(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI happened to be at a hospice in Stafford yesterday on a ministerial visit and was extremely impressed by the work that the hospice staff were doing on family counselling, and advice and engagement both with the patient and family and loved ones, so the right hon. Gentleman is right that the hospice sector, among others, plays a vital role in that holistic engagement with patients throughout the process.
Amendment 374 requires that the co-ordinating doctor must notify the voluntary assisted dying commissioner where they witness a second declaration and where they make or refuse to make the supporting statement under clause 13(5), and that the commissioner must be provided with a copy of the second declaration and any statement. I hope that those observations were helpful to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under you this morning, Ms McVey. My amendments 374 and 471 serve to clarify that the second declaration must be made before it is witnessed—it is a drafting amendment—and to bring clause 13 in line with the reporting requirements elsewhere in the Bill. For the functions of the commissioner to be carried out effectively, including supervising the assisted dying panels and making annual reports on the legislation’s operation, it is essential that all relevant details and reports are made available.
I am unable to support amendment 457, in the name of the hon. Member for Richmond Park. As I said when we started discussing the amendment, I do not fully understand why it has been positioned at this stage in the process. The shorter period of reflection is a recognition that a person’s death is expected within a month, so they literally have a few weeks left of life.
That was the hon. Member’s response when I made my speech on the amendment in the previous sitting. I have reflected on that over the weekend. I still think that the issue of the voluntary stopping of eating and drinking is a very serious one that ought to be reflected somewhere in the legislation, but she is correct that, at this particular point, we are talking about the second period of reflection already being at an end, so it cannot be hastened in any way by such a measure. Therefore, I will be withdrawing the amendment.
I appreciate that; that is helpful and I thank the hon. Member. As the Minister said, a person whose death is approaching may have stopped eating and drinking for a number of reasons. They may simply be too ill. They may be unable to digest food. It may be that they have lost their appetite, or that they will be even more ill if they eat and drink, so it would seem particularly cruel to intervene on that basis at that point, but I appreciate her comments.
Amendment 316 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for York Central seeks to mandate the action a doctor must take if a patient is likely to die within one month. Like other amendments, it goes against the basic principles that underlie the Bill—that the wishes of the person seeking assistance should be respected. Surely that is even more important than ever as they face their final weeks. As the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said, palliative care will have been discussed at length throughout the assisted dying process. It is also worth noting, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said, that evidence from other jurisdictions with similar laws—Australia and America—shows that between 80% and 90% of people who have gone through the assisted dying process are already receiving palliative care, so I am not minded to support the amendment.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 207, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out “Schedule 4” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 4).
Amendment 470, in clause 13, page 9, line 26, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must provide that a second declaration contains—
(a) the following information—
(i) the person’s full name and address;
(ii) the person’s NHS number;
(iii) contact details for the person’s GP practice;
(iv) specified information about the certificate of eligibility;
(b) the following further declarations by the person—
(i) a declaration that they have made a first declaration and have not cancelled it;
(ii) a declaration that they understand that they must make a second declaration in order for assistance to be provided under this Act;
(iii) a declaration that they are making the second declaration voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it;
(iv) a declaration that they understand that they may cancel the second declaration at any time.
In this subsection “specified” means specified in the regulations.”
This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a second declaration must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).
Amendment 471, in clause 13, page 9, line 27, leave out from “if” to “that” in line 28 and insert
“the coordinating doctor is satisfied (immediately before witnessing it)”.
This amendment removes wording which would suggest that a second declaration is made before it is witnessed.
Amendment 208, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out “Schedule 5” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a statement by the coordinating doctor following the making of the second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 5).
Amendment 472, in clause 13, page 9, line 41, at end insert—
“(6A) Regulations under subsection (6)(a) must provide that a statement under subsection (5) contains—
(a) the following information—
(i) the person’s full name and address;
(ii) the person’s NHS number;
(iii) the coordinating doctor’s full name and work address;
(iv) specified information about the certificate of eligibility;
(b) the following declarations by the coordinating doctor (in addition to a declaration that they are satisfied of all of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)(a) to (d))—
(i) a declaration that they are satisfied that a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of the person;
(ii) a declaration that the second declaration was made after the end of the second period for reflection;
(iii) if the second declaration was made before the end of the period mentioned in subsection (2)(a), a declaration that they have the belief mentioned in subsection (2)(b);
(iv) a declaration that they are satisfied that neither the first declaration nor the second declaration has been cancelled.
In this subsection “specified” means specified in the regulations.”
This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a statement under subsection (5) must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).
Amendment 374, in clause 13, page 10, line 2, at end insert—
“(8) Where the coordinating doctor has—
(a) witnessed a second declaration, or
(b) made or refused to make a statement under subsection (5),
the doctor must notify the Commissioner and give them a copy of the second declaration or (as the case may be) any statement under subsection (5).”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner of witnessing a second declaration, and of having made or refused to make a statement under clause 13(5).
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Cancellation of declarations
I beg to move amendment 375, in clause 14, page 10, line 9, at end insert—
“(1A) Where notice or an indication is given to the coordinating doctor under subsection (1)(a), the doctor must as soon as practicable notify the Commissioner of the cancellation.”
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 376, in clause 14, page 10, line 12, after “doctor” insert “and the Commissioner”.
This amendment requires a practitioner other than the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner (as well as the coordinating doctor) of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.
Clause stand part.
I hope that these are a couple of nice, simple amendments. The right of the patient to cancel at any time is obviously really important. It is also important that, for the purpose of monitoring and reporting the process, the commissioner, as proposed, is kept informed at every stage. I hope that the whole Committee can see the necessity of these amendments.
The hon. Lady is quite right that there is nothing to object to in these amendments or the clause. It is worth stating at this point, though, that in the context of the debate we are having in this Committee, we are moving at some pace. The likelihood is that there will be opportunity for only a five-hour debate on Report—maybe more, but possibly not. This Committee is the time we have to consider in detail the content of the Bill. My concern is that moving too quickly and trying to do too much too soon means that we will miss the opportunity to debate very important aspects of the Bill.
The hon. Lady says that these are “nice, simple” amendments, as if the only thing being discussed here is the paperwork around the declaration. What should we say to patients who decide to cancel their declaration? My concern—I am unaware of any other point when we could appropriately discuss this question—is what happens in the event of a cancellation. What duty of care do doctors have to patients who have decided not to proceed with an assisted death? The Bill does not currently address that question: it imposes no obligation on doctors to follow up in any way after a declaration has been cancelled.
I am speaking to the group as a whole, which includes clause stand part. I have no objection to the amendments. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. As I said, the expectation is that the medical professionals involved in the person’s care will have laid out their options clearly. We are to a certain degree trusting in that because amendments to insist on it have been rejected, although I recognise that it will be the clear expectation. He is right that it is hard, as it were, to prove a negative.
Nevertheless, the purpose of my speech at this point is to tease out from the advocates of the Bill what their expectation is. My right hon. Friend has clearly explained his expectation, which is that we are dealing with somebody whose mind is clear, rational, uncluttered by other concerns and entirely free of any undue influences or anxieties about the different choices they might make. Having previously decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they wanted to go through the procedure, they have now decided in the fullness of their autonomy that they want to do the opposite, and we should say, “Fine. We have no further interest in your decision making. It is your choice—you’re on your own.” I am very concerned about the implication of my right hon. Friend’s comments about the sorts of patients who might be involved in the process of assisted dying.
To allay those fears, perhaps the fundamental answer to the question is that those people do not stop being patients—sadly, they do not stop being terminally ill patients. They have just chosen to cancel the declaration, and they will already have wraparound care. To some degree, the hon. Gentleman answered his own question when he said that doctors have a duty of care. That duty of care does not stop because the person has chosen to take this course of action. They will still be cared for by the professionals looking after them.
Well, we certainly hope so. Nevertheless, that is inconsistent with the doctrine of absolute patient autonomy, which in this circumstance allows a patient to withdraw from the medical treatment, or at least from the support of the medics who had been facilitating their assisted death. They are rightly under no obligation to receive any other sort of care.
Of course, one would assume that in most cases medics will be closely involved in looking after these patients, because they are likely to be very ill. Nevertheless, the Bill has nothing more to say about patients who have just stepped back from the brink of suicide; the medics will have no further obligation to ensure that they will be looked after—except by the GP, as soon as it is practicable for the provider who has just been denied the business of looking after the assisted death to get round to emailing them. If that is seen as sufficient to ensure that those patients will be properly looked after, I beg to differ.
The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on amendments 375 and 376. The amendments require that where the co-ordinating doctor, or any registered practitioner from the person’s GP practice, receives a notification or indication from the person seeking assistance under the Bill that the person wishes to cancel their first or second declaration, the doctor or practitioner must inform the voluntary assisted dying commissioner as soon as practicable. Where a registered practitioner from the person’s GP practice has received a notification or indication from the person to cancel their first or second declaration, they must also inform the co-ordinating doctor. I hope those observations are helpful to the Committee.
I repeat what I said earlier about what will happen to the patient if they choose to cancel: their care will continue. From a medical practitioner perspective, it is inconceivable that those patients would be abandoned, as the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is suggesting. That would not happen.
I understand that cancellation of the second declaration does not need to be included in clause 14(4) because of when in the process it would happen. The first declaration comes much earlier, so clauses 7 to 9 would be applicable; the second declaration comes further down the process, so does not need to be included. However, I am happy to look at that in further detail and come back to the hon. Member on that, if necessary.
Amendment 375 agreed to.
Amendment made: 376, in clause 14, page 10, line 12, after “doctor” insert “and the Commissioner”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment requires a practitioner other than the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner (as well as the coordinating doctor) of a cancellation of a first or second declaration.
Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Signing by proxy
I beg to move amendment 321, in clause 15, page 10, line 33, at end insert—
“(d) the reason why the person was unable to sign their name.”
My hon. Friend is making a really sensible point and a fair argument, and I am very happy to support the amendment.
I welcome my hon. Friend’s acceptance of the amendment, and I think she sees the point behind it. It was meant not to be awkward—I do not think I have been at all awkward during this process—but simply to state that, if there were concerns later, the reason why the proxy was required should be there in a transparent way. I commend amendment 321 to the Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and I very much support his amendment; it is good to hear that the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, will as well. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has made his points very powerfully, and it is good that we are in agreement.
I also support amendment 431, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which would restrict proxies to donees of lasting power of attorney. The point is that somebody who has been through the process of taking on power of attorney has been properly vetted and approved; they are required to demonstrate their fitness for the role and undertake a meaningful duty of care to the person for whom they are a proxy. That strikes me as an appropriate suggestion from the hon. Lady.
Amendment 411, tabled by the hon. Member for Broxtowe, suggests that the phrase
“a person who is of good standing in the community”
should be deleted. I think she is absolutely right to suggest that. I made the point on Second Reading that—
I think the hon. Lady is about to say that her own amendment addresses that point.
I would not want to pre-empt the regulations, because clearly that is the point of the process. If this Bill gets Royal Assent, we then move on to making regulations, and I have confidence in the good offices of parliamentary counsel, legal advice and the drafting process. I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman, however, that the purpose of those regulations must be to remove ambiguity, not to increase it. I am confident that the system will produce regulations that address his concern.
Does the Minister agree that it will be on the record that we have had this conversation, and that many of us—including myself—have expressed our concerns about the concept of good standing in the community? I would like to think that that will be taken into consideration.
I am acutely conscious that every word we say in this Committee is on the record. My hon. Friend makes a valid point in that context.
The purpose of amendment 253 is to clarify that a person acting as a proxy can both sign and revoke a declaration on behalf of a person seeking assistance under the Bill. This amendment would extend the provisions under clause 15 to a person who is acting as proxy to the person seeking assistance under the Bill, enabling the proxy to act on behalf of the person to cancel their first or second declaration if they are unable to sign their own name by reason of physical impairment, being unable to read or for any other reason. I note that the cancellation of a declaration is governed by clause 14, and the cancellation may be given orally, via writing, or
“in a manner of communication known to be used by the person”.
It does not require the signature of the person seeking assistance under the Bill, so a proxy may not be required for some people in relation to revoking a declaration, even if they have been required under clause 15.
I will speak first to my amendment 473. It is important to be clear that the role of the proxy is very specific and would be used only in a very limited number of cases, where the patient is not able to sign their own name. That is, however, important when we are talking about terminally ill people who may be physically impaired, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford alluded to.
I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Lady so soon into her speech. Nevertheless, the clause says that someone can use a proxy when they are unable to sign their name
“by reason of physical impairment, being unable to read or for any other reason”.
Does the hon. Lady acknowledge that that is tantamount to saying that somebody can have a proxy for any reason at all? There is literally no restriction in the clause on the reason for why somebody could have a proxy—anybody could have one.
That is why amendment 321 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford is really important. We have to put the reason down for why there is a proxy. It depends on personal circumstances and what that patient is going through, so we have to have a bit of flexibility, but they have to be unable to sign their name and they have to explain why they are unable to sign their name.
I hope that this does not appear pedantic, but we are talking about life and death after all. The patient’s inability to sign their name could be psychological; it is not as if they will have to do a writing test. They simply have to say that they are unable to sign their name, unless the hon. Lady is proposing that there could be some sort of test for that.
I entirely support amendment 321 in the name of the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford about the proxy being obliged to state the reason why—it is good to finally have the question “Why?” being asked in the Bill. Nevertheless, there is no obligation for anything to be done about that reason; someone could give a reason that would be regarded as irrelevant. I respect the intention behind the amendment, but it does not clarify the point that literally anybody could effectively get a proxy to sign their name, having said to the assessing doctor, “I want my friend to sign for me.”
That is the sort of thing that the doctor would explore with the patient. It would happen in a very limited set of circumstances. We have to accommodate people who are physically impaired as a result of their terminal illness, and we have to include that there are a range of circumstances where this might apply. The proxy is being asked not to make any kind of judgment or assessment, but merely to act as an intermediary for the patient if they are unable to sign for themselves. They would have to explain why they are unable to sign for themselves, and the proxy has to be satisfied that the person understands the nature and effect of the making of the declaration.
I thought long and hard about who should and should not be accepted as a proxy. As always, I try to imagine how it would be seen by someone with a terminal illness. As we know, no two people are the same, nor are their circumstances. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire said that surely it should be done by someone the patient knows. The clause defines a proxy as someone the patient has known for two years, which is an important inclusion, but not everyone might have known for two years a person who they are comfortable asking to undertake that role.
I also appreciate the challenges with the wording
“of good standing in the community”.
I will let the hon. Member for East Wiltshire and the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire fight that out among themselves. I am sure we all have our own version of what that means.
I have explored various options and, contrary to the suggestion of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, I have spent a huge amount of time on this question, because it is very important. Looking at different lists, there is the list of people who can sign the back of someone’s passport. I do not think that would be appropriate, so I moved away from that. I have also looked at much shorter lists. I do think that this question would be part of a consultation; it is really important to get it right, which is why we must have it as part of a consultation. I am content that having the Secretary of State put it in regulations is the right thing to do.
As I said, I am happy to support amendment 321 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It is a sensible amendment that makes the reasons for the use of the proxy more transparent. If amendment 253 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Claire Hazelgrove) is moved, I am happy to support that too. As the Minister said, a cancellation need not be in writing; it can be made orally or through any other form of communication.
Amendment 321 agreed to.
Amendment made: 473, in clause 15, page 11, line 3, leave out from “person” to end of line and insert
“of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment provides that persons of a description specified in regulations (rather than persons “of good standing in the community”) may be proxies.
Amendment made: 253, in clause 15, page 11, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) For the purposes of this section “declaration” includes the cancellation of a declaration.”—(Sean Woodcock.)
This would allow a cancellation of the first or second declaration to be signed by a proxy.
Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Recording of declarations and statements etc
Amendments made: 209, in clause 16, page 11, line 8, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
“(b) a report about the first assessment of a person is made under section 7;
(c) a report about the second assessment of a person is made under section 8;”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 420 and 421.
Amendment 377, in clause 16, page 11, line 12, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
“(d) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person;
(da) a panel has refused to grant such a certificate;”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
I beg to move amendment 474, in clause 16, page 11, line 17, at end insert—
“(1A) In this section ‘recordable event’ means an event mentioned in a paragraph of subsection (1).”
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 475, in clause 16, page 11, line 19, leave out from second “the” to “in” in line 21 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 476, in clause 16, page 11, line 24, leave out from “the” to “, and” in line 26 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 477, in clause 16, page 11, line 27, leave out from “the” to “in” in line 29 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 478, in clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out from second “a” to end of line 32 and insert
“declaration, report or statement within subsection (1) must include the original declaration, report or statement.”
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Clause stand part.
The amendments are designed to streamline the drafting of the Bill. Taken together, they create a new definition of a recordable event, namely those events set out in clause 16(1), where declarations and statements are required at any stage of the process. We can all agree that record keeping is essential, so it is necessary to define the events that should be recorded. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
I very much respect the hon. Lady’s intention, and I support the amendments. On clause 16, however, I must take the opportunity to express a certain concern. The clause applies if, under subsection (1)(b), the co-ordinating doctor
“refuses to make…a statement”
to be entered into the person’s medical records. That is good but, as I understand it, a statement could be made that complies with the Bill but does not put on record, in relation to subsection (2), which requirements the co-ordinating doctor did not believe were satisfied. We have missed an opportunity to have more clarity about which exact requirements have not been met. There is also the eternal question about the co-ordinating doctor’s reasons for reaching that conclusion. I just note the missed opportunity to be a little safer with the drafting.
My more general point is about the importance of effective record keeping and declaration. I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley, who throughout the whole Bill process has stressed the importance of good data collection and record keeping, which will be vital so that in later years, if the Bill passes, we can judge whether it is working as intended.
I am concerned about going on the evidence of other countries, which is frequently adduced in support of the Bill, particularly in respect of the absence of evidence of coercion, questions around capacity, proper administration of drugs or the support that patients receive. It is often said that concerns are exaggerated or inappropriate, “because look at what happens in other countries”, but let me briefly run through some evidence from abroad.
The fact is that no other country does adequate record keeping. One ambition of the hon. Member for Spen Valley that I really do share is to have a better system of keeping data than in other countries. In Oregon, the most recent annual report demonstrates a whole series of failures in record keeping. Ingestion status was unknown for 25% of the patients prescribed the drugs, so we do not know whether they took the drugs or what the process was. In 72% of cases, it was unknown whether there were complications; we have been talking about how exaggerated my concerns and those of other Members are about complications, but in 72% of cases in Oregon we do not know. In 30% of cases, it was unknown whether a healthcare provider was present. In 44% of cases, the duration between ingestion and death was unknown.
I very much recognise that the intention of the Bill is not to have those sorts of mistake. Indeed, the intention is to ensure that some of them should be impossible, because a doctor should be present and so on. Nevertheless, there is evidence that in other countries that have inspired the Bill, the data is inadequate. I will give a few more examples.
British Columbia has poor documentation, incomplete assessments, recurrent and excessive delays in reporting. In the debate on the last group of amendments, we spoke about the necessity that a doctor be informed if a declaration is cancelled; I am very concerned that that will not happen quickly and that people could fall through the gaps. That is what happens abroad. We have seen evidence from the former Attorney-General of Victoria, Australia, of all sorts of irregularities, with doctors falsely certifying that patients had signed statements and so on.
I do not know the details of the individual cases that the hon. Member speaks about, but he makes a powerful point and we absolutely agree on the importance of recording and monitoring. I know that he voted against the changes at clause 12, but I hope he gets some reassurance from the changes that the commission would bring in. Having the commission and the panels would ensure robust monitoring and reporting. I hope he agrees that that is a positive step.
I absolutely recognise that the hon. Lady has every intention of insisting that the system works well, that doctors do their job and that good record keeping happens. My concern throughout has been that we have not been robust enough in ensuring that all of that happens.
A huge amount of faith is being placed in the good professional conduct of doctors. Patient autonomy has been stressed, but it often translates into doctor autonomy. We are relying enormously on doctors doing their job well, and we are giving them significant latitude to do their job properly. As we see in other jurisdictions, particularly when assisted suicide becomes normalised and services are established explicitly to provide assisted suicide, we get into a dangerous area in which adequate documentation and reporting might not happen.
I will conclude with evidence from Canada, which is a very comparable country; it has a slightly different mechanism for delivering assisted suicide, but its legal framework is very similar to ours. The Health and Social Care Committee in our last Parliament received evidence from an academic in Canada, Dr Kotalik, who stated that federal regulations had been
“mandating a collection of data from MAID providers”,
just as the Bill will do. However, he noted that
“those legal and regulatory efforts have yet to produce evidence that the program operates as intended. We have no publicly accessible evidence that the eligibility criteria and safeguards prescribed by law were respected and that the Criminal Code has not been transgressed.”
It is fine for us, in this Committee and in Parliament, to specify that all doctors should do their job properly and that all data should be appropriately collected, transmitted and recorded. Nevertheless, as we all know from our casework, the reality is often one of bureaucratic mistakes being made, albeit not with any ill will. Given the volumes that we may well be dealing with, I think it is appropriate to raise significant concerns about the operation of the Bill and the data collection that we seek.
The purpose of amendments 474 to 478 is to improve the drafting of the Bill by creating a new definition of “recordable event”. Recordable events are the events set out in clause 16(1) related to the recording of declarations and statements.
The amendments would also make consequential changes to clause 16, which refer to the occurrence of the recordable event, as per the new definition, and include reference to a report in addition to a statement or declaration. The reference to a report is consequential on the amendments already agreed by the Committee to clauses 7 and 8.
I have nothing further to add.
Amendment 474 agreed to.
Amendments made: 475, clause 16, page 11, line 19, leave out from second “the” to “in” in line 21 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 476, in clause 16, page 11, line 24, leave out from “the” to “, and” in line 26 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 477, in clause 16, page 11, line 27, leave out from “the” to “in” in line 29 and insert
“occurrence of the recordable event”.
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Amendment 478, in clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out from second “a” to end of line 32 and insert
“declaration, report or statement within subsection (1) must include the original declaration, report or statement.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment is consequential on amendments 209 and 377.
Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Recording of cancellations
I beg to move amendment 479, in clause 17, page 11, line 37, leave out “at” and insert “with”.
This amendment clarifies that a cancellation may be given to a practitioner with the person’s GP practice.
The amendment, which would clarify the drafting, speaks for itself. The important point is that the record of cancellation be with the GP practice as soon as is practicable. It is not necessary for that to take place physically at the practice, as that could potentially delay its delivery.
Clause 17(2) provides that where a notice or indication regarding a cancellation of a first or second declaration is given to a registered medical practitioner “at” the person’s GP practice, that practitioner must record the cancellation in the person’s medical records as soon as possible. Amendment 479 seeks to clarify that the requirement to record the cancellation applies not just where the cancellation is given to a registered medical practitioner physically at the GP practice, but where the cancellation is given to a registered medical practitioner “with” the person’s GP practice, irrespective of whether the notice was given at the GP practice. I hope that that explanation is helpful.
I commend the amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 479 agreed to.
Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Provision of assistance
Amendment made: 378, in clause 18, page 12, line 9, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) a certificate of eligibility has been granted in respect of a person,”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment is consequential on NC21.
I beg to move amendment 462, in clause 18, page 12, line 20, at end insert—
“(3A) When providing a substance under subsection (3) the coordinating doctor must explain to the person that they do not have to go ahead and self administer the substance and they may still cancel their declaration.”
The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful speech, and I thank him for the respectful way in which he is doing so. He has given an example of a very personal story; it is also important to remember the other personal stories we have all heard. We have with us today in the Public Gallery family members who have lost loved ones. Catie’s mum went to Dignitas in Switzerland for an assisted death, and her daughter could not go with her. As a family they have suffered to this day as a result of that experience.
We need to be really careful about the language we use around suicide. We have spoken about this before. The cases we have heard of are not people who want to die. They are people who want to live, but they are terminally ill. We need to be really sensitive to that, having heard so many examples of families who have been through these really difficult situations. But the hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, and I am minded to support his amendment because I think it comes from a good place.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I hear what she has said; we have had this conversation before. I am afraid that I do insist on my right to use the English language accurately. What is proposed in the Bill is a carve-out of the Suicide Act, so I regret to say to the hon. Lady that I will continue to describe it in terms that are appropriate to it. I hope I do so with absolute sympathy and respect for the many families who have suffered from the trauma of seeing their loved ones die badly—loved ones who would have wished for an assisted death under the terms of the Bill. I am very glad to hear that the hon. Lady supports my amendment. I do not think it would be any sort of imposition on families for the doctors to let the patient know at the last moment that they have the opportunity to turn back.
That is absolutely right. We have to think about the no doubt quite turbulent emotions that people will have as they approach the end of their life, and to reiterate their genuine autonomy. They are not on a conveyor belt that they cannot get off until the very last moment—until they have passed through this gateway. The amendment seeks to remind them and, indeed, their families of that. I am afraid we do hear terrible stories of people who have arranged their assisted death: often family members have flown in from abroad, doctors have been summoned and so on, and then they feel they have to proceed because, as the hon. Gentleman says, they feel a burden as it is and do not want to be an annoyance at the end by making everybody wait. I am afraid that is indeed the reason for the amendment. I am pleased to hear that it sounds like it will be accepted, and I am grateful to Members who will support it.
Amendment 463 is the other, more substantial, amendment in my name in this group. It would leave out paragraph (c) of clause 18(6), which says that the doctor can assist the patient
“to ingest or otherwise self-administer the substance.”
Here we are in a lot of difficulty and a grey area. Let me try to unpack the reasons for objecting to paragraph (c). The hon. Member for Spen Valley argued in an interview that there is a “very clear line” between the Bill and euthanasia, which is someone else doing the deed. She said that the act
“has to be the decision of the individual, and it has to be the act of the individual”,
which
“creates that extra level of safeguards and protections”.
I agree with her—it is right that we introduce the additional safeguard of insisting that the patient performs the final act themselves.
I recognise that there is a distinction between euthanasia and assisted suicide, and I support the hon. Lady’s attempt to insist on that distinction in the law. It is another safeguard. But the fact is that there is a blurred line between the two, and I can also understand why many people object to the exclusion of euthanasia—of the fatal act being administered by other people. A doctor from Canada said it was inherently ableist to require the patient to self-administer, and I think that is unarguable. If that is the case, the logical provision would be to enable euthanasia, if one believes in the autonomy of the patient.
I am afraid my strong belief is that the reason why euthanasia has not been proposed in the Bill or by the campaign, which has been led by an organisation that used to call itself the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, is because the campaign has concluded that such a Bill would not pass Parliament and believes—I think correctly—that Members of Parliament and members of the public would object to euthanasia. But the logic of the Bill and of the campaign is actually for euthanasia, if one believes genuinely in autonomy, in equal rights and in not discriminating against people who are physically unable to perform the act themselves.
