Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

98ZA: Clause 29, page 36, line 13, at end insert “or another international agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that due regard is given to other international agreements when indefinite leave to remain is considered by the Secretary of State under Clause 8AA(5).

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to do two things that the Government Chief Whip does not like. First, I am going to take a little time over my remarks in moving this amendment. Secondly, I am going to read my speech, because these are very complicated matters in Clauses 29 to 36 and I want to be sure that I am covering what are quite dense political points. What we are doing at the moment is not just a question of opining on an issue of the day; we are actually analysing crucial legal provisions in a piece of legislation so I do not apologise.

I shall speak once in a single contribution covering my clause stand part on every clause in this section of the Bill and my Amendments 98ZA and 98EA to Clauses 29 and 35 respectively. The clauses are extremely important and, in my view, regrettable provisions. They are pernicious in depriving refugees who ever met the four conditions in Clause 2 of any chance, long term, of integrating into and contributing to our society by denying them any prospect of settlement or citizenship, with few exceptions. British citizenship enables a person to live and work in the UK permanently, vote, hold public office and participate fully in British life in a way that no other type of status allows.

The amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, focus specifically on those entitled to various kinds of British citizenship who need to register to secure recognition of that, and I pay tribute to their work on this, which I know has a particular focus on children.

I am taking a global view of the operation of this section of the Bill, whether on entry, leave to remain or any kind of citizenship, whether by registration or naturalisation, because the issues are interrelated. The clauses impose lifelong prohibitions on lawful re-entry or gaining leave to remain in the UK and on grants of citizenship, as opposed to the maximum 10-year re-entry ban under the current Immigration Rules. They are an extension of the whole deterrence agenda and are in conflict with several international obligations. The clauses breach Article 8 of the ECHR and the right to private and family life because they are axiomatically disproportionate. A blanket ban allows for no individual consideration whatever, such as in no possible circumstances could you ever be granted status. The UK has, for instance, certain positive obligations under Article 8 to allow family reunification, such that failure to allow a relevant individual to reunite with their family members by entering or settling in the UK could breach those obligations. The breach of Article 8 ECHR could even escalate to a breach of Article 3, which bans torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. It is also unclear, as a practical matter, where the Home Secretary has determined that a human rights claim or asylum claim is inadmissible by virtue of Clause 4, how an individual could apply to the Secretary of State for an exception to be made in their case. Perhaps the Minister could put me right on that point.

The Bill is in a multitude of ways incompatible with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which protects the right of children to a nationality, prohibits discrimination and requires that the child’s best interests are counted as a primary consideration in actions concerning them. The Bill is also incompatible with current UK law, such as the Children Act 1989.

The JCHR, which I thank for its excellent report published yesterday—in which, as I am no longer on the committee, I had no part—highlights the legal problems with the Home Secretary’s discretionary exception-making powers. Giving her discretion to act in accordance with the UK’s international obligations also means giving her power to act in breach of them, and a refusal to exercise discretion may not be capable of an effective challenge. The UNHCR says:

“In order to bring this section of the Bill into line with the UK’s obligations under international law, the exceptions to the ineligibility for all forms of leave and for citizenship should be based on compliance … with European Convention on Human Rights and other international agreements and those decisions should not be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State”.


Where a breach of the UK’s international obligations would otherwise occur, the Home Secretary should surely be under a duty to make an exception, rather than have a discretion to do so. If a person entered the UK by irregular means but could not, for whatever reason, be removed, Clause 29 in conjunction with Clause 4 would prevent them from regularising their stay in the UK, leaving them in perpetual immigration limbo and would of course be the prelude to their having no chance of access to citizenship. Depending on the length of the delay and the private and family ties they have generated during that delay, this could violate the UK’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR, the refugee convention, the convention against statelessness and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to name but the most obvious ones.

UNHCR comments that, as at present the UK is effectively unable to remove asylum seekers to third countries:

“It is entirely foreseeable—and in Clause 29-36, expressly foreseen—that many refugees and stateless people who will be ineligible for any form of leave to remain will nonetheless remain in the UK for extended periods of time, if not indefinitely, trapped ‘on the margins’ of society”.


Throughout proceedings on the Bill, beginning with Second Reading, many of us have raised this worry about people being left in limbo. Because we lack the impact assessment from the Government, we all have to go on the one from the refugee commissioner, which estimates that there could be 200,000 people within three years, marginalised, in limbo, destitute—really healthy for our society.

Even if the Home Secretary exercised her discretion to grant some form of leave eventually, anyone who had ever been subject to the removal duty would be permanently ineligible from becoming a British citizen through several of the main routes available under the British Nationality Act 1981. However, Article 34 of the refugee convention requires contracting states as far as possible to

“facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees”.

