Wednesday 24th May 2023
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberIllegal Migration Act 2023 View all Illegal Migration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 133-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (24 May 2023)
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I will just add my voice to the requests from various noble Lords across the Chamber for specific answers to these specific questions that have been raised; I think the Committee deserves those answers.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, Clause 1 sets out the Bill’s overarching purpose and provides an overview of the provisions in the Bill. The purpose of the Bill is to prevent and deter illegal migration and, in particular, migration to the UK by unsafe and illegal routes, by requiring the removal from the UK of individuals who arrive in breach of immigration control.
Subsection (2) then summarises the key provisions of the Bill that advance this core purpose, including the duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of persons from the UK who meet the conditions in Clause 2.
The numbers arriving on small boats in 2022 exceeded 45,700, and, as I set out at Second Reading, the Bill is essential to deal with these illegal, dangerous and unnecessary channel crossings. Putting the purpose of the Bill front and centre, right at the start of the Bill, will make it abundantly clear to all, including the illegal entrants themselves, NGOs, the courts and others, what Parliament’s intent is in enacting this Bill. As subsection (3) provides, the subsequent provisions in the Bill should be interpreted by the courts and others in line with this statutory purpose. Again, it is incredibly helpful to make this explicit on the face of the Bill, although I should add that subsection (3) simply reaffirms the established principle that the courts and others should interpret the Bill to deliver its purpose.
To assist this purpose, Clause 1 also disapplies Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. As I have already explained in the previous debate, the disapplication of Section 3 will ensure that the Bill’s provisions will be interpreted to meet the legislative intent of Parliament, rather than strained interpretations by the courts to achieve compatibility with convention rights.
The noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Paddick, asked about the impact assessment. We have already published an equality impact assessment and will publish an economic impact assessment in due course. The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to the purported impact assessment published by the Refugee Council. We do not recognise the assumptions and costs referenced in that document. Any assessment of the impact of the Bill must also acknowledge the cost of not proceeding with it. Our broken asylum system is costing this country £3 billion a year, and over £6 million a day in hotel costs. This cannot continue. The noble Lord also seems to be labouring under an assumption that Clause 1—
Lord German (LD)
The noble Lord has made two points. I am particularly asking about this sentence in the Government’s ECHR memorandum—so the Government’s position. It says at paragraph 1.5 about the removal of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act:
“This does not affect the Government’s assessment of compatibility of the Bill with the Convention rights”.
Article 5 of the convention clearly states:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court”.
So is the paragraph in the memorandum compatible with what I have just read out? If so, it means that when people are detained, they will be able to take their cases to a court in this country.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The answer to the question, if I have understood the noble Lord, is yes, but I think he misinterprets the purpose of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. It is not the clause by which the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights are reflected in UK domestic law. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act invites a court to construe parts of other domestic statutes or secondary legislation compatibly with convention rights. It does not mean that this is the mechanism by which convention rights are actionable in UK law, which is the standpoint that I think the noble Lord, Lord German, appears to suggest is the basis for his point. I fear that, as a matter of legal analysis, I think that to be wrong.
The noble Lord also seems to be labouring under an assumption that Clause 1 somehow upsets the separation of powers. It does not. It simply makes it clear that in interpreting this legislation, judges should seek to advance the purposes of the Bill. The Bill, and actions taken under it, are still clearly capable of review in the courts, and individuals can seek to prevent their own removal by making a suspensive claim. So, the courts are still involved, and regulations are still subject to approval by Parliament. I hope the noble Lord can rest assured that on closer inspection, this Bill leaves our separation of powers undisturbed.