Despite my efforts, hon. Members have not been able to conceptualise the difference between withdrawing a medical treatment that affects a particular medical condition on the one hand, and administering drugs that annihilate the person on the other. There is a meaningful and important difference between those two things. One is a person declining to use a shield, and the other is the person using a sword against themselves. I think there is a difference there, and I regret that colleagues do not see it.
Where I do not see a difference, however, is between a person injecting themselves and asking someone else to inject them. There are two versions of the death of Saul in the Bible. I think this is the only reference to the Bible that I will make in this whole debate, and I make it partly to show that there is an inconsistency in the Bible—there is not a single Biblical view of these matters. In one account of the death of Saul, having been defeated by the Philistines, he asks his servant to run him through with his sword, but his servant refuses, so he falls on his own sword and kills himself. In the other version, he gets a passing soldier to run him through—to kill him.
To me it does not matter: the inconsistency in the story is interesting historically, but conceptually, logically and morally I do not see the difference. Whether you fall on your own sword or ask someone else to do it to you, it is still a sword, you are still actioning it and you are still responsible, if we recognise that the individual has autonomy. But there is a practical difference. We are talking about assistance to die and the role of another person who supports your decision and helps you to fulfil it, but that results in an obscuring of the practical difference. In practice, as we see in clause 18(6), the assistant comes very close to euthanasia. The role of the assistant, in my view, is closer to that of the soldier who kills Saul than of the servant who refused to do it.
The hon. Member is making an interesting philosophical point with his biblical references. I think the point he may be making is that there might not be any difference for the individual, as the result is sadly the same, but I put it to him that there is quite a significant difference for the other person. If we think about the autonomy of the medical professionals we ask to be involved in the process, there is a strong argument that it would be very different for them to be more involved in the process. Does that makes sense?
I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for his amendment, and for speaking in the powerful, sensitive way that he did. I also thank my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Banbury, who made interventions.
I did not intend to speak to this amendment, but having heard the hon. Member for East Wiltshire speak so powerfully and sensitively, it is important for me to share a few things. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said a couple of times that the difference between people who commit suicide and those who will take this route is that the patients have been given less than six months to live, and that was not a choice. I was a Samaritan for years, because I had two failed suicide attempts in my early years, and since then I have battled with mental health demons all my life because of my experiences. To suggest that there is a difference between someone who gets a terminal illness and wants to take this act and people who want to commit suicide, and to suggest that they are doing it out of choice, is wrong. I felt really emotional when that exchange was happening. The reason why I think it is wrong is that, at the time that I wanted to commit suicide, I did not feel that I had a choice. I could not see a way out.
When I was on those Samaritans phonelines, speaking to people who rang in to unpick their feelings about what was driving them to feel suicidal in that moment, it was not because they want to die, but because they were in circumstances that drove them to feel that they had no option but to commit suicide. In some instances, it takes an amount of courage and bravery to even contemplate that option. To diminish that, which I feel is what has, intentionally or unintentionally, happened on occasion, is really wrong, because I have been there, and it was not easy and it was not because I wanted to die.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I certainly have not heard anyone try to diminish the experience of suicidal people. We probably all have our own stories of loved ones who we have either lost to suicide—I know that I do—or who had very severe mental health issues. The point I would make is that the families I have met who have lost loved ones through assisted dying or a harrowing terminal-illness death have said that they desperately wanted to live. That is the distinction I would make, but I appreciate that my hon. Friend is absolutely right that people with suicidal tendencies and ideation also want to live—they just do not feel they have a choice. It is a very delicate debate to have, but please be assured of my sensitivities to it.
I am genuinely grateful for my hon. Friend’s intervention, because I do not want the Committee—or our constituents—to feel that there is an equivalence. There is not. People who are in that space, who ring the Samaritans helpline to speak to them, all desperately want to live a brilliant life. That is what brings us here: each and every one of us wants to make this place the best it can be, so that our country is the best it can be and all our communities, people and constituents—all members of society—thrive. It is a sensitive debate, but let us be careful not to draw a parallel where there is not one. It was important for me to put that on the record.
I will support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire because we have already voted down an amendment requiring doctors to simply ask the question why. This speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury raised: I know, through my experience at the Samaritans, as somebody who has attempted suicide and as somebody who has gone on to chair a charity that leads mental health interventions, how difficult it is for a patient has gone through the process of having had that conversation with their family, who might not necessarily agree, and having convinced them that they are going to take this option because they want autonomy, and fear losing it.
I cannot imagine what it must be like for those people, at that moment, saying their final goodbyes, and the level of potential pressure they face right at the last minute, having spoken to everybody and put their family members, and indeed themselves, through the process. Would they not feel internal pressure on themselves to go through with it? Would they really have the option, and not feel, in a sense, obliged to say, “Yes”? Do we really not want to ask that question?
When we debated the amendment requiring doctors to ask the question why, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud said that doctors would ask it anyway, but that argument would not work in this instance because doctors would not do this anyway. They would not say, “I am about to give you something—have you changed your mind?”, because by that point they are in a process. The drug, in whatever form it takes, is in the process of being, or will have been, handed over to the person who wants to take that option, so it is not the same. I genuinely hope that the Committee will support the amendment, because it is our last option to make this intervention.
(2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe hon. Member’s concerns are absolutely noted. I completely understand that hon. Members are not comfortable with this, but what I am trying to do is set out the Government’s view on the workability of what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley is seeking to achieve and the basic principles on which that is built.
Amendment 497, on which the Government have worked jointly with my hon. Friend, would amend clause 18(11), which states:
“Where the person decides not to self-administer the approved substance, or there is any other reason that the substance is not used, the coordinating doctor must remove it immediately from that person.”
Under the clause as it is currently drafted, there could be difficulties in relation to the duties of the co-ordinating doctor where the co-ordinating doctor does not know what the person has decided. Amendment 497 seeks to resolve that ambiguity by clarifying that the duty on the co-ordinating doctor to remove the approved substance applies where the person
“informs the coordinating doctor that they have decided”
not to self-administer the approved substance.
I turn to amendment 498. At present, clause 18(11) provides that the co-ordinating doctor has the duty to immediately remove the approved substance where the person decides not to self-administer the approved substance, or there is any other reason that the substance is not used. The amendment clarifies that the duty to remove the substance arises when the co-ordinating doctor believes that the substance will not be used. I hope that those observations have been helpful to the Committee.
The Minister has covered my amendments 497 and 498 very clearly, so I will not speak to them.
I am happy to support amendment 462, tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, about which we had a conversation this morning. I only make the observation that there is already a requirement in clause 18(4)(b) that, at the time the approved substance is provided, the co-ordinating doctor must be satisfied that the person has
“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.
Nevertheless, I am happy to support the amendment, because the hon. Member made a very valuable point this morning.
I cannot support amendment 463, however. The Bill states that the patient must self-administer the drugs. Clause 18(7) states that “the final act” of self-administering the substance
“must be taken by the person to whom the substance has been provided.”
That is very clear. The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, with his medical background and expertise, has been clear and helpful on this point: it is a question of passive versus active. We have to be clear that the patient must have an active role in self-administration.
I completely understand where these amendments are coming from. In many jurisdictions where assisted dying laws are in place, this would be an accepted part of the process. However, as I have said repeatedly, our Bill stands in its own right, and its safeguards are stronger than those anywhere else in the world. One of those safeguards is that the line cannot be crossed between a person shortening their own death by administering the drugs themselves and by having another person—in this case the doctor—do it for them.
While I am hugely sympathetic to the argument, that is a line that I do not believe the Bill should cross. I concur with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West about Second Reading and what the House voted for, and with those of the hon. Member for Reigate about medical profession levels, which we discussed this morning. I also agree with the Minister’s comments about the concept of an independent witness, and with the comments from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley about the concept of additional assistance. On that basis, I will not be supporting the amendments.
I will keep it short and sweet. I had not intended to push the amendments to a vote and will not be doing so. A lot of important points have been raised. Irrespective of whether the amendments were going to be pushed to a vote or would have been successful, it is important that we listen to and take into account the voices of people with different diseases who might wish to access an assisted death. We must also take into account the evidence that organisations have submitted, because it is important that those voices are heard too. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I am supportive of all the amendments in this grouping, including amendment 255 in the name of the hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Claire Hazelgrove) about the importance of recording the means of administration of the substance. We have discussed that a bit, and I think it is important to include it. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford are also important, as they insist on the actual physical presence of a doctor while the treatment is being carried out. His amendments also suggest that there should be a code of practice about what should happen when things go wrong; I want to go further than that, but I do approve of that measure.
On amendments 532 and 533, tabled by the hon. Member for Ipswich, I again support in principle the requirement—although there is a little too much regulation by the Secretary of State, in my view—that we be clear about where the act should take place and make provision about what the co-ordinating doctor is legally permitted to do if they determine that the procedure has failed. That is the point I really want to discuss; the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), and the amendment that I tabled, would impose an obligation on the co-ordinating doctor to provide assistance if the procedure fails.
Let me take a moment to explain to the Committee how important it is that we recognise the genuine risk of that eventuality in the case of assisted suicide being performed. There is significant evidence—even given the lack of adequate data collection and the paucity of record keeping, with over half of assisted deaths not properly recorded at all in many places—that in places such as Oregon, which is one of the worst offenders when it comes to data collection, there are significant rates of complication. These can be difficulty with ingesting the drugs, regurgitation and seizures. As I said, 72% of deaths do not record whether complications have occurred, but among the quarter that do, there are significant rates of complication.
Sometimes death can take days, and there can be a long time of unconsciousness. The Committee has heard from me and others in previous debates about the extent to which there is real concern about the actual experience of the administration of assisted death. But it is striking how ill-defined the current Bill is on the point about complications, compared to jurisdictions where such laws are in operation. In other countries, there is clear guidance in law for what should be done. In the Netherlands, euthanasia is recommended when assisted suicide seems to be failing; in Canada, doctors are likewise given licence to administer the death themselves if it fails. The Committee has decided not to proceed down that road. Nevertheless, the question arises as to what on earth patients should do.
To the point that we are talking about a small or non-existent population group—those we might have to worry will experience complications after the administration of fatal drugs—I refer back to a previous debate, when the hon. Member for Stroud, referring to me, said:
“The hon. Gentleman is bringing up lots of rather horrible stories about assisted death. That is why, in Australia, Switzerland and Holland, they have decided, instead of using the regime that he is talking about, to use pentobarbital…One of the reasons why Dignitas uses it is that it is so effective and it does not have those effects.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 11 March 2025; c. 925.]
Having looked into the issue and consulted other medics, I am afraid that the fact is that the safety of pentobarbital is highly contested. It has been debated in litigation in the United States because of its use as a death penalty drug. The executioners who used it said that the deaths were peaceful and akin to falling asleep, but lawyers for inmates on death row have said that
“pentobarbital caused flash pulmonary edema, in which fluid rushes through quickly disintegrating membranes into lungs and airways, causing pain akin to being suffocated or drowned.”
That is evidence from professionals who have examined the effect of pentobarbital on deceased people.
The anesthesiologist Joel Zivot of Emory University hospital in the United States testified to the Canadian Senate on the subject of assisted suicide drugs. He said that when he researched the autopsies of those executed by lethal injection, he stumbled on an alarming discovery:
“When I looked at the autopsies, to my surprise, I found that, in most of the cases, the individuals who had been executed by pentobarbital had fluid congested in their lungs. The lungs of these individuals were twice the normal weight, full of water. Now, the only way that this could have happened would have been as a direct consequence of the pentobarbital that was injected into these individuals.”
What is the relevance of that for assisted dying?
I am not aware of the situation in America, but is the hon. Gentleman not reassured that the evidence from Dignitas, which we all now have access to, says that there have been
“no cases of failure at Dignitas using this medication”?
Let me come on to that, because I am not aware of any evidence from Dignitas that disputes the assertion that is being made—certainly none that would meet the concerns raised by the genuine evidence of the effect of pentobarbital on death row patients. Again, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I do not think that Dignitas has supplied evidence to contradict the point that I am making.
For the hon. Gentleman’s reference, I believe that the evidence is TIAB 425.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. Let me let me look that up later. I am happy to exchange data, because this is clearly something we should be trying to get right.
Nevertheless, I want to try to explain why I am suggesting that we have a problem with the drugs that are used in assisted dying and that it has been suggested we use here. Let me continue the quote from Dr Zivot:
“When one watches an execution, it’s not clear that this is happening”—
meaning that it looks like a peaceful, painless death. He continues:
“There is not much to see. Executions, like, I imagine, medical assistance in dying, are a rather bloodless event; not much can be seen outwardly. But the autopsies revealed a very disturbing and surprising finding.”
He makes the point that that is particularly disturbing, given that assisted dying often uses a paralysing drug, which induces the impression of peace and calm in the patient, when in fact something else might be going on below the surface.
To conclude my quote from Dr Zivot, he says:
“To claim that this is a death that is peaceful, well, it can be nothing else because now a person is unable to move in any way, but whether or not they have any conscious experience of what is happening is unknown…it should be clear to the Canadian public that the kind of death that they will experience…will be something other than the way it is represented. It could be exceedingly painful and more akin to drowning.”
I cannot judge whether Dr Zivot is right, but we should be very wary of any claims that there is a simple answer to the question surrounding lethal drugs. To the point made by the hon. Lady, and I think by the hon. Member for Stroud, there is no evidence in the many reports from Dignitas, which has a regime very similar to the one we are imagining here—I will certainly look at the evidence mentioned made by the hon. Lady—that contradicts the concerns raised by Dr Zivot.
There is great anxiety about the validity of much of the evidence in this space. I have great respect for the work of Dr Zivot, because nothing else gets us close to understanding the actual effect of these drugs, once somebody has died.
In response to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, the evidence from Dignitas is really clear: there have been no cases of failure when using this medication.
My strong suspicion is that this is because the evidence is not being accurately collected or reported. With Dignitas and in all these jurisdictions, as the hon. Lady has acknowledged, there are significant failures of data and record keeping. Obviously, it is very much in Dignitas’s interest not to collect and certainly not to publicise evidence of things going wrong. However, that clearly happens in jurisdictions where data is properly collected.
I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make. We have discussed this point at length, across a range of subject areas, but we cannot legislate for every single permutation that could possibly happen. That could be about the initial conversations, when the patient is given a terminal diagnosis. Where do those conversations leave us? Clearly there will be a number of different scenarios, which could occur to various degrees.
I do not think it is possible to legislate for every single eventuality. I do not believe that whether to revive or not revive will be so black and white; it will completely depend on the scenario at that particular moment in time. Therefore, further work would need to be done over the coming months and years before the final introduction of the Bill. I believe that it is important to allow the time for that work to happen alongside the existing guidance as it stands.
I do not seek in my amendment to stipulate exactly what every single permutation might be—indeed, that could run to many pages and beyond. The amendment seeks to empower the Secretary of State and the Department to make sure that those eventualities, and the concerns that the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has raised, are covered by regulations over time.
In my view, the failure to provide a clear answer to these questions is an oversight. Data from Oregon shows that it is unfortunately not totally uncommon for patients to suffer complications following the administration of a lethal substance. In 2023, of the 102 patients for whom we have data on whether they suffered complications—out of a total of 367 patients who died by assisted death in Oregon in that year—10 suffered complications. That is just under 10% of the patients we have data for.
Of those 10, eight had difficulty ingesting the substance or regurgitated it. One suffered a seizure, and for one we have no data of what complications occurred. If I may say so to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, that goes back to the variances that I referred to. It is not as simple as whether to resuscitate or otherwise. There are a number of different factors. Although that is a relatively small sample size, it shows the diversity of the challenges ahead.
In Oregon, information about complications is reported only when a physician or another healthcare provider is present at the time of death, which means that we evidently have less data on this issue than is desirable. However, despite the small sample size, that data would put the complication rate at one in 10. It would not be a completely uncommon occurrence for patients to experience complications following the administration of a lethal substance, although it would be rare.
My hon. Friend is referring to Oregon. Obviously every jurisdiction has its own methodology when it comes to assisted dying. Is he reassured somewhat by the evidence from Dignitas that for not one person did the procedure fail? A survey from Victoria in Australia showed that 1,076 deaths from the self-administration process took place, and 86% of patients died within one hour. There are different models, and it is important to look more broadly at this if we can.
I fully accept my hon. Friend’s points, and I agree. To reiterate, complications are not a regular occurrence by any means. They are relatively uncommon. In saying that, there are still 10% of people who did experience them. As she says, these complications are not huge, but there were issues with being able to ingest the substance or with regurgitating it. The figure of 86% that my hon. Friend refers to is absolutely correct, but that would suggest that for 14% of people it took longer than an hour. In my view, that is a relatively high percentage for what we are talking about here.
As I say, my amendment does not seek to stipulate in the Bill exactly what measures have to be taken in every single scenario. I am not suggesting for a moment that we have to legislate about what we must do in the event that, for instance, someone has difficulty ingesting the substance; I am sure that will come naturally with the GMC regulations. I fully appreciate the points made about how this will probably naturally occur, but it is important to provide a reassurance that we are looking at the long-term effects in such scenarios.
I think the Bill is very clear on the legal parameters. A doctor may not act, in terms of administering the substance, in a way to hasten death. Within that, we are back into the realms of normal medical practice, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud set out. I am sure that there will be legal guidance, whether that be from the GMC or elsewhere, if and when the Bill were to pass. The Secretary of State would have the powers anyway under clause 30, but for the avoidance of doubt, amendment 430 strikes the right balance in giving backstop permissions to the Secretary of State to clarify anything if needed.
On the hon. Member for Richmond Park’s point, which a couple of people have made, I do not think anyone is saying that this is not a new situation—of course it is, as we are all aware. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud’s point was that a doctor being with a patient who is dying is not a new situation. That is the important distinction.
I can help my hon. Friend out on this point. There is an expectation in the jurisdictions where assisted dying happens that it happens in different locations, very much centred around the patient’s wishes, which is the approach we should take.
That is exactly right. That will quite possibly include people’s individual homes as well as not in their homes, in places of appropriate care and peace and tranquillity.
How amendment 436 is drafted makes for a real challenge, because it is not clear what detail should be set out in the person’s medical records or in the report to the chief medical officer and the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. There is ambiguity in the drafting of the amendment.
To try to tie this together, I should say that there seems to be consensus that something has to be recorded in the event of complications. It feels to me as though what the Government are saying is that this is not the best crafted way of doing that—that is the worst sentence ever; I apologise. We have to look at the best way of achieving the intention of a number of amendments. I am looking at amendment 430, which I think achieves the objective. This feels as though it is a drafting issue, rather than necessarily a policy issue. I might be wrong.
Of course, if we can find ways to improve the Bill, we should—that is what this Bill Committee is for. But the input from my officials and parliamentary counsel legal advice have raised red flags about the amendments because of how they are drafted and the ambiguity that they give rise to. Clearly, it is up to the Committee to decide whether it wants to include the amendments or whether those issues could be looked at later—either on Report or when the Bill is going through the other place.
Fundamentally, the role of the promoter of the Bill is to decide whether the Bill, as passed through this Committee, meets the policy intent that she wishes to achieve. Our job as Ministers is to work with her to deliver that objective. If the promoter of the Bill comes to the view that any of the amendments should be considered and added to the Bill, we will of course work with her to enable them to be delivered. My job at the moment is simply to say that there are concerns about these amendments due to the issue of ambiguity.
As a matter of clarity, although I appreciate the power that the Minister has just given me, which amendments we vote for is actually the job of the Bill Committee—rather than just my job, I would hope.
Absolutely, it is the job of the Committee to decide which amendments pass, but my hon. Friend’s role as the promoter of the Bill is to define the policy intent of the Bill—its fundamental objectives, the fundamental safeguards issues and its architecture in that sense. It is absolutely the responsibility of the Bill Committee to decide whether to amend the Bill.
My response would be to refer the hon. Lady to clause 30(1), which sets out that the Secretary of State will produce a code of practice. Amendment 430, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said she is minded to support, would also ensure that the code of practice includes guidance on the matter that the hon. Lady raises. I think there is a commitment to a code of practice, and if amendment 430 passes then it would be explicitly in the Bill that that code of practice should include the issue that she raises.
Amendment 533 places a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying where the provision of assistance under the Bill may take place. It sets out a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate prior to making such regulations, including certain specified groups.
Amendment 430 would broaden the Secretary of State’s power to issue codes of practice under clause 30. It would explicitly enable the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice in connection with responding to unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance under section 18, including when the procedure fails.
I understand that amendment 255 is no longer relevant as it relates to schedule 6, which is going to be changed—I think that is right—so, in that sense, the amendment is null and void. I hope that those observations were helpful.
I thank colleagues for a thorough discussion of a group of interesting and important amendments. Amendment 429, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, would require the doctor to remain in the same room as the person. I respectfully disagree with my hon. Friend on that point. If a person is literally in the last few minutes and moments of their life, it should be up to them to decide who is in the room with them. In some cases, that might be the doctor, but I suspect that in many cases it would be loved ones and close family members.
We have had a thorough discussion of the range of amendments that look at how we deal with complications. My view is that amendment 430 would do what needs to be done. We need the Bill to show that this has been considered, and the logical place for that would be clause 30, on codes of practice. I am happy to support that amendment when the time comes to vote on it.
The Minister suggested that there will be a code of practice, but clause 30 says that there “may” be a code of practice. Does the hon. Member accept that there might not be one and that, even if there were, the only obligation on professionals would be to have regard to such a code? There is a big difference between that and a stipulation in the Bill.
I believe that amendment 447, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central, would change the “may” to a “must”. I am minded to support it for that very reason.
Amendment 532, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, comes from a good place as is meant to be a way of trying to help the doctor, but I worry, as medical colleagues have commented during our deliberations, that it could create more of a problem for the doctor in that it would remove flexibility and the use of their clinical judgment and expertise. It always worries me when we are considering putting that level of detail in the Bill.
I appreciate what my hon. Friend is getting at in terms of what might happen down the line, but the amendment would not restrict any doctor’s flexibility at all or bind them in any way. All it would do is ask the Secretary of State to form a set of regulations.
The challenge would be in whether the co-ordinating doctor would be able to take actions that were not listed. I worry that a list would be quite restrictive. Amendment 430, which would look at the code of practice, would achieve something in a less restrictive way, which is why I am minded to support it.
We have had a really interesting discussion about amendment 533, and we will probably come further down the line to discuss where patients should have the choice to have an assisted death. I am not entirely sure how the amendment would work, which is why I am not minded to support it.
I am slightly concerned about the terminology and am not sure what the definition of “disadvantaged and marginalised communities” would be for the purposes of the amendment. I refer my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich to new clause 8—the duty to consult—bearing in mind that there will be a long period of consultation before the Bill, if it passes, is enacted.
The Minister referred to amendment 255, which I think will fall as it refers to a schedule that has been removed from the Bill.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I rise to support amendment 22, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft. Before I carry on, I am happy to give my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley the opportunity to say whether she will accept the amendment, because my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft has had a hat-trick of amendments being accepted around training on coercion.
I am very happy to accept amendment 22 from my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft, as it follows the theme of the previous amendments.
There are some amendments in this grouping—namely, amendments 210 and 49—that we worked on with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, and I will come to them later in my remarks.
If amendment 408 is passed, the person to whom assistance is being provided would have to be consulted before they consent in writing to another medical practitioner being authorised to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions. All registered medical practitioners must uphold the standards set out in the General Medical Council’s “Good medical practice”, which requires registered medical practitioners to support patients to make informed decisions prior to consenting. Therefore, the proposed amendment may have relatively minimal impact.
Turning to amendment 210, clause 19(2)(b) sets out that a registered medical practitioner may be authorised to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions only where they have
“completed such training, and gained such qualifications and experience, as the Secretary of State may specify by regulations.”
The purpose of the amendment is to provide that the required training, qualifications or experience are to be determined by a person or organisation specified in the regulations. An example of such a specified organisation might be the General Medical Council. Allowing for that to be specified in regulations rather than on the face of the Bill ensures flexibility.
Amendment 499 provides that where a registered medical practitioner who is authorised to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor is not satisfied that all matters have been met, they must notify the co-ordinating doctor immediately.
If amendment 22 is made, regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the named registered medical practitioner who is authorised by the co-ordinating doctor to carry out the co-ordinating doctor’s functions under clause 18 would need to include mandatory training relating to domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. The Committee has already made equivalent changes to requirements on training for the co-ordinating and independent doctors, so this amendment would bring the clause into line, should the co-ordinating doctor change, for the purposes of clause 18. Should this amendment be accepted, it would require setting up training mechanisms to equip registered medical practitioners with the knowledge and skills needed to identify domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.
On clause 19—sorry, I was going to refer to clause 19 stand part. That is the end of my observations.
Clause 19 applies when the co-ordinating doctor may not be available to provide assistance. They may be out of the country or unavailable due to other personal circumstances, as the hon. Member for Richmond Park articulated beautifully—I associate myself with her comments. Of course the doctor who steps in has to be trained appropriately, and if they are not satisfied of all the matters mentioned in clause 18(4), they must immediately notify the co-ordinating doctor. That is what my amendments 210 and 499 cover.
On amendment 408 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, who sadly is not with us today, it could be argued—and I take on board the comments by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley—that it is unnecessary because it would be common practice by practitioners to consult. However, I also take on board the fact that the word “consultation” does some heavy lifting, and I think that is an important point, so I am happy to support amendment 408.
I have mentioned already in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West that I am happy to support amendment 22, for the reasons I have given previously in relation to similar amendments.
Just before we move on to Sarah Olney to wind up the debate, I think I heard the Minister say, “No, that’s stand part.” Stand part is part of this grouping. Did the Minister wish to comment on stand part?
My view is that this is very clearly a matter for the Secretary of State, but with expert clinical and medical guidance. These are the people who should be making the decisions about such drugs. The evidence about this type of medication exists. As part of the commencement period and the consultation period, I anticipate there will be wide consultation about the drugs that are available. I think it is best left with the Secretary of State, so I would leave the clause unamended.
I will press amendments 465 to 467, but not amendment 409. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 379, in clause 21, page 14, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) The coordinating doctor must, as soon as practicable, give a copy of the final statement to the Commissioner.”
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to give the Commissioner a copy of a final statement.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 500, in clause 21, page 14, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must provide that a final statement contains the following information—
(a) the person’s full name and last permanent address;
(b) the person’s NHS number;
(c) the name and address of the person’s GP practice (at the time of death);
(d) the coordinating doctor’s full name and work address;
(e) the date of each of the following—
(i) the first declaration;
(ii) the report about the first assessment of the person;
(iii) the report about the second assessment of the person;
(iv) the certificate of eligibility;
(v) the second declaration;
(vi) the statement under section 13(5);
(f) details of the illness or disease which caused the person to be terminally ill (within the meaning of this Act);
(g) the approved substance provided;
(h) the date and time of death;
(i) the time between use of the approved substance and death.”
