and want to have an assisted death, but might end up limited in their scope and ability to access it?

Dr Ward: Look: assisted dying is the same as any other healthcare choice. It is always going to be limited. We are not going to reach everyone that we absolutely would want to. There are people who want to have this option and this choice who will not qualify under a terminal illness definition, but we have to draw the line somewhere. We looked at international evidence from Commonwealth countries that are very closely linked to Scotland and the UK. We drew the line with the definition that the person has an advanced progressive illness from which they are unable to recover and that will cause their premature death. For us, that demands the support of Members of Parliament in Scotland and the support of the public.

I really stress the fact that each jurisdiction has to legislate according to its own constitutional, societal, legal and cultural considerations, which is what we have done in Scotland. That is the definition that is working for us now. Previously, there were more liberal attempts that did not gain the support of the House. We believe that we have arrived at a situation that is very similar to the definition of terminal illness here in Westminster, and that is both safe and compassionate but also draws the line so that people who should not be able to access this do not.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Q Professor Owen, yesterday Professor Allan House gave evidence and talked about capacity and coercion, and I want to pick up on some of the concerns. In all four of the jurisdictions that collect data on the issue—Oregon, Canada, Western Australia and Washington—between 35% and 59% of people cite being a burden as a reason for assisted dying. What do you think is the level of confidence of psychiatrists to assess capacity and consent reliably? What would your concerns be, if any?

Professor Owen: This is an essential question. I work clinically in the over-65 age group, where there is a lot of terminal illness, some of it in the last six months. You have to understand the population. The population is typically over 65 and frail. There can be a terminal illness, very typically with comorbidity. That comorbidity is often mental health comorbidity. Depression is at rates of 20% or thereabouts. Delirium and cognitive impairment is very common and often not picked up. There is patchy safeguarding, patchy access to social care and, as I know you have been hearing, patchy access to palliative care.

That is the ordinary person in the NHS. I know people who select into assisted dying are not necessarily that mean person, so to speak, but that is just a picture of what it looks like for me when I go to work. That is where one starts. Now think about burden. Well, this is a group that do feel very burdened. You might think some of that is excessive; some of it maybe is natural, given the life stage. So it is a mixed picture.

When it comes to pressure and coercion, I know you have been grappling with this a lot as a Committee, and I know there have been some amendments that address this. We have talked about clause 26 particularly in relation to this. Of course, when it comes back to the training question, you can take evidence on the state of safeguarding and how people are really able to assess coercive control, domestic violence and so on.

I would like to draw attention to something else that I am not sure has come so much to the attention of the Committee, which is not the offences or the criminal side of this; it is the common or garden capacity assessment side of it. This relates really to clause 1. It is the issue of how you deal with interpersonal pressures on somebody in a situation where there may be a mental health problem and there may not even be a diagnosis. You might be talking about a kind of cognitive impairment that has not reached the threshold for a diagnosis of dementia; you might be talking about a kind of mood problem or an anxiety problem that is sub-clinical; or you might be talking about a level of intelligence that is not clinically a learning disability. But it is there and it is interacting with a form of pressure within a family, let us say, which is often not malign in its intentions, but it exists. It is a very overvalued relationship, for example, with a strong sense of loyalty to somebody, or an enmeshment, for example.

What you have are situations where there is an impairment and also an interpersonal pressure. They interact and they amplify each other. That can have an important consequence in terms of the functional ability of mental capacity. Outside of the assisted dying context, when you look at that in the Court of Protection, which has been struggling with quite a lot of cases like this, that phenomenon of interaction that I am talking about between interpersonal pressure and impairment is recognised. It struggles with it. I have been involved in some research to try to structure the understanding of it, but it is not at the point where it is a kind of training manual that you can lift down from the shelf and roll out across the workforce. It is much more in a kind of research and development phase.

So it is important to draw attention to pressure not necessarily as malign in its intention, but which nevertheless operates in these situations and can have a subtle impact on the functional test of decision-making capacity. To bring us back to what the decision-making capacity is that we are talking about, it is the decision to end one’s own life.

[Bambos Charalambous (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)]

Q Dr Ward and Professor Hoyano, we heard yesterday evidence about the interplay between assisted dying, the Equality Act 2010 and the European convention on human rights. Should amendments be made to the Bill to deal with those issues? What are your thoughts about the interaction between those pieces of legislation and the Bill?

Dr Ward: I heard the session yesterday and would agree with the comments that were made there, particularly around proportionality. Article 2 is an absolute right —the right to life—whereas article 8 is a qualified right. Again, it is about that balancing act. The courts have been very clear that we need to protect vulnerable people, and I feel strongly that the Bill straddles that very well by giving choice but in a very limited set of circumstances.

On the Equality Act, there have been some claims made—this happened in Scotland—that the definition of disability in the Equality Act would cover people who are terminally ill. That that is not my reading of it, and that position is widely shared by the people advising us in Scotland on the legal capacity. That is all I have to say.

Professor Hoyano: I would only point out to the Committee that the common law entrenched the human rights of the patient a long time before the Human Rights Act 1998. We must remember that we do not just have to look at the European convention and Strasbourg. The common law has been very active in entrenching fundamental principles of the rights of the patient, particularly their autonomy in decision making regarding their own body, since long before the HRA.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call Naz Shah to ask the final question.

[Naz Shah]

Q Professor Owen, to follow up on the interaction that Mr Atkinson talked about, where are the gaps in research right now?

Professor Owen: There are a lot of gaps. Take that point as I intend it—I do not say it as a downer on this project; I say it because it is true. There are just a lot of gaps. We are going into uncharted territory, so you might think it would be good to have more of a map before we start. This is one area where there are evidentiary gaps. It is not clear how those sorts of interactions should be assessed, what sorts of threshold should be set or what kind of training should be available. There has been a lot of talk about training; training is all very well and good, but you need to know what the point and purpose of the training is. The training has to be valid before you can roll it out. There are lots of gaps here.

That relates to the question of mental capacity assessment. It is often said, “Why are we worried about mental capacity? We have so much experience of doing it in health and social care contexts; we have the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection and all this experience.” We do, and that extremely important work has been done since the parliamentary discussions you had about the Mental Capacity Act all those years ago. In some areas, it is being done reasonably well: in relation to treatment and care residents’ decisions, one can talk about a body of professionals who understand the concepts, can do the assessments and can achieve, at least when trained, good levels of agreement, so you can get the system to work.

But in areas of decision making where the decision itself is unsettled or conceptually much more profound or novel—I would suggest that the decision to end one’s own life has those characteristics—you cannot expect there to be such levels of reliability. That can be shown empirically in other areas where the decision making is unsettled. The question of how well capacity assessment works is actually matter-specific. That should not surprise us, because the whole concept of mental capacity is that it is matter-specific. That is the whole functional idea of mental capacity. The matter here is of the decision making to end one’s own life.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of the allocated time for the Committee to ask questions. I thank the witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence.

Examination of Witnesses

Professor Preston, Dr Richards and Claire Williams gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

Yes.

Dr Richards: Maybe Nancy knows the evidence on that. Talking about gaps in research, I am an anthropologist, so I am interested in the discourse and the conversations that are happening, and I think there is a lack of evidence about that. We have a lot of evidence where it is tick boxes, for example, about motivations and procedure being following. We have less qualitative, in-depth, interactional evidence about that kind of holistic decision making.

Professor Preston: We have done some research where we interviewed doctors and healthcare workers who have had those conversations. The majority decide against it, but they are still having those conversations. We also heard the experience of the bereaved family, and what it was like to have those conversations. On the whole, the conversation is predominantly about palliative care—“Can we do something different? How can we meet and assess your needs?”

In some cases, the doctors in palliative care, particularly in Switzerland, certainly would never suggest assisted dying, but if the patient asks for it, they equally do not advise them how to get an assisted death. In some cases they said they sort of consciously blocked the conversation, so that the person timed out and could not have it. The emphasis is perhaps the other way in places like the Netherlands and Belgium, where it has been around longer and is much more integrated into other services, such as care homes and palliative care, as part of a holistic assessment.

I remember visiting a team in the Netherlands, and when they got a new patient they said, “We assess them for their preferences about whether they want to die, about resuscitation, about advance care planning and about euthanasia.” My jaw dropped; I was British—this was illegal. They do it in such a natural way. They said, “We need to plan that for them, because we need to understand what is right for them.” They are not suggesting it—they are just trying to take it on board. I would say that the predominance of the conversation is about palliative care, but if the patient wants the assisted death, they either might assist—which is rare—or suggest how they go to a right-to-die association. But more likely they will still tell them how palliative care can help.

[Naz Shah]

Q Professor Preston, in your written evidence to the Committee, you said that Parliament should:

“Consider whether there should be a stated exception to the usual presumption of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in the Bill.”

What kind of standard do you think Parliament should consider adopting instead of the use of the Mental Capacity Act, and why do you think that?

Professor Preston: Again, this came from my colleague Suzanne Ost, who is a professor of law. As Naomi said, this is something very different from choosing to consent to an operation or even a research study. This is finite—it is a finite decision, so therefore the assessment should be a bit more. What I will say about mental capacity is that we had a PhD student who assessed mental capacity decisions by hospice care staff—particularly doctors, but also a lot of the nursing team who were making the decisions. She was a lawyer, and her conclusion was that it was incredibly well assessed. That was in terms of safeguarding—so, when people were going back to what we might consider unsafe homes—but that is what the person wanted, because their life was that unsafe home. I am talking about social deprivation and things like that. The people in this particular team were very good at assessing that and applying the Mental Capacity Act, according to her research.

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)]

Q Claire, you mentioned multidisciplinary teams and decision making. We have heard in a couple of other evidence sessions from palliative care social workers, nurse practitioners and the Royal College of Nursing about the multidisciplinary approach in care. What are your thoughts on the ultimate approval as set out in the Bill being a doctor, another doctor and then a legal okay at the end? Would a more multidisciplinary approach to approval have stronger outcomes or better safeguards?

Claire Williams: I absolutely agree that a panel/committee approach would have better safeguarding for patients, because the decision is being made collectively with legal expertise and with other healthcare professionals—that might be palliative—or ethicists like myself. It is having that collective view, ensuring that everybody is happy and that that is exactly what the patient wants. I believe it should be a committee/panel-based approach for the final decision. As I said before, expecting a High Court judge—just one individual—to make that decision alone is hugely burdensome and not an approach that we should be taking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

I think that my question has been covered by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. I just wanted to be sure that we were secure if the doctor was not in the room, but that has been answered.

[Naz Shah]

Q My question is to Dr Richards. I will get to where I need to get to, so bear with me. You talk about this being a very explicit conversation, but I would argue that that is not entirely true. We are talking about a set of doctors who will have opted in to have that conversation; not all doctors will do that. We have also had evidence from people suggesting that doctors and lots of other people would leave hospice care if assisted death was provided on the NHS. Yesterday, we had care providers telling us that if people engaged in providing voluntary assisted death, they would leave those hospices. So it is not quite as explicit as what you are suggesting, is it?

Dr Richards: It would have to be. Those examples that you have just given would not mean that it was not an explicit conversation.

[Naz Shah]

But it is not, because—

[The Chair]

Order. One question, one answer. I call Danny Kruger.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Before we move to the next panel, is there anyone else who has pressing questions, or would you prefer to have a five-minute comfort break?

[Naz Shah]

Q Dr Richards, you were talking about elderly people in particular. We have heard evidence, particularly yesterday, about young women under 40 where terminal illness was deemed legislatively applicable to anorexia. It appears that that is quite a phenomenon. When we talk about the explicit conversation that you are suggesting, I would argue that it is not necessarily clear cut. Do you agree that there would be a risk there when it comes to people with anorexia?

Dr Richards: I do not really understand why the case of terminal anorexia would be different to any other case in terms of the conversation. It would be necessary to have a very explicit conversation with somebody requesting assisted death; it does not matter what their illness is.

On the issue of anorexia, the numbers are really tiny. In the Oregon model, which is what is in the Bill, you are talking about one or two people in the history of assisted dying. It is a very minor issue to get focused on. I have seen so much about this in the press and being discussed here. If you are very concerned about terminal anorexia, I am sure you could do some tinkering with the Bill so that people would not be eligible for assisted dying, but in terms of the empirical data in jurisdictions that have legalised the Oregon model, which is what this is, there are one or two cases.

This should not be given a huge amount of time, because it is a distraction from the fact that really we are talking about a new mode of dying, which is a cultural response. Just as palliative care is a cultural response to suffering at the end of life, so is assisted dying. It is a different track; it is offering something different. Different types of people will want to go for that. It is a response to the protracted dying trajectory that we see now, which is new. In the history of human dying, we have never taken so long to die before. There has never been so much medical intervention at the end of life, and assisted dying is a cultural response to that. To get fixated on the two people with terminal anorexia who have accessed assisted dying in the States is a bit of a red herring.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

Q This is a question for Mr Malone. May I say how greatly I sympathise with what you have been through? I am very sorry to be fighting against you in this matter. I really can imagine how that feels. Thank you for what you said. I just want to ask about your sister’s experience. On the eligibility question, is it your belief that she would have qualified for an assisted death under the Bill, with the six-month terminal illness criterion? To follow up on that, do you think we should expand the scope to include people with motor neurone disease who might not fall within the six months?

Pat Malone: She would not qualify, because there was no telling how long she would live as a live brain in a dead body, as she said. It could have been months or even years, so she would not qualify in any case under this Bill. However, you have moved mountains to get to this point, so the last thing in the world I want to do is pile more requirements on the Bill. I would like to see some stuff stripped out of it, actually, to make it easier, but I am not going to ask for that because we desperately need to get away from the status quo. This Bill gets us away from the status quo.

[Naz Shah]

Q Thank you very much for coming today and sharing your stories. I have two questions. Julie, you said that you had family liaison and counselling. How long did that go on for? This Bill does not have that requirement, so do you think it is something that we should put in it?

Julie Thienpont: Maybe I said “counselling”, but it was not a session of counselling. It was somebody asking my opinion to check that I was 100% behind Guy. His son also did that by proxy—via us—because he was in a different part of Spain. They wanted to ensure that he had talked it over with family members. It was not hastened along, because he had been given a short life span, so it did not take terribly long. He had to wait about three weeks before the initial ball started rolling, and then two weeks later a family doctor and nurses from the hospital came round for form filling, reading through, translating and signatures, and again another two weeks after that. Each time, I believe it went before a panel. We did not, but the paperwork had to go before a panel. They were left in no uncertain terms that that was the way he wanted to end his life.

It was a very peaceful, serene and beautiful death, as opposed to what it would have been like. He was able to speak to his relatives in Australia, his brothers in Belgium and other family members, and I was able to hold his hand. Guy had always been a bit of an old cowboy, and he always said that he wanted to die with his boots on. I am proud to say that that is what he did. At the end, we were holding hands, and I said to him, “Don’t be afraid.” He said, “I’m not afraid,” and he winked at me just before he closed his eyes.

On the process, perhaps I should have said that it was intravenous, so he had a drip in each arm. It was quite a quick process—maybe 10 to 15 minutes, which I thought was quite quick—but we had had lots of time that morning, you know. It was a beautiful end—the wink especially. I am left with very good memories of such a peaceful death, which was going to happen regardless. He was at peace with it, so that helped me.

[Naz Shah]

Q Thank you very much for sharing such personal experiences. Liz, you talked about your brother, and going over, and how peaceful it was for you. We have heard lots of witnesses talking about people who have felt like a burden. I am glad that was not the case with your brother’s death. Would you support adding more safeguards to the Bill to make sure that we protect those who are at risk from coercion and who might not have capacity?

Liz Reed: I understand the big focus on coercion. It is very similar in Australia. The difference between the Queensland Bill, specifically, and the Bill proposed here is that, in the Queensland Bill, coercion is punishable both ways: you can be punished for trying to coerce someone into an assisted death but also for trying to change their mind the other way. Those safeguards are in place because you hear anecdotally from practitioners that, broadly, people are being coerced out of this.

In our experience, the day before my brother died our mum said to him, “Are you sure?” She was not trying to coerce him, but was she trying to make him go on longer? Absolutely. That is her son, and that is completely natural and normal. She did not want to see him die. His response was, “This isn’t living.”

[Naz Shah]

Thank you very much.

Pat Malone: As far as my brother and sister were concerned, there was no check for coercion. There needs to be, as in the Bill, but there are many more safeguards in the Bill than there are now. The people who are contemplating suicide now have no safeguards at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Q My question is directed to Dr Mulholland. Thank you to the Royal College of General Practitioners for the helpful written evidence. I want to pick up on something in it, which is summarised in paragraph 6 but gone into in more detail in paragraph 7, and that is around the refusal of practitioners to engage in the assisted dying process. I note the wording that has been used by the Royal College, which is that GPs and any other healthcare professionals can refuse “on any ground”. That is distinct from the Abortion Act 1967, which in section 4(1) sets out that it can be a conscientious objection. Can you explain why you have decided to take what appears to be a broader expansion of that definition, and why you have chosen that particular wording?

Dr Mulholland: We are aware that we have a range of views in RCGP across general practitioners. Some of them have very strong views for or against based on moral grounds, and some of those are based on religious grounds—traditional conscientious objection grounds. But others do not want to take part in assisted dying just because they do not want to; they do not feel it is part of what being a GP is, or part of what they trained for.

In discussion with colleagues today, someone shared with me that for 35 years they have spent their time trying to extend the life of patients—that has been our role—and to help them towards the end of life. It is a philosophical change if they start to think about whether the patient’s life should end earlier. There are some colleagues who may decide that for those reasons, they do not want to take part in this. There will be others who very definitely do. We have that range, so we feel that a doctor or a health professional should have the right not to take part on any ground, and that should be protected—they should not feel the obligation to do something that they do not feel is within their wishes.

[Naz Shah]

Q My question is to Dr Price. We heard yesterday from Professor House and this afternoon from Professor Owen, who were talking about capacity and coercion. They also talked about how different people’s life experiences impact their ability and their state of mind, and the lack of research or evidence in that area—the courts are grappling with those issues at the moment. Is there any evidence about the effect on patients’ mental health when they have a diagnosis of a terminal or serious physical illness?

Dr Price: There is a lot of research evidence around depression in people with palliative care needs and people nearing the end of life. We know that depression is common, and across a number of studies it is at around 20%—much more common than in the general population. We know that depression is strongly associated with a wish to hasten death, and that if depression is found and treated in that group of patients, there will be significant change in the wish to hasten death.

There are a number of associations other than depression with a wish to hasten death, and they include difficult symptom experience, poor functional status—needing a lot of help with things—and being socially isolated. Those are really key ones. They also include a sense of loss of dignity and feeling like a burden on others. These things can all come together to make life feel very unbearable. We know that there is also an overlap between a wish to hasten death, which is a response to suffering, and feeling that one is better off dead, ending one’s own life or harming oneself. I was involved in a study where we asked people both the wording of “a wish to hasten death” and the suicide question from the PHQ9, which is a depression screening tool. Those who had a wish to hasten death were 18 times more likely to also feel suicidal, according to the psychiatric definition, than people who did not have a wish to hasten death. There is a strong association.

[Lewis Atkinson]

Q My question is for Dr Price as well, please. We heard in the week from the chief medical officer earlier, who said that he was “relieved” that this Act based capacity on the Mental Capacity Act, noting that it already provides that

“the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.]

and that it is used in tens, if not hundreds, of life and death cases in the NHS every week. The example he gave was someone refusing blood products that they would need to continue their life. In the light of that, I suppose I am a bit confused about your evidence saying that the MCA is not suitable for life or death decisions of this type. Do you think the MCA is not fit for purpose for those current life or death decisions that are being made, or is there something about the life or death decisions that would be made in an assisted dying context that makes that different?

Dr Price: The assumption that the Mental Capacity Act can translate neatly into this specific decision without a really clear sense of what that would look like in clinical practice is something that needs more careful thought.

I was involved in research in this area, and one of the things that I did was to scrutinise the concept of capacity as discussed in a number of forums—for example, the Commission on Assisted Dying, discussions in the House of Lords, and also interviews with doctors in England and Wales and in Oregon. There is a broad sense of what capacity is. For some, it is a very tight, cognitive definition that would mean that in practice, in assisted dying, most people would be found to be capacitous. Those who advocate a much broader sense of what capacity is—these can be contained within the framework of the Mental Capacity Act—would advocate a much broader sense of what that is, thinking about values and the person’s life experience and making more judgments, really, about that person’s life in a general sense.

What I do not think we have really pinned down is what concept of capacity is operating in the thoughts behind this Bill. Is it enough to say that we will essentially refer to the Mental Capacity Act, or do we need to be more specific about what is capacity for this decision? Is it sufficient to say, “We will refer out”, or do we need it on the face of the Bill so that anybody assessing capacity for this decision knows exactly what they should be doing and exactly how they should be having that conversation? Even though you may be operating within a legal framework, I think that the actual conversation —the actual content—will vary across practitioners. Is that good enough? Is that sufficient? Is that a good enough standard? When I do a capacity assessment, I have in mind that it may be appealed against—that is somebody’s right—and it should be available for scrutiny by a court. Essentially, that is the standard we are looking for, so it needs to be clear where the standard lies.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

There are three people left who want to ask questions, so can I beg for brevity?

[Naz Shah]

Q Under clause 4(2), doctors would be allowed to raise the issue of assisted dying with a patient, unprompted. Dr Rachel Clarke gave evidence to this Committee that, in some circumstances,

“The very act of raising assisted dying in that way will make that vulnerable patient think, ‘God, is this doctor telling me that my life is not worth living any more?’”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 75, Q93.]

We heard from Dr Jamilla Hussain yesterday. She talked about mistrust of the NHS, particularly post-covid, where people had DNRs attached to them—disabled people and people of ethnic minority backgrounds in particular. Dan, are you concerned about the potential impact on people with learning disabilities?

Dan Scorer: Yes. One of the first things that I said earlier was about how the initiation of that first conversation is potentially an extremely risky and dangerous moment for people with a learning disability who are terminally ill. Your question is absolutely spot on, from the point of view that it could be highly suggestive and push people on a course that they may not want to go down. That is why I am suggesting that that initial conversation has to be incredibly well supported and structured.

There should, in our view, be an advocate who is supporting the person and preparing them for that discussion. Under the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the person should have accessible information in advance of that discussion so that they are fully informed about all their rights in terms of treatment options at end of life. That discussion with a clinician should not be taking place until the person has been able to consider that information and have support from an advocate, so when the conversation does happen the person is fully informed and has had time to think about what their wishes might be. That would reduce the risk, which is absolutely there, that people could take the initiation of that discussion as a statement, “This is what you should do.” We absolutely do not want people to be in that position. We want strong safeguards and support in place if the Bill becomes law.

[Dr Tidball]

Q Dan, I am really keen that we ensure that if the Bill passes, the voices of disabled people are continually involved in understanding its impact, particularly on the issue that you have just raised. Earlier, we heard evidence about implementation taskforces that are used in other jurisdictions. I am considering tabling an amendment on an advisory council. How might we ensure that the voices of people with learning disabilities can be included in such a body?

Dan Scorer: There are a couple of things that I would like to say in response. One is about clause 31, on guidance from chief medical officers. Immediately, I would say that people with a learning disability should be involved in the development of that guidance from chief medical officers. That guidance will be key to many of the issues that we have discussed.

Clause 35 is about the review of the Act. The lived experience of people is absolutely vital to that. The Bill says that it will be five years until we have that review. Our view is that that is far too long. If the Bill becomes law and if there are really serious issues and discrimination taking place against people, we will want to know that a lot earlier than in five years’ time, and we will want action to be taken. Our suggestion is that review should be earlier. We would want to see strong representation from patient groups across that, as well as from people who have been involved in the process, such as family members, advocates and clinicians, to make sure that if serious issues are being raised, they can be picked up early and addressed.

[Lewis Atkinson]

Q It is late, and I am far from being an expert on Welsh devolution, but I want to ask Professor Lewis a question, not least because we have not come to him for a little while.

Although it is not my area, I absolutely note the concerns and the discussion about respecting the democratic will of the Senedd in these matters. Would you suggest any potential avenues in the Bill to incorporate an element of positive affirmation by the Senedd, or its consent? What do you suggest we look at?

Professor Lewis: Formally, there is a need in any event for a legislative consent motion in relation to the specific bits I mentioned earlier, I have suggested one potential avenue, which is that the Senedd and Welsh Government take on responsibility for whether and when the Act commences in Wales. Another option might be to do a thorough “think once, think twice, think Wales” review to see to what extent other functions of the Secretary of State might be better exercised in Wales by the Welsh Ministers. That is a non-exhaustive list, but I hope it helps.

[Naz Shah]

Q Dr Price, you talked in your earlier evidence about depression. One Committee member suggested that 20% of people were on antidepressants; actually, the factual position is that 10% to 11% of the adults in this country are on antidepressant medication, according to the latest statistics. To be clear, are you saying that people who are depressed are more likely to ask for or go down the road of assisted dying?

Dr Price: The evidence that we have from research—this is in populations who would fulfil the criteria in terms of terminal illness—is that the prevalence of depression is around 20%. That is across a number of populations. It is associated with a wish to hasten death. Depression might impact upon that person’s decision making; I am not saying that it absolutely would, but it might. Also, treatment might change their view. We know that there is a strong association, for example, between pain and a wish to hasten death. Unresolved physical symptoms make people want to die, and when that pain is better, people no longer feel that way.

That is borne out in my clinical practice. We will get urgent referrals to see somebody who wants to die and who they are very concerned about. Then the pain is under control: we see them that day or the next day and they say, “Do you know what? The pain’s better. I don’t feel like that any more.” When we think about symptoms, we need to think carefully about what is treatable and what is remediable. That may be about psychiatric interventions, but it is often about a biological, psychological and social approach.

[The Chair]

May I thank the panel for giving evidence today? We really appreciate your attendance.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I thank the Member for making that point of order. It is normal practice for evidence to come in, and for it to be submitted as it comes in. However, due to the large amount of evidence and its substance, and to the importance of the Bill and this line-by-line scrutiny, I will seek the advice of the Clerk and will come back to him.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Ms McVey. My concern is about written evidence that has been submitted but not yet read—I have certainly not been through the last batch of evidence that we have had. How do we proceed when, for example, we might have gone through clauses 1 and 2, or even up to clause 4 or 5, and we receive evidence related to those clauses? We will have already discussed them in Committee. We have been told we will only get five hours on Report, while on Second Reading more than 100 MPs, including me, were unable to speak. The evidence could inform amendments. I am struggling to understand how this will be workable. I would value your advice.

[The Chair]

I am pleased that people feel they are free to make those points. It is for the Committee to decide how fast to move through the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Olney]

I heard Sir Chris Whitty in particular say that it would be preferable to have a more straightforward Bill that did not have too many bureaucratic hurdles for people to overcome. That was why he was keen for the Mental Capacity Act to be retained. However, I tabled the amendment precisely because, when people are thinking about whether assisted dying is an appropriate decision for them, I do not think that it is safe for them to be judged merely on the basis of their capacity. It is by no means my intention to increase bureaucracy; I am merely proposing that the Act is not sufficient in this case.

[Naz Shah]

Three psychiatrists gave evidence to the Committee in person: Professor Allan House, Dr Annabel Price, of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and Professor Gareth Owen. All expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person was in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Does the hon. Lady agree that we should place great weight on the opinion of psychiatrists when assessing whether the Act should be used to assess applicants for assisted dying? It is a horse before the cart scenario, because the Act was not made for this context; when it was passed, we were not talking about the ability to choose to die.

[Sarah Olney]

I agree exactly with the hon. Lady’s point. The Act was not designed for this purpose, and it is essential that we carefully scrutinise whether it should be used in this way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

I appreciate the hon. Member’s intervention, but I do not agree. Taken together, the parameters around the six-month limit, clause 2(3) and the requirement for a mental capacity test cumulatively create a safeguard in the Bill.

Importantly, the MCA’s two-stage capacity test is already underpinned by robust safeguards, which address exactly the issue the hon. Gentleman raised. Stage one asks whether there is a disturbance or impairment in the person’s brain or mind, and stage two asks whether the disturbance or impairment is severe enough that the person cannot make a specific decision. That two-stage test already deals with the issue he raised. The references to the Mental Capacity Act in the relevant clauses of the Bill ensure, crucially, that we import that test too.

Elements of the language in the new concept of ability proposed by the hon. Member for Richmond Park appear to attempt to echo the second stage of the Mental Capacity Act test, as just described. That has four elements: understanding information about the decision to be made, retaining that information in the mind, using or weighing that information as part of the decision-making process, and communicating the decision by talking, using sign language or any other means. It is important to say that those core elements are built on the scaffolding of the five principles of the MCA, working in a progressive way.

Opposition Members talked about the unwise decision, but the principles in the Mental Capacity Act work collectively and cumulatively together. That is only one step, then, which is followed by the fact that decisions must be taken in the person’s best interest, and there is well-worn and well-trodden understanding of how we ascertain that. It is important that those things all work together. The issue is already addressed under the MCA; if we do away with the MCA, we lose not only the scaffolding of the five principles, but the important safeguards of the two-stage test.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend made reference to that already being done, but where is the evidence that the capacity stage she talked about is actually happening? We had evidence from the Royal College of Psychiatrists and, as she said, Professor Chris Whitty. Where is the evidence that it is being done well, as things stand?

[Dr Tidball]

I do not have a list of the case law in front of me—I am sure it will be possible for that to be found for my hon. Friend—but it is done regularly. The Mental Capacity Act is used regularly in decisions about the withdrawal of life-support treatment. That is the case, and she is welcome to search for the case law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Member makes a reasonable point. I agree with her on many issues, but on this issue I have some reservations. Clause 18(4) says:

“The coordinating doctor must be satisfied, at the time the approved substance is provided, that the person to whom it is provided…has capacity…has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.

Of course, under the wording of section 26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, that decision can be made at an earlier time and deemed to have currency, once capacity has been lost, for its enactment at a later date. I think that there could be a minor tightening of the wording or reassurances from Government to address that, but it is an important point to raise and air.

[Naz Shah]

rose—

[The Chair]

Order. Before we proceed any further, I remind hon. Members that we are discussing capacity and ability.

[Naz Shah]

I am just trying to understand what the hon. Member is communicating. Under the Bill, if somebody has anorexia, diabetes or kidney failure and has the capacity to make that decision because they meet the criteria for the capacity to refuse treatment, will that mean that they can decide to sign up to this option?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The Bill is very clear in determining that it is for those who have a progressive illness, disease or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. On my reading of the Bill, it excludes that category of individuals who choose not to engage with treatment that in ordinary circumstances would prevent the progression or deterioration of their condition. I therefore do not see it as analogous with the hon. Member’s scenario of someone who could have a long life expectancy if they had taken their treatment, but who chooses not to. That is not captured within the Bill, in my interpretation.

[Naz Shah]

I am struggling with this, because it is clear from the evidence from our witnesses that that is the case where somebody has anorexia, for example, and they make that choice. As has been referred to plenty of times in the context of the Bill, the Mental Capacity Act has been used, and is sufficiently used, for people to withdraw treatment. Personally, I think that that is a pretty false equivalence, because when a person’s life support machine is turned off, the decision is made not by the person receiving lifesaving treatment, but by their loved ones.

According to what we have heard this morning, if someone has the mental capacity to use the MCA to withdraw treatment for a condition, that will lead to a diagnosis of terminal illness. It could kill someone. If I refused to take insulin, and I was diabetic, I would have the mental capacity to say, “Actually, I’m not going to take this treatment, so can I make a decision?” I am just trying to check the hon. Gentleman’s understanding.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

With the greatest respect to the hon. Member, I think that she is conflating two issues. Someone can stop treatment under the MCA; over time, that will lead progressively to death, with some conditions—she gave the example of being a diabetic without insulin—but that would not be a terminal illness in reference to this Bill. The Bill is very clear that it is about an inevitable and progressive illness, disease, or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. Diabetes, treated with insulin, is not a progressive condition that becomes a terminal diagnosis; it is terminal only by virtue of somebody refusing treatment, which therefore would not be captured within the Bill.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

Just to clarify, I am not questioning that they were not telling their truth. I completely believe that, from their perspective, they honestly believe they have never seen a case of coercion. Maybe I am more of a glass-half-empty kind of girl than some other people, but I question whether that is really the case. In my 45 years on this planet, I have learned enough about humankind to know that these things do happen, but different people will take different views when it comes to detecting them.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady has made some important points. I repeat something I said yesterday in response to another Member: the word “coercion” and the idea of encouragement were not even in the vocabulary in this place until very recently—only 10 years ago. I do not want to dismiss people’s expertise, but for me it is quite a leap of faith—I wonder whether she shares that idea—to believe that in that jurisdiction, zero people were coerced, when every other jurisdiction records people being coerced and people saying they feel a burden.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend is very knowledgeable about these things and is well qualified on the legal side. I value his contributions on this matter. The reason I want to include “unduly influence” is because it deals with those more subtle forms of coercion. Arguably, it could be included in “coerced or pressured”, but by including “unduly influence” in the Bill it becomes more explicit that a clinician has to be looking for it. In the absence of the language, clinicians will not be required to look for those more subtle forms of influence.

The provision is something that is included in the assisted dying laws of other jurisdictions. We have the opportunity here to learn and benefit from jurisdictions that have already implemented it. We heard various witnesses give us very useful evidence during the sessions. For example, California includes “undue influence” in the law. We should recognise that there is value in including it here. It is a well-established legal term that is used in myriad situations, so it is relevant that we include it.

[Naz Shah]

May I take the hon. Member back to the point of clause 24, and the issue of suicide and the terminology there? Perhaps the Minister could respond as well, although I am not sure how that would work in this Committee. What I think we are doing in clause 24 is to decriminalise encouraging suicide. That is my understanding. So can we have some clarity? Are we trying to decriminalise encouraging suicide? That is what clause 24 says, so in that case it would be absolutely right to talk about the word “encouragement”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

It is helpful to understand the Government’s position. If the amendment is not made, I hope that the Minister is right, but one thing that I have learned in my time is that different judges will have different views on these things. Personally, I would prefer to see this provision in the Bill, as it would absolutely ensure that the protection is in place. We all know that decisions in the courts can sometimes go a different way from what we expect.

[Naz Shah]

I have a concern about what the Minister says. As one psychiatrist put it, the Bill is very novel and untested. The MCA has not been tested. Now the Government say that this will work, without consultation or any impact assessment. I struggle to understand that. Does the hon. Lady share my concern that this does not feel right?

[Rebecca Paul]

It is reassuring to hear that I am not the only one worried about this, so I thank the hon. Lady for that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

Does the hon. Lady share my concern? My understanding is that, in normal parliamentary business, if the Government announce any changes to the law in the press first, they are usually rebuked by Mr Speaker in the Chamber. I appreciate that this is a private Member’s Bill, but a Guardian piece yesterday outlined how we will now scrap the involvement of a High Court judge and have a panel instead, with an amendment to be tabled to that effect. I am happy for my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to clarify how the system is going to change.

Once we have debated the amendments on undue influence and coercion, we have debated them. We cannot then come back to them, because of the nature of private Members’ Bills. Does the hon. Lady share my concern that, as we said yesterday, the horse has bolted? We are having to go over things and we might not be able to revisit this issue, which is why it is even more important to have probing conversations on the record so that, if nothing else, we can refer to them on Third Reading, for which we have only five hours.

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady. We should not make the mistake of assuming that certain amendments will be accepted. Until there is a Division, we do not know what the Bill is going to look like. It is incredibly difficult to table amendments early on when we do not know whether other fundamental things are going to change. That is why it is important that we are really thorough and improve the safeguards as much as we can, clause by clause. I do not want to get to the end of this process without our having accepted any of the improved safeguards, only for the Bill to be turned on its head at the end when there is a Division on something fundamental. As the hon. Lady rightly says, we do not get the opportunity to come back and review the decisions we have made on the back of that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the right hon. Lady for that really helpful intervention. That is exactly the kind of advice that is extremely useful to us new MPs undertaking this process. I will have to make the decision on that question in a matter of minutes, and it is very difficult, but I will do my best to make the right decision.

New clause 5 seeks to define encouragement for the purposes of the Bill and includes some exclusions. We have already talked about some of the challenges with exactly what encouragement means, and clearly there are certain acts that we do not want to be captured by it. The aim of the clause is just to ensure that it is only intentional, targeted and effective encouragement that is covered. I am very open to working with the Government to ensure that the drafting reflects the intent; it may well be that some other things go in there to address some of the concerns raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire around support being given by families. No one wants to see that included in this definition—I think we all agree on that.

In summary, I hope hon. Members will view these amendments, incorporating undue influence and encouragement into clause 1, favourably, in order to bolster the safeguards in this Bill. It is vital that subtler forms of influence are addressed, to protect patients and to ensure that it is not just the obvious signs of coercion that are looked for. I also welcome amendment 113, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, which is very much in the same spirit as amendments 23 and 82 and would insert the word “manipulated”. I hope we will debate it because, if accepted, it would certainly improve the safeguards in the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. Just to put it out there, to begin with on amendment 23, the Court of Appeal, in the case of “Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)”, held that undue influence was relevant to medical decisions and said that doctors must check for it. Undue influence is about power imbalance, rather than outright coercion.

That brings me nicely on to the points we discussed in some detail yesterday. The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire talked about having a conversation with his family, with his wife and children and so on. I will give another example. Say there is a woman who has been the victim of domestic violence—we know this happens; we know two women a week are killed in this country, to this day—and she is subtly encouraged: “Sweetheart, you’ve got a diagnosis and the option is to have this.” There is a fine line, and the fine line conversation has been mentioned quite often as well, but I would rather stay on the side of caution with that fine line conversation when it comes to domestic abuse, coercion and the power imbalance in a relationship.

Let me come back to that woman or elderly person whose loved ones have the conversation—and they indeed have the conversation; it happens every day. Ask any victim of domestic violence. On average, it takes a woman 40 attempts to leave an abusive partner—that is the fact—because we do not even recognise it.

I know somebody who recently left an abusive partner—that took three years of encouragement because she did not recognise that what was happening to her was about power and control. It is when power is juxtaposed with vulnerability that there is the potential for abuse. That happens—it happens every single day. Victims of domestic abuse are not just younger people; according to Age Concern, over 375,000 older people are at risk of domestic abuse.

The abuse of people is a cancer in our society, and that very subtle power imbalance is where the fine line is crossed. Given that the Court of Appeal has ruled and is already saying that medics have to look out for undue influence, I would argue that amendment 23 actually strengthens the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has repeatedly insisted that this Bill needs to be the tightest in the world. How does the amendment not complement her view? How does it not strengthen the Bill, to protect victims?

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend mentioned domestic violence and vulnerable people. Do we not also need to think about the many people in hospital beds and nursing homes who may not have any relatives? They might get influenced or encouraged to choose this route by professionals because of the pressure on the NHS and hospices. Amendment 23 would strengthen the Bill in that respect as well.

[Naz Shah]

I would like to hope that that would never happen; I have a huge love of the NHS and of the people I know in it who make decisions every day, particularly given all the cuts—even more so, post covid. But there is that risk; I would like to hope that it is very small.

When it comes to mental health, the debate is similar to the one about capacity: it is the same conversation about whether something is fit for purpose. Just because something already exists does not mean that it will necessarily suit what we are doing here.

On International Women’s Day, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence against Women and Girls, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), eloquently reads out a list of victims of domestic violence who have been murdered. There are two a week—I make no apologies for keeping coming back to this. Only yesterday, there was an article about women’s charities that support victims of domestic abuse citing their concerns. The amendment speaks to those concerns. How could it not be supportive?

I am not convinced by the idea that the amendment would introduce an element of jeopardy. People make decisions with their families every day. We sit and have conversations. I speak from a position of privilege—as we all do in this place, frankly. We speak from positions of privilege about how we could have these conversations with our families. But we know that inequalities exist and that some people do not have those privileges. We know that society is unequal. We know that domestic abuse, elder abuse and mental health issues exist.

In my constituency, it takes 14 months just to get a child and adolescent mental health services referral for a young person; I appreciate that we are not talking about young people. My point is that there is a real backlog in the NHS—in terms of waiting times and pain medication, for example. Palliative care is not equal, as I said yesterday. I am genuinely asking Committee members: which bit of the amendment can we not support?

[Sarah Olney]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful speech. She referred to an article she read yesterday about domestic violence in relation to the Bill; it may have been the article by Sarah Ditum in the New Statesman, which I also read yesterday. It cited two cases in which people had been on trial for murder and had pleaded mercy killing, or said that they had carried out the killing of their spouse or partner on the basis that that person was suffering greatly at the end of their life. In both cases, when the evidence was examined, the men were found guilty of murder, because it was very clear that that was what had actually happened.

The article had a profound impact on me, because it demonstrated the risk that we are running: that people will be able to use the Bill in instances of domestic violence. We have to take that very seriously and consider the implications.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for her powerful intervention. She is right: that was the article I mentioned. Reading about such stories does have a profound impact.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making some powerful and important points about, sadly, a lot of the ills in society, which we all deal with.

Let us take the example of a woman who has a terminal illness and is coerced and pressured by a loved one to end her own life. At the moment, we have no idea whether that has happened, because there is no legal framework around that dreadful situation. The Bill would create a legal framework, so that conversations would be had with that woman prior to that point and, hopefully, that point would never come. She would speak to two doctors, potentially a psychiatrist, and other experts to ensure that that did not happen. At the moment, there is no legal framework around that. The Bill also includes a criminal offence of coercion, for which someone could go to prison for 14 years. At the moment, that just is not there.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend, but I feel that the point is being missed. It is true that there is no framework, but for somebody to get to this point in the first instance they need to have a terminal illness. There is a framework around domestic violence, and domestic violence laws exist for everybody. Frameworks already exist for women fleeing domestic violence, and there is no shortage of attempts to try to get those legal frameworks right across society. That is why we had the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, why we have committed to halving violence against women and girls, and why the Prime Minister made a personal commitment in that regard—and rightly so.

There has already been a test case in which a judge said that medics have an obligation in this context. An hon. Member referred yesterday to assisted dying being a treatment, although I disagree, and we had that conversation later.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

That was a misunderstanding; I was talking about “treatment” as a legal term.

[Naz Shah]

No, I was talking about another hon. Member, not the Minister. We already have laws to protect people from domestic violence, but that does not mean that they necessarily access them.

[Daniel Francis]

From what I understand from the promoter of the Bill, the argument is that we should put these measures in place to protect from coercion people who have less than six months to live, but we would not put those protections in place for people who have nine or 12 months to live. If we are putting the measures in place for someone with six months to live, why are we not doing so for someone with nine or 12 months to live?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. There has already been a test case, and the Court of Appeal has ruled that undue influence is relevant to medical decisions and that doctors must look at it. If that is already a ruling, I struggle to understand the resistance to adding the words “undue influence” to a Bill that, in the promoter’s own words, should be the safest in the world. A judge has already ruled on it. We already know that we are not going to get to a judge. I struggle to understand this.

[Kit Malthouse]

As the Minister pointed out, the concepts that the hon. Lady is trying to embed in the Bill are already covered by what is a settled legal interpretation and a framework that, over the last 10 years, has become used to dealing with those issues. Do not forget that families who are going through such situations will be advised and will examine the legislation quite carefully. I am nervous about injecting yet another level of consideration for them that might mean that conversations are interpreted—by them, but not necessarily in a legal sense—in a way that is not beneficial to the patient.

I understand the group that the hon. Lady is seeking to protect—that is what we are all trying to do. But what about the majority of people in such circumstances, who might say, for example, “Darling, I am thinking about taking an assisted death because of my horrible disease. If you were me, what would you do?” If I then say, “Well, painful though it is for me, I would do exactly the same thing,” how would families interpret that?

I also want to respond to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. He made a strong point, but I am not sure he is exactly right. I think that if at nine months I have a disease that is progressing, and somebody in my family says to me, “When it comes to it, Kit, you have absolutely got to take an assisted death. We really want you to,” and then when I get into the six-month period I do, and I tell the doctor, my interpretation is that would be covered under the Bill.

I think what the Minister was eloquently trying to establish was that we have to be careful about the clarity of the legal language, and not make it embroidered in a way that makes interpretation by laypeople as well as by lawyers more difficult and complicated. I will come on to this in the next grouping, but we must not use language in a way that skews behaviour, or that makes what should be healthy and fulsome discussions within families guarded and nervous.

[Naz Shah]

I have to respectfully disagree with the right hon. Member that this is a settled position. I also challenge, on the record, what the Minister said. I struggle to understand how the Minister and the Government can say that this is a settled position without having gone to consultation on the Bill and without having an impact assessment. That does not satisfy me. My role when I agreed to be on the Committee was to come in to scrutinise and help strengthen the legislation. In doing so, these are the things that I am pointing out, because the safeguards are not strong enough for me.

I come back to the Court of Appeal. This would be a medical intervention, albeit to end somebody’s life. It would be administering a lethal drug to end somebody’s life, and it would be done by medics. Medics are involved in every stage. If there is case law that has already established that doctors have to look at undue influence in medical decisions, then I say to every single person on the Committee: what are we resisting? When the Court of Appeal has already said so, why is the Committee debating keeping this language out because it makes things complicated?

Let us go back to the words of Dr Jamilla Hussain, who gave evidence to the Committee. She is a clinician, and she absolutely accepts that there are some people who would really benefit from this law. As a clinician, she wants to get there. Indeed, I spoke to Professor John Wright, and he said, “Naz, absolutely—this is where we need to be.”

[Sean Woodcock]

My hon. Friend is making a very powerful argument. She is absolutely right to focus on protecting the vulnerable people who this law might apply to. She has touched on medics. I also want to mention the state and its role in what we are talking about. For example, I am opposed to capital punishment, and I link this discussion to that because we are talking about the state providing an individual with a method by which they can end their own life, such as by handing them a pill. I am concerned that, if we are not taking these safeguards seriously, we are abandoning vulnerable people by allowing the state to aid and abet the misuse of the Bill against them. Does my hon. Friend share my concerns?

[Naz Shah]

I share my hon. Friend’s concerns about the Bill not being tightened and fit for purpose. We cannot afford for those people to slip through the net. One woman’s death is one too many. One older person’s death is one too many. That is the bar we have to set.

I come back to the words of Dr Jamilla: she said, “Yes, absolutely.” Every single Committee member, and anyone familiar with this debate, found it heartbreaking to listen to those who came in to give testimony about how members of their families died. Those stories will stay with us forever, and rightly so. That is why, in principle, I am supportive of where we need to get to with the Bill. However, as Dr Jamilla said, we cannot get there by ignoring this big lot of people with vulnerabilities and inequalities, who would absolutely need this legislation. We need to fix the inequalities first.

Let us be honest: as legislators, we know that we will not fix every ill in society, otherwise we would not need a police force. We would not need laws if everybody behaved as they should and supported each other. However, it is incumbent upon us, as legislators in this place, to try our best.

Nobody came to this Bill Committee thinking it was going to be a walk in the park. We certainly did not know that we were going to get evidence throughout it, and plenty of challenges are popping up. We came to this Committee—I came new to the subject—because it is of such importance. I sat in the Chamber for five hours on Second Reading, bobbing, but I did not get the chance to speak—and that happened to another 100 colleagues, who also did not get to speak. However, those who made contributions—whether they were for the Bill, concerned about the Bill or were clearly not going to support the Bill—did so because they feel very strongly about it. That is our responsibility.

I come back to amendment 23, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate: we should really consider adding it to the Bill, because that would strengthen it. The amendment does not dilute the Bill, and it does not add another hurdle given that the Court of Appeal has already said that there is a responsibility to look for undue influence. I do not understand the resistance to the amendment, which I will support.

[Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)]

This debate has been very interesting and has reminded me of my life before being elected. When I was a barrister in court, I was often junior counsel and, by the time I stood up, all the best points had been taken. I feel a bit like that this morning.

I have some observations, the first of which is on what is in the Bill currently. My central submission is that the Bill does more than enough in this area, and that simplicity is what is required, especially when dealing with very complex and difficult subjects, which coercion is. There are two sides to the coin of coercion: one is about acts by third parties, such as family members or society at large, and the other is the individual making the decision.

Clause 1 is clear that, as part of the assessment made by the doctor, judge or panel, the person must have

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”

voluntarily. That precisely echoes words from the Crown Prosecution Service guidance on whether to prosecute that is currently in operation. That guidance has been in use for some time, and it seems perfectly rational and logical to continue that.