I also want to pick up on a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who suggested that the Bill prevents human rights challenges. This is simply not the case. The Bill provides for two kinds of challenges that would have the effect of suspending removal. Other legal challenges, whether on European Convention on Human Rights grounds or other grounds, are not precluded, but they do not suspend removal. As I have indicated, Clause 1 makes the purpose of the Bill crystal clear for all to see. This will help to guide all decisions made by officials and immigration officers, Ministers, the courts and others in giving effect to the Bill. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister can help me on this. The “strained decisions” of the courts is a phrase that has been used at least three or four times this evening. As a former judge, I find that difficult to understand. I would like some elucidation as to what is meant by “strained decisions” and what examples there are.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The context of a strained decision, as the noble and learned Baroness will be aware, are circumstances where there is an ordinary, natural reading of a statute but a judge feels constrained to interpret the words of a statute in a particular way to give effect to a convention right. As the noble and learned Baroness is aware, this is a fairly obvious application of the term, and it is quite usual for such—perhaps more difficult—interpretations to be described as “strained”. I can certainly identify a number of examples, and I will write to the noble and learned Baroness in relation to them.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, the Minister is a persistent non-answerer of questions; I am a persistent asker of questions. The two questions I asked—I will repeat them at dictation speed if he wishes—were echoed by the Liberal Democrat Front Bench spokesman and the Labour Front Bench spokesman. I think we are due a reply to both those questions. Does the Minister have the answers, or do I have to repeat the questions?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The noble Lord does repeatedly ask questions, and I repeatedly answer them. As he identifies, there is a difference in interpretation of Article 31 of the refugee convention. I entirely appreciate that he does not accept my interpretation; and I do not accept his. That is where we are. It is not a rigmarole. This is a matter of position and legal analysis, and I am afraid that this is the Government’s position.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I believe I have answered both the noble Lord’s questions.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
The second question was: could the Minister please tell us that the phrase that he used, which was that nothing in this Bill “requires” the Government to take action contrary to our international obligations, does not obviate the fact that the Bill enables the Government so to do if they so wish and without any further recourse to Parliament?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
That is consistent with the normal practice in statute.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, perhaps I might come back to the question asked by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I think the Minister said that he would write to her with examples of strained interpretation. I sat for many years on the Appellate Committee in the Supreme Court dealing with cases under the Human Rights Act, and I am not aware of any particular case where I was straining the language. I do not think I went very far beyond the ordinary meaning of the words.
I remember we were faced with a very difficult case involving two men who wanted to marry. In those days, the Marriage Act was very specific that marriage was between a man and a woman. We could have strained the language, but we did not do that; we said the provision was incompatible, which I think the Minister would recognise as a perfectly orthodox way to proceed. I think we were quite careful not to stray beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation. I would be very interested to know whether he has examples of where we really did go beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As I said, I will be writing to the noble and learned Baroness, but the House will recall that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, set out various examples, including Ullah and Al-Skeini, and there are others. This has been a matter of jurisprudential development since the commencement of the Human Rights Act. It is a well-known evolution in interpretive principle, and it is that which is addressed by the provisions in this Bill.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Following-up on my question about impact assessment, the Minister says that the Government do not recognise the impact assessments provided by NGOs, but why not? How can they say that they do not recognise the impact assessments provided by NGOs when they do not have their own impact assessment with which to contradict them?
The Minister also talked about the cost of not enacting this legislation, in terms of the current cost of what I think he called the “broken asylum system”—of a Government who have been in power for 13 years. To what extent is the high cost of accommodating asylum seekers in the UK down to the fact that there is a huge backlog of applications that have not been processed by the Home Office, when some 15 years ago there were almost double the number of applications and hardly any backlog?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The Government do not recognise the figures in the purported impact assessments provided by the bodies that were referred to, such as the Refugee Council, because we do not recognise the assumptions and costs referenced in them. Furthermore, those documents do not acknowledge any assessment of the impact of the effect of not proceeding with the measures in the Bill.
Lord German (LD)
What is the Minister’s definition of “soon”, which he said was when we would receive the impact assessment? Will it be before the end of Committee, before the start of Report or after Report and before Third Reading? Perhaps he could be more explicit.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The impact assessment will be provided when the decision is taken that it is appropriate to disclose it.