This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a final statement must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i).
Amendment 439, in clause 21, page 14, line 20, at end insert—
“(7) The relevant body must supply—
(a) full medical records,
(b) court records, and
(c) all documentation relating to the assessments and procedures,
relating to bringing about the death of the person in accordance with this act must be made available to the Chief Medical Officer and the Assisted Dying Commissioner.
(8) For the purposes of subsection 7 the ‘relevant body’ is—
(a) the coordinating doctor, if they are a practitioner with the person’s GP Practice;
(b) in any other case, the person’s GP practice.”
This amendment would require full medical records, court records and all documentation relating to assessments and procedures to be supplied to the Chief Medical Office and Assisted Dying Commissioner.
Clause stand part.
Amendment 379 would ensure that the co-ordinating doctor provides the commissioner with a copy of their final statement in cases in which the person has successfully been provided with assistance to end their life in accordance with the Bill. That is an important part of the reporting procedures and of the role of the commissioner. If agreed to, the amendment will ensure a robust recording and monitoring process for assisted dying.
Amendment 500 provides that regulations about the form of the final statement must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) of proposed new subsection (3A). It builds on my amendment 214, which would amend subsection (3)(a) to require that the form of the final statement must be set out in
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This is another way of ensuring robust and thorough reporting.
I thank the hon. Lady for explaining the purpose of the amendments. Amendment 500 specifies the information that a final statement must contain. Will she clarify why there is no requirement to record any details of what happened once the drugs were administered, other than the time between the use of the approved substance and death?
In this debate, we have acknowledged the importance of record keeping. If the intention is to maintain public confidence in the system, should there not be some provision to record whether complications happen and what complications there were? This skirting of the issue of complications is concerning. We have ruled out explicitly informing patients of the risk of complications.
I do not think that anyone has ruled out discussing complications. Clause 9 makes it clear that the doctor has a very clear discussion with the patient about what will happen if they proceed with an assisted death.
I am sorry; I mis-spoke. I should have said that we have ruled out clarifying the expectations of what doctors should do in the event of an assisted death, and whether or not that is specified by the patient.
Earlier today, the Committee again ruled out specifying what the obligations on doctors are if complications arise, whatever the patient has discussed earlier. With this amendment, we now seem to be ruling out gathering any information about what happened, which is surely vital not just for safeguarding but to develop good practice in the operation of the Bill, a point that the hon. Member for Ashford made earlier. There is too much silence in the Bill, between the taking of the substance and death, on what happens if there are complications, what is permitted and, now, what is recorded. Amendment 439, in the name of the hon. Member for York Central, attempts to address that point. I hope that the Committee will accept it.
The amendments relate to clause 21, which applies where the person has been provided with assistance to end their own life in accordance with the Bill and has died as a result. Throughout this process, we have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Amendments 379 and 500 have been mutually agreed on by her and the Government, so I will offer a few technical and factual comments.
Amendment 379 would require that, where a person has been provided with assistance to end their life and has died as a result, the co-ordinating doctor must provide the voluntary assisted dying commissioner with a copy of the final statement under clause 21 as soon as practicable. That links to the commissioner’s role in monitoring the operation of the Bill, as set out in new clause 14. Amendment 500 sets out the information that must be included in the form of a final statement, which is to be set out in regulations in accordance with amendment 214.
The effect of amendment 439 would be to introduce a new requirement for the relevant body, defined as either the co-ordinating doctor or the person’s GP practice, to provide full medical records, court records and all documentation related to assessments and procedures relating to bringing about the death of the person in accordance with the Bill to the chief medical officer and the voluntary assisted dying commissioner. The amendment is broad, and it is not clear whether doctors would be able to comply with the duties fully.
For example, GPs do not normally have access to court records, and would need to request them to provide them to the chief medical officer and the commissioner. Currently, a decision to share court records is made at the discretion of the judiciary in most cases. As such, any statutory burden to disclose court records agreed by both Houses would require consultation with the independent judiciary. Depending on the type of record, there could also be data protection considerations.
I have nothing to add other than to respond to the fair point made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire about complications. The doctor does have to record the final statement in the medical records, and I am confident that they would also record any complications in the medical records. Similarly, we have talked about the code of practice with regard to complications, so there is scope to include what would happen in those instances there. It is, however, a fair point, and it could be something to look at amending on Report, if the hon. Gentleman wants it to be in the Bill.
Amendment 379 agreed to.
Amendment made: 500, in clause 21, page 14, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must provide that a final statement contains the following information—
(a) the person’s full name and last permanent address;
(b) the person’s NHS number;
(c) the name and address of the person’s GP practice (at the time of death);
(d) the coordinating doctor’s full name and work address;
(e) the date of each of the following—
(i) the first declaration;
(ii) the report about the first assessment of the person;
(iii) the report about the second assessment of the person;
(iv) the certificate of eligibility;
(v) the second declaration;
(vi) the statement under section 13(5);
(f) details of the illness or disease which caused the person to be terminally ill (within the meaning of this Act);
(g) the approved substance provided;
(h) the date and time of death;
(i) the time between use of the approved substance and death.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment provides that regulations about the form of a final statement must make the provision mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i).
Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Other matters to be recorded in medical records
I beg to move amendment 380, in clause 22, page 14, line 25, at end insert—
“(1A) The coordinating doctor must, as soon as practicable, notify the Commissioner that this has happened.”
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to notify the Commissioner of a matter mentioned in subsection (1).
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 440, in clause 22, page 14, line 34, at end insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3)(b), the information recorded must include—
(a) any interventions made by a medical practitioner in response to the procedure failing, and
(b) the timing of those interventions.”
This amendment would specify certain information to be recorded under section 22 when the procedure fails.
Clause stand part.
The amendment would require that if a person has decided not to take the substance or the procedure has failed, the co-ordinating doctor must, as soon as is practicable, notify the commissioner of that. It is fairly straightforward.
Amendment 380 is one that the Government have worked on with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. As the Bill currently stands, clause 22 sets out that where a person decides not to take an approved substance provided under clause 18 or where the procedure fails, the co-ordinating doctor must record that that has happened in the person’s medical record or inform a registered medical practitioner with the person’s GP practice. The amendment would require that in those circumstances, the voluntary assisted dying commissioner must also be notified.
I turn to amendment 440. As I have just mentioned, clause 22 provides that the co-ordinating doctor is required either to record in the person’s medical records or inform a medical practitioner registered at that person’s GP practice if the person has decided not to take the substance or the procedure has failed.
The amendment increases the requirements on the co-ordinating doctor to document in such cases any interventions made by a medical practitioner and the timing of those interventions. The requirement on the co-ordinating doctor to record interventions following a failed procedure is open-ended in time, which could lead to operational challenges. For example, the co-ordinating doctor would remain obliged to record the medical interventions made by others in response to the procedure failing, even if those interventions took place weeks or months after the event itself. I hope that those observations have been helpful to the Committee.
I have nothing to add, other than to say that the complications that have been referred to many times today would be covered by the code of practice that we will introduce by agreeing to amendment 430.
Amendment 380 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 440, in clause 22, page 14, line 34, at end insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (3)(b), the information recorded must include—
(a) any interventions made by a medical practitioner in response to the procedure failing, and
(b) the timing of those interventions.” —(Sean Woodcock.)
This amendment would specify certain information to be recorded under section 22 when the procedure fails.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(3 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Sir Roger.
Amendment 301 would prolong the first period of reflection, after which point the independent doctor can conduct the second assessment. In the original draft of the Bill, the first period of reflection is seven days, but the amendment would extend that period to 14 days. That means 14 days would have to pass between the time that the co-ordinating doctor has made their statement following the first assessment, and the independent doctor carrying out the second assessment.
Amendment 317 would increase the duration of the period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration from 14 days to 28 days. It relates to cases where a person’s death is not reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration.
Amendments 314 and 315 would increase the duration of the second period of reflection before a person may make a second declaration, in cases where a person’s death is reasonably expected within one month of the date of the court’s declaration, from 48 hours to seven days. They would also introduce a requirement for a mandatory immediate referral for urgent specialist palliative care. The requirement would be introduced into the definition of the second period of reflection. It is unclear what impact it would have on the duration of the period of reflection. The amendments do not say who should be responsible for making the referral or where it should be recorded. The drafting is also ambiguous as to what happens if a person does not consent to such a referral or care.
I hope these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments put forward by various Members. Whether these amendments should form part of the Bill is a matter for the Committee to decide.
I have nothing to add on this group of amendments. I am confident that the Bill as drafted already includes significant periods of reflection. Bearing in mind that we are putting dying people through a very lengthy process already, I remain confident that the periods of reflection are adequate as set out in the Bill.
I have a couple of additional comments. We talked last week about the reflection periods. I referred to the fact that when even someone buys something from a shop, they have 28 days to return it; when they are deciding on whether to have an assisted death, there is a great deal more at stake. During that debate, someone asked, “What if someone had a prognosis of just one month?”, but clause 13 has an option for a fast-track process in that situation—the person would be able to access the service in 48 hours.
I beg to differ with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the Bill’s promoter, who said that we have enough reflection periods in the Bill. Yes, there are reflection periods, but they come after the panel’s decision. The reality is that the NHS is under so much duress, with patients waiting weeks to see their GP for anything other than urgent treatment, that getting an appointment with another GP in seven days is unlikely; it is unlikely to happen given how uncommon that is at the moment. It is right that doctors are able to triage their patients to prioritise those who require medical intervention to keep them well, to prevent hospital admission, or to stop them deteriorating or even dying.
The Government are trying to protect the NHS, and the best way of achieving that is to ensure that medical interventions are provided at the earliest opportunity before a patient deteriorates. In some cases, a medical appointment may need to take priority over an appointment for an assisted death. If someone who is dying has longer—even just a further week—in which to reflect, it removes the pressure from GPs and consultants, and enables them to prioritise properly their patients. It does not build up false expectation in patients that they have a right to a rapid consultation process. Likewise, we know that it can currently take a few weeks for patients to see another consultant, if not months or even over a year. It is therefore more helpful for the patient to have a more realistic period of reflection before moving to the next stage of their assessment.
Issues of such intensity as someone planning to take their own life should not be rushed. We know from all the work that has been undertaken on suicide that other interventions and conversations can help with reflection and reconsideration. It is important that people are given this opportunity. In their first raising the matter with a doctor, the doctor would have provided a lot of information about alternatives to the patient, such as what treatment options would be available. Perhaps they would have had a discussion with a palliative medicine consultant to review their options. There needs to be time for a patient to really reflect on all this new information. If the patient does want to explore assisted dying, there will also be all the conversations about drugs and their impact, which we will come to when we discuss later clauses.
Amendment 317 to clause 13 seeks to increase the reflection period from 14 days to 28 days. I gently suggest that we should have the reflection period before the decision, whether it be by the judge or a panel, to give people the right amount of time to consider; currently, the reflection period is afterwards. This is such a monumental decision that people should be able to contemplate all other options available. As it is, the process is rushed, and a patient could be caught up in the moment of concentrating on getting through the stages. I appreciate that others have suggested that once we have got past that stage, with the paperwork and all those things out of the way, then there is time to reflect. During the process, however, the patient has not had time to consider the options in making their decision. I am not convinced that there is enough reflection during, as opposed to after, the process.
Amendment 314 seeks to increase the reflection period from 48 hours to seven days for patients who have been given a month to live. In that case, seven days is quite adequate time to reflect on the information they have received to make informed choices. If this is about autonomy, which my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has talked about many a time, it is important for people to have choices. To have that autonomy is surely to have the options in front of us and be able to consider them in detail.
In considering whether to sit on this Bill Committee, I slept on the decision. I can usually make instantaneous decisions, but knowing the amount of work, knowing that I was new to the subject, and knowing the things that I knew then—not the things that I know now—it was a big decision for me. I was even thinking about how I would manage the workload. We are talking about something that is not at all comparable. We are talking about somebody who will be taking a decision to potentially exercise the right—if the Bill becomes law—to an assisted death. That is really important for me.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.
Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—
(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and
(b) give a copy of the report to—
(i) the person who was assessed,
(ii) the coordinating doctor,
(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and
(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.
(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—
(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);
subsection (2)(a)
(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;
(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—
(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;
(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;
(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;
(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;
(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.
Amendment 348 seeks to add an additional requirement to clause 8(5). This would mean that, where the independent doctor is satisfied that the requirements under clause 8(2) have been met, they must
“inform the person’s usual or treating doctor and, where relevant, the doctor who referred the person to the independent doctor, of the outcome of the assessment.”
Some elements of amendment 348 duplicate requirements that already appear in the Bill, such as the requirement in clause 8(5)(b) for the doctor to inform the co-ordinating doctor of the outcome, including providing a copy of the statement.
The amendment would also overlap with the requirements in clause 16 for the co-ordinating doctor to make entries in the person’s medical record that must include the original statement or declaration. Where the co-ordinating doctor is not with the person’s GP practice, they must also give notice to a registered medical practitioner with the person’s GP practice of the outcome of the assessments.
Amendment 303 seeks to prevent a person from seeking multiple second assessments from different independent doctors. It places a requirement on the independent doctor to confirm
“that no other practitioner has undertaken a second assessment for the same person.”
This amendment creates the risk of a medical practitioner inadvertently committing an offence if there is no centralised record-keeping. It may also have the impact of preventing the person seeking assistance from obtaining a second opinion, as provided for in clause 10. Under the amendment, as drafted, it is unclear how this is intended to interact with the possibility of an independent doctor’s becoming unable or unwilling to continue to act as the independent doctor following the second assessment, when an alternative independent doctor may therefore be required.
On amendment 458, as the Bill stands, clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement confirming that they are satisfied that matters in clause 8(2)(a) to (e) are met, the co-ordinating doctor may refer the person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6), and is able and willing to carry out an assessment mentioning clause 8(2). The effect of the amendment is to restrict the circumstances in which the co-ordinating doctor can make a referral under clause 10(1) to a different registered medical practitioner to only when there has been a material change of circumstances. It is not clear from the amendment who is required to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances and/or how that will be proved. That may cause some uncertainty for the co-ordinating doctor.
I now turn to amendment 459. Clause 10 provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement that they are satisfied that the person meets the criteria in clause 8(2)(a) to 8(2)(e) when conducting the second assessment, the co-ordinating doctor may, if requested to do so by the person who made the first declaration, refer that person to a different registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of clause 8(6) and is able and willing to carry out an assessment of the kind mentioned in clause 8(2).
The effect of the amendment is that, where such a referral is made to the registered medical practitioner under clause 10(1), the co-ordinating doctor is required to provide them with the report by the independent doctor setting out their reasons for refusal. If the new registered medical practitioner reaches a different conclusion from the original independent doctor, they must produce a report setting out why they disagree. The two reports must be made available to any subsequent decision maker under the Bill, and to the commissioner. This additional requirement for reports on the reasons for refusal or differences in opinion may make the process of seeking assistance longer and add to capacity demands on co-ordinating and independent doctors.
Turning to amendment 460, clause 10(3) provides that if, following the second assessment, the independent doctor refuses to make the statement mentioned in clause 8(5), the co-ordinating doctor may make one referral for a second opinion. The effect of the amendment is to remove the word “particular” from clause 10(3), which says that only one second opinion may be sought
“In consequence of a particular first declaration made by a person.”
The amendment is unclear and could have several possible effects in practice. For example, it could have the effect of limiting the circumstances in which a referral can be made under clause 10(1) to the first time a person makes a first declaration.
I hope that these observations were helpful to the Committee.
I associate myself with the Minister’s comments regarding the other amendments in the group; however, I listened carefully to the debate on amendment 459 and the points made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the Minister. My view on that amendment has changed: I do think independence is really important in the doctor’s opinions during the normal process that the Bill sets out. However, it is a really fair point to make that if the independent doctor refuses the patient, there needs to be transparency about that, and it is important that everybody involved in the process can see how that decision has been made. That is a really valid point. It is a good example of how this Bill Committee is operating, and should be operating, in that we have been listening to different views and opinions.
I take on board the Minister’s point on capacity. We need to be aware of that. We will hopefully debate the third layer later today. That layer may be a panel of experts who are there to oversee the full picture of the patient journey. For them to see what has happened with the doctors that they have interacted with is very important. Therefore, I am minded to support amendment 459.
I want to respond to a point made by the hon. Member for Stroud. It is relevant to the whole debate about whether we are talking about a medical treatment at all. He made the point, in respect of the question of a second or subsequent referral to an independent doctor, that it is appropriate in medicine to have second opinions; he said that that is normal in medicine, and he is absolutely right. Indeed, there is nothing to stop a patient seeking a third, fourth or any number of opinions if they want to do that and can get a doctor to consider them. The fact is that what we are discussing here is not a medical diagnosis—that is not what is being asked for when someone goes to see the second doctor, or indeed the first. What they are asking for is permission to proceed with the process.
I am satisfied that the items contained within the clause have been adequately debate. I do not therefore propose to permit a clause stand part debate.
Clause 8, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Doctors’ assessments: further provision
I beg to move amendment 201, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, leave out “and their medical records” and insert
“, examine such of their medical records as appear to the assessing doctor to be relevant,”.
This amendment provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 422, in clause 9, page 5, line 36, after “records” insert
“make such enquiries of professionals who are providing or have recently provided health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate,”.
This amendment requires an assessing doctor to make such enquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate.
Amendment 468, in clause 9, page 5, line 37, at end insert—
“(aa) ask the person why they are seeking an assisted death.”
Amendment 423, in clause 9, page 6, line 20, at end insert—
“(2A) To inform their assessment, the assessing doctor must—
(a) consider whether they should consult a health professional or social care professional with qualifications in, or experience of, a matter relevant to the person being assessed;
(b) consult such a professional if they consider that there is a need to do so.
(2B) Where an assessing doctor consults a professional under subsection (2A)(b), the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”
This amendment requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult specialist health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
Amendment 201 provides that the duty on an assessing doctor to examine a person’s medical records is limited to records appearing to the doctor to be relevant, which makes sense. Amendment 422 requires an assessing doctor to make such inquiries of professionals who are providing, or have recently provided, health or social care to the person as the assessing doctor considers appropriate. Amendment 423 requires the assessing doctor to consider whether they should consult health or social care professionals, and to consult them if they consider there is a need to do so. A record of any consultation must be shared with the other assessing doctor.
The amendments seek to emphasise the importance of taking a holistic and multidisciplinary approach to the assessments by both doctors. The Bill as drafted provides that the assessing doctor must
“make such other enquiries as the assessing doctor considers appropriate”
when making the first and second assessments. With the amendments, I have sought to strengthen that language, by being much more explicit and making specific reference to consulting health and social care professionals. I have done so in response to the evidence we have received from professionals such as nurses and social workers, who often spend a significant amount of time with terminally ill adults.
It is clearly right that the assessing doctors should have access to all relevant details of a person’s medical records. If the records show that the person has recently been receiving health or social care, that may impact their application, so the doctors have to consult the providers of that care. As is the case at all stages in the process, records should be kept of any and all such discussions, and reports should be shared where appropriate.
Taken together, the amendments would ensure that the doctors’ assessments are thorough and comprehensive, and have taken into consideration the views and opinions of any wider health and social care team that may be working with a patient.
I will speak briefly to each of the amendments in this group. I will allow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate to speak to the amendment in her name, but I state clearly that I very much support it. In my view, it is very important that the doctor asks the simple question of the patient, “Why do you want an assisted death?” The question is not being asked at the moment.
I respect the points that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just made about amendment 201, and that the amendment may be intended to focus assessments on the information that is relevant. Nevertheless, it would introduce subjectivity into what is deemed relevant, and by narrowing the scope of the review of patient records, it could unintentionally allow for incomplete assessments, thereby undermining the safeguards that we all want to see. The risk is that potentially crucial medical history, including past mental health concerns, poor coercion indicators or undisclosed diagnoses, might be overlooked.
I call the Committee’s attention to the evidence from the British Geriatrics Society, which raised concerns that the definition of terminal illness in the Bill is often vague and risks misclassification, especially for older patients. Limiting the review of medical records could exacerbate that issue, as doctors may not have a full picture of the patient’s long-term prognosis and their mental health history. The General Medical Council has called for strong regulatory oversight to ensure that eligibility assessments are thorough.
Allowing doctors to determine which records are relevant, without standardised criteria for that judgment in the Bill, risks inconsistency and potential misdiagnosis. The criteria should include diagnosis and prognosis, treatment history, consultation, second opinions and mental health history. Consideration should also be given to disclosures of domestic violence and abuse, or patterns in medical records that might indicate domestic abuse without explicit disclosure, such as frequent visits for unexplained pain, chronic pain complaints, mental health concerns such as anxiety and depression, inconsistent explanations for injuries, and multiple visits to different healthcare providers. All of that should be properly considered by the assessing doctor.
I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that in the Netherlands, 1% to 2% of assessments annually—a significant number when we consider the volumes we are talking about—are deemed “not careful” under the law. Other countries do not have adequate ability to look into the data, but that is significant, and it is often due to inadequate consultation or documentation. I also draw attention to the fact that in our country, I am afraid to say, the cause of death listed by doctors is too frequently inaccurate. Analysis of postmortems suggests that one in 20 deaths have been wrongly recorded. Clearly, mistakes are made in medical records, and therefore it is particularly appropriate to require doctors to give complete consideration to the full medical history of the patient.
I recognise very much that we are trying to create a Bill that works in practice; nevertheless, I think we can emphasise streamlining and efficiency at the expense of patient safety, and we are doing that here. If we tell doctors that they are only required to sift through records that appear relevant to them—a quick skim of recent notes, a glance at the obvious items in a medical history—that may sound efficient, streamlined and practical, but it is likely to leave the vulnerable exposed, in particular when social workers and psychiatrists are not involved at this early stage, as they plainly should be. No multidisciplinary team is looking at the patient at this stage.
I will come on to that. I agree with him: amendment 422 is a very helpful amendment, and I support that. It is a very good suggestion that wider consultation should be made, and it is a point that we have been trying to make with amendments throughout. I recognise that that would enhance the safeguards in the Bill—I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.
Amendment 422 seeks to introduce an additional requirement that the assessing doctor must consider whether to consult health or social care practitioners who are providing, or have recently provided, care to the patient. The amendment is presented as addressing previously expressed concerns, but I regret to say that I feel it is excessively weak. It is a positive step in recognising the issue, but it does not ensure a broader and more informed assessment of a patient’s condition and external influences.
Patients with terminal illnesses often receive care from palliative care teams, social workers or community nurses who might have crucial insights into their wellbeing and the potential external pressures on them. The British Psychological Society has highlighted that mental health and social pressures are often overlooked in assisted dying requests in other countries. Social workers and allied health professionals play a key role in assessing whether a patient feels pressurised due to financial, social or familial burdens. As I have repeatedly said and we will debate further in due course, in my view it is very important that that assessment comes earlier in the process.
We have evidence from doctors—I will not cite it at length—pointing out that independent doctors who refuse assisted dying requests are often ignored, and patients are simply referred to another doctor willing to approve the request, as we have discussed. Consultation with health and social care professionals could act as an additional safeguard against that practice. Although the amendment introduces an obligation to consult other professionals, it leaves it to the discretion of the assessing doctor. It relies on the doctor’s subjective judgment
“if they consider that there is a need”.
I think that is too weak for assisted dying, where consistency is so critical. One doctor might consult a palliative care specialist to explore pain relief options, while another might not, assuming that they understand the patient’s suffering sufficiently. The variability in the Bill—this discretion—undermines fairness and safeguarding.
There is also a lack of accountability in what is a very sensitive process. There is no requirement to document the consideration process, which weakens oversight in a context where errors could be fatal. I respect the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire that we must not police conversations and that being prescriptive may encourage a tick-box approach. I am afraid that we risk that tick-box approach if this amendment is all that we do on this subject. We can imagine a scenario in which a doctor simply makes a note in the record with little underpinning substance.
There is also no obligation to act on the specialist input, so the duty ends at the consultation. There is no requirement to integrate the findings of the additional input that the doctor has received, which is a glaring flaw in what is an irreversible procedure that is being authorised. Finally, there is insufficient rigour for the ethical stakes. This discretionary duty is too weak to catch the difficult cases.
On the hon. Member’s point about recording those consultations, amendment 423 states in its proposed new subsection (2B):
“Where an assessing doctor consults a professional…the assessing doctor must give a written record of the consultation to the other assessing doctor.”So the consultation is recorded.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right, and that is very welcome. My concern is that there is no obligation to do anything about it. There is no obligation for the doctor to integrate the conclusions of the additional professionals that they have consulted into their treatment. I recognise that that provision is valuable and I welcome the amendments, but I suggest that they do not go far enough.
Let me use a hypothetical example to bring my point home to the Committee. Imagine a woman with terminal lung cancer asking to end her life. Her assessing doctor considers consulting a palliative care specialist for symptom control or a social worker to check on her home life, but decides, “My notes are enough. There’s no need for that.” What if the patient’s pain could be eased with a new approach that the doctor does not know about? What if her family’s pushing her to spare them the burden of her care goes unnoticed without a social worker’s input? The lady might die needlessly or be denied treatment unfairly.
The discretionary duty that the amendment would introduce essentially collapses because it does not force the broader scrutiny that patients deserve. The amendment sees the problem, but it is too feeble: it is too discretionary, too vague and too unenforceable for a choice as profound as assisted dying. While I will support it, I do not think it goes far enough.
Amendment 423 builds on amendment 422 by requiring that if the assessing doctor consults a specialist, a written record of that consultation must be shared, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley just mentioned. It is critical for transparency, consistency and accountability in decision making. In high-stakes cases, such as assisted dying requests, paper trails matter. Without a formal record, one assessing doctor might dismiss concerns raised by another professional without accountability—a point made by the hon. Member for Richmond Park.
As I pointed out in an intervention on the hon. Member for Richmond Park, it is remarkable how few jurisdictions around the world have such safeguards. The American model in Oregon, Washington and California does not track how many doctors a patient consults before finding one willing to approve an assisted dying request, so we do not know the extent of doctor shopping abroad. Canada’s system does not require refusals to be formally documented, making it difficult to assess the patterns of approval. Ensuring that records are available to both assessing doctors would add an extra layer of scrutiny and help to prevent doctor shopping.
However, while the amendment is a step in the right direction, it does not require an independent review of the records. Sir James Munby, the former president of the family division of the High Court, has criticised the lack of procedural rigour in oversight mechanisms, warning that assisted dying laws risk becoming a rubber-stamp exercise if refusals and approvals are not documented with transparency. The Royal College of General Practitioners has called for independent oversight of the entire process, not just a reliance on individual doctors. These amendments would partially address that, but would not fully resolve it.