The focus of the assessment should be on the individual and whether they make the choice freely. Clause 1 makes that clear, and I presume purposefully echoes the language from the CPS guidance. It then says it must be established that the person has

“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.”

That must of course be read with clause 26, which introduces a new offence:

“A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration, or not to cancel such a declaration, commits an offence.”

That carries a sentence of up to 14 years in prison.

[Naz Shah]

I am trying to understand the expertise my hon. Friend is speaking from. Was he a criminal barrister?

[Jake Richards]

I am very happy to share my CV afterwards. I practised as a barrister mainly in family law and Court of Protection law, but back in the day I also practised criminal law as a very junior barrister in the magistrates courts up and down the land.

I do not want to delve into the criminal element too much, because we are on clause 1, but it appears to me that the criminal offence set out in clause 26 is far stronger than the Suicide Act 1961, which talks of an act of encouragement. That is not included in clause 26, which talks about inducement—a much more holistic and wider concept than that of an Act probably drafted back in the late 1950s. In my submission, that brings the law far more up to date with modern concepts of coercion and pressure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jake Richards]

I did not draft the legislation, but my understanding is that the reason why the word “dishonesty” appears in clause 26—I do not know whether the Minister wants to comment on this—is that when there is a criminal offence, there needs to be a mens rea. The person who has committed the offence needs to have been intentional or reckless in doing so. As I say, I was a criminal barrister only very briefly; I am sure my law tutors are shaking their heads.

[Naz Shah]

The principle of statutory interpretation means that by mentioning one thing, we exclude others, so it is my understanding that having the terms coercion and pressure in the Bill excludes undue influence. Will my hon. Friend, who has clearly gone through this in detail, also comment on the fact that section 2A of the Suicide Act says that encouragement includes pressure?

[Jake Richards]

With respect, I think my hon. Friend is wrong: it is certainly not an exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account. The courts—this is why we have a common law system—interpret the language used in legislation.

[Naz Shah]

To build on that, I referred to the Court of the Appeal earlier, but when it comes to someone giving their organs, I think from the age of 12 or 13—I will try to find the reference—the words “undue influence” are used in the legislation. It comes back to the crux of my argument; I would like to understand why my hon. Friend is so concerned, from a legal perspective, about putting in the words “undue influence”, when they already appear in legislation.

[Jake Richards]

The issue I have is that if we open the door to all different types of terminology, it will never end. The law is best served when it is clear, simple and straightforward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Juliet Campbell]

rose—

[Naz Shah]

In response to the intervention of my hon. Friend, we are here to make the Bill as safe as possible, but this is a new thing. When the Bill returns to the House, I have to make a decision on whether to support a new Bill that is of such huge magnitude to our communities and the whole country. This Committee is the only process available to us, and words matter.

I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. The concept of manipulation, as she set out, is very important. I come back to the issue of abuse, particularly in respect of women. I have never heard the phrase “Fifty Shades of Manipulation”—that is an interesting one—but this happens every day, across society. I encourage people to talk about these words. We, as parliamentarians, benefit from that: we are better people for understanding other experiences, because different people bring different experiences to this conversation. I have certainly learned a lot, and it strengthens the House itself when we speak from positions that we have debated. That is the whole purpose of us being here. I am not concerned by talking about adding language—I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe shares my view—because that is point of us being here in the first place.

[Juliet Campbell]

To reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, I understand that the writers, promoter and sponsors of the Bill want it to be as simple as possible. The thought is that if we make it as simple as possible, there is less room for confusion and misinterpretation, but there are times when we can make things so simple that we allow far too much interpretation. Words such as those that the hon. Member for Reigate wants to be put into the Bill are really important. Manipulation is really important. Coercion and pressure are not measures of every type of controlling behaviour that happens to individuals.

[Juliet Campbell]

I thank my hon. Friend for looking that up so swiftly. I still think that those additional words need to be included in the Bill. “Coercion” and “pressure” are used as a catch-all for manipulation, but the Bill does not allow people who are using it in their everyday life—doctors, clinicians, nurses and social workers—to understand that.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous with her time. To come back to the CPS’s terminology, does she agree that, in an ideal situation, the Bill would be so safe that we would not need to look at that CPS definition? The Bill would be so tightly defined that nobody could be prosecuted for coercing somebody into taking the option of assisted death.

[Juliet Campbell]

I absolutely agree that we do not want people not to understand what the Bill allows them to do or not do. We spoke earlier about making the Bill simple enough for professionals to understand so that they know how to deal with particular instances, but it is not here to make life easy for professionals; it is here to ensure that anyone who is vulnerable—anyone who has six months to live, or for whatever other reason—is protected.

A continuous theme of our debates and all our conversations is that we must make safeguarding as tight as possible so that people are protected. I believe it is not too much to ask to include those additional words to ensure that the wording is as tight as possible and protects the people who need our protection every single day.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The risk of gaming—of patients playing the game, and doctors seeking out words to say or not say—is an issue throughout the Bill. That is a general problem with the Bill; thankfully, it is not just a free-for-all. However, in the scenario that my right hon. Friend suggests, that is exactly my concern: if the patient says that their spouse agrees with them or encourages them, that should be a red flag. Under the current Bill, it is not clear that it would be. There is no obligation on the doctor to record that there has been undue influence or to push back, because at the moment, the doctor is looking only for evidence of coercion. As I will come to later, that bar is too low to use, so if the doctor hears those words, I would like him or her to start asking questions, to push back, and to satisfy himself or herself that there has been no overt encouragement or undue influence. That is the point of what we are trying to do.

[Naz Shah]

To come back to an earlier point—I want to make these points, simply because it is really important that we get them on the record—my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley talked about undue influence and encouragement perhaps being archaic terminology. However, just last year, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 cited undue influence, as did the Anatomy Act 1984. Acts passed by Parliament in the last few years have used that terminology, so does the hon. Member for East Wiltshire share my concern about the resistance to having those words added to this Bill?

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Member is absolutely right—undue influence does exist in law, including in laws that have been passed very recently. I recognise that the hon. Member for Rother Valley is not impressed by laws that are more than 10 years old, but I hope he might be satisfied that a law passed last year is sufficiently up to date and modern for him to regard as morally valid. Undue influence is an existing term, and we should apply it in this case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I am sure that the hon. Lady will acknowledge that those investigations will still happen, because not everybody who commits suicide will be subject to the Bill; not everybody who is terminally ill and wants to take their life with the assistance of their loved ones will be caught under it. I am sure she acknowledges that it is therefore still appropriate to have safeguards against assisted suicide outside the law—in fact, the Bill strengthens those safeguards. Those will still continue. I also regard it as appropriate and necessary to have a law against assisted suicide, for all the reasons that we have been discussing.

The hon. Lady is right that it is appropriate for Parliament or the authorities in general to ensure that cases such as those we have discussed, and that have been powerfully testified to us, are handled sensitively. In an overwhelming number of cases, the police do handle them well and sensitively. It might be that we need to improve the guidance around prosecution, and that is an important question. I certainly do not want the families of people who have taken their own lives to be harassed and chased through the courts, and I think we would all agree on that. In that respect, the guidance for the CPS and the police will always evolve.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member may recall that we heard from the former head of the CPS in the oral evidence sessions, and I asked him whether the Bill would address concerns about such prosecutions. I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley that we want to address that. However, this Bill is not the route to address those issues unless they fall into that six-month bracket.

[Danny Kruger]

I think that is right. I do not accept the claim that this Bill is somehow a response to the problem of abuse, coercion or the pressure to end life in families. Tragically, in jurisdictions that have an assisted dying law, the number of unassisted suicides—suicides that happen outside of the law—go up, because no law can catch all the people who might want to take their own lives. Thankfully, there is no blanket support for any assisted suicide; all the jurisdictions have some restrictions.

More significantly, if the state said that some people’s lives are not worth living and that it is an acceptable choice for them to end their own life—which is not what the current law says; we have legalised suicide, not actually endorsed it—by passing a law that endorsed the choice of some people to take their own life, we would be sending a signal that we agree that some people’s lives are not worth living. The social consequence of that is clear in the evidence from other jurisdictions: suicide in the general population goes up as a result of an assisted dying law.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Electronic devices should be turned off or switched to silent. The only cups that I should see are those filled with the water provided in the room—no tea or coffee. Let us continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.

Clause 1

Assisted dying

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 281, in clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert—

“(c) has met with a palliative care specialist for the purposes of being informed about the medical and care support options.”

This amendment would mean that illness, disease or medical condition etc, the progress of which can be managed or controlled by treatment are not characterised as terminal illness.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 299, in clause 7, page 4, line 17, after “(g)” insert

“and the condition in subsection (4) has been met”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 298.

Amendment 298, in clause 7, page 4, line 26, at end insert—

“(4) The coordinating doctor may not take the steps set out in subsection (3) unless they receive confirmation from a palliative care specialist that the person has had a consultation with that specialist about the palliative care options available to them.”

This will require the coordinating doctor to be of the opinion that the person has had a consultation with a specialist in palliative medicine.

Amendment 304, in clause 9, page 5, line 41, leave out “any available” and insert

“the person’s experience of specialist”.

This amendment would require the assessing doctor to discuss the person’s experience of specialist palliative, hospice or other care.

Amendment 311, in clause 12, page 8, line 14, at end insert

“and

(i) the person has had a consultation with a consultant who is a specialist in palliative medicine.”

This amendment would require that a person has had a consultation with a specialist in palliative medicine before the High Court could issue a declaration.

[Naz Shah]

Amendment 281 would ensure that the patient receives advice on palliative care options from a specialist in the field. Medicine is fast-paced, with innovative and new medicines becoming available in quick succession. Although those in the profession try to keep abreast of developments, it is hard to maintain the depth of knowledge necessary in all specialties. A co-ordinating doctor may or may not have specialist knowledge in palliative medicine. Some courses may provide the opportunity to learn more, but others only touch on palliative medicine—covering it in less than a day of a five-year medical degree. Specialists who are leading in this field of medicine, innovating advances and working to palliate a patient’s symptoms at the end of life will have far greater knowledge of the specialism. Even in this wider debate, many who work in a different field of medicine or in general practice have simply got their facts wrong when speaking about palliative medicine—not through intent but because they have drawn on their own, perhaps out-of-date, experience or simply do not have the competencies to understand all that palliative care can provide.

Pain and symptom control techniques are advancing; in our debates on this Bill, people have articulated instances of poor care rather than what clinical experts are able to achieve. It is therefore essential that a patient has a consultation with an expert in the field of palliative medicine, who can alleviate a patient’s fear, support them with a plan for the end of their life, and discuss how pain and symptoms can be managed. Hearing an alternative approach to the end of life can be life-affirming, help people discuss their fears and concerns about dying, and provide a patient with what they are seeking physically, psychologically, emotionally, socially and perhaps spiritually. Specialists in palliative medicine are trained to home in on the challenges that people naturally have on receiving a diagnosis of terminal illness and are skilled at supporting a patient to explore what end of life could look like for them.

If the Committee does not pass this amendment, it would be placing itself above palliative care specialists when talking about such matters. It would undermine the need for such a specialty in medicine, like a GP who may not know the breadth of palliative medicine options for their patients. The Committee must not assume that it knows those options. Rather, it should enable those with a specialist understanding of palliative medicine to deploy their skills in this process by working through palliative care options with patients before the consideration of a path that will end with an assisted suicide.

Amendment 299 is consequential on amendment 298, which would ensure that a person has a consultation or consultations with a palliative care specialist. Amendment 298 would further embed this into the practice of managing the end-of-life process to provide the patient real choice over their options at the end of life, as what can be achieved through the practice of high-quality palliative care is often significantly different from people’s perceptions—even those of clinicians. Palliative care, like so many fields of medicine, continues to advance in its application and in the steps that can be made available to palliate a person’s pain and symptoms. When pain is difficult to control using oral or intravenous pharmacology, other interventions, such as a nerve block, can result in the absence of pain. A specialist is required to provide such a procedure, but for most people who are in receipt of palliative care, this option is rarely made available. Palliative care is about not just pain and symptom control, but the holistic journey of a patient at the end of life.

[Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)]

The hon. Member mentions the principle that palliative care is a holistic service. Does she agree that, given that the Bill’s advocates—including the promoter, the hon. Lady for Spen Valley—emphasise the need for a holistic range of opportunities for end-of-life care, palliative care needs to be central to that? Rather than suggesting that there is an either/or between palliative care and assisted dying, the advocates of the Bill have often stressed the importance of having both options. Does the hon. Member for Bradford West agree that it is strange that the Bill does not require palliative care consultation as part of the range of services that are offered to patients when they are having their consultation?

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree, which is why the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) is very important. I urge the Committee to accept it, as it would ensure the provision of a palliative care consultation. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has always said, it is about having a holistic approach—we need to get back to that.

In the evidence sessions, we heard that palliative care social workers can play a pivotal role in supporting patients. Those from other professions—psychological services, chaplaincy services, physiotherapists, occupational therapists and speech therapists—along with specialist nurses and medics can all contribute to the care of a patient at the end of life. In discussions with palliative care specialists who listened to the debate on 29 November, they were perplexed by the symptoms that were graphically described in the case studies, and cited poor care as the reason for them. Many such symptoms can be controlled, and they were shocked that such examples of poor care were presented as a reason for assisted death, rather than for making good quality palliative care available to all patients.

We further heard evidence, especially from Dr Jamilla Hussain, that access to palliative care is inequitable. We know that those from minoritised communities and from low socioeconomic backgrounds have poorer access to good palliative care, and that people can have poor access depending on where they live, and on the day of the week or the hour of the day. Through this amendment, we want to ensure that everyone who is seeking an assisted death, or who has it suggested to them, as this Bill allows, is able to access a consultation or consultations with a palliative care specialist, who can dispel the myths while supporting them with their end-of-life plan.

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend talked about the stories that we heard on Second Reading. Does she acknowledge, as Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said, that there are cases where palliative care cannot meet a patient’s needs? We have a lady in the Public Gallery this morning whose mother had a horrible death, having had ovarian cancer and mouth cancer; she had to have her tongue removed, so she could not eat and drink, and she essentially starved to death. We have to be careful not to dismiss those cases, because they are real stories of real human beings, and we have to acknowledge the limitations of palliative care.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree. Nobody in this Committee, from what I have heard over the weeks of evidence that we have taken, is suggesting in any way that we are dismissive of people who actually need an assisted death and would benefit from the Bill. As I have said previously, and as Dr Jamilla said very clearly, there are some patients who clinically would benefit from an intervention such as an assisted death. I came on to this Bill Committee to ensure we have the best legislation and safeguards in place. The Bill currently does not ensure that people are aware of the options. This amendment would ensure that people have considered all options and can make an informed choice. If there is no requirement to speak to a specialist, I am afraid the Bill would do a disservice to those who might want to use it to seek an assisted death by not presenting them with those options.

In evidence from the representative of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, we heard an example of somebody who was in lots of pain and decided to seek an assisted death, but changed their mind once they understood that their pain could be alleviated. That is what this amendment is about. I urge the Committee to vote for it, because it is fundamental that we enable people to make an informed choice and to understand the services and options available to them.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend think that giving everyone access to palliative care would resolve some of the concerns about coercion and consent?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend comes from a mental health background, and I appreciate his expertise. We have talked a great deal about coercion—we have debated it for hours and hours—and I agree palliative care specialists, who deal with such issues as their day job, can provide that intervention and support the patient by establishing a much stronger relationship with them. I added my name to this amendment because I feel very strongly that palliative care must be a central part of the Bill if it is to provide patients a real choice at end of life. There should not be an assumption, as there is in the Bill as drafted, that assisted death is the predominant option once a person embarks on this pathway.

Let me return to the matter of minoritised voices. Dr Jamilla submitted written evidence, and spoke passionately, about the options available to people from black and minority ethnic communities. She said that they feel very much ignored. As I have said previously, palliative care is not fit for purpose because there is postcode lottery: provision depends on where a person lives, whether they have a hospice nearby, what the hospital options are and so on. There is a fear among ethnic minority communities of being pushed towards assisted death.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure the Bill delivers for the people for whom it is intended, such as the person the hon. Member for Spen Valley spoke about? It would put in place protections for the people for whom there is a choice, and that where those choices exits, they are laid out in full and properly examined before a final decision is made.

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree. It is imperative that those options—pain options and care options, including with the family—are explored in detail. The last time that I spent time in a hospice was when my brother-in-law was dying of cancer, and I remember that, as a family, we were very much involved in those conversations. Having such expertise empowers not just the patient but the family. Losing somebody who has a life-threatening condition is a difficult time for families and loved ones. When the wraparound model of palliative care, with specialist nurses and doctors, is good, it can be amazing. I have heard plenty of stories about when it is good. Last week, I mentioned a friend of mine who lost her husband last year, and she said that the palliative care nurses and doctors could not do enough. That gives the family confidence to explore the options. In that instance, that person would have benefited from this Bill—she encouraged me to support it.

As Dr Jamilla said, some people would absolutely benefit from the Bill, and they cannot be dismissed, but how do we legislate to cover people who do not have equal access to palliative care or to healthcare? There is discrimination. The covid experience that we went through recently showed the impact of inequalities. Disabled people, people with mental health conditions, elderly people, and people from black and minority ethnic communities, say that they were DNR-ed—subject to “do not resuscitate” orders. There is already a lack of trust in services, so we need to strengthen palliative care.

There is a fear among these communities that they will be pushed towards assisted dying. A consultation with participants from Pakistani, Roma, Nigerian, black Caribbean and Indian backgrounds revealed overwhelming mistrust, which is deeply rooted in the experience of discrimination and the disproportionate impact of covid-19. As one participant put it,

“They are doing this to save money…to kill us off.”

To get confidence among communities back, we need specialists people can rely on. That is what the amendment speaks to, and I hope that the Committee will support it.

[Danny Kruger]

I rise to briefly speak in support of amendment 281, moved by the hon. Lady and tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell).

At the moment that somebody seeks assisted death through a consultation with a doctor, they stand at a fork in the road: they can either proceed towards the assisted death about which they are inquiring, or turn towards other treatment options. On Second Reading, almost every Member on both sides of this debate stated that we need more palliative care, and everybody emphasised the value of providing good palliative care to all who need it. The amendments in this group would simply give force and power to the clear call of the House of Commons for a strong, realistic palliative care option as an alternative to assisted death, and I would be astonished if members of this Committee chose to vote them down. They give clear expression to the will of the House: that palliative care should be offered, and that it should be apparent that a patient has clearly understood their palliative care options.

I implore members of the Committee to consider what they would be communicating if they rejected the amendments. They would be saying that this is not a fork in the road, but a one-way street: there is only one way that someone is likely to go, and that is onwards to an assisted death. If that is the will of the Committee, it should vote the amendment down. If it thinks, as so many people said on Second Reading, that there should be real choice, and that palliative care should be explained and properly available, then I implore the Committee to support the amendment.

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[Naz Shah]

Professor Sleeman’s evidence to me around palliative care says:

“‘Essential’ services are not provided: A good example is that our study of community services that are provided to people with advanced illness found that just 1 in 3 areas consistently provides a 24/7 palliative care telephone advice line—even though this has been a NICE recommendation since 2011…Another example is that the most recent NACEL audit (National audit) found just 60% of hospitals provide a 7 day face to face palliative care service— even though this is also a NICE recommendation, and was a recommendation in the One Chance to Get it Right report (that came out of the Neuberger review—around 2015.)”

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s important point, but does he agree that not every GP is able to keep abreast of all the palliative care advances being made, which palliative care consultants would know about?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s intervention, which leads on to the point I was going to make. We are getting bogged down in nomenclature about what speciality is involved when this is actually about training. It is about whether the individual having the conversation has the requisite skills to have a meaningful conversation. Clauses 5(3)(a) and 8(6)(a) stipulate that the co-ordinating doctor or independent doctor

“has such training, qualifications and experience as the Secretary of State may specify by regulations”.

That is the key part. This is about ensuring that people having incredibly sensitive, challenging and difficult conversations with patients about choices available to them at the end of life have the requisite skills and knowledge to do so. That may not be applicable to each and every general practitioner, but those having those conversations should have that knowledge.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I fear that my hon. Friend may be oversimplifying what I was saying. Perhaps I was not clear enough, so I will elucidate. I was certainly not suggesting that the required skills were merely those of being able to have a consultation and a conversation. I was talking about having the skills to have the information that needs to be imparted and the knowledge that underpins that and being able to articulate that within a consultation. It is a much wider picture than just having the communication skills—it is having the knowledge that underpins that. I am saying that that is not necessarily the domain only of someone who works in palliative care. There are a number of specialists who work within this field—it is a multidisciplinary field—and they all bring their expertise. The issue is about ensuring that anybody having these conversations has the knowledge base to conduct them properly.

[Naz Shah]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will try to make some progress. I want to move on to the other point I want to address, which is around bogging down the whole process with layer upon layer of bureaucracy. We are talking about a relatively small group of patients who are in the last six months of life and are then battling against the system that is meant to be helping them. If we put in layer upon layer and hurdle upon hurdle, it will become a much more difficult system for people to navigate. That does not mean that it would be a less robust system, but it would be a more difficult system. We are trying to make life easier, not harder, for those patients. This comes back to the central point that Professor Whitty made in his evidence about overcomplicating Bills: we overcomplicate Bills out of good intentions, but rarely make the safeguards more robust—in truth, we make them less safe.

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[Naz Shah]

rose—

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I will give way because the hon. Lady has been very patient.

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is being generous with his time. I want to bring in something that is very real for me at the moment. As a result of a hit and run, I have nerve pain for which I receive steroid treatment. I had treatment a couple of weeks ago and suffer from pain at the moment. My doctor is not a specialist in nerve pain; he has to refer me to a musculoskeletal service and I have been waiting for over a year for surgery.

I mention that because we already have care pathways for specialisms such as nerve pain. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley referred earlier to somebody who had cancer and it was a horrible experience. I would like to have thought that in that instance they would have been offered tube feeding. However, to go back to the point, the GP does not necessarily have the skillset. My GP, and there are lots of them in that practice—it is a brilliant practice at Kensington Street—has to refer me on. That is the point of the Bill. The amendment speaks to developing an established care pathway. If we are to pass this legislation into law, we must ensure that there is a care pathway to explore palliative care.

At the moment clause 4(4), which my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud referred to earlier, says this has to be explored in the wider term. However, what that looks like is not a specialty. For some people with cancer and palliative care needs and six months to live, their trajectories could be—

[The Chair]

Order. This is supposed to be a short intervention.

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, Mr Efford. How can a GP guarantee that all those options have been covered, even in that initial discussion?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. She makes a number of points. First, may I say that I am sorry about her own health issues? I think she hit the nail on the head when she said that the GP may not be able to offer that service. For instance, take shoulder injections. Some GPs can do a shoulder injection with steroids; some will refer to the hospital for it. My father was a GP who could do them, but others would have referred to me when I was an orthopaedic surgeon and I would have done them in clinic.

This will not be right for every single general practitioner; the issue is about having a cohort of general practitioners who have the skill and ability, and about having a flexible system that works for patients. It all circles back to the training point. The individuals who do this have to have the requisite skills. That, of course, will be set down in regulation.

The other point that the hon. Member for Bradford West made is that clause 4(4)(c) says that any clinician having that discussion must be able to explain

“any available palliative, hospice or other care.”

It therefore follows that if the clinician is unable to do that because of a lack of skill or knowledge, they should refer on to somebody who can do it. That is the fundamental principle of having informed consent and discussion with patients. If a clinician cannot provide that information, they ask for somebody who can. That was not uncommon in my practice: if I had something that was outside of my area of knowledge or specialist interest, I would refer it to a colleague. That is how those conversations take place.

The Bill as it stands allows that flexibility for patients without confining them. But it gives them the very welcome option of a palliative care referral; that is entirely open to them—it is not closed off from them. Of course, they will be fed into the palliative care route anyway, following the trigger of their terminal diagnosis. They will be going on the journey, and having further conversations around their end of life care. Those are the points that I wish to make.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

I do worry about the lack of faith in our professionals. We have medical practitioners on the Committee and we have heard stories of the very good practice that happens, so it concerns me that we are so cynical about our system. Ultimately, we have to put faith in our professionals to do their job and to take that patient-centred approach, as I firmly believe they do. Dr Sarah Cox from the Association for Palliative Medicine said in her evidence to the Committee:

“In clinical practice, we make all these decisions in multi-professional teams…shared decisions are much better quality, much more robust and much safer.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q90.]

I absolutely agree with her, and that would continue to be the case.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member mentioned earlier the idea that this is happening in isolation, but it is her Bill that is saying that it will just be two doctors, not a team of medical professionals.

[Kim Leadbeater]

But it does not say that at all. It actually says that they have to refer, and that they have to consult with other people. That is part of the process. That is exactly what happens now. Professor Aneez Esmail, who is the emeritus professor of general practice at the University of Manchester and who has been a practising GP for over 30 years, told us in his evidence to the Committee:

“In terms of holistic care, currently when I look after dying people I never do it on my own; I am with district nurses, Macmillan nurses, or on call to a palliative care consultant. There is already a team of people looking after dying people…palliative care…works very well and it works in a multidisciplinary way. I think that this legislation will allow a much more open discussion and proper monitoring. It will improve training, guidance and everything else. People say that it will enhance palliative care, and that is what I think will happen.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 171, Q219.]

Indeed, as was referred to by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, if we consider the training included in the Bill, which doctors will undergo as part of the introduction of assisted dying, evidence from other jurisdictions shows that these are very detailed conversations where health professionals work together in the same way as they do at the moment in end of life care and decision making. As I have said repeatedly, the training is fundamental. I agree absolutely with Dr Rachel Clarke, who told us:

“If there is one thing that I would say to the Committee regarding making the Bill as robust, strong and safe as possible, it is: please consider seriously the matter of education and training”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 71, Q85.]

I agree 100% and I have embedded that in the Bill.

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The Government remain neutral on the substantive policy questions related to how the law in this area could change. However, I hope those observations on the purpose and effect of the amendments are helpful to Members of the Committee in their consideration.

[Naz Shah]

I have a few concerns about what we have just heard in relation to the amendment. One of them is in relation to Dr Cox’s evidence. What Dr Cox actually said was:

“The second difference, I would say, is that you are absolutely right that we do make those decisions with patients—with their families, if they wish—but in a multi-professional team. I would almost never make those decisions as an individual doctor without the support of my colleagues, for several reasons. First, as I have said already, that makes for much better decisions”. ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q91.]

[Danny Kruger]

To pick up on that point about Dr Cox, I think it is critical that the hon. Member for Spen Valley cited Dr Cox in support of the hon. Lady’s contention that the Bill is adequate. Dr Cox, in her evidence, was saying that there is a problem with the Bill because it does not require the multidisciplinary consultation that we all think needs to happen. Dr Cox was suggesting that the Bill should be amended in order to ensure that the NHS does its job properly, and that multidisciplinary consultations are held. Her evidence was not in support of the Bill as it stands.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

[Kim Leadbeater]

On the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, the Bill does not replace what already happens, and what Dr Cox was saying was that those conversations are already happening in a multidisciplinary way. We do not take that away.

[Naz Shah]

One of my concerns is that although the Government position in relation to the Bill, as they have said, is neutrality, the Government, in my opinion, have taken a position without an impact assessment, which might suggest that there is some ambiguity. Would the Minister therefore support redrafting potential amendments to include that? If it did specify a doctor or nurse, would the Government then, in their tidying-up, be prepared to accept that amendment?

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

Referring back to Dr Cox, she said:

“We need to make sure that the 75% to 90% of people who are dying and need palliative care are getting it. We need to make sure that there is not inequity in palliative care, so that you do not have to be white and rich and have cancer to get good palliative care. We need to make sure that hospitals have seven-day services. Seven-day-a-week cover is unavailable at 40% of hospitals.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 78, Q101.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that we need an inequality impact assessment to understand the current position and to get that right, in line with the Bill?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Without the impact assessment, how do we know what we are dealing with? That would be a normal way of progressing a Bill and dealing with amendments such as these. It feels as though we have just talked about something when the Government have already had a position on it, or have supported a particular position on an amendment.

To conclude, I will press the amendment to a vote, simply because it is important that we explore every option. We are already specifying what doctors have to do. I maintain again that there are 100,000 people in this country who do not access palliative care as it is. Palliative care is crucial when we are talking about end of life and people who have had a diagnosis of less than six months to live.

We will talk about illness and diagnosis in the next round of amendments, but on this amendment, I do not think that ensuring that somebody has at least explored that option is, as the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley repeated at least three or four times, “bogged down”. For me, it is not bogging down when we are talking about providing assisted death. The Bill is the biggest legislation on a conscience vote since 1967 in this House, and I do not care how long it takes. I feel very strongly that if we are to deliver a Bill that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said has the tightest safeguards in the world, then this debate has to happen. These conversations must happen and be explored not just for us here as parliamentarians, but in order for us to go away and say that we have done the best we can.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising that point. I think that what has been looked at is the number of unassisted suicides. The hon. Lady makes the good point that obviously we need to look at all the different factors that could be part of that, but I am just making the point that when we look at territories that have introduced assisted dying, we find that at the point at which it is introduced, we generally see, in most territories, an increase in unassisted suicide. I do not think that we should rush to disregard that. We need to recognise that in helping a small group of people at the end of their life, which undoubtedly this Bill will do, there will be a price to be paid. That price will be paid by our young people and other vulnerable groups.

I will not vote in favour of clause 1—I do not think that there will be a Division on it anyway—but I will not oppose it either, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire set out. I understand that it is the key clause in order for us to progress and continue the debate, which is what Parliament wishes us to do, but I hope that the Committee will be more receptive to improving the safeguards as we progress through the Bill. The amendments really were tabled in good faith. We did our best to write them in a clear way, but obviously the private Member’s Bill process makes that more difficult. This is not a Government Bill, but we are all doing the best we can to table amendments that would improve the safety of the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I just have some concluding remarks. None of the amendments was voted for. I feel that in the clause 1 stand part debate, huge opportunities have been missed. I have talked a lot, throughout the debates, about the issues of people from ethnic minority communities. Opportunities were missed to safeguard disabled people and people from ethnic minority backgrounds.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich made a point about amendments being clear, and about ambiguity. The truth is that if the amendments were supported in principle, they could have been tidied up by Government. There are some good amendments that could have been clarified by the Government. In principle, they were good options. I struggle with the whole narrative throughout the debate on clause 1: “Yes, we accept the principle, but we are not going to do it because it is ambiguous or the wording is incorrect.” There is lots of wording that we will debate throughout the rest of the Bill that is not quite clear, and that is the whole point of going through this exercise. Going forward, I encourage us, as the hon. Member for Reigate did before me, to do as we have been doing, with sincerity, in trying to make this Bill the best in the world it can be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley intends.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will make some brief remarks on the legal and practical effect of clause 1, as amended, to assist hon. Members in making their own assessment. Clause 1 sets out the eligibility criteria that a person must meet in order to request to be provided with lawful assistance to end their own life under the provisions of this Bill. A person must be terminally ill; this term is defined in more detail in clause 2.

Clause 1(1) sets out a further four requirements, which require that a person must also have the necessary capacity to make the decision, which is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005; be aged 18 or over; be ordinarily resident in England and Wales and have been resident for at least 12 months; and be registered as a patient with a GP practice in England or Wales. This clause provides that, in particular, clauses 5 to 22 of the Bill require steps to be taken to establish that the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life and has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person in making that decision.

The clause, as amended by the insertion of new subsection (3), will ensure that the service can be accessed only by an individual ordinarily resident in England and Wales. That amendment, amendment 180, has been drafted to give effect to the policy intent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for this legislation: that it is to apply only to those in England or Wales and is not to be accessed via medical tourism.

As I have said, the Government remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area would be changed. The clause is a matter for the Committee and Parliament to consider, but the Government’s assessment is that the clause, as amended, is workable, effective and enforceable.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Terminal illness

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[Rebecca Paul]

I rise to speak to amendment 11, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. This is one of the areas of the Bill where we all agree on what we are trying to achieve, so it comes down to making sure that the drafting does exactly what we all intend in order to protect people.

The definition of “terminal illness” in the Bill has two components. The first is that the person has an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition; the second is that their prognosis is less than six months. An issue raised in our evidence sessions is that there is a risk that a person with a mental disorder or disability will meet that definition if they are suffering physical symptoms that mean that they satisfy both parts of the test; a possible example could be a young woman suffering with severe malnutrition as a consequence of anorexia. With respect to the point that the hon. Member for Stroud made, I agree that anorexia on its own would not qualify, but the issue arises when there is a physical manifestation from that disorder such as severe malnutrition or even diabetes, which can co-occur, as we heard in the evidence sessions.

It is clear that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Spen Valley or anyone on the Committee, as evidenced by the inclusion of subsection (3). I thank the hon. Member for making that point; it is much welcomed. However, in oral evidence, Chelsea Roff said that

“we have case law in the UK where people with anorexia are being found to be terminal. We have to take that reality into account.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 153, Q194.]

Before I get into amendment 11, which aims to address the issue, it is important to understand what clause 2(3) is trying to do. It reads as follows:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both”

of a mental disorder or a disability; it refers to the relevant bits of law. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has set out, the words “for the avoidance of doubt” make it clear that this is a clarifying subsection that does not make any change to the rest of clause 2. It appears to be clarifying that mental disorders and disabilities alone will never qualify someone for assisted dying—I think we all concur with that—unless they also have a physical condition that meets the terminal illness test, namely that it is inevitably progressive and irreversible and that the person has a prognosis of less than six months.

This is where the problem lies. If someone has a physical condition arising from their mental illness, such as severe malnutrition resulting from anorexia, and if the physical condition meets the definition of a terminal illness, they will qualify. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in its position statement:

“The wording of the Bill could also be interpreted to include those whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental disorder. While anorexia nervosa, for example, does not itself meet the criteria for terminal illness as it is not an ‘inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment,’ its physical effects (for example, malnutrition) in severe cases could be deemed by some as a terminal physical illness, even though eating disorders are treatable conditions and recovery is possible even after decades of illness.”

To remedy the issue, amendment 11 would remove the words “For the avoidance of doubt”, to make this a legally effective clause, rather than just a clarifying one. That means that it is providing an additional safeguard to those with mental disorders and/or disabilities. It would also remove the word “only”, to ensure that a physical condition resulting from a mental disorder or a disability will not make a person eligible for assisted dying. The amendment is further bolstered by amendment 283, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which would make it clear that comorbidities arising from a mental disorder do not qualify a patient for an assisted death.

I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 181 to try to address the issue, but I do not believe that would quite solve the problem, which is quite a tricky one. “For the avoidance of doubt” would still be there, as would “only”. The sentence beginning with “Nothing in this subsection” makes it crystal clear that if a condition meets the six-month condition and the rest of the definition, it will be considered a terminal illness. There is therefore no exclusion for physical symptoms manifesting from mental illness or disability, which I think is what we are all trying to get to.

In my view, the only amendment that would address the issue is amendment 11, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. It would remove both “For the avoidance of doubt” and “only”, and would therefore better ensure that a physical condition resulting from mental illness or a disability does not make a person eligible for assisted dying.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendments 10, 181 and 283. I will start with amendment 10, which is very significant: it would make a small but crucial change to clause 2.

[The Chair]

Order. I think you are speaking to the wrong amendment.

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, I mean amendment 11. Thank you, Mr Efford.

I think it will be helpful to spell out what the Bill currently says, and what it would say if amendment 11 were adopted. I will also set why the amendment would provide a much stronger safeguard than amendment 181, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

Clause 2(3) states:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only”

—I stress the word “only”—

“of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

If amendment 11 is agreed to, clause 2(3) will read:

“A person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

That may seem a very small change, but it is an extremely important one.

The Bill, as presented to Parliament on Second Reading, would allow someone to qualify for assisted dying if they had a mental health condition such as anorexia nervosa and a physical condition such as malnutrition. To put it with absolute bluntness, that means that somebody with anorexia nervosa could stop eating until they suffered so badly from malnutrition that two doctors prognose that the patient is likely to die within six months. That person, under the Bill, would then qualify for assisted dying.

[Kim Leadbeater]

This is a really important discussion and I am so glad that we are having it—some brilliant points have been made. As someone who has worked with people with anorexia, I am very aware of the sensitivities of the condition and the issues around it. Would my hon. Friend agree that, as part of this discussion, we have to consider the capacity assessment of people with eating disorders? It is a very serious mental health condition; it would require a lot for somebody with anorexia to pass the capacity threshold for making a decision of this magnitude. It is certainly the sort of instance where I would be very surprised if a doctor did not refer to an eating disorder specialist. Does my hon. Friend agree that we have to look at the condition and how the patient should be cared for holistically?

[The Chair]

Order. I remind hon. Members that there are a set of amendments in the next group about anorexia. Let us not go too far down this road.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that there need to be specialists—we will come to that debate later. Let me bring our debate back to the amendment we are discussing. I understand that the Bill is drafted so that people who suffer mental disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, cannot qualify for assisted death—when my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley sets that out, I have absolutely no reason to doubt it—but that is not enough to safeguard people with such disorders. As we know, people with anorexia can and have stopped eating until they suffer advanced malnutrition, which is a physical disorder. In some cases, that malnutrition becomes so advanced that doctors will prognose death within six months.

If we wish to protect people with anorexia and other eating disorders, we must rewrite the Bill. We must ensure that people who have those disorders, and who also have a physical disorder, cannot qualify for assisted dying. I must underline that this is not a hypothetical point or some clever objection that has been dreamed up without reference to the real world. It has actually happened—not once, but dozens of times in countries that have assisted dying.

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[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point. Does she agree that the reporting and data around assisted dying are fundamental? That is why it is important that, if the law is to change in this country, we get that absolutely right. What we propose in the Bill is closest to the laws in Australia, and in my understanding there have been no assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia. However, my hon. Friend makes a valid point about the accuracy of reporting; we do not know whether those examples were people with anorexia who happened to have cancer as well. We just do not know, and that is not good enough.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree that if the Bill is to get through Parliament, it has to have those mechanisms and safeguards in place, but I am sure we will come to those later. If we do not know with any reasonable degree of accuracy how many cases there have been worldwide, we cannot say where the majority of such cases have occurred. When we are told that there have been zero assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia, I would err on the side of caution—another witness said that there were zero deaths involving coercion.

I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendment 181 also attempts to change clause 2, but the change would still allow people to qualify for an assisted death if they had a mental disorder alongside a physical disorder. I have no doubt that this stems from a compassionate desire not to exclude—for example, someone who has mild depression and a major physical illness—but its effect is to create a major risk for people suffering from both a mental health disorder that affects their eating and a physical disorder caused by not eating. To avoid that risk, the Bill must be much more tightly worded than it was when presented to the House on Second Reading, and it must be much more tightly worded than amendment 181 would make it.

We must make it much harder in the Bill for people to qualify for assisted death by way of having malnutrition caused by an eating disorder. It is a complex problem, and I believe no one amendment will solve it completely. I have submitted two amendments with the aim of making a contribution. Amendment 11 would also make a significant contribution to solving the problem, and I urge all Members to support it.

I turn to amendment 181, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Although the Acts mentioned in clause 2 define mental illness and disability as being taken from the clear medical model, it is not clear if she is further suggesting that a new definition should be used—for instance, the social model. Someone could have a significant impairment under a social model of disability, and for the purposes of the Bill, not consider themselves to be a disabled person. Therefore, they could qualify for an assisted death, thus rendering the provision of no worth.

It is therefore unclear what my hon. Friend is similarly proposing with regard to mental illness. Amendment 11 is needed to provide assurance that if someone does have a mental illness, then it is tightly defined and would preclude them from being able to access an assisted suicide, in case the reason they are seeking it is the mental illness and not the terminal diagnosis. I will speak further on that later.

If amendment 181 was agreed to, the clause would read that a person is not to be considered terminally ill

“only because they are a person with a disability”.

There are two obvious problems with the amendment. First, the amendment removes references to the Equality Act 2010 and the Mental Health Act, which previously defined who did and did not have a disability or a mental health disorder, but having removed those definitions, it does not then define disability or mental disorder in the Bill. What definition will medical practitioners, and indeed applicants, use to determine who does or does not have a disability or mental disorder?

[Kim Leadbeater]

In terms of the removal of references to the Equality Act, I was not aware when the Bill was initially drafted that cancer is actually classed as a disability. Given the fact that in some countries 70% of assisted deaths are for cancer patients, it would seem ridiculous to exclude cancer patients from having the option of assisted death. I hope that goes some way towards explaining that point.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for clarifying that—that is really helpful. But where does the amendment leave us in terms of disabled people? I am just trying to understand.

[Kim Leadbeater]

The concepts of a mental disorder and a disability are well understood, and those terms are well used. In the eyes of the law, we would not need to provide a definition of those in the Bill, but the removal of the reference that would include people with cancer is an important thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate that cancer does come under disability, and that people with cancer can identify as a disabled person, but my initial thought is that that weakens the Bill.

[Danny Kruger]

The fact that cancer is included in the Equality Act definition does expose a concern about the Bill. It suggests that there is a real connection there, which is of concern. I think the solution is to accept the amendment 11 and ensure that disabled people and those with mental health conditions would not be eligible for assisted dying, and then to introduce a further amendment—either now, as a manuscript amendment, or later—to exclude cancer from the definition. That is a tidying-up exercise that could be done in light of the point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made about the reference in the Equality Act. The most important thing is that we tighten the clause to protect disabled people.

[Naz Shah]

I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has considered whether she would tighten the clause. Have any options been explored, and what have the Government said about her removal of the Equality Act—

[The Chair]

Order.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Before we adjourned, I was talking about the two obvious problems with amendment 181. The first is that it would remove references to the Equality Act 2010 and the Mental Health Act 1983, which previously defined who did or did not have a disability or mental disorder. The amendment would remove those definitions, and the Bill would not define disability or mental disorder. What definition would medical practitioners, and indeed applicants, use to determine who does and does not have a disability or mental health disorder?

I appreciate that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley explained, that was done on the basis of advice she took to remove the references to the Equality Act because people with cancer could also declare themselves to be disabled people. However, that leaves a real opening, which weakens the clause even further. I cannot understand why we would remove one clear definition but not provide a replacement. That is a serious concern.

However, there is a bigger problem with the clause as it would be changed by my hon. Friend’s amendment. In referring to someone who could not be disqualified from assisted dying, the clause would still use the word “only”—again, I emphasise the word “only”. That leaves the door open for individuals with mental health disorders or disabled people to qualify for an assisted death based on the physical consequences of their condition. If the goal is to prevent people with mental illness or disabled people from qualifying, this amendment fails to do that. It weakens, rather than strengthens, the Bill’s safeguards.

As we heard in oral evidence, there are now 60 documented cases of individuals with eating disorders who have died by assisted death internationally.

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend accept that nearly all those cases were in jurisdictions whose schemes bear no resemblance to the one proposed in the Bill?

[Naz Shah]

I accept that the majority of those 60 cases are in such jurisdictions, but to me it does not matter whether it is the majority or one—one death is too many, as I am sure my hon. Friend will agree. In Oregon, the evidence was that it was two, but it is also important to reflect on the fact that Oregon does not record these things. There is no record of the people who had anorexia—by and large, it is women—and who felt that they fit the criteria for assisted death, or that they were on a trajectory to fit it, because they had decided not to eat. So we cannot exactly rely on the two cases that have been found—and those were found only because of the research that was carried out. That does not quite satisfy the question.

[Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)]

Does the hon. Lady agree that it really does not matter what happens in other jurisdictions? The question is, does this legislation prevent people who are currently suffering from anorexia from seeking an assisted death or not?

[Naz Shah]

I completely agree with the hon. Member.

Coming back to the physicians who justified eligibility by citing the physical complications of anorexia, not just the mental disorder itself, we know that in all 60 of the cases that have been cited, the person did not have a terminal illness other than the one that was caused by anorexia, because that then fit the definition. Under the Bill, the same could happen here. I say in response to the hon. Member for Richmond Park that eating disorders or substance use disorders could still qualify if a doctor determines that the resulting physical deterioration meets the criteria for terminal illness. I will speak to anorexia in much more detail when we debate a further amendment that I have tabled.

Amendment 181 would also remove references to the Equality Act and the Mental Health Act, and the Bill would not define disability or mental disorder. That raises serious concerns, so I will not support the amendment. I encourage Committee members to strengthen the Bill in this regard and not weaken it. The Acts define mental illness and disability as taking a clear medical model, and again it is not clear whether my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is further suggesting that a new definition should be used—but I am going over ground that I have already been over.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

The amendments before us have left me in a significant quandary, as some Members are aware. I am concerned that while their proposers are genuinely seeking to improve the Bill, legal loopholes may remain.

Prior to Second Reading, the Equality and Human Rights Commission produced a briefing note on the Bill. It included a section relating specifically to discrimination and equality considerations, which stated:

“It may also particularly impact disabled people. We recognise that this bill is focused on assisted dying for adults who are terminally ill, and does not propose access to assisted dying on the basis of disability or chronic conditions. However, there is not always a clear line between terminal illness and disability. Disabled people can also suffer from terminal illness, and illness may itself amount to a disability. Parliament should note that the exclusion of disability as a standalone criterion for accessing assisted dying does not mean that the rights of, and protections for, disabled people do not need to be considered in relation to this bill.”

I note that amendment 181, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, seeks to clarify these matters, but I remain concerned that, with its reference to

“only because they are a person with a disability”,

it would retain the ambiguity that she is seeking to remove. I understand the legal advice that she has received on this matter. My view is that although the amendment would remove the reference to the Equality Act, that Act still sets out that disability is one of the specified protected characteristics. Paragraph A9 of the Government’s guidance on the Equality Act reads:

“The Act states that a person who has cancer, HIV infection or multiple sclerosis (MS) is a disabled person. This means that the person is protected by the Act effectively from the point of diagnosis.”

I remain concerned about this point. I have previously raised my concerns about the language used on Second Reading and, if I had spoken then, I would have raised this point. We have heard throughout the Bill’s passage that being a disabled person does not make someone eligible for assisted dying, but I have just diagnosed three disabilities in the Equality Act that may or may not be eligible under this Bill.

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[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making her points very clearly. The last words of amendment 181 are:

“Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if (disregarding this subsection) the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).”

Does that not demonstrate that the amendment does not change the test for terminal illness?

[Kim Leadbeater]

My apologies; I am speaking to amendments 399, 400 and 401. I will be happy to come back to that point at the appropriate time, but I first want to finish my comments on those amendments.

As I have said, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has done a good job this morning of improving the clarity of the issue. That shows that the Committee is doing its job and working effectively. I am therefore open to supporting those amendments.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I am sharing the content of written evidence. People working in this arena—medical professionals and clinicians—have taken the time to submit written evidence, which suggests that they see a risk, so this is something that we need to think about. The hon. Gentleman could be right when he asks why someone would seek assisted death in that situation, but it is more about if someone technically qualifies. Obviously, we are still yet to get through the Bill, and there is lots for us to debate, but we want to ensure that people are not put on that pathway if they are not actually terminally ill and their condition can be managed. People could be in a low place, and we need to provide support. This comes back to my point about the balance of best interests. It is really difficult to set the right level, but we need to think about best interests and protect people at their lowest point.

In Oregon, conditions such as anorexia, diabetes, arthritis and hernias have qualified for assisted death, not because they are inherently fatal but because treatment was refused or was unaffordable. We also need to think about situations such as supply chain issues with certain treatments. Situations that we do not want to happen could arise, and we need to think about what that means for this Bill.

Some lawyers and doctors in the US have advised patients on how to bypass the terminal illness criteria by refusing food and water until they become terminal—we have talked about that quite a lot today. There is some evidence of that happening. Cody Sontag, an Oregon woman with early-stage dementia, had few symptoms and was not eligible for assisted death, but after she refused food and water for a few days, her doctor ruled that she met the six-month prognosis requirement.

It is important that we carefully consider young women suffering with eating disorders, but I appreciate we have spoken about that group a lot today, so I will be brief. In Chelsea Roff’s evidence, she set out that at least 60 people around the world have been euthanised or assisted in suicide where anorexia nervosa has been listed by name as a terminal condition. In 100% of the cases, the people were women, a third were between the ages of 18 and 30, and two thirds were under the age of 40. Roff said,

“I have to emphasise that these were young women who did not have failing organs and did not have comorbid terminal conditions…they had decades of life ahead of them.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 139, Q175.]

