Baroness Ludford
Main Page: Baroness Ludford (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Ludford's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am, of course, hugely disappointed that some of our colleagues do not want to listen to a fascinating debate on Clause 60 of the Illegal Migration Bill, just as some of those who stayed until 4 am the other morning did not want to participate in the debates on the Bill. However, I am delighted that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, is joining our ranks. It is wonderful to have an Earl Russell back. Those who remember Conrad Russell will know what a formidable Member of this House he was, and I am sure that his son will do justice to his memory.
I am talking against Clause 60 standing part. This clause was added by the Government on Report in the Commons, so it was not discussed by MPs. It would amend a section of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 that is about factors that damage the credibility of an asylum applicant.
The point of Clause 60 is to expand the circumstances in which credibility would be damaged—where a claimant fails to produce or destroys an identity document or, indeed, where they refuse to disclose information such as a passcode that would enable access to information stored electronically, such as on a mobile phone. It is rather odd that we should be debating this poor, lonely little clause on its own. Indeed, there was perhaps a good argument that it should have been grouped with Clause 14, which my noble friend Lord German, on whichever day it was—
Yes, when it was proposed that Clause 14 should not stand part of the Bill. My noble friend debated issues about the powers of the Government to extract information concealed behind PIN numbers on phones. If memory serves, Clause 14 was particularly in relation to people who are detained, while Clause 60 oddly stands on its own—apart from Clause 14. But they need to be looked at holistically, to try to get some assessment as to what new powers the Government want. Are we in danger of getting spillover to sectors other than asylum?
The failure to provide information, an identity document or a PIN number would be added as a type of behaviour considered damaging to a claimant’s credibility. It is not restricted to people who are caught by Clause 2; the intended effect seems to be directed more at people seeking asylum who arrive on a direct flight from the country in which they face persecution. In a sense, it does not have much to do with this Bill, which is another reason why it sets off a bit of an alarm bell. The problem is that making a direct journey from a country in which the person is at risk of persecution, perhaps where the persecutor is the state or an agent of the state, may require the person not to travel with documentation that would identify them if they presented that documentation or were searched as they passed through an airport. That would concern an identity document—so there are some issues around penalising a person because they have not produced such a document, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond on that issue.
On the other arm of it, with regard to insisting on the person delivering the passcode or PIN for their phone, I am wondering how widely that is expected to apply and how it relates to Clause 14 on getting access to PIN numbers and, indeed, to handing over mobile phones. My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the problem that that would mean asylum applicants not having access to their contacts. In the scenario that this Bill covers, that means that people could not phone their family to say, “I’m safe—I haven’t drowned in the channel”. So that is one aspect that arises. The other aspect is that of access and forcing someone to give up the PIN on their phone. When the Minister replied to the debate on Clause 14 and Schedule 2, he said that that the information on the phone
“can … assist in determining a person’s immigration status or right to be in the UK … We all know that mobile telephones contain a wealth of data relating not just to the owner of the phone but to where that phone has been and who they have been with—all of which can be used to build up an intelligence picture which can facilitate criminal prosecutions”.—[Official Report, 7/6/2023; col. 1542.]
We are all in favour of facilitating prosecutions. That is one of the reasons why we have been so dismayed by the provisions on victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Another reason is that there is nothing in the Bill to enhance the prosecution of smugglers and traffickers. Suddenly the Minister came out with this route which is supposed to facilitate criminal prosecutions. My noble friend Lord German referred to a High Court case which said that what the Government had been doing was illegal and that they were wrong to extract information concealed behind PINs on phones. The Minister said that the powers that have been put into the Bill in Clause 14 are fresh powers to respond to the High Court judgment, so this is a new suite of powers.
What we have got is in two different clauses. We have new powers, and the common theme across them is access to people’s mobile phones and other electronic devices by forcing them to give up PINs. I am wondering what the scope of this is, beyond people detained or caught by Clause 2, because Clause 60 appears to apply to anybody who is outwith the scope of the Bill. What are the boundaries of the powers that the Government are granting themselves to access people’s mobile phones? I cannot claim to be an expert on this issue, but I know there has been a lot of commentary and activity on the question of victims’ mobile phones in sexual abuse cases. Will the Minister clarify exactly what the purpose of Clauses 14 and 60 is? Why was Clause 60 brought in to stand on its own rather than Clause 14 being amended? What is the composite picture that the Government are painting? How are their powers going to be constrained? Are the rest of us going to find that one day all these powers apply to us as well? I am raising this point as a clause stand part debate because Clause 60 seems to raise some rather troubling questions about the powers that the Government want to give themselves to access mobile phones.