Lord German (LD)
Does the Minister therefore think that it is appropriate that the body which is deciding about this Bill—Parliament—should receive the impact assessment, and should that impact assessment be with us before we complete Committee on the Bill? Surely that is appropriate. It is not for the Government to decide. It is for the Government to make their case to Parliament. If they cannot do so, because they have not got the document, because the document is not sufficiently robust or because it is not available, then the Minister should be able to tell us that right now, so that we know the basis on which we are judging this Bill.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am afraid that I can tell the noble Lord only that it will be published in due course and that this is entirely normal.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Frankly, this is unacceptable. Without being rude, I say that the Committee must at some point have the impact assessment. How on earth can we make many of the judgments on amendments and on the various things that we may wish to come forward with on Report if we do not have an impact assessment? It is normal practice for an impact assessment to be provided so that proper decisions can be made. Can the Minister at least go back to the department and say that this Chamber—I think I speak for everyone —is very unhappy that no impact assessment is due, and that we need one? Will he ask his department to provide one for us—at least well before Report?
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
To add to that, we should have had a child rights impact assessment. That is supposed to be done right at the outset of the policy discussion. Therefore, it would have been appropriate for it to have been published at the same time as the Bill.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The House knows my position. I have obviously heard what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, have said, and I will of course take those points back to the department.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said, echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, Clause 2 is the centrepiece of the scheme provided for in the Bill. At its heart, the Bill seeks to change the existing legal framework so that those who arrive in the UK illegally can be detained and then promptly removed, either to their home country or to a safe third country.
Clause 2 seeks to achieve this by placing a legal duty on the Secretary of State to remove those who come to the UK illegally. The duty applies where an individual meets the four conditions set out in Clause 2, which I will briefly rehearse.
The first condition is about the lawfulness of the person’s entry into the UK. This underlines the Government’s commitment to take all possible measures to stop people making dangerous journeys to enter the UK illegally, particularly across the English Channel.
The second condition is that the individual must have entered the UK on or after 7 March—the day of the Bill’s introduction in the House of Commons, as my noble friend Lady Lawlor noted. This is a crucial condition that will ensure that we do not create a perverse incentive for migrants to take illegal and dangerous journeys in an attempt to avoid being subject to the Bill’s provisions. I will return to this point in a moment.
The third condition states that the duty will apply to an individual who has not come directly from a country in which their life and liberty were threatened. That means that anyone entering the UK from another country where their life was not in danger will fall within the scope of the duty. This is consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention and upholds the principle that asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. There is manifestly no need for people to make those dangerous journeys when they are already in a country where they are safe or could, in the case of France, for example, claim asylum. It places themselves and others at risk and puts money into the hands of organised criminals.
The fourth and final condition is that an individual requires leave to remain but does not have it. The duty to make arrangements for removal is subject only to very limited exceptions signposted in Clause 2(11), which we will come on to at a later date when we come to a later clause.
The fundamental point is that, subject to these limited exceptions, the Home Secretary will be under a clear and unambiguous legal duty to make arrangements for the removal of persons from the UK who satisfy those four conditions. She should not be deflected from fulfilling that legal duty. These provisions make it very clear that if you meet these four conditions you will not be able to make a new life in the UK.
A number of the amendments in this group relate to the four conditions I have described. Amendment 6 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, relates to the second condition. In effect, this and other amendments tabled by the noble Lord seek to do away with the backdating of the duty to remove so that it applies only to those who illegally enter the country from the date of commencement rather than from 7 March. Amendment 39 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, deals with the same point.
The explanatory note to the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 39 sums up the position well, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. It says:
“This amendment seeks to give effect to the principle that, unless for good reason, legislation should operate prospectively and not retrospectively”.
I was challenged by the noble and learned Lord to explain what that good reason was. The Government entirely agree with the explanatory note from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Committee will know that it is not uncommon in exceptional circumstances for legislation to have retrospective effect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, noted. But as the noble and learned Lord has acknowledged, there must be good reason for such exceptions. I suggest to the Committee that there is good reason in this instance for retrospection.
I would say that the retrospective nature of these provisions is critical. Without it, we risk organised criminals and people smugglers seeking to exploit this with an increase in the number of illegal arrivals ahead of commencement of the provisions in the Bill. This would likely lead to an increase in these unnecessary and dangerous small boat crossings and could even place more pressure on not only our asylum system, but our health, housing, educational and welfare services, not to mention our services for saving lives at sea.