The impact on children of a lifelong prohibition on re-entry or gaining leave to remain could be particularly severe and is difficult to reconcile with the UK’s international and domestic obligations. Consideration of the best interests of an individual child is absent from Clause 29, but how can a blanket ban be in the best interests of a child for the purposes of either Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or, domestically, the Children Act 1989 or Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009?

The Government have acknowledged that children affected by this Bill

“will rarely qualify for citizenship”

if they or a relevant family member are subject to Clause 2. The JCHR considers that this seems to contravene Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits the discrimination or punishment of a child on the basis of the status of or activities of their parents or guardians. Where the child, as will of course be the case, will have had no control over their parents or the decisions which led to them arriving in the UK irregularly, the automatic imposition of a lifelong ban which they then have to convince the Home Secretary to reverse seems to fall within the definition of a punishment. Can the Minister tell me how Clause 29 is compliant with the Supreme Court case of Zoumbas and subsequent case law on the issues concerning children’s best interests in an immigration context? How can routine application to children of a blanket ban on entry and leave to remain without consideration of their particular circumstances possibly be lawful?

I am on my last page. The Home Secretary’s discretion under Clause 29 when deciding whether to lift a ban on limited leave to remain has to be exercised so as to avoid a breach of the ECHR or any other international agreement to which the UK is a party but, in a similar situation with regard to a grant of indefinite leave, only conformity with the ECHR is said to be relevant. Perhaps the Minister can explain the contrast between those two situations in Clause 29, because I have not managed to pin down the rationale. My Amendment 98ZA in any case adds in other international agreements so as to align the two legs of Clause 29 on leave to remain.

Many children, either because they arrived unaccompanied as a small child or because removal has not been possible in practice, may be born or spend their entire childhood here and have a solely British identity. The Bill would mean previously acceptable routes to citizenship, such as the discretionary route or the settled route, being either blocked or fundamentally altered. The 10-year route would be possible in theory but, for children whose parents were irregular entrants, those parents could be prohibited from obtaining leave to remain, citizenship and employment, thus creating instability and poverty in the child’s life.

The Bill would also put stateless children at significant risk. If a relevant family member was an irregular entrant subject to Clause 2, they and the stateless child would be subject to mandatory removal, jeopardising the child’s years of residency and potentially condemning the child to a lifetime without citizenship. Clause 35 as originally introduced would in fact have allowed the Home Secretary to make an exception and grant nationality if there were compelling circumstances or it was necessary to comply with the UK’s obligations under not just the ECHR but any other international agreement to which the UK is a party. However, unaccountably, that latter part has been removed, risking the UK being in breach of its legal obligations under those other international agreements.

Even if ECHR grounds are not established, the UK’s legal obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child may be breached under the prohibition of discrimination or punishment of a child on the basis of the activities of their parents; I have referred to this. This backwards redrafting appears to have eliminated an avenue for stateless people, refugees and others to obtain British nationality in reliance on the refugee convention, the statelessness conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Can the Minister explain, therefore, why the Government have narrowed the available exceptions between the original draft of the Bill, as considered in the other place, and the Bill as it came to this House? I hope that, unless a convincing answer can be given, this House will see fit at a later stage to seek to restore the grounds for making exceptions under Clause 35 to the version introduced in the other place; namely, on the grounds of both the ECHR and any other international agreement.

I hope that I have explained sufficiently why these Benches have tabled amendments and clause stand part notices, which would remove all the clauses in this part of the Bill and at least bring the Home Secretary’s exercise of discretion in line with international law. I beg to move.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to a number of amendments in this group in my name; namely, Amendments 98A to 98H. I also oppose Clauses 33 and 34 standing part; those notices stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I have added my name to them. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, for each of my amendments and the clause stand part notices. This is a coherent suite of amendments: they do one thing but are necessary to do that thing throughout a whole section of the Bill that, in essence, covers Clauses 30 to 36, which stand together as a form of deprivation. I am grateful to Amnesty for its assistance in drafting these amendments; I should also say right at the outset that I am grateful to the Minister, my noble friend Lord Murray, for the time he gave to a meeting in advance for us to discuss them.

The essence of what is happening is that the Bill has a two-step deterrence mechanism. It is frankly and openly deterrent, designed to deter people from setting off on a certain course. The first step in that deterrence, and to my mind a very powerful one, is the prospect of rapid removal from the United Kingdom to another country. Coming on top of the money that people have paid, as they have in many cases, to cross the channel or for whatever their mode of arrival, I would have thought that the prospect of immediate removal is a very significant deterrent indeed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, clearly this needs to be looked into and I hear what the noble Baroness says. After the conclusion of the Committee we can have that meeting, explore the issue and I can respond in full. I am certainly not unsympathetic to the points raised.

