Baroness Kennedy of Shaws
Main Page: Baroness Kennedy of Shaws (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Kennedy of Shaws's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendment 98I, and I thank Amnesty International and the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens for their steadfast support for those who wish to register as British citizens. My friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, who added his name, was here earlier in the day but was unable to stay through to the evening.
This amendment aims to tackle a matter of great significance that affects the lives of many individuals residing in the UK under British national overseas visas. They include many people from Hong Kong who are rightly entitled to British citizenship but face serious uncertainty about their legal status. Many Hong Kongers have reported appalling responses from immigration officials regarding their children born here, being told that they cannot have any travel documentation and even querying whether they are allowed to become British citizens in the future.
We all know the turmoil and uncertainty that has plagued the people of Hong Kong in recent years—many have been subjected to unimaginable hardships, fearing for their safety and the future of their families—so it is concerning that so many face anxiety about the citizenship status of their children. The people of Hong Kong have shown immense courage and resilience against Beijing’s totalitarian regime, and many of those who have come to the UK face profound challenges, including concern about the safety and security of their families living abroad. The nature of the treatment of protesters and dissidents by the Chinese Communist Party means that many of them are now permanently settling in the UK. This amendment is, simply, testament to our support for the people of Hong Kong, and it ensures that their status is not subject to further confusion.
All the way through Committee, it has appeared that the Minister and his team have set their face against accepting any amendments whatever. Here, I suggest, are two—the well and clearly argued one from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and this one from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton—on which they could really give something tonight.
My Lords, as noble Lords will see, my name is attached to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I support it. I am a patron of both Hong Kong Watch and another human rights organisation, The 29 Principles, relating to what is happening in Hong Kong and China. I, too, have been lobbied by many young people and Hong Kong families here, who have fled because of the threats to their safety back in Hong Kong. They face great difficulties and uncertainties around the status of their children. I will not rehearse all of the arguments that noble Lords have heard.
Having heard the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, make an eloquent argument about the whole business of citizenship, and listening to my noble friend Lady Lister, I support this clause stand part proposition. Our special relationship with Hong Kong, and our special duties and responsibilities concerning those people, should be at the forefront of this Government’s mind.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 95EA in the name of my noble friend Lady Ludford. The amendment seeks to ensure that all UK obligations under EU law are considered when persons are considered for ineligibility in terms of the rights to entry or citizenship.
As my noble friend said, the consideration of rights under the ECHR raises a number of concerns, such as in relation to Articles 2, 3 and 8. This includes, for example, the right to family reunion, the right for individual circumstances to be considered, and even the rights of safety and not to be tortured. The need to consider the best interests of children is a priority under the ECHR as well as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Indeed, the Government have acknowledged that children affected by the Bill will rarely qualify for citizenship, so it is difficult to see how provisions in the Bill are in the best interests of children, as required by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The right to citizenship is the means by which an individual is able to construct a life, settle, earn a living and feel at home in their circumstances. However, individuals fulfilling Clause 2 conditions will be denied those things. They will most likely be kept in a form of limbo, waiting to be moved elsewhere. Ineligibility for citizenship is particularly important for children, who, in effect, will be denied a future by this Bill through no fault of their own.
The Bill does not comply with many of the UK’s international obligations and penalises the most vulnerable and threatened people. The safeguards of ministerial discretion to protect people from breaches of international law are inadequate, as the report of the JCHR makes clear in its recommendations. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response to those recommendations.
We have heard from noble Lords some of the punitive measures in the Bill, so how could any of us support what the Government propose in terms of treatment of children? How can it be right to punish children for the activities of their parents? That is unjust and insupportable. To flout international law is deplorable, as it condemns many who have already suffered to more injustice. The Joint Committee has exposed the inadequacy of the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will consider its recommendations.