Lord Paddick (LD)
Can the Minister explain why in that case the Nationality and Borders Act does not have a retrospective clause? What evidence does the Minister have, having announced the retrospective elements and that the provisions apply from when the Bill was first introduced into the House of Commons? What deterrent effect have we seen in terms of reducing the number of boat crossings?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Certainly. The structure of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 was very different. It was not a Bill like this one, which focuses on a duty to remove and is targeted at creating a disincentive effect on people crossing the channel. This is a very differently structured piece of legislation and therefore the retrospective element is a vital and logical part of the scheme in the Bill.
As to the evidence of the deterrent effect taking effect from the date of introduction, this is seen potentially in the fact that—and one can only draw inferences from the figures—it would appear that the numbers are down on this time last year. I accept that the weather has facilitated a good measure of that, but it is certainly right to say that had there not been a retrospectivity measure in the Bill I would conjecture that the numbers crossing the channel would have been far higher. It would have been easy for people smugglers to advertise their services—and I will come to this in a moment—as something of a fire sale, saying, “Get across the channel now. Here’s your opportunity before these measures in the Government’s new scheme take effect”.
The provision in the Bill does not mean that all those who enter the country illegally on or after 7 March will be subject to the duty to remove in Clause 2(1). We have expressly provided in Clause 4(7) that asylum and human rights-based claims made on or after 7 March may be decided by the Secretary of State prior to the commencement of Clause 4. Where a person is then granted leave to remain, they will not be removed.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted that retrospectivity is problematic because it impinges on legal certainty. The key here is that we have been clear in the Bill and in the public messaging—for example, in the statement given by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the other messaging—that this is the date when the scheme will commence. That means that there can be no uncertainty about the Government’s intention. While I accept that this is unusual in our legal system, it is not unheard of. The Revenue sometimes announces intended changes to tax law which are then later introduced by Finance Bills but backdated to the date of the announcement. In those cases, it is usually to prevent a closing-down sale of improper tax structures. There, retrospectivity is designed to protect tax revenue. Here, it is to prevent a closing-down sale of dangerous, sometimes fatal, channel crossings in the lead-up to some prospective date. We do not take this step lightly but feel it is necessary to reduce this perverse incentive.
I say “reduce” advisedly. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has pointed out that migrants on the other side of the channel may not be as well advised as some taxpayers, but it is clear they are alive to changes in policy in the UK. For example, it is clear that announcements of a change in the approach to Albanian illegal migrants has led to a very significant dropping off of that cohort in the small boats, even before removals have begun at scale. This shows that the criminal gangs and migrants are aware of policy announcements in the UK, as my noble friend Lady Lawlor has pointed out. Similarly, the original announcement of the Rwanda scheme was known in the camps in Calais, with some suggesting in reporting that asylum seekers sought to go to the Republic of Ireland instead to avoid being sent to Rwanda. Indeed, the then Taoiseach Michael Martin noted a surge in applications and partly blamed the Rwanda announcement.
While clearly announcing the start date of the new scheme may not have had a decisive impact, it is important to do everything we can to discourage those dangerous journeys. Announcements such as this can have an impact on behaviour, and we hope they will reduce the incentive for a surge in dangerous crossings, perhaps at a time when the weather makes crossing very dangerous. To answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, these are the compelling and exceptional circumstances that justify this decision.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I apologise to the Minister for intervening at this late hour. If I understand him correctly, it will now be permissible to legislate retrospectively in any case of criminality because, by definition, it is very important not to have a fire sale. If we believe that certain conduct is wrong and there is a gap, whatever that conduct is, and if it is a serious enough matter to legislate in criminal terms, for example, it would now and in the future be permissible to legislate retrospectively.