My Lords, I am happy to provide that reassurance and explanation. I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the noble Lord for their thoughts on Clause 60.
Clause 60 clarifies and modernises Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, which relates to the credibility of asylum claimants. First, in response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, this provision will not be relevant to those who meet the conditions in Clause 2, as their asylum claims will of course be inadmissible, but it will be relevant to other asylum seekers. It is appropriate that we use the opportunity afforded by the Bill to address this issue for the reasons that I will come to in a moment. The clause puts it beyond doubt that destroying, altering, disposing of or failing to produce any identity document—not just a passport—is behaviour that should be viewed by decision-makers as damaging a claimant’s credibility.
Secondly, the clause modernises Section 8 to reflect the fact that mobile phones and electronic devices play a much more significant role in people’s daily lives in storing relevant documents and information than they did 20 years ago. We have therefore expressly provided that refusing to disclose information, such as a passcode which would enable access to a person’s mobile phone or other electronic device, should be damaging to their credibility. In so doing, we are reading across provisions that exist in criminal law in relation to Section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and equivalent provisions in Scotland. I hope noble Lords agree that it would be inconsistent to treat what would amount to the effective concealment of a document, by not providing access, stored electronically any differently from the concealment of a physical document.
Finally, the clause brings Section 8 of the 2004 Act up to date by clarifying that the provisions relating to documents apply where those documents are stored in electronic form.
Clause 14 is a separate part of the Bill and introduces new powers. We already have some powers to seize devices, but Clause 14 introduces new powers, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, observed, and as we discussed in Committee on the relevant group of amendments. Clause 60 will of course apply no matter which power of seizure is used.
I hope that I have provided the requested clarity, and I further hope that Clause 60 will stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for those explanations. It may be that my brain has gone to cotton wool—I will read his response in Hansard to try to see the whole picture. At the moment, I cannot see the overall coherence of this scheme.
The Minister is going to send me scurrying off to look up the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, of which I have just a vague memory. I am sure that colleagues on other Benches will know its provisions off the top of their heads, but is there any sort of reasonable suspicion trigger, or some such, in that Act, about investigating crime and suspected terrorism? I do not know, but my fear with all of this is of mission creep. I am not sure whether the Minister has fully removed that fear, but I will carefully read his response and I am sure that, with his normal courtesy, if I have any follow-up questions he will deal with them in writing.
I was pleased to hear the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, who added another sensible and rational Conservative Back-Bench voice to the earlier remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. Good heavens, I have just remembered that they are both former MEP colleagues of mine—not from the same political group, obviously—and perhaps that is where they learned a sensible approach to policy.
At first blush, the inclusion of this amendment with others about the asylum backlog might not seem the right context, but the rationale of the grouping is that, with such a big asylum backlog, the impact of not allowing asylum seekers to work is all the greater; not only are more people left to stew, unable to support themselves, but for longer. Some people wait not only months but years—many years in some cases—for resolution of their asylum claims.
To pick up something I said earlier, all of these attempts—most of them from the opposition parties but not entirely; there was lots of contribution from the Cross Benches—are trying, perhaps in a piecemeal way, to construct a more sensible asylum policy than is in this Bill or last year’s Bill. Many of us think that the Bill is not designed to work and that the mess will, I fear, be dumped on the next Government—I see the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, smiling. The Bill is designed to get the Government through the next election.
Some of us are trying to suggest elements of a more sane asylum policy—the Government could, with all the information resources at their disposal, go out and put a case to the public for why you need more sensible things to manage asylum. That is where this amendment, on the ability of asylum seekers to work, fits in. I happen to have put in the amendment that it would be after three months, but I am not particularly insistent on the time—it could be six months. The point is that, after the initial processing, and people having the ability to focus on something else, it makes sense to put people to work and give them the opportunity to contribute.
At the moment, people seeking asylum in the UK are effectively prohibited from working, such that they are forced to subsist on asylum support of £5.66 a day while they wait for a decision on their asylum claim. A lot of the public assume that such people are able to access welfare benefits and are just sitting idly in clover, but that is far from the case. They can apply for permission to work only if they have waited for a decision for over 12 months, and only for jobs on the Government’s highly restrictive shortage occupation list. This has not always been the case: until 2002, people were able to apply for permission to work if they had waited for a decision for more than six months, and only in 2010 was the right to work restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list. Today, almost seven in 10 people who are waiting for a decision on their asylum claim have been waiting for more than six months.
