Tuesday 28th November 2023
(12 months ago)
Commons ChamberCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Cleverly)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Victims of crime must have justice, and lawbreakers must face the consequences of their actions. This Criminal Justice Bill will give the police the powers they need to crack down on criminals and ensure that those who pose the biggest threat to the public are imprisoned for longer. It will give the public greater trust in the police and more confidence that the system works for them. We have always faced criminal threats, but those threats mutate and evolve, so we have to stay ahead of them by updating our technological capability and also updating our laws.
We are building on strong foundations. Compared with the year ending spring 2010, as measured by the crime survey of England and Wales, domestic burglary is down 57%, vehicle-related theft is down 39% and violent crime is down by 52%. Police-recorded homicide is down by 15% and the number of under-25 NHS admissions for assault by a sharp object is down by 26% in the year ending June 2023, compared with the year ending December 2019.
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)
I thank the Home Secretary for giving way. It is so good to see him in the Chamber now. Could he tell us what the percentage increase has been in knife crime since 2015?
James Cleverly
The right hon. Lady has made an intervention. Let me make some progress now—[Interruption.] If she had the answer, she could have just stood up and said it rather than making this rather performative intervention. I will make some progress.
We have also taken the fight to the county lines drug gangs and to antisocial behaviour. Of course, these successes are not the Government’s alone, but we have enabled and supported that success with record funding for police; record numbers of police officers in England and Wales; expanding the powers to stop and search; and expanding the powers to tackle disruptive protests. Of course, we have also cut red tape, which means that more of those police officers are out on the beat fighting crime. We are building over 20,000 more prison places and ensuring that offenders face the toughest possible punishment for their crimes.
We will never rest, and we will go further still. This Bill will support the Government’s zero-tolerance approach to crime by giving the police, the courts and the other criminal justice agencies the powers they need to make our neighbourhoods even safer still.
Illegal drugs and knife crime bring chaos and misery to individuals. They destroy families and ruin neighbourhoods. Knife crime is a scourge in many of our cities and, during my time on the London Assembly and as a Member of this House, I have seen for myself the devastation it can bring to families.
Any family can be affected by drug misuse. I send a message to so-called casual users of recreational drugs that their actions underpin a vicious trade that has a profound and negative human cost. That is why we are giving the police more powers to seize and destroy bladed articles and to drug test more suspects upon arrest.
The Bill increases the maximum penalty for selling dangerous weapons to under-18s and creates a new criminal offence of possessing a bladed article with intent to cause harm. It will enable the police to seize, retain and destroy knives held in private when officers are lawfully on private property and have reasonable grounds to suspect the item or items will likely be used in violent crime.
The police will also be able to test individuals in police detention for specified class B and class C drugs, just as they can already test for specified class A drugs. This will mean that the police can direct more suspects using illegal drugs into treatment, which will help to reduce drug use, support recovery and, of course, cut crime. Those who refuse a drug test, or who fail to attend or stay for the duration of a directed drug assessment, may be committing a further offence.
Tony Lloyd (Rochdale) (Lab)
Although drug testing makes sense, it is also important that we have drug and alcohol treatment facilities, which are still very patchy across the country. Will the Home Secretary comment on what can be done to improve that patchiness?
James Cleverly
The hon. Gentleman makes an incredibly important point. Of course, this Bill focuses on the crime and criminal justice part of the equation, but he is right that treatment is important. That is why I am very proud that this Government have invested an extra £600 million in the very thing he raises, because we realise that, as well as having robust criminal justice action, we need those treatment facilities.
A tough but humane approach to illegal drugs is the only plausible way forward. The House knows that being a victim of any kind of crime is deeply distressing. No crime should be screened out by the police solely because they perceive it to be minor. In August, the police committed to following all reasonable lines of inquiry for all crime types. That is a hugely welcome development, and it is my job to give police forces every possible support in that endeavour.
The Bill confers additional targeted powers on the police to enter premises without a warrant to seize stolen goods such as mobile phones where they have reasonable grounds to believe that there are particular items of stolen property on the premises. GPS location tracking technology, for example, could provide such grounds. This gives the police an opportunity to address a particularly prevalent crime type. The Bill also gives the police greater access to the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency’s driver records in order to identify criminals.
Public confidence in policing is, of course, vital, but it is also vital that officers have confidence in each other and that police leaders can root out those who are unfit to wear the uniform. We want to ensure that we never again see the culture of defensiveness and self-interest that, sadly, we saw in the aftermath of the terrible incident at Hillsborough and following the killing of Daniel Morgan. The Bill therefore introduces a duty of candour in policing. This follows Bishop James Jones’s report, which shone a light on the experience of the incredibly brave families of the Hillsborough victims. Those families have been through a lengthy and terrible ordeal.
Florence Eshalomi (Vauxhall) (Lab/Co-op)
I welcome the Home Secretary to his position. He rightly says that a new proposal is being brought forward on police misconduct, but he also mentions public confidence. Would the public not have more confidence in the police if any officer who failed their vetting was automatically dismissed?
James Cleverly
We are taking action to ensure that police officers, both at the start of their career and through their career, are held to appropriately high standards. On that particular issue, this is something we are taking forward. It is part, but not the totality, of what needs to be done, which is why we are outlining a number of things in the Bill.
Through the Bill, we will give chief constables the right to appeal the outcome or findings of a misconduct panel to the police appeals tribunal. Chief constables are responsible for upholding standards in their force, so it is right that they have a statutory route to challenge decisions that they consider unreasonable.
A person is not safe unless they are safe everywhere: in their home, at work, in public places and, of course, online. The Bill builds on the intimate image sharing offences in the Online Safety Act 2023 by introducing new offences addressing the taking or recording of intimate images or films without consent, as well as addressing the installing of equipment to enable the commission of the taking-or-recording offence. This means we now have a comprehensive and coherent package of offences that is effective in tackling intimate image abuse, which is a truly horrible crime that can have a lasting negative effect on victims.
Dame Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
I thank my right hon. Friend and his colleagues for their fantastic work in implementing the Law Commission’s review in this area. It really is a testament to the Government that they have done that. However, some victims of intimate image abuse face another issue, because their images are still legally online and have not been taken down by some website providers. Will my right hon. Friend encourage one of his Ministers to meet me to talk about this further, and about possibly addressing it in this Bill?
James Cleverly
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s intervention. I am more than happy to ensure that her point is discussed with the Department, so that we can see what we can do to incorporate what she hopes to achieve either in this Bill or in guidance to the internet service providers and online platforms.
The Bill also fulfils the Government’s commitment made during the passage of the Online Safety Act to broaden the offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm to cover all means, not just communications, by which serious self-harm may be encouraged or assisted. That could include, but is not limited to, direct assistance such as giving someone a blade with which to seriously harm themselves. This broader offence will give full effect to the recommendations of the Law Commission’s 2021 “Modernising Communications Offences” report.
Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)
I welcome the Home Secretary to his post. Not only is he the Home Secretary, but he is an old friend of mine, and I hope he stays longer in this post than he has in the others. Having had a tragedy close to my family of a young woman taking her own life, may I ask that we remove from social media these aids to and promotion of suicide, and things showing people how to conduct it?
James Cleverly
The hon. Gentleman makes an incredibly important point. Sadly, far too many people have, like him, experienced the implications of this kind of content online, and I take his point very seriously. We will look at both legislative and non-legislative measures to make sure that we genuinely do everything we can to remove content that encourages sometimes very vulnerable people into a dark place.
The Bill creates a new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected to the end of a relationship or the victim’s intention to end a relationship. Killing in that context is the final controlling act of an abusive partner, and its seriousness will now be recognised in law. The Bill also adds the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour to the list of offences that require automatic management of offenders under the statutory multi-agency public protection arrangements.
We recognise that antisocial behaviour does so much to blight people’s lives and undermine the pride and confidence that they rightly have in their local communities. At its worst, antisocial behaviour can drastically lower the quality of life for whole neighbourhoods. The Government’s antisocial behaviour action plan, published in March, sets out a strong approach to working with local agencies so that antisocial behaviour is treated with the seriousness and urgency it deserves. The Bill enhances that with a range of new measures, including enabling the police to make public spaces protection orders and registered social housing providers to issue premises closure notices; lowering the minimum age of a person who may be issued with a community protection notice from 16 to 10; and increasing the maximum amount of a fixed penalty notice from £100 to £500 for breaches of a public spaces protection order or community protection notice.
Every public service should be accountable to the public, and we are strengthening the accountability of community safety partnerships and improving the way in which they work with police and crime commissioners to tackle crime and antisocial behaviour. For example, PCCs will be given the power to make recommendations on the activity of community safety partnerships, which in turn will be duty-bound to consider those recommendations. That proposal follows feedback from various sources that the powers available to the police, local authorities and other agencies could be used more consistently. We need every part of the system to work together as one well-oiled machine.
Nuisance begging and rough sleeping can, of course, be a form of antisocial behaviour. The former may be very intimidating and the latter may also cause damage, disruption and harassment to the public.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
The Home Secretary will be aware of the campaign across the House to scrap the Vagrancy Act 1824, which does not come into force until all these clauses come in—so I am very pleased to see them. Looking at the detail, we see that it forms a third of the Bill—it is enormous. Does he share my concern that by replacing the Vagrancy Act with a measure of this level and strength, we are not treating homelessness with the compassion that we said we wanted, and we are creating a rod for our own back, which we just do not need?
James Cleverly
We have committed to scrapping the 1824 Act, and nobody should or will be criminalised simply for having nowhere to live. That is why we are repealing the outdated 1824 Act. However, we need to make sure that things such as nuisance begging are addressed, because the British public have told us that they feel these actions are intimidating—I am sure that Members from across the House hear that in our advice surgeries and will have had people tell them that—and it is right that we respond to their concerns. The hon. Lady makes the point, implied in her question, that people end up rough sleeping for a wide variety of reasons, including, sometimes, because they are themselves the victims of abuse or they have medical conditions, be they physical or mental. That is why last year we published our “Ending rough sleeping for good” strategy, and we have made an unprecedented £2 billion commitment over three years to accelerate the efforts to address homelessness at source.
Layla Moran
I thank the Home Secretary for giving way again; I will not test his patience too much more. However, I should point out that we have been working on this since 2018, when I started this campaign. I have met countless Ministers over the years and not once did nuisance rough sleeping come up as the issue. Nuisance begging did, and there is a debate to be had on that and I would happily have it. All I ask is: will he consider meeting me and others from both sides of the House who have taken a keen interest in this issue for a very long time so that we can put across our concerns about what is in this Bill to replace the 1824 Act? I say that because this looks like Vagrancy Act 2.0 on steroids.
James Cleverly
We have presented a Bill and the House has the opportunity to debate it. So rather than having conversations in private, the legislative process—the process of debate—is designed for Members from across the House to inject their ideas, thoughts and suggestions into the legislation. That is literally what the passage of a Bill is designed to do.
Paula Barker (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)
I wish to share my concerns, which are those the hon. Lady has mentioned. The Bill introduces a wide definition of “nuisance rough sleeping” that is incredibly concerning to me, because it will criminalise people who are rough sleeping. In practice, it will result in worse criminalisation of people sleeping rough than under the draconian Vagrancy Act. Will the Home Secretary and Government Members give any assurance and clarity about the intentions?
James Cleverly
The Bill makes it clear that any actions that will be taken will be in response to a continuing refusal to abide by the moving-on powers that the Bill provides, so I do not agree with the hon. Lady’s assessment of how this will play out in practice. However, as I say, this is the Second Reading of the Bill and there will be opportunity through its passage for ideas, thoughts, concerns and potential improvements to be put forward. I encourage her and the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran) to put forward their ideas, because we recognise that this is an important issue. We want to get it right, but we are responding to specific concerns that have been raised.
Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)
The Home Secretary is right to say that the Vagrancy Act, as it comes to its bicentenary, is ripe for renewal and change, and there is an interesting debate to be had. He is right to identify that it is a problem for many of our constituents. The other problem, which he knows I will be talking about later, is the offence of spiking. I was listening keenly to what he said and no doubt he will touch on that in a moment or two.
James Cleverly
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the need to update a number of provisions, including the Vagrancy Act 1824. I know he feels strongly about that and, through the passage of the Bill, I am more than happy to listen to his contributions about other opportunities to update and modernise legacy legislation, which has served us well but for a very, very long time, to ensure that it is relevant for the modern world, not the Victorian—or sometimes Georgian—era when the provisions were originally drafted.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
These matters raise the issue of proportionality, and I am sympathetic to the Government’s position, but does my right hon. Friend accept that a number of other areas in the Bill, most of which is very good, will need careful examination? For example, the power to enable entrance to premises without a warrant will need to be supported by the evidence base. Will my right hon. Friend also bear in mind that we need to move with some care on the practicalities of transfer to foreign prisons? Although that may be useful to have in the toolbox, when it has been used abroad the evidence is very mixed as to how long and significant a difference it can make. As the Bill progresses through the House, will he engage with the Justice Committee and others on the evidence that we have received on those issues?
James Cleverly
My long-standing hon. Friend makes a number of points. Of course we want to ensure the Bill works. When the Bill is enacted, we want to ensure it improves the lives of people who might be victims of crime and helps to avoid that victimisation, but we also want to ensure that appropriate checks and balances are in place. I feel confident that those are in place, but it is the duty of those on the Treasury Bench to ensure that all Members of the House share that confidence.
Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)
In that spirit, on the basis that this is Second Reading and there are opportunities for this otherwise good Bill to be improved, will my right hon. Friend take on board the important points about ensuring that we get right the extension of the identification principle on corporate criminal liability? We made big progress in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and the Government are now following through on their intention, but I want to ensure we get the wording absolutely right.
Secondly, I note with enthusiasm the presence in the schedule of restricted cost provisions relating to restraint orders for the proceeds of crime. We have long said that uncapped costs are a deterrent to making robust applications. Will he consider extending those principles to other areas of activity, so that we can see more applications being made without the fear of being clobbered by costs?
James Cleverly
My right hon. and learned Friend makes some important and useful points based on his extensive experience. Of course, we listen very carefully to the contributions that have been made. With the indulgence of the House, I want to make progress so that Back Bench Members have time for debate.
We need to understand that crime is a business—a big business. Serious organised criminals are relentless, adaptable and resourceful. That is why we are banning articles that are used to commit serious crime, including templates for 3D printed firearms components, pill presses, and vehicle concealment and signal jammers that are used in modern vehicle theft. In banning the supply, adaptation, manufacture and import of those articles, as well as their possession, we will target the corrupt individuals who profit from supplying those articles to those involved in serious criminality while keeping just enough distance from the offences being carried out to avoid facing the inevitable consequences of their actions.
We are also strengthening the operation of the serious crime prevention orders. It is absolutely right to make it easier for the police and other law enforcement agencies to place restrictions on offenders or suspect offenders and stop them from participating in further crime. Fraud is now the most prevalent form of crime. It costs this country billions of pounds annually and is a terrible personal violation. I have no doubt that every Member of the House will know constituents who have suffered from that type of crime.
The Criminal Justice Bill contains several new measures to tackle fraudsters and the perpetrators of other serious crimes. We are prohibiting the possession and supply of SIM farms that have no legitimate purpose. Law enforcement agencies will have extended powers to suspend domain names and IP addresses used for fraudulent purposes or other serious crimes. We are also reforming the powers used to strip convicted criminals of the proceeds of crime. A new scheme will see the Government work with the financial sector to use the money in accounts suspended on suspicion of crime to fund projects tackling economic crime.
Going beyond economic crime, we are further expanding the identification principle, so that companies can be held criminally responsible when a senior manager in that company commits a crime.
Dame Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
While fraud accounts for 40% of recorded crime at the moment, only 1% of police resources are used to deal with it. What are the Home Secretary’s thoughts on that?
James Cleverly
By the nature of this crime type, specialism in investigation is inevitable. Ultimately, the training and deployment of the resources of the police and other crime fighting agencies will naturally need to reflect that. It is not quite as simple as mapping the proportion of crime to the proportion of police officers, but implicit in the right hon. Lady’s question is the fact that we need to upskill investigators so that they can focus on those crime types. We are putting the legislative measures in place, the funding is in place, the increase in police numbers is in place and we are happy to work with PCCs and chief constables to ensure that those resources are deployed in the most effective way.
Sir Robert Neill
It may save the House hearing from me at some length later.
I welcome the measures on fraud, because they follow on from the Justice Committee’s report last year that highlighted the gaps in our ways of dealing with it. Will the Home Secretary look carefully at how we reform the identification principle? There remains a concern that the exemptions that were placed on the size of businesses in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 may have the perverse effect of allowing many fraudsters to split their businesses up into smaller units that fall below the threshold in that Act. Glencore, for example, had only 50 employees but was still one of the biggest frauds that did massive harm. Can we take the opportunity to look at that issue?
James Cleverly
Once again, my hon. Friend makes a good point. We are always willing to listen to suggestions from colleagues around the House that will strengthen the ability to close loopholes, so that sinister but clever and adaptable individuals do not find a way of navigating through the legislation, so I take his ideas on board. I do not have much of my speech left, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am sure you would encourage me to move quickly, and I beg the indulgence of the House to do so.
There has been a concerning increase in the number of serious offenders refusing to attend their sentencing. It is a further insult to the victims and the families; as we have seen, it causes a huge amount of upset. That is why we are giving judges express statutory powers to order offenders convicted of an offence punishable with a life sentence to attend their sentencing hearings. That measure will apply to all offenders convicted of any offence that carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Adult offenders who refuse to do so, without reasonable excuse, will face punishment with an additional custodial sentence of up to 24 months. The legislation will also make it clear that judges in the Crown court may direct the production of any adult offender, and that the custody officers can use reasonable force to ensure that they are produced.
James Cleverly
I am sorry, but I promised Madam Deputy Speaker that I would be winding up.
Last year, the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse published its final report. It revealed the terrible extent to which children have been betrayed over decades not only by rapists and abusers but sadly, in too many instances, by those who should have been there to protect them. We must honour the courage of those who have spoken out by doing things differently. Everything possible must be done to prevent these crimes. When they do occur, they should be met with heavy punishment. The Bill introduces a new statutory aggravating factor to capture offenders who demonstrate grooming behaviours in connection with specified sexual offences against children and young people, or whose offences have been facilitated by grooming by others.
The grooming itself need not be sexual; it may be undertaken by any offender or a third party and committed against the victim of the underlying offence or a third party. The Government will also bring forward amendments to the Bill to restrict the ability of registered sex offenders to change their names in certain circumstances. Following consideration of the responses to our consultation, which closes on 30 November, we also plan to bring forward amendments to provide for a legal duty to report child sexual abuse.
Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)
I am incredibly grateful to the Home Secretary for bringing forward legislation on sexual offenders changing their name by deed poll, but we could not find it anywhere in the Bill, so is there any reason why there is a lag?
James Cleverly
It is because we will have to bring it through as an amendment, but I can assure the hon. Lady that we are committed to making this work. [Interruption.] It is a Government amendment. [Interruption.] I disapprove of theft in all circumstances except for when someone brings forward a truly good idea.
Let me return now to the duty to report child sexual abuse. Walking by or turning a blind eye should never, and must never, be an option. The Bill enables polygraph testing to be extended to more serious sexual and terrorism-linked offences, including for convicted murderers who are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also ensures that those serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence can be tested for the whole of their licence period. The measure further applies to individuals convicted of non-terrorism offences who would have been determined by the court to have a terrorism connection if the option had been available at the time of the sentencing.
The Government have a programme to build 20,000 new prison places. It is the biggest prison building programme since the Victorian era. Prison demand is likely to increase over the medium term, as we continue to empower police forces and the courts to drive down crime and punish offenders.
In order temporarily to increase prison capacity, the Bill will introduce domestic powers to transfer prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas subject to future agreements with other countries. Norway and Belgium have successfully rented prison places from the Netherlands in the past. The Bill will also extend the remit of His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons to include any rental prison places abroad.
The Criminal Justice Bill will give the police greater powers, the public greater confidence, and the courts greater ability to punish offenders and protect the law-abiding majority, and I invite the whole House to get behind it.
Yvette Cooper
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the impact of shoplifting. If town centres do not feel safe, it is local businesses that are hit and can end up going under as a result, undermining local economies and putting off local residents who want to go shopping. Sometimes elderly residents, in particular, will simply not go into town anymore if they do not feel safe, and if they feel that laws are just not being enforced when they watch people leaving the shops with a big bag of goods stolen from the shelves and see nothing being done. It is just not good enough.
That is why my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris) rightly called for stronger measures to tackle assaults on shop workers. The Government did finally agree, as a result of his campaigning, to an aggravated sentence for assaulting shop workers, but that is not enough. The whole point is to make it simpler for the police to take action and to send a clear message from Parliament to police that this is an offence we take immensely seriously. That is why Labour will be tabling amendments that reflect the campaigns by USDAW, the Co-op, Tesco, the British Retail Consortium and small convenience stores for a new law and tougher sentences for attacks on our shop workers. Everyone should have the right to work in safety and to live free from fear.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
We do take retail theft and shoplifting very seriously and agree that more needs to be done, but may I draw the shadow Home Secretary’s attention, and that of the House, to the retail crime action plan, which the Government agreed with the National Police Chiefs’ Council just a few weeks ago? In that plan, the police commit to investigating reasonable lines of inquiry for all shoplifting cases, including running CCTV evidence through facial recognition software, attending the scene of a crime where that is necessary to gather evidence, where there has been an assault or where the offender has been detained, and using data analytics specifically to go after prolific offenders. All that is in addition to Project Pegasus, a joint project with retailers to go after serious and organised crime. I hope she will join me in welcoming the plan, which I believe will be very effective.
Yvette Cooper
I would gently say to the Minister that the fact that it is an announcement—
Yvette Cooper
It is a plan; it is not even an announcement of something that is going to happen. It is an announcement that there is a plan for the police to check CCTV when a theft has taken place. That just shows how bad things have got over the past 13 years. We welcome any work that is being done, including by the British Retail Consortium with the National Police Chiefs’ Council. However, the Government are not taking the action that they should be taking to underpin this. In particular, they are not changing the law either on assaults against shop workers or on the £200 limit, and neither are they supporting the neighbourhood police we need to do the work to deliver the plan. There are 10,000 fewer neighbourhood police and PCSOs on our streets and in our communities, and communities know that. It does not matter what the Policing Minister says or what figures he plucks from thin air: people know. They can see it. We all see it in our own towns in our own constituencies, and half the country now say they never see the police on the beat.
Yvette Cooper
I will give way, because the Policing Minister is a glutton for punishment on this one.
Chris Philp
The shadow Home Secretary is very kind to give way. I am sorry that facts and figures get in the way of her argument but, as I said at oral questions yesterday, the neighbourhood policing figures that she keeps quoting are unintentionally misleading. Local policing numbers cover neighbourhood policing, emergency response and others. Since 2015, which is the year that she cites, those numbers have gone up from 61,000 to 67,000, and overall policing numbers are at record levels, at 149,566—3,500 higher than under the last Labour Government.
Yvette Cooper
This is the problem with the Policing Minister: he just thinks that the country has never had it so good on crime and policing. As far as the country is concerned, he is incredibly out of touch. That is not what is happening in towns and cities across the country. The idea that we can just merge neighbourhood policing and response teams, which are different things, shows that he simply does not understand the importance of neighbourhood policing or what it actually does.
Neighbourhood police are the teams who are located locally. They will not just be called off for a crisis at the other end of the borough, district or force area; they are the police officers who can deal with local crimes. They are not the officers who have to deal with rising levels of mental health crisis, which we know so many of the response units have to deal with. There has been a big shift away from neighbourhood policing and into response policing because the police are being reactive, dealing with crises that this Conservative Government have totally failed to prevent for 13 years.
The Government have demolished a lot of the prevention work and teamworking between neighbourhood officers and other agencies in local areas, and as a result the other response officers are having to pick up the pieces instead. The Policing Minister’s approach just shows why the Tories are failing after 13 years. It is not the answer.
Priti Patel
That is a very nice practical example of a community coming together to commemorate and recognise that public service. We are speaking about people who give public service to our country to protect us all, while at the same time making enormous sacrifices. I had the great privilege of spending much of my time as Home Secretary with law enforcement, including police officers on the frontline, and with some of their family members, so I have heard first-hand testimony of the sacrifices made. That is particularly the case for the loved ones of officers who have died in the line of duty; it is incredibly sobering.
This Bill is important, and as it progresses I look forward to working with the Front-Bench team on the measures they are introducing. I will touch on some of the positive measures, as there are sections of the Bill that are hugely welcome. This legislation goes further in giving the public confidence in criminal justice and policing to keep our citizens and our country safe. There are provisions to address the use of 3D printers and electronic communications devices that aid vehicle theft. I think it is fair to say that we are great believers in designing crime out through the use of technology—making it harder for criminals who abuse the system to even commit the crime in the first place. The measures in the Bill should help in that preventive work.
Criminals are clever: they are constantly adapting, they are agile and they evolve their methods. As legislators, we must be prepared to make sure that we can do more to support the police to fight offenders. I welcome more details on how the Government will continue to grow their plans. The Policing Minister mentioned facial recognition, and I support that work. It is about time that we stood up to some of the legal challenges and brought in more facial recognition provisions to strengthen law enforcement.
I particularly welcome the measures in clauses 9, 10 and 18 relating to knives and bladed articles. I agree that more can be done. Online loopholes around the purchase of weapons has been a subject of discussion in the House for a long time, and I think we could do much more there. It is a fact that we are all horrified and shocked by the impact of knife crime on our streets on victims and their families. The lives of so many young people are blighted by the horrors of knife crime, and we can absolutely come together on this issue. Our hearts go out to victims of knife crime and their family members. We never, ever want to experience the grief and anguish that they endure, but we can do more. I pay tribute to the many campaigners in this space; we should stand with them to do much more.
I am pleased to see that clause 13 and schedule 2 include new provisions to strengthen the legal framework to prevent people taking, sharing and broadcasting intimate images—of course, I am referring to revenge porn. There are still loopholes, and we want to do more to close them. It is a sickening offence that blights people’s lives. Essex police investigated a very high-profile revenge porn case that led to the successful prosecution of an offender, Stephen Bear. I pay tribute to Georgia Harrison, who was on television again just yesterday, both for her bravery in speaking out so strongly and encouraging others to come forward and for the many ways in which she has championed this issue. Our laws have to be flexible and able to adapt to modern technology, so that victims are protected from the people who commit those dreadful crimes.
That brings me on to the measures in the Bill that cover the management of offenders who have a record of coercive and controlling behaviour. Clause 30 puts those offenders under the multi-agency public protection arrangements, which is very welcome. Those measures build on a strong record of supporting victims of domestic abuse and violence, and it is vital that they are put into effective practice. Having mentioned domestic abuse and violence, I want to touch on a really harrowing aspect of that issue: domestic homicides. A great deal of work has taken place in the Home Office around domestic homicide reviews. I led that work, and would like to see it strengthened so much more. We see too many loopholes, and I am afraid local authorities are not always following up on domestic homicide reviews in the way we would like them to. A lot of good practice is already out there, with some local authorities championing that work, working with multi-agency teams and law enforcement.
I also welcome the measures in clause 32 of the Bill to confiscate the proceeds of crime, and serious crime prevention orders, which are dealt with in clauses 34 and 37. Again, it is important that we constantly adapt and update our legislation, and that those measures are operationalised and implemented in an effective way. I look forward to hearing more details from the Government about those areas.
I have already touched on the great work undertaken to keep our streets safe and fight crime, particularly the work of the police, who are on the frontline. I believe that we should back the police when it comes to new technology, but also by standing by them as legislators, including in difficult times when the way in which they are policing and operationalising and their professional judgments are under scrutiny, including public scrutiny. The police are the ones who put themselves in harm’s way to protect the public, and in recent weeks, we have seen the pressures they face when it comes to policing in challenging circumstances. I pay tribute to the police—I have seen them in very difficult situations. They are skilled professionals, and the recruitment of 20,000 police officers did not come out of the ether. A great deal of detailed work took place around that recruitment, but also around retaining them—how our laws back them, and how new technology and funding enables them to do their jobs. Our police officers are a credit to our country, and we should always show them our appreciation. They are diligent and maintain the highest possible standards, as I have seen myself.
However, we have of course seen some shocking and disturbing incidents, inappropriate conduct and serious criminality involving police officers. We have debated that issue in this House many times, both during my time as Home Secretary and since I left that position. It is right that chief constables and police commissioners across the country work to improve professional standards—I have had many discussions to that effect—but it is also important that we learn the lessons when things go wrong. In particular, the measures in clause 73 relating to ethical policing and the duty of candour can build on the work that has taken place through recent reviews. Of course, inquiries are still taking place, in particular the Sarah Everard inquiry that Dame Elish is working on. It is important that we maintain those standards going forward—we have a lot of work to do.
I will now touch on some areas in the Bill where I want to see greater scrutiny to ensure that the measures in this legislation will make a difference and will go further in some quarters. One area that needs reflection is clause 19, which the Chair of the Justice Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), touched on already. That clause contains measures that would permit entry into private premises without a warrant.
I am the first to recognise the desired outcome that the Government are seeking: to support the police in tackling the issue of stolen goods by enabling them to enter and search premises and to seize items without a warrant. We all want to see those responsible for those crimes apprehended more quickly, and the goods returned to their rightful owners—that is absolutely right. Too often, victims of crime are left frustrated by the challenges involved in investigating those crimes and getting their goods back. However, as the party of law and order that believes in safeguarding the rule of law, I want to ensure that if this power is introduced, freedom and civil liberties are maintained and due process remains in place. There is the prospect that that power will be misused, leading to miscarriages of justice.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I share my right hon. Friend’s slight misgivings about that clause; it will be interesting to hear the argument that the Minister makes. Obviously, there are already circumstances in law where, if the police have reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime, they are able to enter that person’s premises in pursuit of them or the goods they have supposedly stolen. As such, I am unsure what more the clause will add; it will be interesting to see where the Government take it. I share my right hon. Friend’s nervousness about breaching a long-standing settlement with the British people about their privacy and the ability of the police to invade it.
Priti Patel
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He and I spent a great deal of time discussing policing powers and what more we could do to strengthen them in relation to all aspects of criminality. The Bill rightly includes some safeguards, but there are measures in place already. We need to understand how the proposed powers will work—how their use will be authorised, and in what circumstances. The Bill is at an early stage, and it will obviously be scrutinised in Committee, but there are questions that need to be answered. We welcome those discussions.
I will say a few words about the provisions relating to nuisance begging and rough sleeping. I have listened with interest to the comments that have already been made about this issue on both sides of the Chamber. Members will recall that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contained provisions to repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824, which is nearly 200 years old. I and my colleagues in the Government at the time worked with all Members of the House on that—it was right that the repeal took place—and we spoke about the replacement legislation as it came forward.
No one in the House would dispute that dealing with homelessness is a difficult, sensitive and highly complex issue. I worked with Government, local authorities and charities on these issues as Home Secretary, as did my former ministerial colleagues. In particular, we looked to provide resources and the right kinds of interventions to support those sleeping rough on our streets. Project ADDER was brought in to deal with a lot of the addiction issues that are associated with homelessness. That is an incredibly successful programme that works with local authorities. The Government must invest more in it and roll it out further.
I recall working on this issue with my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), who was then Policing Minister. He brought his London experience to the fore regarding problems in central London. There were some specific cases of begging and homelessness on Park Lane, and we were able to address those issues and deal with rough sleeping, which was causing a lot of problems in that community, by bringing in the police and Westminster City Council and taking some proactive measures. There are also some incredible charities doing outreach work in London and across the community, in particular those that engage with rough sleeping.
We should reflect on the fact that this issue involves some veterans with complex needs, including the challenges posed by mental health issues, as well as some individuals who need trauma-informed support. We need to invest time across different Departments and agencies to tackle this problem, rather than looking at it just in the context of a criminal justice Bill. It is right that the Government look at the legislation required to prevent rough sleeping, and it is also essential that they bring in measures from other Departments to provide the right help and support. It will be interesting to hear from Ministers about the work that will take place in this area and to hear some of their reassurances.
I would like to touch on the point my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) made about spiking. Some work on that has taken place already, and we have met victims of this horrendous crime and campaigners against it. I had the privilege of working with the police on spiking issues, and in fact with Assistant Chief Constable Maggie Blyth, who was brought in to support all the work on violence against women and girls in particular.
During my tenure as Home Secretary, we certainly introduced new restrictions on some of the drugs used for spiking, and we brought in tougher sentences. We also reviewed whether a new and specific offence was needed. One has not been brought forward, but it is subject to debate, and the Policing Minister is familiar with all this. As the Bill progresses, it will be interesting to see where the Government take this issue, particularly because it is difficult to track, as we know from policing data. We should recognise that as a House, but we want to do more to prevent further victims of spiking, and we need to come together to look at what practical measures can be put in place.
I look forward to working with Ministers. We have a very strong team, who will be very diligent when it comes to both building on previous measures and looking to strengthen the Bill to bring in proper practical measures. No one would dispute that the country wants robust action when it comes to going after offenders and punishing those who do dreadful things across our communities, leaving victims harmed. It is right that the Government bring in this Bill and it is right that we work collectively to strengthen our laws, but we do need practical measures to make sure that the legislation actually delivers for victims. We want fewer victims of crime, and we want to protect our communities and strengthen our safety.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Laura Farris)
It is a pleasure to close this important debate on the Second Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill, a Bill that puts public protection and community confidence at its core. It has a strong empirical basis, building on the detailed work undertaken by the Law Commission, by Baroness Casey into misconduct in the Metropolitan police, by Clare Wade KC into domestic homicide and coercive control, and by the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse.
It consolidates the significant progress this Government have made since 2010 and it was disappointing to hear the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the shadow Home Secretary, only rely on the statistics from police recorded crime when she knows as well as I do that the Office for National Statistics says that the correct measure is the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which provides—
Laura Farris
I will not because I have little time. That survey provides a more reliable measure of long-term trends than police recorded data.
Laura Farris
If we use the correct measure, the regrettable conclusion for the Opposition is that like-for-like crime is down by 56%.
Laura Farris
Violent crime is down from where it was in 2010 by 52%, and domestic burglaries are down by 57%. If we compare—[Interruption.] If we compare where we were in 2019 to today—
Laura Farris
Domestic abuse, a sensitive category of crime, has fallen between 2019, before the pandemic, to today by 16%. [Interruption.]
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
Order. Even the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has to understand that the Minister is not giving way.
Yvette Cooper
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Minister will know that the time is not limited. We do have time and she has named me. I do understand that she has the right not to take an intervention but she will also know that, having named me, as a courtesy to the House, she would normally do so.
Mr Deputy Speaker
That is not strictly a point of order for the Chair. The right hon. Lady understands the procedures extremely well.
Laura Farris
The hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said that this Government have failed in their duty to keep citizens safe. It is regrettable that His Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary, Andy Cooke, takes a different view. He has said:
“England and Wales are arguably safer than they have ever been.”
In the limited time I have available, I will address some of the points that came up today. I will respond in writing to those whose speeches I cannot address. Under this Bill, we are taking the fight to serious organised criminals, cutting off their capacity to churn out new firearms, mass-produce illegal drugs and perpetrate fraud with devices using multiple SIM cards. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) elegantly put it, we are designing crime out. We are cracking down on some of the most pernicious harms, which are often hidden from view. We are developing recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, and we are developing the package of measures announced by the Prime Minister in April by creating an obligation in law to treat grooming as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) on the name change measure. I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher), who introduced a ten-minute rule Bill on that issue. I will just pick up on the point about mandatory reporting, which the House will know was the subject of a principal finding and recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I hope that the hon. Member for Rotherham agrees that the measure is a good step forward.
I will briefly address two other issues. Making murder at the end of a relationship an aggravating factor, recognising that the moment of maximum danger for many victims is when they tell him finally that they are leaving, is not the only thing we are doing in that space. Yesterday, the Ministry of Justice announced a consultation on whether coercive and controlling behaviour or the use of a knife or weapon that is already on the scene should become aggravating features in any murder case. I pay tribute to Carole Gould and Julie Devey for their campaign on that.
Finally, I will address the point that was raised about whether the measures we are taking adequately answer the findings of Baroness Casey in her report into misconduct in the Metropolitan police and our handling of it. The measures in the Bill are not the only ones we are taking. We are also acting to ensure that any officer who cannot hold appropriate vetting clearance can be removed from office and that a finding of gross misconduct will automatically result in summary dismissal, and we are giving chief constables the right of appeal following a misconduct hearing if the conclusion is that one of their subordinates has not been subject to an adequate sanction.
The depth and breadth of this debate highlights the need to stay ahead of criminal ingenuity through enhanced supervision, interception and disruption, and by cutting criminals off from the tools of their trade. We are developing legal principles that find their roots in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Online Safety Act 2023. We are cracking down on crime at every level. From antisocial behaviour all the way to serious organised crime, it blights our communities and targets the most vulnerable. I therefore commend this Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Criminal Justice Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Criminal Justice Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on 30 January 2024.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No.83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
Criminal Justice Bill (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Criminal Justice Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:
(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by a Minister of the Crown, and
(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
Thursday 14th December 2023
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Alex Norris
Q
Nick Smart: The purpose of vetting is to make sure that the right people get into the organisation. There is certainly a reputational risk in having the wrong officers in the organisation; we have seen the damage it can do to trust and confidence in the police service. I believe that the measures that the College of Policing will instigate for licence and vetting units are a positive step to make sure that they adhere to a certain standard.
Having His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary review vetting units as part of its inspections is a sensible way of safeguarding and making sure that they are working effectively. As with any issue, if you want to enhance the vetting it will mean more staff, which will cost more. The current budgets are set, so if you put more people and resources into more robust vetting, which is a sensible idea, something at the other end will have to give, because there is no endless money pit for the police budget.
Yes, we welcome it and we believe that it is the right thing to do. As an observation, an officer is vetted at the time of joining, but you could have repeat vetting at some point during their service, to make sure that they still have the appropriate vetting. Also, when you get promoted to superintendent level, for example, you go to management-level vetting, which is slightly more intrusive. If you are a counter-terrorism officer, you may get some even more enhanced and developed vetting that takes more time and resources. We would welcome more robust vetting, and I think most chief constables would welcome it, but it is a question of resourcing and staffing to make sure that the process is fit for purpose.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Nick Smart: In terms of the appeals process?
Laura Farris
In terms of the two things. Do you think that that is the range of tools that they need in order to better manage?
Nick Smart: In terms of the appeals process, having a JR is really expensive and takes time. If the officer is to be dismissed, a JR prolongs the period unnecessarily. An appeals tribunal should be swifter, so if the officer is dismissed the process is more satisfactory for everybody concerned. We believe that this is an appropriate tool for chief constables.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: It plugs a gap. Previously, officers who were lawfully on premises could not seize knives that were essentially held there—we all have knives in our house—but there are examples of domestic situations in which a knife could be used to commit a heinous offence. This provision allows us to seize that knife if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal act will be committed. We would support this.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Basically, yes. There are examples of officers who have attended various incidents, perhaps with people with mental health problems, in domestic situations where knives had been lawfully bought but could be used in a criminal act, and the officers have not been able to seize them properly. Again, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a criminal act may be committed with a bladed article—a weapon—it is entirely appropriate that we have the power to seize it and stop that from happening.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: I think it is a reasonable belief rather than a suspicion. Giving that power to our officers is welcome. It comes with the caveat that there is a legitimacy angle. Officers not having to obtain warrants to enter premises presents a big trust and confidence issue for the public, and rightly so. That is where the quality of policing comes in with respect to officers’ guidance, understanding and application, and with respect to His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary making sure that those powers are used appropriately and that there is accountability.
It plugs a gap. For example, we all have an iPhone, and we all have Find My Friends on it. If somebody has lost a bit of tech and the app can pinpoint an address, that, along with other reasonable lines of inquiry, gives the officer the reasonable belief to enter the premises and recover the property. That seems appropriate.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Yes, I do. On the scale of reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief, you have to have virtually no doubt that the item is in that property before you enter it. Rather than reasonable suspicion, where you can just have a hunch, there have to be active lines of inquiry based on intelligence to justify a reasonable belief, but if it is there, it is entirely appropriate for an officer to enter and recover a member of the public’s stolen property.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: I think it gives us the flexibility and dynamism we need to address issues that occur, fight crime, deter crime and reassure the public. In my force, West Yorkshire, public spaces protection orders have been used against nuisance vehicles where individuals have been wolf-whistling at females, so they link to the violence against women and girls agenda and they have been used quite successfully. Our power to create PSPOs is entirely appropriate in the circumstances and is very welcome.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Again, it relates to the accountability for everybody’s actions. It is not just older people who commit antisocial behaviour; it is often youth-related and it is linked to families. We welcome the provision allowing social housing providers to remove nuisance tenants, but we understand that they have an obligation to rehouse them, so it is not just about moving them from one place to another and the same behaviour happening. There has to be community safety partnership work to ensure that there is the health, education and social care provision to change their behaviour. Otherwise, you are just displacing the problem from one area to another.
Stephen Metcalfe (South Basildon and East Thurrock) (Con)
Q
Nick Smart: On the powers, possession with intent is a really useful operational tool for officers. It is similar to firearms legislation, in which there is an offence of possession of firearms with intent to endanger life. Having an offence for knives with a similar intent is welcome. We have seen gangs taunting each other with knives on social media, on podcasts and things like that. Possession with intent is a welcome operational tool, used in line with intelligence and obviously monitored with the usual safeguards. Operationally it is very welcome, and if it saves lives we are all for it.
The Chair
Q
Nick Smart: If I may, there is one item—the powers of entry—which I think you alluded to. An issue that we looked at was that of immediacy. Section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows the police to search after arrest, and that requires an inspector’s authority. In certain circumstances, if the inspector is not available or there is a policing need, the constable can go in and get retrospective authority.
In the circumstances outlined in the Bill’s powers of entry, nothing in there regards that immediacy. If the officer at the time needs to go in to recover the property but cannot get hold of the inspector—for example, if the inspector is in custody dealing with a review, or they are dealing with a complaint or a critical incident, and because they need to review what is going on and then give that authority—it would be helpful to have that provision in so that the officer can seek that respective authority from the inspector as per section 18 of PACE. The precedent is there, but a provision would tackle immediacy—
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Absolutely. I think in 99% of the cases the inspector’s authority would be granted.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: There is always the potential when you go through somebody’s door without a warrant for that. I think Andy Cooke from HMIC said that mistakes will be made. However, if there is a genuine belief that you are at a property, you have somebody with a mobile phone, they have seen you and you think that they will run out the back door of the property, or try to hide or destroy that property, you must wait for the inspector to give you the authority. That gives the individual time to act and potentially lose, damage, alter or destroy that property, so that when you go through the door you do not find it for whatever reason. It is an observation; we are not saying that it should be in there, but it is a consideration. As I say, the precedent is there in section 18 of PACE, which I think certainly we, and HMIC, would say has not been abused over time.
The Chair
Thank you for your evidence. If there is anything you would like to add or that you feel you have missed when you go back on the tube, you can always write to the Clerk.
Examination of Witnesses
Councillor Sue Woolley, Emily Spurrell and David Lloyd gave evidence.
Alex Norris
Q
Emily Spurrell: From my point of view, if the system was working as it should—again, I am reflecting on my own experience in Merseyside—you should all be talking about the same things anyway. When I look at my CSPs in Merseyside, if they are not all talking about serious organised crime, something has gone wrong. They are all talking about it, because it is an issue in all their areas. There will be some really specific issues that I think CSPs need to be able to look at but, generally speaking, if they are not talking about those issues, something else has gone wrong further upstream. It could be helpful to put this in because then, as David says, there is a reminder that you need that connection. The reality is that if they are not really talking about those things, there are bigger issues at play, in terms of why those same priorities are not being picked up.
Councillor Sue Woolley: I think that if at all possible, when you have partners around a table and they are equal partners, that is a conducive way to good practice and working. I am quite sure that works really well in some places. In my own area, that works particularly well. All partners are equal around the table; everybody works together. I am quite sure that in other areas, that bond may not be as strong. Rather than just legislating for something, I would suggest that, if at all possible, there could be something around a duty to work together. You will know the language better than me.
Emily Spurrell: That actually already exists for PCCs. It is within our duty to work in partnership as well.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: We of course hold the chief constable to account in a variety of ways and in different places. Realising that there is a duty of candour is another part of the armoury, because it is something that we can push back. I know that this was very much part of the post-Hillsborough legacy. Clearly, that whole lack of candour was one of the things that went wrong. We are good at holding the chiefs to account, and it should happen locally. With this extra duty there, it is something that we will need to be reminded about—it is helpful for us to be reminded that there is a duty of candour—but we can then ask those questions as well.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: Clearly, there are people who are homeless, who are also almost aggressively begging; there are people on the streets who are aggressively begging, and are almost aggressively homeless, if that does not sound like a strange thing to say. However, I think we do need a great deal of care. I suspect that the vast majority of people who are homeless on the streets would not be seen as committing a criminal offence by any court, police officer or PCC. They require care and a way of ensuring that any drug and alcohol addiction or mental health issues are supported. It is a difficult area.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: I think there is a distinction. We have heard evidence, and I am sure that you have heard evidence, of people sleeping in doorways who cannot be moved on by the local authority and there is nothing that can be done.
I suppose my real concern within this is that, especially as budgets get tighter and tighter, the duty around homelessness may change from being a duty on the local authority to a police issue. I do not think that that would be overly helpful if it were not structured in the right way—that it is seen that the principal duty is on the local authority rather than it being a policing issue. I think that there is a real danger of getting to the point that the police need to pick this up. Clearly, policing is not going to be able to deal with anything other than the very sharp and focused bit about this moment; there is far more to it than just this moment.
Laura Farris
Councillor Woolley, given your role, do you have a view on that?
Councillor Sue Woolley: I think we have to be very careful that we do not unnecessarily criminalise rough sleeping. As you are probably aware, through their various services, councils work very closely with those people that might be rough sleeping. There is a combination of rough sleeping and begging.
If we go down the road of criminalising something, then we run the risk of not being able to support those people and the one thing that we do want to do as a society is to support those people. I would just play back that, during covid, we got those people off the street. When we got them off the street, we were able to put services in for them and work with them. I would love to see that happen again. However, we do have a cohort of those who engage in nuisance begging, and we also have a situation of organised gangs sitting behind those who are begging. It is not a black and white answer at all.
Laura Farris
Q
Emily Spurrell: I think it would be useful. We obviously already have the community trigger process in place at the minute, where if someone is dissatisfied with the response from the local authority, they can ask for a review from the PCC’s office to check whether the process was followed sufficiently. I think there are challenges around that in terms of public awareness; I do not think we are seeing huge numbers of that in some areas because much of the public are not aware that that is an option.
It comes back to what we were talking about at the beginning: it is not about the PCC trying to instruct or direct; it is about being able to have the powers to question, challenge and say, “As a partnership, are we doing enough to tackle this issue?” There will be times when actually it will be the police that need to step up in that response, but there will also be times when the local authority have not made a good enough response to that particular incident. It is about having someone who has the power to take another look and say, “Actually, I think we have missed something here. How do we put that right?” and then giving reassurance and saying, “Actually, the local authority or the partnership have done everything possible and there is no more that we can do.” It is a helpful check, and it probably is just an expansion of what we already do at the minute around the community trigger.
Laura Farris
Q
Emily Spurrell: It is a step in the right direction, yes. It is useful just to ensure that those victims of ASB are not dismissed as low level and are considered. We do see incidents where, if victims of ASB are not taken seriously at that first stage, things can escalate and become quite serious, so it is important that victims feel as though they have been heard and that everyone is working towards trying to find a solution, which is not always the case.
The Chair
Q
David Lloyd: I am broadly supportive of the Bill. I am particularly interested in suspending short custodial sentences. I think that makes a great deal of sense and I would highly recommend that. I have covered the piece on nuisance begging and rough sleeping that I was interested in. As a real victims champion and someone who has pushed hard on violence against women and girls since 2012, the aggravating factor for murder at the end of a relationship and MAPPA for controlling and coercive behaviour is something that, again, I highly commend and think that we need to do.
The other thing I picked up from the earlier session was the question around vetting. We need to just consider whether we need to, in many ways, vet to values. We are clearly doing it more and more in our recruitment process, but it strikes me that there are very few officers who have met the criminal threshold and therefore are likely to have on their file a criminal conviction. That does not mean to say that we do not have misogynists or racists or homophobes within the organisations. We have much to do around that. We need to just think about what else we might be able to do to vet to values, so that we make sure we have police forces that are fit for the public. I think that the very vast majority are fit, by the way—I am not suggesting for one moment that they are anything other than that—but we might want to look at that quite closely.
Emily Spurrell: I echo some of what David said there about some of those challenges. To go back to the begging point, which is a wider issue and I know that it is linked with what is going through to the Sentencing Bill, there is a real emphasis and a real push to try to reduce the number of short-term sentences and we want more people in the community. I worry whether some of the provisions for the Criminal Justice Bill, such as the aggressive begging provisions, will actually see an increase in that, which is not what we want, and the two will work counter to each other. I would just say to be mindful around that.
As for some of the bits that David alluded to around vetting and some of the work that is under way to try and increase trust and confidence, there is probably scope to go further. I know there is work being done. The Mayor of London has been quite keen to push some of that and I think he has been working with Harriet Harman on an additional level of scrutiny around the ability to dismiss officers who have been convicted of serious criminal offences and more flexibility around pension forfeiture, for example. There is more scope to do more around that building of trust and confidence within policing in terms of that scrutiny.
Around the vetting, there is work under way. I am aware that there is a national project to try and increase vetting. Echoing what the superintendent said in the previous session, trying to make sure that there is that regular touch base, particularly when officers are crossing forces, is really helpful.
The only other thing I will say around that is that the big challenge we face is around how long these things are taking. It would not matter so much that people were going through a process if it was resolved quickly. Instead, we see some of the examples the superintendent was referring to, where officers accused of gross misconduct sit for years waiting for an outcome and then it gets an NFA or gets downgraded. There is a real challenge here around capacity in the system, both internally in professional standards and with the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and how we can speed up those processes so that we have a robust system that is not taking up so much time and taking officers off the streets.
My only other comment would be in relation to the introduction of the express power for the courts to direct prisoners to attend their sentencing hearings. You will obviously be aware that this came up quite strongly after Olivia was murdered on Merseyside and her family have been very clear about the insult to her mum and her family when the offender did not turn up to hear the victim’s personal statement. I really welcome this, notwithstanding some of the logistical challenges, because it is a really welcome change: offenders should be expected to listen to the impact of their crimes on their victims and their families.
Councillor Sue Woolley: Very briefly, and following on from the point that Emily just made, I would just make a point about the capacity issue, particularly around child sexual abuse reporting. We must be very careful that justice needs to be seen to be swift. What has been shown with various reports on child sexual abuse is that reports have been made but it is taking too long for those individuals—those young people—to be supported when they have then been taken through a process.
Therefore, although it is laudable and the right thing to do to ensure that reports are made in a timely fashion, let us make sure that we have the capacity at the other end to be able to support those young people.
Laura Farris
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Judges have always had the discretion to order a defendant into the dock. When we used to run a court in the ’90s, there was many a time that we would have used force on a prisoner to get them in front of a judge. That discretion has always been there. It is the right way to do things—we are best suited to decide when it is appropriate and proportionate to use force.
