Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, we have had a very interesting, long and good debate, which has had perhaps more than a hint of a Second Reading debate—but, of course, that is unsurprising, given that Clause 1 sets out the purpose of the Bill. We will of course be able to revisit this debate in the second group when we have the “clause stand part” Question.

We have heard thoughtful speeches from many noble Lords, but I particularly valued the insights from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, my noble friends Lord Hodgson, Lord Horam, Lord Sandhurst and Lady Lawlor, and my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson.

For now, let me respond to the amendments directly. First, Amendments 1 and 5, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seek to add into the Bill definitions of “illegal migration” and “unlawful migration”. The noble and learned Lord has suggested that this would be helpful in the interests of legal certainty. As a lawyer myself, I am all in favour of legal certainty but, in this instance, I am not persuaded that adding these definitions helps in this regard.

It is important to incorporate Bill-wide definitions in a Bill where terms are used across the Bill. We have done that in this Bill and, as noble Lords will have noticed, Clause 64 includes an index of defined expressions. But I put it to the noble and learned Lord that nothing hangs off the terms “unlawful migration” or “illegal migration” and, consequently, there is no need to define them. The term “unlawful migration” is used only once in the Bill, in Clause 1(1), while the term “illegal migration” is used only in the Short Title, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, observed. Moreover, it is clear from Clause 2 that the duty to make arrangements for removal applies to persons who meet the four conditions in that clause. It does not apply to other persons who may be in the country unlawfully—for example, because they have overstayed their limited leave to enter or remain. In short, the Bill is clear without these two terms being defined.

As regards the early intervention in the debate from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, a point repeated by both the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Hamwee, as well as my noble friend Lord Kirkhope and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, I remind your Lordships that the Immigration Act 1971 was recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 with regard to the criminal offences relating to illegal entry and arrival. This includes people who enter the UK without leave or arrive in the UK without permission: for example, without a visa where that is required under the Immigration Rules. This means that such persons are illegal migrants whether or not they go on to claim asylum. This, if I may say, answers the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, of what makes a route illegal. The answer is: legislation, passed in the normal way, and scrutinised and passed by this House.

The suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that anyone making claims under the refugee convention can never be illegal, represents, with respect, a muddled reading of the convention. The convention is clear that states can still operate controls on illegal migration and, under Article 31, it is expressly permitted to disadvantage those who have arrived illegally from safe countries—which is true of all who come from France. This embodies the first safe country principle in the sense that Article 31 protections apply only to those who have come directly from unsafe countries—a point made by my noble friend Lady Lawlor.

The first safe country principle is also widely recognised internationally, including in the Common European Asylum System, a framework of rules and procedures operated by EU countries together, based on the refugee convention. I would add that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, may have overlooked the fact that, under Clause 2(4) of this Bill, the “duty to remove” does not apply to those who have come directly from unsafe countries, in line with the refugee convention.

The refugee convention seems to be raised to support statements that are not all borne out by its terms. We must interpret the convention as it is written, not as others would wish it to be written.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I merely want to ask whether you are recommending that all of the 46,000 who arrived last year should be sent back to France. If so, has the Prime Minister had any discussions with President Macron about that?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord knows, the Prime Minister and President Macron have had regular discussions and there have been regular treaties and agreements in relation to the enhancement of police powers in France, but it is not presently the position of the French Government that they are willing to accept the return of those who have entered the UK illegally. That is what drives the Government to look for other avenues to dissuade people from embarking on the dangerous journey across the channel.

Turning to Amendment 2, tabled—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am sorry to intervene on the Minister, but I wonder if he could direct my attention to where in Article 31 of the refugee convention it refers to “illegal migrants”. I can find a reference only to “illegal entry or presence” or “entry or presence without authorisation”. It is the entry or the presence that is illegal or unauthorised; it is not the person. That is the problem that many of us have with the term “illegal migrant”. I cannot find it in Article 31 of the refugee convention; perhaps I have not looked hard enough.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. I was indeed about to mention her in my next sentence. Let me address that point and repeat what I said earlier. The phrase “illegal migration” in the Short Title of the Bill refers to the fact that the act of entering otherwise than in accordance with immigration controls was criminalised by an Act passed by this House and the other place in 2022. That is why it is correct to describe such people as “illegal migrants”—because they did not enter in accordance with immigration controls. That is the long and the short of it. The interpretation of Article 31 is irrelevant as regards that point of certainty.

I turn now to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. This amendment seeks to strike out subsection (5), which disapplies Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The disapplication of Section 3 will ensure that the Bill’s provisions will be interpreted to meet the legislative intent of Parliament, rather than the strained interpretations imposed by the courts to achieve compatibility with convention rights. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson, King’s Counsel, pointed out, Section 3 is an unusual provision in UK law and there is, in principle, no reason why it cannot be excluded in cases like this.

It is our view that Parliament and the Government are better suited to address the sensitive policy issues involved in this legislation. It is therefore only right that Section 3, which requires the court to interpret the provisions to achieve compatibility with convention rights, must be disapplied so that courts interpret the law in accordance with the purpose of the Bill. Through this, we are ensuring that the balance between our domestic institutions is right and that Parliament’s intent is clear to the courts.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, explained, Amendment 3 flows from the recent report of the Constitution Committee. I am very grateful to that committee for its scrutiny of the Bill. We are studying its report carefully and will respond in full ahead of Report. As for the genesis of the amendment, the noble and learned Lord explained that the Constitution Committee considered that more explanation was needed around the Section 19(1)(b) statement that I made on the introduction of the Bill in this House.

Notwithstanding that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quoted from my Second Reading speech on this issue, I reiterate the point I made at that stage: a Section 19(1)(b) statement means not that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with the convention rights, only that we cannot be certain that they are compatible. The assertion suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in his speech a moment ago, that the statement amounts to a concession that measures in the Bill are incompatible, is not the case. The purpose of Section 19, as my noble friend Lord Wolfson set out, is that it is a statement that the provisions of the Bill are incompatible with convention rights and we cannot be certain that they are compatible. It is of course a measure in a piece of legislation passed by the last Labour Government and therefore something that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would no doubt place great weight on. Those are the terms that we find in Section 19 of the Human Rights Act.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the Minister not think that it might at least be a courtesy to the Committee to set out which of the provisions, in his view and that of the Home Secretary, are or are not compatible with the convention? That would help us to determine the quality of the legislation that is proposed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come to address the issues of the broad applicability of the Section 19(1)(b) statement. There is no requirement in the Act for a statement to identify any particular section. Indeed, I do not want to wade into the waters that were nearly ventured into during the interventions on my noble friend Lord Wolfson’s speech about whether the Section 19(1)(b) statement in relation to the Communications Bill, as it then was, was in accordance with the statute.

In any event, I return to the principle of Section 19(1)(b) statements. It is right to say that they have been made by Governments of all stripes, not least in the Communications Bill, as we heard earlier in the debate, but also by the coalition Government and by Nick Clegg in the House of Lords Reform Bill 2012. As my noble friend Lord Wolfson rightly indicated, issuing a Section 19(1)(b) statement is a legitimate choice given to Ministers under the Human Rights Act. Why else would the Act provide for such a course?

As I have said, previous Governments have issued such statements, and clearly that has not caused our international reputation to collapse. More broadly, I encourage the Committee to approach questions of international reputation with a proper perspective. The world can be in no doubt that we are defenders of rights and liberty, the most obvious example being our leading support for Ukraine.

Requiring guidance to be approved by Parliament on how the Bill’s provisions are to be interpreted within the meaning of the Human Rights Act is unnecessary. On 7 March the Government published a memorandum addressing issues arising under the ECHR, and a supplementary memorandum was published in April in relation to the government amendments tabled for Report in the Commons. These memoranda set out a provision-by-provision ECHR analysis, so I submit that the Government’s position is clear, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will find the answers to his questions about what sits behind the Section 19(1)(b) statement in those memoranda.

It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide Home Office staff, immigration officers and others with appropriate guidance to support the implementation of the Bill. It would not be appropriate for such routine operational guidance on the implementation of a particular Act to be subject to parliamentary approval.

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[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

When my noble friend was replying to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, he said that the ECHR memorandum set out precisely which articles of the convention had that effect and which clauses in the Bill were compatible or not, and, as he says, different rights are listed. But what is the status of that definitive document? He says it is the answer to the noble Lord’s question, but what is its status? Presumably it does not have legal effect in itself.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is correct: the ECHR memorandum is one of the documents prepared to support the Bill in its passage through Parliament. Obviously, if a matter of interpretation were required, it is the sort of material that those looking for an interpretation might be minded to refer to. Indeed, it is open to those in Parliament to refer to such documents. It is, of course, right to say that the ECHR memorandum is a standard part of the package in relation to public Bills—so, in that sense, it has regular status.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Before the Minister leaves this part of his address, will he tell the House whether it is the intention of the Government that the implementation of the Act should be compliant with all the conventions that are set out in Amendment 4? Do the Government intend to comply with those conventions? This House is entitled to know.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already outlined, it is clear that there is nothing in the Bill that would require the UK to breach its international obligations. The UK takes compliance with those obligations very seriously. As for the other international instruments referred to in these amendments, they have not, by and large, been incorporated into UK domestic law, and we should not seek to do so in this Bill through the back door.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister seems to be placing a great deal of weight on there being nothing in this Bill that requires the Government to take action contrary to our international obligations. He would surely agree, however, that there is a great deal in this Bill that enables the Government to take action that would be contrary to our international obligations—and that without any recourse to Parliament.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am not sure that I agree with the noble Lord. There is no requirement that powers should conceivably be expressed on the face of every Bill in such a way that they are trammelled by international obligations. That would be contrary to the dualist system, as my noble and learned friend Lord Wolfson made abundantly clear. I am reluctant to reopen that particular exchange at this juncture, given the time that we have remaining prior to the dinner break.

States take different approaches to their international law obligations. Some states treat international law as part of their domestic law, but the UK, like other countries with similar constitutional arrangements, including many Commonwealth countries, has the dualist approach that we have discussed before. In those states, international law is treated as separate from domestic law and international law is incorporated into domestic law only by decisions of Parliaments through legislation. That is a point we have already discussed. The effect of these amendments would be to make the provisions of all the listed international agreements effectively justiciable in the UK courts. It is legitimate for noble Lords to make the case for incorporation into domestic law of one or more of these international instruments, but that is not the Government’s position, and we should not be using this Bill to secure that outcome.

I hope that, in light of my explanation, the noble and learned Lord will be content to withdraw his Amendment 1.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I wonder whether the Minister could help me. He said that the Government would apply—I gather—all the conventions that are in Amendment 4. May I suggest that it would be impossible for the Government to apply the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child? It is perfectly obvious that the best interests of a child throughout the Bill will not be recognised.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Clearly, as I have already said, it is the Government’s view that nothing in the Bill requires the UK to breach its international obligations, whether in relation to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or any of the other listed international instruments. Of course, the United Kingdom takes compliance with its international obligations very seriously.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this very interesting and far-ranging debate. I am conscious of the time, and I am sure the Committee would not wish me to go over the ground in any detail, and I am not going to do that.

The Minister, with great respect, has not really answered many of the questions that have been raised. We will come back to this, I am sure, possibly in the next group, but certainly these questions will come back on Report and will need to be answered in much more detail. So far as my own amendments are concerned—the definition point—the Minister has pointed out that nothing hangs on these words because they do not reappear elsewhere in the Bill. I was well aware of that when I tabled the amendment, but that raises the question: why brand the actions of these people coming here as unlawful or illegal, unless, of course, they are in breach of specific legislation, which is not always the case? That illustrates the unfortunate wording of Clause 1, which we will come back to.

As far as Amendment 3 is concerned, which deals with the question of guidance, I do not think, with great respect, that the ECHR memoranda amount to the kind of guidance that is needed in a situation where access to the courts is being denied. Something more specific is needed, and that is what the amendment is driving at. Perhaps we will come back to that at some later stage. For the time being, I think the simplest thing I should do, so that we can move on, is beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will just add my voice to the requests from various noble Lords across the Chamber for specific answers to these specific questions that have been raised; I think the Committee deserves those answers.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 1 sets out the Bill’s overarching purpose and provides an overview of the provisions in the Bill. The purpose of the Bill is to prevent and deter illegal migration and, in particular, migration to the UK by unsafe and illegal routes, by requiring the removal from the UK of individuals who arrive in breach of immigration control.

Subsection (2) then summarises the key provisions of the Bill that advance this core purpose, including the duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of persons from the UK who meet the conditions in Clause 2.

The numbers arriving on small boats in 2022 exceeded 45,700, and, as I set out at Second Reading, the Bill is essential to deal with these illegal, dangerous and unnecessary channel crossings. Putting the purpose of the Bill front and centre, right at the start of the Bill, will make it abundantly clear to all, including the illegal entrants themselves, NGOs, the courts and others, what Parliament’s intent is in enacting this Bill. As subsection (3) provides, the subsequent provisions in the Bill should be interpreted by the courts and others in line with this statutory purpose. Again, it is incredibly helpful to make this explicit on the face of the Bill, although I should add that subsection (3) simply reaffirms the established principle that the courts and others should interpret the Bill to deliver its purpose.

To assist this purpose, Clause 1 also disapplies Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. As I have already explained in the previous debate, the disapplication of Section 3 will ensure that the Bill’s provisions will be interpreted to meet the legislative intent of Parliament, rather than strained interpretations by the courts to achieve compatibility with convention rights.

The noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Paddick, asked about the impact assessment. We have already published an equality impact assessment and will publish an economic impact assessment in due course. The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to the purported impact assessment published by the Refugee Council. We do not recognise the assumptions and costs referenced in that document. Any assessment of the impact of the Bill must also acknowledge the cost of not proceeding with it. Our broken asylum system is costing this country £3 billion a year, and over £6 million a day in hotel costs. This cannot continue. The noble Lord also seems to be labouring under an assumption that Clause 1—

[Lord German (LD)]

The noble Lord has made two points. I am particularly asking about this sentence in the Government’s ECHR memorandum—so the Government’s position. It says at paragraph 1.5 about the removal of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act:

“This does not affect the Government’s assessment of compatibility of the Bill with the Convention rights”.


Article 5 of the convention clearly states:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court”.


So is the paragraph in the memorandum compatible with what I have just read out? If so, it means that when people are detained, they will be able to take their cases to a court in this country.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The answer to the question, if I have understood the noble Lord, is yes, but I think he misinterprets the purpose of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. It is not the clause by which the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights are reflected in UK domestic law. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act invites a court to construe parts of other domestic statutes or secondary legislation compatibly with convention rights. It does not mean that this is the mechanism by which convention rights are actionable in UK law, which is the standpoint that I think the noble Lord, Lord German, appears to suggest is the basis for his point. I fear that, as a matter of legal analysis, I think that to be wrong.

The noble Lord also seems to be labouring under an assumption that Clause 1 somehow upsets the separation of powers. It does not. It simply makes it clear that in interpreting this legislation, judges should seek to advance the purposes of the Bill. The Bill, and actions taken under it, are still clearly capable of review in the courts, and individuals can seek to prevent their own removal by making a suspensive claim. So, the courts are still involved, and regulations are still subject to approval by Parliament. I hope the noble Lord can rest assured that on closer inspection, this Bill leaves our separation of powers undisturbed.

I also want to pick up on a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who suggested that the Bill prevents human rights challenges. This is simply not the case. The Bill provides for two kinds of challenges that would have the effect of suspending removal. Other legal challenges, whether on European Convention on Human Rights grounds or other grounds, are not precluded, but they do not suspend removal. As I have indicated, Clause 1 makes the purpose of the Bill crystal clear for all to see. This will help to guide all decisions made by officials and immigration officers, Ministers, the courts and others in giving effect to the Bill. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister can help me on this. The “strained decisions” of the courts is a phrase that has been used at least three or four times this evening. As a former judge, I find that difficult to understand. I would like some elucidation as to what is meant by “strained decisions” and what examples there are.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The context of a strained decision, as the noble and learned Baroness will be aware, are circumstances where there is an ordinary, natural reading of a statute but a judge feels constrained to interpret the words of a statute in a particular way to give effect to a convention right. As the noble and learned Baroness is aware, this is a fairly obvious application of the term, and it is quite usual for such—perhaps more difficult—interpretations to be described as “strained”. I can certainly identify a number of examples, and I will write to the noble and learned Baroness in relation to them.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister is a persistent non-answerer of questions; I am a persistent asker of questions. The two questions I asked—I will repeat them at dictation speed if he wishes—were echoed by the Liberal Democrat Front Bench spokesman and the Labour Front Bench spokesman. I think we are due a reply to both those questions. Does the Minister have the answers, or do I have to repeat the questions?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord does repeatedly ask questions, and I repeatedly answer them. As he identifies, there is a difference in interpretation of Article 31 of the refugee convention. I entirely appreciate that he does not accept my interpretation; and I do not accept his. That is where we are. It is not a rigmarole. This is a matter of position and legal analysis, and I am afraid that this is the Government’s position.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

And the second question, please?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I believe I have answered both the noble Lord’s questions.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The second question was: could the Minister please tell us that the phrase that he used, which was that nothing in this Bill “requires” the Government to take action contrary to our international obligations, does not obviate the fact that the Bill enables the Government so to do if they so wish and without any further recourse to Parliament?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is consistent with the normal practice in statute.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I might come back to the question asked by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I think the Minister said that he would write to her with examples of strained interpretation. I sat for many years on the Appellate Committee in the Supreme Court dealing with cases under the Human Rights Act, and I am not aware of any particular case where I was straining the language. I do not think I went very far beyond the ordinary meaning of the words.

I remember we were faced with a very difficult case involving two men who wanted to marry. In those days, the Marriage Act was very specific that marriage was between a man and a woman. We could have strained the language, but we did not do that; we said the provision was incompatible, which I think the Minister would recognise as a perfectly orthodox way to proceed. I think we were quite careful not to stray beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation. I would be very interested to know whether he has examples of where we really did go beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I said, I will be writing to the noble and learned Baroness, but the House will recall that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, set out various examples, including Ullah and Al-Skeini, and there are others. This has been a matter of jurisprudential development since the commencement of the Human Rights Act. It is a well-known evolution in interpretive principle, and it is that which is addressed by the provisions in this Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Following-up on my question about impact assessment, the Minister says that the Government do not recognise the impact assessments provided by NGOs, but why not? How can they say that they do not recognise the impact assessments provided by NGOs when they do not have their own impact assessment with which to contradict them?

The Minister also talked about the cost of not enacting this legislation, in terms of the current cost of what I think he called the “broken asylum system”—of a Government who have been in power for 13 years. To what extent is the high cost of accommodating asylum seekers in the UK down to the fact that there is a huge backlog of applications that have not been processed by the Home Office, when some 15 years ago there were almost double the number of applications and hardly any backlog?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The Government do not recognise the figures in the purported impact assessments provided by the bodies that were referred to, such as the Refugee Council, because we do not recognise the assumptions and costs referenced in them. Furthermore, those documents do not acknowledge any assessment of the impact of the effect of not proceeding with the measures in the Bill.

[Lord German (LD)]

What is the Minister’s definition of “soon”, which he said was when we would receive the impact assessment? Will it be before the end of Committee, before the start of Report or after Report and before Third Reading? Perhaps he could be more explicit.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The impact assessment will be provided when the decision is taken that it is appropriate to disclose it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord German (LD)]

Does the Minister therefore think that it is appropriate that the body which is deciding about this Bill—Parliament—should receive the impact assessment, and should that impact assessment be with us before we complete Committee on the Bill? Surely that is appropriate. It is not for the Government to decide. It is for the Government to make their case to Parliament. If they cannot do so, because they have not got the document, because the document is not sufficiently robust or because it is not available, then the Minister should be able to tell us that right now, so that we know the basis on which we are judging this Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I can tell the noble Lord only that it will be published in due course and that this is entirely normal.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Frankly, this is unacceptable. Without being rude, I say that the Committee must at some point have the impact assessment. How on earth can we make many of the judgments on amendments and on the various things that we may wish to come forward with on Report if we do not have an impact assessment? It is normal practice for an impact assessment to be provided so that proper decisions can be made. Can the Minister at least go back to the department and say that this Chamber—I think I speak for everyone —is very unhappy that no impact assessment is due, and that we need one? Will he ask his department to provide one for us—at least well before Report?

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

To add to that, we should have had a child rights impact assessment. That is supposed to be done right at the outset of the policy discussion. Therefore, it would have been appropriate for it to have been published at the same time as the Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The House knows my position. I have obviously heard what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, have said, and I will of course take those points back to the department.

Clause 1 agreed.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, Clause 2 is the centrepiece of the scheme provided for in the Bill. At its heart, the Bill seeks to change the existing legal framework so that those who arrive in the UK illegally can be detained and then promptly removed, either to their home country or to a safe third country.

Clause 2 seeks to achieve this by placing a legal duty on the Secretary of State to remove those who come to the UK illegally. The duty applies where an individual meets the four conditions set out in Clause 2, which I will briefly rehearse.

The first condition is about the lawfulness of the person’s entry into the UK. This underlines the Government’s commitment to take all possible measures to stop people making dangerous journeys to enter the UK illegally, particularly across the English Channel.

The second condition is that the individual must have entered the UK on or after 7 March—the day of the Bill’s introduction in the House of Commons, as my noble friend Lady Lawlor noted. This is a crucial condition that will ensure that we do not create a perverse incentive for migrants to take illegal and dangerous journeys in an attempt to avoid being subject to the Bill’s provisions. I will return to this point in a moment.

The third condition states that the duty will apply to an individual who has not come directly from a country in which their life and liberty were threatened. That means that anyone entering the UK from another country where their life was not in danger will fall within the scope of the duty. This is consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention and upholds the principle that asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. There is manifestly no need for people to make those dangerous journeys when they are already in a country where they are safe or could, in the case of France, for example, claim asylum. It places themselves and others at risk and puts money into the hands of organised criminals.

The fourth and final condition is that an individual requires leave to remain but does not have it. The duty to make arrangements for removal is subject only to very limited exceptions signposted in Clause 2(11), which we will come on to at a later date when we come to a later clause.

The fundamental point is that, subject to these limited exceptions, the Home Secretary will be under a clear and unambiguous legal duty to make arrangements for the removal of persons from the UK who satisfy those four conditions. She should not be deflected from fulfilling that legal duty. These provisions make it very clear that if you meet these four conditions you will not be able to make a new life in the UK.

A number of the amendments in this group relate to the four conditions I have described. Amendment 6 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, relates to the second condition. In effect, this and other amendments tabled by the noble Lord seek to do away with the backdating of the duty to remove so that it applies only to those who illegally enter the country from the date of commencement rather than from 7 March. Amendment 39 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, deals with the same point.

The explanatory note to the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 39 sums up the position well, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. It says:

“This amendment seeks to give effect to the principle that, unless for good reason, legislation should operate prospectively and not retrospectively”.


I was challenged by the noble and learned Lord to explain what that good reason was. The Government entirely agree with the explanatory note from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Committee will know that it is not uncommon in exceptional circumstances for legislation to have retrospective effect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, noted. But as the noble and learned Lord has acknowledged, there must be good reason for such exceptions. I suggest to the Committee that there is good reason in this instance for retrospection.

I would say that the retrospective nature of these provisions is critical. Without it, we risk organised criminals and people smugglers seeking to exploit this with an increase in the number of illegal arrivals ahead of commencement of the provisions in the Bill. This would likely lead to an increase in these unnecessary and dangerous small boat crossings and could even place more pressure on not only our asylum system, but our health, housing, educational and welfare services, not to mention our services for saving lives at sea.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Can the Minister explain why in that case the Nationality and Borders Act does not have a retrospective clause? What evidence does the Minister have, having announced the retrospective elements and that the provisions apply from when the Bill was first introduced into the House of Commons? What deterrent effect have we seen in terms of reducing the number of boat crossings?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Certainly. The structure of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was very different. It was not a Bill like this one, which focuses on a duty to remove and is targeted at creating a disincentive effect on people crossing the channel. This is a very differently structured piece of legislation and therefore the retrospective element is a vital and logical part of the scheme in the Bill.

As to the evidence of the deterrent effect taking effect from the date of introduction, this is seen potentially in the fact that—and one can only draw inferences from the figures—it would appear that the numbers are down on this time last year. I accept that the weather has facilitated a good measure of that, but it is certainly right to say that had there not been a retrospectivity measure in the Bill I would conjecture that the numbers crossing the channel would have been far higher. It would have been easy for people smugglers to advertise their services—and I will come to this in a moment—as something of a fire sale, saying, “Get across the channel now. Here’s your opportunity before these measures in the Government’s new scheme take effect”.

The provision in the Bill does not mean that all those who enter the country illegally on or after 7 March will be subject to the duty to remove in Clause 2(1). We have expressly provided in Clause 4(7) that asylum and human rights-based claims made on or after 7 March may be decided by the Secretary of State prior to the commencement of Clause 4. Where a person is then granted leave to remain, they will not be removed.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted that retrospectivity is problematic because it impinges on legal certainty. The key here is that we have been clear in the Bill and in the public messaging—for example, in the statement given by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the other messaging—that this is the date when the scheme will commence. That means that there can be no uncertainty about the Government’s intention. While I accept that this is unusual in our legal system, it is not unheard of. The Revenue sometimes announces intended changes to tax law which are then later introduced by Finance Bills but backdated to the date of the announcement. In those cases, it is usually to prevent a closing-down sale of improper tax structures. There, retrospectivity is designed to protect tax revenue. Here, it is to prevent a closing-down sale of dangerous, sometimes fatal, channel crossings in the lead-up to some prospective date. We do not take this step lightly but feel it is necessary to reduce this perverse incentive.

I say “reduce” advisedly. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has pointed out that migrants on the other side of the channel may not be as well advised as some taxpayers, but it is clear they are alive to changes in policy in the UK. For example, it is clear that announcements of a change in the approach to Albanian illegal migrants has led to a very significant dropping off of that cohort in the small boats, even before removals have begun at scale. This shows that the criminal gangs and migrants are aware of policy announcements in the UK, as my noble friend Lady Lawlor has pointed out. Similarly, the original announcement of the Rwanda scheme was known in the camps in Calais, with some suggesting in reporting that asylum seekers sought to go to the Republic of Ireland instead to avoid being sent to Rwanda. Indeed, the then Taoiseach Michael Martin noted a surge in applications and partly blamed the Rwanda announcement.

While clearly announcing the start date of the new scheme may not have had a decisive impact, it is important to do everything we can to discourage those dangerous journeys. Announcements such as this can have an impact on behaviour, and we hope they will reduce the incentive for a surge in dangerous crossings, perhaps at a time when the weather makes crossing very dangerous. To answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, these are the compelling and exceptional circumstances that justify this decision.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I apologise to the Minister for intervening at this late hour. If I understand him correctly, it will now be permissible to legislate retrospectively in any case of criminality because, by definition, it is very important not to have a fire sale. If we believe that certain conduct is wrong and there is a gap, whatever that conduct is, and if it is a serious enough matter to legislate in criminal terms, for example, it would now and in the future be permissible to legislate retrospectively.

My second point is that the Minister seems to suggest, like his noble friend Lady Lawlor, that because Ministers have announced a prospective change in the law, that should be good enough, because presumably we now believe that executive fiat and ministerial announcements and pronouncements are enough to suggest to people, not just in our own country but across the world, that that is what the law is and will be and always was. Have I understood the Minister correctly on this point?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

No, I am sorry to say. Clearly the position is not that in every case where there is a change in the criminal law it should have retrospective effect to the date of the Bill’s introduction. That is absolutely not what I am saying. What I am saying is that, in this context, to prevent a rush of people into these dangerous vessels, crossing the channel at a time when there is potentially bad weather, those were the special circumstances that justified retrospection in these provisions. To go back to one of the last major Bills to go through your Lordships’ House, which became the Public Order Act, I would not dream of suggesting that the offence of locking on should have had retrospective effect to the date of the introduction of the Bill; there would have been no exceptional circumstances for that.

While I am on the topic of the speech just given by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I would like to address her suggestion that limited retrospectivity will lead to refoulement. This is clearly not the case. I can do no more than repeat that this Bill does not allow refoulement. It does not allow the Government to remove individuals to places where they will be in danger—and that, quite rightly, is under the supervision of the courts.

In particular, I would refer noble Lords to the clauses in the Bill relating to suspensive claims—Clauses 37 to 50—which allow Upper Tribunal judges to determine whether an individual faces a risk of “serious and irreversible harm”. If such a case is made out, the individual will not be removed to that place.

Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, relates to the third condition and to the issue of whether a person has or has not “come directly” from a country where their life and liberty were threatened. It is right that we prioritise protection for the most vulnerable people arriving through safe and legal routes rather than those who are strong or rich enough to have journeyed through safe countries and paid the people smugglers before they reach the UK.

In answer to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord German, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, people seeking sanctuary should apply for asylum in the first safe country they reach. There is no uniform international interpretation of the many concepts of the refugee convention. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the treaty to be interpreted “in good faith”. It is on this basis that we have set out our interpretation of “come directly” through Clause 2. I might add that, were Amendment 7—

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The Minister is beginning to address the question that I have raised twice: why should we accept this Government’s interpretation of the refugee convention over and above that of the body that is given authority by the UN to interpret it for the international community? Every other organisation that has briefed us has followed the UNHCR in its interpretation and there are very real fears of refoulement. As a noble Lord opposite said earlier. the reason given seems to be “Because we say so”, as you would say to a child. That is not good enough. We want to know exactly why we should accept the Government’s interpretation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. The reality is that the Government take legal advice. The UNHCR is clearly a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the refugee convention. Some parts of the UNHCR have views on the Government’s position, but it is always worth recalling that the UNHCR itself maintains refugee arrangements and accommodation in Rwanda. In December, the High Court considered the submissions from the UNHCR and discounted what was said. So I invite the noble Baroness, rather than simply taking the Government’s word for it, to review the judgment of the Divisional Court, a careful and considered judgment, which considered the legality of the removal scheme.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister has latched on to the wrong point—not the point that the UNHCR has made again and again that it is not compatible with the obligations of our membership to refuse to consider a request for asylum. It is nothing to do with Rwanda; it is to do with refusing a request for asylum. The Minister admitted earlier that there is no explicit provision in the refugee convention that permits us to do that. That is the basis of the UNHCR’s position. Frankly, his suggestion that there are differences of opinion in the UNHCR is pretty contemptible. The High Commissioner for Refugees has said he does not think this is compatible.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I again find myself at odds with the noble Lord. The reality is that the UN itself relocates refugees to Rwanda. As I say, there is no suggestion that people’s asylum claims will not be dealt with under this scheme; their asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda once they are removed, and that is entirely compatible with the convention. There is no requirement on a member state of the convention to determine asylum claims within its own territory. That is abundantly plain.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The Minister says there is no requirement in the convention for a convention state to handle an asylum request on its own territory, but surely the deal with Rwanda rules out our ever hearing these cases. In Rwanda, people are allowed to apply for asylum in Rwanda, but their case for asylum in the United Kingdom will never be admitted. Is that not correct?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is entirely correct, yes. Their asylum claim will be determined by the Government of Rwanda. That is the system that the High Court found to be entirely lawful in December.

If Amendment 7 were agreed, removing the third condition, the duty to remove would also apply to those who had come directly from a country where their life and liberty were threatened, and I am sure that is not what the noble Lord would want.

Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, also relates to the third condition. I put it to the noble Lord that the wording in Clause 2(4), referring to threats by reason of a person’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, reflects the definition of a refugee in Article 1 of the refugee convention. We have heard a lot today about adherence to the refugee convention and other international treaties. There may be a case for amending the definitions in the convention to reflect the world of today rather than what it was in 1951, but we should not put the cart before the horse and insert wording in the Bill at odds with the current wording of the convention.

I add that the reference to membership of a particular social group may, on the facts of a particular case, cover a person fleeing persecution on the basis of their gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Lastly, it is not right to suggest, as the noble Lord does, that the Bill removes individualised assessments. It does not. Officials will make assessments and those can be challenged, including by way of suspensive claims, as we have already discussed.

Amendment 9 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove subsection (7). This ties in with the fourth condition, which is that a person requires leave to enter or remain in the UK but does not have it. We will have a fuller debate about unaccompanied children later in Committee, but subsection (7) recognises that the duty to remove does not apply to unaccompanied children, and where they are not to be removed under the power conferred in Clause 3, the expectation is that they will normally be provided with temporary permission to remain in the UK until they are 18 years old under provisions to be made in the Immigration Rules. If subsection (7) is removed from Clause 2, an unaccompanied child given this temporary permission to remain would not then satisfy the fourth condition, thereby undermining our approach to unaccompanied children. As I say, we will have a fuller debate on this issue when we get to Clause 3, which feels like some time away.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also has Amendment 10, requiring the Home Secretary to inform people when it has been decided that the duty to remove applies to them. Such information would include providing details of any evidence relied upon to make that decision. We have already provided, in Clause 7(2), for a person to be issued with a removal notice detailing, among other things, their right to make a suspensive claim. It is implicit in these provisions that the issue of a removal notice follows a determination that the person satisfies the four conditions in Clause 2. The four conditions relate to issues of fact. A person in receipt of a removal notice will themselves know, or ought to know, whether the conditions apply. If they have compelling evidence that the Home Secretary has made a mistake of fact, they can submit a factual suspensive claim to challenge the removal notice. We will return to those provisions, too, in due course in Committee.

Amendment 11 was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and others. As we will come on to in later clauses, we have made particular provision for potential victims of modern slavery who are co-operating with law enforcement agencies, and it is necessary for them to remain in the UK in furtherance of such co-operation. In later debates, we will address the wider issue of the progress being made by the NCA and others in tackling the criminal gangs that are not perpetuating human trafficking but are engaged in people smuggling. It is worth also noting, in response to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that if an individual who had been trafficked came forward, they would be sent only somewhere where they would be safe—whether their own home country, if it was safe, or a safe third country. In all cases, they would no longer be in the control of their trafficker.

A key purpose of the Bill is to break the business model of the people smugglers. That will not happen if we undermine the central tenet of the Bill: that if you come here illegally you cannot stay, and instead you will be liable to detention and promptly removed. If we build exceptions and loopholes into the fabric of the Bill, it will be undermined and will not work. If those coming over on small boats have information that will assist in the investigation of people-smuggling offences, they can provide it, but this cannot be a reason to delay removal. Any co-operation with law enforcement agencies can, if appropriate, continue from abroad. If the experience of the pandemic has taught us anything, it is that a lot can be achieved remotely. Indeed, our domestic courts and law enforcement are well used to this by now.

Finally, Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, deals with the issue of entry into the United Kingdom over the Irish land border. We discussed this at length during the dinner break business yesterday in relation to the recent SI on electronic travel authorisation. I note that this is a probing amendment relating to the concerns that have been raised regarding tourists and other people who inadvertently arrive in the UK from the Republic of Ireland via the land border with Northern Ireland. As is currently the case, tourists from countries requiring visas to come to the UK as visitors should obtain these before they travel. That is as it should be. That said, I recognise the issue she has raised and accept that some individuals may, entirely unwittingly, enter the UK without leave via the Irish land border, as I said yesterday.

We are examining this issue further. I would point the noble Baroness to the regulation-making power in Clause 3, which will enable us to provide for exceptions to the duty to remove where it would be appropriate to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me about the status of a child born in the UK to a woman who meets the conditions in Clause 2. The short answer is that the child will not satisfy the conditions in Clause 2, but I will write to her with a more detailed explanation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about compatibility with article 2 of the Windsor Framework. There is a later amendment to which she has added her name, Amendment 137, on this very issue. We will come on to that later in the Committee.

As I indicated at the start, this clause provides the foundations for the Bill as a whole. It is fundamental to the effective operation of the scheme and my fear is that the amendments put forward would serve only to weaken the effectiveness of the scheme. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, there was an issue about adoption of a child who came to this country, or came in the womb of somebody arriving in the country, into a British family. Are they at danger under the Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me: as I thought I said, the status of a child born in the UK to a woman who meets the conditions in Clause 2 is that they would not satisfy the conditions in that clause. I realise that there were a number of hypotheticals in the way that that question was written. If I may, I would like to go away and think about them. I will reply by letter in due course, and obviously publicise that letter.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

The Minister talked about an amendment that I had co-signed. Was it Amendment 132?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It was Amendment 137.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

The Minister, not to my surprise, did not address my question about what happens after the election. I will phrase the question another way. In your Lordships’ House, we often ask about “must” and “may” provisions. Rather than a duty to remove, surely the Government could make it that the Secretary of State “may” remove. That would allow this Government to act as they wish but would not attempt to tie the hands of any future Government.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid the structure of the Bill is that it creates a duty on the Secretary of State. That is in order to send the deterrence message that entering the country illegally is unacceptable and to reduce the number of people crossing the channel. I am afraid to say that it is a logical step that if the Government were to change, then it would be open to that other Government to pass legislation of their own. That is democracy.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his patience, but it is not quite right that that is the reason for the “must”, is it? It is not to send a signal to all those people overseas who are reading our draft legislation; it is to give a direction to our courts. The Home Secretary is choosing to tie her own hands. It is really in order to oust the jurisdiction of the courts and their ability to say that where the Secretary of State has a choice, they should exercise that choice in compliance with international law.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Clearly, the intent is to send a message—that people really must not make these dangerous journeys across the channel. As I say, all the avenues of legal challenge are open but there are only two categories that will suspend removal. There are a number of provisions—I am sure the noble Baroness and I will be debating them at length over the coming days in Committee—and that is how the Bill will have its effect.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Could I ask that the Minister copies everyone who took part in this debate into the letter he is going to send, because it is of interest to many of us?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will certainly place a copy in the Library of the House. I hope that suffices. I am sure that my private office can work out who is here and is participating.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the noble Lord stands up again, I feel I should bring this debate to a close. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly those who supported the amendments in my name. A number of other very interesting issues have been raised. I have no doubt that we will be returning to a number of them on Report; I certainly will.

The reasons given by the Minister for what he recognises is the exceptional course of retrospectivity—I am using his words—involved conjecture: a conjecture that a very small change in the numbers, for whatever reason, of people coming on boats shows that the retrospectivity is working. I have been a Silk for 39 years. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, we have probably met more criminals than the rest of this Committee added together. My observation would be a rather less naive one than that made by the Minister. Criminals are infinitely adaptable. If the Government think that the boats are being stopped, it is not evidence that fewer people are coming into this country, because there are different ways and means of doing it.

From what we have heard today—maybe on Report we will hear something different—I really believe that the case for exceptionality is far from proved. I take the view, therefore, that we will have to come back to these subjects. I urge the Government to meet noble Lords who have spoken in these debates before Report so that we can see whether there is some common ground we can find that will make this a better Bill rather than a battleground in your Lordships’ House. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I hesitated to come in before and I apologise for not participating at Second Reading, but I followed the debate closely. I must declare an interest: I have been instructed before by the Government as a member of the Bar on matters relating to the subject matter of the Bill. But I can speak freely on Amendment 13 because it is not anything on which I advise. I wish to speak in support of it.

The negotiation of removal or readmission agreements is, of course, a matter for the Government and not for Parliament. But there are many examples in treaty negotiations of Governments invoking pressure from their parliaments—or even from their courts—as a reason for not being able to make a concession or for insisting on concessions from the other side. It seems to me that it might end up strengthening the hand of the Government in these negotiations if they are able to say that Parliament is insisting on them.

The most difficult negotiation is, as we have heard, with the European Union. The European Union is not opposed to readmission agreements. On the contrary, it concluded a number of them with many countries, from Turkey to Belarus. Incidentally, the readmission agreements with Belarus and Russia have been suspended, quite rightly, because of the situation that has arisen. A number of us, I think, would have regarded those agreements as problematic from a human rights point of view even before that.

The reason why a readmission agreement with the UK is difficult is that the UK is a country from which European Union member states would have to take people back, rather than send them back. The Government published a draft readmission agreement for negotiation with the EU in the summer of 2020. That text is still available on the government website. If the EU had accepted that treaty, it would have allowed the UK to send people back to EU member states—not only permanent residents and nationals, but also third-country nationals who have transited through an EU member state. The provisions in that draft treaty proposed by the UK were identical to a number of provisions found in readmission agreements concluded by the European Union, including the one with Turkey. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong about this, but I think that negotiations with the EU on the Government’s draft proposal never took off.

It is worth noting that both the UK and the EU—and that includes the EU in its own capacity and EU member states—are subject to quite wide-ranging treaty obligations on both migrant smuggling and human trafficking. These treaties impose various obligations of international co-operation, including, in the case of the migrant smuggling protocol, the obligation to

“cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the smuggling of migrants by sea”.

Generally speaking, these are obligations of conduct rather than by result. They do not oblige the EU to accept the terms of the treaty proposed by the UK. They do, however, require the EU, EU member states and all parties to those treaties to engage in good faith negotiations with the UK on readmission, particularly where very similar treaties have been concluded in other contexts. It would be a very unattractive position for any party to these treaties to take the view that they are open to readmission agreements only when they are in their interest and not when they are not.

It seems to me that Amendment 13 would bring some of these questions to the surface by requiring the Government to update Parliament on the status of these negotiations and on the reasons why these negotiations might not be progressing. That is outlined in subsection (3) of the new clause proposed in Amendment 13. It would not be a case of government and Parliament speaking with separate voices; on the contrary, it would be a case of Parliament adding its voice and adding pressure for the purposes of achieving an objective that both Parliament and government consider important.

My final point concerns the language of “formal legally binding agreements” in subsection (1). It is broadly right that this should be the optimum arrangement—the formal legally binding agreement—but it is also the case in this sort of practice that states will often conclude agreements that are not binding. The European Union has two such agreements with Guinea and the Gambia. For various reasons, those agreements, in some cases, are more appropriate. My understanding—and the Minister will, again, correct me if I am wrong—is that the arrangement with Albania that was announced a few weeks ago is actually part of a non-binding arrangement that was built on an existing treaty. The treaty itself is the one from 2021, but the further agreement that was announced by the Prime Ministers at their recent meeting is an example of such a non-binding agreement that can, in certain circumstances, be a better way of achieving that same objective. I would agree, however, with the notion that the formal and legally binding agreement is the gold standard in this kind of situation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill sets out a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person who has arrived in or entered the UK illegally and satisfies the four conditions set out in Clause 2. In the majority of cases, formal returns agreements are not required in order to carry out removals. Most countries co-operate with returns, and these relationships are managed through official-led engagement with immigration counterparts in receiving countries and through consular services based in the UK. Returns agreements can be a useful tool to solidify or improve returns co-operation and are sometimes requested by the receiving country. We carefully consider whether it is beneficial to enter into negotiations to formalise a returns relationship, having regard to the potential requests that the other side would seek to incorporate into an agreement, such as a liberalisation of the UK visa requirements in respect of their nationals.

As of May 2023, the Home Office has 16 returns agreements in place. Recent additions to the list include Albania, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. Just last week, the Prime Minister announced the start of negotiations on a new returns agreement with Moldova. A number of these agreements are sensitive, and receiving countries might withdraw co-operation if they are publicised, so it would be detrimental to formalise and publish all such agreements. There are also some countries where the existing security and country situation might prevent returns taking place, such as Sudan and Afghanistan. We continue to monitor the situation closely in those countries with a view to resuming enforced returns as soon as is practicable and safe.

I should add that, while returns agreements have a valuable role to play, they are not silver bullets. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has, in terms, accused this Government of ripping up the Dublin convention, but may I just remind the noble Lord that the UK was a net recipient of migrants under the Dublin scheme? As my honourable friend Tim Loughton said in the other place:

“In the last year that we were covered by the Dublin convention, before the pandemic struck, we applied to the EU for 8,500 returns under that returns agreement and only 105 were granted—that is 1.2%—so what he says is complete nonsense. It did not work when we were in the EU, and he is now expecting to magic up some agreement that the EU will not give us anyway”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23, col. 792.]


Mr Loughton was, at that time, intervening on the speech of Stephen Kinnock in the other place.

In addition to the returns agreements, we also have our world-leading migration and economic development partnership with Rwanda. I remind the House that there is no limit on the numbers that can be relocated to Rwanda under the partnership agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, cited various figures, including in relation to the current asylum backlog. I remind noble Lords that, under Clause 4, any asylum claims made by persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 are to be declared inadmissible. It is, of course, important to deal with the current backlog. The Prime Minister announced today that the initial decision legacy backlog is down by over 17,000, but there is no correlation between these legacy cases and the cohort to be removed under the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, asked about the impact assessment for the Bill. We have already published the equality impact assessment, and we will publish an economic impact assessment in due course. Noble Lords will have to wait patiently for the economic impact assessment. In the interim, I do not propose to comment on impact assessments issued by NGOs or leaks in the media.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I have a very important question. The noble Lord and government Ministers keep saying from the Dispatch Box, here and in the other place, that certain things will happen if the Bill goes through. Has the Home Office actually completed an impact assessment which clarifies exactly what the Minister is saying?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Certain things will happen when the Bill goes through; the system described within it will take effect. I assure the noble Lord that this is something that the Home Office expects to happen—that is, that returns will be effected in accordance with the duty imposed on the Secretary of State.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

If the impact assessment is to be provided in a timely way—or if not—will the Minister ensure that it contains an estimate or assessment of the number of people who would have been granted asylum but will not be because they are excluded as a result of the blanket effects of the Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is not for me to dictate what is in the impact assessment. The department will provide the impact assessment in due course—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I think I have taken enough interventions.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lords in due course, but I need to make progress.

The broken asylum system costs the UK £3 billion a year, and that is rising. There seems to be an impression that, without the Bill, those costs will not continue to rise at an alarming rate year on year. Doing nothing is not an option.

In conclusion, I agree with the noble Lord that returns agreements have a place, and we will seek to negotiate these where appropriate. By their nature, any such negotiations involve two parties. The UK cannot compel other countries to enter into such agreements; they are a two-way process. Moreover, it will not enhance such negotiations to require their status to be set out in a three-monthly report to be laid before Parliament.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I ask the noble Lord to bear with me for a moment.

[The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, if I may, I remind the House that it is not required for a Minister to give way. However, your Lordships may like to recall that we are in Committee, and the normal procedure of Committee is that someone can intervene again. However, I think it is always helpful for the House to allow the Minister to complete his remarks—and then, doubtless, the noble Lord may wish to comment on them.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I say, this will not advance our negotiating position—quite the contrary. This amendment could well make such negotiations harder. It does not help the UK’s negotiating position to be setting out its negotiating strategy in public. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord and I appear to be talking somewhat at cross purposes. My answer was that it was not for me as the Minister to inform the contents and the conclusions of the impact assessment; it is of course for the Minister to ask broadly for the topics that the impact assessment should cover.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Does the Minister understand that, if he answered the questions that your Lordships are asking, he would not experience this number of interventions? It is a rudeness not to answer our questions.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness will have heard the comments from the Lord Privy Seal.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

To take the noble Lord back to the question that was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has the economic impact assessment been completed or not? If it has been, why do we not have it? If it has not been, surely it should have been informing the Bill itself.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I can do no better than say that the impact assessment will be published in due course.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

How do the Government justify not having an impact statement until presumably the whole of this House has completed its dealing with the Bill? It seems to me outrageous. How can the Government justify that?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I say, I am afraid the impact assessment will be published in due course.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My noble friend must accept that the Bill can be expedited and the House can be satisfied if a proper impact assessment is produced in time for Report. The whole purpose of Committee is to probe, as we are doing this afternoon and so on. However, when it comes to Report, when the House has to make significant decisions on the most sensitive piece of legislation that has been before Parliament for a very long time, it is crucial that we have all the facts at our disposal.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Of course, I hear what my noble friend says.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Regardless of when the impact assessment will be published, the Minister keeps restating issues as fact. I therefore ask: have those facts been determined by a completed impact assessment that he and his colleagues have seen and signed off?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot do more than say that the impact assessment will be published in due course.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The Minister really should say whether an impact assessment was produced. I apologise for reverting; I was the one who raised the question of the impact statement. I am not terribly happy with the message that the Minister is conveying. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, put her finger on it. Presumably the Government did their own assessment of the impact of the policy that is reflected in the Bill; therefore, an impact assessment of some kind existed. If it did not exist, I do not know how the Government could have decided to adopt this policy. If it does exist—I am sure it does, in some form or another—the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, are surely right. We are being asked to take a decision without knowing its effect. We do not know—other than breaking humanitarian law and international commitments—what practical effect the Bill will have. Therefore, before we finish Committee, the Minister should change his line and let us have it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I must disagree with the noble Lord. The point about the Bill is that we know that deterrence has effect, and we have seen that, as the Prime Minister announced this morning, in relation to the effect of our returns agreement with Albania.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his patience. Could I try this another way in relation to the debate on the impact assessment? If I am wrong about this, I want to be set right. This is not a rhetorical question; this is a genuine question about the process and purpose behind these impact assessments. I had been thinking that the purpose of these various assessments by the department was that they become part of the case for the legislation in Parliament. The department does the drafting and the policy and that is the Bill, that will be law; and to back it up, it has its case based on the evidence that it has marshalled.

