Illegal Migration Bill

Lord German Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am, of course, hugely disappointed that some of our colleagues do not want to listen to a fascinating debate on Clause 60 of the Illegal Migration Bill, just as some of those who stayed until 4 am the other morning did not want to participate in the debates on the Bill. However, I am delighted that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, is joining our ranks. It is wonderful to have an Earl Russell back. Those who remember Conrad Russell will know what a formidable Member of this House he was, and I am sure that his son will do justice to his memory.

I am talking against Clause 60 standing part. This clause was added by the Government on Report in the Commons, so it was not discussed by MPs. It would amend a section of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 that is about factors that damage the credibility of an asylum applicant.

The point of Clause 60 is to expand the circumstances in which credibility would be damaged—where a claimant fails to produce or destroys an identity document or, indeed, where they refuse to disclose information such as a passcode that would enable access to information stored electronically, such as on a mobile phone. It is rather odd that we should be debating this poor, lonely little clause on its own. Indeed, there was perhaps a good argument that it should have been grouped with Clause 14, which my noble friend Lord German, on whichever day it was—

[Lord German (LD)]

On a variety of days.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Yes, when it was proposed that Clause 14 should not stand part of the Bill. My noble friend debated issues about the powers of the Government to extract information concealed behind PIN numbers on phones. If memory serves, Clause 14 was particularly in relation to people who are detained, while Clause 60 oddly stands on its own—apart from Clause 14. But they need to be looked at holistically, to try to get some assessment as to what new powers the Government want. Are we in danger of getting spillover to sectors other than asylum?

The failure to provide information, an identity document or a PIN number would be added as a type of behaviour considered damaging to a claimant’s credibility. It is not restricted to people who are caught by Clause 2; the intended effect seems to be directed more at people seeking asylum who arrive on a direct flight from the country in which they face persecution. In a sense, it does not have much to do with this Bill, which is another reason why it sets off a bit of an alarm bell. The problem is that making a direct journey from a country in which the person is at risk of persecution, perhaps where the persecutor is the state or an agent of the state, may require the person not to travel with documentation that would identify them if they presented that documentation or were searched as they passed through an airport. That would concern an identity document—so there are some issues around penalising a person because they have not produced such a document, and I would be grateful if the Minister could respond on that issue.

On the other arm of it, with regard to insisting on the person delivering the passcode or PIN for their phone, I am wondering how widely that is expected to apply and how it relates to Clause 14 on getting access to PIN numbers and, indeed, to handing over mobile phones. My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the problem that that would mean asylum applicants not having access to their contacts. In the scenario that this Bill covers, that means that people could not phone their family to say, “I’m safe—I haven’t drowned in the channel”. So that is one aspect that arises. The other aspect is that of access and forcing someone to give up the PIN on their phone. When the Minister replied to the debate on Clause 14 and Schedule 2, he said that that the information on the phone

“can … assist in determining a person’s immigration status or right to be in the UK … We all know that mobile telephones contain a wealth of data relating not just to the owner of the phone but to where that phone has been and who they have been with—all of which can be used to build up an intelligence picture which can facilitate criminal prosecutions”.—[Official Report, 7/6/2023; col. 1542.]

We are all in favour of facilitating prosecutions. That is one of the reasons why we have been so dismayed by the provisions on victims of modern slavery and trafficking. Another reason is that there is nothing in the Bill to enhance the prosecution of smugglers and traffickers. Suddenly the Minister came out with this route which is supposed to facilitate criminal prosecutions. My noble friend Lord German referred to a High Court case which said that what the Government had been doing was illegal and that they were wrong to extract information concealed behind PINs on phones. The Minister said that the powers that have been put into the Bill in Clause 14 are fresh powers to respond to the High Court judgment, so this is a new suite of powers.

What we have got is in two different clauses. We have new powers, and the common theme across them is access to people’s mobile phones and other electronic devices by forcing them to give up PINs. I am wondering what the scope of this is, beyond people detained or caught by Clause 2, because Clause 60 appears to apply to anybody who is outwith the scope of the Bill. What are the boundaries of the powers that the Government are granting themselves to access people’s mobile phones? I cannot claim to be an expert on this issue, but I know there has been a lot of commentary and activity on the question of victims’ mobile phones in sexual abuse cases. Will the Minister clarify exactly what the purpose of Clauses 14 and 60 is? Why was Clause 60 brought in to stand on its own rather than Clause 14 being amended? What is the composite picture that the Government are painting? How are their powers going to be constrained? Are the rest of us going to find that one day all these powers apply to us as well? I am raising this point as a clause stand part debate because Clause 60 seems to raise some rather troubling questions about the powers that the Government want to give themselves to access mobile phones.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think that that question has been asked and answered by my noble friend; I cannot update the House on that at the moment.