UK courts have already ruled that treatment can be withdrawn from young women with anorexia, acknowledging that the likely result will be their death, after doctors framed their condition as terminal or untreatable. These examples powerfully demonstrate why it is vital these amendments are accepted, so that these conditions do not lead to a person qualifying for assisted death, if they can be managed sufficiently with treatment. In oral evidence, Dr Miro Griffiths asked us,

“What constitutes six months left to live, particularly if you are engaging with technological devices, medical assistance and so on? For example, I have a progressive condition that continuously makes me weaker and has respiratory complications and so on. If I remove the ventilator that I use at night, if I remove my other medical devices and if I stop my engagement with therapeutic services, does that constitute me having a terminal illness, because my rapid acceleration towards death becomes more evident?”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 142-143, Q179.]

In written evidence, Pathfinders Neuromuscular Alliance warned that for those with conditions like muscular dystrophy, access to treatment is essential. It said,

“It would not be unreasonable therefore to suggest an individual with neuromuscular respiratory failure could die within six months—and yet they might also live 20 to 30 additional years in this state.”

In written evidence, a group of leading physicians and researchers, including experts from John Hopkins University and the Royal College of Psychiatrists said,

“The Bill’s definition of terminal may not adequately distinguish between a condition that is inevitably fatal and one that only becomes terminal without adequate care.”

They added,

“Under this Bill, patients with incurable but treatable conditions could become terminal if they are unable to access timely treatment or choose to forego life-sustaining care.”

It is therefore vital that the definition of terminal illness is tightened to avoid unintended consequences. These amendments would ensure that the Bill applies only to those who are generally at the end of life, without prospect of recovery. I urge the Committee to give consideration to accepting them.

[Naz Shah]

First, I will speak to amendments 9 and 10, then to amendment 234, and then to my own amendments 48 and 402. I hope it is in order to note that the hon. Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), as the hon. Member for Reigate already mentioned, is a type 1 diabetes sufferer. Amendments 9 and 10 both concern matters of which she has a personal understanding.

Amendment 9 would mean that an illness, disease or medical condition, the progress of which can be managed or controlled by treatment, would not be characterised as a terminal illness. The amendment provides that instead of saying that the illness cannot be “reversed” by treatment, the Bill should say that its progress cannot be “controlled or substantially slowed”. The amendment is clearly a most important one. It seeks to prevent illnesses that can, in fact, be treated effectively from being classified as terminal illnesses.

The amendment would work to mitigate two very serious risks posed by the Bill. First, it would make it more difficult for someone who, for whatever reason, wished for an assisted death to qualify for that process by failing to follow a reasonable course of treatment. I do not say that the amendment would make it impossible for anyone not to do so, but it is an important safeguard. It would also provide a safeguard against the expansion of those conditions that would qualify people for assisted death.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley and members of the Committee have repeatedly praised the Oregon law, but we surely do not want to follow that example in every way, since we know that in Oregon, sufferers of anorexia have been able to access assisted dying. Again, I do not say that the amendment would make it impossible to expand the list of conditions, but it would make it harder. My hon. Friend has said repeatedly that she wants the Bill to have the strongest safeguards of any assisted dying law in the world, so I hope that she will join me in voting for amendment 9.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

Just to clarify, I will not be supporting that amendment.

[Naz Shah]

I agree very strongly with the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Penistone and Stocksbridge, and I hope that the Committee can later return to the state of palliative care in this country.

I underline that the matter of the six-month prognosis was not some minor detail on Second Reading; rather, it was a central plank of the arguments made by those who said that we should pass the Bill because its safeguards were the toughest of any assisted dying law in the world. It is less than three months since my hon. Friends spoke those words, and yet we are already discussing an amendment that would remove the six-month prognosis.

[Kim Leadbeater]

We need to be fair to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who has said that he will not press the amendment to a Division. Indeed, it would not be something that I would support if he did do so, for the reasons that my hon. Friend has stated. I also think that we need to give him credit for ensuring that the voices of people with neurodegenerative conditions, such as MND, Parkinson’s and Huntingdon’s, are heard. They are an important part of this debate, whatever our views might be on the tightness that is needed in the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend, and my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, for making it clear that they would not vote for the amendment. I also thank the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough for bringing forward an amendment that discusses those issues. However, whether it is withdrawn or not, it is an amendment that we are debating and talking to.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who tabled the amendment, no doubt feels very strongly that the conditions of patients with neurodegenerative diseases make a case for relaxing the six-month prognosis to 12. There may well be a good case for doing so, but we can only consider the case for extending the prognosis to 12 months because of the challenges created by neurodegenerative diseases if we have first considered that extremely complex subject.

We cannot say that the Committee has studied the difficult subject of neurodegenerative diseases and how they would affect the administration of the Bill. We have not heard from witnesses on the subject, and we have not been able to ask them questions. We did solicit evidence on whether neurodegenerative diseases would affect the ability to self-administer lethal drugs, but we have not had time to study the written evidence.

I appreciate that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough is not going to press the amendment to a Division, which leaves some of what I wrote earlier obsolete. I appreciate the hon. Member’s efforts. We are sent here by our constituents to represent them to the best of our ability. I certainly try to do that, and I know my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley always tries to do that—I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough and all others are trying to do that. We vow to represent our constituents, and had the amendment gone to a Division I would not have been able to support it, simply because we cannot make those difficult decisions without being properly informed. We cannot make up our minds to change the Bill because of a complex set of diseases.

[Jack Abbott]

Just as a point of clarification, I remember asking one of the witnesses at our oral evidence sessions about this very issue—Sir Nicholas Mostyn, an esteemed judge who has written and spoken about the issue extensively. We asked his views about neurodegenerative diseases and extending the time to 12 months, so it was something that we were aware of and discussed as a Committee. In fairness to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, it has not come completely out of the blue.

[Naz Shah]

I agree that we did hear that, but we did not hear from experts in the Bill, and at that point it was not discussed. While I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s point that we did speak to Sir Nicholas Mostyn, we did not have further evidence, and this measure was not in the Bill when we took evidence from those witnesses.

[Tom Gordon]

I find this a little bit baffling, because we had a comprehensive list of witnesses that we were able to circulate in advance. The format in which those oral evidence sessions were held was really helpful and informative. We were able to ask questions, and as the hon. Member for Ipswich mentioned, we were interacting with people and families. We heard from Pat, who gave oral evidence about his sister who had to go to Dignitas. Again, it was not just a small figure; a number of people brought this issue up. Could the hon. Member reflect on that?

[Naz Shah]

The crux for me is that at Second Reading, when the Bill was voted on, many Members cited that one of the central planks to that debate at the time was the six-month prognosis. The amendment would increase that to 12 months. As I have said, my concerns are that we are only three months on from that conversation and we are already trying to expand the Bill, which is why I would not support the amendment. I have said quite a bit on amendment 234, so I will leave it.

I will now speak to amendment 48, which I tabled. Under the current wording of the Bill, a person is terminally ill if their death

“can reasonably be expected within 6 months.”

My amendment would change that so that for a person to be considered terminally ill their death would have to be

“expected with reasonable certainty within 6 months, even if the person were to undergo all recommended treatment”.

One of the risks that confronts the Bill is that of misdiagnosis. That is not some remote possibility. Let me go into detail. As hon. Members know from the evidence brought before the Committee, prognosis is not a precise science. Even with physical illnesses, determining life expectancy is highly unreliable. Government data from the Department for Work and Pensions reveals that one in five people given six months to live are still alive after three years. A study spanning 16 years found that doctors wrongly predict how long terminally ill patients will survive in half of cases. Out of 6,495 patients who were predicted to die within six to 12 months, more than half—3,516, to be precise—lived longer than expected. If the Government themselves cannot accurately determine terminal illness for benefits, how can we rely on such predictions to justify ending lives?

Studies cited in written evidence submitted to the Committee have found that clinicians are routinely inconsistent and inaccurate in their prognostic assessments, often underestimating survival. Professor Katherine Sleeman, a palliative care specialist, underlined that point in her evidence to the Committee. Doctors face considerable difficulty in prognosing whether somebody is in the last six months of their life. Professor Sleeman cites studies based on large samples of patients for whom doctors prognosed life expectancy. The studies found that 47% of the patients whom they predicted to have six months to live in fact lived for longer than that—in some cases considerably longer.

I would argue that there is a danger in using the standard of prognosis currently in the Bill. The current research into doctors’ prognoses indicates that almost half of their estimates that a patient has six months to live are incorrect. We do not want people to choose assisted dying on the basis that they have only six months to live when a very high proportion of them will in fact live longer if they are not given assistance to die by taking a lethal drug or drugs.

My amendment would hold doctors to a higher standard of certainty. Under that measure, they would be explicitly held to prognosing that death would occur with “reasonable certainty” within six months, and that that would be true even if the patient underwent all recommended treatment.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

I think we all accept that prognosis is quite difficult, but one reason why I think this is fundamentally important is that a member of my constituency Labour party was given a prognosis of 12 months in 2012. Last year, they were out delivering leaflets for me in the general election. That is why it is so important that we make sure we get this right. I am sure that my hon. Friend has examples of her own. Is that what is guiding her to press this amendment?

[Naz Shah]

It is absolutely what is guiding me. I am sure we all know people who were told that they had six months to live and have lived a lot longer. We have heard stories of people who were told that they had six months to live and lived beyond 20 years more. We have heard lots of tragic cases, for example in the world of Dr Jamilla Hussain, that would really benefit from the Bill’s being available to them. But equally, there are other families whose loved ones have survived—and not just survived, but thrived for years and years. In fact, a close friend of mine, who happens to be a constituent of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, was diagnosed not to live very long. It was an emotional time for her daughters. Eighteen and a half years later, she is still alive, well and thriving.

[Dr Opher]

I must admit that I rejoice in these stories—it is fantastic that these things can happen—but shall we just outline exactly how the Bill will work? If you are given a prognosis of six months by a doctor and you decide that you want to—

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[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. Actually, there is nothing in the Bill that suggests that. We can only imagine and try to empathise as much as we possibly can with any person who has been given a diagnosis of six months to live. In that six-month process, they might not wait; as my hon. Friend, who is a doctor himself, has said, this is about autonomy. They might not wait until they get to a position where there is a lot of suffering; they might not wait to see those six months out. They might decide they do not want to take that risk, when actually they might have lived another 15 years, another year or another two years. That is the point of this amendment.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech and it is good to have this debate. May I ask her opinion on two things? One is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has alluded to, the research around the world shows that between 30% and 40% of people who sign up for assisted death never actually do it, because they do get better or because the treatment makes their condition manageable—or because they have a death in a different way. What are her thoughts on that? The other thing to point out is the number of people who we know, sadly, are taking their own lives because they are terminally ill at the moment. I go back to the point that I make quite regularly: no one is monitoring that—

[The Chair]

Order. As I said before, these are interventions seeking clarification. They are not mini-speeches.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. If we take that 30% to 40% figure, and the figure—she might correct me if I am wrong here, and I am happy to be corrected—that there are about 600 people on average going to Dignitas, for example—

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is people taking their own lives.

[Naz Shah]

Sorry—would my hon. Friend like to intervene?

[Kim Leadbeater]

Just to clarify, my understanding is that it is between 600 and 700 people who take their own lives; it is suicide.

[Naz Shah]

If we take that number, then that 30% or 40% who do not take that decision is maybe a few hundred people. However, the truth from Professor Sleeman’s evidence is that we are talking about thousands of people who are misdiagnosed every single year. She was talking about 3,516 who lived longer than expected. Yes, I recognise and value my hon. Friend’s comment that 30% or 40% of people do not take up assisted dying, but—perhaps I will talk about this when I move on to the next amendment—there is also a risk. If we go back to the Bill promoter’s intention to make the wording tighter, then surely this is a safeguard that she would support, just to ensure that we are making it as tight as we possibly can.

[Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)]

Can my hon. Friend clarify for me what she means by “reasonable certainty”, and how that differs from the clause as drafted? Can she also explain why, in her amendments, normal language around the burden of proof, such as “on the balance of probabilities” or “beyond reasonable doubt” is not used?

[Naz Shah]

First, this is not an issue for a tribunal, where it would be on the balance of probabilities; it is not an issue for a court of law or a criminal court, where we would be using proof beyond reasonable doubt. What I am trying to demonstrate is that doctors, in those diagnoses where they do get it right, have much more certainty. It might be that people have six months to live because they have different types of cancer. I am certainly not a clinician or an oncologist, but I know from the evidence we have had and from speaking to people that some people’s diseases—the specialists know better—have a trajectory of plateauing out and then dropping right at the end and some have a jagged kind of decline. Some of those diseases can be predicted with much more clarity than others. On the surface of it, in September, it might be the case for somebody that that is within the time—as for one lady who was told that she would not have more than six months to live. She is the founder of the Music of Black Origin awards and I was with her last week. She was absolutely fighting; she was not supposed to make it to that day. It is for the medics to decide—it is not for me to decide—but I would like medics to have much more certainty than they currently do, so that we would not have 47% of cases being misdiagnosed. That is what I am trying to get to, but I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention.

I argue that there is still a danger of using the standard prognosis that is currently in the Bill. The current research into doctors’ prognoses indicates that about half of their estimates are incorrect. My amendment would hold doctors to a higher standard of certainty. Under the measure, they would be explicitly held to a prognosis that death would occur with reasonable certainty within six months, and that that would have to be true even if the patient underwent all recommended treatment.

To go back to my hon. Friend’s intervention, this amendment is about raising the bar for how our medics make decisions. I submit that it would be a stronger test than the one currently included in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has frequently stated that she wishes to create a Bill with the toughest safeguards in the world. I keep coming back to that, because the whole purpose of speaking to all these amendments is to put in opportunities to try to strengthen the Bill. By their nature, all these amendments reflect hon. Members’ concerns. This amendment would tighten the prognostic standard required of doctors and would therefore contribute towards tightening the Bill’s safeguards. I hope that hon. Members support it.

Finally, I turn to amendment 402. I will repeat a lot about anorexia, but it is an important amendment. I have tabled it for a simple but extremely important purpose: to prevent people from qualifying for assisted dying by stopping eating and drinking to the degree that they develop severe malnutrition, such that a doctor would give them a prognosis of six months to live. It specifically aims to protect people with severe eating disorders, including anorexia nervosa, and would also protect people with a severe wish, as one of the psychiatrists who testified before the Committee put it, to “hasten death”. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and all other Committee members, will support this amendment.

Let us make no mistake: the Bill, as currently drafted, has a horrible loophole that all of us should seek to close. We know that anorexia sufferers and other people with eating disorders can and do stop eating to the point where they are dying of malnutrition. We should not allow such people to qualify for assisted death. Unfortunately, that is not a hypothetical danger; it is happening.

We know from the evidence that the Committee has received that that has happened in other countries. A group of eight experts on eating disorders submitted written evidence TIAB54 to the Committee some weeks ago. The experts included Chelsea Roff, who has been referred to many times in this Committee, and who gave clear testimony before the Committee, as well as seven medical doctors from hospitals in the UK, the US and Canada.

I hope that all Committee members have read the evidence, but I would understand if they had not, because we have had nearly 400 pieces of evidence to go through and very little time to read it. It seems to me, however, that if we are trying to write the best possible Bill, with the strongest possible safeguards, we have to pay the written evidence of experts the attention that it deserves. In their written evidence, that group of experts said:

“Patients with severe eating disorders frequently experience profound psychological distress and may express a desire to die. While this may appear to reflect a clear and informed wish, it is often a symptom of their psychiatric condition, which is remediable with appropriate treatment.”

The experts found that at least 60 patients with eating disorders received assisted death in several jurisdictions worldwide, including the US, Canada, the Netherlands and Belgium. I stress the phrase “at least 60” because we cannot be entirely sure that that is the full total. It is sadly the case that some jurisdictions are much more painstaking and transparent in the data they publish on assisted death than others.

In itself, it is tragic that people died in that way, but two things surely make the fact even worse. There are certainly men with eating disorders, but this is a problem that disproportionately affects women and girls. We know that the incidence of anorexia nervosa is much higher among women than among men in every age group. That is tragic. In every case we know of where a person with an eating disorder received an assisted death, that person has been a woman. I say it again: we cannot allow the Bill, as currently written, to stand. The Labour Government was elected with a mandate to reduce violence against women and girls. We surely cannot pursue that goal while at the same time increasing the vulnerability of women and girls who have eating disorders. There is nothing in the Bill as it currently stands that would stop doctors signing off on assisted death for someone who had starved themselves into malnutrition.

The courts in England and Wales have already begun accepting that some people with anorexia have reached a terminal stage. In the Court of Protection case, The NHS Trust v. L & Others, which took place in 2012, a 29-year-old with severe anorexia was described in the ruling as follows:

“The prospects of her recovery overall approach zero…given that it is extremely unlikely that Ms L will recover from her anorexia…in best interests to move to palliative care if L…in terminal stage of her illness.”

The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire raised the Court of Protection. There are 10 cases where the Court of Protection has made rulings. Of them, only one case, in 2012, ruled that the young lady could be force-fed.

[Kit Malthouse]

It is the other way around.

[The Chair]

Order.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. I have it in evidence and I am happy to provide the reference.

[Kit Malthouse]

My understanding is that it is the other way around. In all but one case, force-feeding was decided by the courts. In the case the hon. Lady is referring to, L, the court did wrestle over that particular issue and realised that, such was the advanced stage of the patient’s condition and the complexities of force-feeding, it could not quite bring itself to authorise it. My understanding is that in all bar one case force-feeding has been authorised.

[Naz Shah]

Actually, it was the other way around and I am happy to provide a reference to the right hon. Gentleman. Nine cases found lack of capacity, but still not in the best interest. One of the girls was 19 years old. The judge found that they lacked capacity to make decisions about their treatment. The question of whether they had the capacity to decide to end their life is completely different and not something we have asked judges to rule on before. The judge’s ruling clearly implied the capacity to refuse force-feeding even if it resulted in their death. I am happy to provide the references for that. It was against their best interest to force-feed them. Tragically, in nine of the 10 cases the judges accepted that that would inevitably lead to the deaths of those young girls.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has repeatedly stressed that her Bill is modelled on the Death with Dignity law in Oregon.

[Kim Leadbeater]

Actually, I have not said that.

[The Chair]

Order. With the greatest respect to Members, this is not a dialogue; this is a debate. This is not chit-chat. It is a very serious issue and interventions of that nature are not helpful.

[Naz Shah]

I am happy to correct the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

That is ultimately a matter of opinion. If the hon. Lady wishes to ask the hon. Member for Bradford West a question and get clarity from her, that is fine, but this is becoming a dialogue. People cannot hear what is being said. I want the Committee to be run in an appropriate fashion. We have rules of debate in the House and I am trying to apply them. Otherwise, there lies perdition and chaos.

[Naz Shah]

I am happy to withdraw that comment, given the welcome intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. When intervening on me in a previous sitting of the Committee, she stressed that most of the assisted deaths of people with eating disorders took place in the Netherlands and Belgium. The survey that Ms Roff and her colleagues carried out did find that the Netherlands and Belgium had more assisted deaths of people with eating disorders than Oregon, but it also found that Oregon itself had more than one such case. California and Colorado have also accepted people with eating disorders as subjects for assisted death. I remind hon. Members that, as I noted earlier, Oregon has a considerably smaller population than England and Wales. In 2023, the last year for which we have full data, Oregon had a population of just 4.25 million. By contrast, England and Wales had a population of 60.85 million—more than 14 times higher.

Perhaps it is the case that Oregon has had two assisted deaths for anorexia sufferers, as one witness told the Committee. In England and Wales, we have 14 times the population of Oregon. If it became legal for sufferers of advanced-stage anorexia to take their lives by assisted dying, we would almost certainly have more cases than Oregon.

[Dr Opher]

Does my hon. Friend not believe that an eating disorder is reversible? Under the Bill’s provisions, if someone has a condition that can be reversed by treatment, they would not be appropriate for assisted dying. Is she saying that eating disorders are not reversible?

[Naz Shah]

Absolutely not. That is not the point that I am making. Eating disorders are reversible, but it has been found that where this kind of legislation has been enacted, across the globe, somebody who has anorexia and decides not to eat then falls within the scope of assisted dying because it becomes a terminal illness.

[Danny Kruger]

I do not want to cut off the hon. Lady in full flow, but I want to echo her points. The hon. Member for Stroud has made his point before and we have had an exchange on it. There is quite a lot of research, to which I refer him, that shows how people in the UK, being treated by the NHS, are having diagnoses of terminal anorexia. It is happening. I refer him to Professor Agnes Ayton, the campaigner Hope Virgo and the eating disorders all-party parliamentary group in this place, which is looking at that. It seems bizarre to us, because of course someone can resume eating, but the fact is that anorexia is treated as a terminal illness in parts of the NHS today.

[Naz Shah]

I concur with the hon. Member’s remarks.

[Dr Opher]

Actually, there is a lot of debate about whether terminal states of eating disorders actually exist or not, so they cannot be said to be a real thing in that way. Some people in the profession think they certainly do not exist, so I would contest the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, but the truth of the matter is we have 10 cases that have gone to the Court of Protection. In nine of those 10 cases, judges ruled that the young people—women and girls, one was only 19—did have the capacity not to take treatment.

[Kit Malthouse]

Just to clarify, what I said earlier was slightly incorrect—I misread my briefing. While the hon. Lady may be right that the court decided not to proceed with force-feeding, a number of those applications were by the individual to stop the force-feeding. While the court decided that, on balance, that was the right thing to do, in all those cases since 2012 the individual was not found to have capacity to make decisions about their own condition; the decision was made by the court for them. That means that, under the terms of the Bill, they would not qualify. Some of those cases were quite complicated. A number of them, as I read it—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

To some extent, there is an issue here of repetition. Standing Order No. 42 gives me the power to stop potential repetition. I do not want to use it—I do not want to interfere with the debate—but I am afraid we are getting to the point of repetition. If I need to invoke Standing Order No. 42, I will.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the right hon. Member for his intervention, but my understanding is that the judge found that those individuals lacked capacity to make decisions about their treatment; whether they had the capacity to decide to end their life is a completely different test. I apologise in advance for repeating this, but it is not something that we have tested. They had the capacity to refuse. The judge ruled that they could not be force-fed. Tragically, in nine cases, while not force-feeding those young women would lead to their death, the judge insisted that force-feeding would not be in their best interests. That is what happened in those cases.

[Kit Malthouse]

I stand to be corrected, but my understanding is that in the seminal case that the hon. Lady is talking about, the case of The NHS Trust vs. L, the court decided not to force-feed L because the prognosis was that force-feeding would precipitate her death.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the right hon. Member for his intervention. I have talked about that case, and the court concluded:

“The prospects of her recovery overall approach zero… Given that it is extremely unlikely that Ms L will recover from her anorexia it is…in her best interests to”

move to palliative care, as it was considered a terminal illness. In some ways, that makes my point for me: she was diagnosed as terminally ill. The purpose of the amendment is to close that loophole. The majority of these cases are young girls and young women. I do not want them to get to a stage where they qualify under the Bill because they have a terminal illness due to refusing food, because that can be treated. That is the point that I am trying to make.

Let us say that only one or two people with anorexia have an assisted death if the Bill becomes law without my amendment. I hope that every member of the Committee would agree that even one such death would be unacceptable. Some might say, “Oh, but we must not make the perfect the enemy of the good.” That has been said in the debate, or sentiments have been expressed that reflect that sentence.

That is a good argument to make when we are trying to persuade our teenagers to finish their homework for school and so on. It does not wash for me when we are trying to create a Bill with the strongest possible safeguards for vulnerable adults, and it is too close to the arguments made in favour of brutal actions across the globe. We say things like, “To make an omelette, you’ve got to crack a few eggs.” If we want to make the Bill the best it can be, we cannot use such arguments. Perfection is not the enemy of the good—perfection is absolutely what we should be pursuing in this Committee.

Reference was made to one of the witnesses who gave oral evidence. I remember being aghast at the idea that these two people who died in Oregon were somehow a red herring and that there had been only two. It was really disappointing, and I was extremely angry at that comment. That is not something we should be doing or the standard we should be setting. We cannot be saying that.

There is nothing good about letting people who have sadly reached an advanced state of malnutrition be given assisted dying. Surely we can agree on that. If this Bill does not include my safeguard, it will do two things. First, it will increase the dangers of anorexia. People already develop anorexia to such a degree that they perish of malnutrition. Allowing such people to apply for assisted dying will mean that more severe anorexics die. If we do not adopt my safeguard, we run the further risk that those who are not anorexic, but wish to hasten death, stop eating in order to qualify for an assisted death. Both of those would be truly malign. I would hope all Members of the Committee will accept my amendment to protect those who would otherwise be at risk of starving themselves to an assisted death.

I also want to bring to the Committee’s attention a public letter that has been released this afternoon by nearly 40 individuals who work in the field of eating disorders. They have said, on the amendment to which I am speaking:

“This amendment states that mental illness alone does not qualify as a terminal illness, but as the legal text (“Nothing in this subsection…”) makes clear it has no effect beyond restating that the condition must meet the requirements of clause 2(1). If a doctor holds that a mental illness meets the test in clause 2(1) for terminal illness, this amendment will do nothing to prevent that.”

They further say:

“Eating disorders are treatable. They are life-threatening when left untreated or poorly treated, but this risk is preventable, and deaths from eating disorders are not inevitable. As campaigners, clinicians, charities, and organisations working with those affected, we urge the committee to take these concerns seriously and ensure this bill does not put people with eating disorders at risk of premature death under the guise of assisted dying.”

On my amendment 402, they say:

“Amendment 402: Explicitly states that a person cannot be deemed terminally ill because they have stopped eating or drinking.”

On amendment 48, they say:

“Amendment 48: Clarifies that a person is only considered terminally ill if their death is reasonably certain within six months, even with all recommended treatment.”

They are supporting those amendments, 9, 10, 48, 402 and 11. On that note, I will finish.

[Sarah Olney]

I rise briefly to speak against amendment 234 in the name of my good and hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough. I will keep it brief as I know he is not going to press to a vote.

First, the Bill that was voted on on Second Reading was a Bill for terminally ill adults in the last six months of their lives. I do not believe attempting to amend the scope of the Bill in Committee is what the House has asked us to do. I think the House voted for a Bill that was specifically for people within the last six months of their lives and that to be amending it—although I accept he is not putting it to a vote—is not in order.

Secondly, I want to reflect on Professor Sir Chris Whitty’s oral evidence to the Committee about how difficult it is to determine when somebody is within six months of the end of their life and how much more difficult it would be to determine whether someone is within the last 12 months of their life, notwithstanding that we are talking about a very specific category of people. For me, that really does give rise to the fear that we would not be able to make a specific determination on whether somebody was in the last 12 months of their life. There would be a risk that people actually have many years left to live. In the case of motor neurone disease, for example, we have seen prognoses of between two and five years, so we risk shortening people’s lives unduly. Furthermore, people might not want to make the prognosis, and therefore people who would like to have the right to end their life in their final 12 months because they have a neurodegenerative disorder might be denied that right, because it is impossible to come to such a determination.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I accept that, which is why amendment 282 is probing only. It is trying to demonstrate the point. I recognise that even the expedited process is likely to take up to a month to get through, so that would be difficult. Nevertheless, if our intention is to restrict this to people who are literally in their last days, which is frequently what we hear, I think it would be appropriate to restrict the time.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member talks about the amendment being probing. Does he know why we went for six months? Was it was based on research? I am not sure whether he is aware or can help me understand that.

[Danny Kruger]

I am not. I think we have allowed six months to creep into common legal parlance because of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992; we now recognise in law that it is possible to have certain rights and entitlements on the basis of a six-month prognosis. I presume that is the basis of it. It does feel like a reasonable period, and I understand the rationale for it, but given the difficulty of prognosis and the intense seriousness of what we are doing, I think it is inappropriate and dangerous.

Another way of achieving greater safety—less precise but perhaps more generous to people who want an assisted death—is to tighten the definition of terminal illness to mean those whom doctors think it is reasonably certain, rather than reasonably expected, will die within six months. That is the intent of amendment 48 tabled the hon. Member for Bradford West. The amendment also insists that the condition is terminal even with “all recommended treatment”, so that somebody could not make themselves eligible by refusing treatment. That is a very important point that the hon. Lady is trying to insist on.

By the way, that does not mean—and I hope people will not conclude that it does—that someone is required to have every treatment that might be possible, including invasive and unpleasant chemotherapy. The point is that it would have to be treatment recommended by the doctor: if the doctor recommends it, then it is appropriate. A doctor might be offering chemotherapy, but they would not be recommending it in all circumstances.

For the avoidance of doubt—an important phrase— I think that the hon. Lady’s amendment 402 is very important too. Just in case nutrition is not seen as treatment—perhaps it is arguable that it may not be—it is very important that we specify explicitly that declining food or drink does not qualify someone for an assisted death.

[Naz Shah]

Does the hon. Member agree that one point that is really important in this afternoon’s debate is that a person has a right to refuse treatment, and indeed food and water, if they have capacity, but that malnutrition is practically reversible? The argument has been made by doctors in Oregon around the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking that doctors cannot legally force a person with capacity to eat, and if they refuse food, their condition can be considered irreversible and terminal. That is the crux of the point. Does he agree with me?

[Danny Kruger]

I think so. The hon. Lady is absolutely right that there is this difficult loophole that somebody may have capacity and be refusing food and drink and would therefore potentially be eligible. In the Bill as it stands, we have an expedited process for people whose prognosis is only a month. There, the 14-day waiting period could be reduced to just 48 hours. If a person stopped eating and drinking, their death would almost certainly happen within a month. In other words, a person who is not terminally ill could make themselves eligible for an assisted death within 48 hours simply by refusing sustenance. It is very important that we recognise that and explicitly exclude it.

I will refer quickly to other jurisdictions where this specific situation occurs and the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking is used to qualify for legal drugs. A peer-reviewed article in the Journal of the American Geriatrics Society discusses this case—it may be the one referred to earlier. The authors noted that if anyone can access VSED—voluntary stopping of eating and drinking—then anyone can qualify for medical assistance in dying. In Colorado, 12 people qualified for assisted suicide based on a diagnosis of severe malnutrition.

The American Clinicians Academy on Medical Aid in Dying, an organisation of doctors who provide assisted suicide, acknowledges this loophole. Its guidance states that

“there is nothing in the letter of the law”

to prevent voluntary stopping of eating and drinking from being used in this way. It adds that that would

“essentially eliminate the criteria of terminal illness,”

because a person could always qualify as having terminal illness if they stopped eating and drinking. That is obviously not what the Bill’s sponsor and drafters wish. I hope they will consider accepting the amendment to close that loophole.

I will not repeat points made very eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, but I echo the need to ensure that the Bill is not for conditions that, although they cannot be reversed by treatment, can nevertheless be controlled or substantially slowed. I will therefore support the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough and to the people he speaks for in tabling amendment 234. I recognise absolutely that the MND Association has pointed out that the six-month rule would not work for all MND sufferers. It successfully persuaded the last Government to change the rules on benefits in recognition of that point, and its evidence to us, it has requested a clear and workable definition for assisted suicide. It was not very clear on what that would be, and there are practical problems with extending to 12 months, specifically the one we have with six months—the difficulty of prognosis, which would be twice as bad. I also refer to the evidence from Professor Sleeman, who made the point that a non-neurologist would find it particularly difficult to make an accurate 12-month prognosis for MND.

The main reason to object to the principle of the amendment—I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is not moving it, but it is an important principle to discuss—is that it makes no sense at all to have two different prognosis periods. Of course, we can see where it will go. The fact that the amendment has been tabled and selected, that it is in scope, and that people will support it in this Committee or beyond, or outside Parliament, is evidence of where things go. We saw it very clearly in the evidence we heard from witnesses from Australia, who pointed out that there is no logical reason to have two prognoses—one for cancer and one for neuro-degenerative disorders. Their response was, “Well, let’s make it 12 months for everyone,” and of course that is the way things would go.

I finish with a tribute to the great quixotic effort of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who is not on the Committee. Runnymede is the home of Magna Carta; the spirit of liberalism lives on in my hon. Friend, a genuine liberal who wants to scrap the period of prognosis altogether, because he genuinely believes in absolute autonomy. I have been trying to make the Bill live up to its claim to be a Bill for safeguarding; he wants it to live up to its claim to be a Bill for autonomy. In principle—in logic—he is absolutely right. If we think that some people should have access to suicide assisted by the state, then why should person A get it and not person B? Needless to say, I disagree with him.

--- Later in debate ---

In some cases, a terminal illness progresses more slowly, and as we heard in evidence, prognosis is not an exact thing. If a dying person’s terminal illness progresses more slowly than might have been expected, they are delighted. They do not think, “Well, I have this approval, so I am going to access assisted dying anyway.” I feel like some of our debate has missed the essential humanity of people at the end of their lives, as though, just because people are able to do something, they will. That is as much about autonomy, dignity and respect as anything else we are talking about in this debate.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, and I agree with what he says about autonomy. As I said earlier, autonomy does not necessarily have to lead to pain, and it could be that I do not want to get to that stage. People will never know whether they could have lived longer. Does he not agree?

[Lewis Atkinson]

Sensible amendments have been tabled elsewhere in the Bill—not to the clause that we are debating—that would strengthen the initial conversations and ensure that people make informed decisions and have access to, and conversations about, all the forms of support, psychological or otherwise. I think that those will address my hon. Friend’s point.

In terms of the eligibility criteria, Chris Whitty was clear that there is diagnostic uncertainty in both directions. He said that

“a significant minority of people die before they actually get to the point”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 37, Q15.]

of the six-month prognosis. Because of that uncertainty, if we attempted to make the criterion much less than six months, we would end up excluding people. From all the conversations I have had, it is clear that once people have a terminal diagnosis, they want to put their affairs in order; doing so means that they can enjoy their final months with their families. We must not reduce eligibility and limit access to those whose disease unfortunately progresses more quickly than they would like and the prognosis suggests. I therefore oppose amendment 48, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.

The amendment talks about “recommended treatment”. In all my years in the NHS, shared decision making has been a key principle. No one other than the person in question can make the decision about what trade-off they are willing to accept. Invasive chemotherapy may have a 20% chance of elongating my life. Am I willing to accept a 20% chance? Am I willing to accept a 30% chance? What I decide is right for me may be different from what other individuals decide, so a doctor is not in a position to say, “You should accept this because it will give you a 10% chance,” or, “It will give you a certain level of pain that I’m willing to accept.” We each have to make those decisions ourselves.

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Lewis Atkinson]

No, I will make some progress.

I feel that the amendment risks pressuring people to accept courses of intervention against their will, and I do not think it is consistent with the important principles of autonomy and consent. Because of the safeguards, approvals and reflection periods built into the Bill, going through the process of approval will clearly take in excess of a month. That is why amendment 282, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, which would limit the eligibility to one month, is fundamentally not compatible with the safeguards in the Bill, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley made clear. To me, six months is absolutely the right balance. It reflects people’s wish to put their affairs in order and allows for prognostic uncertainty on the downside—someone given six months may actually only have two or three months to live—but it still allows the operation of robust safeguards and reflection periods.

I turn briefly to the other amendments. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe for the points she made. I share the concern that replacing “inevitably” with “typically” would risk weakening the definition of “terminal illness” and expanding access to other conditions. I fear that “typically progressive” is a weaker interpretation, so I cannot support the change, because I support a tightly drawn Bill with tightly drawn eligibility criteria. For the same reason, although I have sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, I think it goes beyond the scope of what the House discussed in November and the contours of the current debate.

Amendments 9 and 10 refer to disease being controlled or substantially slowed. Those are not recognised medico-legal terms. What is the definition of “substantially slowed”? Who would define it? Is it something that takes 20%, 50% or 100% longer? We talk about the risk of inserting undefined terms and of court interpretation, and I fear that introducing such an amendment would give rise to that.

The people best placed to make decisions about whether the treatment will suitably slow the progression of the disease are the dying people themselves. They are the only people who should do that—fully informed, of course, by their medical and clinical teams. Each of us, when the end is nigh—it will come to me, as it will to us all—has to make that decision ourselves, not on the basis of a recommendation mandated in law or some definition of “controlled” or “substantially slowed”. It feels that the legislature would be putting in primary legislation decisions that I should make about the treatment that I should accept, so I am not in favour of those amendments.

I finish with reference to amendment 402. Although earlier I wanted to make progress, I do not want to rule out any further interventions, if my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West or others would like to come in. I recognise the concern, and we need to talk about people with anorexia with the respect, dignity and seriousness they deserve. I have heard it said—I think my hon. Friend said it—that there is nothing in the Bill to stop that being the case, and I fundamentally disagree for many reasons. First, as the Bill sets out, capacity is checked eight times. The Court of Protection has repeatedly found that people with anorexia do not have the capacity to make decisions about stopping eating. Although a best interest test may have been made, that is not relevant, as set out in the Bill. People have to have the capacity to request an assisted death, checked eight times. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has already set out that she is minded to accept—or will accept—amendment 6 to clause 9(3)(b), so that, if there is any doubt about capacity, a psychiatric opinion “must” be sought.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, I considered the written evidence saying that, in instances of a patient with anorexia, psychiatric input is absolutely necessary. Absolutely—in every case where someone has anorexia, under an amended clause 9, psychiatric opinion must be sought as to capacity. That is before we get to the further set of amendments to clause 12.

[Naz Shah]

In the cases that went before the court, the judges, in nine out of 10 cases, found that all those young ladies did indeed have capacity to refuse their food, and it was as a result of that that their deaths became inevitable. Will my hon. Friend comment on that?

[Lewis Atkinson]

That is not my understanding, and I have sought some clarification, including from Professor Hoyano, who provided oral evidence to us, and I believe that that was not her understanding either.

Given the “must” in clause 9 regarding psychiatric referral to a third tier panel—which, let us remind ourselves, is not in place in any of these jurisdictions from which figures are cited around potential deaths of people with anorexia—I feel there are significant safeguards. Furthermore, we have just agreed to amendment 399 tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, clarifying the “medical condition” piece, which provides a further safeguard.

I respect the need for us to consider these matters carefully, but I urge a degree of holistic thinking when we talk about individual clauses. Some of the statements being made—that there are no protections in place—just do not fly, to me, given the Bill as a whole.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 282 is similar to amendment 48 but would require the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor to have “reasonable certainty” that a person can be expected to die in consequence of their inevitably progressive illness or disease within one month, instead of six months, even if that person were to undergo all recommended treatment. As with amendment 48, this carries risks of making the assessment of a person’s prognosis more complicated from the point of view of the assessing doctors. I have already set out why that can be challenging. It is an established principle that a patient with capacity must always retain the right to refuse treatment, if that is their wish.

[Naz Shah]

I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central; I was actually incorrect. The girls did not have capacity, so he was correct. However, in the cases that went before the court, those nine girls did not have capacity yet the judge made a decision that they should not be force-fed to keep them alive, and they should be allowed to die. Perhaps the Minister could comment on how the amendment would not meet that criteria. Would it fix that loophole?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am just talking about the amendment to reduce the time from six months to one month. I will come on to the issue of eating and drinking in a second.

As amendment 282 would reduce the time within which the person is expected to die from six months to one month, it would also limit the number of people with a terminal illness who would be eligible for assisted dying under this legislation. Furthermore, there may be very challenging workability issues in delivering a service within one month, given the other time-dependent safeguards elsewhere in the Bill.

Amendment 51 would remove the requirement for the patient to have a six-month prognosis to be defined as “terminally ill”. If agreed to, it would expand the pool of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life beyond those with a life expectancy of six months or less. In other words, it would remove the timeframe requirement of when death can be reasonably be expected.

Amendment 234 would widen eligibility to include cases of neurodegenerative diseases, illnesses or medical conditions where a person is reasonably expected to die within 12 months. Matters such as this are for the Committee, and ultimately for Parliament, to decide, but it is clear that the effect of the amendment would be to broaden the number of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life under this legislation.

Amendment 10 would provide that, if treatment exists for a person’s progressive illness, disease or medical condition that alters the overall prognosis of that person’s condition, they are not terminally ill and would not be eligible for assisted dying services.

Amendment 402 would exclude a person who would not otherwise meet the definition of “terminally ill”—namely, being diagnosed with an inevitably progressive illness with six months or less to live—if that person meets that definition as a result of stopping eating or drinking. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent a person from being defined as “terminally ill” as a result of their own actions of stopping eating or drinking, or both. The Government’s analysis suggests that this may also exclude people who are terminally ill under the definitions of the Bill and who are, for various reasons, unwilling or unable to eat or drink. For example, it may include those with conditions such as oesophageal cancers, which could result in their being unable to eat or drink.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether someone who is on intravenous fluids or being fed through a feeding tube would be considered to have stopped eating or drinking under the amendment. I think that addresses the concern expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, but she is welcome to intervene again if she would like to. The amendment could therefore lead to uncertainty over the person’s eligibility for assistance under the Bill.

The Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. Questions around the definition of terminal illness and who should be eligible to access voluntary assisted dying under the legislation are matters for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by various Members.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Opher]

Yes, I totally accept that. The Mental Capacity Act is set so that we assume capacity and look for evidence of lack of capacity. The great danger with the amendment is that it would change a whole raft of very well used provisions. As Professor Whitty said, the Act is used up and down the country every day; I have used it myself many times, and taught it as well. If we change the emphasis from the presumption of capacity to the presumption of incapacity, which is what my hon. Friend is suggesting, that is a major change in the Act.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Given what my hon. Friend has just said—that he accepts the premise of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford that the doctor would have to assist—can he help me to understand where that leaves the issue of autonomy if a doctor is, as he has agreed, allowed to assist in the decision?

[Dr Opher]

The way the doctor assists, if making a mental capacity assessment, is to try to tease out the four concepts. Does the patient understand what they are being asked to agree to? Sometimes mental capacity assessments are very straightforward and last five minutes; sometimes they last an hour. I have done one that lasted about 90 minutes because it was really important to tease out whether the patient genuinely understood what they were doing. That is the sort of assistance I am talking about. It is not about trying to persuade them to make a decision that I think is the right decision; it is just making sure that they understand it, can remember it and so on.

[Naz Shah]

How does my hon. Friend respond to not one, not two, but multiple witnesses, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, saying, absolutely contrary to what he is saying, that the Mental Capacity Act is not the right bar and that the bar is too low?

[Dr Opher]

Well, that was disputed by other psychiatrists. We are asking questions about whether the Mental Capacity Act is safe and correct for the Bill. This whole Committee is about making the Bill safe. None of us would dispute that. However, I think that if we accept the amendment, the Bill will become less safe because the amendment would change a massive piece of legislation and therefore have a number of repercussions that we do not understand.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

I understand what the amendment is trying to do; my argument is that it will not achieve that because it will muddy the waters of a mental capacity assessment, which will make how we do it less safe. I would also like to return to Professor Whitty’s comments and to say that in the majority of cases mental capacity is very clear. It does not actually take very long to assess whether someone has mental capacity.

[Naz Shah]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[The Chair]

Can the hon. Gentleman be allowed to fully answer the questions that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire and the hon. Member for Richmond Park asked, before we have an intervention on another point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

It is really important to understand that for the majority of people mental capacity can be assessed reasonably quickly because it is very clear whether they have it or do not have it. What we are talking about, I think, is a small proportion of patients in which it is unclear whether they have mental capacity. There is scope in the Bill for those circumstances, when the patient should be referred to an enhanced level of mental capacity assessment by a psychiatrist or a psychological nurse. In that way, it makes it much safer. We do not need to redesign the Act for that small number of patients because we already have a very safe route to assess capacity.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he has been generous with his time. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has seen the evidence from Alex Ruck Keene KC on mental capacity. He sets out very clearly the myths around mental capacity, one of which is that mental capacity is well understood. He argues that it is not. How would the hon. Gentleman respond to that?

[Dr Opher]

I think that in most cases mental capacity is very well understood, and it is very clear, as I have said. I would say that, as practising clinicians, almost every GP has to do it. I would not sign up a doctor in training if they could not do it. I think it is a little bit rich to suggest that we cannot assess capacity. I agree with many of the comments that have been made about assessing capacity in more difficult cases for most doctors, and I think we do need an avenue, in those situations, to get further opinions.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Gentleman said it would be rich for people to say that capacity cannot be assessed. That is not the case. I am not convinced about that, and I am not sure, from the evidence I have seen, that anybody is saying that anybody is not capable of assessing capacity per se. Would the hon. Gentleman agree that the argument is about assessing capacity for this Bill in particular? That has not been tested. The Royal College of Psychiatrists is very clear, as are many other experts, including legal experts, that the Bill has not been tested for that purpose. Therefore, the Mental Capacity Act does not meet the purpose for the Bill.

[The Chair]

Order. I will give people the opportunity to explore this issue but, as I have said, interventions are not mini speeches.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I will pick up on some of the points to which my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud referred, given his expertise. We heard from three senior psychiatrists during the evidence sessions, who were very clear; I have already mentioned much of their evidence. The Royal College of Psychiatrists’ written evidence states:

“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill. Extensive consideration needs to be given to what an assessment of mental capacity should consist of for AD/AS prior to the passing of legislation and, indeed, whether a determination through such an assessment can be reliably arrived at in this novel context.”

It goes on to say that the capacity to end one’s life is “entirely different” from assessing for the capacity of deciding treatment.

The Bill moves us into new territory. We need a definition that meets the criteria of what we are assessing, which is to end one’s life. That has never been applied in this country. The Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, requires assessors to presume that someone has capacity until incapacity can be proven, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford referred to in moving amendment 322.

Dr Annabel Price, Professor Allan House and Professor Gareth Owen all expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person is in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Because there is nothing in the current medical assessment that requires careful explanation of these factors, there is a real worry that there will be no opportunity to change them. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground.

Professor Owen said:

“I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience”.

The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts us into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity issue under consideration. He said:

“It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.]

He further said that we are in “uncharted territory”, because the ideas in the Bill are very novel. That is the hub of the Bill: it requires assessors to assume capacity as a starting point. To make the Bill the safest in the world, that is not the yardstick that we should be applying, according to very senior psychiatrists across the country.

Alex Ruck Keene KC also provided evidence to the Committee. He set out some of the myths in a video. There are a few things in this for me. One is the article in The Telegraph, which senior psychiatrists alluded to, that suggested there was a shortage of specialist psychiatrists. We have already had a conversation about the shortage of judges, but we are now having a conversation about the shortage of psychiatrists. Should the measure remain in the Bill as it stands? I would like to understand from the Minister whether that is something that has been assessed, given that we do not have an impact assessment.

Alex Ruck Keene referred to the National Institute for Health and Care Research, which funded a number of research projects in 2022 under the umbrella topic of implementing the Mental Capacity Act in practice—the rationale being that

“The Mental Capacity Act…is designed to empower and protect people who may lack the mental capacity to make their own decisions about their support and treatment, ranging from everyday issues to more serious, life-changing decisions.”

Evidence has highlighted several aspects of the way that the assessments are being carried out that are not compliant with the Mental Capacity Act. If we already have issues with how the Act is being implemented in the everyday work of the NHS and psychiatrists, how many mistakes will be made if the Bill goes through as it is? How much potential is there for mistakes to be made when assessing the capacity of those who are most vulnerable?

The Care Quality Commission in its most recent “State of Care” report in October last year said:

“The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) directly affects the lives of millions of people. Everyone providing care to people over the age of 16 must be familiar with this vital piece of legislation, which introduced rights and protections for people who may lack mental capacity. A decade after the House of Lords report, we continue to find a lack of understanding of the MCA among providers.”

That is the most recent research, and it is telling us that we have not got this right.

The Mental Capacity Act was passed over 20 years ago in 2005, but is still not understood properly or being applied for the reasons it was supposed to be. If we have not got that right in 20 years, how can we as a Committee be assured that the legislation will be applied properly when it is applied to something that it has never been applied to before and that has not been tested? How can we say that we should be rejecting an amendment that would change that and raise the bar for people? Ultimately, this affects people who are vulnerable; I will come on to that in more detail in the next group of amendments.

That is a real concern, which is why I urge Committee members to support amendment 322 to get the safeguards right. We spent hours talking about capacity, but the amendments to clause 1 were not accepted. This amendment comes from experience, and I really appreciate the personal experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford on this issue, because he speaks about the reality. We are not the experts, and we should be relying on the experts who give us their witness testimony.