The benefits of permanent settlement and British citizenship should not be available to those who come to the UK illegally. These clauses serve to underline our core message that if you come to the UK unlawfully, you will not be able to build a life in this country. I commend Clauses 29 to 36 to the Committee and invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, our debate on this group has given me a new respect for nationality law, which is at least as confusing as I ever imagined. It has always been a rather “Here be dragons” subject for me; that has been fully confirmed by this debate. I need to try to make sense of my scribbles.

One thing still puzzles me: I do not really understand why the Government are excluding registration for some forms of British citizenship but not for others. I remain bemused by that; I shall have to read exactly what the Minister said in Hansard. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, grasped that explanation better than I did.

I have sympathy with the particular issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on registration. I happen to think that there is more commonality with the issue of excluding routes to naturalisation than the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, wishes to acknowledge or give any quarter to, but on the issue of registration he made some important points. I wish him well in his pursuit of those issues with the Minister, but I also believe that there are serious issues around excluding people from the right to remain and a route to citizenship.

I did not grasp the Minister’s explanation of why the phrase “other international agreements” was taken out by the Government. Why did you—I do not mean the Minister personally; I mean the Government and the Home Secretary—put it in the original draft of the Bill a few months ago and then take it out if it did not meet the tests of clarity and concision? I think that was the Minister’s explanation. I accept that taking out those few words makes the clause more concise, but I do not think that doing so makes it clearer because we are then left wondering how the Government are going to secure compliance with those other international agreements —including the refugee convention, the statelessness conventions and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—which are not referred to in the Bill.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Minister tried to explain that hanging fast to the ECHR was some new discovery by the Government. As I said last week, we tend to find it quite confusing as to when the Government like the ECHR and when they do not. They appear to act rather fast and loose on this subject.

I applaud the probing amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Brinton. I hope that she gets a fruitful meeting with the Minister because, as she and other noble Lords said, this issue seems to be the subject of considerable muddle and is having a severe impact on people’s lives. It is giving them extra anxiety. They have had to leave home and come to this country, but now they are being given the runaround by Home Office staff.

I was left unclear, it has to be said, on the situation raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. What will happen to the dependants of BNO status holders who are having to leave Hong Kong irregularly and perhaps also arrive in this country irregularly? I am not clear whether we are sure about how their welfare and status will be assured. The Minister said that BNOs are not covered by this Bill, but if somebody who is not a BNO but is a dependant of one arrives in this country irregularly, surely they will potentially be subject to the Clause 2 duty to remove.

Also—and almost finally—the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, highlighted a very interesting contrast between the Government wanting a duty to remove people but wanting only a discretion to be fair to them in legal and human rights terms. That does not seem very consistent. So I end by saying that I still feel very firmly that the duties under Clause 29 and 35 should be expressed in terms of not a discretion but a duty to obey our international legal obligations under the ECHR and other international treaties that we have signed.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 37, as amended, should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I warned your Lordships that I would keep popping up this evening, but I am glad to say that the cavalry is coming to my assistance. On the Bench opposite there are all my legal heavyweight friends who are going to row in on this issue. In moving that Clause 37 should not stand part of the Bill, I shall speak similarly with regard to Clauses 38 to 42 and in support of my Amendments 114 and 115 as well as all the other amendments in this group.

At the moment, under existing law, a human rights claim would effectively suspend a claimant’s removal; the suspensive effect of a human rights claim is a crucial safeguard against individuals being removed to face human rights abuses before the validity of their claim has been established. As was referred to in earlier groups, we on these Benches believe that pursuing a claim from another jurisdiction is likely to be very difficult and in some cases impossible. We were talking about trafficking victims earlier, but I contend that it applies to anyone trying to pursue a claim from abroad. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to an effective remedy under Article 13, taken together with Articles 2 and 3, guarantees the ability to present an asylum claim effectively. We would say that you cannot do it effectively if you are outside the country.

Clause 4 of the Bill makes it clear that the Clause 2 duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for removal will still apply to a person making a claim that removal would violate their human rights. The continuing application of the duty means that, under the Bill, these claims would all be non-suspensive. The Bill provides narrow exceptions to this non-suspensive effect by establishing two categories of suspensive claims that prevent the removal of the claimant while they are ongoing: the serious harms suspensive claim and the factual suspensive claim. These are the only ways in which anyone who satisfies the Clause 2 conditions—whether they are seeking asylum, have been trafficked or have otherwise come without permission—would be able to challenge their removal before it takes place. Even a successful claimant will remain subject to the Secretary of State’s removal duty and prohibition on getting leave to enter or remain under Clause 29, as we have just been discussing, and will thus remain in a state of limbo regarding their immigration status—at least theoretically still awaiting removal—so it does not necessarily solve the problem. Most human rights claims will stay non-suspensive and have to be pursued from outside.