If I am right about that, that gives rise to the concerns about why we are going further and further down the legislative process before the court of Parliament—if you like—without the evidence base. Of course, that is particularly important in the case of so-called illegal migration, because public expense is such a concern in the public debate about immigration: cost-benefit economic analysis is always a keen part of the debate in the Committee, in Parliament and in the public square.

Finally, on this same point about process and the impact assessment, the Minister said earlier that it was not for him to dictate what would be in the impact assessment, and I do understand that, because no Minister would want to dictate that. However, if I am right, and the purpose of these assessments is that they are part of the Government’s case for the legislation, surely it is for the Minister and his colleagues at ministerial level to sign off on the quality of this work and the soundness of the proposition in it. Perhaps the Minister could clarify that. It is not a judicial process; it is an executive process of marshalling the economic case for this legislation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

There is no statutory requirement to have a public impact assessment in relation to items of public legislation. Indeed, as I understand it, many pieces of legislation do not have one at all; so it is not a statutory requirement, as perhaps the noble Baroness seemed to suggest. Clearly, there is work done in the department behind the development of policy, and an economic impact assessment is certainly not an essential part of that process; nor is it a fundamental part. It is a part and, as I say, it will be published in due course.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, surely this is not just about statutory requirements. Will the noble Lord contrast this with the way in which the right honourable Theresa May presented to Parliament the modern slavery legislation? That was dealt with by pre-legislative scrutiny, by consensus being developed across the political parties in another place, and by getting bicameral as well as bipartisan agreement around a similarly controversial question, much of which informs this particular Bill. Will the noble Lord accept, therefore, that the expressions that have been voiced around the Chamber are as much about the integrity of Parliament and the way we do things as they are about the substance of the Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Well, I always listen intently to the noble Lord’s measured contributions. Of course, the key distinction between this Bill and the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is that this Bill is to address an emergency presently affecting our country and to stop people drowning in the channel. That is why this measure has to be taken through Parliament at pace—in order to put in place a deterrent effect that stops those journeys being made.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister has made reference to the reduction in the number of Albanians using the cross-channel route, which is the object of this Bill. I think many of us strongly welcome and support what the Government did to negotiate with Albania and return people who are economic migrants. But would he not recognise that all that is happening under powers in the Nationality and Borders Act? It is nothing to do with the legislation before us. It is not relevant, frankly, to the case of Albania. So, it would be best not to pray in aid the welcome reduction in the number of Albanians crossing the channel, which is being dealt with under existing legislation. Is that not true?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Hesitate as I do to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, relates to returns agreements. We have negotiated with Albania an effective arrangement allowing for the return of Albanians. It is more to do with that, I suggest, than with the 2022 Bill, although of course it all plays its part. It is an example which demonstrates that deterrents work.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, the Committee is entitled to ask what the Minister means by “in due course”. Specifically, will the impact assessment be available before Report? My thinking is that the House should not allow the Bill to begin Report without the impact assessment being available.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I hear what the noble Lord says. I will take back his comments, and those of others, and we can reflect on them.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, can the Minister write to him, and put a copy of the letter in the Library, on whether the impact assessment will be published before Report,?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I say, I will take the mood of the Committee back to the department.

[Lord Horam (Con)]

My Lords, as an economist I am aware of the fallibility of economic forecasts. The Governor of the Bank of England had to admit recently that the forecast for the inflationary effect was 30 years out of date. We should be wary of placing too much reliance on economic forecasts as part of any impact assessment.

Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has just said, there must be some understanding of what the likely effect will be, based on international evidence and so forth. The Government have not gone into this totally blind. Nevertheless, we are talking here about a novel situation. We just do not know what is likely to happen as a result of a deterrent effect. We do not know what effect the Nationalities and Borders Act has had, and we do not know what effect this will have. We should therefore be a little guarded about the value and importance of an impact assessment in this case.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for that intervention; he makes a very good point, with which I agree. Economic assessments are guarded with caveats, like any other economic forecast.

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be very happy to agree or disagree with whatever impact assessment arises, when I see it. How can we possibly take the advice just offered and make an opinion about something that might or might not be accurate until we see what to base our judgment on? It is an extraordinary, circular argument, from someone who wants to give a fig leaf to the Minister.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I hear what the noble Lord says, but in any Bill the economic impact assessment—where one is provided, which is not in every case—is only ever one piece of the documentation that is available in support of a Bill. The impact assessment will be published in due course; I am afraid I cannot give the noble Lord any more information. I hear what he says, and the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and will take their comments back to the department.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, on 24 May, the Minister said the same thing: that he would take our concerns back to the department. There have been nearly two weeks for the department to reflect and act on our concerns about the economic impact assessment and the child rights impact assessment—which some of us consider to be even more important.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I have nothing to add other than that it will be published in due course.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am sure that the Minister did not mean to ignore the questions that I put to him. Perhaps he has not had the chance to read today’s Times. Can he write to me on the veracity of the reports in today’s Times and, while doing so, respond to the article in the Telegraph saying that the Home Office has failed to identify sufficient detention spaces as required by the Treasury?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord well knows, it is not government policy to comment on leaks. That is a fairly long-standing convention. I do not propose to do so now.

--- Later in debate ---

To go back to the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, one of the great things that the Conservative Government did was stopping the detention of children. It was a massive step forward; I think it was the Cameron Government who did that, and said it was a disgrace that we were detaining children. Why have the Government gone back on one of the most radical and good reforms that the Cameron Government introduced? I think it would be interesting to hear the answers to some of those questions—I can hear the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, saying “Why?”—as again, it is not only principle but practicality. I think we all look forward to the Minister’s answers.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 3 sets out the power to remove unaccompanied children. This power will be exercised only in very limited circumstances ahead of an individual reaching adulthood. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, outlined, these include: reunion with the child’s parent; where the person is to be removed to a safe country of origin; where the person has not made a protection or human rights claim; or in other circumstances specified in regulations. If an unaccompanied child arrives in the UK illegally from a safe country of origin, they may be returned to their country of origin before they are 18. Of course, any such decision would be taken on a case-by-case basis.

I reassure the Committee that officials and Ministers take these decisions very seriously, with due concern for the sensitivities that have rightly been outlined by the Committee. But we need also to have in mind the profile of those who come on small boats. For context, I remind the Committee that—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Perhaps I can take the noble Lord’s question in just a moment. For context, I remind the Committee that the majority of unaccompanied children who claimed asylum in the UK in 2022 were aged 16 or 17. Where there is a dispute about age, half are found to be adults.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I hope the Minister will stop this characterisation of the effects of this Bill as being just on those who arrive by small boats. He just did it again then. Is it not the case that this affects everybody, regardless of how they get here? It is not just small boats.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Clearly, this Bill affects every person who falls within the four categories described in Clause 2, and that is all people who enter by any illegal method. Of course, at the moment, as we know, the majority of such entry is effected by small boats.

For any unaccompanied child who is removed while under 18, we will ensure that adequate reception arrangements are in place where the child is to be removed to. It is not simply a case of putting them on a plane back whence they came.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I would be grateful for the Minister to respond to my point. I read from the factsheet, as he has just done. Where in the Bill is that made that a requirement?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already made clear, the answer is that the department has stated in both Houses that this is our position. The adequacy of reception arrangements is not something you would expect to see in the Bill, and it is consistent with the present regime that is operated in relation to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me. I must make progress. Doubtless, the noble Lord will have an opportunity at the end of my remarks.

Taking these measures will send a clear message that children cannot be exploited and cross the channel in small boats for the purpose of starting a new life in the UK. The clause provides the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to remove an unaccompanied child. However, the Government consider it necessary to be alert to the people smugglers changing their tactics to circumvent the Bill. As such, it is appropriate to have a power to extend the circumstances in which it would be possible to remove an unaccompanied child via regulations. This is very much a reserve power. We have to be mindful of changes in the modus operandi of the people smugglers. I cannot give the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, examples now of how the power might be exercised but I can assure her that such regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure and therefore will need to be debated and approved by each House.

Clause 3 also sets out the power to make provisions for other exceptions to the duty to remove via regulations. This provision is important for providing the flexibility to make additional exceptions to the duty should we not want the measures in the Bill to apply to certain categories of persons. I will give one possible example of this: a person who is subject to the duty to make arrangements for removal may also be the subject for extradition proceedings and it would be appropriate for an extradition request, if approved, to take precedence over the duty to remove in Clause 2.

Amendments 14, 15 and 17 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, seek either to exclude unaccompanied children altogether from the duty to remove or only permit the removal if it was in their best interests, even when they reach 18. Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, covers similar ground. It seeks to provide for asylum and human rights claims from unaccompanied children to continue to be admissible within the UK.

All these amendments would undermine the intent of the Bill. As I have indicated, if we fill it with exceptions and carve-outs it will not achieve its aims and will serve to put more children at risk as the people smugglers would seek to fill the boats with even more young people, putting further lives at risk and splitting up families. I can confirm that since January 2018 around one-sixth of arrivals on small boats have been children aged 17 and under. We do not want an increase in this proportion or in the absolute numbers. Our asylum system is under increasing pressure from illegal migration, and the Government must take action to undercut the routes that smuggling gangs exploit by facilitating children’s dangerous and illegal entry into the United Kingdom, including via dangerous routes such as small boats.

Stopping the boats is in the best interests of small children who might otherwise make these dangerous and unnecessary journeys. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who raised the issue of a lack of safe and legal routes, I remind the Committee that the safest course for children and adults alike is to seek sanctuary in the first safe country they reach. These amendments would undermine the central premise of the Bill that if one comes to the UK via an illegal route, one will be removed and not permitted to remain in the UK and build a life here. The amendments will increase the incentive for adults to claim to be a child and encourage people smugglers to pivot and focus on bringing over more unaccompanied children via dangerous journeys. The effect would be to put more young lives at risk and split up more families. It is, I say again, in the best interests of children to enact these provisions and stop the boats. It is these amendments that will encourage the people smugglers, not the provisions in the Bill.

The noble Lords, Lord German, Lord Purvis and Lord Coaker, pressed me to set out the evidence underlying the purpose of the Bill. It is the Government’s view that if a person arriving illegally in the UK is faced with the prospect of being detained on arrival and swiftly returned to their home country, or removed to a safe third country, they will not pay the people smugglers thousands of pounds to provide them with passage across the channel.

We recognise the particular vulnerabilities in relation to unaccompanied children. That is why the Bill provides that the duty to make arrangements for removal does not apply until they reach adulthood. However, as I have explained, the Bill confers a power to remove unaccompanied children. This is not new but reflects current policy. This will be exercised, as I have said, in very limited circumstances, taking into consideration the best interests of the child. Following amendments brought by the Government at Report in the Commons, this clause now expressly sets out the circumstances in which the power to remove unaccompanied children may be exercised.

Turning to Amendment 16A, I first comment that the noble and learned Baroness set out what is likely to be an exceptional scenario. That said, she has a point in that an unaccompanied child who is subsequently adopted in the UK by a British citizen has an automatic route to British citizenship. They would therefore not be subject to the citizenship bans in Clauses 30 to 36. In this scenario, we agree that it would not be appropriate for the duty to remove to be applied to that child. We can address this by using the regulation-making power in Clause 3(7) to provide for exceptions to the duty to remove. An amendment to the Bill is, therefore, not required. In addition to adopted unaccompanied children, such regulations would also cover any other cohorts to whom the duty would apply but who exceptionally obtain British citizenship following their arrival in the UK. I hope that the noble and learned Baroness and my noble friend Lord Cormack will be reassured by this.

Amendment 18 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is on one level unnecessary in that the regulation-making power in Clause 3(7) could be used to deliver the desired outcome. However, I come back to the aim of the Bill: namely, promptly to remove from the UK those who meet the conditions in Clause 2. We have brought forward a robust legal scheme that will enable us to do just that and I urge your Lordships not to add caveats, exceptions and exemptions to the Bill such as to make the scheme unworkable.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I should add that I very much value the continued dialogue we are having with the Children’s Commissioner for England. She recently met the Immigration Minister and me, and I am due to meet her again soon to discuss the Bill.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, that point was specifically about the alignment of the Children Act with this legislation. Clauses 17 and 20, which deal with standards of accommodation, were raised by several noble Lords. Is the Minister intending to say something about that before he moves on?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Clearly there are other provisions in relation to the standards of detention in the detained estate in relation to children. In the event that they are not detained, the usual prevailing regulations will apply and I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more detail in relation to that.

The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee in relation to the regulation-making power in Clause 3(7). We are studying that committee’s report carefully and aim to respond before Report.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the use of force. We will address that point when we reach Amendment 70 on Wednesday.

In conclusion, Clause 3 adopts an appropriate balance in respect of unaccompanied children and, in those circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Committee noted the Minister confirming that there would be no duty on Ministers to ensure that adequate reception arrangements are in place for an unaccompanied minor to be received. That is tragic. Can he also answer my question with regard to the fact that the only place at the moment with which the Government have an MOU is Rwanda? Are there any facilities for children in Rwanda that the Government have agreed-?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I say, the occasions when a child will be removed will be very exceptional and the two cases that are envisaged are for family reunion, therefore reception facilities will not be required, or if it was a return to a safe country, and that of course would not arise unless it was a Rwandan child. In those circumstances, I do not see the particular purpose of the noble Lord’s question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The other category does apply. If it cannot be to the safe country of origin, it applies to the schedule countries. The only scheme that we have at the moment, if it is not a safe country, would be Rwanda, so it is a simple question: are there any facilities for children in Kigali which the Government have agreed?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I said, the power will be exercised very exceptionally. I am happy to go away and look into that point, and I will write to the noble Lord on it.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

I asked a number of questions around the child rights impact assessment. Please do not say that we will get it in due course, because I quoted from the UN committee’s guidance on impact assessments and it was very clear that it should be shaping the policy process from the word go—so it must exist. Why do we not have it? It is good that the Children’s Commissioner is now being involved in discussions, but she complained that she was not consulted prior to the publication of the Bill. Given the impact on children, surely that is grave discourtesy to the Children’s Commissioner.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

From my experience, the Children’s Commissioner was involved, certainly while the Bill was passing through the other place, but I will look further into that point on timings. However, the noble Baroness is absolutely right that it is very important that she is engaged with in full in relation to the development of this legislation in so far as my personal view goes. In relation to the point about the child impact assessment, I am afraid that, however much it will disappoint the noble Baroness, I must revert to the usual answer and say that it will be provided in due course—but I of course take away the sentiment that she has evinced.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

In relation to the situation when the child becomes 18, have the Government taken into account the impact on younger children who may have spent many years in this country and are then basically deported?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble and learned Baroness is quite right that it is a very difficult balance that we have to draw. The difficulty is that we cannot allow there to be a loophole which incentivises people smugglers to put young children into boats and expose them to greater danger. There is clearly a balancing act to be performed. There are powers in the Bill, as the noble and learned Baroness will have seen, in relation to exceptional circumstances. However, the principle is that a minor will be removed at the date of their majority. I should add, in relation to a point that was raised in the speeches, that of course children become adults at 18, and that is recognised in international instruments. I appreciate that children develop at different rates, but that is the legal position, as I am sure the noble and learned Baroness will agree.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Further to the point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, can I ask the Minister to look at this? I raised it in my remarks as well. My noble friend Lady Lister raised the case of an eight year-old. There is a problem here. I appreciate the point the Minister made, but there is a very real problem, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, mentioned. If you have a child who is 10 or 11, they will be here for eight years and will then be deported at 18. Can the Minister at least go away, have a look at this and discuss with his officials whether there is a way of being consistent with the Bill, as the Minister would have it, but also reflect on that as particular point that causes problems?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I assure the noble Lord that these points have received bags of consideration, not least from me, because they are very difficult. Of course, the length of time a child is present is a material factor. I am glad to say, as I said in my earlier remarks, that the vast bulk of children who are found in the small boats are not in the eight to 10 age bracket but are more likely to be 16 or 17. I can hear the noble Lord saying sotto voce that I have not answered the question. The answer is yes, of course I will carry on thinking about it, but it is a difficult question. In the Government’s view, we have come to the only logical solution that does not provide a very large hole in the scheme of the Act.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The Minister made reference to the balance that the Government believe there is in the Bill around unaccompanied minors and encouraging smugglers. There have been a lot of speeches in this group about the rights of the child. Article 2 says they apply to every child; Article 4 says that Governments must do all they can to make sure that every child can enjoy their rights; and Article 22 on refugee children says Governments must provide them with appropriate protection and assistance to help them enjoy all the rights of the convention. How is that balancing the rights of the child? I wonder whether the Minister could write to compare and explain—otherwise, I can see that the UK will have to withdraw itself from the rights of the child.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not need to write to answer that. The answer is that there is nothing incompatible with the UNCRC, because obviously a child who is here is having all their rights as a child respected, and if they are exceptionally removed under the circumstances described in the Bill it will be in a manner that is compliant with the UNCRC, particularly if it is for family reunion or for return to a safe country, which is presumably also a signatory to the UNCRC and will afford them their own rights.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

With the greatest respect to the Minister, we have not yet seen the detail. That is the problem. The Minister has outlined two or three areas and said there will be others. It is not clear to this Committee exactly what those details are. I will repeat the earlier request: will he please write and set them all out?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

To my mind, I have set out the detail, but of course I will go back and give it further thought.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The Minister made a slightly unconvincing effort to persuade us that what is envisaged is in the best interests of the child. It rested on a couple of planks. One was that the safest route for the child will be to stop in the first safe country they come to. Hundreds of thousands of them do. If you go to look at the camps in Turkey, Greece or the Lebanon, you see that there are hundreds of thousands of unaccompanied children who have fled from conflict zones and are there. I am not sure that it is in their best interests to be there. There is a minuscule number who come here, perhaps because they speak English and not Greek or Turkish, perhaps because they have family or connections here, or perhaps they have the possibility of a home here. I cannot see why it is in their best interests to go into the camps in the first safe country they come to you and not come to their connections, family or prospects in this country.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I know that the noble Lord and I do not agree, but the international law position is that children, and indeed asylum seekers, cannot be selective about where they wish to seek asylum. It is not an evaluative decision that an applicant can make. That is not the way the refugee convention works and, as we made clear at Second Reading, and as I think was widely accepted across the House, we sadly cannot take everyone who would want to come here—and that, I am afraid, is almost the logical corollary of what the noble Lord suggested.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister has chosen not to reply to various points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and me about conformity with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. He has simply stated, “In our view it’s fine”. The committee set up at the United Nations to overview this has considered this legislation and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, has come to the view that it needs to be amended—a view that is rejected by the Minister. Presumably the UK was represented on that committee. Can the Minister give the Committee an account of the British representative’s statement in reply to the criticisms that led to it adopting that opinion?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord knows, that is not something that I would have to hand in the course of the discussion of this amendment, but I will of course look into it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hope the Minister will forgive me, but a narrow but important point of principle was raised by both the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed; they spoke on different matters but on the same issue of principle. One case was about what would happen to a child who came to this country as an infant and was adopted; another, put by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, concerned a child who would not be returned to adequate reception arrangements. I believe that the Minister said to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that we can deal with that in regulations—so nothing to worry about there—and the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was that the Government have no intention of removing children to a country which, even if it meets the other criteria in the clause, does not have adequate reception arrangements for an unaccompanied child.

The whole structure of this so-called robust legislation is about creating tightly crafted duties to tie the hands of the Secretary of State. We know what that game is: it is about ensuring that we have, in effect, ousted the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Powers become “duties to remove” and then, because there is a little ounce of compassion in relation to children, they say they will flip the duty and so there will not be a duty but, in certain circumstances, a power to remove even unaccompanied children. Given that this is the approach of the scheme, why on earth cannot comfort be given in the Bill to both the noble and learned Baroness and the noble Lord on those two limited circumstances? Why can the Bill not say that a child who came as an infant and who has now been adopted by a British national cannot be removed? For a child who would otherwise be removable because they have an identity document—there is a thought—or sent to a country where they are a national but there are no reception arrangements, why can it not be a criteria that there should be adequate reception arrangements? Why cannot that be in a Bill that is so tightly and robustly drawn by the Home Office?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness is always a powerful advocate but, in this instance, these provisions are already clear. As I have said, and for the reasons that I have explained, there is no need, in those limited circumstances, for further exploration in the Bill. As I have said, these are things that we can explore, and doubtless will return to in other parts of the Bill, but for the moment I am afraid there is no need for further additions in relation to those areas.

[Lord Touhig (Lab)]

In 28 years of service in this House and the other place, I have never had more difficulty in getting an answer to a question.

The Minister has responded several times, and I spoke about it earlier this afternoon. He confirms that local authorities alone have the statutory power to look after these unaccompanied migrant children. He confirms in a Written Answer that the Home Office does not have corporate parent responsibility. So can he tell us which Act of Parliament the Home Office is using to detain these children and put them into these hotels, or—I always say never assume but I am going to break my rule—are we to assume that the Government know they are acting unlawfully?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I must apologise to the noble Lord for not addressing that point in my remarks; I did mean to do so. It is a topic that the House has canvassed in Oral Questions on a number of occasions, particularly, as I seem to remember, in the winter of last year.

The present position will change when this Bill passes. As the noble Lord will have seen, there are provisions in the Bill relating to the transfer of responsibility for children, which set out the responsibility in the context of unaccompanied children. If the noble Lord looks, for example, at Clause 16, he will see that it concerns

“The power to transfer children from Secretary of State to local authority and vice versa”.


The present position arose as a result of the way in which the emergency in the channel has come about. As I said in my Answer, which was very fairly read out by the noble Lord, the clear position is that the responsibility should be for the local authorities, save for the circumstances described in Clauses 15 to 20.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

In trying to answer my question, the Minister just reiterated what it says in the equality impact assessment. It was an important question. If the central tenet of the Bill is that children—accompanied or unaccompanied—not being given any dispensation will act as a deterrent, where is the evidence for that? In answering, the Minister said that this was the view of the department. Well it is the view of some children that the tooth fairy exists but, looking at the empirical evidence, it is quite clear that this may not be so. My question is clear: on what empirical evidence is the view of the department built, and when will this House get to see that evidence?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is a fairly standard rhetorical tool to ask where the evidence is but in this kind of field we have to operate looking forwards as to what might happen as a consequence of legislation, applying our own experience, and particularly that of the department in administering the UK border. It is the department, I would suggest, that is in a position to come to a view on these matters. It is not simply a case of some unqualified person reaching that assessment. The net effect is that it is the opinion of the department—

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Based on what?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is the opinion of the department that a person would not pay a people smuggler to cross the channel if they were going to be detained and removed. It stands to reason, whatever the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, might shout from a sedentary position.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

So the Minister agrees that this is not just about small boats; this is about the whole refugee and immigration system. Where is the evidence that the provisions in this Bill will meet the central issue that the Government wish to address and act as a deterrent to children, whether accompanied or unaccompanied. Where is the evidence?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Obviously, as these provisions are not in force, there is no evidence of the impact of these measures. The noble Lord appears to require me to look into a crystal ball. We can make reasonable conjectures about the effect of these measures, and that is what we have done.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

Some time ago, the Minister asked me if I was willing to withdraw my amendment; I have a feeling that I ought to respond to that request.

This has been an extraordinary debate; I have never known there to be a debate following a request of the person to withdraw their amendment. The speeches from right across the Committee have been extraordinarily and unbelievably powerful because of course this is such an emotive subject. This Government want to detain and lock up children—accompanied, not unaccompanied, in the middle of an adoption or whatever else—in the most appalling accommodation. We know that, because this Government want to copy the model of the Greek islands, where the national view is that that accommodation is unacceptable and inhumane. We know that. That is what the Home Secretary wants to do. It is not surprising that people feel rather strongly against that proposal. That is just part of the proposition. The other is that, once children grow up, whether they are unaccompanied, adopted, leading normal lives over here or whatever else, they should be removed from this country, and of course regulations may determine the circumstances in which they may be required to be removed.

This is an appalling Bill, if I may say so. In a way, the application of the Bill to children just sums up the depth of the inhumanity of this Bill. I like to think that our Minister perhaps does have humanity and that he does respect our international obligations, and our 1989 Act and the rest of it—but he is acting and speaking on behalf of the Home Secretary, and I do seriously question whether she has the humanity that we all want her to have.

It was very important that we not only heard incredibly powerful speeches from the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and Cross-Benchers, but also that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, made a point on which I think we all agree: this Bill does not reflect what we on any Bench expect from the Conservative Party. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. That is why there is such an incredible unanimity of view that these clauses—Clause 3, Clause 4 and the rest of them—should not stand part of this Bill.

All I can do here is, for today, withdraw Amendment 14 on the basis that without a doubt these matters will return on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group focuses on the disregarding of protection claims, trafficking claims, human rights claims and judicial review, as outlined first in Clause 4. This is quite a large group, with different strategies to remove or edit Clause 4 to remove the duty on the Secretary of State to declare human rights claims and other claims inadmissible if the person arrives into the UK illegally.

My noble friend Lord Dubs has tabled Amendment 23, which would mean that a protection or human rights claim must be considered if the person has not been removed within six months. In his very eloquent speech he said that it would have the effect of trying to reduce the number of people who are effectively in a permanent limbo—he gave the figure of 160,000 who are stuck in this status. As he said, the amendment goes a little way to ameliorating this position. I am glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Coventry supports my noble friend.

My other noble friend Lord Hunt’s series of amendments beginning with Amendment 19A would ensure that potential and recognised victims of trafficking would not be removed before they got the opportunity to submit an application to the national referral mechanism and have it considered. His amendments would remove trafficking from the list of claims that the Secretary of State can ignore, so although they would help trafficking victims, they would not help others making claims under different legislation, which would remain on the list. In my noble friend’s speech he referred to the Liberty brief, which I also found extremely helpful, and to the statistics there about the increase in the NRM claims we have seen over recent years, to which the Home Office makes particular reference. My noble friend made the point that the Bill as currently drafted would dissuade victims of modern slavery from coming forward.

As a youth magistrate, I very much recognise the point about the modern slavery system and the national referral system getting completely overwhelmed by the number of referrals into that method of checking for modern slavery. Certainly, in my experience as a youth magistrate, it almost logjammed the system of reviewing what I might call normal criminal cases referred into the NRM, which were sometimes stuck in that system for literally one or two years.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, gave a couple of very appropriate anecdotes. He did not particularly explain the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, but, as he said, they were fully explained by the noble and learned Lord himself. I think the central point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was making was that the people who find themselves making appeals are not an unworthy cohort. They very often win their claims, so surely we should be reinforcing and backing up the systems we have signed up to in international law for protecting claims of legitimate claimants.

I think all other noble Lords supported my noble friend Lord Hunt’s amendments; in fact, most noble Lords supported all the amendments in this group. I just want to make a particular aside to the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, who also supported my noble friend Lord Hunt. As he will know, he facilitated a trip for me to Ballymena district court, where I sat in on a youth court. I found it very interesting that the Modern Slavery Act has not been enacted in Northern Ireland. I have tried to get an explanation for that but, as far as I know, I have not received one. Although I am sure that the noble Lord supports the Modern Slavery Act, I find it surprising that the Act has not been enacted for young people in Northern Ireland.

As I said, I think all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments have supported them. In many ways they go to the heart of the Bill, because it is where the Government are seeking to step away from some of the commitments they have made in a number of treaties and in a number of different forums over many decades. It is for the Government to justify why they should take such a radical step.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 4 provides that if a person meets any of the four conditions set out in Clause 2, regardless of any claim made by an individual, including a protection claim, a human rights claim against their country of nationality or citizenship, a claim as a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, or an application for judicial review in relation to their removal, they will still fall under the duty to remove.

As such, if a protection or human rights claim is made, this will be declared as inadmissible. Inadmissibility is a long-standing process and is explicitly provided for in UK law, most recently in the strengthened provisions in the Nationality and Borders Act. So although the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was praising the innovation of the Home Office, the concept of inadmissibility is indeed a long-standing one that appeared in immigration legislation from the turn of the millennium.

As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, correctly identified, Clause 4 is critical to the Bill. By expanding the scope of existing inadmissibility provisions to apply to anyone who has arrived illegally to the UK, the Government’s intention is made clear: namely, that those who fear persecution should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach and not put their lives at risk by making unnecessary and dangerous journeys to the UK.

We know that some people make spurious claims in a conscious attempt to frustrate their removal. Provisions in Clause 4 will restrict the right to challenge the decision to remove those who enter the UK illegally. In doing so, it will put a stop to the endless merry-go-round of legal challenges that those with no right to be here use to thwart their removal. In 2022 there were 60% more small boat arrivals—45,755—than in 2021, when there were 28,526. Our asylum system is consequently under significant pressure, and with this inexorable rise in the number of illegal arrivals adding more pressures to our health, housing, educational and welfare services, the Government must take action and prioritise support for those who are most in need.

We remain committed to working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify those who are most in need so that the UK remains a safe haven for the most vulnerable. Once illegal migration is under control, we will create more safe and legal routes following consultation with local authorities, and that will be subject to an annual cap set by Parliament—we will come on to debate those provisions later in Committee.

The Bill will send an unequivocal message that if you come to the UK on a small boat or via another illegal route, you will never be able to return to the UK or build a life here. It is only right that we prioritise people who come here safely and legally, and it is unfair that those who enter illegally should benefit over those who play by the rules. If people know that there is no way for them to stay in the UK, they will not risk their lives and pay criminals thousands of pounds to get here.

Having set out the purpose of Clause 4, I turn to the specific amendments. First, Amendment 19A and the other amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, effectively seek to exclude all potential victims of modern slavery from the duty to remove and the associated detention powers until a conclusive grounds decision has been made following a referral to the national referral mechanism, or NRM.

There is no escaping that, regrettably, the NRM affords opportunities for those who enter the UK unlawfully to frustrate their removal. In 2022, there were around 17,000 referrals to the NRM—the highest annual number to date and a 33% increase on 2021, when there were 12,706, and a 625% increase on 2014, when there were 2,337. The average time taken from referral to conclusive grounds decisions made in 2022 across the competent authorities was 543 days. Given these decision times, it is self-evident that, were the noble Lord’s amendments to be made, the intentions of this Bill—namely, to deter illegal entry and to allow for the swift removal of those who do enter illegally—would be undermined.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. I am listening very carefully to what he is saying regarding the loophole. My understanding is that a referral to the NRM can be made only by a first responder authorised by the Home Office; that first responders have to be certified for their professionalism by the Home Office; and that the referral mechanism goes to a dedicated individual within the Home Office. Why is the Home Office so incompetent that it is allowing this system to abuse itself, given the fact that only the Home Office and first responders can refer?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is not the Home Office abusing itself—to use the noble Lord’s phrase. The reality is that it is the large number of claims made by people advised to make claims, often at the last minute, in order to delay removal. When people are referred to the national referral mechanism, they give an account of slavery that then requires investigation. A threshold is applied that means that the allegations are looked into, and the number of people making applications now has given rise to the length of time to determine those claims.

If I may, I will respond to points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Morrow.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

If I may—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, at the end. I can confirm that removing this incentive is compliant with our international obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings—ECAT. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld from potential victims of trafficking on grounds of public order. There is a clear and unprecedented threat to public order through the loss of lives and the pressure on public services that illegal entry to the UK is causing. I again remind noble Lords that the number of small boat crossings has risen from 8,500 in 2020 to over 45,000 last year. We will have a fuller debate in respect of the modern slavery provisions when we reach Clauses 21 to 28 in Committee, but I cannot agree to the noble Lord’s proposition that the foundation of those provisions in subsection (1)(c) be removed from the Bill.

Amendment 20, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, seeks to strike out subsection (1)(d), the effect of which would be to enable any judicial review to put a block on removal until the legal proceedings had been concluded. It seems to me that the key words—and perhaps I could invite the noble Lord to refer to the Bill—are in Clause 4(1)(d), which relates to an application for judicial review in relation to their removal. As my noble friend Lord Horam indicated, such an amendment would again undermine a key feature of the scheme provided for in the Bill. We must stop the endless cycle of late and repeated challenges that frustrate removal under the current law. Of course, it is right to say, too, that there is no general block on non-suspensive judicial review provided for in the Bill.

The Bill provides for two types of claims that would suspend removal, and we will come on to those in due course in Committee. Those provisions provide sufficient remedies to challenge a removal notice and afford the necessary protection to a person suffering serious and irreversible harm were they to be removed to the specified third country. All other legal challenges, whether on ECHR grounds or otherwise, should be non-suspensive. Therefore, Clause 4(1)(d), read with Clause 52, does not oust judicial reviews; those provisions are simply making it clear that any judicial review cannot block removal.

As regards Amendment 21, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I have already indicated that inadmissibility is not a new concept. It has been a feature of the UK asylum system for some time and is already enshrined in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. While I welcome the Constitution Committee’s scrutiny of the Bill, I cannot accept its characterisation of the provisions as having significant rule of law implications. What does have significant implications for the rule of law, I suggest, is tens of thousands of people arriving on our shores each year in defiance of immigration laws. These individuals should be claiming asylum in the first safe country they reach, and, in these circumstances, it is legitimate to declare any protection claims inadmissible to the UK system.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked what would happen to an asylum or human rights claim that had been declared inadmissible, but where the person had had their factual or suspensive claim accepted. In such a case, the person’s claim would be considered under the existing law. That might include existing inadmissibility provisions. I again remind the Committee that inadmissibility is a long-standing process intended to support the first safe country principle. It is an established part of the international asylum procedures applied across the EU and specifically provided for in UK law, most recently in the strengthened provisions introduced in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. In the circumstances that he accurately sets out, could a declaration of inadmissibility be reversed so that the human rights claim or the protection claim could proceed in the normal way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The provisions of the Bill in relation to that are a little involved, and I will write to the noble Lord.

Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, also deals with inadmissibility. It seeks to provide for asylum and human rights claims from those who have not been removed within six months to continue to be admissible within the UK. In effect, the amendment seeks to perpetuate our current broken asylum system. Again, it seeks to chip away at and put holes into the scheme provided for in the Bill, undermining its coherence and effectiveness. This amendment would regrettably again encourage illegal migrants to use every tactic to frustrate their removal, in the knowledge that after six months their asylum claim would be processed. Moreover, the amendments would unfairly result in individuals who have arrived illegally in the UK being prioritised alongside those who have availed themselves of our safe and legal routes—something which, I suggest to the Committee, is manifestly unfair.

The Bill must send a clear message that if you come to the UK via an illegal route, you will never be able to return to the UK or build a life here. The benefits of settlement should be open only to those who abide by our rules. The whole construct of the scheme is to enable illegal migrants to be removed within days and weeks, not months and years. There is no prospect of someone being left in perpetual limbo, as suggested by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Coventry. Amendment 23 is therefore redundant. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, or his proxy, not to press Amendment 20.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister answer the question that I put to him about the disapplication of a national referral mechanism in the case of children, a point which has been raised by the Children’s Commissioner? If he does not have the answer now, can he write to me?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me; I intended to address the noble Lord’s point in relation to that. Obviously, the provisions in Clause 4 make specific reference to the power to remove children, which is contained in Clause 3. That in itself is a safeguard to protect the welfare of children. It operates in a way that promotes the interests of children, I suggest, but I am happy to look further at that point and will take it away.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Can I clarify the point that I was making? The Minister alluded to maybe coming back to me. He implied that the problem arose with those who claim, when arriving here under what the Government say is an illegal route, that they are victims of trafficking. The review of that happens only after a referral is made, and there cannot be a self-referral. He seemed to blame the threshold on which that assessment is made as to whether a first responder then submits that person to the NRM. That threshold is the Home Office threshold and the first responders are Home Office- licensed. Why does the Minister think that the Home Office is getting it so wrong?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I disagree. The Home Office is not getting it wrong. As I already set out in my remarks, the numbers of people claiming to have been modern slaves in this scenario indicates that there is extensive abuse. I do not think that the noble Lord could say anything else, looking at the very persuasive statistics of people in detention. I simply do not agree with him on that point.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

If we have found that there is no loophole in the system, that is good—so it is just the numbers. Therefore if the number of those who are trafficked goes up, that is the problem. It is not that there is a loophole in the system meaning that a higher proportion are falsely claiming that they are being trafficked. What message does that say around the world? The UK is now blind to the individual merit of a young woman being trafficked if there are many young women being trafficked—that is when we close our doors.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is not the case. Much as we might wish it to be, the simple reality, I am afraid, is that our modern slavery protections are being abused. The measures in the Bill directly address that.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If they are being abused, what is the percentage success rate of people who were referred in the last two years?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those statistics to hand, but I can write—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I can help the Minister. I think it is 82% and 91%, on average. The issue is therefore that, once these cases have been looked at, the Home Office is granting people asylum based on them being part of the modern slavery system.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord will be aware that there are two stages to the process—a reasonable grounds decision and a conclusive grounds decision—and different statistics. A light touch has hitherto been applied in relation to reasonable grounds. I will need to look into the precise statistics and revert to him on that. I am afraid I do not recognise those statistics immediately, so they will require further research.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

24: Clause 4, page 6, line 21, leave out “or citizen”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

25A: Clause 4, page 6, line 30, at end insert “, and
(c) any other application to a court or tribunal which is required by an enactment to be determined by applying the principles that would be applied by a court on an application within paragraph (a) or (b).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment expands the definition in the Bill of “application for judicial review” to cover in particular an application to the judicial review jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal or the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

28: Clause 5, page 7, line 8, leave out “or citizen”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 5th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

31: Clause 5, page 7, line 24, after “Convention,” insert “or has obtained a passport or other document of identity in such a country,”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 7, line 17.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

34: Clause 5, page 8, line 5, after “2002,” insert “and has not obtained a passport or other document of identity in such a country,”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 7, line 17.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

38: Clause 5, page 8, line 28, after “State” insert “, or who has obtained a passport or other document of identity in that State,”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 7, line 17.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group centres around Clause 7, as we have heard, and seeks clarification on procedures which outline the provisions about removal. There are several smaller amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, on the details of removal. Probably the most important amendment is Amendment 55, in the name of the noble Baroness, which would ensure that the Government produce guidance on the criteria by which individuals will be prioritised for full removal.

In her very extensive introduction, the noble Baroness asked who P’s representative can be when going through this process. Should the representative be a lawyer, someone from an NGO or some other status of representative? If I might be allowed a short recollection, I sat in on an immigration tribunal at Hatton Cross as a member of the public. I was astonished that neither the applicant going through the immigration tribunal process, nor their representative, spoke English. That was the reality of the situation that I witnessed. I very much hope that, in the sorts of examples that we are talking about in this Bill, P will be properly informed about the processes that they are going through, that they know what their rights are and that they can make their decisions as appropriate.

Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, is about the requisition of services by private actors and companies. He explained his amendment very fully. It may be unfortunate that this overlaps a lot with group 3, as my noble friend Lord Davies has just said, but nevertheless that is where we are. My noble friend asked about representations and what consultation has been done with the trade union movement about who will be asked to play their part in working in these companies. I would be very interested to hear the Minister’s answer to my noble friend’s questions.

On the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—I will not even attempt the rhetoric of the noble Baroness; it is just not my style—the point, nevertheless, is that the recipient needs to understand what is being said to them and the language must be appropriate. This is a common-sense amendment. It is a simple amendment. I hope that the Minister can indicate that some form of wording can be found in this Bill to ensure that P, who is the subject concerned, understands what is happening to them. We support the amendments in this group.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 7 makes provision for a removal notice to be given to a person and specifies what information this must contain. Each notice must specify that the individual is to be removed under the duty, be clear on their destination and set out a claim period in which to make a factual suspensive claim or a serious harm suspensive claim. That is, of course, suspensive of removal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, described her Amendment 55 as a probing amendment, seeking to elicit our intentions as to the order in which individuals will be removed from the UK under the duty to remove in Clause 2. The whole purpose of the Bill is to remove persons who satisfy the conditions as soon as practicable. On the day of commencement, we will be dealing with two separate cohorts. First, there will be those who enter the UK illegally on or after the commencement date. Putting unaccompanied children to one side, as we already have debated how they will be considered, our aim will be to process new arrivals as quickly as possible as they arrive. Clearly, the speed with which individuals are removed will depend on whether they consent to a voluntary departure or, if not, whether they make a suspensive claim. Secondly, as we have discussed, the Bill will have a retrospective effect and the duty to remove will apply to those who entered illegally on or after 7 March this year. Where, in the case of this cohort, any asylum or human rights claim has not been decided by the commencement date, we will commence removal action in accordance with the duty in Clause 2, in parallel with the enforcement action that is being taken against new arrivals.

I assure the Committee that the necessary planning is under way to support the effective and efficient implementation of the Bill, which will ensure that we have an integrated and robust end-to-end process from arrival through to removal. This will cover the use of detention, case-working operation, management of appeals and the logistics associated with the returns themselves. I agree with the noble Baroness that development of robust guidance and training will be a key component across all of this. However, while work on implementation is well under way, we should not get ahead of ourselves. First, we must get the Bill on to the statute book in a form that is operable. We cannot be legislating for a scheme that is so full of holes that it is unworkable.

Amendment 55A seeks to probe how the process will operate, should an individual indicate that they do not wish to make a suspensive claim. If an individual notifies the Secretary of State that they do not intend to make a suspensive claim, the person may be removed to the country or territory which they have been given notice of. As the noble Baroness suggests, such notification may be to an immigration officer or a Home Office official. Where it is given orally, it will be duly recorded. I hope that affords an answer to her point.

Amendment 56, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would set out in statute two additional requirements to the notice, which must be given to the person before they may be removed—that it is provided in a language which they understand and provides information on how to access legal advice. It would be prohibitively expensive to provide translations of decision notices in all possible languages and dialects up front, and there would be a time delay in doing this on an individual basis. It is therefore more efficient to work with interpreters. It is already our current policy to ensure, when serving notices in person, that the contents are explained to the individual in a language which they understand, using interpretation services where required. We also provide information on how to access legal services where relevant.

On the question of legal advice, I reassure the Committee and the noble Lord that, in giving this notice, we will ensure that we also provide information on how to access any legal advice which individuals are entitled to and on how to make a voluntary departure. We will discuss this further in relation to the legal aid provisions, which will come before the Committee in the next few days. Therefore, it is unnecessary to put these additional requirements into the statute.

Amendment 57, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, deals with the legal obligations that these provisions place on transport operators. The noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Balfe raised the same point. This amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out, overlaps with his own group of amendments, which we are debating in the next group. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord German, will be content if I deal with the substance of his Amendment 57 when we reach Amendment 57B.

Amendment 57A seeks to test the drafting of Clause 7(8), where it refers to a vehicle being

“specified or indicated in the direction”.

A direction “specifying” a ship, train, aircraft or vehicle may refer to a particular ship et cetera scheduled to depart at a specified date and time, whereas a direction “indicating” a ship may be a more generic item, for example, specifically or simply referring to a flight to depart that day rather than to a particular flight. Moreover, I point out that the drafting here is drawn from and reflects long-established terminology used in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.

I will deal briefly with Clause 9. It simply makes a number of consequential amendments to existing immigration legislation to ensure that it works smoothly. There is no contradiction alongside the new provisions for removal in the Bill.

To respond to the noble Lord, Lord German, persons served with a removal notice will have eight days to submit a suspensive claim beginning from the day that they were given such a notice. We will come on to Clause 54 in due course; as I have already said, it provides for free legal advice for those issued with a removal notice. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Bach, persons subject to the duty to remove will have access to advice.

[Lord German (LD)]

I was interested in two stages. The Minister has talked about when the notice of removal is issued. Presumably there is also a statement of inadmissibility when you have arrived, because it takes some time to prepare the document or whatever the detail is for a removal certificate or notice. Is there an earlier notice? If so, is that the place where people can seek advice?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not have the answer to that at my fingertips but, if I may, I will revert to the noble Lord with it. I suspect that the availability of legal advice will be drawn to the attention of individuals at the earliest possible time, but I will check that point and come back to the noble Lord.

In conclusion, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made some valid points on which I will further reflect. I hope I have at least gone some way to respond to the probing amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. On that basis, I ask whether she is content to withdraw her Amendment 55.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is Committee stage and, as the whole Committee knows, that is what I will do.

On this amendment, the Minister said, possibly twice, that things will be done “as soon as practicable”, but we know that not very much is practicable. It sounds like a parallel, idealised—well, it is not ideal to me but it may be in the Government’s mind—universe where all is possible. On the previous group, my noble friend referred to being somewhere within the wizardry of Oz. I do not know who is which character, and perhaps it would be inappropriate to speculate. However, the point about uncertainty in the minds of the individuals concerned is serious, which is why I made it earlier.

I do not think the Minister answered my question on Amendment 55A about whether notification can be given by a representative of the individual and whether that has to be a legal representative or could be a support worker from an organisation in the sector. Is he able to respond to that now?

[Lord German (LD)]

I also asked a question to which the Minister did not reply, about a person escaping from South Sudan via Kenya. Kenya would be treated as an unsafe country because it is in Schedule 1. Could the Minister respond to that when he has a moment?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I apologise for not answering the noble Baroness’s question. Yes, is the answer; representatives could be provided in that way.

To reply to the hypothetical situation that the noble Lord referred to about someone from South Sudan travelling via Kenya, it would depend on the facts of the specific case and whether the conditions were met. It is perhaps not directly relevant to the debate we are having on this amendment, but I am happy to consider that hypothetical in more detail and write to the noble Lord.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

To be absolutely clear, is the Minister saying that notification can be given via any representative and that they do not have to be qualified in a particular way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That is certainly my understanding. If the situation is any different, I will let the noble Baroness know.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I think that is quite important, as it matters how these things work in practice. Having said that, and as I indicated, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Davies for Amendments 57B and 58A, which I think are very worthy and have signed. They encapsulate the points that I and many noble Lords have made throughout the passage of the Bill so far, and no doubt will in the future, that it is not only issues of principle that concern many of us with respect to this but that many of the provisions are simply unworkable and raise serious questions.

If noble Lords have not done so already, it is worth taking up the point of the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, and reading Clause 7(12)(a) and (b), which is at the heart of this group of amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, pointed out, the captain of a ship or aircraft, the manager of a train or the driver of a vehicle must conform to the directions of an immigration officer to detain an individual and stop them escaping. That is not only if it is reasonable to do so or if it is something you could understand them doing; they must do it—they have no choice. I do not know about some of the lorry drivers the Minister knows, but good luck with that. The serious point was made that the language barrier will be enormous, or at least significant, in many of those instances.

I have some specific questions, and they repeat and reinforce some of the points that have been made. Can the Minister explain how the captain of a ship, a lorry driver or a train manager—that is who we are talking about here—will detain these people? If the immigration officer requires them to detain someone, how are they meant to do that? As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, ably put it, given that they are not warranted officers and do not have the powers of police officers or other individuals, what force can they use? “Excuse me, please do not get out of my lorry. I have been required by the immigration officers to stop you”—I am not sure that that would work, but let us say it does. But if it does not, and the person tries to get out, what can they do to stop them? I hope the Minister can explain that. The problem is that if they do not stop them, they can be prosecuted. One of the noble Lords who contributed said that it is not that they might be prosecuted but that they will be prosecuted if they do not conform. What happens if they try but the person escapes? Who decides whether they have tried enough—that they have gone to a sufficient extent to prevent the person leaving? Knowing the practicalities of this would be useful.

Clause 7 says “vehicle”, which means a lorry, but does it also mean a car or a campervan? If you are a driver of a car and somebody is in the back, do you have to stop them getting out on the direction of an immigration officer? Is it the same rules for children as for adults? The Minister will say I am nitpicking, but we are in Committee and that is the whole point of Committee. Whether for a lorry driver, train manager or car driver, we need to know whether the Government assume that you can do the same with children and what force is applicable with respect to children vis-à-vis an adult. There are, as I say, a significant number of questions.