I would like to see dialogue between the staff in the courts and the judge because, if the prisoner is being extremely violent or aggressive, I do not think sitting them in front of a judge is the right way to do things. Maybe we could do it remotely, in a secure room, so the victim still has the opportunity to read out their impact statement, rather than proceedings being disrupted—when you do things remotely, you have the ability to mute. We could still force the prisoner to address those victims, and the victims would feel as if they were getting some sort of justice.
Laura Farris
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, there have been some really high-profile cases over the past couple of months in particular. It does seem to be a trend, because there is no deterrent. If you are already getting a lengthy sentence, then really, in your eyes, as the perpetrator of the crime, you are untouchable.
As well as sentencing people for failing to appear, maybe we need to look at what we can do when they are serving their sentence. What privileges can we take off them? Can we stop them getting face-to-face visits from family and friends, or force them to do the visits remotely, as a consequence of their actions? Let’s take some privileges off them while they are serving their sentence so it really hits them hard, and so that people think that justice is actually being served—“You are not untouchable, and we are going to affect the way you serve your sentence.”
The Chair
Q
Mark Fairhurst: There is just one concern in particular with this Bill, where you are forcing serious offenders —particularly sexual offenders—to serve their entire sentence.
Laura Farris
That is in the Sentencing Bill.
Mark Fairhurst: Usually, they get released at the two-thirds point for good behaviour. If there is no incentive to behave in prison, that could have a knock-on effect on staff. Also, if you force someone to serve their entire sentence, we must remember that they are no longer subject to a licence in the community, so there is no supervision for them when they are released after serving their entire sentence. That is another consideration.
The Chair
Thank you very much for your contribution, and have a good day.
Mark Fairhurst: Thank you very much, everyone.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)
Tuesday 12th December 2023
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Alex Norris
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Yes. I would like to bust a few myths, if that is possible while giving evidence. There is a perception in the media and the community that young people are the main perpetrators of antisocial behaviour when, in fact, they are not: the vast majority of antisocial behaviour is perpetrated by adults.
In focusing on young people, we should be thinking about how they are impacted by antisocial behaviour. They are often victims. You will have seen terrible films on TikTok and social media outlets of fights, violence and aggression. That means that those young people are victims rather than perpetrators as a whole. We certainly need to recognise that if we can get in early and use the early intervention and prevention tools available to us to stop the antisocial behaviour or stop those young people becoming antisocial, we will be able to reduce antisocial behaviour as a whole.
Antisocial behaviour is often a precursor to more serious crime, so if we can use our opportunity—I call it a “golden moment”—to intervene with a young person, perhaps with an alternative trusted adult from outside the home, and work with them to understand the impact of the behaviour that they may be perpetrating, that in itself does not fall into the idea that we should be reducing the CPN to the age of 10.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Harvey Redgrave: I am in favour of this measure. I think it was used relatively effectively under the last Labour Government in relation to prolific offenders. [Interruption.] Sorry, do I need to speak a bit louder?
The Chair
Please try to speak up a bit.
Harvey Redgrave: I am in favour of the measure. It is right to test more offenders, particularly prolific offenders, many of whom are driven by addiction. The more we can divert offenders into treatment to address their offending behaviour, the better. I think there needs to be a broader look at how we deal with prolific offenders who recycle around the system sometimes tens or hundreds of times before they stop their offending. There used to be something called the prolific and other priority offenders programme, which was disbanded along with the whole infrastructure around it.
There is a need to place this drug-testing measure within a broader set of interventions that look at how we grip prolific offenders, how judges are able to defer sentencing, and how offenders are able to be rehabilitated and dealt with much earlier on rather than them serving short sentences, coming out, reoffending and going back in at great expense to the taxpayer.
Laura Farris
Q
The other question I wanted to ask is about Crest Advisory’s role in Baroness Casey’s review—again, if you were not personally involved in that, you can correct me. I think Crest Advisory played some role in supporting her review into the misconduct issues in the Met police, and there are two provisions in this Bill that at least partially respond to that. I would like to look at clause 73, which is on ethical policing and the duty of candour. In the light of your work with Baroness Casey, do you think it is important, and if so why? What does it answer in relation to her findings about failings in the Metropolitan police?
Harvey Redgrave: To clarify, some of my team at Crest Advisory were seconded in to support Baroness Casey on her review, but obviously she led the review and wrote it herself. It is really important that we look at the ethics and systems around misconduct within policing. There is a crisis of public confidence in policing at the moment, particularly among women. The Commissioner of the Met has spoken repeatedly about wanting to have more say and control over getting rid of officers when there are cases of misconduct, and I think the Government have acted on some of that.
I support the measure, but I would argue that there is a case for going even further and looking at the whole system around vetting and how that takes place within policing, and the system of who really upholds the professional standards within policing. Which body do we hold responsible—the College of Policing, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, or the Home Office? It feels to me like there is a slight lack of clarity at the moment about where the buck stops on some of this at a national level, with each force able to adopt slightly different practices.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: I think that it is helpful and is a welcome step, but I am not sure that, in isolation, it will be enough to bring about the kind of culture change that Baroness Casey believes is necessary, within not just the Met but policing as a whole.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: It comes back to the question of whether the chief constable should have more discretion over being able to hire and fire people, and to be able to get rid of people they are unhappy with. We have created systems and processes over the last 20 or 30 years that have taken some of that discretion away. It is a balance, and we need proper professional standards to be upheld by the College of Policing. In general, I think it a good thing for there to be greater discretion for chief constables to be able to act when they believe there is misconduct within their force.
Laura Farris
Q
We heard from the Crown Prosecution Service this morning, and it said that it did not think such an offence was necessary because the mechanics of an assault charge apply anyway—obviously, with actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm, if that should arise. There is also a statutory aggravating factor for assaulting a retail worker. Do you have a view on this? If you do, could you set out what it is and why?
Harvey Redgrave: Shoplifting is a real concern and we need some deterrents in the system, but I am not sure that we get those deterrents through harsher sentencing. A bigger problem is whether we are catching offenders, charging them, and convicting them. All the evidence shows that for this type of offending, it is swiftness and certainty that deter rather than severity. Not many shoplifters are thinking about aggravating factors or how long they are going to spend in prison.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: In general, the Bill probably focuses too much on sentence lengths and not enough on what is happening at the front end, around the police’s ability to catch, detain and bring offenders to justice. That is where I think the real gap is.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
Q
Rebecca, thank you for joining us this afternoon. In response to the shadow Minister, you raised questions about reducing the minimum age for community protection notices from 16 to 10, which is enclosed within clause 67 of the Bill. Do you agree that bringing 10 to 15-year-olds into the scope of CPNs provides an opportunity to halt a path into criminality that might otherwise occur? Combined with that, there is an opportunity to make other interventions to try to prevent the young person from getting into crime.
Rebecca Bryant: It is using a hammer to crack a nut. For 10 and 11-year-olds in particular who are on the cusp of causing antisocial behaviour, there are many other tools available to partners. I am not necessarily thinking about fining parents, because a lot of the young people who are involved in antisocial behaviour come from more deprived backgrounds, and breaching and fining is not going to enable change.
What we are looking for is a change of behaviour in the longer term. Yes, we are looking to prevent in the first instance, but then we look for change. Being able to engage with a young person and their parents by putting in positive mentoring and other youth interventions would surely have longer term success than a community protection notice would have. Also, there is a community protection warning before a notice; that kind of warning and discussion between a parent, a child and the authorities, which could be the housing provider, the local authority or the police, has much more impact when you are offering a positive intervention.
Chris Philp
Q
Rebecca Bryant: More extreme antisocial behaviour is often a criminal offence, so potentially there would be criminality and therefore a charge. That may be welcome in some cases, but not a blanket reduction to say that anybody from the age of 10 could have a CPN, which could then lead to breach and fine. As I say, from our members’ perspective, that seems too young.
Chris Philp
Q
Rebecca Bryant: First, our members absolutely welcome the repeal of the Vagrancy Act. It is outdated and clunky, and has not been fit for purpose for many years. The replacement powers suggested in the Bill are generally welcomed by our members. I think there is some movement around more community rehabilitation. The people we are talking about here are particularly vulnerable members of society who have been through significant trauma or who have significant mental health problems, drugs and alcohol addiction, and their behaviours and rough sleeping are due to those underlying facts. Thinking about community rehabilitation and support to change is as important as moving people on and creating the powers to do that.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Q
Harvey Redgrave: No, it needs to be attached to more resourcing.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh, can I continue the line of questioning about the warrantless power of entry where it is necessary to recover stolen goods when there is no time to get a warrant? Andy Cooke just mentioned that the inspectorate would keep a close eye on whether that power, if granted by Parliament, is being exercised properly. Could you confirm for the Committee’s benefit whether you would in due course, if this were passed, produce some authorised professional practice to make sure that police forces exercise the power in a way that is responsible?
Andy Marsh: Minister Philp, as you are aware I am strongly supportive of police officers conducting all reasonable lines of inquiry to catch criminals and keep communities safe. It caused me great frustration as a chief if ever a letter landed on my desk to say, “My bike’s on sale on eBay, my daughter’s phone is in a house and you said you couldn’t do anything”.
We have already started our plans to hardwire this new power into our guidance, our training and our standard setting to do our very best, along with working in partnership with His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to ensure that we use this power consistently in two respects. I do not want to see circumstances where the power should be used, where it is not and people could be caught and property returned; and I certainly do not want it to be used in such a way that would undermine confidence in policing. As in many things in policing, we need to get this just right. The College has a fundamental role in achieving consistency and getting it just right.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh: I do.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh: I am.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh: It should be a very significant moment in policing. The first code of ethics was put in place in 2014. I could explain to the Committee why we think we are able to improve on that, but we have to talk about why it is going to make a big difference. The College is able to put a code of practice in place which requires a chief constable to have due regard.
We wanted to make that code of practice as strong as possible around a duty of candour, but there were many other things in it—for example, a duty on a chief constable to ensure ethical behaviour in a force, through their processes, policies, reward recognition, promotion, application of the victims code, challenging unprofessional behaviour, looking after staff welfare, dealing with misconduct and vetting properly.
Even before we get to the duty of candour, which is very strong, this is the strongest lever the College of Policing can pull in order to bring about cultural change around standards in policing. We will be working with the launch of the second two parts of the code in January, which is different from the legal code. We will be working on supporting policing over a change programme to secure that cultural change, over many months—possibly years.
Chris Philp
Q
As you know, we made assaulting a public-facing worker a statutory aggravating factor for other assault offences in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. We have already created a separate offence of assaulting emergency workers. Some people now say that we should have a separate offence for assaulting a retail worker, to give it more prominence. Others say, “Well, where do you draw the line?” You could have an offence for assaulting a teacher, a local councillor—and so it might go on. What is your opinion about whether there is any use in creating that separate, stand-alone offence?
Andy Cooke: I think I am right in saying it is an offence in Scotland, but I do not know how much that has resulted in a change in offending behaviour. I have not particularly looked at that point. It is a question of where you draw the line. The key issue is not whether a new offence should be constructed for assaulting a shop worker. It is more about how well, or not, policing is dealing with assaults, full stop; and how well police officers are dealing with the offence of shoplifting and the ancillary offences that sometimes go with that. I am aware that the National Police Chiefs’ Council is doing an awful lot of work around this at the moment, working with the PCC for Sussex and yourself, Minister.
Certainly, there has been a large reduction in the number of positive outcomes or detections for shoplifting over the last five or six years. That is not acceptable. It is in line with an awful lot of the other core charge and outcome rates that we have seen across policing. This is more about ensuring that the police across England and Wales treat this more seriously, particularly where there are aggravated offences alongside, such as assault. That is what Chief Constable Amanda Blakeman is attempting to do on behalf of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Rather long-windedly, to come back to your initial question, without seeing the evidence for how that reduces offences or increases detections, I would not necessarily be in favour of a separate offence.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Cooke: All those issues will be captured by the police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspections that we do every two years on every police force across England and Wales. We will look at reasonable lines of inquiry particularly and at the overall outcome rates—not just charge rates, because the out-of-court disposals are important as well, as it is whatever is the best sanction to fit the individual and the community at the end of the day. We look right across that to ensure that policing is doing what it should be doing, as we do every week of the year, and will continue to do so.
This is a really important issue for me, because these are crimes that strike at the heart of communities and neighbourhoods. It is really important that policing gets confidence and trust back. Whether that is the confidence and trust of shop workers or across neighbourhoods and communities, whichever way it is, a large part of getting that confidence and trust back is by the police showing themselves to be effective in what they do. The police need to increase their efforts to do so.
Chris Philp
Q
Andy Marsh: The College is supporting policing with guidance around dealing with retail crime, particularly persistent offenders. I agree with everything that has been said: much more needs to be done in order to deal with this crime type.
In relation to the specific offence, I can see that there are two purposes to it. The first is that it might well act as a deterrent. The College of Policing holds the evidence base for policing. We cannot categorically tell you there is an evidence base for deterrence, but that would be one of the reasons for putting it in place. I think the second, more important reason is for Parliament to signal its concern about a particularly disruptive crime that damages the fabric of our communities and society. This sends out a signal that the police need to do better. I am supportive of the proposal.
Chris Philp
Q
Moving on to a proposal contained in clause 21, which relates to giving police access to driver licence records—particularly the photograph—which currently are only readily accessible for road traffic purposes. The idea is that they can be used for facial recognition searches, where an image is retrieved from a crime scene from CCTV. That might include a shoplifting offence. This would make the DVLA driving licence database searchable by the police, in the same way that other databases are, including for facial recognition purposes. In your view, both Andy Marsh and Andy Cooke, would that assist the police in investigations? Is that a measure you would support?
Andy Marsh: I am supportive.
Andy Cooke: Yes, I support it. What goes alongside that is ensuring that the actions of the police on facial recognition are ethical and lawful. I am a big supporter of facial recognition used in the right way, and I think that opening up that database would benefit the detection of crime.
Chris Philp
Q
Do you agree with the Met Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, in saying that this measure will help chief constables better to manage their workforce and root out officers guilty of misconduct where appropriate and where necessary?
Andy Cooke: It would certainly help in relation to that. At the moment, the only recourse is judicial review, which as we know can be exceptionally expensive and difficult, so I see no problem at all in having that right of appeal for a chief constable.
Andy Marsh: The code of ethics, which we have just been talking about, puts a responsibility—in fact, a duty—on a chief constable to discharge their responsibilities around standards, conduct and behaviour; and I have been in a position, as a chief, where I have not been able to do that because ultimately I haven’t had the decision on who I ultimately have serving alongside me as a police officer. They are not employees—they are servants of the Crown. I have found that to be a deeply unsatisfactory position, so I am supportive of this.
Jess Phillips
Q
Andy Marsh: Yes, I do. That is a periodic hard stop, let us say, where there is a full review, but there should be a number of different control measures, both automated data searches and a duty—a responsibility to report and self-report—that will occur in real time between those vetting periods.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: To explain the process, when a complaint is raised, internally and externally, the chief constable will have a delegated appropriate authority, which tends to be the deputy chief constable. They will have a pretty much weekly meeting, but sometimes it is a real-time daily meeting if something crops up that they need to consider.
The first thing that would happen is that a complaint would reach a threshold of gross misconduct or, indeed, criminal. Once it has reached that threshold, the deputy chief constable—the delegated appropriate authority—needs to make a decision about what should happen to that person. Should they be suspended? Can they continue with their duties? Should they engage in some degree of protected-type duty? What I can say, from my experience of working with police forces across England and Wales, is that the threshold and the tolerance before suspension has dropped substantially.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: No, I am not expressing it clearly, because if it would appear to be a substantial complaint—a complaint which would undermine the trust and confidence of the public should that officer remain serving—then they should be suspended. Actually, I can reassure you, in all the cases that I am aware of and that I look at where there are allegations of violence against women and girls, I see a very low threshold for suspension, so if I have misled you at all, I am sorry.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: Then they are very likely to be suspended, and I am really happy to write to the Committee and share the guidance and information—
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: It is very low. If I was accused of any form of domestic abuse, verbal or physical, or coercive control, I can guarantee you that I would be suspended.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Andy Marsh: In explaining this, I am in no way seeking to justify a lack of attention, but when a call is made to a police control room, they will triage it and they will use something called a threat, harm and risk matrix. If the offender has left the scene and no one is at immediate risk, that is unlikely to secure an immediate deployment. There is more likely to be a follow-up investigation. The retail crime action plan and guidance on our website, and all the focus on the use of images and facial recognition and on persistent offenders, is bringing a much sharper focus to an area of standards and police response that has slipped to an unacceptably low level.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I think they probably need to be strengthened quite a lot. I do not think there is anything in there that could criminalise somebody who provided a means for doing it as opposed to encouraging it. So if someone provides—I do not know—a knife or some drugs, I am not sure there is provision for that, and I think that is a big miss. This is a really worrying area and we need to legislate, and that is one of the good things in the Bill.
Laura Farris
Q
In that context, coercive control is making its way through in different forms. I have a narrow question about what you thought about the use of MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements—in relation to the management of a serious coercive control offence.
Dame Vera Baird: I think it is good to state that formally. I am sure that it happens now quite a lot.
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: It is a strict regime and it is very carefully managed. The probation service is aware of the high level of risk. It is definitely beneficial for dangerous offenders, and the probation service has recognised domestic abusers. Even when they have not committed domestic abuse offences, it still recognised them as presenting that danger, if they are already in MAPPA. I am sure that the most coercively controlling offenders already go into MAPPA. It is not a closed box that you can only fight your way into through these five categories of offending. It is much wider than that, but let’s do it—fine.
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: That is a very interesting question, but they are better and they have positive bits to them, don’t they?
Laura Farris
A DAPO does allow GPS monitoring, for example.
Dame Vera Baird: That is an improvement on the current model. There will have to be close working between those who apply for the DAPOs and those who are running MAPPA to make sure that there is no overlap or missing bits and so forth. This cross-boundary working is going to be particularly important with that. But they are both good steps. I do think MAPPA is slightly redundant, but let us do it, and the DAPOs and those positive requirements are definitely a big step forward. What you said about the statutory instrument is really interesting—
Laura Farris
Lord Bellamy, today in the Lords—
Dame Vera Baird: Yes, that is really good to hear, but these are going into statute. Why is the protection for women only going into a statutory instrument, which frankly fewer people will ever get to know about? Why is it being done in that way? Why is it not in here with these?
Laura Farris
I will have to revert to the Committee on the answer to that, because I actually do not know.
Dame Vera Baird: Anyway, I am not supposed to ask you questions—[Laughter.]
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I think it is bound to, yes. I have felt since their inception that DAPOs, because of those positive requirements, were likelier to be more effective than just the negative nature of whatever they were called—I forget what they are called currently.
MAPPA is an effective mechanism. You raise very interesting questions about how they will interact, and I just think it is about cross-working, really, between police and probation in particular. They have to work in IOM anyway, so they must have ways of working together that ought to be reasonably effective. But I hope that you will, as it were, as a Government draw to their attention the need for an understanding of how those mechanisms will work together, because that would be an important way to point out that it needs to be done effectively.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: No, I do not think so at the moment. I am in constant contact with counter-terrorism police and the Home Office. I am not aware that the Government are looking for yet further types of measure; if they were, I think they would have sought to bring them in within this Criminal Justice Bill. All that this particular measure does is allow an existing measure, polygraphs, to be applied to a wider range of people. My beef with that is that it allows it to be applied to people who have never been convicted of terrorism, without it going in front of a judge. So I think that the answer is no.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: Let us say that someone is in the community. They could be asked about their daily routine. The most likely outcome is that someone who is subject to a polygraph measure would feel that they have to tell the truth, and the evidence is that people who are subject to polygraphs make admissions. You could say, “Are you in touch with the well-known terrorist Jonathan Hall?”, and the effect of polygraphs tends to be that people go, “Actually, I am,” because they are worried about giving it away through the polygraph measure. That would give counter-terrorism police an amazing source of information to show that, contrary to what that person had been telling his probation officer, he was still in touch with the dangerous terrorist Jonathan Hall. That would allow new licence conditions, for example: if Jonathan Hall lived in a certain part of Birmingham, a licence condition could be imposed that prevented that person from going there.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes. You are completely right. This is not about extracting evidence that can be used in a criminal trial; it is about extracting information that is relevant to the management of offenders. If you think about a released terrorist offender who is now serving their sentence in the community, what you want to know is what their pattern of life is, who they are meeting, where they are going and what their objectives are. Are they visiting shops that sell knives, for example? Usman Khan must have gone to a shop to buy knives and tape to create the weapons used to kill two people. There are lots of factual matters that they can be asked about.
One of the benefits of the polygraph, I suppose, is that ultimately it is not covert. While MI5 and the police may have covert monitoring, it would be quite hard for them to put that information to the suspect. If the suspect has made an admission—“Yes, I am going to meet Jonathan Hall, the well-known terrorist,” or “Yes, I am going to visit knife shops”—that can be put to the offender, and you can work on rehabilitating the offender.
The Chair
As there are no further questions, I would like to thank the witness for giving evidence.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Professor Lewis: I am afraid that is not something that we have looked at.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: Many paragraphs of the schedule do implement our recommendations. We are extremely pleased to see our recommendations implemented extremely swiftly. This project only reported over a year ago. We obviously do think that the changes we recommended would make a difference in the ways I mentioned earlier, which included improving enforcement and the ability to seize offenders’ assets, limiting unrealistic and in some cases unfair orders, and allowing victims to receive compensation more promptly.
We estimated at the time that the reforms could lead to an extra £8 million in funds being retrieved from criminals in England and Wales every year. That obviously helps to return more money that can be used on public services, for instance. I am happy to talk in more detail about specific recommendations if that would be helpful.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: One of the things we thought was most important, in addition to trying to make the system more efficient, was to balance it with also making it more fair. In terms of efficiency, we recommended things like expediting the setting of a confiscation timetable, which is in paragraph 12, and creating a settlement process, which already happens informally—we call it EROC, which stands for early resolution of confiscation. That has been implemented in paragraph 13. We note also that better enforcement will improve the recovery of funds.
There have been several recommendations that have been implemented in order to improve enforcement. Enforcement plans, which largely implement our recommendations for contingent orders, are in paragraph 16; and allowing enforcement to take place in the Crown court as well as the magistrates court is in paragraph 17. We think that those will make the system much more efficient and will radically improve enforcement.
In terms of fairness, it is really important that orders accurately deflect a defendant’s benefit from crime. There are two ways in which we have recommended, and the Government have introduced clauses to implement, improving the fairness of confiscation orders. One concerns where someone has made only a temporary gain—for example, a money launderer who allows their bank account to be used to transfer £1,000,000 but gets paid £10,000 for doing that. When the gain is only temporary their benefit from crime is not really £1,000,000, given that they do not get to keep that. At the moment, orders can be made in the amount of the temporary gain and that recommendation has been taken up. I will find the paragraph for you in a moment.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: I am happy to address that. The temporary gain issue is in paragraph 8. The other improvement to the calculation of benefit is in circumstances where the defendant has already disgorged some of the proceeds of their crime—so, for example, that may have been forfeited or seized by the state already. That should not be double counted, so that the defendant then has to pay back something that has already been seized by the state. That is in paragraph 5. We are very pleased to see those fairness recommendations, as well as the efficiency gains.
In terms of deadlines, ultimately there is a deadline: it is called the default term of imprisonment. When a confiscation order is made against a defendant, a term of imprisonment in default is set. The defendant may end up serving this period of imprisonment if it is activated by the court, on the basis that the defendant has demonstrated either wilful refusal to pay the confiscation order or culpable neglect in failing to pay it. The defendant can of course secure release from the default term by paying the confiscation debt. In the consultation paper we cite a case where, as the person is being taken off to prison, finally the confiscation debt is settled. So, we do know that that does work—at least, anecdotally.
In the consultation paper we provisionally proposed something that would be even more stringent than that. At the moment the defendant is released halfway through the default term. After that, there is no more threat of imprisonment. We provisionally proposed that the defendant should be released only on licence, similar to the way in which life prisoners are released, for example. I think that was probably our most controversial proposal. There were some people who were in favour of that, but lots of people thought it extremely draconian; another sector thought that it really would not work, and within that was His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service. In other words, probation is not really designed to get people to pay their confiscation orders; it has another purpose. It has a rehabilitative purpose.
Ultimately, we decided that there are better ways to try to ensure enforcement. So, yes, there is the default term that remains, and that is a real threat to defendants. However, we also recommended confiscation assistance orders, requiring the defendant to attend enforcement hearings after the default term has been served and requiring the provision of financial information with penalties for non-compliance or providing false information. The first two of those—assistance orders and requiring the defendant to attend enforcement hearings after serving the default term—are both in schedule 4.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: Again, we do not have a view; it is not something that we have looked at. Obviously, in our hate crime project we looked at circumstances where sentences were aggravated because of hostility towards a protected characteristic, and we recommended equalising the protection that the various protected characteristics carry so that every protected characteristic would have aggravated offences, as well as enhanced sentencing for those offences that do not have aggravated versions. However, we have not looked specifically at the individually aggravated offences such as the ones for assaulting a police officer and so on, I am afraid.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: We do not have a corporate view, because we have not done work on it. You are right to worry that one is drawing very fine lines, and once one has added one offence, there is another group of people who are not included in the bespoke offences. One ends up with a proliferation of bespoke offences for different categories of function.
Chris Philp
Q
Professor Lewis: I do not think that I would go further than that. I think that concern should be considered, but I do not think that I am in a position to have a personal view, having not looked at it in any depth.
Thursday 14th December 2023
(11 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 December 2023 - (14 Dec 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Kennedy Talbot: No, neither am I. I am just here for clause 32 and schedule 4, and that is in schedule 5. However, I can say that I acted for a bank in a case in the High Court last year, which was effectively part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 being used to recover all the funds that were in suspended accounts, so it is possible to do it without new law, but I have not looked at the provisions of schedule 5 in any detail to be able to help with that; I am sorry.
Laura Farris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: Do you mean as they stand?
Laura Farris
In the Bill.
Kennedy Talbot: I think that the good things about the Bill include the statutory process to reach settlements immediately after a defendant is convicted. It is abbreviated to EROC, early resolution of confiscation, where the court can direct the parties to meet and seek to reach a settlement. I think that is a good idea. In my view, it needs some tinkering with, because at the moment the convicted defendant has no incentive to co-operate, and most defendants want to put off for as long as possible the day when their assets are confiscated, as you might expect. Unless we can work in some incentives, I do not think that will work as well as it might.
Laura Farris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: It might be difficult for the court to be able to ameliorate the sentence that the defendant might suffer. It may be possible to reduce slightly his confiscation liability—to give a reduction, as one gives a reduction to defendants who plead guilty—but by that stage, when we come to confiscation, most defendants are serving prison sentences, and their prison conditions are the most important thing to them, so prison privileges and categorisation might be the way to incentivise without damaging the public interest and people getting reductions in their sentences unjustifiably.
The Chair
Do any other Members have questions for this witness? No. In that case, thank you very much, Mr Talbot, for your time and for assisting the Committee in the way you have.
Kennedy Talbot: It has been a pleasure and a privilege. Thank you for inviting me.
Examination of Witnesses
Paddy Lillis, Paul Gerrard and Helen Dickinson OBE gave evidence.
Alex Norris
Q
Paul Gerrard: I gave evidence to the Scottish equivalent of this, when Daniel Johnson MSP’s Protection of Workers (Retail and Age-restricted Good and Services) (Scotland) Bill was passed. Our sense is that it resulted in the police in Scotland taking incidents far more seriously. It is quite hard to come by data, but the data that I see tells me that for attendance at the scene when we report incidents, Police Scotland is one of the five best forces in the country.
Paddy referenced this: when a report is made of violence in stores in Scotland, the individual is arrested 60% of the time. England and Wales are nowhere close to that; here, it is penny numbers. I do not pretend that this is empirical, but our sense as a business is that the protection of workers Act in Scotland increased the importance of this for the police, and the police have responded. If we could get to the position of 60% of reported violent offences resulting in an arrest, my colleagues would be very grateful, as would Paddy’s members, and all the members of the British Retail Consortium.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
Q
Helen Dickinson: It was like a practice for today.
Chris Philp
Q
You referenced the retail crime action plan. Paul, you just said that you thought that the stand-alone offence in Scotland got increased attention from the police. In law, assaulting a retail worker is illegal, and since the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, if the victim is a public-facing worker, that is statutorily an aggravating factor. You pointed to police attention as a benefit of introducing a separate offence. Just a couple of months ago, we all, except maybe Paddy, sat together at No. 10 Downing Street to launch the retail crime action plan. Do you agree that the commitments made in that plan, if operationalised—my expectation is that it will be, but we have to ensure that police do operationalise it—will deliver what you need, which is the police dealing with this comprehensively?
Paul Gerrard: We very much welcome that action plan. For a number of months, we have been calling for attendance at incidents involving violent repeat offenders. That is what the police have committed to. As you know, Minister, they are a long way from that; they are not attending 70% of serious incidents at present. I very much welcome the plan, and it is great that the police will turn up. I say that as a former law enforcement officer and Customs and Excise officer. When they do, they need the full tools available.
My strong view is that having a stand-alone offence will give the police, when they do turn up—I am with you; I really hope that they do—all the options they need. It will make it easier and quicker to investigate and prosecute the crime as a summary offence. I would also not underestimate, Minister, the power of Parliament saying that it is a specific offence to attack a shop worker. That will have an impact on three million shop workers, who frankly are not sure at present if Parliament cares what happens to them.
Chris Philp
Q
Paul Gerrard: When your predecessor introduced that, we welcomed it, though we said at the time that we would prefer a stand-alone offence. I remember being in a meeting —Paddy was there, as was Helen—with the then Home Secretary, the Attorney General and the Lord Chancellor, and we all welcomed it. The Home Secretary said that if the measure did not work, they would revisit the idea of a stand-alone offence.
Since that aggravated offence has come in, we have seen no discernible difference. I know that the Home Office cannot tell us how often the measure has been used—I am not sure whether it actually has been used—but I do not think that it has made a difference. It cannot be used when the police do not attend in the first place.
Chris Philp
Q
Paul Gerrard: They are hugely important commitments, and we said at the time—I said clearly on behalf of the Co-op—that we very much welcome the retail crime action plan. My point is that there is still a long way to go before that happens, and I know that you are aware of that. However, when police attend, they need the full toolkit, and one of those tools should be a stand-alone offence, because that makes it quicker and easier to prosecute the individual. It also sends a powerful message to 3 million shop workers in this country.
Chris Philp
Q
Paddy, perhaps I could turn to you to follow up on that point about tools. We discussed that a little yesterday, in our retail crime steering group meeting. One of the tools that both retailers and the police have at their disposal for identifying, arresting, and prosecuting offenders, and ultimately sending them to prison, is facial recognition. They can use it retrospectively, to catch offenders, and live, to identify prolific offenders who wander into a store. Do you want to share your views on the potential that that technology has to protect retail workers, and retail stores?
Paddy Lillis: Anything that protects retail workers and the product, and makes society better, I am in favour of. I am in favour of facial recognition, but it needs to be robust, because we already know that in some areas, it is seen as something that could bring racial bias, so we have to ensure that it is tight and robust to deal with that. As for anyone going into a store who is worried about facial recognition, if you go in to shoplift, or to assault a retail worker, then you should be worried about it, but if you are going in to carry out your day-to-day shopping, you should not have a problem with it. I welcome anything that helps the retail workers.
Coming back to what was said about a stand-alone offence, there is no real data tracking. Assaulting a public-facing worker was made an aggravated element that has to be considered by the courts, but it only has to be considered. Having assault of a retail worker as a stand-alone offence means that we can track the data, and track offences going through the court system. That is the benefit of the system in Scotland; more than 6,000 incidents have been investigated by the police, and we can track them through the courts.
This whole thing is about sending out the message to the criminal fraternity that we are all on the side of workers. They should be able to go to work free from fear of being abused, threatened or assaulted at work. This has been going on for too long, and this upsurge in violence and abuse is getting worse. I really urge you to look at this again. This is a win-win for every constituency in the country. You have an opportunity in this Bill to do this.
Chris Philp
Q
Helen, we talked about the new commitment in the retail crime action plan on the police to always attend in the circumstances that I mentioned, in order to address the issues that Paul quite rightly pointed to. For the Committee’s benefit, can you talk a bit about the way that we—the Government, policing and the retail community, particularly the British Retail Consortium—can work together to make sure that the commitments in the action plan are delivered in practice?
Helen Dickinson: There are a couple of things that I would highlight. When we are in conversation with the police, they often talk about whether enough of the right information is being reported to them to enable them to act. One of the workstreams associated with the action plan is about ensuring that people right across retail are aware of what data needs to go into various police systems to enable them to respond as appropriate. There is activity on the retail side, with the support of the police, on that interaction.
The second point you are perhaps alluding to is this data question. Certainly, we have agreed to provide support in the interim period, so that data is collected on response rates. Paul is doing that from a Co-op point of view. The question is whether we can get a wider read. That impacts on this issue. We think a stand-alone offence is required because it really builds on the accountability and visibility that is required from a police resourcing point of view. I think you had various policing people here, talking to the Committee, in previous sittings. If police do not have visibility across forces on what is happening in local communities, they are not allocating resource to the right place and are not necessarily able to respond.
We can certainly help by building the data that will give us a snapshot of whether the commitments made by the police in the action plan are being fulfilled, but that is not a long-term solution that will give us the response rates required from the police to address what is becoming an epidemic across the country, and what we see on the frontline in our communities. When we spoke yesterday, you said you were worried. I think everybody here should be worried. What is happening in certain parts of the US is much worse than the UK, but we are at a real turning point. Will the trajectory be halted? Without police visibility, as well as industry visibility, of the scale of the problem, so that they can put the resource in the right place, we will not make progress on the problem.
You are looking at me, Minister; I have not answered your question. We are really keen to continue the very strong engagement that we have had with you over the past few months. I know that this is a cross-party point, and that everybody takes what is happening very seriously. We are very happy to continue to do that.
Chris Philp
Q
I have just one more question. On the issue of the stand-alone offence, which has come up again and again, we have talked about the data point, and there may be other ways of addressing it. One question that will come up as we debate this issue is that if we create a separate offence for retail workers—we already have a separate offence for assaulting emergency workers, of course—what do we say when the teaching unions say, “Can we have a separate offence of assaulting a teacher?”, the transport unions say, “Can we please have a separate offence of assaulting a bus or tube driver?”, or someone says, “Can we have a separate offence of assaulting someone under the age of 18?” A lot of groups have claims that are just as valid and strong as yours. Will we end up with 50 stand-alone offences—for teachers, bus drivers, train drivers and so on?
Helen Dickinson: That is a very valid question, but I would turn it around: if any of those other industries was saying, as we are today, “This is an epidemic on a very scary scale, and it is having a huge impact not just on the 3 million people who work in retail, but right across every single community that we live and work in,” and that epidemic was everywhere, that would be valid. However, we are saying that this is a unique situation. It is very specific to what is happening in the retail industry today, and that is why we think that you should focus on retail.
Paddy Lillis: There are about 1,000 incidents a day, and we think that that is just the tip of the iceberg, because most retail workers are not reporting them. They see them as part of their job. We are trying to get over that. If you are abused in any form at all, it should be reported, so that we get proper data. On a daily basis, there is the cost to industry of sick pay, mental health issues, injury—
Helen Dickinson: The cost of inflation.
Paddy Lillis: Absolutely. It really needs to be focused on. These are people performing a duty and serving the public, and if they are abused or assaulted in execution of their duty, they should have the protection of Parliament.
Paul Gerrard: I have two observations. I said before that I was a customs officer; I have done plenty of night shifts at Dover, and I have done shifts seizing cigarettes. I have never seen, even doing that job, the kind of abuse and violence that shop workers face. It is worth reflecting on just how unpleasant and lawless it is at times. I am not sure that other sectors can say quite the same, but it is for them to make the case.
My second point—I mentioned it before, but I will say it again—is that as legislators, you have asked these people to enforce the law, be it on age-related sales or social guidance during the pandemic. You ask them to enforce the law and put themselves at risk. The work that USDAW does demonstrates that very often violence follows enforcing the law. If you are to ask them to enforce the law, you must give them proper protection. That is the deal that I had always assumed was being made. I will not make a special case for retail workers, but if you are going to make them enforce the law, you should give them proper and special protection in the law for doing so.
Chris Philp
Q
Paul Gerrard: There are a couple of things there, Minister. First, I would say yes, although that provision is for all people in public-facing service. The difference here is that if my colleague decides to sell alcohol to someone they should not sell alcohol to, they will face a criminal sanction. This weekend, I was in Manchester, and one of my colleagues refused to sell cigarettes to a minor, who jumped behind the kiosk counter, attacked every single kiosk, and pushed, shoved and threatened staff. If they decided, “Actually, I do not want that to happen; I will just sell them the cigarettes,” they would be breaking the law. That is the difference.
I get the point about public service—as a former public servant, I think that is right—but if you are asking people to enforce the law, you should give them special protection in the law through a stand-alone offence, of the kind that I had when I was a customs officer. It is a stand-alone offence to attack a customs officer, because they are enforcing the law.
Chris Philp
I will certainly continue to work with you all, regardless of the details in the Bill, to get the retail crime action plan fully implemented and bring into force a zero-tolerance approach. I think we all agree that that is necessary, and I will do everything possible to ensure that the police deliver that operationally. Thank you for your work in this area, and I look forward to keeping on working with you.
Alex Norris
Q
Helen Dickinson: I agree completely with that comment. The reason why over 90 chief executives signed the letter to the Home Secretary from right across different parts of retail was that they are concerned about the fact that they are doing all they can, but feel that there is nothing more they can do. Paddy mentioned some statistics.
How do I describe it? It has two big impacts: one is financial, on the bottom line, how the profit of companies will be impacted unless they do everything that they can to address what could impact their business; and the second impact is on their biggest asset, which is their people, whether that is in absenteeism, morale or motivation to do their job well. Those two motivating factors, from a business leader point of view, mean something to every single business leader that I talk to. Literally, that is probably the thing that comes up most in the chief executive conversations that I have, because they feel that they have done everything that they can and that they are running out of road in terms of things that they could do.
The Minister asked about facial recognition, and I know that that is being explored by a lot of people. There have been various announcements about body cameras. People pay money into business improvement districts and regional partnerships. We have the Pegasus Project, which is trying to get better co-ordination across different parts of the police, specifically focused on organised gangs. That is being funded by retail businesses. They are not handing it all back and going, “It’s someone else’s problem.”
That is my answer to whoever it was. I am very happy to put them in front of any retail business, and I am sure they will be given lot of reasons. Paul, I do not know if there is anything you want to add.
Paul Gerrard: The Co-op is one of the businesses that is funding Operation Pegasus. Over the past four or five years, we have spent £200 million on security measures in our stores. That is four times the sector average. If you go into some of our stores, you will see state-of-the-art CCTV, body-worn cameras and headsets. We have increased our guarding budget by almost 60% from pre-covid days. We are constantly investing. We have had a problem with kiosks, where people jump behind the kiosk counter, often armed, terrifying colleagues who are still in the kiosk. We have just invested heavily in new kiosks to stop people from doing that.
Helen is absolutely right: the retail sector takes this really seriously. We consider the first responsibility to be ours, which is why we invest as much as we do to keep colleagues and shops safe, but we are getting to the point with some stores in the Co-op estate and across retail where it is increasingly hard to work out how to run a store that keeps colleagues safe and can make a commercial return. That will mean that shops will close, and we all see what happens when shops close: communities face tough times.
I have heard the police express that idea that we are not doing anything. They have had a similar, less-than-polite response from me when they have said it, because it is patently untrue.
Paddy Lillis: It is 21st-century Britain, and we have retail workers with body cams on—it sounds like a war zone. At the time, we are trying to get things right and get people back into the towns and city centres, but we are helpless. It is a societal problem, something we all need to work towards addressing. We must put the support we need behind retail staff and businesses. I have worked with them. Security measures just last year cost £1 billion, with more and more going in, but somewhere along the line we all pay for that. It is a massive problem that has to be addressed.
Chris Philp
Only to put on record that we actually have record police numbers now. It is not getting back towards the peak; the peak has been exceeded by about 3,500—
Laura Farris
Q
We all know that you are, of course, supportive of the clause 24 provision, which mirrors what you recommended, but I wanted to ask you about some of the things that you have just said. You said in your report that you found that coercive control underpins all domestic abuse. I think that you also made reference to the fact that there is now a consultation happening on minimum sentences in two regards. The first is in relation to whether any killing—any domestic homicide, to use your language—where there has been coercive control should attract a minimum sentence. I think that that goes a bit wider than anything that you put in your review. I will ask you about that first, and then I will go on to the second part.
Clare Wade: My view about setting minimum sentences in stone is quite strong. I am actually not a fan of minimum terms and starting points because I think that it takes away quite a lot of judicial discretion. Even though they are only starting points, we often get stuck with them. There is an argument that schedule 21 is probably not fit for purpose. As I say in the paper, it is frozen in 2003 and it comes with the problem that there is always this issue of, “Do we add another starting point in?” I think that the 25-year minimum terms has done nothing but cause problems.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, it was.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, that is one of the problems, I think. There are two issues. First, it creates legal anomalies anyway, because once you delineate a starting point for something like that, you have all sorts of problems about, “When is it taking something to the scene?” and you then have laws saying that taking a knife to the doorstep is taking it to the scene but taking a knife to another room is not taking it to the scene. That just reduces confidence in the law, I think; it just causes anomalies.
Secondly, as it stands, it does not fit with the other sorts of categories of harm within schedule 21 because, as I say in the report, it does not consider the vulnerability of the victim. It has one harm at purpose. That has caused all sorts of issues in terms of an obvious disparity, and we identified that disparity in the review. There is a disparity of six and a half years on average.
So it causes problems, and yes, you are absolutely right: it obfuscates the real issues because, by looking at the cases that we have looked at, looking at the literature and looking at our experience and the experiences of frontline responders and so forth, we know that the real issues are about what is now being identified as overkill or gratuitous excessive violence. The real issues are about, “Why do we not have a proper forensic approach to domestic abuse?” We do not have that. The whole idea of placing controlling and coercive behaviour and the model that I have identified at the forefront of the thinking is to achieve a proper forensic approach. We will not have this woolly attitude and people saying, “That’s not proper abuse,” and basing stuff on myths and so forth.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: First of all, there were only two cases in the actual sample that came within the “rough sex” category: gross negligence manslaughter and unlawful act manslaughter. In one of those cases, culpability was levelled at category C, so around the middle, and in the other at category B, so higher culpability.
I said that those cases should always involve higher culpability, because the risks of some of the behaviour, in particular with strangulation—while that was not apparent in the cases that we looked at—are high. At the moment, the law distinguishes between “obvious” and “high”, and my view is that this is just a legal nicety when you are talking about strangling or choking somebody. All the experts will say—
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: No, it is not. The court is always constrained in terms of section 36 applications and referrals. They are always constrained by what evidence was before the sentencing court. There was found to be this distinction between “obvious” and “high”, and I am not sure that can exist.
My view is that we need to look at everything, and look at society as a victim. We need to dismantle the cultural scaffolding that goes with some of this offending, if we are really going to tackle domestic homicide. There is such a resonance with other harms. Even the harm of overkill, which is about obliterating women’s bodies because of anger and the motivation to kill and so forth, is apparent in strangulation. It was very important to look at that.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: It is a source of tension. The Sentencing Council has also said that the cases are decided on their own facts. I would agree that a real tension is there. In only one of the cases that we looked at did the sentencing judge find that it was high culpability.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, there was another one that was category C—given that there were two cases, 50% of them were category C.
The review is probably the first document that brings into consideration the current thinking of academics, campaigners, specialists and doctors. There has been a lot of research done, for example, by Dr Cath White on strangulation. It brings it all into play, and we are trying to have a coherent approach. The beauty—if I can call it that—of using the coercive control model, is that it gives us that. As I said before, ultimately we want a proper forensic approach to domestic abuse in criminal law.
My view is that that approach is lacking at the moment, and that is why we struggle. That is why there is seeming injustice, for example, when a minority of women kill their abusive partners. They do not always get justice, as some of the research shows. Only by having that proper forensic approach across the board will we be able to change things. That is important.
The other point is that the Sentencing Council is conducting its own review—I have not seen all the cases it looked at—and what applies to that applies to my review as well: sentencing comments in themselves are an imperfect way of measuring everything that underpins these cases.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: The victim cannot give evidence. If you are looking at sentencing comments, you are not looking at the evidence in the case. Take the two cases with which we started the review, those of Ellie Gould and, in particular, Poppy Devey Waterhouse—the review was initiated by the campaign on those cases. I was able to look at the prosecution case files and see that some of the factors we were able to identify in looking at the evidence were apparent in those cases.
In one of the cases, there was some stalking; in both cases, the killing happened at the end of the relationship where the victim wanted to leave the relationship; there was a little bit of violence. We found those factors, but they were not necessarily apparent from the sentencing remarks—one had to look at the papers through the coercive control prism to be able to identify them. Looking only at sentencing remarks is an imperfect way of looking at all these cases. That is why I welcome the Law Commission looking at the issue of defences.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Clare Wade: I would obviously welcome that. We have had some very high-profile cases where police officers have committed dreadful offences. Public confidence, particularly the confidence of women, needs to be restored in policing, so I would welcome that transparency.
I suppose there is an underlying cohesion in some of what we say. For example, one of the questions that we wanted to answer in the review is how domestic homicides sit and fit with misogynistic killings of women generally. I hope that by identifying the real harms and placing them at the forefront of the law, we are able to show that. That goes back to some of the things we were saying a moment ago, namely that strangulation is a particular harm. It is pertinent to domestic killings, as we identified in the review, but it is also something that happens in other misogynistic killings of women. It is important to not just be able to isolate domestic killings of women, but have a policy that encompasses the misogyny that underpins some of the awful offences we have seen in the last few years.
Thursday 11th January 2024
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I hope to follow your instruction to be free-wheeling as far as I physically can.
As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), said on Second Reading, we support this legislation. This is likely to be the final chance during this Parliament for us to legislate in the area of crime, policing and criminality, and there is much to do. There are very many good things in this legislation, so the bulk of my contributions on the initial clauses, and my amendments more generally, seek clarity and will give the Minister a chance to put certain things on the record, rather than challenging the principle of the Bill.
As we start line-by-line consideration, it is important to recognise that the public expect more from the Government and this place on crime. Ninety per cent of crimes go unsolved and the charge rate has dropped by two thirds. That means that a person who commits a crime is less than half as likely to be caught as they were in 2010, and the public feel that very significant change. Of course, that is before we get to the woeful backlogs in the court system, and what they mean for victims and the likelihood of successful prosecution. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North will no doubt cover that issue in due course.
To that record is added low confidence in policing, the disastrous legacy that we still feel of the cut of 20,000 officers, 10,000 fewer police on the frontline, and the fact that 50% of the public—a number that has doubled—say they never see a uniformed presence in their community, so there is clearly much to do. Restoring policing and justice in this country must be a national priority. We welcome in most part what the legislation offers, and most of our discord lies with what is not in the Bill and the missed opportunities. We will seek to add those things in due course.
Clause 1 relates to articles for use in serious crime. Serious and organised crime is a growing menace in our country. Organised crime is often left out of the debate about community safety. The way crime is counted pushes organised crime, and particularly fraud, to the fringes of the debate, but it is a growing enterprise and it has to be tackled head on. By its nature, it is fast moving and shapeshifting. We are in the fourth industrial revolution—an era of significant technological change at breathtaking pace—and it is crucial that we seek to keep pace. Given the nature of law and legislation, that is hard, but we have to keep pace as best we can. We know that the tools that criminals, particularly violent criminals, use to conceal their work are ever changing, so we must change to meet that need.
Clause 1 criminalises the possession of items that can be used in serious crime, and my amendments relate to that. Without pre-empting the clause 2 stand part debate, the sorts of items we are talking about include 3D printer firearms templates, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. We heard in the evidence sessions that such items are being used by some of the most serious criminals in this country and those who facilitate their work, and it is right to address that.
I turn to amendment 51, which stands in my name. Clause 1(3) says:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that the person did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Basically, if the police arrest someone and want to charge them with possession of one of the items specified in clause 2, the person can say, “I didn’t know it was going to be used in this way.” My amendment would delete that provision. It is of a probing nature—I do not intend to put it to a Division—but I want to hear from the Minister why the clause has been written in such a way. It is not without precedent, but we would not routinely specify on the face of a Bill the defence that a person facing a criminal allegation could use; that would be a matter for them.
Crucially, the burden will be on the prosecutor to prove that a crime has been committed. We know from clause 1(1) that a successful conviction for the offence requires prosecutors to prove to a criminal standard that, first, the person facing the charge possessed the article in question and that, secondly, they did so in circumstances that could reasonably give rise to suspicion that it would be used to commit a serious offence. The burden is on the prosecutor to prove that, so I am keen to understand why we need to specify on the face of the Bill that a defendant could make the defence that they
“did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with any serious offence.”
Is subsection (3) not just subsection (1) turned inside out? On that basis, is it necessary? If subsection (1) describes the alleged crime, surely it is axiomatic that the defence would be the opposite. Does subsection (3) need to be on the face of the Bill? Could the Minister explain that? We are in danger of asking people to prove negatives, which is harder. Specifying that defence may well be relied on by authorities in the future, and if an individual struggles to prove intent, which can be quite hard, or a lack of intent, which, frankly, is even harder, it could be challenging for the justice process further on. I am keen to understand the Minister’s perspective.
Amendment 52 would have the same effect on clause 3(3) as amendment 51 would have on clause 1(3): it would remove clause 3(3). The arguments for doing so are the ones I have just made.
The final amendment I have tabled in this group is amendment 55 to clause 1. Clause 1(1) relates to possession, and subsection (4) explains what “possession” means in this context. It says that
“if it is proved that a relevant article—
(a) was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or
(b) was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which the accused habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public,
the court may assume that the accused possessed the relevant article”—
that is how possession is proven, and I would argue that is quite a broad definition—
“unless the accused shows that they did not know of its presence on the premises or that they had no control over it.”
That is what my amendment seeks to test, because I do not think the intention of the clause is to sweep up people for being in the presence of an article that was not theirs.
My concern relates particularly to shared accommodation. I lived in shared accommodation for a couple of years before I met my wife, and for a period of time it was with people I did not really know: I did not know what they did for a living; I did not know their personal characters; and, to be honest, I did not have an awful lot of engagement with them. Many came and went, and the communal areas were largely not used, but it would not have been out of the question for someone to leave work equipment around. It would not have been impossible for someone acting in bad faith to have one of the items detailed in clause 2 in a communal area, and then to have said that it was another person who was living there or that another person at some point had touched that item in order to move it and put something else next to it. Whose article it was—and therefore who is responsible and who may well have committed an offence under clause 1—could then become quite a challenging question. There needs to be more clarity that, in such circumstances, an individual would not have committed a crime.
That is what amendment 51 seeks to add. I do not intend to labour the point all the way to a Division, but I hope the Minister will put on the record that that is not how he sees the provisions working, and that he will give the Committee some degree of comfort on how such circumstances will be avoided.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a huge pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Dame Angela, as it will be in the Committee’s sittings in coming days.
I will not try to respond to the shadow Minister’s opening remarks in any detail, as we debated the wider issues on Second Reading, but I will observe in passing that we have record numbers of police officers, and overall crime, measured by the crime survey on a like-for-like basis, is 56% lower today than it was in 2010.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
That must be the only place where there are extra police.
