(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is another important group of amendments and we support all of them. I remind noble Lords of the importance of this. Since the Bill assumes that everybody arriving irregularly will be detained and automatically removed, where they are going to be removed to becomes important to us all, and for us to have some consideration about the criteria which the Government will use is of particular importance. Can the Minister confirm that deterrence does not trump human rights with respect to removals? That was the implication of what his noble friend Lord Murray said earlier—that deterrence is everything and something that has to be achieved irrespective of any other consequence.
Since the Government always say that they are on the side of the British people, let me be controversial for a moment. With regard to the issues that we have been discussing in this group of amendments, I do not believe that the British people believe that deterrence should trump human rights. Let us make this real. I have looked at this, as other Members have done, in relation to various LGBTQ rights in countries that the Government say will be safe to send failed asylum seekers to through the Bill. Let us take the case of Nigeria; as my noble friend Lord Cashman has said, you can be flogged for being gay there. In Malawi, it is up to 14 years’ imprisonment with or without corporal punishment. In Liberia, it is a maximum of three years in prison.
Can the Minister tell us, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, whether a failed asylum seeker who is gay would be removed to those countries? In the end, that goes to the essence of what we are talking about. I want to know, and the British public and this Chamber want to know: will such an individual—or anyone in circumstances detailed in the helpful amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett—be deported, or not? I do not think they should be deported in those circumstances. I do not see how those countries can be included in Schedule 1; I do not understand that at all. I do not believe that the Minister would want anyone —a female asylum seeker, for example, who has failed according to the terms of the Bill—to be returned to a country where they would be persecuted. Would such a country be included in Schedule 1? Rather than these general terms, let us see the specifics of what would happen.
Some noble Lords who have been Members of the other place will know that people will often say in general terms, “It’s an outrage”, or that “It’s about time those people were sent back” or “dealt with”. Then, the individual case—the individual family, the individual asylum seeker, the individual gay person—comes up and that very same community launches a campaign to stop them being deported. You can see it happening up and down the country because people are genuinely decent. When the human consequences of a piece of legislation are made clear, that general enthusiasm and support dissipates because they understand its consequences.
When the Minister answers the various questions of noble Lords, I want him to answer the specifics about an individual gay person who has failed as an asylum seeker under the terms of the Bill. Will they be returned to the sorts of countries and the sorts of persecution that other noble Lords and I have outlined?
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have put forward amendments in this group and contributed to this debate. The Government completely understand the sincerity and thought that has gone into these amendments and we are grateful for those observations but, for the reasons that I hope I will be able to explain, the Government do not feel that we should accept the amendments.
I wish to probe a little more what the Minister said. I understand his points about certain parts of countries. As I understand it, the Government accept that, in certain parts of countries, the risk to the individual will be such that that person should not be returned or sent to them if they are part of what could otherwise be a safe country. What is our Government’s mechanism to secure a guarantee from that country’s Government that that person would not then be sent to that region?
I suppose that the direct answer is that one would have to negotiate an appropriate agreement with the country concerned. I agree that that may not be enough, and the situation may well be such that it is not appropriate to designate a part of the country. All I am saying is that one should have this power; I am not necessarily saying the circumstances in which one should exercise it. It would still be open to an individual, in a suspensive claim, to say, “I’m still at risk because I might be transferred to the part of the country where it would be too dangerous for me to be sent”. That would be part of the analysis that the tribunal seized of the case would have to make.
I appreciate that the Minister said that, therefore, a negotiation may have to be done on not sending someone to part of a country. How would the British Government and the Home Office then monitor that to ensure that the host country kept to the agreement and that people were not moved to the part of the country that was deemed unsafe?
The Government would have to monitor it as best one could, and, if it turns out that an arrangement is not satisfactory, it probably may not be a good idea to designate that part of the country as safe in the first place. All I am saying is let us not deprive ourselves of the opportunity to have this flexibility. We can work it out as we go forward.
What I should come to now are Amendments 35, 36, 41 to 52 and 54 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, so ably developed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and spoken to by others. In essence, they seek to amend either Clause 5 or the references to various countries listed in the schedule on the basis that certain individuals would have a well-founded fear of persecution and that we should therefore now declare in statute which these countries are and on what basis people should not be sent back to them. In general terms, the Government’s view is that it is not desirable to enshrine in statute descriptions of which countries are safe or not, or of particular groups of individuals or those with protected characteristics. The route—
I will finish my train of thought and then give way. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, rightly asked about the route for the protection of the individual. If there is a removal notice to a country in question, and if they have a well-founded fear of persecution and would be at real risk of serious and irreversible harm if removed to that country, they have a right to make a suspensive claim—a claim of suspensive harm—and that claim is then appealed to the Upper Tribunal. That is their individual protection in which their individual circumstances are closely considered, including in a judicial process. That is the essential protection.
