Monday 3rd July 2023
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberIllegal Migration Act 2023 View all Illegal Migration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 148-III Third marshalled list for Report - (3 Jul 2023)
15:17 - Division on Amendment 15 - Ayes: 204 / Noes: 168 - Amendment 15 agreed.
15:27 - Division on Amendment 37 - Ayes: 216 / Noes: 147 - Amendment 37 agreed.
15:40 - Division on Amendment 51 - Ayes: 230 / Noes: 152 - Amendment 51 agreed.
15:52 - Division on Amendment 57 - Ayes: 230 / Noes: 151 - Amendment 57 agreed.
16:24 - Division on Amendment 64 - Ayes: 226 / Noes: 152 - Amendment 64 agreed.
17:05 - Division on Amendment 66 - Ayes: 216 / Noes: 163 - Amendment 66 agreed.
18:02 - Division on Amendment 89 - Ayes: 218 / Noes: 158 - Amendment 89 agreed.
18:14 - Division on Amendment 95 - Ayes: 214 / Noes: 150 - Amendment 95 agreed.
18:26 - Division on Amendment 96 - Ayes: 202 / Noes: 154 - Amendment 96 agreed.
19:32 - Division on Amendment 130 - Ayes: 187 / Noes: 139 - Amendment 130 agreed.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, before the House resumes consideration of the Illegal Migration Bill on Report, we come to two Divisions that the House agreed to defer after the failure of the pass reader Division system on 28 June, beginning with the deferred Division on Amendment 15.
Baroness Mobarik
“(2D) Detention under sub-paragraph (2C) is to be treated as detention under paragraph 16(2) for the purposes of the limitations in paragraph 18B (limitation on detention of unaccompanied children).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others to Clause 10 in the name of Baroness Mobarik, would retain existing limits on the detention of unaccompanied children (24 hours).
Baroness Mobarik (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 51 in my name seeks to retain existing statutory time limits for the detention of unaccompanied children put in place by a Conservative Government. I am grateful for the significant support from these Benches and across the House during last Wednesday’s debate. Although we have received some verbal reassurances throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have yet to put in place the necessary safeguards in time limits to protect children from the harms of detention under the Bill. Therefore, I have no alternative but to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, if Amendment 51 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 52 to 54 because of pre-emption.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
“(2L) The Secretary of State may not exercise these powers to detain a person under section (2C) where they fall within section 21(3) of this Act.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Baroness Mobarik
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would retain existing limits on the detention of children (72 hours or one week with ministerial approval).
Baroness Mobarik (Con)
My Lords, I have thought long and hard about calling another Division from these Benches, this time on retaining our current statutory time limits on detention of accompanied children or children who are with their families. These children are likely to be much younger. The psychological harms of detention on young children are significant and likely to impact them for the rest of their lives. For that very reason, I ask that we retain the statutory time limits put in place by a Conservative Government. I wish to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, this is consequential and I beg to move.
Baroness Mobarik
“(2B) Detention under subsection (2A) is to be treated as detention under paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 for the purposes of the limitations in paragraph 18B of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (limitation on detention of unaccompanied children).””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others to Clause 10 in the name of Baroness Mobarik, would retain existing limits on the detention of unaccompanied children (24 hours).
Baroness Mobarik
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others to Clause 10 in the name of Baroness Mobarik, would retain existing limits on the detention of unaccompanied children (24 hours).
Member's explanatory statement
This is a technical amendment that is consequent on the amendment in my name to Clause 10, page 17, line 32. This is because section 10(10) as currently in the Bill is consistent with the exclusion of pregnant women from section 60 protection, and should therefore be removed as a consequence of the other amendment.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I move Amendment 64 and will introduce Amendment 65. One is consequential to the other so I will take them together. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Gohir, for their invaluable support, and Women for Refugee Women for all its work on the amendments.
The amendments do no more than restore the status quo ante by limiting the detention of pregnant women to 72 hours, extendable up to a week with ministerial authorisation. This aim is supported by the JCHR, Children’s Commissioner and many organisations.
The existing time limit represented a compromise put forward by the then Home Secretary Theresa May in response to your Lordships’ House voting time and again for the absolute exclusion of pregnant women from detention, as recommended in the government-commissioned review by Stephen Shaw, former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman. Shaw based his recommendation on what he considered to be the incontrovertible evidence of detention’s deleterious effects on the health of pregnant women and their unborn children. His verdict was referenced in a recent letter to the Times from, among others, the CEO of the Royal College of Midwives and the president of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, calling on us to oppose the removal of the detention limits.
I still await an answer to the question I posed in Committee, citing an unanswered letter from the Independent Advisory Panel on Deaths in Custody to the Home Secretary. Has the Home Office
“carried out a full assessment of the risks linked to the indefinite detention of pregnant women”?—[Official Report, 7/6/23; col. 1494.]
Given that the limits on detention for pregnant women were introduced only seven years ago, and it has been admitted that very few have come over in small boats, there must surely be strong grounds for this change in policy. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, exposed so skilfully in Committee, we have been given the flimsiest of justifications, lacking any evidential base. For example, in Committee the Minister declared that he was
“happy to repeat … that we must not create incentives for people-smuggling gangs to target pregnant women or provide opportunities for people to exploit any loopholes”.—[Official Report, 7/6/23; col. 1504.]
Could the Minister explain what the Government have in mind here? Are they suggesting that women might deliberately get pregnant to avoid unlimited detention or that people smugglers will be scouring refugee camps for pregnant women?
To be fair to the Minister, he tried to persuade us that pregnant women would be treated well on a case-by-case basis. But let us remember what Theresa May said in 2016:
“This new safeguard will ensure that detention for pregnant women will be used as a last resort and for very short periods”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/4/16; col. 679WS.]
For a safeguard to be effective, it needs the backing of law. Discretionary case-by-case consideration is simply not enough to ensure the protection of women in very vulnerable circumstances. We can see this from what was happening before the time limit was introduced. Previous Home Office guidance stated:
“Pregnant women should not normally be detained”.
However, under this guidance, nearly 100 pregnant women were detained in 2014, with one-third held for over a month and four held for between three and six months. The gulf between policy and practice has been closed only with the implementation of the statutory time limit.
The Minister also insisted that pregnant women will be protected through categorisation as adults at risk level 3. Yet during the passage of the 2016 Act, the Government ultimately recognised that this approach provided insufficient safeguards. Why are they now arguing the opposite? The Minister further tried to reassure us by pointing out that
“it will be open to pregnant women to apply to the First-tier Tribunal for immigration bail after 28 days”
or that
“a writ of habeas corpus”—
which, as pointed out in Committee, is very limited in its application—could
“be made at any point”.—[Official Report, 7/6/23; col. 1505.]
But these are women who are likely to be very stressed and may already be traumatised by what they have been through, with damaging effects on their unborn baby. Twenty-eight days in detention is a long time, particularly in the context of a pregnancy.
How realistic is it to expect them to have to engage with the legal system for protection that they receive automatically now? If they did so, why would the Government want to spend time and money on what should be unnecessary legal challenges? This is all in the context of what the JCHR has described as a severe restriction on judicial supervision.
When we debated a similar amendment in Committee, not only did all those who spoke give it unequivocal support but I was aware of a number of noble Lords sitting on the Government Benches and the Cross Benches who were supporting the amendment in silent solidarity. That was quite something, given that it was well past midnight. While I feel passionately about the amendment, it is a very small cog in the wider wheel of the Bill. It is one which the Government could easily concede without undermining the Bill’s objectives, as much as I disagree with them. I very much hope that the Minister will remember what is at stake for pregnant women and their unborn children and will do the right thing today. I beg to move.
The Lord Bishop of Gloucester
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who expertly outlined why the amendment is needed.
I will not repeat all the points made, but this is an issue of dignity for a highly vulnerable group. I will highlight one or two things that have been said. There is no evidence to suggest that the current 72-hour time limit on their detentions resulted in lots of pregnant women making the crossing. The Government have previously conceded that the adults at risk policy would not adequately safeguard pregnant women, and, in response, the 72-hour limit was brought in. We have research from prior to the introduction of this time limit that highlighted the inadequate healthcare for detained pregnant women. It is hard to believe that any healthcare arrangements would therefore relieve the stress of detention and the damaging impact on both a pregnant woman and her unborn baby.
We have already heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on the number of medical organisations and people who are opposed to removing the 72-hour limit. I join with them by strongly supporting this amendment, and I urge noble Lords to do likewise.
Baroness Gohir (CB)
My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to which I have added my name, because this Government are compromising the safety of pregnant migrant women and their babies.
To date, the Minister has not provided evidence that the numbers will increase if women are not detained. I wrote to the Minister and last week he acknowledged that, since January, no pregnant migrant women have arrived in this country illegally. Evidence has also not been provided that housing a few handfuls of migrant women, who have probably arrived over several years, will provide a danger to our society. For those reasons, I urge the House to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.
Baroness Sugg (Con)
My Lords, I support the cross-party amendments in this group. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his engagement, which I have truly appreciated, but I regret to say that I have yet to hear an argument as to why this amendment should not be accepted.
This is a very narrow and focused amendment that simply maintains the current protection on the detention of pregnant women. There is a clear medical case, which is why it is supported by the royal colleges, medical professionals and over 140 groups representing women. It will not create loopholes. It will not incentivise pregnant women to make a dangerous crossing across the channel. It does not exempt women from the rest of the provisions of the Bill, such as removal. It will not create a pull factor, and there is really no way it can be exploited by the criminal gangs who arrange crossings. There cannot be false claims of pregnancy, as the time limit starts only once the Home Office is satisfied that a woman is pregnant.