This forced inactivity is totally at odds with government policy, which, in most instances, aims to move people away from any kind of dependency and into work. It also increases the difficulty of integration for those who are eventually permitted to stay. I remember as an MEP dealing with a refugee from the Middle East. I never saw the end result of his case, but he came to me after about three and a half years. He was a doctor, but his skills were obviously deteriorating and he was losing status in his family because he could not support them, and generally he was in a very deteriorated state—mentally, physically and in his whole ability to live any kind of decent life. That is a personal and social tragedy.
Not being able to work increases the difficulty of integration for those eventually permitted to stay and puts an unnecessary cost on the public purse, even with £5.66 a day. The Lift The Ban coalition, which I applaud for its campaigning, estimates that reform of this policy could lead to a gain to the public purse of almost £200 million, about three-quarters of which would be from tax and national insurance contributions. A study by British Future found that 71% of the public supports the right to work after six months—my amendment says three months but, as I say, I am not hung up on that figure. One of the members of the Lift the Ban coalition is the CBI. I heard its new director-general, Rain Newton-Smith, on the Laura Kuenssberg Sunday morning programme the Sunday before last, calling for asylum seekers to be able to work, so this is not just the cause of those with a lefty-liberal axe to grind. Mind you, I look at the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and I would not dare put him in that category. It is because it makes sense, and makes sense for employers.
We have seen articles in the Financial Times saying the same thing. An article in Mach said that it is
“a human disaster for the refugees involved, and it hurts the economic prosperity of the places where asylum seekers live while waiting to have their claims processed”.
Another article of just over a year ago, under the headline,
“Keeping asylum seekers in limbo is bad for everyone”,
said:
“‘Human capital’ is damaged when people are shut out of labour markets”.
The article also made the point that:
“The UK stands out internationally for its reluctance to let asylum seekers work. In the EU”—
I remember, because I worked on that directive, and there was a fight over it—
“the law specifies they must be allowed access to the labour market after a maximum of nine months”.
The UK, which could choose whether to opt in, refused to opt in to that directive, for reasons that we will come to. The article continued by pointing out that many countries have shorter periods, with Sweden giving immediate access to its labour market, while Portugal puts just a one-month stay on it.
The argument for reform is that it would ensure that many people seeking asylum who have skills and experience in keyworker roles and the desire to contribute are able to do so. I know that we sometimes overuse the phrase no-brainer, but I suggest that this is one of those.
Another point is made by Professor David Cantor, director of the Refugee Law Initiative at the University of London, who says that the Government’s approach seems designed to push refugees into illegality. He asks:
“Why would a refugee present herself in good faith to the authorities on arrival, or stay in touch afterwards, if there is no prospect of protection, only detention and lack of status? If released on bail, why not simply disappear into irregularity?”
The ability to work would keep people plugged into the system, paying tax and national insurance, and they would necessarily be in touch with the Home Office—they would also have an incentive. They would not disappear into the shadows, but come forward and lawfully await the determination of their claim. That would put more order and sense into the system.
In January, the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, replied to the following oral question from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard:
“Would the Minister agree that it would be better if those waiting in that internal queue were able to work—better for them, the Exchequer and the country?”—
very succinct. The noble Lord, Lord Murray, said:
“I am afraid that I must disagree with the noble Lord. It is clear that one of the major pull factors for people crossing the channel is that they hope to work in Britain”.—[Official Report, 17/1/23; col. 1700.]
This is replicating a debate that we had on the Nationality and Borders Bill last year. I should have mentioned it at the beginning, but in that debate, we were discussing an amendment led by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. She told me earlier that she would have liked to be here to participate in the debate today because she continues, with admirable consistency, to support this cause, but she unfortunately had another commitment that she had to go to. However, I remember —and I am afraid that I am going to repeat—a citation that I made a year or so ago of the report from the Migration Advisory Committee. That is an independent committee that advises the Government. In a report of December 2021—some of us know this bit by heart—it took issue with the Home Office’s assertion about a pull factor. The report concluded:
“To the extent that the Home Office has robust evidence to support a link between the employment ban and a pull factor, they should of course make this evidence publicly available for scrutiny and review. That is how good policy is made”.
In other words, it is not made by making unsubstantiated assertions that every other commentator rebuts.