Chris Philp
The fine city of Stockton.
I thank the shadow Minister for the thoughtful, reasonable tone that he adopted in discussing the amendments and in his opening remarks. I am sure that tone will characterise the exchanges throughout the Committee’s proceedings.
As the shadow Minister mentioned, clauses 1 to 4 criminalise the possession, importation, making, adaptation or supply of certain specified articles, where they can be used for serious criminal purposes, including items such as pill presses used to manufacture illegal pills and the templates for producing 3D firearms, about which the National Crime Agency and others are increasingly concerned.
As with strict liability offences, these offences entitle a prosecution to start with the assumption that the accused would have known what the articles were concerned with. I have mentioned a couple of those articles; there are very few, if any, legitimate uses for them.
The shadow Minister posed a reasonable question, asking why we have constructed the burden of proof in the way we have. Why say it is for the defendant to demonstrate that they had a legitimate purpose, rather than the other way round? The reason is because these articles have pretty much no legitimate uses other than for criminal purposes. Why would someone have a template to construct a 3D firearm other than for criminal purposes? There is no innocent use for that article that I can think of. The situation is similar for pill presses, unless it were a pharmaceutical company. To answer the shadow Minister’s fundamental and foundational question, that is why the burden of proof has been constructed as it has.
Amendments 51 and 52 would remove the ability for the defendant to expressly advance as a defence that they did not know about the purpose of the article, and did not know they were possessing it and so on. If the amendments were agreed to, those defences would not be available and the clause, as amended, would make these strict liability offences, with no defence that could be offered. The effect of the amendments would actually be to make the clause less favourable to the defendant.
Amendment 55 addresses items found on a premises. As the shadow Minister pointed out, at the end of clause 1(4), there is a defence that the person did not know about the item’s presence on the premises or they had no control over it; it can be one or the other, and does not have to be both. I will take the give example of shared accommodation, where people share a flat or a house. Clearly, if someone’s flatmate possessed one of these illegal articles and the flatmate did not know about it, or even if they knew about it but did not have control over it—it can be one or the other; it does not have to be both—that would then be a defence available to them. I can certainly give the assurance that he requested.
At the bottom of page 1, the clause provides that where flatmates are sharing accommodation, if one of the flatmates possessed the articles, and another flatmate had nothing to do with any offending and either did not know about the articles—or, even if they knew about them, had no control over them—that second flatmate would not be guilty of an offence, because the defence set out would be available to them. I hope that that gives the shadow Minister the assurance that he wanted.
Dame Angela, shall I save my wider remarks about the clauses for the stand part debate in the second group, or would you rather I addressed them now?
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his full answer. I am deeply disappointed that I could not draw him on wider issues, but I suspect that on a long enough timeline, he will relent. The Minister must think about the fact that he is tempted to tell us that, on crime, we have never had it so good. That is something that we will test with the general public at some point this year, and he may be disappointed. We are ready on any day of his choosing—the sooner the better.
Alex Norris
That is a very reasonable correction.
I am grateful for the Minister’s response, and in particular the comfort on amendments 51 and 52, which relate to clause 1(3) and clause 3(3). I am not 100% convinced that a defendant’s ability to say that an item was not theirs has been removed; they could say that routinely, as they frequently do to police up and down the country in relation to various matters. Nevertheless, we would not want to weaken the defence, and the Minister’s point about that is enough for me to withdraw the amendments.
I am also grateful for the assurance on subsection (4), which it is important to have on the record. This is an issue—perhaps this is not for the face of the Bill—that will have to be thought about in a policing sense. The way the clause draws possession is quite broad: being on the same premises as something that someone used habitually. For example, perhaps a small group of people use a social club routinely and are engaged in a joint endeavour of committing crime. That would be quite hard for the police to identify. Probably the most likely outcome is that all individuals get charged, but there will be challenges. Again, that is probably not for the face of the Bill, but it may be something that the Government need to come back when it comes to its operation as a practical measure. They will need to work with the police to ensure that it is a practical power, because we want it to be used. We do not want the police to think it is too complicated or too broad to use, because it is very important.
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, after “means” insert “—
(a) in England and Wales,”.
This amendment and amendments 15 to 18 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 15 to 17.
Government amendment 41.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 18 and 19.
Clause 2 stand part.
Government amendments 20 to 22.
Clauses 3 and 4 stand part.
Government amendment 40.
Government amendment 49.
Government amendment 44.
Chris Philp
As we have discussed, clauses 1 to 4 introduce new offences to criminalise the importation, manufacture, modification, supply, offer to supply and possession of particular articles used in serious and organised crime. They currently apply to England and Wales only, but after consultation with the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Government tabled amendments 14 to 22 and 41 to extend the criminal offences to the whole of the UK. This follows a request from the devolved Administrations, which we are happy to agree to.
Clause 2 contains a delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of items covered by the clause. At the outset, we cover the templates for 3D-printed firearms, pill presses and concealed compartments. This creates a power, using an affirmative statutory instrument that is subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, to add additional items as we become aware of them. It is impossible for us sitting here to foresee or anticipate what items criminals may come up with in the future, so it is important to have this power to future-proof against criminal innovation.
The practical effect of amendments 40, 44 and 49 is to add these offences to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which means that when a person is found guilty of an offence, they will automatically be considered guilty of having a criminal lifestyle when the court is making a confiscation order. I am sure that the Committee will agree that when someone is involved in serious criminal activity, we would want the proceeds of that criminal activity, particularly if it is serious organised crime, to fall into the scope of the POCA regime. I have already mentioned the items included, which are listed in clause 2, and I have also referenced the affirmative statutory instrument process for adding additional items in the future.
On clause 3, it is important that we include measures on vehicle theft in the Bill. I am sure that all of us have been contacted by constituents who are concerned about their cars being stolen, particularly from their home address. Criminals do that using various forms of technology that enable them to either pick up the signal from a key fob, or hack into a vehicle’s control system, disable the immobiliser, and activate and unlock the vehicle. They then drive off. Unfortunately, that is relatively prevalent.
There are things that constituents can do, such as put their key fob into a so-called Faraday bag—a little bag with an iron mesh around it—but that could be stolen. More modern vehicles, particularly in the past two or three years, have better security measures. Nonetheless, we parliamentarians want to do everything we can to prevent this kind of technology falling into criminal hands. That is why we are providing for two new criminal offences relating to vehicle theft using electronic devices such as signal jammers, but there are others also. The first offence criminalises possession of those devices, and the second criminalises importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply those devices.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I might be showing my entire ignorance of signal jammers, but is there no other use for these bits of technology? I can see whether there is when it comes to stamping things on pills and plans to build a gun on a 3D printer, but my ignorance about signal jammers means that I do not know whether there is another use for them.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for that very good question. These two offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with vehicle theft. The judge or the jury, depending on whether we are talking about magistrates court or the Crown court, have to be satisfied there is a reasonable suspicion that that is what the device will be used for. It is important that the police have the powers to arrest and prosecute people involved in this kind of activity. The offences should help a great deal in stopping these electronic devices getting into criminal hands.
We have talked a little bit about the evidential burden of proof in clause 4, and I will not rehearse those points at great length, in the interests of Committee members’ patience and time. As many of the articles that we are talking about can be used only for criminal purposes, it is reasonable to construct the clause this way. Members of the Committee will recall that we took evidence on this issue from a number of people in law enforcement, including Graeme Biggar, the director general of the National Crime Agency. Law enforcement—both territorial policing and the NCA—strongly welcomes these measures as strengthening the police’s armoury in the fight against organised crime. Through this regulation-making power, Ministers and Parliament will be able to keep up with changes in technology, which is extremely important given how fast technology is moving these days.
Alex Norris
I will start with the Government’s amendments. It is good, in general, for Governments to amend their Bills; it shows that they are still looking at the legislation. We hope to see them show the same flexibility to our amendments in due course. I am grateful for the written explanation the Minister has furnished, although it is possible that my first emotion upon getting dozens of amendments in the week before Christmas may not have been gratitude; I think there might have been a bit of swearing when we got the other set earlier this week, too. Nevertheless, we appreciate the explainer.
As we have heard, Government amendments 14 to 17, 20 to 22 and 41 extend the provisions in clauses 1 to 4 to Scotland and Northern Ireland, which is welcome. A four-nations approach to tackling serious and organised crime is wise. We do not want such activity to be displaced to places that are not covered by legislation, or for areas or indeed countries to be seen as safe havens. That has to be the right thing to do. I hope that the Minister will say a little about the discussions he had with colleagues in Scotland and Northern Ireland to reach this conclusion, and what other work may be done to ensure that the legislation is used effectively.
Having listened to what the Minister said on Government amendments 40, 49 and 44 on proceeds of crime, we are similarly comfortable with the approach being taken with those. As the Minister said, we heard from Graeme Biggar and other witnesses about the importance of the proceeds of crime. These measures would tighten that regime, which is welcome.
I covered most of our views on clause 1 when speaking to my amendments, so I will not repeat them. I will just say that the clause is an important step forward, and something on which we are keen. Clause 2 defines what is meant by “relevant article”. The articles in scope today are 3D printer firearms templates, encapsulators, tablet presses and vehicle concealments. [Interruption.]
Chris Philp
I will briefly respond to one or two of the points the shadow Minister raised. We engaged with the devolved Administrations both at an official level and through correspondence. I am glad to say that they were pretty keen to ensure that the new offences applied in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As the shadow Minister said, it is very important to ensure that serious criminals have no part of the United Kingdom in which they can operate. I am glad to observe generally that despite political differences, particularly with the nationalists in Scotland, we have a relatively good relationship on law enforcement co-operation. Generally, we work quite constructively together in a non-confrontational, non-politicised way, as I guess our constituents, the public, and the whole House would expect.
On the affirmative regulation-making power, I am grateful to the shadow Minister for breaking his habit and supporting it. He is quite right to say that this is technically a Henry VIII power, in that it is a statutory instrument that can amend primary legislation—under clause 2(3), the statutory instrument can amend the clause—but it has very limited scope, because only this clause can be amended. The only purpose for which the power can be used is specifying additional types of technology, because that is all that the clause does. While this is a Henry VIII power, it has very limited and specific applicability.
As for adding future items, there is nothing immediately on the list. I expect us to stay very closely in touch with the law enforcement community, particularly the National Crime Agency, but also the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for serious and organised crime, and the regional organised crime units, who would rapidly identify new bits of technology used by criminals, so that we could very quickly add them. There is not a statutory duty to consult—other than, of course, with Scotland and Northern Ireland’s devolved Administrations—but we did consult on these provisions. It would be our intention, unless there was an emergency situation, to consult prior to adding any new items, lest there were unintended consequences. I hope that addresses the points raised, and I commend the four clauses to the Committee.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Amendments made: 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, at end insert—
“(b) in Scotland, an offence specified or described in Part 1A of that Schedule;
(c) in Northern Ireland, an offence specified or described in Part 2 of that Schedule.”
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 16, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 17, in clause 1, page 2, line 5, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”.—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 14.
Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Section 1: meaning of “relevant article”
Amendments made: 18, in clause 2, page 2, line 17, after “1968” insert
“or, in Northern Ireland, Article 2(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I. 3))”.
See the statement for amendment 14.
Amendment 19, in clause 2, page 2, line 30, leave out “subsection).” and insert
“subsection or subsection (4)).
(4) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Scottish Ministers, and
(b) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. —(Chris Philp.)
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under this clause.
Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Electronic devices for use in vehicle theft
Amendments made: 20, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) in England and Wales—
(i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or
(ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority);
(b) in Scotland—
(i) theft of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft constructed or adapted for use for transporting one or more persons or of anything in such a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
(ii) an offence under section 178 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (taking motor vehicle without authority);
(c) in Northern Ireland—
(i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or
(ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority).”
This amendment and amendments 21 and 22 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 3, line 16, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”
See the statement for amendment 20.
Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 3, line 17, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);
(ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 20.
Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Possession of a SIM farm
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.
Government amendment 47.
Schedule 1.
Chris Philp
As Members will be aware, criminals often use telecommunications networks to target people to try and defraud them, for example with scam texts and scam calls. In fact, the secretary of my local residents association in Coulsdon, in my constituency of Croydon South, sent me a message just this morning with an example of a scam text that she had just received, purporting to come from the Royal Mail and inviting her to click on a link and fill in her details. This is clearly a problem.
I am sure that we have all heard such examples; indeed, we have probably received messages ourselves. Although most people can identify them as scams trying to elicit fraud, unfortunately some people who receive them are taken in, because the messages can often be quite realistic, and often they end up losing significant amounts of money.
Very often, these scam texts can be traced back to so-called “SIM farms”, which are electronic devices that sometimes hold hundreds of physical SIM cards that can be used to send out thousands and thousands of scam text messages in a matter of seconds. These devices are relatively easy to buy and—until this Bill passes into law—they are legal to buy online, enabling criminals to commit large-scale fraud by abusing our telecommunications network. In the fraud strategy, we committed to stopping that, which is why we are legislating.
We consulted on these proposals in May 2023 and received broad support for these measures. There were some concerns about the definitions being too broad, such that they would inadvertently criminalise some legitimate activity, but we have worked to develop the legislation in order to address those concerns.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
On that particular point about possession of a SIM farm, the Bill says that a person charged with an offence under the clause must provide “good reason”. It goes on to state what the good reasons are, for example providing broadcasting services. However, I would have assumed that a broadcasting service would be already licensed; similarly, if a body is operating a genuine public transport service, it is probably a local authority. Could the Minister explain that “good reason” a bit more? It seems a bit woolly or wide to me. Somebody who is clever enough to run a SIM farm would be clever enough to find a way around that somehow. I want to support the Government in advancing their proposal, but is it possible to tighten it up a bit more?
Chris Philp
The hon. Member raises a concern that inventive criminals might exploit the defences we set out in clause 5(3), on lines 37 to 40 at the bottom of page 3, which he was quoting from. He is concerned that criminals might find a way of pretending or purporting to offer, for example, legitimate broadcasting services when in fact they do not. I think that a court would take a view on legitimate broadcasting services. If there was a prosecution and a criminal advanced that defence, it would be up to the jury to decide whether the broadcasting services really were legitimate.
Since the hon. Member has raised the point, I will happily take it away and see whether there are any concerns that the clause might inadvertently provide a loophole for ingenious or inventive criminals. I will seek to satisfy myself that that is not the case, but if he has identified a problem or potential loophole, I will happily come back to the Committee. I will take that away as a point to double check. We can probably rely on juries, or magistrates in a magistrates court trial, to apply common sense to those defences, but it is good that he raised the question and I will certainly look into it.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
On that point, it is possible for scammers to intercept texts that come from a credible bank, so they can slot in a text in the line of communication between a person and their credible bank. Have the Government given any thought as to how we can stop that happening? I feel it makes us even more vulnerable.
Chris Philp
That sort of interception and insertion is not addressed by this clause, which is about SIM farms and the almost industrial-scale transmission of thousands of messages. What the hon. Lady is describing is a little different. It can happen to emails as well. For example, if someone is about to buy a house, they may be corresponding with their solicitor. When the solicitor tells them to transfer the funds to X bank account, a criminal can insert themselves into the email chain, pretending to be the solicitor, and put in a message telling the client to send the funds to their own bank instead of the solicitor’s client account. Inserting messages into an email chain happens quite a bit, but that is not what this clause is designed to address. The Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), is very aware of the issue because it falls into his portfolio rather than mine. Perhaps I could ask his officials to write to the hon. Lady to update her on the work he is doing with law enforcement on that point, because this clause just does not address it.
Turning back to the group of clauses, it is worth saying that these offences will make it difficult—I hope impossible—for criminals to access and use SIM farms for the purposes of fraud, and the police will be given the tools that they need to disrupt them. Clauses 5 and 6 ban the possession and supply of a SIM farm. However, as I have already said in response to the hon. Member for Bootle, if a person has good reason or lawful authority, obviously that is not criminalised. We have talked a bit about the legitimate use issue already, and there are some examples provided in clause 5, as we have discussed.
I will turn to amendment 47 to schedule 1. Schedule 1 confers powers of entry, search and seizure in relation to these offences. There is an offence of intentionally obstructing a constable when they are carrying out a search—the search is to be unimpeded, obviously . That offence also needs to apply in the case of people who are exercising the power of a constable, such as designated National Crime Agency officers, who are not necessarily constables. Amendment 47 to schedule 1 is a technical amendment that makes sure that all the relevant people can exercise this power of search: not just constables, but any person who is exercising the power of a constable. It is a technical amendment, making sure that it applies to everybody undertaking those searches to hopefully find and prosecute criminals who are using SIM farms. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.
Alex Norris
Fraud is an everyday, large-scale fact of life in this country. According to the crime survey, there were 3.7 million instances of fraud in England and Wales in 2022. Fraud now represents 40% of all crimes. It is an everyday peril that all of us face and from which vulnerable people are clearly at risk.
Furthermore, the National Crime Agency estimates that 86% of fraud goes unreported. That means that victims are unsupported and vital evidence that could break some of the fraud rings goes uncollected. We have to do better and build confidence among the public that fraud is not just a fact of life but that, if they report it, something will happen.
We have to push back on the idea—I hope that the Minister will be very clear about this in his response—that, to some degree, fraud is a lesser crime. When citing the statistics on crime reduction that the Minister cited in his opening speech, about which people say, “Yes, but you have not counted fraud in that”, we have heard other Ministers say—although I do not think we have heard this Minister say it—“Well, fraud is not quite the same as those crimes. It is a lesser crime. It doesn’t feel quite as bad”. That is wrong, and I hope that the Minister will say, on the record, that that is not the view of the Government.
Alex Norris
If I were to open my social media accounts now, I think that I would find myself called an awful lot worse than Alex Cunningham, so I have no problem with that at all.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North is absolutely right, though. That sort of action can ruin lives. And it can destroy a business. I probably should not be relying on “Coronation Street” for my arguments, but there is a good storyline about that at the moment. It can ruin a business. We know that there is vulnerability there. For an individual, losing that sort of sum of money—£6,000—could ruin their life. It could jeopardise their housing situation, and it can jeopardise relationships, too—we have seen that happen in the past—so it is very serious. It knocks people’s confidence as well; it makes people not want to engage with others. This is just as important as other crimes, and it is really important that we send out that message.
Part of the reason for the success that criminals have is that they can do mass-scale phishing. That means that, while there are things that we all receive and think, “Well, that’s a pretty crude scam. Who is going to fall for that?”, we know that trying crude and rudimentary things over and over again on a mass scale can, on a long enough timeline, succeed.
That is before we get to the incredibly sophisticated methods that my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle mentioned, and I welcome the response that the Minister gave on that. There is a difference. The Minister mentioned his constituent and Royal Mail. Most of the time, I would look at the link and say, “Well, that’s not Royal Mail.” I would ignore it and move on. But, if I was expecting something from Royal Mail, I cannot tell you with 100% certainty that I would do that. That is the case not least because we always want what is coming: “Where is it? Come on, I’m ready for it.” I can easily see how that mistake can be made, and that mistake could have a profound and long-term impact on someone’s life. It is only possible to do that because of technology that allows relentless and repeated communication attempts, and we know that so-called SIM farms are the way that that is done.
We support the aim behind clause 5 of making an offence of the possession of a SIM farm. I have reservations about the utility of subsection (2), but we have probably tested that debate to destruction. The point that was made about “good reason” was really good. I am slightly uncomfortable with the Minister’s response that the court will set that; I think we could do that. There are legitimate, although deeply irritating, marketing purposes for that degree of communication—it is for others to say how effective it is. Even political parties engage in it sometimes, so bulk text messages are not without precedent. It feels like we can tighten up the clause to specify who can use these things and to what purpose. Again, there will be edge cases that fall between the marketing of a bad product and the marketing of a fraudulent product. There is a difference between those things. People have a right to advertise a product that is not very good. We would not want to consumer it, use it or buy it, but they can do that. That would be at the edge of the cases we are talking about here, so we need greater clarity, and perhaps the Government can tighten that up before Report.
Clause 7 introduces schedule 1, which is amended by Government amendment 47. The schedule relates to the offence of obstructing a person in their endeavours to investigate possible offences under clauses 5 and 6. The effect of the amendment is that a person cannot obstruct someone other than a constable as that search warrant is being executed. Again, we do not have a problem with that—people need to comply with the provisions of the law—but we need a bit more clarity. I do not say this to be smart; I just want to understand it. The Minister characterises this as a technical amendment, which is a term of art in this place. Was there a drafting error or does it genuinely not change the substance of this provision? I do not think the intention is for lots and lots of people to have the ability to exercise these powers. It is tightly defined, and those who are not constables who can do this will be accompanied by a constable, but we could do with a bit more clarity.
Finally on this topic, part of the challenge we face is that although some of these enterprises will be set up in this country, they can also be set up and executed from other nations that have weaker arrangements than we will have, assuming this legislation passes. Will the Minister tell us about the conversations the Government are having with European and global partners about this, and give us some information about where the hotspots are so that there is greater public awareness?
Chris Philp
Let me respond to one or two of the issues that the shadow Minister quite reasonably raised.
Fraud makes up about 40% of all criminal offences—the figure I have in my mind is 41%. The hon. Gentleman is right that it is incredibly serious, and I have certainly never suggested anything to the contrary. It can devastate people’s lives. People who have worked hard over a lifetime building up their life savings to fund their retirement or their children’s education can suddenly have them taken from them in very distressing circumstances, so there is no question but that fraud is an extremely serious crime. The Government take it extremely seriously, which is why there is a fraud action plan, backed with investment—we recently provided over £100 million of extra money.
I was one of the Ministers through whose hands the Online Safety Act 2023 passed during its extremely lengthy gestation. It will have a significant effect by requiring the large social media platforms to proactively take steps to prevent fraud. Some of them have already done that voluntarily, and there have been big reductions in the amount of online-originated fraud, so this is a huge priority.
The simple reason we do not include fraud when comparing the overall crime figures to 2010 is that it got picked up by the crime survey for England and Wales, alongside computer misuse, only in about 2016. If the figures going back to 2010 existed, we would obviously include them. When we talk about a 56% reduction in crime since 2010 to on a like-for-like basis, which I am sure I will be referring to once or twice in the next year, it excludes fraud and computer misuse only because they were not in that series of figures.
Chris Philp
I will in a moment. When we compare the crime figures since 2016, we see that overall crime has fallen. For example, overall crime including fraud and computer misuse has fallen by 10% in the last year, which I am sure the shadow Minister is about to stand up and welcome.
Alex Norris
I gently say that, in their attempts to create a picture of community safety—which is not what people feel—there is a problem in Government Ministers relying on statistics that they know to be incomplete. There should be some reflection on the numbers cited. I understand the like-for-like point—that is true—but it is problematic to tell the public how much safer they are if that argument relies on excluding a significant and growing type of crime. That must be wrong.
Chris Philp
It is not reliant on that. It is simply that the data does not exist. The chief inspector of constabulary Andy Cooke said in his state of policing report last June that we are arguably safer than we have ever been before. If we look at the crime types for which we do have continuous data going back to 2010 and before—such as burglary, robbery, the vehicle theft figures that the shadow Minister himself quoted recently, violent and seriously violent crime—we see that all of those individual crime types have fallen dramatically.
Chris Philp
In a moment. Bicycle theft is down by 39%, vehicle crime by about 50%, and violent crime by around 50%. It is not the case that some sort of artifice going on and that if we added fraud, that would paint a different picture. Whichever crime type we look at, we see that it is going down according to the crime survey. We all know why police reported crime sometimes shows different trends. It is because the police are being driven by—we are getting a bit off topic here, so I am probably going to get told off in a minute.
Chris Philp
Yes. There is probably another time to debate this point, and perhaps now is a good moment to give way to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
Jess Phillips
I think I am at risk of offending you in the Chair, Dame Angela, but may I have the data for whether rape, child abuse or domestic violence have gone up or down?
Chris Philp
Thank you, Dame Angela; you were extremely tolerant, but I could sense the frostiness beginning to build without even looking at you.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, asked two more questions on this group, which I will answer very briefly. He asked for assurance that this technical amendment was not a smokescreen for some nefarious Government plot. The wording of Government amendment 47 is very clear, in that it just inserts the words,
“a person who has the powers of a constable”.
Therefore, it extends the powers of search only where that person has the powers of a constable, which of course is set out in legislation. I gave as an example certain employees of the National Crime Agency. This is not an open-ended provision—it is very specific and precisely defined in law as someone who already has the powers as a constable. We are not creating any new powers in the Bill, other than that those people who have the powers of a constable can conduct these searches.
The shadow Minister also asked about international co-operation, which is extremely important. My colleague the Security Minister works very closely with international partners—in fact, he is almost constantly travelling. There will be an international summit chaired by the Home Secretary later this year on the very topic of combating fraud, working closely with the Five Eyes and engaging bilaterally with the European Union and other key countries. There are various jurisdictions that tend to originate more of this fraud—Russia, for example—and the Security Minister in particular and the Home Secretary are working very closely on that. In order to avoid any further disapproval, Dame Angela, I think I have answered the questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Possession or supply of Sim farms: powers of entry etc
Amendment made: 47, in schedule 1, page 75, line 15, after “includes” insert “—
(a) a person who has the powers of a constable;
(b)”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides that the offence in this paragraph applies in respect of persons who have the powers of a constable.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8
Fraud facilitated by electronic communications: possession or supply of other
articles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have already discussed that technological change can be very rapid, and that criminals, including fraudsters, are quite technologically literate and very often embrace emerging tech capabilities to attempt to defraud the public. Just as we previously discussed in relation to articles used for serious and organised crime, so here, in clause 8, we are proposing to create a power by regulations for the Secretary of State to make a list of new items that might be prohibited where they can be used for the purposes of committing crime by way of electronic communications.
As the shadow Minister has said, one has to be a little cautious about conferring regulation-making powers too freely, so there are constraints on this. For example, the offences created using these regulation-making powers can only create summary offences of possessing or supplying technology to be used in connection with fraud facilitated by electronic communication. It is very specific and very narrow.
The shadow Minister previously asked about consultation. I said that there was no statutory requirement to consult on those extensions—outside of the devolved Administrations, of course—but that the broad intention was to do so, unless there was a very good reason otherwise, such as an emergency. Here, however, we do have a statutory duty to consult. Members will find it in clause 8(5), which states that
“the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing…to be likely to be affected by the regulations”.
There is therefore a statutory obligation to consult here, which I hope provides the shadow Minister with the assurance that he is probably about to ask for.
Alex Norris
I am afraid that clause 8 deeply frustrates me. I do not think it is in any way the same as clause 2(3). That provision allows the Secretary of State to add items to and remove them from an established list concerning an offence that is established in law on the face of the Bill. This is slightly different. Clause 8(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations create a summary offence of possessing or supplying an article specified in the regulations.”
That is making a law, not monitoring a list. This is an example of a Henry VIII power used badly. The provision should be in the Bill, and if the nature of the networks is likely to change over time, there should be a mirroring power, similar to that in clause 2(3), that enables us to change the list. We would have supported that. This puts us in an invidious position. Of course, we want this to be in legislation and we want there to be regulation and control over electronic communications networks or services being used in a dangerous way. However, we are being asked to jump into the abyss and to choose between either voting against including in the Bill something that we think is broadly a good idea, or allowing the Government to do an incomplete job and leave a placeholder. Even as I stand here, I am not sure which is the right answer.
I welcome the fact that consultation is on the face of the Bill. That gives us some degree of safeguard. However, accepting the clause would mean accepting that a significant offence would be created and decided upstairs, rather than in the white heat of the legislative process. I do not think that is right. I am not sure if the Minister is able to say anything that will give me slightly greater comfort. If we were able to see what the offence looked like between different stages of a Committee, that would probably be enough to salve my pain. I do not think that will happen, but I will listen to what the Minister says.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his question. I point to the way the clause is constructed. Clause 8(2) is narrowly defined, in that is says:
“An article may be specified only if the Secretary of State considers that there is a significant risk of the article being used for a purpose connected with fraud that is perpetrated by means of—
(a) an electronic communication network, or
(b) an electronic communication service.”
Clearly the Secretary of State’s decision would be amenable to judicial review if it were unreasonably exercised. The scope of the ability to create a new criminal offence is highly circumscribed and it has to fit within that narrow box in the Bill.
Alex Norris
I accept that that is circumscribed; it is not narrow. However, electronic communication networks constitute an exceptionally broad area of British life, touching us every minute of every day, and that does not feel very narrow at all.
Chris Philp
That is only part of the circumscription, because prior to that the clause says,
“being used for a purpose connected with fraud”.
If we think about that as a Venn diagram, the shadow Minister is right to say that electronic communication networks and services represent an enormous field. However, that is not where the power is created. It is created in the intersection between that bit of the Venn diagram and the bit where the article or technology is being used for a purpose connected with fraud, and that intersection is a lot smaller.
I do not think that any member of this Committee or any Member of Parliament, of either party, would object to criminalising technology being used for a particular fraudulent purpose. In addition to the protection afforded by the statutory obligation to consult, there is also the fact that this can only be a summary offence, which severely limits the maximum penalty that may be applied.
Alex Norris
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is being very generous. I completely agree that there is not a person in this building—including, I suspect, the mice on the Terrace—who think that it is a bad idea to have powers that restrict fraudulent use of electronic communications. The problem is that in the previous debate the test for that was good reason and then we would rely on the court. In the eyes of Government, therefore, it is clearly not black and white whether it is fraud and they may well rely on others to define that. In order to get through the blockage, perhaps the Minister could think about that in the context of the assurances he gave on good reason to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. That would probably be enough for me at this point.
Chris Philp
I can certainly confirm that where someone possesses technology for a good and legitimate reason, by definition it would not be getting used for a purpose connected with fraud. I can also confirm that where someone possesses communications technology for a legitimate purpose and not for use in connection with fraud, we would not expect that to ever be criminalised, either through offences created via this clause or in any other way. I hope that assures the shadow Minister.
Subsection 4 says:
“The regulations may—
(a) contain exceptions or defences”
of exactly the kind that we have created in clauses 1 to 4 already.
I hope that the assurance I have given, which will be in Hansard, combined with the narrow nature of this, the narrow scope of the ability to create offences, the statutory duty to consult, and the fact that it is a summary offence, meaning that the maximum term is six months at the moment—all those things taken together—will give the shadow Minister assurance on the questions that he is raising.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Possession of weapon with intent to use unlawful violence etc
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 53 in clause 9, page 6, line 24, at end insert—“(c) a sword.”
This amendment would make clear that the bladed articles in scope include swords.
Alex Norris
Clause 9 introduces a new offence of possessing an article with a blade or point or an offensive weapon with the intent to use unlawful violence. Knife crime is a scourge in this country. It devastates communities and families. It feels that we have a steady drumbeat of tragic cases, which, as I say, have a devastating effect, and it is right that we are taking action to do something about it. We should want to take action. This is not new; it feels to some degree that we have been spinning our wheels on action, but we are here now, so let us take that on its face.
The Government consulted in April last year on restricting the possession of so-called zombie knives and have announced on multiple occasions that they plan to enact such restrictions. I hope the Minister will give some clarity but, from the explanatory notes, I think that this is an attempt to make good on that. Paragraph 45 of the explanatory notes says:
“Following the closure of the consultation in June 2023, the Government published its response in August 2023. In that response, the Government committed to implementing all the proposals.”
Those are the proposals relating to restrictions on so-called zombie knives.
“Clauses 18, 10 and 9 give effect to those requiring primary legislation”.
I hope the Minister will be able to say whether this is the final stage of the ban’s implementation. Previously, we have been expecting secondary legislation in this regard.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for that commitment. Currently, it is an offence to carry an article with a blade or point of over three inches, with the exception of a pocket-knife, in a public place. It is also an offence to threaten somebody with an offensive weapon and to carry in public any article intended to be used as an offensive weapon. As we understand it, the introduction of this new offence bridges the gap between threatening someone with a bladed article and being in possession of such an article.
Again, we support the intention to close the gap and ensure that we crack down on this scourge. Sharp instruments or knives are currently responsible for 41% of homicides, so clearly the police need stronger powers to deal with that. However, we think that the Government could go further and be clearer about what blades or weapons should be covered by the new offence. That is the effect of my amendment 53. Secondary legislation may be the place for that, rather than the Bill, but I do not want to miss the substance of amendment 53.
In recent years, there has been progress on banning certain weapons used in violent attacks. We have debated measures, for example, on adding knuckledusters, sword-sticks and now zombie knives to the list of offensive weapons. That progress is welcome, but again it does not go far enough because with increasing frequency supposedly decorative blades, such as ninja swords, are being used in violent knife attacks. It is vital that we update legislation again to include blades such as those.
The impact of my amendment would be to add swords to the list. I am perfectly aware that the Bill may not be the most elegant place for it, but what I am trying to get from the Minister is a commitment to extend the ban to swords. Recently, I met the family of Ronan Kanda and their Member of Parliament, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). They told me their story and about their campaign for justice. Ronan, a beloved son and brother, was just 16 years old when he was walking back to his home in Wolverhampton after picking up a PlayStation controller from a friend’s house. Just a few yards from his front door, Ronan was attacked from behind by two 16-year-olds carrying a machete and a ninja sword. Ronan was stabbed twice, suffering wounds to his back and chest. Tragically, he died at the scene.
It was later revealed that the perpetrators of this heinous act had mistaken Ronan for someone else and that he was not the intended target. The weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators—just 16 years old themselves at the time—using another person’s ID, and had been collected from a local post office by them on the day of the attack. In July this year, they were sentenced to 18 and 16 years in prison for their crime.
When I met Ronan’s family recently, it was clear that what happened had shaken them to their core. It has had a devastating impact on their lives. I commend their unspeakable bravery in campaigning to try to create change as a result. I felt very guilty—this will happen with many others, too—that they had to tell their story yet again when I met them; there is that process of telling the story all over again in the pursuit of change. The family campaign now for ninja swords, the type used in Ronan’s murder, to be taken off the streets so that other families do not suffer such a loss. I again commend their extraordinary bravery.
The test that I will apply to the Government’s changes on zombie knives, and on broader knife crime, is whether they would take off the streets a weapon like the one that killed Ronan; if not, the changes will fall short. Existing legislation does not cover ninja swords, and nor does the Bill. From the Government’s response to the consultation on knife crime, I understand that they intend to stop short of ninja swords. I believe that to be a mistake, which will be compounded by other restrictions.
Leaving the ninja swords loophole in place will push sales and marketing towards ninja swords—if people cannot buy a zombie knife but can buy a ninja sword, that will displace activity and make the swords more likely to be carried. That risks more lives being lost, due to the lesser consequences for carrying.
Amendment 53 would add ninja swords explicitly to the Bill. We think the clause is good and important, but the amendment would enhance it. I know that an issue has been raised about ninja swords for decorative purposes, but I do not think that it is beyond us to have arrangements for when that can be managed. Again, the clause is not about possession—it is narrower: about the intent to cause unlawful violence—so I do not think that issue should be a concern, although there could be some sort of licensing scheme to address it.
I am very much looking forward to what the Minister says. This is not a criticism, but I just do not understand why in his plan he stopped short of ninja swords. I hope to get that clarity. Even if not today, the Government need to move on this. I hope to hear that that process is starting.
Chris Philp
It may be helpful to clarify the two different kinds of provisions that apply; the shadow Minister was conflating the two slightly. The first area, the one that we are debating, is to do with the existing offence of possessing any bladed article in a public place without good reason. That can include a legal kitchen knife. That carrying is a criminal offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. That applies to every bladed article, even ones that are legal, such as a kitchen knife or anything else. It also applies to swords, including ninja swords, because they are bladed articles with a sharp point.
At the moment, the possession of any such knives, including so-called legal knives, carries a maximum sentence of up to two years if someone is caught in possession. For a second possession offence, the mandatory minimum is six months in prison, absent exceptional circumstances—we tightened that up in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That is the law for possessing blades in public.
The clause states that when someone possesses any bladed article—including a legal kitchen knife—with intent to cause damage, the maximum sentence will not be two years, as currently, but four years, if that person intends to cause harm. For example, they might put a video on TikTok saying, “I’m going to stab X”. If there is intention to cause harm, that doubles the maximum sentence. That is what the clause does. The amendment to include swords is not necessary, because every bladed article, including swords, is already included.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North was actually talking about a different set of provisions, which were included in our consultation and our response: banning certain kinds of knives. When a knife is banned, it cannot be sold, imported or possessed even in private. Something such as a zombie knife was covered in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, where it has threatening writing on the blade. Such knives cannot even be held in someone’s home. Having banned knives at home or selling them to anyone is an offence; a kitchen knife can of course be sold and had at home, but even a kitchen knife cannot be carried down the street without a good reason.
In our consultation, we were talking about the knives that people cannot even possess privately at home; they cannot be sold or imported, and they are completely prohibited. The measures we announced in the Bill will simply increase the list of things on the completely prohibited list. For example, a loophole in the 2019 Act meant that threatening words on the blade were required for the zombie knife to be illegal. We are removing that provision, so that any zombie knife, even with nothing on the blade, will still be illegal—common sense, really.
Those changes—widening the range of knives that will be completely illegal—will be made not through the Bill, but through secondary legislation that will be laid before the House in the near future, by which I mean a small number of weeks. I do not wish to provoke the ire of the Chair, so I should say that the place to debate what should be in and out of that list is probably in the Delegated Legislation Committee that will come soon, in a small number of weeks.
I thank the shadow Minister for mentioning the case raised by his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). I have also met Ronan’s family, who were brought into Parliament by the right hon. Member. We obviously both heard the same account of their story. It was extremely moving and tragic that such a young life was lost. I think it was a case of mistaken identity—as the shadow Minister said, Ronan was attacked from behind. I add my tribute to the family, and to Ronan’s mum and sister in particular, who have recounted the terrible, traumatic event to try to improve law enforcement in this area. We are mindful of that case, and I look forward to debating what is on and off the list when we come to it.
For complete clarity, I repeat the point that the possession of any bladed article, including swords and even kitchen knives, in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of two years. When a knife is possessed with intent, as in the attack on Ronan—the two youths obviously intended to go and kill someone, although it was someone else—the clause increases the maximum sentence from two years to four years. In that case the youths clearly committed homicide, which obviously has life as a maximum sentence.
I hope that I have provided clarity about the purpose of the clause and explained why the change is necessary, because it is included already, and that in secondary legislation we are altering the law on completely prohibited weapons. That will happen in a small number of weeks. I hope that addresses both the hon. Gentleman’s amendment and the substantive provisions in clause 9.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the clarity on what will be covered under the provision. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment. I must say that I am a bit frustrated: it was not clear from the explanatory notes whether this was the full ban. Clearly, from the answer that I have been given, it is not. However, it is a shame that the change will come in secondary legislation, because we are here now—we have legislation in front of us—and we cannot amend secondary legislation.
There will be a big debate in the Delegated Legislation Committee on the point about swords. We will be put in an invidious position, because of course we will not vote against the secondary legislation, but we will not be able to get the change that we really want and we will continue to miss out. The Government’s approach is slightly frustrating. The commitment that the secondary legislation is coming shortly is good, but I hope that the Minister will use the time to reflect on my point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Thursday 11th January 2024
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
On a point of order, Ms Bardell. First, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Secondly, for the record, I just clarify that the maximum sentence for a possession offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is four years. This morning, I inadvertently said two years.
The Chair
I thank the Minister for that point of order.
Clause 10
Maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Bardell, and to resume proceedings. They were very good-natured this morning, and I am sure they will be similarly good-natured this afternoon.
Clause 10, like clause 9, relates to the Government’s consultation on banning or restricting sale or possession of knives. As we did this morning, we support that important venture. Clause 10 increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of importation, manufacture, sale and supply, and possession of a weapon, flick knife or gravity knife. This is a welcome change that we support. We must send a clear message that those who commit such offences, whether to supply offensive weapons or to profit from them, are not beyond the reach of the law.
It is also welcome to see that these offences will be triable either way, and therefore to provide the police more time to investigate alleged offences without the pressure of the current time limit of six months for prosecution. It is right that we give the police the flexibility to ensure that they can gather the necessary evidence to secure convictions and ensure that the full impact of these changes can be felt. Clause 10, taken with clause 9, is very much a step in the right direction.
I want to use this opportunity to press the Minister, through amendment 54, on an area that I think is missing from the Bill: proper age checks for those who are buying bladed products. Again, similar to the debate we had on clause 9, it may be that the Government want to look at this issue in a different way. As it stands, age checks must be carried out on delivery of bladed products to ensure that those receiving such items are of the correct age, but too often we hear of incidents where that has not happened, and the consequences can be fatal. This is an area worth revisiting.
I refer back to the case that I raised this morning: the tragic murder of Ronan Kanda. During the trial of those convicted of Ronan’s murder, it was revealed that the weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators. They were just 16 years old, so they should not have had those products. They used another person’s ID and collected from the local post office on the day of the attack. Those are breaches of the law in and of themselves, which led to a devastating breach of the law later that day. The age verification process clearly failed there, and just hours later there were tragic consequences. This is just one incident, but it is part of a wider problem, which, if we do not have really good controls on, could mean knives and blades falling into the hands of children who cannot have, or have not, thought of the danger to themselves and others that comes with such weapons. We know that a failing process creates that vulnerability. It is a weakness in the legal framework.
Amendment 54 therefore seeks to raise the penalty—from just a fine—for those who deliver bladed products or hand over bladed products or articles to someone under 18. It would increase that penalty, which I believe would create more rigour in the age check. That in turn should help prevent knives from falling into the wrong hands; it could address that weakness. This issue is perhaps a good reminder of the challenges that our shopworkers face, although we have tabled new clauses that I suspect might give us the chance to discuss that matter, so I will not do so today.
Being able to verify someone’s age and deny someone a knife they are trying to buy seems like a friction point to me, so it is right that there should be counterpart legal support, but that that really good quality verification must happen, or there is real danger. My attempt to have age checks carried out diligently is one way of doing it, but it is not the only way. Campaigners rightly want this change. If it is not to be this change on the face of the Bill, I hope we might hear from the Minister about how it can be strengthened and how we can ensure really good confidence in that verification process.
Chris Philp
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out his amendment and his views, as he did this morning in such a thoughtful and considered way.
I turn first to the substance of the clause. It increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of possessing, importing, manufacturing, selling or supplying prohibited offensive weapons when they are sold to those under the age of 18. We take seriously the sale of knives to under-18s, so the increase in the penalty from six months to two years is important.
We do not want people under 18 to be sold knives; we have heard about all kinds of tragic examples of them using knives to commit homicide. On 27 September, a tragic case in my own borough, Croydon, involved a 15-year-old schoolgirl, Elianne Andam, who was brutally murdered with a knife at 8.30 in the morning. The alleged perpetrator was himself only 17 years old. Preventing such knives from getting into the hands of young people is critical. That is the purpose behind the clause.
The clause relates to selling knives to those under 18, but the amendment speaks to a slightly different point: delivering knives to those under 18. Delivering something is obviously different from selling it. If someone is selling it, they are a shop, a retailer, and the person responsible for the transaction. Acting as a delivery agent—whether the Post Office, FedEx, UPS or some such—means delivering a parcel on behalf of someone else, which is a slightly different responsibility. That is why the law as it stands sets out in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 some measures to address the issue. The delivery company must have arrangements in place, together with the seller, to ensure that the items are not delivered into the hands of someone under 18. The penalty for delivery is an unlimited fine.
Some new guidelines have been set out by the Sentencing Council. They came into force on 1 April 2023. Organisations now face fines with a starting point of between £500 and £1 million. That is a starting point, so they can be very substantial fines indeed when applied to a corporate body. Individuals can, of course, be fined as well. It is important to make it clear that corporate bodies can be liable for such fines, as I said a second ago, because they are obviously capable of paying much larger amounts of money than an individual.
Amendment 54 raises an important issue. The case that the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred to is relevant—I completely accept that—but I think that the changes made in the Offensive Weapons Act and the Sentencing Council guidelines that came into effect less than a year ago strike the right balance on the delivery of such items. For the sale of items, however, we are increasing the custodial maximum up to two years.
In addition, the provisions of the Online Safety Act, which will be commenced into full force once the various codes of practice are published by Ofcom, will place duties on things such as online marketplaces, which historically have not been regulated. Online marketplaces have been facilitating, for example, the sale of knives to young people or the sale of illegal knives—the kind of knives that we are banning. Those online marketplaces will fall into the remit of the Online Safety Act, so the online space will get clamped down on a great deal.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
For the sake of clarity, will the Minister confirm that if a shop owner sells offensive weapons, the shop owner will be liable and not the person who works on the premises—obviously, they should not be held accountable for a shop owner’s decision to sell the weapon.
Chris Philp
On the sale, it could be either an individual who makes a sale and/or the business. A defence of coercion is available generally, however—I am not sure whether it is in common or statute law. If a shop worker were coerced into selling something, or compelled to do so in some way, that might be a defence if they were accused. Coercion certainly would be a defence in that case.
The increase in the maximum sentence up to two years makes a lot of sense. I have referred to the provisions in the Online Safety Act. On delivery—when someone is simply delivering as opposed to selling—the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 broadly strikes the right balance, but I certainly agree with the shadow Minister that anyone involved in the supply or delivery of knives has a very strong moral obligation, in addition to the legal ones I have set out, not to supply under-18s, because we have seen very tragic consequences, such as the cases in Wolverhampton and Croydon, and tragically many others as well.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s answer, which has given me a significant degree of comfort. The point we will hold under review is the nature of delivery companies and the nature of their employment. Some of that is third party and some involves self-employment, which has been a matter of debate in this place on many occasions. I fear that that weakens to some degree the chain of accountability. Nevertheless, very significant fines are in place, as the Minister said. I wonder whether a custodial sentence backstop would strengthen the provisions a little further, but given that the current guidelines are relatively new, as the Minister said, we ought to give them time to work.
The point about online marketplaces was important and has been of interest to the shadow Home Secretary. We are very keen that that should happen as soon as possible. We are grateful for that assurance from the Minister. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Encouraging or assisting serious self-harm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 11, page 8, line 23, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
This amendment and amendments 24 and 43 extend the offence under this clause to Northern Ireland.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 24 and 43.
Clause stand part.
Clause 12 stand part.
Laura Farris
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. Government amendments 23, 24 and 43 amend the penalty provisions in clause 11 and the extant provisions in clause 77 extend the broader offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm to Northern Ireland.
Clause 11, together with clause 12, fulfils a commitment made by the Government during the passage of the Online Safety Act to broaden the offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm to cover all the means by which that may occur, including direct assistance such as giving somebody a substance or even a weapon with which to perform the act.
Unlike the offence in section 184 of the Online Safety Act, which it replaces in so far as that offence applies to England and Wales, the broader offence is not confined to verbal or electronic communications, publications or correspondence. In that respect, it implements the recommendation that the Law Commission made in 2021, in its important “Modernising Communications Offences” report.
There are two key points that I want to draw the Committee’s attention to today: capacity and intent. Clause 11(1) says that a person commits the offence if they do an act that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm”
and if their act was intended to elicit that response. In so far as those two threshold tests are met, it is then a strict liability offence.
Subsection (2) provides that the person committing the offence does not need to know or be able to identify the person to whom their conduct is directed; it is enough that the conduct takes place at all. Secondarily, the offence is committed irrespective of whether serious self-harm eventually materialises.
Subsection (5) sets out the maximum penalties for the offence. The offence is triable either way; in a magistrates court it is subject to a fine or, on conviction on indictment, to a custodial term, or both, and in the Crown Court it is subject to a fine or a custodial term not exceeding five years, or both.
Broadening the offence has allowed us to simplify the drafting in a way that is more consistent with the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide. Members of the Committee will recall that that was discussed extensively during the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023—that we should be bringing self-harm, in terms of the elements of the offence, to read more consistently with the law on suicide.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I missed Clare Wade’s evidence because I was unwell when she gave evidence to this Committee. Are we to assume that the clause will be used in the prosecution of cases where self-harm is caused by incidents within domestic abuse relationships or as a result of grooming, sexual violence and broader violence against women? I think that it was clarified during the evidence session that that was the case.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. It is quite clear that Parliament’s intention, in the way that we are framing the clause, and how the clause might actually play out when it comes before the courts, are probably quite different. I have been thinking about that myself. This is very much an extension of what I may call—I hope you will forgive me if I use this as a shorthand—the “Molly Russell” principle, which was established by that tragic case and led to all the new principles of the Online Safety Act—bringing them into line with the offline environment.
However, I think that you are quite correct; when we read clause 11, we see that it belongs in a range of different circumstances, all of which I have thought through. Yes, I think that you are right to say that it could very easily exist within a domestic—
The Chair
Order. I remind the Minister to speak through the Chair and observe the usual conventions.
Laura Farris
My apologies. I am sorry for being too informal; I am not familiar with this. I think that it is the case that the issue is readily identifiable within certain forms of domestic abuse scenario, and that the clause would apply in those circumstances. It is obvious in the statutory language.
Jess Phillips
I will speak more broadly about the issue in a moment, and I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said; that is what we would all want to see. However, I am concerned about the each-way offences that the Minister outlined. Let us say that in a case of suicide a coroner found that domestic abuse had been involved—I mean, chance would be a fine thing in most cases—and a manslaughter charge was laid and then the perpetrator pled guilty. There has only been one case of this. I just wonder how these summary limits and these each-way offences would work in that situation.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady again for her question. Actually, I think that we would have to concede immediately that it would be on the charge sheet. However, the hon. Lady has raised the topical, important and very difficult issue of whether or not a domestic abuse perpetrator has elicited suicide in circumstances where, as she will know, there are evidential difficulties. There is a discussion happening within Parliament, and more widely within the legal profession, about the offence of manslaughter and its ambit when it takes place in the context of suicide.
Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Lady, though, by saying this: if we stop short of suicide—very much mindful of the fact that that engages quite difficult legal issues—and we think about the offences created under clause 11, I think that it is almost inconceivable that there would be a circumstance in which a clause 11 offence existed and was not accompanied by an offence of coercive control under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I just do not think that, in a domestic abuse context, those two things would not exist in parallel. Therefore I think that we would already be looking at a more serious form of sentencing if we were into an “eliciting self-harm” clause 11 offence. It would also be automatically brought under the ambit of the Domestic Abuse Act, and it is already a more serious offence in that context.
Clause 12 is the facilitation element of the offence, and subsection (1) provides that anyone who arranges for somebody else to do an act capable of amounting to inducing self-harm is also committing an equivalent offence. Subsection (2) provides that an act can be capable of encouraging or assisting self-harm even when done in circumstances where it was impossible for the final act to be performed. For example, if pills were provided to a person and they ended up not to be the pills that were intended, it is exactly the same offence. Equally, if something harmful was sent by post but never arrived, the offence and sentence are the same irrespective.
Subsection (3) provides that an internet service provider does not commit the offence merely by providing a means through which others can send, transmit or publish content capable of encouraging or assisting serious self- harm. Subsection (5) provides that section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is repealed in consequence of these provisions, which create a much broader basis, bringing the online and offline environments into parity.
Jess Phillips
The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.
As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.
There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.
Alex Norris
I am really grateful for my hon. Friend’s contribution. I think that is exactly right. We will hear from the Minister in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley where the Government settle on that point. Certainly on the face of the Bill, institutions are left out. I do wonder whether clause 14 would give us the opportunity to reconnect institutions. I suspect that is not the motivation behind that clause, but it may work in that way. Those are pertinent questions that I am sure the Minister is about to address.