[Daniel Francis]

In the evidence from Mencap and in large swathes of the written evidence, we have heard grave concerns from communities representing people with learning disabilities about how this legislation was enacted during covid, particularly with “do not resuscitate” notices. Evidence shows that people with learning disabilities were far more likely to have those placed on them. The written evidence we have suggests that that is due to a misinterpretation of the Mental Capacity Act or bias within the medical community. Can my hon. Friend comment on that?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes a very valid point. Another issue that we have not got to yet, but that we will be looking at, is the doctors who do not want to take part in this process. We must consider whether there will be a bias; he is right to point that out. Will there be a subconscious bias towards helping people? My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud suggested earlier that doctors assist a person to reach a decision, according to the Mental Capacity Act. This is the crux of it for me: when a doctor is assisting a person in their best interests to come to a decision about treatment, for example, that is a different test from what we are testing here.

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

I share the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford about the use of DNRs—what happened during covid to people, particularly those with disabilities, was a disgrace. Does my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West accept that this is an entirely different situation, however, in that people must actively seek it, be tested multiple times, and express a wish for it? The situation with DNRs involved medical professionals making decisions on behalf of a patient without their input.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I will be speaking to that in the next group of amendments, so I do not want to go through it in detail now, but I absolutely accept that that was a disgraceful situation—

[The Chair]

Order. Can Members please address the Chair?

[Naz Shah]

Apologies. My hon. Friend is right that those were different situations, but I remind him of the evidence that we heard from Dr Jamilla, for example. I am glad that he reminded me of this point, because although what happened in covid was done under different circumstances—I agree that what happened with DNRs was a “disgrace”, in his words—that is where the trust in NHS providers was lost. That leads me on to my next point: where there is no trust, there is vulnerability, and that vulnerability, in turn, affects capacity.

That brings me to what Alex Ruck Keene said about vulnerability. If people feel—as they did during covid-19—that they have been DNR-ed and that, as some have said, “They’re going to kill us off!”, then the vulnerability directly impacts on their capacity. I accept that, as my hon. Friend says, these are different situations, but the argument is strong and speaks to supporting this amendment.

There is a myth that mental capacity is well understood, but we have gone through that—there are a lot of myths about mental capacity. The reason that mental capacity is always difficult to assess, according to Alex Ruck Keene, is because 85% of capacity determinations by those who actually understand the law are relatively straightforward—that concurs with the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud—with difficulty arising usually because of not having enough time or not listening to the person. Some research was conducted into the experience of liaison psychiatrists through an interview study across three jurisdictions, which concluded that there are four key sources of difficulty in capacity assessment, spanning both clinical and ethical domains.

Those four sources included, first, a difficulty determining whether the decision is the patient’s own or driven by illness. That is important because we are talking about people who are terminally ill, so their decision-making processes may be impacted because of that, or because there is a vulnerability—either could be possible. The 15% of mental capacity determinations that are difficult include for such people. There may also be, secondly, a difficulty in applying ethical principles or, thirdly, a difficulty in avoiding personal bias. Again, that speaks to the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford—if doctors are already signed up to this Bill and believe in it, will they have a personal bias? A lot of doctors and psychiatrists—according to the last article I read—are saying that they do not agree with it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. It is an interesting irony of the Bill that it is presented as the free choice of individuals, but actually it imposes all sorts of obligations and repercussions on other people—the very term “assisted” conveys that. Many other people will be affected by the decision to take an assisted death. She is right that it would be very helpful for the doctors to be confident that they have done their job properly because they have a clear list of communications they are expected to make.

My understanding is that doctors are indemnified against legal challenge in consequence of decisions they make around this; that is an interesting point and one that I am uncomfortable with, but we will come to that later in the Bill. Leaving lawsuits out of it, from the point of view of the doctor’s professional conduct and their peace of mind, it would be very helpful for them to have it clearly specified what information they are required to convey.

I am grateful for Members’ interventions, and I appreciate the good faith and good sense that has been spoken, but I have not yet heard any reason for objecting to this amendment, other than the possible question of its being otiose and not necessary. That is not a sufficient reason to object to an amendment. We should not be objecting simply on drafting grounds. There can be tidying-up exercises later if there is repetition. I have not heard objections to the content of the amendment, and I would very much welcome Members’ support.

[Naz Shah]

Does the hon. Member agree that the amendment ultimately aims to provide clarity, and that clarity ultimately leads to safety?

[Danny Kruger]

Exactly. A few more words of clarification should not be regarded as burdening the Bill or creating bureaucratic obstacles for doctors and patients; the amendment actually specifies more explicitly what is going on. It is almost akin to the debate we had on amendment 181 and those dangerous words “for the avoidance of doubt”; that is essentially what this amendment does, but it goes further, because it imposes clearer obligations on doctors to do their job properly.

[Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)]

Much has been covered today, and the issue of capacity was debated at length when the Committee considered clause 1, but I do have some observations.

I am sympathetic to the assertion that there should be changes to presumption and burden. Those are things that I have considered and spoken about with the promoter of the Bill and, outside the Committee, with experts who gave evidence to the Committee. I have spoken about them publicly as well; I am very sympathetic.

At the heart of this, we have two options. We could change the burden and presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying, rewriting 20 years of case law and medical practice. There is certainly some value to that, but that would be a radical departure from current medical practice, and there are other concerns. The alternative is to put in place rigorous processes and training around the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that it is implemented properly. After some reflection, I err on the side of the latter option, for a number of reasons.

First, I accept that there is debate among psychiatrists about this issue. We heard evidence from some who deem the Act not to be suitable for this new realm—I accept that we are entering new grounds, and I will come back to that point—but many psychiatrists and lawyers working in this area would deem it uncomfortable and unnecessary to depart from the Act.

Secondly, there is an oddity in changing presumption. There is an oddity in someone having to prove that they have capacity to fulfil their own desire. That oddity is one of the reasons that the Act is drafted as it is. It is partly—there are two sides to this coin—to ensure that there is no discrimination, partly to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 and human rights more generally, and partly to ensure that we do not end up in a medical situation that is patrician, whereby medical doctors take an intrusive view of capacity rather than meeting the individual as they are.

Thirdly, the Bill, when amended—I will come on to the amendments that give me some comfort—will offer more safeguards than the Mental Capacity Act. Amendment 5 to clause 9(3) would ensure a further level of assessment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she will support that important amendment, as have all members of the Committee. If there is any doubt, there will be a further assessment by a psychiatrist. That goes some way to reassuring me that it is not necessary to rip up the burden or change the presumption in this area.

I want to make an observation about burden of proof, presumption and the nature of the assessment. Professor Whitty clarified his evidence. It is right that the burden and the presumption do not change, but of course the nature of the assessment rightly changes according to the circumstances. Every assessment of capacity is somewhat different, which is why amendment 50 is too prescriptive, in my view.

Of course, we can consider incredibly serious cases involving deprivation of liberty or the ability to conduct litigation. I have worked with parents whose children are being removed and looked at whether they have the capacity to make decisions about how they present their case. It is very dangerous to compare the severity and the profound nature of different circumstances, but let us not pretend that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to assess the most complex issues of capacity every day.

I am very sympathetic to amendment 50. I have met the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled it, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to discuss it, but I stress that such a prescriptive provision is not appropriate for primary legislation when we are entering new ground. I accept, as hon. Members with different views have said, that we are entering new territory and that this is difficult. I accept that psychiatrists and medical practitioners will have to think long and hard about the nature of the capacity assessments, especially under clause 9(3), when that is activated. That work will have to be done. It has been set out in primary legislation through some of the training clauses, which have already been referred to.

There is no doubt that there will be a lot of work and consideration, but I do not deem it appropriate to have a clause drafted by one psychiatrist, albeit an undoubtedly esteemed and experienced one: the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled the amendment. Rather, the work needs to be done as the Bill is implemented over a two-year period. It needs to be done as part of a full consultation with psychiatrists, once the Bill has been passed, and that should be set out in guidance. That is what would usually happen with deprivation of liberty. I do not think it appropriate for primary legislation to set out the factors for a capacity assessment.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is saying that that will take two years. The MCA, which has been implemented over 20 years, is misunderstood. Does he not see the risk of two years? This is new territory, without change—

[Jake Richards]

We need to be careful when we say that the Mental Capacity Act is misunderstood, full stop. Let us be clear—

[Naz Shah]

Not full stop.

[Jake Richards]

Well, that was the sense—

[Jake Richards]

I am grateful, Mr Dowd.

The evidence that we have received is that this is a test. These are assessments that happen every day across the country. Now, there are more complex assessments, and there will without doubt be areas in which the assessment is not done as rigorously as it should be done, but that is why I am assured by the safeguards in the Bill that if there is any doubt—any doubt—as to capacity at first instance, there will be a full and thorough assessment by a psychiatrist.

Let us think that through for a minute. Any competent psychiatrist trained in this area will no doubt have a sense of what the Mental Capacity Act says and of the normal test for capacity. Someone who is seeking assistance to die from a doctor who has doubts as to their capacity will have been referred. To my mind, it is unfathomable that that assessment, at that stage, would not be rigorous and would not satisfy every Member that it had been done to the correct extent practicable.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend about that in most cases, but in nine of the 10 cases that went to court, young girls were found to have capacity, but their treatment was stopped, leading to their inevitable death. That is not excluded here.

[Jake Richards]

We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity.

This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jake Richards]

Yes, there are safeguards and mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that and to protect from a culture that would incentivise this practice.

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jake Richards]

No, I am not going to, actually. I am taking my rights.

My final point concerns section 1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act and the discarding of the principle about whether a decision is deemed to be unwise. This is an issue we have already debated, but it is really important. Introducing a best interests test is, to my mind, impossible without ending up with a law that discriminates against certain groups. Essentially, it is impossible to do fairly.

I remain to be convinced. If there were an amendment that could do what I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire wants, I would support it. If there were an amendment that could look into someone’s mind and make sure that they are doing this for reasons that society would deem fit, I would support it, but I think that that is impossible. What the Bill aims to do is assess a person’s capacity and ensure that they are making this decision voluntarily. It also aims to protect them from the influence of third parties and outside sources. That is the only way, if this principle is to be adhered to.

Finally, I will be voting against the amendments, but I will finish where I started. I have genuinely thought long and hard, in particular about the presumption. I have spoken to experts who disagree with me, but in my mind it comes down to whether we rip things up and start again or whether we add rigorous safeguards, practices and processes, which may be a bit more boring but will actually be more effective at protecting any patients who go down this road.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I rise to speak in support of the amendments. Having worked as a mental health nurse for 22 years, I completed mental capacity training many times in my career, and I carried out capacity assessments as part of my day-to-day job. I think that the capacity assessment proposed in the Bill is not safe enough. That was one of the main reasons I voted against the Bill on Second Reading. I have spoken to many people who oppose the Bill, and one of their concerns is about the capacity assessment.

We have talked about capacity assessments every day in this Committee. It is one of the key issues that we will need to resolve to strengthen the Bill if it goes through. One of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ concerns is that capacity decisions are

“opinions with a margin of error and are time specific. A person’s capacity can change”.

I will talk about my experience with those margins of error.

A person’s capacity can be influenced by various factors, including their life circumstances, the medication they are taking or severe pain. Suicidal thoughts due to their mental state or depression can also influence their capacity. I have worked in acute mental health units. Every day, we carried out capacity assessments, including before we let someone out of the ward, whether they were admitted under the Mental Health Act or were receiving treatment as a voluntary patient. If somebody wanted to leave the ward, before the member of staff opened the door, they had to assess that person’s capacity. Sometimes a person might have said, “I am going to kill myself,” and the nurse would have had to decide whether or not they had capacity before opening the door.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West has talked about unconscious bias. The initial capacity assessment when a person comes to a hospital is very important. If a doctor has assessed at the beginning that the person has capacity, the following assessment can be influenced by that initial assessment. I totally agree with my hon. Friend’s argument about unconscious bias in capacity assessments. As Members have mentioned, the Bill proposes many occasions in the process when capacity will be assessed, but I am still not confident that each capacity assessment will not be influenced by the initial assessment. The amendments would strengthen that area of concern.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making a very important speech. Members have alluded to the provision in the Bill that the patient would be present and would potentially have an option to be reassessed. We have heard evidence from various experts on capacity, particularly on the issues of coercion and vulnerability, and doctors have told us that it takes years to build rapport with people. At the second stage, the doctor has to be somebody independent who nobody has met, so how would they be able to tease out whether that person has capacity and whether those other influences are affecting them? Does my hon. Friend share that concern?

[Sojan Joseph]

I agree that when an independent doctor comes to assess a patient’s capacity and sees them for the very first time, they are more likely to be influenced by the assessment made at the beginning by the doctor who has known them for many days, weeks or months. I agree with my hon. Friend’s argument.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)]

I will briefly go through my impressions of the amendments. A lot of amendments in this group call to mind one of the difficulties that we are having in Committee, which is about the role of professional integrity against what we should be putting down in law. One problem is that, if we state something in law and a professional does not do it, then they are acting in an illegal way—and that introduces a different concept into a medical consultation. We must be very careful about introducing to a medical consultation a load of requirements in law, therefore reducing the freedom of that consultation whereby the doctor and patient can decide on what is best for the patient.

Amendment 342 is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. I reiterate that all the amendments have been tabled in good faith, and I absolutely respect them. The amendment would mean that the initial doctor—who is likely to be a GP—to whom the person comes and wants to speak to about assisted dying “must” conduct a preliminary discussion, rather than

“may (but is not required to)”.

The problem there is that some doctors will be conscientious objectors to assisted dying and we have to protect their integrity. We must not force them to do something that is against their will.

I note that amendment 341, which we will come to later, is about the obligation to give information to the patient if they ask for assisted dying. That is an appropriate amendment, but forcing a doctor who does not agree with assisted dying to discuss it is not fair on the medical practitioner. That is not what the Bill is about. In many other places, there is freedom for the medical doctor to avoid getting involved in discussions if they do not wish to. That is an incredibly important part of, and concept in, this Bill. Without that, I think the medical profession would not accept the Bill. That is very important.

Amendment 285 is about needing to consult a specialist in the relevant illness. I think we need to understand the process of what will happen under the Bill. Let us take an example of a patient under an oncologist—a cancer specialist. The oncologist will almost certainly say at some point during the consultation with the patient, “I think that there is no further treatment that is going to prolong your life, and you are likely to have six months or less to live.” That will be done by a specialist. I do not know general practitioners who would confidently predict a prognosis of six months or less; it would come from a specialist. Indeed, cancer care in this country, until the palliative phase, is generally run by specialists and hospitals. GPs are not generally involved, apart from to support the patient. However, if the oncologist feels that the patient has less than six months to live, they would probably come to see the doctor under this legislation, and the initial discussion will then take place. They will already have a steer as to the likely prognosis.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I am trying to understand. My hon. Friend is saying that the oncologist is a specialist, but that they might not be the first doctor to have the first discussion; he said that they might not want to be a part of this process. I would like to understand that a bit more.

[Dr Opher]

As far as I see, under the Bill there is an initial discussion when a patient who is requesting assisted dying goes to see a medical practitioner. It does not specify what type of practitioner, which is good because it means they can ask either the oncologist or the general practitioner. That initial discussion is with a doctor, and then the doctor will refer for the first declaration, or they may do the first declaration themselves. That is how the Bill is set out, but the general practitioner will have had specialist opinions on the patient. They would not just say, “Well, maybe you’ve got less than six months to live—I don’t really know, but let’s have a guess.” This will be based on informed information from a specialist.

--- Later in debate ---

On the part of the amendment about the treatment available and the likely effect of it, those are the discussions we have. We sometimes say to people, “Well, you can go for further chemotherapy. It will often make you sick and you might lose your hair”—we give all the disadvantages—“but it might give you another couple of months of life.” Those are the general discussions we have as medical practitioners.

[Naz Shah]

From what I hear, my hon. Friend is supportive of the amendment. Does he agree that it just sets out what he says is best practice? I am trying to understand the objection to setting out good practice on the face of the Bill.

[Dr Opher]

Again, I bring my hon. Friend back to the fact that this is a Bill in law, and what we have to guide us as doctors is the General Medical Council, which sets standards for doctors. That is how we do it. If we are hemmed in by legal matters, we can break the law without being aware of it, if we are not careful. If too many legal parameters are set around medical consultations, the patient will get less good care because the doctor will not be free to offer it. I can see that my hon. Friend does not agree with that, but it is the case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

I will be brief, as I am conscious that the Committee needs to make progress. I will speak briefly to amendment 275 in my name, which, as others have said, amends the current reference of “any available” to “all appropriate”. Listen—people at the end of their life deserve the best. They deserve to know about and have the option to access all appropriate care. In my experience of the NHS, that is exactly what clinical teams ensure patients get. But we need to guard against any suggestion that the information given should be somehow filtered around availability, which I know is not the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

In my experience, views on availability are often incorrect anyway, so ensuring that “all appropriate” options are offered in information is the best thing to do. If nothing else, it creates a level of societal pressure to ensure that all appropriate care is available, which I hope we can all support.

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Lewis Atkinson]

No, I am going to make some progress because I am conscious of the time, and we want to get through these provisions.

I want to speak in favour of amendments 108 and 183. Those two amendments, taken together with amendment 275, create additional safeguards and assurances on the points made by colleagues on Second Reading that this is not cannot be raised in isolation—as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has made clear should not be the case—and that referral should always be offered to specialists in palliative and wider care.

As others have said, those patients will almost undoubtedly be in touch with a variety of different multidisciplinary healthcare teams. The suggestion that there must be a further referral to another multidisciplinary team under the Bill, regardless of which teams an individual is seeing, is therefore not appropriate. I also refer Members to amendment 6 to clause 9, which states that a referral to a psychiatrist “must” be made. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she is in favour of that amendment. That reinforces the fact that there will be a multidisciplinary approach, including psychiatric input, where there is any doubt before the third-tier stage of the panel.

For those reasons, I do not feel the other amendments—285, 343 and so on—are necessary. By accepting amendments 275, 108 and 183, we will be able to strengthen the Bill in the way that was set out to the House, and as we heard in oral and written evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sojan Joseph]

There are other people who support this concept, and they are the people who will be having the conversation—we have both sides of the argument. I believe that the best person to have that preliminary discussion would be the doctor who knows about that patient the most—about their circumstances, prognosis, family situation and pain. We talk about compassionate care, but where is the compassion in here? I am not saying that another doctor would deny that—but I am talking about compassion. Someone going through the most difficult time in their life would have the confidence to talk to the person who knows the most about them, which is why I fully support that the initial discussion should happen with them. I am not saying that they should say yes or no, but they should be talking about the care provisions and options available to the patient. Amendment 342 is one of the most important amendments we will debate.

I will move on to amendment 425. When I tabled amendment 1, my thinking was that a psychiatrist should be involved in these discussions, but I think amendment 425 will safeguard most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sittings. Amendment 425 talks about a “multidisciplinary team” and having a psychiatrist involved as well. Written evidence was sent to us on 29 January by the Royal College of General Practitioners, which recommended that a separate pathway that

“covered every stage of the process would ensure healthcare professionals of multiple disciplines…who wanted to do so could still opt in to provide assisted dying, but this would be arranged through a different pathway.”

The hon. Member for Sunderland Central spoke earlier about how patients may be going through many multidisciplinary teams already, but it could be that none of those multidisciplinary teams have talked with them about assisted dying. They could have been pharmacists or nurses talking about the patient’s care—not assisted dying. We are talking about setting up a multidisciplinary team with a mental health nurse, doctor and social worker who can look in detail at evidence of the patient’s capacity, whether they are choosing it because they feel they are a burden, and whether there is any coercion. I think that is a safeguard for most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sessions. I would love to see a psychiatrist involved, because psychiatrists deal with some of the most challenging patients, including those with suicidal thoughts, on a day-to-day basis. They are the most experienced people to carry out a capacity assessment and, if they are a part of the multidisciplinary team, it will safeguard the Bill.

I strongly support amendment 425 and I urge Members to consider it. It will reassure many people who are concerned about some of the discussions. I know it also talks about giving power to the Secretary of State to formalise who should be part of the multidisciplinary team, which would be a discussion for later. I thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendments 285 and 286, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. On amendment 285, we have to understand that, in medicine, clinicians only retain the areas of expertise in which they have clear confidence. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, who made very powerful points that, if anything, actually support this amendment. This is why we have developed a health system with so many specialities. Although generalists have incredible knowledge, they cannot confess to the depth of understanding that someone who dedicates their career to a speciality has. Therefore, the amendment seeks to draw on such knowledge rather than assume that a GP, for example, specialises in all fields of medicine.

Clause 4(4) would require a generalist to work alongside a specialist to secure the understanding of a patient’s diagnosis and prognosis. Once again, I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud suggested that that already happens and does not need to be tied up in law. However, I feel the amendment gives us more protections if we are to make the Bill safe. It would then enable specialist clinical advice to be provided in the conversation about treatment options.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I am afraid the situation is even worse, because the fact is that under the Bill they will not be liable for mistakes made in pursuit of the scheme set out in the Bill. They will be exempt. They are indemnified against civil liabilities for malpractice in the course of their job. It is only guidance, and GMC guidance specifies that breaking the guidance is not itself necessarily considered a serious matter. The provisions are not strong enough at all.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member makes a valid point. That brings us to a very important question: do we wait for something to have happened? In this instance, people will have died.

If we were considering kidneys, for example, and the issue of consent, it would require somebody independent. It needs a specialist. We come back to the point about specialisms: whether they relate to diagnosis, coercion, the care pathway, palliative care or the drugs that bring a person’s life to an end, which we will discuss later, these are specialisms. I know that later my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley will speak to her amendment about the panel, which is intended to require expertise. That is what amendment 285 speaks to, and I hope hon. Members will support it.

Amendment 286 would set out the requirements for the co-ordinating doctor and ensure that the standards are upheld throughout the process of assessment, so that the patient and clinician have the highest levels of advice available. Even though the co-ordinating doctor might already have sought the advice of specialists as part of their assessment, the purpose of having an independent doctor is to assess the patient without preconceptions influenced by the co-ordinating doctor’s decision-making process. It is therefore important for the clinician to have access to the same level of advice to inform their clinical decision making.

In medical practice, should a second opinion be sought, the person providing that second opinion might consult a range of sources to establish an opinion. This measure would therefore be in line with normal medical practice. I hope that hon. Members will support the amendments.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

I will make progress.

Clause 4 creates no duty to raise assisted dying, a point supported by the BMA. Keeping things secret is not helpful for the patient making such difficult decisions about how best to live their death with dignity and respect.

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Tidball]

I will make progress.

In reply to a question from me about those who are seeking assistance, Dr Jane Neerkin, a consultant physician in palliative medicine, said:

“For them, it is about trying to regain some of that control and autonomy and being able to voice for themselves what they want. That is what I tend to see that people want back at the end of life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 201, Q263.]

Importantly, amendments 183 and 275 would strengthen clause 4 to ensure that we avoid a situation that gives those with the most social capital more choice, while leaving those who might otherwise be unaware of all other options available to them without that choice. If the Bill is passed by Parliament without them, it will exacerbate health inequalities rather than abating them.

Together, the amendments expound and elaborate on the need for discussion of all appropriate palliative and other end-of-life options available to someone with a six-month terminal illness. I commend them to the Committee.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The amendments would make changes to the discussion between the medical practitioner and the patient. They are largely focused on clause 4, on the initial discussions, but several are thematically linked or related to later clauses.

Amendment 342 would impose a requirement on the registered medical practitioner to conduct a preliminary discussion with a person where that person has indicated that they wish to seek assistance to end their own life. As it stands, the Bill allows registered medical practitioners to opt out should they not wish to hold that conversation with someone, although they have an obligation under clause 4(5) to refer an individual to another medical practitioner for that discussion.

The amendment would remove that discretion and thus remove the opportunity for a medical professional to opt out of having the preliminary discussion. That may conflict with the principle set out in clause 23 that no registered medical practitioner or other healthcare professional is under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance. Our analysis suggests that in removing discretion as to participation, the amendment could interfere with an individual’s rights under article 9 of the European convention on human rights, on the freedom of thought, belief and religion, and article 14, on the prohibition of discrimination.

Amendment 285 would require the registered medical practitioner who conducts a preliminary discussion with a person on the subject of an assisted death to discuss with them, in consultation with a specialist, the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatments available and their likely effects, and any available palliative, hospice or other care. The amendment would therefore require additional registered medical practitioners or other specialists to be consulted as part of the preliminary discussion under clause 4(4). The additional time required for consultation with specialists would be likely to lengthen the period over which a preliminary discussion can take place.

I also note that clause 9, “Doctors’ assessments: further provision”, will already require the assessing doctor to make such other inquiries as they consider appropriate in relation to the first and second assessments.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister’s point speaks to what my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and I have spoken about in relation to the amendment, so I wonder which bit he supports. The Minister says that there will be extra time, but my hon. Friend pointed out that doctors do this routinely, so the objection is only that it will be on the face of the Bill. I just want to understand the Minister’s position on that.

[Stephen Kinnock]

If I understood the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud was making, I think it was that the basic provisions in place enable doctors to carry out their work based on their experience and expertise, whereas the amendment would require additional registered medical practitioners or other specialists, so that would be in addition to what my hon. Friend was talking about.

I turn to amendment 343. As the Bill stands, a registered medical practitioner undertaking a preliminary discussion with a patient is required to discuss the person’s diagnosis and prognosis. The amendment would require a registered medical practitioner also to discuss any relevant probabilities and uncertainties of a person’s diagnosis and prognosis. It would put an additional legal requirement on what needs to be discussed during the preliminary discussion with the patient. In considering whether the amendment is required, the Committee may wish to note that all doctors acting in accordance with the General Medical Council’s “Good medical practice” are expected to discuss uncertainties about diagnosis and prognosis, and potential risks and uncertainties about treatment.

Under clause 4, the registered medical practitioner conducting the preliminary discussion must discuss any treatment available to the patient and the likely effect. Amendment 344 would require the registered medical practitioner conducting the initial discussion to discuss, as part of the conversation on the treatments available, the risks and benefits of such treatment, potential side effects and the impact of the treatment on the person’s quality and length of life. As with amendment 343, the Committee may wish to note, when considering whether the amendment is required, that all doctors acting in accordance with “Good medical practice” are expected to discuss the risks, benefits, uncertainties and the likelihood of success of treatment with a patient.

Amendment 275 would change the wording of clause 4(4)(c) to “all appropriate palliative hospice and other care”. That would require a registered medical practitioner who conducts a preliminary discussion with a person on the provision of an assisted death to explain and discuss palliative and hospice care on the basis of appropriateness for the individual, not on the basis of the care that is available. Clause 4(4) sets out that a registered medical practitioner who conducts the preliminary discussion on assisted dying must, as part of that discussion, explain and discuss the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatment available and the likely effect—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Seventeenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

I echo the points that have been made about the importance of the initial conversations, particularly for those who do not have English as their first language. I made a commitment to my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich that in his absence I would press amendments 414 and 415 to a Division, as he requested.

I support the general principles of the amendments relating to those who are seeking or who need interpretation to explain aspects of assisted dying to them. I support the merit of that principle and the intention behind amendments 414 and 415.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Like the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd and the hon. Member for Reigate, I will not press the amendments to a vote, but I certainly want to speak to them. I do not think that they go far enough. Let us put ourselves in the position of people of colour: if the English language is seen as superior to or more powerful than Welsh, that means an extra layer of intervention that I do not think the amendments quite capture. We have not even talked about British Sign Language in our discussion of languages, but it is also really important.

I am a qualified interpreter from Urdu to English—in health, funnily enough—and I can tell the Committee that in Urdu there is not even a word for depression. The word for depression does not exist. In a previous life I chaired the largest mental health charity outside London for ethnic minority communities, and I am a former NHS commissioner, so when we talk about health inequalities and patient intervention, I understand acutely the nuances involved in translating from one language to another.

In the first instance, there is a language that someone does not understand. In the second instance, particularly for minority communities who speak languages from the south Asian subcontinent such as Punjabi, Urdu or Hindi, the words do not exist to translate the Bill literally or to talk about assisted death. That speaks to the point that the hon. Member for Reigate made about understanding what it means. I have the same stats that she cited, which show that people do not understand what assisted death is.

I would really value a response from the Minister and from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to these questions about the nuances of having such a difficult conversation. These are really brave conversations, both on the doctor’s side and on the patient’s. Take a woman from an ethnic minority background whose first language is not English and whose doctor is unable to translate their conversation with her. Would that conversation be disempowering? Would it be empowering? Would we be doing a disservice to that person, with the best will in the world from the doctor? I really would like to understand what consideration is being given to making this accessible, if it is to be a service and a piece of legislation that is open equally to all.

I have mentioned this point a few times and have raised it with the Minister, and I appreciate that the Minister has responded, but this is where my frustration—for want of a better word—comes from about not having an impact assessment in the first place. If we had had an impact assessment, the Government would have looked at these things. Even with small Bills, we go out to consultation for weeks and weeks. With this Bill, we have not spoken to anybody during Committee stage about the nuances of the provisions on languages and what they will mean for patients. Although I support the essence of what the amendments are attempting to achieve, they fall short of providing the necessary protections. I do not know how the Government will address that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sean Woodcock]

I am grateful for that intervention, which goes to the heart of my next question: why would we record and document later conversations, but not the initial one? That conversation could be one in which coercion takes place and without a record of it happening, patients and doctors are at risk. We have acknowledged that patients can be influenced by their doctors, whether consciously or unconsciously. We also noted how certain groups lack trust in the healthcare system. Dr Jamilla Hussain, in her written evidence, TIAB252, explained that the various inequalities faced by certain communities

“contribute to mistrust in health and social care services”

and that

“minority patients frequently express fear of having their lives shortened by healthcare providers, especially at the end-of-life with medication such as morphine and midazolam.”

In situations where patients are uncertain or lack trust in medical professionals, a record of the initial conversation is important to protect everyone involved. As Professor House stated, documenting the process and making records is common medical practice, so why would we differ here? We must protect patients and doctors, and making clear records at every stage of the process contributes to that.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendments 288 and 295 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), both of which would improve the quality of records kept about people applying for assisted dying. Their aim is to make parliamentary and public scrutiny of the system easier and better. Amendment 288 would insert a new subsection at the end of clause 4, on page 2, line 36, reading:

“All efforts to dissuade the person from ending their own life must be recorded in the clinical records and subsequently made available to the medical examiner.”

That recognises that a doctor may follow existing guidelines and seek to dissuade the person from ending their life. It would ensure that such efforts are recorded to improve understanding of the Bill and its interaction with suicide prevention. As Professor Allan House noted in his written evidence, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidelines apply

“in other areas where it is important to explore thoughts about life not being worth living”.

After an episode of self-harm or instances of suicidal thoughts, the medical professionals will explore

“current and recent personal and social circumstances, recent adversities, psychological state beyond merely assessing mental capacity and the presence of severe mental illness.”

In line with this suicide prevention strategy, a doctor may feel the need to explore those psychosocial factors and seek to dissuade the person from ending their life. We know that suicidal thoughts and depression are particularly common among terminally ill people. Dr Annabel Price, a member of the faculty of liaison psychiatry at the Royal College of Psychiatrists, gave oral evidence that among people who need palliative care at the end of their life,

“20% will have diagnosable depression, around 10% will have a wish to hasten death, and around 4% will have a more persistent wish to hasten death.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 270, Q351.]

She went on to say:

“Those who had a wish to hasten death were 18 times more likely to also feel suicidal”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 275-276, Q359.]

Terminally ill people are therefore at particular risk, and it is vital that the Bill does not diminish wider suicide prevention strategies. The amendment would record instances where the medical practitioner may try to dissuade the person from ending their life. Some doctors may take the view of Professor Allan House, who said in his written evidence,

“a statement about wanting to end one's life cannot be simply taken as the result of a straightforward rational decision to choose one type of end of life care over others.”

Furthermore, this amendment would also address some of the concerns about unconscious bias. Recording efforts to dissuade the person from ending their life would show when doctors assume a person should have an assisted death where others should not. Fazilet Hadi of Disability Rights UK spoke about this in her oral evidence:

“We often find that doctors, because they cannot treat or cure us, do devalue our lives. We have had disabled people who have actually had it suggested to them or their families that their lives are expendable, when actually those people have got a lot of years to give.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 180, Q234.]

Providing records of a doctor’s efforts to dissuade the person from ending their life will address some of these concerns. It will ensure that there can be a more meaningful review of the impact of the Bill on different groups, so that the right to die does not become a duty to die.

In conclusion, amendment 288 would strengthen the safeguards in the Bill by ensuring transparency and accountability in doctor-patient discussions by requiring the documentation of efforts to dissuade individuals from ending their lives. We would lessen the impact of the Bill on wider suicide prevention strategies and provide evidence for meaningful review at a later date.

Amendment 295, also tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, is about enabling public and parliamentary scrutiny of the assisted dying system. It will ensure that, if the Bill passes, there are good records of all applications for assisted dying and that they are readily available to the medical examiner. Some Members will know exactly what the medical examiner does, but I note for the record that it is a newly created public office, in operation since 2024. The task of the medical examiner is to examine any deaths within the context of healthcare, whether NHS or private, that are not being examined by a coroner.

In light of the magnitude of the decision being made, it is important for records to reflect that. It is equally important that those who will depend on the evidence can access the same evidence on which the co-ordinating doctor made their determinations. Therefore, it is essential that the basis of the decision making is accurately recorded, along with the evidence from other practitioners. For instance, if a palliative care specialist, a clinical consultant and a psychiatrist or psychologist have been consulted, evidence of what they did and said must be readily available, and it is essential that that sits with the record of the co-ordinating doctor. The information must be gathered for the medical examiner to be able to come to their determination with all the evidence before them. It is also vital for the reporting mechanisms to be deployed for the process by which the chief medical officer compiles their report. That is ultimately what Parliament will be able to scrutinise.

Both these amendments would greatly improve the quality of records kept on assisted dying. If I recall correctly, the role of the medical examiner was brought into legislation following Shipman, to tidy up and tighten the records we keep—because clearly we had lessons to learn from them. Also, we have heard in evidence that some other jurisdictions keep good medical records, especially when that speaks to people who are potentially coerced. In one jurisdiction, we had somebody who said that they had never felt a burden, but there were many more who said that they had felt a burden.

There is no doubt that these services will continuously need improving. If we keep these records and understand that these conversations have been had then, ultimately, should this Bill become law, these records would form part of the data collection that we could rely on as parliamentarians and for those service improvements. The amendment speaks not just to the Bill itself, but to ensuring that it continues to do what it is intended to do going forward.

These amendments improve equality in assisted dying. That, in turn, will make it far easier for us in Parliament, for our constituents and for the media to find out what is happening with any assisted dying system. In this country, we believe in open justice and open Government. Assisted dying is much too important to be allowed to operate without strong scrutiny by the press, the public and ourselves in Parliament. I therefore urge hon. Members to vote for both these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

This series of amendments relates to the various discussions and assessments that registered medical practitioners, co-ordinating doctors and independent doctors will have with individuals seeking assistance to end their life in accordance with the Bill. In particular, they seek to amend the requirement for recording information about those discussions. As I have done throughout, I will limit my remarks to comments on legal and practical impacts of amendments. In executing our duty to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with the hon. Member for Spen Valley on amendments to the Bill, including new clause 19 in this group.

Amendment 345 would require the registered medical practitioner, following a preliminary discussion with a person, to record and document in that patient’s medical records the discussion and any information provided to the patient, and it would require them to provide a copy to the patient.

Amendment 288 adds an additional requirement on the registered medical practitioner who conducts an initial discussion with the person on the subject of an assisted death to record all efforts to dissuade a person from ending their own life in the person’s medical records, and subsequently to make those records available to the medical examiner. As drafted, it is not clear whether the wording “all efforts” is intended to include efforts made by the registered medical practitioner alone, or to include efforts made by others that could be reported to the registered medical practitioner. Further clarity would be needed to establish the practical implications of the amendment. The amendment does not require this information to be recorded at a specific time. I would also note that, operationally, medical examiners are not involved in scrutinising all deaths. Some deaths are investigated by coroners. Clause 29 will consider inquests and death certifications in relation to assisted death.

Amendment 297 requires a full written transcript to be produced for any consultations that occur as part of the first assessment undertaken by the co-ordinating doctor. That would potentially add some operability challenges and, if passed, we would want to explore those further. For example, there could be situations in which the person seeking assistance does not want there to be a written transcript. Further clarity is also required on whether the amendment intends to capture only consultations between the co-ordinating doctor and the patient, or whether it also intends to capture conversations with relevant persons other than the person seeking an assisted death.

I turn now to amendment 295. As the Bill stands, if, having carried out the first assessment, the co-ordinating doctor is satisfied that the person being assessed has met all requirements in clause 7(2), the co-ordinating doctor must:

“(a)make a statement to that effect in the form set out in Schedule 2, and sign and date it,

(b) provide the person who was assessed with a copy of the statement, and

(c) refer that person, as soon as practicable, to another registered medical practitioner who…is able and willing to carry out the second assessment”.

Amendment 295 seeks to add an additional requirement for the co-ordinating doctor to

“collate all evidence provided regarding the condition of the patient in a document to be provided to the Medical Examiner and the…Chief Medical Officer after the person has received assistance to die”

in accordance with the Bill. The aim of the amendment is to ensure that the documentation will be available when required by the medical examiner.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister referred to a patient not wanting to keep a written record. How does that fare if there is a potential issue of negligence later on? Is that not a requirement of every NHS service that we provide? For example, in the case of a kidney donation where an independent assessor was needed, the details would have to be kept. I am just a bit confused. I wonder if the Minister might comment on that.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The challenge we found with amendment 297 is that it is not entirely clear what would happen if the person were to say expressly that they did not want a written record. That eventuality is not baked into the Bill as it is currently drafted, so I think it would require a lot of thinking through—again, we are back to the law of unintended consequences—about the impact the amendment would have in certain circumstances if, for example, someone were to say expressly that they did not want a written record. That is the question: the impact of the amendment is not clear.

[Naz Shah]

If that is an issue, then it is my understanding, being new to Bill Committees, that it is not because the provision is poorly drafted, but because the outcome is not clear. Can the Government not clarify that on Report or Third Reading? I have heard nothing from the Government, even where they are supportive of amendments, about going away and looking at them. There is none of that conversation coming from the Government. Perhaps the Minister will comment on that.

[Stephen Kinnock]

As my hon. Friend knows, there will be an impact assessment on the Bill once it has cleared Committee. The Government’s impact assessment would be based on the Bill as it cleared Committee, so it would include the amendment we are discussing, if it were to pass. As things stand, I cannot tell her what the impact of the amendment would be in the event that it passed, because that has not been thought through from all the different angles, including if someone were to expressly say that they did not want a written transcript.

I turn to amendment 300, which would require a full written transcript of the second assessment as a record of the conversation. This goes further than the requirement that the Bill currently places on the independent doctor, which is to make a statement in the form in schedule 3. As with amendment 297, further clarity is required on whether the amendment is intended only to cover consultations with the patient, or whether conversations with other individuals should also be transcribed.

Amendment 302 would require the independent doctor to provide details of the way in which the second assessment was conducted alongside a written transcript of any consultation to the relevant chief medical officer and the person’s GP.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being very generous with his time. I want to understand the idea that someone might say that they do not want a written transcript, when everybody in our country who uses the NHS has a written medical record. Why, in this instance, are the Government of the view that we should stray from normal practice?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I think it reflects the fact that, as the Committee has agreed, we are in uncharted territory on a whole range of issues here. I think it is best to think through the implications of every amendment. If it passes, every clause of the Bill will have to be assessed for its potential impact. I have other questions about amendment 297 in my notes. Does it intend to capture only the consultations between the co-ordinating doctor and the patient, or does it intend also to capture conversations with relevant persons other than the person seeking an assisted death? That is not clear from the amendment. What I am saying is that it poses more questions than it answers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being generous with his time. I am even more confused now. Originally, the Minister suggested that a patient might not want a transcript, but in response to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, he mentioned that under new clause 19 people will have access to their written records. That appears to be a contradiction. I just want to nail this down. What will it be? If a patient does not want a written record, we would not have a written record to access, so that contradicts the Minister’s response. I want to understand exactly what the Minister is suggesting.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The Government’s view is that if the Committee accepts it, then that new clause will provide the level of robustness and resilience that the system requires. The Government are not convinced that, on its own, the amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West is talking about would provide the level of robustness and resilience we would be looking for. As things stand, the choice has been made to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19, and we are satisfied that that would provide us with the operational integrity we need.

Amendment 302 would require the independent doctor to provide details of the way in which the second assessment was conducted, alongside a written transcript of any consultation to the relevant chief medical officer and the person’s GP. The independent doctor would be required to maintain a copy of that record to provide to the relevant medical examiner.

As I have mentioned, in executing our duty to ensure that the Bill, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The new clause would require a practitioner to include a record of a preliminary discussion having taken place under clause 4. The record of the preliminary discussion must be included in the person’s medical records. Where the medical practitioner is a member of the person’s GP practice, they must make such a record in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable. Where the medical practitioner is not a member of the person’s GP practice, they must, as soon as practicable, provide a written record of the preliminary discussion to a medical practitioner at the person’s GP practice, who will then be required by the new clause to include it in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable.

The Committee may wish to note that amendment 424 would add a definition of “preliminary discussion” to the Bill that would make it clear what discussion medical practitioners would be required by law to record.

That concludes my remarks on this group. I thank the Committee for its attention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

I will be brief. I am pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley confirm that she is minded to support amendment 341. It is incumbent on all of us, but perhaps particularly those in favour of the Bill, to place on record our appreciation and recognition of the fact that many people who work in our health services have strongly held religious beliefs, or beliefs of conscience—however they are motivated. As is the case for a range of other procedures and medical interventions, the law has to allow them scope to continue to practise. They make a valuable contribution to our health service and national life, and we should not do anything to impinge on that.

There is already strong guidance from the General Medical Council about personal belief, and that applies, as the hon. Member for Reigate mentioned, to the Abortion Act, as well as to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 and other procedures. It is not for any of us to second-guess someone’s conscience.

[Naz Shah]

I would like to add that there is nothing about female genital mutilation in anybody’s religion. It is not a religious belief; it is cultural, and it is actually child abuse. That is what it is—there are no ifs or buts about it.

[Lewis Atkinson]

I do not disagree with my hon. Friend. I gently say that the GMC guidance specifically references that Act, so that is what I was referring to.

I am pleased to see amendment 341, which I believe would bring the legislation into line with that GMC guidance, ensuring that removing the duty to refer would absolutely not be a licence for people to be left without access to care. The GMC is very clear, as the hon. Member for Reigate said, that people must be given sufficient information and be empowered to seek the options and information that they need. Therefore, I am pleased to support the amendment.

[Daniel Francis]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said that she is minded to accept amendment 341. I will, however, still briefly speak to amendment 338 and new clause 13, which stand in my name.

The British Medical Association has said that it strongly urges MPs to support the amendments, which would remove the referral requirement in relation to preliminary discussions and establish an official body to provide factual information to patients about the range of options available to them. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire mentioned, Dr Green, in his oral evidence, said:

“The provision of information would be very useful, because in a situation where a doctor was unwilling to have an initial discussion with the patient, it would provide a way for the patient to get that information that was in no way obstructive.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 46, Q37.]

He went on to say:

“I do not believe that it is ever appropriate for a doctor to recommend that a patient goes through an assisted dying process.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 48, Q40.]

He also said:

“The word “referral”, to a doctor, means writing a letter or communicating with another doctor to see, but some doctors would find themselves not able to do that. For that reason, we believe that there should be an information service for the doctor to direct to.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 48, Q41.]

The BMA’s position is that the proposal is analogous to doctors’ professional legal obligations regarding abortion, and consistent with the Bill’s inclusion in clause 23 of a right to refuse, for any reason, to carry out activities directly related to assisted dying. It has said:

“In tandem, we believe creating an official body to provide individual information and advice to patients, to which doctors could direct (rather than refer) patients, would ensure that the doctor’s views are respected, whilst also—crucially—ensuring that patients can easily access the information and support they need. Currently, whilst the Bill acknowledges the need for accurate, impartial information and advice for patients, it gives no indication of how this might be delivered—generic published information would not be sufficient. Patients would need individual advice, guidance, and support so that they can make informed decisions, and an independent information service could meet this need.”

As the hon. Member for Reigate mentioned, a member of the Royal College of General Practitioners also said:

“The BMA referred to the word “refer”—referring to a colleague, for those who did not want to do it. We agree that signposting is a better process.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 279, Q365.]

He went on to say:

“Similar to other services, such as termination of pregnancy, we think that the best option would probably be that the GP could signpost to an information service, such as something like what the BMA suggested the other day. They would not have to do anything more than that, and they would not withhold any option from the patient.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 273, Q354.]

Therefore, I commend amendment 338 and new clause 13 to the Committee.

[Naz Shah]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. I rise to speak to amendment 287, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. Clause 4(5) currently says:

“A registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion mentioned under subsection (3) must, if requested by the person to do so, refer them to another registered medical practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct that discussion.”

If this amendment was to be adopted, it would read:

“A registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion mentioned under subsection (3) must, if requested by the person to do so, refer them to another registered medical practitioner who is qualified to undertake such a preliminary discussion, and set out palliative medicine options to provide the patient with appropriate end of life care, including referring them to a palliative medicine expert.”

Put simply, the amendment would mean that if a doctor met with a patient with a severe illness who might die within six months, but the doctor was themselves unwilling to have an initial discussion on assisted dying, they would still have to refer the patient on to a doctor who was willing to have that discussion. The patient’s decision to explore assisted dying would not be obstructed; the main change would be that that doctor would now have to discuss palliative care options with the patient. That is surely a measure that would increase the patient’s welfare.

Let us think about the kind of patient who can apply for assisted dying. They must have a diagnosis of a serious illness and a prognosis that they are likely to die within six months. The Bill’s supporters have said many times that they are worried about any changes that will reduce the autonomy of people seeking assisted death. This amendment quite obviously does not in any way reduce people’s autonomy, nor does it in any way place an unreasonable burden upon doctors. If a patient has a diagnosis of a serious illness, and if they have themselves asked for a conversation on assisted dying, then it surely must be good practice for that doctor to discuss palliative care options.

It is also only good practice that one of those options would be for the doctor, if the patient wishes, to refer the patient to a palliative medicine specialist who is more able to talk about such options. That means that the amendment would not place any undue burden on either the doctor or the patient. The doctor ought to be offering such advice on palliative care. The patient may or may not decide to take the doctor’s advice on palliative care, but they have had it, and the patient may well benefit from having had advice on palliative care.

Given the conversations we had this morning, I can foretell one objection to this amendment: that since good doctors will do this anyway, it is unnecessary to have a provision on the face of the Bill to ensure it. This seems to me a very weak objection. Let us be honest, the doctors that we have in this country are of extremely high quality. They are dedicated, skilled and compassionate men and women. We are lucky to have them, but we cannot say that every doctor participating in all the processes that they currently undertake always follow best practice.

Similarly, we simply cannot say that in any assisted dying process doctors will always automatically follow best practice. People make mistakes. That includes people who are highly trained and extremely compassionate. I would be astonished if we could find a doctor who said they had always got everything right. As lawmakers, we have to guard against the fact that even some of our most admired professionals can and sometimes will make mistakes. One way that we will guard against that is to set out duties that they have to follow. This amendment does just that.

I hope that we will not hear the objection that we have heard to a great many good amendments: that it will somehow make the Bill more dangerous by adding complications. The amendment simply adds a small step, by placing a duty on a doctor to give palliative care advice to a patient with a diagnosis of serious illness. Surely the Bill cannot be so lacking in robustness that such a small change would make it dangerous.

In summary, the amendment is a sensible change. It would in no way block the ability of adults who meet the conditions set out by this Bill to explore assisted dying, nor would it place any burden at all upon doctors. It would simply place upon them a duty to follow what we can all surely agree is best practice, and it would greatly improve the early access to palliative care advice for patients with a diagnosis of serious illness. That would improve those patients’ chances of receiving good palliative care. I therefore urge hon. Members to support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand that, but amendment 126 also refers to a register of appropriate medical practitioners being maintained. Of course, new clause 7 would similarly create such a list. We are debating all three proposals, so I wanted to explain why I oppose them, as indeed the BMA does.

As has been outlined in previous speeches, the Bill creates an opt-in model effectively, whereby people who want to be the co-ordinating doctor or indeed the second doctor have to opt in and be trained, and therefore become accredited, so by definition they would be approved for that service.