I turn to the test for these suspensive claims, which I think is where some of the amendments come in. The test established in the Strasbourg court is where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question would face a real risk. However, this appears to mean that individuals who can establish a real risk of treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 but cannot establish that it is imminent would still be removed under this Bill and left to pursue their claims from overseas. The JCHR says, and we on these Benches agree, that this would likely breach the Government’s obligations under the ECHR—the convention to which the Government are newly converted.

Another problem is that a serious harm suspensive claim would have to contain compelling evidence that the serious harm condition is met. This appears to be a new evidential standard created by this Bill. Freedom from Torture told the JCHR that this amounts to

“an extremely high evidential threshold which may, in fact, be higher than ‘real risk’ or even ‘the balance of probabilities’. How an individual who has just fled persecution could provide evidence to this threshold is unclear”.

The next problem is that the Bill retains a power for the Secretary of State to make provision about the meaning of “serious and irreversible harm” in regulations. Our Constitution Committee considers that

“the implications of this definition are so significant that it should be amended only by primary legislation unless any delegated power to do so is limited to prevent fundamental risks of harm being removed from the definition”.

The committee supports my proposition that Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill or heavily circumscribed.

This is also the subject of criticism by the JCHR. Not only does the committee

“urge the Government to reconsider its decision to make human rights claims non-suspensive, and the extremely high threshold imposed to establish serious harm suspensive claims”

but it believes:

“The meaning of ‘serious and irreversible harm’ should not be open to amendment by regulations”


and:

“Clause 39 should be removed from the Bill”.


Lastly, timeframes are the subject of my Amendments 114 and 115. In the Bill, the Government are imposing very tight timescales: the lodging of a claim within seven days following receipt of the notice, a decision within three days and appeal to the Upper Tribunal within six days. My amendments aim to increase both the claim and the decision deadlines to 30 days. All in all, my amendments in this group, with the support of other noble Lords, are designed to restore better fairness to the possibility of people appealing against removal. I beg to move.

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to a number of amendments in my name in this group: Amendments 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111 and 112, all of which are supported by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who is a co-signatory. I am grateful to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who has also supported one of them. I am also grateful to the Minister for a remote meeting with me to discuss my amendments, which I appreciated.

We are here dealing with the situation where a person claiming refugee status has been given a third country removal notice. That notice will be for removal to a country specified in Schedule 1, and the refugee claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution if they are removed to that country. Under the Bill, the removal notice can be challenged only by a serious harm suspensive claim. The serious harm condition is defined in Clause 38(3): the person claiming refugee status must, within a specified period called “the relevant period”,

“face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed … to the country or territory specified in the third country removal notice”.

The majority of my amendments in this group focus on the inappropriateness of the requirement to show an imminent risk of “irreversible” harm within a specified period.

The first point to note is that, by way of general observation, whereas the serious harm suspensive claim focuses on the situation of an individual claiming refugee status, the well-established approach both internationally and under our own jurisprudence is to ask, in the case of a “particular social group” within Article 1A(2) of the refugee convention, whether the members of that group have a well-founded fear of persecution by virtue of being a member of that group.

Secondly, that change in approach is explained by the appearance, for the first time, of a requirement for an individual claiming refugee status to be able to resist removal to an otherwise unsafe country only if they can additionally show that they would personally suffer serious and irreversible harm. There is no such requirement in the refugee convention or in any jurisprudence of our own courts or, so far as I am aware, those of any other country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I can only repeat that the Supreme Court decision in HJ (Iran) and the other documents provided by the UNHCR are not relevant in this context because they do not deal with the same mechanics. Those cases were asylum or protection claims, whereas this deals with the specific statutory category of serious and irreversible harm. Of course, although there may be some crossover in the arguments deployed, ultimately they address a different issue. I cannot provide the type of assurance that the noble and learned Lord seeks, I am afraid.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, if two noble and learned Lords and one learned with a small “l” noble Lord—if I may call the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that—are frowning and struggling to understand what the Minister has just said, there is no hope for me. I must confess that I found it pretty difficult to understand. I would be most grateful if the Minister could put the letter that he has promised the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in the Library so that the rest of us can try to understand.

It would be of great concern if the worry that the noble and learned Lord raised was to be shrouded in doubt in terms of the status of the Supreme Court case, which said that you cannot expect a gay person to have to live in a closeted fashion—that is, you would expect them to be able to live openly for a country to be considered safe. If that precedent were to be put in any doubt, it would have serious implications, as would the concerns that were raised about healthcare; I am not sure what point we have precisely got to on that subject.

The overall concern, if I may put it like this, is if it ain’t broke there is no need to fix it. The courts seem to have got a handle on these issues, and what the Government are doing with their word salad is creating quite a lot of instability and confusion in something that is being handled pretty competently by the courts. They have reached some position on how to assess issues such as risk, foreseeability and reality of risk—and here the Government come, like a bull in a china shop, trying to upset and disturb all that. I am rather minded to think that the Government would do better just to leave it to the courts.