I also clarify that, if you read the Bill with care, you will see that people cannot be sent back to a country unless we are satisfied that the country is prepared to accept them. In practical terms, that will include Rwanda at the moment and other countries in the future, with which we might be able to form immigration partnerships. However, that is a precondition that does not necessarily apply to many of the countries listed in the schedule.
First, following on from what the Minister said at the beginning of the answer he has just given, when he said that the Government do not feel that it is appropriate to list characteristics of individuals in the Bill, I ask him: why in Schedule 1 are there, on eight occasions, a description of an individual in the list of countries for men only? They are deemed not safe for women; therefore, the Government have described certain groups of individuals by a characteristic.
Secondly, and very importantly, the point I raised—which the Minister may be coming to, based on his last answer—was that most people who claim asylum on LGBT, sexual orientation or gender identity grounds tend not to start with that. Therefore, it would be completely missed if there were not people supporting them to be able to go through a normal process. In some cases, it takes five or six attempts before that person will claim asylum on their own characteristic, because they do not trust authority, and so that trust has to be built.
My Lords, in relation to the first part of the question asked by the noble Lord, it is true that there are certain countries designated for men only, and so forth, in the existing schedule. The Government do not consider that that is an appropriate precedent to extend at this stage. Circumstances change and countries change, so it is much better to deal with this on an individual basis. It is probably the case, one would have thought as a matter of common sense, that, if it arises, the Government’s travel advice to particular countries, to raise one particular point, is likely to be a highly material fact, when they come to consider the risk of serious and irreversible harm.
I am grateful to the Minister for the answer he gave to a point I raised earlier. I ask him whether, before Report, he will talk to some of those organisations which have been the secondary referrals for people who have tried to make claims that they would be in danger in unspecified other countries. They face the extreme inconsistency of quality legal advice in different parts of the country, and they often obtain quality legal advice only when some well-meaning social worker or other person refers them to the Children’s Society or some other organisation, which has a proper team of lawyers, who are able to give informed advice. Around the country, where the people we are talking about tend to be dispersed, the knowledge of this part of the law is thin.
My Lords, the Government are always prepared to talk to anybody who would like to put forward various ideas. We will come to the question of legal advice and legal protections and procedures in a later group, where I will be very happy to elaborate on the Government’s plans in that respect.
The judge in an Upper Tribunal would no doubt be trying to determine the will of Parliament in deciding the issues before us. In what circumstances do the Minister or the Government believe a judge would send a gay individual going to the Upper Tribunal as the result of a suspensive claim back to Nigeria or a similar country?
I am not sure I completely understood the question. It may well be that in practice there will be various countries to which people with certain characteristics will never be sent because it is well known either at the level of the case worker and the Home Office or at the level of the judiciary that such a claim would give rise to a risk of “serious and irreversible harm”.
Let me try again for the Minister. It is often said in court that judges were uncertain as to the intention of Parliament and it was not clear in the legislation what Parliament actually meant and therefore there was ambiguity. For the sake of avoiding any ambiguity, let us say that a suspensive claim goes to the Upper Tribunal, where the judge will determine whether that claim is right and whether an individual should be sent back to a particular country. So that the judge in the Upper Tribunal is not in danger of misreading the will of Parliament, I do not think that Parliament would want a gay individual who had failed because of the terms of the Illegal Migration Bill to be sent back to a country such as Nigeria which flogs gay men. I am asking the Minister of the Crown to say what the Government’s attitude is towards gay men in those circumstances, so that a judge in an Upper Tribunal will know what the intention of Parliament was. I hope that was clear enough for the Minister.
My Lords, the Government’s position is that no one should be sent back if to do so would lead them to face
“a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm”.
If that is the position in relation to gay men in Nigeria, there should be no difficulty in them satisfying those conditions.
I am sorry to trouble the Minister again, but I have been listening to this with great interest and have two questions. First, is the Minister able to say any country outside Europe where it would be safe to send a gay man or indeed woman back? Secondly, if there are any countries, would it be possible for the Government to put those on their website?
It will remain a question of fact in each case and the examples of relevant harm are set out in Clause 38(4), which refers to
“death … persecution … torture … inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”
and where onward removal would raise a risk of
“real, imminent and foreseeable risk of … harm”.
If that in practice amounts to a situation in which you could not send a gay person back to that country, that would be a decision for the tribunal.