The last point I want to make, which was raised by my noble friend Lord Davies, is about the detention period for which someone can force a person to stay in their train, on their aircraft or in their car. What is the reasonable length of time? How does it work? I think the Bill may say a few hours but what happens when that expires? The Secretary of State is then required to say that it can be extended. How does that work? How is the driver informed about that? On the practicalities, the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, made a really interesting point, which again sounds like nitpicking. If you are a train driver or a lorry driver, and you arrive somewhere and are required to stay there for 12 hours or 24 hours, what rights do you have? Are you required to stay there, or can you pass it on to somebody else to take over from you and carry on with that period of detention?

My noble friend Lord Davies and the unions, and others who have supported them, have raised a series of important questions about why the detail is so important and why many of us have questions about not only the principles of the Bill but some of the proposals in it and the workability of them.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 7 includes requirements for various persons, such as owners and agents of a ship, aircraft, train or vehicle, the captain of a ship or aircraft, the train manager or the driver of a vehicle, to comply with directions for an individual’s removal from the UK. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, has explained in his Amendments 57B, 58A and 71B that he seeks to probe the legal obligations these provisions place on transport operators.

If I may, I will address the point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about whether this relates to private vehicles. The answer is that it is related to scheduled or chartered services, not individual cars or campervans.

I would like to make it absolutely clear that the Government are not making transport workers or operators undertake immigration functions. Clearly, I am in agreement with much of what we have heard during the debate on this group. That is not something we would want to do. Nor are the provisions in Clause 7 about commandeering vessels or vehicles, as was suggested in the debate on the last group; we can and do make arrangements for removal by scheduled services or chartered services. Nor are these new requirements; they reflect provisions that are already in place in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 for arranging the removal of persons not subject to the new duty in the Bill but otherwise liable to removal from the UK.

Having placed a person on board a ship, aircraft, train or vehicle for their removal from the UK, it is only reasonable that the Secretary of State or an immigration officer may require the relevant captain, manager or driver to prevent the person disembarking while that vehicle, ship, aircraft or train is still in the UK, and effectively keep that person in their custody until they have reached the destination. Clause 9(2), which is the subject of Amendment 58A, then applies the relevant existing criminal offences in Section 27 of the Immigration Act 1971—which already apply to carriers who fail to act under instructions to remove a person under that Act—to instructions to remove a person under the powers set out in this Bill.

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[Lord German (LD)]

We are discussing the issues raised in the previous group and I accept that the Minister wants to talk about them now. I also accept that there are provisions in existing law. Perhaps the Minister can tell us why, therefore, the Government need to put these provisions into the Bill if there is already legislation that stands by that. The difference that I can perceive is the requisitioning of services, particularly transport services. That may be slightly different from what we had before. If the Minister cannot say exactly why these provisions are needed, because they are already in existing powers, there is no point putting them into the Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The powers in Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act will continue to apply to those being removed who are not subject to the new duty in the Bill but are otherwise liable to removal from the UK. The powers in the Bill will relate to those who fall within the cohort in Clause 2. They provide clarity and certainty by being present in the Bill in this context. It is also clearly right that the 1971 Act powers need to be applied to the Bill, so that is the purpose for their inclusion. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I hope I conceded earlier that we know that there have been directions issued to captains and others since the 1971 Act; that is not in contention. My concern, given the greater controversy of a forced duty to remove people who have not even had a refugee claim considered, and given the larger numbers that the Government clearly anticipate in relation to this policy, is about some of the detail. The Minister said that we need greater clarity, but that greater clarity will bring greater concern. I personally do not remember all this deeming of legal custody and the criminalisation of transport workers, certainly not in the original 1971 Act. Maybe more of that has happened over the years.

I ask the Minister to go back to the issues of policy and principle, and not just to rely on the precedent of the creep of legislation forcing these duties on transport workers. Whether that creep has happened or not—I can see that it has—some of us are really concerned about where it has gone. He said that this has passed without comment or controversy but that is not the case, is it? Every so often, somebody dies while being removed because of the coercion and force that is necessarily involved. If the people using that force are not prison guards, soldiers or police officers, but just common or garden transport workers, there is a real concern and controversy. I would be very grateful if the Minister would address that as a matter of principle.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I do not agree with the noble Baroness that there is a substantive difference in the fact that the people being removed under the Bill have had their asylum claims rendered inadmissible, because under the present law categories of people have inadmissible asylum claims and they too are subject to removal. They have been subject to the powers in the pre-existing legislation, so I am afraid I do not accept the premise of her intervention.

I should add that we regularly read of instances where there is disorder on an aircraft or instances where a pilot is obliged to land somewhere; then the doors are opened and the police remove a person from the aircraft. That detention can be as simple as keeping the doors closed until the agents of the law arrive to remove the necessary people, and similarly on trains with electric doors. The effecting of the detention is not going to be overly burdensome on the operators as a result of these provisions.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Lister for introducing this group of amendments, which concern the duty to remove those who are not detained, and their access to support because they would be otherwise destitute.

Clause 8 amends relevant legislation to provide support on the same basis as for those whose claims are declared inadmissible under Section 80A or 80B of the 2002 Act. My noble friend introduced her amendments in great detail. They would allow for appeals to be made on decisions around support. They would allow financial support to be provided where accommodation support is not needed. They would allow people awaiting decisions on accommodation support to be provided with interim accommodation. They make it clearer that if someone has not yet been removed from the UK, despite the duty from the Secretary of State to do so, they face a genuine obstacle. As my noble friend said, the Government must ensure that no one awaiting deportation faces destitution and danger.

Given the questions about the Government’s ability to actually remove people given the lack of returns agreements, what assessment have the Government made of the support that will be needed? We read in the newspapers that the Government are renting two more barges. Of course, the numbers the barges can accommodate will not touch the sides of the amount of accommodation that will be needed.

My noble friend Lady Lister and the noble Lord, Lord German, asked a number of detailed questions, as did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who I suspect is getting his train as we speak. As the right reverend Prelate said, in practice it will be local authorities, faith groups and voluntary organisations which will be picking up the pieces if there is not adequate government support for people who find themselves in this position. I will listen to the Minister’s response with interest.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 8 ensures that there is support available to individuals who would otherwise be destitute where their asylum claims have been declared inadmissible, pending their removal from the United Kingdom. It also seeks to incentivise those whose asylum claims have been declared inadmissible to comply with the arrangements to remove them from the UK, whether that be to their country of origin—where it is safe to do so—or to a safe third country. These provisions will support the overall objective of the Bill and ensure that those who come to the UK illegally will not be able to stay. Pending their removal, we will ensure that we support those who are complying with arrangements for removal. I make no apology for introducing these measures to protect and preserve the integrity of our asylum and migration system.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for setting out her amendments to Clause 8. Amendments 57C and 57F seek to create a right of appeal against a decision to refuse an application for support under Section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which would take effect only if supporting provisions in the Immigration Act 2016 are brought into force. The Government keep these matters under review but I can answer the noble Baroness’s question directly: there are no current plans to bring those measures into force, and so we consider these amendments unnecessary. Therefore, those who are refused support under Section 4 of the 1999 Act will still be able to appeal the decision.

Similarly, we do not consider Amendment 57D necessary. As I have told noble Lords frequently throughout Committee, our intention is to detain and swiftly remove people. We expect that the overwhelming majority of those who fall within the scope of the duty to remove will need accommodation as well as financial support. These individuals will therefore be provided with financial support to meet their essential living needs, pending their removal from the UK.

Although I recognise the intention behind Amendment 57E, the Government do not consider it necessary to provide a statutory basis on which to provide temporary support. As I have said, our intention is to detain and swiftly remove those who enter illegally and meet the conditions in Clause 2. The details of how the scheme will work in practice, including the support provided during this interim period, are currently under active consideration. We are confident that there is sufficient scope to be able to provide adequate support to individuals pending a determination of their application under Section 4 of the 1999 Act. Obviously, we will bear in mind the contributions made during this short debate.

Finally, Amendment 57G seeks to amend uncommenced provisions in the Immigration Act 2016 and, in so doing, alter the long-standing position that Section 4 support would be available only to people who face a genuine obstacle in leaving the UK. The Government have no plans to implement the 2016 Act provisions in the immediate future; even if we were to do so, we see no need to alter the existing approach to eligibility under Section 4 for this group of people. Eligibility for Section 4 support is a long-standing position. As long as individuals whom we support pending their removal co-operate with the process, they will remain eligible for support.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord German, and the train-bound right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham asked about the Section 4 application form. We are working on the arrangements for implementing these provisions. As part of that, we will consider what changes, if any, are required to the Section 4 application form.

Where necessary, the Government will provide accommodation and basic support for those who are subject to the duty to make arrangements for removal and who are not being detained pending their removal. In answer to the right reverend Prelate, I can assure him that, with the changes made by Clause 8, we consider that there is sufficient legislative cover to provide such support where a person would otherwise be left destitute. On that basis, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, including the right reverend Prelate, in his absence; we know that he had to get his train. I am also grateful to the Minister for answering more questions than I expected him to be able to.

I am disturbed by the proposition that it is not necessary to provide a statutory basis for temporary support because the intention is to remove people quickly. The Government are the only people who think that removal will be quick. All the organisations on the ground predict a state of semi-permanent limbo—purgatory, as some of them have called it. There needs to be a proper statutory basis for the support that these people are provided with. I hope that the Minister will look at this point again.

Other noble Lords have asked questions that have not, I think, been answered. I would be grateful if the Minister or his officials could look through Hansard and answer any remaining questions. The noble Lord, Lord German, certainly asked a number of questions that have not been addressed. I will not detain the Committee now by pressing them—I am sure that the noble Lord will not either—but I ask that a letter answering those questions goes to the noble Lords who have participated in Committee before Report.

It would also be helpful if the Government published as clearly as they can a statement on what is proposed. We can piece bits together from the Minister’s reply today but the point has been made that local authorities, faith groups, refugee organisations and others need to start planning; they need to know. A clear statement would therefore be helpful.

I finish by quoting the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who said that this is going to be like detention without walls. That is a very telling statement. It is important that we get this right. We do not want large numbers of people destitute on our streets because they are in this permanent limbo. I look forward to seeing what the Minister has to say in any subsequent letters but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I am slightly nervous to stand up here. On a serious point, I want to say a few brief words in support of the amendments in this group, in particular Amendment 58B, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and Amendment 69, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Etherton, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and others.

In the interests of being brief, I will try to cut through to what I think is the fundamental issue. This group is about standards in detention. The reason this raises such concern, which I think the Minister should address, is that new subsection (2I), as inserted by Clause 10, as has been mentioned by others, says:

“A person (of any age) detained under sub-paragraph (2C) may be detained in any place that the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.


That is a huge power to give to the Secretary of State: to allow the detention of people arriving since 7 March, of any age, in any place. It is perfectly legitimate, and summarises all the amendments and all of the comments —I will not go through them all, and if I have got this wrong then people can intervene and I will apologise—for noble Lords to ask the Minister what that actually means in practice.

I thought that the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark, on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, cut to the chase. If that is the situation, how are those standards going to be maintained? What actually are those standards? Are the standards the same in a barge or in a military camp? These are the sorts of details that the Committee would wish to hear from the Minister. What are the standards, given that it can be any age and in any place? What difference will there be between arrangements for unaccompanied children, families and others? This is particularly important because the power in new subsection (2C) is not actually for people who have been definitely determined as being people we would wish to remove; it is that the immigration officer “suspects”. We are talking about the detention of individuals, maybe children, who we suspect.

That leads us into the next group. However, if we are talking about standards, this becomes particularly relevant. We are talking about people who might actually be regarded as legitimate and eligible asylum seekers, even under the criteria of this Bill.

In order to be brief, I think noble Lords are seeking an answer to the question posed by new subsection (2I). A significant extension of power to the Secretary of State to designate any place for somebody of any age demands that the Minister be very clear about what the standards will be in each of those places, and who will monitor them to ensure that those standards are kept to.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments bring us on to the issue of detention. The amendments in this group look at the standards of detention accommodation and seek to impose certain minimum standards in respect of accommodation and the treatment of detained individuals.

As I have repeatedly made clear, we need a new, radical approach if we are successfully to tackle the people smugglers and put an end to the dangerous, illegal and unnecessary small-boat crossings of the channel. The scheme provided for in the Bill needs to be unambiguously clear that if you enter the UK illegally you will be liable to detention and swiftly returned to your home country or sent to a safe third country. I want to make clear that the welfare of those who are detained is of the utmost importance. We will detain families and children, including unaccompanied children, only when it is necessary to do so and in appropriate accommodation with appropriate healthcare provision.

Amendments 61, 61A, 62, 66A and 69, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Scriven, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, deal with the issue of accommodation standards and limiting the place of detention. I assure noble Lords that persons detained under the powers conferred by the Bill will be detained in age-appropriate accommodation that meets appropriate standards.

We detain persons for immigration purposes only in places that are listed in the Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 2021 in accordance with the long-standing provisions of the Immigration Act 1971, at paragraph 18 of Schedule 2. In answer to the point raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark, following Royal Assent we will update that direction in line with the new detention powers. Moreover, we already have robust statutory oversight of immigration detention, including inspection by the prisons inspectorate and independent monitoring boards at every detention facility, and effective safeguards within the detention process that, I submit, are sufficient.

My noble friend Lord Wolfson made some powerful points about the application of the international instruments to the question of detention standards, and clearly made the point that the UNHCR was expressly not given the right to issue determinative interpretations of the convention. It is up to states to interpret its terms in good faith, as we are doing.

The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, also has Amendments 59B, 64B and 79C in this group, which seek to transfer certain powers in relation to the detention and accommodation of unaccompanied children from the Home Secretary to the Secretary of State for Education. To be clear, the noble Lord referred to the temporary housing of unaccompanied children in Home Office-provided accommodation prior to their transfer to the care of a local authority. Such accommodation is not detained accommodation and is therefore not caught by the provisions of these clauses. I assure the noble Lord and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that we will return to this issue when we reach Clause 15.

The immigration functions provided for in the Bill are properly a matter for the Home Office. As noble Lords would expect, we regularly consult and work with the Department for Education on matters impacting on children, and that will continue to be the case in respect of the powers conferred by the Bill as they impact on unaccompanied children. As I have said, these are matters that properly fall within the purview of the Home Secretary and, as such, the functions to which these amendments relate should be exercised by her.

In relation to Amendment 70A which is specifically on the health and well-being of detained individuals, I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that we will work closely with the Department for Education to ensure that there are proper provisions for children in detention, and we will build on our current detention facilities to ensure that they are appropriate and provide safe and secure accommodation for children. The statutory guidance referenced in the noble Baroness’s amendment would not be applicable where someone is detained, but we will ensure that all relevant policies that relate to detention will continue to apply.

All persons entering detention are medically screened on arrival and have access to round the clock healthcare. This will continue to be the case. The existing adults at risk in immigration detention policy will be updated in line with the Bill and will continue to act as a safeguard for vulnerable persons in detention.

The noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked about our plans to increase detention capacity. We are increasing our detention capacity to ensure we have enough detention space, and we already have plans in place to build two new immigration removal centres. These include developing a new immigration removal centre in Oxfordshire on the former site of Campsfield House and a new immigration removal centre at Gosport in Hampshire on the former site of Haslar.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If the central tenet of the Bill is to deter people from coming to the UK, why are the Government expanding detention centres?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I can imagine the noble Lord’s response if we did not expand detention centres. The point is that, as a matter of government planning, we need to have sufficient capacity to ensure that we can detain and swiftly remove those who enter the country illegally, in particular those embarking on dangerous journeys across the channel.

Change will not happen overnight, but we are committed to making this legislation work. We are working to find other solutions to scale up our detention capacity too. The first step is to change the law, which is why we are focusing on getting this Bill through Parliament.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, raised a related point, suggesting that large numbers would need to be detained in the absence of returns agreements. I remind him that in addition to our partnership with Rwanda we have returns agreements with 16 countries and that, as I have indicated, a returns agreement is not a prerequisite to our ability to remove people. I hope I have been able to reassure noble Lords about our commitment to maintain appropriate standards of detention accommodation and to provide appropriate care for those held in detention under the powers conferred by the Bill. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord German, will be content to withdraw his Amendment 58B.

Amendment 79C intends to ensure that the Secretary of State for Education has responsibility for unaccompanied children as soon as they arrive in the UK. I suggest that the amendment does not in fact have this effect. It places no duty on the Secretary of State for Education to have any responsibility for arriving children. It would give the Department for Education the power to provide accommodation but not a duty to do so. At this stage the children are already in the Home Office system and the Home Office has pre-existing duties under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 towards those children. The Home Office also runs existing relevant mechanisms such as the national transfer scheme. It is a matter for the Government as to which department should operate these powers.

This amendment could create a great deal of legal uncertainty, which is not in the best interests of children. For example, where children were not accommodated by a local authority on arrival, the Home Secretary could not use her powers under Clause 16 to move children into local authority placements quickly unless those children were in DfE-run accommodation, which DfE would be under no duty to provide. That uncertainty continues with regard to the application of Clause 19 and how any accommodation power linked to a government department that operates in England only could be applied to the devolved Administrations. For that reason, I invite the noble Lord not to move that amendment.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I asked whether confirmation could be given that the Government will adhere to the 18 minimum conditions in the UNHCR Detention Guidelines. It would be very helpful for the Committee to know specifically which ones they intend to comply with and which they do not.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already indicated, the standards that will be adhered to are those prescribed already in legislation. While the points set out in the UNHCR’s document map on in some respects, there is no exact overlap. The regime which will be applied is that which I have already described.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I wonder if I could ask the Minister two questions. The first relates to his comment before last to my noble friend Lord Scriven about whether the Secretary of State for Education should be the corporate parent for government, as opposed to the corporate parent being local authorities. In the event where there is a delay after a child has arrived before a local authority is allocated to be the corporate parent, who is the corporate parent for that child? The Home Secretary does not have that power; there is no protection and no oversight. I say this in light of the fact that, in Kent, there is a special arrangement for Kent not to be the corporate parent for all unaccompanied minors that have arrived there, for fairly obvious reasons. The concern would be that that child might not get the protection that it needs. That is the first question, which is completely separate to the one on my Amendment 70A.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comments about appropriate healthcare, but without knowing what appropriate healthcare is and whether it meets standards that have been set out—even if he says that the guidance would not work—I am somewhat at a loss. Could he write to me to set out exactly what those standards were, because many doctors are extremely concerned about the current standards available for children in detention at the moment?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Yes, certainly. In response to those two points, as the noble Baroness will have seen, we will discuss this again when we reach Clause 15. But Clause 15(1) provides that the Secretary of State may provide or arrange for the provision of accommodation in England for unaccompanied children. As the noble Baroness rightly identifies, presently in Kent there is an agreement which works well. Initial reception facilities are provided by Kent County Council as the corporate parent, then any unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are transferred within the national transfer scheme. Obviously, it is sensible to have the powers in Clause 15(1) as a backstop, in the event that those powers might be needed. I hope that therefore provides a complete answer to the noble Baroness’s first question.

In relation to the second part of her question as to the standards, as I hope I have already made clear, we will be applying the standards that presently remain. It is abundantly clear that those standards are very detailed as set out. I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness to outline what they are. We will definitely be able to provide that.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord with regard to the first issue. I wondered if there was actual data on the time that it takes to provide that transfer for children. What I am concerned about is the gap; we may be discussing it later, but the noble Lord raised the issue himself. Could he provide me with a letter that shows exactly how long it takes to get that transfer through, because I am hearing that there are gaps?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Because the powers in the Bill are obviously not yet in force, I cannot answer as to whether there would be a gap. But clearly it is anticipated—it is hoped—that there will not be a need to utilise the powers in Clause 15 routinely, because the situation with respect to Kent and other relevant local authorities should provide an answer. I am afraid that the noble Baroness cannot expect me to look into my crystal ball and predict what the situation will be after the Act is implemented.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am really sorry to prolong this. The noble Lord referred to the national transfer scheme. There is a concern that either it is taking some time or some children are not being transferred; they are, at the moment, without a corporate parent. There must be current data. That is why I ask: what is the normal gap and how many children have not been allocated?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very happy that the noble Baroness has asked me that question. I am delighted to say that, as of yesterday, there are zero children in Home Office UASC hotels. They are all in the care of local authorities. I hope that provides a fairly clear answer to her question. Perhaps I can invite the noble Lord, Lord Alton, to intervene.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. My question rather builds on what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has been asking. Earlier I specifically asked about the disapplication of the duty on the Secretary of State to consult with the independent family returns panel and the criticism that has been made by the UK Committee for UNICEF, which said that it regretted that decision. I asked the Minister if he would give further consideration to that point and think further about the safeguards that it enables to be put in place to deal with the kinds of issues the noble Baroness has put to him.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I am sorry that I did not answer that question. The relevant provision is in Clause 13 of the Bill. We will come to discuss it in the 11th group of amendments. Perhaps that might be the moment to explore those detailed points more thoroughly.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, may I press the Minister on the issue of disabled asylum seekers? I raised this specifically in terms of what is happening in general provision, what is happening at Manston, how the Government foresee—or not—disabled asylum seekers being accommodated on barges and whether they foresee provision in the new arrangements under this Bill complying with UNHCR detention guidance for disabled asylum seekers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness raises an important point. It is obviously right that our guidance reflects the special needs of disabled people in accordance with our duties under the Equality Act. That will continue to be the case. I hope that provides some reassurance for the noble Baroness.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate, not least because I have seen two lawyers agreeing with each other after having a debate of 10 or 15 minutes about a point of law. It is a fascinating experience.

To turn back to the amendments before us, I thank everyone who participated. In the response the Minister just gave, there are a number of matters which I would like to ask him about. If I understood correctly, he said it is the intention to only allow detention in line with the Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 2021. I think that is what the Minister said. He then immediately said that, after this Bill is enacted, we will amend it—we will uprate it. I do not quite understand what the uprating mechanism is and why you need to uprate a direction you presently agree with. It would be helpful if the Minister could say what he means by uprating and if they are following the Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 2021—which, I acknowledge, is the right thing to do.

On Campsfield and Gosport, the Minister said that the capacity would be increased. Could he give an indication of the numbers of places there will be in each of those, or the total for both.

Finally, I have what I consider a bit of a non sequitur, but the Minister said it several times and repeated it today. He said that return agreements are not a prerequisite for returns. I did not quite understand that because if you want to return somebody, you need an agreement that they will be taken. That seems to be an agreement. It was a bit of a non sequitur and certainly did not fall within the wonderful statements we had from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, about these matters earlier. If the Minister could address those three questions, I will then be in a position to deal with the amendment.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I hope I made clear, once the Bill is passed, the direction will need to be updated, rather than “uprated”. It will reflect the new provisions and any new detention facilities that are available to be utilised at that point. I am afraid that I am not in a position to give the noble Lord an indication of the size at this stage.

On returns agreements, as I think I made clear in a previous group on the second day in Committee, there are different relations with various countries, so circumstances can arise where people can be returned to countries with which we do not have a formal returns agreement. I can write to the noble Lord in more detail on that subject.

[Lord German (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his answer. It would be helpful to know whether the matter of capacity of the two places is just unknown or whether it has not been concluded yet. If that is the case, I presume that the Minister could tell me at some stage what the capacity is.

This has been an important debate and I am sure we will return to it on Report. On the basis of those answers, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 10 is an integral part of ensuring the success of this Bill, both as a deterrent and as a means of ensuring that the Home Secretary can comply with the duty to make arrangements for removal. The statutory powers to detain are spread across several different pieces of immigration legislation, such as the Immigration Act 1971 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The provisions in this clause create new powers that will enable the detention of illegal migrants to establish whether the new duty to remove applies and to promptly remove those eligible from the UK. Many of the amendments in this group seek to limit these detention powers in one way or another, impacting our ability swiftly to remove those to whom the duty applies.

Amendments 58C, 58D, 63A and 63B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, probe the threshold for detention and in effect seek to raise it by replacing the current test based on an immigration officer or Secretary of State suspecting the relevant matter with a test that requires an immigration officer to have “reasonable grounds for suspecting.” To deliver the objectives of this Bill, our detention powers need to enable detention of illegal migrants to ascertain whether someone falls within the duty to remove, and these amendments seek to reduce our ability so to do.

The issue of time limits is the subject of Amendments 60 and 65, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and Amendments 59 and 63 tabled by my noble friend Lady Mobarik and co-signed by my noble friend Lady Helic. The detention powers in the Bill are fundamental to our approach, and here, as elsewhere, we need a robust and uniform scheme that broadly applies to all and does not allow the system to be gamed, for example by adults pretending to be children, or provide scope for the people smugglers to exploit any exceptions or carve-outs. The Bill will create new detention powers specific to all migrants subject to the duty to remove being introduced in this Bill. These new powers will not be time-limited. However, in line with our other existing immigration detention powers, detention will be limited to a period of time that is reasonably necessary for the statutory purpose to be caried out. The new detention powers will not be subject to the same statutory limitations as existing detention powers to ensure the power can apply more widely.

We recognise the particular vulnerability of unaccompanied children, and therefore the Bill provides that the statutory detention powers may only be exercised to detain an unaccompanied child in circumstances prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State, such as, but not limited to, for the purpose of family reunion or where removal is to a safe country of origin. We will set out, in due course, having reflected on debates in this House and the other place, a new timescale under which genuine children may be detained for the purposes of removal without judicial oversight—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Will those regulations be available, even in draft form, before Report?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will certainly take that request back to the department.

Along with a new timescale under which genuine children may be detained for the purposes of removal without judicial oversight, the Bill will also allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying time limits to be placed on the detention of unaccompanied children for the purpose of removal, if required. I would remind my noble friends Lady Mobarik, Lady Helic and Lady Sugg that unaccompanied children are not subject to the duty to remove and the power to remove them will be exercised only in the limited circumstances we have already described. For the most part, unaccompanied children will not be detained under the provisions of the Bill but will instead be transferred to local authority care—that care which the Committee has broadly agreed is the correct place for these children to be located.

In answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I do not recognise the figure of 13,000 detained unaccompanied children in the NGO report to which he referred. Those statistics did not of course include any allowance for the deterrence effect of the measures in the Bill.

Amendment 73, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord German, seeks to introduce time limits on detention that apply at large, not just to detention under the powers conferred by the Bill. An absolute bar on detention of all children and a 28-day time limit on detention of adults would significantly impair the effectiveness of our enforcement powers. Such a time limit is likely to encourage individuals to frustrate immigration processes to the point where the time limit is exceeded, necessitating their release, which would then significantly inhibit our ability to remove those who have no right to be here and are subject to the duty. I agree that immigration detention cannot, and should not, be indefinite; as we will come on to with later clauses, the legislation places clear limitations on the duration of detention and provides for judicial scrutiny of continued detention. We judge the existing safeguards provided for in respect of existing and new detention powers to be sufficient.

Amendments 61B and 64C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, relate to the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee. I am grateful for the work of the Delegated Powers Committee in its careful scrutiny of the Bill. We are considering the report, published just before the Whitsun Recess, and will respond ahead of Report stage.

Turning to Amendments 74, 75 and 76, which relate to the detention of vulnerable persons, I can assure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that the existing adults at risk policy, which I discussed earlier, will be updated to take account of the provisions in the Bill, and will act as a safeguard when detention decisions are made in respect of such persons. This statutory policy requires that evidence of a person’s vulnerability be balanced against immigration factors when considering whether detention is appropriate in their particular case. Finally, I remind the noble Baroness that under the terms of Section 59 of the Immigration Act 2016, revisions to the statutory guidance must be laid in draft before each House and then brought into force by regulations subject to the negative procedure, so there will be an opportunity for this House to scrutinise the necessary changes.

There are no exemptions from immigration detention for any particular groups of people. Amendment 76B, again tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to create an exemption to immigration detention for potential victims of modern slavery. When decisions are currently made regarding detention or continued detention, potential victims of modern slavery are considered under the existing adults at risk in immigration detention policy.

To sum up, the Government recognise that unaccompanied children are particularly vulnerable. That is why we amended the Bill in the other place to place limitations on their detention under the powers conferred by the Bill. For all others caught by the duty to remove in Clause 2, we believe it is appropriate for the Bill to provide for a single legislative framework for their detention, with tailored provision being made in our adults at risk statutory guidance. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord German, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, can I clarify that the 13,000 figure was not just in respect of unaccompanied children? It included families with children.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful for that clarification.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, it has been an interesting debate in which it appears there has been one speaker against and everybody else in favour of changing the Government’s proposal.

To sum up the discussion, with the exception of the Minister, the key issues have been the impact of detention on children, that this is a backward step, that it is not in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and that no evidence is given of a sufficiently robust nature to state the objectives of these clauses. To sum it up in a single phrase, “We are going to lock children up to deter the boats”. The rationale of locking up children has just been put to one side. It is a backward step. Therefore, I am sure we will return to these matters at the next stage of the Bill. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as I have repeatedly set out, we need bold and radical action to tackle the dangerous, illegal and unnecessary crossings in the channel. We will deter such crossings only if those who would seek to make them know that they will not be able to build a life in the UK. Instead, they would be liable to be detained and swiftly removed. To achieve this, it is necessary not only to make asylum and human rights claims inadmissible but to withhold modern slavery protections from those who meet the conditions in Clause 2.

As was set out earlier in response to amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, the national referral mechanism presents clear opportunities for abuse by those who would seek to frustrate removal. We have heard many statistics in this debate, and, of course, when the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and others quote from official statistics I do not dispute the figures, but let me add some more which have not been mentioned. It is worth repeating the statistics which demonstrate the sharp rise in NRM claims, where someone is detained pending removal. The NRM referral rate for people arriving in the UK on small boats and being detained for return has risen from 6% of detentions in 2019 to 73% in 2021. In contrast, where people were not detained for return, less than 3% of people who arrived in 2021 were referred to the NRM within three months of entering the UK. I suggest that these figures cannot be ignored.

Clause 21 is firmly based on the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, or ECAT. Article 13(3) expressly provides that states are not bound to observe the minimum 30-day reflection and recovery period if

“grounds of public order prevent it”.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, omitted to mention this provision when they stated the other provisions of ECAT.

The measures in the Bill are intended to deal with the immediate and pressing broader public order risk arising from the exceptional circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK, including the pressure on public services and the threat to life arising from the dangerous channel crossings. We recognise the exceptional nature of these provisions. That is why Clause 25 includes a sunsetting provision such that these provisions will cease to operate if not extended two years after commencement.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

The Minister is making a very bold proposition when he says that Article 30 gives the Government an excuse to ignore ECAT. Can he give us examples of public order events which justify that bold, and in my view unjustifiable, statement?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It was Article 13(3). The events which the Government say warrant the grounds of public order which prevent observance of the 30-day reflection and recovery period are the conditions which I identified earlier in relation to the pressure placed on public services and the threat to life arising from the dangerous channel crossings.

I do not propose to address all the amendments individually, suffice to say that where the Secretary of State is satisfied that an individual is participating in an investigation or criminal proceedings relating to their alleged exploitation, and considers it necessary for them to be present in the UK to provide that co-operation, and considers that their co-operation outweighs any significant risk of harm to the public they may pose, that individual will be exempt from the disqualification. This allows the Government to protect against the threat to public order arising from the current circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK, while also ensuring that investigations can be progressed to bring perpetrators to justice. By one means or another, the amendments seek to negate, or at least roll back, the intended effect of the provisions in Clause 21 and subsequent clauses.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

What does my noble friend say to the statement that what is being done here is in effect dismantling a world-renowned piece of legislation—the Modern Slavery Act—passed only eight years ago?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I do not agree with my noble friend. These provisions are strictly limited to deal with the present emergency that we face.

As with the amendments to the other parts of the Bill, if we add exceptions, exclusions and exemptions, we will significantly undermine the efficacy of the Bill overall and the scheme will be undermined, making it unworkable. The Bill will then not deliver on its stated purpose.

Having said that, I want to touch on some of the specific amendments. However, before I do so, I will respond to the request of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to give an update on the economic impact assessment. At the risk of repeating myself, it remains the Government’s intention to publish the document in due course. However, I undertake to provide an update to the House before the first day of Report.

In relation to Amendment 86, put forward by my noble friend Lord Randall, I point out that for the cohort caught by the Bill—particularly those apprehended in Kent, having crossed the channel in a small boat—few will be victims of exploitation in the UK. It is important to remember that victims of modern slavery who are British citizens, or those who are in the country illegally having overstayed their visa, will not be caught by the public order disqualification. Similarly, unaccompanied children who are not to be removed under the power conferred in Clause 3 will continue to benefit from NRM support—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. As for others who are to be removed pursuant to the duty in Clause 2, their relocation to a safe third country will remove them from their exploiters.

I remind the Committee that our partnership agreement with Rwanda includes express provision for the Rwandan Government to take all necessary steps to ensure that any special needs that may arise as a result of a relocated person being a victim of modern slavery are accommodated. This should not be downplayed, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham suggested. I can also assure my noble friend that we will continue to engage with the police and the CPS as we prepare the statutory guidance provided for in Clause 21(6). I reiterate what my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister said at the Commons Report stage:

“we will look at what more we can do to provide additional protections to individuals who have suffered exploitation in the UK”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 781.]

That remains the Government’s position.

I turn to Amendment 88. It is the unfortunate reality that criminal gangs are good at adapting to changes in the law to continue their nefarious activities. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that such an amendment may result in a change of methodology by the people traffickers, either by targeting vulnerable women to a greater extent or by encouraging illegal migrants to make false claims to seek removal under the Bill.

Amendment 90, spoken to by my noble friends Lord Randall and Lord McColl, relates to the presumption that it is not necessary for a person to remain in the UK to co-operate with an investigation. It is one of the enduring legacies of the Covid pandemic that much more can now be done remotely. We all see this in the changes to the way we work. Even now, some Members of your Lordships’ House take part in debates by videolink. It is simply no longer the case that a victim of crime needs to be in face-to-face contact with police or others to assist with an investigation. There is no reason why, in the majority of cases, such co-operation cannot continue by email, messaging and videoconferencing. The presumption in Clause 21(5) is therefore perfectly proper.

We have provided statutory guidance to support decision-making by caseworkers when determining if there are compelling circumstances why the presumption should be set aside in any particular case. We are considering carefully the recommendation of the Delegated Powers Committee that such guidance should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Given this, I am not persuaded that the substitution of a regulation-making power would make a material difference.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

Sorry—it has taken me a little while to contemplate but is the Minister effectively saying that the use of video and email and so on is as good as in-person interviewing and in-person interventions? I really think that needs to be rethought.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the right reverend Prelate will appreciate, it is the experience of litigators that the use of remote facilities has become very commonplace.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

With respect to the Minister, that is not quite what I was asking. Absolutely, it is happening, but is it as effective?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

That all depends on the facts of each particular case, As I say, that is what will be considered in accordance with the guidance that I have just described.

Where the Home Secretary concludes it is necessary for someone to remain in the UK for the purpose of co-operating with a law enforcement agency, the continued need will be kept under review. Section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act already provides for the grant of limited leave to remain in such cases. The length of such leave should be considered on a case-by-case basis. As such, it would not be appropriate to provide for an arbitrary minimum period of 30 months, as Amendment 89 seeks to do.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Would the Minister accept that, given the extreme sensitivity of persuading victims in these categories of offences to co-operate in the first place, and the almost full-time pastoral care that they have to be given in the approach to a trial, doing all of this from the countries to which these people are likely to be sent is going to be inordinately difficult?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I do not accept that, because of the advances in technology that I have already described. That is the position in respect of Amendment 89.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Does the Minister not understand that for a victim of crime who is in effect persecuted by the Government by being sent to another country, that is going to have an impact on their likelihood of co-operating with the Government in order to prosecute traffickers?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

One would hope that a victim of trafficking would want to facilitate the prosecution of their traffickers. It is clear, for the reasons I have already set out, that we cannot afford to create any loopholes or exclusions from the scheme.

Amendment 92 seeks to limit the countries to which a person can be safely removed. There is no one international standard to assess a country’s ability to provide support for victims, so we should not be tied to removing potential victims of modern slavery only to signatory countries of the ECHR or ECAT. In addition, this amendment would have the perverse effect of preventing the return of potential victims to their home country where it was safe to do so; I am sure the noble Lord would not want such a block to apply. As I have indicated, our partnership with Rwanda has in place provisions for supporting survivor recovery needs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he do the usual thing, which is to answer reasonable questions that were asked of him, particularly the question I asked about the due diligence carried out in preparation of Schedule 1 and how advice was obtained as to whether it was right to put almost entirely unqualified entries into that schedule?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I had in mind the sage words of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in the House last week. As the noble Lord will recall, the origins of Schedule 1 were canvassed at length by the Committee in the previous group. The countries listed in the schedule are an amalgam of previous pieces of legislation where the safety of those countries has been established in that legislation.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)]

My Lords, earlier when referring to ECAT provisions in relation to the amendments I brought forward and the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the Minister seemed to say, and I would argue, that applying Article 13(3) of ECAT to a large group of people would go against the spirit and character of ECAT. I think it was never intended to apply to a group but to individuals and that the breadth of application coming from the Minister is a bit of stretch, so I ask him to consider that matter again and maybe come back on Report with an amendment similar to the ones that I proposed.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Obviously I hear what the noble Baroness says. Clearly the public order disqualification is capable of being applied in the way that the Government suggest it is here, and of course it is also a matter of individual application—but no doubt those in the department will read what the noble Baroness said. For all those reasons I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

I wonder whether my noble friend would consider my invitation. If I can arrange it, will he come with me to meet a victim of modern slavery, so he can actually see the people we are talking about who would be potentially affected by this?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Well, I would be very happy to meet the noble Lord, with or without such a victim, to discuss his amendment. I would be happy to do that.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

I asked the Minister whether he would meet a victim of modern slavery.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I would be happy to do that too, as I said.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I asked the Minister three questions and, not to my great surprise, I did not get answers to any of them. To focus on one of them: will the famous impact assessment include consideration of the damage to UK communities—or “potential damage”, if the Minister will not acknowledge the damage—done by the failure to be able to prosecute illegal enterprises engaging in modern slavery in the UK?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot comment on what might or might not be in the impact assessment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, rather than make a lot of different remarks, let me just say this: in my honest opinion, this is no way to do a Bill, particularly one as contentious as this. Numerous questions have been put by Members of your Lordships’ Committee, which the Minister has failed to address. How can we do our job if the Minister fails to engage with what is being said?

For the Government to turn around and say, in light of what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and many other noble Lords have said, that it may be that the impact assessment is available on the first day of Report, is totally and utterly unacceptable. It is simply not good enough for all of us who are considering amendments. Rather than dealing with many of the points put forward, I will say that it is clear that there will be a considerable number—to say the least—of amendments on Report. How can we judge those amendments—how they should be phrased and determined, and which ones are more important—if we have no impact assessment? It is frankly unbelievable to be left in that situation and it is no way to do a Bill.

I read—I did read much of it; my noble friend Lady Kennedy will be pleased—an excellent report by the JCHR. I am going to quote from the summary on the “Role of the JCHR”, because I could not believe it:

“We would have liked the opportunity to have questioned the Home Secretary about this. We invited the Home Secretary to give evidence on the Bill and she was unable to do so”.


This is a flagship Government Bill dealing with something which, as we have just been told, allows derogation from Article 13 of the European convention because the continued small boat migration is a threat to public order. Yet the Home Secretary cannot be bothered to go to the JCHR.

The report goes on to say:

“We also wrote to the Home Secretary with detailed legal questions on the Bill in order to inform our report and requested a response by 24 April 2023. The Home Secretary belatedly responded to us by letter dated 2 June 2023. We therefore did not receive her response before the Bill commenced Committee Stage in the House of Lords. The Home Secretary did not give any explanation for her undue delay in responding to our letter and many of the questions remain unanswered”.


To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, the report then says:

“We consider both the delay and her lack of explanation for the delay to be discourteous not just to this Committee but to both Houses of Parliament”.


I could not agree more with that.

We are supposed to be the revising Chamber. The Government lecture us and will say that the elected Government of the day have a right to get their legislation through. Many of us, including me, try to protect that convention, but it is based on a two-way process. That two-way process involves the Government giving all of us the proper information to make our decisions. It depends on Ministers answering questions; it depends on impact assessments being made available so that we can make our judgments. It does not depend on Ministers saying that they think a noble Lord is wrong; that somebody does not get it; somebody is misreading the information; somebody does not understand the statistics. It depends on detailed, logical argument and debate.

I will tell you what that leads to: it leads to better policy. It means that you do not have the ridiculous situation of the Government abandoning a key part of a Bill they only passed a few months ago by Written Statement a couple of days ago. That is where we will get to with this Bill if it is not properly considered. Even under the Government’s own terms it will not work. I say to the Minister that it is not good enough and he needs to reflect on what he is going to do about it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said when he introduced this group of amendments, it is quite extraordinary to deny assistance and support to the victims of modern slavery, as provided by Section 50(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said, it is cruel to do this.

Modern slavery is a devolved matter in relation to the support provided to victims, yet the Bill appears to undermine devolution in overruling the provision of support provided in Northern Ireland and Scotland. It was very interesting to hear the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, quite rightly highlighting the issues facing Northern Ireland, with its border with the European Union and the common travel area. It was even more interesting to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, about how this Bill potentially conflicts with EU directives that Northern Ireland is still subject to. It will be very interesting to hear the Minister’s answers on the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, in particular.

In asking the Minister to justify these provisions, both in terms of denying support and in terms of devolution, I am very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, said about the impact that meeting victims of modern slavery had on them. I wonder whether the Minister, who I think previously suggested that he had not met a victim of modern slavery, or anybody involved in the drafting of these provisions, has met a victim of modern slavery—bearing in mind the impact it has had on the noble Baroness and the noble Lord.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee has said, we do not believe that Clauses 22, 23, 24 and 27 should stand part of this Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments relates to the provision of support to potential victims of modern slavery. We have, of course, recently had an extensive debate about the application of the public order disqualification to those who meet the conditions in Clause 2 of the Bill. I will not go over the same ground again, save to say that it is a necessary consequence of the provisions in Clause 4 that the duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for removal of persons who meet Clause 2 conditions should apply regardless of whether the person claims to be a victim of modern slavery.

It follows that, for the provisions of this Bill to work as intended, individuals who arrive illegally in the UK and receive a positive reasonable grounds decision must be disqualified from the protections of the national referral mechanism. Clause 22 gives effect to this principle for England and Wales by disapplying the duties on the Secretary of State, under Section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, to provide necessary assistance and support to potential victims during the recovery period. Clauses 23 and 24 have the same effect in relation to corresponding legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. Clause 27 then makes the necessary consequential changes to the relevant legislation that applies in each part of the United Kingdom.

If an individual arrives in the UK illegally and a first responder suspects that they may be a victim of modern slavery, they will still refer that individual into the NRM and that person will receive a reasonable grounds decision. That process will not change under the Bill. However, as I set out before in relation to Clause 21, Article 13 of ECAT envisages that the obligation on signatory states to provide assistance and support to potential victims may be withheld on grounds of public order. This is precisely what Clauses 22 to 24 give effect to as a result of the public order threat arising from the current scale of illegal entry into the United Kingdom by people undertaking dangerous and unnecessary channel crossings in small boats. That means that they will not benefit from the protections otherwise afforded to potential victims of modern slavery, subject to the exception set out in Clause 21, which we have debated at some length.

It is right that the Government take meaningful steps to ensure that these illegal and dangerous channel crossings are stopped and that any incentives to enter the UK by such means are closed off. That is what these clauses seek to do. Clauses 22 to 24 operate subject to the same exception as Clause 21 in relation to those potential victims who are co-operating with a public authority in connection with an investigation or criminal proceedings in relation to their alleged exploitation, and it is necessary for them to remain in the UK to provide such co-operation.

The effect of Amendments 93, 94, 95 and 96 is no different in practice from proposition by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to strike out these clauses as a whole. The amendments effectively gut Clauses 22 to 24, such that the existing requirements relating to the provision of support would continue to apply. It will therefore come as no surprise to noble Lords that I cannot commend these amendments to the Committee.

In response to the devolution points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Morrow, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, I remind the Committee that immigration and nationality are reserved matters in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and therefore matters for the UK Government. It is also our view that the modern slavery clauses also deal specifically with the reserved matter of immigration, and they are for a reserved purpose. As for the Bill as a whole, they would not therefore engage the legislative consent process.

I assure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham that anyone who has arrived illegally in the UK on or after 7 March and before commencement would in this period receive support as now.

[Baroness Bryan of Partick (Lab)]

Will the Minister confirm that support for people who have been trafficked and involved in modern slavery is a devolved issue?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

No, I am afraid that is not the view of the Government. These provisions are in a measure that relates to a reserved issue.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Forgive me, but I am just answering this point. So it is the Government’s view that the provisions in this Bill fall within the reserved matter that I described a moment ago.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

The specific issue that was raised was about support for victims of human trafficking, which clearly is a devolved matter—or alternatively the legislation, for example, that was passed through the Assembly last year would have been ruled out of order and incompetent on that basis. It dealt specifically with the levels of support that victims of human trafficking would receive.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord that, in that context, the Assembly had competence to consider those issues. However, in the context of the overall Bill, this measure deals with immigration. Therefore, for the reasons I gave, the measures fall within the competence of the United Kingdom Government.

The current rate of dangerous and unnecessary small boat channel crossings represents a clear and present threat to public order, justifying our invoking the relevant provisions of ECAT. They risk lives and place unprecedented and unsustainable pressure on our public services—housing, health, education, welfare and others. The Government are right to take the necessary measures in the Bill to remove the clear opportunities to misuse our modern slavery protections in order to frustrate the duty to remove in Clause 2. On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee and invite the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, jumps up, could I ask the Minister something? Unless I was being inattentive, in which case I apologise, I am not sure that he answered the point raised by the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Morrow, about the Windsor Framework—which is to be known as the Northern Ireland protocol—the duties in it and the application of EU law. He mentioned the trafficking directive and the victims directive. How is the Bill compatible with those obligations in Northern Ireland? If I have got it wrong, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, will correct me.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

I am happy to confirm that the noble Baroness is right.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My understanding is that the measures are compatible with the Windsor Framework, but I will take that point back to the department and will write to both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on it.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank those who contributed to the debate. I will come to the more general point about assistance and support as they relate to Clause 22, but I will first respond to the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Morrow, and my noble friends Lady Bryan and Lady Kennedy. I am not sure about this, so can the Minister go back and check that it is right? From all my reading about devolution, I think that everyone accepts and understands that immigration is a reserved matter. I find it really difficult to understand why, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the devolved Administrations’ ability to enhance support is not a devolved matter. I do not understand why, if they choose to do more to support a victim of trafficking, they cannot do so. I respectfully ask the Minister to check that that is the case, because I cannot believe it is.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will certainly do so.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That would be helpful, looking at the incredulity on the faces of the noble Lords, Lord Morrow and Lord Weir.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have just heard, Clauses 29 to 36 place a permanent bar on those who fall within the scheme outlined in Clause 2 from lawfully travelling to the UK or securing settlement or British citizenship through naturalisation or registration; this is subject only to exceptions to comply with international agreements or where there are compelling circumstances. If the Bill fails to succeed in its aim of removing people, there will likely be a whole class of people stuck in the UK for extended periods without access to a system through which they can obtain lawful status. Therefore, they will be unable to work or rent a home. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expanded on this point eloquently. To sum up the noble Baroness’s speech: she wants compliance with international law. We support her Amendment 98EA.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, gave a clear exposition of the Government’s intentions with this Bill, and on the different statuses on the second step, as he put it—the ban on acquiring citizenship by naturalisation but also by registration. As he said eloquently, registration is not a concession or a reward for good behaviour but an entitlement. His amendment seeks to address that point, with particular examples given in his speech.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also spoke about the specific cases of Hong Kongers and BNOs, and how this Bill could cut across—or seems to cut across—their potential rights. My noble friend Lady Lister, who added her name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, attacked the problem from the perspective of concern for children who could be subject to this ban because of the actions of their parents. As she rightly argued, this is not fair on those children; she wants to revert to the original wording of Clause 35.

We support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. It has been particularly illuminating; I have noted the quality of the speeches and hope that I can answer the questions that have been put in relation to these clauses.