Amendments 422 and 423 are welcome but otiose: they would simply give doctors permission to do what they should be doing anyway. If they are conscientious, they will do it anyway, and if not, they will not. It is slightly like an illegal gun amnesty: the good guys will not have illegal firearms in the first place, and the bad guys with guns are not going to hand them in voluntarily. I fear that we are requiring good behaviour of good people, and not requiring it of doctors who are not doing their job properly.
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI rise to speak to amendment 20, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato).
The key point for me is that doctors are not specialists in coercive control, but this amendment would give them training to spot abusive and coercive relationships, which are difficult to detect. Domestic abuse and coercive control have a disproportionate effect on women and disabled people, and if doctors just rely on their experience to detect coercive control and abuse, they are more likely to miss cases. Some doctors will be more experienced or more perceptive than others. This amendment is not a perfect safeguard, but it will improve the chances of doctors stopping people being coerced.
The amendment would ensure that co-ordinating doctors must have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. It is a significant and distinct amendment. In particular, it addresses the issue of repeated coercive control, which so far has been overlooked in the Bill. I believe that amendments seeking to improve safeguards against coercion that do not address the issue of repeated coercive behaviour are inadequate in protecting vulnerable people, particularly women.
It is regrettable that in our witness sessions we did not hear from any experts on repeat coercive control. Such testimony would have been valuable, helping the Committee to understand why this specific environment puts people at risk with regard to the Bill.
We have already spoken a great deal about coercion in this Committee and other Members have referred to that. We have raised concerns about someone coercing another person into the process of assisted dying in a one-off incident. However, we have not yet discussed the very real issue of repeated coercive control and what it means to live in that environment, nor the implications that the Bill may have for people in those situations.
Dr Hannah Denno submitted written evidence to this Committee. She wrote:
“As a doctor I am not trained to detect coercion, and I do not believe that the Bill pays sufficient attention to the detection of those who are under pressure from themselves or others to end their lives. The Bill describes two independent medical assessments, both can be carried out by doctors who have never previously met or cared for the patient.”
I just want to provide some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West. I have met my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft and today I will support amendment 20, which she has tabled. I hope that provides some reassurance to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention and I am really grateful that she is supporting the amendment. However, the reason I am making this speech is that I do not think the amendment goes far enough in terms of providing safeguards within the Bill. So, I will make some progress with my speech and then I will address some of the issues that are not addressed in this particular amendment, and set out how we can go further, as well as highlighting some of my concerns.
I return to what Dr Denno wrote in the evidence that she submitted. She wrote that she was:
“not trained to detect coercion”.
And she also wrote that
“Social workers are better placed to screen for coercion but are not mentioned in the Bill.”
Since that submission, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has tabled an amendment that would mandate a social worker to sit on a panel to consider each application for assisted death. However, I am afraid that I must repeat several points about these panels, points that have already been made frequently. These panels are under no obligation to interview the applicant for assisted death in person. Panel members may do so if they have any concerns, but they may not. That makes it harder for panel members to detect possible coercion.
There is also an absence of any mechanism for people who know assisted dying applicants to report any concerns they have that that person is being coerced into this form of action. The panels are not used in that way, which is the way that multidisciplinary panels are used in the NHS to decide on the pathway for a patient. Instead, the panels introduced by my hon. Friend’s amendment would wait until the two doctors have submitted their statements on the applicant and then the panel members would scrutinise those statements. If they spot problems with the way that the doctors have determined that the patient is not being coerced, then, yes, they would call the patient in for more scrutiny. However, they will first have to come to that conclusion without seeing the patient. That is not a very robust safeguard.
I am in the process of tabling an amendment that would change the panel to that effect, so that it would speak to the patient. Hopefully, that provides some more reassurance for my hon. Friend. I am sure that we are working very effectively through the Committee process to achieve what we all want to see.
I am pleased to hear that my hon. Friend will table further amendments, but I have not seen that amendment, so I cannot speak to it.
I would slightly beg to differ with my hon. Friend in terms of making progress in the way that I would like to have seen. I would just gently remind her that I am not convinced that we are. I think we are making good progress, but I also voted against one clause stand part and had lots of concerns about another one, so we will agree to disagree on that one.
The non-governmental organisation The Other Half observes in its written evidence to this Committee—TIAB 104—that the Bill makes no provision to identify family members who may benefit financially from the death of a patient, and, therefore, the Bill is unable to protect the vulnerable. That is something that I have said before in this Committee.
This amendment makes training in respect of financial abuse mandatory. It is vital that a medical practitioner is trained on how to identify coercion—we can all agree on that—but coercion is different from domestic abuse. Coercion may be relatively obvious to spot, but, in contrast, coercive and controlling behaviour is much less obvious. It can be subtle. It can be hidden, and unexpected to an outsider. It requires much more sensitive questioning and a degree of a doctor-patient relationship to identify. Multiple people have raised that a patient-doctor relationship is important for spotting that, and, currently, there is nothing in the Bill to say that the two independent doctors have to have met the patient before.
That subtle coercion could have happened over years. We have repeatedly heard from people giving evidence that it is really hard to spot, and the reason it is hard to spot is because it is a matter of trust for a patient to be able to tell somebody—for a victim of coercive control to be able to express that. Even recognising that there is subtle coercion going on is hard for victims of that coercion to understand.
If there is domestic violence—again, I say in this Committee that I first campaigned on domestic abuse in the mid-1990s, and I am not convinced that the stats have changed much. I will refer to some more later on, as I make progress, but it takes women, on average, 40 times to leave an abusive partner—40 times—and it took me a long time to leave my abusive forced marriage when I was very young. The coercion that happens is so subtle and, again, when it is repeated coercion, it is hard to even recognise it as a victim, let alone for a professional to be able to see it. Even when a professional may pick up on it, it is acknowledgment from the victim—that they recognise what is happening—that is important, and that often is not the case.
Again, multiple people have raised that the doctor-patient relationship is important, and there is nothing currently in the Bill to ensure that there is a long-standing relationship between the doctor and the patient. Therefore, it is unreasonable to assume that someone in an abusive relationship, or who experiences coercive and controlling behaviour on top of their terminal illness, would be willing and able to disclose that to a stranger, even if that stranger is a doctor.
On top of that, research suggests that a significant proportion of medical staff in the UK do not feel that they have had adequate training to spot domestic abuse. Research by YouGov and the charity SafeLives in 2018-19 found that half of UK healthcare professionals are untrained to spot domestic abuse.
I understand the current difficulty in ensuring that doctors have a prior relationship with patients; it may not be practically possible. In many cases, where patients will know their doctors, or even know them well, it is even more vital that both doctors have been thoroughly trained in spotting coercive-control behaviour.
Like the other Labour MPs on the Committee, I was elected on a manifesto pledge to halve violence against women and girls within the next 10 years. We must not forget that as we scrutinise this legislation; I want my colleagues and I to remain committed to that in this Bill.
This Bill will have particularly grave consequences for women, since we know that domestic abuse disproportionately affects them. The crime survey for England and Wales estimated that 2.3 million people aged 16 years and over experienced domestic abuse in the year ending March 2024. Of those, 1.6 million were women and 712,000 were men. In the same year, there were only 51,183 domestic abuse-related prosecutions—a very small number compared with the number of people who experienced domestic abuse. That is in addition to the abuse of our elderly, on which Age Concern submitted evidence. Those figures demonstrate that we already frequently struggle with bringing domestic abuse cases to prosecution stage. They show that even the dedicated members of our caring professions have trouble detecting domestic abuse. If something is hard, we need to train our doctors to do it.
Our society already diminishes the status of elderly, infirm women and I have concerns that the Bill will further entrench that. We need to be aware of and ensure that we address the problem of mercy killings in the Bill. That issue is distinctly gendered and the Bill as currently worded will have a distinctly gendered impact if we do not address it. In 2024, The Other Half carried out a review of more than 100 UK cases of so-called mercy killings. It found that
“‘mercy killings’ are not the wanted, ‘hastened’ deaths that need assisted dying.”
Instead, the review found that:
“They are overwhelmingly violent domestic homicides of women, by men: and show that our society is still poor at detecting and responding to domestic abuse.”
Some groups are more vulnerable to domestic abuse than others. A higher proportion of people aged 16 and over with a disability—a group that we know is vulnerable in relation to the Bill—experienced domestic abuse in the last year than those without a disability.
The law and Parliament have, unfortunately, taken a very long time to even start adequately responding to these problems. Coercive control was first recognised as a distinct offence in English law only in the Serious Crime Act 2015. As written, the Bill would not mandate training to the doctors whose role it would be to consider assisted dying cases. Of course, no training can be perfect, but to allow the Bill to go forward without ensuring that doctors have training in this complex matter would be negligent. It would mean that we were failing to even try to carry out our responsibilities to protect people, especially women, in abusive and coercive relationships.
I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said that she will accept the amendment, but it does not go far enough. The question is: how do we prevent abusers making use of the Bill if it becomes law? The amendment gives us one way of mitigating that risk to a degree. We already have issues recognising domestic abuse. The amendment cannot perfectly solve that problem, but it would take steps to do so.
We must safeguard vulnerable people who live subject to coercive and controlling behaviour on a daily basis from opting for assisted dying as a result of that environment. Thorough and specific training on spotting that is vital for doctors. I am grateful that my hon. Friend, in accepting the amendment, will ensure that some of that training will be forthcoming. Even one abused person being driven by their abuser to use assisted dying is one too many. I am confident that all hon. Members would agree with me on that deeply important point.
In the last few days, I have been looking at suicide, and one of the issues that has come up is that last year, for the first time in our history, suicide by victims of domestic violence overtook deaths from what we would term intimate partner homicide. In the last two weeks, there have been further reports highlighting that the number of women driven to suicide because of the experience of domestic violence has risen. Tomorrow, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips) will read the name of every woman who has been killed in the last year, as she does every year. Two of those women were my constituents, and many more kill themselves to get away from their abusers.
I thank the right hon. Lady for that. We go back to the point about the true significance of the 2011 Welsh Government Measure, which sets a basic foundation for the duty of the Welsh Government to ensure that Welsh language provision is provided through the Welsh NHS. There is absolutely no debate about that point; that is nailed on. The question is simply how we ensure, if we are to amend this Bill along the lines that the right hon. Lady suggests, that that does not create a lacuna or confusion in the system. I think we need to sit down and discuss that, to ensure that whatever we propose is watertight.
It may be helpful to note, as in discussion of amendment 413, that regardless of this amendment, under the Welsh Language Measure of 2011 the NHS in Wales has a statutory duty to deliver its services to the public in both Welsh and English. That legislation gives the Welsh language official status in Wales, and the Measure states that individuals in Wales should be able to conduct their lives through the medium of Welsh if they choose to do so. The Welsh Government’s active offer for health is intended to support all staff across NHS Wales to provide a service in Welsh for patients without their having to ask for it.
Under amendment 20, regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor would be required to include mandatory training relating to domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse. Amendments 185 and 186, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, would require that regulations made by the Secretary of State on the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor covered training related to assessing capacity and whether a person has been coerced or pressured by another person. But I note that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has said, she is minded to support amendment 20, which clearly would ramp up the requirement, as previously discussed.
As I have said, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed, but to clarify the intent of the Bill, we have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in relation to amendments 185 and 186, which would place the Secretary of State under a duty to make regulations regarding the necessary training, qualifications and experience of the co-ordinating doctor. That would include specific training on assessing capacity and assessing whether a person has been subject to coercion or pressure.
I hope that that explanation and those observations have assisted the Committee. I thank hon. Members for their attention.
I rise to speak first to my amendments 185 and 186, which would make important changes to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations about the training, qualifications and experience required to act as the co-ordinating doctor, as the Minister says. Moving from “may” to “must” would make it a legal requirement that such training take place and would thereby strengthen the Bill. In its present form, the Bill gives the Secretary of State that power to make such regulations but does not legally require him or her to do so.
Amendment 186 would ensure that regulations must include training about
“(a) assessing capacity;
(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.”
Colleagues will appreciate that it is difficult for me to resist the temptation to put the entire training manual in the Bill—we all want to show the thorough approach that has been taken—but doing so would not make for good, clear legislation and can be limited in terms of flexibility and future-proofing. However, given the importance of the matters of capacity and coercion, I felt that it was important that this level of detail be specified in the Bill, because those issues have been at the heart of so many of our deliberations on this hugely sensitive and important issue.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who tabled amendment (a) to my amendment 186, has made a compelling argument, as always. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, I have some concerns that the amendment would limit the number of disabled people who are covered and that it would not cover people with mental disorders, but I understand the concerns around autistic people and those with learning disabilities.
I am also mindful, given that people with Down’s syndrome will typically have some form of learning disability, that amendment (a) may help to address some of the concerns that were expressed yesterday about ensuring that the Bill meets their needs and takes them into consideration. I take on board the Minister’s comments about the Health and Care Act 2022, but I am minded to support the amendment and work with my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and others as necessary to make any further changes as the Bill progresses.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for supporting that amendment. We have often debated the level of detail that should be set out in the Bill. I fully appreciate that she does not want to include the whole training manual; I will not discuss my amendment, which concerns culture and trauma-informed care, because I recognise that it is much too detailed in that respect. However, does she agree that where possible, and where it does not create unintended consequences or loopholes, we should reassure not just colleagues across the House but members of the public, who want to see these sorts of thing on the face of the Bill?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If the Bill passes, it will be a huge change. We have a duty to the public to show that we are including sufficient detail in the Bill and to provide reassurance in any way we can. To be honest, I would quite like to put the entire training manual in the Bill, but I appreciate that from a legislative perspective that is not possible. However, there are occasions when, for the avoidance of doubt, we should make certain provisions clear on the face of the Bill.
That brings me to amendment 20, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft, who has a huge amount of experience and expertise in the field to which it relates. Her amendment states:
“Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”
At the moment, there are no safeguards for terminally ill victims of domestic abuse, financial abuse or coercive control. That concerns me, and it feeds into the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.
If a victim of domestic abuse or coercive control—it is often a woman, as we know—is also terminally ill, I can only imagine what a lonely place that is. At the moment, that person is under no supervision. Sadly, there have been instances in which those people have taken their own life. They will continue to be the victims of their incredibly difficult personal circumstances on top of having a terminal illness, which is an absolute tragedy. Opening up the conversation with doctors and healthcare professionals about their circumstances has to be a good thing. It will shed light and transparency on what must be an incredibly difficult situation.
Diolch, Gadeirydd. As Professor Emyr Lewis of Aberystwyth University told this Committee in oral evidence, because this Bill is a private Member’s Bill it has not gone through the usual process of engagement with devolved Governments. I recognise that there will be amendments and changes and amendments to amendments, but I can speak to the principle here and we will have to adapt as we move ahead, as we are learning to do in this Committee.
The Wales Act 2017 formally acknowledged the Sewel convention by amending section 107 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 with a declaration stating—this is important—that
“it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Senedd.”
It is in that spirit that work needs to be done to ensure that the devolved legislature in Wales and the complexities of legislating across reserved and devolved matters are fully considered and represented in the Bill. That is what these 28 amendments seek to do.
The use of the term “appropriate authority” does two things. First, in the here and now, it recognises the complexity of which competency lies where and with which Minister or Secretary of State. Secondly, it future-proofs the legislation, which we know is important. If and when there are any changes to devolved powers and competencies, the appropriate authority can move with time with the specifics of who is responsible for what.
Amendment 169 would amend clause 40 to include a definition of “appropriate authority”, the term that is used in my other amendments. It would mean the Secretary of State in relation to England and the Welsh Ministers in relation to Wales, where those powers are devolved rather than reserved. The amendment would provide for my other amendments, which would modify each relevant mention of powers provided to the Secretary of State in the Bill, to supply Welsh Ministers with equivalent powers in Wales.
Amendment 144 would amend clause 5 to allow Welsh Ministers the same powers as the Secretary of State in England to specify the training, qualifications and experience of the medical practitioner representing the co-ordinating doctor, because that matter is devolved to Wales. Amendment 145, similarly, would require Welsh Ministers to consult persons they consider appropriate before making the relevant regulations in Wales.
Amendment 146 would amend clause 6 to allow Welsh Government Ministers equivalent powers to make provision around proof of identity. Amendment 147 would similarly amend clause 8 in relation to the training, qualifications and experience of the independent doctor; we are talking, of course, about the co-ordinating doctor.
And so on, and so on. I assume that hon. Members now understand the purpose of my various amendments. I am more than willing to explain them further if necessary, but otherwise I will skip ahead.
Amendments 155 and 156 would modify clause 30 so that the Welsh Government are provided with a power to issue a code of practice over arrangements in relation to this legislation in Wales. That might be a useful route into further discussions on the specifications of the codes of practice; it might also be significant in discussions with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and the Government about how to recognise legislative differences in safeguarding and the Welsh language.
Amendments 157 and 158 are also important. They would provide Welsh Ministers with the power to make regulations under clause 32 to ensure that assistance is available through the health service in Wales. That is the responsibility of Welsh Ministers. As Committee members know, Senedd Cymru voted against a motion to support an assisted dying law by 26 to 19, with nine abstaining. There are a number of issues of which we need to be aware when bringing an England and Wales law into Wales. To ignore them would be irresponsible; we do so at our peril, frankly, especially given that clauses 33 and 34 will place explicit obligations on Welsh Ministers and the chief medical officer for Wales.
I put it on the record that I am disappointed that the Committee was not able to question the chief medical officer for Wales. I understand that he was invited. As there are matters in the Bill that we do not deal with every day in this place, that would have been useful. The Bill is unprecedented, certainly for a private Member’s Bill, in respect of the support, information and advice that the Committee needs, and that would have been an obvious opportunity for us to receive advice. I understand that the chief medical officer has advised on other pieces of legislation, including vaping, although that was Government legislation.
I can confirm that the chief medical officer for Wales was invited to give evidence. I do not know the circumstances of why he did not. If it is helpful for me or other colleagues to meet him, the offer is definitely open.
I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s intervention.
Amendments 161 to 165 relate to clauses 35, 37 and 38. Amendments 161 to 163 would provide for the Welsh Government to review the operation of the legislation in Wales, which is vital to understand the specifics of the Welsh context and to learn and adapt as appropriate. To not allow Welsh Ministers that power would be to dismiss the particularities of health policy in Wales, as well as the additional implications of contextual differences. I strongly believe that we require an impact assessment to understand those differences properly within the context of health being devolved to Wales, alongside significant population differences in relation to demographics, age and sickness.
For clarity, amendments negatived in Committee, if they are pressed today, can be tabled again on Report. I say that in case the right hon. Lady wished to press the amendment and it was defeated. I hope there was clarity from me on that.
I welcome this important debate about the impact of this potential legislation on Wales. I thank the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd for her valuable contributions. I also welcome the Minister’s commitment to meet the right hon. Lady and me for discussions with parliamentary counsel and the relevant authorities.
This is really important. The criminal justice system covers England and Wales, so it is important for the Bill to do the same, given that it disapplies the Suicide Act in certain very carefully defined circumstances. But health is, of course, devolved and the Welsh Government quite rightly make decisions on the Welsh NHS. I want to make it clear that I recognise that reality and its importance, and I am fully committed to observing the same conventions that the Government would if this were a Government Bill.
As has been said, I am working with UK Government officials to ensure that the right steps are taken at the right time, and I would expect to engage colleagues in the Welsh Government as the Bill progresses. Indeed, I really look forward to doing so and would be happy to visit the Senate if appropriate—although, as Members can tell, I need to work on my Welsh a bit. I look forward to continuing these conversations.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 359, in clause 5, page 3, line 18, at end insert—
“(ba) who has conducted the preliminary discussion in accordance with section 4,”—(Danny Kruger.)
This amendment requires that the coordinating doctor has conducted a preliminary discussion prior to witnessing the signing of the first declaration.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The amendment speaks to the general confusion we remain in about how the assisted dying law would be implemented and who would operate it. We are in a great cloud of unknowing about whether we are talking about an NHS service or a private service. If there were to be a private service and people were to be paid to deliver it outside the NHS, the amendment would clarify obligations regarding how their remuneration would be recorded.
There is an established precedent for publishing financial interests where there is a potential for a conflict of interest. Senior officials in NHS England, NHS trusts and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency must declare financial interests—including relationships with pharmaceutical companies—in public registers. Those interests include consultancy fees, gifts, hospitality, shareholdings in pharmaceutical companies or research funding, because there is a concern that those influence drug approvals, procurement and healthcare policy and that there is a risk of bias.
NHS England guidance on managing conflicts of interest encourages the detailed disclosure of significant payments from pharmaceutical companies, often with exact figures or ranges for payments above a £500 threshold. The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry runs Disclosure UK, which requires pharmaceutical companies to publicly report payments to healthcare professionals and organisations. It would be appropriate to follow this well-established precedent and ensure that people involved in the administration of assisted dying are accountable for the transparency for their remuneration.
Clause 5(3) recognises that there could be a conflict of interest and that there is a risk that someone who is related or might benefit financially may not be a neutral assessor of someone who wishes to die, but clause 40(4), which comes rather late in the Bill—it should be up front—specifies that
“a registered medical practitioner is not to be regarded as benefiting financially or in any other material way from the death of a person by reason only of the practitioner receiving reasonable remuneration for the provision of services”.
Here is where we discover that the Bill does envisage remuneration, but people being remunerated are excluded from the definition of people who financially benefit from the service. To me, that feels dangerous.
Although it has not resolved the question of whether assisted dying is to be an NHS service, the Bill clearly envisages the establishment of a private market for these services, perhaps with a specialist service like Dignitas. Are we content with the Bill’s assertion that remuneration is not a matter for scrutiny? What level of remuneration would we consider reasonable? What level would we consider excessive—remuneration that is capable of influencing a doctor’s thinking? Would they be paid for administering assisted death on a per patient basis, or as a cumulative practice?
As MPs, should we not have some unease at the idea that this could be a highly profitable specialism for private practice? Transparency on what is being charged and who is profiting from the service would help us to understand what is happening in the system that is being established. I suggest that we bring more sunlight into the system, as we do in many other areas.
It is notable that there is little public data on what is charged, or how much revenue assisted dying generates for medical practices, in other countries where assisted dying is a private service. That is regrettable, and I hope we will not replicate that here. We do know that at Dignitas, which is a not-for-profit, the cost for a single patient is between £5,000 and £8,500 in fees alone. What is reasonable remuneration for a practice that provides assisted dying here in the UK? The term is entirely undefined, and I would be grateful for any clarity.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s keenness to get to the debate on clause 32, on the provision of the service—we will come to that in due course—but this conversation is about the amendment. To be clear, there is no expectation that assisted dying would be set up as a private enterprise or service. It would be delivered within the provision of the NHS.
I am glad to have that suggestion. Clause 32 is extremely broad. It basically empowers the Secretary of State to set up a service in any way they choose, potentially including in the private sector. The hon. Lady says it is not envisaged that would happen, as she is suggesting this should be an NHS service. I am grateful for the clarity, but I wish it were clearer in the Bill.
I am glad to hear we will have more clarity. Having assisted suicide as an NHS service is fraught with enormous risks, along the lines we have discussed and will no doubt continue to discuss. At least we have that clarity. If the hon. Lady is going to rule out private provision and profit making or remuneration of people outside the NHS, I would be grateful for amendments specifying that. That would help to address this question.
My amendments would mean that if there is private provision of assisted suicide, as the Bill currently allows, the public and Parliament could understand who is being paid what, which I think is very appropriate.
I am grateful for that clarity, although we now seem to be less clear than we were. I understood the hon. Member for Spen Valley to be saying that there will not be private provision, but my right hon. Friend is saying that there may be.
It would be helpful if the hon. Lady clarified whether private provision will be allowed under the Bill, because I think we have a party split. My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire supports private provision, but the hon. Lady suggests this should be done only on the NHS.
This service, like many others, will be delivered through a range of providers, as alluded to by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire. I understand the keenness to have this debate now, but we will come on to it further down the line. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire is right that this is really important.
It certainly is. Okay, so it could be either. This will be an NHS service, with all the implications for general practice, doctor-patient relations and secondary care and social care, but there will also be an opportunity to deliver it privately, without any clarity or transparency on who is being paid and how.
In answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, this is different from cosmetic surgery, as even cosmetic surgery is regulated. In many ways, there is more regulation of the administering of Botox than there is in this Bill. The administering of assisted dying is of a significantly different category and gravity. It is appropriate and important that financial interests are clearly revealed and made public, particularly with the new intervention we are creating. If other hon. Members do not support the amendment, what provisions do they propose that would reveal where there may be potential conflicts of interest and how we may regulate this?
I agree. Like any other aspect of what doctors and general practitioners do, this service is based on remuneration. They are professionals and should be remunerated as such, so the tariff will be important. It is also important that we do not jump ahead into defining the operating model. As I said, officials are working on this with the Bill’s promoter, and it will be made clear when we get to the relevant clauses.
Hopefully the Minister and other colleagues are reassured that, if the Committee agrees to the introduction of the voluntary assisted dying commission, monitoring will be very intense and reporting will be very robust. That might allay some of the fears that have been raised today.
As I have repeatedly said, the Government are neutral on the fundamental question of the Bill, but we are absolutely committed to ensuring it is workable should it receive Royal Assent. The role of the commission will be pivotal in ensuring that the Bill is workable and that all the necessary monitoring and regulation mechanisms are in place.
(3 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing amendment 361, in clause 5, page 3, line 28, at end insert—
“(7) Regulations under subsection (3)(e) are subject to the affirmative procedure.”
This is linked to Amendment 360.
In the light of the suggestion from the hon. Member for Spen Valley that there will be further amendments later, when we can discuss the shape of the provision and presumably any remuneration, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 186, in clause 5, page 3, line 23, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the training, qualifications and experience that a registered medical practitioner must have in order to act as the coordinating doctor.
(3B) The regulations must include training about—
(a) assessing capacity;
(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.
(3C) Subject to that, the regulations may in particular provide that the required training, qualifications or experience is to be determined by a person specified in the regulations.”—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 185.
Amendment made to amendment 186: (a), after
“(b) assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person.”
insert
“(c) specific and up-to-date training on reasonable adjustments and safeguards for autistic people and people with a learning disability.”—(Daniel Francis.)
Amendment 186, as amended, agreed to.
I beg to move amendment 187, in clause 5, page 3, line 24, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment is consequential on NC8, which contains a single duty to consult before making regulations under various provisions of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 188, in clause 5, page 3, line 28, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 233, which contains a single set of provisions about the procedure for regulations under the Bill.