The Minister was not very persuasive in his argument that the wording in the Bill is necessary to stop projections of hypothetical risk. Surely, the courts can be relied on to filter out fantastical imaginings when they assess the reality of risk. I am afraid I found his responses on this group pretty unpersuasive. He keeps coming back to this hoary old chestnut that the use of detention is necessary to ensure swift removal. The idea that this Government are going to ensure swift removal of a lot of people strikes most people living in the real world, to use that phrase again, as for the birds. However, with that said, I shall not oppose the clause standing part.

Clause 37, as amended, agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 43 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Yes, I am sorry, it is me again. I am looking forward to the next group, when someone else will be in charge.

I shall speak to the question of whether various clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I am grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on Clauses 49 and 51, the ouster clauses. The situation at the moment is that, generally, immigration and asylum decisions can be appealed to the First-tier Tribunal with a further appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law, but under the Bill, the rejection of a suspensive claim may be appealed only to the Upper Tribunal, bypassing the First-tier Tribunal. The fear is that while reducing appeal rights may speed up the process, it could be at a significant cost to justice. As with the suspensive claims themselves, the Bill requires the notice of appeal to be supported by compelling evidence, and this could result in a notice of appeal being rejected despite there being evidence that, while not coming under the definition of “compelling”, is nevertheless sufficient to establish the normal tests that the Upper Tribunal would apply.

Also, if the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded, there needs to be permission from the Upper Tribunal to appeal to the Upper Tribunal and this will be granted only if the Upper Tribunal considers that there is compelling evidence that the serious harm condition is met, with the additional requirement that serious harm is “obvious”. This could result in the Upper Tribunal refusing permission despite being satisfied that the serious harm condition is met. It could have to refuse it on the grounds that it is not obvious serious harm, which could expose the claimant to a risk of irreversible harm in breach of the convention.

We come to the denial of the right to judicially review the decisions of the Upper Tribunal. Justice said in its evidence to the JCHR that since vulnerable individuals will be

“restricted to one, fast-tracked hearing, it is even more important that there is proper oversight from experienced judges”.

The Bill therefore denies the right to judicial review even where an error has been made in reaching the decision. It insulates decisions of the Upper Tribunal from any kind of judicial oversight or correction by the higher courts. This is a cause of considerable worry. The risk to those removed despite having a human rights claim pending is extremely serious. If appeal rights in suspensive claims are limited, there should at least be effective judicial supervision and the Bill should be amended to remove the unnecessary ouster of judicial review.

--- Later in debate ---

All in all, this is a coherent and logical framework for appeal. It is true, if I may use the word colloquially, that it is relatively tough in terms of time limits, subject to the possibility of extension, but the procedures are essentially fair and will result in just decisions.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his responses. I am not really persuaded by his answer on Clause 49: that these are just some little minor issues that cannot be JRed from the Upper Tribunal. Subsection (3) states that

“the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision”.

So the fact that it has made an error is apparently not subject to judicial review, which seems to me not particularly minor. An application for judicial review can be made if the tribunal

“has acted … in bad faith or … in such a procedurally defective way as amounts to a fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice”.

I do not suppose those crop up very often, and I would imagine that bad faith would be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish, so I do not think there is much wiggle room in Clause 49—but those who know more about how these things work might have other thoughts, and if they do I would be grateful if they would share them with me in due course.

I do not think the Minister covered the point about First-tier Tribunal judges being appointed to act as Upper Tribunal judges. If he did not—I will check what he said—perhaps he could write to me with any answers.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I will happily write to the noble Baroness. I thought I had covered it when I said that it was creating a pool. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, nods. It is creating a pool of judges so we have enough judges of relevant standing and experience to decide what are essentially factual questions. These are relatively limited factual questions.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I apologise. I was clearly inattentive as I was trying to look at the other groups that are coming up. Even so, I think concerns remain about promoting, and possibly overpromoting, people before they are ready. What the Government are proposing to do seems a little odd.

On the tribunal rules, I note the Minister’s citation of a precedent, but at one point he said that the problem is that the committee works too slowly. I would have thought that if processes do not work very well or do not work in a reasonable timeframe, the way to resolve that is to work with the relevant bodies to speed them up rather than to grab power from them. However, I find that this Government seem to have an appetite for grabbing powers from everybody else, whether it is the courts, other agencies or indeed Parliament. I worry that the Government are getting rather too big for their boots. Perhaps one day they will even come a cropper. That said, I think I have probably taken these issues as far as they can go.