Clauses 29 to 36 prevent a person who has entered the United Kingdom unlawfully, and meets the conditions in Clause 2, being able to lawfully re-enter the UK, secure settlement or become a British national through naturalisation or most registration routes. A person who arrives in the UK illegally should not be able to make the UK their home and eventually settle here. Settlement in the UK confers significant benefits, such as the freedom to study, work and access healthcare and public funds; of course, it is also a pathway to British citizenship which, in turn, confers further benefits.

Allowing someone who arrives in the UK illegally to settle clearly creates an incentive for people to make those dangerous journeys. It is a vital part of the deterrent effect that those categories should be included. This is because people taking advantage in that way is unfair. It is unfair on those who play by the rules and come here legally, it is unfair on those who are genuinely in need, as it constrains our capacity to help, and it is unfair on the British public.

Clause 29 precludes people who meet the conditions in Clause 2 from ever settling here and, once removed, being able to re-enter. This is achieved by preventing them from being granted any form of permission through the immigration system. We do, however, recognise there will be occasions when we will need to waive the bans and grant permission; for example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, noted, where not granting permission would contravene our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Clause 29 balances our need to disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys to the UK by ensuring that there is no benefit to be gained from entering the UK illegally, while recognising there may be a limited number of scenarios in which it is appropriate to grant permission. I put it to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that this is a proportionate and balanced provision. Therefore, I do not recognise her description of the Bill as “wielding a sledgehammer”.

Clause 30 sets out that a person will not be eligible for British citizenship, British Overseas Territories citizenship, British overseas citizenship and British subject status if they enter the UK unlawfully and meet the criteria in Clause 2. The ban will also apply to someone who enters a Crown dependency or British Overseas Territory unlawfully in a similar way. We have included the other types of British nationality as we do not think it is right that illegal entry should allow a person to acquire any form of British nationality, but also to prevent a person using it as a stepping stone to register as a British citizen. Illegal entry into the UK, a Crown dependency or an overseas territory will have the same effect. We do not want people to be able to enter illegally in any of those locations and use that as a way to acquire citizenship and, ultimately, a right to enter and live in the UK.

Clauses 31 to 34 set out the routes to which the citizenship ban will apply. The key citizenship route which will be affected is naturalisation, as my noble friend Lord Moylan noted. This is the main way in which adults born outside the UK can acquire British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship. The ban will also apply to certain registration routes. However, those applying under provisions that address historical inequalities in British nationality law will not be affected. This includes people born before 1983 to British mothers, those who missed out on citizenship because their parents were not married or those applying on the route for descendants of Chagossians.

Clause 35 allows us to exempt a person from the citizenship ban if treating them as ineligible for citizenship would contravene our obligations under the human rights convention. This means that if a person can demonstrate that, for example, their right to a family or private life can be met only by us considering a grant of citizenship, we will not exclude them from applying. We do not think that acquiring citizenship will usually be essential to allow a person to have a private or family life in the UK; other options, such as leave to enter or remain, may satisfy that. However, in very exceptional cases where considering a grant of citizenship is needed to prevent us breaching our ECHR obligations, Clause 35 may apply. We will publish guidance for nationality caseworkers setting out how to assess human rights in the nationality context.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan would remove registration routes for British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship from the ban so that it applies only to naturalisation. They would also remove the bans on becoming a British overseas citizen and British subject through registration. My noble friend Lord Moylan has described registration as an “evidence-based process”, with decisions not based on the Secretary of State exercising discretion. I am afraid to say that I disagree with my noble friend as this is not universally the case: some registration routes are dependent on ministerial discretion and there is no automatic entitlement.

Let me explain this further. As my noble friend Lord Moylan said, not all registration routes are included in the ban. Those that allow people to acquire British nationality they missed out on because of previous unfairness are not included; nor are the specific routes for children born in the UK or stateless persons. However, registration routes that rely on residence or specifically for children born outside the UK are included in the ban, as we expect people who want to become citizens to have followed a compliant pathway, including having entered lawfully.

For example, Section 4(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 allows people who already hold another form of British nationality to register as a British citizen on the basis of five years’ lawful residence in the UK. The residence requirements mirror those for naturalisation: the only significant difference between the routes is that other British nationals wanting to register under that route do not need to meet the knowledge of English and life in the UK requirements. Given that the residence requirements are the same as for naturalisation, it would be appropriate for them to be subject to the ban in the same way as naturalisation applicants. This is the route that BNOs can use if they come to the UK under our scheme and become settled: they can go on to apply for citizenship. It is right that those who apply and come through legal routes should have the right to become citizens, but we do not think it is right that those who enter unlawfully should benefit.

The registration routes for children who are subject to the ban include two routes for children born abroad to British citizens by descent. Both have a residence element: either that the parent lived in the UK for a period of three years before the child was born or the family lived in the UK for the three-year period before applying to register the child. We do not anticipate that children of British citizens would be brought to the UK on a small boat when there are routes available to them as family members, but should that happen, the child will not be able to register as a citizen.

The other child route that is included in the ban is registration of children at the Home Secretary’s discretion. The only statutory requirements are that the child is under 18 and is of good character if over 10. However, guidance sets out expectations about when a child will be registered. The normal expectation is that the child will be settled in the UK, and that the parents will be British, or at least settled. It is unlikely that children who enter the UK unlawfully would be able to meet the normal expectations of having a British or settled parent, being lawfully present and having completed a period of residence, as under the Government’s proposals, children who have entered illegally will be removed. The citizenship ban will, however, prevent a child being registered under this provision unless there are ECHR grounds. This fits with the Government’s intention to discourage parents from bringing children to the UK via dangerous methods, including crossing the channel in a small boat, and that such a child cannot become a British citizen and create a means for the family to stay.

My noble friend raised, quite rightly, the issue of compassionate cases. As I have said the ECHR exemption will allow us to consider registering, in rare and exceptional cases, where a person meets the statutory requirements and granting citizenship would be essential to allow them to exercise their family or private life.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I have two short questions. First, how can a child be culpable? The whole point of the Bill, as I understand it, is that people should not be encouraged to come by illegal means, they should not jump the queue, et cetera. We disagree about that, but none the less, in that conversation about culpability, how can a child be culpable? Secondly, why should the ECHR take on the slack of compassion? There are many members of the Minister’s Government who do not think we should even be signatories of the ECHR any more, and now the ECHR is being relied on for discretion and for slack and compassion. How can that sit well with this Government?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

On the first point, there is no suggestion that these measures impute culpability in the way that the noble Baroness suggests. On the second point, I would have thought that the noble Baroness would approve of the fact that the statute relies upon the convention rights as being the pressure valve for exceptional circumstances in the way that I have described.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

It may be that I have not quite understood what the noble Lord is saying, but the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I specifically asked the kind of question that was posed by the JCHR. Why have the Government narrowed the reference down from the original wording of the clause to the ECHR, when originally it was to any other international agreement to which the United Kingdom was a party? Why has that gone?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The answer, which I will turn to in a moment, is that it was considered that greater clarity and concision was needed. In that respect, it is the Government’s view that the test set out in Clause 35 meets that requirement. That was the reason for the change.

Turning now to Amendment 98ZA—

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Before my noble friend turns to that amendment, I am of course not a lawyer but really quite a simple soul, who is struggling to catch up in some ways with the things he has explained to us. But it seems—forgive me if I have grasped this entirely wrongly—that we are now talking about two quite separate Bills. In one Bill, if your pestilential foot is set upon English soil the Home Secretary, as the Secretary of State, has a duty to remove you forthwith. That duty having been satisfied, the question might arise in your mind: are you in fact entitled to registration as a British national on the facts of your case? I fully accept that a degree of discretion is always involved in judging these facts, because they will rarely be compelling either way. You would be doing this, presumably, from your new home in Rwanda or whatever country it is to which you have been safely deported.

On the other hand, the Bill my noble friend is describing is one through which these people will, having landed illegally, already have acquired some sort of settlement here—the Home Secretary, presumably, having failed entirely in the duty that we are imposing on her to remove them. They will be exploiting the advantages of that settlement and clocking up hours on the clock, qualifying increasingly for British nationality, which my noble friend thinks—I rather agree with him—is a little unfair because you are getting ahead of the queue by getting in illegally. Then the clock is running and you would be accumulating all the benefits. Which Bill are we discussing here? The Bill I thought I was discussing was one through which the vast majority of the people who would be making a claim for registration of British nationality, with very few exceptions, would already have been subject to the duty to remove. How many does my noble friend think will not have been subject to it?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that contribution. The position, as he outlined in his speech, is that the deterrence effect takes its force from a number of sections in the Bill: the first, obviously, being the detention and removal, as he rightly identified; the second being the bans on the ability to settle or stay here, the idea being that that disincentivises people from entering illegally using dangerous routes. I do not accept that there are two Bills in the way that my noble friend identifies. The reality is that the question of registration of citizenship, which he raises, is unlikely to arise in as many cases as the naturalisation circumstance—I think we can agree on that—so it is natural that what we are talking about is probably an exceptional state of affairs, in any event. That is potentially why my noble friend perceives a dissonance between the deterrent effect and the two factors, but in fact there is no such distinction.

Amendments 98ZA and 98EA, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to expand the circumstances in which the bans on settlement and citizenship are to be disapplied. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, also touched on this issue. We consider that the circumstances in which a grant of settlement or citizenship would be an appropriate remedy are wholly covered by the ECHR, so our view is that the addition of other international agreements is unnecessary, hence the amendment, as we have already canvassed.

I turn now to Amendment 98I tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. This seeks to provide a broader protection for those holding British national (overseas) status. We do not believe this is necessary. The clauses which prevent people from obtaining various forms of British nationality already do not mention British national (overseas) status. This is for the simple reason that no one has been able to obtain that status since 1997 and, consequently, there is no need to ban people from obtaining it should they arrive illegally.

We already have in place a dedicated migration route for people from Hong Kong and, as the noble Baroness knows, it has been a significant priority for the Government and the department to offer this route to British national (overseas) people from Hong Kong in response to the situation there. We have done a great deal for the citizens of Hong Kong and hope to continue to do so. As cited in my response to my noble friend, Lord Moylan, a route to citizenship exists under Section 4(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. There should therefore be no reason for a person holding British national (overseas) status to arrive illegally in the manner which would mean they fall under this Bill’s provisions.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

I was just going to posit to the noble Lord that some of these people having to flee are aged 16 and 17 and were involved in demonstrations and so on and then fled by unusual routes out of Hong Kong. Some of them are making their way via Europe to join family members here in the United Kingdom. Would they automatically, under this Bill, be deprived of ever joining their families?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for raising that. In fact, I was just turning to that very issue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked a couple of specific questions about the children of BNO passport holders—the issue that the noble Baroness now raises again. These address issues which fall outside this Bill; none the less, I can advise the noble Baroness and others interested in this topic that dependants of BNO status holders who themselves do not hold BNO status do not need a valid Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport to renew their BNO visa. However, I am afraid that renewal of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passports is not something the UK Government can assist with and until they qualify for British citizenship, such children are not eligible for a British passport.

The Government’s view is that this is not relevant to this clause, but I am, however, very interested in this topic and can entirely understand the concern that has been expressed. I would be content to meet the noble Baroness and perhaps the right reverend Prelate, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and some BNOs to discuss this issue because it is obviously important. I suggest that this amendment is not the mechanism for us to discuss this, but I entirely understand that clarification and explanation is needed.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am very grateful for the Minister’s answer. One of the reasons why I wanted to lay this probing amendment is that BNO paper-holders feel they are getting a clear message from Border Force and immigration officials that their children do not have that protected status. It is that hole that we are trying to get the answer to, and we have not had it yet. I am very grateful for the meeting, but they need to know because at the moment some of them are being told that their children have no rights and should have Chinese travel documents. If the Government’s officials are saying that, surely that is wrong.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, clearly this needs to be looked into and I hear what the noble Baroness says. After the conclusion of the Committee we can have that meeting, explore the issue and I can respond in full. I am certainly not unsympathetic to the points raised.

The benefits of permanent settlement and British citizenship should not be available to those who come to the UK illegally. These clauses serve to underline our core message that if you come to the UK unlawfully, you will not be able to build a life in this country. I commend Clauses 29 to 36 to the Committee and invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, our debate on this group has given me a new respect for nationality law, which is at least as confusing as I ever imagined. It has always been a rather “Here be dragons” subject for me; that has been fully confirmed by this debate. I need to try to make sense of my scribbles.

One thing still puzzles me: I do not really understand why the Government are excluding registration for some forms of British citizenship but not for others. I remain bemused by that; I shall have to read exactly what the Minister said in Hansard. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, grasped that explanation better than I did.

I have sympathy with the particular issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on registration. I happen to think that there is more commonality with the issue of excluding routes to naturalisation than the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, wishes to acknowledge or give any quarter to, but on the issue of registration he made some important points. I wish him well in his pursuit of those issues with the Minister, but I also believe that there are serious issues around excluding people from the right to remain and a route to citizenship.

I did not grasp the Minister’s explanation of why the phrase “other international agreements” was taken out by the Government. Why did you—I do not mean the Minister personally; I mean the Government and the Home Secretary—put it in the original draft of the Bill a few months ago and then take it out if it did not meet the tests of clarity and concision? I think that was the Minister’s explanation. I accept that taking out those few words makes the clause more concise, but I do not think that doing so makes it clearer because we are then left wondering how the Government are going to secure compliance with those other international agreements —including the refugee convention, the statelessness conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—which are not referred to in the Bill.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Minister tried to explain that hanging fast to the ECHR was some new discovery by the Government. As I said last week, we tend to find it quite confusing as to when the Government like the ECHR and when they do not. They appear to act rather fast and loose on this subject.

I applaud the probing amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Brinton. I hope that she gets a fruitful meeting with the Minister because, as she and other noble Lords said, this issue seems to be the subject of considerable muddle and is having a severe impact on people’s lives. It is giving them extra anxiety. They have had to leave home and come to this country, but now they are being given the runaround by Home Office staff.

I was left unclear, it has to be said, on the situation raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. What will happen to the dependants of BNO status holders who are having to leave Hong Kong irregularly and perhaps also arrive in this country irregularly? I am not clear whether we are sure about how their welfare and status will be assured. The Minister said that BNOs are not covered by this Bill, but if somebody who is not a BNO but is a dependant of one arrives in this country irregularly, surely they will potentially be subject to the Clause 2 duty to remove.

Also—and almost finally—the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, highlighted a very interesting contrast between the Government wanting a duty to remove people but wanting only a discretion to be fair to them in legal and human rights terms. That does not seem very consistent. So I end by saying that I still feel very firmly that the duties under Clause 29 and 35 should be expressed in terms of not a discretion but a duty to obey our international legal obligations under the ECHR and other international treaties that we have signed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

99: Clause 37, page 40, line 30, leave out “or citizen”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

--- Later in debate ---

If the original eight-day deadline for the decision-making process is missed and the Home Secretary decides that there are not compelling reasons for this, the person will only have seven more working days to apply to the Upper Tribunal. I know that this may be drifting into points for the next group, but the Upper Tribunal has eight more working days to determine its appeal application. Can the Minister comment on this, or at least say that this will be answered in the next group? It goes back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the timeframe. Many of us think that the Government are simply creating a complex legal situation to make it practically impossible for anyone to fight removal, no matter how compelling their circumstances.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 37 provides for two types of suspensive claims, which have the effect of suspending a person’s removal—a factual suspensive claim and a serious harm suspensive claim. A factual suspensive claim is a claim that a mistake was made in deciding that a person meets the four conditions set out in Clause 2. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the UK to a country other than their country of origin. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, the risk must be real, imminent and foreseeable. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold, reflecting the test of the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39.

These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed. In responding to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I start by making the general observation that suspensive claims are relevant to people who have received a third-country removal notice. In this context, an asylum claim would not be relevant. Therefore, they do not impact the definition of “refugee” in the way that he suggested.

Amendments 100 and 108 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period that it would take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the third country. If accepted, these amendments would enable people who receive a third-country removal notice to raise serious harm suspensive claims against their removal, based on a risk of harm that many not materialise for many months, if not years, after the person’s removal to the safe third country. This cannot be right. We cannot have a position whereby a person’s removal from this country is prevented based on a risk that does not currently exist and may not exist until a significant amount of time has elapsed after the person is removed.

Amendment 101 would remove the need for the risk of harm to be imminent and foreseeable. If accepted, this would have a similar effect to Amendments 100 and 108, enabling a person to successfully challenge their removal based on a risk that may occur a long time in the future.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

A great deal of research has gone into the risks associated with countries where the law still criminalises homosexuality. The research of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has shown that those countries permit levels of murder of gay men and women, violence towards them and discrimination against them in many different forms. The violence experienced by people who are part of the LGBT+ community in those countries is exponentially greater than anywhere else, even in countries known for high levels of violence. The idea the Minister is talking about—risk that is far down the line and many years ahead—is not what we are talking about here. For many people going to those countries, there will be risks almost immediately.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes an entirely fair point. In those cases, of course, it would be an imminent feature. As she points out, in those circumstances that is something the courts would be able to have regard to.

The inclusion of “imminent and foreseeable” is intended to prevent the courts from considering risks that are dependent on a series of hypothetical events before the harm might occur. That is the reason, as I understand it, that “imminent” features in the European Court of Human Rights practice direction on interim measures. We cannot allow illegal entrants to be able to thwart their removal based on an unknown risk that cannot be foreseen and may not even arise for many months or years, if at all.

Amendments 102, 103, 104, 109, 111 and 112 would remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. These amendments would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the UK. Again, I point out with the greatest of respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that

“a real risk of serious and irreversible harm”

is the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures, as he alluded to during his speech.

Amendments 105, 106 and 107 would remove specific examples of harm, relevant to the availability of healthcare and medical treatment in a third country—a passage that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, drew the attention of the Committee to—in circumstances that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. There is existing case law that indicates that claims based on harm resulting from differing standards of healthcare fall short of the Article 3 threshold. It is simply unjustifiable for those who enter this country illegally to be able to remain here indefinitely and have unlimited access to our healthcare systems solely on the basis that they may not receive the same level of medical treatment in the country or territory they are rightly removed to.

For these reasons, Clause 38 makes it clear that a serious harm suspensive claim based on a risk of harm relating to differing standards of healthcare cannot succeed and, as a result, will not prevent that person’s removal to the safe third country. Clause 38 also makes it clear that a claim based on pain or distress resulting from a lack of medical treatment is unlikely to succeed. By including specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm in Clause 38, it is ensured that the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of the risk of serious and irreversible harm and go no further than intended.

The Bill provides a fast-track process for the consideration of a claim which may temporarily suspend a person’s removal from the UK. Clauses 41 and 42, as the Committee has noted, set out the procedure and timescale for making a suspensive claim and the timescale for a decision to be made on a suspensive claim.

Amendment 113 would remove the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include compelling evidence of the risk of serious harm that a person would face if removed to a third country, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Reducing the evidential burden in this way risks the process being abused through spurious and unmeritorious claims, similar to those that we have seen in other immigration applications. Evidence that is compelling is defined as that which is reliable, substantial and material to a person’s claim. I suggest that this is a reasonable requirement and necessary to ensure that the suspensive claims process is not open to abuse.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out an explanation of the word “compelling”. He used three adjectives and my impression is that that explanation is intelligible; it is not quite as alarming as “compelling”. Would it not be better to substitute the three words that he quoted for “compelling”? “Compelling” could be read as setting a very high standard indeed, which I do not think the three adjectives that he mentioned do.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am grateful for that suggestion from the noble and learned Lord. If I may, I will take a moment to reflect on that and will revert to him in relation to it.

Amendments 114 and 115 would significantly increase the timescales for making and deciding a serious harm suspensive claim, undermining the fast-track process that we have created in the Bill and our ability swiftly to remove illegal entrants. Where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, it will be possible to extend both the claim period and the decision period. Legal aid will be available to assist a person in receipt of a removal notice in making a suspensive claim. With these safeguards, I suggest to the Committee that it is reasonable to expect a person to bring a suspensive claim within the time periods set out in the Bill. I hope that that addresses the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.

The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that illegal entrants are removed as quickly as possible. Extending the decision and claim periods to a total of 60 days for all cases increases the risk that immigration bail would be granted by the First-tier Tribunal and, where bail is granted, that a person would disappear into the community in order to frustrate their removal. The use of detention is therefore necessary to make sure that they are successfully removed from the UK, and our ability to detain a person is dependent on any suspensive claim being both considered and decided quickly. The timeframes outlined in the Bill send a clear message that if you arrive in the UK illegally you will be swiftly removed.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that the regulation-making power in Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill. We are considering that committee’s recommendations and will respond before Report stage. I would, however, comment that the Delegated Powers Committee did not comment on this power.

The amendments put forward would undermine the suspensive claims procedure and the timeframes outlined in the Bill, where what this Government need to do is send a clear message that if you arrive in the UK illegally you will be swiftly removed. For the reasons that I have outlined, I ask that noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

Before the Minister sits down, there were two specific questions that I raised at the end of what I said that I would like an answer to. I do not believe that he has answered them at the moment.

The first is confirmation that there is nothing in the Bill that in any way derogates from the decision of the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) that a person qualifies as a refugee under our jurisprudence if they would face persecution living openly as an LGBT person. This is relevant to the question of serious irreversible harm, the question being whether it is the Government’s view that you would have to, if necessary, act discreetly and that, if you acted discreetly, the harm would not be suffered. Is it intended, through the Bill, to undermine this landmark decision of the Supreme Court?

The second point on which I would like a specific answer was similarly in relation to the UNHCR’s latest advice—from 2023, I think—about what constitutes an appropriate flight alternative. Where would it be appropriate to deny refugee status because there is a place within a territory or country where there would be no persecution and where it would be reasonable for the person in question to live in an ordinary way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for repeating those questions. He is entirely right that I should have answered them; I apologise for not doing so.

The short answer is that this is a separate strategy regime to the one that the case of HJ (Iran) was decided under. Of course, although the findings in that case and the line of cases concluding in that case would be relevant, the decision will always be taken on the facts of each case. I cannot, I am afraid, give the noble and learned Lord an undertaking on what he might perceive to be an inconsistent decision in relation to that case. I am happy to look into it further and will write to him about that, but that would certainly be my instinctive reaction.

In relation to the further report from the UNHCR, again, each of these matters is fact-sensitive to each serious harm suspensive claim. It would not be right for me to try to predicate at this Dispatch Box what the outcome might be.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am sorry to come back on this, but it is important. The Government must give some guidance to the judges of the Upper Tribunal who try these cases with these novel and, if I may say so—I am adopting the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—complicated provisions. These are new provisions that are not found anywhere else in our jurisprudence or in anybody else’s. We are talking about a special type of irreversible harm that has to be predictable. Any guidance that we can give on how the existing jurisprudence and UNHCR advice would still apply will be extremely important for the actual mechanics of delivering justice in these cases.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I can only repeat that the Supreme Court decision in HJ (Iran) and the other documents provided by the UNHCR are not relevant in this context because they do not deal with the same mechanics. Those cases were asylum or protection claims, whereas this deals with the specific statutory category of serious and irreversible harm. Of course, although there may be some crossover in the arguments deployed, ultimately they address a different issue. I cannot provide the type of assurance that the noble and learned Lord seeks, I am afraid.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, if two noble and learned Lords and one learned with a small “l” noble Lord—if I may call the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that—are frowning and struggling to understand what the Minister has just said, there is no hope for me. I must confess that I found it pretty difficult to understand. I would be most grateful if the Minister could put the letter that he has promised the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in the Library so that the rest of us can try to understand.

It would be of great concern if the worry that the noble and learned Lord raised was to be shrouded in doubt in terms of the status of the Supreme Court case, which said that you cannot expect a gay person to have to live in a closeted fashion—that is, you would expect them to be able to live openly for a country to be considered safe. If that precedent were to be put in any doubt, it would have serious implications, as would the concerns that were raised about healthcare; I am not sure what point we have precisely got to on that subject.

The overall concern, if I may put it like this, is if it ain’t broke there is no need to fix it. The courts seem to have got a handle on these issues, and what the Government are doing with their word salad is creating quite a lot of instability and confusion in something that is being handled pretty competently by the courts. They have reached some position on how to assess issues such as risk, foreseeability and reality of risk—and here the Government come, like a bull in a china shop, trying to upset and disturb all that. I am rather minded to think that the Government would do better just to leave it to the courts.

The Minister was not very persuasive in his argument that the wording in the Bill is necessary to stop projections of hypothetical risk. Surely, the courts can be relied on to filter out fantastical imaginings when they assess the reality of risk. I am afraid I found his responses on this group pretty unpersuasive. He keeps coming back to this hoary old chestnut that the use of detention is necessary to ensure swift removal. The idea that this Government are going to ensure swift removal of a lot of people strikes most people living in the real world, to use that phrase again, as for the birds. However, with that said, I shall not oppose the clause standing part.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

115A: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Procedure for Tribunal Procedure Rules(1) The first time after the passing of this Act that Tribunal Procedure Rules are made for the purposes of any of sections 43 to 48 (appeals in relation to suspensive claims), the Rules may be made by the Lord Chancellor rather than by the Tribunal Procedure Committee.(2) Before making Tribunal Procedure Rules by virtue of subsection (1), the Lord Chancellor must consult—(a) the Senior President of Tribunals,(b) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales,(c) the Lord President of the Court of Session, and(d) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.(3) The Lord Chancellor is not required to undertake any other consultation before making Tribunal Procedure Rules by virtue of subsection (1).(4) A requirement to consult under subsection (2) may be satisfied by consultation that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act.(5) Tribunal Procedure Rules made by virtue of subsection (1) are to be made by statutory instrument.(6) A statutory instrument containing Tribunal Procedure Rules made by virtue of subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament after being made.(7) Tribunal Procedure Rules contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (6) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(8) In calculating the period of 40 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which— (a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(9) If Tribunal Procedure Rules cease to have effect as a result of subsection (7)—(a) that does not affect the validity of anything previously done under the Rules, and(b) subsection (1) applies again as if the Rules had not been made.(10) In this section “Tribunal Procedure Committee” means the committee of that name constituted under Part 2 of Schedule 5 to the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause provides for the first Tribunal Procedure Rules made after the passing of the Bill for the purposes of any of Clauses 43 to 48 to be made by the Lord Chancellor and to be subject to the made affirmative procedure.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

115B: Clause 51, page 53, line 35, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (9), at the beginning, insert “Subject to subsection (10),”;(c) after subsection (9), insert—“(10) A statutory instrument containing the first rules made for the purposes of section 2AA (appeals in relation to the Illegal Migration Act 2023) must be laid before Parliament after being made.(11) Rules contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (10) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(12) In calculating the period of 40 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(13) If rules cease to have effect as a result of subsection (11)—(a) that does not affect the validity of anything previously done under the rules, and(b) subsection (10) applies again as if the rules had not been made.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the first rules made by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under section 5 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 for the purposes of section 2AA of that Act (inserted by Clause 51(5)) to be subject to the made affirmative procedure.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

115C: Clause 52, page 53, line 40, after “court” insert “or tribunal”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendments in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 54, line 1 and page 54, line 7 modify Clause 52 so that a tribunal (as well as a court) may not grant an interim remedy that prevents or delays, or that has the effect of preventing or delaying, the removal of a person from the United Kingdom under the Bill.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I think everybody is really waiting to hear what the Minister has to say about this. It has been a fascinating debate and, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, it appears that Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, accept Rule 39—the Minister made that very clear in what he read out—and yet we have had the silence about Clause 52. I do not think I can add anything of substance to the debate at this stage and I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 52 underpins the suspensive claims and appeals process by prohibiting the courts from granting interim remedies in relation to any other proceedings which would prevent or delay the removal of an illegal entrant subject to the duty. Amendments 116 and 117 would require the Home Secretary to provide a statement to Parliament, on a case-by-case basis, explaining why the courts should prevent the granting of an interim remedy and for this to be approved by the other place—and only the other place, I note—before the restrictions set out in Clause 52 could come into effect.

These amendments seriously risk undermining our efforts swiftly to remove illegal entrants from the UK. To prevent the courts granting an interim remedy and delaying removal, it would be necessary to seek parliamentary approval in every case subject to the duty to remove. This, I am sure the Committee will agree, is simply not practicable; nor is it necessary or appropriate.

These amendments are fundamentally misconceived. They proceed on the basis that there is an individual rationale for barring interim remedies in each case, but the rationale is universal; namely, that the Bill itself provides for a mechanism for a person subject to the duty to remove to challenge their removal and for removal to be suspended while the claim and any appeal to the Upper Tribunal have yet to be determined. That being the case, it is the Government’s contention that there is no case for the courts separately to grant interim remedies. The blanket approach taken by Clause 52 is therefore entirely appropriate, and I suggest to the Committee that that is an entire answer to the second point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Clause 52 will encourage compliance with the suspensive claims process. It also provides an effective safeguard against other types of legal challenges being brought in an attempt to thwart removal. This will ensure that our ability promptly to remove those with no legal right to be in the UK is not undermined.

Turning then to what may be seen as the main event, Clause 53, I want to make it clear from the outset that the UK is fundamentally committed to the international rules-based order and there is nothing in this clause which requires us to act incompatibly with our international obligations. Under Rule 39, an interim measure may be indicated by the European Court of Human Rights where there is an imminent risk of irreparable harm. The inclusion of Clause 53 reflects the concerns we have raised with the Strasbourg court about its interim measures process, as identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

We want the interim measures process to have greater transparency and fairness to ensure the proper administration of justice, reflecting what we would apply in a domestic scenario, as identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. This includes clear and reasoned decisions and an opportunity to make meaningful representations before and after a decision is made. It cannot be right that our ability to control our borders is undermined by an opaque process conducted at the last minute, with no formal chance to put forward our case or to appeal that decision. This process risks derailing our efforts to tackle the people smugglers and prevent people making dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys across the channel.

Clause 53 affords the Home Secretary, or other Minister of the Crown, personal discretion to suspend the duty where an interim measure has been indicated. This will mean that a Minister may suspend removal in response to a Rule 39 interim measure but, crucially, is not bound by UK law to do so. This will be dependent upon the individual facts of each case. For broader context, I direct noble Lords to the recent and well substantiated paper by Professor Ekins of Policy Exchange, already discussed by the Committee, together with its valuable forewords written by Lord Sumption and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann. The key arguments made by Professor Ekins were helpfully summarised and powerfully expanded upon by my noble friends Lord Sandhurst and Lord Wolfson, who I know will have given great consideration to the Strasbourg court’s jurisdiction and procedural rules in their preparation for the Committee.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

116A: Clause 52, page 54, line 1, after “court” insert “or tribunal”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 53, line 40.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

117A: Clause 52, page 54, line 7, after second “court” insert “or tribunal”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 53, line 40.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

119A: Clause 54, page 56, line 7, leave out from “sections” to end of line and insert “43 to 48 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, or under Tribunal Procedure Rules made for the purposes of any of those sections.””
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment corrects the references to the Clauses in the Bill under which advocacy in the Upper Tribunal can take place, and adds a reference to the Tribunal Procedure Rules made for the purposes of those Clauses.

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It will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to all the various points that have been made—but, at the heart of it, if the Government do not make some changes and bring forward some of their own amendments on the basis of the very real problems that have been identified in the Committee, we will see some amendments brought forward at Report. As my noble friend Lady Lister has pointed out, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and the right reverend Prelate have said, we are talking about children here. Many will be denied the justice that they deserve if this is carried forward unamended.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these clauses and amendments take us on to the provisions regarding age assessments. As I set out last week, the duty to make arrangements for removal in Clause 2 of the Bill does not apply to unaccompanied children until they reach adulthood. There is a power to remove them, but the Bill provides, as the Committee well knows, that this may be exercised only in very limited circumstances, such as for the purposes of reunion with a parent or where removal is to a safe country of origin.

Given that unaccompanied children will be treated differently from adults under the Bill, and the obvious safeguarding risks of adults purporting to be children being placed within our care system, it is important that we take steps to deter adults from claiming to be children and to avoid lengthy legal challenges to age-assessment decisions preventing the removal of those who have been assessed to be adults. Receiving care and services reserved for children also incurs costs and reduces accessibility of these services for genuine children who need them.

Assessing age is inherently difficult, as the right reverend Prelate identified. However, it is crucial that we disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children, given that unaccompanied children will be treated differently from adults under this Bill. Our data shows that between 2016 and March 2023 there were 8,611 asylum cases where age was disputed and subsequently resolved following an age assessment, of which nearly half—47%, 4,088 individuals—were found to be adults. Accordingly, Clause 55 disapplies the yet to be commenced right of appeal for age assessments, established in Section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, for those who meet the four conditions in Clause 2 of this Bill. Instead, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, but that review will not suspend removal and can continue from outside the UK after they have been removed.

In addition, Clause 55(5), identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

The Minister referred to the figures increasing for disputed children, because the figures in 2021 had increased. I am looking at the information from the Helen Bamber Foundation. The foundation makes the point that in 2021, the Home Office started publishing statistics which included children who were being treated as adults by the Home Office after a short visual assessment only, but the actual data has not been disaggregated beyond that. Does the Minister recognise that it is apples and pears—it is not looking at the same thing? A different group of children were being included within the data.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not recognise those statistics, but I will of course look at the Helen Bamber Foundation report that the noble Baroness identifies. The facts are stark. As I have already identified, a large proportion of disputed age-assessment cases result in the applicant being found to be over 18.

Clause 55(5), as commented upon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seeks to ensure that age assessment judicial reviews will be considered by the courts on normal public law principles such as rationality, public law unreasonableness and procedural fairness. Such a challenge on these grounds is not as restrictive as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has suggested. However, Clause 55(5) will seek to ensure that the court does not consider age as a matter of fact and will not substitute its own decision on age, distinguishing itself from the position of the Supreme Court in the judgment of R (on the application of A) v London Borough of Croydon 2009.

Amendments 121 to 123, tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seek to negate these provisions by omitting Clause 55(2), (4) and (5). They are not amendments which I can commend to the Committee. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham asked whether a person would be returned to the UK if a judicial review was successful. This would depend on the nature of the court’s judgment and any associated order. We will, of course, comply with any order of the court.

Amendments 124 to 126, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, would similarly have the effect of neutering Clause 56. Clause 56 again seeks to disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children by making use of scientific age-assessment methods already employed in many other European countries, including the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Specifically, Clause 56 will enable us to bring forward regulations to provide that a person is to be treated as an adult if they refuse to consent to specified scientific methods for the purpose of age assessment, and the clause already provides that this would be the case only if the refusal was without good reason. I assure the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Brinton, and other noble Lords that the regulation-making power will not be exercised until the science is sufficiently accurate to support providing for an automatic assumption of adulthood.

Given this, it would be premature to provide draft regulations as to the level of parliamentary scrutiny to apply to those regulations. We note the Constitution Committee’s recommendation that the affirmative procedure should apply—a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—and we will respond in advance of the next stage.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can I just pick up something before the Minister leaves this point? If I understood the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, correctly, she wanted to know how a child could consent to a scientific assessment that assesses their age.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

They participate in the particular type of medical scan that is utilised. That is the practice adopted by our European partners.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Whether it is adopted by our European partners or not, Gillick competence is the key UK law that is used to decide whether a child can or cannot do it. It is not just Gillick competence; it is about whether they have the language to understand what is being asked of them. Could the Minister respond on the Gillick competence point, please? That is UK law.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The provisions in the Bill are clear, and, as I say, in due course draft regulations will be provided, and they will be subject to scrutiny by this House. I am afraid there is little point speculating in the abstract on questions of Gillick competence in the absence of the regulations. But the point is clear that it would be contrary to the purpose of these provisions if an applicant was able simply to refuse to participate in scientific age assessment and that were to have no consequences; that would rob such provisions of efficacy, as the noble Baroness would have to concede, I suggest.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

It is quite astonishing to hear a Minister of the Crown say, from what I can understand, that a child can therefore be forced to comply with some scientific method of age assessment. In every area of public life in this country, the competence of a child to make a decision is structured in a way that takes into account the fact that they are children, even if, as in this case, they are potentially children. What the Minister is saying is quite astonishing. I have no idea what it means regarding how you assess the age of a child and ensure that that child in some way gives consent. Is there a social worker? Is there someone acting in loco parentis? Is there some sort of structure that means that you cannot just force a child to take part in some sort of scientific method that looks into their age?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I fear that we are speaking at cross purposes. I certainly would not compel any child to participate in age assessment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The whole point is that they are, in effect, being compelled. This point was made by the interim age advisory committee—a committee set up by the Government. Why are the Government ignoring its advice? They are doing the opposite of what it says should be done. It said:

“The consequences of refusal should not be so disproportionately adverse as to bias the applicant towards consent”.


That is exactly what is happening.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is difficult to debate these measures. As I say, in the event that the situation is advanced by the development of these scientific methods and regulations are brought forward, we can have further discussions about the provisions on that occasion. However, in principle, there is nothing wrong with having available a protection that would mark the fact that, if you have scientific age assessment, simply saying “I don’t consent” would provide you with an opportunity not to adhere to the scheme that applies to everyone else. For those reasons, at an abstract level, there is no reason you could not have a situation where willingness to undertake a scientific age assessment is given full weight by a decision-maker in a way that, if someone refused to participate, it might not be. It always depends on the circumstances in regulations.

[Baroness Neuberger (CB)]

I am sorry but can the Minister explain how this can be acceptable when subjecting young people—children—to investigations such as X-rays that are not at all for their benefit is inherently unethical? How can this be justified in the way he has just done?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am not sure that I agree with the allegation that this is unethical because, as the noble Baroness may recall, on a previous occasion when the principles of age assessment were discussed in this House, my noble friend Lord Lilley observed that the radiation risk in taking an X-ray is comparable to that of a transatlantic flight. I suggest that, as long as the appropriate safeguards are in place, there is nothing in principle wrong with inviting an applicant who says that they are under 18 to participate in an X-ray procedure.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, has expertise that the Committee is not aware of but the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is very clear that every single doctor registered with the GMC—and the equivalents for X-ray technologists and others—would be required, under the terms of their registration, to consider whether the work that they were doing was ethical. It is absolutely confident that it would not be, so one further question here—I do not want us to go into it now because we do not have time—is: how will the Government deliver this measure if all registered professionals are told by their registration bodies that they should not do this work?

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Baroness rightly says, now is not the moment to discuss this hypothetical but it is notable that our European neighbours operate such schemes and clearly have professionals who participate. These are all matters that would need to be looked at in the event that the scheme—

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Has the Minister had discussions with the GMC and social workers, for example?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Baroness now invites me to embark on a discussion that she just said she did not want to have. I agree with her first position because it is not relevant to the amendment that she raises.

Amendment 127 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on scientific age assessment methods, the attendant scientific advice and the statistics relating to their use. The Home Office already publishes such information: quarterly datasets including age disputes are available on GOV.UK—we have heard references to those in Committee this evening—and, when scientific methods of age assessment are introduced, the Home Office will ensure that we report and monitor that information. The Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee continues to provide scientific advice to the Home Secretary and the Home Office’s chief scientific adviser. Their first report was published on GOV.UK, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, identified, and the Government will continue to seek advice from the committee. Given that we already publish the kind of information and data proposed by the noble Lord, I submit that his amendment is unnecessary.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

What is the point of seeking advice if it is then ignored? While I am on my feet, because I was not quick enough earlier, the Minister gave some figures that the right reverend Prelate, other noble Lords and I disputed, but it is as if we have not spoken. The evidence we presented was just ignored. It suggests that government Ministers tend to wildly exaggerate the proportion of children who are wrongly assessed as adults presenting themselves as children. We want the Minister to engage, if not now then in writing, with the figures that we came up with. I am appalled that the Minister has not even read the Helen Bamber Foundation report, because that is the best report on age assessment that there is. I very much hope that at least his officials have read it, but I will leave it at that.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Of course we consider the advice provided by the Age Estimation Science Advisory Committee and the Home Office’s chief scientific adviser, and we will continue to do so. It is because we are in the process of awaiting such advice that the age assessment process is not fully operational. That demonstrates that we take and appreciate the advice that we are given.

As to the information questions, I will look at the statistics that the noble Baroness raises. I do not recognise them immediately, which is not to say that they are not properly reflective. There are a lot of statistics published on the Home Office website, so I appreciate that there may be some conclusions to draw. I will certainly look at that.

Government Amendment 123C is a clarificatory amendment that simply ensures that Clause 55 applies to any decisions following the regulations made under Clause 56, which automatically assumes someone to be an adult as a result of their refusal to consent to a scientific age assessment. It includes a decision as to whether an individual has reasonable grounds to refuse consent to a scientific age assessment.

We cannot escape the fact that almost half of asylum seekers claiming to be children were found to be adults. Those seeking to game the system in this way create clear safeguarding risks to genuine children and delay their removal. Clauses 55 and 56 are a necessary part of the framework of the Bill to ensure that we can swiftly remove those subject to the duty in Clause 2. I therefore invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

The Minister did not allow me to intervene earlier, so will he allow me to intervene now? In what world can he say that a child freely consents to a scientific assessment on the basis that, if that child does not consent, they will be treated as an adult and removed from the United Kingdom?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

We have already canvassed these topics, but there are many ways for a decision-maker to take a refusal to consent into account. It need not be an automatic presumption that somebody is of age; it can be treated in a variety of potential ways, which will be described in the regulations. They will be subject to debate at that time. I am afraid that that is the answer to the noble Lord’s question.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

I thank all noble Lords for contributing to the debate and for interjecting during the Minister’s response with many of the questions that I noted. I repeat what I said earlier: the Minister of State justified the inclusion of Clauses 55 and 56 in the Bill by saying that

“around 50% of those people who are assessed are ultimately determined to be adults”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/4/23; col. 777.]

To be fair, the noble Lord, Lord Murray, said just under 50%, which is a slight change.

However, I went on to ask whether the Minister could confirm that this figure is misleading, given that it includes individuals subsequently found to be children after referral to a local authority. He has not answered that question, but please do not try to do so now; please write. The Helen Bamber Foundation found that 1,386 individuals were referred to local authorities in 2022, of whom 867 were found to be children. That is about 62% to 63%. Clearly, several of us are going to read Hansard very carefully and we would like the Minister to go away and reflect on the figures a bit further.

For all the reasons that have been raised by colleagues, who I thank for all their support—I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his additional proposal, which makes complete sense—the Minister will not be surprised that we are likely to return to this on Report, because we think these things matter enormously.

I think there is an assumption made by the Home Office that it is adults pretending to be children; most of us come at it the other way round, and are worried about children who are deemed to be adults and are therefore placed in unsafe places. Somewhere, the two have got to meet and talk with each other and consider each other. I suggest that the Home Office has some very good conversations with the DfE, social workers and health professionals about how to understand children and how they work, including children who are 16 and 17 years old, because they are still not adults. However, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

123A: Clause 55, page 56, line 33, after “court” insert “or tribunal”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 56, line 36 supplement references in Clause 55 to the court with references to the tribunal.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

128: Clause 57, page 58, line 41, at end insert—
“(iii) at the appropriate place insert—““national” includes citizen;”;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment modifies the amendments to section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 in clause 57. The new amendment to section 80A inserts a definition of “national” which applies to references to a person who is a national of a State (in that section and section 80AA of that Act) so that citizens of that State are included. This is for consistency with the freestanding provision in the Bill.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say to many of the questions raised. We will then consider what to do between now and Report.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken: the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Hacking.

The measures in Clause 57 aim to deter claims from nationals from safe countries who seek to abuse our asylum system and do not need to seek protection in the UK. It will consequently reduce pressure on our asylum system and allow us to focus on those most in need of our protection.

Treating asylum claims from EU nationals in this way is not new, as I think all noble Lords recognised. It has been a long-standing process in the UK asylum system and is also employed by EU states. However, EU states are not the only safe countries. It is right that we expand these provisions so that they apply not only to nationals of the EU but to other safe countries that we have assessed as generally safe. At this time, the list has been expanded to include the other European Economic Area countries, Switzerland and Albania. This clause also includes powers that would allow us to expand this list further to other safe countries of origin in future.

Furthermore, these provisions will expand this approach to include human rights claims. If a country is generally safe, it stands to reason not only that asylum claims should be declared inadmissible but that any related human rights claims should be treated likewise. If a person has other reasons for wishing to come to the UK, they should apply through the appropriate routes. People should not seek to use our asylum system to circumnavigate those routes.

However, even if a country is generally considered safe, it is acknowledged that there could be exceptional circumstances in which it may not be appropriate to return an individual. If the person does not meet the conditions of the duty and makes an asylum or human rights claim, and there are exceptional circumstances as a result of which the Secretary of State considers that a claim ought to be considered, then their claims will be considered in the UK. If a person meets the conditions of the duty and makes a protection and human rights claim, and the Secretary of State accepts that there are exceptional circumstances which prevent removal to their country of origin, they will instead be removed to a safe third country. Therefore, it is considered that these provisions incorporate appropriate safeguards to ensure that we will not return an individual where it would not be safe to do so.

Amendment 128A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, seeks to remove Albania from the list of safe states for the purposes of Section 80A. For a country to be added to the list of safe countries of origin, it must be assessed as safe, as per the test set out in new Section 80AA of the 2002 Act. We are satisfied that, in general, Albania—a NATO member, an ECAT signatory and an EU accession country—meets that test. Indeed, the cross-party Home Affairs Committee, chaired by Dame Diana Johnson, said in its report published just yesterday:

“Albania is a safe country and we have seen little evidence that its citizens should ordinarily require asylum”.


Furthermore, as already set out, the provisions incorporate appropriate safeguards, should it be accepted that there are exceptional circumstances why an Albanian national should not be returned there.

As I have indicated, these sensible extensions to the inadmissibility arrangements which currently apply to EU nationals will help to reduce the pressures on our asylum system and enable us better to focus on those most in need of protection. I commend the clause to the Committee and invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken, especially my noble friend Lord Hacking; he has been extremely noble to stay this late to speak, and he speaks from his first-hand experience of Albania.

The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, said that if there had not been so much repetition, we would not still be here at this time. However, the Minister, in his reply, has shown why sometimes there is repetition: because there is no evidence that the Minister listens. I talked about the Home Affairs Committee and why the response to it was not good enough, but he read his speech about the Home Affairs Committee as if it had not been mentioned. This happens time and time again. The main repetition I heard this evening was from the Government Benches giving very detailed information about the Policy Exchange report over and again. We could have done without that.

It is late, and I do not think that we want to go beyond 2 am, if we can possibly help it; I am shaking with tiredness. The Minister has not engaged at all with the arguments put that, while Albania may be a safe country for many people, it is not safe for everyone. It is just not good enough to say, “Well, in exceptional circumstances, their claims can be considered”. There are some very vulnerable people—people who have fled extremely difficult circumstances that none of us would want to face—who have sought asylum here and been granted asylum here for good reason. I sometimes wonder what the point is of us standing up saying these things, when the Minister then stands up and gives us a response that takes no account whatever of what has been said. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for her clarification of the statistic used in the earlier debate on age assessments.

Turning to the remarks of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, I am heartened to hear, and indeed I entirely agree with him, that this group particularly highlights a point on which all across the Chamber are agreed—that there should be safe and legal routes—and the question is about the mechanics of that safe and legal route and how it fits with the scheme in the Bill to deter people embarking on dangerous journeys across the channel. It is in the spirit of that consensus that I conclude this debate.

Before I turn to the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I say a little about Clauses 58 and 59, not least as this will provide important context for the examination of the amendments. This Bill will introduce for the first time a cap on the number of people entering the UK through safe and legal routes based on local authority capacity. Clause 58 sets out how that cap will be developed and agreed. In answer to the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the cap is being introduced in recognition of the limited capacity that local authorities have to house and support through integration and local services, such as health and education, those in need of resettlement in the UK, a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Green.

In recent years, following the fall of Kabul and the war in Ukraine, we have welcomed and provided sanctuary to larger numbers of people than we could comfortably manage because it was the right thing to do, and I appreciate the remarks that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made in relation to that. Going forward, it is right that both Houses have the opportunity to debate and approve through the affirmative procedure—which I can confirm to the noble Lord—the numbers to be admitted to the UK each year through safe and legal routes. That is the purpose of Clause 58. Local authorities have been required to provide accommodation for these large cohorts and subsequently there is no longer sufficient capacity in our system for our UNHCR-referred global settlement schemes to function in the way in which they were intended.