Indeed, the Home Office itself rebutted that assertion in a research report from September 2020 called Sovereign Borders: International Asylum Comparisons Report. It was produced by a unit called Home Office Analysis and Insight, and delightfully subtitled, Informing Decisions Through Evidence—which is what I think many of us would like the Home Office to do. One of its conclusions was:
“Economic rights do not act as a pull factor for asylum seekers. A review of the relationship between Right to Work and numbers of asylum applications concluded that no study reported a long-term correlation between labour market access and destination choice … Denied the right to work, many migrants may be forced to turn to clandestine work in highly insecure jobs in both the formal and informal labour markets to meet their basic needs”.
Perhaps it is not surprising that this report was labelled “Official Sensitive”, since if it got out into the public domain, it would be used to undercut the Government’s completely unsubstantiated assertions that the pull factor is the reason why they will not allow asylum seekers to work. Their own internal research, along with the independent Migration Advisory Committee, says: “You haven’t got a leg to stand on”.
There is no argument, except a gesture politics one, against allowing asylum seekers to work. Allowing people to work presses so many buttons in terms of their own personal well-being, the well-being of society and the well-being of the Exchequer. I hope that I will hear something positive from the Minister about this subject.
My name is on Amendment 133, and I had planned to make a speech debunking our friend the pull factor. Unfortunately, my speech has just been made rather brilliantly by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. Let me try something slightly different on the Government: since we last debated this issue during the passage of the Nationality and Borders Act, the economic arguments for allowing asylum seekers the right to work have surely strengthened considerably. Our productivity problem is greater than it then was.
I hesitate to interrupt the noble Baroness as I will have a right of reply after the Minister, but I do not think I have said any such thing. I did not say that everybody who crosses the channel or comes in another way irregularly is entitled to refugee status. Obviously, they are defined as refugees under the refugee convention, but if they are seeking status in the UK, they have to go through a process and those who do not qualify should be removed—deported. That is what a rational, fair and proper asylum procedure looks like. Our objection to the Bill is its refusal to admit anybody to the determination process. I have never said, nor have any of my noble friends, that everybody who arrives should be allowed to stay, under whatever status. Of course you cannot run an asylum system in that way and we have never said that.
What the noble Baroness does through many of her contributions is argue against anybody using the terminology “illegal immigrant” by virtue of the fact that they have come via that route and have claimed asylum. My understanding of what she is arguing is that their status as an asylum seeker should be accepted by virtue of the fact that they have made that claim.
I said at Second Reading that I based my remarks on conversations that I have had with people who work alongside immigrants in workplaces which are very different from the one we spend our time in. I said that if there was one way I could define the main message that they were seeking to make clear to me and to this House and to Parliament as we consider this legislation—I am quoting myself here—it was:
“Don’t assume or believe that everyone attempting to enter our country illegally is a genuine asylum seeker fleeing persecution”. —[Official Report, 10/5/23; col. 1814.]
I said that because I think that some of the arguments being made about being able to work are based on a desire for us to address that in a context where the noble Baroness’s perception of the situation is rather different from that of other people.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, invoked economic and productivity arguments in favour of allowing asylum seekers to work. Again, I can see where he is coming from and I do not in any way disagree with him or any noble Lord about the hard-working nature or enterprising disposition of people who come to this country. That is not something I would enter into any kind of discussion about. But I think that if we are going to raise economic arguments as a reason for the Government to accept these amendments and allow asylum seekers, at this current moment in time, to work in the way proposed, we must also remember that we have 5 million people on out-of-work benefits at a time when there is a record number of job vacancies.
I do not have that figure to hand, but I will find out and write to my noble friend.
By tackling the backlog and processing asylum claims in a timely manner, we will address the issues raised by many noble Lords in relation to Amendment 133. I am sure we will return to these issues in the coming weeks and months, but for now I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I feel that he slightly demolished his own argument. He claims that the asylum system and working should be insulated from each other. The logic of that is that no asylum seeker would ever be allowed to work, yet government policy has the extremely unsatisfactory rule that they can apply after 12 months to a restricted list. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said that the case that he knows of took another 12 months to get permission—yet more bureaucracy. All we ever get from the Home Office is more bureaucracy. The Minister cannot have his cake and eat it. If he does not think that asylum seekers should ever work, why does that government policy exist at the moment? It is very unsatisfactory.
Noble Lords have made some very good points. Like others, I much appreciated the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, who referred to “Conservative” principles of self-help and self-improvement. I would say that they are not uniquely Conservative, but they are also Conservative. That is why this policy makes sense to most people from all directions—on all Benches. It would help us have an orderly and well-run asylum system, as well as giving people the dignity and hope that have been mentioned.