Clause 43 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I can be relatively brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for introducing her amendments so powerfully and with such knowledge. I agree with her that there is a curious disparity between Clauses 52 and 53, and my proposition is that they should be swept away and should not stand part of the Bill. As she said, the Home Office getting its act together and making decent decisions in the first place would be how to reduce the workload and what the Government seem to think is the overreach of the courts—I do not agree that it is overreach. If you get things right first time, you would not need to keep attacking the courts.

Clause 52 is a straightforward ban on domestic courts granting interim remedies to stop the removal of a person from the UK. We are familiar with this “courts are enemies of the people” stuff. The interim remedies are valuable because they allow the courts to maintain the status quo while a claim is considered. When the harm in question is a violation of human rights, the ability to freeze the situation is valuable. Denying the courts the ability to use interim remedies when justice demands it undermines the guarantees of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Clause 52 should be removed, and I am glad to say that the JCHR agrees.

Clause 53 is a different animal altogether. It is really rather peculiar, and it takes a strange and circuitous route to block interim measures from Strasbourg, by giving a Minister discretion to decide whether or not to disapply the duty on the Home Secretary to remove the person. Given the negotiations under way over the procedure for deciding interim measures, as reported in the press and alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, this clause appears to be more politics than law. It is strange, given that the Prime Minister was recently in Reykjavik, at the summit of the Council of Europe—and given that the JCHR’s recent report says:

“We welcome the Prime Minister’s recent reaffirmation of his ‘deep and abiding’ commitment to the ECHR”


and the European Court of Human Rights, made at that very recent summit.

Then, the Government propose in Clause 53 to give Ministers permission to act in direct violation of the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. Talk about right hand and left hand: it is not only incoherent but provocative. That does not seem wise, if the aim is open and good-faith negotiation on possible procedural reform. It is very reminiscent of the way the Government went about dealing—or rather, not dealing—with Brussels over the Brexit negotiations: always aiming to antagonise, then turning around and saying that they are punishing us.

Clause 53 is irresponsible and it is not going to progress any negotiations, in so far as they are necessary, and given the small number of interim measures issued by the Strasbourg court, it seems to be taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Not only is Clause 53 likely to hinder discussions on procedural reform, if that is necessary; it makes broader conflict with the European Court of Human Rights all but inevitable. If there is dissatisfaction with the procedures in Strasbourg, the solution is to pursue reform at the European level—and there have been many instances of discussions in the Council of Europe about the processes of the convention and the court. It is not even saying, “We will never obey interim measures”; it gives the Minister the discretion to refuse to comply with our obligations by obeying interim measures. Surely, the UK’s interests are better served by remaining, in the Foreign Secretary’s words, a “serious player” on the world stage, rather than undermining its own influence in this way. I therefore believe that Clauses 52 and 53 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

I want to make a brief contribution on Clause 53. We cannot ask the Minister to comment on the impact assessment, because it is yet to be born, but we have the advantage of the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. At paragraph 12, on page 121 of that report, in its recommendations and conclusions, it says that

“clause 53 gives Ministers legislative permission to act in direct violation of the UK obligations under the ECHR. Where a Minister chooses to ignore an interim measure and therefore breach Article 34 of the ECHR, clause 53 also prevents the courts from having regard to interim measures when considering proceedings under this Bill. This clause therefore permits deliberate breaches of our obligation to comply with interim measures of the ECtHR. Clause 53 must be removed from the Bill”.

That is the conclusion of an all-party Joint Committee of both Houses of this Parliament, and I trust that, in his response to the debate, the Minister will respond and give us his reasons for not accepting that carefully considered conclusion of the committee in one of the largest reports it has ever produced—and in the time when they could have produced 20 impact assessments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, threw down a verbal gauntlet, so let me try to pick it up and answer the central question that she posed. That was this: why should the UK think that it does not have to abide by Rule 39 indications from the court in Strasbourg? The short answer is that the Strasbourg court does not have jurisdiction to grant those Rule 39 indications and certainly not in the manner in which they are currently granted. I will develop that point shortly, but the fact that it is a jurisdictional point—I would say, with respect, that jurisdiction ought to unite all lawyers, even commercial lawyers—means that whether the court has jurisdiction or not is pretty important. I will focus my remarks on Clause 53 and the amendments thereto. I yield to nobody in my respect for the rule of law.

There is a great danger, which happens here and in other places, of the following syllogism being rolled out: the rule of law is a good thing, this—whatever issue you are talking about—is a good thing and therefore this is part of the rule of law. Well, it is not always. Even what is incorporated within the rule of law is a matter of some debate. One can compare the famous work of Lord Bingham, which is expansive to the work of Sir John Laws, which is rather narrower. But this is not about whether we have respect for the rule of law. It is about whether the Strasbourg court in fact has jurisdiction. To put the matter in that way shows respect for the rule of law, because jurisdiction is fundamental to that. Certainly, as far as I am concerned—I am sure as far as the Minister is concerned as well— words such as “game” and “swindle” are not entirely appropriate ways of approaching this topic.