Amendment 192, in clause 6, page 3, line 36, leave out subsection (4).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 199, in clause 8, page 5, line 28, leave out subsection (8).
See the statement for Amendment 187.
Amendment 200, in clause 8, page 5, line 30, leave out subsection (9).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 206, in clause 11, page 7, line 24, leave out subsection (3).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 211, in clause 19, page 13, line 31, leave out subsection (5).
See the statement for Amendment 187.
Amendment 212, in clause 19, page 13, line 33, leave out subsection (6).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 213, in clause 20, page 13, line 39, leave out subsection (3).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 215, in clause 28, page 17, line 11, leave out subsection (3).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 216, in clause 30, page 18, line 37, leave out subsection (4).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 217, in clause 30, page 18, line 38, leave out “that procedure” and insert “section 39”.
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 218, in clause 32, page 19, line 31, leave out subsection (4).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 219, in clause 33, page 20, line 24, leave out subsection (5).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 222, in clause 38, page 23, line 1, leave out subsection (2).
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Amendment 233, in clause 39, page 23, line 6, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under section 5(3A), 8(6A), 30(3) or 32 unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(5B) Any other statutory instrument made by the Secretary of State containing regulations under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
This amendment brings together the various provisions about the procedure for regulations and makes regulations under clauses 5 and 8 about training, qualifications and experience subject to the draft affirmative procedure.
Amendment 225, in clause 40, page 23, leave out line 23.
The amendment is consequential on Amendment 233.
Amendment 226, in clause 40, page 23, leave out line 37.
The amendment is consequential on Amendment 233.
New clause 8—Duty to consult before making regulations—
“(1) Before making regulations under section 5, 7, 8, 13, 19 or 21, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, and
(b) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) The persons to be consulted under subsection (1)(b) must include —
(a) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have capacity, and
(b) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have been coerced,
unless the Secretary of State considers that, having regard to the subject-matter of the proposed regulations, it would not be appropriate to consult such persons.”
This new clause imposes a duty to consult before making regulations under various provisions of the Bill.
This group of amendments is consequential on new clause 8, which would create a single duty for the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations under various provisions of the Bill. It would consolidate the previous requirements to consult in relation to clauses 5, 8 and 19 and expand the duty to cover additional clauses. It would require the Secretary of State to consult the Equality and Human Rights Commission and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The persons to be consulted under subsection (1)(b) must include persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have capacity, and persons appearing to the Secretary of State to have expertise in matters relating to whether persons have been coerced.
This is an important strengthening of the Bill. It applies to multiple clauses: clauses 5, 7, 8, 13, 19 and 21. The duty to consult experts, particularly on issues around capacity and assessing for coercion, is an important change that reflects the detailed debate that the Committee has undertaken on those two important issues.
Amendment 233 brings together the various provisions about the procedure for regulations. It would make the regulations to be made under clauses 5 and 8, on training, qualifications and experience, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so that Parliament has to debate and approve them first. Again, that would strengthen the Bill.
In a sense, this is a technical set of amendments that consolidate the provisions for secondary legislation. However, it reflects the seriousness of a concern that I and others have raised, which is that so much in this Bill will be left to the discretion of Ministers, often through the negative procedure.
It is important to reflect briefly on the questions that we are considering. The hon. Lady has mentioned quite a few of them, but we are talking about the training of doctors; the High Court procedure, if there is one; the substances that may be used in the administration of assisted death; the prescribing of those substances; the registration of deaths; the codes of practice to be introduced; provision through the NHS; notification to the chief medical officers; changing the schedules in the Bill, and so on.
Those are important matters. I recognise that many of them are complicated and technical, and that it is appropriate to leave them to a degree of professional and ministerial discretion. Nevertheless, my great concern, which relates to the parliamentary procedure—you may have a view on this, Mrs Harris—is that we are having this debate without the benefit of a delegated powers memorandum to explain why each power has been taken, the nature of it, the reason for taking the power and the procedure to be selected.
In a recent report on the Bill, the Hansard Society notes that under the Government’s “Guide To Making Legislation”, a delegated powers memorandum would normally be published prior to Second Reading for a private Member’s Bill on issues of conscience on which the Government are neutral. The report explains that a delegated powers memorandum gives
“details of each power in the bill, including its context, its scope, to whom the power is delegated, and the parliamentary scrutiny procedure…the reasons for taking the power; and…why.”
It points out that
“where the responsible department recommends that the Government should support the Private Member’s Bill or remain neutral then a DPM should be produced for consideration by the relevant Cabinet Committee—the Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Committee—alongside other key documents such as the explanatory notes, a legal issues memorandum, and an impact assessment”.
We have not yet had an impact assessment either.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. The amendments have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in consultation with the Government. This reflects the Government’s role in ensuring that the Bill is legally robust and workable. The amendments relate to the regulation-making powers and bring together various provisions about procedure and requirements for regulations and consultation.
I will address the amendments in two groups, starting with new clause 8 and its consequential amendments 187, 199 and 211. The new clause contains a duty to consult before making regulations; it is intended to consolidate three subsections that contain duties to consult before making regulations, as set out in the original draft of the Bill under clauses 5, 8 and 19. In addition to retaining the existing duties to consult before making regulations in clauses 5, 8 and 19, the new clause requires the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations under clauses 7, 13 and 21, and brings together these requirements under a single duty.
The new clause would place an additional requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the Equality and Human Rights Commission, as well as such other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The latter group must include persons with expertise in matters relating to whether persons have capacity or have been coerced, unless it would not be appropriate to consult such persons.
I turn to amendments 233, 188, 192, 215 to 219, 222, 225, 226, 212, 213, 200 and 206. There are provisions throughout the Bill, as it is currently drafted, about the procedure for making regulations. All regulations, except for those made under clause 5(3)(a), clause 8(6)(a), clause 30(3) and clause 32, are required to be made under the negative procedure. Amendment 233 would bring together the various provisions about the procedure for making regulations into a single clause, clause 39, thereby removing repetition in the Bill. The amendment seeks to achieve that by replacing subsections (3) to (5) in clause 39 with the following:
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under section 5(3A), 8(6A), 30(3) or 32 unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(5B) Any other statutory instrument made by the Secretary of State containing regulations under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
The amendment would require that any regulations made under those provisions must be laid before, and approved by, a resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This procedure, the draft affirmative procedure, will apply to regulations setting the training, qualifications and experience of both the co-ordinating and the independent doctors, establishing a code of practice and securing arrangements for the provision of assisted dying under the Act. Any other statutory instrument made under powers within the Bill will remain subject to the negative procedure.
As I have said, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions. These comments relate to the legal and regulatory side of the Bill, and I hope that my observations are useful to the Committee.
I have nothing further to add.
Amendment 187 agreed to.
Amendment made: 20, in clause 5, page 3, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations under subsection (3)(a) must specify that training in respect of domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse is mandatory.”—(Daniel Francis.)
This amendment would require the registered medical practitioner acting as the coordinating doctor to have undertaken training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse.
Amendment made: 188, in clause 5, page 3, line 28, leave out subsection (6).—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 233, which contains a single set of provisions about the procedure for regulations under the Bill.
Clause 5, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Requirement for proof of identity
I beg to move amendment 189, in clause 6, page 3, line 30, leave out
“where a person makes a first declaration”
and insert
“in relation to the making of a first declaration by a person”.
This amendment adjusts the wording so as not to suggest that a first declaration has been made before it is witnessed.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 190, in clause 6, page 3, line 31, leave out
“at the same time as that declaration is made”
and insert “before signing that declaration”.
This amendment provides that the required two forms of proof of identity must be provided before the person signs the first declaration.
Amendment 291, in clause 6, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“(2A) At least one of the forms of identity required under subsection (2) must contain photographic proof of identity.
(2B) The person must, at the same time as that declaration is made, provide proof that they have been resident in the UK for at least a year to the coordinating doctor and the witness mentioned in section 5(2)(c)(ii).”.
This would require a person to produce a form of photographic ID and proof they have been resident in the UK when making the first declaration.
Amendment 292, in clause 6, page 3, line 34, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This places an obligation on the Secretary of State to make regulations on proof of identity.
Amendment 191, in clause 6, page 3, line 35, at end insert—
“(3A) The coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of subsection (2) have been met.”
This amendment provides that the coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of subsection (2) are met.
Amendment 419, in clause 6, page 3, line 35, at end insert—
“(3B) The coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if—
(a) the coordinating doctor has conducted a preliminary discussion with the person or is satisfied that another registered medical practitioner has conducted such a discussion, and
(b) the coordinating doctor has made or seen a written record of the preliminary discussion.”
This amendment provides that the coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that a preliminary discussion of the kind mentioned in clause 4 has taken place and that a written record of it has been made.
Amendment 293, in clause 6, page 3, line 36, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.
This will change the process to the affirmative procedure for statutory instruments specifying acceptable forms of ID for the first declaration.
Amendment 419 provides that the co-ordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that a preliminary discussion of the kind mentioned in clause 4 has taken place and that a written record of it has been made. The co-ordinating doctor must have made or seen a written record of the preliminary discussion. Amendment 189 adjusts the wording so as not to suggest that a first declaration has been made before it is witnessed to clarify that proof of identity must be provided before the declaration is signed and witnessed.
Amendment 190 provides that the required two forms of proof of identity must be provided before the person signs the first declaration. Amendment 191 provides that the co-ordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of clause 6(2) are met; that is to say, that the patient has provided two forms of identity to the co-ordinating doctor. This is a relatively straightforward set of amendments to tidy up the requirements around proof of identity.
I rise to speak to amendments 291, 292 and 293, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell). I do not intend to press them to a vote; they are probing amendments. They all relate to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley about the identification required of applicants for assisted dying. They do not change those requirements; they take a more logical and businesslike approach to proving that those requirements are met.
Amendment 291 would change the current requirements on identification and require applicants for assisted dying to produce a piece of photo ID and proof of residence in the UK for the previous year. As currently written, clause 6(2) states:
“The person must, at the same time as that declaration is made, provide two forms of proof of identity to the coordinating doctor and the witness mentioned in section 5(2)(c)(ii).”
Subsection (3) states:
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”
Surely that is not tight enough.
In particular, the Bill as written does not specify that either form of proof of identity should be photo ID. That may be a major omission. For much less significant decisions, the law of England and Wales requires at least one form of photographic ID. For example, there is currently a requirement to have photo identity to work on the parliamentary estate, vote, or have a bus pass or railcard. None of those is as important as applying for an assisted death.
I remind hon. Members that assisted death is a process that would end in a person being issued with and then taking a mixture of lethal drugs. In a hospital setting where drugs are dispensed, rigorous processes are undertaken to verify the patient. Drug errors are not uncommon. The previous Health and Social Care Committee’s report into pharmacy witnessed how clinical practice was being improved to reduce drug errors. Given that a lethal dose is dispensed as part of this process, the identification mechanisms are weak and should be addressed in this preliminary stage through the provisions set out in this amendment. It is possible that the wrong person could be prescribed the medication. That would be an extreme case, but we are talking about creating a wholly new power that would relate to life and death. We are talking about making assisted dying available to people who are, in many cases, extremely distressed. People in extreme circumstances will sometimes do extreme things. We should expect some extreme cases and seek to guard against them.
Amendment 291 would provide such a safeguard. The Bill says that to qualify for assisted dying, applicants must have been resident in the UK for at least a year, but it does not ask them to provide any proof of that residence. In such a serious matter, we surely cannot simply accept someone’s word that they live in the UK. Making that a requirement without a test to establish it de-values the importance of the criteria for qualifying.
Amendment 292 would change clause 6(3), which currently reads,
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of subsection (2).”
The amendment would change that “may” to a “must”, as the former treats the identification process with reduced seriousness. If the word “may” stays in legislation, there is no obligation to have rigour in the identification process. As drafted, the Bill is more open for abuse.
Amendment 293 seeks to place the regulations concerning identification under the affirmative procedure, which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire mentioned earlier. Assisted dying is so important that no regulations made under it should be drawn using the negative procedure. As Members will know, if a statutory instrument is made under the affirmative procedure, it must be approved by Parliament within a certain timeframe, which is usually 28 or 40 days. If that does not happen, the change to the law made by the statutory instrument will not take place. In the Bill as drafted, these regulations are covered by the negative procedure, which means that if and when the Secretary of State decides to change them, they could go through on the nod unless Members raised an objection. A statutory instrument laid through the negative procedure becomes law on the day the Minister signs it and automatically remains law unless a motion rejecting it is passed by either House within 40 sitting days.
Placing all changes to regulations under the affirmative procedure would ensure that we have scrutiny by Parliament. We should all approve this. Our responsibility for this legislation will not end when and if it becomes an Act of Parliament. These amendments speak to tighter safeguards and parliamentary scrutiny for all new regulations made by the Secretary of State in relation to identity and residence. All hon. Members should support them.
I will quickly echo the points well made by the hon. Member for Bradford West in support of the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for York Central. It is important to specify the form of identity that will be presented. The person presenting themselves for an assisted death needs to be who they say they are. At the moment, the power to specify the forms of proof of identity has no minimum requirements. As written, it does not require the Secretary of State to specify what is acceptable.
Two specific aspects we have to pay particular care to are age and residency. The process must be accessible only to over-18s. I am concerned that we rejected amendments yesterday that would have prevented people under 18 having the conversation. In light of that, it is even more important that we make it clear that people who access assisted death must be adults. We need to ensure that the forms of identity are specified and that Parliament can satisfy itself that they are robust.
We did not reject proposals for the preliminary discussion not to be taken by people under 18. We actually put a clause into the Bill that would ensure that the preliminary discussion was not taken with someone under 18.
That is right. The preliminary discussion will not, but there is nothing to stop the conversation beginning before the person is 18. I know they cannot formally begin the process of an assisted death, but the concern—although I will not revisit the debate—was that the topic should not be raised or discussed with children, and we did not succeed in that.
The proposal is to ensure that we have proper ID—a passport, driving licence or other combined photo ID and proof of age, so a birth certificate must be paired with something if it is to be robust. We think such questions should be reflected more clearly in the Bill. All sorts of ID would not be appropriate, such as student ID, a sworn statement with no underpinning official record and other such things, which we want to avoid.
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. We have the term “ordinarily resident” in the UK in clause 1. Obviously if the Committee sees fit to accept the amendment it would change to “resident”, which is a looser term. This matter would also be one for the Home Office, as the custodian of our rules and regulations on immigration, but my sense would be that if we stick with “ordinarily resident” then someone who is not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom would not qualify for assisted dying.
As the Bill currently stands, the Secretary of State has the power but not the obligation to set these requirements in regulations. This amendment would remove this discretion and require the Secretary of State to specify what forms of ID must be provided.
Amendment 293 ensures that regulations on acceptable forms of proof of identify must be approved by both Houses of Parliament before coming into force, by requiring these regulations to follow the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. As I said earlier, the Government’s position is neutral, but I hope my observations—
This is a thought based on the comments by the hon. Member for Reigate. The issue of photographic ID is worth giving consideration. Photo ID is used in multiple settings for different reasons. My slight concern is that some of the people we are thinking about with this Bill would be older and I think of some of my own family members who no longer have driving licences, passports or potentially any form of photographic ID. I would be concerned this could be a barrier for terminally ill people. Considering we are making this a robust process, which I totally agree with, I would be concerned that might present an issue.
You will be delighted, Chair, that I have nothing further to add.
Amendment 189 agreed to.
Amendments made: 190, in clause 6, page 3, line 31, leave out
“at the same time as that declaration is made”
and insert “before signing that declaration”.
This amendment provides that the required two forms of proof of identity must be provided before the person signs the first declaration.
Amendment 191, in clause 6, page 3, line 35, at end insert—
“(3A) The coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of subsection (2) have been met.”
This amendment provides that the coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that the requirements of subsection (2) are met.
Amendment 419, in clause 6, page 3, line 35, at end insert—
“(3B) The coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if—
(a) the coordinating doctor has conducted a preliminary discussion with the person or is satisfied that another registered medical practitioner has conducted such a discussion, and
(b) the coordinating doctor has made or seen a written record of the preliminary discussion.”
This amendment provides that the coordinating doctor may witness the first declaration only if satisfied that a preliminary discussion of the kind mentioned in clause 4 has taken place and that a written record of it has been made.
Amendment 192, in clause 6, page 3, line 36, leave out subsection (4).—(Kim Leadbeater.)
See the statement for Amendment 188.
Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
First doctor’s assessment (coordinating doctor)
Amendment proposed: 296, in clause 7, page 4, line 2, leave out from “must” to end of line 3, and insert
“after a first declaration is made by a person, arrange a time and which is convenient for both the medical practitioner and the person date that does not jeopardise the care of other patients, to carry out the first assessment.”—(Naz Shah.)
This amendment replaces the requirement that the coordinating doctor to arrange a first assessment as soon as practicable with a requirement to arrange it for a mutually convenient time which doesn’t jeopardise the care of other patients.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 127, in clause 7, page 4, line 2, leave out
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
and insert “within 10 working days”.
The amendment requires the coordinating doctor to carry out an assessment under the Act within ten working days.
Amendment 128, in clause 7, page 4, line 23, leave out “as soon as practicable” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor to refer a person within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable to another registered medical practitioner to carry out the second assessment.
Amendment 129, in clause 8, page 4, line 29, leave out
“as soon as reasonably practicable,”
and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the independent doctor to carry out the second assessment within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable to another registered medical practitioner to carry out the second assessment.
Amendment 130, in clause 16, page 11, line 19, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor, where they are a practitioner with the person’s GP practice to record the making of the declaration or statement, or the refusal to make the declaration or statement, in the person’s medical records within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable.
Amendment 131, in clause 16, page 11, line 23, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor, where they are not practitioner with the person’s GP practice, to give a registered medical practitioner from that practice notice of the making of the declaration or statement, or the refusal to make the declaration or statement, in the person’s medical records within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable.
Amendment 132, in clause 16, page 11, line 27, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor, where they are not a practitioner with the person’s GP practice to record the making of the declaration or statement, or the refusal to make the declaration or statement, in the person’s medical records within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable.
Amendment 133, in clause 17, page 11, line 38, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the coordinating doctor, where they are not a practitioner with the person’s GP practice to record the making of the declaration or statement, or the refusal to make the declaration or statement, in the person’s medical records within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable.
Amendment 134, in clause 17, page 12, line 2, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
This amendment would require the medical practitioner to whom notice or indication of the cancellation of declaration is given to notify a registered medical professional from the person’s GP practice within 10 working days rather than as soon as practicable.
Amendment 135, in clause 17, page 12, line 5, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 136, in clause 21, page 14, line 12, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 137, in clause 21, page 14, line 15, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 138, in clause 21, page 14, line 18, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 139, in clause 22, page 14, line 27, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 140, in clause 22, page 14, line 30, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Amendment 141, in clause 22, page 14, line 33, leave out “as soon as practicable,” and insert “within 10 working days”.
Okay. I might address the question at a future point, because the issue of how we reflect on these proceedings outside this place has come up privately.
I do not consider for one second that there is any ill intent behind the amendment, but I am slightly concerned about the language, which is what I think my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley meant. The issue is the suggestion that a doctor would, in any circumstances, jeopardise the care of other patients. We are talking about doctors a lot, and we have the utmost respect for medical practitioners, but I imagine that that would be a worrying concept to have in writing from their perspective.
I respect that point, and it is a fair charge: that doctors would not do this. Nevertheless, as I have been stressing, we are in uncharted territory, and there is a genuine concern about the resource implications of the Bill.
The Bill clarifies and emphasises things in lots of other places—“for the avoidance of doubt” and so on—and the amendment would clarify that the procedure under the Bill would not take precedence in a clinician’s time over other matters that they also consider to be pressing and urgent. That is an appropriate safeguard for doctors.
I think most points have been covered, so I will be brief. The point of the amendment 296 is to recognise the challenges faced by medical practitioners in the NHS. It is really well intended. I suspect that there are different ways to do this, which we could discuss, but the amendment would recognise that medical practitioners will come under a lot of pressure.
The very nature of the assisted dying process means there is pressure to move quickly—for obvious reasons. If someone is in pain and an assisted death is what they have chosen to do, they are going to want to move forward at pace. It cannot be as usual, with however long it can take in the NHS—often for a normal procedure. The point of the amendment is simply to be cognisant of the fact that other patients, too, require healthcare. This comes back to the debate we have had many times about what is healthcare and what is not. It is one of the issues that comes up when we have assisted dying amalgamated with general healthcare in the NHS.
We are hearing concerns from doctors on the frontline. In written evidence, eight doctors, six of them GPs, say that the NHS lacks both the time and the capacity to create the new role of co-ordinating doctor with its grave responsibilities. The statistics bear out their concerns. In a 2024 survey by the Royal College of General Practitioners, over 40% of UK GPs who responded said that they were “unlikely” to be practising still in five years’ time; 40% feel stressed to the point of “not coping” at least once a week; and 79% are concerned about having fewer GPs at their practice and its impact on the quality of care that their practice can deliver. The reality of the matter is that we have to recognise that the introduction of assisted dying places another pressure on our health system, and to try to address that head on.
The hon. Lady is making some interesting points, but would she agree that we are talking about not new patients, but existing patients who are already in their last few months of life? It will not create a whole new pressure on the health service, because they are already receiving treatment.
I thank the hon. Member for that point. There will absolutely be some occasions where that is the case, but assisted dying is a different pathway—and we have a whole Bill on it, so there will be other formalities and safeguards. We are all here to make sure that rigour is applied to that pathway. With the best will in the world, there will always be more work and pressure, especially time pressure, on doctors. That time pressure will be critical.
These amendments introduce requirements on the timing within which the co-ordinating doctor must carry out a first assessment once the first declaration is made by a person. I will turn first to amendment 296. As currently drafted, clause 7(1) requires that the co-ordinating doctor must carry out a first assessment
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
after a person has made a first declaration. Amendment 296 would require that after the first declaration is made, the co-ordinating doctor must arrange a mutually convenient time and date for the first assessment to take place, but it removes the stipulation that the assessment must be carried out as soon as reasonably practicable. The amendment would also require the date and time agreed not to jeopardise the care of other patients. The effect of the amendment may be to lengthen the period between the first declaration and the first assessment, in some cases.
Amendments 127 to 141 seek to ensure that the assessments, declarations and statements made throughout the Bill are finalised and recorded within 10 working days of being started. The amendments achieve this by inserting the term “within 10 working days” in place of
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
in clauses 7, 8, 16, 17, 21 and 22. This would put in place a time-bound limit that the medical practitioner must adhere to when carrying out the first and second assessments, when recording information in medical records at various stages, including the High Court declaration, and when recording other matters in medical records.
Our assessment suggests that in most circumstances, although it would depend on the facts of a particular case, the requirement to do an action as soon as practicable would generally amount to a requirement to do the action sooner than in 10 working days’ time. In terms of the operational effects, having a set timeline may give greater certainty to individuals seeking assistance. However, it may limit doctors’ discretion to set the timeline based around the patient’s wishes. These are matters for the Committee to weigh up and consider.
That is an interesting point, but we are not discussing organ donation, and we are dealing in a different environment here; the patients we are talking about are about to die, and all we are giving them is the right to control the moment and manner of that death. I acknowledge that using a psychiatrist in organ donation has its benefits, but in this service, getting every patient—who, for example, are frail and ill by definition, because they are about to die—to see a psychiatrist is frankly neither applicable nor appropriate.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. If we think about some of the people we have met—the families who have lost loved ones to terminal illness and the patients who are terminally ill—they are very clear in their decision. For me, it would be another barrier to those patients, who are dying people, to make them see a psychiatrist for every single case.
I will do the easy bits first. As the Minister said, amendment 370 in my name is a drafting change to the definition of a psychiatrist, which is obviously very important. These useful amendments have enabled us to have this discussion, and they all come from a good place in trying to enhance safeguarding within the Bill.
On organ donation, my sister-in-law has had two kidney transplants. On neither occasion, to my understanding, did a psychiatrist speak to either her or the organ donor, who in one instance was her brother—my sister-in-law would be very upset that I have mentioned her in Parliament. My understanding of the law is that someone may be referred to a mental health specialist. I am happy to be corrected if that is not the case, but I do not think a consultation with a psychiatrist is compulsory.
As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, it is absolutely right that we support amendment 6. From the start, I have been clear that we should move from “may” to “must” in referring to a psychiatrist where either doctor has any doubt. That is a sensible approach, and it covers most of today’s discussion.
However, introducing a whole new system that would almost sit alongside the Bill, and that would change the process, is unnecessary. Those are my conclusions, based on what has been another very interesting discussion.
I will not come back on anything but, obviously, I will press some of these amendments in due course.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 294, in clause 7, page 4, line 5, after “doctor” insert
“based on provided evidence that”.—(Daniel Francis.)
This amendment would require that the doctor bases their assessment on provided evidence.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe challenge is the dissonance in how the guidance under the Down Syndrome Act, which is currently very close to publication, is directed towards authorities such as trusts, but there is no coverage around individual doctors. At this stage, without seeing a clear distinction between the two or how it would work for individual doctors, the Department’s concern is that it could create confusion as to the obligations on individual medical practitioners under the 2022 Act. I am obviously open to conversations about how to clear that up, but the lacuna between the authorities and the individual doctors is the problem being flagged by the Department.
I take the Minister’s comments on board. Will he agree to a conversation with me and with the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), who tabled amendment 368, to take the discussion forward?
I am happy to have conversations with the hon. Lady and other hon. Members, but as things stand it is not clear to the Department or to me how the proposal would work in practice.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. The amendments relate to the initial discussions with medical practitioners, and it is important to highlight that clause 4(1) states:
“No registered medical practitioner is under any duty to raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person.”
However, subsection (2) states that
“nothing in subsection (1) prevents a registered medical practitioner exercising their professional judgement”.
Doctors and healthcare professionals, like any other group of people, hold a range of views on assisted dying. We need only reflect on the oral and written evidence to see that. However, the British Medical Association has a neutral position on assisted dying, and its representatives were very clear when I met them, and in oral evidence to the Committee, that they wanted an opt-in model for doctors to provide assisted dying, as well as the right to decline to carry out activities directly related to assisted dying, for any reason. These requests have therefore been incorporated into the Bill.
The BMA was clear in its submission that it opposes amendments 8, 124 and 276, as well as amendment 342, which we will come to later. It said that adding a prohibition or limiting factors in the Bill would
“create uncertainty and legal risks for doctors, which may inhibit effective doctor/patient communication and understanding.”