My second point is that the Minister seems to suggest, like his noble friend Lady Lawlor, that because Ministers have announced a prospective change in the law, that should be good enough, because presumably we now believe that executive fiat and ministerial announcements and pronouncements are enough to suggest to people, not just in our own country but across the world, that that is what the law is and will be and always was. Have I understood the Minister correctly on this point?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
No, I am sorry to say. Clearly the position is not that in every case where there is a change in the criminal law it should have retrospective effect to the date of the Bill’s introduction. That is absolutely not what I am saying. What I am saying is that, in this context, to prevent a rush of people into these dangerous vessels, crossing the channel at a time when there is potentially bad weather, those were the special circumstances that justified retrospection in these provisions. To go back to one of the last major Bills to go through your Lordships’ House, which became the Public Order Act, I would not dream of suggesting that the offence of locking on should have had retrospective effect to the date of the introduction of the Bill; there would have been no exceptional circumstances for that.
While I am on the topic of the speech just given by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I would like to address her suggestion that limited retrospectivity will lead to refoulement. This is clearly not the case. I can do no more than repeat that this Bill does not allow refoulement. It does not allow the Government to remove individuals to places where they will be in danger—and that, quite rightly, is under the supervision of the courts.
In particular, I would refer noble Lords to the clauses in the Bill relating to suspensive claims—Clauses 37 to 50—which allow Upper Tribunal judges to determine whether an individual faces a risk of “serious and irreversible harm”. If such a case is made out, the individual will not be removed to that place.
Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, relates to the third condition and to the issue of whether a person has or has not “come directly” from a country where their life and liberty were threatened. It is right that we prioritise protection for the most vulnerable people arriving through safe and legal routes rather than those who are strong or rich enough to have journeyed through safe countries and paid the people smugglers before they reach the UK.
In answer to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord German, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, people seeking sanctuary should apply for asylum in the first safe country they reach. There is no uniform international interpretation of the many concepts of the refugee convention. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the treaty to be interpreted “in good faith”. It is on this basis that we have set out our interpretation of “come directly” through Clause 2. I might add that, were Amendment 7—
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
The Minister is beginning to address the question that I have raised twice: why should we accept this Government’s interpretation of the refugee convention over and above that of the body that is given authority by the UN to interpret it for the international community? Every other organisation that has briefed us has followed the UNHCR in its interpretation and there are very real fears of refoulement. As a noble Lord opposite said earlier. the reason given seems to be “Because we say so”, as you would say to a child. That is not good enough. We want to know exactly why we should accept the Government’s interpretation.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. The reality is that the Government take legal advice. The UNHCR is clearly a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the refugee convention. Some parts of the UNHCR have views on the Government’s position, but it is always worth recalling that the UNHCR itself maintains refugee arrangements and accommodation in Rwanda. In December, the High Court considered the submissions from the UNHCR and discounted what was said. So I invite the noble Baroness, rather than simply taking the Government’s word for it, to review the judgment of the Divisional Court, a careful and considered judgment, which considered the legality of the removal scheme.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
The Minister has latched on to the wrong point—not the point that the UNHCR has made again and again that it is not compatible with the obligations of our membership to refuse to consider a request for asylum. It is nothing to do with Rwanda; it is to do with refusing a request for asylum. The Minister admitted earlier that there is no explicit provision in the refugee convention that permits us to do that. That is the basis of the UNHCR’s position. Frankly, his suggestion that there are differences of opinion in the UNHCR is pretty contemptible. The High Commissioner for Refugees has said he does not think this is compatible.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am afraid that I again find myself at odds with the noble Lord. The reality is that the UN itself relocates refugees to Rwanda. As I say, there is no suggestion that people’s asylum claims will not be dealt with under this scheme; their asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda once they are removed, and that is entirely compatible with the convention. There is no requirement on a member state of the convention to determine asylum claims within its own territory. That is abundantly plain.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
The Minister says there is no requirement in the convention for a convention state to handle an asylum request on its own territory, but surely the deal with Rwanda rules out our ever hearing these cases. In Rwanda, people are allowed to apply for asylum in Rwanda, but their case for asylum in the United Kingdom will never be admitted. Is that not correct?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
That is entirely correct, yes. Their asylum claim will be determined by the Government of Rwanda. That is the system that the High Court found to be entirely lawful in December.