Some have said that pregnant women are unlikely to be removed, given fitness to fly, but that is not the case, as NHS guidelines say that women can travel safely well into their pregnancy. That argument also misses the point, as this narrow amendment is not about removal; it is about detention. If it is the Government’s case that pregnant women may not be removed, it is even more important that this amendment be accepted, so that pregnant women are not detained for lengthy periods of time.
The amendment does not undermine the Bill. It is not a wrecking amendment; I have been very careful to try to avoid those. It impacts just a small number of women, but it will have a big impact on those women’s health and futures.
My noble friend the Minister is sincere when he says that the Government do not wish to detain pregnant women for any longer than is strictly necessary. Sadly, however, before this protection was in place and in legislation, women were kept in detention for weeks and sometimes months. We should not return to that. This narrow amendment is designed to ensure that that does not happen and that no women can slip through the cracks. Even at this last minute, I sincerely hope that my noble friend will accept the amendment. If he does not, however, and the amendment is pressed, I will, with regret, vote against the Government and in support of the amendment.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, we on these Benches are pleased to support both amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I recommend that the Minister take note of the request she has made time and time again in this House for some form of impact assessment in respect of pregnant women.
Baroness Hayman (CB)
My Lords, I have not spoken earlier on the Bill, but I hope the House will forgive me for speaking for a couple of minutes now.
This debate takes me back 25 years to when I chaired a hospital trust. Pregnant women prisoners from Holloway were brought in wearing handcuffs and were chained to beds when receiving treatment and giving birth. We fought a battle with exactly the people who are supporting this amendment to stop that practice. It left me with an overwhelming long-term view that, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, pregnant women should not be in prison in the first place—and those were pregnant women who had been convicted of crimes. Here, we are talking about the detention of people who have not been convicted of crime in that way: they are migrants who are extremely vulnerable. It would be a terrible, retrograde step to take away the protections they have at the moment, so I support the amendment.
Lord Cormack (Con)
My Lords, enforced equality, no matter where, cannot be right. To say that everybody must be treated precisely the same under this Bill—which is the only substantive argument that has been advanced—is something that I just could not accept.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Lister and the others who have signed these amendments, which we fully support. At its heart, there may be debate and disagreement with respect to this Bill. It is certainly contentious and sometimes we have large disagreements. Despite that, however, whatever the disagreements, we should do the right thing. That is why we support the amendments from my noble friend Lady Lister—because they seek to do the right thing by pregnant women.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, with these amendments we return to the issue of detention time limits in relation to pregnant women. As I explained last Wednesday, holding people in detention is necessary to ensure that they are successfully removed from the United Kingdom under the scheme provided for in the Bill, which is designed to operate quickly and fairly.
However, our aim is to ensure that no one is held in detention for longer than is absolutely necessary to effect their removal. The duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of all illegal entrants back to their home country or to a safe third country will send a clear message that vulnerable individuals, including pregnant women, cannot be exploited by the people-smuggling gangs facilitating their passage across the channel in small boats on the false promise of starting a new life in the UK.
Under the Bill, detention is not automatic. The Bill confers powers to detain, and the appropriateness of detention will be considered on a case-by-case basis. As regards pregnant women, we expect that anyone who is in the later stages of pregnancy and who cannot be removed in the short term will not be detained but would instead be released on immigration bail.
For women who are detained in the earlier stages of pregnancy, we already operate our adults at risk policy, where pregnant women are recognised as a particular vulnerable group. In all cases in which a pregnant woman is detained for removal, the fact of her pregnancy will automatically be regarded as amounting to level 3 evidence under the adults at risk policy, and thus the pregnancy will be afforded significant weight when assessing the risk of harm in continued detention. This means a woman known to be pregnant should be detained only where the immigration control factors that apply in her case outweigh the evidence of her vulnerability—in this case, the evidence of her pregnancy. Such control factors at level 3 are where removal has been set for a date in the immediate future or where there are public protection concerns.
The detention of a pregnant woman must be reviewed promptly if there is any change in circumstances, especially if related to her pregnancy or to her welfare more generally. Examples of specific welfare considerations that may need to be taken into account include the stage of pregnancy, whether there have been complications in the pregnancy, any known appointments for scans, care or treatment, and whether particular arrangements may be needed to facilitate safe removal. While in detention, pregnant women will receive appropriate healthcare.
I assure the House that, as now, the enforced removal of a pregnant woman must be pursued only where it can be achieved safely and there is no suggestion that her baby is due before the planned removal date. Additionally, pregnant women will not be removed from the UK if they are not fit to travel based on medical assessments.
Given the safeguards we have already built into the arrangements for the detention of pregnant women, the Government remain of the view that these amendments, however well-meaning, are not necessary. I am very grateful to those who have spoken in this debate for outlining their—I am sure—well-held concerns and for their thoughtful contributions. However, in light of what I have just said, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, to withdraw her Amendment 64. If, however, she is minded to test the opinion of the House, I invite noble Lords to reject the amendment.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who spoke, and to the Minister as well. Unfortunately, I do not think that he really heard, or listened to, the arguments put. He says he does not think that the amendment is necessary. I am sorry, but countless health organisations, Members of this House and many others think that it is. It is not enough simply to give us assurances here. I have no choice but to test the opinion of the House.
Member’s explanatory statement
The effect of this amendment is that section 60 of the Immigration Act 2016 (which limits the detention of pregnant women normally to 72 hours under existing powers of immigration detention) will apply to the new powers of detention created by Clause 10 of the Bill.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
“17A(A1) This paragraph is subject to section 11(7) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.”Member’s explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 66 to 76, which stand in my name, and in support of Amendments 77 to 79. The substance of my amendments is in Amendment 76. What I apprehend will happen, if the matter is brought to the opinion of the House, is that we will vote on Amendment 66 and, if it is carried, Amendments 67 to 76 will be moved formally. That seems the correct procedure to me; I have not been contradicted in that.
The amendments I have tabled are designed to confirm that the lawfulness of immigration detention is not simply put in the hands of Ministers but remains subject to the principles established in common law. All the amendments in this group would reinstate the existing Hardial Singh principles and be consistent with the conclusion and recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights at paragraph 202 of its report. What did it say? It said:
“The common law approach to immigration detention, established in the case of Hardial Singh, currently operates to ensure that immigration detention complies with Article 5 ECHR”.
Before we possibly hear criticism from some quarters of the House about the use of the European Convention on Human Rights, I remind your Lordships, as a parenthesis, that it has recently been cited by the Government in support of their case in the High Court. They cannot have it both ways; they have had it the way of wanting to support the convention in court. The Joint Committee goes on:
“This recognises that it must be for the courts to determine the legal boundaries of administrative detention … We are extremely concerned that this change would result in an immigration detention system that is not consistent with Article 5 ECHR. The Bill should be amended to ensure that there is independent, judicial oversight of individual liberty and compliance with Article 5”.
What are the Hardial Singh principles? Before I come to them, I will cite a dictum from my noble friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, who—very sadly for the rest of us on this side of the House—retired recently. In 2012, in the case of Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department in what was then the House of Lords, rather than the Supreme Court, he stated:
“Freedom from executive detention is arguably the most fundamental right of all”.
That has been adopted, repeated and uncontradicted.
The four limbs of Hardial Singh, which were created by my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf in his judgment in that case, have been identified and described in more detail by Lord Dyson as four propositions governing the legality of Immigration Act detention emerging from Hardial Singh:
“i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose;
ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances;
iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention;
iv) The Secretary of State should act with … reasonable diligence and expedition”.
Those are magnificent principles, created after repeated cases following our common-law tradition of creating sound precedent when there is not statutory law in place that is lawful.
The court makes its own judgment when applying the Hardial Singh principles and is not limited to reviewing the jurisdiction that has been exercised by a Secretary of State. It can examine “incidental questions of fact”, some of which
“the court may recognise that the Home Secretary is better placed to decide than itself, and the court will no doubt take such account of the Home Secretary’s views as may seem proper”.
Those are the words of Lord Justice Toulson in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department in 2007.
That is the legal basis for these amendments. I will now leave the world of reality and the law and take a short trip into cloud-cuckoo-land. If any of your Lordships wishes to have a quick cup of tea, they can hear a shorter version of this by simply going into iPlayer and listening to last weekend’s edition of “Dead Ringers” on Radio 4, which tore this Bill to pieces in about 35 seconds. We keep hearing from the Minister something that is not based on reality. He seems to have forgotten that the Government lost a case in the Court of Appeal last week. We hear their plea in mitigation that it was a 2:1 decision, but every day in this House we have majority and minority votes. Verdicts of juries by 11 to one or 10 to two are no less verdicts of juries than verdicts by 12 to zero, so that argument has no power whatever.
Above all, we in this House are entitled to expect the Government to obey the law. They cannot send anyone to Rwanda; it is unlawful. The Court of Appeal found that the risk of unlawful refoulement from Rwanda meant that the Rwanda scheme was unsustainable. Furthermore, when the statistics for June—which I mentioned in the House last week—were recalculated yesterday, they showed that the number of people coming on small boats has reached record levels. So it is not exactly the deterrent that the Minister has been calling for repeatedly, unless they are going to change their approach and say, “Come to Britain in your small boats; it’s the quickest way of getting to Rwanda and to the two-star hotel accommodation that is being supplied there”.
We are not in a realistic situation, because they can send nobody to Rwanda at the moment. The appeal to the Supreme Court will not be heard and adjudged upon before October at the earliest. We will probably be into the next Session of Parliament. It is a little bit of an insult to this Parliament that the Government have not obeyed the law as found in that case, withdrawn this Bill and said, “We’ll start again when we have a decision from the Supreme Court”.