As others have said, the systematic wrecking of long-supported safeguards for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers is totally unacceptable. The potential for the contravention of international obligations has been clearly established by the JCHR, and is the basis for Amendment 98EA and many other amendments in this part of the Bill, which deserve our support. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
I thank my noble friend for that contribution. The position, as he outlined in his speech, is that the deterrence effect takes its force from a number of sections in the Bill: the first, obviously, being the detention and removal, as he rightly identified; the second being the bans on the ability to settle or stay here, the idea being that that disincentivises people from entering illegally using dangerous routes. I do not accept that there are two Bills in the way that my noble friend identifies. The reality is that the question of registration of citizenship, which he raises, is unlikely to arise in as many cases as the naturalisation circumstance—I think we can agree on that—so it is natural that what we are talking about is probably an exceptional state of affairs, in any event. That is potentially why my noble friend perceives a dissonance between the deterrent effect and the two factors, but in fact there is no such distinction.
Amendments 98ZA and 98EA, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to expand the circumstances in which the bans on settlement and citizenship are to be disapplied. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, also touched on this issue. We consider that the circumstances in which a grant of settlement or citizenship would be an appropriate remedy are wholly covered by the ECHR, so our view is that the addition of other international agreements is unnecessary, hence the amendment, as we have already canvassed.
I turn now to Amendment 98I tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. This seeks to provide a broader protection for those holding British national (overseas) status. We do not believe this is necessary. The clauses which prevent people from obtaining various forms of British nationality already do not mention British national (overseas) status. This is for the simple reason that no one has been able to obtain that status since 1997 and, consequently, there is no need to ban people from obtaining it should they arrive illegally.
We already have in place a dedicated migration route for people from Hong Kong and, as the noble Baroness knows, it has been a significant priority for the Government and the department to offer this route to British national (overseas) people from Hong Kong in response to the situation there. We have done a great deal for the citizens of Hong Kong and hope to continue to do so. As cited in my response to my noble friend, Lord Moylan, a route to citizenship exists under Section 4(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. There should therefore be no reason for a person holding British national (overseas) status to arrive illegally in the manner which would mean they fall under this Bill’s provisions.
I was just going to posit to the noble Lord that some of these people having to flee are aged 16 and 17 and were involved in demonstrations and so on and then fled by unusual routes out of Hong Kong. Some of them are making their way via Europe to join family members here in the United Kingdom. Would they automatically, under this Bill, be deprived of ever joining their families?
I thank the noble Baroness for raising that. In fact, I was just turning to that very issue.
The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked a couple of specific questions about the children of BNO passport holders—the issue that the noble Baroness now raises again. These address issues which fall outside this Bill; none the less, I can advise the noble Baroness and others interested in this topic that dependants of BNO status holders who themselves do not hold BNO status do not need a valid Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport to renew their BNO visa. However, I am afraid that renewal of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passports is not something the UK Government can assist with and until they qualify for British citizenship, such children are not eligible for a British passport.
The Government’s view is that this is not relevant to this clause, but I am, however, very interested in this topic and can entirely understand the concern that has been expressed. I would be content to meet the noble Baroness and perhaps the right reverend Prelate, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and some BNOs to discuss this issue because it is obviously important. I suggest that this amendment is not the mechanism for us to discuss this, but I entirely understand that clarification and explanation is needed.
My Lords, Clause 37 provides for two types of suspensive claims, which have the effect of suspending a person’s removal—a factual suspensive claim and a serious harm suspensive claim. A factual suspensive claim is a claim that a mistake was made in deciding that a person meets the four conditions set out in Clause 2. A serious harm suspensive claim is a claim that a person would, before the end of the relevant period, face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if they were removed from the UK to a country other than their country of origin. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, the risk must be real, imminent and foreseeable. The serious and irreversible harm test is designed to be a high threshold, reflecting the test of the European Court of Human Rights when considering whether to indicate an interim measure under Rule 39.
These amendments seek to change how Clause 38 defines the risk of harm, lowering the threshold for a serious harm claim to succeed. In responding to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I start by making the general observation that suspensive claims are relevant to people who have received a third-country removal notice. In this context, an asylum claim would not be relevant. Therefore, they do not impact the definition of “refugee” in the way that he suggested.