Laura Farris
A number of very good points have been made and I will try to respond to all of them. On Scotland, the offence relates to devolved matters, but Scottish Ministers have decided that the broader offence should not extend to their jurisdiction. They are sticking with section 184 of the Online Safety Act for now. That is why the amendment does not extend the offence to Scotland.
Let me turn to the point that the shadow Minister and the hon. Members for Birmingham, Yardley and for Bootle all made about the ambit of clause 11(1). If I may recap what I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, I think it is absolutely possible that some forms of domestic abuse will fall under the provisions of clause 11. She gave a good illustration of where that might occur. As I have said already—I hope I satisfied her with my answer—I think there is almost no circumstance where the clause would not be read or even pleaded in tandem with the Domestic Abuse Act. It will be a compound offence, and the charge sheet will have more than a section 11 offence if it occurs in the context of an intimate relationship or a former relationship. Conversion therapy was raised, and I think it is possible that that could fall within the ambit of clause 11 too. It is quite obvious how that could be the case.
Laura Farris
Well, okay, but I struggle to conceive of circumstances, other than very unusual and extreme ones, where it would be said that a statutory body was doing an act with the intention of eliciting the consequence of self-harm. Anyway, the point has been made and I have responded to it. I know the hon. Lady’s case is an emotive one.
Jess Phillips
I am not going to talk about my case, but with regard to the charge sheet, coercive control legislation does not currently cover adults who are sexually exploited in grooming situations. In the case of a woman who is sexually exploited by an adult, like the woman I was with this morning, coercive control legislation does not apply. However, self-harm—I mean, I am going to say that literally being forced to be raped by 20 men a day is self-harm—is absolutely part of the pattern of coercion and abuse that those people suffer, so we would assume that adult-groomers would be covered by the Bill.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I think a very helpful fabric of possible scenarios has been identified this afternoon. I simply say that in the different circumstances that she has just outlined, there are different criminal offences that would also apply. My simple point is that a case of the nature that she has described would not be confined to a section 11 offence under the Criminal Justice Act 2024, as I hope it will become in due course; there would be a range of serious criminality connected to that.
Jess Phillips
There isn’t. I hope, as the Minister hopes, that there will be by the time we have got to the end of our scrutiny of the Bill, but there is no crime of grooming adults in sexual exploitation; that exists only for children as an aggravating factor in offences. I suppose pimping legislation would not count in the case I mentioned if self-harm was caused. I do not think there are other bits of legislation for adult victims of sexual exploitation.
The Chair
Order. We are having a very important and thoughtful debate, but can we please try to observe the normal procedures so that Hansard colleagues, and those who are watching, can catch all of the proceedings?
Laura Farris
I am sorry if I misunderstood the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I thought she was identifying a rape scenario, which would be caught by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is probably not particularly fruitful for us to talk about every instance of criminality, but I think there is a point of agreement between Members on both sides of the Committee. Opposition Members have quite rightly and properly identified that clause 11 is likely to go much wider—the way it will be interpreted or pleaded, or how it will end up in court, is probably a bit different from the way in which it was presented to the House during the progress of the Online Safety Bill, when we were confined to two or three particular instances of self-harm. The Opposition correctly identified that issue, as we did on the Government Benches. I am not trying to get out of responding, but I think the provision will be tempered by common law as it goes through the courts.
Amendment 23 agreed to.
Amendment made: 24, in clause 11, page 8, line 24, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”.—(Laura Farris.)
See the statement to amendment 23.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 20—Sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film: modesty clothing—
“(1) Section 188 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) After inserted section 66D(5)(e) insert—
‘(f) the person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.’”
This new clause would see definition of “intimate image” extended to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups.
Laura Farris
The clause is the latest in a sequence of legislation dealing with intimate image abuse. People may correct me if I am wrong, but I think I am right to say that we have not dealt with intimate image abuse until this Parliament. The first time it hit the statute book properly was the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I think it is also right to say that, as a Parliament, we have framed it correctly as something that is more often than not just another ugly incarnation of coercive control. It is highly intrusive, humiliating and distressing conduct.
In November 2022, following the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, the Government announced their intention to create a suite of new offences to deal with intimate image abuse, closely based on the Law Commission’s recommendations in its July 2022 report. Under the Online Safety Act 2023—I hope the Committee will not mind if I spend a moment on the chronology and the legislative journey on intimate image abuse—the Government repealed the offences of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images, replacing them with four new offences of sharing or threatening to share intimate images.
The Bill goes further to tackle the taking of intimate images without consent, and the process of installing equipment for that purpose. First, it repeals two voyeurism offences related to voyeurism of a private act and taking images under a person’s clothing, for which we use the shorthand “upskirting”—although that precedes the life of this Parliament, so I am wrong about that. Anyway, both those offences are reasonably new and have resulted in amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Bill will replace them with new criminal offences to tackle the taking or recording of intimate images without consent and the installing of equipment for such purposes.
Those taking offences build on the sharing offences identified in the Online Safety Act to provide a unified package of offences using the same definitions and core elements. That addresses the criticism that there was previously a patchwork of protection, which the police told us led to gaps in provision when it came to this type of behaviour. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller), who is not a member of the Committee. She has done a lot of work on the issue, and identified this problem in particular. As we know, one of the issues was proving intent.
I am grateful to the Law Commission for its work. It consulted widely with the police, prosecutors and legal practitioners, so we could not only read its report, but hear from a range of experts, including those supporting and campaigning on behalf of victims, and others who are far more knowledgeable than any of us.
The clause will insert a suite of new provisions after section 66 of the 2003 Act. The clause will create three new offences: the taking or recording of an intimate photograph or film without consent; and two new offences about installing equipment to enable a taking offence. I will go through them briefly.
The first provision of the clause is the creation of what we call a base offence of taking any intentional image of a person in an intimate state without their consent. That amounts to what we will call a section 66AA offence. It removes the requirement for a reason or motive. It does not matter if the person was doing it for a joke or for financial payment, or even if their reason was not particularly sinister. The base offence would be met if those elements were established. The offence is triable summarily only and will attract a maximum prison term of six months.
The wording of the two more serious offences mirrors some of the language that we are familiar with; the offences refer not just to “intentionally” taking an image, including of a person in an intimate state without their consent, but to having the intent of causing them “alarm, distress or humiliation”, or taking the image for the purpose of “obtaining sexual gratification” for themselves or another person. The offences are serious and carry a maximum sentence of two years. The three offences are designed to achieve the right balance between the protection of the victim and the avoidance of any over-criminalisation. I will return to that when I speak to new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
The base taking offence is subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, such as a police officer taking an image without consent for purposes connected with criminal proceedings. Similarly, a base sharing offence is subject to the defence of reasonable excuse; for example, images taken for the purpose of a child’s medical treatment would meet that threshold, even if the victim was distressed by that. There is another exemption—I do not know who came up with this example, but it is a good one—if the image is taken in a public place and the person shown in the image is in the intimate state voluntarily. A distinction is therefore drawn between, for example, a photo of a streaker at a football match, and that of someone who had a reasonable expectation of privacy; that would relate to upskirting, for example.
We are also creating two offences to do with the installation of spycams, which I am afraid we see more and more of in cases going through the courts: an offence of installing, adapting, preparing or maintaining equipment with the intention of taking or recording intimate photograph or film; and an offence of supplying for that purpose. To be clear, it will not be necessary for the image to have been taken; if equipment was installed for that purpose, that is enough to meet the requirements of the offence.
Overall, the clause amends the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to ensure that notification requirements can be applied, where the relevant criteria are met, to those convicted of the new offence of taking for sexual gratification and installing with the intent to enable the commission of that offence. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will respond to the new clause later.
Jess Phillips
I will be brief. New clause 20 would extend the definition of “intimate image” to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups—for example, instances of a person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.
Alex Norris
Clause 13 is right and is a welcome addition, so I do not have much to say about the two lines that form it. I will keep my powder dry for my amendments to the schedule that the clause introduces, which is where the action is.
New clause 20 is a welcome addition to the debate and would be a welcome addition to the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley says, some people get forgotten in our discussions. The point of having a diverse Parliament that represents the country that we serve is that we try to work that out, but we all have a responsibility to step up and meet the moment. I will be interested to hear what the Minister says about the new clause. When we talk about intimate photos or films, the question is: to whom is it intimate? The new clause—and we—say that it is intimate to the person who has suffered that photo or filming, and who is being threatened with the sharing of those images. It is intimate to them, rather than to the perpetrator. Nothing could be clearer than that in the horrible case that my hon. Friend raises. We support the new clause, and I hope that the Minister does, too.
Laura Farris
I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.
We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.
One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.
Laura Farris
I will, but I would like to develop this point a little bit more.
Jess Phillips
I strongly suggest that the hon. Lady does not come from the same community as me. I described images being sent to the community; the nature of the image would absolutely be clear to lots of people where I live.
Laura Farris
I was going to complete the point. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will do so before I give way again. We have to create laws that apply equally to everybody in the United Kingdom. If we are to create an offence of sharing intimate images, we have to have a translation of intimacy that is absolutely irrefutable to anybody sending that image around. Even if they do not know the person in the image, it has to be absolutely clear to the sender that they are sending an intimate image. I have already made the point that it would not be immediately obvious to everyone in the United Kingdom that an image of a woman showing her hair was a humiliating image of her. It would not automatically be an intimate image even if the person sharing it knew that the woman in the image was Muslim, because some Muslim women do not wear headscarves.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a very dark case. She mentioned the language of blackmail and honour-based violence. She intimated coercive control. My simple point is that in the circumstances she has identified, there are a host of serious criminal offences being committed in conjunction with the use of the intimate image. We would say, very respectfully, that we think that kind of crime belongs much more comprehensively within other offences.
Laura Farris
I am not going to engage in a case-by-case discussion. It is so difficult for me to do that; I do not have the papers in front of me. I understand the issue about community-based events, but if the purpose of sending the image is to blackmail a person, they have already engaged another element of the criminal law, and there is already aggravation, in that the perpetrator is being domestically abusive or is committing an honour-based offence, as the hon. Lady described.
I want to make it clear that by introducing the base offence, this legislation is removing the need to show an intention to cause distress. That is the issue that Georgia Harrison had, but managed to circumvent when she got that very successful and high-profile conviction against Stephen Bear, who went to prison for two years. She had an evidential difficulty in proving intent in her case. Although she did, she then became a really powerful advocate for removing intent from the offence, and we have done so.
I am not for a moment suggesting that there will not be cases of maximum sensitivity in which somebody is humiliated, but as I say, in the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described, in the background, other offences were materialising. Our view is that it is more appropriate that they are dealt with under other elements of the law, rather than our muddling the police response, or even creating offenders where we do not mean to, because under the hon. Lady’s offence, the offender does not know they are committing an offence. They might think that they are sharing an image of a glamorous woman, not knowing that it is grossly offensive that they have shown a picture of a woman who does not have her hair covered as she normally would, because they do not know her.
I hope that answers the hon. Lady. With great respect, I urge her not to press her new clause. However, I would like to hear from her, because I did not give way to her a moment ago.
The Chair
The rules allow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, to come back again—and the Minister can, in fact, respond again, if she would like to.
Laura Farris
I have probably gone as far as I can. There are no circumstances in which Georgia Harrison’s case would not be covered by the provision that we are discussing. The other person can be a current partner or an ex, or there can be no relationship. [Interruption.] I know that the hon. Lady is talking about a different category of case. I wonder whether one of the problems in the case that she raises is the adequacy of the police response, rather than whether an offence exists for it. It is difficult, in drafting legislation, to create a category of offender when an image would not be recognised as being intimate by everybody in the United Kingdom. On that basis, with great respect, I am afraid that we would have to reject her new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained intimate photograph or film
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A publishes, hosts or makes viewable a photograph or film of another person (B) which has been obtained (1) unlawfully under sections 66A, 66AA, 66AC or 66B, subject to the provisions of sections 66AB and 66C.
(2) For the purposes of this part, “publishing, hosting or making viewable” includes—
(a) physical or online publication, and
(b) uploading to a user-to-user service,
(c) in relation to owners or administrators of a user-to-user service, allowing public access to a photograph or film uploaded by another person, and
(d) maintaining or providing for the presence or availability of a photograph or film by any other means or in any other place, whether or not such service or access is conditional on the payment of a fee.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make it an offence to make publicly available, either through publishing or online hosting, intimate photographs or videos which have been obtained unlawfully.
Jess Phillips
I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.
Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.
The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.
The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.
However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.
Laura Farris
Opposition Members have made two very good points, which I will respond to. The issue of publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained internet photographs is salient. It was probably thrown into its sharpest relief by Nicholas Kristof at The New York Times when he did a big exposé of Pornhub. I have never read off my phone in any parliamentary sitting before, but I will briefly do so, because the opening to his article is one of the best that I have read about Pornhub:
“Pornhub prides itself on being the cheery, winking face of naughty, the website that buys a billboard in Times Square and provides snow plows to clear Boston streets. It donates to organizations fighting for racial equality…Yet there’s another side of the company: Its site is infested with rape videos. It monetizes child rapes, revenge pornography, spy cam videos of women showering”.
The point is very well made.
Under the Online Safety Act 2023, we have ensured that all user-to-user services in scope of the illegal content duties are required to remove that type of illegal content online when it is flagged to them or they become aware of it. That would cover something such as the Pornhub apps I have described. We believe that the robust regulatory regime for internet companies put in place by the Act, with the introduction of the offence of sharing intimate images, which extends to publication, are the most effective way to deal with the problems of the spread of that material.
Our essential answer is that under the Online Safety Act a host site—I have given a big name, because I am critical of that particular site—would be under a legal obligation to remove content flagged to it as featuring prohibited content, so it would have an obligation under the law to remove an intimate image of an individual created without their knowledge or consent or to be subject to criminal sanctions. Under the Online Safety Act, those are substantial; Parliament worked collectively to ensure that meaningful sanctions would be applied in that regard.
There is a concern that creating a new offence would partially overlap with existing criminal offences—for example, that we would basically be duplicating some of the provisions under section 188 of the Online Safety Act. We worry that that would dilute the effectiveness with which such activity will be policed and charged by the Crown Prosecution Service. I understand that the provisions under the Act have not yet been commenced, so we would be legislating on top of legislation that has not been commenced. Respectfully, I invite hon. Members to allow the Act to come into force comprehensively before we make an assessment of whether we need to legislate again on the issue of hosting unlawful content. However, I am sympathetic to it, and I think the whole House agrees with the principle.
Equally, the Law Commission was asked to look at the issue of deepfakes, which it considered and responded to. I will remind the Committee of how it undertook its inquiry into the issue. It undertook a full public consultation on the point and engaged with the CPS and police, and it concluded that making a deepfake offence was not necessary. It identified certain associated risks, including difficulties for law enforcement and, again, the risk of overcriminalisation, which potentially would outweigh the benefits. The Government share the view of the Law Commission and have decided not to create a separate making offence.
I will provide hon. Members with some reassurance: nobody is in any doubt about the risk. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described harmful, culpable conduct relating to her personally and to other senior politicians in this House. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest gave hypotheticals that could easily materialise, and we all know that there is an increased risk of that as we move into an election year on a global scale, because elections are happening all over the world this year. Nobody doubts the risk. I want again to provide the reassurance that such conduct generally involves sharing of these images, or threats to share, both of which are criminalised by offences under the Online Safety Act, or by other offences—communication offences and harassment offences—so it is already captured.
The secondary issue identified by the Law Commission concern the prosecution difficulties, because it would be difficult to prove some elements of the offence, such as an intention to cause distress, in circumstances in which the image had not been shared—by the way, I take out of that a circumstance in which the defendant has told the victim that they hold the image, because that has already crossed the threshold. The question that I asked officials—I have now lost the answer, but they did give it to me. Hang on a minute; someone will know where it is. Will the Committee give me one moment?
Alex Norris
Now I have to work out something to say. There was certainly a degree of bravery in saying to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that there is a belief that there is a robust regime in place— I thought I could hear steam coming out of her ears. It is a given that we all share a view, but that does not mean that that is necessarily reflected in output at the moment. [Hon. Members: “Keep going!”] It is very important that what is in the Bill reflects what we are trying to solve, and I am concerned that at the moment it does not, but the Minister clearly takes a different view.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.
I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.
I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.
Jess Phillips
On the answer that the Minister got from her officials, there are so many bits of legislation about abuses of children, sexual violence towards children, sexual grooming of children and sexual exploitation of children, and there are none about adults, as though such behaviour is not harmful when someone turns 18. If the same kid in the same class is 17 and makes images of a person who is turning 18, the view is that one day it would be a problem and the next day it would not, as though the abuse of adult women is just fine. The Online Safety Act does not say the word “woman” once, so I will gently push back on the idea that it deals with this. I am going to scour Pornhub now—I will not do it while I am in Parliament in case somebody sees me—to look for these images, and I will rise to the Minister’s challenge. I am going to go to the police once the Online Safety Act is in force and we will see how far I get.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.
First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point about copyrights, which was absolutely bang on the nose. We should not give any succour to any platform telling us that this is too hard to do. All we need to do is, on Saturday, sit with our phones at about 3.15 pm and wait for someone to score in the premier league. We will be able to see that goal for about 90 seconds—someone will share it because it is watchable in other countries. Within 90 seconds, however, we will no longer be able to watch it and it will say, “This is no longer available due to a breach of copyright”. That is how quick it is—no more than 90 seconds. This absolutely can be done when the stakes are considered high enough.
I am grateful that my hon. Friend was willing to share her personal experience—I did not know whether she would choose to or not. Again, what she has to put up with is extraordinary and would test any human being. I am often amazed by her strength to carry on, but those people do not know the person they are taking on. But that is no excuse and gives no cover. This penalty is being exacted on her for a supposed crime: yes, it is for being a prominent person in politics and yes, it is for holding strong views on the left of politics. But the real crime, at root, is that she is a woman. I do not have a public platform like my hon. Friend’s, I am absolutely delighted to say. If I did, my treatment would be entirely different because I am white and I am a man. This again has to be seen through a gendered lens, and we have a responsibility to protect women in this regard.
I will refer to a couple of points that the Minister made. First, on hosting, we will see about this robust regime. I would be keen to know either today or at another point how soon these provisions are going to be turned on. They need to be turned on and used, otherwise they are of absolutely no use to anyone. We will see. It is reasonable for her to want that regime to have its chance to operate. I accept that and withdraw amendment 56 on that basis. But we will see and we will certainly come back.
Similarly, on deepfaking, I know the Law Commission chose not to go into this space, but its report was not carved on tablets of stone. We are allowed to go further if we think that the case is there. [Interruption.] I do not share—my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley is going to have steam coming out of her ears soon—much of a concern around overcriminalisation in this space. That just does not connect to reality. [Interruption.]
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend is not operating “Weekend at Bernie’s”-style—I promise. That is a dated reference. She talked about people being the same age, so maybe that will be the test of that.
We will welcome the point around children, but it must be seen in the context of what my hon. Friend said. The Minister has said she is satisfied on both points. We say, “We will see whether that holds”. We need those provisions to be enacted and to see the laws on the statute book used properly on deepfakes, otherwise we will have to return to this point. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
A mendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 48 in schedule 2, page 85, line 32, at end insert—
“Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)
1 In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert—
‘177DA Photographs and films to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences
(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66AA(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (taking or recording of intimate photograph or film).
(2) The photograph or film to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purpose of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).’”
This amendment amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the amendment to the Sentencing Code made by paragraph 19(2) of Schedule 2 to the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 36 and 50
Government new clause 10—Power to seize bladed articles etc: armed forces.
Government new clause 11—Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces.
Government new clause 12—Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces.
Chris Philp
I hesitate to say that these are technical amendments; given the shadow Minister’s comments this morning, I do not want to unduly provoke him. However, this series of amendments simply extends some of the measures within the Bill to the service police —the military police—of all branches of the armed forces and to the service justice system. The relevant measures are: the power to seize bladed articles, contained in clause 18; the power to enter property to seize stolen goods without a warrant, contained in clause 19; the power to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing, contained in clause 22; and making grooming a statutory aggravating factor for sexual offences against a child, contained in clause 23.
Amendment 48 to schedule 2 also ensures that the offences relating to intimate images provided for in the schedule also fully read across to the service justice system. Our armed forces do incredible work, of course, but we must ensure that the law applies to those serving in uniform as much as to members of the public. That is why we are proposing these important—although also technical—amendments.
Alex Norris
We are getting to the witching hour on a Thursday, but the Minister tempts me around technical amendments. The point that I was making earlier was merely about whether we were using the same definition. I would also perhaps dispute that a technical amendment could be “important”, because I think that, at that point, it would cease to be technical. However, as I say, I think that that is a distinction of classification rather than substance, and that these are sensible amendments—although I would not say that they were technical. There are other issues that will come up in those later clauses that the Minister mentioned, but we will debate them, I am sure, in due course.
Amendment 48 agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14
Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
The identification doctrine is a legal test used to determine whether the actions and mind of a corporate body can be regarded as those of a natural person. The concept has existed in common law since 1971, but, since then, companies and corporations have grown in size and complexity, which has made it more difficult to determine who a controlling mind might be. That means that employees of large corporations with significant control over business areas are none the less not considered sufficiently controlling under that common-law legal test originally dating from 1971. Therefore, the corporations for which they work might not be held criminally liable where we think they should be.
Substantial progress was made to address the issue in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, which put the identification doctrine on a new statutory footing, making provisions to ensure that corporate liability can exist where a senior manager commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority. However, because of the scope of that Act, it only applied to economic offences.
During the passage of that Act through Parliament in the last calendar year, the Government committed to expanding the statutory identification doctrine that I have just described—the expanded version that applies to large companies and the many senior managers in them—to all kinds of crime. Clause 14 makes good on that Government commitment by repealing the relevant sections of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and replacing them with the identification doctrine applying to all crime and not just economic crime.
I am sure that all of us here want to make sure that when large corporates commit offences, they are held to account and prosecuted. The common law provisions, dating back to 1971, are too restrictive. They do not go wide enough or reflect the fact that modern-day corporations have quite a few senior managers taking decisions. The clause takes what has been done already for economic crime and applies it to all criminal law. On that basis, I hope it commands the immediate and enthusiastic assent of the Committee this afternoon.
Alex Norris
I am not sure what “immediate” means in that context—must I instantly print off clause 14 and staple it to my back? Nevertheless, we support the clause. We supported similar provisions in the passage of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and this finishes off the job. It is actually very pertinent to the week we have had in Parliament, because it is safe to say that this week has been dominated by the outrage about the Post Office/Horizon scandal. There is a legitimate expectation among the public and in this place that when such things happen, individuals and entities will be held accountable, so I do not think we will find much to disagree with. Obviously, the provisions will not apply in the case of the Post Office/Horizon scandal, but they will do so in the future.
The Post Office/Horizon scandal is exceptionally important. There will be others that come through and find their moment, for whatever reason—whether they relate to Hillsborough, Primodos, sodium valproate, surgical meshes or anything covered by the Cumberlege review. We need much quicker action. The Post Office/Horizon scandal is ongoing, presumably because the major elements of perpetration have already taken place. They would not be in scope of the Bill, so I would be interested in the Minister’s views. Other than that, I am happy to give the clause our support.
Chris Philp
In common with most legislative provisions, these provisions are prospective, rather than retrospective; we legislate retrospectively only rarely. I understand that some Post Office-specific measures may be brought before Parliament. There will be ample opportunity to debate them and to seek to right the very grave injustice that has clearly been committed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Tuesday 16th January 2024
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 January 2024 - (16 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk and please switch your electronic devices to silent. As you know, tea and coffee are not allowed at these meetings.
Clause 15
Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 15, page 11, line 19, leave out lines 19 to 21.
The amendment and amendment 26 ensure that procedural provisions in respect of regulations made under new section 63CA of PACE 1984 operate as intended.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 26.
Amendment 133, clause 15, page 11, line 27, at end insert—
“63CB Diversion services for persons testing positive for controlled drugs
Where a person has tested positive for the presence of controlled drugs in a sample taken under section 63B, that person must be directed to an appropriate drug diversion service.”
This amendment would require the police to refer individuals who test positive for a controlled drug to a drug diversion service.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 27 to 31.
Clauses 16 and 17 stand part.
Government amendments 45 and 46.
Government new clause 13—Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs.
Chris Philp
It is a great pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mrs Latham.
This series of Government amendments and associated clauses expands the police powers to drug test on arrest to include locations outside of custody. That includes introducing a new police power into part 3 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to drug test persons on arrest at a location outside of the custody suite when certain conditions have been met. It also amends part 3 of the Drugs Act 2005 to provide the police with a power to require people who test positive to attend an initial assessment—and, when appropriate, a follow-up assessment—in respect of their drug misuse.
The Government are keen to get more people into treatment: something that we have funded with £300 million of extra cash over two or three years, with the aim of creating 54,500 extra drug treatment places. I am sure that we can all agree that the best thing is to get people off drug addiction, to prevent criminal behaviour.
The assessments that I have just referred to will enable those people to be referred into treatment or support services, whose funding has just been increased, as I mentioned. The new power will operate alongside the existing power, as expanded in the Bill, to drug test people on arrest or charge in police detention under section 63B of PACE.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
During the evidence sessions it was made very clear, by both experts in the field and the police officers, that currently there is absolutely no possibility of this resource being available. Will the Minister please outline what resources the Home Office will put in place to ensure that the drug testing that he is rightly outlining will be able to take place?
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for raising the point. It is important to have capacity to deliver the testing. As I mentioned a couple of moments ago, we are now in the second year of a three-year funding commitment, as part of the 10-year drug strategy, to fund 54,500 extra drug treatment places across the country, delivered in partnership with local public health bodies. Those places have been created. There are now also liaison and diversion officers, I think, in every—or almost every—custody setting and in many courts as well, to help identify people who have a drug addiction.
Just before Christmas, I visited the custody suite in Northampton, where I met liaison and diversion officers. They speak to people who have been brought into custody and, if there is a substance problem, get them referred as we are describing. I accept that there is a need for resources, but those investments are being made. The implementation is being tracked by a cross-Whitehall taskforce that meets on a regular basis and includes officials from lots of Departments.
Jess Phillips
I thank the Minister for that and am fully in favour of more drug support services. What I was asking was whether the police have the resources to undertake the drug testing that the clause outlines. The police said no; this is not about whether somebody then gets referred on—the police, in the evidence session, said no. The Casey review into the Metropolitan police last year found that samples from rape cases were being kept next to packets of sandwiches in a police officer’s fridge. Yesterday, there was the story about the foetus in Rochdale. Also, if—
Jess Phillips
Okay. There are just not the clinical resources in police stations currently. Will the Minister outline how the testing will be funded?
Chris Philp
I have talked about the liaison and diversion officers and the treatment capacity, but on police resources, which the hon. Lady was asking about, we have just completed a substantial police recruitment programme. We now have 20,951 more officers than we had four years ago and 3,500 more than we have ever had before. The training takes two to three years; as officers complete their training, more and more will be available for frontline deployment. In addition, we are also—
Chris Philp
Well, the actual tests often get administered by police officers, and the hon. Lady asked about police officer capacity.
We are also removing some of the administrative burdens on policing by reforming the Home Office counting rules—that has already saved half a million hours of police time per year. Furthermore, the NHS are in the process of picking back up mental health cases where there is no criminality or threat to public safety. That is right; people in a mental health crisis need medical treatment, not the police. Once that is fully implemented, and we are in the middle of doing it now, it will free up more than a million hours of police time. In addition to record police numbers, we are removing some of the burdens keeping them from frontline activity, including what we are discussing.
I am satisfied that both police resources and medical treatment resources are available. If anything, the challenge is actually that we are not using all the treatment places available. Some of the proposals in this legislation will help the police refer more people for that initial assessment, which we hope and expect will lead to treatment in the extra places that we funded.
I do not want to stray too far from the clause, Mrs Latham. Following the community safety partnerships review and antisocial behaviour powers consultation, we are, as I mentioned, expanding drug testing on arrest to locations outside of custody so that the tests can be done quickly and easily and take up less time, to answer the point made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. That expansion, in addition to the expansion of drug testing to class B and class C drugs, as the Bill already provides, will ensure that police have all the necessary powers to identify people with a drug problem and get them into treatment.
The Government amendments confer a power on the police to drug test when a person aged 18 or over has been arrested for an offence and the officer has requested that the person give a sample. The power is discretionary, to be used when the officer feels that it is an appropriate course of action. It is also worth being clear that when drug testing takes place outside of police detention—that is, not in a police station—only a non-intimate sample, such as a swab or saliva, may be taken, for obvious reasons.
As with the current powers to drug test in police detention, testing may take place only when a person has been arrested for a relevant trigger offence, or another offence where an officer of at least the rank of inspector has reasonable grounds to suspect that the misuse of a specified controlled drug has caused or contributed to the offence and expressly authorises the test. A refusal to provide a sample without good reason will be a criminal offence, as is currently the case with the existing regime for drug testing on arrest.
Jess Phillips
In many domestic abuse cases—the fatal ones, sadly—the fact that the perpetrator was on drugs is used as a mitigating factor to get, for example, a manslaughter charge rather than a murder charge; I could cite many cases, but I will not stretch the Chair’s patience. Will drug testing be done in cases of domestic abuse, and has the Minister thought about how that might help the perpetrator?
Chris Philp
As I just set out, drug testing might be done, particularly if the inspector thinks that drug abuse might have contributed to the offending. If someone is on drugs that are causing them to commit domestic abuse, I am sure we would all want that identified so that action can be taken.
On the hon. Lady’s point about homicide versus manslaughter, that is not in the scope of this Bill—we are not making any changes in that area. I do, however, share her concern about the cases of people who murder their partners. We should not be somehow excusing their behaviour or seeking to diminish their culpability by saying, “Oh, they’re on drugs,” and getting the charge dropped from homicide to manslaughter. Although that is not the topic of this Bill—the Bill makes no changes as far as that is concerned—I share the hon. Lady’s concern. I hope that the legal community have heard the point that she has just made, with which I have enormous sympathy. I think it sounds reasonable.
The safeguards for the new power include that it can be used only by approved constables; that the statutory PACE codes of practice must include provision about how the new drug testing power is to be exercised; and that the sample may be taken only for the purpose of a drug test. That is to ensure that the power is used proportionately and only by those with appropriate experience.
The individual being tested must also be given a notice setting out why, when and where they were tested, and the result of the test. Following a positive test, a person can be required to attend an assessment with a drug-support worker, as is the case with the current drug testing regime. Non-attendance without good reason will itself be an offence. We will probably debate Opposition amendment 133 later; that tries to go further on this issue.
The trigger offences and specified controlled drugs will be set out in secondary legislation. The Secretary of State will, in line with the regime for drug testing in police detention, have the power to specify in regulations those trigger offences within the scope of drug testing in locations outside of custody, and the controlled drugs to be tested for. Such regulations will be subject to the affirmative and negative procedures respectively. That will ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny and allow for the regime to be varied if circumstances require.
The amendments also make various—I hesitate to use this term after the comments from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, last time—technical and consequential amendments; I think we should excise the word “technical” from our discussions in future to avoid triggering the shadow Minister. The amendments make various important and consequential changes to ensure that the drug testing regime outside of custody has the same legal effects as drug testing in police detention.
In talking through the amendments, I have explained the intent behind clauses 15 to 17. I will rest my remarks there and reply later to any further points raised in the debate.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
As we have heard, clauses 15 to 17 expand police powers to test for drugs in suspects who have been arrested and are in police detention. Drug testing on arrest was originally introduced as a police power under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which inserted sections 63B and 63C into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That legislation gave the police the power to drug test those arrested if aged 18 and over, or charged if aged 14 and over, for the presence of specified class A drugs if arrested or charged either for a trigger offence or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has reasonable grounds to suspect that specified class A drug use has caused or contributed to the offence and authorises the test. Trigger offences include theft, handling stolen goods, going equipped for stealing and possession of a controlled drug if committed in respect of a specified class A drug. We know that such offences have a significant link to substance misuse. Clause 15 expands police powers to test not just specified class A drugs but any specified controlled drug.
We were very keen on such measures 23 years ago in relation to class A drugs, and we support their expansion to include any specified controlled drug; my anxiety stems from the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned, we heard in the evidence session and we know from engagement with our local police forces that there is not likely to be the capacity to do this effectively.
The Minister said that there are record police numbers, but he knows that there are 10,000 fewer police in neighbourhood settings. His pushback to that in previous debates has been to classify response police as neighbourhood police, but they would certainly not be able to do this type of activity. The burden of proof is on the Minister and the Department to show where the capacity will come from. We have real doubts, although we hope the measure will work.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Routinely or in extremis, demand pressures can push officers to do just the basics—keeping people safe and putting people in detention—rather than dealing with the broader issues, as we want them to. That problem creates further issues, and that is a challenge for us all.
Chris Philp
On that point, it is important to clarify the reason we are introducing the national partnership agreement, which applies Right Care, Right Person across the whole of England and, we hope, Wales too. Following a successful pilot in Humberside, it was found that in many of the mental health cases that the police were dealing with there was no criminality and no threat to public safety, so a police response was not right for the person suffering the mental health crisis. Not only was that taking up lots of police time that should have been spent doing other things, such as dealing with drug offences, but the person suffering a health episode was not being properly treated. It was found in Humberside that it is better for everyone, including the patient, to get a medical response in those circumstances. That is the motivation for the national partnership agreement, which the hon. Gentleman just referred to.
Alex Norris
The evidence from Humberside was strong and gave us encouragement to expand the scheme nationally; the challenge will be whether we see the same level of thought in its implementation across the country as we saw in Humberside. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle said, the risk is that forces will apply the scheme by simply not responding or turning their phone off, and displacing the activity. Humberside is a really good example of something done thoughtfully and well, but we should not assume that we will see that nationwide.
Jess Phillips
I believe in so many principles that I know in reality cannot be realised. I believe in the principle that when someone is in crisis with suicide, there should be a telephone line that I can call that means that they get what we used to call—because it used to exist—a safe and well check. I have done that many times myself. I believe in principle that that should happen. If a Minister were to stand in front of me and tell me that that was the policy, it would be like them telling me that the sky is green. It may very well be the policy, but the reality is completely different. In the evidence sessions, all the experts in the field backed me up.
I want to know how this will actually work. I absolutely want it to work, but, to the hon. Gentleman’s point, I am very concerned about some of the safeguards. One of the things that people who work in the criminal justice system notice is the trends in how wrong ’uns, essentially, start to get away with things—there is always some new defence coming down the line. In the days when we did not believe victims of domestic abuse and they could just be ignored—see yesterday’s report on Rochdale—people did not need a response. The current favourite of a domestic abuse perpetrator on a summary or more serious offence is a counterclaim against the victim—“Well, she’s abusing me”—and my God, does it work! The amount of women who are victims of domestic abuse currently being accused by police forces across the country of being perpetrators, not victims, of domestic abuse is plentiful.
We also know that if we look at our female prison population, or at the roll of women in any substance misuse service, we would go a long way before we found one who had not been a victim of domestic abuse or sexual violence—in childhood and adulthood—and exploitation. There is a reason why women end up substance-dependent. Incidentally, there is a reason why men do too, but the main reason why women end up substance-dependent is abuses they have suffered. It is very likely that a counterclaim that brings a woman into a custody suite will find that she smoked a few spliffs the day before. That will go against her not just in the criminal court, where she is much more likely to be convicted of those crimes than her partner, if we look at all the data on female convictions, but in the family court, where she will lose her children as a result of that evidence.
If a woman is distressed because she has just been attacked or has lived with fear and she is behaving erratically—who wouldn’t?—and somebody says, “I think she might be on drugs,” it will be used against her. On the defences I talked about, if a person commits domestic abuse and is on drugs, that will be considered a mitigating factor. I have seen it lots of times; in the most serious cases, it is the difference between manslaughter and murder. Let us flip it around: if a person murders or harms someone who is themselves on drugs, it is seen as an aggravation on their part, and they get manslaughter again. If a person kills a woman who is behaving erratically because she is on drugs, jackpot—manslaughter! If a woman takes drugs and is killed, it is a reason to give a man manslaughter. If a man takes drugs and kills someone, it is a reason to give him manslaughter. Frankly, the cards are stacked against us.
I agree with the principle of the clause, but what happens if there is a counterclaim and the woman is drug-tested and found to be on drugs and the man is not, or the other way round? Either way, there is a possibility—well, it is not a possibility, because every other law we have tried to change has been used by perpetrators; they are better than us in this regard and know their way around the system, as do their lawyers—that he will get a lighter sentence.
I wish the police were trained well enough, but only 50% are trained on coercive control, for example. We have to make sure that there is guidance so that, in cases of domestic abuse, where the woman has a potential counterclaim, these things are not taken into account; otherwise, they will be used to take her children off her—they will be used against her. I can already see it in my future. I ask that that is given some really serious thought, because I am a bit frightened about how this is going to play out.
As somebody with decades-long experience of living side by side with a heroin, crack and cocaine addict, who I am pleased to say is well now and has dedicated his life to the service of other people in that situation, I have to say that the idea that a person “has to” go to one session—it is about the compulsion—means that they are just going to go and tick a box. My mum sent my brother halfway round the world to have different interventions. They did not work. Thousands of pounds were spent trying to get somebody off drugs.
I hear what the Minister says about more money being put into this, and my brother was and continues to be part of Dame Carol Black’s review. However, there is this idea that just one interview will do the job. In reality, it is a tick-box exercise, and it will not work unless people’s initial trauma is dealt with. You would have to go a long way to see somebody with problematic substance misuse who has not suffered some form of trauma. Loads of people take drugs recreationally, and it does not harm them; they are not allergic to it and do not become problematic addicts. The reason why that happens to some people and they go on to commit crimes is that something else is wrong. One meeting will not a problem solve. If one meeting had been what it took, my mother would have died in a happier position than she did.
This proposal is not a panacea, unless we work with things such as the 12-step programme—I declare that I am on the all-party parliamentary group for 12 step recovery. The programme is completely free, so commissioners do not understand it; they do not know how to behave when no one is asking them for any money. I cannot stress enough that if this proposal is just to make a nice headline—“We are going to drug-test everybody”—rather than something that will work in reality, it is a massive waste of police time; it is pointless. I will leave my comments there.
Chris Philp
I will try to respond to some of the points made on this group of amendments and clauses. On mental health, as the national partnership agreement is rolled out, we are asking the NHS to do more to treat people when it is just a medical condition, and that is what the NHS should do, because a medical crisis requires a medical response.
To respond to the point about resources, the NHS is this year receiving an extra £3.3 billion above and beyond what was planned. A lot of extra money is going into mental health specifically, and things such as mental health ambulances and mental health places of safety are being invested in to create the capacity required for the NHS and the ambulance service to take on people who have, in the last few years, wrongly been picked up by the police.
On making sure that the roll-out is done as thoughtfully elsewhere in the country as it has been in Humberside, we are not taking a “big bang” approach; we have not just flicked a switch and said that it is going to happen nationally from tomorrow. Implementation is happening on a force-by-force basis. In each area, the police are working with the local hospital trust, the mental health trust and the ambulance trust to make sure that the capacity is in place before things get switched over.
The roll-out has already happened in some areas. In London, I think it went live on 1 October or 1 November, but it may not be implemented until the end of this year in other areas, because they are going through the process of making sure that the NHS side of the equation has the capacity and is ready. Things are being done in a thoughtful and measured way around the country to replicate the success in Humberside, to which the shadow Minister referred.
I will try to address one or two of the other questions.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I did not intend to intervene in this debate, but will the Minister address one issue before he moves on? In my area, the mental health trust is under considerable stress, and there have been various patient deaths and things like that. The mental health services tell me that they are struggling to get professionals to join them so that they can provide what is needed. How can the Minister be confident in what he is saying if we do not have professionals joining the service and are more likely to see them leaving?
Chris Philp
We are getting a little way off topic. Briefly, since the shadow Minister has raised the question, the roll-out is happening in a thoughtful way, rather than immediately, to make sure that such issues are addressed. As I said a moment ago, extra money is being put in. The NHS workforce plan, which is now in place, is designed to make sure that the people needed are there to meet the challenges, not just in mental health, but across the whole NHS spectrum.
Fundamentally, we all want to see people who have a mental health condition treated medically. Where there is no criminality and no threat to public safety, it is completely inappropriate to get a police response, which has been happening in recent years. Those people need to be treated, not put in a police custody cell, for example. That is the right thing to do, not just for the police, whose capacity is freed up to protect us and our constituents and to catch criminals, but for patients, who need and deserve a medical response. We are now working to ensure that that happens across the country, building on the successful trailblazer in Humberside, which shows that this can work.
On the question from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, about using the negative versus the affirmative procedure in Government amendments 25 and 26, no substantive change is being made. Essentially, changing the list of specified controlled drugs is subject to the negative procedure, the trigger offences are subject to the affirmative procedure and, if the changes are some mix of the two, that is subject to the affirmative procedure. That does not substantively change the current position.
Let me turn to the questions that arose on drug testing outside of a custodial setting. To be clear, we are conferring a discretionary power on the police. We are not compelling them to test; we are leaving it up to the police officer. There may be occasions when, for operational reasons and to test more people, they find it more operationally appropriate to test on the spot outside of a custodial setting. It may be that they do not plan to take the person back to a custodial setting. That will save police time. This is a discretionary power, not an obligation; the police can use it where they judge it to be helpful.
The shadow Minister also asked about time. These tests are not sent away to the laboratory. I accept that we need laboratory tests to be a lot faster, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley highlighted in her remarks. However, these are on-the-spot tests, similar to those that might be seen in an airport—by the way, I think those are testing for explosives.
Chris Philp
I am relieved, but not surprised, to hear that. The result of these on-the-spot tests takes between 13 and 35 minutes to come back, so it is pretty quick.
I said these were so-called non-intrusive tests, and the shadow Minister asked, “What about urine samples?” To be clear, non-intrusive tests are defined in section 65 of the PACE code. That does not include urine samples but does include hair—excluding pubic hair—saliva and a swab taken from a non-intimate place, such as under the armpit. We are talking about pretty non-intrusive stuff.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 32, in clause 18, page 14, line 13, after “application” insert “(including any appeal)”.
This amendment clarifies that for the purposes of clause 18(8)(b), the final determination of an application includes the determination of any appeal.
Chris Philp
The clause provides a new power for the police to seize, retain and destroy any bladed article—a knife, for example—held in private when they are on the private premises lawfully, but where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the item is likely to be used for unlawful violence. Such knives are legal and held privately, but the police are concerned they might be used for unlawful violence.
Data shows that incidents with a knife or sharp instrument have fallen by 26% since December 2019, but it is still disturbing to see the number of cases admitted to the NHS every year—we look at NHS hospital admissions data because that is the most reliable measure of knife crime. As I say, hospital admissions for injuries with a bladed item have fallen by 26% in the last four years.
Currently, the police have no power to remove potential weapons from individuals unless those are to be used as evidence in an investigation or are subject to a ban. Even if the police come across several potentially dangerous knives while they are in a property with a search warrant for an unrelated matter—for example, a drugs charge—the only way they can legally remove those knives, even if they have reason to suspect they will be used unlawfully, would be if they were to be used as evidence in the investigation. These knives do not fall foul of the definition of knives that are inherently illegal, which we discussed in our previous Committee proceedings. We will widen the definition of illegal knives shortly via a statutory instrument, and such knives are always illegal, even if possessed in private. We are talking here about knives—a kitchen knife, for example—that will remain legal. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West for her campaigning on the issue of banning a much wider range of knives completely.
It might assist the Committee if I share a case study to illustrate the need for this measure. A police officer might be conducting a search in the residence of a male arrested for murder involving a firearm. The person might have multiple links to local gangs. A quantity of drugs might be recovered from the premises, along with a number of knives. Although there were drugs offences, if the knives found were not related to those offences, the police would have no power to seize them, even though they were found in the possession of a known criminal.
Jess Phillips
I seek clarity. There is a load of big kitchen knives on the wall in my house, and I can see them when I walk in. I deal with the issue of violence in a domestic setting all the time, but would that count?
Chris Philp
No, it would not count. For the police to exercise the proposed power, they must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the item is likely to be used for an unlawful purpose. I do not think there would be any reasonable grounds to suspect that kitchen knives hanging on the wall of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley would be used for an unlawful purpose. By contrast, if the police were in the residence of a known prolific drug dealer and gang member, drugs had been recovered from the premises and they had been arrested or convicted for previous violent offences, that would be an instance where a quantity of knives—perhaps different knives beyond kitchen knives—would meet the threshold that I just set out. I hope that sets out the rationale.
In his evidence to the Committee on 12 December, Chief Constable Gavin Stephens, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, said that giving the police this power is
“a very important preventive measure.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 11, Q18.]
That is why are seeking to introduce the provision, justified in the way that I have set out. If somebody believes that their property—their knife—has been seized in error, they will be able to make a complaint to the police, as with any other police matter. In addition, we are providing a right of appeal in court to have the item returned, if the court agrees. If somebody did unreasonably seize the kitchen knives of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, she would be able to complain to the police in the first instance. If they did not address her complaint and return the knives, she would then be able to go to the court and get them returned.
It is also important to say that there is no additional power of entry associated with the new power. The police would need to be in the property lawfully, which, presumably, would also not be the case in the hon. Member’s house. For example, they would need to be there as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter or invited into the property. We will amend code B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to ensure that the codes of conduct reflect the new power, so that it is used in a fair and reasonable way.
Finally, amendment 32 is a minor technical amendment —we must not forget that—which clarifies that for the purposes of clause 18(8)(b), the final determination of an application includes the determination of any appeal. This provision will help the police to take dangerous knives off the street, or out of people’s houses, even if they are legal, where they are suspected of being used for unlawful violence. It is a useful additional power. The police asked for it in their evidence to the Committee, and I hope that it will command cross-party support.
Alex Norris
This provision is to some degree the less controversial—though not unimportant—counterpart to clause 19, so I will keep some of my arguments for the next debate. The Minister wants cross-party support and he will secure it on this matter. The consequences of the clause will be that if a constable is lawfully on a premises and they find a bladed or sharply pointed item that they think might be connected to unlawful violence, they can seize the article. It passes an important test, which I think about quite a lot: if I had to explain to my constituents that the reverse were true, would they think I am an idiot? In this case, I think that the test is passed. If bladed or pointed weapons that might be used for unlawful violence are found during a lawful visit relating to another purpose, they absolutely should be seized. It is in the public interest.
We will discuss this point in the next debate, but it is important that the principle of search warrants is upheld, and that they have a definition; they cannot be used for fishing trips or exploratory trips. Nevertheless, when these sorts of items are found, we must be able to take them out of use. I am interested in whether the Minister thinks there is a need for training or awareness among officers. We could apply a Phillips test quite easily: if someone has a knife but they do not have any food or a kitchen, that is probably a bad sign. That in itself is possibly not the quality of regulations a Secretary of State might wish to set, so I would be interested to hear how the Minister thinks that might work.
I am grateful for the clarity that clause 18(1)(a), which states,
“is lawfully on the premises”,
means that the power applies on any visit, for whatever purpose, whether that is a search warrant or a response call. I do not disagree with that, but it is important that we state that. It is important that it is understood. It must be demoralising for staff to visit for a certain purpose—say, on a search warrant—and then to have people there laughing at them because they cannot withdraw from circulation some dangerous weapons. I think, therefore, that the provision will be welcomed by officers as well.
Chris Philp
I will briefly reply to a couple of the questions. We propose to use the same processes already in place for property that is seized. There is a very standard form and process that the police routinely use, and the same would apply here. The hon. Gentleman asks about subsection (7), on the basis on which a court might hear an appeal, and about paragraph (b) in particular, which appears towards the top of page 14. The subsection states that the court may make an order if it appears to it that the person is the owner and that
“it would be just to make the order”.
The hon. Gentleman askes what that means. I think the meaning is that the test set out in subsection (1)(c) is met—that is to say, there are
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant article would be likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence”
were it not seized. I think the test of whether the decision to seize and retain the blade is “just” essentially refers back to the test set out in clause 18(1)(c). It would seem reasonable that if that is the statutory test that the police officer applies when deciding whether to seize the knife, one would expect the court to apply precisely the same test, and that is how, therefore, I would expect the court to apply the term “just”. I hope, should there be any ambiguity, the transcript of this answer will assist the court in interpreting the use of the word “just” in what will be section 18(7)(b).
Amendment 32 agreed to.
Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Stolen goods on premises: entry, search and seizure without warrant
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 19, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(8) A constable may search a specified premises for specified items without obtaining authorisation under subsection (1) if the constable believes that the search is necessary for the effective identification of stolen goods.
(9) If a constable conducts a search by virtue of subsection (8), they shall inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector that they have made the search as soon as practicable after the completion of the search.
(10) An officer who is informed of a search under subsection (9) shall make a record in writing—
(a) of the grounds for the search;
(b) of the nature of the items sought;
(c) confirming that the officer would have given their authorisation under subsection (2) had the constable sought it.”
This amendment aligns the power given under Clause 19 with that in section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and enables a police constable to undertake a search for stolen goods without a warrant without obtaining authorisation from a superior officer.
Clause 19 is one of the more significant clauses. It introduces very significant new powers of entry, search and seizure without a warrant. That is not without controversy, as I think we will cover in the next three debates. Amendment 2, which proposed to leave out clause 19, has not been selected for debate, but it is worth noting that it received quite a lot of signatures spanning a very broad range of parliamentarians across the Conservatives, the Lib Dems and the Democratic Unionist party. Clearly, a significant range of colleagues with significantly different world views are discomforted by these provisions. That is always an interesting and important sign that we should get something right.
Again, I subject this to what my constituents think and the conversations that I have had with them in the past. So many items are now fitted with a GPS or geolocation tracker, but it is a matter of considerable frustration and no little confusion that the fact that we know where an item is does not provide appropriate grounds for a constable to retrieve it. That is deeply frustrating and, as we have seen in the explanatory notes and heard in the evidence sessions, is a problem that the clause seeks to solve.
The clause inserts into the Theft Act 1968 proposed new section 26A, which confers power on a police officer to enter and search any premises for stolen goods without a warrant. Under the current provisions in the Theft Act, a warrant would have to be issued by a magistrate before such a search could take place. Given the nature of the enterprises that pinch digital technology or expensive bikes, or that may even be stealing cars to order, we know that that delay involved could mean that our response is far too late and that the moment for retrieval, for detection and perhaps for breaking up an organised group of criminals has been missed.
Clause 19 goes on to state the parameters for the new power whereby the need for a warrant can be bypassed—namely, that a police officer of at least inspector level must authorise a constable to enter premises and search for the specified items, in this case stolen goods. It also sets out the conditions—namely, that the police officer of at least inspector level must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the items have been stolen, that they are on the premises and that it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant without frustrating or prejudicing the search—and that authorisation can be oral or written. Again, this process seems reasonable, given that the crime that it is concerned with often involves the rightful owner having that degree of tracking information and being able to provide it to the police, showing the precise location of the stolen goods, but at present the police cannot do anything about it.
There are certain checks and oversights. A uniformed constable must conduct the search; it must happen within 24 hours of authorisation, although I suspect that such searches will take place much more quickly than that; and it must be done at a reasonable hour. Again, in principle we support these measures; without wanting to prejudge the stand part debate, I need to establish that context before I can turn to my amendment.