We have to be careful that we are the antidote to oblique motives. There are oblique motives based on the assumption, and not on any good grounds, that the Government will be able to send people to Rwanda—maybe they will, maybe they will not, but at the moment they have lost. My request and submission to your Lordships is that the only decent thing this House can do—Members on all sides, and I hope that the lawyers will not contradict this—is support the Hardial Singh principles and back Amendments 66 to 79.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 76 which, in my view, sets out in the clearest possible terms the principles that should be applied to the power of detention presently under discussion. Indeed, if I have correctly understood the law—of which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, reminded us—Amendment 76’s principles are principles that are currently being applied by the courts, and will be applied unless this Bill is enacted in its present form.
It is perhaps worth reminding the House of the strategic purpose of the Bill: to deter would-be migrants by the prospect of deportation to their country of origin or to a safe country. In my view, that is a perfectly legitimate objective; nation states are entitled to regulate the flow of migration. However, I also think that, in the modern world, that can be done only by the collective action of countries working together. That may require—I think it probably will—the substantive amendment of existing international agreements and conventions. I think there is very little prospect of unilateral action succeeding, save on the margins of the problem. The policy that underpins this Bill will fail because it will not be possible to deport migrants in sufficient numbers to constitute an effective deterrent.
Given that, I am extremely concerned about the ability of a Secretary of State to use a power of detention to reinforce, rather than to implement, the policy of deterrence. That would be an improper use of the power of detention. I am also deeply concerned that the power of detention as contemplated by the Bill will be used as an administrative convenience: detention without obvious limits of time in the hope that some possible prospect of deportation in respect of an individual will turn up. In my view, that would be highly objectionable.
I come to the four detailed provisions in Amendment 76. They should be considered individually. I will not repeat each one, because the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has read them out, but just take the first and ask a sensible question:
“the Secretary of State must intend to remove the person being detained and can only use the power to detain for that purpose”.
That seems to be a very fair statement of the law, and we are entitled to know from my noble friend the Minister what the principled objection to such a statement is. The same question applies to each of the remaining three provisions. I will not read them out because the noble Lord already has. Each one of them seems to me to be wholly right as a statement of principle, and this House is entitled to know the principled objection to them if there is one.
As it happens, I think I know the principled objections—at least I know the objections—because they are set out in paragraph 95 of the Explanatory Notes. The Government wish to give the Secretary of State, rather than the courts, the right to determine the length of time deemed to be reasonable for a period of detention. Moreover, when early deportation is not practicable, the Bill will give the Secretary of State the power to detain for such a period that the Secretary of State deems reasonable. That is a huge enlargement in the discretionary powers of a Secretary of State, and I do not want to give any Secretary of State, least of all the present Home Secretary or her immediate predecessor, such additional powers. In my view, the judgment of the legality of detention should be left to the judges and the courts, in applying the principles that are so well set out in Amendment 76.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I have been asked by my Front Bench not to speak at all and, if I break that, to speak in the shortest possible terms. I can do that, because I completely support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in the speech that he just gave and most particularly in his admonishing the Government for not withdrawing this Bill. I have read the two court judgments and can say only that, until or unless the Supreme Court takes a different view, Clause 2 is a nullity, and that is the heart of the Bill.
Lord Green of Deddington (CB)
My Lords, I shall be even briefer. I listened with great interest to our two lawyers. They spoke with the fluency and knowledge that one simply has to respect. However, I point out that we face a very difficult policy problem, with serious effects on public opinion towards immigrants and arrivals in Britain. We face a situation in which, so far, what the Government have done has had no or very little effect. If this continues for some months or longer, there will be a serious impact on the authority of this Government and, possibly, the successor Government. I ask the lawyers and other Members of the House to bear those aspects in mind.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lady Ludford, who cannot be in her place today, I will speak to Amendments 77, 78 and 79, which are in her name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. Those three amendments are intended to tackle the same issues as those tackled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, albeit with a different approach. If the noble Lord wishes to press his Amendment 66 to a vote, we will support him.
It is critical that the decision about the reasonableness—we have just heard that word from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—of the length of immigration detention remains a matter for judges, not for the Secretary of State. Incidentally, those who read the judgment of the Appeal Court last week will have noted subsection (5) of paragraph 264, in which the Appeal Court questions
“whether the culture of the Rwandan judiciary will mean that judges are reluctant to reverse the decisions of the Minister”.
This very much puts the separation of powers between the courts and the Executive in Rwanda under question. Here we have virtually the same process, in which the courts of this country are being denied the principles on which they have operated. Set against that is a decision that is down to the reasonableness of the Secretary of State.
It is critical to preserve the Hardial Singh principles to ensure that the most vulnerable people do not have their freedoms curtailed unjustifiably. When the Secretary of State deprives someone of their liberty, there must be a clear avenue for the person to seek independent review of the legality and necessity of their detention. Detention should be for only a short period pending removal. We know now from the judgment that that will be much more unlikely. With no viable agreements in place, save with individual countries for individual persons who belong to those countries, it is highly likely that the 28 days that people will be detained on arrival in the UK will not be pending removal but will be purposely and purely to deter others.
We will be building up more and more people in detention or in some form of curtailed liberties. That is wrong, and it is why the judiciary needs to maintain oversight. This is critical, given that the Bill intends to detain everyone, regardless of age, ill health, disability and trauma. I am pleased to speak to these amendments and, as I say, these Benches will support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if he wishes to press his amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, we will support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, when he presses Amendment 66, and we would expect the subsequent amendments he mentioned to be consequential to that. He clearly and helpfully set out the four Hardial Singh principles and gave their legal basis and history, and I thank him for doing so. As he pointed out, the Government themselves recently cited those principles in a High Court case. I also thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who succinctly summed up the Opposition’s view on the Bill. He said that there is little prospect of unilateral action succeeding, and we agree. He deplored the Secretary of State’s using the power of detention to reinforce the message of deterrence, rather than speaking of the need to implement the Bill, and we agree with that as well. He said that the power should not go to the Secretary of State rather than the courts, and he cited the Explanatory Memorandum. We agree with that too, so I thank the noble Viscount for summarising our view of the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Green, said that what the Government have done so far has not had much had effect. The Government are asking us again to support them to do more, yet they have been unsuccessful in the various Bills they have introduced in recent years to try to address this problem. It is a real problem, and there needs to be a different approach to reduce the numbers. Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord German, as well. For all those reasons, we will be happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, as we have just heard, Clause 11 clarifies the time period for which the Secretary of State may detain individuals by placing two of the common law Hardial Singh principles on to a statutory footing. As we have also heard, the principles provide that a person may be detained only for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances, and if it becomes apparent before the expiry of the reasonable period that the Home Secretary will not be able to examine, effect removal or grant leave within a reasonable period, the Home Secretary should not seek to continue the detention.
As my noble friend Lord Hailsham noted, the Explanatory Notes published with the Bill make it clear that it is the Bill’s intention expressly to overturn the common law principle established in R on the application of A v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2007, and that henceforth it will be for the Secretary of the State rather than the courts to determine what constitutes a reasonable time period to detain an individual for the specific statutory purpose. In this regard, these amendments seek to preserve the status quo and leave it to the courts to determine the reasonableness of the period of detention. I put it to your Lordships that it is properly a matter for the Home Secretary rather than the courts to decide such matters, as the Home Office will be in full possession of all the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in the circumstances.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
If my noble friend is right, he is effectively saying that people who are detained will be released if there is no prospect of deportation. If that is right, the policy of deterrence is entirely without merit.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My noble friend is right, in that it is one of the Hardial Singh principles that, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, that person should not be detained. But I cannot agree with him that the policy of deterrence is not right, because it is clearly the Government’s intention to remove any illegal entrants to a safe third country. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I add that the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that being lawful as a matter of principle.
We recognise that circumstances can change. Where that is the case, detention must be reviewed. If it is considered that the anticipated period of detention is not reasonably necessary, the individual will be bailed. This reflects the existing legal and policy position on the use of detention.
It remains the Government’s view that the provisions in Clause 11 provide an appropriate balance between the respective roles of the Home Secretary and the courts. Accordingly, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I express my gratitude to the noble Viscount and others who have spoken on the Bill, including the noble Lord, Lord German. I now come to this place for my daily dose of disappointment. It seems to me that the Minister is deliberately missing the point. He cannot be failing to see it, and I very much regret having to say that.
Who do noble Lords trust to make these decisions: a Minister or the courts? I will tell them something about the latter, in case they have never seen any of these cases in court. Judges sit day after day in the Administrative Court, hearing case after case involving asylum and refugees, and they make decision after decision about whether a period of detention is too long, too robust or unreasonable in some other way. They have built up a corpus of law which has become reliable and admired not just in this place but throughout our jurisdiction and the common law world.
Make your choice. I am going to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Lilley (Con)
My Lords, can the noble Lord explain why our courts, and our officials acting under their duties, reach such different decisions from the courts and officials on the continent? Why do we reject only 25% of claims for asylum, whereas France rejects 75%?
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, this is Report and that intervention is not appropriate, I am afraid.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
Whether it is appropriate or not—and I tend to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on that subject—it seems to me that the noble Lord who just intervened has made a very selective judgment without analysing the continental cases that have taken place. I have given a fair description of what happens in our jurisdiction; it is the one that I regard well, and I hope that your Lordships will too.
Lord Carlile of Berriew
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
“(c) section 11(7) of the Illegal Migration Act 2023.”Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
Member's explanatory statement
This relates to the amendment in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew to Clause 11, page 21, line 15.