At this point, I wish to clarify this route for the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. The UK’s global resettlement schemes do not involve an application process. Instead, those who have sought sanctuary in the first safe country should on arrival register with the relevant authorities as a person in need of international protection. The UNHCR is expertly placed to help the UK authorities identify and process vulnerable refugees who would benefit from resettlement in the UK and has responsibility for all out-of-country casework activity relating to our resettlement schemes.

I remind the Committee, especially my noble friend Lady Helic, that even under our current constraints between 2015 and March 2023 the UK resettled more than 28,400 individuals under UNHCR resettlement schemes, around half of whom were children. I should be clear that the cap does not remove any routes or change our willingness to help. However, consulting on capacity and developing the cap figure based on the response is the right way to continue offering resettlement pathways to the UK for those in need of our protection as part of a well-managed and sustainable migration system.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I apologise for missing the start of this debate as I was in a committee. Will the Minister explain why Clause 58 imposes a cap on the maximum number of people who may enter the United Kingdom, not the maximum number of asylum seekers, using safe and legal routes—in other words, tourists, businessmen, or whatever? They tend to come by safe and legal routes. I do not understand the drafting. Secondly, will the Minister consider the cart and horse problem? He has said more than once—I hope I have got it correctly—that once illegal immigration is under control the Government will create new safe and legal routes. However, the way of getting the illegal immigration problem under control is by creating safe and legal routes. Will he address that point?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I appreciate that the noble Lord was unable to be here at the beginning of the debate. I hope that Clause 58(1) makes it clear that the regulations must specify

“the maximum number of persons who may enter the United Kingdom annually using safe and legal routes”.

There is a cross-reference to subsection (7), where noble Lords will see that “safe and legal route” is a defined term. It means

“a route specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State”.

Those regulations will clarify what that term means.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I understand the Minister’s point, but it does not answer the question that I asked: why does the clause talk about “persons” rather than asylum seekers?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is because that is the structure of the legislation, and it simply makes for good parliamentary drafting. There it is. Forgive me: I shall make some progress because we have a lot of groups to deal with.

Clause 58 provides for the Home Secretary to consult local authorities, and any other organisation or person deemed suitable, to understand their capacity. The cap figure, and by extension the routes to be covered by the cap, will be considered and voted on in Parliament through a draft affirmative statutory instrument. The cap will not automatically apply to all current and new safe and legal routes that we offer or will introduce in the future. The policy intention is to manage the accommodation burden on local authorities, and my officials are currently considering which routes are most suitable to be included within the cap.

Alongside the cap on safe and legal routes, Clause 59 further requires the Home Secretary to publish a report on existing and any proposed new safe and legal routes. In response to the right reverend Prelate, we will continue to work with the UNHCR and other organisations as the Secretary of State considers appropriate in devising proposed additional safe and legal routes.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

This is a technical point, but it is important to reflect on it before Report. It is not a substantive policy point, but the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, may have hit on something, in relation not just to the question of why it does not say “asylum seekers” but to a potential unlawful sub-delegation. If the regulation-making power is about safe and legal routes, and “safe and legal routes” will not be defined in vires in the primary legislation but will be determined in the regulations, there is a circularity that is in danger of looking either too vague or specifically like a potential unlawful sub-delegation. No doubt the Minister and his colleagues can discuss that with parliamentary counsel. I may be totally wrong, but the noble Lord may have hit on a point which the Government have been given an opportunity—there is time—to consider before Report. That is what Committee is for.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I said, we have considered these issues and are satisfied with the drafting as it is, but of course I will look again at what the noble Baroness suggests.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

The Minister talked about “devising” new schemes; I asked for co-creation. Is he willing to go so far as to say “co-creating”?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The right reverend Prelate is right to point to the fact that these things are always a joint effort. The Home Secretary of the day will consult, and consider input, so yes, all those words would be applicable in my view. Clearly, ultimately the scheme has to come from the Home Office, but it will be done following appropriate consultation with and the involvement of interested parties.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

If the noble Lord will forgive me, I should probably, in order to have a more coherent speech, take his more general points at the end. I am conscious that we need to make progress, not least because we do not wish to be here into the small hours.

As I say, the report described in Clause 59, which will be laid before Parliament within six months of the Bill achieving Royal Assent, will clearly set out the existing safe and legal routes that are offered, detail any proposed additional safe and legal routes, and explain how adults and children in need of sanctuary in the UK can access those routes. This clause is being introduced to provide clarity around the means by which those in need of protection can find sanctuary here.

Through the report, we will also set out any proposed additional safe and legal routes which are not yet in force. While a range of routes is offered at present, we believe it important to consider whether alternative routes are necessary and, if so, who would be eligible. In recognition of the different needs of children and adults in need of protection, the clause will require the report to set out which routes are accessible by adults or children.

It is against this backdrop of the Government’s approach to expanding the existing safe and legal routes that I now turn to the amendments in this group.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. My intervention is pertinent to that clause. Can he confirm, first, what I had indicated from the Independent Commission for Aid Impact: that it was the Home Office that asked for the UNHCR to direct the resettlement scheme to be focused on Afghans only, therefore closing it down for other countries; and, secondly, that when it comes to what the Government could consider to be new and safe and legal routes, they could simply be expanding some of the funding available for the UK resettlement scheme, because that is what the Government currently define as a safe and legal route, rather than it being new country routes?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

On the first point, I do not have that detail to hand so I will go away and find that out and write to the noble Lord. But on the second point, obviously, the UK resettlement scheme is a general scheme to take refugees who have been identified by the UNHCR and in that sense it is not geographically specified. Obviously, these are all issues which would be considered in the report provided for under Clause 59, so the noble Lord is right to identify that.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Before the Minister moves on, I asked a question about children, which was echoed by my noble friend Lord Coaker. The Minister mentioned children in relation to appropriate routes but the Children’s Commissioner has argued that children should be excluded from any cap. I asked what the Government’s response was to that recommendation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I ask the noble Baroness to forgive me; I was going to come to that. I have met with the Children’s Commissioner and we have an ongoing dialogue on the provisions in the Bill. There is no intention to exclude children, for the simple reason that children utilise resources in the same way as adult asylum seekers do. Therefore, in assuming the global level of resources needed to provide adequate support and integration for asylum seekers, whether adults or children, it is appropriate that a global view be taken. Therefore, it is necessary to take a global view of the cap.

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My noble friend the Minister just spoke of “alternative” rather than “additional” routes. Can he confirm that these would in fact be additional routes, rather than just taking one route out and putting another route in?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Yes, I was simply using the word “alternative” to discuss that particular route, but there is no intention to withdraw any routes. Obviously, it may be that routes are consolidated or changed so that they are incorporated—I do not want to tie any future Government’s hands on that—but I can reassure my noble friend in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

In just a second. My noble friend Lady Sugg also spoke to this amendment.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My intervention is on the previous topic.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Can we come back to that at the end?

On Report in the House of Commons, my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Immigration confirmed that the Government’s aim is to implement any proposed new safe and legal routes as soon as practicable, and in any event by the end of 2024. I hope that directly answers the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I believe that the timeframe proposed by the Immigration Minister is suitable as it will allow for proper consultation on potential new safe and legal routes, and meaningful consultation with our international partners and key stakeholders, to ensure that any proposed routes work well. It will enable us to work collaboratively across government to welcome and integrate new arrivals. While we are committed to considering new safe and legal routes, we must also acknowledge the current local authority capacity to house and support refugees. It makes no sense to launch new routes where we do not have the capacity to bring people to sanctuary in the UK and ensure their successful integration into our society; otherwise, it would simply be an exercise in paperwork.

In addition, as I have indicated, Clause 59 commits the Home Secretary to publishing a report on current and any proposed new safe and legal routes within six months of the Bill achieving Royal Assent. The proposed amendment would risk rendering this report meaningless. I believe the proper thing to do is to lay the report before Parliament, as we have committed to do, after which we can make a measured decision on any new safe and legal route that may be needed. My noble friend’s amendment, while well-intentioned, would not enable us to do the work needed to ensure that our safe and legal routes form part of a well-managed and sustainable migration system.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for allowing me to intervene. I return to Amendment 128B and his comments on those with BNO status. I raised whether they should be included within the safe and legal routes for the clear reason that they are not seeking protection and do not fall under UNHCR; they are British citizens who have rights under the British Nationality Act. If there are limits to their numbers, are the Government proposing to change the arrangement for BNO status applicants, and can we please add this to the agenda of the meeting that he promised me on Monday night? It is a very specific issue but a major political one if these people with British national rights are suddenly to be treated as if they are refugees.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I say, the definition of those to be caught will be specified in the regulations. Those are all highly pertinent points and, for the reasons I set out on Monday, we can certainly add them to our meeting agenda. I do not anticipate that we are at odds on this, but the topic is not really for the discussion of the Committee at this stage, because these matters would be covered when any regulations were considered.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

With the greatest of respect to the Minister, it is covered by Amendment 128B. It is quite explicitly covered by that amendment.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I hear what the noble Baroness says and hope to be able to offer her some more reassurance during our meeting but, for the reasons I have already set out, the Government do not accept that Amendment 128B is a necessary amendment to the Bill. No doubt we can discuss this further in due course.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

The Minister has left me a little confused about numbers. He said that it would be a terrible thing if we admitted more asylum seekers by safe and legal routes than could be housed by local authorities. He has made much of the fact that this would be an exercise in futility—a “paper exercise”, he said. Can he say what assurances the Government got from local authorities about housing the 606,000 people in the net migration figures this year? It seems a bit odd that a much smaller number of asylum seekers should be subjected to these limitations whereas the much larger number is not.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord omits to understand that the obligation to assist an asylum seeker is born of Section 95 of the 1996 Act, which applies to destitute asylum seekers. Those entering the country on a visa—for example, as a student—would not be entitled to government support for housing. The noble Lord is perhaps eliding two points in a way that is not particularly helpful.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I am slightly confused on this point as well. On a number of occasions, the Minister has said that the cap will be set based on the number of available housing places that local authorities are able to provide. However, Clause 58(5) refers to:

“If in any year the number of persons who enter the United Kingdom using safe and legal routes exceeds the number specified in the regulations”.


I have two questions about that. Under what circumstances would the Minister and the Government expect that number to be exceeded? More importantly, if local authorities have said that they can deal with only a certain number in a year, where will the people who breach the cap go?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Obviously, consultation with local authorities is important—they are the primary consultee set out in Clause 58(2)(a)—but, as the noble Lord will see from paragraph (b), other persons and bodies are also possible consultees. All this information will be fed into the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State in drawing up the regulations, and by this House and the other place in discussing them. It is not just about how many people we can house; it is about the whole network of support and integration that we can provide. As the noble Lord will immediately appreciate, Clause 58(5) is there as an enforcement mechanism for Parliament to ask a Secretary of State why they have permitted the cap to be exceeded. That is the purpose of making the Secretary of State lay before Parliament a statement setting out those breaches. That is the purpose of Clause 58(5). It is not envisaged that the Secretary of State will allow the cap to be exceeded, for the sensible reasons that the noble Lord provides.

I must make some progress. Amendment 129, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seeks significantly to increase the current scope of the UK’s refugee family reunion policy to include additional family members. This amendment needs to be seen in the context of what I submit is already a very generous family reunion policy for bringing families together. Under this policy, we have granted more than 46,000 visas since 2015; that is no small feat, and a fact that the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett, seem to have overlooked.

The focus of our refugee family reunion policy is on reuniting core family groups. This is as it should be. It allows immediate family members—that is, the partner and any children aged under 18—of those granted protection in the UK to join them here, if they formed part of a family unit before the sponsor left their country to seek protection. In exceptional circumstances, children over 18 are also eligible.

There are separate provisions in the Immigration Rules to allow extended family members to sponsor children to come here where there are serious and compelling circumstances. In addition, refugees can sponsor adult dependent relatives living overseas to join them where, due to age, illness or disability, that person requires long-term personal care that can be provided only by relatives in the UK. There is also discretion to grant leave outside of the Immigration Rules which caters for extended family members where there are compelling compassionate circumstances.

Amendment 129 would routinely extend the policy to cover a person’s parents, their adult unmarried children under the age of 25, and their siblings. Extending family reunion without careful consideration of the implications would significantly increase the number of people who would qualify to come here. We must carefully weigh the impact of eligibility criteria against the pressure that this would undoubtedly place on already strained central government and local services.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am afraid that the Minister’s use of the word “impact” triggered me. It would be very interesting to know, when we get the impact assessment— I hope sooner than “in due course”—the costings the Government would expect from something such as my amendment, or indeed my Private Member’s Bill.

I want to draw attention to something that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, mentioned. All the time, the Government imply that those of us who argue for better family reunion, the right to work and not having group 1 and group 2 refugees, are portrayed almost as though we are trying to obstruct the asylum system. Actually, we are trying to front-load it and make it more efficient and streamlined, so that in the end there would not be a backlog of160,000 asylum applications because the system would work better; people would be more integrated and more productive, and would not have to worry all the time about what was happening to their relations.

I am sorry that this has become a bit of a rant but I also have a question. Is the Minister going to cover the point that I felt was not answered in the Government’s response to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee? Why do the Government insist on having all these different definitions of family? Is it not all the time adding more complication into the immigration and asylum system? That is not the best way of getting caseworkers to be able to focus efficiently on their job. It means that, all the time, there are backlogs and inefficiency because the Government insist on not doing the rational thing.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I recall debating these topics and the very similar text of the noble Baroness’s Private Member’s Bill at its Third Reading. The reality is that she and I differ on the appropriate numbers that would come in and the resources that would then be necessary to attend them. It is simply a policy decision, and we differ on that.

I turn to Amendments 130 and 131, put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. These seek to create routes through which an individual may travel to the UK for the purpose of making a claim for asylum or protection. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and my noble friend Lord Kirkhope raised a similar point. The Government are clear that those in need of international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. This policy aligns with international law, and indeed with those of previous Governments, including the previous Labour Government. In answer to the question posed by the noble Lords, Lord Hannay, Lord Purvis and Lord Paddick, that is the fastest route to safety. Such schemes would only add further untold pressure to UK systems.

Amendment 130 defines an eligible applicant as someone who

“is present in a member State of the European Union”.

This underlines the point: EU member states are inherently safe countries with functioning asylum systems. There is therefore no reason why a person should not seek protection in the country concerned. Moreover, this amendment would also encourage more people to make dangerous and unnecessary journeys, including across the Mediterranean, to qualify for a safe passage visa.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

Does the Minister think that the cost should also be measured in terms of the reputation of the United Kingdom, the country as it is and the way it feels about itself? It is not just money.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I clearly recognise the points the noble Lord makes—that it is believed that not providing a visa route of the type described in the amendment will damage our international reputation—but no countries that I am aware of currently have a visa route of the type suggested. I am afraid that this is a consideration to be weighed in the balance. It would seem irresponsible not to consider the potential extreme cost of the proposal.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister should not be conflating the two amendments: they are distinct amendments with distinct mechanisms and purpose behind them, so it is a wee bit cheeky of him to do that. As for an estimate of some of the costs, can he do me a deal now in the Committee? I am not sure if this is able to be negotiated across the Committee, but I will show him mine if he shows me his before Report. He needs to present the impact assessment, which will be the Government’s estimate of the tariff costs for their UK resettlement scheme expansion, which he is proposing, to be part of a new safe and alternative or additional safe and legal route. I will use the basis of the central core estimates of what the Home Office is estimating to be the expansion necessary in the tariff funds available, which are scored against overseas development assistance, and I will use that on the threshold of what a humanitarian visa scheme might be. His scheme suggests to an Iranian woman that she has to flee to a neighbouring country to go to the UNHCR; then she is processed by the UNHCR, to be resettled in the UK. Our scheme allows that woman within Iran to go through a similar threshold to be able to access the UK. Which is most efficient?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I look forward to reading the noble Lord’s document when it arrives.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

In due course.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

In due course— I am very grateful. All these questions make it clear that bringing up legal migration is irrelevant to the Bill, a point that relates to comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The issue for the Bill is that the UK Government and local authorities have limited capacity to provide or arrange accommodation, hence a sensible cap is needed. There are other questions we need answers to. Are these safe passage visas to be given to young single men at the expense of those in more pressing need of sanctuary in the UK?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I hope the Minister will reflect before Report on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Winston. I do not recall a cap on Czechs in 1968 or on Hungarians in 1956. There was no cap on Germans and Austrians in 1938 and 1939. The reputational damage to this country done by the idea of a cap would be considerable. It could be defused if the Government would consider an amendment to Clause 58(3) which made it clear that a change of international circumstances, as well as a change of domestic circumstances, could create the need to change the number. To me, the horror is that we are doing this all endogenously, as if needs have nothing to do with what happens exogenously in the world out there—so if something awful happens in the world, we will pay no attention because we will be concerned about the consultation we had with local authorities about houses.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am not sure the noble Lord and I actually differ on the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Winston. It seems to me that the impact on the national reputation of Britain is not relevant, given the provision for the cap to be varied in the event of an international emergency such as he outlined. As he will see, Clause 58(3) states:

“the Secretary of State considers that the number needs to be changed as a matter of urgency”.

He can provide that regulation to both Houses of Parliament without consulting, and therefore the matter will be capable of discussion and approval and the cap lifted. In reality, I do not think there is any risk to our national reputation as a place which takes its obligations of international protection seriously.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

Forgive me, I have taken an awful lot of interventions, and I am very conscious of the time. I ask the noble Lord to keep this intervention until the end and allow me to make some progress.

I will return to the amendment. If, on the other hand, some numerical limit is envisaged, these schemes will not stop the boats and they are not an alternative to the Bill. Those who do not qualify for a safe passage visa will continue to be exploited by the people smugglers, all too ready to continue to take their money on the false promise of a new life in the UK.

As I have set out, we are ready to expand existing safe and legal routes as we get a grip on illegal migration, and the Bill already provides for this. That is the way forward, not amendments which exacerbate the current challenges. I commend Clauses 58 and 59 to the Committee and invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I was very encouraged by the answer the Minister gave. He seems to be saying that the needs referred to in Clause 58(3) could be exogenous as well as endogenous: that the cap could be raised in response to an urgent need even if that need had nothing to do with housing here but something to do with massacre or war abroad. If that is the case, could that not be made clear in the Bill by a government amendment to Clause 58(3)?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

I can certainly think about that. I will take it away, but I do not think we are terribly far apart.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for answering and clarifying some of the questions. My prophetic powers in saying “about two hours” were slightly wrong. The last two and a half hours will be memorable for a number of things—the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, quoting Ronald Reagan being one of them—and there were helpful reminders of no person being illegal. There were helpful alternatives to “safe and legal routes”, but I think that we will have to live with “safe and legal routes”. No one has implied that we will change the wording in the Bill. The Minister helpfully pointed out that there will be a definition in the regulations, so that helps us. I am not sure that the Minister answered the historical question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, about why the change happened around 2011 concerning the use of embassies, but I am not going to ask him to stand up.

Your Lordships will not be surprised to hear me say that, overall, I am disappointed that my amendment, not just about Hong Kong but particularly about Hong Kong, has not been accepted. It does not damage the Bill in any way to accept that amendment. Likewise, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, tries to clarify. That is the purpose, and the Minister’s response has not helped us move forward on that. I have no doubt that all of us involved will find ourselves in discussions about what we might bring back on Report. The desire is to take things forward on safe and legal routes.

At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I am happy to provide that reassurance and explanation. I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their thoughts on Clause 60.

Clause 60 clarifies and modernises Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, which relates to the credibility of asylum claimants. First, in response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, this provision will not be relevant to those who meet the conditions in Clause 2, as their asylum claims will of course be inadmissible, but it will be relevant to other asylum seekers. It is appropriate that we use the opportunity afforded by the Bill to address this issue for the reasons that I will come to in a moment. The clause puts it beyond doubt that destroying, altering, disposing of or failing to produce any identity document—not just a passport—is behaviour that should be viewed by decision-makers as damaging a claimant’s credibility.

Secondly, the clause modernises Section 8 to reflect the fact that mobile phones and electronic devices play a much more significant role in people’s daily lives in storing relevant documents and information than they did 20 years ago. We have therefore expressly provided that refusing to disclose information, such as a passcode which would enable access to a person’s mobile phone or other electronic device, should be damaging to their credibility. In so doing, we are reading across provisions that exist in criminal law in relation to Section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and equivalent provisions in Scotland. I hope noble Lords agree that it would be inconsistent to treat what would amount to the effective concealment of a document, by not providing access, stored electronically any differently from the concealment of a physical document.

Finally, the clause brings Section 8 of the 2004 Act up to date by clarifying that the provisions relating to documents apply where those documents are stored in electronic form.

Clause 14 is a separate part of the Bill and introduces new powers. We already have some powers to seize devices, but Clause 14 introduces new powers, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, observed, and as we discussed in Committee on the relevant group of amendments. Clause 60 will of course apply no matter which power of seizure is used.

I hope that I have provided the requested clarity, and I further hope that Clause 60 will stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for those explanations. It may be that my brain has gone to cotton wool—I will read his response in Hansard to try to see the whole picture. At the moment, I cannot see the overall coherence of this scheme.

The Minister is going to send me scurrying off to look up the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, of which I have just a vague memory. I am sure that colleagues on other Benches will know its provisions off the top of their heads, but is there any sort of reasonable suspicion trigger, or some such, in that Act, about investigating crime and suspected terrorism? I do not know, but my fear with all of this is of mission creep. I am not sure whether the Minister has fully removed that fear, but I will carefully read his response and I am sure that, with his normal courtesy, if I have any follow-up questions he will deal with them in writing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. I am not sure whether she heard the evidence provided by my noble friend Lady Ludford from the Home Office report, which said that providing work was not a pull factor in the way that the noble Baroness has suggested.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group all relate in one way or another to the operation of the asylum system. They variously seek to enable asylum seekers to work after three months and to reduce the backlog of asylum claims, an objective which we all share. Let me address each of these issues in turn.

Amendment 133, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, would enable asylum seekers to seek employment after three months. Asylum seekers are allowed to work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months or more, through no fault of their own. Those permitted to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list which, in turn, is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee, about which we heard during the debate. The list comprises skilled jobs where there is an identified shortage which it is sensible to fill, at least in part, through immigration.

It is important that our policy approach distinguishes between those who need protection and those seeking to work here, who can apply for a work visa under the Immigration Rules. Asylum seekers do not need to make perilous journeys to seek employment in the United Kingdom. There are various safe and legal routes for those seeking to work in the UK under the points-based system. Amendment 133 would fundamentally undermine our immigration framework. Instead of people applying to work in the UK through the proper channels, this amendment would simply encourage them to come to the UK illegally or overstay on a visitor’s or student visa, and then claim asylum in the knowledge that they would be able to work after three months.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The Minister’s assertion needs evidence. Sweden allows asylum seekers to work immediately, Portugal after one month, Germany after three months and Belgium after four months. Per 10,000 people per capita, there is no outlier in those countries with the rest of Europe, so what evidence does the Minister have that allowing people to work after three months is a pull factor, when the evidence in other countries in Europe shows significantly that it is not?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not agree that the evidence from the rest of Europe is any indicator of what might drive people across the channel in small boats. It stands to reason that, if people want to come to the UK to work, they may well seek to circumvent our asylum system by crossing the boats in small channels—I mean crossing the channel in small boats, rather than crossing the small channel in big boats. It therefore clearly stands to reason that it is sensible to refuse asylum seekers the right to work unless there is a delay of 12 months which is not the fault of that individual. It cannot be gainsaid that simply because we cannot produce evidence of what is going on in the mind of someone seeking asylum there is no reason to adopt the policy. I simply do not accept the logic of the noble Lord’s proposition.

My noble friend Lady Stowell made some pertinent points about the UK employment market that go to the difficulties posed by the amendment. I also very much welcomed the thoughtful speech by my noble friend Lady Lawlor. It is for all these reasons that the Government cannot support this amendment, and certainly not in this Bill, focused as it is on stopping the boats.

Amendments 139FA, 139FC and 150 all concern the current asylum backlog. We can all agree on one thing: namely, the need to process asylum claims efficiently and effectively, so that robust decisions are taken in a timely manner. We do not need new legislation to achieve this, and certainly not Amendment 150, which, quite inappropriately, seeks to tie the commencement of the Bill, which is to deal with the small boat crossings, to a reduction in the asylum backlog.

That said, I will set out the steps we are taking to reduce the current backlog. As noble Lords will know, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister pledged to clear the backlog of 92,601 initial asylum decisions relating to claims made before 28 June 2022, or legacy claims, by the end of 2023. We are making good progress. We have reduced the initial decision legacy asylum backlog by 17,000 in the past five months. We know there is more to do to make sure that asylum seekers do not spend months or years living in the UK, at vast expense to the taxpayer, waiting for a decision. That is why our commitment to tackle the backlog has focused on people who have sat in the backlog for the longest, often living in expensive hotels, while we process their case.

One way in which we will achieve that is via the streamlined asylum process which is centred around accelerating the processing of manifestly well-founded asylum claims. Another way in which we will achieve this is by grouping asylum claims by cohort. This means grouping asylum claimants and prioritising claims based on, for example, the type or volume of claims from a particular nationality, grant rate or compliance rate, and those on asylum support rate. This process means to conclude more efficiently outstanding asylum claims made before 28 June 2022 by the end of the year. This will allow decisions to be assessed in a more efficient manner. We have already doubled our decision-makers over the past two years, and we are continuing to recruit more. This will take our headcount of the expected number of decision-makers to 1,800 by this summer and 2,500 by September 2023.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt, but my noble friend referred to 17,000 claims having been processed. How many have been given permission to stay?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not have that figure to hand, but I will find out and write to my noble friend.

By tackling the backlog and processing asylum claims in a timely manner, we will address the issues raised by many noble Lords in relation to Amendment 133. I am sure we will return to these issues in the coming weeks and months, but for now I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I feel that he slightly demolished his own argument. He claims that the asylum system and working should be insulated from each other. The logic of that is that no asylum seeker would ever be allowed to work, yet government policy has the extremely unsatisfactory rule that they can apply after 12 months to a restricted list. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said that the case that he knows of took another 12 months to get permission—yet more bureaucracy. All we ever get from the Home Office is more bureaucracy. The Minister cannot have his cake and eat it. If he does not think that asylum seekers should ever work, why does that government policy exist at the moment? It is very unsatisfactory.

Noble Lords have made some very good points. Like others, I much appreciated the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who referred to “Conservative” principles of self-help and self-improvement. I would say that they are not uniquely Conservative, but they are also Conservative. That is why this policy makes sense to most people from all directions—on all Benches. It would help us have an orderly and well-run asylum system, as well as giving people the dignity and hope that have been mentioned.

I am afraid that I completely disagree with almost everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said. The policy would not encourage people to disappear. By keeping people plugged into the system, and assuming that they are paying tax and national insurance and are known to the authorities—it would help if we had labour market inspectors—it would be easier to keep track of them. If they do not succeed with their asylum claim, they should be removed from the country. I am trying not to get even more grumpy than I am after many days on this Bill—normally I am a completely ungrumpy person—but the suggestion that I, or anyone else on these Benches, want some kind of free-for-all where anybody can come, there are no borders or regulations and so on, is completely untrue. I totally deny that suggestion; indeed, I rather resent it. I am sorry to say that I found the noble Baroness’s contribution valiant but unconvincing.

It is certainly true that I object to the term “illegal” being used to describe a person. I have long held that view. I do not believe that any person is illegal. You can say, if you must, that they have arrived by illegal routes, but the refugee convention, which, unlike some people, I rather admire, talks about “irregular” arrival because people are allowed to arrive in a country to claim asylum—so they have not made illegal entry either. It is irregular but not illegal. I am a bit of a stickler for terminology, and I stick to that of the refugee convention. I am not sure whether I have to apologise for that, but I do not think so.

I have probably said everything that I can. I think the Government are wrong. I hope a future Government will revisit this issue—not in the manner of the Government of 20 years ago, who withdrew asylum seekers’ right to work—and implement the sense of this kind of provision. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

Yes.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate and my noble friend Lord Murray. I did indeed mean that, and I apologise. However, if I may, I will stay with the right reverend Prelate, because he opened the debate on Amendment 139A, which deals with data sharing in relation to victims of crime.

I understand fully the sentiment behind the amendment. The whole Committee, and indeed the whole House, can agree on the need to protect all victims of crime, regardless of their immigration status. As the right reverend Prelate will be aware, guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, updated in 2020, makes it clear that victims of crime should be treated as victims first and foremost.

The NPCC guidance provides that police officers will not routinely search police databases for the purpose of establishing the immigration status of a victim or witness or routinely seek proof of their entitlement to reside in the United Kingdom. In addition, police officers must give careful consideration, on a case-by-case basis, to what information they share with the Home Office and when to do so. The reasons for sharing information must be recorded and the victim advised as to what has been shared and why. Noble Lords will appreciate that I am setting up a paper trail of responsibility. I should stress that any data sharing is on a case-by-case basis, so, to that extent, I respectfully submit to the Committee that subsection (1) of the proposed new clause is misconceived in referring to the “automatic” sharing of personal data.

We should not lose sight of the fact that benefits may flow from sharing information, as it can help to prevent perpetrators of crime coercing and controlling their victims on account of their insecure immigration status. Moreover, providing a victim with accurate information about their immigration status and bringing them into the immigration system can only benefit them.

We appreciate the need to protect women and girls from threats of violence. All that being said, the Committee will understand that the Government are duty-bound to maintain an effective immigration system, protect our public services and safeguard the most vulnerable from exploitation if that might happen because of their insecure immigration status.

Information is shared with the Home Office to help protect the public, including vulnerable migrants, from harm. The need for this was recognised by Parliament in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which permits the Home Office to share information for the purposes of crime prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution, and to receive information for the purposes of effective immigration control. As for the officers charged with fulfilling those duties, Immigration Enforcement has a person-first approach and will always seek to protect and safeguard any victim before any possible enforcement action is taken.

It is important to note that the mere fact that the Home Office is aware that a person does not have lawful status and is an immigration offender does not lead automatically to that person’s detention or removal. The decision on what may be the most appropriate course of action is based on many factors that require a full assessment of the individual’s circumstances, and evidence of vulnerability is an essential part of that assessment.

The public rightly expect that individuals in this country should be subject to its laws, and it is right that when individuals with an irregular immigration status are identified they should be supported to come within our immigration system and, where possible, to regularise their stay. The Home Office routinely helps migrant victims by directing them to legal advice to help regularise their stay. The NPCC guidance provides, I submit, an appropriate framework for data sharing between the police and the Home Office where a victim of crime has insecure immigration status. On that basis, I do not consider the amendment necessary.

Amendment 139B, tabled, again, by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, would place on the Home Secretary a duty to give effect to the recommendations of the Chief Inspector of Prisons in so far as they relate to immigration detention accommodation. I start by making the general observation that recommendations by an independent inspectorate are just that: recommendations and not directions. It is properly a matter for the Home Secretary to consider whether in all the circumstances it is appropriate for her to accept and give effect to relevant recommendations by the Chief Inspector of Prisons. We naturally take very seriously all reports and recommendations by the chief inspector and have accepted many practical recommendations to improve our immigration detention accommodation. The Home Office regularly publishes service improvement plans alongside His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons’ report on its website. However, on occasion, there may be good policy, operational or other reasons why it would not be appropriate to accept a particular recommendation, and it would be wrong to bind the Home Secretary’s hands in the way that Amendment 139B seeks to do. However, I assure the right reverend Prelate and others in the Committee that the duties to report will remain and that the existing inspection framework will apply to any new detention accommodation, as my noble friend Lord Murray said from the Dispatch Box at an earlier juncture of this Committee’s deliberations.

Turning to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, a moment ago, I compliment the noble Lord on his important work in the field of detention, in particular working with persons rendered especially vulnerable by their sexuality. I assure him and the Committee that the Home Office does not ignore, but rather considers carefully, the recommendations which come to it. Independent scrutiny is a vital part of assurance that our detention facilities are safe, secure and humane, and the Home Office carefully considers all recommendations made by the Chief Inspector of Prisons along with the service improvement plan which sets out the action that will be taken by the Home Office, and such a plan is published in response to any concerns raised.

The noble Lord, Lord German, spoke to two amendments. If I may, I will take them out of the order in which the noble Lord put them, so I shall start with Amendment 139FE. I assure the noble Lord that the power in Clause 62 to make consequential amendments to devolved legislation is commonplace. The examples that I put before the Committee are Section 205 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and Section 84 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

As the noble Lord knows, it is the Government’s contention that the Bill deals with matters—in this case, immigration—that are reserved to this Parliament rather than to the devolved Administrations. As we see in Clause 27, it may be necessary to make consequential amendments to devolved legislation pursuant to that reserved purpose. The standard power in Clause 62 simply enables regulations to make any further necessary consequential amendments to enactments. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not comment on this regulation-making power in its report, and any regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation would be subject to the affirmative procedure.

--- Later in debate ---

With that, I want to end by adding just one practical point to the debate and the strategy; whether it is appropriate, I do not know, but I am going to make this point as these things sometimes get lost. Many of the trafficking victims that the national referral mechanism and the police in our country deal with are internal victims of trafficking. They are people who are being trafficked within our own country. British children—British citizens—are being trafficked. In the context of all this, we should never forget that.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I too am grateful to the most reverend Primate for setting out the case for these amendments, which would require the Home Secretary to produce a 10-year strategy for tackling human trafficking.

I can confirm, of course, that the Government are absolutely committed to taking a long-term approach to this issue. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, we certainly appreciate that this is a massive global problem. Work on modern slavery and human trafficking is based on three strategic pillars: prevention, enforcement, and identification and support. I can assure the most reverend Primate that this Government are working tirelessly with our international and domestic partners to tackle human trafficking. If I may, I will take just a moment to share some of that work with noble Lords.

The UK’s international efforts to fight modern slavery and human trafficking are supported by our overseas programmes, including through the Home Office’s Modern Slavery Fund—over £37 million has been committed to the fund between 2016 and March 2023. Projects across Europe, Africa and Asia seek to identify and protect victims from re-trafficking, strengthen national responses and criminal investigations and reduce vulnerability to exploitation. A snapshot of previous successes includes direct support to over 2,500 victims of trafficking and targeted outreach work to prevent modern slavery with over 180,000 vulnerable people.

Further, the Government have continued to strengthen our international co-operation. For example, we have issued a joint communiqué with Albania and signed a joint action plan with Romania, both of which reinforce our commitment to working collaboratively to tackle modern slavery and human trafficking, in both the short and long term. We continue to engage with the international community on a global scale by working with multilateral fora such as the G7, the G20, the Commonwealth and the UN. Article 32 of ECAT requires parties to co-operate in tackling human trafficking and we take that obligation very seriously.

The Government collaborate with law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, including the police, the National Crime Agency, the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, the Crown Prosecution Service and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to ensure that policy and legislation are incorporated into operational policy and practice, to target and disrupt crimes and bring perpetrators to justice. In addition, the Home Office has continued to invest in policing to improve the national response to modern slavery and human trafficking by providing £17.8 million since 2016 to support the work of the Modern Slavery and Organised Immigration Crime unit, about which we heard in the previous group.

I also add that the United Kingdom is the first country in the world to require businesses to report on the steps that they have taken to tackle modern slavery in their operations and supply chains. This has driven a change in business culture, spotlighting modern slavery risks on boardroom agendas and in the international human rights community.

Strategies have their place; I do not want to downplay the impact that they can have in the right circumstances to help focus attention on a particular issue and drive change. But they are not a silver bullet. A strategy in and of itself will not enhance the collective response to a particular challenge. It is a moot point whether a 10-year strategy is too long a horizon in this area. The most reverend Primate pointed out that policies can change with changes of government—and, indeed, one Government cannot bind their successor. There is also always a risk that resources are consumed preparing strategies and monitoring their implementation rather than getting on with the vital core task at hand.

The Government remain committed to strengthening our response, both domestically and internationally, to combat modern slavery and human trafficking, and we are considering the next steps on our strategic approach. The immediate focus of this Bill, however, is stopping the boats. If we do not tackle and substantially reduce the current scale of illegal entry into the UK, our resources will continue to be sapped by the sheer numbers crossing the channel, necessarily impacting on our capacity to address the strategic challenges that the most reverend Primate has clearly articulated.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My noble friend has very helpfully gone through a whole series of things that the Government are doing and will do. Why is he opposed to that forming a strategy? Any business would do it that way. No one would have merely a series of things which one can put out in that way. Why can he not accept that a strategy that you are implementing would be much better than a series of individual things which defend where you are?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am afraid that I have already—in the last few moments—outlined why it would be inappropriate for it to be in the Bill. The reasons are that, clearly, one can have strategies without them being in primary legislation and, secondly, it would not be right to fix a strategy for 10 years in length for the reasons I have given, not least because one Government cannot bind their successor. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Deben made some wider and insightful points in his earlier address about the drivers of refugee crises, such as the impact of climate change, those topics take us into the next group. I am sure there will be other remarks we can address at that point. I noted that my noble friend said that he takes the Church’s Whip; that might explain a lot.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

As my noble friend has mentioned that, I said I would take the Church’s Whip because I happen to believe that moral issues overcome any other issues. The Churches are united in saying that we have to be more sensible about this Bill. I am a Catholic; I take the Church’s Whip on this because it is a moral issue and we should stand up for moral duties.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

With respect to my noble friend, I would say that the Government’s position is the moral position, but that is possibly an argument for a different type of debate, so I will revert to the topic of the proposed amendment from the most reverend Primate.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The most reverend Primate’s amendment does not say what the strategy should be; it says just that there should be a strategy. Is the Minister really suggesting that another Government would say, “We’re not bothered about slavery; we don’t want a strategy on slavery”? The whole point is to get Governments to think strategically.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I assure the noble Baroness that this Government certainly do think strategically, but there is no reason for such a strategy to be required by reason of a statutory amendment. I appreciate that the most reverend Primate has laid this amendment, and I do not think that he realistically expects such an amendment to be accepted by the Government. What is clear is that—

[Lord Deben (Con)]

Why?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

For the reasons I have already given; shouting “why” from a sedentary position does not assist.

I am very grateful to the most reverend Primate for raising this issue. It is very important that the Committee has had a chance to step back and discuss these strategic issues in the way that it has. I am very grateful to him for affording us this opportunity to debate this issue but, having done so, I hope he will be content to withdraw his amendment. Of course, we will shortly consider the wider context of the refugee question.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

Just before the most reverend Primate responds, what I heard the Minister say from the Dispatch Box was that the Government do not believe in strategy, not that the Government oppose strategy being in primary legislation. Perhaps I misheard him.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

No, I certainly did not say that the Government do not believe in strategy.

[The Archbishop of Canterbury]

My Lords, it is as likely that the Government did not believe in strategy as to find that a bishop did not believe in God.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is an optional extra.

[The Archbishop of Canterbury]

Without wishing to channel “Yes, Prime Minister”.

I am very grateful, in addition to those who so kindly co-signed the amendment, to noble Lords who contributed to this debate: the noble Lords, Lord Hannay, Lord German, Lord Paddick and Lord Coaker. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, really worried me, because every time he said something, I found it was in my speech on the next group. That is going to make the speech shorter, which is a great advantage, but it does slightly worry me as to whether he has a hitherto unsuspected hacking habit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to make a short contribution on an amendment that we very much support. Before I make general remarks, I ask the Minister to reflect again on the importance of a strategy and why strategies can move between Governments, as I know from having seen Governments change. That does not mean that they stay exactly the same, and a strategic framework may not bind another Government, but that does not stop Governments producing strategies for themselves. I ask the Minister to reflect on that—I am sure that others who have had experience in government would bear that out.

I was reflecting more generally about the references to the 1951 refugee convention. I mention that because the world faced a global crisis in 1951, and what did it do? Visionary people came together to sort the problem out as best they could and to deal with the challenges that they faced. As the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, said, it was more than regional; it was global, affecting the global institutions and world powers, which had major conflicting differences—poverty and goodness only knows what else was going on, with countless millions of people displaced.

I am not saying that the world is currently in a post-World War II situation, but I agree with the most reverend Primate that we face a global crisis that cannot be solved by one country on its own—it just cannot. The world will be driven by a common interest, in some ways, to sort this out. Whatever we think of other countries, their own self-interest will drive them to sort it out. Countries will try to sort it out on their own, but they will not be able to.

Without being a prophet of doom about this, I say that things are going to get more difficult. I do not mean that we are at the edge of the end of the world, or anything like that, but you can see the impacts of regional and ethnic conflict as well as overpopulation, failing crops, the changing climate, water and energy competition and the food crisis, as well as millions of people moving—in fact, countless millions. I know that figures have been arrived at. Many noble Lords have been to parts of the world where it is unbelievable to see some of the poorest countries in the world dealing with millions of people. If those people came into some of the richest countries, I am not sure how they would deal with it. I went to Angola 20 years ago, after the civil war, and you just could not believe it. I went to one refugee camp and there were 1 million people in it—and that was internationally supported, so it was fantastic. I went to Jordan and the number of people who had flooded across the border from Syria into temporary camps there was unbelievable. There were huge numbers of people—and you can replicate that. I do not think that it is going to stop any time soon, and we need to understand how we are going to deal with that and cope with it. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, was quite right to point out the various impacts.

The most reverend Primate is not trying to say that therefore that means that the UK should just allow in anybody who wants to come—that is just trivialising the argument. Of course you have to have control and manage the situation. The point that the amendment seeks to make is that, if this is going to be sorted out—over and above the problem of the boats, which we accept needs to be dealt with—the UK is still a significant power. It is challenged at the moment through some of its attitudes to international conferences, conventions and treaties, but we are still a member of the United Nations Security Council, NATO and the Commonwealth, which we have not mentioned. When you travel, you recognise, understand and see the influence that the UK still has.

In backing the amendment proposed by the most reverend Primate, though the initiatives that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham has mentioned—with the Clewer Initiative and the Anglican community across the world—I say that in the end people are going to have to come together to sort this out. Somewhere along the line, it will need big, visionary people to stand up and say, “We’re going to do that”.

I am going to make this point—and I am going to take a minute on this issue. The argument in this country, which those of us who stood for election know is difficult, and the conflation between immigration, migration, refugees and asylum makes things actually really difficult, because it is all lumped together as one problem. Somewhere along the line, part of what a strategy does is to get people to step back and reflect. The British public, along with all the publics in the world, can do that. If people are presented even with difficult choices that they may not wish to confront, they are not stupid—they know that sometimes things have to be dealt with.

This is a really important point: people are decent. I know that sometimes they will rant and rave about how this is happening and they cannot believe that everybody is coming here, but I have seen myself, and I am sure that everyone has seen it in their own communities, that if you try to deport one family that has lived in community for a considerable period of time, there will be a campaign in that community to stop them being removed. That is because people are decent. If you look at it as individual children and grandparents, individual men and women, we all know from our own personal experiences that people look at it in a different way. All that the amendment proposed by the most reverend Primate is doing is to say that we should harness that and bring it together into a way of addressing a problem that we have as a country but which we have globally as well. If we do not try to sort it out globally, we will have a problem, because the problem will not go away—but it is a challenge that we can meet. This gives us an opportunity to develop a strategy that has at its heart using the privileged position that our country has as a world leader to be an agent for change in a way that would bring about a better world and offer hope to millions of the poorest people in the world.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As before, I am grateful to the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury for explaining so clearly the case for a 10-year strategy for tackling refugee crises. I agree with him that an assessment of the root causes of refugee migration to the UK, and indeed any country, is a worthwhile endeavour. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, by extension from his remarks, in questioning whether the British Government, or indeed any one national Government, are the appropriate body to develop such a strategy.

Indeed, the most reverend Primate also acknowledged in his speech on Amendment 139C that developing global solutions to such issues cannot be done by one country alone. None the less, I assure my noble friend Lord Bourne that this Government are strongly committed to international action and collaboration in this area. Indeed, as many have noted, we have a strong track record of international collaboration with both state and non-state actors, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Bank, non-governmental organisations and other donors, and through our direct engagement with major refugee-hosting countries.

The UNHCR has a global mandate to protect and safeguard the rights of refugees and to support internally displaced populations and people who are stateless or whose nationality is disputed. We will of course continue to work with the UNHCR, as we have done many times before, to respond to displacement crises globally and offer safe routes to protection in the UK.

I understand the most reverend Primate’s reasoning for introducing his amendment; after all, the UNHCR estimated that, as of mid-2022, the number of forcibly displaced persons exceeded 100 million. We heard earlier today that the figure is now said to be in excess of 110 million. That figure results from armed conflict, violence, persecution, climate change, economic uncertainty and food insecurity—all of which are on the rise.

As the most reverend Primate and my noble friend Lord Bourne indicated, the international community can address displacement on this scale only collectively, through a holistic approach, utilising, where appropriate, developmental, diplomatic, military and humanitarian interventions. I also acknowledge our work with faith groups, not least the Anglican community, in furthering our policy objectives in this area. That is the approach that the UK has taken. Recognising the need for a holistic approach in our own strategy, rather than creating a siloed refugee strategy, the UK Government have already embedded actions to tackle refugee crises throughout existing cross-government strategies, including the Integrated Review Refresh, as well as the international development strategy and the humanitarian framework.

We already take a long-term approach to tackling refugee crises. The UK has been one of the largest donors to the agencies working on the front line over many years. We have also played a key role in intergovernmental processes that have shaped the way in which the international community responds to displacement crises, such as through the development of the Global Compact on Refugees—mentioned earlier by the right reverend Prelate—which was adopted by the international community in 2018, and, before that, through the World Humanitarian Summit, as well as through our engagement with major development actors such as the World Bank. In particular, the Global Compact on Refugees provides the international community with a shared strategy for tackling refugee crises, and a shared vision and strategy for how to operationalise the principles of predictable and equitable burden and responsibility sharing—principles that underpin refugee protection.

In response to the point raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, the Home Office continues to work closely with the FCDO in preparation for the next Global Refugee Forum in December.

The Government are constantly considering the longer-term drivers, impacts and policy implications of migration, alongside delivering more immediate improvements to the system. Our approach is cross-government: we work with a wide range of departments on diplomacy and development, and with law enforcement agencies, in developing this. I believe that this is the most appropriate means by which to do so.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

139G: Clause 63, page 63, line 19, leave out “66” and insert “66(1)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment has the effect that the power for regulations under the Bill to make consequential etc provision and to make different provision for different purposes applies to the power to make transitional and saving provision in connection with the coming into force of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

141: Clause 64, page 64, line 20, at end insert—

“national

section 3(11)”

Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 5, line 38.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, before the Minister replies, can I mention that I have two amendments in my own name, which are consequential? They relate to the ability to have judicial review if the amendment to Clause 1 succeeds.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has set out, Amendment 5 seeks to replace Clause 1 with a new clause that provides that nothing in this Bill requires an act or omission that conflicts with the five international agreements specified in the amendment. This includes the European Convention on Human Rights. Amendment 4, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is focused on compatibility with the ECHR. As I have repeatedly said in the debates on the Bill, and to reassure my noble friends Lady Helic and Lord Cormack, the Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the Bill that requires any act or omission that conflicts with UK international obligations. Amendment 5 is therefore, on one level, unnecessary. But what might be viewed as a benign amendment takes a wrecking ball to our long-established constitutional arrangements, with uncertain consequences, as outlined by my noble friend Lord Wolfson.

Along with other countries with similar constitutional arrangements to the UK, we have a dualist approach, where international law is treated as separate to domestic law and incorporated only by domestic law passed by Parliament through legislation. We have, of a fashion, reproduced in domestic law aspects of the text of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act 1998, but that is not generally the case with other international instruments listed in the amendment.

The effect of this amendment would be to allow legal challenges based on international law in the domestic courts. As my noble friend Lord Wolfson has eloquently explained, this amendment would incorporate these instruments into our domestic law by the back door, thereby making substantive changes to the Bill. I therefore have to disagree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, on the effect of Amendment 5. As my noble friend said, this is wrong in principle and far from being an academic point for the lawyers. There is a legitimate case to be made for incorporation but this is not the Government’s intention, and we should not make such a fundamental change to our domestic law on the basis of a two-hour debate in Committee and a rather shorter one again today.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, hit the nail on the head in her insightful contribution in Committee. In the Bill we are legislating to prevent and deter the small boats by putting in place a scheme that makes it unambiguously clear that if you arrive in the UK illegally, you will not be able to stay; instead, you will be detained and returned to your home country or removed to a safe third country. That is the proposition we are seeking to put on the statute book. That is the proposition which Parliament will have endorsed and, having done so, that is the proposition that our courts should give effect to. As the noble Baroness said, we risk undermining the reputation of this place and the elected House if the clear intent of Parliament can be unravelled by this misguided amendment.