It welcomed the Bill’s provision that a doctor is not under a duty to raise assisted dying, which it felt was necessary to avoid any suggestion that doctors have a legal duty to raise it. It was concerned that these amendments would remove that provision, leaving doctors in a position of legal uncertainty. It said:
“If doctors are concerned that they may be legally obliged to raise assisted dying with all potentially eligible patients, this will impact on how, when, and by whom the issue is raised…It is essential that decisions about when and how to discuss assisted dying are made on the basis of what is best for the patient—rather than to avoid legal challenge. All patients deserve to have this important and sensitive conversation with a doctor who is confident, competent and happy to have the discussion…Doctors should be able to talk to patients about all reasonable and legally available options; a provision that limits or hinders open discussion about any aspect of death and dying is likely to be detrimental to patient care. Doctors should be trusted to use their professional judgement to decide when and if a discussion about assisted dying would be appropriate, taking their cue from the patient as they do on all other issues.”
That is the BMA’s position, and I agree.
As Duncan Burton, the chief nursing officer for England, said in oral evidence to the Committee,
“it is clear that there is increasing discussion in society around death and dying, and I think that is important. It is important that we have discussions and support people with their choices at the end of life, so anything we can do to increase that is important.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 41, Q22.]
Dr Ryan Spielvogel from California told us:
“People cannot make informed decisions for themselves if they do not know what their options are. While this is top of mind for all of you and for the doctors…even if this Bill becomes law, the general population is still not going to realise that it is an option.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 105, Q143.]
He strongly advised against not allowing doctors to discuss patient choice, because in his experience that really hampers their ability to take care of patients. Dr Jessica Kaan of End of Life Washington reiterated the point:
“It is a huge burden to put on patients and their loved ones if they have to bring it up themselves. I would highly caution against any sort of language that requires that, because it is just not fair to them. They are already going through so much”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 106, Q143.]
In the light of our recent discussions, I draw the Committee’s attention to the current BMA guidelines regarding patient requests for assisted dying. Those guidelines will obviously need updating if the law changes, but they are comprehensive and give us a much greater understanding of the approach that doctors take when speaking to terminally ill patients, as well as what these hugely sensitive conversations look like, which is really important to know.
The BMA guidance addresses situations in which patients make an explicit request for doctors’ assistance in or information about ending their life or hastening their death. I will refer to that guidance now. The guidance advises the doctors to
“Explore the patient’s feelings, emotions and thoughts….It might be helpful to discuss their understanding of their condition or their fears and concerns…If you feel that the patient is depressed or suffering from another mental health condition, or would benefit from more support, therapy or counselling should be offered.”
Doctors are also advised to
“Use the opportunity to address those concerns: you should also investigate whether other practical arrangements could help improve the patient’s quality of life. Involve a colleague: you might like to involve a more experienced colleague—making clear to the patient that this is what you will be doing.”
The guidance also talks about involving other sources of support:
“you might like to seek support and input from other members of the healthcare team, such as a specialist palliative care team, colleagues from mental health, or the chaplaincy or voluntary services.”
The hon. Lady says that the GMC states that doctors have an obligation to raise the treatment options before them, and I think that she thinks that this is a treatment option. Surely the obligation is on doctors to raise assisted dying in all cases where it may be an option for the patient. Does the hon. Lady agree that doctors should offer assisted dying when that treatment may be appropriate for the patient?
I agree that, under the provisions of the Bill, the doctor will have a duty to lay out options available to the patient, if they meet the eligibility criteria—absolutely. That is the whole purpose of the Bill.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me a very clear answer. I just want to be totally clear that we understand each other. Is she saying that every doctor facing a terminally ill patient—someone who is eligible under the Bill—should make clear to them that they have the option of an assisted death?
Well, that is the purpose of clause 4: the doctor has to lay out the options available to the patient as long as all the criteria are met.
We can see from the guidance that currently exists that doctors take a very sensitive and patient-centred approach to end-of-life conversations. If the law were to change, that approach would continue with additional training specifically related to assisted dying, as has been discussed. It would also mean that the issues that doctors currently face around discussing assisted dying would be addressed.
As the BMA says, at the moment
“The law does not provide a clear definition of which actions might constitute assisting or encouraging suicide…What if a patient wishes to travel abroad for assisted dying? While the act of travelling abroad for assisted dying is not illegal, assisting, facilitating, or encouraging someone to do so is a criminal offence…doctors need to be aware of the possibility of legal and professional sanctions if they were to do so.”
I imagine that that must create a real sense of jeopardy for doctors. Similarly, the GMC recognises that doctors will face challenges in
“ensuring that patients do not feel abandoned”,
while ensuring that the advice or information that they provide does not encourage or assist a person to end their own life.
These are very difficult conversations for patients and doctors, but by legalising assisted dying in this country we can give clear guidance through a robust legal framework, and create the thorough, transparent process that is currently lacking. These conversations provide a safeguard while the person is still alive. As the former director of public prosecutions, Sir Max Hill, told the Committee,
“In each of the 27 cases I considered, the deceased individual was already dead, and that is when the scrutiny started. The major advantage of the Bill, if I can put it that way, is that that will be reversed, and scrutiny will be before death.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 86, Q111.]
Mark Swindells from the General Medical Council told us:
“We do get inquiries from doctors who are concerned that they are doing the right thing when it might become apparent to them that a patient wants to travel overseas to access assisted dying.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 46, Q36.]
Bringing those conversations out into the open has to be better for the patient and the practitioner.
With reference to amendment 8, and further to the intervention from the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, can my hon. Friend reflect on the provisions as set out in clause 4(1) and (2), which say that the issue relates to doctors’ professional judgment and that doctors are under no obligation to raise those issues in any situation?
Absolutely. This is about professional judgment, which is what the BMA is really clear about. Doctors have to be able to use their professional judgment. They are not under any obligation to raise the issue, but they are not under any obligation not to raise it. The BMA is really clear about that. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention.
I welcome amendments 319 and 320 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and I thank him once again for his positive engagement with the Bill. He raises a very valid point about the initial discussion. While the Bill is very clear that it applies only to terminally ill adults over the age of 18, in that someone would have to be over 18 to make the first declaration, it is not clear that the initial discussion could also not happen with someone under the age of 18.
We should not prohibit open conversations with terminally ill young people and their families, as they create openness, transparency and safeguards and provide much-needed support at what most of us can only imagine must be the most difficult time of anyone’s life. However, I think it should be made clear that the actual assisted dying process cannot be embarked upon unless someone is over the age of 18. I have taken advice about how best to incorporate that into the Bill from a drafting perspective. As a result, I have tabled amendment 418, which applies to clause 5, and states that regulations must provide that the first declaration contain, among other things,
“a declaration that they have had a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner, that they were aged 18 or over when they had that discussion, and that they understand the information referred to in section 4(4)(a) to (c) that was provided during that discussion”.
As such, the aim of amendments 319 and 320 is achieved. I hope that that is to the satisfaction of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford.
With regard to amendment 339, I have listened very carefully to the concerns of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who tabled it, and the evidence from Mencap chief executive Dan Scorer, who suggested that for terminally ill people with learning disabilities
“that initial conversation has to be incredibly well supported and structured…the person should have accessible information in advance of that discussion so that they are fully informed about all their rights in terms of treatment options at end of life”. ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 280.]
I absolutely agree with the intention of the amendment. I am seeking advice on the legal and technical implications, as I believe there is some tightening up that would need to be done around some of the phrasing, such as the concept of “sufficient time” or what would constitute a “supporter”. I therefore cannot support the amendment as it stands, but I am very happy to look at ways to take this forward and to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the amendment, which, quite rightly, gives special consideration to people with autism and learning disabilities. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge is also considering tabling amendments that would have a similar effect; perhaps we could all meet together.
I also reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford that I am considering the involvement of people with learning disabilities, and groups representing them, in the development of guidance and training on assisted dying and end-of-life conversations. As Dan Scorer said,
“people with a learning disability should be involved in the development of that guidance” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 281.]
I absolutely agree.
Amendment 368, tabled by the right hon. Member for East Hampshire, has been discussed this morning. I sought advice about it as it was new to me. I believe that no statutory guidance has yet been published under the Down Syndrome Act, so we lack detail. That Act resulted from another private Member’s Bill; I am sure we can all agree what an excellent process this is for making important changes to the law. As the Minister said, the amendment is likely to be unworkable for doctors so I cannot support it. I would, however, be very happy to discuss the thoughts of the right hon. Member for East Hampshire and look at how we can meet his objectives—possibly through an addition to new clause 8, which is about the duty to consult and the Secretary of State consulting with the Equality and Human Rights Commission. At that point, the specific needs of not just people with disabilities but those with other protected characteristics will be represented. Alternatively, we could look at the codes of practice in clause 30.
I am happy to take those discussions forward and may even be able to speak to the right hon. Member for East Hampshire at the drop-in session he is doing this week with the National Down Syndrome Policy Group, ahead of Down’s Syndrome Awareness Week.
As the hon. Lady will know, a number of our proceedings have been misinterpreted, shall we say, on social media. For complete clarity, with regard to the initial conversation, the Bill leaves to the discretion of the doctor whether it is appropriate to raise the matter, given their knowledge of the patient. They have no obligation to raise it. If the patient themselves indicates a wish to raise the matter, then a doctor is under an obligation to lay out all the options available to that patient. We would not want to leave the outside world with the impression that, in all circumstances, the doctor is obliged to raise the option of assisted dying. It is only when they professionally think it is appropriate or if the patient raises it with them.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. As I have said, the BMA has been very clear that doctors should use their professional judgment. For example, if they had a patient whom they knew to be deeply religious and who had no interest whatsoever in an assisted death, it is highly unlikely that they would raise the possibility. It is up to them to use their professional judgment to accommodate the wishes of the patient. It has to be a patient-centred approach.
We have had a good debate on the amendments in this group. I do not intend to push amendment 278 to a vote, and I have nothing further to add to my previous remarks. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 8, in clause 4, page 2, line 16, leave out from “practitioner” to end of line 20 and insert
“shall raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person who has not indicated to that or another registered medical practitioner that they wish to seek assistance to end their own life”.—(Daniel Francis.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I just want to let the hon. Gentleman and the Committee know that I met my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet last night, and I am delighted to support her amendment 108.
I am very pleased to hear that. That is very encouraging news, because I have been concerned that the hon. Lady was resting her case on amendments to clause 12, which would not require a palliative care specialist. I am grateful to her for intervening to inform us of that.
Nevertheless, we need to go further. The amendments in the name of the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) would require that a specialist, rather than just a GP, leads the initial assessment. The fact is that despite their enormous range of expertise, general practitioners are not qualified or confident in making prognoses of terminal illness. The written evidence from the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland cited a 2021 paper showing that over half of GPs were not consistent in how they applied their predictions to different patients. It is important that specialists in the relevant conditions should be involved in these assessments so that patients receive expert input with a lower risk of error.
It is significant that, during the Second Reading debate on 29 November, the House was unanimous in its appreciation of, and praise for, palliative care specialists. It seems strange that their expertise should not be considered essential to a terminally ill person’s consideration for an assisted death. When we look at other countries, we see that it is not an exceptional safeguard. South Australia’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021 specifies:
“Either the coordinating medical practitioner or each consulting medical practitioner must have relevant expertise and experience in the disease, illness or medical condition”—
we are not using that any more—
“expected to cause the death of the person being assessed.”
I urge the Committee to reflect on the South Australia model, which is good in this regard.
I turn to amendment 53, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, and amendment 275, in the name of the hon. Member for Sunderland Central. The Bill currently requires doctors to discuss “available” palliative care options, but that may limit what patients are told. Amendment 275 would provide that patients should be informed of “all appropriate” palliative care alternatives, even if they are not readily available in their local area. We do not want patients choosing assisted dying simply because of unequal geographic provision of palliative care making them unaware of alternatives that could improve their quality of life.
I would go even further in support of amendment 53, which hits the nail on the head. Fundamentally, we have always said that assisted dying should be available only to people who palliative care cannot help. That is what amendment 53 entails: it states that assisted dying should be available only for people for whom the relevant palliative care is actually an option and, if they decline it, that would be their choice.
Finally, I will speak to amendments 425 and 426 in my name, which express the need for a proper multidisciplinary team at the right stage of the assisted dying process. The hon. Member for Spen Valley has emphasised the importance of multidisciplinary teams, and I welcome everything she said. It is very good to get her agreement, through the amendments that she has tabled, that two doctors working alone are not enough to protect and support every patient. I welcome that recognition.
Amendments to clause 12 attempt to fill this gap by introducing the expertise of a psychiatrist and a social worker, but they do not fulfil the role of a multidisciplinary panel. Rachel Clarke, one of the witnesses who told us to consider multidisciplinary assessments, has written subsequent to the amendments being tabled: “A ‘judge plus’ panel”—there will not actually be a judge, so perhaps we should call it a “lawyer plus” panel—
“is not an MDT…the panel’s scrutiny comes only at the end of the process, not at the beginning, when a patient first asks for the intervention of assisted dying. Yet this is a moment of peak vulnerability.”
We will get on to the question of whether a judicial panel should replace a High Court judge, but I emphasise very strongly that the introduction of this process is not the equivalent of having a proper multidisciplinary team considering the application for an assisted death at the appropriate moment.
As the Association for Palliative Medicine said last week, the Bill
“does not align with the standard multi-professional team…decision-making process used across the health service.”
It said that the panel is too distant from the patient and comes too late in the process. It said that the Bill would be stronger if the initial assessments were
“carried within a multi-professional team model”.
It is at the stage we are debating here—in the initial assessments—that the MDT needs to apply. For the record, if it has not been properly noted before, I also state that when the hon. Member for Spen Valley quoted Dr Sarah Cox on the importance of multidisciplinary teams, Dr Cox was not endorsing clause 12, but explicitly arguing for earlier introduction of the multidisciplinary process.
To be clear on the multidisciplinary approach, the point that I was making in that contribution was that that happens already. We are misrepresenting what goes on in current practice with terminally ill patients if we say that there is not a multidisciplinary approach, as indeed various witnesses told us. It is important to acknowledge that.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that that is what witnesses told us, but we need to ensure that it happens in all cases; the purpose of these amendments is to ensure that good practice is universal. In the case of assisted dying, bad practice would be terrible. Of course, good doctors seek the guidance of others and do not operate in isolation, but the Bill would allow them to do so. It is important to ensure that the system lives up to the good practice that she refers to.
Committee members will be glad to hear that I am not going to rehearse the arguments about capacity and coercion, but those concerns are why it is important to have a multidisciplinary team at an early stage. The Committee has rejected all attempts to strengthen the capacity test, but it could at least allow a psychiatrist to have an earlier role in the process of checking for capacity. We heard from multiple witnesses about the importance of doing that, and that is what National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance states. As the hon. Lady said, it is good practice, so as Professor House said in his evidence to us, it would not be “a terribly radical thing” to do it.
On coercion, as the social worker Jess Carrington wrote to us:
“The only people who are comprehensively trained to recognise signs of abuse, in particular, coercive control, are social workers.”
According to research by Dr David Ross, doctors suspect less than 5% of cases of elder abuse. I will not rehearse the arguments around coercion, but I hope that the Committee will note that the only way—or the best way; it will not be foolproof—to ensure that coercion is spotted is by having a social worker at the very beginning of the process.
I think that is enough from me, Mr Efford—I am sure you agree.
I rise in support of the amendments, especially amendments 342 and 425. We have discussed various aspects of the Bill, especially capacity, coercion and medical practices, under many previous amendments. As somebody who worked as a mental health nurse for many years, and who worked as part of a multidisciplinary team, I think that amendments 342 and 425 are some of the most important.
Amendment 342 talks about the preliminary conversation with the medical practitioner with whom the patient makes contact. Do we not think that the doctor who knows most about that patient is the best person to have that preliminary discussion? They will have the most information about them. When the patient, who has gone through so much difficulty, goes to their doctor or to a GP who knows them well and says, “I would like to choose the assisted dying pathway,” would that doctor then say, “I do not want to discuss this. Somebody else will.”?
Is my hon. Friend not concerned about the concept of conscientious objection? The BMA strongly opposes amendment 342, because it does not think doctors should be obligated to have that initial conversation if they do not want to.
There are other people who support this concept, and they are the people who will be having the conversation—we have both sides of the argument. I believe that the best person to have that preliminary discussion would be the doctor who knows about that patient the most—about their circumstances, prognosis, family situation and pain. We talk about compassionate care, but where is the compassion in here? I am not saying that another doctor would deny that—but I am talking about compassion. Someone going through the most difficult time in their life would have the confidence to talk to the person who knows the most about them, which is why I fully support that the initial discussion should happen with them. I am not saying that they should say yes or no, but they should be talking about the care provisions and options available to the patient. Amendment 342 is one of the most important amendments we will debate.
I will move on to amendment 425. When I tabled amendment 1, my thinking was that a psychiatrist should be involved in these discussions, but I think amendment 425 will safeguard most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sittings. Amendment 425 talks about a “multidisciplinary team” and having a psychiatrist involved as well. Written evidence was sent to us on 29 January by the Royal College of General Practitioners, which recommended that a separate pathway that
“covered every stage of the process would ensure healthcare professionals of multiple disciplines…who wanted to do so could still opt in to provide assisted dying, but this would be arranged through a different pathway.”
The hon. Member for Sunderland Central spoke earlier about how patients may be going through many multidisciplinary teams already, but it could be that none of those multidisciplinary teams have talked with them about assisted dying. They could have been pharmacists or nurses talking about the patient’s care—not assisted dying. We are talking about setting up a multidisciplinary team with a mental health nurse, doctor and social worker who can look in detail at evidence of the patient’s capacity, whether they are choosing it because they feel they are a burden, and whether there is any coercion. I think that is a safeguard for most of the concerns we have discussed in previous sessions. I would love to see a psychiatrist involved, because psychiatrists deal with some of the most challenging patients, including those with suicidal thoughts, on a day-to-day basis. They are the most experienced people to carry out a capacity assessment and, if they are a part of the multidisciplinary team, it will safeguard the Bill.
I strongly support amendment 425 and I urge Members to consider it. It will reassure many people who are concerned about some of the discussions. I know it also talks about giving power to the Secretary of State to formalise who should be part of the multidisciplinary team, which would be a discussion for later. I thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment.
(4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Dowd.
When we broke at 11.25 am, I was talking about amendment 108. Clause 4(4) sets out that a registered medical practitioner who conducts the preliminary discussion on assisted dying must, as part of that discussion, explain and discuss
“the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”
Amendment 108 would supplement that with a requirement for the registered medical practitioner also to offer to refer the person to a specialist in palliative, hospice or other such care for the purpose of further discussion.
The amendment would add an additional level of specificity to the preliminary discussion on palliative, hospice or other care, but would not in itself place a duty on the registered medical practitioner to make such a referral, or on the person to accept it. In considering whether the amendment is required, the Committee may wish to note that the General Medical Council’s good medical practice already requires doctors, when providing clinical care, to refer a patient to another suitably qualified practitioner when this serves their needs.
As the Committee is aware, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on several amendments to ensure that the Bill is legally and operationally workable and reflects her policy objectives. Amendments 183 and 424 are two such amendments.
The purpose of amendment 183 is to emphasise, not change, the existing provisions in the Bill that provide that the preliminary discussion held with the person by a registered medical practitioner must not discuss assisted dying in isolation. Rather, the discussion must reference the matters contained in clause 4(4), including
(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”
Amendment 424 seeks to clarify the meaning of “preliminary discussion” in clause 40, to align that with the description of the discussions in subsections (3) and (4) of clause 4. It is a drafting change. As per subsections (3) and (4), a preliminary discussion takes place between a person seeking the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill and a medical practitioner, about the requirements that need to be met for such assistance to be provided. The preliminary discussion must include
“the person’s diagnosis and prognosis…any treatment available and the likely effect of it…any available palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.”
Amendment 425 would introduce a requirement that a person seeking assistance under the Bill is referred to a multidisciplinary team to consider support and care for the person. The Secretary of State may provide regulations to determine what kind of professionals should make up such a team, but the amendment would require that at a minimum each team should include a medical practitioner or nurse, a social worker and a psychiatrist. The obligation to refer to the multidisciplinary team would apply each and every time
“a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act”,
so there could be multiple referrals. Finally, I note that the amendment might have wider resource implications, including for social workers.
Together, amendments 53 and 54 propose changes to clause 7—rather than clause 4, which we have been considering so far today—the effect of which would be that in carrying out the first doctor’s assessment, the co-ordinating doctor must, in addition to the other requirements, be satisfied that the person has relevant and available palliative care options. As such, the amendments would mean that people are eligible for assistance to voluntarily end their own lives only when they have relevant and available palliative care options. The amendments would create an additional criterion, which may reduce the number of people able to receive an assisted death, linked to the availability of palliative care services to any given individual.
Amendment 426 would prevent the co-ordinating doctor from finalising the first assessment process until they had received confirmation from a multidisciplinary team—as set out in amendment 425—that the person seeking assistance to end their own life had met with the multidisciplinary team. The Committee may wish to note that under the amendment there would be no requirement on the multidisciplinary team to provide that confirmation in a given timeframe. That might lead to delays in the co-ordinating doctor being able to make their statement and onward referral.
Amendment 286 would remove the requirements in paragraphs (a) to (c) of clause 9(2) and insert three new requirements. The three new conditions require the assessing doctor, for both the first and second assessment, to consult specialists in relation to the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatments available and the likely effect of those treatments, and any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support.
The Committee may wish to note that, as drafted, amendment 286 might have some unintended consequences. That is because by replacing clause 9(2)(a), (b) and (c), it would remove the words
“explain to and discuss with the person being assessed”
at clause 9(2)(b). Consequently, the amendment would remove the requirement for the assessing doctor to have a discussion with the person about the factors currently set out in clause 9(2)(b). The assessing doctors would also not be required to examine the person and their medical records, and to make other inquiries as they consider appropriate.
The amendment could also lead to a significant loss of essential discussion between the assessing doctors and the person seeking assisted dying. The removal of clause 9(2)(b) would eliminate the requirement to explain and discuss the diagnosis and prognosis, treatment options and palliative care. Additionally, the amendment would remove the requirement to discuss the person’s wishes in the event of complications arising in connection with the self-administration of an approved substance, which may be seen as important for fully informed decision making.
I thank the Committee for its attention.
I will try to keep my comments as brief as possible because we have had another very thorough discussion. First, my amendment 424 is, as the Minister said, a simple drafting change in clause 40 that confirms that “preliminary discussion” means a discussion as per clause 4(3).
Amendment 275 from my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central would, in many circumstances, broaden the scope of the conversation that the doctor would have with the patient, and I am happy to support it.
I am also happy to support the very sensible amendment 108 from my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington). It is perfectly acceptable to ask the doctor to offer to refer the patient to a specialist, as they would probably do in most cases anyway, but the amendment is for clarity.
I refer colleagues to the comprehensive comments on my amendment 183 earlier in proceedings, and also to the support of the British Medical Association. Following Second Reading, I listened carefully to Members’ concerns about the possibility of doctors only discussing assisted dying with patients. Even though the Bill states that that cannot be the case, for the avoidance of any doubt the amendment emphasises that the initial discussion mentioned in clause 4(3) may not be conducted without also explaining and discussing the matters mentioned in subsection (4). Accordingly, such a preliminary discussion may not be conducted in isolation from an explanation of and discussion about the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) of that subsection—that is, doctors cannot discuss the option of assisted dying in isolation but only in conjunction with discussion about all other available and appropriate treatment.
Indeed, Andrew Green of the BMA told us that
“some patients find it very difficult to bring up sensitive subjects with their doctors, even when those are the most important thing on their mind.”
He asked us to
“please do not pass legislation that makes it harder for doctors to understand their patients.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 42, Q24.]
That concludes my remarks.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 270, in clause 4, page 2, line 25, at end insert—
“(3A) Before conducting a preliminary discussion under subsection (2) the registered medical practitioner must ensure that the person has no remediable suicide risk factors which pose a significant risk to their life.”—(Danny Kruger.)
This amendment requires that the doctor ensures that there are no remediable suicide risk factors before proceeding to the initial discussion about assisted dying.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I am happy to have that discussion, to better understand how it might all work in practice.
If amendment 415 is agreed to, it will mean that an assessing doctor making an assessment under subsection (2) must first ensure the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers, including the use of interpreters. As with amendment 414, the Committee may want to note the existing standards that all medical practitioners must uphold, which include requirements for the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers.
Amendments 416 and 417 would amend clause 30, which states that the Secretary of State may issue codes of practice on a number of matters, including on arrangements for ensuring effective communication and the use of interpreters. The amendments would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to issue one or more codes of practice in connection with arrangements for ensuring effective communication, including the use of interpreters, and to do so within six months of the passing of the Act. The requirement to issue any such code of practice within six months may prove unworkable. Under clause 30, it would be necessary to consult on the code of practice, make regulations to allow for the code of practice to come into force, have the regulations approved by both Houses of Parliament and then issue the code of practice, all within a six-month period after the passing of the Act.
As I have said, the Government will continue to remain neutral on whether or how the law in this area should change. As I have made clear, that is a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to members of the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled to it.
On amendment 413, from the right hon. Member from Plaid Cymru—with apologies, I will not embarrass myself by trying to pronounce the wonderful name of her constituency—I am very sensitive to issues around devolution. We have had many conversations about it, which I am very happy to continue. The Minister has confirmed, as I understand it, the issue around the Welsh language, in that it would be covered by the Welsh language legislation, which states that individuals in Wales
“should be able to live their lives through the medium of the Welsh language if they choose to do so.”
I am very supportive of that. I am also happy to continue those conversations, where necessary, with the Minister.
I turn to amendments 414 and 415. I think several Members of the Committee have had the same message from my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, who was clearly struggling to get here on time. I, too, would be happy to move them in his name. They seem very sensible amendments, and I am happy to support them. Along with the GMC’s “Good medical practice”, which sets out the principles, values and standards of professional behaviour expected of doctors, it is a belt-and-braces approach to an issue that is very important, for reasons that several hon. Members have set out.
I cannot support amendments 416 and 417, however, because the timeframe that they would impose would not fit with the rest of the Bill. In reference to the two-year implementation period, that would just not be workable or possible.
I will not press amendment 413, because I anticipate further conversations on these matters.
Amendment 414 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 285, in clause 4, page 2, line 28, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—
“(a) the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, in consultation with a specialist in the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,
(b) any treatment available and the likely effect of it, in consultation with a specialist in the provision of such treatment,
(c) any palliative, hospice or other care, including symptom management and psychological support, in consultation with a specialist in palliative care.”—(Naz Shah.)
This amendment ensures that a specialist carries out the assessment of the patient, the treatment options available and the palliative care options available, since these may not be known to a doctor coordinating an assisted death.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I will speak to this group of provisions as one, given that amendments 71 to 80 are consequential on new clause 4. The purpose of these provisions is to create a new statutory body—the assisted dying agency—which has the purpose of co-ordinating requests from people to be considered for assisted dying. The provisions provide for various functions and duties of the agency, including assigning a co-ordinating doctor and an independent doctor to a person seeking assistance to end their own life.