The current process for obtaining warrants to search properties for stolen goods with tracking information can be an inefficient use of police and magistrates’ time. It hampers investigations and allows criminal enterprises to benefit from their activities, using the slowness of the authorities to do things much more quickly, and obviously we know that that can have a knock-on effect for further crimes as well.
An interesting point was well made in the evidence session when we heard from Superintendent Nick Smart of the Police Superintendents’ Association. He challenged the Committee about why the Bill appeared to sit differently from existing powers set out in section 18 of PACE. Amendment 61, which I have tabled, sets out to probe that issue.
Section 18 of PACE allows entry and search without the prior authorisation of a more senior officer, provided that it is after an arrest and the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that there is evidence on the premises being searched relating to the offence that has been committed, or to a connected offence. Therefore, there is precedent in current legislation for entry and search without a warrant or prior authorisation, and section 18 of PACE allows for consent to be sought afterwards, with a senior officer at the rank of inspector or above having to sign off on that, saying that they would have authorised the search if they had been there in that moment. That is also an important caveat.
Amendment 61 merely seeks to align the powers in clause 19 with similar powers in section 18 of PACE. The reason I think that would be quite helpful is that it would be more consistent from an officer’s point of view. I do not think that we would want officers to think, “Ah, am I using section 19 of the Criminal Justice Act or section 18 of PACE?” and therefore asking, “Can I, or can’t I?” The possibility for error is quite clear there.
More importantly, however, I think there would be some clarity for the public, too, because, once again, just as it would be challenging but not unreasonable to ask for officers to be very conscious of the different sections of the powers that they are using—of course they need to know that, although there are times in the heat of the moment when mistakes could happen—I do not think it is reasonable to expect members of the public to hold such things in their minds.
Therefore, consistency in the regime used is important; I think that was the point that Superintendent Smart was making, which is probably a good one. I want to press the Minister as to why that approach was not taken and why his approach is better.
Chris Philp
I very much welcome the Opposition’s support for the principle behind clause 19. As the hon. Member for Nottingham North mentioned, some people—a small number, I would add—have expressed reservations, but I am glad that we agree on the principle that the clause will help police officers to retrieve stolen goods; our constituents will welcome that. Amendment 61 aims to fine-tune the detail of how that is done. In fact, it goes a little further in its drafting than the Government are proposing. The hon. Gentleman referred to section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, noting that in some circumstances constables can enter premises without a warrant or prior authorisation from a more senior officer. He seeks to implement the same thing via his amendment.
The difference, however, is that under in the PACE provision the police must either suspect that a person is on the premises or be in pursuit of a particular person, whereas clause 19 is about stolen goods. Of course, individuals are a little more mobile than stolen goods: a stolen mobile phone, iPad or car can be moved, but that requires a person, whereas if the police think a person is in the premises, they can leg it pretty quickly. We do not need prior authorisation from an inspector under section 18 of PACE, because that relates to a person the police are after, whereas in this case we are talking about stolen goods. If the police think that there are both stolen goods and a person, the PACE provisions will apply and they can enter the premises without a warrant and without prior authorisation. The reason that we have built in the little extra step of prior authorisation by an inspector is that we are talking just about stolen goods, not about a person.
I can assure the shadow Minister that inspectors are used to authorising the use of various police powers—that is relatively routine—and inspectors are always available in each relevant area 24 hours a day, so there should not be any particular delay. We think that the clause is ECHR-compliant, and of course on the front page of the Bill there is a statement under section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act that in the view of the Secretary of State, its provisions are consistent with our ECHR obligations—a topic that may be debated on the Floor of the House today and tomorrow.
It is very welcome that the Opposition support the clause in principle. I do not think that the calibration of the inspector’s prior authorisation will cause any delay practically. Because we are going after goods and not people here, I think the balance is right. While welcoming the Opposition’s support for the clause in principle, I therefore gently resist their amendment.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. His points about human rights are really important. In this Committee, and during the Bill’s remaining stages in this place and down the other end of the building, we will have to fine-tune—I think that is the phrase he used—the balance of these provisions.
The Opposition certainly do not support routine warrantless searches, just on spec, of people’s lives, premises or property. We have to find a balance; that is why we have a warrants regime. If there are cases—I think that the clause provides us with one—in which it is reasonable to set that to one side, we must do so in a tightly defined and clearly understood way. I do not want to start the next debate prematurely, but that is very much my view, and I will be pressing the Minister further on it.
I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation, which is enough to give me comfort. It is slightly strange to hear conversation about the ECHR up here in Committee, given what we will hear downstairs on the Floor of the House this afternoon, but that is for others to debate. For the purposes of this debate, what the Minister said is a helpful caveat. What I offer perhaps would go further, and given that we are moving gently into this space, perhaps it is not wise to go the whole way. I suspect that this might have to be kept under review. The Minister talked about property not being fast-moving. Perhaps that will be tested by time, but at this point I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Peter Dowd
My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North has laid out the context for amendments 58 and 59 with thoughtfulness and with consideration, as he did for amendment 61. I agree with him that seeking a review within two years or thereabouts of the application of the powers is really important. It is important to ensure that when we give additional powers to the police, we ensure that the operation, implementation and use of those powers are subject to review. I think we would all agree that it would be beneficial on various levels, including operationally and in policy terms, to step back after a period of time and take a look at the implementation of the powers.
Notwithstanding the fact that my hon. Friend has described the powers as narrow, people will not be used to them. Let us say that in the first five or six months of last year, there were about 50 or 60 bike thefts in my constituency and that half of those bikes had a locator on them. Although they may have a “stolen” bike in their home, people are not used to the police just turning up, going into the shed and getting the bike, so we must explain why we are doing that. It is important to have a review after a couple of years to ensure that my constituents know that they will not be on the receiving end of a disproportionate intervention by the authorities. I have no reason to believe that the powers will be used indiscriminately or outside the spirit of our discussions today, but we live in a democracy and we want to live in a cohesive society, so it is important that we have checks and balances. A review after a couple of years, to ensure consistency, is important.
I agree with amendment 59, which would require the College of Policing to produce a code of practice in relation to the use of the powers. The College of Policing often talks about using
“evidence-based knowledge in everything we develop”.
That is crucial, so I am sure that it would welcome my hon. Friend’s proposal. It is important that the modus operandi of the police officer or constable be guided by authorised professional practice guidelines, which the College of Policing has, to ensure that their interventions are as appropriate as possible. That is all the more important in the light of the challenging circumstances in which some powers will be used. As I have indicated, the College of Policing is already well versed in the production of codes of practice, including—to name just a couple—those on the use of the police national computer and the law enforcement data service and on armed policing and the use of less lethal weapons.
I hope that the Minister will give careful consideration to the points that my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and I have made about the amendments. As my hon. Friend says, if the Minister will not accept the amendments, we ask him for an assurance that the spirit of them, if not the letter, will be included in the Bill. I know that the Minister is always equitable in these matters, and I am sure he will give careful consideration to the well-thought-out and considered views expressed by my hon. Friend.
Chris Philp
Let me respond briefly on amendments 58 and 59. Amendment 58 asks for review. Members of the Committee will know that review and scrutiny of statutory powers happens on a regular basis. The Home Office collects and publishes more data on the use of police powers than it ever has before. There are plenty of opportunities for Members to scrutinise the use of powers both via written questions, oral questions, the Select Committee, and so on and so forth, but critically the normal post-legislative review of the Act will happen three to five years after Royal Assent, as is usual. The scrutiny of how this works in practice will happen through those mechanisms, particularly through the post-legislative review that always happens three to five years after Royal Assent. A range of scrutiny mechanisms exist beyond that. The police are not under-scrutinised.
On amendment 59, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee, particularly the shadow Minister, that we intend to update PACE code B, which covers police powers of entry, search and seizure, to give a clear statutory guide—even stronger than the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice—on how best these powers should be used. Under section 66 of PACE, there is a requirement for us to do that. We are of course happy to do it, but we do not actually have any choice; it is a statutory requirement under section 66. That will include the new powers covered in clause 19 of the Bill. We will work with the college to ensure that any supplementary guidance it issues on these new powers reflects the wording of updated code B, but updating code B is compulsory; we have to do it. It is statutory, and I can confirm that we will comply with our statutory obligations. I hope that addresses the issues raised by amendments 58 and 59.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for colleagues’ contributions. My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle raised a couple of points. We must always hold in our head how things will operate in practice. What is in the Bill is in the Bill but often what happens in that moment—perhaps a moment of challenge or conflict at 11.30 on a Friday night—can feel very different from what is in the Bill. We ought to hold practical operations in our head, which is what we have been seeking to do.
The Minister addressed my hon. Friend’s point about stepping back and scrutiny to some degree, which was very welcome. I feel a certain degree of risk saying in an election year—obviously, I aspire to swap places with the Minister by, say, this time next year—that this may come back with a degree of interest. In this place in general, we are getting better at pre-legislative scrutiny, but I do not think that has been the norm. Notwithstanding what the Minister said about post-legislative review, I do not think that we do that very well, certainly not in Parliament. In fact, it is largely something we do not do.
We are lawmakers, and the temptation to make law and fill the parliamentary time will always be there, but very rarely do we go back and ask of something we tried three to five years ago, “Did it work? And if it didn’t, why? Did we need to do more law? Was it right to have done this by regulation rather than primary legislation?” It could be that people like me, who by nature are perhaps more interventionist than other colleagues in the room, might think, “Perhaps that was the wrong time to intervene.” It is about all those things. I do think we do that process very well, because we basically do not do it at all.
I have a degree of confidence. I am grateful for what the Minister said about post-legislative review, but I suspect that will be more of a departmental and less of a public exercise. There is something about being willing to own our errors in our proceedings that is good for public confidence—when we are willing to do it. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Similarly on amendment 59, what the Minister has offered in lieu on PACE code B is better than my proposal, so that is a very good deal indeed. On that basis, I am happy and willing not to press my amendment.
Perhaps the Minister, being a diligent student of Parliament, is saving his powder for the stand part debate, which is probably right given the gusto with which I entered the stand part debate during the debate on amendment 61. I really hope to hear in the stand part debate clarity from the Government that this is seen as a tightly-defined variation of the search warrant regime under a very tightly-defined set of circumstances. We have not yet heard that. We are about to debate the clause, and although I dare say we have covered most of it, so it may only be a short debate, we really need to hear that message.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We have touched on many of these issues already, so I will not speak at great length on clause 19 stand part. Suffice to say, our constituents expect the police always to follow up leads where they exist, particularly to retrieve stolen goods, whether mobile phones, e-bikes, cars or whatever it may be. As members of the public and as parliamentarians, we expect the police to always follow those leads. Just a few months ago, the police made a national commitment to do precisely that. An important part of that is the ability to retrieve stolen goods where their location is known or reasonably suspected. With technology now, many items—mobile phones, cars, and so on—have tracking devices, and the public are rightly frustrated if the police do not always follow them up.
This power enables the police to respond quickly to retrieve stolen goods where they have reasonable grounds to believe they know the location. Quite often, those stolen goods move very quickly indeed. For example, the thief may take them off to sell them, and therefore there is often not enough time to go through the process of getting a warrant. The police may want to act in a manner of minutes or hours. In investigatory principles, there is the concept of the “golden hour”, talked about by Chief Constable Andy Marsh, now chief executive of the College of Policing. That first hour is really important. Even the best magistrates court in the world will not be able to respond in an hour to authorise a warrant, but a phone call to an inspector can be done within that golden hour. That is why we are making these changes.
This is only one part of the police commitment to always follow all reasonable lines of inquiry. For completeness, I will mention the use of facial recognition technology. Where there is a photograph of somebody committing a crime on CCTV, Ring doorbell, dash cam, or someone’s phone, we expect the police to always run that through the facial recognition database, but that is a separate element of their commitment.
It is important to ensure these stolen items are recovered. It is more than irritating to our constituents when the police do not always follow them up. This legislation will give them the power to act quickly and decisively where needed, and I think it is balanced and proportionate. Historically, we have required warrants—unless the police are in pursuit of a particular individual, as we debated previously—but we think this strikes the right balance.
On the commitment the shadow Minister asked for around the scope of this provision, the circumstances in which this power can be used are clearly set out on the face of the Bill. I draw the attention of the Committee to clause 19(2); subsection (2) of proposed new section 26A of the Theft Act 1968, sets out very clearly when this power can be used. The conditions are that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that, first,
“the specified items are stolen”,
secondly, that
“the specified items are on the specified premises”,
and thirdly, that
“it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant…without frustrating or seriously prejudicing its purpose”
—that is, a concern that the goods may be moved on before a warrant can be obtained.
The scope of this power is very clearly defined on the face of the Bill, and I think strikes the right balance. The evidential test the police have to meet is that they have reasonable grounds to believe that those three things are met. The wording uses the formulation “and”, so it is not just that any one of them have to be met; all three have to cumulatively be met before the provisions of this clause are engaged. There is a very clear need for this provision, as it will help police to recover stolen goods. The public will welcome it, and it is very clearly defined in clause 19(2).
Chris Philp
I will do my best to conclude prior to 11.25, when the Committee might consider adjourning.
Clause 20 and schedule 3 create a new power for UK law enforcement and other investigative agencies to suspend IP addresses and domain names that are being used in serious crime. Under the power, law enforcement will be able to apply for a court order requiring the organisation responsible for providing the IP address or domain name to prevent access. Sadly, we have all too often seen that criminal actors use domain names and/or IP addresses to carry out crime including fraud and malware dissemination, targeting the vulnerable. When IP addresses and domain names are being used to conduct criminal activities, law enforcement agencies need to be able to block access, preventing the crime occurring.
In the UK, the police and other law enforcement agencies currently use public and private partnerships, and industry will, in the majority of cases, voluntarily suspend domain and IP addresses used for criminal purposes. This has led to the UK being generally one of the safest jurisdictions in the world. However, voluntary suspension is not an option in all cases. In particular, the majority of cyber-crime emanates from outside the UK, where the same voluntary arrangements are not available. Quite often, internet infrastructure providers based overseas will only take action when a court order is handed down. This measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Overseas infrastructure providers are much more likely to comply with a court order than a simple request made by the police without a court order.
We reviewed the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in 2021. As part of that, we invited views from stakeholders. Responses indicated that although much of the 1990 Act remains effective, more could be done in cases where the UK wants to take action against offences committed from overseas. The main function of these provisions is to ensure that UK law enforcement and certain investigative agencies can act to suspend IP addresses and domain names where they are being used for criminal activity with a link to the UK. Schedule 3 enables UK law enforcement agencies listed in paragraph 12 of the schedule to apply for a court order, which they can serve on entities based outside the UK.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
Will this apply to illegal gambling sites and crypto casinos? Will the Gambling Commission have the authority to have these addresses pulled down?
Chris Philp
If illegal activity were taking place, which would include illegal gambling, then the provisions of the clause would apply. As to whether the Gambling Commission can make the application or whether it would have to be the police, to answer that question we will have to refer to schedule 3 on page 91 and look at the list of entities. The hon. Member will see that paragraph 12(2)(e) does include
“a member of staff of the Gambling Commission of at least the grade of executive director.”
Indeed, paragraph 12(1)(a)(v) also expressly references the Gambling Commission, so I hope that answers the question about the Gambling Commission’s powers. I obviously prepared that in advance, anticipating her question—as Members of the Committee could surely see!
That is very helpful and will strengthen our hand with overseas entities that might not respond to a polite request but are willing to act when there is a court order. I hope that is something that we can all get behind. It will help protect our constituents from online crime, particularly fraud, but other forms of illegal activity, including illegal gambling. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Swansea East for her work combating gambling harm, which I saw at first hand during my time as Minister for technology and gambling a couple of years ago.
Alex Norris
Given the time left in this sitting, I thought there was a degree of optimism when the Minister stood up on a matter related to some degree to illegal gambling and thought it would be quick; I will try to bring my remarks in under the wire, but I may fail, when I assume I will be cut off in my prime.
Much of our discussions so far have had a digital and online dimension: the sale of knives and bladed articles, the posting of intimate images, the sale of stolen goods, and the digital online element of fraud. This is a very live, shape-shifting part of the debate. It was feature of the Online Safety Act 2023 discussions and is an important part of this Bill. Our basic principle is that we must give our police and broader enforcement agencies the best tools possible for them to stand half a chance of keeping up. This clause and schedule 3 fit with that approach and, as such, we support them.
For all the creative and direct uses that criminals can exploit modern technology with, there remains a basic staple: a website, a domain name and an IP address. That can be used in a variety of ways: selling illicit goods, selling stolen goods, pirating live events, pirating software or content, scamming or illegal gambling. It is right that enforcement agencies can close such sites down. Although this is a modern venture, I suspect it is today’s version of the 1975 classic Whac-A-Mole, as we chase scammers, fraudsters and thieves around the internet. I dare say that is frustrating but it is important for enforcement agencies to do.
The provisions in the schedule allow for the suspension of IP addresses and domain names for up to 12 months, following an application to a judge. In doing so, four criteria must be met. Three are relatively simple: condition 1 is that the address or domain name is being used for serious crime; condition 3 is that it is necessary and proportionate to shut the site down to prevent crime; and condition 4 is that the address or domain name would not be shut down by another route. The industry picture can be good, as the Minister says, but I do not think it is always good. That is the nature of the type of crime. We talked previously about pirating a premier league game—that would go pretty quickly. If the site is hosting an intimate image that was unlawfully obtained, that tends to take an awful lot longer, or indeed does not happen at all; that point has been debated.
Conditions 1, 3 and 4 seem clear to me, but I want to press the Minister on condition 2. That is met under four scenarios, although I believe the use of the word “or” means any one of the four scenarios, including,
“(a) that a UK person is using the IP address for purposes of serious crime”,
which is very similar, if not the same, as condition 1. The other scenarios are: (b)—that a UK person is a victim of the serious crime that the site or domain name is used for; (c)—that the IP address is being used for unlicensed gambling, which goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East; or (d) —the IP address is allocated to a device located in the UK. I think only one of those four tests needs to be met in order for condition 2 to be met. Given that (a) is essentially the same as condition 1, but with the proviso that the person is UK based, how does that operate in practice? Is that not a degree of duplication? The Minister can mull that one over while having his lunch.
I will move on to the heading
“Inclusion of non-disclosure requirements in suspension orders”.
As in the Bill, as part of a suspension order, a judge can require that the individual deprived of their domain name or IP address does not tell anyone that that has happened to them.
Thursday 18th January 2024
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 January 2024 - (18 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 64, in clause 26, page 23, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”
This probing amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Clauses 26 and 27 stand part.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
It is again a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell.
Clauses 25 to 27 concern the transfer of prisoners to foreign prisons. Clause 25 introduces the measures that are relevant to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas. It defines key terms relevant to the following sections, and establishes the nature of the agreements and to whom those provisions may be applicable. The measures have been drafted to apply to a broad cohort of adult prisoners. This will ensure that the measures are applicable to the final cohort that will be decided on under the terms of any final agreement with a partner state. Prisoners will be subject to a transfer only after an assessment of the individual circumstances of their case. Although the details will be subject to future negotiation and agreement, additional exclusion criteria may apply.
Clause 26 deals with the transfer of prisoners between the territory of the United Kingdom and rented prison spaces overseas. It will allow the Secretary of State to issue warrants for the transfer of individuals from the United Kingdom to rented prison spaces overseas or for the return of prisoners held in rented spaces overseas to the territory of the United Kingdom. It allows for transfers both ways, as needed. Like many of the provisions relating to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas, these provisions may be used only once prison rental arrangements with foreign countries are in place, and may be used only for the specific purpose of transferring prisoners as part of that arrangement. The clause also provides that time spent in a rented prison space overseas will count towards the prisoner’s sentence as determined in England and Wales.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Will the Minister tell the Committee whether the Government intend to transfer women prisoners? Literally decades of data shows that women prisoners are predominantly victims of domestic and sexual violence, which is often a pathway to their offending.
Laura Farris
The hon. Lady’s question is a good one. She will know that women form a very small part of the overall cohort of prisoners, that women prisoners have unique vulnerabilities and that they experience prison in a very different way from the male cohort. It is true that women are not expressly excluded from the provision, but obviously the United Kingdom Government are bound by the considerations under the European convention on human rights, and one can readily imagine how those will extend to female prisoners. It is obviously more likely that men will be transferred, because of the size of the cohort.
Jess Phillips
Would it not be better to put on the face of the Bill that women are carved out? I do not see any reason why we could not do that, if it is so vanishingly unlikely that a Government would transfer women prisoners. I am afraid to say that Governments are not always great on the issue of women in prison—not just this Government, but any Government, including any that might come in—so would it not be better to include that safeguard?
Laura Farris
I am sympathetic to the hon. Lady’s point, which I will take away. The purpose of the provisions is to set the framework for future agreements, so of necessity they are deliberately quite widely drafted and do not seek to tie our hands. The hon. Lady’s points are irrefutable; I looked at the issue when I was a member of the Justice Committee.
Domestic powers to transfer individuals to rented spaces such as these do not currently exist in UK law, and the provisions, widely drafted though they are, are essential for the operation of a future agreement. Clause 27 contains provisions regarding the operation of warrants, which are proposed in clause 26. The provisions allow the Secretary of State to appoint individuals to escort prisoners in transit to and from rented prison spaces overseas and to provide those individuals with the powers necessary to exercise those duties.
The provisions are similar to existing transport and escort provisions contained in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and are built on long-standing operational practices. They are an essential complement to the powers set out in clause 26 and are necessary for the effective operation of a warrant for transfer. The clause also contains provisions to enable designated individuals to detain prisoners who may attempt to escape or who find themselves unlawfully at large in the process of transit to or from a rented prison space overseas. I commend clauses 25, 26 and 27 to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for the introduction to this cohort of clauses, which I will address along with my amendment 64.
As the Minister has outlined, the clauses facilitate the transfer of prisoners in England and Wales to an overseas jurisdiction and make provision to ensure the oversight of any agreement with a foreign country under which the UK prisoners will be held. Sadly, the Bill and accompanying notes do not provide the detail of exactly how the scheme will work, who the partner countries will be, nor where responsibilities will actually lie.
The charity Justice has provided some useful context. It says:
“In advancing his policy the Home Secretary made reference to arrangements which existed between Belgium and Norway on the one hand, and the Netherlands on the other, within the last two decades, as a successful means of increasing prison capacity. In fact, neither was an overwhelming success in terms of either rehabilitation or reduction in prison overcrowding. That is despite the fact that, particularly in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, there were linguistic and cultural similarities, and geographical proximity. There is no guarantee that this will be true of any future arrangements that the United Kingdom may enter into.
Indeed, it is understood that the Ministry of Justice has been in talks with Estonia about using space in its prisons. While one of these is located in the capital, Tallinn—itself a three-hour flight from London, with no direct flights from elsewhere in the UK—the other two are 150-200km away by road. This is one illustration of the difficulties which will arise in facilitating family visits to those imprisoned abroad wherever they are, and of course access must also be provided to HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Independent Monitoring Board members and legal representatives.”
I will return to some of those issues later, but perhaps the Minister can share with the Committee which countries the Government are actually negotiating with. More importantly, perhaps she can give us some insight into how the very real barriers to this policy will be addressed.
Amendment 64 in my name and that of the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood), proposes limitations on the types of prisoners who can be transferred. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has addressed very specifically the issue of women, and I welcome the fact that the Minister has agreed to take that away. I am sure we could support any amendment that she cares to bring forward on Report in order to exclude women from being accommodated abroad.
Others we would have excluded are prisoners with less than 180 days or six months of their custodial period left to serve, those serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection, and those participating in any proceedings before a court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation to take place in a prison in a foreign country. Releasing prisoners from foreign prisons back into the community in the UK would also pose severe challenges for probation and other services in ensuring that the necessary resettlement support is in place on their return.
The services and support that prisoners typically need on release include accommodation, welfare and employment support, ongoing treatment of drug and alcohol addictions, and health and social care. Arrangements to effectively monitor and supervise the individual unlicensed in the community also need to be put in place ahead of release. Making arrangements for the provision of these services requires effective co-ordination between the prison offender manager and community offender manager. In England and Wales, both of these roles are provided by His Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service.
Releasing an individual directly from a foreign prison into the UK would require co-ordination between services based in two separate jurisdictions. That would present considerable logistical challenges and may lead to mistakes being made and the necessary support not being put in place. That could put the individual and others at risk and increase the likelihood of reoffending.
Excluding prisoners with a period of less than 180 days to serve from being issued with a warrant would help ensure that prisoners continue to be released from UK prisons into the community. The sentences of imprisonment for public protection and detention for public protection were abolished in 2012. However, the abolition was not retrospective, which means that thousands of people remain in prison, yet to be released after having been recalled to custody.
The plight of those prisoners, serving a sentence that Parliament has not deemed fit to remain on the statute book, has been well documented in the authoritative report of the cross-party Select Committee on Justice. In 2022, there were nine self-inflicted deaths of IPP prisoners, the highest number of self-inflicted deaths among the IPP prison population since the introduction of the sentence. As of December 2022, there have been 78 self-inflicted deaths of IPP prisoners since the sentence was introduced in April 2005. That is 6% of all self-inflicted deaths during the period. Forcing IPP and DPP prisoners to serve their sentences could further increase the risk of suicide and self-harm if they are accommodated abroad. Furthermore, it would make it extremely difficult for them to access the courses and interventions they need to demonstrate reduced risk and access timely legal advice and support through the parole process.
The amendment would also enable the Secretary of State to exclude a prisoner from being issued with a warrant if they are satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of receiving instruction or training, which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in a foreign country. That may include prisoners who are engaged in higher education that could only be provided in the UK, or prisoners involved in an employment scheme with the prospect of further training or a job opportunity on release in the UK.
Transferring prisoners abroad would have an impact on a prisoner’s access to legal advice, legal remedies for prison-related issues or their ability to participate in any ongoing legal processes related to their conviction or sentence at home, including the parole process. That is contrary to European prison rule 23 and Mandela rules 41 and 61, which give the right to accessible, timely and confidential legal advice. Being sent abroad would have a significant impact on someone being able to meaningfully participate in any legal process.
There is history in the immigration context of the Government legislating to say that people can pursue appeals against being removed and deported and then having to do so after actually being removed to their home countries. In those cases, the courts have ruled that, in practice, that is not possible and is therefore a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. The Law Society has expressed concern that certain groups of vulnerable prisoners could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. That includes those with health issues, such as individuals who are pregnant or disabled, and those who have mental health or learning difficulties. There are currently no explicit safeguards or guarantees to protect against that. How will the Minister ensure effective resettlement arrangements under the provisions?
Prisoners with primary caring responsibilities could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. Transferring UK prisoners abroad will have a significant impact on their ability to maintain family ties. The Farmer review found family relationships to be the “golden thread” to help reduce reoffending.
There is recognition in the Government’s impact assessment that the policy will need to
“ensure prisoners’ rights to family life are protected in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, including access to visitation on par with what would be provided in HMPPS.”
However, the impact assessment goes on to say:
“It has not been determined who would bear the cost of these visits.”
Can the Minister offer any clarification on who is expected to foot the bill? Does she expect the children or the families of those imprisoned abroad to have to finance a trip abroad to visit their loved ones? Families and loved ones already struggle to meet the cost of visits to prison in the UK and they are unlikely to be able to meet the additional costs or logistical challenges involved in visits abroad. Imagine somebody having to spend five hours travelling to a foreign prison for a one-hour visit and then having to spend another five hours travelling back. That is total nonsense.
Mrs Flick Drummond (Meon Valley) (Con)
I rise to speak to the three clauses, which I also have deep concerns about. I once asked a prison officer at Winchester prison how many prisoners were truly evil and how many just got it wrong. He said, “About 5% are truly evil.” They are the ones that I am sure we would like to export to a gulag in Siberia and never see again, but I assume we will not use Russian prisons.
Any criminal who is a danger to society should be locked up for life and never released. However, the other 95% are capable of being rehabilitated, and in many cases part of that rehabilitation is to stay in contact with their families. A constituent wrote to me recently about this. She told me that her son had got into trouble and gone to prison. She believed that one reason why he has now become a responsible citizen was that his family were frequent visitors and able to be there for him.
What will we do about access for families if we send prisoners abroad? I have deep concerns about sending our prisoners overseas. There are many legal reasons why that is problematic. The impact assessment recognises the need to ensure that a prisoner’s right to a family life is protected, in accordance with article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and that access for families should be the same as the access that our Prison Service offers. Other issues include access to legal advice, and the ability to participate in ongoing legal processes; there are also potential problems with day release. The hon. Member for Stockton North laid those issues out clearly, and I will not repeat everything that he said.
We need clarification on what type of prisoners will be subject to transfer. We need to know what the criteria will be, and what support there will be for vulnerable prisoners. What will happen if things go wrong for the prisoner? Will that be dealt with under the host country’s legal processes, which may be different from ours?
Lastly, there is the cost of the system. The impact assessment says that it will cost £200 million up front, with an annual cost of £24 million, based on 600 prisoners being held abroad, but as we have not got any agreements in place how can we know what the true cost is? The policy will not come into effect until 2026, so it will not alleviate the issues that the prison estate currently faces.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the issues that I have raised, as this is a major change in policy, and I will not be comfortable supporting it until I get further clarification. She mentioned that the provisions are a framework, but I would like details before I support the clauses.
Laura Farris
I thank the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley for their contributions, and I will respond to them as best I can. First, I want to talk a little about the context of the pressure on prison places. As of September 2023, 16,200 people were on remand in prisons in England and Wales. The reason why we have such a big remand population is that during the white heat of the pandemic, the Government took the decision to continue with full jury trials.
I remember listening very carefully to what the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—now shadow Foreign Secretary, then shadow Justice Secretary—said on the issue. Colleagues may recall that at one point he called for a reduction in the size of juries. He said that it was imperative to keep the criminal justice system moving, and he advocated for a shift to juries of five, only during covid. He was robustly attacked by Baroness Kennedy in the Lords, a Labour peer, who said that that was an absolute dereliction of article 6 rights. She gave a very passionate speech about it, brilliantly written, and I noticed that the shadow justice team never mentioned reducing the size of juries again.
Respectfully, I say it is reasonable to infer that the Opposition supported our decision to continue with full jury trials. If I am wrong about that, they can direct me to where they called for something different, but as I say there was a tension between the then shadow Justice Secretary and Baroness Kennedy. [Interruption.] It was incredibly difficult, and I think that is why the shadow Justice Secretary got himself into a bit of a muddle.
The decision to continue with full juries of 12 people determining the result of criminal trials during covid contributed heavily to the backlog, and to why we have so many people on remand awaiting trial.
Laura Farris
I will continue a little more. We are undertaking the biggest prison building exercise since the Victorian era. We have committed to creating 20,000 new prison places, and have already got 5,700 of those places on stream, but we are not there yet.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North gives rise to a number of sensible points. Let me distil them: he thinks that prisoners should not be transferred if they are getting near to the end of their sentence, have a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, are going through constructive rehabilitation treatment, or are implicated in some form of criminal proceeding. All those are very sensible ideas, but we respectfully believe that they are best addressed through policy, based on the appropriate expertise from within the prison system, not set out in primary legislation.
In fact, I think the hon. Gentleman made the point tacitly himself. He gave a number of other very good examples, including prisoners who have serious mental health conditions, are pregnant or are someone’s primary carer. All those factors are highly material. Let me reassure him slightly, if I can. To the extent that the exploratory conversations have begun, we are only having them with other European countries. That means that they are bound by the same obligations under the European convention on human rights, which would be material in the types of cases the hon. Member for Stockton North has suggested.
Alex Cunningham
Is that a confirmation, then, that no prisoners will be moved to countries not covered by the ECHR?
Alex Cunningham
With respect to the Minister, this is a fundamental point going forward. As I said in my speech, if prisoners are removed to a country—Rwanda, let us say—they will not have the same protections as they would have if they were moved to Holland. It is important that the Government clarify exactly whether people will be removed to jurisdictions outside the ECHR.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman, who makes a fair challenge. I am only aware of exploratory conversations with European countries bound by the European convention on human rights. I understand that there will be no partner country that is not also complying with the European convention rights, but I think he deserves clarity on that point.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate what the Minister is saying; she has been very clear about the point being well made. But if prisoners cannot be removed to a country that is not covered by the ECHR, perhaps that needs to be stated in the Bill.
Laura Farris
It is in the Bill that the Bill itself is compliant with the European convention on human rights.
Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)
This may well be helpful to the Minister: the ECHR may in fact apply extraterritorially to British subjects or British prisoners who are placed in prisons outwith the member states that are part of the Council of Europe. She might want to check whether it applies in extraterritorial circumstances. [Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. I know that Members feel passionately about this issue, and they are, of course, welcome to make further contributions. If they want to, can they please indicate that once the Minister has finished?
Laura Farris
I want to address the points made by the hon. Member for Stockton North and explain why we think these matters are best placed in the policy itself rather than in the Bill. He will respect the fact that the whole status of IPP prisoners is currently a matter of review; as a member of the Justice Committee, I contributed to the report that has now been taken up by the Ministry of Justice, so I have looked at the issue of IPP prisoners carefully during my time in Parliament.
The points that the hon. Gentleman made about rehabilitation are, of course, important. He raised a number of other points and I will try to answer all of them. He asked how on earth the Parole Board could be expected to successfully manage a prisoner if they were released directly from a foreign prison to the United Kingdom. I want to reassure him that prisoners will be repatriated for the final section of their prison sentence before that, so that they are assessed by the Parole Board in the normal way. He also asked about the availability of legal advice, which was a very good point. First of all, the whole landscape of court procedure has changed in the last few years. Receiving legal advice can be done remotely, and court proceedings often take place remotely via a live link.
It is imperative under article 6 of the European convention on human rights that somebody should be able to access legal advice where appropriate, but I gently remind the hon. Gentleman that the first time the possibility of obtaining legal advice from the United Kingdom in a foreign country was embedded in primary legislation was under the last Labour Government. That was in a slightly different context, under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—David Blunkett’s legislation—but it provided for the removal of people whose immigration appeal had failed and for them to then submit out-of-country rights of appeal. The last Labour Government ran that quite successfully, and that was before we were really in the technological era that we are in now; in every single area of the law, we now make more and more use of video proceedings and online courts. I hope I have provided some reassurance on this point.
The hon. Member for Stockton North made a lot of sensible points about how prisoners’ families would travel to visit them. We have not set the criteria for who the prisoners are, but I gently make the point that more than 10% of the people in prisons in England and Wales are not British nationals anyway—somewhere in the region of 10,000 out of a total prison population of over 80,000. Some family and primary care considerations are already rather different with that cohort because they are not British nationals.
Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)
The Minister is making an important point. An excellent point was also made by my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley on the importance of prisoners being close to their family.
There is a very busy local prison in my constituency of Chelmsford. From time to time, I get the prison governor and other experts explaining to me that sometimes it is important to split people up. For example, if people have come from the same criminal gang or opposing criminal gangs, it can be important to move them so that they are not all in the same prison. There are parts of the country where getting “overseas” can sometimes be easier than visiting a family member who may, for example, be a long distance away in our own country. Sometimes, cases are different and are not about making sure that the prisoner stays in the local prison. That might not provide the best circumstances for that prisoner’s rehabilitation.
Laura Farris
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention. She is quite right. I will try to distil her point. I expected the challenge from the Opposition this morning about the circumstances of each prisoner being vital—whether they have family or connections—but it is true, as she said, that some prisoners will not have family or connections; there may be different imperatives. Obviously, we would be looking precisely at considerations of that nature before making a decision about prison transfer.
It is not possible to say that every prisoner needs to be imprisoned locally or is going to be the primary carer for all their children. Look at how decisions on the deportation of foreign national offenders are made by the immigration appeal tribunal: if an offender who has committed a serious offence tries to rely on the fact they have children in the UK, the tribunal will very often say, “You have already abandoned them because you were in prison for 10 years.” Some of that claim is lost anyway.
Mrs Drummond
The Minister made the very good point that 10,000 people in our prisons are foreign nationals. Why are we not sending them back to their countries and relieving the pressure for our own domestic prisoners?
Laura Farris
I reassure my hon. Friend that we are making significant progress on that. It is a good point. There has been an acceleration in that process. I have some data here. Between January 2019 and September 2023, over 16,000 foreign national offenders were removed from the United Kingdom. In the last 12 months alone, that returns rate increased by 20% when compared with the previous 12 months. There has been an acceleration in the returns agreements.
We have also expanded the early removal scheme, so that we can remove FNOs up to 18 months before the end of their sentences. The Home Office has deployed more caseworkers to focus on prison removals; we also have prisoner transfer deals with some countries, including Albania, that are already operational. I want to provide reassurance that that work is continuing at pace.
Alex Cunningham
I accept the points about foreign prisoners, but many are European nationals who have families in the UK. We cannot have a one-size-fits-all solution to this situation. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that.
Laura Farris
The provisions on the removals of foreign nationals are set out in the 2012 immigration rules; it is section 339 that governs removal. If the sentence has been two years or more, only truly exceptional circumstances would allow them to stay. The simple fact of somebody who has committed a category A or B—
Laura Farris
Let me finish the point. It has to be truly exceptional. I have done cases in court for the Home Office. The Home Office is nearly always successful when it relies on that clause because, as the court always says, when the offence is serious, there is an overwhelming public interest in the removal of a dangerous offender from the United Kingdom. Article 8 is qualified under paragraph 339 of the immigration rules.
Carolyn Harris
Would those exceptional circumstances include prisoners whose crime was committed after they had been trafficked to the United Kingdom, if they committed it because of the trafficking?
Laura Farris
I have never been involved in a case of that nature; cases where the offending is really serious tend to be much more straightforward. There is flexibility, because we can take such cases to court to appeal the removal. Obviously, when someone is already a victim of crime, that is a different context, so I do not know how the courts would deal with it. The law itself, however, is set out under the established immigration rules, in primary legislation and has been operational for 12 years now. That is not part of the dispute today.
To continue, it is right that we take innovative measures to ensure that we always have sufficient prison capacity to fulfil the orders of the court and to punish the most dangerous offenders. I reiterate at this stage that the powers simply lay down the foundation for future arrangements. I repeat: all the points raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, about the considerations that might apply were relevant, but this is about future arrangements so that we will have the power to transfer prisoners to rented foreign prisons. No foreign prison rental agreements are yet in place, however. As he is aware, there is precedent in Europe: both Norway and Belgium have similar arrangements with the Netherlands at present.
Jess Phillips
I want to respond to some of what the Minister said. She told us not to worry about people’s families visiting, because 10% of them are foreign nationals. She went on to say that foreign nationals have children abroad. I represent loads and loads of people who are not British nationals but who definitely have family in the UK, so the idea that 10% of the prison population do not have any families who want to visit them, or that the families of all non-British nationals in UK prisons live back home, is wrong. Welcome to the world—people move about and they have babies with people here in this country. That is a bit of a reality check on some of what was said.
I also did not understand the Minister saying that we now have a massive backlog because the justice system carried on during the pandemic. Was the justice system due a three-year break to stop the backlog? Do we normally have a three-year break to make sure that we have enough prison places? That is a weird justification, which I did not really understand.
On human trafficking, there are more victims of human trafficking in prison than there are human traffickers; the woeful rates of conviction of people who people-smuggle or commit modern slavery are well charted. Last week, I was in a meeting with the bishops, the Lords Spiritual—I always think “Lords Spiritual” sounds like a rock band—about this exact issue. Prison wardens and governors from a variety of prisons were there to give evidence, as was the Bishop of Gloucester—I believe her role is as the overarching Lord Spiritual for prisons—the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and lots of organisations who work with trafficking victims, including the Salvation Army and others. I was there, and the prison governors made it very clear that lots of people in prison have a pattern to their behaviour.
If we look at the Rochdale case from last week, we see that a young girl was criminalised as a pattern of her sexual abuse. That is not uncommon or unknown; it is in fact the opposite—it is well known, well charted and well evidenced. There is a huge amount of evidence for that, so I absolutely want to see a carve-out in that particular space for anyone identified as a victim of modern slavery.
The Minister asks us to wait for policy to feel comfortable about this, rather than writing things into the Bill. I totally understand that legislation does not necessarily need to be very detailed, but I would have liked, for example, to have had the word “women” once in the Domestic Abuse Bill—but, you know, we can’t be picky.
The trouble is that I have seen what happens when we leave things to policy that is skew-whiff and ambiguous in the Home Office, especially when it comes to cases of human trafficking. As the Minister said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, she has not been involved in any particular cases.
Currently, Government policy is a bit skew-whiff on how we remove or deal with victims of human trafficking. It is not exactly clear, and even the lawyers are not clear, both those from the Home Office and those seeking to represent victims of human trafficking who are threatened with deportation. Last week, I was with a barrister in a case, and she clearly said that the policy is to remove all victims of human trafficking from Albania, which the Government have said is a completely safe country—perhaps, unless you are a young woman who has been trafficked repeatedly, in which case all of the evidence suggests that Albania is incredibly dangerous.
I was in court because the Government were trying to deport a victim of human trafficking who had stayed within the national referral mechanism—in fact, had had her therapy paid for by that very same Home Office —for three and a half years. The Home Office had agreed yes, she is a victim of human trafficking. Literally, she has a piece of paper from the Home Office—it might as well have been signed by the Home Secretary—to say, “You are a victim of human trafficking.” She had two children, and both had lived in Britain for seven years, both born here of the rapes that she had suffered. But the Home Office was trying to deport her to Albania, a place they had already deported her to once; she had been re-trafficked from there immediately after reporting to the police. So excuse me if I do not trust something not being written into a Bill about how to handle these difficult cases.
I want to see on the face of this Bill provision so that no woman, no victim of human trafficking and no one with autism—the number of people with autism in our prison estate is phenomenal. Where are the safeguards so that barristers such as the one I was with last week have something to lean on when the Home Office decides that its policy is a little bit grey and so it can actually do what it wants?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her submission. I will confine myself simply to arguments as they relate to the prison transfer issue. Furthermore, this part of the Bill is Ministry of Justice, not Home Office.
Let me address two points. I am sorry if I was insufficiently clear when I talked about foreign-born offenders. Of course I do not make the crude assumption that none of them will have connections with the United Kingdom, including family, but some will not. We know we have problems with foreign gangs coming over. My simple point in response to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, is that not every single prisoner will have strong local ties in the United Kingdom, because that is not true and will be a relevant consideration in assessing the cohort for transfer.
On my other point, I am again sorry—perhaps it was my mistake—if I was confusing about the decision to maintain full jury trials during covid. That decision was a controversial one because of the number of jurors required. Those were physical trials at the time, and having the number of jurors required to sit together in a courtroom during a period when social distancing was set out in law was incredibly difficult. Without doubt, that delayed the process of the criminal justice system, so much so that some Supreme Court justices urged the Government to dispense with juries altogether. As I said in an earlier observation, the then shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), suggested we shrink juries rather than abandon them altogether. Other eminent lawyers—I cited one—thought that that was the wrong idea.
This was a very difficult decision on how to operate criminal trials, but in the end we decided that it was imperative, in the interests of justice and of article 6, the right to a fair trial, that everyone who was charged with a criminal offence in the Crown Court had the right to have justice administered as fairly as possible, so we stuck with the juries. That has led to delay, and that is why the remand population—in other words, people still awaiting trial—is higher than it otherwise would be, which has caused pressure on prison places. I apologise if that was insufficiently clear. That concludes my remarks.
The Chair
My powers may be great, but they are not sufficient for me to compel a Minister to intervene against her will. You are welcome to intervene, Minister, if you would like to do so.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful.
The right hon. Member for Chelmsford made an interesting contribution about gangs. I agree that it is often necessary to move people to different areas to break gangs up—that is absolutely essential. I do not know whether the Government intends that such people would be a popular cohort to be moved abroad to foreign prisons, but perhaps the Minister will address that when she winds up the debate.
The Minister referred at some length to my amendment. I am not convinced that we should not press it to a vote. I will press it, because we cannot rely on policy unless it is written down. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said the same and illustrated exactly why we cannot depend on policy. Policy changes all the time, so we need to nail down the provisions in the Bill and who will be included and excluded. Someone may table an amendment on Report in relation to whether women should be sent abroad to serve their prison sentence, but it is important to address the issue of foreign nationals—I spoke briefly about this earlier—who have families here, are in married relationships here and may be European citizens who are entitled to be here. I accept what the Minister says about the two-year threshold and everything else, but we cannot just say that it is okay to send men off to foreign prisons because they are foreigners—that does not wash at all. I will leave it at that, but I would like to press the amendment to a Division.
Laura Farris
I thought my last speech was supposed to be my final response, but I will come back on the two points made by the hon. Gentleman. First, I will come back to him on the point about bearing the cost. Secondly, I hope I was not speaking so crudely as to suggest that anybody foreign-born would be shipped off immediately; that is not what I was trying to say. I was simply saying that not every prisoner in a British jail has local ties, family or some of the compelling circumstances that he outlined. We do not disagree that some prisoners have very compelling circumstances; in the course of this debate, we have heard about people who would be at the top of that list for consideration. It is clear that there will have to be a difficult exercise.
I acknowledge that there is not much detail in the Bill. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are putting it into primary legislation to create the framework for the agreements. There will then be individual agreements with European states. I have provided that clarity: each one will be a bespoke agreement. These are the legislative provisions to allow that, which is why the Bill does not go into more detail.
The Chair
To clarify, Minister, you can go back and forth a number of times.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Warrant for transfer of prisoner to or from foreign prison
Amendment proposed: 64, Clause 26, page 23, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This probing amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Cunningham
I have already addressed many of the principles pertaining to the Government’s proposals in this part of the Bill, so I will largely confine my remarks to amendments 65 to 68, with some relating to clause stand part.
Amendment 65 would require the controller to make a report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement between the foreign country and the UK. Clause 28 provides for the Secretary of State to appoint a “controller” role to keep under review, and report on, the running of any rented prison spaces abroad. It also extends the power of His Majesty’s chief inspector of prisons to inspect and report on the conditions of any such spaces.
As it stands, the Bill places a great deal of unaccountable authority in the hands of the Executive to make provision for any arrangement by means of secondary legislation. It is silent on how those subject to this arrangement will be treated. Similarly, it provides no guarantee that the prison rules in secondary legislation, which govern crucial issues including segregation, complaints and the use of force, would apply. I would hope that the Government would agree that, given the potential human rights implications, any agreement made between the UK and a foreign state should be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, and to guarantees of compliance with existing human rights standards and obligations.
Furthermore, the implementation of any agreement by a foreign state will need careful monitoring and oversight to ensure compliance. It will also be vital to ensure that any breach of the agreement by the foreign state is promptly reported and acted on. Amendment 65 would help to enable that by requiring the controller to report any breaches of the arrangement to the Secretary of State.
The Bill should also be amended to ensure that it is the UK’s responsibility to investigate and bring to justice any ill-treatment or torture, should it occur under this arrangement, in line with the UK’s obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the UN convention against torture. It should also require that any prisoner transferred to serve their sentence in a foreign country would have to be held in and have access to equivalent conditions and the same quality and range of services afforded to prisoners held in England and Wales, as mandated under Prison Rules 1999. As it stands, nothing in the Bill and related documents gives any indication that the same legal standards and rights in relation to treatment of prisoners, as set out in the prison rules, would apply.
I would be obliged if the Minister would address a number of related questions. Will she confirm the need for the operation of the scheme to be under constant review and that Parliament is entitled to reports on how successful or otherwise it is? Will British prison rules apply to UK prisoners sent abroad? Does she accept that it should be the UK authorities that investigate any allegations of ill treatment or torture of prisoners accommodated abroad under her policy?
I know that services, particularly work and access to rehabilitation services, are very limited in UK prisons because of the crisis in the service, but does the Minister agree that any prisoners sent abroad should have access to at least the same level of services as those held at home?
Amendment 66 would ensure that the prisons inspectorate “must” conduct the duties specified in proposed new subsection 5D in section 5A of the Prisons Act 1952, and would ensure its consistency with the legislative basis for its role in England and Wales.
We are concerned that the oversight of both the controller and His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons will ultimately be subject to negotiation with a relevant partner country. The wording in the Bill relating to the powers of HM inspectorate of prisons differs from the Prisons Act in that it states the chief inspector “may” inspect rather than “shall” inspect. The implication is that inspections could take place only by invitation of the foreign state rather than as a statutory requirement. That leaves open to future negotiation crucial aspects of HMIP’s role and methodology, such as its ability to conduct unannounced inspections, to speak to prisoners in private and to access records such as those relating to the use of force. That would mean a lower standard of independent scrutiny would be applied to the treatment and conditions for UK prisoners held under such arrangements. It would fall short of the UK’s obligations under the optional protocol to the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—OPCAT—which establishes requirements for independent detention monitoring to be conducted by a national preventive mechanism.
In the UK, the national preventive mechanism was established in 2009 and HMIP is one of the bodies designated to it. Amending the Bill to ensure that HMIP’s role can be performed in accordance with its duties under OPCAT would provide an important safeguard to ensure rigorous independent scrutiny of the treatment and conditions for prisoners held under these arrangements. Will the Minister guarantee that HMIP will be able to conduct its crucial role to the same standards that we would expect for any inspection on home soil, with unfettered access to prisoners, their records and staff?
Amendment 67 would ensure that HM inspectorate of prisons can inspect escort arrangements under which prisoners are transferred to foreign prisons. Clause 28 specifies that the chief inspector may inspect or arrange for the inspection of any prisons where prisoners are detained under an arrangement between the UK and a foreign state. Our amendment would bring the legislation into line with the inspectorate’s powers in relation to prisons in England and Wales by also enabling it to inspect or arrange for the inspection of escort arrangements.
The inspectorate’s powers to inspect escort arrangements were made by amendments to the Prisons Act in section 46 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. It is particularly important that the inspectorate should be able to inspect the escort arrangements for the transfer of UK prisoners to foreign prisons. We had a debate the other day about escort arrangements and the security of staff, which comes into play here. How do we ensure the safety of the staff of whichever organisation is moving people from this country to another?
A foreign state with which the UK makes an agreement could potentially be many thousands of miles from the UK. The transfer of prisoners could involve a lengthy journey involving a variety of modes of transport, including potentially prison vans, planes, trains and ferries.
As countless HMIP inspection reports show, escort, particularly when a person is being transferred against their will, can pose a number of risks to prisoners, including the mixing of men, women and children in the same transport—although I acknowledge that children will not be sent abroad; poor information sharing with escort services of the needs and risks presented by prisoners; poor conditions; poor escort safety and lack of seat belts; risk of suicide and self-harm, which may be exacerbated by long journeys under stress; lack of food, drink and comfort stops; poor treatment by escort staff; failure to address health and welfare needs; overuse of restraints with potentially fatal consequences; poor complaints processes and accountability; and damage to prisoners’ property.
The potential for trouble appears limitless. I hope that the Minister will recognise that she needs to act now to ensure all the necessary processes are in place to make sure that it is contained. Failure to do so could result in all manner of actions against the Government, including civil actions by prisoners who could well have grounds for going to court because they have not been treated properly in line with the UK law under this new policy.
12.30 pm
I turn to amendment 68. This probing amendment would clarify how the Government intend to apply their obligations under article 2 on the right to life of the Human Rights Act, through ensuring that the duties of the coroner also apply to any death involving a prisoner subject to a transfer agreement with a foreign country.