I am afraid that I completely disagree with almost everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said. The policy would not encourage people to disappear. By keeping people plugged into the system, and assuming that they are paying tax and national insurance and are known to the authorities—it would help if we had labour market inspectors—it would be easier to keep track of them. If they do not succeed with their asylum claim, they should be removed from the country. I am trying not to get even more grumpy than I am after many days on this Bill—normally I am a completely ungrumpy person—but the suggestion that I, or anyone else on these Benches, want some kind of free-for-all where anybody can come, there are no borders or regulations and so on, is completely untrue. I totally deny that suggestion; indeed, I rather resent it. I am sorry to say that I found the noble Baroness’s contribution valiant but unconvincing.
It is certainly true that I object to the term “illegal” being used to describe a person. I have long held that view. I do not believe that any person is illegal. You can say, if you must, that they have arrived by illegal routes, but the refugee convention, which, unlike some people, I rather admire, talks about “irregular” arrival because people are allowed to arrive in a country to claim asylum—so they have not made illegal entry either. It is irregular but not illegal. I am a bit of a stickler for terminology, and I stick to that of the refugee convention. I am not sure whether I have to apologise for that, but I do not think so.
I have probably said everything that I can. I think the Government are wrong. I hope a future Government will revisit this issue—not in the manner of the Government of 20 years ago, who withdrew asylum seekers’ right to work—and implement the sense of this kind of provision. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Swire, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that I have for months been calling for more statistics from the Government and for the publication of the impact assessment. They join me in calling on their noble friends on the Front Bench to publish the impact assessment.
I would be delighted if we knew how many people the Government were detaining and removing. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, made the point that numerous noble Lords have made all the way through: we have no statistics. Clearly, the Government have them and will not tell us them. I suspect that is because they are embarrassed or worried, or because it would set up some sort of mechanism by which they could be judged on whether they have succeeded or failed. We have all said it would be helpful to publish the number of people we are detaining, whom the Government regard as illegal, and the number we are removing. We have not demanded it for a year after the passing of the Bill. That would be helpful, but we are demanding to know now what the assumptions are behind the planning within the Bill.
Perhaps, just to help the noble Lord, Lord Swire, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the rest of us, the Minister could tell us now what assumptions the Government are working towards as to the number of people they expect to detain under the Bill and the number they expect to remove. That would make that part of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Swire, unnecessary, and it would help our deliberations.
There is one further thing that would be helpful on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Swire. Before we had the cut-off date of 7 March 2023, how many people had failed their asylum application and were at that time waiting to be deported? It would be interesting to know how successful the Government’s policies had been up to that point in assessing whether people needed to be detained.
I particularly wanted to say a couple of things. I will leave Amendment 137; those debates about compatibility with various international conventions are well made, and we will return to them. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for signing and supporting that amendment. I do not want that to be seen as somehow meaning that they are not important. I hope the Minister will respond to the amendment, but the compatibility of the Bill with various international conventions has been debated all the way through Committee and I do not want to repeat those debates now. That is not to be taken to mean that those debates are not important; they are essential and will no doubt be returned to on Report.
I will focus particularly on Amendment 139FB in my name, which relates to our ability to tackle the gangs. There has been a lot of emphasis on victims, the potential number of asylum seekers and so on. These are government statistics. I repeat what I said earlier: the number of convictions for people-smuggling gangs has reduced considerably, has it not? Can the Minister give us an up-to-date figure on the number of smuggling gangs and a helpful comparison? Can he try to do us a favour by comparing with a year that gives a true reflection, rather than picking a year that gives a good percentage outcome? That would be helpful, because it is in all our interests to know exactly what is going on. Can he confirm my figure that over the last 12 months, the criminal smuggling gangs have made £180 million, and can he therefore tell us why so few people in smuggling gangs have been convicted?
As I understand it, there is some debate about whether the number of officers, officials and National Crime Agency staff working on this has gone up or down. Can we have an indication of the number of them involved in tackling this? My amendment deals with the National Crime Agency. Can the Government confirm that it is the law enforcement agency that is leading all this work? What other agencies, both national and international, are working to tackle the criminal gangs? My amendment says that to tackle organised immigration crime across the channel, there is a need to maintain a specific unit. Is a specific unit already in existence, making my amendment unnecessary? If not, would that help?
Essentially Amendment 139FB is a probing amendment to try to understand the current law enforcement activity with respect to tackling this heinous crime, from a national perspective but also an international one. I join the noble Lord, Lord Swire, in demanding from his Government some statistics, please.