However, the Bill does not envisage that the initial conversation is necessarily with the co-ordinating doctor. There might well be other medical personnel or practitioners—we have talked a lot about semantics in this debate—who are presented with the situation where a desperate person, somebody who has been given some extremely bad news, wants to talk about their situation and what their options might be. We hope and believe that training will spread throughout the NHS to those who want it. Nevertheless, we have to leave open the option that someone may not be accredited and that they may need to pass on someone, by whatever means the Bill determines, to a doctor who is accredited, who can act as the co-ordinating doctor, who has had the appropriate training and opted in, and I am afraid the register would not allow for that.

The second thing that concerns me slightly, and which we need to avoid for the benefit of both the patient and the system, is any kind of “doctor shopping”—the notion that there is a list of doctors that I can shop around and choose from. I worry slightly about that.

My hope is that these types of conversations, which are necessarily private and sensitive, will take place in an environment of embrace and familiarity between doctor and patient. We have talked a bit about whether doctors have to refer or provide information—obviously, we have just accepted an amendment that seeks to set out how that will work. What I would oppose, for two reasons, is the creation of a list that people can move up and down on, and pick somebody they like the look of, or who they think might be handy for them. First, I am not sure that it would be entirely reputable; secondly, we have to remember who we are dealing with here. These are dying people who may not have long left to live—we are talking about six months as a minimum, but actually they might have only two or three months to go. We need to create a sense that this is something that will be provided to them in an environment that is familiar. They will not have to spend their time finding a doctor on a list, and their phone number, then ringing up their office and saying, “This is what I want to do. Can I make an appointment?” There is a privacy aspect to it.

My third objection is, to be honest, about privacy—not just that of the patient, but that of the doctor. The hon. Lady will know that unfortunately—I do not know whether she thinks it is unfortunate, but I do—there are some people who object so strongly, for example, to abortion that they are willing to go and protest outside clinics that provide that service. This House has legislated to balance the rights of those who want to avail themselves of that service and those who want to protest. That has been a source of conflict.

I am afraid that a public list of doctors who provide this service would raise questions about the privacy of doctors, about patient privacy and about access to that service. I am concerned about it from that point of view.

[Naz Shah]

I hear what the right hon. Member says, and I get his point, but we already have lists of specialists. With Choose and Book, for example, although it is for treatments, the NHS provides a list of doctors, so why would this be any different?

[Kit Malthouse]

We do not necessarily have specific registers. People are members of professional bodies, and within those professional bodies, people become accredited because of their training. As the Minister referred to earlier, there is no such thing as a list of palliative care specialists; it is not defined in that way. Creating a list in this way would present problems for the privacy of doctor and patient as they go about what I hope we all acknowledge is a very sensitive and private process at the very end of someone’s life. I will conclude at that point and say that, unfortunately, with great respect to the hon. Member for Broxtowe, I oppose these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I rise briefly to put on the record my disappointment. In our debates today on various amendments, we have discussed how some patients could see doctors’ language as a suggestion rather than an option. I make no apologies for the fact that I said that this could be the next Horizon scandal or the next infected blood scandal. I struggle with that.

A chap called Nick Wallis, who exposed the Horizon scandal, said something pertinent that I want to put on the record. He said that the difference is that there will not be anybody else left to campaign—

[The Chair]

Order. I am genuinely trying to provide as much latitude as possible, but the Question before the Committee is whether the clause stands part of the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. I will not oppose clause 4 stand part, but I put on the record my disappointment that we did not go further by putting in the safeguards that we had the option to add.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I apologise to the Member, who was within his rights to speak to amendments 403 and 404.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to my amendment 277, which would add a new subsection to clause 5. Like my amendment 276, it would alter the time that must elapse between a person receiving a diagnosis of severe illness and their discussion of assisted dying with a medical practitioner. To put the most important point first, the amendment aims to prevent people opting for assisted dying while they are suffering from the initial shock of having a serious illness diagnosed, by imposing a pause. There would have to be 28 days between when a person receives a diagnosis and prognosis of the illness that might end their life within six months, and when they could have their second consultation with a doctor about assisted dying.

The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire asked me whether I was aware of pancreatic cancer. A dear friend of mine, who was known as the “king of curry” in Bradford, told me only in June—the day I launched my election campaign, funnily enough—that he had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. In October, he was gone. I am overly familiar with pancreatic cancer and how fast he went down from being a healthy individual. He is greatly missed in Bradford.

The Committee has already rejected amendment 276. I ask all Members to think again and in particular to consider the evidence given to us by several distinguished doctors, including senior psychiatrists. What those doctors said to us, in both written and spoken evidence, was that immediately after someone receives a diagnosis of serious illness they often experience a major increase in depression and a desire to hasten death. For some patients, that desire to hasten death is what psychiatrists call an increase in suicidality; that is, the patient wants to actively do something to end their own life. For other patients, they do not have an active desire to carry out a physical act to end their life, but they do wish that their life would end sooner.

We can all empathise with people who have just received such a shocking diagnosis and prognosis. They have been told that they are likely to die soon. They may also either have been given information that makes them think their remaining months of life will be degrading and painful, or they may assume that they will be. That might well be how many of us would think if we had such devastating news. But the psychiatrists who gave evidence also said that depression and a desire for death are often not permanent conditions for people who have received such a diagnosis. When a patient gets treatment for their physical symptoms plus social care, and if necessary psychological treatment, the desire to hasten death will often fall.

Let me refer to the evidence of Dr Annabel Price, vice chair of the Royal College of Psychiatrists Liaison Faculty. I appreciate, Mr Dowd, that I am repeating some things I have mentioned previously, but when I spoke previously with reference to this evidence it was to other amendments. Hence, I am having to repeat it for the purpose of this amendment in particular. She said:

“There is a lot of research evidence around depression in people with palliative care needs and people nearing the end of life. We know that depression is common, and across a number of studies it is at around 20%—much more common than in the general population. We know that depression is strongly associated with a wish to hasten death, and that if depression is found and treated in that group of patients, there will be significant change in the wish to hasten death.”

She said that there were a number of factors besides depression that were associated with the wish to hasten death. In those who had received a diagnosis of serious illness, she told us:

“they include difficult symptom experience, poor functional status—needing a lot of help with things—and being socially isolated. Those are really key ones. They also include a sense of loss of dignity and feeling like a burden on others.”

For patients who have all those factors, she said:

“These things can all come together to make life feel very unbearable.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 275, Q359.]

Perhaps the most important part of Dr Price’s evidence was when she said what good medical and social care could do for people who felt their lives were unbearable. She said:

“The evidence that we have from research—this is in populations who would fulfil the criteria in terms of terminal illness—is that the prevalence of depression is around 20%. That is across a number of populations. It is associated with a wish to hasten death. Depression might impact upon that person’s decision making; I am not saying that it absolutely would, but it might. Also, treatment might change their view. We know that there is a strong association, for example, between pain and a wish to hasten death.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 281, Q369.]

[Kit Malthouse]

On a point of order, Mr Dowd. I am very sorry, but I just want your guidance. The hon. Lady is giving a speech which I am afraid we have covered before. We have had extensive debates on the impact of terminal diagnosis on people’s mental health and depression. I just want your guidance on what the Committee should do to resist the temptation to repeat debates that we have already had extensively, while we are considering these amendments.

[The Chair]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that point of order. I reiterate the point I have made on a number of occasions. I do not want to interrupt Members when they are making a point, because we are in a very sensitive situation—of that there is no doubt. I exhort Members, when they are discussing these things, to bear in mind those factors and those issues.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. Before I carry on, may I just add to that? I did refer to that and I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s point of order, but these things speak to this particular amendment on 28 days. While they speak to many other debates, the Committee will have no doubt that there are many issues in which one piece of evidence crosses over many amendments. I assure the Committee that my intention is just to draw attention to the evidence that is related to the particular amendment that I am speaking to. I appreciate there that there is huge repetition—for want of a better word—but I feel that it is necessary, unless advised otherwise. I would be happy to take your guidance, Mr Dowd.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighteenth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Will hon. Members please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? Tea and coffee are not allowed in the Committee Room. We are continuing line-by-line consideration of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. I remind Members that the most valuable of all talents is never using two words when one will do. I take that from Thomas Jefferson.

Clause 5

Initial request for assistance: first declaration

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 290, in clause 5, page 3, line 13, at end insert

“who is not a physician associate or doctor in any training grade or in postgraduate training or a locum tenens post and—”.

This amendment would exclude physician associates and doctors in training from acting as a coordinating doctor.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 185, in clause 5, page 3, line 14, leave out from “who” to end of line 15 and insert

“meets the requirements specified in regulations under subsection (3A)”.

This amendment and Amendment 186 impose a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the training, qualifications and experience required in order to act as the coordinating doctor.

Amendment 335, in clause 5, page 3, line 14, after “such” insert “specialised”.

This amendment is linked with NC12.

Amendment 52, in clause 5, page 3, line 15, leave out from “State” to end and insert

“must specify by regulations, including experience of managing terminal illnesses,”.

This amendment would require the coordinating doctor to have experience of managing terminal illness.

Amendment 359, in clause 5, page 3, line 18, at end insert—

“(ba) who has conducted the preliminary discussion in accordance with section 4,”.

This amendment requires that the coordinating doctor has conducted a preliminary discussion prior to witnessing the signing of the first declaration.

Amendment 186, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the training, qualifications and experience that a registered medical practitioner must have in order to act as the coordinating doctor.

(3B) The regulations must include training about—

(a) assessing capacity;

(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.

(3C) Subject to that, the regulations may in particular provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”

See the statement for Amendment 185.

Amendment (a) to amendment 186, after

“(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.”

insert

“(c) specific and up-to-date training on reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and people with a learning disability.”

Amendment 340, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The Secretary of State must make regulations under subsection 3(a) specifying specific and up to date training on reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and people with a learning disability.”

Amendment 427, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) In Wales, all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure the practitioner under subsection (3) has fluent proficiency in the Welsh language if services or functions in the Act are to be provided to an individual in Welsh.”

Amendment 20, in clause 5, page 3, line 25, at end insert—

“(4A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”

This amendment would require the registered medical practitioner acting as the coordinating doctor to have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.

Amendment 336, in clause 8, page 5, line 13, after “such” insert “specialised”.

This amendment is linked with NC12.

Amendment 337, in clause 19, page 13, line 20, after “such” insert “specialised”.

This amendment is linked with NC12.

New clause 12—Obligations related to training—

“(1) No registered medical practitioner or other health professional is under any duty to opt in to undertake specialised training wholly or largely relating to the provision of assisted dying in accordance with this Act.

(2) No medical practitioner or other health professional who has carried out training as may be specified by the Secretary of State under—

(a) section 5(3)(a),

(b) section 8(6)(a), or

(c) section 19(2)(b),

is under any duty to participate in the provision of assisted dying under the terms of this Act.”

This new clause would set out that a registered medical practitioner or other health professional is not under any duty to undertake training in relation to the provision of assisted dying. And anyone who undertakes such training is not under a duty to provide assisted dying under the Act.

[Naz Shah]

Amendment 290 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell). Clarity is needed on who a medical practitioner is. With the regulation of physician associates, there was much unease from the British Medical Association and others on the role and function of the new profession. Although I do not want to debate the merit of this today, it is clear that involvement in the assisted dying process requires someone of significant experience to support a patient while undertaking complex assessments and co-ordinating their care between specialists and others.

In some jurisdictions, we have heard that clinicians have extensive clinical experience, whereas they do not in others. Therefore, being able to determine the level of experience and competencies of the medical practitioner is important to ensure that the patient is receiving care from someone who has significant practice expertise. A doctor in training, whether as a specialist or general practitioner, although making very specific clinical decisions, should not be deemed as having the experience, competencies or breath of experience for the purposes of this process. An associate practitioner should also not be deemed to reach these thresholds. Amendment 290 would therefore show the public that the person who would act as the co-ordinating doctor held such experience, and that there was no doubt in their standing to register for such a role. The public can already be confused on the exact status of the clinician they are under or indeed the profession itself. Including this safeguard would ensure that the patient’s interests are upheld.

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd.

I rise to speak in support of amendment 185, in the name of the hon. Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, regarding training requirements that need to be made by regulation. It would place a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about training qualifications and experience required in order to act as a co-ordinating doctor. Similarly, amendment 186 says that the regulations should specifically include training relating to the assessment of capacity and assessing whether a person is being coerced or pressured by any other person. Proposed new subsection (3C), introduced by amendment 186, would make provision that

“the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”

In making those regulations, reflection of expertise is vital. We heard from many experts who gave us evidence about the importance of training, development and mentorship, which we would expect to see covered in the regulations. Placing those requirements in regulations would mean that they could be developed through consultation with experts and stakeholders, after gaining a wide range of feedback. It would also future-proof the requirement of any training to be developed and strengthened through future experience.

As part of the safeguards in the Bill, the key principles around assessing capacity and potential coercion are really important. I am therefore minded to press the hon. Member for Spen Valley also to support amendment 20, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), which states:

“Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”

That would provide further clarity, and would further strengthen training on assessing coercion in all senses of the word as part of the safeguards, which many Members, even in the earlier debates, have said that it is so important that they see. I agree, and I hope that the promoter of the Bill will support amendment 20.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 20, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato).

The key point for me is that doctors are not specialists in coercive control, but this amendment would give them training to spot abusive and coercive relationships, which are difficult to detect. Domestic abuse and coercive control have a disproportionate effect on women and disabled people, and if doctors just rely on their experience to detect coercive control and abuse, they are more likely to miss cases. Some doctors will be more experienced or more perceptive than others. This amendment is not a perfect safeguard, but it will improve the chances of doctors stopping people being coerced.

The amendment would ensure that co-ordinating doctors must have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. It is a significant and distinct amendment. In particular, it addresses the issue of repeated coercive control, which so far has been overlooked in the Bill. I believe that amendments seeking to improve safeguards against coercion that do not address the issue of repeated coercive behaviour are inadequate in protecting vulnerable people, particularly women.

It is regrettable that in our witness sessions we did not hear from any experts on repeat coercive control. Such testimony would have been valuable, helping the Committee to understand why this specific environment puts people at risk with regard to the Bill.

We have already spoken a great deal about coercion in this Committee and other Members have referred to that. We have raised concerns about someone coercing another person into the process of assisted dying in a one-off incident. However, we have not yet discussed the very real issue of repeated coercive control and what it means to live in that environment, nor the implications that the Bill may have for people in those situations.

Dr Hannah Denno submitted written evidence to this Committee. She wrote:

“As a doctor I am not trained to detect coercion, and I do not believe that the Bill pays sufficient attention to the detection of those who are under pressure from themselves or others to end their lives. The Bill describes two independent medical assessments, both can be carried out by doctors who have never previously met or cared for the patient.”

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I just want to provide some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West. I have met my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft and today I will support amendment 20, which she has tabled. I hope that provides some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention and I am really grateful that she is supporting the amendment. However, the reason I am making this speech is that I do not think the amendment goes far enough in terms of providing safeguards within the Bill. So, I will make some progress with my speech and then I will address some of the issues that are not addressed in this particular amendment, and set out how we can go further, as well as highlighting some of my concerns.

I return to what Dr Denno wrote in the evidence that she submitted. She wrote that she was:

“not trained to detect coercion”.

And she also wrote that

“Social workers are better placed to screen for coercion but are not mentioned in the Bill.”

Since that submission, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has tabled an amendment that would mandate a social worker to sit on a panel to consider each application for assisted death. However, I am afraid that I must repeat several points about these panels, points that have already been made frequently. These panels are under no obligation to interview the applicant for assisted death in person. Panel members may do so if they have any concerns, but they may not. That makes it harder for panel members to detect possible coercion.

There is also an absence of any mechanism for people who know assisted dying applicants to report any concerns they have that that person is being coerced into this form of action. The panels are not used in that way, which is the way that multidisciplinary panels are used in the NHS to decide on the pathway for a patient. Instead, the panels introduced by my hon. Friend’s amendment would wait until the two doctors have submitted their statements on the applicant and then the panel members would scrutinise those statements. If they spot problems with the way that the doctors have determined that the patient is not being coerced, then, yes, they would call the patient in for more scrutiny. However, they will first have to come to that conclusion without seeing the patient. That is not a very robust safeguard.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am in the process of tabling an amendment that would change the panel to that effect, so that it would speak to the patient. Hopefully, that provides some more reassurance for my hon. Friend. I am sure that we are working very effectively through the Committee process to achieve what we all want to see.

[Naz Shah]

I am pleased to hear that my hon. Friend will table further amendments, but I have not seen that amendment, so I cannot speak to it.

I would slightly beg to differ with my hon. Friend in terms of making progress in the way that I would like to have seen. I would just gently remind her that I am not convinced that we are. I think we are making good progress, but I also voted against one clause stand part and had lots of concerns about another one, so we will agree to disagree on that one.

The non-governmental organisation The Other Half observes in its written evidence to this Committee—TIAB 104—that the Bill makes no provision to identify family members who may benefit financially from the death of a patient, and, therefore, the Bill is unable to protect the vulnerable. That is something that I have said before in this Committee.

This amendment makes training in respect of financial abuse mandatory. It is vital that a medical practitioner is trained on how to identify coercion—we can all agree on that—but coercion is different from domestic abuse. Coercion may be relatively obvious to spot, but, in contrast, coercive and controlling behaviour is much less obvious. It can be subtle. It can be hidden, and unexpected to an outsider. It requires much more sensitive questioning and a degree of a doctor-patient relationship to identify. Multiple people have raised that a patient-doctor relationship is important for spotting that, and, currently, there is nothing in the Bill to say that the two independent doctors have to have met the patient before.

That subtle coercion could have happened over years. We have repeatedly heard from people giving evidence that it is really hard to spot, and the reason it is hard to spot is because it is a matter of trust for a patient to be able to tell somebody—for a victim of coercive control to be able to express that. Even recognising that there is subtle coercion going on is hard for victims of that coercion to understand.

If there is domestic violence—again, I say in this Committee that I first campaigned on domestic abuse in the mid-1990s, and I am not convinced that the stats have changed much. I will refer to some more later on, as I make progress, but it takes women, on average, 40 times to leave an abusive partner—40 times—and it took me a long time to leave my abusive forced marriage when I was very young. The coercion that happens is so subtle and, again, when it is repeated coercion, it is hard to even recognise it as a victim, let alone for a professional to be able to see it. Even when a professional may pick up on it, it is acknowledgment from the victim—that they recognise what is happening—that is important, and that often is not the case.

Again, multiple people have raised that the doctor-patient relationship is important, and there is nothing currently in the Bill to ensure that there is a long-standing relationship between the doctor and the patient. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that someone in an abusive relationship, or who experiences coercive and controlling behaviour on top of their terminal illness, would be willing and able to disclose that to a stranger, even if that stranger is a doctor.

On top of that, research suggests that a significant proportion of medical staff in the UK do not feel that they have had adequate training to spot domestic abuse. Research by YouGov and the charity SafeLives in 2018-19 found that half of UK healthcare professionals are untrained to spot domestic abuse.

I understand the current difficulty in ensuring that doctors have a prior relationship with patients; it may not be practically possible. In many cases, where patients will know their doctors, or even know them well, it is even more vital that both doctors have been thoroughly trained in spotting coercive-control behaviour.

Like the other Labour MPs on the Committee, I was elected on a manifesto pledge to halve violence against women and girls within the next 10 years. We must not forget that as we scrutinise this legislation; I want my colleagues and I to remain committed to that in this Bill.

This Bill will have particularly grave consequences for women, since we know that domestic abuse disproportionately affects them. The crime survey for England and Wales estimated that 2.3 million people aged 16 years and over experienced domestic abuse in the year ending March 2024. Of those, 1.6 million were women and 712,000 were men. In the same year, there were only 51,183 domestic abuse-related prosecutions—a very small number compared with the number of people who experienced domestic abuse. That is in addition to the abuse of our elderly, on which Age Concern submitted evidence. Those figures demonstrate that we already frequently struggle with bringing domestic abuse cases to prosecution stage. They show that even the dedicated members of our caring professions have trouble detecting domestic abuse. If something is hard, we need to train our doctors to do it.

Our society already diminishes the status of elderly, infirm women and I have concerns that the Bill will further entrench that. We need to be aware of and ensure that we address the problem of mercy killings in the Bill. That issue is distinctly gendered and the Bill as currently worded will have a distinctly gendered impact if we do not address it. In 2024, The Other Half carried out a review of more than 100 UK cases of so-called mercy killings. It found that

“‘mercy killings’ are not the wanted, ‘hastened’ deaths that need assisted dying.”

Instead, the review found that:

“They are overwhelmingly violent domestic homicides of women, by men: and show that our society is still poor at detecting and responding to domestic abuse.”

Some groups are more vulnerable to domestic abuse than others. A higher proportion of people aged 16 and over with a disability—a group that we know is vulnerable in relation to the Bill—experienced domestic abuse in the last year than those without a disability.

The law and Parliament have, unfortunately, taken a very long time to even start adequately responding to these problems. Coercive control was first recognised as a distinct offence in English law only in the Serious Crime Act 2015. As written, the Bill would not mandate training to the doctors whose role it would be to consider assisted dying cases. Of course, no training can be perfect, but to allow the Bill to go forward without ensuring that doctors have training in this complex matter would be negligent. It would mean that we were failing to even try to carry out our responsibilities to protect people, especially women, in abusive and coercive relationships.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said that she will accept the amendment, but it does not go far enough. The question is: how do we prevent abusers making use of the Bill if it becomes law? The amendment gives us one way of mitigating that risk to a degree. We already have issues recognising domestic abuse. The amendment cannot perfectly solve that problem, but it would take steps to do so.

We must safeguard vulnerable people who live subject to coercive and controlling behaviour on a daily basis from opting for assisted dying as a result of that environment. Thorough and specific training on spotting that is vital for doctors. I am grateful that my hon. Friend, in accepting the amendment, will ensure that some of that training will be forthcoming. Even one abused person being driven by their abuser to use assisted dying is one too many. I am confident that all hon. Members would agree with me on that deeply important point.

In the last few days, I have been looking at suicide, and one of the issues that has come up is that last year, for the first time in our history, suicide by victims of domestic violence overtook deaths from what we would term intimate partner homicide. In the last two weeks, there have been further reports highlighting that the number of women driven to suicide because of the experience of domestic violence has risen. Tomorrow, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) will read the name of every woman who has been killed in the last year, as she does every year. Two of those women were my constituents, and many more kill themselves to get away from their abusers.

[The Chair]

Order. I understand where the hon. Member is coming from, but I think she is very close to moving outside the scope of the amendment, so can I ask her to bear that in mind? As I have said, this is a very sensitive issue and I am giving people latitude, but that cannot go too far. I do not want to interrupt Members, but I will if they do not stick to the confines of the amendment.

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful, Mr Dowd. I will bring my remarks back to the issue in the amendment, which is related to training. I will also bring them back to the issue of interpreters.

In November 2023, the Imkaan group issued a report, “Life or Death?” It literally is a matter of life and death. The report talked about the use of interpreters, training and minoritised women. Imkaan said that

“The availability and use of quality interpreting services can be critical to women’s access to safety and protection”

and that the current position on police use of interpreters breaches the Equality Act and amounts to indirect discrimination. It also breaches the commitments under the Istanbul convention. I appreciate that that issue is about police training, but surely the principles are exactly the same. We have a service—the police and domestic violence services—which supports victims of coercive control and of domestic violence. Unfortunately they come into contact with it, as our NHS and our medics do, way too often for my liking.

[The Chair]

Order. The issue of interpreters is not within this group. I am just trying to look for that and it is not in this group, so I am afraid the hon. Lady is out of scope of the clause. It is in a later group, so perhaps she could pick it up then.

[Naz Shah]

I thank you, Mr Dowd. My apologies. I have made a mistake, but I was referencing the comments of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd about the use of languages, which is the subject of one of the amendments; that is my understanding. But again, I am happy to be guided by you, Mr Dowd.

To come back to the issue of training and domestic violence, in Committee, we heard evidence from Dr Jamilla Hussain about minoritised women. Again, from the data collection of ethnic minority groups, training is right at the top of the agenda, whether it be training of doctors or specialists.

Language is important when it comes to training as well. When people are training or trained to look at coercive control and to spot that coercive control, there is often an interpreter between them and the victim who is being assessed. They may be an ethnic minority woman or a man from an ethnic minority background whose first language is not English, so that training would need to include cultural sensitivities in relation to spotting coercion and control, and to repeated coercion in particular.

These are subjects that are already taboo for people to discuss. We know the issue of domestic violence is hard to spot. We have repeated that time and again, as have others. We talk about training, but that has to go further when it comes to victims or people seeking assisted dying who are from ethnic minority backgrounds and who have different cultural understandings. I talked about yesterday that. The hon. Member for Reigate also talked about the issue: the understanding of assisted dying among ethnic minority communities is very different if there is a language barrier.

I would like to ask the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, whether her amendment will go further in addressing some of the inequalities and intricacies that are presented when we are dealing with women from ethnic minority communities or elderly people from ethnic minority communities. I would be happy to sit down and talk her through those issues, so that I can support the development of her amendment to address the concerns I have raised today.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady talked earlier about the tragedy of victims of coercive control who commit suicide. Does she consider that the amendments we are looking at will help to address that challenge? What specific support does she think victims of coercive control would need to prevent them from taking that terrible step?

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member asks a very important question. When I am talking about reflective services for black and minority ethnic communities, which is something I have delivered training on and worked on in a previous role, I often use the example of my mother, who was a victim of domestic violence. Had she been arrested by a woman instead of a man, her experience might have been different. Had she had a solicitor who was a woman, not a man, her experience might have been different. Had she had judges who were women, not men, her experience might have been different. Let us now add another layer to that. Had the police officer been a woman from the background she was from, they might have understood it.

The same analogy potentially applies to patients who are asking about going down the route of assisted dying, because it is helpful if somebody comes from the same cultural background. If a female victim of domestic violence or coercive control meets a specialist doctor who looks very similar to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire—a white, middle-class male—and he does not have that cultural understanding, he will then rely upon training, and he will no doubt rely upon an interpreter to translate.

That is the kind of thing I am trying to tease out, and these are the kinds of protections I want to see in the Bill. If we want a Rolls-Royce service, and if this is to be the best Bill in the world, it cannot ignore the most vulnerable in society. If the patient is a disabled woman, it is whammy upon whammy and layers upon layers of intersectionality that the Bill does not address. That is why I want to see the Bill strengthened.

I want to talk about the training that doctors get and the training in palliative care. We heard from Dr Jamilla Hussain, who was very clear about the fear among minoritised communities because of what happened during the covid pandemic, with “do not resuscitate” orders and their whole experience. Some people potentially died who could have been saved because they did not have the trust in NHS services to access them.

In this instance, it is important that we have a first doctor. That first doctor might have no relationship with the patient because their regular doctor does not want to engage in the process. Let us take the example of a patient in Bradford West who has had a diagnosis of terminal illness. They might well have a doctor or consultant who has been dealing with them for six months or even a year, to the point where they have reached the terminal stage. They might have a relationship with that doctor, who might have spoken their language and might be from a particular faith background but who does not want to engage in the assisted dying process. According to the Bill, that doctor would then have to refer that patient on to somebody who is prepared to have that conversation, but that person might not have that training or those language skills, and they might not—

[The Chair]

Order. The hon. Lady needs to keep her remarks to amendment 20. I have looked at other amendments to which this is relevant, including amendment 186, but that has been starred. I exhort the hon. Lady to focus on the particular issues covered by amendment 20.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. My understanding is that this all relates to amendment 20, and I am happy to clarify why. Ultimately, this is about the professional’s intervention with a patient, and the amendment is about training people adequately to assess coercive control and domestic violence. I am trying to demonstrate—I accept that I might not be doing it well enough—that there is a pathway and a catalogue of things that relate back to the person who is being assessed. I am trying to explain to the Committee in detail, because I feel very strongly about it, what that care pathway might look like for somebody, and why the amendment, although I welcome it, does not safeguard the most vulnerable in society. I am happy to be guided if that is not what I am doing, but that is certainly what I am attempting to do. May I carry on, Mr Dowd?

[The Chair]

The hon. Lady should take this in the spirit in which it is intended. Dipping in and out of issues throughout the course of a speech is okay, but I am afraid that dipping in and out of issues that are not relevant is not, and we are getting to the stage where the information she is imparting is not necessarily relevant, in significant elements, to the amendments that we are dealing with.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd. I would argue otherwise. I would say that actually, every single—

[The Chair]

Order. My ruling from the Chair cannot be challenged. I exhort the hon. Lady to stick to the amendments before us. If she does not, I will have no other option but to intervene and move the debate on.

[Naz Shah]

Thank you, Mr Dowd.

I come back to the issue of potential coercive control, which is what amendment 20 addresses. As I have outlined, there are patients who could be in that position. Given the examples that I have put before the Committee, I argue that the amendment, although it is brilliant in getting us to a better place than where we started out with the Bill—I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she is happy to discuss strengthening the safeguards—does not go far enough, for the very reasons that I have outlined, and no doubt will outline further when speaking to other amendments.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd. As I have said, the Government remain neutral and my role is not to offer a Government view on the merits of the amendments, but to provide a factual explanation of their technical and practical effect to assist the Committee in its scrutiny.

The Government remain committed to ensuring the legal robustness and workability of all legislation, so I have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on some amendments. Where changes have been mutually agreed by my hon. Friend and the Government, I will offer a technical, factual explanation and rationale for the amendments. Those include amendments 185 and 186 in this group. The Government remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying.

This group relates to the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor. As drafted, clause 5 gives the Secretary of State the power to specify the training, qualifications and experience required for a registered medical practitioner to act as a co-ordinating doctor, but there is no legal duty for the Secretary of State to do so. Amendments in this group either seek to change that power to a legal duty, or would introduce specific training, qualifications and experiential requirements for a registered medical practitioner to act as a co-ordinating doctor.

Amendments 185 and 186 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley would introduce a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor. Giving the Secretary of State a duty rather than merely a power would ensure certainty as to the training, qualifications and experience that the registered medical practitioner must have in order to act as a co-ordinating doctor. The Secretary of State’s duty in this respect would include making provision in regulations about training for co-ordinating doctors relating to assessing capacity and assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by another person. Amendment 186 would also enable the Secretary of State, subject to the specific training requirements already mentioned, to delegate the determination of the training, qualifications and experience needed for a co-ordinating doctor to a person specified in the regulations. That would allow that determination to be delegated to a body or bodies with appropriate expertise, in line with other aspects of training for healthcare professionals.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

It is not for me to make that decision.

[Naz Shah]

I wish to divide the Committee on amendment 290.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

Exactly. That is what worries me. I acknowledge what the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said about pharmaceutical sponsorship, but I do not think that has anything to do with what we are talking about here. What we are talking about is specifying what doctors are doing as part of their daily job, for which they are trained. It would not be fair to publish those figures and put those doctors at risk.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate what my hon. Friend is saying, because I have mixed views on this. I would like to understand what would be appropriate. My concern is that there will be a difference, because doctors normally have these set-ups for treatment options but, in this instance, the service is not a treatment, so to speak. I genuinely want to understand: in his eyes, what would a good service that provided scrutiny and accountability look like?

[Dr Opher]

There are examples. Appraising other doctors, for instance, is specified as a job that doctors are trained for, and it is paid at a set rate agreed with the Department of Health and Social Care. There are many instances where this occurs. I totally agree that the fee a doctor attracts for the service should be clearly specified and in the public domain, but I do not agree that a single doctor should be identified as having seen, say, 10 patients who have requested assisted death. I think that is unnecessary, will not lead to increased patient safety and will make it less safe for the medical practitioners too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The challenge in the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is the term “total turnover.” A GP would have to extrapolate from the service provided to a whole range of other costs that may apply—for example, the share of the overhead they pay into their primary care network, the share of admin costs or the rent on their building. The definition of total turnover is the entire cost and entire revenue from the tariffs. As officials have made clear, this additional level of complexity would be an onerous task, although not necessarily impossible.

Total turnover is one side of this issue; the other, much more salient point is the quantum leap between having transparency on a particular tariff and pointing at a specific doctor and saying, “You over there—you did this much work on that much tariff, and that’s how much money you made for it.” There is a big difference between the two.

[Naz Shah]

I also do not like the idea of doctors being identified in such a way, as they have with abortion clinics, but I am trying to understand how we will protect these services. If it is an NHS provision and specialty, with doctors in certain practices signing up to provide services for assisted dying and becoming either the primary or the secondary doctor, by definition those will be the practices to which people will refer. That will become common knowledge, just as it is for musculoskeletal or podiatry services, for example. In this instance, there would be an assisted death service, and there would clearly be practices that do not provide it. How would we then protect the doctors? How will the Government respond to all these concerns?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Nineteeth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kim Leadbeater]

Amendment 419 provides that the co-ordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that a preliminary discussion of the kind mentioned in clause 4 has taken place and that a written record of it has been made. The co-ordinating doctor must have made or seen a written record of the preliminary discussion. Amendment 189 adjusts the wording so as not to suggest that a first declaration has been made before it is witnessed to clarify that proof of identity must be provided before the declaration is signed and witnessed.

Amendment 190 provides that the required two forms of proof of identity must be provided before the person signs the first declaration. Amendment 191 provides that the co-ordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of clause 6(2) are met; that is to say, that the patient has provided two forms of identity to the co-ordinating doctor. This is a relatively straightforward set of amendments to tidy up the requirements around proof of identity.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to amendments 291, 292 and 293, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell). I do not intend to press them to a vote; they are probing amendments. They all relate to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley about the identification required of applicants for assisted dying. They do not change those requirements; they take a more logical and businesslike approach to proving that those requirements are met.

Amendment 291 would change the current requirements on identification and require applicants for assisted dying to produce a piece of photo ID and proof of residence in the UK for the previous year. As currently written, clause 6(2) states:

“The person must, at the same time as that declaration is made, provide two forms of proof of identity to the coordinating doctor and the witness mentioned in section 5(2)(c)(ii).”

Subsection (3) states:

“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”

Surely that is not tight enough.

In particular, the Bill as written does not specify that either form of proof of identity should be photo ID. That may be a major omission. For much less significant decisions, the law of England and Wales requires at least one form of photographic ID. For example, there is currently a requirement to have photo identity to work on the parliamentary estate, vote, or have a bus pass or railcard. None of those is as important as applying for an assisted death.

I remind hon. Members that assisted death is a process that would end in a person being issued with and then taking a mixture of lethal drugs. In a hospital setting where drugs are dispensed, rigorous processes are undertaken to verify the patient. Drug errors are not uncommon. The previous Health and Social Care Committee’s report into pharmacy witnessed how clinical practice was being improved to reduce drug errors. Given that a lethal dose is dispensed as part of this process, the identification mechanisms are weak and should be addressed in this preliminary stage through the provisions set out in this amendment. It is possible that the wrong person could be prescribed the medication. That would be an extreme case, but we are talking about creating a wholly new power that would relate to life and death. We are talking about making assisted dying available to people who are, in many cases, extremely distressed. People in extreme circumstances will sometimes do extreme things. We should expect some extreme cases and seek to guard against them.

Amendment 291 would provide such a safeguard. The Bill says that to qualify for assisted dying, applicants must have been resident in the UK for at least a year, but it does not ask them to provide any proof of that residence. In such a serious matter, we surely cannot simply accept someone’s word that they live in the UK. Making that a requirement without a test to establish it de-values the importance of the criteria for qualifying.

Amendment 292 would change clause 6(3), which currently reads,

“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”

The amendment would change that “may” to a “must”, as the former treats the identification process with reduced seriousness. If the word “may” stays in legislation, there is no obligation to have rigour in the identification process. As drafted, the Bill is more open for abuse.

Amendment 293 seeks to place the regulations concerning identification under the affirmative procedure, which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire mentioned earlier. Assisted dying is so important that no regulations made under it should be drawn using the negative procedure. As Members will know, if a statutory instrument is made under the affirmative procedure, it must be approved by Parliament within a certain timeframe, which is usually 28 or 40 days. If that does not happen, the change to the law made by the statutory instrument will not take place. In the Bill as drafted, these regulations are covered by the negative procedure, which means that if and when the Secretary of State decides to change them, they could go through on the nod unless Members raised an objection. A statutory instrument laid through the negative procedure becomes law on the day the Minister signs it and automatically remains law unless a motion rejecting it is passed by either House within 40 sitting days.

Placing all changes to regulations under the affirmative procedure would ensure that we have scrutiny by Parliament. We should all approve this. Our responsibility for this legislation will not end when and if it becomes an Act of Parliament. These amendments speak to tighter safeguards and parliamentary scrutiny for all new regulations made by the Secretary of State in relation to identity and residence. All hon. Members should support them.

[Danny Kruger]

I will quickly echo the points well made by the hon. Member for Bradford West in support of the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for York Central. It is important to specify the form of identity that will be presented. The person presenting themselves for an assisted death needs to be who they say they are. At the moment, the power to specify the forms of proof of identity has no minimum requirements. As written, it does not require the Secretary of State to specify what is acceptable.

Two specific aspects we have to pay particular care to are age and residency. The process must be accessible only to over-18s. I am concerned that we rejected amendments yesterday that would have prevented people under 18 having the conversation. In light of that, it is even more important that we make it clear that people who access assisted death must be adults. We need to ensure that the forms of identity are specified and that Parliament can satisfy itself that they are robust.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

We cannot have it both ways. We cannot give doctors and clinicians autonomy, which the Committee has repeatedly seen as a ground to reject all sorts of obligations that I and others have proposed to ensure that doctors do the job in a specific way, and then suggest the opposite in this instance. I recognise what the hon. Gentleman says, and he may be right that that is inappropriate.

[Naz Shah]

Does the hon. Member agree that perhaps the amendment is not just about the context in which it has been referred to so far, but about protecting doctors in future? When mistakes happen, people would have a means to protect themselves.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We should not forget that doctors are indemnified against any civil claims under the Bill. Nevertheless, they will want to protect themselves against the accusation that they inappropriately prioritised one case over another. That is the purpose of the amendment, and I urge the Committee to support it.

I will finish with this point. I am ashamed to say it, because my party was responsible for the NHS for the 14 years until last year, but the fact is, as Labour Members said frequently when they were in opposition, that there are enormous resource constraints on the frontline in the NHS. I do not think that is inappropriate to consider, when we create a new service, how it might have an impact on existing treatments in the NHS. Leaving aside all the ethical questions, including on coercion and capacity and our concerns in that respect, what will this mean for hard-pressed GPs and clinicians of all sorts on the frontline? What protections can we offer them when they make difficult decisions about whether to support an assisted death application?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

That has been a very useful discussion. I have nothing to add.

[Naz Shah]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Daniel Francis]

I beg to move amendment 347, in clause 7, page 4, line 4, leave out from “to” to the second “the” in line 5 and insert—

“ensure that steps have been taken to confirm that”.

This amendment would remove the emphasis on the role of the coordinating doctor in making these assessments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

I agree with my hon. Friend about the number of amendments in this vein, but clearly the amendments suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch bring us into line with existing regulations. In her evidence, Dr Cox said:

“If we look at the evidence of suicide, we know that it is increased in people with serious illnesses, but it is actually increased in the first six months after diagnosis, not in the last six months of their lives, so it is about the trauma of the diagnosis.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 82, Q105.]

It is likely, therefore, that those diagnosed with a terminal illness will experience mental distress that could affect their capacity to make a decision about an assisted death. In her written evidence, Dr Virginia Goncalves, a retired clinical psychiatrist with over 30 years of experience in the NHS, writes:

“In my consultant psychiatrist role, I have encountered many desperate and suicidal patients wanting to end their lives after struggling with longstanding mental distress, who could have easily sought the option of assisted suicide if it had been available to them! But however depressed and hopeless they felt, with a compassionate and hope filled approach from their care givers and the correct medical and psychological treatment, the vast majority recovered enough to be able to have a ‘life worth living’. In so many cases, these patients have thanked me later for not giving up on them! Not once have I heard anyone say ‘you should have let me die when I wanted to do it’.”

A meeting with a psychiatrist or other psychological specialist will protect people who may otherwise not have chosen assisted dying. I emphasise again that we already ensure that patients who will donate an organ have this assessment, so why not those seeking an assisted death? We must protect vulnerable terminally ill people from being coerced into assisted death, and psychiatrists and other specialists are best placed to spot that. That is why the assessment is included for living organ donation.

[Naz Shah]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is a safeguard that would actually strengthen this Bill, especially given the conversations we have had around repeated coercion?

[Daniel Francis]

Absolutely. This amendment, of course, is widely supported by Committee members for that very reason. As I was saying, we already use that assessment for organ donation, and Members supporting this amendment believe that should be the case for those that are seeking an assisted death.

I now move on to amendment 284, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. This amendment would change clause 9(3). Currently, that subsection lays out, and I will quote the language of the Bill, that the assessing doctor,

“(b) may, if they have doubt as to the capacity of the person being assessed, refer the person for assessment by a registered medical practitioner who is registered in the specialism of psychiatry in the Specialist Register kept by the General Medical Council or who otherwise holds qualifications in or has experience of the assessment of capability;”

This amendment would change the word “may” to “must”. In other words, the assessing doctor would have a duty to refer the person being assessed to a consultant psychiatrist if they had any doubt about that person’s capacity. I argue that this is a change that we both should make, and can easily make. If a doctor has doubts about the capacity of an applicant, it is good practice for them to refer that person to a doctor or a specialist in that field.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

I agree with all of this. I think psychological assessment is incredibly important in all patients, and I personally specialise in it from a primary care basis. But we are suggesting here that the two other doctors have no ability to do any sort of psychological assessment, and that is simply not true.

[Naz Shah]

rose—

[Dr Opher]

I apologise to my hon. Friend; I will continue for a little bit. We use secondary care and psychiatrists when we have a doubt about our decisions. If we have a doubt, then it is entirely appropriate to use psychiatrists in that instance, and we must do so. That is why I approve of amendment 6.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Opher]

I completely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. By amending clause 12 to include social workers, who specialise in spotting coercion, there would be a psychological component in that panel. I emphasise that the first two doctors are trained in psychological assessment—they have to be to become a doctor, and we must respect their knowledge and decision making. Psychiatrists will be incredibly useful in difficult cases of capacity, but using them in every case would not be using them in the best capacity.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is being generous with his time. I do not question the capability of those doctors, but how does that square with the concerns of the Royal College of Psychiatrists that if a doctor has never met the person before, they cannot make an assessment on coercion? That might impact on capacity.

[Dr Opher]

Sorry, could you make that point again? I did not quite understand it.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twentieth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 11th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)]

I have nothing to add on this group of amendments. I am confident that the Bill as drafted already includes significant periods of reflection. Bearing in mind that we are putting dying people through a very lengthy process already, I remain confident that the periods of reflection are adequate as set out in the Bill.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I have a couple of additional comments. We talked last week about the reflection periods. I referred to the fact that when even someone buys something from a shop, they have 28 days to return it; when they are deciding on whether to have an assisted death, there is a great deal more at stake. During that debate, someone asked, “What if someone had a prognosis of just one month?”, but clause 13 has an option for a fast-track process in that situation—the person would be able to access the service in 48 hours.

I beg to differ with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, who said that we have enough reflection periods in the Bill. Yes, there are reflection periods, but they come after the panel’s decision. The reality is that the NHS is under so much duress, with patients waiting weeks to see their GP for anything other than urgent treatment, that getting an appointment with another GP in seven days is unlikely; it is unlikely to happen given how uncommon that is at the moment. It is right that doctors are able to triage their patients to prioritise those who require medical intervention to keep them well, to prevent hospital admission, or to stop them deteriorating or even dying.

The Government are trying to protect the NHS, and the best way of achieving that is to ensure that medical interventions are provided at the earliest opportunity before a patient deteriorates. In some cases, a medical appointment may need to take priority over an appointment for an assisted death. If someone who is dying has longer—even just a further week—in which to reflect, it removes the pressure from GPs and consultants, and enables them to prioritise properly their patients. It does not build up false expectation in patients that they have a right to a rapid consultation process. Likewise, we know that it can currently take a few weeks for patients to see another consultant, if not months or even over a year. It is therefore more helpful for the patient to have a more realistic period of reflection before moving to the next stage of their assessment.

Issues of such intensity as someone planning to take their own life should not be rushed. We know from all the work that has been undertaken on suicide that other interventions and conversations can help with reflection and reconsideration. It is important that people are given this opportunity. In their first raising the matter with a doctor, the doctor would have provided a lot of information about alternatives to the patient, such as what treatment options would be available. Perhaps they would have had a discussion with a palliative medicine consultant to review their options. There needs to be time for a patient to really reflect on all this new information. If the patient does want to explore assisted dying, there will also be all the conversations about drugs and their impact, which we will come to when we discuss later clauses.

Amendment 317 to clause 13 seeks to increase the reflection period from 14 days to 28 days. I gently suggest that we should have the reflection period before the decision, whether it be by the judge or a panel, to give people the right amount of time to consider; currently, the reflection period is afterwards. This is such a monumental decision that people should be able to contemplate all other options available. As it is, the process is rushed, and a patient could be caught up in the moment of concentrating on getting through the stages. I appreciate that others have suggested that once we have got past that stage, with the paperwork and all those things out of the way, then there is time to reflect. During the process, however, the patient has not had time to consider the options in making their decision. I am not convinced that there is enough reflection during, as opposed to after, the process.

Amendment 314 seeks to increase the reflection period from 48 hours to seven days for patients who have been given a month to live. In that case, seven days is quite adequate time to reflect on the information they have received to make informed choices. If this is about autonomy, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has talked about many a time, it is important for people to have choices. To have that autonomy is surely to have the options in front of us and be able to consider them in detail.

In considering whether to sit on this Bill Committee, I slept on the decision. I can usually make instantaneous decisions, but knowing the amount of work, knowing that I was new to the subject, and knowing the things that I knew then—not the things that I know now—it was a big decision for me. I was even thinking about how I would manage the workload. We are talking about something that is not at all comparable. We are talking about somebody who will be taking a decision to potentially exercise the right—if the Bill becomes law—to an assisted death. That is really important for me.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.

Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—

(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and

(b) give a copy of the report to—

(i) the person who was assessed,

(ii) the coordinating doctor,

(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and

(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.

(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—

(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);

subsection (2)(a)

(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;

(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—

(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;

(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;

(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;

(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;

(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)

This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.

[Danny Kruger]

I beg to move amendment 348, in clause 8, page 5, line 10, at end insert—

“(c) inform the person’s usual or treating doctor and, where relevant, the doctor who referred the person to the independent doctor, of the outcome of the assessment.”

This amendment would ensure that the independent doctor communicates the outcome of their assessment to the referring doctor as well as the usual or treating doctor.

--- Later in debate ---

Let us be clear what we are doing: if the first doctor declines an application, a person can shop around until they find a doctor who will approve it, and there is nothing to stop private practices springing up that would be happy to accommodate that request. If the second independent doctor declines, the person can also shop around, although that is limited to a single second attempt, but in that case the person could just go back to the beginning and start again. If we want simply to allow anyone with a terminal diagnosis to have an assisted death, the Bill will do that. Let us not pretend that we have safeguards to stop people shopping around until they find a doctor willing to help them.

[Naz Shah]

Does the hon. Member share my concern that if a doctor refused somebody an assisted death because they thought there was some form of coercion, the door could be open for people to keep going back through this route?

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. We will address in later debates the point that insufficient attention will be given to the reasons why an application has been refused. If an application has been refused on the grounds of coercion, a future doctor will not necessarily know that that was the reason. As the hon. Lady says, in cases of coercive control there is a very real danger that if a person has been unduly influenced to seek an assisted death and the doctor declines their application, possibly because they detected coercive control, the patient can then be coerced, or influenced, into starting again with a new doctor. There is nothing to stop that in the Bill. We have a real problem, and I hope the Committee will consider the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

I support amendments 422, 468 and 423, which I think would strengthen and safeguard the Bill. However, as someone who worked in mental health for many years, I have grave concerns about amendment 201, which would restrict access to medical records. Health professionals work in environments with great confidentiality of records; I have no concern about health professionals or doctors having access to health records. Some Committee members have talked about doctors not needing to know whether a person had tonsillitis, but most medical records or GP summaries will note whether someone has had tonsillitis, along with details about vaccinations and infections. I do not think that those records will necessarily be relevant or that a doctor would look in detail at what medication they have had in that respect.

What is relevant, however, are records for people who have a mental health disorder or are vulnerable. For example, people with serious mental illnesses such as chronic treatment-resistant schizophrenia may be on treatments such as clozapine that, if stopped, will have an impact on their mental health. The treatment that they may undergo during terminal illness may have an interaction, and medication that they have been using for many years to treat their mental health condition may have to be stopped. Doctors need to know why the person wanted to choose that route, and whether it will have an impact on their mental health.