It is our view that the nature of the arrangement to send individuals to overseas prisons will establish the UK’s jurisdiction over any deaths that occur. Given the unprecedented nature of these arrangements, it is crucial that the responsibility of coroners to investigate overseas deaths be established clearly in advance, otherwise it would invite significant uncertainty and likely legal challenge if any individual were to die while imprisoned overseas. Furthermore, such a move will ensure that the coronial system is prepared to address the practical challenges of holding such an inquest, which are likely to include challenges in obtaining evidence and witness statements.
I move on to my comments on clause stand part. I am well aware that there is a school of thought that says that prisoners give up their rights to everything when they commit a crime and are deprived of their liberty, but I hope the Minister will agree with me that they do have rights and we have a responsibility to ensure they are not deprived of them, whether in a prison on home or foreign soil. It is critical that we nail down exactly how UK systems will be implemented abroad. I see that as all but impossible if we do not specify in the Bill the necessary requirements for that to happen.
The Minister is likely to say that we have to have a level of trust in the agreement with any foreign Government to stick to the standards required, but I am not so sure it is as simple as that. There will be huge costs associated with what may well just be a Government experiment—costs relating to travel and escort services, the fees to the receiving prison, potential costs for families of prisoners to travel abroad to visit, plus all the costs related to managing, inspecting and reporting on the services provided.
Put simply, the choice to send British prisoners abroad is a serious endeavour that requires meaningful protections to prevent abuses. It is also likely to come at substantial cost to the taxpayer, with the Government’s own best estimate of cost being £24.4 million per year to house a tiny number—600 prisoners. That amounts to £40,700 per prisoner, approximately £8,000 less per prisoner than to house them in a domestic prison: figures which are difficult to reconcile given that incidental costs like transportation will be additional to ordinary prison expenditure.
In any event, the proposal is going to create only a small number of spaces, meaning that it is not just an easy answer to the overcrowding crisis. Rather, if prisoners end up being mistreated or are simply unable to engage in rehabilitation and other processes that can help get their lives back on the straight and narrow, it could lead to more problems than it solves.
If the Minister is not prepared to accept our amendments, I ask her to take them away and consider exactly how she will fulfil her duties under the law in relation to UK prisoners accommodated abroad, and perhaps bring forward her own amendments on Report, which we would happily consider.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for his amendments, which I will address before turning to clause 28. I hope that nothing we have said and nothing that appears in the Bill would suggest for a moment that any of the 600 prisoners who end up being transferred to a foreign prison would not have their human rights respected. We remind the hon. Member that prisoners remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State. Although the matter of the exact arrangements will need to be negotiated, we are committed to ensuring parity for prisoners—that they have access to the same regime and the same rehabilitation opportunities—as part of any agreement.
I thank the hon. Member for his views on performance management mechanisms. We agree that they need to be in place. The controller role stands alongside our wider plans for robust and effective scrutiny mechanisms, including making arrangements for independent inspection and monitoring in rented prison places. The UK-appointed controller will be responsible for reporting to the Secretary of State on the running of a rented prison via HMPPS performance-monitoring mechanisms, and will be expected to report to the Secretary of State on the running of a rented prison overseas. I want to provide some reassurance that we have begun the process of engaging a number of existing inspection monitoring bodies in England and Wales to discuss how best that service might be provided.
My second point is that we are committed to ensuring that Parliament has appropriate opportunities to scrutinise any treaty that we negotiate with a partner state. Our current intention is that any future treaty establishing rental arrangements, including monitoring and control, would be subject to ratification, which would of course be subject to further scrutiny by Parliament, according to the procedure set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
On amendment 66, clause 28 currently only extends the inspectorate’s remit and does not place an obligation on it to inspect rented prisons overseas, as the shadow Minister pointed out, but we fully agree that rented prison places must be subject to effective inspection and we are ensuring that an appropriate inspectorate will be able to conduct such inspections. That commitment is made with due regard to the inspectorate’s need for operational independence and freedom of access to prisoners, including in private as the shadow Minister described, and to prison facilities. We are considering the logistical realities that that kind of access implies.
We are already working with HM inspectorate of prisons to discuss how best to ensure that the inspections will take place. The exact arrangements will be subject to negotiation and agreement with a partner country, at which point, if necessary, we can confirm what the law ought to say on this matter and make amendments as necessary using the delegated power that we are seeking in clause 29.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister just said that these rights and arrangements would be “subject to negotiation”. Could she explain what she means by that? Does that mean that some rights and arrangements may well not be available to prisoners or to inspectors in carrying out their duties?
Laura Farris
We are committed to ensuring that any foreign prison will be subject to an inspection arrangement; it is simply the terms of that inspection arrangement that we are not putting into primary legislation.
Amendment 67, tabled by the shadow Minister, is important. Arrangements for the independent inspection of escort arrangements in England and Wales already engage HM inspectorate of prisons to some extent, and the Prison Act 1952 allows the Secretary of State to investigate any matter connected to prisoners and prisons in England and Wales. We are committed to ensuring that effective scrutiny of escort arrangements is in place but, again, the exact terms of the arrangements are yet to be concluded and it is inappropriate to attempt to distribute specific responsibilities without prior agreement.
Amendment 68 addresses deaths in custody. This is an important point and must be subject to high-level scrutiny. That is especially true where there may be a death in custody that occurs overseas. This matter will be of primary importance to us during negotiations with any partner country. We are committed to ensuring that we are able to comprehensively investigate any deaths that may occur in rented prisons overseas.
This subject is a prime example of how we intend to use the delegated power we are seeking in clause 29. Once we have agreed arrangements with a partner country, we intend to use our delegated power—by potentially extending the remit of relevant bodies in England and Wales, for example. Until those arrangements are finalised it would be inappropriate to bind any potential body or person, including coroners, in law.
We are also committed, of course, to upholding the human rights of prisoners, including their rights under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. That is legally binding on us, and those are absolute rights. We are currently considering only entering into arrangements to rent prisons from countries that can demonstrate that their prison conditions and capabilities—including for death investigations—comply with that same human rights law and our expectations on the fair treatment of prisoners.
On the basis that this is an important issue for future negotiations, or is non-negotiable given our international obligations, it is too early to begin considering how issues such as death investigation will be accounted for without first making precise arrangements with a partner country. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw this amendment and to not press the other amendments in his name in this group.
I will speak now to clause 28, which concerns oversight arrangements for rented prison spaces. I have said already that the clause establishes a duty on the Secretary of State to appoint a controller. I have also set out their responsibilities for ensuring that any prisoner transferred to a foreign prison will be returned before the end of their sentence to allow for sufficient time for resettlement and reintegration back into the United Kingdom before release.
Clause 28 also extends the remit of His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons to allow for inspections of any rented prison spaces overseas and subsequent reports to the Secretary of State on their findings—respecting their operational independence. Consideration of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners has been, and will remain, central to our decision making.
Jess Phillips
On the point of saying here, and the law even saying, although the law does not say it, that prisoners will be returned to the UK before the end of their sentence, is there—well, I imagine that there is—a chance that their sentence might be extended because there is no place for them to be brought back to?
For example, our modern slavery laws say that we would have to wait for 45 days of reflection in cases of modern slavery. In reality, it is 700 days at the moment. So, laying out a term: is there any worry that, if we say that prisoners have to come back here before they are released to do a period of parole, we will in fact be extending people’s sentences because there are not any places for them to come back into?
Laura Farris
Can I just clarify that I have understood the hon. Lady’s intervention?
Laura Farris
I think it would have to be part of the planning for any prisoner who was going to be transferred for there to be space for them to be returned, because that is part of the policy—that they will be brought back into a domestic prison before release so that there can be proper engagement with the parole and probation services. That is, as hon. Members would expect, to facilitate a smooth release back into the community, as with any prisoner.
We are mindful of the need to ensure that effective inspection and monitoring provisions are in place. While the exact arrangements will be subject to future negotiation, we will ensure that those are sufficient, and they will also be subject to further parliamentary scrutiny. I commend clause 28 to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
I have listened carefully to what the Minister said, and an awful lot of it seems to be about something that might happen in the future or be subject to negotiation. Many of the measures that we are pushing for are in our amendments; as I said, I invite the Minister to take the amendments away and consider them in some detail. Being “subject to negotiation” is not good enough. We actually need to know that the necessary access or protections will actually be in place.
I will not press any of the amendments to a vote—with the exception of amendment 66, because I think that the inspector must carry out the necessary inspection. I accept that the Minister said that that is the intention, but “intention” is not good enough; that provision needs to be in the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 65.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Laura Farris
Before I come on to clause 29, I want to address one point made by the shadow Minister, as this is part of the same family of clauses. The reference to negotiation does not mean that things like inspection and equivalent conditions themselves are a matter for negotiation—in other words, that we might not have any of those things. We are going to insist on all those things, but the terms are the matter for negotiation—what the inspection regime would look like, for example. It is not that we would not be monitoring what happens in a rented prison space overseas. The mandatory language in clause 28(1) about the use of a controller goes to that on the issue of oversight.
Alex Cunningham
I am really quite interested because the issue is about negotiations. Is the Minister actually saying that there will be no agreement with any country that cannot provide the same standards of service, accommodation and access that a person would have in the UK?
Laura Farris
I cannot say that the programme would be exactly the same, but we are looking for equivalence. We even set out in the Bill that there will be a supervisory arrangement already, and I talked in the previous debate about what inspection would look like and who we are engaging on that.
Clause 29 creates a delegated power that would allow the Government to make future legislative amendments strictly for the purposes of implementing a future prison rental agreement. We are currently in exploratory talks with potential partner countries, but, as previously noted, formal negotiations have not commenced. While we have sought to draft broad enabling provisions that will facilitate any future arrangements, it is impossible to be certain on what legislative changes will be necessary to give effect to the agreements prior to the conclusion of negotiations and the subsequent agreement with a partner country on those terms.
For that reason, we are seeking a delegated power that will allow us to amend legislation for the sole purpose of complying with the terms of any future prison rental agreement that we sign. That is to ensure that the UK is able to swiftly comply with our obligations under such agreements. Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise our proposed use of any delegated power by means of the proposed affirmative procedure when amending primary legislation. That will ensure that Parliament may be content that such amendments are made pursuant to future prison rental agreements.
It is not possible, at this stage, to anticipate the outcomes of any negotiations, and any anticipation could significantly bind negotiating power. It is also not clear which matters will remain the responsibility of the Government and which will fall to other jurisdictions. Without this delegated power, further primary legislation would need to be taken through Parliament at the conclusion of individual negotiations to implement the international agreements. That would impact the Government’s ability to act swiftly.
The delegated power forms an essential part of the future-proofing framework that we have designed to accommodate future negotiations and arrangements with partner countries. It ensures that Parliament will still have sufficient opportunity to scrutinise the use of the powers and to feel content that the powers are strictly limited to use further to prison rental arrangements agreed with the partner country.
Alex Cunningham
My concerns are the same as those I expressed about previous clauses. I remain concerned that items not in the Bill are being delegated to secondary legislation. We are not going to oppose the clause, but the Minister needs to bear in mind all the things that have come before and to reassure us that there will not be any abuse here, as what should be important primary legislation is being pushed upstairs to a Delegated Legislation Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Laura Farris
On a point of order, Ms Bardell. What are the timings for this morning’s sitting?
The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Scott Mann)
It is until 1 o’clock.
The Chair
The timings I was given were that the Committee would run until 1.30 pm, but it is a matter for the Whip.
Scott Mann
The Government Whip has noted that the hon. Gentleman is very much in order.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Thursday 18th January 2024
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 January 2024 - (18 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Clause 30 makes amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to ensure that offenders who are convicted of coercive or controlling behaviour and receive a sentence of 12 months or more in custody are automatically managed under the multi-agency public protection arrangements. That will mean that the police, probation and prison services must assess and manage the risk of controlling or coercive offenders in the same way as violent, sexual and terrorist offenders. A range of agencies will also have a duty to help to assess and manage these risks.
This is just the latest development of the law on coercive and controlling behaviour. This Government were the first to formalise coercive control as a criminal offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. We extended it to apply even after the end of a relationship under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. In a number of different legislative vehicles, we have applied coercive control as an aggravating or, in some cases, mitigating factor for the purposes of sentencing. Today, we are adding it to the MAPPA arrangements in certain circumstances.
We are doing this for three reasons. First, it will build on what we have already done to ensure MAPPA is used for high-risk domestic abuse cases. We have strengthened the statutory guidance to require agencies to consider discretionary management under MAPPA in all domestic abuse cases. In the last reporting year, we have seen a 30% increase in the take-up of that offer. For that reason, we consider it appropriate to put it in the Bill.
Secondly, we also know that it is a significant risk factor for future abuse and that it is a known risk factor in domestic homicide, so this clause is pre-emptive. It will support the identification and risk management of perpetrators, thereby disrupting potential abuse, preventing revictimisation and protecting future victims.
Third, we are bringing coercive and controlling behaviour offences in line with other violent offences connected with domestic abuse. Perpetrators of other forms of domestic abuse, including threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, attempted strangulation, harassment and certain stalking offences, are already eligible for automatic MAPPA management. We think that it is right to bring coercive control in line with those.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The clause makes a straightforward amendment that would provide for the automatic, rather than discretionary, MAPPA management of offenders convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship who are sentenced to 12 months or more. As a result, such offenders will be treated as category 2 rather than category 3 offenders for MAPPA purposes.
It should come as no surprise to the Government that we enthusiastically support the clause. Labour has committed to halving incidents of violence against women and girls within a decade. For far too long, those dangerous criminals have been let off and victims have been let down. Indeed, the multi-agency public protection arrangements were introduced by the last Labour Government in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, being strengthened again in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those arrangements see the police, probation and prison services working together to ensure the proper management and monitoring of sexual or violent offenders. In a joint thematic inspection of MAPPA, I have seen them called
“one of the success stories of the criminal justice system”.
The inter-agency approach of MAPPA improves public protection by bringing together criminal justice organisations, as well as others, in a structured way to address and actively manage the behaviour of offenders who can sometimes be difficult to accommodate and who may pose serious levels of risk. Labour is in complete agreement with the Government that perpetrators of coercive and controlling behaviour should be brought more directly under the remit of MAPPA. As Women’s Aid said, this signals that the crime of coercive and controlling behaviour, which is central to so much domestic abuse, is being taken more seriously by the justice system. As it also points out, bringing CCB offenders automatically under the remit of MAPPA is particularly important given the links between coercive control and homicide.
For cases where there is high risk of domestic abuse, the active management and inter-agency engagement that MAPPA provides can be an effective response. However, a report by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in 2021 identified a lack of multi-agency management of individuals who posed the most significant risk of harm to women and girls through domestic abuse. As part of the inspection, HMICFRS asked forces to identify the five individuals whom they considered posed the highest threat to women and girls within the local force area. Of the 40 individuals identified, only three were being managed under MAPPA.
Additional guidance for category 3 offenders who are perpetrators of domestic abuse has been welcome, but HMICFRS noted in its 2022 MAPPA review that there
“is still not a clear enough pathway for those who pose a risk of harm through domestic abuse, particularly for those who commit lower-level offences over a sustained period of time but pose a real risk of harm to their victims through long-term abuse.”
The impact that the clause might have, while welcome, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, is relatively limited, given the number of individuals who have been convicted of coercive and controlling behaviour since the introduction of the offence in 2015. Fewer than 2,000 people have been convicted of that offence, and yet—I think this is probably one of the most important points that I will make during this Committee—the data from the crime survey in England and Wales estimates that 2.1 million people experienced domestic abuse in the year ending 2023. Not every case of domestic abuse will include instances of coercive and controlling behaviour, but given the centrality of such offending behaviours in many cases of domestic abuse the number of CCB convictions still appears very low. Since the provision will apply to that relatively small cohort of offenders, it is difficult to discern what huge impact it will have.
I am interested to hear from the Minister about any additional provisions that her Department has been looking at in preparation for the Bill in relation to MAPPA and perpetrators of domestic abuse, particularly if it has looked at other measures that would make individuals who have committed domestic abuse MAPPA-eligible, because repeat perpetrators of this appalling violence against women and girls too often get away with their patterns of criminality and go on to commit more violence and cause more harm.
As I said, we fully support the clause and will vote with the Government, but we fear the level of impact that it will have. The criminal justice system is in crisis, and the Government are completely failing to address the shocking levels of violence against women. As with much of the Bill, we do not oppose the measures, but we are left wondering if these tweaks are all that the Government have to offer a system in crisis.
Laura Farris
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.
Laura Farris
I will make some progress. I want to respond to the points raised by the shadow Minister. [Interruption.]
The Chair
You do not need to apologise, but we are more freewheeling in Committee. If the hon. Lady wants to come back in later, she can.
Laura Farris
The provision has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. She said:
“This provision will help to ensure that perpetrators are properly managed in the community and victims can be kept safe from further harm. The Commissioner welcomes this provision and will continue working with the government to develop proposals for the effective management of perpetrators.”
In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, in the data we have, which is from 2022, 566 people were convicted of coercive control, and it is estimated that, as she suggested, around 200 would be serving 12 months or more and would have been eligible for MAPPA management. We simply make the point that the MAPPA framework is used for the most serious offenders; whether it is a sexual, violent or terrorist offence, people qualify for MAPPA if their sentence is one year or more. We are not doing anything unorthodox or irregular in having that criteria in relation to coercive control.
I will respond to one of the shadow Minister’s final points. He asked whether there was provision for other forms of domestic abuse to fall under MAPPA management —the answer is yes. We strengthened the statutory guidance to clarify that MAPPA management can be considered by the relevant agencies in all domestic abuse cases. I hope that answers his query.
Jess Phillips
I did not find the piece of paper from Refuge, but I knew it would be about 200 people. Just to make it clear for the record, in one ward in my constituency there will be 200 violent perpetrators of domestic abuse. To the Minister’s point that she did not wish to take my intervention on the piece of legislation that was passed, I will never, ever criticise this Government on that. They have passed lots of legislation, so the skins of goats have had lots of words written on them. It means absolutely nothing—pieces of words on goat skin mean absolutely nothing if they are not then properly resourced, managed and implemented in our communities. The women in refuge accommodation speak of little else than what a nirvana it has been recently under this Government.
Laura Farris
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 31, page 26, line 23, at end insert
“(and, in the case of a service offence, the corresponding offence is not so specified).”
This amendment provides that, for a service offence, the corresponding offence must also not be specified in Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 38.
Government amendment 39.
Clause stand part.
Laura Farris
Amendments 37 to 39 are not technical amendments, as my brief says; they are amendments that extend the operation of clause 31 to Scotland. I will be scolded by my officials if they do not agree, but that is what the amendments do.
Clause 31 ensures that categories of offender who were previously out of scope for polygraph testing are brought into scope. It ensures that there is express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who pose a risk of sexual offending or who committed historic offences connected to terrorism.
Polygraph examinations are used, most importantly, to monitor compliance with licence conditions, and the information obtained during testing is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans. They have proved to be somewhere between 80% and 90% effective and have been used successfully by the probation service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. More recently, they were extended to terrorist offenders under the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Provisions in the Domestic Abuse Act also enabled the Secretary of State to commence a three-year pilot of mandatory polygraph testing on specified domestic abuse perpetrators.
Laura Farris
I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.
The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.
The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.
The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.
The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.
Alex Cunningham
In his evidence to the Committee, Jonathan Hall said:
“In fact, if you look at the wording of the Bill, the Secretary of State will be allowed to be ‘satisfied’—not beyond reasonable doubt, just satisfied—on exactly the same test that currently applies to judges”
in determining whether the test should be taken. He went on to say:
“There is obviously a fundamental issue there, which I can expand on, but there is also a really practical issue, because what is a terrorism offence is not always very obvious.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66, Q170.]
He was clear that the clause might not have all the bolts and washers that it needs to be totally effective.
Nevertheless, I thank the Minister for introducing the clause. As she said, it will allow the polygraph condition to be imposed where the Secretary of State considers that an offender convicted of murder
“poses a risk of committing a relevant sexual offence on release”,
and where an offender is
“serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of an offence who…at an earlier time during that sentence was concurrently serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of a relevant sexual offence”.
It will also extend the use of polygraph conditions for terrorist offenders by enabling the Secretary of State to extend polygraph conditions to offenders where the Secretary of State is satisfied—just satisfied: this was the issue that Jonathan Hall was concerned about—that the offence
“was, or took place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or…was committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
Labour supports the clause. Where polygraph conditions have proved to be effective with certain offender cohorts, we should certainly be enabling the courts to impose such conditions to improve public protection. The extensions included in the clause are sensible additions to the scope of polygraph conditions.
We are also happy to support the Government amendments to the clause. They clarify some matters in relation to service offences and offences with alleged terrorism connections in Scotland. I would be interested if the Minister could share any additional recent evidence that she may have of the effectiveness of polygraph conditions on public protection, particularly if there are any ongoing assessments by her Department of the current use of polygraph conditions in England and Wales. Conducting polygraphs can be an expensive and time-consuming process, so I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that there is a robust evidence base to show that expanding the conditions will contribute further to public protection.
Although we support the clause, I am left to ask the Minister: is this all there is? Offender management has been in disarray for years, especially following the failed structural reforms through which the Government have dragged it. The Public Accounts Committee said that the probation service was
“underfunded, fragile, and lacking the confidence of the courts.”
That was even before the additional serious challenges that it has faced throughout and following the pandemic.
The chief inspector of probation noted that the high-profile independent reviews into the supervision of the likes of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney found
“broader systemic issues in both cases which we are seeing time and time again, both in our local probation inspections and thematic reviews. These included: overloaded practitioners and line managers with well above their target workloads; significant delays in handing over cases from prison to community probation staff, resulting in last minute and inadequate release planning; and incomplete or inaccurate risk assessments. This is the case at both the court stage and start of supervision, with very inexperienced staff being handed inappropriately complex cases with minimal management oversight.”
That is the reality of our probation service today. It is another criminal justice agency in deep crisis.
A properly functioning probation service—I will say more about this on a later clause—is essential to keep the public safe by managing the risk of offenders in the community. The Government have brought yet another justice Bill before us and have given themselves another chance to improve the probation service and provisions around offender management. The Minister will probably talk about the new investment in the probation service, but we have to set that in the context of the huge cuts that the service has suffered since the current Government came to power in 2010. They have missed a lot of opportunities with this Bill. As I said on the previous clause, the offender provisions in the Bill are so slight that their impact will be negligible.
We are seeing a Government who have simply run out of ideas and are not doing enough to keep our communities safe. Although we fully support the clause, I again put on record our disappointment at the lack of ambition that the provisions show when our justice system is in chronic and intractable crisis.
Laura Farris
On Jonathan Hall’s comments, there are two points to make. First, given his expertise, it is relevant to consider what he said about polygraphs in general, which is that
“polygraph measures for released terrorist offenders are a good thing.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 64.]
You asked for an updated example of where polygraph testing had been instrumental, and he gave an example—in fact, I do not think it had been used—when he said:
“I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66.]
It is difficult to prove a negative, but they were brought in shortly after that.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
Can the Minister clarify whether the polygraphs are administered by the private sector or the statutory sector? Given that we have had some startling problems with technical issues in the private sector of late, it would be interesting to know who is responsible for the polygraphs.
Laura Farris
Can I come back to you on that? The shadow Minister talked about the categorisation of former terrorist offenders, and I hope I can answer his point.
We have made the point, and I hope it was clear, that those who were convicted of an alternative offence where there was a strong belief that there was a terrorism connection—it is a small cohort—were convicted before the counter-terrorism law came in. They would have been convicted separately. Politicians are not making a random adjudication of whether an offender should be classified retrospectively as a terrorist. It is about looking at the sentencing remarks and what the judge, who heard all the evidence and sat through the trial, made of that offender.
It is a fair challenge. I know that it is quite an irregular provision in law to have, effectively, a retroactive clause. However, when you look at the failings that applied in the Fishmongers’ Hall case, there is a very strong public interest in ensuring that we maximise and extend the protection of this provision in a way that the public would find reasonable. When you refer back to sentencing remarks, you can be reasonably confident that you are—
The Chair
Order. I gently remind members of the Committee, from Ministers down, that when you use the word “you”, you are referring to me. You must refer to the hon. Gentleman either by his constituency or by his title, otherwise I might get a bit worried about what I have been up to.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although I am not sure that I completely followed it.
To answer the point about who administers the polygraph testing, it is the probation service.
The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing and funding. We have injected extra funding into the probation service, as he acknowledged: it is now getting an extra £155 million a year. In the past 12 months, there has been a recruitment exercise that brought in over 1,500 new recruits. That is on top of the 2,500 since 2021, so in the past two and a half years alone we have added 4,000 people to the service and given it some increased funding. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions.
Amendment 37 agreed to.
Amendments made: 38, in clause 31, page 26, line 31, after “applied” insert
“(and was not an offence in relation to which section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 would have applied if paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of that section were omitted)”.
This amendment excludes, from inserted subsection (4BB), an offence tried in Scotland where it was alleged but not proved that the offence was aggravated by having a terrorist connection.
Amendment 39, in clause 31, page 27, line 4, leave out “(4BB), (4BC) and” and insert “(4BA) to”.—(Laura Farris.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.
Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Confiscation
Amendment made: 40, in clause 32, page 27, line 8, at end insert—
“(2) In Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland), after paragraph 9A insert—
‘Offences relating to things used in serious crime or vehicle theft
9B (1) An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (articles for use in serious crime).
(2) An offence under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (electronic devices for use in vehicle theft).’”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment adds the offences created by clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill to the offences listed in Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 62, in schedule 4, page 119, line 18, leave out paragraph 25.
This amendment would remove the risk of dissipation as a condition for the making of a restraint order.
Schedule 4.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
As always, Dame Angela, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship.
Clause 32 introduces schedule 4 to the Bill, making reforms that are more than technical: they are significant reforms to the confiscation regime in part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to which I suggest we refer henceforth as POCA. That Act was passed over 20 years ago. The measures that we are introducing apply only to the regime in England and Wales contained in part 2 of POCA; there are separate confiscation regimes that apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland in parts 3 and 4 of POCA respectively. We are discussing with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice whether the reforms introduced by the Bill should also be applied to the regimes in Scotland and Northern Ireland. If they so wish, no doubt there will be amendments in due course.
In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations. The commission’s report was published just over a year ago, in November 2022. It contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in this Bill; essentially, we are implementing the Law Commission’s recommendations.
Reform is necessary to ensure that the confiscation regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible, prevents criminals from retaining the ill-gotten gains of their criminality, and makes it clear to offenders and victims that crime does not pay. We will achieve that in schedule 4 by streamlining processes, creating realistic confiscation orders and expediting enforcement.
The Government have consulted extensively on the measures for reform, which benefit from over 20 years of operational insight. These reforms will support the delivery of key objectives in the economic crime plan 2 and the fraud strategy to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery. The 10 parts of schedule 4 contain a number of reforms, which, broadly speaking, do what I have set out; I would of course be happy to go through them in detail should any Committee member so wish.
I note that the hon. Member for Nottingham North has tabled amendment 62. I propose to respond briefly to that amendment once the hon. Gentleman has spoken to it.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Angela. I rise to speak to amendment 62.
Clause 32 and the weighty schedule that it introduces deal with confiscation orders and the regime that governs them. As the Minister says, they are not technical; they are substantial and important. It is safe to say that it is a matter of unanimity across the House that where people are convicted who have benefited, and in many cases made huge sums, from crime and its attendant misery, that money should be recovered from them where possible. Convicted criminals should not make out ahead as a result of their crimes. They should always know that that is what we believe in this place—perhaps they should have priced it in as a cost of doing business that they will not benefit from the misery that they bring.
It is no great surprise that we believe strongly in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but it is important to ensure that it remains effective, two decades on, and that gaps are closed wherever they may exist. The Law Commission work commissioned by the Home Office was very valuable. Its 119 recommendations will help us to improve the process by which confiscation orders are made, ensure that orders are made realistic and proportionate, and improve the enforceability of orders. Those are noble goals, and we are grateful to the commission for its excellent work. We welcome and support clause 32 and schedule 4.
There is only one small change that I would suggest, and I am interested in the Minister’s views on it. I am grateful that he is letting me make my case first; sometimes with groups of amendments we get the case against what we are about to say before we have said it, which always seems a little unkind. I would like to see what he thinks about my amendment 62.
The Committee took evidence from Kennedy Talbot KC that dissipation was a material factor in delaying or preventing restraint orders. He suggested that we take it out. His evidence was of great interest:
“I am sure that the Committee is familiar with the power for the court to make restraint orders preventing people who are suspected of crime, and then charged with crime, from dealing with their assets. At the moment, a statutory proposal in the Bill is that the risk of dissipation factor—such risk needs to be established for an order to be made under case law, not under statute—should be specified. The answer, in my view, is to scrap the risk of dissipation, so that it is not a requirement.
In many cases, what prevents prosecutors from applying for restraint orders is that they feel they cannot meet that test. Normally, that is because the case is brought to them some time after an investigation first started. The defendants are often aware that they are being investigated, and the case law more or less establishes that unless you can show that a defendant is on the point of selling his house or moving £100,000 to the UAE or whatever it may be, you cannot get a restraint order. Scrap the risk of dissipation.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 102, Q44.]
The challenge put to us by Kennedy Talbot KC is that although the risk of dissipation factor is well meant and was designed to find a fair balance as to effectiveness and proportionality between the individual and the collective, it is acting as a perverse incentive not to pursue confiscation orders or pursue assets. I do not think that that is what we want.
I must say, my amendment is possibly not the most elegant way of making that a reality. It would simply delete paragraph 25 of schedule 4, which relates to the risk of dissipation. There may be—in fact, there doubtlessly will be—other ways in which that could be done, and we would be very interested in that.
I am interested in what the Minister has to say in response because, if he is not willing to accept my amendment, I think it is incumbent on him to say whether he shares Kennedy Talbot KC’s concern. If he does, how else might we clear that test? But if he does not share it, why not, because that seemed a pretty reasonable point to me?
On Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Minister pre-empted a question that I was going to ask. This seems like another area where a four-nations approach would be desirable, so that there are no parts of the Union where someone is treated differently, or where it is better to base oneself to exploit differences in regimes. The Government have tabled an awful lot of amendment for this Committee stage. I would hope and expect them to slow down that approach over the rest of this Bill’s stages—in this and the other place—but we would very much welcome it, and they would have nothing to fear, if they tabled an amendment. Perhaps the Minister will say whether any further conversations are planned. Clearly, very effective conversations have taken place on the rest of the Bill, but I wonder whether conversations on this have ground to a halt. Could the Minister tell us whether this is an ongoing process?
Chris Philp
I will first respond to the questions about amendment 62, to which the shadow Minister just spoke. I agree with the concern that he is raising. We must ensure that the barrier is not set too high, and that these orders can be made so that, where there is a risk of dissipation, the assets can, essentially, be placed under control so that they cannot be sold—or “dissipated”, as the Bill puts it.
As the hon. Gentleman said, there is already case law that the court has developed. It cannot be done arbitrarily. The court is essentially freezing someone’s assets, or preventing them from disposing of them at least, and there should be some sort of test before that draconian—but, of course, sometimes necessary—step is taken. That is currently in case law; all we are doing here is putting it on to a statutory footing. Law enforcement partners have welcomed that, because it provides clarity where currently there is simply case law.
Therefore, the Committee could reasonably ask itself whether the way in which this is drafted is reasonable and whether the test is set at the right level. The relevant part is part 8 of schedule 4, which starts at line 18 of page 119 and sets out exactly what the test is. As we would expect, the first test is that the first to fifth conditions in this section of POCA already apply. Secondly, the critical phrase is in paragraph 25(2)(a):
“there is a real risk that relevant realisable property”—
meaning stuff that someone can sell—
“held by any person will be dissipated unless the Crown Court exercises the powers”.
Therefore, the test is set as there being a real risk that the relevant property may essentially be sold off. That is where the threshold is: “a real risk”.
Chris Philp
I will in just one moment. Then, to determine whether there is a real risk, the schedule sets out towards the end of page 119 what the court may have regard to. That includes the nature of the property and the extent to which steps have already been taken, which is only one consideration, not a determinative consideration. Other items include the circumstances of the person and evidence of their character, which means that, if they are a crook, the court would take extra care. It would also have regard to the nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Are they a fraudster? Are they into money laundering and moving cash around? It will also take into consideration the amount of money involved and the stage of proceedings. Presumably that means that the further advanced the proceedings, the more sensitive the court will be. None of those different factors is individually determinative, but they should all be considered. On page 119, line 24 of the Bill, schedule 4 inserts in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 the critical phrase,
“there is a real risk”.
I would be interested to hear the shadow Minister’s view on that point, and not on any other points he may wish to intervene on.
Alex Norris
The Bill defines many terms, and I hope that “crook” will become one such term at a later stage. It is a great phrase.
In previous debates, the Minister has said that putting things on the record may be valuable to future court interpretation. What I am hearing from the Government is a clear message that by “risk of dissipation”, we are talking about not acts of or in the throes of, but a much broader definition. That would be enough comfort to me on my amendment.
Chris Philp
Yes, I am very happy to give the shadow Minister that assurance and to state clearly on the record in Hansard that that is the Government’s intent, and I think it is also the Committee’s intent—I can see waves of agreement rippling around Committee Room 10. We do intend for this to be applied widely. This does not just mean that an asset is on the cusp of being sold; it is much wider than that. It means that any real risk that property might be sold should engage the provisions of this clause, and the judge should have the confidence and, when this is passed, the statutory basis to make that order. The shadow Minister is absolutely right that there is cross-party agreement that this should be quite widely interpreted by the courts, should it be passed. I absolutely put on the record what he was saying.
On the shadow Minister’s other question, discussions are ongoing with the devolved Administrations. We would be very happy to extend these provisions to them. As he said earlier, it is much better that these things are done on a UK-wide basis. We the UK Government are certainly engaging constructively. I am hoping to have more to say on Report. If those jurisdictions want to take up these provisions, I expect there will be an amendment on Report, but it would obviously require their agreement. That is certainly something we would want to facilitate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Confiscation orders: England and Wales
Amendment made: 49, in schedule 4, page 96, line 21, at end insert—
“(4A) After paragraph 9B (inserted by sub-paragraph (4)) insert—
‘Offences relating to things used in serious crime or vehicle theft
9C (1) An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (articles for use in serious crime).
(2) An offence under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (electronic devices for use in vehicle theft).’” —(Chris Philp.)
This amendment adds the offences created by clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill to the offences listed in Schedule 2 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences).
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 33
Suspended accounts scheme
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 33 and schedule 5 will enshrine in law a power for the Secretary of State to create a suspended accounts scheme, with details to be set out in regulations. The scheme will allow financial institutions, such as banks and building societies, to transfer to a Government-appointed scheme administrator amounts equivalent to the balances of customer accounts that have been suspended based on suspicion of criminality. These funds would then be used to finance projects relating to economic crime.
As part of its commitment to tackling economic crime, alongside its legal obligations—for example, to combat money laundering—the financial sector has been suspending customer accounts where it suspects criminal activity. Where practicable, our law enforcement agencies will then investigate such criminality. However, it is not always possible for law enforcement to investigate the alleged criminality to the point that a conviction can be secured, for a variety of reasons, including where the source of the funds and the owners cannot be identified, especially where techniques designed to obfuscate the funds’ origins or ultimate beneficial ownership have been deployed. As a result, quite a lot of money remains suspended across industry. From a survey conducted with the financial sector, it is estimated that it currently holds £200 million of suspected criminal funds in suspended accounts and that a further £30 million a year could be suspended in the future. There is currently no way to access those funds; they simply remain suspended.
This scheme presents an opportunity to leverage our world-class public-private partnership to extract the money that is currently suspended and to invest it in measures to combat economic crime. I am sure that we can all get behind that opportunity. We worked closely with industry partners on developing this measure and consulted with them. We held targeted stakeholder engagement to test the proposals, and they are broadly supported. I am grateful to the stakeholders for the work they have done. I think that this is quite a sensible measure: it will get more cash out of suspended accounts, where it is not doing any good, and into combating economic crime for the benefit of all of our constituents.
Alex Norris
It is absolutely right that we do that, Dame Angela.
The clause and the schedule govern suspended bank accounts and, more pertinently, what happens to the money in those accounts. We should say on the record that it is right that banks are vigilant to the possibility of fraudulent activity and, when they suspect that it is taking place, that accounts are suspended. We know that that sort of regime and the culture of the industry have changed significantly in recent years. We could argue that there is a commercial disincentive to doing that, but banks clearly understand that being a trusted part of a system that does not want fraudulent activity or to have money washing around is good for everybody. That work and its creative use should be recognised, because, as the Minister says, if we held strictly to a criminal standard, there would be all sorts of reasons why that money would not be stopped. We know that good uses of terms and conditions for holding an account have been employed by the industry, which is welcome.
It is important to have a suspended account scheme in place so that those funds have somewhere to go. We support this clause and schedule. Earlier this week, I was getting very excited about the use of regulations rather than putting things in the Bill. This is a case where that is the right approach, and we look forward to good engagement while that is being developed.
Paragraph 114 of the explanatory note says:
“For the past…15 years, organisations in the financial sector (and to a lesser extent in other parts of the Anti-Money Laundering Regulated sector) have been suspending accounts and transactions where criminality is suspected. Organisations have been doing so on a private law basis taking into account their terms and conditions and threat analytics.”
Clearly, this has been going on for a while, and we are now catching up with a regime so that we can give some shape for releasing that money. It is sensible that the funds have somewhere to go, and of course we would support the purpose of that money being to go back into tackling economic crime. That is a good, virtuous loop.
I hope that the Minister will address this. We know that there has not been a scheme to release this money. Are we to understand from that paragraph of the explanatory note that there are 15 years’ worth of suspended funds just sat there? I do not see anything about that in the Bill, and I wonder whether the Minister can make it clear whether he anticipates there being anything in regulation that would mean that funds that predate the legislation would be out of scope of the scheme. I do not read anything about that in the Bill; as I said, my reading is that they are in. That gives rise to a very obvious question: how much money is there? That will be an issue of great interest for colleagues.
The beginning of schedule 5 says that financial institutions “may” take part in this scheme. I wonder whether the Minister got a sense from the consultation responses and the conversations that he has had with the industry of how widely he expects financial institutions to participate in the scheme and of whether there is a degree of risk—or any anxiety in the Home Office about there being a degree of risk—of displacement to financial institutions that are known not to take this action. Again, I suspect that most of the major players are doing this activity and therefore would wish to be part of it. I would be interested to know how widespread the Minister expects take-up to be.
It is right that there is a compensation mechanism for individuals who have their fund suspended and taken away, because mistakes can and doubtlessly will be made in this sort of scheme. Paragraph 5(1)(c) of schedule 5 governs that this ought to be part of the regulations, and we support that. I presume that that would be a liability against the scheme in its aggregate. Paragraph 5(2) states that it is possible to cap the amount of compensation money that the scheme can pay an institution. What is the reason for that? Clearly, there are institutions that are not being careful, so I presume that the measure covering the money they pay to the scheme is an incentive for them to be more careful in how they handle and freeze accounts. However, is there not a risk that shareholders or executives decide to cap the contribution at the compensation sum, so that they do not inadvertently create a liability on their balance sheet? The Minister might say that that will be covered by regulations, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that once a financial institution is part of the scheme, it must always be part of it, or that, for every account it suspends, it must send all of the money, in full, to the suspended accounts scheme.
The Government may not know the answer to that yet, but they must have thought about it because they have set up a compensation cap. If someone has had their account frozen incorrectly and they have not engaged with it for a number of years, that money is going to a suspended accounts scheme. If they then come back and say, “Hang on a minute, I’d like my money back,” it is not unreasonable—in fact, it is very reasonable—to think that they should get it back in full. The Government have chosen to cap that. That might be because they want to encourage good behaviour, but I am keen to get an explanation from the Minister. I really look forward to having, hopefully to a pounds and pence level, a sense of how much he thinks will go into this scheme when it is opened on day one.
Chris Philp
I mentioned this in my introductory remarks. It will apply to all the balances currently held, which includes all those balances accumulated over the last 15 years. The estimation is that that adds up to £200 million. We estimate that the inward flow each year will be £30 million or more. I hope that gives the shadow Minister a sense of the quantum.
We expect wide take-up across the whole financial services industry. Obviously, financial institutions are already suspending accounts, to the tune of £200 million up to date and, we think, £30 million or more a year going forward. Our engagement suggests that there will be wide take-up.
On the shadow Minister’s point about the limit to the compensation, the last words of paragraph 5(2) of schedule 5 are “in any period”, which I presume is to ensure that the scheme remains solvent. He is right to say that any compensation will be paid from inside the scheme and not subsidised by the wider taxpayer, so it will be internally financed, not creating any wider financial liability. It may be the case that, if there is one big claim, the “in any period” caveat would allow for the compensation to be paid over more than one period.
The shadow Minister also asked whether this might inadvertently create a perverse incentive for financial institutions to only make transfers up to the limit of the cap. Clearly, where that cap is set requires some thought. That is a very good question to dig into when these regulations are brought forward and debated. I will make sure that colleagues in the Home Office designing these regulations do so with that concern in mind. When we bring the regulations back, the shadow Minister or his colleagues can have a look at how that is designed. He has made a good point, and we will make sure it is reflected in the way in which the regulations are designed in due course.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 34
Electronic monitoring requirements
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 34, page 27, line 16, at end insert “and Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 85 to 88 provide that a serious crime prevention order made in Northern Ireland may include electronic monitoring requirements.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 85 to 89.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 90 to 108, 110 to 113, 115, 118, and 120 to 132.
Chris Philp
I have about 10 minutes on each amendment, if that is all right. [Laughter.] No?
Chris Philp
I would like to remain popular with colleagues, so I will not do that.
The Government amendments relate to clauses 34 to 37, which seek to strengthen the operation of serious crime prevention orders. SCPOs are a powerful tool for preventing and disrupting the activities of the highest-harm criminals involved in serious crime. However, they are not currently being used to maximum effect and their use is significantly lower than was when they were introduced in the Serious Crime Act 2007.
As drafted, clauses 34 to 37 apply to England and Wales only. Having consulted the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, we tabled the amendments to extend the application of the clauses to Northern Ireland, which will ensure parity between England and Wales and Northern Ireland when it comes to SCPOs. Scotland will keep the existing regime, as set out in the 2007 Act, whereas Northern Ireland will benefit from the various provisions of clauses 34 to 37. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the express power for courts to impose electronic monitoring; the opportunity for a wider range of frontline agencies to apply directly to the High Court for an SCPO; the introduction of a prescribed set of notification requirements for these orders; and the enabling of the Crown court in Northern Ireland to make an SCPO on acquittal where the two-limb test is met.
Ideally, we would apply these measures on a UK-wide basis. However, at the request of the Scottish Government, they will not be extended to Scotland at this time. I think it would be better if they were, but on this occasion we will respect the request made by the Scottish Government. However, we have considered how we can manage the differences in regime between Scotland and the rest of the UK once the measures come into force.
Scotland will, of course, continue to benefit from the existing SCPO regime under the 2007 Act, and in instances where an SCPO made in England, Wales or Northern Ireland is breached, the offender will not be able simply to flee to Scotland. The offence of breaching an order, as set out in the 2007 Act, remains a UK-wide offence, so enforcement against breach continues on a UK-wide basis. The exception to that will be in breaches of the prescribed notification requirements in clause 36, as the offence of not providing that information will apply to England, Wales and Northern Ireland but not to Scotland.
That is the substance of the amendments. As for the substance of clause 34 itself—I think that we will talk about clauses 35, 36 and 37 separately—it provides an express power for the courts to impose an electronic monitoring requirement as part of an SCPO. Tagging the subject will be used to monitor their compliance with various relevant terms, such as an exclusion zone or a curfew, and that will make the orders more effective. They are strengthened in other ways too, but those ways are set out in clauses 35 to 37, which we will talk about later. Clause 34 provides for those electronic monitoring or tagging obligations to be imposed as part of the SCPO.
Alex Cunningham
I am sure that the Government Whip, in particular, will be pleased to know that I am going to make one speech to cover clauses 34 to 37, and it is relatively brief.
Clauses 34 to 37 make several amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007, in relation to serious crime prevention orders, that will apply to England and Wales only.
Alex Cunningham
I will be guided by what you say, Dame Angela.
We support the changes proposed in relation to clause 34 on electronic monitoring requirements. We recognise, as the Minister did, that SCPOs can be a powerful tool for disrupting the activities of the highest-harm serious and organised criminals. The orders are not currently being used to maximum effect and clause 34 amends the 2007 Act to strengthen and improve their functioning. Applications to the High Court have been significantly lower than anticipated since the 2007 Act was passed. The idea is to streamline the process for the police and other law enforcement agencies, place restrictions on offenders or suspected offenders, and stop them from participating in further crime.
As I have said before—it is particularly pertinent to clause 34—the Government have recognised the Bill’s many weaknesses, evidenced by the many amendments they have tabled. In fact, I do not recall, having scrutinised half a dozen justice Bills, seeing seen so many amendments to one clause. Even with the amendments, the Bill will not bring about the changes necessary in the light of the crisis in our probation system, which will have a major role to play in the work created by this clause. I recognise what is, in fact, the replacement of funding to the probation service outlined by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Newbury. I acknowledge that we also now have additional staff—4,000 people. That is very good news, but the probation service is still playing catch-up, and the people recruited are of course very inexperienced in comparison with those who have left the service.
It was not so many years ago that the then Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), implemented a disastrous privatisation of the service, and it has been under a huge strain ever since. Even with the partial reversal of those reforms in 2021 with the partial renationalisation of probation, the service is still facing huge challenges and pressures due to a host of issues. That impacts very much on the work introduced by the clause.
I will quote directly from a report from the chief inspectorate that contains important context. It states:
“We’ve found chronic staff shortages in almost every area we’ve visited and poor levels of management supervision – as well as large gaps in whether the needs of people on probation that might have driven their past offending are being met.
It swiftly became clear that the service was thousands of officers short of what was necessary”—
I acknowledge that more have been more recruited—
“to deliver manageable workloads under the new target operating model for the re-unified service…68 per cent of probation officers and 62 per cent of PSOs rated their caseloads as being… ‘unmanageable’”.
Against that backdrop, does the Minister expect these changes to fulfil their statedobjectives?
Furthermore, the outgoing chief inspector of probation, Justin Russell, reported in September that
“chronic staffing shortages at every grade…have led to what staff report perceive to be unmanageable workloads”.
The Government frequently boast about the funding put into the recruitment of staff and having beaten their target of recruiting 1,000 trainee probation officers. However, that should not distract from the huge problems around retention and burnout in the service. The probation system’s own case load management tool shows that probation officers are working at a case load of between 140% and 180% of their capacity. It should be 90% 95%, so half the current load, for staff to do their job effectively.
In the year to March 2023, 2,098 staff left the probation service, which is an increase of 10% on the year before. Two thirds of those had five or more years’ experience; 28% of probation officers who left in 2023 had been in service for less than four years, so something clearly needs to be done to recruit and retain staff; and 19% of trainee probation officers recruited in 2021 have left the service.
The staffing shortages and retention issues put a strain on those doing more work than they can manage. In 2022, 47,490 working days were lost due to stress among probation staff; the average working-day loss per staff member due to stress was two days. We know that that has an impact on public safety. The recent report by Justin Russell warned about the impact that cuts to probation were having and said that there was “consistently weak” public protection. That followed a similar report in 2020.
In the cases of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney, we saw the impact of the poor conditions facing probation. In both cases, incorrect risk assessments meant that junior probation officers were dealing with offenders who should have been classed as a high risk. The Government’s impact assessment states:
“There is insufficient data with which to monetise the benefits of this measure”.
Can the Minister address whether data collection in this department could do with improvement?
The impact assessment for the Sentencing Bill, which is being scrutinised in parallel to this Bill, shows that the case load for probation will increase by between 1,700 and 6,800. That will cost around £3 million for probation, with a running cost of between £3 million and £4 million a year—a good measure, with real costs and issues behind it. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Chris Philp
Many of the questions concerning the probation service are for the Ministry of Justice, not the Home Office, but I know that the Ministry of Justice is investing more resources. Now that the probation service has been effectively renationalised, there is a lot more direct control over its activities and some of the quality problems that arose a few years ago. It is worth saying that it is not the probation service that manages SCPOs, but the National Crime Agency, but I wanted to offer the hon. Gentleman reassurance about the probation service.
The National Crime Agency supports these measures. In last two years, between 2021-22 and the current financial year, 2023-24, there has been a 21% increase in its budget from £711 million to £860 million, giving it quite a lot of bandwidth to monitor these orders. The issue, really, is getting more orders made, but the monitoring of them is also important, as the shadow Minister says.
Amendment 84 agreed to.
Amendments made: 85, in clause 34, page 27, line 18, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 84.
Amendment 86, in clause 34, page 27, line 28, at end insert “—
(a) where the order is made in England and Wales,”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 87.
Amendment 87, in clause 34, page 27, line 30, at end insert—
“(b) where the order is made in Northern Ireland, must be of a description specified in an order made by the Department of Justice under Article 40(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (N.I. 1).”
This amendment provides that the person responsible for conducting electronic monitoring must be a person specified by the Department of Justice under Article 40(3) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (N.I. 1).
Amendment 88, in clause 34, page 28, line 23, leave out “The court” and insert
“A court in England and Wales”.
This amendment sets out the requirements to be satisfied for a court in England and Wales to impose an electronic monitoring requirement. It is limited to England and Wales because electronic monitoring is available throughout Northern Ireland.
Amendment 89, in clause 34, page 28, line 29, leave out “In” and insert “For the purposes of”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment clarifies that the definitions in new section 5C(5) are relevant to subsection (4)(a) (but the defined terms are not all set out in subsection (4)(a)).
Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Applicants for an order: England and Wales
Amendments made: 90, in clause 35, page 30, line 16, leave out “the appropriate court” and insert “a court or sheriff”.
This amendment restates the position under sections 8 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in relation to applications for serious crime prevention orders to the High Court of Justiciary or the sheriff in Scotland under section 22A of that Act.
Amendment 91, in clause 35, page 30, leave out lines 32 and 33 and insert—
“(ii) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office,
(iii) the Director General of the National Crime Agency,
(iv) the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs,
(v) the chief officer of police, or
(vi) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, and”.
This amendment provides that the persons listed in the amendment may apply to the High Court in Northern Ireland for a serious crime prevention order.
Amendment 92, in clause 35, page 30, line 34, leave out from “by” to end of line 39 and insert
“a person listed in paragraph (a)(iii) to (vi), only if the person has consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.”
This amendment omits the requirement that a chief officer of police in Northern Ireland may only apply for a serious crime prevention order if it is terrorism-related. It also provides that each of the applicants listed in paragraph (a)(iii) to (vi) must consult the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland before making an application.
Amendment 93, in clause 35, page 30, line 39, at end insert—
“(1D) A serious crime prevention order may be made by the Crown Court in Northern Ireland—
(a) only on an application by—
(i) the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland,
(ii) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, or
(iii) a chief officer of police, and
(b) in the case of an application by a chief officer of police, only if—
(i) it is an application for an order under section 19 or19A that is terrorism-related (see section 8A), and
(ii) the chief officer has consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland.”
This amendment makes provision for the Director of the Serious Fraud Office to apply to the Crown Court in Northern Ireland for a serious crime prevention order.