On the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the Government have published two memoranda addressing issues arising under the ECHR, and I remain unpersuaded of the case for statutory guidance on how the Bill’s provisions are to be implemented compatibly with convention rights. It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide Home Office staff and others with appropriate guidance to support the implementation of the Bill. In the Government’s view, it would not be appropriate for such routine operational guidance on the implementation of a particular Act to be subject to parliamentary approval.

Amendments 13 and 16, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would strike out Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of a person who meets the conditions in Clause 2 applies regardless of any judicial review challenge to their removal. The noble and learned Lord’s explanatory statement for Amendment 13 describes it as consequential on Amendment 5. It may well be the noble and learned Lord’s intention to provide for judicial review challenges to removal—whether on ECHR grounds or otherwise—to be suspensive of removal, but that is not the Government’s stance, and I do not accept that his amendment is consequential on Amendment 5. We need a scheme that will enable removals in days and weeks, not, as now, in months and years. Clause 4(1) is critical to achieving that objective and I cannot support its evisceration.

Finally, as regards Amendments 1 to 3, I simply remind the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that it is an offence to knowingly enter the United Kingdom without the required leave or to arrive without valid entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation. That being the case, Clause 1(1) quite properly refers to “unlawful migration” and “illegal routes”.

In response to the point raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, I point out that the refugee convention is clear that states can still operate controls on illegal migration. Under Article 31, it is indeed expressly permitted to disadvantage those who have arrived illegally from safe countries, which is true of all who come from France. This embodies the first safe country principle, in the sense that Article 31 protections apply only to those who have come directly from unsafe countries. The first safe country principle is widely recognised internationally, including in the common European asylum system, which is a framework of rules and procedures operated by the EU countries together, based on the refugee convention.

These amendments, particularly Amendment 5 but also Amendment 13, go to the heart of the workability of the Bill. Your Lordships’ House has a choice: either we can continue to accept the status quo, which could see the £3.6 billion spent on supporting asylum seekers in 2022-23 mushroom to £11 billion a year, or £32 million a day, by 2026, or we can back the Bill, retain Clause 1 and Clause 4(1)(d), and stop the boats. The House should be in no doubt that these are wrecking amendments. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, not to press his Amendment 4, and ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not to press her amendment. However, were she to do so, I would have no hesitation in inviting your Lordships’ House to reject the amendment.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

With reference to what has just been said about the first safe country principle, I would point out to the Minister and to the House that the UNHCR is on record from last week as authoritatively, formally saying that there is no requirement in international law for an asylum seeker to seek protection in the first safe country they reach. We may not like what the umpire says, but he is the umpire.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord will recall, and as my noble friend Lord Wolfson made clear in Committee, the UNHCR is not empowered to interpret or referee the convention. That is clear from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The UNHCR is not in a position to make that assessment, and I refer the House to the comments I made a moment ago.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful, as always, to all noble Lords for their contributions and to most noble Lords for their brevity. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the second group of amendments centres on the major changes this Bill creates, particularly the duty to remove. We tabled Amendment 9, in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker, in Committee and hoped to hear from the Government, but since we last discussed this issue significant progress has been made on putting in place returns agreements. That is the answer to the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann: putting in place returns agreements and negotiating them vigorously, so that people can be deported as they are now. Nobody on this side of the House has said that should not happen, but greater effort needs to be made to put them in place.

Turning to Amendment, 6 on retrospection, which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, spoke to, I hope he will get the response he is looking for from the Minister; we are behind him in seeking that response. As he said, retrospectivity is the enemy of legal certainty. He quoted some powerful figures showing that the threat of stopping the boats is not having any effect on the number of people crossing the channel. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that brevity does not mean half-heartedness, and I will carry on being brief in addressing the points raised.

My noble friend Lady Lister challenged the Minister again on the child rights impact assessment; I look forward to discovering whether he can give a more convincing answer than he managed yesterday. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who I would count as a friend outside this Chamber, gave a speech he has given on a number of occasions, concerning the overall figures, which are indeed very serious. As he fairly pointed out, illegal migrants, who are the subject of the Bill before us, account for roughly 10% of the overall figures. Everyone on this side of the Chamber—indeed, throughout the House—acknowledges that there is a very serious issue. The focus right now is illegal migration, although I acknowledge the point he made about the wider context.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, spoke compellingly, as ever, about the rights of the child. I find it mind-boggling that she was having breakfast with my noble friend Lord Coaker this morning in Warsaw. Both gave compelling speeches this afternoon. My noble friend Lord Hacking also spoke with passion, and I am glad that he will not be putting his amendment to the vote today.

This has been a relatively brief debate and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 2 is the centrepiece of the scheme provided for in this Bill. Without it, the Bill as a whole would be fundamentally undermined. It therefore follows that I cannot entertain Amendment 8 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, who frankly conceded its wrecking effect in his speech. At its heart, this Bill seeks to change the existing legal framework so that those who arrive in the UK illegally can be detained and then promptly removed, either to their home country or to a safe third country. As my noble friends Lord Clarke and Lord Howard, both fellow lawyers, so powerfully put it, we cannot sit by and do nothing.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has set out, Amendments 6, 17, 22, 23 and 88 address the retrospective effect of the Bill. The second condition set out in Clause 2 is that the individual must have entered the UK on or after 7 March 2023—the day of this Bill’s introduction in the House of Commons. In effect, the noble Lord’s amendments seek to do away with the backdating of the duty to remove, as well as of other provisions in the Bill, so that they apply only to those who illegally enter the country from the date of commencement rather than from 7 March.

As I set out in response to the same amendments in Committee, the retrospective nature of these provisions is critical. Without it, we risk organised criminals and people smugglers seeking to exploit this, with an increase in the number of illegal arrivals ahead of commencement of the Bill. This would likely lead to an increase in these unnecessary and dangerous small boat crossings and could place even more pressure on not only our asylum system but our health, housing, education and welfare services. This risk will only grow as we get closer to Royal Assent and implementation. We must take action to prioritise support for those who are most in need and not encourage people smugglers to change their tactics to circumvent the intent of this Bill. I recognise that the retrospective application of legislation is not the norm and should be embarked upon only when there is good reason. I submit to the House that there is very good reason in this instance, given the scale of the challenge we face in stopping the boats.

Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, deals with entry into the United Kingdom via the Irish land border. As is currently the case, tourists from countries which require visas for them to come to the UK as visitors should obtain these before they travel. That said, I recognise the issue and accept that some individuals may inadvertently enter the UK without leave via the Irish land border. We are examining this issue further. I point the noble Baroness to the regulation-making power in Clause 3, which would enable us to provide for exceptions to the duty to remove where it would be appropriate to do so.

Amendment 10, spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, relates to the removal of an unaccompanied child once they reach the age of 18. To permit their removal only if it was in their best interests, even when they reach 18, would undermine the intent of this Bill. The Government must take action to undercut the routes that smuggling gangs are exploiting by facilitating children’s dangerous and illegal entry into the United Kingdom. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor indicated, this amendment would increase the incentive for an adult to claim to be a child and encourage people smugglers to pivot and focus on bringing over more unaccompanied children via dangerous journeys. The effect would be to put more young lives at risk. That said, where a person enters the UK illegally as a young child, Clause 29 affords discretion to grant them limited or indefinite leave to remain if a failure to do so would contravene the UK’s obligations under the ECHR, which would, among other things, take in any Article 8 claims. I hope that provides some reassurance to the noble and learned Baroness.

With regard to Amendment 9, as I indicated in Committee, formal returns agreements are not required to carry out removals, although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that returns agreements can be useful to improve returns co-operation. We will seek to negotiate these where appropriate.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Perhaps I might ask the Minister for clarification. He referred to the 16 agreements, and he knows I asked him specifically for the list of those 16 countries, because the House of Lords Library could not find them for me. The Minister obviously did not think it necessary to write to me between Committee and Report, so can he list those 16 countries now?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord will recall, during our exchange I made clear that not all of those 16 agreements are in the public domain, so I am not going to provide him with the list he seeks.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I am very disappointed at the Minister’s response, for two reasons. First, despite being asked to produce evidence to show that retrospectivity has some factual basis for its inclusion, he has failed to answer that challenge, and he must have done so deliberately. I am afraid that leads me to be very suspicious about whether there is any such evidence whatever of a credible nature.

The second reason I am very disappointed in the Minister is that he knows perfectly well that it would be open to him to suggest a date other than the date of the commencement of the Act: for example, the day when this Bill does pass, which could be within days, or even today. That would, of course, be an element of retrospectivity, but it would be a considerable mitigation of what is provided in the Bill.

Given that discussions have taken place on these issues, I am very surprised that he has simply remained his intransigent self on this issue. The notion that a glut of small boats will be crossing the channel if the period between March and, say, now is not the subject of retrospectivity, is, frankly, absurd, ridiculous and completely lacking in any kind of credibility. I ask him to think about that; I am perfectly prepared not to press the amendment if he stands up and says he is prepared to consider that issue seriously and enter into discussions with other Ministers. Otherwise, I will test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to rise to support many of the amendments in this group, but in particular Amendment 12. I thank my noble friend Lord Hunt, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for moving such an important amendment.

I start by saying that, as a proud Labour politician, I am the first to recognise the phenomenal achievement, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, pointed out, of the Conservative Government in passing the Modern Slavery Act. That is important, and he pointed out the cross-party nature of that. That is why it is so bewildering that we have a Conservative Government driving forward this legislation.

Notwithstanding that, Amendment 12 goes to the heart of the various amendments. It is important to reiterate the explanatory note to my noble friend’s amendment, which simply seeks

“to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered”.

That seems a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but of course, under this Bill, everybody who arrives irregularly —primarily by small boat, as far as the Government are concerned—is automatically excluded. That inevitably means that victims or potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking will be caught by the legislation and their needs will not be met.

We have talked about evidence. Helpfully, on Monday the impact assessment was at last published. The Government recognise the draconian nature of these provisions, as they have put in their own sunset clause, and they say they are doing this because the system is being gamed. On page 24, the impact assessment states:

“For context, of the 83,236 people that arrived in the UK on small boats between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2022, 7 per cent (6,210 people) were referred to the NRM”.


Of course, as was made clear, that 7% of those 83,000 were referred by government-approved officials. They were not necessarily then deemed to have conclusive grounds; they were referred in order to have their situation considered.

That is the issue Amendment 12 seeks to address. It does not say there are not sometimes people who apply who should not, but that the purpose of the Modern Slavery Act is to ensure that victims have the right to have their case heard, to be supported where necessary, and to not be removed from the country during that process. Amendment 12 is therefore perfectly reasonable and if my noble friend chooses to test the opinion of the House, I hope that many of us will support it, because it is a simple but very important amendment.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, has explained, his amendments would prevent the detention and removal of any person who meets the conditions in Clause 4 and who is the subject of a NRM referral until a conclusive grounds decision and any appeal has been determined. The current average time taken from referral to conclusive grounds decisions, made in January to March 2023, across the competent authorities, was 566 days. Against that backdrop, these are wrecking amendments. They would profoundly undermine the Government’s ability to tackle the threat to life arising from the dangerous, illegal and unnecessary channel crossings and the pressure they place on our public services.

Amendments 95, 99, 101 and 104 in the name of my noble friend Lord Randall seek to mitigate the effect of the provisions in the Bill in a more targeted way, but here too I have concerns that the amendments would undermine what we seek to do in these provisions. As I set out in Committee, the NRM presents clear opportunities for abuse by those who would seek to frustrate removal. It is worth repeating the statistics relating to NRM referrals of people arriving in small boats, which demonstrate how the NRM could be open to abuse.

In 2021, 404 people were detained for return after arriving in the United Kingdom on a small boat, 73% of whom were referred to the NRM while in detention. The latest published figure, for the period January to September 2022, is only slightly lower, at 65%. This is a large increase on earlier years; just 6% of those detained for return in 2019 were referred to the NRM while in detention. So far, only a minority of people who arrived on small boats have been detained for return, but if enforcement activity is greatly expanded, as it would be under the terms of the Bill, and if this rate of referral continues, the number of referrals could be substantially higher. These figures cannot be ignored.

I can provide some assurance to my noble friend and other noble Lords. The Bill does not impact NRM referrals of British citizens or persons who are in the UK without valid leave, having overstayed, and who are therefore, I suggest, more susceptible to exploitation in the UK; nor will unaccompanied children arriving on small boats be affected while they remain under 18. They are not subject to the duty to remove until they turn 18. Finally, the Bill provides for an exception to the application of the public order disqualification where it is necessary for someone to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation or prosecution related to their exploitation.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can the Minister explain whether the figures he has given us are in the impact assessment? It would have helped us if they were; I apologise if I have missed them. Has the Minister changed the way he is coming to the percentage figure? Are the Government now saying that it is not the percentage of the number of people who arrive by small boats but the percentage of those who arrived by small boats and are detained? The percentages are going to be significantly higher because the numbers who are detained are not the sort of numbers I was talking about. The number I quoted is from the Government’s own figures. What figures are the Government using and how are they coming to them? Perhaps he can explain to the Chamber how many of the 83,236 people who arrived by small boats were detained, so we can get some idea of the percentages he is talking about.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

First, I am afraid I have read so many documents in the past few days that I cannot immediately recollect whether the stats are in the IA. I will confirm whether they are, and I am sure I will be able to do that shortly.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Order! Secondly, I suggest that the material figures are those in detention. It is a fundamental part of the scheme that people will be detained and removed. We can see from the figures that those in detention have been utilising NRM claims; you can see the increase from the statistics I gave a moment ago. On the noble Lord’s final point, those are all published statistics, and I can confirm that the 65% figure is in paragraph 143 of the impact assessment.

I remind noble Lords that the application of the public order disqualification is firmly grounded in the provisions of the European convention against trafficking, or ECAT. Article 13(3) of ECAT clearly provides that states are not bound to provide a recovery and reflection period on the grounds of public order. It is again worth stressing that these provisions are time-limited. We recognise their exceptional nature, and the Bill expressly provides for Clauses 21 to 24 to cease to apply after two years unless both Houses agree to extend their operation for no more than 12 months at a time.

For the reasons I have set out, we consider that this sunsetting provision is more appropriate than the sunrise provision proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, in his Amendment 113A.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I wonder whether the Minister could help me on this. On the figure of over 500 days in the NRM, from beginning to end, is that entirely due to Home Office officials not getting through it in a timely way, or is there any other reason why it is taking so long?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The NRM process requires the gathering of evidence and input from the party, so it is not down entirely to Home Office resourcing issues.

The appointment of the new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is at an advanced stage, and I am sure that once appointed they will want to monitor closely the impact of these provisions.

In relation to my noble friend’s amendments, I repeat the assurance that my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister made in the other place: namely that we will consider additional protections through statutory guidance for those who have experienced exploitation in the United Kingdom. We are continuing to develop such guidance and in doing so will adopt an appropriate balance between protecting victims of modern slavery and delivering the intent of this Bill.

As regards Amendment 103, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, quite properly raises the issue of how the modern slavery provisions in the Bill sit with the continued operation of the relevant EU directives in Northern Ireland. As I have said in earlier debates in Committee, the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the Windsor Framework. In particular, in the context of this amendment we do not consider that the 2011 anti-trafficking directive falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.

Amendments 96, 102 and 105, tabled respectively by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, relate to the presumption that it is not necessary for a person to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation. As I outlined to the Committee, remote participation is now the norm in the workplace, and the criminal justice system is no different. It is simply no longer the case that a victim of crime needs to be in face-to-face contact with the police or others to assist with an investigation. In some cases, victims may even feel safer providing virtual or video-recorded evidence. I assure noble Lords that we are working to ensure that the relevant technology, interpreters and intermediaries are available where needed.

We have provided for statutory guidance to support decision-making by caseworkers when determining if there are compelling circumstances why the presumption should be set aside in a particular case, but there is no evidence as to why, in the majority of cases, such co-operation cannot continue by email, messaging and video conferencing. The presumption in Clauses 21(5), 23(5) and 24(5) is therefore perfectly proper and should be retained.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I would be really grateful if the Minister could answer the question I asked him as to whether the Director of Public Prosecutions had been consulted about the effect on modern slavery and trafficking cases if the victim was not merely in another studio in another building in London or Manchester but in a country thousands of miles away, with no facilities to encourage or even compel them to give evidence.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I do not know whether the DPP has been consulted on that point but I will certainly find out and write to the noble Lord.

Amendment 112, put forward by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, would prevent the public order disqualification provided for in the 2022 Act being applied to a person whose positive reasonable grounds decision was based on exploitation which had occurred before they were 18. It is, in our view, entirely appropriate for the public order disqualification provided for in that Act to be capable of applying to all relevant individuals, including those exploited as children. In this regard, it is important to note that the public order disqualification in the 2022 Act applies only to specified persons, such as those who have been convicted of a serious criminal offence. In such cases, the age at which the exploitation took place is, I submit, irrelevant to the threat to public order an individual now poses, and we cannot tie our hands on this matter on the basis of the time at which exploitation took place.

The modern slavery measures in the Bill, alongside the others, are intended to deal with the immediate and pressing public risk arising from the exceptional circumstances relating to illegal entry into the UK. We need to take bold action and now. This Bill will not achieve its objective if removals are put on hold for over 500 days awaiting a conclusive grounds decision. As I indicated at the start, these amendments will quite simply wreck the Bill. I hope therefore that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will be content to withdraw his Amendment 12. If he is not, I invite the House to reject it.

[Baroness Wheatcroft (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but he referred again to the 500-plus days involved in the NRM process. Earlier, in response to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, he said that one of the reasons for that was examining the evidence. However, since he cites this as a reason for going ahead with these appalling proposals, can he explain to the House why it is not possible to shorten that period? Is he content that a process that takes more than 500 days is humane?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Considerable efforts are taken to seek to shorten the period but that is not an easy process. I agree with the noble Baroness that we should aspire to have a shorter period but we have to legislate for the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.

I can now confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the CPS was indeed consulted in respect of these provisions.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, in the spirit of reciprocity, we wholeheartedly support Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, as well as my noble friend Lord Dubs’s amendment.

My noble friend’s amendment points out that we should absolutely not rule out unaccompanied children from being admissible if they come via an illegal route. As we have heard from a number of noble Lords, this would not be in keeping with the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German, is a practical amendment on granting re-entry into the asylum system for those the Government are not able to remove, and we are happy to support it. It would avoid potentially thousands of children, as well as other asylum seekers, being kept in limbo. As he very fairly pointed out, this is a backstop for the Government because, if they are true to their aspirations for the Bill, they will never have to use the noble Lord’s amendment. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord German, have explained, these amendments relate to the provision in Clause 4(2), which provides for protection claims and relevant human rights claims made by persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 to be declared inadmissible.

On Amendment 14, we recognise the particular vulnerability of unaccompanied children, as observed by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which is why we need to prevent them making unnecessary and life-threatening journeys to the UK. If we are serious about wanting to prevent and deter these journeys, it is crucial that we maintain the position currently set out in the Bill. We must avoid creating a perverse incentive to put unaccompanied children on small boats and make dangerous journeys.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I point out that the Bill provides for a wholly new scheme. We are in a different position from the one we were in in the last Session, when the Nationality and Borders Bill, as it then was, was debated.

As I have said before, the Secretary of State is not required to make arrangements to remove an unaccompanied child from the UK, but there is a power to do so. The Bill sets out that this power will be exercised only in limited circumstances ahead of them reaching adulthood, such as for the purposes of reunion with a parent or where removal is to a safe country of origin. Where an unaccompanied child is not removed, pursuant to the power in Clause 3, we continue to believe that it is appropriate for the Bill to provide for the duty to remove to apply once they turn 18. To provide otherwise will, as I have already said, put more young lives at risk and split up more families by encouraging the people smugglers to put more and more unaccompanied children on to the small boats. In answer to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, the Bill is very much about protecting children.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

18: Clause 5, page 7, line 31, at end insert “or territory”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment supplements the reference to a country in subsection (4)(b) of clause 5 with a reference to a territory, for consistency with the earlier reference in subsection (4) to a country or territory within subsection (3)(a) or (b) of that clause.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

38: Clause 7, page 10, line 37, after “State” insert “or an immigration officer”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment supplements the reference to the Secretary of State in clause 7(8) with a reference to an immigration officer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I am grateful to the Bill team for confirming this, but it would be useful to have it said in the Chamber that “immigration officer” is an immigration officer of any rank at all. There does not have to be any seniority attached to the post when an immigration officer is given powers in these provisions and elsewhere in the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, for moving the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, which seeks to protect transport providers. I understand the concern that this is causing.

To answer the points of the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Coaker, Clauses 7 and 9 simply reflect the current position, corresponding to the long-standing requirement set out in Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act. As now, risk assessments must be made before directions are given to a carrier, and escorts will be provided where this is assessed to be necessary.

All the practical issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, apply equally under existing powers, and there are established protocols for dealing with them. We are not putting any additional burdens on the transport sector; in fact, we are providing for the costs of complying with directions under the Bill, but they will be paid for by the Secretary of State and will not be at the carrier’s expense. The amendment would therefore put the powers surrounding the giving of removal directions at odds with existing provisions and would effectively turn a requirement to remove people into a request, which would then impact on the number of illegal immigrants being removed.

Government Amendments 46 and 47 are prompted by a question posed in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who asked how transport workers could deal with a non-compliant person. Again, the answer lies in the Immigration Act 1971. It is already an offence under Section 24(1)(f) of that Act for a person subject to removal to disembark, and these amendments simply apply that offence to removals under the Bill. This then engages Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, which enables a person to use reasonable force to prevent a crime—a provision that I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in particular, will be very familiar with.

Finally, returning to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, Amendment 85 seeks to amend the definition of “vehicle” to limit the power in Schedule 2 to search vehicles to only those hired by the Secretary of State to remove persons pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3. We would not want to limit the power to search vehicles in this way; doing so would prevent immigration officers being able to search small boats, for example.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sure the Minister answered this in Committee, but can he just confirm that vehicles are lorries, van and cars? Does “a vehicle” mean all types of vehicle?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I seem to remember —I am sure the Bill team will correct me if I am wrong—that it does not include private cars and camper-vans. I hope that clarifies the point; if am wrong, I will be sent a message, I am sure.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

46: Clause 9, page 12, line 16, leave out “(2) and” and insert “(1A) to”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 12, line 17.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we on the Labour Benches strongly support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, and if she presses them to a vote on Monday, we will be supporting her. Her amendments address the removal of safeguards for children put in place when a Conservative Prime Minister sat in No. 10, and it is clear that potentially thousands of children could be detained, some potentially indefinitely. This would undoubtedly cause long-term damage to their health, well-being and development. We are happy to support those amendments, and we are very interested to hear about the ongoing discussions which noble Baronesses on the other side of the House have mentioned.

Regarding the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, I interpret them as probing amendments into the rules concerning detention and, particularly in the case of barges with the quite astonishing figures he gave today, the cost and where there will be areas for people to walk around and exercise in the vicinity of the barges. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that in response to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord German. We are happy to support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, with these amendments we return to the issue of detention time limits in relation to unaccompanied children and the limiting of places of detention. Amendments 49, 53, 56 and 61, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, limit the “place of detention” in the Bill to those that are presently authorised for detention. We detain persons for immigration purposes only in places that are listed in the Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 2021. As I set out in Committee, following Royal Assent we will update the direction in line with the new detention powers.

For more than 50 years we have operated a framework where the Home Secretary sets out the places where persons may be detained for immigration purposes in an administrative direction. The provisions in paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 have operated perfectly satisfactorily. I see no case now to change to a position whereby places of detention are to be set out in primary legislation.

I assure noble Lords that the welfare of detained individuals is of paramount importance. Any place of detention must be suitable for the persons we are detaining there, and adequate provision will be made for the safety and welfare of the detained person. The Detention Centre Rules 2001 make provision for the regulation and management of immigration removal centres. These rules set out:

“The purpose of detention centres shall be to provide for the secure but humane accommodation of detained persons in a relaxed regime with as much freedom of movement and association as possible, consistent with maintaining a safe and secure environment”.


The rules also set out the specific requirements which an immigration removal centre must comply with, including, but not limited to, provision for maintenance, general security, healthcare, access and welfare. These rules will continue to apply to detention in immigration removal centres under this Bill. I hope that is a complete answer to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. I add that, as their name suggests, these rules apply to detention accommodation, not to non-detained accommodation such as the Bibby Stockholm barge, from which of course people may come and go.

Moreover, we already have robust statutory oversight of immigration detention, including inspection by the Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards at every detention facility, and effective safeguards within the detention process which, I would suggest, are efficient.

I turn to the issue of detention time limits. Amendments 51, 57, 59 and 63, tabled by my noble friend Lady Mobarik, seek to retain the existing time limits on the detention of children. It is an unavoidable fact that holding people in detention is necessary to ensure that they can successfully be removed from the United Kingdom under the scheme provided for in the Bill, which is designed to operate quickly and fairly. However, our aim is to ensure that no one is held in detention for any longer than is absolutely necessary to effect their removal.

The duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of all illegal entrants back to their home country or to a safe third country will send a clear message that vulnerable individuals, including children, cannot be exploited by the people smugglers facilitating their passage across the channel in small boats on the false promise of starting a new life in the United Kingdom. The detention powers are an integral part of ensuring the success of this Bill, both as a deterrent and as a means of ensuring that the Home Secretary can comply with the duty to make arrangements for removal.

We must not create incentives for people-smuggling gangs to target children or provide opportunities for people to exploit any loopholes. Children may be put at further risk by adults seeking to pass off unaccompanied children as their own. I know this is not my noble friend’s intention, but that is what these amendments would, perversely, achieve.

Under the Bill, detention is not automatic. The Bill provides powers to detain, and the appropriateness of detention will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, recognising their vulnerability, I remind my noble friend that the Bill makes particular provision for the detention of unaccompanied children.

It is important to recognise that unaccompanied children would be detained only for the purposes of removal in a minority of cases. They are not subject to the duty to remove, and our expectation is that they will generally be transferred to the care of a local authority until they turn 18. Where they are to be detained, the powers in the Bill may be exercised in respect of unaccompanied children only in circumstances to be prescribed in regulations, as we have already discussed during today’s debate. This would be, for example, for the purposes of an initial examination or, where necessary, in the limited cases where they are to be removed to effect a reunion with the child’s parent or to return them to a safe country of origin. As we have already debated, such regulations are now to be subject to the affirmative procedure, as a result of the government amendments to Clause 10.

The Bill also includes a power to place a time limit on the detention of unaccompanied children where that detention is for the purposes of removal. We will keep the operation of these provisions under review, and should it be necessary to introduce a time limit, we have the means to do so.

Given the safeguards we have already built into the arrangements for the detention of unaccompanied children, the Government remain of the view that these amendments, however well-meaning, are not necessary. I therefore ask my noble friend not to press her Amendment 51. However, if she is minded to test the opinion of the House, I ask noble Lords, if and when the Division occurs, to reject the amendment.

Ahead of that, I hope that I have been able to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord German, and that he will be content to withdraw his Amendment 49.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, will he please answer my question, which I put for the fourth time, at the risk of being extremely boring and sounding like a broken record: where is the child rights impact assessment? We have nearly finished the first of three days on Report, and we still do not have it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I said yesterday, the child rights impact assessment will be provided in due course.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I have listened very carefully to his answer regarding the potential pull factor if unaccompanied children are not placed in detention. However, children have not been placed in detention since the 2014 provision, and there has been no proportional increase in unaccompanied children claiming asylum. In the impact assessment, which the Government produced on Friday, there is absolutely no indication at all of it being a non-monetary risk. Where is the evidence for that claim being made at the Dispatch Box? Both the legislation since 2014 and the Government’s own impact assessment show that there is no evidence to say that it would be a pull factor.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Clearly, the economic impact assessment is targeted at economic impacts, and the noble Lord invites me to comment on something that is a non-economic impact not being in the impact assessment. I am afraid that is a complete explanation for that. As to the pull factors, I suggest to the noble Lord that it is self-evident that there is that risk of a pull factor, and that is an end to the matter.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

If it is a pull factor, why was it not a pull factor in 2014?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am not suggesting that it was not a pull factor in 2014.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I have been in this House for only 13 years, and in that time I have had many Ministers coming forward with things I do not agree with, but my noble friend has repeatedly—four times—asked for the assessment. To be told “in due course” at the end of the first day on Report is extremely poor. I suggest that the Minister goes back to his department and gets the assessment here. It does not help his case one iota to say “in due course” to the House at this stage. We should have had this thing weeks ago. I really hope he goes back and understands how cross the House is about this. We have only two days left on Report and then Third Reading. It really is not good enough.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I have listened very carefully to what the noble Lord has said and I will certainly take it back to the department.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting but short debate. It is interesting that once again we focus on evidence. I often find it strange in this House when people are asked to make judgments about very important matters, particularly affecting young people, and we are not provided with the evidence.

It is not just four times that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has asked. It is probably four on top of four and many times beforehand. She always asks for this in a very decent manner. It is so important that we have that information in order to make judgments about legislation we are being asked to approve or to change. It is not good enough for the Government to say, “Take our word for it”. They should provide that evidence as we would normally expect, at the right time and in the right place. We are now moving rapidly beyond the place where it will be in demand. I dread to think about the devices that one uses in the legislative process that allow us to keep coming back to this matter until such time as we can deal with that evidence.

On the amendments I was talking to, I think I have had a partial answer in that the Detention Centre Rules 2001 are to be followed, so that is something about standards. The bit that I did not have answered was what the difference would be between detention and the places where people will be held or provided with accommodation. In the case of the barge that I told the House about earlier, the only difference was that there would be no curfew and the gate would be closed. That seems the only difference in the standards between the two.

It is a matter that I will keep coming back to, but I am minded to withdraw. Before I do, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, that on these Benches we are certain that if she were to move these to a vote we would support her. The issues she has raised are crucial, especially as we lack the evidence for anybody to say that the case being made has been dealt with appropriately. If I could encourage that, I would be very grateful. In the meantime, I withdraw Amendment 49.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Lister and the others who have signed these amendments, which we fully support. At its heart, there may be debate and disagreement with respect to this Bill. It is certainly contentious and sometimes we have large disagreements. Despite that, however, whatever the disagreements, we should do the right thing. That is why we support the amendments from my noble friend Lady Lister—because they seek to do the right thing by pregnant women.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, with these amendments we return to the issue of detention time limits in relation to pregnant women. As I explained last Wednesday, holding people in detention is necessary to ensure that they are successfully removed from the United Kingdom under the scheme provided for in the Bill, which is designed to operate quickly and fairly.

However, our aim is to ensure that no one is held in detention for longer than is absolutely necessary to effect their removal. The duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of all illegal entrants back to their home country or to a safe third country will send a clear message that vulnerable individuals, including pregnant women, cannot be exploited by the people-smuggling gangs facilitating their passage across the channel in small boats on the false promise of starting a new life in the UK.

Under the Bill, detention is not automatic. The Bill confers powers to detain, and the appropriateness of detention will be considered on a case-by-case basis. As regards pregnant women, we expect that anyone who is in the later stages of pregnancy and who cannot be removed in the short term will not be detained but would instead be released on immigration bail.

For women who are detained in the earlier stages of pregnancy, we already operate our adults at risk policy, where pregnant women are recognised as a particular vulnerable group. In all cases in which a pregnant woman is detained for removal, the fact of her pregnancy will automatically be regarded as amounting to level 3 evidence under the adults at risk policy, and thus the pregnancy will be afforded significant weight when assessing the risk of harm in continued detention. This means a woman known to be pregnant should be detained only where the immigration control factors that apply in her case outweigh the evidence of her vulnerability—in this case, the evidence of her pregnancy. Such control factors at level 3 are where removal has been set for a date in the immediate future or where there are public protection concerns.

The detention of a pregnant woman must be reviewed promptly if there is any change in circumstances, especially if related to her pregnancy or to her welfare more generally. Examples of specific welfare considerations that may need to be taken into account include the stage of pregnancy, whether there have been complications in the pregnancy, any known appointments for scans, care or treatment, and whether particular arrangements may be needed to facilitate safe removal. While in detention, pregnant women will receive appropriate healthcare.

I assure the House that, as now, the enforced removal of a pregnant woman must be pursued only where it can be achieved safely and there is no suggestion that her baby is due before the planned removal date. Additionally, pregnant women will not be removed from the UK if they are not fit to travel based on medical assessments.

Given the safeguards we have already built into the arrangements for the detention of pregnant women, the Government remain of the view that these amendments, however well-meaning, are not necessary. I am very grateful to those who have spoken in this debate for outlining their—I am sure—well-held concerns and for their thoughtful contributions. However, in light of what I have just said, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to withdraw her Amendment 64. If, however, she is minded to test the opinion of the House, I invite noble Lords to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who spoke, and to the Minister as well. Unfortunately, I do not think that he really heard, or listened to, the arguments put. He says he does not think that the amendment is necessary. I am sorry, but countless health organisations, Members of this House and many others think that it is. It is not enough simply to give us assurances here. I have no choice but to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we will support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, when he presses Amendment 66, and we would expect the subsequent amendments he mentioned to be consequential to that. He clearly and helpfully set out the four Hardial Singh principles and gave their legal basis and history, and I thank him for doing so. As he pointed out, the Government themselves recently cited those principles in a High Court case. I also thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who succinctly summed up the Opposition’s view on the Bill. He said that there is little prospect of unilateral action succeeding, and we agree. He deplored the Secretary of State’s using the power of detention to reinforce the message of deterrence, rather than speaking of the need to implement the Bill, and we agree with that as well. He said that the power should not go to the Secretary of State rather than the courts, and he cited the Explanatory Memorandum. We agree with that too, so I thank the noble Viscount for summarising our view of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Green, said that what the Government have done so far has not had much had effect. The Government are asking us again to support them to do more, yet they have been unsuccessful in the various Bills they have introduced in recent years to try to address this problem. It is a real problem, and there needs to be a different approach to reduce the numbers. Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord German, as well. For all those reasons, we will be happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as we have just heard, Clause 11 clarifies the time period for which the Secretary of State may detain individuals by placing two of the common law Hardial Singh principles on to a statutory footing. As we have also heard, the principles provide that a person may be detained only for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances, and if it becomes apparent before the expiry of the reasonable period that the Home Secretary will not be able to examine, effect removal or grant leave within a reasonable period, the Home Secretary should not seek to continue the detention.

As my noble friend Lord Hailsham noted, the Explanatory Notes published with the Bill make it clear that it is the Bill’s intention expressly to overturn the common law principle established in R on the application of A v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2007, and that henceforth it will be for the Secretary of the State rather than the courts to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain an individual for the specific statutory purpose. In this regard, these amendments seek to preserve the status quo and leave it to the courts to determine the reasonableness of the period of detention. I put it to your Lordships that it is properly a matter for the Home Secretary rather than the courts to decide such matters, as the Home Office will be in full possession of all the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in the circumstances.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

If my noble friend is right, he is effectively saying that people who are detained will be released if there is no prospect of deportation. If that is right, the policy of deterrence is entirely without merit.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My noble friend is right, in that it is one of the Hardial Singh principles that, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, that person should not be detained. But I cannot agree with him that the policy of deterrence is not right, because it is clearly the Government’s intention to remove any illegal entrants to a safe third country. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I add that the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that being lawful as a matter of principle.

We recognise that circumstances can change. Where that is the case, detention must be reviewed. If it is considered that the anticipated period of detention is not reasonably necessary, the individual will be bailed. This reflects the existing legal and policy position on the use of detention.

It remains the Government’s view that the provisions in Clause 11 provide an appropriate balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary and the courts. Accordingly, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I express my gratitude to the noble Viscount and others who have spoken on the Bill, including the noble Lord, Lord German. I now come to this place for my daily dose of disappointment. It seems to me that the Minister is deliberately missing the point. He cannot be failing to see it, and I very much regret having to say that.

Who do noble Lords trust to make these decisions: a Minister or the courts? I will tell them something about the latter, in case they have never seen any of these cases in court. Judges sit day after day in the Administrative Court, hearing case after case involving asylum and refugees, and they make decision after decision about whether a period of detention is too long, too robust or unreasonable in some other way. They have built up a corpus of law which has become reliable and admired not just in this place but throughout our jurisdiction and the common law world.

Make your choice. I am going to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

80: Schedule 2, page 71, line 9, leave out “local” and insert “relevant”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, the first amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 22 and the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 25 have the effect that the reference to a person in the care of a local authority in the definition of “appropriate adult” in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2 is replaced with a reference to a person in the care of a relevant authority as defined by that paragraph.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

86: Schedule 2, page 71, line 38, at end insert—
““voluntary organisation” —(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989 (see section 105(1) of that Act);(b) in relation to Scotland, has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (see section 93(1) of that Act);(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (see Article 74(1) of that Order).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment defines “voluntary organisation” for the purposes of the reference to a person in the care of a voluntary organisation in the definition of “appropriate adult” in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. The amendments before us do not seek to punish children who are in a situation that many of them have no choice in. We have a duty to them as a humanitarian country with proud traditions. We have a duty to protect children, and that is what we seek to do. We need to remember that we are talking about children here. Whatever we do, I do not want to punish children for however they may have arrived here.

We fully support the amendments of the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly Amendments 87 and 89. Amendment 89, of course, is in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and it is one to which I have added my name, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and the noble Lord, Lord German.

I do not want to speak for long, but the point that was made is significant, especially when one looks at Clause 16. The Secretary of State can decide on the transfer date that an unaccompanied child be moved away from the local authority. The point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, goes right to the heart of the issue: the local authority acts as the parent. If you move a child away from that situation, you are effectively making them an orphan. There is nobody responsible for them by law. Is that really what we want? Is that really what we are trying to achieve? We all agree that there is a problem, but we should not make children pay the price of trying to resolve it. That is not the right way of going about it.

As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham pointed out, the Secretary of State can direct the local authority to cease providing accommodation. There is no discussion between the Secretary of State and the local authority to view what is in the best interests of the child. The Secretary of State can compel the local authority—as the parent—to cease providing accommodation for a child, which will then take them into Home Office-provided accommodation. Within that Home Office accommodation, as the right reverend Prelate pointed out, we still have 186 children lost. They are missing. We have no idea where they are. I say it time and again but if the Home Office was a human being and a parent, that human being—the parent known as the Home Office—would be prosecuted. We would not tolerate losing children. We would not say that we are doing all we can. We would ask what on earth is happening that children are being lost. The local authority provides the best solution to looking after unaccompanied children in these circumstances.

The Home Office can demand that of the local authority with no justification. It can demand it with no idea of where these children are going to go and with no idea of the standards to be provided for them. They are simply to be housed in Home Office accommodation or wherever. That is not acceptable to the people of this country, irrespective of the fact that they understand there is a problem with the boats, and irrespective of the fact they understand that something needs to be done. They do not want is to see migrant children, or any child, having to pay the price for that. The Government need to sort it out in another way and ensure that all children in this country are properly protected.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 87 put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seeks to ensure that all children covered by the duty in Clause 2 have the protections afforded to children under the Children Act 1989. No one can disagree with the sentiment behind his amendment. However, in a sense, it misses its intended target, as the 1989 Act does not impose obligations, duties or responsibilities on the Secretary of State but rather on local authorities. There is nothing in this Bill that alters those duties or responsibilities, particularly as regards an unaccompanied child—a point well made by my noble friend Lady Berridge.

That said, Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 already requires that the Home Secretary carry out her functions in a way that takes into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom, and I can assure noble Lords that this will continue to be the case.

Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause brings me to the provisions in Clauses 15 and 16 which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. She seeks to remove those clauses; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham seeks to amend them with Amendments 88A, 89 and 89A.

Clause 15 makes provision for the accommodation of unaccompanied migrant children in scope of this Bill. This clause confers on the Secretary of State a power to provide, or to arrange for the provision of, accommodation and other support to unaccompanied migrant children in England. While the clause contains no time limit on how long any child spends in Home Office accommodation, as I have said previously on a number of occasions, our clear intention is that their stay be a temporary one until they transfer to a local authority for a permanent placement. This is not detained accommodation, and the support that will be provided will be appropriate to the needs of these young people during their short stay.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

The problem is Clause 16, because the Home Office can remove the child from the otherwise permanent care of the local authority. How on earth is what the Minister is saying compatible with Clause 16?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is obviously necessary that the Bill contain a power to allow for such a transfer, in order to ensure the appropriate removal of a child on attaining their majority, for example, or for any other purpose that might be necessary to ensure implementation of the scheme. The Government expect local authorities to meet their statutory obligations to unaccompanied children from the date of their arrival in the United Kingdom, and that the Home Office step in only sparingly and temporarily. Indeed, an unaccompanied child in scope of the scheme may enter local authority care without first being accommodated by the Home Office under this power. However, it is important that there be legal certainty about the ability of the Home Office to step in to ensure that an unaccompanied child arriving on the south coast can immediately be accommodated and supported.

As we have just discussed, Clause 16 then makes provision for the transfer of an unaccompanied migrant child from Home Office accommodation to a local authority in England. The clause provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to decide that a child is to cease residing in Home Office accommodation and to then direct a local authority in England to provide accommodation to the child, under Section 20 of the Children Act, after five working days of the direction being made. As was the subject of the intervention a moment ago, the Secretary of State may also direct a local authority in England to cease accommodating an unaccompanied child and to transfer the child into accommodation provided by the Home Office after five working days of the direction being made. This power is the subject of the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.

I suggest, with respect to the right reverend Prelate, that this amendment is unnecessary given that protections are already in statute in Section 55 of the 2009 Act, which I have already referred to. The Secretary of State is required to have regard to the interests of children as a primary factor in immigration decisions affecting them. Let me be clear: best interests are not the only factor that must be considered; other relevant factors, such as close consideration of individual circumstances, must be taken into account. In making decisions and devising policy guidance under this Bill, the Home Office will continue to apply the Section 55 duty.

We are working through the operational processes relating to unaccompanied children and the circumstances in which we will use this power. This includes engaging with stakeholders to understand the concerns they might have about the power to transfer unaccompanied children into Home Office accommodation. We are working very closely with the Department for Education, as we want to deliver the objectives of the Bill while being mindful of the needs of children and young people. I hope this provides some reassurance to noble Lords.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I refer my noble friend back to his point about legal certainty and the very narrow question I asked: is it correct that while the Home Office is accommodating these children before they go into local authority accommodation, they actually have no parent?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is clearly right that in the situation that arose with the rush of people crossing the channel—which gave rise to this legislation—consideration had to be given to the legislative arrangements. The situation in law is clear and is as my noble friend set out. The Home Office is able, in extreme circumstances, to exercise this power on behalf of local authorities. As I say, the purpose and intention of these provisions is to look after children only for as short a time as possible before transferring them to the care of local authorities. I want to stress that the Home Office is having to accommodate unaccompanied children out of necessity.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, can the Minister give the House an assurance that he will put in the Bill that these children would not be in the so-called care of the Home Office for more than, let us say, 48 hours —some very limited period of time? If that is the Government’s intention, can the Minister assure the House that this will be in the Bill and that it really will be for a very short time?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

No; I am afraid I cannot provide that assurance, and the reason for that is obvious. We are dealing with a situation in which we have thousands of people crossing the channel, and we cannot tie the hands of the Home Office in dealing with this great problem that we all face. I say again that we are having to accommodate unaccompanied children out of necessity. My noble friend Lady Lawlor highlighted in her brave speech the Hobson’s choice that we face here. These children will not all immediately enter the care system on arrival in a small boat, simply because the Home Office does not have the powers set out in Clauses 15 and 16. It is right that we take steps to ensure that there is clarity, and I suggest to noble Lords that it is in the best interests of these children that we put in place these measures, which recognise the reality of the current situation.

On the basis of my explanation and the assurances I have given, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, will be content to withdraw his amendment, and if the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham is minded to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 89, I invite noble Lords to reject that amendment.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure that, like everyone who has listened to this debate, I am now more confused than when it started. Clarity has not been brought. I thank all noble Lords for taking part in the debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, who I completely disagree with; she really does not understand the concept of what safeguarding and the rights of the child are once the child is in the UK. That is the issue, and there is no evidence in any impact assessment or anything that the Government have done that says that protecting and safeguarding children under the Children Act 1989 is a pull factor. But I welcome the noble Baroness’s intervention and understand that she starts from a position that is, I am sure, very different from that of nearly everybody else in your Lordships’ House.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for bringing back these amendments, but I am disappointed that he had to do so given the strong case that he made for them in Committee. They are important from the perspective of both citizenship and the rights of children. I once again declare my interest as a patron of the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens.

From reading the exchanges in Committee, it seemed to me that the Minister was not really listening to the arguments put but simply responded by trying to justify what, in our view, is unjustifiable. Once again, children are the main victims, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, whose amendments I also support. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, it was welcome that the Minister, when challenged on this point, did not impute any culpability to children. However, the fact remains that children are being punished for the actions of a parent, which is contrary to the refugee and other conventions, as has been pointed out by the UNHCR, JCHR and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, among others. This is yet another instance of where we need to see the child rights impact assessment yet, despite the Government Chief Whip promising it for today “if possible”, there is still no sign of it.

It is not an indicator of strength to refuse to countenance any amendments in pursuit of the mythical god of deterrence, regardless of the force of the argument. The main losers are, again, children, whose best interests are being ignored and trampled on. I hope the Minister will think again today.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments relate to the bans on re-entry, settlement and citizenship which are a key part of the deterrent effect of the Bill and send an important message that, if you enter the country illegally, you will not be able to build a life here.

Amendments 114 and 116, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and spoken to so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seek to remove from the scope of the bans those who meet the duty in Clause 2 but who are under the age of 18.

As the Bill is currently constructed, anyone, including children, who meets the criteria of the duty also becomes subject to permanent bans on obtaining leave to remain, settlement, citizenship and re-entry. The application of the bans is irrespective of whether the child was complicit in the act of entering illegally. I hope that addresses the points noble Lords have raised in that regard.

The inclusion of children is to ensure that there is no perverse incentive for parents or others to put children in harm’s way by forcing them on to small boats or other dangerous methods in an attempt to gain entry to the UK. We want to send a clear message that children cannot be exploited and forced into making dangerous attempts to gain entry into the UK for the purpose of starting a new life here. Instead, the only way to come to the UK for protection will be through safe and legal routes. This will take the power out of the hands of criminal gangs and protect vulnerable people, including children.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene. Could he update the House, in light of what my noble friend Lady Lister said, on where we are with the child rights impact assessment?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I was saving that until the end of my remarks, which I will do, if I may.

Under our proposals, anyone who has entered illegally will be removed, so it is unlikely that they will qualify for settlement or citizenship on the basis of long and lawful residence. I therefore take my noble friend Lord Moylan’s point, in that regard. However, the powers in the Bill provide the Secretary of State with the discretion to waive the bans in specific circumstances, as we discussed in Committee. In practice, these powers mean that the Secretary of State retains the discretion to waive the bans on obtaining settlement as well as to consider an application for citizenship where they consider that failure to do so would result in a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECHR.

The Bill also provides additional discretionary powers to waive the bans on limited leave to remain and re-entry. The Secretary of State may waive the ban on re-entry if they consider that other exceptional circumstances make it appropriate to allow someone to return; these would include to ensure compliance with international agreements to which the UK is a party. Similarly, in the limited leave to remain area, there is a power allowing the Secretary of State to waive the ban where it is appropriate to ensure compliance with the ECHR or other international agreements to which the UK is a party, as well as where an individual who is seeking to remain in the UK has been allowed to return on the basis of other exceptional circumstances.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for again raising these interesting issues in the amendments he has tabled. They seek to change provisions in Clauses 30 to 36 so that the citizenship ban applies only to naturalisation and not registration routes. I am grateful to my noble friend for meeting me to talk about this. We had a useful discussion, although we did not quite reach agreement on these topics.