Restricting access to important medical records by the doctor who makes the decision will have an impact on very vulnerable people. As we have discussed before, people may be homeless or may not have any family members, and it will all have an impact on why they decide to seek the assisted dying route. People may feel that they are a burden to society and the system. If there is any documentation from six months or a year ago, it will be relevant for the doctor. Removing access to medical records for doctors will have an impact on people with mental disorders, intellectual disabilities and neurodevelopmental conditions, so I oppose amendment 201, although I support the other amendments.

[Naz Shah]

I will try to keep my remarks brief. I first speak to amendment 468, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate, on the asking of the question why someone wants to have an assisted death. When I originally came to this debate, Dermot, a humanist who was also my election agent—a lovely guy—came to me and said, “Now that this Bill is going through Parliament, will you support it”? I said, “Explain it to me.” He never once mentioned the word “autonomy”. If I remember correctly, what he talked about was suffering, pain and horrible deaths, which many hon. Members have referred to. We have heard lots of examples during this Bill Committee.

My hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said that the decision was none of a doctor’s business and that the issue was about autonomy. However, if a woman was being coerced into an assisted death, the idea that it was none of the doctor’s business would not quite wash with me. We talk about autonomy, but if someone does not have autonomy in their lives—if they are in an abusive relationship, are a victim of coercion or have a vulnerability—they might not have the choice.

When we ask a question, it is often about something else. I have experienced this myself. I am very passionate; when I am talking about things, somebody might just stop me and say, “Naz—what’s this actually about?” That is all it takes to make me stop, take a step back and a breather, and think for a deeper minute about whether the issue could actually be about something else. We do not always stop to think.

[Dr Opher]

The amendment is good practice; I do not in any way deny that. The hon. Member for Reigate is obviously coming from a really good place. However, the amendment is almost like specifying that when someone goes to see a doctor, the doctor has to say, “How can I help? What is wrong?” It is just unnecessary; that is my only feeling about it. If someone came in and said, “I would like to request an assisted death”, the doctor would not just say, “Okay”—they would ask how the patient was feeling. It is normal medical practice to ask what is going on in someone’s mind, so that does not need to be specified in the Bill.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. There is a medical model and a social model of intervention. If I walk into a GP surgery with a really bad headache, I am prescribed paracetamol. If the headache gets worse, I am prescribed something stronger—maybe co-codamol or codeine. Doctors are really busy. We have had to add another 40,000 appointments just for people to get through systems, so we know how hard it is to get a GP appointment.

If the person who turns up at the GP’s with a headache is usually quite healthy, the doctor might not take a minute to ask about what has actually happened. If I say, “I have a headache because I am banging my head against the wall—I have that much stress”, that is a whole different conversation. Having that conversation with the patient—probing a little more—is, for me, very important from a holistic point of view.

[Rachel Hopkins]

I want to check that my hon. Friend was not implying that I had not thought deeply—for more than a minute–in the course of making my comments earlier.

[Naz Shah]

No, that was not my implication. When referring to my hon. Friend’s remarks, I was speaking about a patient perhaps saying “It is none of your business” or that my hon. Friend was talking just about autonomy.

[Rachel Hopkins]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reiterating those points. Does she accept that it is a patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business” in the course of the conversation?

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely accept that it is the patient’s right to say, “It’s none of your business”, with the really clear caveat that they could well be a vulnerable patient. They might say that it was none of the doctor’s business, and that doctor might then not be able to explore the other things going on with that patient. That is why, for me, this does not wash.

The point that I am trying to make is that, in the course of a normal consultation, it is presumed that every doctor will know their patient and be able to have these conversations. In most cases, they probably will because we have amazing doctors; I have amazing relationships with my doctors. But does that mean that the doctors will ask that one question: “Why?” That is the crux of the whole Bill.

[Rebecca Paul]

The right to say, “It’s none of your business” might be fine when no one else is involved, but if someone seeks an assisted death, that involves multiple members of NHS staff. There is an impact on all those people, who need to be comfortable with what they are doing. Maybe the person needs to accept that they do need to provide some information so that the medical staff feel comfortable about the question of eligibility.

[Naz Shah]

That opens up a whole different debate for me. Some clinicians will not sign up to this process and some will. That is a whole different debate, but I take the point that there has to be a reason.

We talk about the option for referral to palliative care. I have previously moved amendments that would have meant a referral, without the option; however, when considering that option, a doctor needs to understand that if a patient says, “I do not have to explain myself—full stop”, or, “I do not want to talk about palliative care”, that should raise alarm bells. If a doctor says, “You’ve got this terminal illness. These are the options—let me spell them out for you. You have the option of referral to palliative care and the option of these drugs, so why do you want to kill yourself?”, and the patient turns around and says, “It’s none of your business”—

[Rachel Hopkins]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, I will just finish my point.

From a common sense perspective—I am not medically qualified—that situation should make me, as a human being, want to understand more. As a human being, I would like to understand whether something else was going on, such as anger towards—

[Jake Richards]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, I will not give way until I have finished my point.

I would like those conversations to be at least explored, which is why I support the amendment.

[Rachel Hopkins]

The Bill already sets out a number of things that a doctor has to assure themselves of, with regard to coercion and capacity. They would do that having had a significant amount of training to establish, in the round, after consulting others, that one way or another the legal requirements have been met. The “Why?” question appears to me to bring in a judgmental element—

[Rachel Hopkins]

Indeed: subjective, as the right hon. Gentleman said. That is the point that I am trying to get at. There is an objective assessment, which is wholly appropriate, but a subjective assessment would lead down a different route and muddy the objective assessment.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely see where my hon. Friend is coming from and appreciate her concern, but we will have to agree to disagree as we have a difference of opinion. A subjective assessment might reveal that something else is going on for that patient.

I hate to put myself in this position, but imagine I have just received a diagnosis and I am going to die within six months. I could have a whole load of anger about that happening to me and I could say, “I don’t want this. I don’t want to talk about it. It’s none of your business. I’m angry—this is what I want.” At that point, does the doctor stop? In most cases, my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire is absolutely right, but in some cases she might not be. I might want to shut the conversation down because I am angry or because other things are going on in my head and I do not want to explain. Amendment 468 would allow the doctor, from a compassionate point of view, to have another conversation with the patient.

[Jake Richards]

Does my hon. Friend agree that she is making a powerful case against amendment 468? A multitude of conversations and different circumstances will need to be taken into account; it is wholly inappropriate to have a mandated question in primary legislation. We should go back to clause 1, which I think the Bill is actually about. It states that the person must have

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.

Does my hon. Friend agree that that is what is at the heart of the Bill, rather than decisions about what is in the person’s best interests?

[Naz Shah]

I respectfully disagree. I am making the case that there is a conversation to be had. Yes, there is informed choice but is my hon. Friend suggesting that the question should not be asked at all? I take the point that with an informed choice there would have been an exploratory conversation, but sometimes just calling something out, or stating the obvious, makes a huge difference.

[Rebecca Paul]

I wish to clarify that the amendment is about not an additional assessment but merely a simple question. Like many who have spoken, I hope that most good doctors would ask the question anyway and take the answer. It may inform them or it may not but sometimes, as the hon. Member for Bradford West has just discussed so powerfully, it is helpful to remind medical staff, who are under lots of time pressure, that sometimes it is worth stepping back and asking why.

[Naz Shah]

I agree. Sometimes it will be the simple thing of asking the question as a human being—among all the conversations that are happening, just stopping and asking why.

[Jack Abbott]

I appreciate that my hon. Friend has given way a number of times, but I gently suggest that we already know the crux of the Bill and what we are debating. The “why” is that people with a terminal diagnosis, with six months to live, would like a course of action to end their lives in a pain-free way and to have the autonomy to do so.

We are in danger of over-legislating for a range of different permutations that could potentially happen in conversations. I agree that these kinds of questions are absolutely crucial, but it may satisfy my hon. Friend that amendment 21, to which we agreed a few moments ago, requires medical practitioners to take training on

“domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse”.

That sort of protection and safeguard has already been agreed to.

We will rely on highly specialised individuals to pick up on these issues. They may want to explore, through further questioning, why people are making these decisions but we cannot legislate for all the different sorts of conversations, and all the emotions that may be going through people’s minds. If someone comes back and says, as my hon. Friend put it, “Well, it’s none of your business,” or whatever the answer may be, we will rely on the specialised professionals to pick up on danger signs. However, that would not necessarily lead them in every single conversation to have a suspicion of the patient’s motives. Life and conversation do not work like that and we cannot legislate in that way.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree that life does not work like that. Life is very complicated and that is why I want the conversation to happen. My hon. Friend referred to amendment 21, which we have just agreed to. I spoke extensively about why that is a brilliant amendment that moves us towards much more safeguarding, but I also think that it does not go far enough for women, marginalised communities and people from ethnic minority backgrounds. I genuinely do not feel that amendment 468 is about over-legislating. It is just stating an obvious fact: sometimes, even in normal life, we go around the houses to get to a conversation and get to the right point. That is what I want to get to.

[Jack Abbott]

To follow up on the example my hon. Friend gave earlier, if—to be glib—someone said, “None of your business”, she would want the doctor to keep probing. At what point does that end? If someone genuinely does not want to have that conversation and says, “I want to end my life because I have a terminal diagnosis. I live in fear of the pain that could await me and I don’t really want to go into much detail,” where does that end? Where does that conversation continue to?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes my case for me. If that person says, “It’s none of your business, but I have so much pain,” at that point, automatically, as we naturally do as human beings—

[Jack Abbott]

But this is a pure example.

[Naz Shah]

That example is a good example that strengthens my position.

[Danny Kruger]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady’s point. The conversation goes on in the way the doctor would want it to, but they have at least asked the question. Is it not very simple? The Bill already requires doctors to look for signs of external coercion. As we have acknowledged, there is no way to determine internal coercion—the influence people have on themselves. There is no way in the Bill at the moment to identify whether somebody feels that they want an assisted death because they fear that they are a burden to others. This question is the only opportunity we have to tease out that answer: does she agree?

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention and he makes an important point.

[Kit Malthouse]

What is an acceptable answer? Can we have a list?

[Naz Shah]

Does the right hon. Gentleman want to intervene?

[Kit Malthouse]

indicated dissent.

[Naz Shah]

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire makes an important point. Where are the opportunities? When doctors are doing the assessment.

The other issue that speaks to me is the question of internalised bias. We will have professionals with subconscious bias or affirmed bias. They will be clinicians who have chosen or agreed to take part in the process; fundamentally, the majority of clinicians will not take part in this process because of their beliefs. It changes the relationship between doctor and patient from a societal perspective.

I know that a number of times I have been stopped during a process and asked a different question, and at times that opportunity for reflection—even without the pressure of knowing I have only six months to live—is of benefit to me. I am sure that others would benefit from it, too, particularly because the decision is so momentous. For that reason, I will certainly support amendment 468.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 201. I have mixed views on it. I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire said about medical records, especially when it comes to women and their past, but I also appreciated what my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford said about his experience from a mental health perspective.

I am still thinking about the amendment and I am not sure whether I will support it or not, but further thought needs to be given to the subject. There are the issues of mental health and women’s rights, but another issue applies, too. If someone has experienced trauma in childhood but that trauma has come out much more recently, even though it does not necessarily affect the decision at hand—whether to choose an assisted death—is there some kind of historical post-traumatic stress disorder that would then need to be explored? I do not have the answer, but I look forward to hearing the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on that point. I would value hearing whether she has thought about that and what her understanding of it is.

[Stephen Kinnock]

As I have mentioned before, the Government have worked closely with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on some mutually agreed amendments, including amendments 201, 422 and 433. The amendments that the Government support aim to ensure the legal robustness and operability of the legislation, should it pass, and I will offer a technical explanation for them.

Amendment 201 will clarify the wording in clause 9 on the doctor’s assessment. It provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records applies only to records that appear relevant to the doctor. The effect of the amendment is to make clear as part of the assessment process that the assessing doctor is required only to review medical records that are considered by the doctor to be relevant to the person’s request to seek an assisted death.

Amendment 422 would add an additional requirement on an assessing doctor to make inquiries of professionals who are providing or who have recently provided health or social care to the person and make such other inquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. This applies to—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-second sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for sharing that. It is useful to have these debates and conversations, but I would suggest that the panel needs to be sure off the back of the information that it has been given and the witness testimony, which goes back to why it is so important to ensure that we have that coverage and the right things feeding into the panel so it can get to that high threshold. I would expect the threshold to be at court level, given the huge, significant ramifications of this decision for that person.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady is making a powerful point. I refer back to the point on jury trials. When we have criminal trials and jury trials, they go through not every single thing in somebody’s life, but the actual act of criminality itself and what is relative to that criminal act. That does not mean to say they trudge through a person’s whole life.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. She eloquently explains exactly the point I was trying to make. That is absolutely right. Clearly, we do not expect the panel to pore over everything. It can only be sure based on the evidence put before it, so I reiterate: that is why it is really important that all the right and relevant information can be fed into the panel in order to get a good, robust, solid decision.

Members will all be relieved to know that I am now coming to the last amendment, amendment (b) to new clause 21. It puts in an additional mechanism for the panel not to grant an application when particular circumstances make it inappropriate. I do not think many in the Committee are going to like the amendment. I make the point again that, in an ideal world, there would have been a best interest clause or something similar in the Bill to protect patients from opting for assisted dying due to some other perfectly solvable challenge in their life, such as being homeless, but, given our amendments were not accepted, I am putting this amendment forward again as a responsibility of the panel, given its oversight role. This is likely to be where the social worker on the panel can play an important part.

In Ontario, assisted dying is monitored by a team of nurse and coroner investigators who review every reported death. The state has also established a death review committee. A recent report shows some of the difficulties for a panel in making its decision. A patient referred to as Ms B successfully applied for an assisted death. She suffered from multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome, which made it difficult for her to find appropriate accommodation. The report found that

“As a result of her housing situation and conditions, necessary to address her MCSS, Ms. B experienced social isolation, which greatly contributed to her suffering and request for MAiD.”

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

It is open to any Member to speak more than once in a debate, as the Committee knows. Naz Shah has indicated to me that, because of the size and complexity of the groupings of amendments, she wishes to speak not once but three times to break her comments into bite-sized chunks. I draw that to the Committee’s attention to put down a marker in case anyone else feels the same way.

[Naz Shah]

It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Reigate, who takes the record for being on her feet the longest in this Committee.

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)]

Oh no—that’s yours!

[Naz Shah]

She beats my record for sure. I assure the Committee that my comments on new clause 17(a) will be brief in comparison with my previous speech.

Yesterday, my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich and I disagreed on a point of detail. In fact, he was right and I was wrong. As he said, a provision in paragraph 4 of new schedule 1 allows the Secretary of State to dismiss a bad commissioner if the circumstances merit it. Although I still maintain my position that too much power is being given to a single person, I thank my hon. Friend both for pointing that out and for the courteous way in which he did so.

The hon. Member for Reigate has spoken very eloquently in defence of her amendment. Just to recap, new clause 17, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, would allow a person seeking an assisted death to appeal to the commissioner if a panel refuses their request. However, it would not allow any other person to lodge such an appeal.

By contrast, new clause 17(a) would allow several other parties to lodge such an appeal, including the two doctors who took part in the process, the applicant’s next of kin or relatives, or anyone who took part in the proceedings before the panel or who gave evidence to the panel. I acknowledge that there are genuine arguments against accepting new clause 17(a), and I have listened to them in detail and given them sincere thought. The family members who might appeal against a decision could perhaps have little or no contact with the person on whose behalf they say they are appealing; I note that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough made a very honest and personal intervention on that subject yesterday, and I accept that that is a real possibility. As we all know, families are complicated.

There is also a likelihood that allowing more people to appeal against a panel’s decision, both for and against an assisted death, could mean that the commissioner will need considerably more resources. Otherwise. it is very likely that appeals will not be heard within a reasonable period.

Those are genuine arguments, but there are equally strong counterarguments. If the Bill passes, we simply do not know how many coercive or abusive people will seek to drive others towards assisted death. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley spoke about coercion being a criminal offence, but the last figures I have seen show that only 4% of cases result in a conviction. However, it is worth noting that many people with experience in this area are very concerned about the possibility.

We also do not know how many people will opt for an assisted death because their palliative or social care needs are not being met. Again, as I referred to extensively in previous speeches, many people with first-hand experience of this field are extremely concerned about that.

We also do not know how many people will opt for an assisted death partly because they do not want to be a burden on their loved ones. We do not know how many of those loved ones would, in fact, be ready to care for the person who feels like a burden, nor do we know what safeguards, if any, will prove effective against any of those dangers.

One thing we do know is that relatives or carers of someone seeking an assisted death may be able to bring those dangers to light. A family member, a GP or even a paid carer may have seen someone come under coercive control. As new clause 17 stands, they might feel that the panel had made a terrible mistake in ignoring the evidence of that. The hon. Member for Reigate’s amendment (a) to the new clause would give those people the chance to bring their evidence before the commissioner.

I have to say that, as it stands, new clause 17 seems to make some fairly odd assumptions. It would allow an appeal if the applicant’s request for an assisted death were turned down, which means that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley acknowledges that the panels may on occasion get things wrong. But the right of appeal is only one way, which seems extremely odd. It surely cannot be the case that the panels might get things wrong when they turn down a request for assisted dying, but are always right when they accept them.

There surely needs to be an amendment that allows people with knowledge of the situation to appeal if they think the panel has made a mistake in allowing an assisted death. Amendment (a) to new clause 17 would also reduce some of the dangers that we first faced. On that basis, I urge the Committee to support the amendment.

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I will be speaking to new clauses 14 to 17 and 21, new schedules 1 and 2, and amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391—although I assure you I will not speak for as long as the hon. Member for Reigate did.

Yesterday, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley referred to the Law Society’s neutral position on the new clauses and new schedules. I will not read out all four pages of its most recent submission on the matter, but, although it is neutral, it does continue to have concerns and queries about the new provisions. I will just read out the headlines.

The Law Society remains concerned about the role of the review, whether it would be accessible and workable for people seeking assistance, and the resourcing required. It seeks clarification on the nature of the functions to be exercised by the commissioner and by panels. It still seeks clarity on how panels will deal with cases and asks us to consider where lawyers may need to play a role and the availability of legal aid. We touched on that matter this morning. I accept that the Law Society’s position was used in evidence on the other side of the argument yesterday and that it is neutral, but I could have read all four pages of its response if I had really wanted. That is its position.

I will oppose some of the new clauses and raise concerns about others, including some of the amendments to new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. As we have heard, the new clauses and amendments would replace the High Court judge mechanism in the original draft of the Bill with a three-person panel. As we said yesterday, that fundamentally changes the Bill from what the House voted for on Second Reading last November.

The panel will consist of a consultant psychiatrist, social worker and legal member who would chair it. I concur with those who have said that it would help if those individuals were involved earlier in the process. Several concerns have been raised about the High Court judge mechanism in the evidence that we have received. Although I accept that the new panel mechanism would address some of those, it would also leave some untouched and in some cases it could make the position worse.

During oral evidence, we asked witnesses whether and how the High Court judge system would work. Some said that they did not believe that it would. I credit my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for listening to those points, but our problem and predicament now is that we were not able to seek oral evidence on the panel arrangement now before us, and that a large amount of the written evidence had already been submitted beforehand. I will come to this again later, but if we had gone through the normal process of a Government Bill—I accept that this is not a Government Bill—we would not be in this position now.

As a group, the 23 of us are now debating these schedules and clauses before Report, but we have not had any oral evidence on what is before us, and I would argue that we have also had a lack of written evidence. The panel system has complications, and it will be of life-and-death importance. We should have been able to ask witnesses whether a system would work, and how, but we have not been able to do that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

I accept what my hon. Friend says, but there are differences of opinion. I accept that that is a very serious matter, but I would argue that a matter of life and death is more serious, and there are processes that we know. As I said, I gave evidence under oath about the demolition of a building and whether someone had followed the correct health and safety regulations, yet we would not be doing so in this case.

[Naz Shah]

My understanding is that, at the mental health tribunal, a person would be entitled to legal representation, which would be an officer of the court or a lawyer, so the bar is very different. Does my hon. Friend agree that actually this is like comparing an apple to a pear?

[Daniel Francis]

Indeed, these are complex matters and these comparisons are made. We have heard a lot about Spain, which I will briefly refer to later, but Spain has a very different legal process from us.

Returning to my comments, currently an individual would not have to give evidence under oath. As I said, the matters discussed by a panel are as important as they can be. In my opinion, people should be giving evidence to the same standards that they do so in a civil or criminal court.

My second concern relates to the procedures for investigating any doubts that the panels may have, and we have heard about that. The panel must hear from at least one doctor and from the applicant under this new set of proposals. They must read the two doctors’ statements and the applicant’s declaration, and then they can decide to ask questions of the applicant and/or one or both of the doctors. The panel can also hear from and ask questions of any other person. How is the panel going to know which people to talk to? Will the panel be asking the right questions of applicants? Applicants will have different circumstances in different cases. Will those professionals also be skilled investigators? I accept the evidence we had on the skills those people have and bring, but it is not clear to me whether they will be acting in a quasi-judicial way. We have heard that it will not be an adversarial system. Although I can see the problems with creating an adversarial system for the panel, there are systems in other countries where that is allowed, and a different appeal system also exists elsewhere.

On the third point, which is about the standard of proof, if the panel finds matters that worries it, but does not find actual evidence of coercion, then it is not clear to me what it does. The panel could find that a patient qualifies for assisted dying on the balance of probabilities, and then approve that request. Three members of the panel could decide that a patient is, on the balance of probabilities, free to make the decision. People have heard my concerns about capacity, and whether the process for determining that is correct. We talked yesterday about how decisions are made in new schedule 2, and particularly subsection 5. There are differing views on the Committee about subsection 5(2), which talks about a “majority vote”, and how that may align with subsection 5(3).

My fourth concern is that there is no provision made in the new schedule or amendments for how the panels will deal with people with learning disabilities. There may be a further amendment to come on that matter. I accept that we agreed to an amendment regarding training for individuals, but I have concerns about how learning disabilities could be judged by the panel. I referred yesterday to how people with learning disabilities could go through this process with no support from friends and family, and then be presented before a panel. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and its code of practice, would the panel have to assist the person in making a decision? That is what, in my mind, the Mental Capacity Act states: that if someone requires help to make that decision, individuals with the power should help them to do so.

There are wide differences in how professionals talk to, listen to and interpret people with learning disabilities. I know that first hand, on a day-to-day basis. The Bill should set out best practice in this field from the start, so that we do not see discrepancies between how panels undertake their work with learning disabilities. I do not think I need to spell out how a bad decision in this field could lead someone choosing assisted death to a place where others may not want to take them.

The fifth area relates to appeals, and that they can only go one way. A person whose application for assisted death is rejected can appeal to the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. The commissioner can then either uphold the decision or allow the person to have an assisted death. We have discussed what happens if a person who knows that that person applying for assisted death has grounds for concern about the case. We have discussed the legal means of people wishing to seek a judicial review, which causes me grave concern. Under the Bill as written, the person known to the person seeking assisted death cannot appeal against a decision. I heard the debate this morning on the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate. The Bill says that the panel can choose to hear from any person who has a relevant connection, but there appears to be no mechanism for someone to apply to register any concerns with the panel.

In the oral evidence we received we heard concerns from Sir Nicholas Mostyn and Alex Ruck Keene that both sides should have the right of appeal. We heard that from a legal background, from supporters—I hear that Alex Ruck Keene was referred to as an objector, but I think he would say he is neutral in the process. People who have differing views about the process said to us in their oral evidence that both sides should have the right to appeal.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making very important points. Is he aware that Professor Mark Elliott, one of the UK’s leading professors of public law and a former chair of the Cambridge law faculty, has spoken about the

“asymmetrical nature of appeals under the Bill,”

and said:

“At best, suggestions that judicial review is an adequate substitute for families who wish to challenge decisions indicate a fundamental misapprehension about the nature of JR.”

On the suggestion that injunctions might work, is my hon. Friend aware that between January 2017 and 2021, the administrative court has issued only one injunction?

[Daniel Francis]

I thank my hon. Friend for that statistic, which I was not aware of. It relates back to concerns that I have had through the process, particularly on learning disabilities and how a family member finds out during the process what processes would be open to them. In my opinion, it is unclear how the proposed panel fits into our legal system. Again, there are all kinds of quasi-judicial panels that do fit into our legal system, and they have an appeal process, of course. They would normally see two parties in a case. I hear what has been said this morning about Spain. It was put to us in oral evidence from a supporter of the Bill that we should look at that part of the Spanish model about having both sides of the process, although I accept that Spain has a very different legal system from the United Kingdom.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

Yes, but he or she will consider a reconsideration only on the basis of an application to reconsider made by the applicant. There is only one opportunity for an appeal and it can happen in only one direction: against a refusal. I will come on to the role of the commissioner in a moment, but in the great majority of cases there will not be a judge involved in the decision. There might be a retired judge on the panel, but that is extremely unlikely; it is more likely to be a lawyer. It is a judicial exercise that is being conducted, so it would be appropriate for it to be a judge sitting properly in a court.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member share my concern that the Bill does not say that the panel can call people and ask them to swear under oath, unlike a mental health tribunal?

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. Having said that the panel is not a proper multidisciplinary team, I agree that it is not a proper judicial entity either. It is a panel with judicial power to approve life-or-death decisions, but it is without a judge or the normal judicial processes that would happen in a tribunal or court. There is no oath being taken by members of the panel or by witnesses; there is no independent appointment process, so the members of the panel will be appointed by the commissioner; there is no power to order the disclosure of information to the panel; there is no power to investigate wills, financial records or anything like that; and there is no requirement to meet the doctors or even to discuss the case with the patient themselves, if the panel considers that appropriate.

There is also no appeal against an approval, just a one-way appeal against a refusal. That appeal goes not to an independent judge sitting in a court, but to a commissioner—an appointee of the Government, who has been set up to facilitate the whole system.

Let me turn to the role of the VAD commissioner, or the Vader as I think of it; I will not labour the point. They can be a sitting judge, which is good, but I suggest to the Committee that it is highly unusual for sitting judges to be appointed to other public functions that are unrelated to a judicial role. I would be interested in the Minister’s view on that. Judges can be appointed to a second judicial job, such as chairing the Sentencing Council, but I am not aware of many examples in which a sitting judge sits in a non-judicial function.

Having looked into it, I discovered that there are three exceptions to the rule. First, the Master of the Rolls holds a number of sinecures in relation to the keeping of the public archives and the payment of the national debt, so that is a non-judicial function that a judge carries. Secondly, the chair of the Law Commission is a sitting High Court or Court of Appeal judge. Thirdly, and exceptionally, with permission of the senior judiciary, sitting judges can be asked to conduct public inquiries. A singular public inquiry, which is time-limited and essentially judicial in its purpose of determining what happened, and which will of course operate in an adversarial way, hearing proper evidence from counsel, is the only exception. However, that is not comparable to the model being set out here, in which a sitting judge is being asked to chair a permanent quango—a Government body.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

It would be very helpful if the hon. Lady could—not now; it need not be in the course of these deliberations—publish the evidence of that assertion. Which senior judicial figures have endorsed the new plan? It would be very helpful to hear from them.

We heard many criticisms of the previous regime. In my view, those objections prompted the change of heart that the new clauses derive from. From what I have seen, the weight of evidence indicates that we still have many of the problems that the High Court system had: a lack of effective powers and questions around capacity. We also have a whole new load of problems to do with the essential illegitimacy of a quasi-medical panel of people making an essentially judicial decision without the opportunity to hear in a meaningful way from all the different stakeholders who should be consulted.

[Naz Shah]

I want to understand and clarify something. The hon. Gentleman said earlier that the commissioner is sitting as a judge, but my understanding is that the commissioner is not sitting as a judge. What did he mean?

[Danny Kruger]

I think the hon. Member for Spen Valley said yesterday that we had to grapple with this confusion, which is that there is a judge not sitting as a judge. It is slightly like a Minister not sitting as a Minister; the Bill has provided all sorts of interesting hybrid creations of people who inhabit split personalities and dual roles.

The hon. Member for Bradford West is, I think, right. From the evidence we have heard from the hon. Member for Spen Valley, although there will be a judge, which satisfies the cosmetic need to present this as some sort of continuation of the High Court stage that the House of Commons voted for, they will not sit as a judge. It is rather like having a hobby or a second job. I am not sure judges do that, but it is like chairing a football club on the side. Their status derives from their judicial role, but they are sitting as the commissioner in a lay capacity—I think I have that right.

[Danny Kruger]

It will be interesting to hear from the Minister, who is more equipped than the rest of us to opine on this. My understanding is that a judge sitting as chair of a judicial inquiry might not be sitting in court, but they are there because they are a judge; their function, as the chair of the inquiry, is essentially judicial. That is the only comparison and it is essentially different, because the exercise of a public inquiry is time-limited and specific to a particular case, which is to determine the truth or otherwise of what happened in whatever situation it is being asked to inquire into.

Here, we are setting up a quango—an arm’s length body of Government—that will sit in perpetuity and oversee a bureaucracy of state. That is something that no judge does in our system and, in my view, would be completely inappropriate for a sitting judge to do, even if we could find a sitting judge prepared to fulfil that function, which I think might be challenging.

The other key difference is that a judge chairing a public inquiry is appointed by the Lady Chief Justice; they are essentially judicial in their appointment and work. The judiciary appoints one of its own to fulfil a judicial function as the chair of an inquiry. It is being proposed here that the Government—the Executive, not the judiciary—appoint the chair of the commission from the Bench of judges.

[Naz Shah]

What the hon. Gentleman has said creates another concern for me. If we do have a judge, and if the expectation is that they sit in a judicial capacity, does that not raise concerns that an appeal is allowed one way—if an assisted death is refused—but not the other way, if someone wants to appeal against an assisted death? By definition, does that position not become compromised?

[Danny Kruger]

I am afraid that that is absolutely right. There is an essential problem with the role of the commissioner as the backstop—the Court of Appeal, as it were—for what are effectively judicial decisions made by the non-judicial panel. The fact that appeals can be heard only against a refusal and not an approval confuses the whole question of appeal and judicial review. It is plainly unjust, and does indeed compromise the idea that the judicial figure has the independence that a judge should properly have. I agree with the hon. Member for Bradford West.

[Naz Shah]

I want to speak to amendment (c) to new schedule 2, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft. The amendment requires members of the panel to have undertaken training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control, and financial abuse. It extends the principle of amendments 20, 21, and 22, also tabled in the name of my hon. Friend, which require the medical practitioners involved in the assisted dying process to have undertaken similar training.

[Kim Leadbeater]

rose—

[Naz Shah]

I am happy to give way to my hon. Friend, the sponsor of the Bill. I am really pleased that she accepted the previous amendments. I do not know whether she will accept this one.

[Kim Leadbeater]

A strong argument has been made to me that the professionals on the panel would have the skills and training to fulfil their role, but it is important, particularly given the time we have spent discussing this issue, that they do have it, so I am happy to support that amendment.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate that. None the less, I will speak briefly to the amendment as I still have concerns. The amendment provides an absolutely necessary safeguard and I welcome the fact that my hon. Friend has accepted it. I am pleased that it extends to panel members, but it does not meet the safeguarding needs when it comes to people of ethnic minority backgrounds, coercion, cultural competence and so on. People and organisations have raised concerns about that.

The truth is that the Bill is very gendered: the analysis by women’s organisation The Other Half has found that if the Bill passes, and trends follow those of Australia, 1.65% of all deaths in this country could take place via assisted dying. If so, as many as 1,400 domestic abuse victims could die each year through that process. It is vital that Members on both sides of the debate are conscious that we are opening up a new avenue for domestic abuse through the Bill. That is what the amendment speaks to. To save the Committee time, I will not go over the detail because it was covered during our discussions of the previous three amendments.

[Kit Malthouse]

I rise briefly to amplify a couple of points from the excellent speeches by the hon. Members for Rother Valley and for Ipswich. First, in clarification, I understand that there are situations where judges can sit in essentially supervisory positions—not least, for example, on the BBC board—and they can of course be Cross Benchers in the House of Lords. They are allowed to undertake other charitable trustee roles, although they are restricted in their activities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

I thank the hon. Member for that point, but when someone cannot describe any version of safeguards that would be possible, and in the light of some of the other conversations we have had, one is led to believe, entirely respectfully, that some people are opposed to the Bill in principle in any instance.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley made on Second Reading that this was the safest model in the world was not just about the fact that there was a judge, but about the fact that there was a third tier. That is not something that is in place in Oregon, or even in Australia, as we heard in evidence. Now, not only are we going to have a third tier of scrutiny, but we are going to have three professionals who must unanimously accept that the strict conditions for eligibility have been reached. I absolutely refute the suggestion that amending away from a High Court model and towards a panel model means that we have to recant any suggestion that this is the strongest model in the world.

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Lewis Atkinson]

I am going to continue this point, if I may.

The hon. Member for East Wiltshire asked what the purpose of the panel is. As is set out very clearly in new clause 21, it is about determining eligibility for assistance, with reference to the stringent rules and conditions that we will lay out in the Bill. The hon. Gentleman went on to ask about the purpose of the judge and suggested that it is a bureaucratic role. As new clause 14(4)(c) makes clear, the commissioner’s role is making arrangements for panels, and new schedule 2 is clear that the commissioner has powers to give guidance about the “practice and procedure” of those panels. Clearly, the commissioner will be a judicial figure with experience of proper process and procedure, and it is absolutely right that that person, who will set out the procedure for each of the panels, is a judge.

The hon. Gentleman made a point about MDTs. I am not sure whether he has worked in or around healthcare, as I and other members of the Committee have, but I say gently that the suggestion that individuals at the end of their lives are not in contact with multiple professionals is highly implausible. We are blessed in this country that we have some of the best cancer nursing in the world, and that we have palliative care social work. He previously asked which bodies had come out in support of this change. Well, the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers says:

“The inclusion of social workers as core members of these panels shows that Kim Leadbeater and her colleagues have taken on board our arguments that social workers are uniquely qualified and equipped to undertake the complex and sensitive tasks of assessing mental capacity and safeguarding individuals who may be subject to any form of undue influence or coercion.”

[Naz Shah]

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

[Lewis Atkinson]

No, I am in a flow, so I am just going to keep going. I am mainly rebutting at this point, and I do not want to open the debate that much wider.

Invariably, we already have individuals at the end of their lives with multidisciplinary input that is appropriate to them, and we have heard already how the independent doctors and the panels will rightly seek input from all those involved in care.

It has been some time since the hon. Member for East Wiltshire and I had an exchange on our difference on the ventilator test, but I know that we have a fundamental, philosophical difference on that. I believe that a dying person saying, “Please, doctor, turn off my ventilator; I want to die,” is not fundamentally different from that person saying, “Please, doctor, let me take that medicine; I want to die.” I assert that the person in the street is closer to my view of that situation than to his, although I respect that people have different philosophical opinions about it. However, let us not forget that we sometimes conduct this debate about the correct oversight of the third tier in a theoretical manner, as if these people were not dying anyway, and as if deaths relating to refusal of treatment, and suicide, were not happening anyway.

--- Later in debate ---

I again gently say that I understand there are in-principle opponents of the Bill, but we are working in good faith through these amendments to respond to the evidence that we have heard and to improve the lives of families and dying people in this country. That is why I am proud to be supporting the amendments in the promoter’s name.

[Naz Shah]

I will speak to amendment (b) to new schedule 2, but before I do, I will address some of what my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central just talked about. To clarify something for the record, Glyn Berry, co-chair of the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers, of which there are 200 members—there are 200 social workers for palliative care in the country as it stands—has not given an endorsement, and has categorically said that the association does not support the panel structure, as it fails to support what the Bill is intended to do on assisted dying. I am happy to send my hon. Friend the reference for that.

The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire referred to panels in particular. I tried to intervene and ask him about this directly, but I will mention it now and I will be happy to give way should he wish me to. He told the Hansard Society that he was not supporting palliative care specialists at an earlier stage, simply because the issue of palliative care would be addressed in the structure of the panels, but that has not happened. I just wanted to put those concerns on the record before I moved on to my substantive speech.

Amendment (b) to new schedule 2, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Catherine Atkinson), would amend the new schedule, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to ensure that the Official Solicitor will nominate a person to represent the applicant before the panel. As it stands, the new schedule does not require the commissioner to give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels. However, if guidance is given, the panels, under paragraph 8(2),

“must have regard to any such guidance in the exercise of their functions.”

Amendment (b) would remove the relevant sub-paragraphs and replace them with the following:

“(1) The Commissioner must give guidance about the practice and procedure of panels.

(2) Such guidance must prescribe a procedure which in relation to each application appoints a person nominated by the Official Solicitor to act as advocate to the panel.

(3) Panels must have regard to such guidance in the exercise of their functions.”

What effect would this have?

I refer hon. Members to the written evidence submitted by Ruth Hughes, a senior barrister due to be appointed King’s counsel on 24 March. The written evidence number is 161. Ms Hughes notes that she has

“17 years’ experience of specialising in mental incapacity and the law in relation to vulnerable adults”

and that she has

“advised the Ministry of Justice on capacity related issues.”

She describes herself as

“one of the most experienced barristers specialising in the property and affairs of persons who lack mental capacity in the country.”

In this context, it is particularly noteworthy that Ms Hughes has frequently appeared in court instructed by the Office of the Official Solicitor and the Office of the Public Guardian. She says:

“In my professional experience, financial abuse of the vulnerable and those who lack mental capacity, or are approaching the borderline, is depressingly common.”

Ms Hughes is not someone who opposes the Bill at all costs; she seeks to strengthen its safeguards for those at risk of coercion. She states in her evidence that

“whilst I do not oppose the Bill, I am highly concerned that the safeguards proposed are insufficient to protect vulnerable people from exploitation for financial gain. I suggest it would be profoundly disturbing and wrong for Parliament to enact legislation which put vulnerable people at risk of being killed for financial gain without creating adequate safeguards to protect them.”

Those are very strong words from someone who I suspect is not in the habit of crying wolf. If we hear that kind of warning from a senior lawyer with Ms Hughes’s specialised knowledge of protecting at-risk adults, we should certainly listen.

Ms Hughes was a strong supporter of the use in the Bill as drafted of a High Court judge as the authority who would decide on assisted dying applications. She wrote:

“I suggest that the judicial safeguard is fundamentally important.”

She recommended, however, that the Bill should be amended to include five additional safeguards. I am pleased to say that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has accepted one of the five proposed protections: the requirement to hear from the person who wishes to die. Ms Hughes’s fifth recommendation bears directly on the amendment we are discussing. She says that the Bill should be amended to include an advocate who would

“ensure that the evidence in support of a claim is appropriately tested.”

Ms Hughes made that recommendation when my hon. Friend was still advocating for a High Court judge, rather than a panel, as the arbiter, but I do not see that the change from court to panel has in any way weakened the argument she made for an independent advocate. Explaining why she wants to increase safeguards, she says that in the Bill as drafted

“there is likely to be significantly less scrutiny of a decision by the Court in relation to assisted dying than there is for example currently in relation to a decision of the Court of Protection to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a person, or even a decision as to where a person lacking capacity should live or with whom they should have contact.”

Ms Hughes said that one problem was that

“importantly, there is no person appointed to assist the Court to consider and test the evidence before it. Our Court system is inherently adversarial. Generally, two or more parties to a dispute will present evidence and argument to the Court and the Court will make findings of fact on the evidence and come to decisions on the law in accordance with those arguments. The Court is not hidebound, but equally it is not set up to obtain evidence itself. A scheme which does not provide for an independent party to consider the evidence and present arguments against an application will be unlikely to be robust and will not be well designed to identify, for example, a lack of capacity or the existence of coercion or pressure.”

This part of Ms Hughes’s evidence seems to be particularly important:

“Doctors, for example, may not be well placed to identify coercion, pressure or control. In my experience they are often missed by solicitors taking instructions for the making of gifts or wills. The best solution, perhaps the only good solution, to this problem would be to require the Official Solicitor to act as advocate to the Court in cases brought under the proposed legislation.”

It would be helpful if we explained the term “advocate to the court.” The Ministry of Justice published the following explanation of what an advocate to the court is and what they do, based on a 2001 memorandum agreement between the Attorney General and the Lord Chief Justice. The Ministry said:

“A court may properly seek the assistance of an Advocate to the Court when there is a danger of an important and difficult point of law being decided without the court hearing relevant argument. In those circumstances the Attorney General may decide to appoint an Advocate to the Court…It is important to bear in mind that an Advocate to the Court represents no one. Their function is to give to the court such assistance as they are able on the relevant law and its application to the facts of the case.”

We should all see the advantage of being able, through the Official Solicitor, to give the panel the assistance of specialist lawyers. We should particularly see the advantage of the Official Solicitor being able to appoint barristers who are experienced in cases where capacity was in doubt or where people were possibly being coerced.

The Ministry of Justice explanation goes on to say:

“An Advocate to the Court will not normally be instructed to lead evidence, cross-examine witnesses, or investigate the facts.”

The word “normally” is important in this context. The advocate will perhaps not carry out these functions when acting to advise assisted dying panels, but we should note that the Ministry’s guidance does not state that they will never carry out such functions. As we have remarked more than once, we are in unmarked territory here.

I will end by quoting some more of Ms Hughes’s evidence, because it is clearly written by an expert in their field. She says:

“In my experience it is not uncommon where a vulnerable person is controlled or is lacking capacity for the person to be apparently expressing wishes in a clear and forceful manner. This can easily be mistaken for a person acting freely and with capacity.”

That statement is a powerful counterpoint to some of the confident claims we heard from witnesses about it being relatively easy for doctors to detect coercion. Some of the witnesses from Australia and California were particularly noteworthy in that regard.

Ms Hughes goes on:

“In short, the risks of the Bill are real and substantial. The challenge for Parliament is how to mitigate them. The current drafting is inadequate.”

That is evidence we should not ignore. It comes from a distinguished lawyer who is not an opponent of the Bill but who fears that, as drafted, it will not protect the vulnerable. She has offered us what seems to be a workable solution to the problem that concerns her: create a mechanism to involve the Official Solicitor. Amendment (b) to new schedule 2, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, would allow us to put that into practice. I hope that all Committee members can support the amendment and increase the protection that the Bill offers to vulnerable people at risk of coercion.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to have you here this afternoon, Ms McVey. I did not intend to make a contribution, but given the number of contributions that have been made, I wanted to respond to them. It has been a really interesting and important sitting.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich is right. I see the panel as a genuine attempt to respond to the evidence we heard in the witness sessions and improve the process. I take that absolutely as read, particularly in respect of the evidence from Rachel Clarke, whose view was that coercion is happening and that we should take the NHS as it is, not as we would like it to be. I see the attempt at introducing a panel as a response to that.

The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire is absolutely right to state that if there is a moral imperative to do something, Parliament should look at passing it and then the public services should figure out how they implement it afterwards. He is right in that. There is obviously a question about whether there is that moral imperative, but he is right to point that out.

Although I take the panel as a sincere attempt to strengthen the Bill, I feel that, as put before us, it is not strong enough. That is why I spoke yesterday to amendment (d) to new clause 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North, which would ensure that the process was done properly and robustly. Nobody wants to see people dragged in front of a court when they are unwell, but there is the matter of safeguarding, and we do have a concern over coercion. It is integral to ensure we have public trust, so I urge the Bill’s proponents to consider those concerns again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sean Woodcock]

Having thought about it, that would be my preference. I am in a difficult position in that there is a lot to be said for the panel, and it would improve the process in many ways, but I cannot get around the fact that the judicial aspect was put strongly before Parliament, and ensuring that we would have those safeguards provided reassurance to Members. When I have been out on the doorstep talking to people who are in favour of the Bill—people who wanted me to vote in favour of it—they have said to me that they think the proposal is safe because it includes two doctors and judicial oversight. That does come up, which is why I think we need to keep judicial oversight in the Bill. I do, though, I recognise the very genuine attempt by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to introduce the panel to improve on some aspects and address the concerns expressed in the witness testimony.

[Naz Shah]

If I may, Ms McVey, I will speak to the issue of the judicial oversight of the panel and the whole of new clause 21. I would like to understand something, and perhaps the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley could help me. We have been talking a lot about judicial oversight. My concern is that even if we had judicial oversight, there is no liability if something goes wrong. We would have had judicial oversight, but now we have panel oversight—non-judicial oversight—of the decision. Even then, what if somebody went down the assisted dying route and an issue was raised afterwards? What recourse would anybody—family members and so on—have to hold anybody liable if they did something wrong, including, potentially, the commissioner?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey.

As my hon. Friend the Minister for Care and I have made clear throughout debate, the Government continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not have a position on assisted dying. Once again, my remarks will focus on the legal and practical impacts of the amendments, with a view to assisting Committee members. I will first speak to amendments 371 to 373, 377, 378, 381, 388, 390 and 391, new clauses 14, 15, 17 and 21, and new schedules 1 and 2, all tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

In executing our duties to ensure that the legislation, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to the amendments, which propose the voluntary assisted dying commission and the panels. They reflect my hon. Friend’s intent to replace the court approval process that is currently set out in the Bill. I confirm that this change was driven not by capacity concerns from within Government, but by the Bill promoter’s policy intent. Let me be clear: the High Court stage could be made to work, but if the Committee and Parliament elect for the commissioner and panel model, the state will work to deliver that.

New clause 14 and consequential amendment 391 would provide for the establishment of a voluntary assisted dying commissioner. In keeping with other appointments of this significance, the commissioner would be appointed by the Prime Minister, and the individual in post must hold or have held office—so it is not sitting judges, but could be a retired judge—as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

New clause 14 sets out the central functions of the commissioner, which will be detailed further in new clauses 15 and 17 and new schedule 1. The commissioner would receive documents, including the reports from the co-ordinating doctor and declarations under the legislation, make appointments to the list of persons eligible to sit on assisted dying review panels, and refer cases to those panels, which would replace the role of the High Court in the original draft of the Bill. In addition, the commissioner would have the responsibility for monitoring the Bill’s operation and reporting annually to Parliament, which we will no doubt come to in clause 34. It is important to pause there, because that is one aspect in which the commissioner model is distinct from that of a court or tribunal. It will serve multiple functions, not least the monitoring of the Bill’s operation and reporting on that annually to Parliament.

New schedule 1 contains practical arrangements for the office of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, as established in new clause 14. In practice, we anticipate that the commissioner’s office will be a non-departmental public body. The establishment of such an office to support the Government-appointed chair or commissioner is common practice for roles of this nature. One such model is the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, which is chaired by a person who is holding or who has held high judicial office. The schedule also introduces the role of a deputy commissioner, who, like the commissioner, must have been appointed by the Prime Minister and hold or have held office as a judge of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal or the High Court.

Both the commissioner and deputy commissioner would be appointed for terms of five years, with their remuneration set by the Secretary of State. The commissioner would have the ability to appoint their own staff, having obtained approval from the Secretary of State in regard to the number of staff, the remuneration and the terms, as well as providing an annual statement of accounts. In the ordinary way, such a public body would be subject to other statutory provisions, not least the Equality Act 2010.

New clause 15 would establish the mechanism for the referral by the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to an assisted dying review panel. When the commissioner receives a first declaration from the person seeking assistance, and reports from the co-ordinating and independent doctors as to their assessments of the person—including a statement by those doctors as to the person’s eligibility for assistance—they would be required to refer the case to a panel as soon as reasonably practical. In practice, the task of organising the work of each panel would fall to the commissioner’s office. The co-ordinating doctor would be required to inform the commissioner where a first or second declaration is cancelled. Where the commissioner is informed of the cancellation of the first declaration, they must not refer the case to a panel, or must inform the panel to disregard the application if already referred.

Amendments 371, 372, 373, 377, 378, 381, 388 and 390 are all consequential amendments on new clause 21, and together establish the mechanism for the consideration of cases by the assisted dying review panels in place of the High Court. Panels would be required to review each case and issue a certificate of eligibility where they are satisfied that all requirements set out in the Bill have been met.