Amendments 100 and 108 would remove the requirement for the harm to occur in the period that it would take for any human rights claim or judicial review to be determined from the third country. If accepted, these amendments would enable people who receive a third-country removal notice to raise serious harm suspensive claims against their removal, based on a risk of harm that many not materialise for many months, if not years, after the person’s removal to the safe third country. This cannot be right. We cannot have a position whereby a person’s removal from this country is prevented based on a risk that does not currently exist and may not exist until a significant amount of time has elapsed after the person is removed.
Amendment 101 would remove the need for the risk of harm to be imminent and foreseeable. If accepted, this would have a similar effect to Amendments 100 and 108, enabling a person to successfully challenge their removal based on a risk that may occur a long time in the future.
A great deal of research has gone into the risks associated with countries where the law still criminalises homosexuality. The research of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has shown that those countries permit levels of murder of gay men and women, violence towards them and discrimination against them in many different forms. The violence experienced by people who are part of the LGBT+ community in those countries is exponentially greater than anywhere else, even in countries known for high levels of violence. The idea the Minister is talking about—risk that is far down the line and many years ahead—is not what we are talking about here. For many people going to those countries, there will be risks almost immediately.
The noble Baroness makes an entirely fair point. In those cases, of course, it would be an imminent feature. As she points out, in those circumstances that is something the courts would be able to have regard to.
The inclusion of “imminent and foreseeable” is intended to prevent the courts from considering risks that are dependent on a series of hypothetical events before the harm might occur. That is the reason, as I understand it, that “imminent” features in the European Court of Human Rights practice direction on interim measures. We cannot allow illegal entrants to be able to thwart their removal based on an unknown risk that cannot be foreseen and may not even arise for many months or years, if at all.
Amendments 102, 103, 104, 109, 111 and 112 would remove the requirement for the risk of harm to be irreversible. These amendments would significantly lower the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim to succeed and undermine the purpose of the Bill to deter illegal entry to the UK. Again, I point out with the greatest of respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that
“a real risk of serious and irreversible harm”
is the test applied by the Strasbourg court when considering applications for Rule 39 interim measures, as he alluded to during his speech.
Amendments 105, 106 and 107 would remove specific examples of harm, relevant to the availability of healthcare and medical treatment in a third country—a passage that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, drew the attention of the Committee to—in circumstances that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm. There is existing case law that indicates that claims based on harm resulting from differing standards of healthcare fall short of the Article 3 threshold. It is simply unjustifiable for those who enter this country illegally to be able to remain here indefinitely and have unlimited access to our healthcare systems solely on the basis that they may not receive the same level of medical treatment in the country or territory they are rightly removed to.
For these reasons, Clause 38 makes it clear that a serious harm suspensive claim based on a risk of harm relating to differing standards of healthcare cannot succeed and, as a result, will not prevent that person’s removal to the safe third country. Clause 38 also makes it clear that a claim based on pain or distress resulting from a lack of medical treatment is unlikely to succeed. By including specific examples of harm that do not or are unlikely to constitute serious and irreversible harm in Clause 38, it is ensured that the courts take a consistent approach in their consideration of the risk of serious and irreversible harm and go no further than intended.
The Bill provides a fast-track process for the consideration of a claim which may temporarily suspend a person’s removal from the UK. Clauses 41 and 42, as the Committee has noted, set out the procedure and timescale for making a suspensive claim and the timescale for a decision to be made on a suspensive claim.
Amendment 113 would remove the requirement for a serious harm suspensive claim to include compelling evidence of the risk of serious harm that a person would face if removed to a third country, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. Reducing the evidential burden in this way risks the process being abused through spurious and unmeritorious claims, similar to those that we have seen in other immigration applications. Evidence that is compelling is defined as that which is reliable, substantial and material to a person’s claim. I suggest that this is a reasonable requirement and necessary to ensure that the suspensive claims process is not open to abuse.