If Amendment 7 were agreed, removing the third condition, the duty to remove would also apply to those who had come directly from a country where their life and liberty were threatened, and I am sure that is not what the noble Lord would want.
Amendment 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, also relates to the third condition. I put it to the noble Lord that the wording in Clause 2(4), referring to threats by reason of a person’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, reflects the definition of a refugee in Article 1 of the refugee convention. We have heard a lot today about adherence to the refugee convention and other international treaties. There may be a case for amending the definitions in the convention to reflect the world of today rather than what it was in 1951, but we should not put the cart before the horse and insert wording in the Bill at odds with the current wording of the convention.
I add that the reference to membership of a particular social group may, on the facts of a particular case, cover a person fleeing persecution on the basis of their gender, sexual orientation or gender identity. Lastly, it is not right to suggest, as the noble Lord does, that the Bill removes individualised assessments. It does not. Officials will make assessments and those can be challenged, including by way of suspensive claims, as we have already discussed.
Amendment 9 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove subsection (7). This ties in with the fourth condition, which is that a person requires leave to enter or remain in the UK but does not have it. We will have a fuller debate about unaccompanied children later in Committee, but subsection (7) recognises that the duty to remove does not apply to unaccompanied children, and where they are not to be removed under the power conferred in Clause 3, the expectation is that they will normally be provided with temporary permission to remain in the UK until they are 18 years old under provisions to be made in the Immigration Rules. If subsection (7) is removed from Clause 2, an unaccompanied child given this temporary permission to remain would not then satisfy the fourth condition, thereby undermining our approach to unaccompanied children. As I say, we will have a fuller debate on this issue when we get to Clause 3, which feels like some time away.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also has Amendment 10, requiring the Home Secretary to inform people when it has been decided that the duty to remove applies to them. Such information would include providing details of any evidence relied upon to make that decision. We have already provided, in Clause 7(2), for a person to be issued with a removal notice detailing, among other things, their right to make a suspensive claim. It is implicit in these provisions that the issue of a removal notice follows a determination that the person satisfies the four conditions in Clause 2. The four conditions relate to issues of fact. A person in receipt of a removal notice will themselves know, or ought to know, whether the conditions apply. If they have compelling evidence that the Home Secretary has made a mistake of fact, they can submit a factual suspensive claim to challenge the removal notice. We will return to those provisions, too, in due course in Committee.
Amendment 11 was spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and others. As we will come on to in later clauses, we have made particular provision for potential victims of modern slavery who are co-operating with law enforcement agencies, and it is necessary for them to remain in the UK in furtherance of such co-operation. In later debates, we will address the wider issue of the progress being made by the NCA and others in tackling the criminal gangs that are not perpetuating human trafficking but are engaged in people smuggling. It is worth also noting, in response to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that if an individual who had been trafficked came forward, they would be sent only somewhere where they would be safe—whether their own home country, if it was safe, or a safe third country. In all cases, they would no longer be in the control of their trafficker.
A key purpose of the Bill is to break the business model of the people smugglers. That will not happen if we undermine the central tenet of the Bill: that if you come here illegally you cannot stay, and instead you will be liable to detention and promptly removed. If we build exceptions and loopholes into the fabric of the Bill, it will be undermined and will not work. If those coming over on small boats have information that will assist in the investigation of people-smuggling offences, they can provide it, but this cannot be a reason to delay removal. Any co-operation with law enforcement agencies can, if appropriate, continue from abroad. If the experience of the pandemic has taught us anything, it is that a lot can be achieved remotely. Indeed, our domestic courts and law enforcement are well used to this by now.
Finally, Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, deals with the issue of entry into the United Kingdom over the Irish land border. We discussed this at length during the dinner break business yesterday in relation to the recent SI on electronic travel authorisation. I note that this is a probing amendment relating to the concerns that have been raised regarding tourists and other people who inadvertently arrive in the UK from the Republic of Ireland via the land border with Northern Ireland. As is currently the case, tourists from countries requiring visas to come to the UK as visitors should obtain these before they travel. That is as it should be. That said, I recognise the issue she has raised and accept that some individuals may, entirely unwittingly, enter the UK without leave via the Irish land border, as I said yesterday.