The agency would be responsible for accepting referrals, replacing registered medical practitioners with the roles of assigned co-ordinating doctor and assigned independent doctor, and receiving and recording declarations, statements and cancellations made by co-ordinating doctors, independent doctors and those receiving assistance under the Bill.
That would be a change from the current provisions in the Bill, which place a number of those duties on the individual co-ordinating doctor and independent doctor. One effect of the proposed new clause is that a new agency would have to be established by the Government. If it passed, we would have to work to assess how that might be possible in practice.
I hope my brief remarks are helpful to Committee members in considering the Bill, the amendment and the new clause.
I have nothing to add, other than to agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire; I do not think any of us on the Committee are keen on the implementation of the assisted dying agency.
Amendment 345 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Anna Dixon); I referred earlier to her record in this area. The amendment would ensure that medical practitioners record and document preliminary discussions with a patient about assisted dying and provide the patient with that information. I welcome the amendments from the Bill’s promoter to make records of the first and second doctor’s assessments. Those safeguard patients and the process. It is important that we have transparency and clarity on such weighty decisions.
Several people raised in their written evidence the importance of good documentation. These amendments meet those concerns. I assume that not including a record of the preliminary discussion is merely an oversight by the Bill’s promoter. The amendment seeks to do what she says she wants to do—protect patients and doctors—by making records of the discussions.
In written evidence TIAB55, Professor Allan House suggested that
“It should be required as it is in all other areas of medical practice, that specific written records are kept of this assessment and of procedures followed to end life—not just the substances used. The written record to be included in the person’s medical record so that it is available to the Medical Examiner. Records also to be available at appraisal to enable assessment of the quality of the process.”
I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. Will he take note of my new clause 19, which is in this group and states that the preliminary discussion has to be recorded?
I am grateful for that intervention, which goes to the heart of my next question: why would we record and document later conversations, but not the initial one? That conversation could be one in which coercion takes place and without a record of it happening, patients and doctors are at risk. We have acknowledged that patients can be influenced by their doctors, whether consciously or unconsciously. We also noted how certain groups lack trust in the healthcare system. Dr Jamilla Hussain, in her written evidence, TIAB252, explained that the various inequalities faced by certain communities
“contribute to mistrust in health and social care services”
and that
“minority patients frequently express fear of having their lives shortened by healthcare providers, especially at the end-of-life with medication such as morphine and midazolam.”
In situations where patients are uncertain or lack trust in medical professionals, a record of the initial conversation is important to protect everyone involved. As Professor House stated, documenting the process and making records is common medical practice, so why would we differ here? We must protect patients and doctors, and making clear records at every stage of the process contributes to that.
I think it reflects the fact that, as the Committee has agreed, we are in uncharted territory on a whole range of issues here. I think it is best to think through the implications of every amendment. If it passes, every clause of the Bill will have to be assessed for its potential impact. I have other questions about amendment 297 in my notes. Does it intend to capture only the consultations between the co-ordinating doctor and the patient, or does it intend also to capture conversations with relevant persons other than the person seeking an assisted death? That is not clear from the amendment. What I am saying is that it poses more questions than it answers.
I might be wrong, but my understanding is that a patient could ask for access to their medical records at any point. On the basis that new clause 19 requires the doctor to record a preliminary discussion, presumably, if a patient wanted to see that record, they would be able to.
I agree with my hon. Friend on that point. As I stated at the start of my comments, officials have worked with her on new clause 19, which I think goes a long way to clearing up many of the points that have been raised, including hers.
The Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The Government’s view is that if the Committee accepts it, then that new clause will provide the level of robustness and resilience that the system requires. The Government are not convinced that, on its own, the amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West is talking about would provide the level of robustness and resilience we would be looking for. As things stand, the choice has been made to work with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19, and we are satisfied that that would provide us with the operational integrity we need.
Amendment 302 would require the independent doctor to provide details of the way in which the second assessment was conducted, alongside a written transcript of any consultation to the relevant chief medical officer and the person’s GP. The independent doctor would be required to maintain a copy of that record to provide to the relevant medical examiner.
As I have mentioned, in executing our duty to ensure that the Bill, if passed, is legally robust and workable, the Government have worked with my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on new clause 19. The new clause would require a practitioner to include a record of a preliminary discussion having taken place under clause 4. The record of the preliminary discussion must be included in the person’s medical records. Where the medical practitioner is a member of the person’s GP practice, they must make such a record in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable. Where the medical practitioner is not a member of the person’s GP practice, they must, as soon as practicable, provide a written record of the preliminary discussion to a medical practitioner at the person’s GP practice, who will then be required by the new clause to include it in the person’s medical records as soon as practicable.
The Committee may wish to note that amendment 424 would add a definition of “preliminary discussion” to the Bill that would make it clear what discussion medical practitioners would be required by law to record.
That concludes my remarks on this group. I thank the Committee for its attention.
I rise to speak briefly to my new clause 19, which refers to the recording of the preliminary discussion. It would require the practitioner to include in the medical records of the person in question a record of a preliminary discussion under clause 4. The initial discussion with the patient is very important and, as such, should be recorded in their records. I hope that colleagues agree and will support the new clause.
I thank the hon. Member for those important points. I reassure her, and possibly other Committee members, that I am minded to support amendment 341.
Amendment 412 would remove the duty in clause 4(5) on a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to, upon request, refer the person to another practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct that discussion. Guidance for medical professionals requires that, where a practitioner objects to performing a procedure, they must refer the patient to a practitioner who can meet their needs.
Amendment 341 removes the duty on a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to, upon request, refer the person to another registered medical practitioner whom they believe is willing and able to conduct that discussion. The amendment requires the registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion with the person to instead ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.
New clause 13 would introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to create, via regulations, an independent information and referral service for individuals who are, or may be, eligible under the Bill for assisted dying services. The accompanying amendment 338 would require a registered medical practitioner who is unwilling or unable to conduct the preliminary discussion to direct the person, upon that person’s request, to another registered medical practitioner or to the information and referral service, as set out in the new clause. The effect of this amendment is to remove the obligation in clause 4(5) for the registered medical practitioner to refer the person to another registered medical practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct the initial discussion. This amendment would make it more likely for a person seeking assistance to be referred to someone who is unwilling or unable to help. In addition, these amendments could carry an operational impact, as the new service would need to be designed and brought into existence.
Amendment 287 would mean that, if the first practitioner is unable or unwilling to conduct the preliminary discussion, they must, upon request, refer the person to a registered medical practitioner who is qualified to undertake the preliminary discussion. They must also set out palliative medicine options to provide the patient with appropriate end-of-life care, including referring the person to a palliative medicine expert. This amendment removes the duty in clause 4(5) to refer to a practitioner whom the first practitioner believes is willing and able to conduct the preliminary discussion.
As with previous amendments, this language could make it more likely for a person seeking assistance to be referred to someone who is unwilling or unable to help. It is not clear what
“qualified to undertake such a preliminary discussion”
is intended to mean. In addition, the term “palliative care expert” is not a defined term. Palliative medicine is a designated speciality of the General Medical Council and a doctor can apply to be entered on to the GMC specialist register for this speciality, provided they have the specialist medical qualification, training or experience. I hope these observations are helpful, and I thank the Committee for its attention.
I rise to speak to amendments 341, 338 and 412 together, and I welcome the debate on these important amendments. Choice is one of the key tenets of the Bill, primarily—but not exclusively—for terminally ill adults with a limited time to live. Choice is also very important for medical practitioners, and I am very respectful of, and acknowledge the importance of, conscientious objection for doctors. When it comes to assisted dying, I believe that they should also have choice. Indeed, the Bill is written so that they can choose not to participate in the process for any reason. That is the BMA’s view, and I agree with it.
The BMA has a position of neutrality on assisted dying, and there are a range of views within medical professions, as there are within all groups of people. That is why I have adopted its position of an opt-in model for the purposes of the Bill. Nevertheless, the process must remain patient focused at all times, and that means enabling them to have a discussion on such an important matter. It would not be right to rely on online advice or even the best-designed written materials. As we have already established, doctors are used to having sensitive and compassionate discussions with people who are terminally ill, and there can be no substitute for that. While a doctor may not wish to participate themselves, and I fully respect that, they still have a responsibility towards their patients, and that should include ensuring that they can speak to a properly qualified medical practitioner at such a difficult time.
I understand that the BMA and others would not be comfortable with the word “refer”, which I understand to have a special meaning within medical practice. The GMC guidelines use different language. They talk about where a doctor has a conscientious objection, in which case they are advised that they must make sure that arrangements are made for another suitably qualified colleague to take over their role. The BMA’s guidance says that patients must be able to see another doctor, as appropriate, and that it need not always be a formal procedure. It is not, however, sufficient to simply tell the patient to seek a view elsewhere—I agree completely.
The BMA supports amendment 341, which says that a doctor
“must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”
I am therefore happy to support the amendment today and, if it were to need further adjustment, I am very happy to consider alternatives based on existing best practice. I would be very happy to meet with the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, who is herself a doctor, to discuss her thoughts and draw on her considerable medical experience.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 341, in clause 4, page 2, line 33, leave out from “subsection (3)” to the end of line 36 and insert
“is not required to refer the person to another medical practitioner but must ensure that the person is directed to where they can obtain information and have the preliminary discussion.”—(Rebecca Paul.)
This amendment would provide that a registered medical practitioner who is unable or unwilling to have the preliminary discussion with a person must provide information to the person about where they can have that discussion, but that this need not take the form of a referral.
As amendments 125 and 126 are consequential on new clause 7, I shall speak to them as a whole and not in turn. The purpose of the amendments appears to be twofold. First, they seek to restrict the role of medical practitioners who can hold an initial discussion to those who have completed training. That training would be specified by the Secretary of State in regulations and would make them eligible to be listed on the register of assisted dying medical practitioners.
Secondly, the amendments seek to apply the same principle to the co-ordinating or independent doctor. In addition, they would place a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations that would create the register to sit outside or alongside the current system of registration of medical practitioners and set out the training requirements to be eligible to be listed on the register.
Both sets of regulations are to be subject to the affirmative procedure, and the Secretary of State must consult such persons as they consider appropriate before making them. The regulations making provision for the relevant training requirements must be laid within six months of the passing of this Act. The regulations establishing the register must be laid within 12 months of the passing of the Act.
Although the purpose of the amendments is clear, our assessment suggests that the drafting would not achieve the desired effect, because the register would include only those doctors who have not undertaken the specified training or who have opted out of the assisted dying service. Additionally, the suggested timeframe for laying regulations is unworkable, given the need to work with regulators and the proposed duty to consult. There are also significant operability concerns regarding the creation of a new register for a subset of registered medical practitioners.
I hope that the Committee has found those observations helpful. I thank Members for their attention.
For clarity, amendment 125 is not being pressed to a Division, as I understand it. If the hon. Member for Broxtowe withdraws amendment 125, there will be an opportunity to vote on amendment 126 and new clause 7 later.
I have made it clear throughout the debate that I am not offering a Government view on the merits of amendments. My remarks are focused much more on the legal and practical impacts of amendments, to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.
The amendments were tabled by the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire. They would create a further eligibility requirement of the person seeking assistance under the Bill. Amendment 271 and 272 would limit those eligible to seek assistance to end their own life, in circumstances where their terminal diagnosis was received less than six months prior to the date on which the person signs the first declaration, to those who have received a psychosocial intervention. This would be subject to any exceptions provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations. Amendment 271 does not define what is meant by “received a psychosocial intervention” in relation to their diagnosis.
The term “intervention” is usually employed in the health service to mean the provision of support or treatment. This is different from, for example, an assessment that a clinician might undertake to assess whether an intervention may be required. While there is not a standard definition of psychosocial intervention, we understand it to mean psychosocial interventions such as cognitive behavioural therapy. The amendment could create uncertainty as to what type of treatment a person will need to undergo to satisfy the requirement. If a person who would otherwise seek assistance to end their own life under the Bill is unable to, or does not wish to, receive a psychosocial intervention, unless an exemption applies, they may need to delay starting the assisted dying process until at least six months has elapsed from their terminal diagnosis. That could be challenging in circumstances where the terminal diagnosis has a prognosis of six months or less.
The amendment would also introduce a requirement for people in certain contexts to undergo an intervention that could undermine a person’s autonomy in making their own treatment decisions. Were the amendment made, it would confer a regulation-making power on the Secretary of State to create exceptions to the proposed provisions on psychosocial intervention. Regulations made using this power would be subject to the affirmative procedure. It would also give the Secretary of State the power to issue a code of practice in connection with the form of the psychosocial intervention required.
If the Committee decides to accept the amendment, further consideration would be needed on Report to ensure that it is operationally deliverable, and my earlier comments about the definition of psychosocial intervention and other comments would have to be clarified. The Government would, of course, stand ready to assist were the amendment to pass.
As I said earlier, the Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed—as I have made clear, that is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations have been helpful, and thank the Committee for its attention.
I have nothing to add, other than to associate myself with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central and those of the Minister.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 5, page 3, line 7, leave out “Schedule 1” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a first declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 1).
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 289, in clause 5, page 3, line 11, leave out “another person” and insert “another registered clinician”.
This amendment ensures that the second witness is a registered clinician.
Amendment 418, in clause 5, page 3, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (2)(a) must provide that the first declaration contains—
(a) the following information—
(i) the person’s full name and address;
(ii) the person’s NHS number;
(iii) contact details for the person’s GP practice;
(b) the following further declarations by the person—
(i) a declaration that they meet the initial conditions for eligibility (see subsection (2B));
(ii) a declaration that they have had a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner, that they were aged 18 or over when they had that discussion, and that they understand the information referred to in section 4(4)(a) to (c) that was provided during that discussion;
section 4(4)(a)
(iii) a declaration that they are content to be assessed, for the purposes of this Act, by medical practitioners;
(iv) a declaration that they are making the first declaration voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it;
(v) a declaration that they understand that they may cancel the first declaration at any time.
(2B) In subsection (2A)(b)(i) ‘the initial conditions for eligibility’ are that the person making the declaration—
(a) is aged 18 or over,
(b) is ordinarily resident in England and Wales and has been so resident for at least 12 months, and
(c) is registered with a general medical practice in England or Wales.”
This amendment makes provision about the content of regulations under subsection (2)(a), which will set out the form of the first declaration.
Amendment 277, in clause 5, page 3, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) A person may not make a first declaration under subsection (1) until 28 days have elapsed, beginning with the day they received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.”
This amendment would mean a person could not make the first declaration until 28 days from the day they received a diagnosis of the terminal illness.
Amendment 420, in clause 7, page 4, line 16, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) After carrying out the first assessment, the coordinating doctor must—
(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (4));
(b) give a copy of the report to—
(i) the person who was assessed (‘the assessed person’),
(ii) if the coordinating doctor is not a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and
(iii) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(c) if satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (g), refer the assessed person to another registered medical practitioner who meets the requirements of section 8(6) and is able and willing to carry out the second assessment (‘the independent doctor’).
(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.
(5) The regulations must provide that the report must—
(a) contain a statement indicating whether the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (g);
(b) contain an explanation of why the coordinating doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;
(c) contain a statement indicating whether the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to the following—
(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;
(ii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;
(iii) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;
(d) be signed and dated by the coordinating doctor.”
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to make a report about the first assessment, and (if satisfied of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)) to refer the person to another practitioner for the second assessment.
Amendment 195, in clause 8, page 4, line 40, leave out “statement” and insert “report”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 420.
Amendment 209, in clause 16, page 11, line 8, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—
“(b) a report about the first assessment of a person is made under section 7;
(c) a report about the second assessment of a person is made under section 8;”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendments 420 and 421.
Amendment 220, in clause 34, page 20, line 36, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) a report about the first assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the coordinating doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 7(2)(a) to (g);
(b) a report about the second assessment of a person does not contain a statement indicating that the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e);”
Amendment 421, in clause 8, page 5, line 4, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) After carrying out the second assessment, the independent doctor must—
(a) make a report about the assessment (which must meet the requirements of regulations under subsection (5A)), and
(b) give a copy of the report to—
(i) the person who was assessed,
(ii) the coordinating doctor,
(iii) if neither the independent doctor nor the coordinating doctor is a practitioner with the person’s GP practice, a registered medical practitioner with that practice, and
(iv) any other person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about the content and form of the report.
(5B) The regulations must provide that the report must—
(a) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in subsection (2)(a) to (e);
(b) contain an explanation of why the independent doctor is, or (as the case may be) is not, so satisfied;
(c) contain a statement indicating whether the independent doctor is satisfied as to the following—
(i) that a record of the preliminary discussion has been included in the person’s medical records;
(ii) that the person signed the first declaration;
(iii) that the making of the first declaration has been recorded in the person’s medical records;
(iv) that the first declaration has not been cancelled;
(d) be signed and dated by the independent doctor.”
This amendment provides that the independent doctor must make a report about the second assessment, and makes provision about the report.
Amendment 203, in clause 10, page 6, line 42, at end insert—
“(A1) This section applies where the independent doctor has—
(a) carried out the second assessment, and
(b) made a report stating that they are not satisfied as to all of the matters mentioned in section 8(2)(a) to (e).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 421.
Amendment 204, in clause 10, page 6, line 43, leave out from beginning to second “the” in line 44.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 203.
Amendment 329, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes the reference to Schedule 4 from the clause and is linked to Amendment 330.
Amendment 207, in clause 13, page 9, line 20, leave out “Schedule 4” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 4).
Amendment 330, in clause 13, page 9, line 26, at end insert—
“(3A) A second declaration must include the following information—
(a) the name and address of the person;
(b) the NHS number of the person;
(c) the contact details for the general medical practice at which the person is registered;
(d) a declaration by the person that they have made a first declaration under this Act;
(e) a declaration by the person that the assessing doctors have made the appropriate declarations under this Act together with the dates of those declarations;
(f) the details of the declaration made by the High Court or Court of Appeal;
(g) a declaration by the person they are eligible to end their life under this Act;
(h) a declaration by the person that they wish to be provided with assistance to end their own life under this Act;
(i) a declaration by the person that they understand that they must make this second declaration under the Act and that they do so voluntarily and have not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it.
(j) a declaration that they understand that they can cancel their declaration at any time.
(k) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(3B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”
This amendment sets out the requirements for the second declaration by the person and is linked to Amendment 329.
Amendment 331, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment removes the reference to Schedule 5 from the Bill.
Amendment 208, in clause 13, page 9, line 38, leave out “Schedule 5” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a statement by the coordinating doctor following the making of the second declaration is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 5).
Amendment 332, in clause 13, page 9, line 41, at end insert—
“(6A) A statement made under subsection (6) must include the following information—
(a) a declaration by the coordinating doctor that the person is terminally ill within the meaning of this Act and the nature of the relevant illness, disease or medical condition,
(b) details of any relevant declaration made by the High Court or Court of Appeal;
(c) a declaration that the coordinating doctor is of the opinion that the person’s death is either likely or unlikely to occur before the end of the period of one month beginning with the day on which the declaration was made by the High Court or Court of Appeal under this Act;
(d) a declaration that the coordinating doctor is satisfied that the requirements of this Act regarding any period of reflection has been met;
(e) a declaration that the person requesting assistance under the Act has the capacity to do so, and that they have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life;
(f) a declaration that neither the first or second declarations by the person have been cancelled;
(g) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(6B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”
This amendment sets out the requirements for the second statement by the coordinating doctor and is linked to Amendment 331.
Amendment 333, in clause 21, page 14, line 9, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment leaves out reference to Schedule 6 and is linked to Amendment 330.
Amendment 214, in clause 21, page 14, line 9, leave out “Schedule 6” and insert
“regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
This amendment provides that the form of a final statement is to be set out in regulations (rather than in Schedule 6).
Amendment 334, in clause 21, page 14, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) The statement mentioned in subsection (2) must include—
(a) the contact details of the coordinating doctor;
(b) the name, NHS number and medical practice of the person given assistance under the Act;
(c) a declaration that the person was provided with assistance to end their own life in accordance with this Act;
(d) the date of any declarations made by the person under this Act;
(e) the date of any statements made by assessing medical practitioners under this Act;
(f) the details of the advanced and progressive condition the person had;
(g) the approved substance provided;
(h) the date and time of death;
(i) the time between use of the approved substance and death;
(j) any other information or signed declarations as may be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(3B) Any regulations made under subsection (3A) are subject to the negative procedure.”
This amendment sets out the information that must be included in a final statement under this Act and is linked to Amendment 333.
Amendment 403, in schedule 1, page 25, line 25, at end insert—
“7. I have—
1. informed my family of my wish to be provided with assistance to end my life and taken their opinions into consideration
2. decided not to inform my family of my decision
3. no family to inform of my decision”.
Amendment 404, in schedule 4, page 29, line 7, at end insert—
“10. I have—
1. informed my family of my wish to be provided with assistance to end my life and taken their opinions into consideration
2. decided not to inform my family of my decision
3. no family to inform of my decision”.
I rise to support my amendments in this group, which seek to clarify the details that must be included, under regulations, in the first declaration, and the report that is consequent on that declaration. While I believe it was useful on Second Reading for MPs to be aware of the content of the form that the doctor should complete, the advice I have received—with which I agree—is that the details are more appropriately a matter for regulations. There is always a balance to be struck, but it would not be reasonable to expect the House to have to consider changes in primary legislation simply to alter the contents of a declaration, important though the details are.
The proposed changes go further in a way that I believe should greatly reassure the Committee. As we discussed this morning, they make it clear that a person must have been over the age of 18 when the first discussion under the Bill took place. They also require doctors not just to make formal declarations, but to produce reports covering the eligibility of the person to request assistance, the nature of the assessments they have made, their discussions with that person and, crucially, the person’s understanding of those discussions and of what the process entails. This will ensure that all the relevant discussions have been recorded and understood, and that an account of them has been recorded and will be available for future reference. For reporting purposes, if a person applying for assistance is found not to be eligible, that information will be recorded too. I hope the Committee will agree that further safeguards will be put in place as a result, without imposing additional stress or burdens on terminally ill patients during such a different period.
I rise to speak in support of amendment 184 and to point out that I have now withdrawn amendments 329 to 334, so we will not vote on them later. Like the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I had thought that although it was sensible at Second Reading to have schedules to the Bill that laid out the forms, they were quite limited and strict in their form, so we needed more flexibility and the opportunity for the House, by regulation, to add content to the required forms in the future. I also wanted to insert a declaration by the person that they had had an initial conversation covering all the factors in the Bill and, critically, that they understood the information that had been presented to them. Amendment 184 would do exactly that.
For Members’ reference, I tabled similar amendments that would have done the same with the other schedules. Following conversations with the hon. Member for Spen Valley, I have now withdrawn them all and amalgamated them into amendments that would do the same as those that she has tabled, along with some additional bits and pieces. Amendment 184 is relatively self-explanatory.
I want to speak against amendment 277, which would impose a time limit of 28 days between diagnosis and the first declaration of a terminal illness. In a lot of circumstances, that would be a very difficult time delay for people to face. As the hon. Member for Bradford West, who tabled the amendment, will know, there are already periods of reflection in the Bill, although it also contains provision for a compressed time limit for those who face imminent death. Particularly for those who are unfortunately diagnosed with certain diseases, adding 28 days will insert a delay at a time when people who are facing what they do not want to face—a horrible death—need as much time as they can to get through the process. For example, if we take together all the factors for people who are sadly diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, the median survival is six to 12 months.
I do not know if the hon. Lady knows this, but pancreatic cancer is a particularly unpleasant cancer, not least because it does not exhibit symptoms in its early stages—people do not know they have it until quite late in its development. Treatment for it is not well advanced, and many people diagnosed with pancreatic cancer sometimes have only weeks to live. The idea that we should make them wait 28 days before they can even start the process seems impractical and, I am sorry to say, cruel to them in many ways. It is worth remembering that this is not a six-month “bang, I go and do it.” Most people who have a terminal illness will begin the application process at six months. Once they have the ability to ask for this service, they will then wait until they decide that their life has come to its end, at the time and place of their choosing. That might be at six months, or it might be at six days. The point of the Bill is to put the power to make that decision in their hands. Although the Bill has periods of reflection—it recognises that people need to sit and think about these things—imposing an absolute 28 days on everybody, without accounting for what stage they are at in their disease and how long they have to live, is not necessarily a sensible amendment, and I will oppose it from that point of view.
I understand the objective of my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire in tabling amendments 403 and 404, which are about informing family. I would hope that those are the sorts of discussions that doctors would have—perhaps one of the doctors on the Committee can tell us. On whether we should put that on the face of the Bill, I have been persistent in trying to make sure that the conversation is not guarded. The amendments ask whether I have any family—I am not quite sure what “family” means. Does it mean my children? Maybe I do not want to tell my children. Does it mean my next of kin? I do not know. Is it distant relatives? Is it my whole family? There are problems with the definition of “family”.
While I will not support the amendment, I understand what my hon. Friend was trying to do. I would hope that those are the kinds of sensitive matters that a doctor would tease out of an individual as they look for the various items that we have put in the Bill to make sure that the person is making the decision on a sound basis as a settled view and has the capacity to do so.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI will return to that. I understand what amendment 11 seeks to do, but I think we should have a hybrid, because I do not think either amendment would completely achieve what we want. I will seek the Minister’s advice in due course. I understand the legal advice to my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on this matter, and I understand that all the amendments have been tabled in good faith, but I am concerned about the loopholes that could remain.
We heard on Second Reading that assisted dying will not be available to disabled people, but let us imagine an individual who does not consider themselves to be disabled. If they were diagnosed with cancer tomorrow, our current legislation states that they would be disabled from the point of diagnosis. They could live with that cancer and receive treatment for a considerable time, while continuing to have no other disability. When they receive a six-month prognosis, they would be eligible for assisted dying due to the same disability they have had for a very considerable time, and it would remain the only disability they have had in their entire life. I remain concerned that my hon. Friend’s amendment still talks about disability, potentially leaving that loophole.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, but the purpose of the Bill is that a person with a terminal cancer diagnosis and six months left to live would have the choice of assisted death. As we have heard, they might have seen the suffering of relatives with a similar cancer, and they might have seen what their death looked like. I understand that people might disagree, but that is the purpose of the Bill.
I hear that point but, looking at my postbag, the people who berate me for not supporting the Bill often talk about their loved ones with motor neurone disease or Parkinson’s, which I understand from oral evidence will be exempt. We need to make it clear which disabilities and conditions will be eligible, and I am not sure that the amendments before the Committee nail it down. I am concerned that the wording would lead to potential loopholes and legal challenges.