Our view is that registration is not just about recognising a person’s claim to British citizenship that they do not have the documents to demonstrate. Instead, a number of the registration routes within the British Nationality Act have requirements based on residence and many have good character requirements. It is not a case, as my noble friend has suggested, of merely acknowledging a status that a person already holds, but an opportunity for a person to demonstrate their suitability to become British.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government Chief Whip promised that it would be published well before Report concludes. Does the Minister really think that tomorrow is well before Report concludes on Wednesday?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Yes.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is clearly not the case. I accept that the Government Chief Whip did not exactly say that it would be put before your Lordships’ House today, but the expectation was that it would be. We have reached 7 pm; we are debating children’s issues and have done so all the way through Report, and we have not got the children’s impact assessment. It is utterly unacceptable for the Government to run a contentious Bill in this way. All the impact assessments were late, by and large. This is particularly late; it is no way to carry on. I can understand my noble friend Lady Lister’s upset and anger at this, and my noble friend Lord Kennedy raised it last week. The Minister knows, frankly, the anger and disappointment there is about this. I do not know what else to say, other than: what does “tomorrow” mean? Is it first thing tomorrow morning, or will it turn up at 8 or 9 pm, just before Report finishes? Perhaps the Minister can clarify what tomorrow means, and register the deep anger and upset in this House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Before the Minister answers, I will add to what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said. Throughout our consideration of the Bill, I have been particularly concerned about children. As far as I can remember, there are no more amendments of any significance in relation to children in the final part of Report. All I have said has been without sight of the impact statement. For me and many other noble Lords who are concerned about children, it is quite simply too late.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I have looked into the history of child rights impact assessments, and they are a rare document. Tomorrow, when the assessment is provided, noble Lords will see an explanation of the background to these documents. There is an element of opportunism about the timing; clearly, these are difficult documents that need to be prepared with care. I say that it will be published tomorrow, so it will be published tomorrow, and at this point I cannot give any more detail as to the precise timing.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief because many of the points have been made by others during the debate. Yet again the Minister has not answered the speakers’ questions. Yet again we are having a discussion, to discover that the impact assessment on child rights will be with us tomorrow after we have debated some key amendments. He did not respond to the issue I raised about why, if a child is in care when they arrive in this country, they are deemed to be able to make decisions. This is going to end up in the courts if the Government will not listen. Every single part of the response to this group has been an embarrassment and a real shame for children’s rights. I will not press this to a vote but the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, may wish either to bring something back at Third Reading or to communicate directly with the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

126: Clause 37, page 41, line 1, leave out “factual” and insert “removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the name of a “factual suspensive claim” to a “removal conditions suspensive claim”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and, in particular, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. Were the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, minded to test the opinion of the House, he would certainly find us supporting him on Amendment 130.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, it was remiss of me not to say a little about Amendment 126 and the other government amendments in this group, so I will do so now. These amendments, as I am sure Members of the House have realised, replace a “factual suspensive claim” with a “removal conditions suspensive claim”. Clearly, I and the department listened carefully to the contributions from noble Lords in Committee on these topics about these suspensive claims, in particular those helpful contributions from the Cross Benches. The changes in the category of suspensive claim are a direct reflection of what was said during those debates.

Currently, a factual suspensive claim can be raised where a mistake of fact has been made in deciding that a person meets the four removal conditions in Clause 2. This definition would prevent a claim being raised where a person had been incorrectly identified as meeting the four removal conditions due to a mistake of law. A removal conditions suspensive claim will instead provide for a claim to be raised where a person who has been given a removal notice informing them that they are subject to the duty to remove does not consider that they meet the removal conditions in Clause 2. The Secretary of State’s or Upper Tribunal’s consideration of a removal conditions suspensive claim will be on whether or not the removal conditions were met. I trust these amendments will be welcome, in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who queried the scope of these claims in Committee.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton and Lord Hope, for setting out the case for the other amendments in this group. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the United Kingdom to a country other than their country of origin. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold and reflects the test applied by the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39 of the rules of court. “Serious” indicates that the harm must meet a minimum level of severity, and “irreversible” means the harm would have a permanent or very long-lasting effect. These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 of the Bill defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed.

Amendment 130 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period it will take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the safe third country. I suggest it is reasonable to expect the harm to occur over a defined period. The very purpose of the suspensive claim process is to prevent those persons subject to the duty to remove suffering serious and irreversible harm during the same period that their human rights claims are considered. Without this requirement, it would be difficult for decision-makers properly to assess the likelihood of any risk materialising. It would also risk abusive suspensive claims being made on the basis of a risk of harm that does not currently exist or that may not materialise until months or even years after a person has been removed from the United Kingdom.

Amendment 130 would also remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. This would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the United Kingdom. Again, I would point out that the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures is one of serious and irreversible harm. So, the serious harm condition and requirement for the risk of harm to be both serious and irreversible reflects that test.

Lastly, Amendment 130 would also remove specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. Setting out a clear approach regarding the interpretation of serious harm on the face of the Bill will, I suggest to noble Lords, ensure that decision-makers and the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of what amounts to a risk of serious and irreversible harm. The examples in Clause 38(5) reflect existing case law and go no further than how we currently approach the consideration of these issues when raised in protection claims.

Amendment 131 would prevent amendments to the examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm set out in Clause 38(4), as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, so eloquently set out. I assure the House that the Government do not intend to diminish or remove the examples of harm listed in Clause 38(4).

Amendment 132 would remove the regulation-making power in Clause 39 to amend the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm”. This would result in the Secretary of State being unable to make amendments which reflect developments in case law. It is worth again pointing out that the Delegated Powers Committee raised no issue with this power in its report on the Bill.

Amendment 133 would alter the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include “compelling” evidence of the risk of harm that a person would face if removed to a third country and replace it with a requirement to provide evidence that is “reliable, substantial and material”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks on the clarity of those three words, which, of course, will be available in Hansard should any questions arise as to what might amount to “compelling”.

However, although evidence that is compelling may also be defined as evidence that is reliable, substantial and material, a requirement for evidence to be compelling is more appropriate and succinct, given that it is the overall impact of the evidence provided, not any particular element or feature of it, that is relevant. The term “compelling” is sufficiently clear and well understood by decision-makers, and should remain unaltered. It is a term that has use in this area of the law. For example, evidence provided by people raising suspensive claims may differ dramatically in terms of volume and substance, but it is the overall impact of such evidence that is crucial when determining whether any claim has merit. For those reasons, the term “compelling” is more appropriate, providing decision-makers and the courts with the right degree of flexibility when making decisions on suspensive claims and appeals.

Finally, the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to extend the claim and decision periods provided for in Clauses 41 and 45. We consider the periods specified in the Bill to be fair and equitable, affording sufficient time to submit and determine claims, commensurate with the Bill’s objective to remove people swiftly from the United Kingdom. However, I remind the noble Baroness that, where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, it will be possible to extend both the claim period and the decision period.

For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask that the noble Lords do not press their amendments.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I am afraid he has not answered my request for an assurance at all, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

134: Clause 42, page 45, line 2, leave out “factual” and insert “removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

138: Clause 42, page 45, line 18, leave out from “the” to end of line 20 and insert “person does not meet the removal conditions,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 3.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

141: Clause 43, page 46, line 10, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) in the case of a removal conditions suspensive claim, the person does not meet the removal conditions,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1 and page 41, line 3.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

143: Clause 43, page 46, line 16, leave out “factual” and insert “removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

146: Clause 44, page 47, line 6, leave out “factual” and insert “removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

148: Clause 44, page 47, line 8, leave out from “the” to end of line 10 and insert “person does not meet the removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 3.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

149: Clause 45, page 47, line 31, leave out “factual” and insert “removal conditions”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in her defence of the rule of law and interim relief in cases involving the alleged expulsion of people to unsafe places. The Government were happy to support the court’s decision not to grant such relief in the current Rwanda cases, but now they want to take away this jurisdiction, forcing more applicants to Strasbourg pending a final UK judicial determination. If the Government are right that Strasbourg interim measures are not binding, Clause 54 is unnecessary. If the European Court of Human Rights is correct that they are binding, our amended Clause 1 should be enough to safeguard international law. With respect to those comments, I urge my noble friend if she is so minded to test the opinion of the House on her Amendment 152, which we would support rather than Amendment 153.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill establishes a bespoke claims and appeals process which provides for a person subject to the duty to remove to challenge their removal to a safe third country. The duty to remove will be temporarily suspended while consideration is given to any suspensive claim or appeal resulting from the refusal of that suspensive claim. That is of itself an effective remedy for those subject to the duty to remove, and these measures will ensure that all suspensive claims raised in response to a removal notice under the Bill will receive full judicial scrutiny.

Clause 53 is critical to the success of the Bill in preventing the United Kingdom’s domestic courts from granting interim remedies in relation to legal challenges which would prevent or delay the removal of a person who meets the removal conditions under Clause 2. Were other human rights claims and legal challenges to be made, they would be considered after a person has been removed. Clause 53 provides a necessary and effective safeguard against the endless merry-go-round of legal challenges that those with no right to be here use to thwart their removal.

Amendment 152 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would incentivise people to obtain injunctions or submit judicial reviews to delay or prevent removal, negating the carefully crafted and balanced provisions we have set out in the Bill, which I have just described. We cannot allow that to happen. The amendment would substantially undermine the Government’s ability promptly to remove those who enter the UK illegally, and our overall objective of stopping the dangerous small-boat crossings.

Amendment 153 similarly seeks to weaken the Bill by striking out Clause 54, which relates to interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights. Let me be clear: it is not the Government’s intention to ignore a Rule 39 interim measure. Indeed, Clause 54 provides a clear framework for a Minister to exercise discretion where a Rule 39 interim measure is indicated. That will mean that a Minister may suspend removal in response to a Rule 39 interim measure but, crucially, is not bound by UK law so to do. This will be dependent on the facts of each case.

As I have said before, the Government take their international obligations very seriously. Nothing in the clause requires the Government to act in breach of international law. I reassure the noble Baroness that reflections within the Strasbourg court are ongoing, and we are closely following the process. We are confident that they will lead to meaningful change.

The inclusion of Clause 54 in the Bill reflects our concerns about the interim measures process. We believe that there needs to be greater transparency and fairness in the process to ensure the proper administration of justice. We cannot allow our ability to control our borders to be undermined by an opaque process which does not give the United Kingdom Government a formal opportunity to make representations or appeal the decision. This process risks derailing our efforts to tackle the people smugglers and stop people from making the dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys across the channel.

For the reasons I have set out, I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment and, if she is minded to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 152 or 153, I strongly urge noble Lords to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so grateful to all noble Lords who have stayed. I say to all noble Lords that the length of debate does not indicate its importance. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for his indication that productive discussions are still in train between His Majesty’s Government and the Strasbourg jurisdiction; I take from that a suggestion to reinforce my suspicion that Clause 54 was always a negotiating position to attempt to improve the due process position in relation to interim measures in the Strasbourg court. On that basis, I want to allow the Government more time to proceed with those negotiations before Third Reading.

However, in relation to Clause 53 and my Amendment 152, on depriving His Majesty’s domestic judges of the inherent jurisdiction to grant interim relief, that jurisdiction does not come from any government or party statute; it comes from the common law. To deprive His Majesty’s judges of the ability to grant interim relief is anathema to our common-law system. With gratitude, again, to all noble Lords who stayed—perhaps even more to those who did not speak than to those who did—I would like to test the opinion of the House.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 5th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher for her last comments; I am sure all of us agree with them.

I support Amendment 156A in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. It is a very important amendment. Of course, when people come forward with sensible and constructive suggestions which would improve an amendment that has been put forward, I have no problem with that, and I know the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham has no problem with that either. In line with the remarks made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, were the noble and learned Lord to move Amendment 158A, we would be minded to support that too, because it seeks to improve the Bill in the way that he said. It would be silly not to do so. I thank him for tabling it and hope he will spare me a heart attack from running around to make sure that it is all is in order.

The serious point is that the amendment would improve the Bill. As has been said, rather than restricting this to areas of law only, it opens it up to grounds of fact. It is a much more sensible, improved amendment, and it would be silly not to accept it. We will see what the House has to say should the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, be minded to move his amendment after Amendment 156A.

Nobody doubts the difficulties that can arise in respect of age assessments, particularly as many of the disputes for unaccompanied children arise around the claimed age of 16 or 17. The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 had relevant provisions, but those have been superseded by the Illegal Migration Bill. The Bill specifically allows for an individual, where there is a disputed age assessment, to be removed—in other words, an individual’s challenge to a decision by way of judicial review is non-suspensive. Amendment 156A, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and others, seeks to address that injustice.

The Government will quote evidence saying that large numbers of individuals claiming to be children are not, and that the system is open to abuse. I point out that in the JCHR report the Helen Bamber Foundation states that, in 2022, 70 local authorities had 1,386 referrals to their children’s services of young people sent to adult accommodation or detention, but 63% were then found to be children. It is therefore deeply concerning that judicial oversight of these decisions is being ousted, and that they will then be removed from the UK while decisions are confirmed or not. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says, how can that possibly be in the best interests of the child—something that has driven public policy in this country for decades?

Others have raised the child’s rights impact assessment. Since we got it only at 5 pm yesterday, it has been difficult to go through it, so I apologise for asking questions that would really be more appropriate in Committee. On the deportation of children—were the Bill to go through unamended—it may interest noble Lords for the Minister to explain why there has been a change of public policy with respect to the use of reasonable force. On the use of force by the Home Office under the Bill, page 4 of the impact assessment says:

“While this is technically not age restricted, use of force against minors is not permitted under current policy except where in the rare circumstances there is a risk of harm”.


I think we all accept that; if a child is going to hurt themselves, you necessarily expect someone to try to intervene in that circumstance. It goes on to say:

“Use of force is not currently used against minors for compliance/removal purposes. We do not envisage the use of reasonable force being used for such purposes under the auspices of the new bill”—


this is the important phrase—

“unless it is necessary as a last resort where other methods to ensure compliance have failed”.

That is a major change of public policy, included in a document that we are being asked to consider at the last stages of Report. The Government are saying that reasonable force can be used in the deportation and removal of children under the auspices of the Bill, rather than it just being used in the circumstances of preventing harm. Nobody would disagree that if you are preventing a child hurting themselves, of course you have to use force and intervene appropriately, but this does not say that. I repeat: it says

“as a last resort where other methods to ensure compliance have failed”.

The House deserves an explanation of why the Government not only have changed public policy with respect to the lack of judicial oversight of age assessment but are now proposing, to ensure that children can be removed under the Bill, to allow reasonable force to be used.

I will not do this but, if this were Committee, noble Lords can imagine all the questions we would ask about training, about what “reasonable force” means and so on. That is not available to us, which makes it even more important that we support the amendment from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham—with the improvement suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, if he moves his amendment as well—to protect children, some of the most vulnerable people who come to our shores.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments take us on to the provisions regarding age assessments. Given that, under Clause 3, unaccompanied children will be treated differently from adults, and given the obvious safeguarding risks of adults purporting to be children being placed within the care system, it is important that we take steps to deter adults from claiming to be children and to avoid lengthy legal challenges to age-assessment decisions preventing the removal of those who have been assessed to be adults. Receiving care and services reserved for children also incurs costs and reduces the accessibility of these services for genuine children who need them.

Assessing age is inherently difficult, but it is crucial that we disincentivise adults from knowingly misrepresenting themselves as children. Our published data shows that, between 2016 and March 2023, there were 8,611 asylum cases in which an age assessment was required and subsequently resolved. Of those cases, nearly half— 47%, or 4,088 individuals—were found to be adults. This percentage aggregates initial decisions on age taken upon arrival, comprehensive assessments and the outcomes of legal challenges. I make clear that only those assessed to be adults will fall within the duty.

Accordingly, Clause 56 disapplies the right of appeal for age assessments, which is yet to be commenced and was established in Section 54 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, for those who meet the four conditions in the Bill. Instead, those wishing to challenge a decision on age will be able to do so through judicial review, which will not suspend removal, and can continue from outside the UK after they have been removed. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I say that we are keeping the commencement of Section 54 under review, but I am unable to provide a further update at this stage.

Clause 56(5) provides the basis on which a court can consider a decision relating to a person’s age in judicial review proceedings. It provides that a court can grant relief

“only on the basis that it was wrong in law”,

and must not do so on the basis that it

“was wrong as a matter of fact”.

This distinguishes the position that the Supreme Court adopted in its judgment in the 2009 case of the Crown on the application of A v London Borough of Croydon, page eight. The intention is to ensure that the court cannot make its own determination on age—which should properly be reserved for those qualified and trained to assess age—but instead can consider a decision on age only on conventional judicial review principles.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

The court will receive evidence from people who have made these assessments, and courts are well versed in determining which evidence is to be preferred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As my noble friend well knows, under a conventional judicial review challenge, the court will review the process of the decision and whether the decisions made were appropriate, applying the conventional judicial review tests, not balancing the evidence and coming to its own conclusion on the facts. The Government’s position is that it is appropriate for those tasked with assessing a person’s age to be entrusted with that responsibility, subject to review on judicial review principles. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, this includes a test of Wednesbury unreasonableness—a decision so unreasonable that no properly directed tribunal could have reached it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I want to be absolutely clear: is the Minister accepting my amendment? I have drafted it as carefully as I can to bring it within the scope of that kind of challenge.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I am coming to the noble and learned Lord’s amendment and will answer that question in a second.

We consider that these provisions are entirely necessary to safeguard genuine children and guard against those who seek to game the system by purporting to be adults. It follows that I am afraid I cannot support Amendments 156A and 158A. However, I assure my noble friend Lord Hailsham that age assessments will, as now, be undertaken in a careful and professional manner. This is not a perfunctory exercise, and it is in everyone’s interests that we get it right.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

158: Clause 56, page 58, line 37, after “tribunal” insert “must determine the application on the basis that the person’s age is a matter of fact to be determined by the relevant authority; and accordingly the court or tribunal”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confirms that, on an application for judicial review of a decision mentioned in Clause 56(3), the court or tribunal must treat a person’s age as a matter of fact to be determined by the relevant authority.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

161A: Clause 59, page 63, line 1, at beginning insert “in England and Wales and Scotland,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, the second amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 63, line 1 and the amendments in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 63, line 2 and page 63, line 25 replace the requirement to consult such representatives of district councils in Northern Ireland as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate about regulations under Clause 59(1) with a requirement to consult the Executive Office in Northern Ireland.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I am to be brief in setting out the government amendments in this group. As the House will recall, Clause 59 provides for the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the maximum number of persons who may enter the UK annually using safe and legal routes. Such regulations must be debated and approved by Parliament. Before making such regulations, the Secretary of State is required to consult representatives of local authorities and such other persons or bodies as they consider appropriate. The intention is that the annual cap reflects the country’s capacity to accommodate, integrate and otherwise support those admitted through safe and legal routes.

Local authorities in Northern Ireland do not have the same remit as those in England and Wales and Scotland. In the context of migration, the relevant functions rest with the Northern Ireland departments. Following discussions with the Executive Office in Northern Ireland, Amendments 161A, 161B, 161C and 162A replace the requirement to consult representatives of local authorities in Northern Ireland with a requirement to consult the Executive Office. The Executive Office will then consult other Northern Ireland departments to inform the response to the Secretary of State.

I will respond to the other amendments in this group once we have had an opportunity to hear from other noble Lords. For now, I beg to move.

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, I again note my interests as laid out in the register. I will speak to Amendment 162. In Committee, I explained the well-intentioned nature of this amendment and hoped it would have afforded the Minister the opportunity to clarify that any cap placed on safe and legal routes would exclude current named schemes already in operation. I appreciate the Minister’s comments. He said:

“The cap will not automatically apply to all current and new safe and legal routes that we offer or will introduce in the future.”—[Official Report, 4/6/23; col. 1980.]


But, with respect, how can local authorities reflect on accommodation provision for new routes without excluding their current commitments from this assessment?

“Safe and legal routes” is not a term that is tightly defined in the Bill, so we are left, as is now unfortunately commonplace, with regulations in this area. Arguably, however, it is not unreasonable for Members to presume that “safe and legal routes” would be for those seeking protection outside existing visa schemes who would be granted refugee status. Therefore, why are the Government leaving the possibility that those who are not granted refugee status could be included within the cap? This applies to schemes such as Homes for Ukraine, which requires a visa—the people in question are not refugees—Hong Kong BNO visas, which are actually for overseas citizens, and the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, which is in recognition of all that happened in Afghanistan. As my noble friend Lady Brinton put it to the Minister in Committee, those from Hong Kong are actually British citizens. I thank the Minister for the meeting that he held with me and her on that specific question.

We still have no credible evidence on the deterrence impacts of this Bill, but we know that offering accessible and safe routes will help prevent people having to make the agonising decision to travel irregularly to reach sanctuary. However, by including current schemes in the proposed cap, we will severely restrict our ability to implement any such safe routes, as there would be limited room, if any, for additional routes. Over the first quarter of this year, 22,000 Ukrainians and British nationals from Hong Kong were resettled here. If we had a cap of 20,000 and those 22,000 were included, we would have a problem. It is to the Government’s credit that these 22,000 have come, but it cannot be used as a justification to abdicate our responsibility to do more across a wider global cohort.

If we do not provide safe routes to those who have had no choice but to uproot their lives to seek safety, we are choosing to require them to rely on dangerous journeys. Perversely, this will create a market for those smugglers determined to capitalise on others’ suffering.

The child’s rights impact assessment states:

“Anybody arriving in the UK through the methods specified in the bill presents a risk to the public due to the very nature of their arrival”.


I put it to the Minister that the vast majority do not pose a risk to our country; what is at risk is their lives. That is why they have fled. I therefore welcome that the Prime Minister has promised that the Government will create more safe and legal routes. This amendment will enable the Government to do only what they have set out to do. Without it, I fear this vital and necessary work will stop before it has even started and the world’s most vulnerable will pay the price.

I wonder whether using the word “person” in Clause 59(1) is unhelpful here and whether it should say “asylum seeker and refugee” instead. Would the Minister consider bringing that back at Third Reading? Beyond Amendment 162, I support the other safe and legal routes proposed here, in particular that in Amendment 164 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging debate on a number of issues of substance. I speak briefly to say that, on these Benches, we will be supporting the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, on her amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, talked about his time in the Foreign Office and the mixing up of UN and national schemes. My noble friend Lord Triesman, who had a similar position to the noble Lord, said he was absolutely right in the way he summed up the position. So, we are happy to support the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, on her amendment.

There have been a number of speeches that have reflected on the extremity of the situation for many people who want to come here. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, was very fair in the way he summed up his position in supporting Amendment 164. He introduced his speech by saying he wants to fix little bits of the system to make it work better. I agree with that point, and that can be done through Amendment 164.

I say to my noble friend Lady Kennedy that I too met Anna Politkovskaya when I was a member of the OSCE in the early 2000s, and she was killed just a couple of months after I met her. There are people in absolutely extreme and desperate situations and there are many pressures on the Government—we understand that—but the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is doing no more than asking the Government to put what they have promised from the Dispatch Box on the face of the Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. My noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord Green, made some powerful points, in particular on the presumed impact of some of these amendments on our ability to stop the boats. They also again highlighted the need to link the numbers admitted to the UK through safe and legal routes to our capacity to accommodate and support those who arrive through those routes.

Amendment 162, put forward by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, seeks to exclude certain existing schemes from the safe and legal routes cap provision in this Bill. Exempting routes from the cap is not in keeping with the purpose of the policy, which is to manage the capacity on local areas of those arriving through our safe and legal routes. That said, I would remind the House that the cap does not automatically apply to all current or any future routes. Each route will be considered for inclusion on a case-by-case basis. This is due to the individual impact of the routes and the way they interact with the immigration system. This is why my officials are currently considering which routes should be within the cap and this work should not be pre-empted by excluding certain routes from the cap at this stage. I also point the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to the power to vary the cap, set out in the Bill, in cases of emergency.

Amendment 163 would see the United Kingdom establish a new route for those who are persecuted on the basis of an individual’s protected characteristics—advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. This would be a completely new approach to international protection that goes far beyond the terms of the refugee convention. At present, all asylum claims admitted to the UK system, irrespective of any protected characteristic, are considered on their individual merits in accordance with our international obligations under the refugee convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. For each claim, an assessment is made of the risk to the individual owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Critically, we also consider the latest available country of origin information.

Under the scheme proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, there would be no assessment of whether, for the individual concerned, there exists the possibility of safe internal relocation, or whether the state in which an individual faces persecution by a non-state actor could suitably protect them. As well as extending beyond our obligations under the refugee convention, this amendment runs counter to our long-held position that those who need international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach—that remains the fastest route to safety.

Amendment 164, tabled by my noble friend Lady Stroud, seeks to enshrine in law a requirement to bring in new safe and legal routes within two months of the publication of the report required by Clause 60 of the Bill. This puts the deadline sometime next spring. I entirely understand my noble friend’s desire to make early progress with establishing new safe and legal routes, but it is important to follow proper process.

We are rightly introducing, as a number of noble Lords have observed, a requirement to consult on local authority capacity to understand the numbers we can effectively welcome, integrate and support arriving through safe and legal routes. We have committed to launching such a consultation within three months of Royal Assent of this Bill, but we need to allow local authorities and others time to respond and for us to consider those responses. We also, fundamentally, need to make progress with stopping the boats— stopping the dangerous crossings—to free up capacity to welcome those arriving by safe and legal routes.

Having said all that, I gladly repeat the commitment given by my right honourable friend the Minister for Immigration that we will implement any proposed additional safe and legal routes set out in the Clause 60 report as soon as practicable and in any event by the end of 2024. In order to do something well, in an appropriate manner, we must have time in which to do so. We are therefore only a few months apart. I hope my noble friend will accept this commitment has been made in good faith and we intend to abide by it and, on that basis, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Amendment 165, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, would enable those seeking protection to apply from abroad for entry clearance into the UK to pursue their protection claim. Again, such an approach is fundamentally at odds with the principle that a person seeking protection should seek asylum in the first safe country they reach. We also need to be alive to the costs of this and indeed the other amendments proposed here. I note the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on the costs of Amendment 165, but I have to say that I disagree. Our economic impact assessment estimates a stream of asylum system costs of £106,000 per person supported in the UK.

The noble Lord’s scheme is uncapped; under it, there is a duty to issue an entry clearance to qualifying persons. Let us say for the sake of argument that 5,000 entry clearances are issued in accordance with that amendment each year, under his scheme. That could lead to a liability of half a billion pounds in asylum support each year. What is more, as my noble friend Lord Lilley so eloquently pointed out, it would not stop the boats. Those who did not qualify under the scheme would simply arrive on the French beaches and turn to the people smugglers to jump the queue.

Amendment 166 seeks to create an emergency visa route for human rights defenders at particular risk and to provide temporary accommodation for these individuals. This Government recognise that many brave individuals put their lives at risk by fighting for human rights in their countries. These individuals are doing what they believe to be right, at great personal cost. However, when their lives are at risk, I say again that those in need of international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. Such a scheme would also be open to abuse, given the status of human rights defenders, and that anyone can claim to be a human rights defender.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Is the UK resettlement scheme that the Government currently operate capped?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Presently, no, but clearly it will be subject to the cap. The problem, as the noble Lord well knows, is that we cannot take as many people as we would like to from the UNHCR because of the numbers who are coming here, jumping the queue by crossing the channel. That is precisely what these measures in the Bill are designed to address.

Amendment 167 seeks significantly to increase the scope of the UK’s family reunion policy, with no consideration as to how these individuals are to be supported in the UK, which could lead of itself to safeguarding issues. The amendment would even allow individuals to sponsor non-relatives. The present family reunion policy provides a safe and legal route to bring families together. Through this route, we have granted over 46,000 visas since 2015. This is not an insignificant number.

Family reunion in the UK is generous, more so than in the case of some of our European neighbours. Sponsors do not have to be settled in the UK, there is no fee and no time limit for making an application, and there are no accommodation or minimum income requirements which applicants must meet. There is also discretion to grant visas outside the Immigration Rules, catering to wider family members when there are compelling and compassionate factors. Given this track record, I remain unpersuaded of the case for the significant expansion of the family reunion route, as proposed by this amendment.

Finally, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I still owe him a letter arising from the Committee stage debate. I shall ensure that it is with him this week.

It is worth repeating that the people of this country have been generous in offering sanctuary to over half a million people since 2015. But our willingness to help those fleeing war and persecution must be tied to our capacity to do so. Clauses 59 and 60 are designed to this end. We are committed to introducing safe and legal routes by the end of 2024, and we remain open to a debate about whether the cap provided for in the Bill covers the current schemes set out in the right reverend Prelate’s Amendment 162. I hope that, on this basis, he and other noble Lords will be content not to press their amendments to a Division. I commend the government amendments to the House and beg to move.

Amendment 161A agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

161B: Clause 59, page 63, line 1, after “authorities” insert “as the Secretary of State considers appropriate,
(aa) the Executive Office in Northern Ireland”Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the first amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 63, line 1.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

162A: Clause 59, page 63, line 25, leave out from “1994” to end of line 26
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for the first amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 63, line 1.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I do not question the most reverend Primate’s motives in putting down this amendment. It is a shame that we are ending like this, because it has been a wide-ranging debate about aspirations beyond the Bill. I have certainly never seen an archbishop move an amendment at any stage of a Bill, let alone the latter stages of such a contentious Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, said, this has been a passionate and fractious debate; nevertheless, people have raised their eyes—if I can put it like that —to talk about the wider issues we are trying to address through the Bill and into the future. The most reverend Primate’s amendment is about strategy.

My colleague quickly checked on the phone, and I cannot help noting that the noble Lords, Lord Horam, Lord Waldegrave and Lord Green, all voted for the Government in the previous vote and have all indicated that they will be supporting the most reverend Primate in the forthcoming vote. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, is shaking his head; I beg his pardon.

Nevertheless, this has been a remarkable debate, partly for the reason that it has been initiated, and also because it is ending a Bill which has really caught the attention of the wider public. We are dealing with fundamental issues concerning the way we manage our asylum system. The Government and the Opposition acknowledge that there are fundamental problems with the way we deal with these very vulnerable people.

There has been a number of speeches in this debate about Britain taking a leading role in trying to come up with a migration system which addresses these fundamental problems. I have been in this place a long time—some 33 years—and in that time I have been on the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the relevant committees dealing with migration issues. These are fundamentally problematic issues. Here, we are addressing an amendment moved by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury that tries to put a strategy in place, and I invite the Minister to accept it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords, but particularly the most reverend Primate, for clearly setting out the rationale behind his amendment. Let me say again from the outset, as I did in Committee, that I entirely understand the sentiment behind the proposed 10-year strategy for tackling refugee crises and human trafficking.

The Government recognise the interconnected nature of migration and the need to work collectively. That is why we are already engaged and working tirelessly with international and domestic partners to tackle human trafficking. As I set out in Committee, we continue to support overseas programmes to fight modern slavery and human trafficking, including through the modern slavery fund, through which more than £37 million of funding has been provided by the Home Office since 2016. The work includes projects across Europe, Africa and Asia, a joint communiqué with Albania and a signed joint action plan with Romania, which reinforce our commitment to working collaboratively to tackle modern slavery and human trafficking in both the short and long term. We also engage with the international community on a global scale by working with multilateral fora such as the G7, the G20, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

Moreover, while I understand the desire for a published strategy, I would not want this to detract from the work already being done to deliver in this way. This Bill is part of the Government’s strategic and interconnected approach to tackling human trafficking and illegal migration. It is the aim of this Bill to tackle the threat to life arising from dangerous, illegal and unnecessary channel crossings and the pressure that places on our public services.

Furthermore, the view of this Government—one which I believe is eminently sensible—is not to create a siloed refugee strategy. As has been highlighted by many noble Lords throughout Committee and Report, refugee crises are complex and something for the entire international community to address. Indeed, migration by irregular routes to the United Kingdom would usually involve individuals travelling through multiple countries, so it follows that, and I agree with many noble Lords that, the United Kingdom cannot tackle this alone. I certainly also agree with the most reverend Primate’s challenge: that the best way to address displacement on this scale is through a holistic approach, utilising, where appropriate, developmental, diplomatic, military and humanitarian interventions. This is what we are already doing, working with our international partners.

During the debate on the previous amendments, I also detailed the United Kingdom’s work in developing the Global Compact on Refugees and our substantial engagement with the World Bank, which I shall not repeat here. However, I wish to stress that we already engage with our international partners through proper channels and will continue to do so.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, our approach to the Bill has always been to respect the fact that the other place has a right to have its legislation passed. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, mentioned, we have a right to revise, scrutinise and pass amendments seeking to improve or change aspects of the Bill. It is my view and that of His Majesty’s Opposition that this Chamber has done its job—not blocking the Bill, however much we oppose it, but improving it. Numerous improved protections and safeguards have been passed, with requirements to uphold traditional judicial oversight and conform to domestic and international laws. In pursuing this, the proper constitutional function of the Lords, I ask of the other place only that sufficient time is given to allow proper scrutiny and thought to be given to our proposals.

In this context, we cannot support Amendment 168AB and the other amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord German. Of course, we understand the motivation and agree with him about Rwanda and his other points, but it appears that the amendment would block, or at the very least significantly delay, the Bill. In the context of what I have said on a number of occasions, and of what my noble friend Lord Ponsonby has said from the Dispatch Box, we do not support that approach.

My Amendment 168BAA says that Schedule 1 cannot come into force for a country not found to be safe until a decision has been overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court. In other words, I ask the Government to confirm that there is no legislative mechanism that they can or will use to avoid or bypass the judgment of the Court of Appeal and deport people to Rwanda before the Supreme Court makes its decision. I am looking for the Minister to confirm the Government’s approach with respect to this, so that we have it on the record.

The Government may say that this is all unnecessary, and many of us thought that to be the case. However, in the media over the weekend, there were reports that the former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has urged the current Prime Minister to fast-track the implementation of the Rwanda migrant policy by changing the law to designate it a safe country. He said that the Government should use their majority in Parliament to use provisions in the Asylum and Immigration Act that would allow them to designate countries as safe. Were the Government to adopt that recommendation from the former Prime Minister, the implications would be clear. Can the Minister categorically rule that out? Presumably, were this to be done, it could be done by secondary legislation—the Minister will be aware of the debate about this on another matter.

Subject to such assurances, I will not press my amendment to a vote—but it would be helpful for the Minister to outline, alongside this, what happens if the government appeal to the Supreme Court fails. Why would this not throw the Government’s policy off course? Do the Government have a plan B, or are they simply ploughing on, in the expectation of a successful appeal? Given the dependence of the Illegal Migration Bill on detention and then deportation, and given the importance of Rwanda to the Government’s policy, it would be interesting to hear what, if anything, the Government plan for that.

Even today, we read that the Border Force’s own forecasts suggest that the boats pledge will fail. As we have said on numerous occasions, we all want to see this challenge met and dealt with—but efficiently and effectively, in a way that is consistent with our domestic and international laws and requirements.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, it will come as no surprise to the noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Coaker, that the Government cannot support these amendments, not least as they are, simply, unnecessary. It may be that they were tabled as a hook to have a further debate about the judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal last week.

As noble Lords will recall, on Thursday afternoon last week, I repeated the Oral Statement that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary had delivered earlier in the day in the Commons; we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, then. To repeat what my right honourable friend said last Thursday, we respect the Court of Appeal’s judgment and welcome the fact that it unanimously found in the Government’s favour on the vast majority of the appeals brought against the policy. In particular, the Court of Appeal unanimously confirmed that removing asylum seekers to a safe country is entirely consistent with the refugee convention, including Article 31. Indeed, the court found that it is lawful in principle for the Government to relocate people who come to the United Kingdom illegally to a safe third country; that the Government can designate countries as safe; and that our processes for determining eligibility for relocation were fair. Members of this House contended that these issues were not the case in Committee and on Report, and we are glad that that feature has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal. That aspect of the judgment reaffirms the core principles underpinning the Bill and, on that basis, there is absolutely no reason why we should not continue with the scrutiny of the Bill and see it on to the statute book as quickly as possible.

On the finding of the court, by a majority decision—the Lord Chief Justice dissenting—on whether Rwanda is a safe third country, we have indicated that we will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The intention is for this application to be determined promptly. If leave to appeal is granted, it is then properly a matter for the Supreme Court to determine when the case will be heard. The Government are disappointed by the judgment, and it is also disappointing for the majority of the British public who have repeatedly voted for controlled migration, and for all those who want to see us deliver on our moral and democratic imperative to stop the boats.

Turning to the amendments, what does the judgment mean for the commencement of the Bill? I will make two points. First, on the core scheme provided for in the Bill—the duty to make arrangements for removal in Clause 2 and the other provisions directly tied to it—our position has always been that we will seek to implement these provisions as soon as practicable. The decision of the Supreme Court and the operation of our ground-breaking partnership with the Rwandan Government are important factors relating to that question of practicality. Clause 67 already provides for Clause 2 and the other elements of the core scheme to be commenced by regulations, so we are not bound to any particular date, and it remains the Government’s position that we will commence these provisions as soon as practical.

Secondly, there are a number of free-standing provisions in the Bill not directly tied to the duty in Clause 2. These include provisions in Clauses 11, 15 to 20, 29 to 36 and 57 to 61. There is no good reason why the commencement of these provisions should be tied to the outcome in the Supreme Court. Indeed, in relation to Clauses 29 to 36, which provide for the bans on re-entry, settlement and citizenship, the Bill provides for these clauses to come into force on Royal Assent.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I do not propose to comment on the recent article written by the former Prime Minister in the Mail; the views expressed in it are a matter for him. Having had this further opportunity to debate this important judgment, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his response. You can understand the concern that was raised by having a former Prime Minister ask the Government to consider bypassing the court judgment by using secondary regulations to give them the power to do that under the Asylum and Immigration Act. All I was asking for is a comment on that. I take heart from what the Minister said because it seemed that, despite what he said about the former Prime Minister, the important part of it was that the Government would of course abide by the consequences of the Court of Appeal judgment, subject to the further appeal, if granted, to the Supreme Court.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I have already said, I am afraid that I cannot comment further—tempted though I am—on what the former Prime Minister said. The noble Lord has the sense of the Government’s response.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

169: Clause 67, page 68, line 29, leave out paragraph (h)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 19.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

3rd reading
Monday 10th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That the Bill be now read a third time.

Relevant documents: 34th and 37th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee, 16th Report from the Constitution Committee, 12th Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Correspondence from the Senedd published.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, before we commence proceedings on the Bill, I am obliged to make a short statement setting out the position on legislative consent. It is the UK Government’s view that the Bill relates to reserved or excepted matters—namely, immigration and nationality—in each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and is therefore not within the legislative competence of any of the devolved legislatures.

The United Kingdom Government note that the Senedd has declined to agree a legislative consent Motion in relation to certain provisions in the Bill, but it is our view that the legislative consent process is not engaged in relation to Wales.

Noble Lords will recall that we added a provision on Report relating to legal aid in Northern Ireland. Such a provision may amount to an alteration of the Department of Justice’s executive functions; as such, we consider that this provision engages the legislative consent process in Northern Ireland. However, due to the continued absence of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, a legislative consent Motion cannot be secured.

For completeness, I add that no legislative consent Motion has been considered by the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Government sought to bring forward such a Motion in relation to the modern slavery provisions in the Bill, but the Presiding Officer concluded that it did not meet the terms of the relevant standing order of the Scottish Parliament and consequently it was not debated. Accordingly, I beg to move.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to detain the House for too long at this stage but, in view of what transpired on Report, it is fitting that I say a few words before the Bill completes its passage through your Lordships’ House.

There is clearly some disagreement about the means, but we all agree on the necessary ends: we must stop the boats. It remains the Government’s contention that the provisions of the Bill, as introduced in your Lordships’ House, are a vital plank of the actions we are taking to stop these dangerous, illegal and unnecessary crossings of the channel. As my noble friend Lord Clarke so memorably noted, we have not heard an effective alternative. But, if we are to stop the boats, it is imperative that the scheme provided for in the Bill is robust and sends the unambiguous message that, if you enter the UK illegally, you will not be able to build a life here; instead, you will be detained and swiftly returned, either to your home country or to a safe third country.

As a result of the many non-government amendments agreed by your Lordships’ House on Report, that message is no longer unambiguous. It is, at best, half-hearted and, at worst, now wholly absent from the Bill. The Government are reflecting carefully on each and every amendment, but I have no doubt that many will not find favour with the other place and we will soon be debating them again.

Having said all that, I record my thanks for all the valued contributions made by my noble friends and noble Lords opposite during the Bill’s passage. It is particularly appropriate, following the sad news of his death late last week, that I express my sincere appreciation for the insightful contribution made by Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood at Second Reading. This was one of his last speeches in this place and I am sure that I speak for all noble Lords if I say that his passing is a great loss to this House.

While there has not been much common ground between these Benches and those opposite, I express my gratitude for the candid and courteous way in which the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Ponsonby, have engaged with me on the Bill. I also extend my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his Front-Bench colleagues for their clarity of message, albeit not one that I have been able to agree with.

Finally, I am duty bound to record my sincere gratitude for the invaluable help and assistance of my noble friends Lord Sharpe and Lord Davies and my noble and learned friends Lord Bellamy and Lord Stewart. I put on record my particular thanks to the excellent Bill manager, Mr Charles Goldie, and thank Gurveer Dhami, the deputy Bill manager, the whole of the Bill team, my private office staff and the officials and lawyers in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice who have provided excellent support, along with the first-class drafting of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.

As I have indicated, I suspect it will be an unusually short time before we are debating these matters again, but for now I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, we have a short time before this Bill comes back and I would like to take this opportunity to say to my noble friend that the Bill has been significantly altered and, in the view of many of us, generously improved in your Lordships’ House.

My noble friend said some fairly strong words and, of course, he is fully entitled to do that but I urge that he discusses with his ministerial colleagues, particularly the Home Secretary, some of the speeches that have been made in this House and the underlying concern of those speeches—many of them made from this side of the House—that there is an absence of kindness, consideration and concern in the Bill that came before us at Second Reading.

The Bill has been improved. It has been made more human and more humane. If there is a particular thing that illustrates what I am trying to say—and it was raised earlier this afternoon, and I raised it myself in the gap when we debated the Windrush generation on Friday—it is that this incident of the painting out of murals designed only to amuse unaccompanied children sends out a message that, frankly, is not worthy of our country. I urge my noble friend to permeate his discussions on this Bill and his consideration with the Home Secretary as to which amendments can be amended, which can be accepted and which they feel they have to resist, with a recognition that it is the kindness and consideration of this country that have made it a great country. One has only to cite the Jews in the years before the war and the Ugandan Asians who came into this country 50 years ago, both enriching our communities.

Of course we cannot have boat people coming indiscriminately, but we must recognise that they are human beings, that they are individuals and that they are worthy of consideration as such. I implore my noble friend to enter some of that spirit into the discussions that he is shortly to have with the Home Secretary and his ministerial colleagues.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start on a sombre note and join other noble Lords and the Minister in paying tribute to Lord Brown, who will be sorely missed by us all. He spent many an hour in the tearoom and elsewhere trying to explain various legal niceties to me in a very calm and dignified way, always treating me with a respect and courtesy I am not sure I deserved. He was a truly remarkable man and a pleasant individual. He will be missed by us all, and it is very sad that he has left us.

I will start with some usual courtesies before I make a couple of comments. I thank the Minister for the briefings he gave us. We have fundamentally disagreed on certain things. We were not pleased about the lateness of the impact assessments, as my noble friend Lady Lister made clear. To be fair to the Minister, even when we have fundamentally disagreed, he has always tried to brief me with respect to the Bill, and I am grateful for that. I thank his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for being similarly available whenever needed with respect to the Bill. Again, we disagreed on various things, but I appreciated his courtesy and help. I would be grateful if he could pass on my thanks to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Bellamy and Lord Stewart, who at different times contributed to the Bill. I have to mention the Government Whip, who sat there all the way through with his normal face, which was always interested and agreeable. It was a pleasure to talk to him, if no one else at times. I also thank the Minister’s officials, who have been really helpful.

My noble friend Lord Ponsonby is always a welcome contrast to my calm and unexcitable demeanour. He generates the rhetoric, drive and passion that I sometimes lack, and I am grateful for him encouraging me to have a bit more zeal at times—but seriously, it is good to have him alongside me. I am grateful to the officials in our office, Dan Stevens and Clare Scally, who have been very helpful, and my Back-Bench colleagues—I am always a bit nervous about this; it is like being at a wedding when you forget the aunt at the back—particularly my noble friends Lady Chakrabarti, Lord Dubs, Lady Lister, Lord Bach, Lord Cashman and Lord Hunt, and many others, for their support and help as the Bill has gone through. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and his team for their co-operation, and Peers from across the House, some from unexpected quarters, who rang me to ask about different things. It has been a pleasure to work with them.

I want to start with some related points, including the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Having said what I said about the Minister, a couple of the things he said at the beginning were disappointing. There may have been times when some have thought it the right thing to do but, generally speaking, this House has not sought to block the Bill. It has recognised that the Commons has a right to pass its legislation. However, many in this House feel that the payback for that—for want of a better way of putting it—is that the other place has to respect that this place has a constitutional role to play as well. We will not be intimidated or made to back off from passing amendments that we think are important, or from saying where we think the Government have got it wrong.

I have been in government; it is hugely irritating to a Government to have this happen, but it sometimes works, in that better legislation is passed. If two and two does not make four, there is a problem. On a Bill as controversial and difficult as this, it is only right that large numbers of amendments be passed. It is only right to ask the other place—as a number of Peers have done—to give due consideration, in proper time, to the amendments we have passed and to adapt and make changes.

To be frank, it is difficult to know exactly what we should think about what will happen tomorrow, given that the only briefing we have had has gone to the newspapers and the media, telling us what to expect in the amendments to be published tomorrow or later today. Some may be things that we could agree to. Many in this place, including me, and a number of Members in the other place, will say that it cannot be right that journalists are ringing to ask your opinion, when you have no idea about it. They ask why you cannot comment and you have to say, “Well, I don’t know what the Government are suggesting”. That cannot be right, and it needs to be looked at.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a passionate point. Sometimes, if a Government get something wrong, as they have with the murals at the detention centre, the right thing to do is to stand up and say that it should not have happened and they will make sure it does not happen again.

As part of our co-operation and work together, the Minister organised a trip to Dover and to Western Jet Foil for my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and myself. My noble friend and I went to the facility with the mural, where Mickey Mouse was painted on the wall. There was nothing offensive about it—nothing at all that anybody could take offence at. All it did was provide comfort and a sense of belonging to children in a desperate situation, which, presumably, is why somebody painted it. They did not paint it out of badness, or to make a political point or embarrass the Government. This was simply a human being, no doubt as an act of kindness, painting something on the wall to comfort children in a desperate situation.

In addition to the Minister’s response being wrong and disappointing, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, made the point he made—he will correct me if I am wrong—in order to show that that attitude cannot prevail when considering the other amendments we have sent to another place, where they are generally dismissed out of hand. The Government may have given way on four, five or six—we do not know—but the 20 or so amendments sent there deserve proper consideration. If the Government object to them, they will need to give a proper explanation. Underlying what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, that is what we are asking for.

This place deserves its proper position within the functioning of the constitution of this country. If it does not have that, the consequence will be poorer legislation. In respect of an Illegal Migration Bill that is so controversial, the impact will be on innocent people, including children, who do not deserve it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I will not address all the speeches, but I can certainly say that I agree with parts of almost all of them. Of course, noble Lords are entirely right that I and the department should think deeply about the amendments proposed, and we will. It is clear that there will be some changes, and I hope to work with noble Lords on that in due course.

Without Lord Brown, this House is very much a lesser place, and I am glad that we had an opportunity to reflect on that today.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 12th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 1, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 1A.

1A: Because it is unnecessary, as the Bill does not require any act or omission that conflicts with the obligations of the United Kingdom under the European Convention of Human Rights or other listed international instruments, and it would undermine the UK’s dualist legal system.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Motion A, I will, with the leave of the House, also speak to Motions D, S, T, U and V.

The Lords amendments do significant damage to the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Bill will only prevent and deter illegal migration if persons who meet the conditions in Clause 2 are swiftly returned to their home country or removed to a safe third country. For that to happen, we must end the cycle of late, repeated and spurious legal challenges. The Lords amendments will perpetuate that cycle.

Motion A relates to Lords Amendment 1, which would replace Clause 1 with a new clause that sets out that nothing in the Act shall

“require any act or omission that conflicts with the obligations of the United Kingdom under”

the five international agreements specified in the amendment.