Amendment 94, in clause 35, page 30, leave out lines 41 to 44 and insert—
“(a) in paragraph (a)—
(i) omit sub-paragraphs (i) and (iii);
(ii) after sub-paragraph (iv) insert—
“(v) in any other case, the person who applied for the order;”;
(b) for paragraph (b) substitute—
“(b) in relation to a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland, the person who applied for the order.””
This amendment makes provision for the meaning of “relevant applicant authority” for serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and is consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 95, in clause 35, page 31, line 17, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 28 (power to wind up companies: Northern Ireland)—
(a) in subsection (1)—
(i) in the words before paragraph (a), after “Northern Ireland” insert “or the Director of the Serious Fraud Office”;
(ii) in paragraph (b), for “of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland” substitute “concerned”;
(b) for subsection (1A) substitute—
“(1A) A person mentioned in section 8(1C)(a)(iii) to (vi) may present a petition to the court for the winding up of a company, partnership or relevant body if—
(a) the company, partnership or relevant body has been convicted of an offence under section 25 in relation to a serious crime prevention order made on an application by the person, and
(b) the person considers that it would be in the public interest for the company, partnership or (as the case may be) relevant body to be wound up.”;
(c) in subsection (3), for the words from “the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland” to the end substitute “a person who is authorised to present a petition in accordance with subsection (1) or (1A).”
This amendment makes provision for each of the new applicants for a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland to be able to present a petition to the court for the winding up of a body which has been convicted of an offence in relation to an order made on the application of the applicant. It is consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 96, in clause 35, page 31, line 18, at end insert—
“(za) in paragraph 12—
(i) in paragraphs (a) and (b), after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”;
(ii) in paragraph (c), after “section 27” insert “or 28”;”.
This amendment extends the functions of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and is consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 97, in clause 35, page 31, line 24, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 98 and 99 extend the functions of the Director General of the National Crime Agency in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 98, in clause 35, page 31, line 29, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 97.
Amendment 99, in clause 35, page 31, line 33, after “section 27” insert “or 28”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 97.
Amendment 100, in clause 35, page 31, line 43, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 101 and 102 extend the functions of the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 101, in clause 35, page 32, line 4, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 100.
Amendment 102, in clause 35, page 32, line 8, after “section 27” insert “or 28”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 100.
Amendment 103, in clause 35, page 33, line 7, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 104 to 105 extend the functions of the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police in relation to serious crime prevention orders in Northern Ireland, and are consequential on amendment 91.
Amendment 104, in clause 35, page 33, line 12, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.
Amendment 105, in clause 35, page 33, line 15, at end insert “or Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.
Amendment 106, in clause 35, page 33, line 20, after “England and Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.—(Chris Philp.)
See the explanatory statement to amendment 103.
Chris Philp
The clause amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to provide additional agencies with the power to apply directly to the High Court for a SCPO. The High Court can already make an SCPO upon application by the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office, as well as by the police in terrorism cases. However, as we have heard already, these orders are not being used to maximum effect. In the 10 years between 2011 and 2021, only two applications were made to the High Court for an SCPO in the absence of a conviction, of which only one was successful.
The clause extends the power to make applications to the High Court for an SCPO to other agencies, particularly the National Crime Agency, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the police in all cases, the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police, so that many more law enforcement agencies can use it. The clause also sets out who is authorised to make those applications, and it streamlines the process for doing so, in the hope that that will encourage more applications. In many cases where criminal proceedings cannot be pursued, those agencies will be best placed to lead the process of applying for an SCPO as they will have in-depth knowledge of the case and subject matter expertise.
The CPS is responsible for evaluating the merits of an application to ensure that an SCPO is not being used inappropriately as an alternative to prosecution, and it can intervene if it thinks prosecution would be more appropriate. In recognition of this role, the agencies being given the right to apply directly to the High Court will be required to consult the CPS before making an application. It will be for the law enforcement agency that applied for the SCPO to monitor and enforce it once it is imposed on the individual concerned.
The clause also extends to those additional agencies the power to submit a petition to the court for the winding-up of a company or partnership. A petition can be submitted only if the body has failed to comply with the terms of the SCPO and it is in the public interest for the body to be wound up.
In summary, we hope that extending the range of law enforcement agencies that can apply for an SCPO will, when combined with the other streamlining measures, help to encourage more applications. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36
Notification Requirements
Amendments made: 107, in clause 36, page 33, line 35, at end insert “and Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 108 and 110 to 113 make provision for notification requirements by persons other than individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 108, in clause 36, page 33, line 38, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.—(Chris Philp.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 107.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 109, in clause 36, page 33, line 39, leave out from second “the” to end of line 40 and insert
“first day on which any of its provisions comes into force—”.
This amendment adjusts the time period within which a notification under section 15A(1) must be made.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 114 and 116.
Amendment 69, in clause 36, page 35, line 2, at end insert
“or, where the person is in custody, within three days of the day on which the person is released from custody,”.
This amendment would mean that, where a person in custody is made subject to a serious crime prevention order, the three day time period within which they must notify the police of notifiable information does not start until the day they are released from custody.
Government amendments 117 and 119.
Clause stand part.
Chris Philp
The clause amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to provide that all those subject to an SCPO are required to provide the police with specified personal data as standard. It includes a set of appropriate requirements for bodies corporate. All those requirements can currently be attached to an SCPO at the discretion of the court, on a case-by-case basis, but the clause will place the same set of notification requirements on all individuals without the need for case-by-case applications.
Most respondents to the public consultation agreed with this proposal. Many highlighted that standardising notification requirements will create consistency and save the court some time. The notifiable information includes information such as the person’s address, employment details, telephone numbers, email address and some financial information.
Government amendments 117 and 119 will add to the list of notification requirements. The clause already includes things such as usernames and display names for social media, because monitoring these individuals’ activity online is very important. Amendment 117 adds to that list a requirement so that, in addition to usernames for social media, the relevant individuals must notify the police of any names used to access, or that identify them on, an online video-gaming service with messaging functionality. Law enforcement agencies report that such gaming websites are frequently used by individuals to communicate with other people, including in an attempt to circumvent restrictions on communications detailed in their order, so that they may re-establish their criminal enterprises.
Tightening the legislation will remove that loophole.
Amendments 109 and 116 provide that the time within which an individual made subject to an SCPO must provide the relevant information to the police is three days from the day the order comes into force—not three days from the day the order is made, as drafted. Although some orders come into force on the day they are made, others do not until, for example, the individual has served their prison sentence. The amendments allow for those different circumstances and will ensure that individuals do not inadvertently fall foul of the offence of failing to provide the required information when that would not be the Government’s intention or be reasonable. The amendments have the same effect as amendment 69, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North—I apologise that the Government have adopted the measure, if that is the right word.
Chris Philp
There we are. We have enthusiastically embraced the hon. Gentleman’s idea. I give him and his colleagues full credit for conceiving it. I acknowledge that the Government amendment does the same thing as his amendment 69 would do, for which I thank and congratulate him.
Finally, Government amendment 114 is a drafting amendment—it might even be a technical drafting amendment—to ensure that the definition of a “relevant body” in proposed new section 15A of the Serious Crime Act 2007 carries through to the proposed new section 15C. I am sure that even the shadow Minister will agree that that is fairly technical in nature.
Alex Cunningham
This has been a long time coming. The Minister and I have looked across at each other many times in this room over the past few years, and I think this is the first time he has accepted that we have actually got it right. I am obliged to him for that. This set of measures improves the efficiency of our court system, and anything that we can do to enable that is critical. Adding the information to the system automatically will make it much easier in future to ensure that those people are properly monitored and can be contacted wherever they are. We are happy to support the clause.
Amendment 109 agreed to.
Amendments made: 110, in clause 36, page 34, leave out lines 4 to 6 and insert—
“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order.
(3A) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order.”
This amendment clarifies the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement under section 15A.
Amendment 111, in clause 36, page 34, line 7, leave out “on summary conviction to a fine” and insert “—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;
(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment makes provision for the penalties to apply in Northern Ireland for a failure to comply with the notification requirements set out in section 15A.
Amendment 112, in clause 36, page 34, leave out lines 22 to 24 and insert—
“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (2) as it applies by virtue of the order.
(4) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if, without reasonable excuse, the person fails to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (2) as it applies by virtue of the order.”
This amendment clarifies the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement imposed by section 15B.
Amendment 113, in clause 36, page 34, line 25, leave out “on summary conviction to a fine” and insert “—
(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to a fine;
(b) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”
This amendment makes provision for the penalties to apply in Northern Ireland for a failure to comply with the notification requirements set out in section 15B.
Amendment 114, in clause 36, page 34, line 36, at end insert—
“(3) In this section “relevant body” has the same meaning as in section 15A.”
This amendment inserts a definition of “relevant body” into section 15C.
Amendment 115, in clause 36, page 35, line 1, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and amendments 118 and 120 to 123 make provision for notification requirements by individuals who are subject to a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 116, in clause 36, page 35, line 2, leave out from “with” to end and insert “the first day on which any of its provisions comes into force,”.
This amendment adjusts the time period during which a notification under section 15D(1) must be made.
Amendment 117, in clause 36, page 35, line 13, at end insert—
“(da) any name—
(i) which the person uses to access a video game that is a user-to-user service or that is available as part of a user-to-user service, or
(ii) the function of which is to identify the person as the user of such a game;”.
This amendment requires the subject of a serious crime prevention order to notify the police of any name used to access a video game which is a user-to-user service or which identify the person as the user of such a game.
Amendment 118, in clause 36, page 35, leave out lines 24 to 36.
This amendment and amendment 120 clarify the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with a notification requirement under section 15D and make provision for the penalties to apply on conviction in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 119, in clause 36, page 36, line 12, at end insert—
“(e) ‘user-to-user service’ has the meaning given by section 3 of the Online Safety Act 2023.”
This amendment defines “user-to-user service” for the purpose of amendment 117.
Amendment 120, in clause 36, page 36, line 12, at end insert—
“(6) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if the person—
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;
(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (6) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.
(8) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person—
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;
(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.
(9) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (8) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”
See the explanatory statement to amendment 118.
Amendment 121, in clause 36, page 36, line 18, after “person” insert—
“who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales”.
This amendment and amendments 122 and 123 clarify the jurisdiction in which a person commits an offence for failure to comply with section 15E(1).
Amendment 122, in clause 36, page 36, line 21, at end insert—
“as it applies by virtue of the order”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 121.
Amendment 123, in clause 36, page 36, line 30, at end insert—
“(3A) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person—
(a) fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with a requirement imposed by subsection (1) as it applies by virtue of the order;
(b) notifies the police, in purported compliance with such a requirement, of any information which the person knows to be false.
(3B) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (3A) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”
See the explanatory statement to amendment 121.
Amendment 124, in clause 36, page 37, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert—
“(3) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in England and Wales commits an offence under the law of England and Wales if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with subsection (1) in relation to the notification.”
This amendment and amendment 125 make provision for a person to commit an offence under section 15G(1) under the law of Northern Ireland.
Amendment 125, in clause 36, page 37, line 17, at end insert—
“(5) A person who is subject to a serious crime prevention order made by a court in Northern Ireland commits an offence under the law of Northern Ireland if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with subsection (1) in relation to the notification.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (5) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.”
See the explanatory statement to amendment 124.
Amendment 126, in clause 36, page 37, line 20, after “Wales” insert “or Northern Ireland”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides for a court in Northern Ireland to make provision in a serious crime prevention order about how notifications under section 15A to 15E are to be made.
Clause 36, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 37
Orders by Crown Court on acquittal or when allowing an appeal
Amendments made: 127, in clause 37, page 38, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert—
“(2) A court that makes an order by virtue of subsection (1) in the case of a person who is already the subject of a serious crime prevention order in England and Wales must discharge the existing order.
(2A) The Crown Court in Northern Ireland may make an order under this section in relation to a person who is acquitted of an offence by or before the court, or where the court allows a person’s appeal against a conviction for an offence, if—
(a) the court is satisfied that the person has been involved in serious crime (whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere), and
(b) the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime in Northern Ireland.
(2B) A court that makes an order by virtue of subsection (2A) in the case of a person who is already the subject of a serious crime prevention order in Northern Ireland must discharge the existing order.”
This amendment and amendment 128 make provision for the Crown Court in Northern Ireland to make serious crime prevention orders on acquittal or when allowing an appeal.
Amendment 128, in clause 37, page 38, line 27, at end insert
“or (as the case may be) Northern Ireland”.
See the explanatory statement to amendment 127.
Amendment 129, in clause 37, page 38, line 38, at end insert—
‘(5A) In section 3(4), for “section 1(2)(a)” substitute “sections 1(2)(a) and 19A(2A)(a)”.’
This amendment is consequential on amendments 127 and 128.
Amendment 130, in clause 37, page 39, line 4, after “19A(1)” insert “and (2A)”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment is consequential on amendments 127 and 128.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 37 also amends the Serious Crime Act 2007 to provide the Crown court the power to impose an SCPO on a person who has been acquitted or when allowing an appeal. The High Court already has the power to impose an SCPO in lieu of conviction, provided that it meets the two-limb test set out in the 2007 Act: the court must be satisfied that a person has been involved in a serious crime, presumably on the balance of probability, and it must have reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime. The serious offences are defined in schedule 1 to the 2007 Act, and they include slavery, drug trafficking, firearms offences, terrorism, armed robbery, people trafficking and economic crime, including fraud, money laundering, sanctions evasion and offences in relation to the public revenue.
Clause 37 sets out that the Crown court can impose an SCPO on acquittal or when allowing appeal if the same test is met. The Government believe that the Crown court, on application from the Crown Prosecution Service or the Serious Fraud Office, is best placed to decide whether to make an order against a person whom it has just acquitted, given that the court will have heard all the evidence relating to the person’s conduct and can ensure that the two-limb test has been met.
There are reasons why a person may be acquitted of a particular offence where the standard of proof is high—beyond reasonable doubt—but where an SCPO may still be appropriate: for example, when the evidence may not satisfy the court beyond reasonable doubt that a serious offence has been committed, but there may be sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the person has been involved in serious crime. The court could then decide that imposing an SCPO would protect the public.
There is precedent for this approach: domestic abuse protection orders under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and restraining orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 also allow for court orders to be made against individuals on acquittal or when allowing an appeal. This clause will streamline the process and help ensure that SCPOs can be used more frequently where appropriate.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister rightly said that, when somebody is acquitted but the court is considering the imposition of an SCPO, the grounds on which the order is made must be very robust and they must pass the necessary tests. How do we ensure that that happens? Given that these people have been acquitted of an offence, will there be any report to Ministers or to Parliament on how the clause is working? It is significant if a person is declared innocent but is still subject to a control order. I would welcome clarity on whether we would have feedback on that.
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister asks how he can be sure that these orders will be used reasonably. The answer to that lies in the two-limb test, which was set out in the 2007 Act. I guess it must have been either the Blair Government or the Brown Government who set out the test. It is that the court—now it will obviously be the Crown court as well as, previously, the High Court—is satisfied that a person has been involved in serious crime and that it has reasonable grounds to believe that the order will protect the public. The protection really is that the court must be satisfied of those two things. All we are really doing is extending to the Crown court the ability that the High Court has had already in applying those tests, which have been around for the past 17 years.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for her question. She has anticipated the fact that that data is not immediately at my fingertips, but I would be happy to provide her, by way of follow-up correspondence, with the data that she has just requested.
In relation to monitoring, which I think the shadow Minister asked about, there will be post-legislative review, three to five years after Royal Assent, that will check up on progress and how this is being used in practice. We do want to ensure that it is properly used, in the sense that it is applied to all the cases where it could protect the public. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley is, I think, right to highlight the risk that it might not be used as frequently as it should be, so we need to ensure that the Crown Prosecution Service, the barristers who are presenting these cases before the court, and the court itself—Crown court judges—are fully informed about this power once we pass it.
Of course, being able to issue an SCPO at the point of acquittal—there and then, on the spot—is much easier than having to make a separate application to the High Court, which I can imagine might get forgotten about, so this should result in a much larger number of SCPOs: the judge can do it on the spot, on acquittal, having just heard all the evidence, and without the need for a whole separate application and process in the High Court to be gone through. But we should definitely monitor the situation to ensure that the power is actually used. I think that probably answers the points that have been raised.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 37, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Eleventh sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 23rd January 2024
(10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
On a point of order, Sir Robert. I am sorry to interrupt the proceedings, but I had a discussion with the Opposition Front Benchers, and we wondered whether—with your consent—we might start this afternoon’s session at 3 o’clock rather than 2 o’clock. I have consulted the Clerk but, of course, wanted to get your consent first.
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Robert.
Clause 38 brings us to the provisions that concern nuisance begging. This clause, and subsequent clauses on homelessness, are closely tied to the repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. The 2022 Act will repeal the Vagrancy Act once the relevant provisions have been commenced, but the Government have said that they will commence those provisions only when replacement legislation is in place. For better or for worse, the clauses in front of us are that replacement legislation.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act was a momentous victory for campaigners, because it effectively decriminalised rough sleeping and begging. The repeal had cross-party support, and many in the House shared the view that those who are destitute and living on the street should not be criminalised or threatened but offered support and assistance. Subsequently, the Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act and set out new offences and powers regarding, for example, the prohibition of organised begging, which is what we are discussing and which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, and the prohibition of begging where it causes a public nuisance, such as next to cashpoints or in shop doorways.
Clause 38 gives effect to some of the Government’s proposals by introducing the power for a constable or local authority to issue a move-on direction to a person if they are engaging in, have engaged in or are likely to engage in nuisance begging. In this context, it is important that we differentiate between nuisance begging and nuisance homelessness, which we will come to. We strongly object to the provisions on nuisance homelessness, but the issue of nuisance begging is more nuanced. We know that some organised criminal gangs use begging for their own ends. They often use begging strategies that are aggressive and antisocial, and they often exploit challenged people to gain illicit private profit off the back of the characteristic kindness of the British people. That is wrong, and we therefore support powers that can tackle organised nuisance begging, but we think the provisions require greater humanity to protect those who are being exploited and those who are genuinely destitute.
The risk is that clause 38 and related clauses will target anyone, regardless of the nature of the harm. As Crisis has said, an effective blanket ban on begging risks pushing vulnerable people into dangerous places where they may be subject to greater abuse or violence. Someone simply sat alongside a cap or a cup could fall foul of the definition. That would be a mistake and risk harming some of the most vulnerable people in society. Many people become homeless and resort to begging through no fault of their own but because of situations such as trauma or family breakdown. They should not be doubly punished for falling through the cracks of a welfare system that is creaking under the strain of widespread poverty in our society. We are concerned that the Government have not quite landed the provision right.
Clause 38 allows for an authorised person—in this case, a constable or someone from the relevant local authority, which is defined in clause 64—to give a nuisance begging direction to someone over 18 who they think is engaging, has engaged or will engage in nuisance begging. The written direction will require the person to leave a certain place and not return for up to 72 hours. We do not, in principle, object to the police or local authority having tools to disrupt highly organised nuisance begging operations, which we know are active, but we fear that the provision will sweep up others along the way.
Amendments 139 and 140 seek to introduce safeguards. Amendment 140 seeks to ensure that, where nuisance begging directions are used, they should not interfere with a person’s attendance at substance abuse support services, mental or physical health support services, or their place of worship. Clause 38(5) states that a direction cannot interfere with a person’s work, their education or a court order. That is wise, but adding substance abuse support services, health services and someone’s place of worship would complete the picture. The amendment is straightforward and reasonable. Its intention is to protect the support and assistance provided to people who might be forced into begging, and to ensure that the Government’s nuisance begging directions do not cut across or undermine that support.
The nuisance begging powers are significant and could have unintended consequences, and amendment 139 is an attempt to maintain some parliamentary oversight. It would require the Secretary of State to lay an annual report before Parliament on the application of the provisions in clause 38, which we think would be an important check to ensure that they are not causing unintended harms, to give Members a mechanism to raise concerns, and to give a degree of parliamentary accountability. I do not think the amendment is particularly onerous. I would like to think—I would be concerned if this was not the case—that the Government will be monitoring the application of the powers and have a sense of how they work and whether they are dealing with the problem that they want them to deal with.
If that is not the Government’s approach, I hope that the Minister will talk a little about what assessment has been made of the possible risks, particularly for those who are facing genuine destitution and may fall foul of the legislation. For example, what will be the impact of imposing a one-month prison sentence or a £2,500 fine on someone in breach of these provisions, when they are already almost certainly in severe financial difficulties? We will get to appeal provisions, but will those who are facing these challenges be likely to be able to use those provisions? Is there not a risk of rather unequal justice? Further, having made such an assessment, what steps will the Government take to introduce mitigation?
My amendments suggest a way to put in some safe-guarding. I hope that the Minister can give us assurances, at least, about the Government’s understanding of how they will differentiate between the genuine, criminal, organised nuisance operations and people who are just in a dire personal situation. It is important that the Committee is mindful of that.
Chris Philp
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert—I think for the first time, though I hope it is the first of many. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for explaining his two amendments to clause 38, which provides for nuisance begging directions. Before I respond to his amendments, let me provide a little wider context for clauses 38 to 64, which the Committee will be relieved to hear I do not propose to repeat at the beginning of our debate on each clause.
These clauses will replace the Vagrancy Act 1824, which was prospectively repealed by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, as the shadow Minister said. The hon. Member for Stockton North and I fondly remember our extensive debates on that subject some years ago. This package includes directions, notices and orders where someone is nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping; offences for nuisance begging and for facilitating organised begging; and a replacement offence for being found on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose.
The Government and, I think, the House as a whole take the view that nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, using regulation-making powers under the PCSC Act—a Henry VIII power to which I presume the shadow Minister does not object. We have put in place a substantial package of support for people who are genuinely homeless, sleeping rough or at risk of doing so. Engagement and offers of support must continue to be the starting point in helping those who are begging genuinely or sleeping rough to move away from a life on the streets and into accommodation. However, we have heard from frontline local authority partners and police that there is still a role for enforcement where that engagement does not work.
It is important not to conflate begging and rough sleeping—although of course the two can be linked—which is why we treat them separately in the Bill. The Government consulted on replacing the Vagrancy Act in 2022 and the majority of respondents were in favour of introducing replacement begging offences, recognising the harm that it causes. We set out our plans in more detail in the antisocial behaviour action plan, published in March 2023.
Accordingly, clause 38 provides that where an authorised person, defined in subsection (7) as a police constable or the relevant local authority, is
“satisfied on reasonable grounds that the person is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to engage, in nuisance begging”,
they can issue a direction to move on. We will come on to the definition of nuisance begging, which is set out in clause 49. Such a direction will require the person to leave the specified location and not to return for up to a maximum of 72 hours, giving respite to those who are negatively impacted by the nuisance. It can also include a requirement for the person to take their belongings, and any litter they have been responsible for, with them. The direction must be given in writing, and it is an offence not to comply with it. The penalty for failing to comply is up to one month’s imprisonment or a level 4 fine, which is up to £2,500, or both.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Can the Minister tell me how somebody looks likely to beg?
Chris Philp
That is a facts-specific determination, but it might, for example, be that someone is carrying a sign soliciting funds, has positioned themselves in a particular location with a receptacle for collecting money, or is positioned near an ATM. It might be that someone has been begging and, although they have not been observed doing so by a police officer, there is a reasonable suspicion that they might do so in the future.
The meaning of nuisance begging is not any begging; it is quite precisely defined in clause 49, which we will come to. Begging in general is not being criminalised. That was the purpose of repealing the 1824 Act, which was very wide in its scope. We are defining nuisance begging in this Bill to be quite precise and targeted. Obviously, we will discuss that in detail, probably in the next hour or so.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I note that clause 38(9) refers to one month’s imprisonment. Can the Minister explain how he reconciles that new sentence with the Sentencing Bill’s presumption against short sentences? These people may never go to prison.
Chris Philp
The hon. Gentleman asks an excellent question. There is in the Sentencing Bill a presumption against short sentences, defined as under 12 months. However—as he knows, as a shadow Justice Minister—that presumption does not apply where the offender is already subject to an order of the court. For a first offence, where the offender is not subject to an order of the court, he is quite right: there would be a statutory presumption—a strong presumption—against a sentence of less than 12 months. If some other kind of court order has been issued for a first offence, the provisions of the Sentencing Bill—in particular the presumption against short sentences—will not apply on any subsequent appearance that the offender makes before the magistrate for a later offence, for so long as that order of the court is in force. That is how the two provisions interact, but that was a very good and fair question. I trust that my answer deals with the point that he raised.
Chris Philp
The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it does not, but it does. I explained how if the offender is subject to an order of the court following a first offence, then the presumption against a short sentence does not apply for a second or subsequent offence. That is how the two interact. The disapplication would apply only on the first occasion; if a court order is made, the disapplication will not apply to subsequent offences for so long as that court order is in force. I think that is a relatively clear and coherent position.
Clause 38(5) provides that a direction must, so far as is practicable, avoid interfering with a person’s attendance at work or education, or with any requirements of a court order—as I have just mentioned—to which the person is subject. Amendment 140 seeks to augment that provision to avoid a direction interfering with the person’s attendance at a substance abuse support service centre, mental or physical health services or a place of worship.
On the face of it, those things sound broadly reasonable, because there are numerous circumstances in which a person subject to a nuisance begging direction may want to enter an area to access those services. It is worth saying that a direction will have a maximum duration of 72 hours, so we are not talking about long periods. Directions must also be proportionate and reasonable. We expect those exercising these powers—a constable or the relevant local authority—to take a joined-up approach and consider their exercise on a case-by-case basis. There is a lot of good practice in multi-agency working to build on, to ensure that people can access appropriate support services.
Chris Philp
I am looking forward to repeating it.
There are many parliamentary mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of Bills, not least parliamentary questions, scrutiny by Select Committees and, critically, the normal process of post-legislative review, which takes place between three and five years after Royal Assent. I hope on that basis that the shadow Minister will forbear from pressing amendments 140 and 139. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and for saying that the Government believe that, for nuisance begging and nuisance rough sleeping, support is the starting point. That is an important message. I also share his view that they are not the same thing, and our treatment of the two are different for that reason. I also agree that there is a place for enforcement, particularly for nuisance begging, although I think the case is weaker for rough sleeping. However, he also said that this is not about just any begging. Although I do not want to pre-empt our discussion of clause 49, which we will debate in due course, the way it is drawn up means that there will not be much left, frankly.
One theme that I will return to—particularly when we come to the homelessness provisions and the point my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about whether someone looks “likely”—is that this will be in the eye of the beholder. That will be a challenge, particularly for rough sleeping, but also in this area, so it is right that there should be anxieties.
I am grateful for the Minister’s comments on amendment 140. As he says, the list is probably not comprehensive, but I am glad that he said it was reasonable in spirit, which is definitely the kindest thing he has said to me in our four months together so far—I will take that as the strongest affirmation that I am likely to get. He has committed to address this issue through guidance, which is perhaps a better way to do it, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.
Similarly, on amendment 139 and this point about post-legislative reviews, that is obviously not something we feel in this place. I suspect it is something that is more internal to Departments. There is a point here about how well we do or do not monitor the impact of legislation three or five years after we have passed it. We do not—we move on and do not really learn anything from it. However, we have had that argument on previous clauses, and I will not rehearse it again. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Nuisance begging prevention notices
Alex Norris
I am grateful for that intervention. The case for resources for local authorities is one that we cannot make enough. My hon. Friend gives a good example of partnership working that has not just turned to criminal justice outcomes and told the police, “Well, this is now your problem to deal with.” We need that good faith partnership working and I hope that my amendments help to promote that to some degree.
Amendment 138 seeks to mitigate those challenges by inserting a new subsection so that
“Where a person has been served a nuisance begging notice the serving authority must refer that person to their local authority who must provide guidance relating to welfare rights or any other associated issue the person faces.”
The amendment seeks to ensure that someone who receives a nuisance begging notice is referred to the right support services and can liaise with the right qualified individuals on the matter. That would move away from criminalising the person and towards making sure that they get support to make a change in their life. My amendment is one way to do that and I would be interested in hearing about other ways from the Minister. In a previous debate, the Minister said it would be “support first”, and this is a way to make that real.
Clause 40 governs what can and cannot be required in the prevention notice. I have sought to amend that with amendment 141, which mirrors what I said in the previous debate. I will not repeat those arguments or press this to a Division, on the basis of what the Minister offered.
Amendment 142 would reduce the period that a prevention notice may be in place from three years to one year. Three years is a lengthy period for which—we will discuss this in relation to clause 49—someone could be told that they cannot attend their local town centre or high street. That could be based on the judgment of quite a junior officer, with minimal oversight, on pain of a month in prison or a fine of £2,500. Setting to one side those who are in genuine destitution, who I cannot believe we would want to banish from their town centres, part of the risk is that criminal gangs will cycle through the vulnerable people that they are exploiting. It will not matter a jot to those gangs that that person has to deal with a very difficult consequence for their life; they will move on to someone else. Amendment 42 would reduce the period of the notice down to one year. I hope that the Minister can explain the rationale for choosing three years.
Clause 41 is about the appeals process. We support an appeals process being included in the Bill, but I have significant concerns, which will be mirrored in the debates relating to homelessness, about access to justice and about whether the most destitute will be able to engage with the magistrates court to try to get a notice lifted. I would not challenge the power in clause 42 to vary notices, as I suspect there will be moments when they will be revised down.
Those are some ideas to try and soften some of the provisions. I am interested in the Minister’s views.
Chris Philp
As the shadow Minister explained, his amendments are to clauses that provide for nuisance begging prevention notices. The notices are a further tool that would be made available to police and local authorities to tackle nuisance begging, where it arises. The nuisance begging prevention notices that are set out in this and subsequent clauses follow the structure of existing notices such as community protection notices, which the police and local authorities are already familiar with using.
The nuisance begging prevention notice builds on the move-on direction in clause 38, allowing for an escalated approach, and can be tied in with relevant offers of support. The notice will prohibit the relevant nuisance begging behaviours and help to direct the person into the relevant support where it is necessary to do so in order to prevent the nuisance behaviour. For example, the notice may state that the individual must not beg close to cashpoints or that they must not approach people to ask for money, and also that they should attend a drug treatment centre so that their support needs can be assessed. In that way, the public would be protected and any relevant underlying drivers causing the nuisance begging could be addressed.
In relation to the point that the shadow Minister raised, I can confirm that the intention is absolutely to support people. We want to help address the underlying causes of begging and rough sleeping, which may be related to mental health problems or drug problems. I will give the shadow Minister a sense of the thinking on this. In drafting the Bill, there was extensive debate about whether we could go further and actually require people to have drug treatment, mental health treatment or whatever, or to attend a refuge or a shelter. There is evidence that people do not always want to accept those offers of help, so we considered whether we could introduce a power to essentially require them to do it. Having taken legal advice, it was suggested that that would not be lawful, and that is why this is constructed in the way it is. However, hopefully that illustrates that the Government’s thinking is that we want to offer more assistance and to get more people who are sleeping rough or begging into mental health treatment, drug treatment and alcohol treatment. We thought of going further, but for legal reasons that are principally connected to the European convention on human rights, we were not able to do so. Hopefully that illustrates the thinking on these issues.
Amendment 142 seeks to reduce the maximum duration of a nuisance begging prevention notice from three years to one year. I should start by stressing that the three years provided for in the Bill is the maximum period over which the notice can be enforced, and, naturally, where appropriate, a shorter timeframe can be specified. It is for the authorised person, which will very often be a local authority officer, not just a police constable, to consider the individual circumstances—all the relevant information about the person’s circum-stances—to decide what is appropriate, reasonable and proportionate.
Jess Phillips
What concerns me, regarding certainty of referral, is if there are cases where people—where I live in Birmingham, the biggest problem in nuisance begging is Romanian women who are clearly being trafficked; there are no two ways about that. I fear their criminalisation more so than their traffickers’ criminalisation, which is nil. I wonder whether there could be a mechanism for referral directly to the national referral mechanism. Both the police and local authorities act as first responders in the national referral mechanism already, so that would not need a change in the law. Maybe that is a compulsory referral that could be made.
Chris Philp
The hon. Lady raises an important point. As she says, first responders, among others, are already under an obligation—I think a statutory obligation—to make referrals into the national referral mechanism. I suspect that it was the Modern Slavery Act 2015—I am looking to my colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, for assistance; it probably is that Act—that enacted our obligations under the ECAT, or Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, treaty. So, those obligations already exist. I would certainly agree with the hon. Lady that, if first responders—either the police or indeed local authorities—think that someone is a victim of trafficking or modern slavery, they should certainly make the referral into the national referral mechanism.
In terms of potential prosecution, obviously there are provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, where someone is the victim of trafficking, that provide protection in those circumstances. I would also say that there are some circumstances in which referrals into support are not necessary. There are many cases—probably the majority of cases—where they are necessary, and I would expect that to happen in those, whether it is the police or a local authority, but there are also circumstances in which it is not necessary, or where the help has been repeatedly refused in the past. I therefore think that a blanket requirement on the face of the Bill, as per the amendment, probably is not appropriate.
However, again, I agree with the spirit enshrined in the shadow Minister’s amendment, and I would like to put it on record that the expectation from the Government, as well as, I suspect, from the Opposition, is that, where somebody needs support—mental health support, drug treatment support, alcohol treatment support, domestic abuse support, or protection from trafficking and other vulnerabilities—the police and local authorities will make the appropriate referral. But that will not necessarily apply in all cases, whereas the amendment, as drafted, covers everyone, regardless of whether there is a need or not.
Amendment 141 is similar to amendment 140, which was in the previous group. As I said then, I am not sure that it is possible or desirable to set out all the possible circumstances in which an individual may need access, so guidance is the right place to put that.
Jess Phillips
The expectation, rather than necessarily the duty in law, is a referral. Beyond a referral, what happens if a woman nuisance begs in the 1,000 days that it takes to get referral through the national referral mechanism? It takes women 1,000 days to get a conclusive grounds decision, and it takes men 500. Or what if someone is waiting for a mental health referral? As I think every Member will know, you might as well wee in the wind. What happens if they nuisance beg in the 1,000 days, or a year, from when they are first helped to when they can get counselling in a domestic abuse service? What happens in the gap?
Chris Philp
If someone is given a nuisance begging prevention notice, the expectation will be that they comply with it. If there is any prosecution for a breach, it may be that the protections in the Modern Slavery Act would apply. Again, if a police officer or local authority officer thinks there is a problem with trafficking, it may well be that they think it inappropriate to make the prevention order. It is a power, not an obligation; they do not have to give the notice. We would expect the officer to have regard to the circumstances of the individual, which might include those the hon. Lady described. The national referral mechanism can take quite a while, although it is speeding up, but it may be that other support is available much more quickly than the support that follows an NRM reasonable grounds decision.
To repeat the point, the expectation is that support is made available where it is necessary, but support could be provided hand in hand with a nuisance begging prevention notice. The authorities could seek to prevent nuisance begging, which is bad for the wider public, by using the notices and other powers, while at the same time ensuring appropriate safeguarding. The two are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to do both at the same time. I also draw the Committee’s attention to clause 39(7), which is relevant to the intervention. It says it is only an offence to breach the conditions “without reasonable excuse”. For example, if someone has been coerced into behaviour that results in a breach, that coercion could—it would be for the court to determine—be a reasonable excuse, and therefore a defence.
I hope that that explains the purpose of clauses 39 to 42. Although I understand and agree with the spirit of the amendments, they are not necessarily the right way to achieve the objectives that the shadow Minister set out.
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. The “reasonable excuse” provision in clause 39(7) gives a degree of comfort, but the reality is that, particularly in the trafficking cases mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, individuals will not say that they have been coerced into nuisance begging. Instead, they will take the punishment; they will not be able to proffer what would be considered a reasonable excuse. That is our concern.
The debate on amendment 141 mirrored previous debates, and I am happy not to move it on the basis of the answers I have had. On amendment 142, I hear what the Minister said about the three-year duration being a maximum, not a target, but I fear that because it is in the Bill, it will become a magnet. With regards to police constables, we know about their training and codes of practice, so we can be confident about the criteria that they are expected to apply, but we are concerned that the Bill is—for good reason—drafted in such a way that very junior local authority officers could be making that decision.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 70, in clause 43, page 42, line 21, after “application” insert “by complaint”.
This amendment provides for applications for nuisance begging prevention orders to be made by complaint.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 44 stand part.
Government amendments 71 to 75.
Amendment 143, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “5 years” and insert “1 year”.
Government amendment 76.
Clauses 45 to 47 stand part.
Chris Philp
Clauses 43 to 47 introduce nuisance begging prevention orders. Alongside nuisance begging directions and nuisance begging prevention notices, these orders—the third tier of escalation—are designed to be an additional tool available to local authorities and the police to keep communities safe. They are not about criminalising the vulnerable or the destitute, but rather acknowledge the impact that nuisance begging can have on individuals and communities, and empower local partners to deal with it in the most appropriate way.
Alex Norris
I will not repeat a lot of what I have said so far. Clause 43 concerns nuisance begging prevention orders, the most severe of the three tiers of powers that the Bill covers. I think it makes sense to align these tiers, as the Minister said in a previous debate, with other civil-type powers, so that they are easy to understand. As defined in clause 43, an authorised person can obtain the order on application to a magistrates court. If the court is satisfied that someone aged 18 or over has engaged in nuisance begging, and has failed to comply with the move-on direction and a notice, this seems like a reasonable escalation of the process for them to face.
My concern is mainly with the duration of such orders; clause 45(4) states that their duration may not exceed five years. That is quite a long period. Is that a proportionate response to the challenge that we are trying to tackle, which is serious and organised nuisance begging and aggressive and antisocial nuisance begging? Is a five-year exclusion the right thing to do, or, again, will it harm vulnerable people? We know that gangs will move on to new people, and the others will be left with the consequences.
There is a degree of comfort in the fact that we are talking about magistrates courts, so I have less anxiety about the measures than I did about the previous provisions, in which case I really think that three years will become a magnet. We can have confidence that a magistrates court will look at the full picture when considering an order of up to five years, but I am keen to know why the five years is being written in sand. Through amendment 143, I seek to reduce the period to one year, as a way of finding a balance between protecting vulnerable people and disrupting organised activity. An appeals process is set out in these clauses, and although this issue is of greater concern in the next part of the Bill, I think there is an access to justice issue for the people we are talking about. How well will they be able to use the legal processes that are there to protect them, and what support will they get to do so? I will stop there, but I am particularly keen to know why five years was the chosen duration of the orders.
Chris Philp
Briefly, five years was chosen—an increase from the three years in the previous provisions—because, as the shadow Minister said, the order is supervised by a court. That duration is a maximum, rather than a target. Courts are very well used to dealing with maximum durations, particularly in the context of sentencing. For example, the prison sentences handed down are often a great deal shorter than the maximum set out. As a matter of evidence and practice, courts often go a long way below the maximum—although we in Parliament might wish they went closer to the maximum in some cases. The duration is set at five years because courts have discretion and are used to working with maximum durations; but the court does have to look at all the relevant information and evidence before deciding. Description of person Time when order takes effect A person who has been remanded in custody, or committed to custody, by an order of a court From the beginning of the day on which the person is released from custody A person subject to a custodial sentence Immediately after the person ceases to be subject to a custodial sentence”
Finally, in relation to the positive requirements imposed, we have offered further safeguards, in that nuisance begging prevention orders can be varied or discharged, should circumstances change during the period. I hope the shadow Minister accepts that giving a court that flexibility is reasonable. We do it the whole time with criminal sentencing, and there is evidence that courts use that power with a great deal of restraint sometimes. I hope that explains the Government’s thinking on the issue.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Duration of nuisance begging prevention orders
Amendments made: 71, in clause 45, page 44, line 8, leave out “on the day” and insert
“at the beginning of the day after the day on which”.
This amendment provides for a nuisance begging prevention order to take effect at the beginning of the day after the day on which it is made.
Amendment 72, in clause 45, page 44, line 9, leave out “subsection (2)” and insert “subsections (2) and (2A)”.
This amendment and amendments 74 and 76 provide that where a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of certain offenders, the order may take effect from a later time described in the table inserted by amendment 74.
Amendment 73, in clause 45, page 44, line 12, leave out
“be made so as to take”
and insert “provide that it takes”.
This is a drafting change.
Amendment 74, in clause 45, page 44, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) If a nuisance begging prevention order is made in respect of a person described in the first column of the following table, the order may provide that it takes effect as mentioned in the second column.
See the statement for amendment 72.
Amendment 75, in clause 45, page 44, line 16, leave out “not exceed” and insert
“be a fixed period not exceeding”.
This amendment clarifies that the specified period for an order must be a fixed period.
Amendment 76, in clause 45, page 44, line 19, after “section” insert
“—
“custodial sentence” means—
(a) a sentence of imprisonment or any other sentence or order mentioned in section 222 of the Sentencing Code or section 76(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, or
(b) a sentence or order which corresponds to a sentence or order within paragraph (a) and which was imposed or made under an earlier enactment;”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 72.
Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 46 and 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 48
Offence of engaging in nuisance begging
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I would like to deal first with clause 49, which defines, as I said earlier, the concept of nuisance begging, which underpins the behaviours being targeted in the preceding clauses that we have debated this morning.
The definition has two parts. First, subsection (2) defines a number of specific locations where begging will automatically be considered to constitute nuisance begging. These are locations where people are likely to be handling money or are less likely to be able to get away from the person begging. The locations include forms of public transport, including bus, tram and train stations, buses, trams and trains, taxi ranks, outside an area of business, near an ATM, near the entrance or exit of retail premises, and the common parts of any buildings.
Subsection (3) provides that it will also be considered to be nuisance begging when a person begs in a way that causes or is likely to cause: harassment, alarm or distress to another person; a person to reasonably believe that they or anyone else may be harmed or that the property may be damaged; disorder; and a risk to health and safety. Where necessary, those terms are further defined in subsection (4).
Distress includes distress caused by the use of threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, or the display of any writing, sign or visible representation that is threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting. That can include asking for money in an intimidating way or abusing people who refuse to give money, all of which I hope hon. Members will agree are behaviours that should not be tolerated on our streets and to which people should not be subject.
Jess Phillips
This is quite an exhaustive list, but much of the law is often London-centric. One of the problems where I live, certainly as a woman driving late at night, is people stopping traffic at road intersections. The feeling of intimidation can differ from person to person, but as a woman on her own at a crossroads in Birmingham, it feels intimidating to have people standing outside my car. How can we deal with that particular issue?
Chris Philp
I recognise the hon. Lady’s point that we need to legislate for the whole country, not just London, and I say that as a London MP. We want to look after the entire country. I accept and agree with her that being approached in one’s car when in stationary traffic or at a junction can be very alarming and worrying for everyone, but particularly for women. There are two things in the Bill that I think may assist. Clause 49(2)(e) specifically references a carriageway, which is defined in subsection (4) as having the meaning given by the Highways Act 1980, and I think that includes a road, so that would be covered.
Secondly, and more generally, clause 49(3) provides that the nuisance begging definition is engaged, or the test is met, if the person begging does so in a way that has caused or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. That means that there is a “likely to cause” protection as well. I think that the combination of those two provisions—but especially the first, which expressly references a carriageway, meaning road, as defined in the 1980 Act—expressly addresses the point that the hon. Lady has reasonably raised.
To return to the substance of the clauses, it is important to include in the definition of nuisance begging behaviours that constitute a health and safety risk. There are many instances, exactly as the hon. Lady has just said, where people approach cars stopped at traffic lights. In addition to being on a carriageway, as caught under clause 49(2)(e), and in addition to potentially causing or being likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, as caught under clause 49(3)(a), it may also be the case that they are causing a road traffic risk. Moreover, they could be causing a health and safety risk if they are blocking fire exits or routes that emergency services may need to pass down. I hope that shows that we have thought about this quite carefully.
Alex Norris
As my hon. Friend says, there would just be fields.
I am keen to understand from the Minister that subsection (3) is an “or” provision to subsection (2) and not an “and” provision—[Interruption.] The Minister nods. Subsection (3) is therefore a significant increase, in the sense that the locations cease to matter quite quickly so long as the nuisance begging
“has caused, or is likely to cause”—
has yet to cause, but may well cause—harassment, possible harm or damage, or a risk to health or safety. This is a very broad and subjective test. I understand what training we could give to a constable, but I am interested to hear from the Minister about what training we can give to local authorities, or at least what guidance he intends to produce regarding the application of this subjective test. We do not intend to oppose this clause but, combined with the clauses before it, the total effect will be that the distinction between begging and nuisance begging, about which the Minister made a point, will not exist in any practical sense. The provisions are drawn broadly enough to apply in virtually any case where an individual wants to beg. We need to know what criteria the authorities are supposed to be working against, so I am keen to hear the Minister’s answer.
Chris Philp
In relation to the first question about why the offence is set out in the clause when we already have the notices, orders and directions—three interventions—that we have discussed already, there may be some particularly egregious or persistent cases where the criminal sanction is necessary.
Of course, it is for the court to decide what is appro-priate. We have already discussed that there is now a presumption—or there will be shortly, once the Sentencing Bill passes—against short sentences for those people not already subject to a supervision order from the court, so a custodial sentence is very unlikely to occur for a first conviction in any case. For offences of this nature, it is open to the court to impose a non-custodial sentence, even for subsequent offences where there is already a supervision order from the court in place. That might include a mental health or alcohol treatment requirement, a drug rehabilitation requirement and so on. It does not follow that the court having the power to impose custody will mean that it will necessarily choose to do so. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. It is a last resort power, but it is important that the police have that available to them.
In relation to the definition of nuisance begging—to which no amendments have been proposed—we want to make sure that people are able to go about their daily business; the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley set out in her intervention how nuisance begging can cause intimidation. The list of locations is based on feedback received from local authorities, business improvement districts, and retail associations and their members, based on their own practical experience. That feedback came from the consultation we conducted in 2022 and subsequently, and it is why the list of locations has been constructed in that way that it has.
Jess Phillips
As the Minister has said, I have outlined the places where I do feel intimidated. There was a homeless man—he died recently—who used to sit outside the local Asda where I live. He was a lovely man who chatted to everybody, and he was not intimidating at all. Would this definition account for him? He did not do anything wrong and I do not think he caused anyone any offence. Would he have fallen under this definition?
Chris Philp
Well, if he was sitting within 5 metres of the retail entrance, then yes, he would have come under this definition. However, I would point out that he would also have come under the definition set out in the current Vagrancy Act 1824; indeed, under that Act, he would have been in scope wherever he sat. If he was begging at the Asda entrance, then he was already breaking the existing law. This change is narrowing the definition a great deal. The fact that he was technically infringing the current Vagrancy Act, but was not arrested or enforced upon, probably illustrates the point that the police and local authority officers do exercise reasonable judgment. If they were not, he would have been arrested.
I hope that what would happen in such cases is as we discussed earlier; if someone like that man needs assistance of some kind—with mental health support, alcohol support, or whatever the issue may be—the expectation of the Government, and probably the Opposition, is that that intervention will happen. It would be interesting to find out if any attempt was made by the local authority in Yardley to assist that gentleman with whatever issue or challenge he may have been struggling with. To repeat the point, the provisions in this clause significantly narrow the scope of criminalisation in the law as it has stood for the last 200 years.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Arranging or facilitating begging for gain
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I hope that the clause is relatively uncontentious and commands unanimous agreement across the Committee. It creates a new criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain, relating to the kind of exploitation that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley referred to in an earlier intervention. Organised begging is often run by criminal gangs, sometimes with links to trafficking and other serious crimes. It exploits vulnerable individuals, causes nuisance to others and undermines the public’s sense of safety. It benefits no one, and it exploits the vulnerable by making money off them.
The clause outlaws this despicable practice, making it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg for gain. That can be anything from recruiting vulnerable people to take part in organised begging to driving them to places for them to beg. I am sure we have all seen, read about or heard about people getting dropped off to beg and then being picked up in luxury cars or vans later in the day. None of us wants to see that activity tolerated. It helps to gather funds that not only arise from the exploitation of vulnerable people, but can be used to support organised criminal gangs and their other illicit activities. The offence rightly helps to shift the risk to the criminals who are organising the begging and exploiting the most vulnerable. To reflect the severity of the activity and the role it plays in criminal gangs, the maximum penalty upon summary conviction will be six months in prison, an unlimited fine or both.
Alex Norris
This is the best of all the clauses that we will debate today, so the Minister will have the unanimity that he seeks. The real criminals are the ones who cause or arrange for people to beg on our streets in order to extract money for themselves. Those are the real villains, and it is right that there is an offence and a sanction. We hope to see it used, although I have slight anxiety about that. I am also glad that it is more severe than the sanction facing the individuals who themselves have been forced to beg. That is the right balance.
I am keen to understand one point. It is certainly my belief, and I think also the technical definition, that forced begging is a form of modern slavery. Therefore, presumably the Government’s point is that this offence is not covered, or insufficiently covered, under modern slavery legislation. I am interested in the Minister’s rationale there.
Similarly, we have to see it in that context. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows well from her work, there has been a retrenchment in recent years of the focus on modern slavery. The important provisions in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, particularly the referral mechanism, obviously have not worked as intended. People who are supposed to be waiting for 45 days for a decision are actually waiting closer to 600 or 700 days in many cases, and certainly multiple hundreds in virtually all of them. There has also been a sign from the Home Office, and from the Prime Minister himself, that in some ways modern slavery provisions are not compatible with the public’s desire for a controlled migration system. That is not our view; we do not believe that that is right, but there is a slight disconnect between this provision and the 2015 provisions, and some of the national rhetoric. I am keen to understand the Minister’s view on the interrelationship between this clause and the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
Chris Philp
I shall respond briefly to the question about the interaction of this clause with the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The Modern Slavery Act applies where someone is coerced, forced, tricked or deceived into labour of some kind, whereas people who are engaged in organised begging might sometimes do so voluntarily. This clause covers the cases where either they have agreed to it voluntarily or it is not possible to produce the evidence that they have been coerced, so it fills those two lacunae.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Nuisance rough sleeping directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I reiterate a point I have made already: nobody should be criminalised simply for being destitute or homeless. That is why we are committed to bringing into force the provisions to repeal the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824. Rough sleeping can cause harm to the individual involved, with increased risks of physical and mental ill health the longer somebody lives on the street.
Alex Norris
This part of the Bill, on nuisance rough sleeping provisions, is certainly the most contentious part, and probably the most interesting to the public as well. I rise to speak with a degree of sadness. I agreed with so much of the first half of the Minister’s speech; the problem is that the first half, which set out the Government’s intent, belief and policy, was not the right counterpart to the second half, which simply is not in service of those goals. We therefore oppose these measures and will, I am afraid, oppose every group of this debate.
The nuisance rough sleeping directions in clause 51 give an authorised person, which, according to subsection (7), is a police constable or someone from the local council, the power to move on a person if the rough sleeping condition, which we will debate at clause 61, has been or, indeed,
“is likely to be, met.”
That is a significant phrase. Subsection (2) sets out what that will mean: that person will be moved on and not allowed to return to that area for 72 hours. Subsection (3) states that that person will have to pack up and take all their belongings and any litter with them. If they fail to comply, they will have committed an offence and may go to prison for a month or be subject to a £2,500 fine.