We should still be concerned about legal review of the Bill, based on indirect disability discrimination. The Equality Act says that indirect discrimination happens when a rule, a policy or even a practice that applies to everyone disadvantages people with a particular disability, compared with people who do not have that disability, where that cannot be shown to be justified as being intended to meet a legitimate objective in a fair, balanced and reasonable way.
If we accepted this amendment to allow the inclusion of cancer and some other disabilities set out in the Equality Act, I believe it would be argued in due course that other disabilities meet the criteria for assisted dying and, despite the promises made to this Committee and to the House in good faith, the loopholes would allow the criteria to be widened.
Other amendments in this group retain the reference to the Equality Act 2010, which could equally result in legal challenges down the line, for the reasons my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley outlined this morning. I am not deliberately being difficult, but I am not sure that any of the amendments would completely achieve what they seek to achieve.
I await the Minister’s view on the matter but, as things stand, I am concerned that we will take the clause back to the House without completely satisfying Members’ aims. By allowing those with cancer to seek assisted dying, there could be a loosening of the rules for other disabilities. I fear there could be manuscript amendments on this matter, but I await the Government’s view on the robustness of these amendments if they were to be accepted.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. She brings us back to the fundamental point made in the Bill, which is that it has to be “an inevitably progressive illness”. Eating disorders do not fall under that definition: that is very clear. I hope that that explanation and the observation that I have made on the other amendments are helpful to members of the Committee in their consideration.
I will keep my comments brief, because we have had a very thorough discussion today. I will first speak briefly to amendment 123, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe. Amendment 123 would change “an inevitably” progressive disease to “a typically” progressive disease. [Interruption.] Is that the next grouping? Oh, I am peaking too soon—my apologies, Mr Dowd.
I will come back to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe, but let me turn to amendments 399, 400 and 401, on the exclusion of “medical condition”, which the hon. Member for East Wiltshire submitted a few days ago, before the end of the recess. I looked at them over the weekend and was very interested to hear his reasoning for them today. This is the purpose of the Committee; I have listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman has said, and he has made some valuable points. All along, I have taken the view that this legislation must not only be the strongest anywhere in the world, but be very clear in its intentions and leave no room for ambiguity regarding who is entitled to request assistance under its provisions.
I am very comfortable with the definition of terminal illness in the Bill, but across the world—I have done lots of research into this, as I know other colleagues have—some jurisdictions use the term “medical condition” or, actually, just the term “condition”, and others do not. Many in Australia do, but in New Zealand, for example, which has a similar law to what is being proposed here, “medical conditions” do not feature, nor do they in a number of states in America.
While I do not necessarily think that it would definitely be problematic to include the term “medical condition”, I appreciate the argument that the hon. Gentleman has made. We have to be as cautious as possible to ensure that the Bill achieves its purpose but does not create a lack of clarity. That point has been very well made.
The advice that I have received from officials is that, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, “medical condition” does not have a clear legal definition and could therefore be seen as imprecise. That does worry me. The purpose of the Bill is clear—it is in the title. It is to give choice to terminally ill adults at the end of life. They must have a clear, settled and informed wish, and be expected to die within six months, in circumstances that are inevitably progressive and cannot be reversed by treatment. The hon. Gentleman has, I believe, helped to make that even clearer, and I am grateful to him for doing so.
My hon. Friend is making her points very clearly. The last words of amendment 181 are:
“Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if (disregarding this subsection) the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).”
Does that not demonstrate that the amendment does not change the test for terminal illness?
My apologies; I am speaking to amendments 399, 400 and 401. I will be happy to come back to that point at the appropriate time, but I first want to finish my comments on those amendments.
As I have said, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has done a good job this morning of improving the clarity of the issue. That shows that the Committee is doing its job and working effectively. I am therefore open to supporting those amendments.
I am delighted to hear it. I am grateful to the hon. Lady and to other hon. Members who have indicated their sympathy for the amendment. I look forward to the Division and to the Minister’s decision.
May I follow up on a point made by the hon. Member for Bradford West? I do not know whether the hon. Member for Spen Valley would like to intervene to help me understand the point. Amendment 181 would redraft clause 3(2) to make it clear that a person does not qualify as terminally ill
“only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder”.
It would add to clause 3(2) the following additional sentence:
“Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if…the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b)”.
Does the hon. Member for Spen Valley agree that that will essentially mean that the clause does nothing? It confirms the terms of eligibility set out earlier in the Bill, and confirms that a person would still be eligible to receive an assisted death if they had conditions that were a consequence of a mental disorder or a disability. If she feels like intervening on me, I would like her to help me understand what that additional sentence adds. To my mind, it negates the purpose of the clause.
I thank the hon. Member for that thoughtful intervention, and I completely concede that it is not entirely clear, and there are different sources that describe it differently, which, for a non-medical person like myself, makes it difficult. There are certain websites, including NHS England, that may reference it as “progressive”, but equally I am sure that there are other sources that do not describe it in the same way. The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough makes a really good point, and he will see that I quite often talk about things arguably being the case; I am not saying that it definitely is—I am just highlighting that there is a risk, because if people disagree on whether it is progressive, that is when we have an issue. I see this as an opportunity to tighten up any of that potential risk.
I would say the ordinary person on the street would not expect diabetes to ever fall within the definition of a terminal illness, yet there is a risk that it could do, for the reasons I have explained. That means that the drafting of clause 2 is not quite tight enough in my view.
Just before the hon. Lady moves on, we may actually have come to a very sensible position based on the other amendments we have been discussing—amendments 399 to 401. I have done a little bit of googling, and diabetes generally is referred to as a “condition”. It might be referred to in other ways as well, but maybe that would be another reason for us all to support amendments 399 to 401.
I thank the hon. Lady for that extremely good news. That would definitely be helpful and provide some reassurance.
Amendments 9 and 10 are essential to ensure that those people who are never intended to eligible for assisted dying under this Bill are kept outside of it. Amendment 9 seeks to ensure that it is not just illnesses that can be reversed by treatment, but illnesses where the progress can be controlled or substantially slowed by treatment, that are ineligible—diabetes being the classic case, which can be slowed and controlled by treatment. Amendment 10 further bolsters that by ensuring that treatments that improve prognosis are not disregarded under clause 2(1)(a).
The problem that we have with clause 2 in its current form is that it fails to distinguish between those who are truly at the end of their life and those who only become terminal if they do not access treatment. There is no requirement for a person to be receiving medical care when their prognosis is assessed, which means that many manageable but irreversible conditions—like diabetes, potentially, and chronic kidney disease—could qualify as terminal if treatment is stopped. Let us take the example of someone with type 1 diabetes, like my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Sarah Bool), who tabled these amendments. If she were to stop taking her insulin, she might meet the criteria for terminal illness under the Bill and qualify for an assisted death—I mean, I certainly hope she would not. Without treatment, type 1 diabetes could arguably be an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition that would result in death within weeks or months.
I agree very strongly with the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Penistone and Stocksbridge, and I hope that the Committee can later return to the state of palliative care in this country.
I underline that the matter of the six-month prognosis was not some minor detail on Second Reading; rather, it was a central plank of the arguments made by those who said that we should pass the Bill because its safeguards were the toughest of any assisted dying law in the world. It is less than three months since my hon. Friends spoke those words, and yet we are already discussing an amendment that would remove the six-month prognosis.
We need to be fair to the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who has said that he will not press the amendment to a Division. Indeed, it would not be something that I would support if he did do so, for the reasons that my hon. Friend has stated. I also think that we need to give him credit for ensuring that the voices of people with neurodegenerative conditions, such as MND, Parkinson’s and Huntingdon’s, are heard. They are an important part of this debate, whatever our views might be on the tightness that is needed in the Bill.
I thank my hon. Friend, and my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, for making it clear that they would not vote for the amendment. I also thank the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough for bringing forward an amendment that discusses those issues. However, whether it is withdrawn or not, it is an amendment that we are debating and talking to.
The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, who tabled the amendment, no doubt feels very strongly that the conditions of patients with neurodegenerative diseases make a case for relaxing the six-month prognosis to 12. There may well be a good case for doing so, but we can only consider the case for extending the prognosis to 12 months because of the challenges created by neurodegenerative diseases if we have first considered that extremely complex subject.
We cannot say that the Committee has studied the difficult subject of neurodegenerative diseases and how they would affect the administration of the Bill. We have not heard from witnesses on the subject, and we have not been able to ask them questions. We did solicit evidence on whether neurodegenerative diseases would affect the ability to self-administer lethal drugs, but we have not had time to study the written evidence.
I appreciate that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough is not going to press the amendment to a Division, which leaves some of what I wrote earlier obsolete. I appreciate the hon. Member’s efforts. We are sent here by our constituents to represent them to the best of our ability. I certainly try to do that, and I know my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley always tries to do that—I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough and all others are trying to do that. We vow to represent our constituents, and had the amendment gone to a Division I would not have been able to support it, simply because we cannot make those difficult decisions without being properly informed. We cannot make up our minds to change the Bill because of a complex set of diseases.
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. Actually, there is nothing in the Bill that suggests that. We can only imagine and try to empathise as much as we possibly can with any person who has been given a diagnosis of six months to live. In that six-month process, they might not wait; as my hon. Friend, who is a doctor himself, has said, this is about autonomy. They might not wait until they get to a position where there is a lot of suffering; they might not wait to see those six months out. They might decide they do not want to take that risk, when actually they might have lived another 15 years, another year or another two years. That is the point of this amendment.
My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech and it is good to have this debate. May I ask her opinion on two things? One is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud has alluded to, the research around the world shows that between 30% and 40% of people who sign up for assisted death never actually do it, because they do get better or because the treatment makes their condition manageable—or because they have a death in a different way. What are her thoughts on that? The other thing to point out is the number of people who we know, sadly, are taking their own lives because they are terminally ill at the moment. I go back to the point that I make quite regularly: no one is monitoring that—
Order. As I said before, these are interventions seeking clarification. They are not mini-speeches.
Just to clarify, my understanding is that it is between 600 and 700 people who take their own lives; it is suicide.
If we take that number, then that 30% or 40% who do not take that decision is maybe a few hundred people. However, the truth from Professor Sleeman’s evidence is that we are talking about thousands of people who are misdiagnosed every single year. She was talking about 3,516 who lived longer than expected. Yes, I recognise and value my hon. Friend’s comment that 30% or 40% of people do not take up assisted dying, but—perhaps I will talk about this when I move on to the next amendment—there is also a risk. If we go back to the Bill promoter’s intention to make the wording tighter, then surely this is a safeguard that she would support, just to ensure that we are making it as tight as we possibly can.
Actually, it was the other way around and I am happy to provide a reference to the right hon. Gentleman. Nine cases found lack of capacity, but still not in the best interest. One of the girls was 19 years old. The judge found that they lacked capacity to make decisions about their treatment. The question of whether they had the capacity to decide to end their life is completely different and not something we have asked judges to rule on before. The judge’s ruling clearly implied the capacity to refuse force-feeding even if it resulted in their death. I am happy to provide the references for that. It was against their best interest to force-feed them. Tragically, in nine of the 10 cases the judges accepted that that would inevitably lead to the deaths of those young girls.
My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has repeatedly stressed that her Bill is modelled on the Death with Dignity law in Oregon.
Order. With the greatest respect to Members, this is not a dialogue; this is a debate. This is not chit-chat. It is a very serious issue and interventions of that nature are not helpful.
On a point of order, Mr Dowd. If something is said that we know not to be correct, what should we do?
The hon. Member invites me to suggest that I think it would be possible to draw a safe safeguard. I do not. I think that one month is better than six months, because with one month we can have more accuracy and doctors are more genuinely right when they say that someone is close to death at that point, while six months is much more inaccurate and 12 months is notoriously inaccurate. If we restrict the Bill by using a time limit, that limit should be as close to death as possible in my view.
Does the hon. Member agree that if we were to reduce it to one month, there would be absolutely no way to have the robust process set out in the Bill—or, indeed, I would argue, to have any sort of robust process?
I accept that, which is why amendment 282 is probing only. It is trying to demonstrate the point. I recognise that even the expedited process is likely to take up to a month to get through, so that would be difficult. Nevertheless, if our intention is to restrict this to people who are literally in their last days, which is frequently what we hear, I think it would be appropriate to restrict the time.
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I am just talking about the amendment to reduce the time from six months to one month. I will come on to the issue of eating and drinking in a second.
As amendment 282 would reduce the time within which the person is expected to die from six months to one month, it would also limit the number of people with a terminal illness who would be eligible for assisted dying under this legislation. Furthermore, there may be very challenging workability issues in delivering a service within one month, given the other time-dependent safeguards elsewhere in the Bill.
Amendment 51 would remove the requirement for the patient to have a six-month prognosis to be defined as “terminally ill”. If agreed to, it would expand the pool of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life beyond those with a life expectancy of six months or less. In other words, it would remove the timeframe requirement of when death can be reasonably be expected.
Amendment 234 would widen eligibility to include cases of neurodegenerative diseases, illnesses or medical conditions where a person is reasonably expected to die within 12 months. Matters such as this are for the Committee, and ultimately for Parliament, to decide, but it is clear that the effect of the amendment would be to broaden the number of people eligible for lawful assistance to voluntarily end their own life under this legislation.
Amendment 10 would provide that, if treatment exists for a person’s progressive illness, disease or medical condition that alters the overall prognosis of that person’s condition, they are not terminally ill and would not be eligible for assisted dying services.
Amendment 402 would exclude a person who would not otherwise meet the definition of “terminally ill”—namely, being diagnosed with an inevitably progressive illness with six months or less to live—if that person meets that definition as a result of stopping eating or drinking. The effect of the amendment would be to prevent a person from being defined as “terminally ill” as a result of their own actions of stopping eating or drinking, or both. The Government’s analysis suggests that this may also exclude people who are terminally ill under the definitions of the Bill and who are, for various reasons, unwilling or unable to eat or drink. For example, it may include those with conditions such as oesophageal cancers, which could result in their being unable to eat or drink.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether someone who is on intravenous fluids or being fed through a feeding tube would be considered to have stopped eating or drinking under the amendment. I think that addresses the concern expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, but she is welcome to intervene again if she would like to. The amendment could therefore lead to uncertainty over the person’s eligibility for assistance under the Bill.
The Government have taken a neutral position on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. Questions around the definition of terminal illness and who should be eligible to access voluntary assisted dying under the legislation are matters for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by various Members.
Colleagues will be pleased to know that, despite my copious notes, I do not intend to speak for very long, because I believe we have had a very thorough and robust debate on these issues. The Minister makes a valuable point on amendment 402, which I do not think anyone else raised. Coincidentally, it relates to the person in the Public Gallery this morning, whose mum had a horrible form of cancer and had to have her tongue removed. She would have stopped eating or drinking, but it was not a choice; it was an inevitable result of her condition. She would have been excluded from having an assisted death, which I am sure is not the intention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West.
We have had an excellent debate and covered a lot of ground. I do not intend to add anything more on this group of amendments. I will only say that if we get a move on, we might be able to get through clause 2 before we close at 5 o’clock.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 9, in clause 2, page 1, line 24, after “reversed” insert
“or the progress controlled or substantially slowed”.—(Rebecca Paul.)
This amendment would mean that illness, disease or medical condition etc, the progress of which can be managed or controlled by treatment are not characterised as terminal illness.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Dr Fellingham: In the UK you are missing a number of the challenges that we have, such as the geographical challenges in a state as vast as Western Australia. You also have a golden opportunity to look, as you are, across every jurisdiction that already has laws in operation and cherry-pick the best bits of what is working well in those jurisdictions, and so create the very best, most robust and most patient-centred legislation you can.
The healthcare systems are broadly similar. We are both first-world, developed western countries. We are still operating in a context of resource limitation, but not resource limitation that is so prohibitive that it would make it particularly difficult to enact a law in the UK. The United Kingdom would be broadly able to follow any of the laws that exist in Australia and implement them very successfully.
Q
Dr Mewett: There is no doubt that traditionally palliative care has eschewed any idea of voluntary assisted dying, for a number of historical reasons that I have spoken about in other fora and will not go into now. But it is changing, and there is a general change in attitude, especially among the younger palliative care training doctors and young clinicians, who see this as part of patient-centred care, honouring the patient’s autonomy and choice, while still addressing deeply their concerns and suffering in pain management and so on.
That will see a change. I do understand where it has come from. When one looks at it almost forensically, it does not stack up and will continue not to stack up to have someone saying, “Well, VAD is not part of palliative care.” VAD is part of patient choice and it will be part of palliative care ongoing. That will evolve over time.
I am sorry but I did not quite catch the meaning of the question about the multidisciplinary aspect, Ms Leadbeater.
Q
Dr McLaren: This was born out of when we started as a Victorian group. We were very individual and we interpreted the law in our own ways. We complied with it as best we could, but we did not have a centralised discussion board or peer group set up at the time. We have propagated advice through the other states to ensure that there are what we call community practices, where clinicians can discuss their cases and learn from each other.
Several months after, from I think June to November, we had no interconnection with other VAD-practising doctors. In November, we had a forum set up where we are able to connect and talk about difficult cases and how we would each interpret them. As the subsequent states came online, we were approached by some of the practitioners from other states saying, “We don’t really want to reinvent that wheel, so can we join your community of practice?” Because it was set up by our state government, they were unable to join, so I saw a gap in terms of creating an organisation where we could propagate that knowledge and not all start from scratch.
It initially started as a group of voluntary assisted dying medical practitioners, and we would discuss cases across the board and ask things like, “What would you do under your legislation?” and we all learned from that. Then we were approached by pharmacists, nurses and others involved in voluntary assisted dying provision, including legislators who wanted to contribute to the custodians of the voluntary assisted dying law, who are the people who actually run the projects. That then led to the creation of Voluntary Assisted Dying Australia and New Zealand, which is a multidisciplinary group of predominantly doctors, but we do have nurses, pharmacists and legislators involved. We have had two annual conferences where we discuss issues faced by many of our practitioners. That has been a great resource for people.
We are developing standards. We feel that in our legislation there was perhaps too much about instilling what the standards are. We feel as though the appropriate-ness of such things as telehealth should be regulated via standards rather than via legislation, which it currently is in Australia. These are the types of topics we have weighed in on and created position statements for in order to protect the laws that we believe in, uphold and like to think of ourselves as responsible practitioners of.
Q
Dr Fellingham: It is important to reflect that only people who are at quite a significant point through their own specialty careers are eligible to become assisted dying practitioners in this country. For instance, I was a consultant anaesthetist and I had already been practising for more than a year. I had lived experience of caring for patients both living and dying, both anticipated and unexpectedly, over a career spanning more than 10 years, before I came to the point of assisted dying.
To become eligible to offer assisted dying, I then had to undertake training developed in a special package by the Queensland University of Technology. That training package takes about two days to complete and there is an exam at the end before someone can become eligible. The exam has a 95% pass rate.
Once someone has qualified with that training, they are offered the opportunity to give their details to the state-wide care navigator service. The vast majority of people opt to do that. Once they do that, they basically become engaged in this incredibly supportive, collaborative and nurturing multidisciplinary team within a professional organisation that, in our state, covers all the assisted dying practitioners—the doctors—but also the care navigators, the pharmacy service, the individual voluntary assisted dying programme managers and the end of life choices co-ordinators, who exist in all our hospital systems.
Because we are all consultants in our own specialties, there is not the same level of supervisory oversight as we would give to junior doctors—there are not forms that we fill in; we do not accredit one another—but we do acknowledge that we are all learning and growing in this space. These are new laws: even the oldest in Australia has only been going for five years. Every single one of us is motivated from a place of wanting to support, collaborate, grow and learn from one another, and ensure that the care we are offering to people in this challenging space is of the absolute highest quality.
We have a really robust community of practice. We meet monthly. Half those meetings are online to allow our regional practitioners to join, and half of them are face to face. They are extremely well-attended closed sessions where, especially over the time that we have developed relationships with one another, we find an incredibly supportive space to share our experiences and to learn, grow and develop from one another.
In terms of CPD, we all have to maintain our professional registration. I have both general and specialist registration with our supervisory body, which is like the General Medical Council. I complete my mandatory CPD requirements each year, as per my specialist college. On top of that, I have just redone the refresher training, which is once every three years. That is just what was mandated in our state. If someone has not done VAD practice, they have to do the whole thing again. That is only for people who have been active in this space. That training is shorter—it is about half a day—but it is really a reflection of what we are doing on a weekly basis. We are living and breathing this work, and really strongly collaborating with everybody else who does it.
I am afraid that has to bring this session to a conclusion. Dr McLaren, Dr Mewett and Dr Fellingham, thank you for giving up your evening for us. The Committee is indebted to you. Thank you very much indeed and have a good night. While we are changing over, I call the Member in charge of the Bill to move a motion.
I beg to move,
That in the list of witnesses set out in the table in the sittings resolution agreed by the Committee on 21 January 2025 and amended on 28 January 2025, leave out “Professor Jane Monckton-Smith OBE” and insert “Hourglass”.
Unfortunately, we found out in the early hours of this morning that one of our witnesses is unable to join us this afternoon.
Question put and agreed to.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Tom Shakespeare, Dr Miro Griffiths, Yogi Amin and Chelsea Roff gave evidence.
I am sorry, but we still have more Members and questions than we have time, so I am going to come down to one question per Member.
Q
“an inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment”.
It also says, for the avoidance of doubt, that this cannot be “a mental disorder” or “a disability”. I hear your concerns, and I want to support you and work with you on this. I am keen to know: what else do you want to see in the Bill that would reassure you that this is not about disabled people or people with mental disorders?
Dr Griffiths: I am conscious of time, so I will be very quick. My first point would be, why would you stick it at six months then? Why not have it at seven days, for example, as a way to take out our concerns? If you are talking about prognosis, let us go back to Chelsea’s point and the point that I made before. My condition is a neuromuscular condition. I have had meetings with clinicians where some have referred to it as a terminal illness, some have referred to it as a life-limiting condition, and others have referred to it as a progressive condition. The articulation of the ideas and the ways in which we think about conditions show the complexity of the issue. We are talking about terminal illness, and people who are terminally ill do constitute disabled people under the Equality Act, so you cannot make the distinction.
If you want to be quite proactive about it, then why not reduce the prognosis timeframe and make it as short as possible to take out the concerns about prognosis, and the concerns around whether individuals are going to live longer or could be facilitated access to alternative treatments to prolong life? I do not understand why we are fixated on a six-month prognosis because, as we have seen in other countries, as soon as you pass the legislation on six months, you will have individuals who say, “Why not seven months? Why not five months?” You will have campaigners who will say, “This does not include me and I have been campaigning for this.” There will be pressure to change and Governments will change. There is no guarantee that you can make that the eligibility criteria will be fixed.
Q
Professor Shakespeare: First of all, a terminal illness is defined as a “condition which cannot be reversed by treatment” I know that that does not mean a cure; you are not aiming at a cure—but it says, “cannot be reversed”. Surely that would not include things like HIV and diabetes because they can be reversed. They cannot be cured; they are still there, but they can be reversed with insulin, antiretrovirals or whatever.
I think, yes, terminally ill people are disabled people almost always, but that does not mean that all disabled people are terminally ill. Even if you have a disease or a condition—like Miro does or like other people do—that will probably result in your death eventually, you are not going to die tomorrow or in six months. You may die in 16 years or whatever. It is very difficult to define terminal illness, and that is why six months, I think, is used in this Bill.
Very recently, my aunt died. She was unconscious for the last month or so of having cancer and then she finally died. She would not have been able to express her will and her preference to have assisted dying, even if she wanted it. Therefore, I think six months when you can have capacity, you can anticipate, you know you are going to die but you want to have control in the manner of your death, is more useful than seven days or less, when you might be unconscious and you might not be able to express a will or preference.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberOn 29 November last year, in a debate widely described as showing Parliament at its best, this House sent the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill into Committee for scrutiny by a majority of 55. It was the clear will of this place that the Bill should be allowed to proceed, in the knowledge that Members will have further opportunities on Report and beyond to decide whether it should be enacted. For that process to continue, the resolution before us today must pass.
Those who oppose the Bill on principle—something they are absolutely entitled to do—are seeking to suggest that there is something extraordinary or improper about this process, and on that they are simply wrong. This is a standard procedure that comes before this House all the time. Without it, there can be no Bill—that, I humbly suggest, is sadly what some people intend. This is not a blank cheque, as some Members have suggested. The right time to discuss the detail of what expenditure may be required is when we know the final shape of the Bill. At that point, if Members are concerned about the expenditure required, or indeed anything else, they can of course vote as they wish.
The hon. Lady says that the right time to discuss the capacity of the judiciary and health service to deliver the Bill is presumably once it has completed its Committee stage, but should the Committee that considers the Bill have the impact assessment that allows it to scrutinise it line by line, mindful of the implications that it might have on our health service and our judiciary?
I respect the right hon. Gentleman’s question, but I would say that point is slightly out of the scope of the money resolution. However, I think it is a fair point, and I acknowledge that a lot of work is being done, as the Government said it would be, to look at the workability and operability of the Bill. I am working closely with Departments on those issues, and those conversations will continue, alongside the work of the Committee. I hope that provides him with some reassurance.
The other point is that I have never sought to stifle debate on the Bill or this really important issue; quite the contrary. I value it and I welcome it, but I do ask that it continues to be conducted in the same respectful and considered manner as on Second Reading. Where we disagree, let us do so with respect and without questioning each other’s motives or integrity.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on how she has conducted this important debate. On stifling debate, does she share my hope that there will be no vote against the money resolution, because such a vote would end debate? While there was a strong vote in support of the Bill, there were many strong arguments for amendment and there was opposition. Does she agree that that debate needs to happen as the Bill proceeds and not be stifled and ended today?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. Having done such a powerful job of debating this issue on Second Reading, it is crucial that we continue that debate in the right manner, as Parliament voted to do. It would be wrong for anything that happens today to put a stop to that debate and those discussions.
Let us not forget that the public are watching our deliberations carefully and that the issue we are discussing means a huge amount to many people. It is extremely serious and, for many, hugely emotive. We owe it to our constituents to treat it with the seriousness it deserves. I ask Members to consider carefully what it would say about us as a Parliament if such an important debate were to be curtailed as a result of procedural manoeuvring, which, sadly, is what I worry is being attempted by some colleagues today.
The money resolution is not about the pros and cons or the detail of the Bill; it will simply allow for proper scrutiny—including of any cost involved—to continue, and mean that the Bill Committee can begin its important work. I urge Members to support the resolution.
There would be added expense. Social workers are trained in understanding family dynamics, and need desperately to be involved in these situations.
I take that point on board. I had a very productive meeting with the Association of Palliative Care Social Workers yesterday, and we had a useful conversation on that issue.