I am so grateful to the Minister for responding with his characteristic courtesy and patience. I think I can help him, because I think the problem here arises from the Government own cake-eating, if I can put it like that. The general proposition in the Bill is that we will now decide on a blanket basis that people are to be removed, regardless of their circumstances, because of the means of their arrival, not because of the circumstances of their past and their persecution. Fair enough; that is the thinking behind the Bill. Then the Government say, “Here is the schedule of safe countries”, again on a blanket basis. Then the Government say, “But only for men”—so they have already adopted the approach that there are some countries that are safe for men but not for women. But then when my noble friends and other noble Lords in the Committee say, “But gay people are a vulnerable group in many parts of the world, just as women are”, the Minister is, I think, forced into the Government’s position of saying, “But women are not a precedent”.
That logic is not standing up to scrutiny, in this Committee at least, so I hope that, after Committee and before Report, the Minister might just consider that issue of gay people, or LGBT+ people, in particular. We all know, in this Committee, that just as there are some countries that may be safe for men but not women, there are many countries that are not safe for queer people either. Rather than playing on this sticky wicket, which he, with his characteristic grace, handles with great aplomb, perhaps before Report, the Government could think again.
My Lords, the Government will of course consider that, as we try to consider everything that is said in this House, before Report. I simply reiterate that under Clause 5(3)(d), it still has to be
“a country or territory to which there is reason to believe P will be admitted”—
and that is probably not very likely to be satisfied in the particular countries we are talking about, such as Ghana, for example. Having responded to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the Government will of course consider the position.
On that very point, what is the point of having Ghana in that schedule? There is no agreement with Ghana at all, so how do the Government know that Ghana would be unlikely to accept someone who is not admissible under the UK scheme? The UK will presumably not necessarily divulge that that person is gay.
My Lords, I sought to explain earlier that Schedule 1 is an amalgam of all the existing schedules that exist. Ghana was already on a list of countries to which people could be sent, and the present practice is not to send people back to places where they are at serious risk. That practice will continue under this Act when you make a suspensive harm application. It is a historical situation, but it has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. As I said to the noble Baroness a moment ago, the Government will reflect on what has been said in this debate.
That brings me to deal specifically with the question of Rwanda and the fact that there are currently proceedings pending in relation to Rwanda, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out. So far, the High Court has upheld the position on Rwanda: we will see what the Court of Appeal judgment says. If the case goes further, it will be a matter for judicial decision and we will see how that works out, but we will not take Rwanda out at this stage, while the matter is still pending. I think that is also the answer, if I may say so, in relation to Amendments 43A and 49A on Hungary and Poland. These are ongoing proceedings: let us see what the outcome is and then it can be properly determined whether Poland and Hungary are countries that should remain on the list. That is not clear yet and it depends on the outcome of those pending proceedings.
I think that I am nearly through, except for the very important points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others, as to whether we should beef up Clause 6(4)(b), which at the moment places certain requirements on the Secretary of State, in deciding on possible new countries and territories. The thrust of the amendment suggested by the noble Lord and supported by others is that effectively there should be a more detailed list of conventions and other international instruments to which the Government should have regard, with a specific obligation of consultation. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others wanted in particular to enshrine the obligation to follow the decisions of domestic courts and the Human Rights Act.
The Government’s position on this—and of course, as with other things, we will reflect on it—is that these are effectively de facto covered in the existing Clause 6(4)(a) and (b). They provide that the Secretary of State must—it is a positive duty—
“have regard to all the circumstances of the country”
and
“must have regard to information from any appropriate source (including member States and international organisations)”.
That, in the Government’s view, necessarily requires the Secretary of State to have regard to case law, whether it is domestic or European; to have regard to international conventions and obligations; and to have regard to what international organisations say—and they are not exactly bashful when coming forward in this kind of area. The Secretary of State would be seriously at risk of being found to have acted irrationally or found not to have taken into account relevant considerations, if there was a major international organisation, a major convention or a major decision that had somehow been overlooked. So the combination of the normal duties of rationality and duty to take into account all relevant considerations, plus the actual wording of Clause 6(4), in the Government’s present view, covers the situation adequately.
I am grateful to the Minister. The hour is late, and I promise not to intervene again on his remarks. Before we get to group 19, which is also linked to this amendment, or indeed before we get to Report, could the Minister arrange for his officials or perhaps for himself or his noble friend to meet the Salvation Army and the other providers and stakeholders to which I referred in my remarks? It was they who raised these concerns—and, given that they have a contract with the Home Office, they are in a pretty good position to know the territory.
My noble friend Lord Murray tells me that that is already in train—or, certainly, there is no objection from the Government’s point of view.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for his patience and graciousness. Given the amendments that I raised, which I co-signed with others, particularly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and given the notion that deterrent trumps all, I am still not reassured that a person would not be returned to somewhere like Uganda, where you face 14 years’ imprisonment or the death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality”. I am not reassured that a person will not be sent to those countries if they are at serious risk. Historically—and I shall close on this intervention—in the Home Office, people have been told that they will be returned to countries where they should not make their sexual orientation or gender identity known. I do not want us to return to those days.