I spoke on this point on Second Reading; we are now in Committee and I am not going to give a Second Reading speech. I expanded on it for those few people who did not read Hansard in the Daily Telegraph a week or so ago. What happened since Second Reading —I touched on it in my piece in the Telegraph—is, as my noble friend Lord Sandhurst mentioned, a powerfully argued paper from Professor Richard Ekins at Policy Exchange. It is unfortunate that in opening the debate on this the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did not engage with any of the arguments in that paper; I do not think that she even mentioned it. The paper is a fine piece of legal work. You can agree or disagree with the conclusions. I am going to be disagreeing with the conclusions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That, I hope, does not indicate any disrespect or discourtesy towards any of the people who sit on that committee; I just disagree with their conclusions. But I am going to deal with their argument because, if I do not, it is difficult to see how the land actually lies. Again, as my noble friend mentioned, we have a preface and a foreword by Lord Sumption the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, two names that, frankly, should make any lawyer sit up and take notice. Even if one does not agree with the conclusion, one has to engage with the arguments.

The main thrust behind the amendments and the clause stand part debate is that the clause breaches international law. That raises the question of whether we have an international law obligation to abide by Rule 39 indications. The short answer is that, no, we do not. Why do we not? Because we have signed up in the convention to abide by judgments of the Strasbourg court against the UK and Article 46(1) where the judgment is of the full court. This is not a final judgment—it is not of the full court—so we have no obligation under Article 46(1).

The Strasbourg court then tries to ground its jurisdiction in Article 34. The reason why it does that— I will not repeat what my noble friend said—is that there is a history to this. There was a suggestion in the draft, back in the 1940s, that the court would have the right to give interim relief. That was deliberately excluded. People tried to persuade the court that it should have that power, but that was rebuffed. The court gave a series of judgments setting out that it did not have that power, but then it did a volte-face and by a majority—I think of one, but I may be mistaken—it held that it did have that power. Of course, the court can change its own jurisprudence, but what it cannot do is to arrogate to itself the jurisdiction. In international law, the court has only the powers that the member states have given to it.

What does the court do? The court seeks to ground its power in Article 34 of the convention. What is Article 34? It is the right not to have your right of access to the courts impeded. I accept that there will be cases where you could justify interim relief and Article 34; a death penalty case would be one of them, as you cannot unscramble that later on, for obvious reasons. However, there will not be many cases like that. The Rwanda case last year was not a case like that. That was a case where the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court had all held that the Government’s promise to bring people back if they were to win meant that there was no impedance of their human rights. That point was decided three times in this jurisdiction, so that was certainly not an Article 34 case.

It also does two other things. First, it shows that if the Strasbourg court is doing a balancing act under American Cyanamid, it is odd that it reached completely the opposite conclusion from that reached by three courts here when applying that approach. Secondly, it belies another point put to the Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in relation to Clause 52. She made the point that if courts here have the ability to grant interim relief, Strasbourg will not interfere. Three courts here heard the Rwanda case and Strasbourg still interfered. I am not sure that that argument works.

Where I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is that there is a procedural problem as well as a substantive problem. The procedural problem cannot solve the jurisdictional problem but makes it worse. Why is there a procedural problem? There is a procedural problem because the rules and procedures do not cater for this jurisdiction, as it has been created out of whole cloth. That is why we have a system at the moment where there is no effective natural justice, where these injunctions are given and indications are made without the state being heard and, importantly, without there being a proper opportunity for the state to put its case even after the indication has been made. That is why these orders are given by a single judge when—the detail is in Professor Ekins’s paper—under the structure of the Strasbourg court a single judge should not have and does not have the powers to do this.

Does this mean that there are no circumstances in which a Rule 39 order can be justified? No, I do not go so far as that. I have already identified a death penalty case as such a case. However, one needs to have a proper review of the court’s jurisdiction. One also needs to have a proper procedure; again, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said that it ought to be possible to create such a procedure. It ought to be possible and it must be possible. If one therefore has a Rule 39 indication with a proper procedure which is grounded in Article 34, which recognises the principle of subsidiarity that is now inherent in the court’s jurisprudence and which gives the state an opportunity to come back in a proper timeframe against the order that has been made, I suggest all of that is the way through.

I will take two minutes, if I may, to say something about the report of the JCHR, because it is an important piece of work and I have read it carefully. On page 45, there is a heading before paragraph 129:

“What are the legal implications of this clause?”


This is Clause 53. It goes on to say that some commentators have suggested that

“the UK is not bound to comply with”

Rule 39 orders. It goes on:

“This is particularly because Article 46 of the Convention, which concerns the ‘Binding force and execution of judgments’, only commits the UK to abide by ‘the final judgment of the Court’ and does not mention interim measures”.