“(7) None of the amendments made in this section permit detention that is inconsistent with the following principles—(a) the Secretary of State must intend to remove the person being detained and can only use the power to detain for that purpose,(b) the person being removed may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances,(c) if, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect removal within a reasonable period, they must not seek to exercise the power of detention, and (d) the Secretary of State must act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would confirm that the lawfulness of immigration detention remains subject to the principles established in the common law. It would reinstate the existing Hardial Singh principles in a single amendment and would be consistent with the JCHR’s conclusion and recommendation at para 202 of the Report.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, the first amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 22 and the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 25 have the effect that the reference to a person in the care of a local authority in the definition of “appropriate adult” in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2 is replaced with a reference to a person in the care of a relevant authority as defined by that paragraph.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and the second amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 22 have the effect that the reference to a social worker of a local authority in the definition of “appropriate adult” in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2 is replaced with a reference to a registered social worker as defined by that paragraph.
““local authority” —(a) in relation to England, means a county council, a district council for an area for which there is no county council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority or the Council of the Isles of Scilly;(b) in relation to Wales, means a county council or a county borough council;(c) in relation to Scotland, means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”Member's explanatory statement
See the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 9.
““registered social worker” means a person registered as a social worker in a register maintained by—(a) Social Work England,(b) Social Care Wales,(c) the Scottish Social Services Council, or(d) the Northern Ireland Social Care Council;” Member's explanatory statement
See the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 12.
““relevant authority” —(a) in relation to England and Wales and Scotland, means a local authority;(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, means an authority within the meaning of the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/755 (N.I. 2)) (see Article 2(2) of that Order);”Member's explanatory statement
See the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 71, line 9.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
““voluntary organisation” —(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989 (see section 105(1) of that Act);(b) in relation to Scotland, has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (see section 93(1) of that Act);(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (see Article 74(1) of that Order).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment defines “voluntary organisation” for the purposes of the reference to a person in the care of a voluntary organisation in the definition of “appropriate adult” in paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 2.
Lord Scriven
“Children Act 1989(1) Upon entry or arrival into England, every child to whom section 3 of this Act applies must have afforded to them all rights under the Children Act 1989.(2) Nothing in this Act may require any act or omission that conflicts with or undermines the obligations, duties or responsibilities of the Secretary of State under the Children Act 1989, in particular the principle that the child’s welfare be a primary consideration and that particular regard be given to the child’s wishes and feelings.(3) This Act must not cause any delay in ensuring that unaccompanied children become looked after as soon as the child's age has been determined.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures all children who enter or arrive in England under section 2 are afforded the rights available under the Children Act 1989. It also provides that well-established duties under that Act are not undermined by the requirements of this Bill.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 87 is in my name, and I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for adding their names to it. We on these Benches support all the amendments in this group. With the exception of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who wishes to remove Clauses 15 and 16 from the Bill—that would be the ideal solution but is unlikely to win the day—they try to fully understand the relationship between the Home Secretary’s new powers as indicated in Clauses 15 and 16 and the obligations and duties of local authorities to children as laid out in the Children Act 1989.
The statutory scheme for looked-after children has been carefully developed over many decades, with safeguards added in response to learning from systematic failings and research into different aspects of child well-being. Empowering the Home Secretary to radically change that statutory scheme and the provisions around it on the basis of how a child arrives in a local authority area is both radical and untested; it restructures England’s child welfare system.
Where there was total clarity on the interests of the child, the clauses bring ambiguity and confusion. I am confused, as are many other noble Lords, about how the powers given to the Home Secretary in Clauses 15 and 16 are in line with the duties and obligations of local authorities. Unaccompanied children seeking asylum are children in need under the Children Act 1989, and local authorities have specific duties to them and specific powers—for example, under Sections 17 and 47. Under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Act, certain activities have to follow.
Section 22C of the Children Act sets out the ways in which local authorities are to accommodate and maintain children. Section 23ZA requires local authorities to regularly visit looked-after children. Sections 25A and 26 place a duty on local authorities to appoint an independent reviewing officer for looked-after children and to make arrangements for independent advocates for them.
The first question I wish to tease out is: when children are removed—either put into the Home Office accommodation initially or removed at the request of the Secretary of State—do they still have looked-after status? If so, how will provision be made for local authorities to carry out the duties they have to looked-after children? The significant question is: what happens when the local authority deems that the Home Office accommodation is not in the best interests of the child, as the statutory scheme suggests? Under this provision of the Bill, can the local authority override the Secretary of State’s request to move a child into certain accommodation and move them into accommodation that is in their best interest? It is a key question that was asked in Committee which the Minister did not answer. The Minister said that he would write to noble Lords on this issue, and I am very pleased that at 12 pm today a letter dated 3 July arrived in our inboxes.
However, that letter creates further confusion and does not answer the following central questions. How will local authorities be able to conduct all their duties under the Children Act 1989? Why does the Secretary of State’s new power lie in the provisions of that Act in terms of where a child shall be put, particularly in terms of the best interests of the child? We really need clarity to be able to understand the interrelationship and how local authorities can carry out their full legal duties under the Children Act 1989 to put the interests of the child first. The Minister was unable to clarify this in Committee and it is important that those issues are now clarified on Report. I beg to move.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I declare that I was President of the Family Division and tried endless care cases involving local authorities. I am extremely concerned about Clauses 15 and 16 and their interrelation with the Children Acts, particularly the Children Act 1989. As the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has already pointed out, the Secretary of State does not have parental responsibility for children.
I pointed this out to the Minister several times in Committee. So far, and I do not mean to be impolite, I am not sure that either he or—more importantly—the Home Office have put their minds to the implications of parental responsibility. I have not seen a copy of the letter that apparently was sent. It would have been helpful if I had seen it before I came to this House, because since I have been here I am afraid that I have not been looking at my emails.
The local authority is, under the Children Act, the only corporate parent and no one else can be. If the local authority goes to the court and seeks a care order under Section 31 of the Children Act 1989, there will be a court order requiring the local authority to keep the child and place the child in appropriate accommodation. I ask the Minister: has the Home Office has reflected on what Clause 16 is saying—that the Home Secretary can take a child away from local authority accommodation and put that child somewhere else? Is it intended that this Bill is to override the Children Acts and create a new situation where parental responsibility is of no significance if the Home Secretary considers that a child should be dealt with by the Home Office and not a local authority?
This is a very serious legal situation for children. Although there may not be all that number of younger children, there are certainly some. Even a child of 16 is entitled to the care of a local authority. I just wonder whether the Government have thought through the implications of this. I do not believe that this matter will be taken to a vote, which I am rather sad about in a way, because I would like the Government to put their minds to the existing law—which, I have to tell noble Lords, a Conservative Government passed in 1989, and I was one of those who played a part in the legislation. I am extremely sad to see these two clauses.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 87. Like the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, I do not support the other amendments, which would get rid of these clauses entirely.
I had hoped not to have to put my name to that amendment, particularly as I hoped there would be a government amendment because of the clarification by the Family Division of the High Court during Committee on 9 June, in a case brought by Article 39, which was trying to make missing unaccompanied asylum-seeking children wards of court. It is interesting to note in that case that the lead submissions from the Government were not from my noble friend the Minister’s department but from the Department for Education, which holds the responsibility for the Children Act.
I have a simple question to my noble friend the Minister. As a Conservative, I believe it is important that every child has a parent. While the children are accommodated by the Home Office when they initially come into the country, who has parental responsibility? From my reading of the Bill—I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—we are changing a fundamental principle in our law and children may not have a parent, without due consideration of the consequences. It might just be for two days, two weeks or four weeks, but it is really important.
I can foresee, even on my cursory glance at this, at least three cracks in that foundation. First, if a child who is being accommodated in these hotels or hostels ends up at A&E and needs an operation but there is no parent to consent to that surgery—so to do that surgery would be an assault—then precious NHS time would be spent contacting the Home Office and not caring for patients.
The second healthcare situation is that children can be detained under the Mental Health Act. That Act gives important powers, duties and safeguards to the statutory nearest relative—and there is a list of those. Again, if a child is under a care order, under the Mental Health Act the corporate parent is the nearest relative. If the child has no parent and is detained in a secure mental health unit, who will be the nearest relative? Again, precious NHS resources will be, in my view, ill-used.
The most worrying crack—which I hope I am wrong about; I remind noble Lords that I am not a criminal lawyer, and I have done my best when looking at this piece of legislation—is that, when child protection functions under Parts 4 and 5 of the Children Act, such as Section 31, are exercised, there is then a very important exemption for local authorities or public authorities from criminal liability under Section 7 of the corporate manslaughter Act 2007. I would be grateful to hear my noble friend the Minister’s view on that statute. It defines senior management. That perhaps includes the board, civil servants in the department, as well as Ministers and, potentially, the Secretary of State. Giving evidence to public inquiries and appearing before Select Committees is commonplace for civil servants; what is not commonplace is being called as a witness to a Crown Court trial for such a prosecution of the corporate body, the Home Office, which is included under Schedule 1 to the corporate manslaughter Act. If there were to be a change of Government next year, it might be the right honourable Member for Pontefract going to the trial, and it would not be good enough for her to say, “We had only been in office for two weeks before the child fell out of the hotel window”.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships for many minutes and will not do so, but I will speak in support of Amendment 87. It will probably not be pushed to a vote, but, if it were, it would help us to regain our self-respect as a nation that cares about the plight of unaccompanied migrant children.
When I spoke in Committee on 5 June, I highlighted the fact that 4,500 unaccompanied migrant children have been placed in Home Office-run hotels and not in the care of a local authority, as prescribed by Section 20 of the Children Act 1989. Some 200 of those children have gone missing. A whistleblower working at the hotel in Brighton said that he believed that they have just disappeared. Perhaps they were trafficked—who knows?—but they have not been found. Some of the children are as young as 10; they are put into hotels, unaccompanied and unsupervised, at the age of 10.
I pressed the Minister in Committee—as I did before and after—to explain which Act of Parliament allows the Government to place these children in the care of the Home Office and not local authorities. In his reply, he did not directly answer my question, but what he said is important:
“The present position will change when this Bill passes”.—[Official Report, 5/6/23; col. 1174.]