In taking full account of what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, has just said, which was obviously a powerful comment, I simply reiterate, as I have said to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the Government will consider the content of this debate. However, I reiterate first of all that this is a judicial and not a Home Office decision, and that those concerned will need to explain to the tribunal why they do not want to be sent back to these countries.
The equality impact assessment that the Government have done on this talks particularly about sexual orientation. The very point that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others have made is that people will be returned. The Government more or less say that that will be the case unless something happens:
“Where individuals are from a country where their sexual orientation is criminalised, and their exploitation is linked to their sexual orientation, they may require additional support in order to trust and engage with law enforcement”.
That is the Government’s own equality impact assessment. Where in the Bill is that extra support in place? I cannot see it anywhere in the Bill to ensure that discrimination does not take place against people from the LGBT community. Therefore, subsequently, if this support is not put in place, people from the LGBT community will be sent to places where they are unsafe due to local LGBT laws.
My Lords, at this stage I do not think I can elaborate beyond the answers I have already given. This is going to be a matter for the judicial process—through the appeal process, the legal advice and the legal representation that these people have. If they can show serious and irreversible harm, then they will not be sent to these places.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the care with which he has responded to these amendments. I do not know whether I am right, and I do not want to embarrass him, but I sensed a slight feeling of discomfort with the issues we are having to address. I applaud him for that.
It seems to me that noble Lords have been both practical and principled in this debate. I agree with the analysis about half an hour ago by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of the position, but the practicality has been by testing the reality of different circumstances. It was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who said that, when faced with the situation of somebody one knows well being in this precarious position, it all looks very different. I agree; it is rather similar to feelings about people who come from other cultures. We are suspicious of them—“But not So-and-so—no, she is fine”.
On Amendment 30, I will read the report of what the Minister has said. I was not challenging most of subsection (4). It was simply the discretion, and I take what has been said about the Secretary of State having to act reasonably and so on. Subsection (5), however, says that “exceptional circumstances include”. That, to me, raises questions about what might not be included on the face of the Bill.
The Minister is quite right that I was trying to read “prevent” as someone being put at risk, and I think the Bill should say so because a person is prevented from being removed only if, in his individual case, he falls within the exceptions. That is not the natural understanding of the term. I have to say that I remain very concerned about the issue of a part of a country. A conflict in one part of a country can spread very fast, and can the risk to an individual—if he is persona non grata in one part of the country, that can become known in another part of the country very easily—and we are talking about individuals.
I am still a bit confused about “in general”. I understand that the lists we have are an amalgam of previous lists. The Minister defends the position—I think I am right in saying—by referring to procedures that can be used to challenge a decision. We are going to get to some more of this later in the Bill, but noble Lords have already shown their concern about the very narrow circumstances in which challenges—if I can use the term broadly—can be made.
A couple of things have come up in the Minister’s response that have made me think again about these. I would have mentioned some in any event, but I sure that noble Lords will understand that I am, at this moment, speaking a little bit slowly for reasons of time. If there is to be a negotiation about a home country and whether to have a negotiation with that country, does that actually raise the risk of drawing the individual to the attention of the authorities in that country and putting that person in greater jeopardy than he may have been?
The notion of acceptance by the receiving country has also been raised. I do not know whether the Minister can answer this tonight; if he can take a couple of minutes to do so, it would be helpful. If the UK and other countries are going to say, “Will you accept this individual?”, does that not, again, put that individual in jeopardy, because the reason for his having sought asylum in the UK will become known? We are in Committee, so the Minister is free to reply if he can help at this point.
My Lords, I expect that I am being asked to play a sort of night watchman role in continuing the batting until stumps are drawn. As far as I know, it is not the case that the Government intend to engage in negotiations in relation to particular individuals. The Government’s general policy is to engage in discussions with particular countries about reciprocal arrangements and migration partnerships. There are various reports of other countries that are currently engaged in discussions.
Subject to correction—I am sure my noble friend Lord Murray will put me right—I think it is very likely to be the case that a lot of what we have discussed tonight in relation to Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda is simply not going to arise. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and others are sceptical about that and it may be that the Government need to provide some further reassurance to satisfy noble Lords. Perhaps the noble Baroness will forgive me for noticing the time.
I am grateful to the Minister. That has raised further issues in my mind about what information may be given—not necessarily about an individual—to a receiving country, whether the questions may be asked and how the UK responds.
I think stumps probably can be drawn, though it is not in my gift to say so. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 30.