I agree with that, except it is only judgments against the UK, but we will let that pass. It goes on to say that the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg

“has held that a failure to comply with interim measures would amount to a violation of Article 34”.

That is right; that is what it has held. It goes on to say, in paragraph 130:

“It is therefore a binding obligation, as a matter of international law, for the UK to act in accordance with interim measures”.


What is the force of that “therefore”? Because the Strasbourg court has held—in the last sentence of paragraph 129—that it would be a violation of Article 34, it is therefore a binding obligation. With the greatest respect to the Committee and whoever authored that part of the report, that is what—before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, banned the use of Latin in our domestic courts—used to be called an ipse dixit. That “therefore” is a conclusory statement; you simply cannot justify the jurisdiction by saying that the court itself says that it has jurisdiction. That is an entirely circular argument. If I could win all my cases with reasoning like that, it would be a very good thing, even though I am only a commercial lawyer.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I beg the noble Lord’s indulgence in standing up and asking him a question. I was piqued by a tweet by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who is not in his place. He intervened on a Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, last Tuesday. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, was replying. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out:

“The member Governments of the Council of Europe, including our own, have repeatedly confirmed the binding nature of interim measures under Rule 39—in the Committee of Ministers, and in the Izmir and Brighton declarations. Is the Minister proud of the United Kingdom’s record of compliance with interim measures?”


The noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, replied:

“On the general point about acceptance in practice of the position of interim measures under the convention, there are two legal views”.—[Official Report, 6/6/23; col. 1244.]


The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and others have talked about the paper by Professor Ekins for Policy Exchange and that is a view, but the Minister did not confirm last week that he shared that view. Clause 53 does not actually say that the Government think that interim measures from Strasbourg are not binding. The tweet by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, noticed that the Minister

“declined to commit to the long-standing governmental position that”

interim measures

“are binding in international law. Views can always change, but surely the government has one”.

What we have not established is what the view of the Government, as opposed to that of Policy Exchange and Professor Ekins, is on whether interim measures from Strasbourg are binding. Our long-standing practice has been to comply with those interim measures. That is what is more important. With full respect to Policy Exchange and Professor Ekins, that is all very interesting, but what is the Government’s view? I do not think that what we are getting out of this whole affair is finding, among this thicket of confusion, what the position of this current British Government is on whether interim measures from Strasbourg should be observed. Indeed, on the Rwanda case, they did observe them, so that is quite different from commentary from Policy Exchange.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Well, my Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord thought my speech about sympathy was repetitious. I have not heard it yet today, and I give those words of sympathy with great sincerity.

The important thing is to look at the state of Albania. Albania was a communist state under a particularly vicious dictator, Hoxha, until the mid-1980s. Great steps have been made since then, and when the USSR broke its ranks many Albanians worked very hard in democracy. But things have not always gone right. For example, in 1997 the Government of Berisha, who was then the president of the country, collapsed in the wake of pyramid schemes and widespread corruption. More recently, in February last year the president was subject to impeachment proceedings which were stopped only by the Albanian constitutional court.

I mention that because in the number of years that I acted as an international arbitrator and conducted arbitrations arising out of activities in the former countries of the USSR, time and again one came across very serious corruption which led to feuds and sometimes to heinous blood feuds. Corruption is a matter of great concern, and one wonders exactly how the list of safe states was drawn up; in that list are other countries of similar background to Albania—Bulgaria and Romania to name two. One looks at the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act to see what the test is, according to that Act, for the Secretary of State to take their decision. In new Section 80AA(3) it says:

“The Secretary of State may add a State to the list only if satisfied that … there is in general in that State no serious risk of persecution of nationals of that State”.


How strictly has that been applied, if it has been applied at all?

As my noble friend Lady Lister said, there is a lot of evidence of significant and outstanding issues in Albania relating to corruption, trafficking, blood feuds, discrimination and violence against the LGBT community, and stigma and discrimination against ethnic Roma and Egyptian communities and so forth. There are real grounds to be concerned whether, on any definition, Albania is properly placed as a safe country. That view is supported in our own Home Office’s work in 2022 when the UK granted protection status to 700 Albanian nationals, including 60 unaccompanied children.

For all those reasons, I hope your Lordships will feel that they should be on the safe side and remove Albania from the list of safe states.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to the proposition that Clause 57 should not stand part of the Bill. Before I do, let me say that there are various myths arising around this Bill, one of which is that the Government are going to deport vast numbers of people, and another is that speeches from this side of the Committee are repetitious. I think it is regrettable that that sort of claim is being made. I referred at the beginning of proceedings today to the fact that this Bill got almost no scrutiny in the other place. As Dr Hannah White, the director of the Institute for Government, said last night on the radio, it has just come to expect that we will do that job.