As I have set out throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government take their international obligations, including under the ECHR, very seriously, and there is nothing in the Bill that requires any act or omission that conflicts with the UK’s international obligations. The only way to break the business model of the criminal gangs and to deter illegal migrants is if it is abundantly clear that the only outcome of illegal entry is not a new life in the UK. Therefore, it is essential that we take bold steps. Although some of the provisions in the Bill are novel, the Government are satisfied that the Bill can be implemented in line with convention rights.

As my noble friend Lord Wolfson set out on Report, Lords Amendment 1 is also objectionable from a constitutional perspective. In the United Kingdom, we follow a dualist approach, whereby international law is integrated into domestic law solely through parliamentary legislation. The Government are often criticised for rushing legislation and not allowing adequate scrutiny. Here, the tables are turned. Amendment 1 has profound and wide-ranging implications. It should not be shoehorned into this Bill without proper consideration of its consequences and an opportunity for Parliament properly to scrutinise the significance of such a step. If a future Government want to incorporate into domestic law the refugee convention or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, it is open for them to do so, but that would be a significant legislative undertaking and a profound change to our domestic legal landscape. Amendment 1 is not the way to do it.

I turn to Motion S and Amendments 74B and 74C from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, which relate to the meaning of serious and irreversible harm. Serious harm suspensive claims recognise that there may be a clear reason as to why a person cannot be removed to a particular third country specified in the removal notice, while any human rights claim in respect of a removal—or related judicial review, if that took place following removal—is resolved. These claims must be based on the fact that the person would face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed for such a temporary period. This test reflects the approach and terms on which the European Court of Human Rights may decide to indicate interim measures under Rule 39 of their rules of court. It is fitting that we use it here in an analogous situation.

We also continue to believe that it is helpful to decision- makers and the courts to set out in the Bill specific examples of harm that do not, or are unlikely to, constitute serious and irreversible harm. This will ensure a consistent approach in the determination of claims by the Home Office and appeals by the Upper Tribunal. That said, we have reflected on the debates on these clauses in this House and revisited the recommendations from the Constitution Committee. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his time in discussing his concerns. As a result, we have brought forward an amendment in lieu which limits the power by regulations to amend the meaning of serious and irreversible harm, such that the power cannot be used to remove the existing examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm.

I reiterate two points made by my noble friend Lord Stewart on Report. First, Clause 38 makes it clear that persecution and onward refoulement are examples of harm which constitute serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of a suspensive claim. Secondly, if the open expression of a person’s sexual orientation would prevent them living in a specified third country for the relevant period without being at real risk of serious and irreversible harm, they would meet the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim, in line with the principles set out by the Supreme Court in the case of HJ (Iran). With these assurances and the amendment in lieu, I hope that I have been able to address the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and he would feel able to support Motion S.

In relation to Motions T and U, we remain firmly of the view that it is right to place limitations on judicial review challenges to removal. We are not preventing such challenges but saying that they should not suspend removal. The Bill includes bespoke provisions for removal condition suspensive claims and serious harm suspensive claims, which themselves afford appropriate opportunities for a person to challenge their removal before it takes place. Given these remedies, it is entirely appropriate that other legal challenges should be non-suspensive.

Finally, in relation to Motion V, I again reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that the Bill, in enabling a court to overturn an age assessment decision on the basis that it is wrong in law, already covers challenges based on Wednesbury unreasonableness. It therefore follows that Lords Amendment 95 is not needed.

The House of Commons has disagreed with Lords Amendments 1, 73, 90, 93 and 95 by strong majorities in each case. It has proposed Amendment 74A in lieu of Lords Amendments 73 and 74, which addresses one of the key concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I therefore invite the House to agree the government Motions in this group. I beg to move.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

Moved by

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s Motion A1 and the various provisions that follow from it. Without getting into the legal arguments that have just been articulated by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Etherton, I support the fact that the key words are the first few words, in particular to try to deal with the criticism that was made of the previous amendment.

The only point I would add is that it is important for us to have something like this in the Bill given the criticism, concern and questions that have been raised about the Bill by many well-respected international organisations, bodies and individuals. We all expect something to be done about the challenge that we face, but we want it done in a way which enhances our international reputation and conforms to the various international treaties and our responsibilities. That is why Motion A1 is particularly important and should be supported.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the House for the dispatch this group has been dealt with and for the contributions from across the Chamber. It will come as no surprise to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that I disagree with her interpretation and agree with that of my noble friend Lord Wolfson. Frankly, if one looks at Amendment 1B, one can see that “regard” must be read alongside “intended to comply”, so this revised amendment is equally problematic. The point my noble friend Lord Wolfson made is entirely right: it amounts to an acceptance that the earlier version of the amendment would also have been a very significant constitutional innovation, predicated on the back of an amendment to the Bill and a massive change to our constitutional framework. I am afraid that I therefore disagree with the noble Baroness and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on Amendment 1B.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 2, 12, 20 and 22 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 22A to 22Q in lieu.

22A: Clause 2, page 3, line 26, leave out “7 March 2023” and insert “the day on which this Act is passed”

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22Q: Clause 66, page 65, line 41, at end insert—
“(za) section (Amendment of date in section 2(3) etc) (amendment of date in section 2(3) etc);”

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Motions F and G.

Motion B deals with the retrospective application of the duty to make arrangements for removal. We have reflected on the arguments put forward on this issue by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on Report. We have brought forward Amendments 22A and 22Q in lieu. Noble Lords will recall that the Lords amendments sought to move the operative date of the Clause 2 duty from 7 March this year to the date of that clause’s commencement. We believe that such a change carries a significant risk of there being a surge in channel crossings—a fire sale, if you will—as we approach the commencement date. To guard against this, the amendments in lieu instead provide for the duty to remove to apply to a person who enters the United Kingdom unlawfully from the date of this Bill’s Royal Assent.

We will keep this under review ahead of the Bill’s implementation, as we have included a reserve power to change the new operative date by regulations. This could, for example, enable us to focus the initial implementation of the Bill on those who arrived here illegally via small boats rather than by other means. I should stress that the 7 March date will continue to apply for the purpose of the power conferred on the Secretary of State to provide accommodation for unaccompanied children and for the purpose of the ban on re-entry, settlement and citizenship. I trust that this compromise approach will meet with the approval of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

Motion F relates to Lords Amendment 9, moved on Report by the noble Lord, Lord German. This relates to the issue of the inadmissibility of asylum and human rights claims within the UK system. It remains the Government’s contention that declaring such claims to be admissible is a core part of the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Court of Appeal unanimously confirmed that removing asylum seekers to a safe country for their asylum claims to be processed is entirely consistent with the refugee convention, including Article 31—a point that I mentioned a moment ago. This amendment would simply encourage people to game the system, drawing things out in an attempt to reach a six-month cut-off date. This amendment was rejected by the Commons by a strong majority of 76. Given that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord German, will be content to agree to Motion F.

Finally, Motion G relates to Lords Amendment 23, put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. The United Kingdom is a stout defender of LGBT communities across the globe. Our commitment to this cause remains unwavering. So, although I understand and sympathise with the noble and learned Lord’s desire to protect LGBT people who would face persecution were they to be sent to one of the countries listed in the amendment, I remain strongly of the view that the amendment is unnecessary as the Bill already delivers the protections that he seeks.

We are committed to the principle of non-refoulement, as a Jamaican national who makes a protection claim will not be returned to Jamaica. Were they to be fearful of being at real risk of suffering serious and irreversible harm, and were they to be removed to a specified third country, they would be able to make a serious harm suspensive claim. As I have previously indicated, in considering such a claim, the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of HJ (Iran) would be applied such that if the open expression of a person’s sexual orientation would prevent them from living in the specified third country without being at real risk of serious and irreversible harm, they would meet the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim.

I hope the noble and learned Lord has been able to reflect on my assurances and on the outcome of the vote yesterday in the other place, and that he now feels able to support Motion G. I beg to move.

Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Moved by

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 22R as an amendment to Amendment 22B—

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Motion C

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

Moved by

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 6, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 65A.

65A: Because it is necessary on grounds of public order to disapply protections for potential victims of modern slavery temporarily in response to the current scale of illegal migration.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak also to Motions H, P and Q. It remains the Government’s view that there are clear opportunities to misuse our modern slavery protections. The amendments agreed by your Lordships’ House on Report would severely undermine and in some cases prevent the Government from being able to prevent potential misuse and effectively tackle the crisis of illegal entry.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the scheme provided for in the Bill will succeed in preventing and deterring illegal migration into the UK only if we can swiftly remove illegal entrants either to their home country or to a safe third country. Having to wait more than 500 days for a conclusive grounds decision is not swift by any stretch of the imagination.

While it remains the case that the Government cannot support any of the amendments to which these Motions relate, I recognise the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Randall and others about the impact of the Bill on those who are exploited in the United Kingdom. It is worth reminding this House that these provisions will not affect potential victims of modern slavery referred into the national referral mechanism who are British nationals and nor will they impact unaccompanied children under the age of 18 or those who lawfully entered the UK and subsequently overstayed. Additionally, changes to the Bill agreed in the other place mean that the retrospective application of the duty to remove will be applicable only from Royal Assent, removing a significant cohort from the reach of these time-limited provisions.

Furthermore, this change reduces the likelihood of individuals in this cohort being exploited in the UK, given that they are more likely to be in detention rather than out in the community. None the less, the Government recognise the importance of enabling potential victims of modern slavery to co-operate with law enforcement to ensure successful prosecutions.

We are committed to stamping out human trafficking and to bringing criminal gangs to justice, including those who commit offences in the United Kingdom. That is why, alongside our pre-existing exception, which allows victims to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation where necessary, we will provide in statutory guidance that an individual who has arrived in the UK illegally and has a positive reasonable grounds decision based on an incident that has taken place in the United Kingdom will be afforded 30 days from this positive decision to confirm that they will co-operate with an investigation in relation to their exploitation. They will not be removed within this period, which affords them protection equivalent with those set out in ECAT. Should they continue to co-operate with such an investigation, they will continue to be entitled to the support and protections of the NRM. Given this, I do not see the need for my noble friend’s Amendment 56, or for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, Amendment 57.

I hope I have been able to reassure my noble friend Lord Randall and other noble Lords as to how these provisions will apply and operate. We expect that relatively few of those subject to the duty in Clause 2 will be potential victims of modern slavery whose exploitation took place in the UK, and for those potential victims, our statutory guidance will make it clear that they can continue to access support where they are co-operating with an investigation.

On this basis, and in view of the votes in the other place to disagree with Amendments 6 and 56, I invite the House to agree the government Motions. I beg to move.

Motion C1 (as an amendment to Motion C)

Moved by

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hunt for moving his amendments in a concise and informed way and for putting before the House the importance of the Modern Slavery Act and defending its principles.

I draw attention to Motion P1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Randall, which is particularly important as it seeks to protect victims of modern slavery exploited in the UK. Although the Minister pointed to the protection the Government may give to British citizens, some of the exploited people the noble Lord, Lord Randall, referred to would not be British citizens and would therefore be out of scope.

It is worth spending a minute considering that we as a Parliament are here tonight reflecting on what was one of the finest achievements of the last Conservative Government and one of the proudest achievements of a former Conservative Prime Minister. I stand here as a proud Labour politician saying that. It was one of the reasons why our country was regarded as a world leader by countries across the world, and it was brought about by the actions of a Conservative Government.

When you read the speeches of not only a former leader, Iain Duncan Smith MP, but a former Prime Minister, it is no wonder that the latter is incredulous that her own party and Government would seek, as she says, to undermine completely an Act of which everyone was proud, including most Conservatives. I find it astonishing that the Government Front Benches of this House and the other place should simply sweep her views aside, almost as though they are the rantings of a failed person who is no longer relevant. She deserves greater respect than that, and to be recognised for what she achieved. I think I am right in saying that it was the first such legislation in the world. It was blown away not by a vindictive Labour Government but by her own Conservative Government, who have somehow just brushed it aside.

The noble Lord, Lord Randall, does us a huge service in bringing forward an amendment that I hope has the support of many of your Lordships, from all sides, and which tries to protect something of that achievement, that triumph, of a previous Conservative Government. In doing that, he gives us the opportunity to mark with great respect that achievement and work of a previous Conservative Government and Prime Minister.

I hope that the noble Lord will test the opinion of the House and that noble Lords will see fit to support the amendment in very large numbers, so that when it goes back to the other place they will think again about what they have done.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the House for the dispatch with which the speeches on this group have been dealt with. To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on just one point, clearly, we do not agree and I am afraid that I cannot accept his amendment. On the statistic that he cited, I simply say that that statistic demonstrates the problem we face when we seek to remove people. Such statistics relate to people who were in detention and it was those in detention who, at a massively increased rate, sought to claim to be victims of modern slavery in order, I suggest to Members of this House, to defer their removal.

For that reason, I must stress to the House that the proposed amendment would blow a hole in this scheme, and I am afraid we cannot accept my noble friend Lord Randall’s amendment, as supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. There are too many opportunities to misuse the provisions in the Modern Slavery Act, with allegations of modern slavery being made by those entering the country illegally. I entirely take on board what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has said about the triumph of the Modern Slavery Act, and I remind the House that it remains in force in relation to victims of modern slavery who are within Britain and are British citizens. These provisions are protected in Clause 21 by a sunset provision. These are emergency measures to deal with an emergency, and for those reasons I cannot accept the amendments.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, it is tempting to respond in detail to the Minister, but obviously I will not do it. What is so striking is how little confidence he has in the department he and his Ministers run to administer a system they have legislated for. It is deeply disappointing, but I beg leave to withdraw Motion C1.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 7, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 7A.

7A: Because, as the Bill provides for two classes of suspensive claims, with a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, it is appropriate that any application for judicial review does not suspend removal.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion D. I beg to move.

Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 8, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 8A.

8A: Because unaccompanied children will be removed only in the limited circumstances set out in clause 3(3) or once they turn 18 and will be able to challenge their removal by making a serious harm suspensive claim.

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[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment to the Motion is about the rights of children, giving them their entitlement to claim asylum, which would be declared inadmissible under the provisions of the Bill. We have talked about children a great deal; indeed, concerns about children run right through many of the debates we have had and many of the other amendments. My point is that any child who arrives in this country, even if not by legally approved means, should still not lose their right to claim asylum. If, for example, a child in Calais with family in this country, not finding any legal method, gets here and uses, unfortunately, these nasty people traffickers, all I would say is that surely we should not deny that child the right to come to this country and claim asylum here; or, having got to this country, to claim asylum here. It is a very simple proposition.

As I understand it, in most instances they will not be removed from this country until they are 18, but at that point they will be removed. This seems to me a very harsh provision, penalising some of the most vulnerable asylum seekers that there can be: children.

There are two other amendments to Motions to do with children, Motion J1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, and Motion K1 in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. Both are good and both are concerned with the length of time that a child might have to stay in detention. They seek to limit that to fewer days and I shall want to support them both. They do not go as far as my Motion E1, which is much more comprehensive and a much better way of protecting the rights of children. However, we have to be realistic and I shall certainly give my full support to Motions J1 and K1.

I have thought about this at length and had quite detailed discussions with my colleagues. The point is that we, of course, want to support Motions that have the best chance of making the Commons think again. I was persuaded that the Motions in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester probably have a better chance of making the Commons think again than something coming from me, even if my Motion is, with all due respect, better. I therefore feel that the right thing to do is to support a Motion tabled by a Conservative and a Member from the Bishops’ Bench, because they are more likely to persuade the Government. They do not have to persuade the Minister but they are more likely to persuade Members of the Commons. It is in that spirit that I have spoken to Motion E1, but I shall in due course be very keen to support the Motions I have referred to. I will not therefore press Motion E1 to a vote, but I shall certainly vote for the other Motions.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as ever, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, was ahead of me, and clearly I should address the amendments in this group. I have already moved Motion E, which is:

“That this House do not insist on its Amendment 8.”


With the leave of the House, I shall speak also to Motions J, K, L, M and N.

The Government have considered carefully the concerns raised in your Lordships’ House about the detention of unaccompanied children and pregnant women. We recognise the sensitivities around the detention of these cohorts and, accordingly, the Government have brought forward amendments in lieu, to which the Commons has agreed.

Regarding the detention of pregnant women, Amendments 38A to 38E are wholly in line with those tabled on Report by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my noble friend Lady Sugg. These amendments preserve the existing 72-hour time limit on the detention of pregnant women. As now, this 72-hour time limit would be extendable to an absolute maximum of one week, provided there is ministerial authorisation in place for the extension. It is important to note that, as per the existing Section 60 provision, this time limit will apply only where an immigration officer or the Secretary of State, as the case may be, is satisfied that the woman is pregnant. I trust that these amendments will be welcomed on all sides of the House.

On the detention of unaccompanied children, the challenge we received in the House of Commons was that in enabling a person to apply for First-tier Tribunal immigration bail after 28 days of detention, the Bill did not differentiate between adults and unaccompanied children, and there needed to be judicial oversight of the detention of unaccompanied children much earlier in the process. Amendments 36A and 36B, agreed by the Commons, do just that. They enable the First-tier Tribunal to review the detention of an unaccompanied child after eight days, where the detention is for the purposes of removal. The eight-day period aligns with the existing framework governing immigration bail for those detained at ports and the eight-day period for making a suspensive claim under the Bill.

I again assure my noble friend Lady Mobarik and other noble Lords that any period of detention for unaccompanied children will be the shortest possible. Where there is doubt that a person is indeed aged under 18, as they claim to be, they will be treated as a child while an age assessment is undertaken. Such a person will be detained in age-appropriate accommodation, as the law already provides. This is provided for by the Detention Centre Rules 2001, made under Section 153 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Rule 11 provides:

“Detained persons aged under 18 and families will be provided with accommodation suitable to their needs”.


If no such accommodation is available, an unaccompanied child will not be detained and will be transferred to a local authority instead as soon as possible. I hope this provides the assurances that my noble friend has been seeking.

The Commons has proposed no change to the Bill in response to my noble friend’s Amendment 33, which relates to the detention of families. We believe this amendment would put children at risk, as well as significantly weakening our ability to remove people from the UK, in accordance with the duty provided for in Clause 2. Such a change would incentivise unscrupulous individuals to co-opt unaccompanied children into a bogus family unit to escape detention. This presents very real safeguarding risks for those children. I hope my noble friend, having secured an important change to the Bill in respect of the detention of unaccompanied children, will be content not to pursue her Amendment 33 any further.

I turn to Motion M and the amendments originally tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which sought to reinstate the existing Hardial Singh principles. Here again the Commons has agreed with the Government that the changes should be made to the existing legislation and that Clause 11 should stand. The Hardial Singh principles provide, among other things, that a person may be detained only for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances and that if, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Home Secretary will not be able to examine, effect removal or grant leave within a reasonable period, that person’s detention should not continue. The Government continue to take the view that it is for the Home Secretary, not the courts, to decide such matters as she will be in full possession of the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in all the circumstances. As I say, the Commons has endorsed this approach, and I hope that the noble Lord, having achieved some significant changes to other aspects of the Bill, will be content to agree Motion M.

Motion N relates to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham’s Amendment 50 to Clause 16. This relates to the Secretary of State’s power to direct a local authority in England to cease accommodating an unaccompanied child and to transfer the child into Home Office-provided accommodation. The amendment would limit the power such that it can be exercised only where the transfer would be in the best interests of the child.

We all accept that the best interests of the child is a very important consideration. That is why the Secretary of State is already required, under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising her immigration functions. In exercising the power in Clause 16, the Home Office will continue to comply with the Section 55 duty. I should also emphasise again that we expect to exercise the power in Clause 16 in only limited circumstances —for example, in advance of returning an unaccompanied child to a parent in their home country.

Finally, I can deal briefly with Motion E, given that this covers similar ground to Motion F, which we have already debated. As I said, it remains the Government’s contention that declaring such claims to be inadmissible is a core part of the scheme provided for in the Bill. The Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, would incentivise the people smugglers to prioritise young people, putting more lives at risk and splitting families. I am sure that the noble Lord would not wish to see this.

The Government have listened to the concerns raised by noble Lords about the Bill’s provisions relating to detention and the Commons has agreed significant changes. I hope, on this basis, that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, my noble friend Lady Mobarik and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester would be content to agree Motions J, K and L. Where the Commons has disagreed with your Lordships’ amendments to Clauses 4, 11 and 16, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord Carlile, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester will be minded to accept that verdict and agree Motions E, M and N.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for his support for my Motion K1, even though I suspect we would both prefer his stronger Motion. I also welcome the government amendments that would allow an unaccompanied child to seek bail after eight days if they have been detained for removal.

I struggle to see why similar rules should not apply to all children. Hence, Motion K1 seeks to rectify the unreasoned omission of children who are with their families. It proposes a 24-hour extension to the current statutory 72-hour time limit for detention of children with families. Hence, the detention of these children would not be indefinite but be for no more than 96 hours or, if a Minister personally approved it, for no more than seven days. This seems a fair and reasonable change and I urge the Government to seriously reflect on it. I really cannot see that it is morally justified not to have equal provisions for children with families and those who are alone; one child is not different from another.

It remains the fact that the institutional nature of detention affects both the physical and mental development of the child and leads to their significant emotional and psychological regression. These impacts, which were witnessed often in children prior to 2010, were not limited to unaccompanied children. All children suffered under a regime which this Government are now proposing to reintroduce without limit for unaccompanied children. I cannot accept that it is right to be prepared to lock up these children for an indefinite period, simply because they happen to arrive with families, when we know the grave consequences. The evidence has not changed. How can it now suddenly be tolerable?

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and I thank my noble friend Lord Dubs for the way that he introduced his amendment to Motion E. He has been extremely practical and political, if I may use that word, in the way that he proposes to deal with the suite of amendments in this group. I agree with him that the two Motions in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, Motions J1 and K1, stand the best chance of making the House of Commons think again. On that basis, from these Benches we will be supporting the noble Baroness and the right reverend Prelate if they choose to put their Motions to a vote.

I want to comment briefly on the contributions of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. In a sense, they are talking from a local authority point of view. I too got the email from the Children’s Commissioner today; she is absolutely right to point to the jigsaw of child protection, which is very much overseen by local authorities. As she rightly pointed out, retrospectivity will apply to those children because that is the point which the Government did not concede on.

Responsibility is key to trying to resolve this as clearly as possible. We hope that the Minister will be able to say something clearer, but the real point is that if it is not, it will be resolved in the courts. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, made that point and it is a very fair one. I understand that the noble and learned Baroness will not be pressing her amendment to a vote. Nevertheless, the Minister should give as clear an explanation as possible of how this matter will be looked at. For the purposes of this group, we will support Motions J1 and K1.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the House for the contributions to this debate. I will focus, if I may, on three points and address first the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on aggregating detention periods. Noble Lords will recall that a question was asked whether the 72-hour limit for pregnant women could be evaded by detaining a pregnant woman first under the powers in the Bill, and then under the powers in the Immigration Act, or vice versa. From a practical point of view, any pregnant women subject to the Clause 2 duty would be detained under the new detention powers provided for in Clause 10. I assure the noble Baroness that we would not detain pregnant women under existing powers then switch to new detention powers, or vice versa, in order to double the detention period.

I thank my noble friend Lady Sugg for her kind remarks. I am gratified for the receipt from Members of the House for the position which we have arrived at in relation to pregnant women.

I turn to the issues raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for whom I have very great admiration. They were raised also by the noble Lords, Lord Scriven and Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lady Berridge in relation to Motion N1.

Amendment 50B would afford local authorities influence over whether the Home Secretary can utilise her powers. I am afraid we do not agree that her powers should be fettered in this way if a local authority simply does not consent. It would also create additional decision-making burdens for local authorities and could have unintended consequences—for example, if local authorities faced legal challenges in respect of their decisions. The Home Office, of course, already works closely with local authorities on matters concerning unaccompanied children and will continue to do so.

I turn to the question raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and Motion N2. The Home Office considers that Amendment 50C, tabled by the right reverend Prelate, is unnecessary. That is so because of Section 55 of the 2009 Act, which already requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the interests of children as a primary factor in immigration decisions affecting them. I assure the House that, in making decisions and in devising policy guidance under the Bill, the Home Office will continue to comply with the Section 55 duty.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord German, and my noble friend Lady Berridge, the Home Office does not have, and therefore, for clarity, cannot discharge, duties under Part III of the Children Act 1989. It is for the local authority where an unaccompanied child is located to consider its duties under the Children Act 1989. There is nothing in the Bill which changes this position and local authorities will be expected to meet their statutory obligations to unaccompanied children from the date of arrival. The relevant duties under the Children Act 1989 sit with the local authority in which the young person is physically present. Accommodation of unaccompanied children by the Home Office does not change the obligations of any local authority in respect of assessment and the provision of services and support, including, where appropriate, suitable accommodation.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed. They have covered a number of aspects, all under the heading of this debate. I am not persuaded by the Minister’s arguments that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, are not totally right in what they are saying. I very much hope the Minister will say something more positive to support them.

I have already indicated that I do not wish to press Motion E1, and I beg leave to withdraw it.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 9, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 9A.

9A: Because the Amendment is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion F. I beg to move.

Motion F1 (as an amendment to Motion F)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 23, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 23A.

23A: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as an LGBT person who is a national of a country specified in the Amendment and who makes a protection claim will not be returned to their home country and can make a serious harm suspensive claim in the event that it is proposed to remove them to a safe third country.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion G. I beg to move.

Motion G1 (as an amendment to Motion G)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 30, 32 and 34, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 34A.

34A: Because it is necessary to ensure that the National Referral Mechanism is not used as a loophole by persons arriving illegally to make false claims to avoid being detained in or removed from the United Kingdom and that persons subject to the clause 2 duty may be detained in order to facilitate their swift removal from the UK.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion H.

Motion H1 not moved.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 31, 35 and 36 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 36A and 36B in lieu.

36A: Clause 12, page 21, leave out lines 16 to 23 and insert—
“(3A) A person who is being detained under paragraph 16(2C)(d)(iv) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 or section 62(2A)(d)(iv) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of unaccompanied child for purposes of removal) must not be granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal until after the earlier of—
(a) the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the person’s detention under any provision of paragraph 16(2C) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 or section 62(2A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 began, and
(b) the end of the period of 8 days beginning with the date on which the person’s detention under paragraph 16(2C)(d)(iv) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 or section 62(2A)(d)(iv) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 began.
(3B) A person who is being detained under—
(a) paragraph 16(2C)(a), (b), (c) or (d)(i) to (iii) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, or
(b) section 62(2A)(a), (b), (c) or (d)(i) to (iii) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, must not be granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal until after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the person’s detention under paragraph 16(2C) of that Schedule or section 62(2A) of that Act began.
(3C) Where a person is detained under a provision of the Immigration Act 1971 and then (without being released) under a provision of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, or vice versa, the periods referred to in sub-paragraphs (3A) and (3B) begin with the date on which the person was first detained under the relevant provisions of either of those Acts.”

36B: Clause 12, page 22, line 26, after “(3A),” insert “(3B),”

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion J.

Motion J1 (as an amendment to Motion J)

Moved by

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Motion K

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

Moved by

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 33, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 33A.

33A: Because the Amendment is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion K. I beg to move.

Motion K1 (as an amendment to Motion K)

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

Moved by

At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 33B to the words so restored to the Bill—

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 37 and 38 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 38A to 38E in lieu.

38A: Clause 10, page 14, line 37, at end insert—
“(2CA) But if the immigration officer is satisfied that a woman being detained under sub-paragraph (2C) is pregnant, then the woman may not be detained under that sub-paragraph for a period of—
(a) more than 72 hours from the relevant time, or
(b) more than seven days from the relevant time, in a case where the longer period of detention is authorised personally by a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975).
(2CB) A woman who has been released as a result of sub-paragraph (2CA) may be detained again under sub-paragraph (2C) in accordance with sub-paragraph (2CA).
(2CC) Where a woman being detained under sub-paragraph (2C) has previously been detained under section 62(2A) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and has not been released in between, the definition of “the relevant time” in sub-paragraph (2CD) is to be read as if paragraph (b) referred to the time when the woman was first detained under sub-paragraph (2C) or section 62(2A) of that Act.
(2CD) In sub-paragraphs (2CA) to (2CC)—
“the relevant time” means the later of—
(a) the time at which the immigration officer is first satisfied that the woman is pregnant, and
(b) the time at which the detention under sub-paragraph (2C) begins;
“woman” means a female of any age.”

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38E: Clause 11, page 19, line 27, at end insert—
“(aa) subsections (2AA) to (2AD) (limitation on detention of pregnant women);”

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion L. I beg to move.

Motion L agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 49A.

49A: Because it is properly a matter for the Secretary of State to determine whether continued detention of a person is reasonable in all the circumstances.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion M. I beg to move.

Motion M agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 50, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 50A.

50A: Because the Secretary of State will be required under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child when making a decision under clause 16(4).

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion N. I beg to move.

Motions N1 and N2 not moved.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 56, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 56A.

56A: Because the Bill already makes sufficient provision to enable a potential victim of modern slavery to remain in the UK where the Secretary of State considers it necessary for the person to do so for the purpose of cooperating with a public authority which is investigating their exploitation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion P. I beg to move.

Motion P1 (as an amendment to Motion P)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 57, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 57A.

57A: Because the Bill already makes sufficient provision to enable a potential victim of modern slavery to remain in the UK where the Secretary of State considers it necessary for the person to do so for the purpose of cooperating with a public authority which is investigating their exploitation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion Q. I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 66 and 67, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 67A.

67A: Because it is right that the Government is able withhold protections from all individuals who pose a threat to public order and because the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, as amended by this Bill, provides sufficient discretion in the disqualification decision process.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion R. I beg to move.

Motion R1 not moved.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 73 and 74 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 74A in lieu.

74A: Clause 39, page 42, line 32, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) may not amend subsection (4) of section 38 to remove any example of serious and irreversible harm which is listed in that subsection when this Act is passed.”

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion S. I beg to move.

Motion S1 not moved.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 90 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 90A, 90B and 90C to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendment 90.

90A: Page 53, line 40, after “court” insert “or tribunal”

90C: Page 54, line 7, after second “court” insert “or tribunal”

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion T. I beg to move.

Motion T1 (as an amendment to Motion T)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 93, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 93A.

93A: Because it is necessary to remove the right of appeal against an age assessment decision and to provide for any challenge by way of judicial review to be non-suspensive of removal in order to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion U. I beg to move.

Motion U1 not moved.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 95 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 95A and 95B in lieu.

95A: Clause 55, page 56, line 34, leave out from “may” to “was” and insert “grant relief only on the basis that the decision”

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion V. I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Murray of Blidworth Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 17th July 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 1B, 7B and 90D to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 90E.

90E: Because Amendment 1B is unnecessary, as the courts should have regard to the UK’s international legal obligations in interpreting legislation; because Amendment 7B is inappropriate because the Bill already provides for two classes of suspensive claims with a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, so an application for judicial review should not provide an additional route for suspending removal; and because Amendment 90D is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, before I get into the detail of the amendments, it is worth reiterating why we are here again debating this Bill late at night. The United Kingdom has a proud history of providing protection to those who genuinely need it through our safe and legal routes. The United Kingdom is one of the largest recipients of UNHCR-referred refugees globally, having resettled 28,000 through UNHCR resettlement schemes between 2015 and 2022. This places the United Kingdom second only to Sweden in Europe.

However, the volume of illegal small boat arrivals has overwhelmed our asylum system. We have a duty to house those arriving illegally, but that is now costing £6 million a day and £3.6 billion a year. With over 45,000 people making dangerous channel crossings last year, this is simply no longer sustainable. If people know there is no way for them to stay in the UK, they will not risk their lives and pay criminals thousands of pounds to arrive here illegally. It is therefore only right that we stop the boats and break the business model of the criminal gangs exploiting vulnerable people, ultimately enabling the Government to have greater capacity to provide a safe haven for those at risk of war and persecution.

We have spent many an hour debating these issues. That is, of course, as it should be, but your Lordships will have also seen that the elected House has today reconsidered amendments a second time, and by a significant majority disagreed with the Lords amendments. I suggest we therefore respect the will of the elected House and the British people by passing this Bill.

I turn to the amendments. As I have set out throughout the passage of the Bill, and as the Immigration Minister has set out in the other place, the Government take their international obligations, including under the European Convention on Human Rights, very seriously. There is nothing in the Bill that requires any act or omission that conflicts with the United Kingdom’s international obligations.

In her speech last week, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in referring to her revised amendment, talked of “softening its requirements”, but the words in Amendment 1B,

“and any acts and omissions made as a result”,

mean that it was not simply an interpretive clause. The effect of those words would be that these conventions would, in effect, be incorporated into our domestic law. A Lords amendment to a purported interpretation provision is not the right place to effect something so constitutionally significant.

Amendment 90F seeks to address this concern by substituting new wording, namely:

“In interpreting this Act, regard shall be given to the United Kingdom’s obligations under”


the various specified conventions. I suggest that the revised wording still presents the same challenges I outlined earlier. Either the new clause has substantive effect or it serves no purpose, and the noble Baroness’s intent is clearly the former.

On Amendment 90H, the Bill creates a bespoke suspensive claim and appeals process which will allow illegal migrants to make a suspensive claim if they consider that a mistake has been made in applying the duty, or if they would face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed to a third country. These are the only claims that should suspend removal, and limiting the ability of any other claims to prevent removal is necessary to deliver the essence of the Bill, ensuring that illegal entrants are promptly removed following the determination of any suspensive claim and appeal.

The Commons has now considered and rejected amendments similar to this on three occasions. It is time to restore the original Clause 1 to the Bill, with its clear statement of purpose: to avoid and deter unlawful migration, and to create certainty. It is time to respect the clearly expressed view of the elected House by endorsing Motion A. I beg to move.

Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)

Moved by

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s Motion A1. We believe it to be a very important Motion.

The only comment I will make in response to the Minister’s opening remarks on the passage of the Bill in the other place is this. We have always said that the Government have a right to get their legislation, but this place also has a right to put forward amendments and to ask for revisions and consideration. It does not help us to believe that this place receives proper consideration of its amendments when the Minister in the other place announced at the end of last week, even before proper consideration, that no concessions would be made with respect to what this House is proposing. That is not the way for business to be conducted. This place has a proper constitutional role to play, which includes sometimes saying to the Government that they should think again, and even sometimes saying it twice.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I simply cannot accept the proposition advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. As the House will remember from the last occasion, a court always has regard, if possible, to the international treaties binding the United Kingdom, as was made clear by Lord Dyson in the Supreme Court in the Assange case.

The noble Baroness’s amendment is simply unnecessary, and, in addition, it would have the effect of changing the constitutional relationship of our law and international law. I am afraid, therefore, that I cannot accept her proposed Motion. I invite noble Lords to vote against it in the event that it is not withdrawn.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords. I have moved Motion A1 and I ask noble Lords to approve it.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 9B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 9C.

9C: Because the Amendment is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Motion B that this House do not insist on its Amendment 9B to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 9C. I will also speak to Motions C, D and E.

Amendment 9B was rejected by the Commons for the second time earlier today by an increased majority. The elected House agrees that declaring asylum and certain human rights claims to be inadmissible is a core part of the scheme provided for in the Bill which must not be reversed. It is not a proportionate or considered amendment and simply creates a perverse incentive whereby people exploit every opportunity, including through protracted legal challenges facilitated by the early amendments, to reach the six-month point.

I note Amendment 9D has an additional provision, but this does not substantially change the effect of the earlier version of this amendment. Having debated this Bill for many hours, we will all be familiar with one of the key objectives of it—to remove illegal entrants in days and weeks, not months or years. That should be our start and end point. As such, this amendment is not only wrong but it is not needed.

I turn to Amendment 23B. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, suggested last week that the Government’s case against this amendment was simply to provide an assurance that,

“this will all come out in the wash”.—[Official Report, 12/7/23; col. 1826.]

There is rather more to it than that. The legislation is clear and affords the necessary protection for LGBT people fearful of persecution if they are removed to a particular country.

Throughout the debates in this House, I have been clear that it is simply not the case that anyone who meets the conditions in Clause 2 can be sent to any of the countries listed in Schedule 1 without further ado. The schedule needs to be read with the provisions in Clause 5, which determine whether a person can be returned to their home country, and with the provisions later in the Bill which enable a person to make a serious harm suspensive claim where they are being removed to a third country.

As to the noble and learned Lord’s point about Rwanda and the ongoing litigation, I point him to the terms of the Commons reason, which states that the amendment is not necessary

“because removal of any person to any country will only be done where the arrangements to do this are lawful”.

The Bill therefore already contains sufficient safeguards. This was recognised by the Commons when they voted for a second time to reject this amendment.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, are doughty defenders of LGBT rights, and I entirely understand their desire to get clarity and certainty on this issue. I believe that the Bill provides the necessary clarity, and on that basis, and in view of the further vote by the Commons to disagree with the amendment, I hope that the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord will now be content to support Motion C.

The detention powers in the Bill are fundamental to achieving its objectives. We need a robust scheme which broadly applies to all and does not allow the system to be gamed. The Bill is designed to be operated both quickly and fairly, and our aim is to ensure that people are not held in detention for longer than is absolutely necessary to effect their removal from the UK.

With regard to Amendment 33B and the detention of families for no more than 96 hours, or the new Amendment 33D, which sets a time limit of 120 hours, I put it to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol that these amendments risk creating a significant loophole in the system. We will see criminal gangs putting together fake family groups, more adults seeking to pass themselves off as children, and genuinely unaccompanied children being put at risk.

On Amendments 36C and 36D, I remind noble Lords that unaccompanied children are not subject to the duty to remove. The power to remove them in Clause 3 will be exercised only in limited circumstances. Therefore, for the most part, unaccompanied children will not be detained under the provisions of the Bill but will instead be quickly transferred to local authority accommodation.

Where an unaccompanied child is detained, this will be for the shortest possible time, in appropriate detention facilities and with relevant support provisions in place. Such a person will be detained in age-appropriate accommodation, as the law already provides. As I informed the House previously, this is already set out in the Detention Centre Rules 2001.

The elected House has now on three occasions endorsed the Government’s positions on the detention powers in the Bill. Indeed, the votes earlier today delivered increased majorities for the Government’s position. Your Lordships’ House should be under no illusion that the position would change if new Amendments 36E and 36F, which only marginally change the earlier amendments, were returned to the other place. I beg to move.

Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)

Moved by

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has asked me to give a short commentary. He did not put an amendment down, but he wanted me to say, first, that the Government have never denied that the specified countries in the Bill are unsafe for LGBT people, and that includes Rwanda. He also asked me to say that it is reasonable that there should be no removals to Rwanda so long as there is litigation in process, and that prohibition on removal in the case of countries facing a proposal of proceedings under Article 7 is right in principle and mirrors the existing provisions regarding return under Section 80A. He wanted me to make those points even though he has chosen not to table a further amendment.

We have heard all the movers of amendments give a full explanation of their amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, spoke about common humanity—I of course agree with that—and about trying to support people who will potentially be kept in limbo through this Bill. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave four examples of why she will be moving her amendment. The one that resonated most with me was her second point about needing to get an emergency protection order for a medical intervention for a child. As a family magistrate, I occasionally do those orders. I find it really quite shocking that, even for relatively routine orders, the Home Office would have to go to court to get a medical intervention. She made other points as well but that is the one that particularly resonated with me.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol introduced her amendment about a time limit of 120 hours, or up to seven days when authorised by a Minister; we will support the right reverend Prelate should she choose to move to a vote.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, His Majesty’s Government cannot accept any of the proposed amendments. I shall deal first with the matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, in relation to his Motion B1 and his amendment concerning a proposed subsection (3C) where subsection (3) would not apply

“if the reason that the person has not been removed from the United Kingdom can be attributed to the actions of that person”.

I suggest that that phrase would generate a tidal wave of litigation were this amendment to be accepted. It would make the statute wholly uncertain and, I suggest, open a very large loophole in the scheme of the Bill.

I turn to the points raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol in relation to the provisions concerning the responsibility in respect of children. I can reassure both the noble and learned Baroness and the right reverend Prelate that we are working closely with DfE on the implementation of this Bill, but I am afraid that I cannot accept the other propositions that they advanced.

Finally, in response to the noble Lord, Lord German, it is not our intention to “lock up children”, as he put it, under this Bill. It is our intention to have the power to do so should that be necessary in very rare circumstances. For those reasons, I invite the House to reject these amendments in the event that they are not withdrawn.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

The Minister said at the outset that Motion B1 contained no substantive change. He has now asserted that it contains a change that would be unworkable, wrecking and mammoth. He ought to make up his mind; but I hope the House’s mind is made up that we are not prepared to see sine die incarceration. I ask to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 23B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 23C.

23C: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as an LGBT person who is a national of a country specified in the Amendment and who makes a protection claim will not be returned to their home country and can make a serious harm suspensive claim in the event that it is proposed to remove them to a safe third country, and because removal of any person to any country will only be done where the arrangements to do this are lawful.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments 36A and 36B; and do not insist on its Amendments 36C and 36D.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion D. I beg to move.

Motion D1 (as an amendment to Motion D)

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 33B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 33C.

33C: Because the Amendment is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion E. I beg to move.

Motion E1 (as an amendment to Motion E)

Tabled by

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 56B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 56C.

56C: Because the Bill already makes sufficient provision to enable a potential victim of modern slavery to remain in the UK where the Secretary of State considers it necessary for the person to do so for the purpose of cooperating with a public authority which is investigating their exploitation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Motion F, I shall speak also to Motions G, H and J. As regards Amendment 56B, this Bill provides an important exception to the application of the public order disqualification where it is necessary for a potential victim of modern slavery to remain in the United Kingdom for the purpose of co-operating with a law enforcement agency in connection with the investigation of their exploitation.

While there is indeed a presumption that it is not necessary for such co-operation to take place within the United Kingdom, the presumption does not apply where there are compelling circumstances to the contrary. In deciding whether there are such compelling circumstances, caseworkers will be guided by statutory guidance, and we are committed to such guidance having particular regard to persons believed to have been victims of slavery or human trafficking in the United Kingdom. Noble Lords will therefore appreciate that this guidance will effectively achieve the aims set out in this amendment.

The guidance will be published ahead of commencement of the relevant provisions of the Act. Statutory guidance assists decision-makers by providing them with detailed information and examples to consider when making judgments. It allows for flexibility in its implementation, which can be adapted to different situations while still adhering to the overarching legal framework, and plays an important role in supporting the interpretation and application of legislation. My noble friend and I are therefore of a similar mind as to the support offered to victims of exploitation that takes place in the UK. The Government’s view is that statutory guidance is the appropriate way to achieve this aim.

Amendment 103B seeks to confer an explicit statutory function on the National Crime Agency to combat organised immigration crime connected to illegal entry into the United Kingdom via the channel. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will be fully aware, the NCA’s functions already extend to combating all types of organised crime, including organised immigration crime. Following the pledge made by the Prime Minister last December to stop the dangerous small boat crossings, the Government have doubled the funding for the next two years for the multiagency organised immigration crime task force, of which the National Crime Agency is a leading component. Our determination to tackle the criminal gangs that facilitate the channel crossings is not in doubt. It remains the case that this amendment is not needed.

We have debated at length what the Government are doing, and by when, to establish additional safe and legal routes. Therefore, in response to Amendment 102B, I will simply repeat what my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart set out last week. These commitments are on behalf of His Majesty’s Government and not just an individual Minister. I therefore hope that this amendment will not be pursued.

Finally, returning to the amendment proposed by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, I remain wholly sympathetic to the need for an holistic approach and action in dealing with large-scale displacement crises and the abhorrent crimes of modern slavery and human trafficking. We work relentlessly to identify victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, delivering personalised, needs-based support and assisting recovery to rebuild lives for some of the most vulnerable in our society. Alongside this, we collaborate with a wide range of domestic and international partners to enhance awareness of modern slavery and human trafficking, bolster resilience and minimise opportunity for exploitation, supporting our ability to take a long-term approach to this issue.

The Government have already embedded actions to tackle refugee crises through existing cross-government strategies, including the international development strategy and the humanitarian framework. Much of this work has effectively and appropriately been spearheaded by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office due to its focus beyond our borders. We also continue to collaborate with state and non-state actors, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organisations. As noble Lords will be aware, the UNHCR has a global mandate to protect and safeguard the rights of refugees. We will continue to work with the UNHCR, as we have done many times before, to respond to displacement crises globally and offer safe and legal routes to protection in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, we have played a key role in intergovernmental processes that have shaped the way the international community responds to displacement crises, such as through the Global Compact on Refugees adopted by the international community in 2018. We continue to work to find durable solutions for refugees with like-minded international partners.

I agree with many of the points made previously on the Bill by the most reverend Primate and other noble Lords. I wholeheartedly recognise the importance of addressing the underlying drivers and taking a long-term approach to tackle these issues, and believe that our ongoing efforts already embody a commitment to an extensive and strategic approach.

Our dedication to tackling these challenges and to finding sustainable solutions remains unwavering. However, the immediate focus of this Bill is stopping the boats. As I set out at the start of this debate, it is only through stopping the boats that we can enable the Government to have a greater capacity to provide a safe haven for those at risk of war and persecution.

The House has fulfilled its proper role within our constitutional framework in relation to the Bill. Your Lordships have asked the elected House to examine these issues again—not once, but now twice. The answer has again come back from the Commons that it disagrees with the Lords amendments. It is time to leave it there. I beg to move.

Motion F1 (as an amendment to Motion F)

Moved by

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The most reverend Primate’s amendment is exactly what we are told by some of those who criticise opposition to the Bill. It is exactly what he is proposing and what we should be dealing with. He has attempted to require through the means of legislation a wide and long view of the issues, and the Government have rejected that. We will be supporting the amendments to the Motions that are moved.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, as I indicated in my opening remarks, I agree with my noble friend Lord Randall—from his speeches in earlier stages of the Bill—and much of what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, that we are of a similar mind as to the support offered to victims of exploitation that takes place in the United Kingdom. It remains the Government’s view that statutory guidance is the appropriate way to achieve this aim, and for that reason the Government resist the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

Moving on to deal with the revised Amendment 103D, to which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke, he seeks to confer an explicit statutory duty on the NCA director-general to produce a report within a period of three months, beginning with the day on which the Act is passed and every three months thereafter. I am sure that noble Lords will join me in thanking the officers of the National Crime Agency, who consistently bring their expertise and dedication to combating serious and organised crime and making the UK a safer place. With regard to publishing reports, surely noble Lords can agree that the NCA’s time is better spent focusing on reducing serious and organised immigration crime and arresting the criminals behind it rather than producing reports. One has only to read the NCA’s annual report to appreciate the range of activities it is already engaged in to help tackle the cross-channel people-smuggling gangs. The NCA has also published its annual plan for 2022-23, which sets out priorities for the year ahead and how it will deliver them. I commend it to noble Lords.

On Amendment 107E, proposed by the most reverend Primate, I welcome the fact that he has put forward a new amendment which no longer seeks to provide for a 10-year strategy but rather a one-off debate. However, I am afraid that the Government remain unpersuaded of the case for his new amendment, and it is not accepted by the Government. It is not for the United Kingdom in isolation to assess the effectiveness of the refugee convention, as the amendment appears to suggest.

For all those reasons, I invite the House, in the event that any of these matters are put to a Division, to oppose them.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, for the reasons that I outlined earlier, and for the reasons that I gave with regard to the Modern Slavery Act, I beg to move my Motion F1 and wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 102B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 102C.

102C: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as the Government has already committed to implement additional safe and legal routes as proposed in the report to be published under clause 59 as soon as practicable and in any event by the end of 2024.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion G. I beg to move.

Motion G agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendment 103B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 103C.

103C: Because the Amendment is unnecessary as section 1 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 already provides for the National Crime Agency to have functions (including duties to publish information) in relation to combating organised crime; this function encompasses organised immigration crime.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion H. I beg to move.

Motion H1 (as an amendment to Motion H)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Murray of Blidworth]

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 107B and 107C, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 107D.

107D: Because the Amendments are unnecessary as the Government already works in collaboration with the UN High Commission for Refugees and others in response to refugee crises and in tackling human trafficking.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I have already spoken to Motion J. I beg to move.

Motion J1 not moved.