I am not trying to put the Minister on the spot—he has enough woes trying to take through this awful piece of legislation—but, from his answer, I must deduce that the Government are acting unlawfully. They know that they are acting unlawfully and that they are not properly caring for these unaccompanied migrant children. All children arriving in this country should surely be afforded the rights under the Children Act 1989. Let us ask ourselves: who among us, if, God forbid, it was one of our children facing this perilous situation, would not want them to be properly cared for?
The Lord Bishop of Durham
My Lords, I declare my interests as laid out in the register. I will speak to Amendment 89, and I am grateful to my noble friends from differing Benches—the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Helic—for their support. It is a damning indictment that an amendment of this nature is even required, as it proposes such a basic safeguard to ensure the well-being of unaccompanied children. It requires that, if a child is to be transferred from local authority child protection systems, a justification should be provided as to why it is in their best interests to be looked after by the Home Office rather than the local authority.
It is reasonable that councils should not be mandated to follow a child transfer direction, regardless of any safeguarding or protection concerns. If the Government are unwilling to accept this point, can the Minister say how they will enable the appropriate scrutiny of a decision to move a child out of the formal child protection system and ensure the highest level of safeguarding consideration? These questions deserve full and detailed answers, since the Bill does not set any standards, safeguards or protective obligations for the Home Office when providing accommodation for children. It is even more pertinent given the Home Office’s own record on accommodating unaccompanied children.
The Minister was pleased to share, during the passage of the Bill, that no children are currently accommodated in hotels, but let us not forget that this does not mean that all unaccompanied children are therefore in the care of local authorities. Up to April this year, 186 children remained missing, and it should keep us all up at night, including Ministers, when we think about whose care those children may now be under.
Regardless of the power that the Bill gives to the Government to accommodate children, two things remain true—both of which have already been explained well. First, the Children Act applies to all children, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or immigration status, and therefore any child under the care of the Home Office should have access to the same level of care and protection as any other child in need. Secondly, as recent legal judgments have shown, the Home Office does not have the expertise, knowledge or experience to look after children.
Therefore, it is only right and just that the power to remove a child from the well-established care system should be exercised only when a child’s well-being will be served by doing so—I suspect that that would be very rare. I share the fear of the Children’s Commissioner that accommodating children outside of foster families or children’s homes will be harmful and unsafe; we have no evidence to the contrary. Fundamentally, the care of children is, first and foremost, not an immigration matter, and safeguarding cannot be allowed to be a casualty in pursuit of the objectives of the Bill. Thus, I also support Amendment 87, for all the reasons already laid out. Neither amendment should be regarded as controversial, as, frankly, a child’s life, security and future are too important for them to become collateral damage. Therefore, I support Amendment 87 and intend to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 89.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I support most strongly the remarks of my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss and the other powerful comments already made from the Conservative Benches, the Bishops’ Benches and elsewhere.
My amendments propose that Clauses 15 and 16 should left out of the Bill in their entirety. These clauses, for the first time, provide the legal power for a central government department to take responsibility for extremely vulnerable unaccompanied children and to provide so-called care, protection and support, both while they are children and as adult care leavers.
I understand that the Home Office has recently been housing unaccompanied children in hotels, without the legal authority to do so. But, according to the Immigration Minister, Robert Jenrick MP, no unaccompanied young people are currently in hotels. The Home Office has recently reopened a hotel in Eastbourne, and another in Brighton and Hove, in anticipation of the Bill becoming law. The local authority in the second case is threatening legal action, and I anticipate that it will be successful.
Ofsted has described the housing of unaccompanied children in hotels as utterly unacceptable. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called for the urgent repeal of the provision in the Illegal Migration Bill, describing this practice as violating children’s rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the refugee convention 1951. Seven organisations responsible for protecting children have written to us, arguing that they consider Clauses 15 and 16 to be such a danger to unaccompanied children, and to our child welfare system, that they must be removed from the Bill altogether. The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services makes the point that unaccompanied children seeking asylum are fleeing desperate situations; they are extremely vulnerable and should not be placed in hotels, where they are open to further exploitations and abuse.
Clauses 15 and 16 are ill conceived and discriminatory in principle. They give the Home Secretary wide powers to house unaccompanied children of any age in any type of accommodation for any length of time—housing a one year-old or 18 month-old in great big ex-Army barracks, or whatever. The clauses direct that a local authority stops looking after an individual child irrespective, it appears, of the child’s needs, characteristics, experiences and legal status. They legitimate and potentially make lawful arrangements that hundreds of non-governmental organisations have contended are unlawful for nearly two years.
I know that Amendments 87 and 89 might help a little. However, bearing in mind the powerful comments from his own Bench from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and from other parts of this House, I appeal to the Minister to seek within himself his humanity and to withdraw Clauses 15 and 16 from the Bill.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I do not support Amendment 87. It would undermine the purpose of the measure to prevent and deter illegal and unsafe routes. It would require that all children who enter this country, and are subject to Section 3, be afforded the same rights as afforded to children under the Children Act 1989, as noble Lords have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. That Act includes that the child’s wishes and best interests are taken into account. However, that could undermine Clause 3, which gives the Secretary of State discretionary powers to remove unaccompanied children who enter illegally, albeit with exceptions. Clause 3 is also concerned with returning children to their parents, and there is provision for that where it is safe to do so.
Moreover, Amendment 87 could and would give families across the world an incentive to try to get their children into this country. For the cost of a modest traffickers’ fee, they would be more likely to make a dreadful gamble to get their children here to be educated, housed, looked after and supported at a cost to our taxpayers. Is there any reason—and I think it is important to ask this question—why taxpayers should be asked to pay sums for those who break the law in this way when there are safe and legal routes for entering this country?
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
This amendment would provide an incentive to send children by these very dangerous routes. It is the very opposite of the purpose of the Bill, which is to deter people from using unsafe and illegal routes.
Noble Lords may not like what I say, but I cannot put from my mind the dangers occurring to children and women and even men on these unsafe routes. Only two weeks ago, we heard of the trawler which left the Libyan port of Tobruk and sank off the Greek coast. According to reports, over 700 people were on that boat. The women and children were in the hold: not one of them survived.
It is incumbent on this House to avoid giving any possible incentive to people traffickers to continue their unlawful and fatal trade. Anything we can do to stop it, we should do. This scheme is the first practical scheme that I have heard proposed which will deter people trafficking and the smuggling of children into the country by that route. The impact assessment has shown that the Australian scheme worked as a deterrent. For these reasons, I would prefer a practical scheme which deterred the use of these dangerous routes. Your Lordships should give the Bill a chance if we want to stop these fatal crossings.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. The amendments before us do not seek to punish children who are in a situation that many of them have no choice in. We have a duty to them as a humanitarian country with proud traditions. We have a duty to protect children, and that is what we seek to do. We need to remember that we are talking about children here. Whatever we do, I do not want to punish children for however they may have arrived here.
We fully support the amendments of the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly Amendments 87 and 89. Amendment 89, of course, is in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and it is one to which I have added my name, along with the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, and the noble Lord, Lord German.
I do not want to speak for long, but the point that was made is significant, especially when one looks at Clause 16. The Secretary of State can decide on the transfer date that an unaccompanied child be moved away from the local authority. The point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, goes right to the heart of the issue: the local authority acts as the parent. If you move a child away from that situation, you are effectively making them an orphan. There is nobody responsible for them by law. Is that really what we want? Is that really what we are trying to achieve? We all agree that there is a problem, but we should not make children pay the price of trying to resolve it. That is not the right way of going about it.
As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham pointed out, the Secretary of State can direct the local authority to cease providing accommodation. There is no discussion between the Secretary of State and the local authority to view what is in the best interests of the child. The Secretary of State can compel the local authority—as the parent—to cease providing accommodation for a child, which will then take them into Home Office-provided accommodation. Within that Home Office accommodation, as the right reverend Prelate pointed out, we still have 186 children lost. They are missing. We have no idea where they are. I say it time and again but if the Home Office was a human being and a parent, that human being—the parent known as the Home Office—would be prosecuted. We would not tolerate losing children. We would not say that we are doing all we can. We would ask what on earth is happening that children are being lost. The local authority provides the best solution to looking after unaccompanied children in these circumstances.
The Home Office can demand that of the local authority with no justification. It can demand it with no idea of where these children are going to go and with no idea of the standards to be provided for them. They are simply to be housed in Home Office accommodation or wherever. That is not acceptable to the people of this country, irrespective of the fact that they understand there is a problem with the boats, and irrespective of the fact they understand that something needs to be done. They do not want is to see migrant children, or any child, having to pay the price for that. The Government need to sort it out in another way and ensure that all children in this country are properly protected.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 87 put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seeks to ensure that all children covered by the duty in Clause 2 have the protections afforded to children under the Children Act 1989. No one can disagree with the sentiment behind his amendment. However, in a sense, it misses its intended target, as the 1989 Act does not impose obligations, duties or responsibilities on the Secretary of State but rather on local authorities. There is nothing in this Bill that alters those duties or responsibilities, particularly as regards an unaccompanied child—a point well made by my noble friend Lady Berridge.
That said, Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 already requires that the Home Secretary carry out her functions in a way that takes into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom, and I can assure noble Lords that this will continue to be the case.
Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause brings me to the provisions in Clauses 15 and 16 which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. She seeks to remove those clauses; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham seeks to amend them with Amendments 88A, 89 and 89A.