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Amendment (a) would require the panel to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt”—the criminal standard of proof—that the Bill’s criteria have been met. In law, the balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied that an event occurred if it considers that, based on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not. The civil standard is currently used for end-of-life decisions and in other similar contexts. In addition to being the relevant standard of proof when deciding whether a person has capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including for serious medical treatment, the civil standard, which would be applied under new clause 21, is also applied in serious cases such as suicide inquests, withdrawal of life support and childcare proceedings. In practice, the panel would establish a case on the balance of probabilities only on the basis of strong evidence, including contemporaneous documentation, records, or hearing from the relevant persons whom they are required to hear from. The panel’s decision must be unanimous.

[Naz Shah]

We have heard before that the panel’s decision must be unanimous. However, I have tried looking in the Bill and it does not state that specifically. My understanding is that two people could nod their head, the other one would not have to, and it would still pass.

[Sarah Sackman]

I believe it is in there. Let me find the relevant provision so that I can refer my hon. Friend to it.

[Naz Shah]

It is a majority vote, not unanimous.

[Sarah Sackman]

It is a majority vote for the other decisions that a panel may make, but in respect of certification, the decision is unanimous. Paragraph 5(2) of new schedule 2 states:

“Decisions of a panel may be taken by a majority vote”.

Such decisions include whether to hear from an additional expert, or whether further investigation is required in respect of an aspect that the panel may be concerned about, such as coercion or capacity. While those decisions can be taken by a majority vote, in respect of certification and granting a certificate of eligibility, I refer my hon. Friend to paragraph 5(3), which states:

“The panel is to be treated as having decided to refuse to grant a certificate of eligibility if any member votes against a decision to grant such a certificate.”

That is a slightly mealy-mouthed way of saying that if any member of the panel resists the grant of the certificate, no certificate can be issued.

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[Naz Shah]

I appreciate that, under the new clause, the panel can hear from anybody. Can the Minister confirm that the panel is unable, unlike a mental health tribunal, to summon people to appear before them or insist that witnesses appear, and to make them swear under oath when presenting their evidence?

[Sarah Sackman]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the Bill as drafted, a panel and the commission are not invested with powers of summons, and the evidence that is heard and requested is not conveyed under oath. It is not a court or a tribunal. Those provisions do not apply, so she is absolutely right. They can make the request, but they cannot compel someone to attend.

Amendment (e) to new clause 21 would make it explicit that, when considered appropriate for medical reasons, the panel would be able to use pre-recorded audio or video material when considering evidence for the purposes of determining a person’s eligibility for assistance. Panel procedure would be set out in guidance issued by the commissioner, which would detail the processes governing the panel process in general, but also for the use of that form of evidence.

New schedule 2, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the. Member for Spen Valley, builds on the new clause 21. The new schedule further details the composition and the intended proceedings of the assisted dying review panels. As we have heard, panels would be formed of three members, including a legal member sitting as chair, a psychiatrist and a social worker.

Thanks to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, we have dealt with the provision on decisions to grant the certificate of eligibility and how they will be determined by members of the panel. We heard from the promoter herself, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, that the intention is that such decisions are unanimous.

The commissioner would be responsible for making appointments to a list of persons eligible to sit as members of the multidisciplinary panels, and for establishing those panels. Under the schedule, the legal member as chair of the panel must hold or have held high judicial office, be one of His Majesty’s counsel—that is a KC—or have been authorised as a temporary judge in the High Court. The psychiatrist member must be a registered medical practitioner and a practising registered psychiatrist, and the social worker member must appear on the register maintained by Social Work England or Social Work Wales.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being generous with her time. I just want to confirm that the Bill does not require the social worker to be a palliative care specialist. Am I right in thinking that?

[Sarah Sackman]

I think the hon. Lady is right that that is not specified as a requirement. All three panel members would be drawn from the relevant professions and would therefore be subject to the standards pertaining to those professions. In the legal profession, they will be practitioners who are experienced in analysis and reaching decisions based on facts and law. The professional standards for all three regulated professions place a high value not just on integrity, but on impartiality. For the commissioner and for any judges on the panel, the “Guide to Judicial Conduct” makes the principles explicit.

[Naz Shah]

The Minister mentions impartiality. As things stand, the doctors who take part in the process will have made the choice to do so. Would the same yardstick be applied to the panel, or would its members just be appointed? Could they choose not to participate in the process?

[Sarah Sackman]

I anticipate that members of the professions will apply to be members of the panel. There will have to be a recruitment process, which is something that the commissioner, who is appointed by the Prime Minister, will undertake. I emphasise the point that all the professions, in their different ways—I am obviously most familiar with the legal profession, particularly the Bar—are governed by professional standards that specify the need for and place a high value on not just integrity, but impartiality.

[Naz Shah]

I struggle to agree that there would be impartiality, because there are people who are committed, believe in, agree with or are advocates for assisted dying. Does that not raise a concern about potential bias—subconscious bias, even?

[Sarah Sackman]

There is no doubt that, as we will see later, the panel would be subject in all its decisions to public law principles, including procedural propriety. The absence of any suggestion of bias—even of the appearance of bias—is an important public law principle. In any event, given the recruitment process, the interviews that would be undertaken and the professional standards to which all these people would be held, I think that they would apply their independent and impartial skills and judgment to the decision making and the assessment of eligibility in a manner appropriate to the task set out in the Bill.

One would expect professionals on the panel to adhere to their professional standards and act with impartiality in ascertaining whether the eligibility criteria have been met. Speaking as the Minister—indeed, even speaking for myself—I have no reason to doubt the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the panel or see any suggestion of bias.

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[Naz Shah]

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. I want to understand something. She says that the Official Solicitor is there to help with adults who lack capacity, but in the cases before the Court of Protection of the girls who had anorexia, the judges took a decision that they should not continue to be force-fed. The judges concluded in nine of 10 cases that they lacked capacity, and yet accepted that these girls were inevitably going to die. In that case, would the role of the Official Solicitor not be helpful as a further safeguard?

[Sarah Sackman]

It is important to look at this issue in the context of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is setting out to do through the legislation, and what the panel’s function is, which is the function that was discussed in the debate. This is not a trial or an inquiry. That is not what is being undertaken by the panel. The panel’s purpose is to ensure that the eligibility criteria process has been followed in a correct, lawful and safe way. As others have pointed out, it is not adversarial, and will not be described as such in the Bill.

All that I am saying on behalf of the Government is that the Official Solicitor’s role is most frequently to assist in court with a difficult or novel point of law when the person cannot do it themselves. Well, we do not have that here. We are not determining points of law; we are determining whether this person has met the eligibility criteria. Secondly, the Official Solicitor’s role is for when individuals lack capacity. In the Bill, by definition, the person who is applying has already satisfied two doctors that they have capacity. Of course, the question of capacity may be something that the panel wishes to explore further—it has the three panel members and the ability to draw on its powers to seek further information to test that—but it is not clear, without altering the current role that the Official Solicitor plays within our legal system, what role they would be serving.

[Naz Shah]

I appreciate the Minister’s position and am grateful for her explanation, but it does not address the central point, which is that nine girls were deemed not to have capacity. Despite all the amendments that have been tabled and the letter from all the charities about anorexia, that has not been addressed. In absence of any impact assessment on one of the issues that most frustrates me, how do the Government conclude that the workability of the Bill is sufficient? Will it work, given that we do not have the protection for those girls who may have anorexia? There is precedent for such girls who did not have capacity. How will the Government safeguard those girls in particular?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fourth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

As we heard from the hon. Member for Richmond Park, her amendment concerns the second period for reflection under the Bill as drafted. The second period of reflection would take place after the panel had approved a person’s application for assisted death. The Bill states that that period would be 14 days, unless

“the coordinating doctor reasonably believes that the person’s death is likely to occur before the end of the period of one month beginning with the day that declaration was made”;

in that case, the second period is shortened to 48 hours.

Some people who have a strong desire to hasten death might wish to avoid the second period for reflection. If they refused food, there would be a strong possibility that their physical condition would deteriorate, so that a doctor would indeed believe that they were likely to die within one month. That is not a hypothetical possibility. We know that there are people who do refuse food to the point where they become gravely ill with malnutrition.

The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said something that I think is relevant here. He was asking questions of a witness before this Committee, Professor Nicola Ranger of the Royal College of Nursing, on 28 January. To quote Hansard, the right hon. Gentleman said:

“At the moment, within palliative care and palliative nursing generally, you are already dealing with patients who are electing to refuse treatment, food and water, or are supporting patients following an advance directive.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 59, Q70.]

On the same day, the right hon. Gentleman said something similar to another witness, Dr Sarah Cox:

“I want to pursue that point a little with you, Dr Cox. My understanding is that your profession is already taking these decisions, or supporting patients to take these decisions—for example, the withdrawal of ventilation for an MND patient towards the end, or if I decide to decline treatment or food and water to end my life as quickly as I can.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 74, Q91.]

In other words, it is not some remote possibility that patients who are already ill may decide to refuse food. That is one thing I hope that the right hon. Gentleman and I can agree on. We also know from the survey undertaken by a group of specialists in eating disorders that, in countries that have assisted dying laws, at least 60 people have qualified for assisted death because they suffered advanced malnutrition.

Some people who are seriously ill and who wish, in the words of a psychiatric witness, to “hasten death”, may see the 14-day period as intolerable. An alarming possibility is that they might stop eating in order to worsen their physical condition and qualify for the 48-hour period. Amendment 457 would remove that possibility. I strongly recommend that hon. Members support it.

People would qualify for a shortened period for reflection only if they

“have not voluntarily stopped eating and drinking”.

That word “voluntarily” is important. I understand the reason that the Bill’s drafters included a provision for a shorter, second period of reflection, but as with much of the rest of the Bill, I am sorry to say that I do not think that they have provided strong enough safeguards. This is a well drafted amendment that would tighten those safeguards. I urge Members to support it.

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[Danny Kruger]

I recognise that, but that is not germane to the debate that we are having, which is about the actual cancellation. There is a question about why there would have been a cancellation. My right hon. Friend is right that there is no obligation to proceed once a patient passes a particular hurdle. Many will not, but when someone decides actively to renounce their decision, a big question should be asked: what is going on, and what further help is needed?

My right hon. Friend suggests that we do not step in and ensure that care is provided—that, in other circumstances, there is no additional obligation in relation to patients. I am afraid to say that he has, as ever, a coldly rationalistic vision of healthcare and of the sorts of patients we are dealing with. As I have said to him, these patients will be acting much as I imagine he would imagine—I think from a position of health and self-confidence—himself acting in that circumstance. In fact, we are dealing with people who have decided to renounce their decision to proceed, and so are by definition in some turmoil.

I crave the indulgence of the Committee, because I am talking at length about a set of amendments that I do not intend to oppose, and I recognise the value and necessity of the clause. However, I draw to the Committee’s attention that we are dealing not simply with a bit of paperwork, but with a human being who, having made one enormous decision—to die—is now making an enormous decision to live, and we are treating it as if it is only a bureaucratic question.

I finish with a question to the hon. Member for Spen Valley or to the Minister, to help me understand something that confuses me in the clause.

[Naz Shah]

I have not given this matter as much thought as the hon. Member has. My interest is very much in the issue of domestic violence. Does he agree that this could be somebody who has experienced domestic violence? Or children could be at risk. This person may then decide not to take the option, even though they wanted to, because of obligations elsewhere.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is right, and her point goes to the question that runs through all of these clauses: why? As a Committee, we rejected the obligation on the doctors to ask, “Why are you doing this?” It was suggested by one hon. Member that it was nobody’s business why somebody was trying to take their own life and that if that person qualified, they should be able to summon the agents of the state to provide them with lethal drugs without any question about their motivation.

I agree with the hon. Lady. There is an equal expectation in my mind that doctors should ask the question, “Why are you changing your mind?” I would expect that. The clause could clarify what further referrals would need to be made, if they had not already been; as we have acknowledged, we would expect appropriate care to be provided by doctors anyway.

I conclude with a factual question. Clause 14(1) lets a patient cancel a first or second declaration, but subsection (4) says only that the duties of the doctor stop when a first declaration is cancelled. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Spen Valley would explain what happens if the patient cancels a second declaration. It strikes me that there would be a need for urgency because if a patient decides to change their mind at that point, that is arguably a more dangerous situation. What would be the obligations on the doctor at that point? Should we read across from subsection (4) that their duties stop in the same way? Perhaps that could be clarified in later drafting, if necessary.

To conclude, my general point is that the issue of a cancelled declaration is about more than the paperwork. Although, of course, we respect the autonomy of a patient to make their own decision to cancel a declaration—obviously, I would insist that that right should be in the Bill—it nevertheless raises a question in my mind: why is that happening, and what should we expect the patient’s medical team, or others, to do in that circumstance?

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I am acutely conscious that every word we say in this Committee is on the record. My hon. Friend makes a valid point in that context.

The purpose of amendment 253 is to clarify that a person acting as a proxy can both sign and revoke a declaration on behalf of a person seeking assistance under the Bill. This amendment would extend the provisions under clause 15 to a person who is acting as proxy to the person seeking assistance under the Bill, enabling the proxy to act on behalf of the person to cancel their first or second declaration if they are unable to sign their own name by reason of physical impairment, being unable to read or for any other reason. I note that the cancellation of a declaration is governed by clause 14, and the cancellation may be given orally, via writing, or

“in a manner of communication known to be used by the person”.

It does not require the signature of the person seeking assistance under the Bill, so a proxy may not be required for some people in relation to revoking a declaration, even if they have been required under clause 15.

[Naz Shah]

On the point made by the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, should the issue of proxy end up before a court, what will be relied on—the conversation that we are having here and the intentions stated in Committee, or a future statutory instrument and what the Secretary of State puts in the guidance?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The regulations will have primacy, and will be shaped by a range of inputs, including the conversation we have just had in Committee. The process is that the Bill gets Royal Assent, then the regulations are drawn up based on a range of consultations and inputs—including the Hansard. The regulations then become the basis on which this proxy process is managed, enforced and executed.

[Naz Shah]

I genuinely want to understand this issue. Even though we have had this conversation in Committee, what if the Secretary of State, following those consultations, decides otherwise? What recourse do we as a Committee have to challenge that?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The Bill, once it becomes an Act, places a legal duty on the Secretary of State to produce those regulations. The Secretary of State would be in breach of the law if he were not to enforce the conclusions of the Act.

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[Danny Kruger]

Once again, we are in an extraordinary no man’s land between medical treatment and something else that we cannot find a word for. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Of course, it is appropriate in medical treatment for a nurse or doctor to assist in the administration of a treatment. As he suggests, if the person found it difficult to raise a cup to their lips, the nurse would help them. Indeed, if they found it difficult to perform an injection, it would be expected that that would be done by the nurse or doctor anyway. But here we are setting up a strange new method of administering a so-called treatment in which the patient has to perform the physical act themselves.

It is apparent from the clause that it is very unclear what assistance actually looks like, so yes, I absolutely imagine that if the patient were struggling to raise the cup to their lips, a nurse or doctor who was present at the final act in an assisted suicide would help them to do so. Similarly, if the patient were finding it difficult to put their finger on the syringe, it would be appropriate—normally, one would expect—for the medical professional to lift the patient’s finger and put it in the right place. What happens next? Do they then apply a little pressure if the patient is finding it difficult to depress the plunger on the syringe? If the cup is at the lips, do they tip it up and let gravity take its course? These very complicated questions about where assistance ends and autonomy begins are, I am afraid to say, impossible to specify in the Act; therefore, it is apparent that we have a grey area.

I conclude with some evidence that we received from Iain Brassington, professor of applied and legal philosophy at Manchester University. He says:

“how are we to determine how the ‘final act’ of self-administration is to be differentiated from the penultimate act, in which the doctor may assist? How would helping a patient lift the cup to her lips be distinguished from helping her ingest its contents?”—

the hon. Member for Ashford referred to that. He goes on to say that

“the definition of the ‘final act’ is unclear, especially granted the wording of”

subsection (6)(c), and:

“The proposed law says that a doctor may not administer a substance with the intention of causing death, but also that a doctor may help a person self-administer. But how should we draw the boundary between helping a person self-administer, and playing a role in administration?”

I come to the penultimate point—not the final act—of my speech. There is some odd phrasing in subsection (7), and I wonder whether the hon. Member for Spen Valley or the Minister can help to parse the English. It says that

“the decision to self-administer the approved substance and the final act of doing so must be taken by the person”.

We understand about the decision being taken by the person, but the phrasing is that the final act “must be taken” by the person. I am not familiar with that construction. Does one take an act? Is that English? You perform an act—an act is not taken, it is done, by a person acting autonomously. The question of whether this is an active or a passive concept runs to the heart of my concern about the clause, and we need to think about redrafting, at least in deference to the English language.

Somewhere in this clause there is a magic moment when assistance gives way to autonomy, and the penultimate act by the doctor yields to the final act, which is supposed to be by the patient. We cannot tell when the responsibility for the action passes from one to the other. In proper medicine it does not matter because the medic works with the patient, but here it does matter. We are insisting that there is a difference between a doctor setting up a death, and the patient performing the action of suicide.

I will end by referencing the case of R v. Kennedy in 2007, a case on which Lord Bingham opined, about the culpability of someone who died from a heroin overdose. Was the person who gave him the drugs and tied the tourniquet around his arm responsible? Was it murder, or indeed assisted suicide? The judge decided that it was not, but made this point:

“It is possible to imagine factual scenarios in which two people could properly be regarded as acting together to administer an injection.”

Given that ruling, we are in a world of difficulty with the suggestion that it is legally possible for a doctor to assist a patient to ingest or otherwise self-administer. To assist someone to self-administer is tantamount to administering. I welcome suggestions from other Members, the Minister, or the hon. Member for Spen Valley about whether it is possible to provide guidance that gives greater clarity on what the clause means, or whether subsequent amendments will help to resolve the problems that I have, but I am afraid I do not think it will be possible to make an adequate distinction between assisted suicide on the one hand—in which full responsibility, not just for the decision but for the performance, rests with the patient—and euthanasia on the other. I do not think there is an adequate logical difference, and the practical difference we are attempting to enshrine here will be very quickly obscured.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for his amendment, and for speaking in the powerful, sensitive way that he did. I also thank my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Banbury, who made interventions.

I did not intend to speak to this amendment, but having heard the hon. Member for East Wiltshire speak so powerfully and sensitively, it is important for me to share a few things. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said a couple of times that the difference between people who commit suicide and those who will take this route is that the patients have been given less than six months to live, and that was not a choice. I was a Samaritan for years, because I had two failed suicide attempts in my early years, and since then I have battled with mental health demons all my life because of my experiences. To suggest that there is a difference between someone who gets a terminal illness and wants to take this act and people who want to commit suicide, and to suggest that they are doing it out of choice, is wrong. I felt really emotional when that exchange was happening. The reason why I think it is wrong is that, at the time that I wanted to commit suicide, I did not feel that I had a choice. I could not see a way out.

When I was on those Samaritans phonelines, speaking to people who rang in to unpick their feelings about what was driving them to feel suicidal in that moment, it was not because they want to die, but because they were in circumstances that drove them to feel that they had no option but to commit suicide. In some instances, it takes an amount of courage and bravery to even contemplate that option. To diminish that, which I feel is what has, intentionally or unintentionally, happened on occasion, is really wrong, because I have been there, and it was not easy and it was not because I wanted to die.

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I certainly have not heard anyone try to diminish the experience of suicidal people. We probably all have our own stories of loved ones who we have either lost to suicide—I know that I do—or who had very severe mental health issues. The point I would make is that the families I have met who have lost loved ones through assisted dying or a harrowing terminal-illness death have said that they desperately wanted to live. That is the distinction I would make, but I appreciate that my hon. Friend is absolutely right that people with suicidal tendencies and ideation also want to live—they just do not feel they have a choice. It is a very delicate debate to have, but please be assured of my sensitivities to it.

[Naz Shah]

I am genuinely grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because I do not want the Committee—or our constituents—to feel that there is an equivalence. There is not. People who are in that space, who ring the Samaritans helpline to speak to them, all desperately want to live a brilliant life. That is what brings us here: each and every one of us wants to make this place the best it can be, so that our country is the best it can be and all our communities, people and constituents—all members of society—thrive. It is a sensitive debate, but let us be careful not to draw a parallel where there is not one. It was important for me to put that on the record.

I will support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire because we have already voted down an amendment requiring doctors to simply ask the question why. This speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury raised: I know, through my experience at the Samaritans, as somebody who has attempted suicide and as somebody who has gone on to chair a charity that leads mental health interventions, how difficult it is for a patient has gone through the process of having had that conversation with their family, who might not necessarily agree, and having convinced them that they are going to take this option because they want autonomy, and fear losing it.

I cannot imagine what it must be like for those people, at that moment, saying their final goodbyes, and the level of potential pressure they face right at the last minute, having spoken to everybody and put their family members, and indeed themselves, through the process. Would they not feel internal pressure on themselves to go through with it? Would they really have the option, and not feel, in a sense, obliged to say, “Yes”? Do we really not want to ask that question?

When we debated the amendment requiring doctors to ask the question why, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said that doctors would ask it anyway, but that argument would not work in this instance because doctors would not do this anyway. They would not say, “I am about to give you something—have you changed your mind?”, because by that point they are in a process. The drug, in whatever form it takes, is in the process of being, or will have been, handed over to the person who wants to take that option, so it is not the same. I genuinely hope that the Committee will support the amendment, because it is our last option to make this intervention.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-fifth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Gordon]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I speak in support of this group of amendments, which address the issue of fairness and accessibility in the Bill. The amendments seek to ensure that those who are physically unable to self-administer the approved substance due to their condition are not excluded from the choice of an assisted death.

The principle at stake here is equity: making sure that this opportunity would be available to not only those with the physical ability to self-administer but all eligible individuals, regardless of their condition. The Motor Neurone Disease Association made it clear in its written evidence that conditions like motor neurone disease can be cruel, devastating and progressive, locking people inside their own failing bodies. More than 80% of people with MND lose the ability to speak. Many lose all limb function, leaving them unable to lift even a glass of water, let alone self-administer medication.

There is a common theme here that relates to a point I made in an earlier sitting, when we debated the period of time for eligibility. For these individuals, the Bill in its current form creates a barrier. It states that the final act of ingesting or administering an approved substance must be taken by the person themselves. For someone with advanced MND, that may simply not physically be possible. The MND Association’s evidence highlights that in other jurisdictions, such as Queensland in Australia, allowances have been made for people unable to swallow or self-administer. If we fail to include such provision here, we risk excluding some of the most vulnerable people or, even worse, creating a perverse incentive for them to seek an assisted death earlier, possibly abroad, when they may still have physical function.

These amendments are not about lowering safeguards in any way, shape or form. As we know, the Bill has robust safeguards, which these amendments would maintain. It would only be applicable in instances where doctors deem it necessary, and it would not be open to more than those with conditions restricting their ability to self-administer. If the Bill is about compassion, then we must ensure that that compassion extends to everyone; if it is about choice, then we should not deny that choice to those with severe physical limitations; and if it is about justice, then we should not allow injustice to be written into the law.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I rise to oppose amendments 350 to 352, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Michael Payne). They would allow the co-ordinating doctor to provide additional assistance to administer the substance in the presence of an independent witness, in some circumstances. Those circumstances would be when, as amendment 350 says, the doctor determines that the person is

“permanently and irreversibly unable to self-administer”

the lethal substance because of an inability to swallow or the loss of use of the limbs. The amendments do not spell out what the additional assistance would be, but I think it is reasonable to believe that it refers to the doctor injecting the lethal substance into a person’s circulatory system.

My hon. Friend’s amendments comes from genuine concern about the situation that some people may well find themselves in. Some people who might otherwise qualify for assisted dying under the Bill might be unable to swallow or inject the lethal drugs. We should all respect the feeling that lies behind the amendments, but we should reject them. If we pass them, we will have accepted that doctors can help people who have qualified for assisted dying to prepare to inject themselves with lethal drugs or swallow them. The Bill does not say that doctors can do that. I do not know whether the House would have voted for the Bill on Second Reading if it had, but that is beside the point—it was not part of the Bill. If we were ever to consider taking such a radical step, we should only do so after hearing as much evidence as possible on why and how this might be necessary. I urge the Committee to oppose the amendment.

[Danny Kruger]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady; I very much agree with her points. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who spoke with his now customary intellectual clarity and moral constituency. He believes in autonomy, and he is doing what he can to resolve the essential contradiction in the Bill, which is designed to enable people to end their lives at their own discretion. He recognises that some of the safeguards in the Bill, which of course I do support, nevertheless represent barriers to what we are now suggesting is a human right, and that that human right will be restricted to a limited number of people, according to the Bill.

It is my view that the pressure, momentum or inherent direction of travel that the Bill sets us on will necessarily result in these sorts of amendments to the legislation in due course, whether in the form of subsequent amendments passed through legislation, the guidance that is issued, or indeed the practice of doctors. As I tried to explain in my comments on the previous group, my concern is that the Bill allows for quite a wide degree of discretion, naturally and necessarily enough, in the form of doctors interpreting their ability to assist in ways that respect the autonomy of patients, but are, in fact, a step beyond what the Bill—quite rightly, in my view—seeks to allow.

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I am afraid that goes for the whole field. There is a great mystery in this space, and the Bill does not clarify it, I am afraid to say.

[Naz Shah]

Following the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, I have just looked at some of the evidence, and it does not cite any papers. In effect, the evidence says the effect can be seen in three documentaries. Nor does it explain why Dr Zivot’s concerns are scientifically accurate. Does the hon. Gentleman want to speak to that?

[Danny Kruger]

There is great anxiety about the validity of much of the evidence in this space. I have great respect for the work of Dr Zivot, because nothing else gets us close to understanding the actual effect of these drugs, once somebody has died.

[Danny Kruger]

My strong suspicion is that this is because the evidence is not being accurately collected or reported. With Dignitas and in all these jurisdictions, as the hon. Lady has acknowledged, there are significant failures of data and record keeping. Obviously, it is very much in Dignitas’s interest not to collect and certainly not to publicise evidence of things going wrong. However, that clearly happens in jurisdictions where data is properly collected.

[Naz Shah]

I recognise that the written evidence, particularly TIAB 425, says there have not been any failures at Dignitas, but it does not cite any published, let alone peer-reviewed, research, nor does it challenge the analysis of scientists such as Dr Zivot. That remains a grey area.

[Danny Kruger]

I agree.

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[Jack Abbott]

Absolutely, I know. I am sure the Committee supports him as well.

I would also point the hon. Gentleman to proposed new subsection (13), which my amendment 532 would introduce, saying what “specific actions” can legally be taken, for example, if

“there is a greatly prolonged time to death”,

the person has been “rendered unconscious” or

“the person is otherwise undergoing complications.”

That quite clearly states that we expect the Secretary of State, through this amendment, to take specific co-ordination actions on that. Under proposed new subsection (12) alone, the Secretary of State would have to make provision on that, which could lead to what the hon. Gentleman is alluding to. However, what I propose in proposed new subsection is very clear: that we would expect specific actions from the Secretary of State in that area.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is making an important speech. He talked about percentages earlier. Is he aware of a study in the Netherlands that concluded that 21 people—18% of the cases in the study—were assisted with lethal injection? In five of those cases, that was because the person could not swallow, but in the rest, they were unable to complete.

[Jack Abbott]

I have used the statistic of 10%; we might find additional statistics from different jurisdictions that put that figure slightly higher or slightly lower. The point I am trying to make is that this is a relatively uncommon occurrence; none the less, this is an area of the Bill that we can make stronger with additional provisions.

I will make some progress on amendment 532. I have made the basis of my point and want to get on to amendment 533. As I have said, amendment 532 seeks to provide clarity on what doctors can do if the procedure fails or is failing by stipulating that the Secretary of State must specify in regulations what actions the co-ordinating doctor can legally take if there is a prolonged time to death; if the person has been rendered unconscious or unfit to make a second attempt at self-administration, but has not died; or if the person is undergoing complications following the initial attempt.

While there is existing GMC guidance, if no further guidance comes forward in the coming years, we risk placing some doctors in an incredibly difficult position. We always say that we should abide by good practice and the experience of many doctors, but additional cover is no bad thing. We need to say what doctors are legally permitted to do in the event of a patient undergoing severe complications. Leaving aside the doctors, that presents a risk to the patient, who may suffer needlessly and intolerably because the co-ordinating doctor does not know what they are legally allowed to do and is thus seeking to avoid legal ramifications of actions. We do not want them to take steps to respond to those complications or support the patient to die in a painful manner.

I will speak briefly to my amendment 533, which is about where assisted dying can take place. The Committee has already touched on that, and I do not want the Bill to be too prescriptive, which is why I have not stipulated exactly where the locations should be. However, this question was raised a number of times in the submitted written evidence. It is incredibly important that we address this question to ensure that assisted dying takes place at a certain location and does not have a detrimental effect on that location or community, and that the implementation of assisted dying does not exacerbate existing healthcare inequalities or deepen the mistrust of the healthcare system that exists among some ethnic minority communities in particular.

We have a duty to ensure that anyone seeking an assisted death under the Bill feels that it is safe to do so, is able to experience the positives of assisted dying and is not traumatised or retraumatised by the process. That is not possible if assisted dying takes place in settings in which people feel unsafe, which they feel unable to control or in which they have no agency. The amendment seeks to ensure that the question of where assisted dying can take place is properly addressed and that the possible impacts of assisted dying taking place at any particular location are fully considered. Only then can we address and mitigate its possible detrimental impacts.

That is a particularly important point because the criterion in the Bill that the doctor must remain with the patient until they have died realistically precludes assisted dying taking place at home, as there may be a prolonged time to death. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said, 86% of patients in Western Australia died within the hour, but 14% took longer than that. To use another comparison, in Oregon, 87.7% of those who died via an assisted death in 2023 did so at home. If we are essentially precluding assisted dying from taking place at home because of the stipulation that a doctor has to be in attendance, we must answer the question of where it can take place.

In written evidence, Sue Ryder and the National Care Forum cited concerns about the impact on the wellbeing of staff and the other residents of hospices and accommodation-based services, should assisted dying take place within those communities. Dr Jamilla Hussain, in arguing that the question of where assisted dying could take place needed to be addressed, stated that her consultations with

“ethnic minority groups across Bradford highlighted the risk that AD could significantly deepen mistrust in healthcare services, including but not limited to palliative care.”

She argued that that needed to be considered when determining where assisted dying would take place, and because of that it would be preferable to avoid

“healthcare settings that these communities rely on, such as hospitals and hospices.”

Again, amendment 533 does not seek to specify where assisted dying should take place—I think further work is possibly needed over the coming months and years before this policy is potentially implemented—or to prohibit any particular location, I must add. The rationale behind the amendment is to ensure that through extensive consultation with relevant parties, the possible impacts of assisted dying taking place at any particular location are fully and comprehensively considered, and thereby any potential harm is addressed and mitigated against.

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[Jack Abbott]

I appreciate that point. Throughout this process we have spoken about the absolute need to ensure that very good palliative care options are being presented to everybody along this pathway. I do not think you can separate care homes and hospices from the Bill, but I fully appreciate and sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. As I have said, there may be some hospices that are simply not appropriate for this, so although amendment 533 does not seek to put that on the face of the Bill in terms of precluding any particular areas of our healthcare system, it would require the Secretary of State, through consultation, to make sure that the legislation is used properly, and make suitable recommendations.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 436, tabled my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. The amendment concerns what would happen after a patient has suffered complications while going through the administration of lethal drugs. Let me stress that we know that people suffer complications when they are undergoing assisted deaths. Unfortunately, one thing we do not know is how common those complications are. Another thing we lack is data that would allow researchers to investigate whether certain drugs, perhaps in combination with certain medical conditions, were more likely to cause complications.

The reason that we do not know those things is because of the many gaps in the data collected in places that have assisted dying laws. It has been mentioned before, but very much bears mentioning again, that the Australian states’ reports on assisted dying do not publish data on complications suffered by patients who self-administer drugs, and that is the overwhelming majority of assisted deaths in Australia.

Western Australia’s most recent report does tell us how frequently there were complications in the cases that involved practitioner administration of lethal drugs—4.3% of those deaths were affected. I understand that the Bill does not allow practitioner administration, but that is not the relevant point. What is relevant is that first, the Australian data shows that some people given lethal drugs suffer complications, and secondly, those complications were ones that we would not wish on someone in their last minutes or hours of life. For example, five out of 198 practitioner administration deaths involved “other complications”, which included people coughing and/or reporting a burning throat after they were helped to swallow drugs,

“hiccups with gastric reflux, involuntary muscular contractions, and delayed loss of consciousness.”

Western Australia could be much better than other states on average in avoiding complications, or it could be worse. I am afraid that we really do not have the robust data that would allow us to make those comparisons. I repeat: the Australian state does not publish data on complications affecting the majority of assisted dying cases. They do not because they cannot, since no one is mandated to stay with the patient and observe their condition. We do not know, therefore, how common those complications are.

Record-keeping in other jurisdictions is also concerning. This House’s Health and Social Care Committee examined the records kept by the state health department in Oregon while inquiring into assisted dying. They found that Oregon authorities kept very poor records into how many patients suffered complications and what those were.

Amendment 436, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, would take a very different approach. Under this amendment, the doctor attending the person having an assisted death would have to make “a detailed record” if the person suffered complications. They would then have to declare that the person had suffered complications, on the final statement concerning that case. Finally, they would have to make a report, to both the chief medical officer for either England or Wales and the voluntary assisted dying commissioner.

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[Dr Opher]

I am interested to hear what the Government say about the wording around that amendment and whether it is safe. I would defer to the Minister on that.

Amendment 430 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, about a code of practice that must address complications and failures, is quite a strong amendment and I am willing to support it. If as doctors we have a code of practice about how we handle this type of thing, the amendment would potentially help, and perhaps answer some of the questions from my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury.

I do not believe that amendment 255 from my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke is necessary. I believe it should be dealt with under clause 21.

I believe that the very well put amendments 532 and 533 from my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich could be covered by amendment 430.

[Naz Shah]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Dr Opher]

Yes. I am sorry; I was going to give way to the hon. Member for Reigate at some point too.

[Naz Shah]

Many doctors have written in to us because they are confused by the Bill. Just as the hon. Gentleman is making his case here, there are many doctors who are writing in to us. I wondered what his response to that was, especially because he is a doctor.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

Amendment 435 would require the co-ordinating doctor to escalate the care of an individual to the appropriate emergency medical services if the assisted dying procedure has failed. Requiring the co-ordinating doctor to make a referral may engage article 8 of the European convention on human rights—the right to family and private life—if the person has indicated that they do not wish to be referred to emergency services or do not wish to be resuscitated. In a situation where the procedure has failed, doctors would, as in their normal duties, support a person in line with their professional obligations and their understanding of the person’s wishes. This could include the involvement of the emergency services, but it would be unusual to specify a particular approach in legislation.

As currently drafted, clause 18(9) provides that:

“The coordinating doctor must remain with the person”

once the approved substance has been provided, until either

“the person has self-administered the approved substance and…the person has died, or…it is determined by the coordinating doctor that the procedure has failed”,

or, alternatively, until

“the person has decided not to self-administer the approved substance.”

Amendment 429 would remove the clarification currently provided for in clause 18(10) that the co-ordinating doctor does not have to be

“in the same room as the person”

once the approved substance has been provided. However, clause 18(9) requires the doctor only to

“remain with the person”.

It may still be possible that the co-ordinating doctor could remain with the person but in a different room if they decide that is more appropriate.

Amendment 436 would increase reporting obligations on the co-ordinating doctor in cases where complications have occurred. It is not clear in the amendment what would be considered a complication and therefore trigger the reporting requirement. It is also not clear what details should be set out in the person’s medical records or in the report to the chief medical officer and voluntary assisted dying commissioner.

[Naz Shah]

I am struggling with this. When amendments were tabled last week, there was a concise direction from the Minister that he understood the intention of the amendments. Could that approach not be applied to these amendments—that there is an understanding of the intention, and they can be tidied up in the wash-up process to make them tight? Could that not happen?

[Stephen Kinnock]

My job and that of my hon. and learned friend the Justice Minister is to defend the integrity and coherence of the statute. The concern that we have with the word “complication” is that it is a wide-ranging term and concept, and its inclusion could potentially undermine the integrity of the legal coherence of the Bill and how it could be interpreted in terms of its implementation. I am simply flagging the risk that if the Committee chooses to accept the amendment, there could be a muddying of the waters in terms of its meaning in law.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

I think what I am saying is that the word “complication” contains a multitude of potential interpretations and meanings. The work that would need to be done by the Government to unpack it and understand what it means certainly could be done if the amendment passes, but the Government are saying that, as it stands, it is not clear. The drafting of the amendment is so ambiguous that it causes the Government concerns about its inclusion.

[Naz Shah]

This is a genuine question because I continue to struggle with this. What kinds of complications would we envisage if a lethal drug is being administered to a patient who has chosen assisted dying? What kinds of examples are there? Can the Minister help me understand?

[Stephen Kinnock]

With all due respect, I think it is more the responsibility of those who draft and table amendments to draft and table them in a way that leaves no room or as little room as possible for ambiguity. I think my hon. Friend would be better off addressing her question about the potential complications to somebody with clinical expertise, who could list off a series of potential physical manifestations. I am not qualified to do that. I do not have a clinical background so I am not able to answer her question.

Amendment 464 would impose a duty on the co-ordinating doctor not to do anything with the intention of causing the person’s death and to seek to revive the person if it appears to them that the procedure is failing. It is unclear what “appears to be failing” would mean, and what criteria would need to be met for the co-ordinating doctor to consider the procedure to be failing. It would be unusual for primary legislation to seek to mandate a clinical course of action in the way proposed by the amendment. In addition, the amendment could potentially create conflict for the co-ordinating doctor if the person has a “do not attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation” order or a legally effective advance decision is in place, as the doctor would have to resuscitate them even if they had stated wishes to the contrary. That could give rise to engagement of article 8 of the European convention on human rights on respect for private and family life.

Amendment 532 would introduce a new duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out what the co-ordinating doctor is legally permitted to do if they determine that the procedure under clause 18(2) has failed. Under the amendment, the regulations would also include specific actions that the co-ordinating doctor can legally take if there is a greatly prolonged death; if the person is unconscious and unable to make a second attempt at self-administration; or if the person has other complications. If specific actions that the co-ordinating doctor can legally take are set out, there is a risk that, when complications arise, they would be unable to take actions that are not listed. That may lead to uncertainty and restrict what the doctor can do, using their professional judgment, to respond to particular circumstances. It is unusual to set out a particular clinical approach in primary legislation.

Amendment 533 places a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying where the provision of assistance under the Bill may take place. It sets out a requirement on the Secretary of State to

“consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”

prior to making such regulations, including certain specified groups.

I turn to amendment 430, which would broaden the Secretary of State’s power to issue codes of practice under clause 30 of the Bill. It would explicitly enable the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice in connection with

“responding to unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance under section 18, including when the procedure fails”.

[Naz Shah]

I respectfully point out that the Minister says that it is not for him to make interpretations and that he has not got the clinical expertise. I genuinely appreciate that, but I am also trying to understand why he accepts provisions that are not clear in the Bill. Why is he okay with those but not with the amendments?

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend will have noted that a number of amendments have been drafted in collaboration with the Bill’s promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. I think that demonstrates that when the Government have seen a lacuna, a lack of clarity or ambiguities in the Bill, officials, along with the Justice Minister, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, and I, have worked with my hon. Friend to table amendments to tighten up the Bill. We are doing that in areas where we feel that ambiguity exists. However, when we feel that the Bill, as drafted, does not give rise to such concerns, our position on the amendments is according to our position vis-à-vis the current wording of the Bill.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

Of course, if we can find ways to improve the Bill, we should—that is what this Bill Committee is for. But the input from my officials and parliamentary counsel legal advice have raised red flags about the amendments because of how they are drafted and the ambiguity that they give rise to. Clearly, it is up to the Committee to decide whether it wants to include the amendments or whether those issues could be looked at later—either on Report or when the Bill is going through the other place.

[Naz Shah]

We cannot have things both ways. I have re-read amendment 436 and I am not convinced that the issue is the drafting. It is very clear:

“If complications occur as a result of the provision of assistance the coordinating doctor must…make a detailed record of the complications…make a declaration…and…make a report”.

I am struggling to differentiate between having a conversation about it and it actually happening—it is still a complication, so why the resistance? Can the Minister agree that the Government will look at this and, perhaps in the wash-up, tidy it up—if that is the issue, and they agree in that instance?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Fundamentally, the role of the promoter of the Bill is to decide whether the Bill, as passed through this Committee, meets the policy intent that she wishes to achieve. Our job as Ministers is to work with her to deliver that objective. If the promoter of the Bill comes to the view that any of the amendments should be considered and added to the Bill, we will of course work with her to enable them to be delivered. My job at the moment is simply to say that there are concerns about these amendments due to the issue of ambiguity.

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The Bill’s requirement for written consent is a start, but mandating consultation could ensure that patients are active participants in this critical transition, not passive recipients. Should their voice not carry more weight than a signature?

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 499, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Let me outline what the amendment does and why I believe that it provides an inadequate safeguard. Under clause 19, the co-ordinating doctor may authorise another doctor to provide assistance—meaning that they will help the patient to take the lethal drugs. For clarity, I will refer throughout my speech to this other doctor who may step in to provide lethal drugs as the second doctor.

Under clause 18(4), the co-ordinating doctor must be satisfied of three conditions before they proceed to assist the person to take lethal drugs. Those three conditions are that the person has a clear, settled and informed desire to end their life, has capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and is not subject to coercion. Implicitly, the co-ordinating doctor can therefore end the procedure if they are not satisfied that those conditions apply. Under clause 19(3), the second doctor has the same duty as the co-ordinating doctor to be satisfied of those conditions before the assisted dying procedure can go ahead.

Amendment 499 would impose a new duty on the second doctor: if they suspected coercion, lack of capacity or lack of clear, settled and informed desire, they would have to inform the co-ordinating doctor. I suggest that the amendment does not take things far enough. It is a very serious matter if any doctor, be it the co-ordinating doctor or the second doctor, suspects coercion, lack of capacity or lack of desire. That means that a very serious mistake may well have been made, and that mistake could lead to someone having an assisted death who should not have qualified for it.

There should be several more safeguards in this part of the Bill. First, let us consider a situation where there was no previous suspicion that a patient had been coerced but where the doctor now suspects that they may have been. There should be a proper system of notification for such cases. It is true that doctors have a duty of care for patients, but it is also true that, given our overstressed, underfunded social care, health and policing systems, difficult cases sometimes fall through the cracks. The Bill should have a clear system for an authority to check back with the social care authorities and a person’s GP to make sure that steps are being taken to protect them from potential coercion. Secondly, the report that the second doctor makes in those circumstances should go to not only the co-ordinating doctor, but the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. Thirdly, when that happens, the commissioner should investigate the incident.

To repeat: if a doctor originally assessed a patient as qualifying for an assisted death, but a second doctor could not support that assessment, that is a serious incident that could lead to the assisted death of someone who should not have qualified for it. That does not mean that the co-ordinating doctor was necessarily at fault—not at all. The co-ordinating doctor will have been taking very difficult decisions under considerable stress. However, it does mean that the proper authorities should investigate the initial assessment, whether it was wrong and, if so, why it was wrong.

We see something similar with the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, which investigates not only accidents, but near misses that could have caused serious accidents. It does not assume fault when it investigates near misses. Often, it finds that there has been no human error. However, it has a statutory duty to investigate serious near misses. That is because the law passed by this House recognises that we need to understand why they happened in order to prevent fatal accidents from ever happening in the future.

For that reason, I do not think that my hon. Friend’s amendment is sufficient to fix the problems with this part of the Bill. I hope we can think about how better to address those problems, but I cannot support the amendment.

[Rebecca Paul]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 408, in the name of the hon. Member for Broxtowe. I also support amendments 499 and 210, in the name of the hon. Member for Spen Valley, and amendment 22, in the name of the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato).

Clause 19 states that

“the coordinating doctor may authorise, in writing, a named registered medical practitioner to carry out the coordinating doctor’s functions under section 18…A registered medical practitioner may be authorised under subsection (1) only if…the person to whom the assistance is being provided has consented, in writing, to the authorisation of that practitioner”.

I support amendment 408, which adds that the person must also have been consulted.

I am sure the Committee recognises that, even where someone has basic training and the experience specified, delegating care at the end of life is something that must be done with great care, given the vulnerability of patients. If a co-ordinating doctor has guided someone through this profound and significant process, there are some intrinsic risks that come with delegating the administration of the final approved substance to someone else. I concede that there will be situations where a substitute may be required, but it will not be the doctor that the patient has trusted, confided in and relied on.

A new doctor will of course do the final checks for capacity and consent, but they do not necessarily have any specific detailed knowledge of the patient and may be unable to pick up less obvious cues that someone who knows the patient may be better able to. That gap matters, and history shows that it can lead to problems. The risks of delegation are well documented. If we take the Mid Staffordshire NHS foundation trust scandal in 2005 to 2009, detailed in the Francis report, consultants often delegated tasks to junior staff or nurses without adequate supervision, which contributed to poor care and an estimated 400 to 1,200 excess deaths. Patients suffered from neglect, untreated infections, dehydration and medication errors. That was partly because delegated staff lacked the training or authority to act decisively, and consultants failed to monitor effectively.

In surgical contexts, delegation can also falter. A 2006 Daily Mail report highlighted NHS payouts exceeding £1 million for wrong-site surgeries, where consultants delegated preparatory or operative tasks to trainees or assistants, who then misidentified sites—for example, operating on the wrong leg or tooth. Those errors often stemmed from inadequate briefing or supervision, pointing to a systemic delegation risk. We have to be really aware of this.

Those examples suggest that when consultants delegate, whether to junior doctors or other practitioners, including their peers, things can go wrong if communication breaks down, or if the replacement lacks equivalent expertise or is simply not aware of some of the detailed information. In order to manage some of the risks better, patients must be consulted about who takes over their care, and not just asked to consent after the co-ordinating doctor has decided what will happen.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I would like to think that that would naturally happen, and we have had lots of conversations where we have said, “In reality, of course this conversation would happen.” But I always like to be belt and braces, and I would like to have these things covered in the Bill. If Committee members are confident that these things would happen anyway, I am not sure there would be any detriment to accepting this amendment.

I want to finish with a question for the Ministers. I have been worried—perhaps unnecessarily—about the lack of photographic identification in this process, and I can see a situation where allowing another doctor to provide assistance could create a risk. Although it might be less of a risk in someone’s home, because it would probably be clear who the person is, I am worried about a doctor in a hospital or clinic being substituted in at the final hour with no photographic verification of the person. At the point where they assist the patient to take the approved substance, how can the doctor be sure that it is the appropriate person if they have not had any involvement with the patient before? I accept, given some of the deep sighs I can hear, that that may be a rare occurrence, but it is worth thinking about. The simple inclusion of a photographic ID check would address some of that risk. I will not go over old ground, but I have been worrying about that.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to support amendment 22, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft. Before I carry on, I am happy to give my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley the opportunity to say whether she will accept the amendment, because my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft has had a hat-trick of amendments being accepted around training on coercion.

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am very happy to accept amendment 22 from my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft, as it follows the theme of the previous amendments.

[Naz Shah]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, which will make my speech much shorter—I have repeated it at least three times on all the other amendments. While I welcome the amendment, I hope we can work towards something that strengthens the Bill even further.

Under the amendment, regulations would be made governing the doctors who could fill the role in the clause. Those doctors would have to undergo mandatory training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Giving doctors that training would not remove the danger that they will overlook evidence of abuse and coercion, but it should decrease it. The doctors we are talking about will spend less time talking to the person seeking assisted death than either the co-ordinating or the independent doctors. None the less, they will spend some time with that person, so I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Batley and Spen—sorry, Spen Valley; I keep going back to Batley and Spen, but we campaigned hard to get her elected there.

[Stephen Kinnock]

There are some amendments in this grouping—namely, amendments 210 and 49—that we worked on with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and I will come to them later in my remarks.

If amendment 408 is passed, the person to whom assistance is being provided would have to be consulted before they consent in writing to another medical practitioner being authorised to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions. All registered medical practitioners must uphold the standards set out in the General Medical Council’s “Good medical practice”, which requires registered medical practitioners to support patients to make informed decisions prior to consenting. Therefore, the proposed amendment may have relatively minimal impact.

Turning to amendment 210, clause 19(2)(b) sets out that a registered medical practitioner may be authorised to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions only where they have

“completed such training, and gained such qualifications and experience, as the Secretary of State may specify by regulations.”

