Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Main Page: Lord Hannay of Chiswick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hannay of Chiswick's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to come back to the points I raised in the first group, because they are the basis for my support for the argument presented by the noble Lord, Lord German. I agree with very much of what he said.
I have two points. The first is why we have to have Clause 1(1) in the Bill at all. As the Minister explained, nothing hangs on “unlawful” or “illegal”. They are tendentious words and I find it uneasy to know what they mean unless they are properly defined. The Minister was not prepared to give me a definition which tied them down to what is in the Bill. I do not see why he is not prepared to do that. His answer was one which I think any parliamentary draftsman would give him, which is that nothing hangs on them because the words do not reappear elsewhere—but that does not remove the need for a definition.
The other point comes back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has been saying about the combination of subsections (3) and (5). I find them really quite sinister. During the passage of the REUL Bill, we debated the need for parliamentary scrutiny in the face of an aggression by the Executive to reform the whole body of retained EU law without parliamentary scrutiny. Here we are again: the Executive assuming to themselves control over the convention without recourse to the courts. Indeed, there are other provisions in the Bill which exclude any kind of judicial scrutiny at all. That is taking matters a very long way and setting an uneasy precedent.
I would much rather this whole clause was taken out for these reasons. They give rise to real concerns about where this country is going, and indeed where legislation of this kind is going, in the future.
My Lords, I wonder whether I could come back to some of the questions the noble Lord failed to answer after the first debate, perhaps understandably in the desire to have a dinner break. Perhaps now he could apply himself to some of those questions.
First, could he please tell me which part of the refugee convention explicitly authorises a country to refuse to even hear the asylum request of a person who arrives on its shore? I would like to hear which bit of the convention says that that is a legitimate thing to do. The answer is not, I am afraid, to go into this rigamarole about returning to the first country they were in.
Secondly, the noble Lord said that nothing in the Bill requires the Government to take action contrary to our international legal obligations, but does he not agree that large parts of the Bill empower the Government, without further recourse to Parliament, to act contrary to our legal obligations? I would be grateful for an answer on that point too.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord German has clearly set out why Clause 1 should not be stand part of the Bill, supported by, among others, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.
The Bill is about depriving a particular group of people of their human rights. That is disgraceful. The impact assessments provided by NGOs that my noble friend cited show that the operation of the Bill will be hugely expensive and create a permanent underclass, unable to work and dependent on the state.
I asked the Minister at Second Reading, and I ask him again: when will this Committee receive the Government’s impact assessment? I am not talking about the equality impact assessment; I am talking about the financial impact assessment. Or do the Government consider that an impact assessment is unnecessary because they agree with the impact assessments that we have been provided with by NGOs? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, both highlighted the questions that they asked on the previous group, to which the Minister did not provide a satisfactory answer. Perhaps he will take the opportunity to answer those questions now.
The context of a strained decision, as the noble and learned Baroness will be aware, are circumstances where there is an ordinary, natural reading of a statute but a judge feels constrained to interpret the words of a statute in a particular way to give effect to a convention right. As the noble and learned Baroness is aware, this is a fairly obvious application of the term, and it is quite usual for such—perhaps more difficult—interpretations to be described as “strained”. I can certainly identify a number of examples, and I will write to the noble and learned Baroness in relation to them.
My Lords, the Minister is a persistent non-answerer of questions; I am a persistent asker of questions. The two questions I asked—I will repeat them at dictation speed if he wishes—were echoed by the Liberal Democrat Front Bench spokesman and the Labour Front Bench spokesman. I think we are due a reply to both those questions. Does the Minister have the answers, or do I have to repeat the questions?
The noble Lord does repeatedly ask questions, and I repeatedly answer them. As he identifies, there is a difference in interpretation of Article 31 of the refugee convention. I entirely appreciate that he does not accept my interpretation; and I do not accept his. That is where we are. It is not a rigmarole. This is a matter of position and legal analysis, and I am afraid that this is the Government’s position.
I believe I have answered both the noble Lord’s questions.
The second question was: could the Minister please tell us that the phrase that he used, which was that nothing in this Bill “requires” the Government to take action contrary to our international obligations, does not obviate the fact that the Bill enables the Government so to do if they so wish and without any further recourse to Parliament?
That is consistent with the normal practice in statute.
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. The reality is that the Government take legal advice. The UNHCR is clearly a UN body; it is not charged with the interpretation of the refugee convention. Some parts of the UNHCR have views on the Government’s position, but it is always worth recalling that the UNHCR itself maintains refugee arrangements and accommodation in Rwanda. In December, the High Court considered the submissions from the UNHCR and discounted what was said. So I invite the noble Baroness, rather than simply taking the Government’s word for it, to review the judgment of the Divisional Court, a careful and considered judgment, which considered the legality of the removal scheme.
The Minister has latched on to the wrong point—not the point that the UNHCR has made again and again that it is not compatible with the obligations of our membership to refuse to consider a request for asylum. It is nothing to do with Rwanda; it is to do with refusing a request for asylum. The Minister admitted earlier that there is no explicit provision in the refugee convention that permits us to do that. That is the basis of the UNHCR’s position. Frankly, his suggestion that there are differences of opinion in the UNHCR is pretty contemptible. The High Commissioner for Refugees has said he does not think this is compatible.
I am afraid that I again find myself at odds with the noble Lord. The reality is that the UN itself relocates refugees to Rwanda. As I say, there is no suggestion that people’s asylum claims will not be dealt with under this scheme; their asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda once they are removed, and that is entirely compatible with the convention. There is no requirement on a member state of the convention to determine asylum claims within its own territory. That is abundantly plain.