I will speak briefly to Amendment 137, which I was pleased to co-sign, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said. The amendment raises some important points in referencing Articles 524 and 763 of the trade and co-operation agreement.
Article 524, in the context of part 3 of the agreement on
“law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”,
is predicated on respect for fundamental rights and legal principles, as reflected in the European Convention on Human Rights in particular. That is one of the reasons. One would expect the Government to be very careful about any undermining of the UK’s commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights in case they, for example, undermined this part of the TCA.
Indeed, Article 763, which underpins the whole of the TCA—not just the law enforcement and co-operation part—says that
“the Parties reaffirm their respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights treaties to which they are parties”.
That must also cover the ECHR. So, basically, our co-operation with the EU in the trade and co-operation agreement depends on our commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights. So it is not just important in the context of the Bill and generally but it is also a factor in the EU regarding us as playing a good- faith part in the trade and co-operation agreement. Undermining our commitment to the ECHR has to be seen in that context.
We benefit from a data adequacy decision from the European Commission, which means that data can be transferred between the UK and the EU. This can apply in the law enforcement and police co-operation sector, but it is also important to businesses, such as those in the City, those in financial services, those in fintech and others, particularly in the services arena. So there is a connection between respect for human rights and data adequacy decisions and business, because one of the factors that can be considered in the grant of a data adequacy decision—I remember debating this several times when we did the Brexit withdrawal legislation, and indeed I worked on the GDPR when I was an MEP—is the human rights compliance of the partner country, which is the UK in this case.
In fact, we commented at the time that that plays more of a role for a third country than it does within the EU, because questions arise about the human rights compliance of some countries within the EU, and it is finding it difficult to deal with them. Unfortunately or not, the UK is in the position of having less leverage in this respect. Believe me, the European Parliament will have something to say on this subject as well. The data adequacy decision gets reviewed in 2025, so the Government need to be careful that they are not undermining the data adequacy decision by disrespecting human rights.
On the situation in Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission points out:
“The UK Government’s ‘Explainer’ document on Windsor Framework Article 2 acknowledges that its protections apply to everyone who is ‘subject to the law in Northern Ireland’. Asylum-seekers are part of the community, subject to the law in NI and are therefore protected by the Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity chapter of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. In court proceedings ongoing at the time of writing”—
about four weeks ago—
“the Home Office has not disputed the argument that the protections of the relevant chapter of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement extend to asylum-seekers and refugees”.
So that has to be considered in a United Kingdom Bill.
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission also points out that, in the explainer on the Windsor Framework, the UK Government have confirmed that
“key rights and equality provisions in the [Belfast (Good Friday)] Agreement are supported by the ECHR.”
So, the ECHR and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework are intimately connected. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, along with the Northern Ireland Equality Commission, have identified several EU asylum directives—reception, procedures, qualification and the Dublin III regulation—as relevant to Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. They conclude:
“Given this analysis, failure to address compliance with Windsor Framework Article 2 in the Human Rights memorandum to the Bill is a matter of concern.”
I am most grateful for what the noble and learned Lord has said, but he may have overlooked that we had a debate, at a much earlier stage, on the way in which the Government use the word “require”. The Minister says that nothing in the Bill requires the Government to take action that would be contrary to our obligations under the TCA. He seems to be overlooking—the use of the word “require” perhaps deliberately overlooks the fact—that the Bill empowers the Government to take action which, if taken, would bring us into conflict with our obligations under the TCA. Perhaps he could answer that point.
Could the Minister confirm whether he agrees with the analysis of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, from which I cited extracts, on the various EU asylum directives that would continue to apply in Northern Ireland? I am afraid I have not checked what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, the other day, but the trafficking directive and the victims directive also apply in Northern Ireland. What are the Government doing to make sure that all those directives are going to be respected in practice in Northern Ireland?
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, from the Cross Benches, submitted my use of the verb “require” to a degree of philological scrutiny, which I had not taken into account when preparing my answer. I take the noble Lord’s point in relation to empowerment as opposed to obligation.
I regret to say that, in relation to the complex interrelating commitments to which the noble Baroness sought my views from the Dispatch Box, I will have to undertake to correspond with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord.
I sum up what has been a short debate by thanking noble Lords for their informed scrutiny of what has been said, not only by me but by others participating in earlier parts of the debate. From the perspective of this Committee, at this stage, the issues have been given a good airing. Noble Lords have referred to the inevitability that we will consider the matter at a later stage but, at present, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.