Clause 15 makes provision for the accommodation of unaccompanied migrant children in scope of this Bill. This clause confers on the Secretary of State a power to provide, or to arrange for the provision of, accommodation and other support to unaccompanied migrant children in England. While the clause contains no time limit on how long any child spends in Home Office accommodation, as I have said previously on a number of occasions, our clear intention is that their stay be a temporary one until they transfer to a local authority for a permanent placement. This is not detained accommodation, and the support that will be provided will be appropriate to the needs of these young people during their short stay.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
The problem is Clause 16, because the Home Office can remove the child from the otherwise permanent care of the local authority. How on earth is what the Minister is saying compatible with Clause 16?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
It is obviously necessary that the Bill contain a power to allow for such a transfer, in order to ensure the appropriate removal of a child on attaining their majority, for example, or for any other purpose that might be necessary to ensure implementation of the scheme. The Government expect local authorities to meet their statutory obligations to unaccompanied children from the date of their arrival in the United Kingdom, and that the Home Office step in only sparingly and temporarily. Indeed, an unaccompanied child in scope of the scheme may enter local authority care without first being accommodated by the Home Office under this power. However, it is important that there be legal certainty about the ability of the Home Office to step in to ensure that an unaccompanied child arriving on the south coast can immediately be accommodated and supported.
As we have just discussed, Clause 16 then makes provision for the transfer of an unaccompanied migrant child from Home Office accommodation to a local authority in England. The clause provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to decide that a child is to cease residing in Home Office accommodation and to then direct a local authority in England to provide accommodation to the child, under Section 20 of the Children Act, after five working days of the direction being made. As was the subject of the intervention a moment ago, the Secretary of State may also direct a local authority in England to cease accommodating an unaccompanied child and to transfer the child into accommodation provided by the Home Office after five working days of the direction being made. This power is the subject of the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.
I suggest, with respect to the right reverend Prelate, that this amendment is unnecessary given that protections are already in statute in Section 55 of the 2009 Act, which I have already referred to. The Secretary of State is required to have regard to the interests of children as a primary factor in immigration decisions affecting them. Let me be clear: best interests are not the only factor that must be considered; other relevant factors, such as close consideration of individual circumstances, must be taken into account. In making decisions and devising policy guidance under this Bill, the Home Office will continue to apply the Section 55 duty.
We are working through the operational processes relating to unaccompanied children and the circumstances in which we will use this power. This includes engaging with stakeholders to understand the concerns they might have about the power to transfer unaccompanied children into Home Office accommodation. We are working very closely with the Department for Education, as we want to deliver the objectives of the Bill while being mindful of the needs of children and young people. I hope this provides some reassurance to noble Lords.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I refer my noble friend back to his point about legal certainty and the very narrow question I asked: is it correct that while the Home Office is accommodating these children before they go into local authority accommodation, they actually have no parent?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
It is clearly right that in the situation that arose with the rush of people crossing the channel—which gave rise to this legislation—consideration had to be given to the legislative arrangements. The situation in law is clear and is as my noble friend set out. The Home Office is able, in extreme circumstances, to exercise this power on behalf of local authorities. As I say, the purpose and intention of these provisions is to look after children only for as short a time as possible before transferring them to the care of local authorities. I want to stress that the Home Office is having to accommodate unaccompanied children out of necessity.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, can the Minister give the House an assurance that he will put in the Bill that these children would not be in the so-called care of the Home Office for more than, let us say, 48 hours —some very limited period of time? If that is the Government’s intention, can the Minister assure the House that this will be in the Bill and that it really will be for a very short time?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
No; I am afraid I cannot provide that assurance, and the reason for that is obvious. We are dealing with a situation in which we have thousands of people crossing the channel, and we cannot tie the hands of the Home Office in dealing with this great problem that we all face. I say again that we are having to accommodate unaccompanied children out of necessity. My noble friend Lady Lawlor highlighted in her brave speech the Hobson’s choice that we face here. These children will not all immediately enter the care system on arrival in a small boat, simply because the Home Office does not have the powers set out in Clauses 15 and 16. It is right that we take steps to ensure that there is clarity, and I suggest to noble Lords that it is in the best interests of these children that we put in place these measures, which recognise the reality of the current situation.
On the basis of my explanation and the assurances I have given, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, will be content to withdraw his amendment, and if the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham is minded to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 89, I invite noble Lords to reject that amendment.
Lord Scriven (LD)
My Lords, I am sure that, like everyone who has listened to this debate, I am now more confused than when it started. Clarity has not been brought. I thank all noble Lords for taking part in the debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, who I completely disagree with; she really does not understand the concept of what safeguarding and the rights of the child are once the child is in the UK. That is the issue, and there is no evidence in any impact assessment or anything that the Government have done that says that protecting and safeguarding children under the Children Act 1989 is a pull factor. But I welcome the noble Baroness’s intervention and understand that she starts from a position that is, I am sure, very different from that of nearly everybody else in your Lordships’ House.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
“(4A) But the Secretary of State may not make a decision under subsection (4) unless to do so is necessary to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment limits the Secretary of State’s power to transfer a child out of local authority care and into accommodation provided by the Secretary of State, by providing that they may only do so where to do so is necessary to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.
The Lord Bishop of Durham
It is my wish to test the mind of the House because the Minister has not answered some of the questions, and my concerns remain. Some of us have not seen a copy of the letter that was circulated to some noble Lords, so can the Minister undertake to ensure that it gets circulated to those who have been involved in these debates? We really need the local authority to have the say in this, so I beg leave to test the mind of the House.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
“(b) that person is or may be a modern slavery survivor, save where the exceptions set out in section 21(3) apply.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
“(d) a person has been identified by a First Responder as appropriate for referral into the National Referral Mechanism;(e) a decision by a competent authority regarding reasonable grounds is pending;(f) a decision has been made by a competent authority that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is a victim of slavery or human trafficking (a “positive reasonable grounds decision”), and has not yet received a conclusive grounds decision;(g) the person is in the course of challenging a negative reasonable grounds decision;(h) the person has received a positive conclusive grounds decision;(i) the person is in the course of challenging a negative conclusive grounds decision.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge
“(3A) Subsection (2) also does not apply in relation to a person if the relevant exploitation took place in the United Kingdom. (3B) Where subsection (3) or (3A) applies in relation to a person the following do not apply in relation to the person—(a) section 22,(b) section 23, and(c) section 24.(4) In this section—”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to exempt people who have been unlawfully exploited in the UK from provisions which would otherwise require their removal during the statutory recovery period and prohibit them from being provided with support during the recovery period or being granted limited leave to remain.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)
My Lords, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
“(10A) A person falling within section 2(1) or section 3(2) will not be treated as a threat to public order solely on the grounds of meeting the conditions set out therein.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential to the amendment to clause 21 in the name of Lord Randall of Uxbridge.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential to the amendment to Clause 21 in the name of Lord Randall of Uxbridge.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 101 pre-empts Amendment 102.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seeks to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)
My Lords, this amendment was tabled by my noble friend Lord Morrow, who sends his apologies. He is unable to attend today and has asked me to move it in his place. I beg to move.
Lord Randall of Uxbridge
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential to the amendment to Clause 21 in the name of Lord Randall of Uxbridge.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 104 pre-empts Amendment 105.
Lord Weir of Ballyholme
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seeks to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with others in the name of Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, seek to amend the Bill so that potential and recognised victims of trafficking will not be detained or removed before they get the opportunity to submit an application to the NRM and have it duly considered.
Baroness Brinton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment aims to exclude children from the provisions of Clause 29.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford is unable to be in her place today. I am introducing her Amendments 114 and 116 in this group, which remove children from the effects of the loss of citizenship pathways under the Bill. On these Benches we welcome the government amendments removing the original Clause 30(4) from the Bill, which would have barred British citizenship children born in the UK after 7 March 2023 if a parent had entered the UK illegally. We also welcome the amendment that removes bars to citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1981—the settled route and the 10-year route. I thank the Minister for the helpful meeting regarding British national (overseas) citizens. I look forward to hearing from him, perhaps on Wednesday, that BNO passport holders will get clearer and correct information from immigration officials in the future.
However, despite the Government’s amendments, there are still key risks for children who the Government admit will rarely qualify for citizenship under Clause 2. That is why Amendments 114 and 116 remove children from the loss of routes to UK citizenship. The fundamental problem that needs to be resolved here is that, as we discussed in the debate on the previous group, as children arrive in the UK they are put under the responsibility of a local authority. As minors, our state decrees that these children cannot make decisions for themselves, so the logic must also be that when they were brought into the UK they were not deemed to have the capacity to make that decision. We noted that the Minister said that there is a potential safeguard under Clause 35 if a decision were to breach the UK’s obligation under the ECHR, but it was just reported again, on Saturday in the i newspaper, that the Government want to remove the UK from the ECHR.
The Government’s intention to prevent these children obtaining British citizenship would close off all the major routes to citizenship if their parents were irregular entrants: the discretionary route, the settled route and the 10-year route. On these Benches we believe that children who are deemed by the state not to be able to make decisions about themselves should not be penalised by the Bill, particularly because they are in the care of the state. On these grounds, I beg to move Amendment 114.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 115 and 117 to 125 in this group, all standing in my name. They have a similar approach to that set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, but the focus is rather different, as I shall explain.
I support the general thrust of the Bill; the argument for the Bill is that it creates a number of deterrents to people arriving in this country illegally. The principal deterrent is of course that of immediate, or at least rapid, removal to another country. But the Bill goes further than that and also seeks to deprive those who have fallen foul of the tests in Clause 2 of their subsequent right to apply for naturalisation as a British subject or, more crucially and to the point of my amendments, their right to apply for registration as a British subject at any point in the future.