The purpose of the amendment is to provide that the required training, qualifications or experience are to be determined by a person or organisation specified in the regulations. An example of such a specified organisation might be the General Medical Council. Allowing for that to be specified in regulations rather than on the face of the Bill ensures flexibility.

Amendment 499 provides that where a registered medical practitioner who is authorised to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor is not satisfied that all matters have been met, they must notify the co-ordinating doctor immediately.

If amendment 22 is made, regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the named registered medical practitioner who is authorised by the co-ordinating doctor to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions under clause 18 would need to include mandatory training relating to domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. The Committee has already made equivalent changes to requirements on training for the co-ordinating and independent doctors, so this amendment would bring the clause into line, should the co-ordinating doctor change, for the purposes of clause 18. Should this amendment be accepted, it would require setting up training mechanisms to equip registered medical practitioners with the knowledge and skills needed to identify domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.

On clause 19—sorry, I was going to refer to clause 19 stand part. That is the end of my observations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

My hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire eloquently covered most of the things I would have said.

We have probably not spoken enough to date about the impact on pharmacists, but we are getting to the point in the Bill where it is really important that we take on board the written evidence and feedback that we are hearing from them. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society said:

“In dispensing a prescription, a pharmacist assumes a proportion of the responsibility for that prescription and therefore must be assured that all legal requirements are in place and that it is entirely appropriate for the patient. The link to the clinical assessment of eligibility criteria is essential and therefore the prescriber should always be one of the assessors. In addition to the usual practice of checking that the prescription fulfils the necessary legal requirement, pharmacists must have full access to the patient’s diagnosis and assisted dying care plan.”

That raises a few valid and interesting points that we need to take on board to ensure that pharmacists can do their jobs in line with the regulations and laws they are subject to, which are ultimately there to maintain patient safety.

I support amendment 466, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, which would ensure that the Secretary of State must be of the opinion that there is scientific consensus that the drug is effective without causing pain. I am of the view that the Secretary of State is probably the right place for that responsibility to sit. One reason for that, which my hon. Friend spoke about, is that I am not sure that the MHRA is the right regulating body for that. I am no expert on this, and I am open to hearing the debate, but the MHRA’s remit covers medicines and healthcare products, so there is a question about whether legally the responsibility falls to it. If it does not, do we set up another body, or do we adjust its remit so that it is covered? I have reservations about doing anything that would merge assisted dying into normal healthcare, but I have laid that out many times over the weeks, so I will not go over that.

My understanding is that, on top of all the things my hon. Friend set out, the MHRA’s role is to give marketing authorisation for the promotion and advertising of medicine. Once that has been given, reams of regulations and compliance must be done, including in respect of the labelling of medicine. I believe it would have to be put on packaging that a medicine could be used for assisted dying. We need to get clarity on that from experts in the field, so that we fully understand it. If that is the case, how do we feel about making it clear that said medicines, potentially out in the market, could be used for assisted dying? I suggest there could be some significant downsides to such clear labelling. That is something for us all to think about. I wanted to raise those important points.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 465, tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Reigate, who has made some powerful contributions. As we have heard, the amendment states that a drug may be approved under the Bill only if it has been approved by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for that purpose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady puts her finger on the tension—my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I expressed it as well—about whether it is appropriate to give the health regulator responsibility for regulating a product that is about not health, but death. Does the hon. Lady agree that no other agency would be appropriate, given the skills she has set out? The purpose of these lethal drugs is to kill the patient; nevertheless, it is appropriate that we consider them in terms of not only that objective but their potential side effects. The purpose is not one of healthcare, but the product is very close to a healthcare intervention. Therefore, despite all our anxieties, it feels appropriate for the healthcare regulator to oversee this.

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely agree and share those concerns. This is important. I appreciate that we have had this debate for many days now. Is this a healthcare intervention? Is it a treatment? What words should we apply? In this instance, when it comes to drugs, there are potential side effects. We have seen that they do not work everywhere and that they create complications. We have just debated whether a doctor should be in the room, outside the room or round the corner, as well as whether they should be visible or able to see what is going on. Ultimately, this is about the drugs. Having looked at the issue, I genuinely cannot imagine anything but the MHRA in this role. Are we really going to set up something completely new, outside our health service, that regulates drugs, their side effects and the potential implications?

[Dr Opher]

The matter of unlicensed drugs sounds very alarming, but we cannot regulate a drug through the MHRA if it unlicensed, and we would be looking for therapeutic effect, which would not apply in this case. More importantly, many other regulatory bodies, like the pharmacy framework and the General Pharmaceutical Council—

[Dr Opher]

Does my hon. Friend accept that there are ways of regulating drugs other than through the MHRA?

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend clearly speaks with expertise. There are other regulators, but the reason why I support amendment 465 is that the MHRA is an institution that we trust and that has the expertise. My understanding—my hon. Friend might be able to tell me differently—is that, of the regulators, the MHRA is the body that does the ultimate rubber-stamping and gives our country confidence in the national health service.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is right that there is no other agency that is appropriate. The difficulty is that the MHRA is itself highly conflicted—we will come in due course to discuss the role of the profit motive in this mooted procedure—and the big problem is that it is overwhelmingly funded by the pharmaceutical companies. We have to ensure that there is no hint of corruption in the system, but I agree with the hon. Lady that the only way to do this is through that agency, but perhaps after reform.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention.

We should be using the world-class pharmaceutical regulator we already have to oversee the drugs that will be used for assisted dying, and I urge all Committee members to support the amendment, which is a very important safeguard.

[Stephen Kinnock]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd.

The Government’s assessment of amendment 465 is that it would significantly impact the legal and operational delivery of the Bill. The Government anticipate that all substances used for assisted dying will have existing licences from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency for other indications, but the amendment would require the approved substances to be licensed by the MHRA specifically for the purpose of assisted dying. That would require additional powers or provisions to ensure consistency with the current legal framework. The Bill does not currently provide for that, so the amendment would create significant issues for the Bill’s operability.

Amendment 466 would require there to be scientific consensus regarding the efficacy of the substances to be used in assisted dying under the Bill. The availability of scientific evidence related to the substances used for assisted dying is limited and varied across international jurisdictions. Although expert advice from clinicians and scientists will be fundamental to agreeing a list of approved substances for this purpose, in any area of medicine it would be challenging to achieve consensus on the medicines or substances to be used. The amendment may therefore open up the regulation-making process to legal challenge on the basis that there is not unanimity, and that might extend the implementation process. In addition, there may be variations in product availability and in clinical practice among countries, and that may require different substances or combinations of substances to be used.

Secondly, the amendment would narrow the scope of the duty, focusing on the drug’s efficacy in eliminating pain as a priority impact over other factors that may be considered. Our assessment is that the experience of pain is subjective. The amendment may limit the ability of a doctor to make an appropriate clinical decision on which approved substances to prescribe for their patient. The decision on an appropriate approved substance would be a clinical decision between the doctor and the person seeking assisted dying, having regard to the needs of the relevant person, including that person’s experience of pain.

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I am sorry; I mis-spoke. I should have said that we have ruled out clarifying the expectations of what doctors should do in the event of an assisted death, and whether or not that is specified by the patient.

Earlier today, the Committee again ruled out specifying what the obligations on doctors are if complications arise, whatever the patient has discussed earlier. With this amendment, we now seem to be ruling out gathering any information about what happened, which is surely vital not just for safeguarding but to develop good practice in the operation of the Bill, a point that the hon. Member for Ashford made earlier. There is too much silence in the Bill, between the taking of the substance and death, on what happens if there are complications, what is permitted and, now, what is recorded. Amendment 439, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, attempts to address that point. I hope that the Committee will accept it.

[Naz Shah]

I rise to speak to amendment 439, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, which would amend clause 21 such that the relevant body would provide the chief medical officer and the commissioner with the full set of documents relating to a person who had undergone assisted dying. The relevant body would be the co-ordinating doctor if that person were a practitioner with the person’s GP practice. If the co-ordinating doctor did not meet that condition, the person’s GP practice would have the responsibility of sending those documents.

Those documents would be the person’s full medical records, court records and all documentation relating to assessments and procedures relating to the person’s assisted death. I note that “court record” refers to the Bill before we agreed to the amendments and new clauses that replace the High Court procedure with a panel system. We should be able to slightly tweak the wording to reflect that when we tidy up the Bill. That is what the amendment does. Let me say a little about why it does so and how it would make the Bill stronger.

The key aim is to ensure proper public oversight of any assisted dying scheme. The Bill creates the role of the voluntary assisted dying commissioner, who will look at and report on the workings of the system, appoint panel members and be the final court of appeal, so to speak. Those are far too many powers to give to one person, but if we are giving the commissioner a duty to report on how the system works, they should have the best possible information. It is only right that the information also be sent to the chief medical officer for England or for Wales, as appropriate; they are both very senior public officials and experienced doctors.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has tabled amendment 382, which, to quote the explanatory statement,

“provides for monitoring, investigation and reporting functions under Clause 34 to be carried out by the Voluntary Assisted Dying Commissioner (instead of the Chief Medical Officers for England and for Wales).”

I will have more to say on that amendment when we come to it, but removing the chief medical officer from the monitoring, investigation and reporting functions is not a good idea.

What use could the commissioner and the chief medical officers make of the data provided under amendment 439? Let me give some practical examples. If there were reported instances of a person experiencing discomfort or pain as a result of taking the medication, that would be of interest to the CMO and the assisted dying commissioner. It could trigger a further exploration of the titration of medication used in the procedure. As another example, let us think about what could happen if a family raised concerns about a person receiving assisted dying despite lacking capacity or being coerced. The CMO and assisted dying commissioner could use the information provided to investigate those allegations.

The amendment will ensure that the assisted dying commissioner and the chief medical officer receive detailed qualitative as well as quantitative data on people who have received assisted deaths. It is an important step towards making sure that the assisted dying scheme receives proper, well-informed scrutiny. In turn, that scrutiny will make it less likely that the scheme will allow abuses or ignore serious problems. I urge hon. Members to support the amendment.

[Rebecca Paul]

I will be very brief. I rise to ask a few questions about clause 21 as a whole. Following our debates on various amendments, I am aware that family and those close to the patient could not be involved in the process, although potentially for understandable reasons. I appreciate that we are not here to deal with the whole operational piece, but we should think about it. For example, what happens with notifying next of kin after death, bearing in mind that “next of kin” has a different meaning after death? That is when we start to get into legal considerations, such as who the executor is—and this could be the first time that they are hearing about it. What would be the process for that, given that the person has potentially died on their own at home with the doctor?

What is the process for handling the next stage? Is there anything that we need to include in the Bill to make it a clearer, simpler and easier process? Who will the medical certificate of cause of death be given to for registration of the death? While all that is going on, what will happen to the body? At that point, we may not have family members to take care of that. Those are some questions arising from clause 21 that are worth reflecting on.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Lewis Atkinson]

In considering the offer of any health or care-related activity, the appropriateness and suitability of the place is always in people’s mind, and clearly that varies. As I mentioned yesterday, we already have a licensing regime under which the CQC specifically licenses places for particular activity. I think my hon. Friend is right, but this is a normal part of decision making in the provision of health services and I do not think we should try to constrain it in primary legislation. However, as I started by saying, I recognise that we must enshrine the rights of individual conscientious objectors, which I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is trying to do with amendment 480, and I hope that we can do that, through some route, with the Bill.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to amendments 441 and 484, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), and in support of new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate.

Amendment 441 would amend clause 23 so that there would be

“no obligation on any care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or the Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance under this Act on their premises.”

I think it is clear that “assistance” in this context means the act of administering lethal drugs. That is the sense in which the word is used in clause 18, for example.

Amendment 484 would tighten that restriction somewhat by providing that there is no obligation on any hospice to permit

“any activity closely related to the provision of assistance under this Act”.

New clause 23 would also apply to all regulated care homes and hospices in England and Wales. It would provide that none of those organisations can

“be subject to any detriment by a public authority as a result of not—

(a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or

(b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises.”

The new clause would also provide that no public authority can make its funding for a regulated care home or hospice dependent on the care home or hospice agreeing to provide assisted dying or to allow assisted dying to take place on its premises.

All the amendments have the same goal: to ensure that the Bill does not harm this country’s hospices. We have heard from many witnesses how much hospices do in providing palliative and end-of-life care. Caring for people who are close to the end of life is difficult and vital work. The people who do that on our behalf include some of the very best in our society. We should all hold ourselves responsible for not making the task of hospices more difficult. The idea that the Bill might do that has been raised with us by people working in this country’s hospices.

Hospice UK takes a neutral position on whether assisted dying should be legal in England and Wales, but it has set out clear positions on how the Bill should and should not affect hospices. On funding, its written evidence TIAB 36 states:

“If assisted dying is legalised and becomes part of the health service, steps should also be taken to ensure there is no financial detriment to any hospice, whatever their positioning on the practice.”

I agree strongly with that argument, for several reasons. The hospice sector in this country receives a mixture of public funds and private or charitable money, including donations and the proceeds of charity shops and fundraising events. Like the rest of the population, the people who work in and run hospices have a mixture of views on assisted dying. Many have strong objections on various grounds. If public funds were made dependent on hospices agreeing to assisted dying taking place, we would see several things happen, all of them bad.

In evidence to the Committee on 28 January, Dr Sarah Cox, a consultant in palliative care and president of the Association for Palliative Medicine, said:

“I am also concerned about our palliative care workforce, which we know is already in crisis. Eighty-three per cent. of our members told the Royal College of Physicians in 2023 that they had staffing gaps, and more than 50% were unable to take leave because of those staffing gaps. Forty-three per cent. said that if assisted dying were implemented within their organisation, they would have to leave. This has a massive impact on palliative care, in terms of its potential to develop both our funding and our workforce, who are really concerned about this.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 70, Q83.]

In evidence to the Committee on 29 January, Toby Porter, chief executive officer of Hospice UK, said:

“If hospices were involved in assisted dying, there is a theoretical risk that that would just reinforce an inaccurate perception about hospice and palliative care: the myth that you are helped along your way by doctors in hospices and hospitals. That is one risk.

More briefly, the second risk relates to the duty of care. What do you need for hospice and palliative care services? You need adequate resourcing, which means staff and finances. In terms of staff, the real fragility in the hospice and palliative care sector is a shortage of clinical staff—that is shared nationally with the NHS and other healthcare providers.”

Mr Porter also mentioned the evidence of Dr Cox. He told us:

“You will know from Sarah Cox’s evidence that the majority of palliative care consultants hold views against assisted dying, many of them very strongly. If the consultants felt, for example, that they could not keep their distance from assisted dying in a 12-bed hospice unit in the way they could in an 800-bed hospital, you could very easily see that if this was not done properly and the consultants deserted the hospice sector, you could no longer offer the specialist care that is so important to the Minister, the NHS and every health and social care provider.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 196, Q256.]

Many people would be entirely willing to enter a care home or hospice if they thought they might receive assisted dying there, but others already fear that they might be pressured into taking assisted dying if they enter palliative care. They may be wrong to fear that, but they do. We heard evidence on that point from Dr Jamilla Hussain, who gave evidence to the Committee on 29 January:

“I work predominantly with an ethnically diverse population. I have gone into those communities and I have spoken to them about this Bill. What they say overwhelmingly to me is, ‘We’re scared. We’re really fearful that this is going to result in a disproportionate impact on our community. We have seen that through covid and we’re so scared. We already don’t access your services. We’re really worried that we won’t want to access them any more, and we won’t want to access the hospitals.’”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 187, Q245.]

That fear will only grow if we use public funds to oblige hospices to permit assisted dying on their premises. Hospices should be able to say clearly to their patients that they do not allow assisted dying to take place on their premises. The dedicated professionals who work in hospices and who deeply object to people being helped to die with lethal drugs must also be protected. They should be free from having to work on premises where something they might disagree with happens.

I anticipate that some hon. Members may argue that amendment 484 draws its restrictions too tightly. They might argue that it would mean that a doctor working on a hospice’s premises or making a visit to a patient in a hospice could not have the preliminary discussion about assisted death with that person. However, I want to be clear that these measures relate to the provision of assistance under this Bill. “Provision of assistance” is the phrase used throughout the Bill to refer not to the preliminary discussion, nor to the interviews with doctors, nor to the panel process, but to that part of the process at which the person takes lethal drugs with a doctor present.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

This is obviously a difficult and sensitive area, but does the hon. Lady think, for example, that a women’s refuge run by a Catholic foundation should be allowed to evict a woman who wants or has an abortion?

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely do not think that, because her abortion rights are set out in law. However, I also think that when that woman is going into a refuge, that refuge will make it clear that she may choose not to. It is about empowering both sides.

I am grateful for the right hon. Member’s intervention, but let us follow that argument. Let us say that somebody wants to pursue assisted death, and they want to go into a place, but they are informed that that organisation does not want to provide or has not signed up to providing an assisted death. It comes back to the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central rightly raised, which is that people do not deliberately go out looking to offend people. If we were in that space—I cannot imagine being there, but I am trying to understand it—would we want to access that service, because its religious belief differs from assisted dying as a principle?

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Just so I am clear, if a young woman is escaping domestic abuse and goes to a domestic violence space close to her home so that her children can carry on going to school, but finds out once she is there that she is pregnant by the abuser, does my hon. Friend think that that is acceptable?

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, do I think which bit is acceptable?

[Dr Tidball]

That the domestic violence protection centre or home can refuse to let that lady stay there because she has latterly discovered that she is pregnant as a result of the abuse and wants to seek an abortion.

[Naz Shah]

Absolutely not. I would be horrified if that were the case. I know we have had cutbacks and we do not have the access, but I cannot imagine any refuge of any religious belief in this country turning away a woman in the situation that my hon. Friend describes.

[Dr Tidball]

I am glad to hear my hon. Friend’s answer. I ask that question because I can imagine an analogous situation of a woman suffering from breast cancer who is allergic to opioids but does not know that when she enters the care home. If her cancer reaches a stage of terminality but she cannot pursue palliative options because of her allergy to opioids, assisted dying would be the only option for her to die with dignity and not in great discomfort. Under my hon. Friend’s scenario, that woman would not be able to pursue an assisted death in that care home.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point, and I absolutely hear what she is saying. If the woman were going into that hospice or care home when she was pursuing an assisted death, I am not sure how that would work.

[Dr Tidball]

To clarify, in my very clear example—it is a real-life example that reflects the experiences of someone who attended this Committee yesterday—the person has a terminal condition and enters a care home that makes her comfortable and is near her family, but discovers while the hospice or care home is trying to find methods to palliate that she is allergic to opioids and therefore her condition cannot be palliated. In the hon. Lady’s scenario, she would not be able to choose assisted death because that care home has a blanket policy against it. That would discriminate against that young woman, who has an allergy to opioids that means that she cannot be palliated.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, which gives me a lot to think about. That is why I said that I genuinely do not have the answers. I want to have this discussion so that I can make the choice whether to support the amendments. I want to explore this issue further, because it is really important.

[Rebecca Paul]

The conversation has moved on a little, but I was just going to make the point that the amendments that I tabled focus very much on the rights of the employer with respect to what they expect from their staff. I wonder whether it would be helpful to explore that a bit more.

[Naz Shah]

If we are talking about employers and employees, not people who are accessing the service as service users, I hope the scenario to which my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge referred would not happen.

[Danny Kruger]

There is much to get into, and I will try to respond a bit more when I speak again. I do not want to revisit the whole question of palliative care but, on the scenario set out by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, the strong advice that I have received from palliative care professionals is that it is not accurate to say that somebody’s pain cannot be palliated. It might well be that there is a difficulty with particular opioids, but there are other palliative care options available to everybody. No palliative care doctor ever says that there is nothing they can do.

[Danny Kruger]

Well, we have been over the whole question of palliative care and alternatives to assisted suicide; nevertheless, I wanted to challenge that scenario.

On the suggestion that there is a comparison with an abortion service no one is suggesting that a woman who goes into a refuge, discovers she is pregnant and wants to have a termination is somehow obliged to have it on the premises of the refuge, which does not believe in abortion. That is not a scenario that could happen, because that is not how abortion operates. What we are suggesting is that somebody who arrives in a care home or hospice that does not want to facilitate assisted suicide would not be able to receive such assistance there. There is no objection to their believing in or desiring an assisted suicide; the point is to protect the institution.

I recognise the difficulty with the specific case the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge raised. Nevertheless, the alternative is to have blanket permission for any resident of any care home or hospice to insist that they can receive an assisted death in that home or hospice, despite what the rest of that community and the management might want. Indeed, the patient might have signed a contract specifying that they will not seek an assisted death in that home or hospice. There is much more to discuss, but I hope that that is helpful for the hon. Lady.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member. What he said is really helpful.

I want to come back to the issue of opioids. As someone who suffers from chronic pain, my understanding is that I have a choice over whether I take opioids or other medication. So when people are allergic to opioids, they can potentially access other medication for pain relief.

[Jack Abbott]

A lot of the focus in the last few minutes has been about a care home having already made it clear that it does not support the process of assisted dying and the fact that anyone entering it would therefore know that. However, there is a clear scenario where some care homes might change their position over time. Someone may be in a care home for many years, but then the care home might change its position and say, “Actually, now we do not support assisted dying.” In that scenario, people would actually have gone into that setting thinking that it supported assisted dying.

Although I am sympathetic to the issue of place being made clear, it has real ramifications. Again, I do not think it is as black and white as saying, “This care home already had a set position.” Some care homes or other settings might change their position over time, even when residents are in situ for a long time. That is the big problem with this particular clause: the situation is not as straightforward as some Members have perhaps suggested today.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes a very valid point: it is not straightforward. That is why people are tabling amendments and having this discussion—to iron this issue out and make sure we nail it, to make the process as safe as possible.

There are laws in our country that protect people’s religious views—for example, we have the Equality Act 2010—and those laws are there for a reason. Speaking to all the amendments, I would not want to see hospices not being funded because they take a certain position. Also, from an employer’s perspective—I appreciate the scenario that has been mentioned, and I will come back to it—they may be recruiting in accordance with their values. We are all in politics, and we all sign up to a particular view of politics. When we recruit our staff, we put on the application form, or other information, that we would like applicants to believe in our value system. That is not discriminating against somebody who has a different value system. That would be my response.

[Lewis Atkinson]

I just want to nail this point about employers and recruitment. We have said that no organisation will be obliged to provide these services, in exactly the same way as with abortion. The example I would give is this: a provider of women’s services says, “We are not providing abortion. But, in addition, we are going to ask staff members we are recruiting if they believe it is ever legal for abortion to take place.” That is exactly the same test of belief, although on a different medical procedure, that my hon. Friend is proposing in this instance.

[Naz Shah]

That is not what I am saying. I am saying very clearly that when we recruit people to any job, we ask them to have the values that we have as an organisation. I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention, but what he says is certainly not the point I am trying to make, and I cannot imagine anybody—even for religious reasons, and even if they have changed their position—genuinely treating somebody in that way. We just do not do that.

[Jack Abbott]

I appreciate that, but as my hon. Friend has said a number of times over the last few weeks, some of these things unfortunately do happen. As I am sure we all do, I have had casework involving people with guide dogs saying that they have been refused certain services, including taxis, even though that is a civil offence because they have a guide dog with them. We have said a number of times that there are flaws in every single system. I appreciate that we want to adopt a good-will attitude, and I am sure the vast majority of settings across the country will operate on that basis, but we know that, in certain circumstances, that is not always the case. That is why, if we put anything in the Bill, it needs to have real clarity and not unintended consequences.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to clarify this.

To sum up, this comes back to some of the questions I have for the Minister, and I wonder whether he can answer some of them. I say that especially because the Committee has had lots of debates on amendments tabled by the Government via my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley giving the Secretary of State statutory duties. Perhaps the Secretary of State will be able to clarify this issue and make it watertight using regulations.

Have we had an assessment of what the impact would be on the provision of healthcare if assisted death were permitted in either a hospice or care home, and is the Minister happy to share that assessment with the Committee? For example, if palliative care specialists are saying, “X amount of people would no longer want to be involved, so there is a real risk of an exodus of specialists from hospices,” we need to know whether there has been an assessment of that. Perhaps the Government can help us to understand that real concern from palliative care specialists.

Given that the Minister mentioned his visit to a hospice this week, has he had any discussions with Care England care homes about allowing this process to happen in care homes themselves? How have the concerns of clinical staff about allowing an assisted death in their healthcare facility been assessed, and have those concerns been put to him? How many staff have indicated that they would need to leave the NHS, care providers or hospices if an assisted death were mandated on their premises?

Coming back to beliefs, there is also the element of charitable bodies. Have we spoken to the Charity Commission about the impact on those bodies if they were pressured by the Bill into changing their charitable aims? Would they be protected from providing assisted death because of their charitable aims?

For me, this debate has raised more questions than answers, and there is much more discussion to be had. I am happy to listen to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, as I can then intervene and probe further.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this morning, Ms McVey, even though it is a little later than originally planned.

Amendment 480 is intended to extend the category of those protected from being obligated to participate in the provision of assisted dying under clause 23 from registered medical practitioners, registered nurses and registered pharmacists or pharmacy technicians to all individuals. The amendment also seeks to clarify what an individual can refuse to do under clause 23(1), by setting out a non-exhaustive list of activities under the Bill that an individual would not be obligated to participate in. The amendment also specifies that the ability not to participate in the provision of assisted dying does not override any duty to signpost someone to information about assisted dying; to perform clerical, secretarial or ancillary acts; or to perform life-saving acts or grave injury-saving acts.

The amendment would introduce significant legal uncertainty and may mean that a person who had opted in to providing services under the Bill could refuse to continue to do so or could use clause 23 as a justification not to perform their duties as described in the Bill. For example, they may use the amendment as justification for not checking eligibility criteria, discussing prognosis or palliative care options, or performing other requirements under the Bill.

Amendment 480 may also conflict with other provisions. It states:

“no individual is under any duty…to be involved, directly or indirectly, in the provision of assistance”,

in accordance with the Bill. That may, for example, mean that although doctors are required under the Bill to notify a cancellation, they would be allowed to refuse to do things under the Bill, even if they have opted in to providing assisted dying services. It is not clear which provision would take precedence, which could allow the doctor to decline to notify a cancellation, by arguing that they are relying on clause 23(1).

Amendment 483 is intended to extend

“the range of activities which medical practitioners and other healthcare providers are not under an obligation to provide to include activities closely related to the provision of assistance”

under clause 23(1).

Amendment 484 is intended to expand the protection from being subject to a detriment by an employer at clause 23(2), to include where a registered medical practitioner or health professional refuses to participate in activity closely related to the provision of assistance. The term,

“activity closely related to the provision of assistance”,

is not defined, and that could create uncertainty as to what types of activity it is intended to cover.

The Bill does not, as currently drafted, specify where the provision of assistance may or may not take place. Amendment 441 would prevent there being any obligation on a care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance to be carried out on their premises. The effect of the amendment may be to limit the places where assistance could be provided. It may thereby reduce access to an assisted death for those residing within a care home or hospice, if a care home or hospice did not wish to allow an assisted death to be provided on its premises. The amendment could preclude some people from accessing services under the Bill if they were near the end of life and leaving their usual place of residence was therefore impeded. It may result in inconsistent treatment for patients when seeking to access an assisted death. That could potentially engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life.

Amendment 481 has two parts. The first aims to ensure that employees cannot participate in the assisted dying process in the course of their employment if their employer has chosen not to participate in assisted dying. The effect of the amendment could be to limit the places where assistance would be provided, and it may result in inconsistent treatment for patients when seeking to access an assisted death. That could engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life.

The explanatory notes suggest that the second part of the amendment seeks to ensure that employers require employees to provide or not provide assisted dying under schedule 9 of the Equality Act 2010. That schedule enables an employer to specify that having a protected characteristic is a requirement of a job when having that characteristic is crucial to the post and a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The ability to specify occupational requirements is conferred by schedule 9 of the Equality Act, and reference to it in this amendment would not have any additional effect.

The purpose of new clause 22 is to provide that the owners or occupiers of a premises would not be obligated to permit the self-administration of an approved substance on their premises. This right to refuse would not extend to a person who has an interest in the land but who is not occupying or operating on those premises, such as a landlord. It is unclear if the term “premises” would apply to a residential property, care home or hospice. As a result, the amendment may mean that someone who is terminally ill and is residing in, for example, a care home or a hospice could be required to leave that care home or hospice in order to receive assistance under the Bill if the care home or hospice owner did not wish to allow assisted dying on their premises. That could engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to acknowledge the wonderful workforce working in end of life care, but there is a range of views within that workforce and there is the individual opt-out. No one has to be involved in this process if they do not want to be. That is clear in the Bill as it stands. I hope that, working together, we can make that even clearer if needed.

Under the Bill, doctors and health professionals already have the ability to opt out for any reason, wherever they work.

[Naz Shah]

Pharmacies have not been mentioned. Would they have the ability to opt out?

[Kim Leadbeater]

It is a good point. My understanding—the Minister might correct me—is that pharmacists currently are within the definition of health professionals, but if they are not, that is an important point, which would be covered by making the change to ensure that no one is under any duty. However, I will definitely check that.

Mr Porter also said:

“hospices evolved out of the community. They exist because communities wanted better deaths. In the end, it is the job of institutions to evolve to fit the values and laws of society as they evolve, rather than vice versa.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 202, Q264.]

The polling on assisted dying shows significant public support for a change in the law, which is one of the main reasons we are here discussing the issue today. The latest figures from the British social attitudes survey, published just this week by the National Centre for Social Research, show that support at 79%, which is unchanged or slightly up on a decade ago. Although I cannot support these amendments, this is an important debate. I think we have conducted ourselves extremely well over the past 24 hours. I think it is important that we continue the debate respectfully and sensitively.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

We cannot risk an innovation in the law of murder with the unintended consequence that some murders go unprosecuted and unpunished. We must pass quality law that solves rather than creates problems. I do not intend to oppose the amendments, except amendment 509, as I do not see why the consent of the DPP should be required in the case of dishonesty, coercion or pressure. It is good that there is clarity on what people are prohibited from doing, but I am anxious that the Government discharge their duty to the statute book and that they do so in an even-handed manner.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, who has raised some concerns for me. I rise to speak in support of the amendments, but also to raise some points. I share the hon. Gentleman’s concerns, but let me begin by speaking about the bits that I feel pleased with and able to support.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has already explained the amendments and may explain them more later. I am pleased that they tidy up errors in the original construction of the Bill. In its original form, subsection (2) rightly states:

“A person who, by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to self-administer an approved substance provided in accordance with this Act commits an offence.”

Unfortunately, in the Bill as drafted, the penalty for such an act is only a prison sentence of 14 years. It is quite right for that to be the penalty for the offence detailed in subsection (1), namely when someone,

“by dishonesty, coercion or pressure, induces another person to make a first or second declaration”,

but does not actually succeed in getting them to the end of the assisted dying process. However, it is easy to agree that 14 years is an inadequate penalty for successfully coercing or pressurising somebody into an assisted death. I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has recognised that problem and has tabled an amendment that would impose a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for such an offence.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central made a powerful speech in this Committee the other day, in which he said that abusive or coercive people are already likely to be forcing their victims to starve themselves or refuse treatment. That is true, and I thank him for raising that important point. I will welcome all measures to make it harder for abusers to do so and will gladly work with hon. Members to do so. However, I want to sound a strong note of caution.

Creating an offence and giving it a strong maximum penalty is only one of the ways to deter abuse and coercion, and perhaps the easiest. As I have mentioned before, the conviction rate for coercion is only about 4%. There are other things that we need to do to deter and prevent abuse. We need the people who may come into contact with it to be aware of what could happen; we need them to be able to spot the signs that it may be happening; we need ways to investigate those signs carefully. Only when we have done those things can we move on to the CPS potentially prosecuting somebody for an offence and, if they are found guilty by the court, to sentencing that person. Those are matters that this clause deals with, and they come at the end of a process.

I welcome the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), which makes training in domestic abuse and coercion mandatory for professionals working on assisted dying cases, and which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has accepted. However, new training on its own will not be enough to make it near-impossible for abusers to succeed. Having unfortunately had lots of experience in the area—having seen it in my own life, the lives of people close to me and the lives of constituents—I know that sometimes abusers are not subtle. Even so, they can be hard to catch, because their victims cannot recognise that they are being abused. The classic—I wish I had a pound for every time I heard it—is “He’s changed.” There are hundreds of justifications and some are very subtle indeed. These people can be very hard to catch, or they may never be caught at all.

I have heard hon. Members say—I think my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said it earlier—that the Bill strengthens the safeguards around people who are terminally ill, because those are not there in the first place. I appreciate that idea, but that is just for those people who are terminally ill. I want to strengthen safeguards more generally. In some ways, the Bill offers people a new opportunity to be coercive, controlling and dishonest. That is why I have been banging on about safeguards so much in this Committee; perhaps people find it a bit much, but I do it because abusers are very persistent and clever people and we have to be clever and persistent in how we devise our safeguards against them.

Although I welcome the clause and the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, I am disappointed that other safeguards have been rejected. I still say that the panel procedure could and should be much tougher. That would not guarantee that abusers would be caught, but it would make it more likely.

[The Chair]

Order. Members cannot continue to talk about the substance of amendments that have already been rejected, and we are now going into that territory. I am not going to stop the hon. Lady talking, but rehashing debates about amendments that we have already had is not in order.

--- Later in debate ---

[Naz Shah]

I apologise, Mr Dowd. I will not refer to them.

I come back to the point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about DPP consent. I will be grateful if the Minister picks up some of these queries. In this place, we make laws. My experience of the law on forced marriage—I was a victim of forced marriage—was that we made a law but never got any convictions. Very little moved on it, because we already had laws in place to prosecute that offence. I am not saying that the same is happening here, but I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that we may be making a law that already exists. If it already exists in the Suicide Act, are we just making a law for the sake of putting something on the statute book or on the face of the Bill?

We have talked a lot about how we should not complicate things. The word “complication” has been used quite a lot in this Committee. Are we adding another layer of complication by putting this measure in the Bill, when we are not prepared to do so for other things that people feel strongly about? This is also something that already exists.

My understanding is that if we were prosecuting coercion, for which unfortunately the prosecution rate is only 4%, that would not need DPP consent. It would be needed, potentially, for assisting suicide, but not for coercion. Do we need some clarity about the application of the law in this regard? Suppose we had a scenario in which somebody was murdered: it was premeditated, and somebody had thought through how to use this process as an avenue to kill that person. I do not want us to make a law that would allow somebody to literally get away with murder. More thought needs to be given to that. I am not an expert or an eminent lawyer like the Minister, but I am concerned by the comments of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, having looked more closely at the issue. I would welcome the Minister’s comments.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-eighth sitting)

Naz Shah Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

I will conclude my remarks by observing that the only reason that we are looking at contracting out assisted dying services to a private provider is that the country is simply not ready for assisted dying. We know how overstretched and under-resourced our NHS is, and we are looking at cutting corners in the Bill, in our policymaking, in our scrutiny of this legislation, and in how this legislation and the service is delivered.

[Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)]

It is interesting to follow the hon. Member for Richmond Park, because I rise to speak to amendment 537, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. The amendment goes further than the hon. Member for Richmond Park would as far as local authorities are concerned.

The amendment also concerns both the national health service and the provision of healthcare by charities. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley knows both fields extremely well. She was the director of quality and strategy and chief analyst at the Department of Health, and then had a senior role at the Centre for Ageing Better. Her amendment would mean that assisted dying services could be provided only by charitable organisations and not by the national health service.

I strongly support the general principle that if we do have assisted dying, it should be free at the point of use. If this House decides that people do indeed have the right to an assisted death under the conditions that this Bill sets out, then it should not be something limited to those who can afford private healthcare. There are, however, strong objections among general practitioners to providing assisted dying as part of their services, and I do not think we should plan to have private firms work under contract from the NHS to provide assisted dying either.

The Royal College of General Practitioners said in its written evidence that

“any assisted dying service should be seen as a standalone specialised service that healthcare professionals may opt to provide with additional training and should not be deemed core GP work.”

The royal college’s advice, which is founded on the views of its members, means that we should give very strong consideration to putting assisted dying outside the normal workings of the NHS. If we do that, it seems that there are a few options. One is for the Secretary of State to invite private firms to tender for contracts and administer assisted dying services. As I have said, there are very strong reasons why we should not plan to have private firms work under contract to the NHS to provide assisted dying; for me, that it is one of the worst possible options.

Another option is for the NHS to fund a specialised assisted dying service that would be separate from its other functions. That could potentially be feasible, but it could also represent a significant cost for the NHS, because we still have not had the impact assessment from the Government and we have no idea how significant that cost may be.

There is also the worry that if assisted dying becomes available on the NHS, some people will become too frightened to access palliative care, as was outlined to the Committee by Dr Jamilla Hussain. I will read a brief part of her written evidence to the Committee. After talking to the patients in ethnic minority and other disadvantaged groups, she said:

“Overwhelmingly, racialised communities expressed deep concerns that they would be more likely to be pushed towards AD through systemic biases and societal attitudes about whose lives are valued… While safeguards were acknowledged, many remained sceptical that they would be applied fairly and equitably, fearing that vulnerable individuals, particularly those who lack strong advocates or English proficiency, might be at greater risk of being guided towards AD rather than offered appropriate care options.”

I want to share something with the Committee. We often get taxis to and from work and home; I got into a cab yesterday, and the chap who was driving was called Dave. His 84-year-old aunt died on Friday. When we were discussing this option, he told me really clearly that she has opted for a cremation, which would cost less money, just because she internalised that idea of burden and she did not want a cost for those that she left behind. She had not seen a doctor for 40 years. That brought home the idea of internalised coercion, internalised pressure and mistrust, because he also talked about what happened during covid. We had an interesting conversation. I told him that it was interesting that he had said that, and today I am talking about it. That is the reality: it is about how people perceive healthcare provision, the potential inequalities, and what the barriers are to access—all the preconceived ideas that we have about the provision of healthcare.

That brings me to a potential third way, which is what amendment 537 is about: charities. Charities are one way of addressing the concerns I and the hon. Member for Richmond Park have outlined about the risk with private companies and the risk of loss of confidence and access to the NHS, as well as the concerns outlined by the Royal College of General Practitioners. They could well be mitigated by ensuring that the lead responsibility for administering assisted dying is given to charities rather than the NHS.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you this this morning, Ms McVey.

I rise in support of new clause 36, which sets out an entirely workable, appropriate and safe set of provisions for the Secretary of State to ensure that these services are provided across England, as well as appropriate powers for Wales, although I am far from being an expert on those matters.

The new clause would convey powers to the Secretary of State to commission services free at the point of use, in a way that is entirely analogous to the commissioning of other health services that are provided, as we know, by a range of providers.

I came to this place having been an NHS manager for nearly 20 years, and I feel that the debate has sometimes slightly confused elements of commissioning, provision and the way in which the NHS commissions and manages services. My hon. Friend the Member for Banbury said that the state must oversee and regulate the service, and I entirely agree. Commissioning powers sitting with the Secretary of State will ensure that that is the case. The hon. Member for Richmond Park said that the issue is who is commissioning. Again, we are clear that the only person doing any commissioning will be the Secretary of State, potentially delegating this to NHS structures at the time.

The NHS and the Secretary of State are not unused to commissioning highly specialised, sensitive services in this way. Indeed, I would be amazed if the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley do not confirm that the Government were involved in the drafting of this new clause to ensure that it is equivalent to the other powers that the Secretary of State has.

This will clearly be a specialist service. It is a new service. At high levels of NHS England and equivalent bodies, there is significant expertise and practice in commissioning specialised services. The importance of the commencement period, which I hope we will discuss later today, is that engagement around the exact service specification will be drawn up in just the same way that it would be for a new cancer treatment or a treatment for a rare disease. It is right that the time will be taken to engage on that.

Fundamentally, services have to be commissioned. Some suggest that this will be a free-for-all, that anyone can provide this service and that anyone can be paid for it, but that idea is nonsense. There is no obligation for the Secretary of State to reimburse anyone who decides they want to provide this service. The service must be explicitly commissioned.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend says that this will be explicitly commissioned. I completely agree with everything he has said, but this will be a newly designed service by definition, so will that not leave the door open for new providers, such as Serco or G4S, to come in, design a new service and bring in the expertise to deliver it?

[Lewis Atkinson]

No, it will not, in the same way that G4S does not suddenly appear and provide treatment through a new cancer service that the Secretary of State decides to commission under specialist powers.

I am afraid that some opponents of the Bill are trying to scaremonger about potential provision as a way of altering the way people voted on Second Reading. A number of amendments clearly deal with whether potential providers should be public sector, voluntary or, indeed, private organisations. I emphasise that the overwhelming majority of GP services in this country are private contractors. It is inconsistent for Members to argue that we should maximise continuity of care and have the best safeguards around coercion and capacity by having someone who has known the individual for a long time, while also arguing that the Secretary of State should not be permitted to commission that individual’s GP to play any role. I challenge opponents on that matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Daniel Francis]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I genuinely did not intend to speak today, but the debate, particularly the speech by the hon. Member for Richmond Park and the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire, has brought me to my feet.

It was 13 or 14 years ago that my wife and I embarked on the IVF road. It never worked—our children came naturally in the end—but I know the pain and despair of that process. Although I do not call into question the efficacy of any doctor, some companies, looking to their profit margins, will always prey on people.

We have had discussions today about the regulations to be made under new clause 36, but we need some clarity on Report. I referred to the annual fertility show at the Kensington Olympia; I have checked, and it is still held. I visited it about 13 years ago. Frankly, it is complete marketisation. People who are already on their knees and really depressed are left feeling that companies are simply trying to make a profit out of them. People can already book their tickets for the event in May and navigate a path through it: there are expert-led seminars, real stories, whereby people connect with others who have been through the process, wellbeing workshops and more than 70 exhibitors. Of course, they are all paying a fee to be there, and they all aim to have made a profit by the end.

Our first set of IVF treatment was free on the NHS. We paid £7,000 for our second, which was again through the NHS. We went through several visits to NHS and private providers to assess whether we were willing to pay a top-up for a slightly better service. I really did not intend to speak this morning, but I wonder whether, in the final part of the process that we are considering, there would be the sort of upsetting process that has taken root in the fertility industry in this country. We need more clarity on that by Report.

[Naz Shah]

I stopped myself intervening on my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central; I had lots of questions, and he has confused me even more. He referred to the provision in clause 8(6)(d) about the doctors being different. If I am right, healthcare providers such as Aspire or Ramsay Health Care could be commissioned to deliver the services. If so, does that mean, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire suggested, that we will need two separate doctors or providers because the co-ordinating doctor and the second doctor cannot be linked? That confuses me even further. After what we have heard this morning, it strikes me that we do not have any proposed model and the measure has not been thought through. It speaks to the idea that this is not right. We are spending hours and hours going through hypotheticals and possibilities—this could happen, that could happen—but there is nothing actually before us.

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I am not sure that anything in the Bill would preclude a private provider—“Virgin Health” or some such organisation—from providing the whole pathway of the assisted death, including employing, albeit in separate clinics or separate practices, the two doctors who would provide the two assessments. The provider would comply with the Bill, but the doctors might be part of the same organisation even if they work in different practices.

[Naz Shah]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I have observed two things this morning. First, the reality has really hit home. Are we going to look at the amendment regarding local authorities providing the service? Are we excluding private providers? Are we excluding big firms? A new service has to be designed. Will it be two organisations or one? How will the Bill be delivered? We do not even have that before us, and that concerns me deeply.

[Kim Leadbeater]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central said, it is common practice in healthcare and in the NHS for services to be commissioned in a range of ways. We would not put such a level of detail in the Bill, but it would be normal practice for the Secretary of State to do that commissioning work. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West has her own experience of that, I imagine.

[Naz Shah]

Absolutely. As a former commissioner, I am very familiar with commissioning; I commissioned millions of pounds’ worth of services across Bradford when I was in the NHS. The difference is that that was under Government Bills that had pre-consultation, impact assessments and a model that was debated. None of that has happened with this Bill. I agree that in an ideal world the process set out in new clauses 36 and 37 would be the right one, but without an impact assessment and a consultation, I am afraid that I have been left really disheartened.

I am disheartened about something else, too. I thank all Committee members, regardless of the points that they have or have not made, for the way in which the debate has been conducted, both before and during our sittings. On a few occasions, hon. Members have questioned other Members’ reasons for tabling amendments—but to suggest, as has been suggested today, that we are scaremongering, when we are actually going through the detail, is something else.

I am afraid. This is not me scaremongering; this is me being afraid for women who are anorexic. This is a gendered Bill. There are amendments that I support because I want to strengthen the Bill. I genuinely do not think that the Bill, as it stands, has that strength. I feel disheartened that we are talking about what is going to happen on Third Reading and potential votes, when we should be concentrating on the amendments on the selection list.

I oppose the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, which would replace clause 32. As my hon. Friend explained, new clause 36 outlines the powers that the Secretary of State for Health would have over voluntary assisted dying services in England. New clause 37 does the same for Wales, but makes changes that are necessary because health is a devolved power. I will concentrate on new clause 36, as I represent a constituency in England.

Put very simply, if new clause 36 is agreed to, it will give the Secretary of State three sorts of power. First, it will give the Health Secretary powers under subsection (4) to, effectively, change the National Health Service Act 2006. Secondly, it will give the Health Secretary powers to set out regulations about how any service, whether public or private, carries out assisted dying services. Thirdly, the Health Secretary will have powers under subsection (1) to commission assisted dying services. As I understand it, the wording means that assisted dying services could be provided directly by the NHS or by private firms working on contract for the NHS. I will discuss those powers in the order in which I mentioned them.

Subsection (4) of new clause 36 says that the Health Secretary may pass regulations that

“may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued under section 1(1) of that Act include references to commissioned VAD services.”

To make it clear how the new clause works, I will quote from the subsection of the National Health Service Act 2006 that it would affect. It states:

“The Secretary of State must continue the promotion in England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement—

(a) in the physical and mental health of the people of England, and

(b) in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness.”

That Act is an adaptation of the original National Health Service Act 1946, section 1(1) of which states:

“It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health…to promote the establishment in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illness”.

The 1946 and 2006 Acts both give the Health Secretary a very clear set of duties that I think we can all support. Those duties have been the basis of how the NHS has been run for the nearly eight decades for which it has existed.

My hon. Friend’s Bill would give the Secretary of State powers to change the duties set out in section 1(1) of the 2006 Act. I ask my hon. Friend and both Ministers why the Bill needs to give the Secretary of State those powers. The only reason I can think of is that someone who was part of the drafting process has pointed out that the Health Secretary’s current duties might be incompatible with assisted dying.

The Health Secretary has duties to secure improvement in the people’s physical and mental health and in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness. Someone could bring a legal challenge on the basis that assisted dying does not fit with that duty, and that challenge might well succeed. I think that, to prevent that happening, my hon. Friend has proposed subsection (1) of new clause 36. If there is any other reason why she has suggested that we should give those powers to the Secretary of State, it is important that the Committee understands and hears it.

What is proposed underlines just how major a change the Bill would make. Since the NHS started operations in 1948, we have had a clear understanding of what it is there for. The 2006 Act is little different from the 1946 Act in that respect. For nearly 80 years, we have had an NHS that is there to improve health and to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of illnesses. The fact that we may have to change that shows us that we are taking a very big step indeed. To make such a fundamental change to the NHS, we should have had the best possible evidence and proper consultation, not three days of witness hearings and then hundreds of pieces of written evidence, often published after we had finished discussing the topics to which they relate. That is nowhere near good enough.

The next set of powers that I want to talk about is mentioned in subsection (3) of new clause 36, which says that the Health Secretary

“may by regulations make other provision about voluntary assisted dying services in England (whether or not the services are commissioned VAD services).”

I absolutely accept that if we have assisted dying services in England, the Health Secretary should ensure that they are properly regulated. That will have to include privately provided services as well as those offered on the NHS. However, I must ask: why does the Bill say that the Secretary of State “may” pass such regulations? The best interpretation I can think of is that a future Health Secretary might decide that private firms should provide assisted dying services directly to paying customers rather than via outsourced NHS contracts. In that case, the Health Secretary would need to provide regulations for those private sector services.

If that interpretation is correct, surely we could have tighter wording. For example, the new clause could say that if the Secretary of State decides to allow private firms to provide assisted dying to paying customers, the Secretary of State must make regulations to govern that. I would welcome clarification on the point, because I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley previously accepted an amendment—I think it was amendment 477—

[The Chair]

Order.