As my noble friend set out on Monday, we will provide an update to the House before the first day of Report.

[Lord German (LD)]

In talking about this matter, could the Minister address the issue of why the Cabinet Office has issued guidance which the department has clearly ignored? Is there a need for the Cabinet Office to give guidance to Ministers on how they should produce legislation? If so, why have the Government not followed that advice?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the answer lies in the words the Home Secretary used this morning in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee. She said:

“We will be publishing it in due course”.


I am sorry to repeat those words again. She added:

“The issue is that there are many unknown factors … upon which the Bill’s success is contingent … For example, … the delivery of our Rwanda agreement. We are currently in litigation and those timelines are out of our control. We need to conclude our litigation relating to our Rwanda agreement. Once we have a clear view of the operability of Rwanda confirmed by the courts, then we will be able to take a very firm view about the economic impact of this Bill. … I would also say that to my mind it is pretty obvious what the economic impact … will be. We will stop spending £3 billion a year on … asylum cost”.


The Bill

“will lead to the cessation of 45,000 people in hotels and £6 million a day. To my mind, those are savings that we cannot ignore”.

I am afraid that I am unable to improve on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Amendment 139A is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew—who has managed to escape for the moment—has added his name to it, as has the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London.

This amendment seeks to prevent immigration data being shared for the purposes of Clause 2(1), under which the Secretary of State must make arrangements for the removal of people who meet the four conditions. I am very happy to have my name to this—I would not have signed it if I were not happy—because the issue of exemption from the Data Protection Act is one which my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have raised many times since we debated the then Data Protection Bill. The exemption from restrictions on sharing data for the purposes of immigration enforcement or immigration control—I do not recall which but it amounts to the same thing—is a very wide exemption.

The concern here is to ensure that victims can approach the authorities for assistance without the fear of removal as a result of that contact, or of data being shared with immigration enforcement. Noble Lords have frequently made the point about people without secure status having more confidence in smugglers and traffickers than they do in the authorities. The traffickers’ threats are not ones that they will take lightly; they control their victims, notwithstanding that the victims have “escaped”.

We have a number of other clause stand part notices, all amounting to the fact that we oppose the whole of the Bill. The clauses which are listed in this group are not substantive clauses; in other words, they are not about policy. I will mention just one, which is about financial provision. I am alarmed—we all are—at how much will be spent on what we consider to be the likely costs of the policy. I will not go over them again. We are firmly opposed; I do not think I need to spend time re-emphasising that point. I beg to move Amendment 139A.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I have two sets of amendments in this group. First, Amendments 142, 143, 144 and 147 seek to examine how the Brook House inquiry findings can influence the way in which the Bill will be enacted. Secondly, Amendment 139FE seeks to examine the devolution issues, which I will be looking at specifically through the legislation governing Wales and, very specifically, the Act of Parliament which I want to test the Government on.

First, my intention is to find out how the Government intend to deal with the recommendations of the Brook House inquiry when it reports and apply them to the changes that it will necessitate in the implementation of the Bill. Under the Inquiries Act 2005, the Brook House inquiry into mistreatment and abuse in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR at Brook House immigration removal centre was instituted in November 2019, following a judicial review proceeding. The inquiry has heard extensive evidence, and it is the first public inquiry into the mistreatment of those detained under immigration powers. The conditions of that detention provided a unique opportunity for public scrutiny of and accountability for detention practices and culture.

The inquiry, which we understand will be published in late summer, has heard evidence from detained persons, detention officers, healthcare providers, G4S—which was the contractor responsible for Brook House at the time—employees, Home Office officials, members of the independent monitoring board and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons. The inquiry also appointed and heard from three experts to address the key issues of the use of force, the institutional culture, and clinical care provision and safeguards. It also examined a vast amount of documentary material and video footage.