Noble Lords are well aware that there is a great distinction between naturalisation and registration. Naturalisation is a concession by the state to those who are not British, to allow them to become British. It is perfectly natural that there should be conditions attached to that, and those conditions very often can and do include good behaviour conditions—such as, perhaps, if the Bill passes, not having previously arrived illegally in a small boat.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for bringing back these amendments, but I am disappointed that he had to do so given the strong case that he made for them in Committee. They are important from the perspective of both citizenship and the rights of children. I once again declare my interest as a patron of the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens.
From reading the exchanges in Committee, it seemed to me that the Minister was not really listening to the arguments put but simply responded by trying to justify what, in our view, is unjustifiable. Once again, children are the main victims, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, whose amendments I also support. As the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, said, it was welcome that the Minister, when challenged on this point, did not impute any culpability to children. However, the fact remains that children are being punished for the actions of a parent, which is contrary to the refugee and other conventions, as has been pointed out by the UNHCR, JCHR and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, among others. This is yet another instance of where we need to see the child rights impact assessment yet, despite the Government Chief Whip promising it for today “if possible”, there is still no sign of it.
It is not an indicator of strength to refuse to countenance any amendments in pursuit of the mythical god of deterrence, regardless of the force of the argument. The main losers are, again, children, whose best interests are being ignored and trampled on. I hope the Minister will think again today.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments relate to the bans on re-entry, settlement and citizenship which are a key part of the deterrent effect of the Bill and send an important message that, if you enter the country illegally, you will not be able to build a life here.
Amendments 114 and 116, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and spoken to so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seek to remove from the scope of the bans those who meet the duty in Clause 2 but who are under the age of 18.
As the Bill is currently constructed, anyone, including children, who meets the criteria of the duty also becomes subject to permanent bans on obtaining leave to remain, settlement, citizenship and re-entry. The application of the bans is irrespective of whether the child was complicit in the act of entering illegally. I hope that addresses the points noble Lords have raised in that regard.
The inclusion of children is to ensure that there is no perverse incentive for parents or others to put children in harm’s way by forcing them on to small boats or other dangerous methods in an attempt to gain entry to the UK. We want to send a clear message that children cannot be exploited and forced into making dangerous attempts to gain entry into the UK for the purpose of starting a new life here. Instead, the only way to come to the UK for protection will be through safe and legal routes. This will take the power out of the hands of criminal gangs and protect vulnerable people, including children.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene. Could he update the House, in light of what my noble friend Lady Lister said, on where we are with the child rights impact assessment?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I was saving that until the end of my remarks, which I will do, if I may.
Under our proposals, anyone who has entered illegally will be removed, so it is unlikely that they will qualify for settlement or citizenship on the basis of long and lawful residence. I therefore take my noble friend Lord Moylan’s point, in that regard. However, the powers in the Bill provide the Secretary of State with the discretion to waive the bans in specific circumstances, as we discussed in Committee. In practice, these powers mean that the Secretary of State retains the discretion to waive the bans on obtaining settlement as well as to consider an application for citizenship where they consider that failure to do so would result in a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECHR.
The Bill also provides additional discretionary powers to waive the bans on limited leave to remain and re-entry. The Secretary of State may waive the ban on re-entry if they consider that other exceptional circumstances make it appropriate to allow someone to return; these would include to ensure compliance with international agreements to which the UK is a party. Similarly, in the limited leave to remain area, there is a power allowing the Secretary of State to waive the ban where it is appropriate to ensure compliance with the ECHR or other international agreements to which the UK is a party, as well as where an individual who is seeking to remain in the UK has been allowed to return on the basis of other exceptional circumstances.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for again raising these interesting issues in the amendments he has tabled. They seek to change provisions in Clauses 30 to 36 so that the citizenship ban applies only to naturalisation and not registration routes. I am grateful to my noble friend for meeting me to talk about this. We had a useful discussion, although we did not quite reach agreement on these topics.
Our view is that registration is not just about recognising a person’s claim to British citizenship that they do not have the documents to demonstrate. Instead, a number of the registration routes within the British Nationality Act have requirements based on residence and many have good character requirements. It is not a case, as my noble friend has suggested, of merely acknowledging a status that a person already holds, but an opportunity for a person to demonstrate their suitability to become British.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, the Government Chief Whip promised that it would be published well before Report concludes. Does the Minister really think that tomorrow is well before Report concludes on Wednesday?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
That is clearly not the case. I accept that the Government Chief Whip did not exactly say that it would be put before your Lordships’ House today, but the expectation was that it would be. We have reached 7 pm; we are debating children’s issues and have done so all the way through Report, and we have not got the children’s impact assessment. It is utterly unacceptable for the Government to run a contentious Bill in this way. All the impact assessments were late, by and large. This is particularly late; it is no way to carry on. I can understand my noble friend Lady Lister’s upset and anger at this, and my noble friend Lord Kennedy raised it last week. The Minister knows, frankly, the anger and disappointment there is about this. I do not know what else to say, other than: what does “tomorrow” mean? Is it first thing tomorrow morning, or will it turn up at 8 or 9 pm, just before Report finishes? Perhaps the Minister can clarify what tomorrow means, and register the deep anger and upset in this House.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Before the Minister answers, I will add to what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said. Throughout our consideration of the Bill, I have been particularly concerned about children. As far as I can remember, there are no more amendments of any significance in relation to children in the final part of Report. All I have said has been without sight of the impact statement. For me and many other noble Lords who are concerned about children, it is quite simply too late.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I have looked into the history of child rights impact assessments, and they are a rare document. Tomorrow, when the assessment is provided, noble Lords will see an explanation of the background to these documents. There is an element of opportunism about the timing; clearly, these are difficult documents that need to be prepared with care. I say that it will be published tomorrow, so it will be published tomorrow, and at this point I cannot give any more detail as to the precise timing.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I will be very brief because many of the points have been made by others during the debate. Yet again the Minister has not answered the speakers’ questions. Yet again we are having a discussion, to discover that the impact assessment on child rights will be with us tomorrow after we have debated some key amendments. He did not respond to the issue I raised about why, if a child is in care when they arrive in this country, they are deemed to be able to make decisions. This is going to end up in the courts if the Government will not listen. Every single part of the response to this group has been an embarrassment and a real shame for children’s rights. I will not press this to a vote but the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, may wish either to bring something back at Third Reading or to communicate directly with the Minister.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the name of a “factual suspensive claim” to a “removal conditions suspensive claim”.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the definition of what will become a “removal conditions suspensive claim” so that it includes any claim that a person does not meet the removal conditions.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make regulations which amend the definition of “working day” in clause 37(8).
Lord Etherton
“Serious harm suspensive claims: interpretation(1) The definitions in subsections (2) and (3) have effect for the purposes of section 37, this section and sections 39 to 51.(2) A “serious harm suspensive claim” means a claim by a person (“P”) who has been given a third country removal notice that the serious harm condition is met in relation to P.(3) The “serious harm condition” is that P would face a real risk of serious harm if removed from the United Kingdom under this Act to the country or territory specified in the third country removal notice.(4) The following are examples of harm that constitute serious harm for the purposes of this Act—(a) death;(b) persecution falling within subsection (2)(a) or (b) of section 31 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (read together with subsections (1) and (3) of that section) (Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention: persecution) where P is not able to avail themselves of protection from that persecution;(c) torture;(d) inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;(e) onward removal from the country or territory specified in the third country removal notice to another country or territory where P would face a real risk of any harm mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d).(5) For the purposes of subsection (4)—(a) protection from persecution can be provided by—(i) the government of the relevant country or territory, or (ii) any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the relevant country or territory or a substantial part of it;(b) P is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—(i) the government, party or organisation mentioned in paragraph (a) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and(ii) P is able to access the protection.”Member's explanatory statement
This revised version of Clause 38: (1) removes any reference to “the relevant period”, (2) removes any reference to irreversibility of harm, and (3) removes examples of harm that do not constitute or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm.
Lord Etherton (CB)
My Lords, this amendment relates to serious harm suspensive claims, and it is important because the Government intend that suspensive claims are the only way that removal notices can be challenged. The point I have been concerned with from the beginning is the position of people who are served with a removal notice in respect of a country in which they have a well-founded fear of persecution if removed there, and they would fall within Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention. In other words, vis-à-vis that country, they would be regarded as refugees. Do they have to show in addition, as required by Clause 38(3),
“a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and”—
this is the critical word—“irreversible harm” to succeed on a serious harm suspensive claim? That would be not only novel but against all principle, and the meaning, intent and wording of the refugee convention.
The point has been illustrated—I have tried to illustrate it, and the Government have taken it up—in the particular case of LGBTQ+ claimants. The decision in the case of HJ (Iran) and HG (Cameroon) was that, in order to qualify as a refugee under the convention, it is sufficient that, if they would wish to live openly as LGBTQ, they would face persecution, even if they would not suffer such persecution if they acted discreetly. The question was, if they or somebody from that community were served with a removal notice and it were to a place where members of that particular social group, within the meaning of the convention, would have reasonable fear of persecution, would they have to show in addition that they would suffer irreversible harm, and within a specified period? I urge your Lordships to accept that that would be entirely wrong.
Throughout this debate on the Bill, my understanding has been that the Minister has said that, yes, such a group would have to show in addition that they would suffer irreversible harm. That seems inconsistent with Clause 38(4)(b), which states:
“The following are examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of this Act … (b) persecution falling within … Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention … where P”—
the refugee—
“is not able to avail themselves of protection from that persecution”.
My heart therefore leapt with joy last Wednesday when I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, who stood in as Minister, say:
“The point I am making is that the serious harm suspensive claim in connection with Clause 38 makes it clear that persecution and onward refoulement are examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of such a suspensive claim.”—[Official Report, 28/6/23; col. 767.]