We are examining this issue further. I would point the noble Baroness to the regulation-making power in Clause 3, which will enable us to provide for exceptions to the duty to remove where it would be appropriate to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me about the status of a child born in the UK to a woman who meets the conditions in Clause 2. The short answer is that the child will not satisfy the conditions in Clause 2, but I will write to her with a more detailed explanation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked about compatibility with article 2 of the Windsor Framework. There is a later amendment to which she has added her name, Amendment 137, on this very issue. We will come on to that later in the Committee.
As I indicated at the start, this clause provides the foundations for the Bill as a whole. It is fundamental to the effective operation of the scheme and my fear is that the amendments put forward would serve only to weaken the effectiveness of the scheme. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, there was an issue about adoption of a child who came to this country, or came in the womb of somebody arriving in the country, into a British family. Are they at danger under the Bill?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me: as I thought I said, the status of a child born in the UK to a woman who meets the conditions in Clause 2 is that they would not satisfy the conditions in that clause. I realise that there were a number of hypotheticals in the way that that question was written. If I may, I would like to go away and think about them. I will reply by letter in due course, and obviously publicise that letter.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
The Minister talked about an amendment that I had co-signed. Was it Amendment 132?
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
The Minister, not to my surprise, did not address my question about what happens after the election. I will phrase the question another way. In your Lordships’ House, we often ask about “must” and “may” provisions. Rather than a duty to remove, surely the Government could make it that the Secretary of State “may” remove. That would allow this Government to act as they wish but would not attempt to tie the hands of any future Government.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am afraid the structure of the Bill is that it creates a duty on the Secretary of State. That is in order to send the deterrence message that entering the country illegally is unacceptable and to reduce the number of people crossing the channel. I am afraid to say that it is a logical step that if the Government were to change, then it would be open to that other Government to pass legislation of their own. That is democracy.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am very grateful to the Minister for his patience, but it is not quite right that that is the reason for the “must”, is it? It is not to send a signal to all those people overseas who are reading our draft legislation; it is to give a direction to our courts. The Home Secretary is choosing to tie her own hands. It is really in order to oust the jurisdiction of the courts and their ability to say that where the Secretary of State has a choice, they should exercise that choice in compliance with international law.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Clearly, the intent is to send a message—that people really must not make these dangerous journeys across the channel. As I say, all the avenues of legal challenge are open but there are only two categories that will suspend removal. There are a number of provisions—I am sure the noble Baroness and I will be debating them at length over the coming days in Committee—and that is how the Bill will have its effect.
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
Could I ask that the Minister copies everyone who took part in this debate into the letter he is going to send, because it is of interest to many of us?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I will certainly place a copy in the Library of the House. I hope that suffices. I am sure that my private office can work out who is here and is participating.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
Before the noble Lord stands up again, I feel I should bring this debate to a close. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, particularly those who supported the amendments in my name. A number of other very interesting issues have been raised. I have no doubt that we will be returning to a number of them on Report; I certainly will.
The reasons given by the Minister for what he recognises is the exceptional course of retrospectivity—I am using his words—involved conjecture: a conjecture that a very small change in the numbers, for whatever reason, of people coming on boats shows that the retrospectivity is working. I have been a Silk for 39 years. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, we have probably met more criminals than the rest of this Committee added together. My observation would be a rather less naive one than that made by the Minister. Criminals are infinitely adaptable. If the Government think that the boats are being stopped, it is not evidence that fewer people are coming into this country, because there are different ways and means of doing it.
From what we have heard today—maybe on Report we will hear something different—I really believe that the case for exceptionality is far from proved. I take the view, therefore, that we will have to come back to these subjects. I urge the Government to meet noble Lords who have spoken in these debates before Report so that we can see whether there is some common ground we can find that will make this a better Bill rather than a battleground in your Lordships’ House. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 6.