However, I received a letter sent at 2pm this afternoon from the Minister which seemed to indicate that he was still insisting that, in addition, one would have to show irreversible harm. All I wish to receive from the Minister to avoid a vote on this is an assurance that, where it is clear that there would be persecution of a recognised category within the convention regarding the country specified in the removal notice, that fact alone is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a serious harm suspensive claim, and that the principle laid down in HJ (Iran) regarding LGBTQ people will continue to apply.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I will speak first to Amendment 131, which would survive even if the amendment to which my noble and learned friend Lord Etherton has spoken were carried and Clause 38 rewritten.
I am seeking to make a very simple point: the power in Clause 39 to
“by regulations amend section 38 to make provision about the meaning of ‘serious and irreversible harm’ for the purposes of this Act”
is unqualified and wide enough to enable the Secretary of State to remove some of the instances of serious harm set out in Clause 38 as it is or as it may be amended. The examples of serious harm given there are absolutely obvious, and they are indeed very serious. It would be a great misfortune if, by some misadventure, the Secretary of State were to remove one or other example from that list for some reason. I would have thought that the Minister could accept the amendment as a sensible qualification of the otherwise unqualified power in Clause 39. I am simply repeating a point I made in Committee, but it is rather important to have clarity on this. The Minister can give an assurance—no doubt he will—that there is no intention to remove examples from Clause 38, but that is not really good enough. It needs to be set out in terms in Clause 39.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, for the reasons that both noble and learned Lords have explained, we support all the amendments in this group. Should the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, not get a satisfactory answer from the Minister, we will support him if he divides the House.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, the House will be aware that I support the direction of travel of the Bill quite strongly. It represents a serious effort—it may be a vain one, and will certainly be so if the Government accept all the loopholes in the amendments we have discussed this afternoon—to address an issue of considerable concern to our fellow citizens. But, although I support the direction of travel, that does not mean that I think it perfect in every sense. I will therefore take a minute to support Amendment 131, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—to which he has just spoken—and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
I do not want to add to the background as the noble and learned Lord has obviously explained that very clearly. However, this does come under the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and I tried to draw to the attention of both Houses when we chaired the Delegated Powers Committee and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee respectively: the way in which power has been slipping through the hands of Parliament, with extensive and wide powers being taken by means of secondary legislation. Some might say that their use is improper, but let us say “extensive” for the purposes of this afternoon. Too often, these issues should have had a degree of scrutiny appropriate for primary legislation, and it is not satisfactory to introduce major issues of policy without that scrutiny.
We have to remember that we do need secondary legislation. Without it, the Government’s machine would gum up completely. But we need to make sure that its use is restricted to what it says on the tin—namely, issues of secondary importance. In my view, Clause 39, entitled
“Meaning of ‘serious and irreversible harm’,”
is of pretty fundamental importance.
I agree with the need for regulation. The world moves on much faster than the rather stately pace of primary legislation. That is why I could not support Amendment 132 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Paddick, because it seeks to delete the whole clause. We need some regulatory power. In much the same way, I am concerned about Amendment 130, because it opens up a whole series of other loopholes that impede the impact of the Bill as a whole.
In response to the wider powers that the Government are seeking under the present formulation, Parliament is entitled to ask for some limits on future ministerial power. Let me use the analogy of driving down a road. The Government are entitled to drive down the road, but in turn Parliament is entitled to ask for guard-rails—guard-rails that will ensure that a future Minister cannot swerve off into parts of—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way and for all his remarks thus far. Would he agree with me, in the light of the Companion, that this would be a good moment to hear from his noble friend the Minister?
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
If the noble Baroness had given me another two sentences, I would have finished. I was going to say we need guard-rails to make sure that future Ministers do not swerve off in directions hitherto undreamed of. It is because I think Amendment 131 represents those guard-rails that I support it.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, we support the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and, in particular, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. Were the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, minded to test the opinion of the House, he would certainly find us supporting him on Amendment 130.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, it was remiss of me not to say a little about Amendment 126 and the other government amendments in this group, so I will do so now. These amendments, as I am sure Members of the House have realised, replace a “factual suspensive claim” with a “removal conditions suspensive claim”. Clearly, I and the department listened carefully to the contributions from noble Lords in Committee on these topics about these suspensive claims, in particular those helpful contributions from the Cross Benches. The changes in the category of suspensive claim are a direct reflection of what was said during those debates.
Currently, a factual suspensive claim can be raised where a mistake of fact has been made in deciding that a person meets the four removal conditions in Clause 2. This definition would prevent a claim being raised where a person had been incorrectly identified as meeting the four removal conditions due to a mistake of law. A removal conditions suspensive claim will instead provide for a claim to be raised where a person who has been given a removal notice informing them that they are subject to the duty to remove does not consider that they meet the removal conditions in Clause 2. The Secretary of State’s or Upper Tribunal’s consideration of a removal conditions suspensive claim will be on whether or not the removal conditions were met. I trust these amendments will be welcome, in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who queried the scope of these claims in Committee.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Etherton and Lord Hope, for setting out the case for the other amendments in this group. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the United Kingdom to a country other than their country of origin. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold and reflects the test applied by the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39 of the rules of court. “Serious” indicates that the harm must meet a minimum level of severity, and “irreversible” means the harm would have a permanent or very long-lasting effect. These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 of the Bill defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed.
Amendment 130 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period it will take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the safe third country. I suggest it is reasonable to expect the harm to occur over a defined period. The very purpose of the suspensive claim process is to prevent those persons subject to the duty to remove suffering serious and irreversible harm during the same period that their human rights claims are considered. Without this requirement, it would be difficult for decision-makers properly to assess the likelihood of any risk materialising. It would also risk abusive suspensive claims being made on the basis of a risk of harm that does not currently exist or that may not materialise until months or even years after a person has been removed from the United Kingdom.
Amendment 130 would also remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. This would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the United Kingdom. Again, I would point out that the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures is one of serious and irreversible harm. So, the serious harm condition and requirement for the risk of harm to be both serious and irreversible reflects that test.
Lastly, Amendment 130 would also remove specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. Setting out a clear approach regarding the interpretation of serious harm on the face of the Bill will, I suggest to noble Lords, ensure that decision-makers and the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of what amounts to a risk of serious and irreversible harm. The examples in Clause 38(5) reflect existing case law and go no further than how we currently approach the consideration of these issues when raised in protection claims.
Amendment 131 would prevent amendments to the examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm set out in Clause 38(4), as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, so eloquently set out. I assure the House that the Government do not intend to diminish or remove the examples of harm listed in Clause 38(4).
Amendment 132 would remove the regulation-making power in Clause 39 to amend the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm”. This would result in the Secretary of State being unable to make amendments which reflect developments in case law. It is worth again pointing out that the Delegated Powers Committee raised no issue with this power in its report on the Bill.
Amendment 133 would alter the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include “compelling” evidence of the risk of harm that a person would face if removed to a third country and replace it with a requirement to provide evidence that is “reliable, substantial and material”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his remarks on the clarity of those three words, which, of course, will be available in Hansard should any questions arise as to what might amount to “compelling”.
However, although evidence that is compelling may also be defined as evidence that is reliable, substantial and material, a requirement for evidence to be compelling is more appropriate and succinct, given that it is the overall impact of the evidence provided, not any particular element or feature of it, that is relevant. The term “compelling” is sufficiently clear and well understood by decision-makers, and should remain unaltered. It is a term that has use in this area of the law. For example, evidence provided by people raising suspensive claims may differ dramatically in terms of volume and substance, but it is the overall impact of such evidence that is crucial when determining whether any claim has merit. For those reasons, the term “compelling” is more appropriate, providing decision-makers and the courts with the right degree of flexibility when making decisions on suspensive claims and appeals.
Finally, the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, seek to extend the claim and decision periods provided for in Clauses 41 and 45. We consider the periods specified in the Bill to be fair and equitable, affording sufficient time to submit and determine claims, commensurate with the Bill’s objective to remove people swiftly from the United Kingdom. However, I remind the noble Baroness that, where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so, it will be possible to extend both the claim period and the decision period.
For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully ask that the noble Lords do not press their amendments.
Lord Etherton (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I am afraid he has not answered my request for an assurance at all, so I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Etherton
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to amend section 38 by regulation by making provision about the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm”.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
“(a) that the person does not meet the removal conditions, or(b) that the person meets the removal conditions.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 3.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 3.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
“(b) in the case of a removal conditions suspensive claim, the person does not meet the removal conditions,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1 and page 41, line 3.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
“(b) in relation to a removal conditions suspensive claim, whether the person meets the removal conditions.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendments in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1 and pageusb 41, line 3.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 3.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Murray of Blidworth at page 41, line 1.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I suggest that Report be adjourned until not before 8.24 pm.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, the noble Baroness has suggested that the House adjourn now. We normally have our dinner break around 7.30 pm, I accept that, but I wonder if it would be convenient for the House to continue with the next group, which is a voting group, and then all sides could release their Members.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, we had Agreement with the usual channels. I know the Labour group often wants to break at 7.30 pm. I do not wish to have a dispute at the Dispatch Box but I ask that the noble Lord stick with the agreement that we had earlier and return no later than 8.25 pm.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, if the noble Baroness wants to have the dinner break now, that is fine, but I think we should move a Motion that allows that if the business finishes a bit earlier then the House could come back a bit earlier, rather than a rigid arrangement.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
The noble Lord is absolutely right that sometimes the dinner break business finishes a bit earlier, and if it does then I am happy that Report resumes then. But the time given for a Statement is usually 40 minutes, and that is exactly what I am giving for the Statement today. That is in the Standing Orders.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
I entirely accept the point that it is normally 40 minutes. However, if it finishes earlier then we should move a Motion that will allow us to come back a bit earlier, rather than saying “no earlier than”.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I suggest that we have been arguing for two minutes. Can we just do the Statement in the normal way and leave 40 minutes for it?