As I say, we oppose these provisions. I take the same view as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley: I understand that nuisance rough sleeping is different from nuisance begging, which can have its roots in organised crime, but even where it is solely a venture by individuals, it can often be intimidating, disruptive and not fair on either businesses or individuals going about their daily lives. It is, of course, right for local authorities and the police to have some degree of power and control over nuisance begging, but rough sleeping is different. There is certainly no evidence that anyone is sleeping rough for profit. As a result, the Government’s rationale for these provisions does not hit the mark.
The repeal of the Vagrancy Act 1824 was a landmark moment for campaigners, including many Members of this House who had worked towards it for a long time. The same people who were elated at that success are now rightly shocked that the Government are opting to pursue this path. We heard on Second Reading—although not from the Minister, I do not think—that it is contingent in law, and certainly in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, that there must be some replacement for the Vagrancy Act lest those provisions cannot be ended. First, I am not sure that is true beyond a de minimis meeting of that legislation, and secondly, that is not a case for what is in this Bill. We have heard that there must be a change, but we do not hear why this change is necessary—why private property laws or health and safety laws cannot be used.
On Second Reading, a Member—possibly a member of this Committee, though I dare not mention the name in case I get it wrong—raised an instance of dangerous rough sleeping in their constituency, where a fire exit was being blocked. The Government cannot tell me that either there are not the right powers on the statute books or we could not have drawn narrow powers to meet that case. Under those circumstances, we would have supported them.
I have drawn significantly on the explanatory notes throughout the considerations of the Bill, and I think it is telling that the policy background element, which is detailed on everything else, essentially gives up on homelessness. I do not think there is a very strong case to be made for these provisions. We should not lose sight of the fact that rough sleeping is a symptom of other failures, particularly Government failures on housing, poverty and mental healthcare provision. I am not sure how criminalising those who then end up with the sharpest repercussions of those failures will in any way move us closer to resolving their individual circumstances or the collective ones.
Chris Philp
I did set out the Government’s commitment to ending rough sleeping and the £2 billion being invested to achieve that objective. The shadow Minister is setting out why he does not agree with these provisions as drafted. He is, if I hear him correctly, implying that no replacement statutory provisions are needed at all. Does he accept that, if customers will not go into shop because a large number of people are camped or sleeping rough outside it, which happens in some areas, to the point that the business is being undermined, there should as a last resort be some hard-edged sanction to protect the business owner in those circumstances? The argument that he advances seems to suggest that there should be no protection at all for that business owner.
Alex Norris
No, the phrase I used was “de minimis”. I believe that there could be some degree of power in that instance—which, I must say, I am not sure is that common, likely or foreseeable across the country. In those extreme circumstances a lower-level power could be set but that is not what we have in the Bill, which is much broader and risks drawing lots of vulnerable people into the criminal justice system. The idea that we could in some way meet the compulsions for a month in prison or, indeed, that those individuals could meet the £2,500 fine is rather for the birds.
We are likely to see something more like what the Minister said in the previous debate to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley—some sort of common-sense application of the laws as they are, with people being moved on and getting a tap on the shoulder. Actually, how will we then have moved on from where we were? The point was not that the Vagrancy Act was not really being used, but that it really should not have been on the statute book and had to go. We are just going to replace it with a range of measures that, similarly, will not be used—or will be exceptionally damaging where they are used. I direct hon. Members to the joint briefing sent by Crisis, Shelter, St Mungo’s, the YMCA, Centrepoint, the National Housing Federation and many more:
“enforcement is far more likely to physically displace people to less safe areas and prevent them from accessing vital services that support them to move away from the streets, entrenching the issue in a way that makes it harder to solve.”
It goes on to say that that can
“push people into other riskier behaviour to secure an income such as shoplifting or street-based sex work.”
It is a critical failure of the Bill that those who know of what we speak fear that those are the sorts of vulnerabilities that people will be pushed into.
Another point of difference between us and the Government—we will get on to this in clause 61—is that the definition is very broad. The Minister raised a specific case in a small set of circumstances, and the answer to that is a broad set of powers in a broad range of circumstances. That seems unwise, particularly as the issue is not even about sleeping rough; it is about the act of “intending to sleep rough”. All sorts of consequences flow from that definition, which we will talk about in clause 61. However, we have heard concerns from the Salvation Army about feeding existing prejudices about those who sleep rough.
Ultimately, the most vulnerable and destitute need support into suitable accommodation, not criminalisation. Clause 51 and the associated clauses will only exacerbate the problems that they face; it may offer a bit of short-term respite for the community, but in reality it will cause greater issues and solve none of the underlying causes. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the clause is a triumph of hope over experience. For that reason, we cannot support it and will vote against its inclusion in the Bill.
Chris Philp
I will briefly respond by making two or three points. The first is that I hope the shadow Minister and others will acknowledge that the clause represents a dramatic reduction in the scope of the criminalisation of rough sleeping compared with the Act currently on the statute book, which is in force as we speak. It dramatically reduces the scope of people who will be caught by the provisions. The hon. Gentleman did not acknowledge that in his speech, but I hope that perhaps later in the debate he will acknowledge that the Bill dramatically shrinks the range of people caught by the provisions.
I made my second point in my intervention. The hon. Gentleman proposes voting against the clause, but he has not proposed any alternatives to it. He has not put down any amendments, and when I pushed him on what he thought should be done to protect shopkeepers, for example, he did not really have any clear answer.
Chris Philp
I will in a second. The Opposition are not proposing any constructive alternative to protect shopkeepers, for example. Both sides agree that the first step should always be support, that we need to end homelessness by tackling its causes and that, first of all, we need to support people to get off the streets and into accommodation. We should address underlying causes such as mental health issues, drug issues and alcohol issues. We agree on all that. However, if those interventions do not work, we need to make sure that there is some residual power as a backstop or last resort when a business premises or high street gets to the point of being adversely affected. That is what we are proposing here.
Some other jurisdictions—some American cities such as San Francisco, for example—have either ceased to apply rules like these or have completely abolished them. That has led to a proliferation of people sleeping in public places and has really undermined entire city centres. I understand the points that the Opposition are making, but we need something that will act as a backstop to protect communities and high streets. We have tried to construct the clause in a way that gets the balance right, and we will debate the details when we come to clause 61.
I will make a final point about moving people on before I give way to interventions and conclude. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley said that, often, if police or local authorities—she gave the example of people running a train station—ask people to move on, those people tend to comply. That is because of the sanctions in the 1824 Act. If we completely repeal that without there being anything to replace it—that is what the Opposition essentially seem to be suggesting—and an officer goes up to someone and says, “Would you mind moving on, please?” then that person could just say, “No, I don’t fancy moving on”. There would be no power to do anything. The officer, the person running the train station or the shopkeeper would have to say, “Look, I am asking you nicely: can you please move on?” If the person in question said, “No,” then nothing could be done at all.
The shadow Minister mentioned trespassing legislation, but the streets are public and that legislation applies to private property. It does not apply to a pavement. It would not apply outside a train station—maybe it would apply inside; I am not sure. I am just saying that, if the statute book were to be totally excised and someone was asked to please move on, there would be no ability to ensure that that happened. I accept that a balance needs to be struck, and we have tried to do that through a definition in clause 61, which we will debate.
I posed questions back to the Opposition, but, with respect, I do not think I heard the answers in the Opposition’s speech. I am sure that we will continue to debate the issue after lunch, particularly when we come to clause 61. We will no doubt get into the detail a bit more then. I had promised to give way to the hon. Member for Stockton North.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I did not know that the days of empire had returned and that we needed to consider ruling in San Francisco.
Alex Cunningham
I get complaints about aggressive begging and nuisance begging. Never in my life as a local councillor or a Member of Parliament have I had a property owner approach me to say, “I’ve got a real problem with this guy sleeping outside my shop every night”. I have never had that, and nobody else has told me that they have. The Minister thinks it a tremendous problem—that property owners are very worried and angry and that they want these people moved on. That idea is very new to me. The Minister needs to justify these measures more.
Chris Philp
I have a great deal of respect and affection for the hon. Gentleman; he knows that, having spent so many hours with me in Committee. With respect, the question to ask is not about the current situation—although there are examples; I will show him photographs after the meeting of tents on Tottenham Court Road that retailers do not particularly appreciate. The question to ask is about what would happen in the future as a consequence of a total repeal. That is the question that needs to be answered.
Chris Philp
We are about to hit the time limit, so maybe we can discuss further when we debate the other clauses.
The question is: what would happen if we were to repeal? To see what would happen as a result of what the Opposition propose, let us look at other cities around the world; I am not doing that because I have imperial designs, but as a case study. Other places such as San Francisco have done it, and the results have been terrible. That is why I am a bit wary of doing what the Opposition propose.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tuesday 23rd January 2024
(10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2024 - (23 Jan 2024)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 5 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham.
The nuisance rough sleeping direction in clause 51 was debated just before we adjourned this morning; it is one of a suite of tools that the Bill introduces to help local authorities and the police to tackle rough sleeping where it poses a nuisance. Clauses 52 to 55 additionally introduce nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices and outline how they will operate.
Although aimed at different behaviour, nuisance rough sleeping prevention notices will operate in a similar way to nuisance begging prevention notices, which we debated this morning. That being the case, I will not go into the detail of clauses 52 to 55, which largely mirror clauses 39 to 42, which we have already discussed. We also discussed at some length the substance of nuisance rough sleeping as part of the debate on clause 51. We may discuss what exactly constitutes nuisance rough sleeping when we come to clause 61, so I will leave my remarks there and simply respond to the shadow Minister or other colleagues as necessary.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
As the Minister says, we gave the issue a pretty thorough airing in the debate on clause 51 this morning. The Opposition are in the same place as we were this morning: we do not think that the provisions are good additions to the Bill and we will not support them.
Having had a chance to reflect on some of the Minister’s arguments, I might test some of them. He mentioned San Francisco frequently. I find it very hard to believe that what is standing between this country’s situation and that of San Francisco, whose challenges are well documented, is the Vagrancy Act 1824—not least because San Francisco never had such legislation, so repeal of legislation could not have led to its problems.
The Minister challenged me on what alternative measures could be used. Actually, I did not detect—certainly not in the debate earlier—much enthusiasm from the Minister for the provisions in the Bill; he was more interested in our view rather than in what the Government were putting forward. Having reflected on that, we will go on to talk about community protection notices—an important civil power, from the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, that the Government are very keen on. The Minister’s question was: if these clauses do not stand part of the Bill, what could be done if an individual sleeping in the doorway of a shop refused to move? I wondered about section 43 of the 2014 Act, which states that an authorised person would have the power to issue a community protection notice
“to an individual aged 16 or over, or a body, if satisfied on reasonable grounds that—
(a) the conduct of the individual or body is having a detrimental effect, of a persistent or continuing nature, on the quality of life of those in the locality, and
(b) the conduct is unreasonable.”
In the case that the Minister discussed, both those tests would be satisfied. They would provide the backstop without the need for any of the provisions that we are discussing. Using those section 43 powers would have the value, on the face of it, of not being targeted at rough sleepers. There would be a general power for use in the locality or amenity that would not require any of this dog and pony show. It would provide enough of a backstop and would pass the test that the Minister set us earlier.
I turn to the clauses themselves. The idea that a rough sleeping prevention notice could be handed, without any sense of adequate follow-up support, to someone sleeping rough, is, to me, for the birds—as if handing it to a person who has so little with them in the world would make any difference. Turning to clause 54, an appeals process would be an important part of such a regime, but we have a duty to be sure that what is written in a Bill in some way reflects the reality that we live in. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has made that point on multiple occasions.
We are talking about some of the most challenged people in society—the people with the fewest assets, and often those living with the most challenging mental health or substance abuse-related issues. I find it very difficult to believe that they will have the resources and support to lodge an appeal against their rough sleeping prevention notice and go to a magistrates court to uphold their rights.
We do not think that these measures are a good addition to legislation. I have given the Minister what is probably a better alternative. On that basis, we will vote against clause 52.
Chris Philp
First, I thank the shadow Minister for giving consideration to the comments I made before the lunch break. That was very helpful and perhaps facilitates a more thoughtful debate.
The shadow Minister referenced the comparison I have drawn with San Francisco and other cities on the American west coast and elsewhere. The point I was making was a slightly broader one. Essentially, some of those cities—Oakland, California is another on the bay—have adopted a very permissive approach to public drug consumption, antisocial behaviour, rough sleeping and things such as shoplifting, which we have debated previously.
A consequence of that very liberal approach has been widespread disorder on the streets of San Francisco and other cities. That has really undermined the quality of life in those places, and I do not think it has done any favours to the people who end up living those lifestyles either. There is no doubt that there is also a lack of treatment and support, but that very liberal approach has led to very bad outcomes. Some of those American cities, which are generally Democrat controlled, as the Committee can probably imagine, are beginning to reverse some of the measures on drug liberalisation, for example, because they have led to such bad outcomes. A complete removal of current laws would be a significant step in that direction, and that would concern me. That was the broader point that I was making.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
To go back to a conversation that we were having prior to the sitting about fentanyl in the US, does the Minister agree that the very strict rules about these sorts of things in various other US states have also led to terrible outcomes with regard to substance misuse?
Chris Philp
The tolerance of drug consumption in public places that we see in San Francisco and elsewhere has led to very bad outcomes. There are also serious problems with synthetic opioids in North America, which are, thankfully, not replicated in the UK. We are very anxious to prevent that from happening, as the hon. Lady can imagine.
The shadow Minister also suggested that there were other powers that could be used in some circumstances. He specifically referenced CPNs. We will debate those a bit more later, but they do not have the same powers as the notices that we are discussing. For example, a CPN does not allow for positive requirements to be set out—a requirement to attend treatment, for example—so it is not quite the same thing. CPNs also require individualised consideration. Many of the notices that we are discussing do too, which is fine, but they are quite intensive instruments to use.
Finally, the shadow Minister denigrated the approach taken in these clauses by saying that they simply criminalise rough sleeping without offering any support. They obviously do not do that. They criminalise nuisance rough sleeping, with “nuisance” defined in clause 61. [Interruption.] I can tell that he is eagerly anticipating our discussion of the precise provisions of clause 61.
On the support point, the purpose of some of these provisions is to help people into support. I think all of us would agree that the first step should be to support people with mental health issues, drug problems and alcohol problems, and to support them into housing. Everybody agrees that support should be the first step. That is what the police and local authorities should do initially, but if that fails and the rough sleeping is preventing a business from operating or adversely impacting other members of society, there needs to be some backstop power. That is the balance that we have tried to strike in these clauses, as we discussed before lunch.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 56, page 51, line 13, after “application” insert “by complaint”.
This amendment provides for applications for nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders to be made by complaint.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 57 stand part.
Government amendments 78 to 83.
Clauses 58 to 60 stand part.
Chris Philp
Clauses 56 to 60 provide a further tool for local authorities and the police to tackle nuisance—I stress the word “nuisance”—rough sleeping: namely, nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders. The clauses set out how the orders will work, specify the maximum time they can last and how they can be varied and discharged, and provide an avenue for appeals.
The clauses essentially mirror clauses 43 to 47 in relation to nuisance begging protection orders, so I will not repeat what I said about those clauses this morning. Similarly, amendments 77 to 83 mirror for nuisance rough sleeping prevention orders amendments 70 to 76 in respect of nuisance begging prevention orders, which we debated this morning. I will of course respond to any points raised by the shadow Minister.
Alex Norris
The Minister is right that we have already given these issues a run-out, so I will not rehash our earlier debate. With specific regard to these clauses, however, they give us at least some degree of comfort that this regime will be reliant on a magistrates court—an impartial arbiter. There is legitimate concern that a constable who might have had some training but not very much, or someone from the local authority—we will have very little sense of what training they have—could make profound judgments with respect to the first two tiers of powers, relating to directions and notices, with minimal oversight and recourse to justice. At least we will get an airing in a magistrates court. I suspect the magistrates will wonder why they are having to deal with the problem and why it was not dealt with by either an earlier intervention or a more positive intervention to help change someone’s behaviour.
Clause 58 allows a duration of five years for a nuisance rough sleeping prevention order. That is five years of not being allowed to go to a certain place or act in a certain way. There are now actually very few crimes, except the most serious, for which someone would be prevented from doing anything for five years. I wonder what the logic is for that duration. Most of what is in these clauses is a counterpart to what is in the clauses on nuisance begging, and the line drawn there is three years. I am interested in the difference.
Again, we will not support the lead clause in this group, clause 56, because we think that these clauses should not be in the Bill at all.
Chris Philp
I think that the maximum period for a nuisance begging prevention order, as opposed to notice, was five years, which mirrors this provision. The lengths of time match up. As we discussed this morning, the power is for the court to use, and it can use its discretion. It is a maximum duration; the court can use its discretion to hand down a shorter period. Courts often pass prison sentences that are lower than the maximum, and that may well be the case here as well.
Amendment 77 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clause 61 is important; we referred to it during this morning’s proceedings. It sets out the conditions that need to be met for rough sleeping to be counted as a nuisance. To repeat my earlier point, the Government do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general; that is why the Vagrancy Act 1824 is being repealed. However, there are some kinds of rough sleeping that cause nuisance to other people to the point that the general public’s own rights are unreasonably infringed. The definition tries to strike a balance. As I said, we do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general, but we do want to define a threshold where the rough sleeping is unreasonably interfering with other members of society. The definition we have set out in the clause aims to strike that balance. I will be interested to hear Committee members’ views on it.
The clause sets out the behaviours accompanying rough sleeping that either cause or are capable of causing nuisance to others: damage, distress, disruption, harassment, creation of a health and safety or security risk, or prevention of the determination of whether there is such a health and safety risk.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I wonder whether three teenagers who grab their tent and decide to sleep at the end of a farmer’s field are causing a nuisance and will therefore fall under this law.
Chris Philp
That is obviously a fact-specific question. [Interruption.] Well it is, obviously. Every piece of behaviour, to assess whether it is criminal or not, needs to be measured against the relevant statute. It would obviously depend on whether it caused damage, disruption, harassment, distress and so on. But let me try to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question—it is quite a good case study, so let us have a look at it and see whether it meets the test.
First, if we look at subsection (4), does the behaviour cause damage? Well, if the teenagers are simply pitching a tent at the end of a track, it probably would not. On the other hand, if they threw a load of rubbish everywhere and trashed the farm, then it might. It depends whether their behaviour causes damage or not, but, as the hon. Gentleman described it, it sounds like it probably would not.
We then come to disruption, which is defined in subsection (5) as
“interference with…any lawful activity…or…a supply of water, energy or fuel”.
If the tent stopped the farmer bringing farm equipment in or out of the farmyard, that might count as interference, but if it did not, and if it did not interfere with water, energy or fuel, then that would not be disruption.
We then come to distress, the next limb of the test. If the people in the tent used
“threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour,”
then the test might be met, but if their behaviour did not include any of those things—no threats, no intimidation, no abuse, no insulting words—then it would not be.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton North for intervening, because this little illustration gives us an opportunity to demonstrate that it is only where those tests are met that the provisions of the clause become engaged. I hope that it was clear from the way I talked through that little case study that the measure is relatively reasonable. That is what I think, but I am interested to hear other views. The clause sets a threshold, and only when that threshold is crossed do its provisions become engaged.
Alex Norris
I do think that was a useful worked exercise. The problem is that the Minister only did half of it, because he only applied the test of whether something causes damage, disruption, harassment or distress. He missed the test of whether something is capable of causing damage, disruption, harassment or distress. Will he do the exercise again for the “capable” test?
Chris Philp
The behaviour concerned might actually cause damage, distress or disruption, but it might also be capable of doing so. For example, someone might set up a tented encampment in a place that blocks a business premises. Let us imagine that they set it up at 4 o’clock in the morning, when the business is closed and there is no one coming in or out. At that point, it is not actually causing disruption. Let us say that the business wants to open at 6 o’clock in the morning. Would we want the police to wait until the business opens and the customers or the employees try to come in, when disruption is actually caused and the provisions are engaged? The police might want the power to take action not when the disruption is actually caused, but when it becomes reasonably foreseeable that it will be—in this case, in advance of the business premises opening.
Members can imagine circumstances like the one I just outlined where, although disruption is not being caused at that moment, it is clear that it is capable of being caused, and it is reasonably foreseeable that such disruption will be caused.
Jess Phillips
I just wonder what else that is annoying that might be outside the front of someone’s business that we could criminalise. The bin lorry? It seems like there are loads of things. Cars get parked outside the front of businesses where I live, and it impedes the Warburtons van bringing in the loaves. The literally happens outside the corner shop right next to my house—bloody criminal! Why is it just homeless people that are a nuisance? I find cars to be a massive nuisance all the time. There are loads of things that are a nuisance. Kids going in and out of school? Nuisance. Criminalise ’em!
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for her characteristically emollient intervention. We are defining precisely what “nuisance” means, not using it as a general term. It means damage, disruption, distress or a health, safety or security risk. We are being precise about what we mean. We are not using it in a general sense; we are being specific.
The hon. Lady mentions a car blocking the highway and asks whether we should criminalise that. I refer her to section 137 of the Highways Act 1980, with which she is no doubt intimately familiar, which does precisely that. It criminalises wilfully obstructing a highway. We are not just picking on people whose disruption is associated with rough sleeping. There are plenty of other things on the statute book, including wilful obstruction of the highway, that seek to do similar things. I do not think it is reasonable to say that this is a unique set of provisions that have no analogues anywhere else on the statute book. [Interruption.] Would the hon. Lady like to make another intervention?
Jess Phillips
Oh yes, absolutely. It seems to me that there is this idea that it would cause distress to somebody to see a homeless person in a tent. I have greater faith in the British public than that. They are not just immediately distressed by somebody who is down and out. I am not immediately distressed by homeless people; I am distressed that they are homeless, but my distress is directed at the Government—who, by the way, I also find to be quite a nuisance, but I am not for one second suggesting that we should criminalise the Minister.
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Lady for her forbearance. Of course we want to combat homelessness. That is why £2 billion is being spent for that purpose. On the serious point, the Government’s position is categorically not that homeless people—or rough speakers, to be precise—cause distress. That is not what the Bill says. Distress is defined in clause 61(5) as being caused by
“the use of threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour”.
The Bill is not saying that rough sleepers in general automatically cause distress. It is only saying that threatening, intimidating, abusive or insulting words are taken as causing distress. It is really important not to mischaracterise what the clause does. It is very precise and specific, and it is very limited, for all the reasons that the Opposition have been pointing out.
Jess Phillips
Just to push my example, if I am obstructed in my daily life by a group of schoolchildren doing exactly that—using abusive, insulting words, saying “bitch” and things when I walk past—why is that any different? Surely causing distress to people is already illegal, so we do not need to define it in terms of rough sleepers.
Chris Philp
The hon. Lady asked what happens if she was insulted in the way she describes, which I am sure rarely happens. There are provisions in the Public Order Act 1986, particularly sections 4, 4A and 5—
Chris Philp
I am not sure if Hansard is going to record that, but I will take it as a compliment. I do try to stay on top of the detail. There are provisions in that Act that would afford the hon. Lady some protection in those circumstances.
This definition is very important, and we are trying to strike a balance. We do not want to criminalise rough sleeping in general or make a generic assertion that rough sleeping causes distress automatically. It does not, and the Bill does not say that. We are trying to define some very precise circumstances for when this clause is engaged to ensure that if interventions to support people either do not work or get declined, there is some backstop power to ensure that members of wider society do not suffer adverse consequences. We are trying to achieve that protection, and this clause is carefully crafted to strike the right balance.
Jess Phillips
I will not speak for long. The Minister and I have had a back and forth, and for the benefit of Hansard, when I called him a geek it was definitely a compliment. He is without a doubt on top of the detail not only of this Bill but of how it interacts with other legislation. It is a pleasure to sit on a Committee with a Minister in that position. I am a massive geek about how all these nice subsections will actually pan out in reality.
My main problem with the clause, although I appreciate it is less specific than the one on begging that we debated this morning, is that I am still at a loss about why we need laws specifically about nuisances caused by the most vulnerable people in society. There are so many things in the public realm that cause me much more nuisance than homeless people or people rough sleeping, such as the sexism that women experience in the street all the time. I get that we have to replace the vagrancy law and that we need guidelines, but do we really need specific laws about those people? Absolutely we need the provisions in the Public Order Act 1980, the year before I was born—
Jess Phillips
Oh, 1986. I was actually five years old then. I was a big fan of it back then.
But why do we need a specific law about this group of people? Why can they not be covered by the laws on the nuisances, insults and harassment that we can all define easily? That is the bit that I find alarming. If people are shooting up in the street or are openly engaged in dangerous practices such as pimping people, we are talking about a different thing, but there are laws covering those things already. If only I were the Minister, I could tell the Committee which ones. I am not him, but I am fairly certain they exist.
My brother, who slept on the streets, said to me, “It isn’t the drugs that will kill me; it’s the stigma. The stigma is the thing that is going to kill me.” He has been clean for seven years, and he said that when he stands at the school gate to pick up his children, he feels like everyone knows he was a homeless drug addict. The idea that you are less—that you are a vagrant, a tramp—never leaves you. That is why I do not want to see people like my brother, who, as I said earlier, was a nuisance to me on many occasions—I just do not want to write that stigma into the law.
Chris Philp
Just to make it clear, at the end of subsection (2)(a) there is the critical word “and”. It is not enough simply to be sleeping rough or intending to sleep rough; it needs to be clear in addition that a nuisance is being committed. The clause requires both conditions to be met; one alone is not enough.
Alex Norris
I appreciate that, and I was getting on to that part of my argument, but that does not dilute the impact of the language “intending to sleep rough”, which is a broad and subjective judgment that we will be asking people likely to have little or no training in this regard to make. The Minister says that the definition is precise. There is nothing precise about that.
As I said, subsection (2)(b) refers to nuisance. We are given a definition of nuisance that is not specific, precise or, I would argue, limited. The Minister half-applied his test to the example given by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North of the tent in the field. He was keen, and made a great display of going through the factors that could constitute having caused, or being in the act of causing, nuisance, but he did not address the factors that constituted being capable of causing it; he would not do that half of the exercise.
Chris Philp
Is the shadow Minister saying that if the words “capable of” were deleted, he would support the clause?
Alex Norris
It would be an improvement to the clause, but that is not what is in the Bill, and we would still have problems with “intending to sleep rough”. There are even issues with “causing” in subsection (5), which mean that we cannot support it. That subsection says,
“‘damage’ includes…damage to a place”,
and being capable of causing damage. If I sleep on a park bench, am I capable of damaging it? Well, I am using it for a purpose for which it was not intended, so, yes, presumably there is a risk of causing damage.
Chris Philp
With respect, I do not think that sleeping on a bench would cause damage to it, would it?
Alex Norris
Using anything for a purpose for which it was not intended risks damage, because the possibility of that damage has not been designed out. What if someone is sleeping on the bench persistently over a period? “Damage” could be breaking one of the wooden slats, but it could also be whittling down the paint or varnish. The Minister rolls his eyes. If he gave the commitment today that he personally will make all these decisions every day across the country, well, that might give me some comfort, but he clearly will not apply the test. It will be applied by possibly relatively junior members of staff with very little training. If the test is applied overly officiously, and there is a clear risk of that, then the damage to an individual could be considerable, and their recourse minimal. That is why this point matters, even in an extreme case.
Subsection (5)(c) refers to
“damage to the environment (including excessive noise, smells, litter or deposits of waste)”.
“Smells” is particularly problematic. That is part of the stigma relating to people who do not have a roof over their head. Smelling could be enough to make them a nuisance. That is a real problem. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the stigma test; the provision does not pass that test.
Alex Norris
As do the Government, as the hon. Gentleman says, but the question is whether that balance has been found. I do not see anything in the real-life example that he used that would not be covered by section 43 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. That notice could be used in that way. When I put that to the Minister in the previous debate, his only quibble, which I found a little hard to accept, was that these notices will give so much more support and that a reliance on section 43 would not provide enough help to homeless people. That does not chime with reality.
I am emerging from these discussions with much more hope than I had thought. I believe, much more than I did when the Bill was published, that the Government want to do something really limited in this space, but there is a significant landing zone for them to do more. We are interested in working on that point between stages. I understand how the mistake—the original sin—has happened. There is an elegance in trying to create a duplicate arrangement with nuisance begging, but actually that misses the point.
We will not be supporting the clause, for the reasons that we have given. Indeed, I am not sure how the Minister can support it, either, because it fails his own tests. We will have to divide the Committee. I think we can do much better than this, and, as I have said, there is a landing zone for that.
Chris Philp
I have made my points already, so I do not want to irritate the Committee by repeating them. The definition is pretty specific. As the shadow Minister has said, it is much more limited—and intentionally so—than the nuisance begging provisions that we debated this morning. However, if there are ways of ensuring that the right balance is struck, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough said, we are always willing to look at them. It is our intention to make this limited, narrow and specific. I think we have done that, but we are always open to ways of improving it.
The Chair
I am not permitted to have a view on these matters, but I will say how welcome it is to see displays of courtesy on the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
I hope that we now sail into less contentious waters. This clause recreates, in modern terminology, the current offence from the Vagrancy Act 1824 of being on enclosed premises for unlawful purposes. While a great deal of the Vagrancy Act is outdated and needs either repealing or replacing, we know through engagement with the police and other stakeholders that this particular offence is still used. It is still useful when someone is found on premises where they should not be and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they are intending to commit a crime. It could be any crime—it does not necessarily have to be linked to begging or rough sleeping, and is probably rarely, if ever, linked in that way. Accordingly, this clause makes it an offence for a person to trespass on any premises, which covers
“any building, part of a building or enclosed area”,
with the intention to commit any offence. The maximum penalty for this summary offence upon summary conviction is three months’ imprisonment, a level 3 fine, which is £1,000, or both.
I checked whether there had been convictions using the offence from the Vagrancy Act, and there have been quite a few in the last few years, numbering in the hundreds, so it is actually used by police. I was made aware of a case involving a former premier league footballer. Somebody was found on their residential premises. They had not stolen anything, but it was reasonably suspected that they might, and a conviction was secured using those provisions. The offence is useful for the police in some circumstances, which is why we are seeking to legislate here.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 63
Power to require person’s details
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
Clauses 63 and 64 make supplementary provision relating to earlier clauses on nuisance begging and, I hesitate to say, nuisance rough sleeping. Clause 63 enables an authorised person, defined as a constable or local authority, seeking to issue a direction or prevention notice, or to apply to a court for a prevention order, to require a person to provide specified personal details, specifically their name, date of birth and, if applicable, their address.
Failure to provide those details, or giving false information, will be an offence subject to a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a fine, or both. That is necessary because, otherwise, an individual who does not want to receive a direction notice or order could simply refuse to provide their details. Failure to comply with the process required to make the direction notice or order is a form of non-compliance and carries the same maximum penalty as failing to comply with the direction notice or order itself.
Clause 64 defines the terms “relevant local authority” and “local authority” for the purposes of clauses 38 to 63. In essence, the definition focuses primarily on the area in which the nuisance begging or nuisance rough sleeping occurred, or the area for which the relevant notice direction or order was given. On that basis, I commend clauses 63 and 64 to the Committee.
Alex Norris
I will be very brief, because I do not want to repeat the arguments that I have already made. Clause 64 defines “local authority” and addresses local councils. I have raised this issue a number of times, but have not asked a direct question. What guidance will be made available to enable local authority staff to apply the provisions in the way outlined by the Minister, as opposed to an overly officious, harmful and unhelpful way?
Chris Philp
Clause 64 relates to which local authority can issue the notice, which is a geographic question. The hon. Gentleman asks a different but valid question about the guidance. I repeat what I said earlier: the guidance will make clear that the first resort, as he and we would want, should always be to help people who are rough sleeping or having issues in their life that cause them to beg, whether that is support with mental health issues, drug treatment, alcohol treatment or support into housing. I reiterate what I said earlier: the guidance will emphasise support, help and treatment, if necessary, as the first action.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Circumstances in which court may attach power of arrest to injunction
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 144, in clause 66, page 58, line 18, at end insert—
“in subsection (4), after ‘48 hours’ insert—
‘, unless—
(a) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to seven days;
(b) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on more than one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to twenty-eight days.’”
This amendment would allow for longer exclusion periods under section 35 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for individuals who receive more than one such direction.
Clauses 66 and 67 stand part.
Amendment 145, in clause 68, page 58, line 37, at end insert—
“(2) Within twelve months of Royal Assent to this Bill, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on police use of the power to make public spaces protection orders and expedited orders under Chapter 2 of Part 4 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (as amended by this Bill).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce a report on the police’s use of PSPO powers.
Clause 68 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Clause 69 stand part.
That schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Clause 70 stand part.
Government new clause 21—Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation.
Government new clause 22—Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities.
Chris Philp
This is quite a large group of amendments, but I shall try to be concise. Before I turn to new clauses 21 and 22, which I have tabled with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, let me set out briefly why clauses 65 to 70 and schedules 6 and 7 should be included in the Bill.
The Government have a strong track record on tackling antisocial behaviour. In March 2023, we launched our antisocial behaviour action plan, which was backed by £160 million of new funding. The plan sets out a new framework for the Government, police forces, police and crime commissioners, local authorities and other partners, including housing associations and youth offending teams, to work together to prevent and tackle antisocial behaviour.
Off the back of the action plan, we launched the community safety partnership review and the antisocial behaviour powers consultation in March 2023. The consultation included a range of proposals to strengthen the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The majority of respondents supported most of the proposals and, as a result, we are taking the opportunity presented by the Bill to back our police, local authorities and other partners to do even more to tackle the blight of antisocial behaviour.
Clauses 65 to 70 make provision for strengthened ASB powers as consulted on last year. Clause 65 provides that a power of arrest can be attached to any civil injunction by the court where it deems it appropriate. Clause 66 extends the period for which a dispersal direction can be in place from 48 hours to 72 hours and, following the issuing of a closure notice, extends from 48 hours to 72 hours the timeframe available to the relevant agency to apply to a magistrates court for a closure order.
Clause 67 amends community protection notices, to which the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred, to lower the age at which they can be given from 16 years to 10 years, bringing them in line with the criminal age of responsibility and the age at which civil injunctions might apply. Clause 68 and schedule 6 give police, in addition to local authorities, the power to issue public safety protection orders. Clause 69 and schedule 7 enable registered social housing providers to use both the closure notice and the closure order to quickly close premises that are being used, or are likely to be used, to commit nuisance or disorder. Clause 70 expands the community safety accreditation scheme so that CSAS officers can impose fixed penalty notices for a wider range of offences, and it increases the upper limit of the value of those FPNs from £100 to £500.
Finally, Government new clauses 20 and 21 build on those provisions by further reforming the dispersal powers provided for in part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. The powers will help the police and others, including local authorities, to tackle antisocial behaviour, and follow a consultation that we ran last year. On that basis, I hope that the Committee can accept the proposals.
Amendments 144 and 145 were tabled by the Opposition, so it would be courteous and appropriate to respond to them once the hon. Member for Nottingham North has had the opportunity to speak to them.
Alex Norris
Antisocial behaviour is a scourge on communities, and it is right that in legislation of this type we seek to ensure that police and local authorities have the correct tools to combat it. This is an issue about which our constituents have serious concerns and, like all right hon. and hon. Members, I have lots of conversations about this with people locally. Tackling antisocial behaviour is one of their top priorities, so we are broadly supportive of the measures in the Bill, although we might have gone a little further.
We have to ground this debate in a conversation about why we are where we are. We should test the effectiveness of the Government’s action on antisocial behaviour, but the roots of the challenges lie in a diminution of neighbourhood policing: there are still 10,000 fewer on the frontline, and our communities have suffered as a result. A move away from proper problem-solving, problem-oriented policing has led us to a lack of focus on the issue. That is why we have many more challenges than we would like.
Chris Philp
I will briefly reply to some of the points raised by the shadow Minister. On clause 21, and the removal of the requirement for an inspector to make the authorisation, any officer of any rank can make that authorisation to speed things up where necessary. In relation to his points regarding amendment 144, which I think extends the exclusion period from seven to 28 days—
Alex Norris
It is seven days for the second offence and 28 days for a subsequent offence.
Chris Philp
Yes. I understand the thinking behind the amendment, and obviously I have a great deal of sympathy for it, as he can probably imagine. The Government considered it, but we need to be cognisant of the restrictions imposed by various articles of the European convention on human rights, on which views around the House vary, to put it mildly. Clearly, if one goes beyond a certain point, one begins to stretch the ECHR articles, for example, concerning freedom of assembly. There is a balancing exercise between what is permitted in domestic law and those European convention rights, and they can conflict. That is why we have set the boundary where we have.
Alex Norris
That is an important answer, but I am conscious that nuisance begging prevention notices, for example, could mean that someone has to quit an area for a period as long as three years. Surely that could not be the case for people engaged in nuisance begging, but not for those who are engaging in antisocial behaviour.
Chris Philp
Clearly, it is at the maximum and will follow fact-specific consideration. A calibration exercise can be performed, and there will be guidance around it, which can ensure that that balance is appropriately struck.
In response to Opposition amendment 145, I will of course mention the regular mechanisms for reviewing legislation, including review three to five years after passage. The Government regularly review the use of police powers under the 2014 Act. In fact, in November last year, just a couple of months ago, the Government reviewed police perceptions of the powers in that Act. We published a report on gov.uk that included data and police perceptions of the use of the 2014 Act powers, including public spaces protection orders. I hope that illustrates that the review of these powers is not just a theoretical exercise that Ministers refer to in resisting Opposition amendments; it actually happens.
On the shadow Minister’s point about the interaction between police and crime commissioners and local councillors, he is right to say that the relationship between elected councillors and the council is a bit different from that between PCCs and the police. While a PCC sets the budget and strategic priorities and holds the police to account, they do not, for obvious reasons, have operational control over the police; they cannot direct the police. He is right to say that the relationships are a bit different; none the less the PCC has an important role to play in co-ordinating, convening and holding the police to account. Although there are slight differences, I think strengthening the role of the PCC in the system is useful and a good step forward. The public mostly know who the PCC is and hold them accountable for the delivery of public priorities on crime. I accept that the shadow Minister raises a fair point, but I think we should welcome the involvement of PCCs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 66
Maximum period of certain directions, notices and orders
Amendment proposed: 144, in clause 66, page 58, line 18, at end insert—
“in subsection (4), after “48 hours” insert—
“, unless—
(a) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to seven days;
(b) the individual has been issued with a direction under this section, relating to the same or a substantially similar or related location or behaviour, on more than one previous occasion, in which case the exclusion period may extend to twenty-eight days.””—(Alex Norris.)
This amendment would allow for longer exclusion periods under section 35 of the Anti-social behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for individuals who receive more than one such direction.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 8.
New clause 42—Requirement for anti-social behaviour lead—
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood within the relevant force area to act as the force’s lead on work relating to anti-social behaviour in that neighbourhood area.”—(Alex Norris.)
This new clause would require each police force to appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood area to lead work on anti-social behaviour in that area.
Chris Philp
As darkness falls over the Thames outside, I rise to speak to clause 71 and its associated schedule 8, along with new clause 42. Clause 71 and its associated schedule give effect to commitments made in part 2 of the police and crime commissioner review by expanding the ways in which local policing bodies work with relevant agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour.
The provisions also define the role of local policing bodies in the implementation of ASB case reviews, which afford a vital safety net for victims to request a review of their case. We recognise that no single agency has sole responsibility for antisocial behaviour. Preventing and tackling ASB depends on strong collaborative working between the police, local authorities, housing associations, health services and a range of other partners. Agencies must, however, collaborate and share information to create a full picture.
Government new clause 42 is—Sir Graham, I have just noticed that new clause 42 is, in fact, an Opposition new clause. I was just testing to see who is awake! I will not speak to the new clause, because I am looking forward to hearing the shadow Minister do so in a minute.
Alex Norris
Exactly, on someone else. But those are important reporting requirements, actually. Having that evidence will be of interest to local communities. I think that transparency could, at times, be challenging for local policing bodies, but that would not be a bad thing.
There are, again, issues relating to antisocial behaviour reviews. We want them to be done properly. We do not want people to get through to the end of the process and feel that they have not been listened to—that would be a double insult, given what they would have already suffered. I do fear that the lessons have never really been learned on the failure of community trigger over the past decade. We do not want to see, particularly with regard to the statistics reviews, a desire to localise blame for failures that often happen at a national level. Nevertheless, that is an argument to have at a later point. We have no issues with the requirements at all.
I have sought to improve the Bill with new clause 42, and I hope the Minister will be minded to show his support for it in other ways, if not directly. If the new clause were to be agreed to, that would be a really important building block in restoring neighbourhood policing for communities across England and Wales, and it would be at the frontline of our battle against antisocial behaviour. As I have said, the diminution and denuding of community policing over 14 years has had a significant impact. That is why half the population now say they rarely ever see the police on the beat—a proportion that has doubled since 2010.
People feel powerless to deal with antisocial behaviour, even though it happens right on their doorstep. That is compounded by the reduction in drug intervention services, as we have discussed in previous debates. Youth service budgets have been cut by £1 billion. Community penalties have halved, and there is a backlog of millions of hours in community payback schemes. We are creating the challenges we face because we are not contesting public space, and we must do something about it. That is what clause 42 offers. It is not a silver bullet, but it would entail rebuilding the fundamentals of good policing: officers serving and protecting their community, which requires the restoration of neighbourhood policing. Communities should know their police officers and be able to approach them directly if they need to.
We know that putting in the hard yards and building relationships makes the difference, and new clause 42 would be the first step towards achieving this. It would introduce a requirement that the
“chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must appoint a designated officer for each neighbourhood…to act as the force’s lead on work relating to anti-social behaviour”.
In other words, there should be a named officer leading on antisocial behaviour in every community. No longer would members of the public feel that, when they report antisocial behaviour, nothing is done and it disappears into the ether. Perhaps they do not have any contact with the police, or perhaps they have to ring 101 and get promised a call-back that does not happen. Instead, an officer embedded in the community—a face and name they recognise—would act as the lead on antisocial behaviour.
That is what the new clause would do, and it does not take much to imagine how an officer could work in this way. They could visit schools, community groups and youth clubs, engage with young people, build trust, try to prevent youngsters from being drawn into antisocial behaviour, and build relationships with parents where there are early concerns. That is what policing used to be, and it is what policing could be: policing in the community and serving the community. I know that there is demand among police officers, who want to be doing this sort of policing. The new clause would be a real enhancement to the Bill, so I hope the Minister is minded to accept it.
Chris Philp
Let me respond to the shadow Minister’s comments on new clause 42. I sympathise with the intention behind it, which is to make sure that there is a named officer working on ASB issues, but we have an important principle: the operational independence of policing.
Neither the Government nor Parliament direct the police to operate or behave in a certain way; they are operationally independent. That separation of powers is a fundamental principle, and instructing the police on how to structure their operations probably crosses the line of operational independence. However, I am sure that police and crime commissioners and chief constables will have heard about the Government’s focus on antisocial behaviour via our ASB action plan. They will have heard our debates in Parliament, including this one, and will understand the significance that we attach to this particular issue.
On accountability and local connections, most forces have safer neighbourhood teams, who are typically attached to a council ward. We certainly have them in London, and they exist in many other places as well. Three or four months ago, we extracted from the police a commitment to always follow all reasonable lines of inquiry in relation to all crime, including where antisocial behaviour crosses the criminal threshold. That is a National Police Chiefs’ Council commitment and we expect all forces to deliver it, including for the criminal elements of ASB.
On local accountability, we also have police and crime commissioners. If the public want to make sure that the police are held to account for delivering the commitment to always follow up on criminal offences, including criminal ASB, they can contact the police and crime commissioner, who is elected. Their job is to hold the local police forces to account for doing exactly the kind of thing that the shadow Minister outlined.
Jess Phillips
The Minister has somewhat answered my question, but what happens if the police do not follow up on every line of inquiry? Let us be honest: we will all have cases in our constituencies where that has happened.
Chris Philp
That is a great question. We have reached this national commitment, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has agreed to do this. But how will we know whether it happens? How can we ensure that the police deliver on that promise? First, we in the Home Office are following up via the National Policing Board. We have a meeting next week—I think it is on 30 or 31 January—and the first item on the agenda is investigations into crime. I will press the police chiefs particularly on the delivery of this commitment. Secondly, Chief Inspector of Constabulary Andy Cooke, former chief constable of Merseyside police, will conduct a thematic inspection of this issue in the spring, checking up on every police force in the country to ensure that they are actually doing this.
Thirdly, the commitment is being incorporated into the regular cycle of Peel inspections. Every couple of years, every police force is inspected. The commitment is going to be checked up on as part of that regular series of inspections. I also expect Members of Parliament and police and crime commissioners to hold the police to account. If we ever hear examples of the police not delivering this commitment, we should be asking the police about that.
The measure was inspired by the work done by Chief Constable Stephen Watson in Greater Manchester, which Sir Graham and I were discussing before the Committee started. He was appointed a couple of years ago and instituted this policy: always following up reasonable lines of inquiry for every criminal offence; no such thing as minor crime. That approach led to a 44% increase in arrests in Greater Manchester, and some previously closed down custody suites and magistrates courts had to be reopened because a load more people were being arrested. We are looking to apply that approach nationally. Of course, the police are never going to get it 100%, but it is the job of parliamentarians and the chief inspector to hold them to account and get as close to 100% as possible. We discussed facial recognition. CCTV evidence, for example, is a critical part of that for ASB and for all crime types.
Jess Phillips
The Minister’s story about Manchester was great and a delight to hear; I hope that is replicated elsewhere because of this scheme. Are the Government committing to opening magistrates courts that have been closed in order to deal with that capacity?
Chris Philp
Magistrates courts are, of course, a matter for the Ministry of Justice. I am sure my MOJ colleagues will do whatever is necessary to ensure appropriate arrangements are in place. I know that they labour night and day—“labour” meaning work—to make sure the right arrangements are in place. I fear I may be about to stretch Sir Graham’s patience in terms of scope.
I hope that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, will hear that I am in great sympathy with the spirit of the new clause. However, for reasons of police operational independence and because the police and crime commissioner has a role in terms of accountability, I do not think new clause 41 is appropriate. But I understand and appreciate its intent.
Alex Norris
I understand, Sir Graham, that I can have a second bite at the cherry; I think I am in order. Very briefly—I would not want to stretch your patience either—I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I think that he is in danger of falling into a trap, as the Home Office sometimes does, when it comes to defending the status quo. Neighbourhood teams at the level of 10,000 people, which would be a council ward—that is not what we are talking about here. That is part of the public disconnect about scale.
Similarly, the point about accountability to the police and crime commissioner is very good; that is an important part of the democratic process. I have a lot more enthusiasm than perhaps others have expressed previously for that role and its importance. However, my police and crime commissioner has nearly a million people in her footprint—her footprint is by no means the biggest—so there is a challenge about operating at the right scale.
On the Minister’s point about all reasonable lines of enquiry—well, we will see. It very much remains to be seen whether that really is going to be meaningful beyond the rhetoric, but I am pleased to hear the Minister say that he thinks that applies more broadly. One of the most pernicious concepts is the idea of low-level antisocial behaviour; all sorts of problems are allowed to develop and a lot of misery is caused by looking at the issue in that way. That should not ever be the view we take.
The Minister’s point about operational independence is a good one and it is probably enough for me to resolve not to push my new clause to a vote. Perhaps I will come back with a different way of addressing the issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 25th January 2024
(10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 January 2024 - (25 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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The Chair
I have a couple of preliminary announcements. Members should send their speaking notes, if they have any, by email to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. That helps to get the transcription done and made available to you as quickly as possible. Please switch electronic devices to silent; I have just checked mine, so hopefully it is okay. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings; that is just one of those things.
Clause 72
Crime and disorder strategies
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your benevolent and wise chairmanship, Dame Angela.
The clause confers a new power on police and crime commissioners and other local policing bodies to make recommendations on the activity of community safety partnerships and, in turn, places a duty on community safety partnerships to consider those recommendations. Community safety partnerships will be duty-bound to consider recommendations, but they are not under a duty to implement them. However, if a partnership does not implement the recommendations, it must share its reasons for not doing so with the relevant local policing body, most likely the PCC.
The feedback from part 2 of the police and crime commissioner review, conducted by the Home Office in 2021, was that while the importance of local partnerships such as CSPs was widely acknowledged, they were not being used as effectively as they could be. Every public service should be accountable to the public, and to the local communities they serve. This provision will strengthen the accountability and visibility of CSPs and improve how they work with the relevant policing body to tackle crime, disorder and antisocial behaviour.
No one single agency can address all drivers of crime and antisocial behaviour, so partnership working between policing, local authorities, local education providers, the prisons, probation service, mental health trusts and so on are all very important. This measure will take a step towards formalising more that kind of collaboration.
I take the view, as I am sure other Members here do, that police and crime commissioners as directly elected representatives of the local people are particularly well placed to convene groups. More often than not, they chair the local criminal justice board. They have a lot of public visibility, convening power and influence, and provide visible public local leadership. The provision helps build on and strengthen the work that PCCs up and down the country are doing together. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Angela.
I am a community safety partnership enthusiast. The partnerships, which were established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, are a crucial forum for leadership, partnership working around crime prevention and reduction, and problem solving. I chaired my partnership in Nottingham a decade or so ago, and saw at first hand the impact of all those partners coming together, with shared priorities and mutual accountability, in a partnership built on trusted, close relationships and focused on solving problems.
It is with a degree of sadness that I say that partnerships have fallen in prominence and impact in recent years. One of the major challenges these bodies have found, and one of the limiting factors to the proposals in the Bill, is that austerity has bitten the partners that formed CSPs, certainly as regards funding, and partners have pulled away. In many cases, we have lost the shared data and insight function, and some of the things that brought partners to the table. Some of the extras done by CSPs are seen as nice-to-haves, rather than crucial functions.
As a result, there is a danger, certainly in some parts of the country, of the partnerships becoming meetings, rather than problem-solving bodies. Of course, whatever saving is made is lost later, through the impact on the criminal justice process. Certainly, if I ever get the chance to sit where the Minister sits, I will seek to reallocate those bodies and use them to their fullest extent, because we know the impact they can have.
In the meantime, we have what the Government have offered us. I probed the issue a little in our evidence session with the police and crime commissioners, and the real impact of this measure is that we are setting the police and crime commissioner or the relevant deputy Mayor as first among equals, and giving them higher status in CSPs. They are clearly to be given primacy. I thought about voting against this clause, but I talked to PCCs and local authorities, and they have fewer concerns than I do. The requirement is relatively light, in the sense that the power is to make recommendations, rather than to direct. That is probably right, so I have not chosen to vote against.
I have some degree of enthusiasm for what the Minister said about public transparency on decisions and recommendations. If recommendations are rejected, at least there will be an explanation why; that is probably enough. We should make it clear—I hope that the Minister will—that circumstances in which this power was necessary would generally reflect a failure. If a PCC needs to direct their CSP, there is no doubt a bigger problem in play.
What we want—I am sure that the Minister does as well—is a family of organisations across sectors in a community. We are talking about principally public sector organisations, but also bodies in the community and voluntary sector and, to some degree, the private sector, coming together on a basis of mutual trust to identify the common challenges for crime prevention and community safety in an area. They should have agreed priorities and plans based on good-quality data, insight and understanding of what each organisation is doing. Those are all parts of the puzzle. They should work to common goals in the interests of their community. That is easy to say, but it can be a difficult alchemy to achieve sometimes. However, that is what makes change, and that is what we need to see from CSPs. It will drive us away from what we have sadly seen in recent years.
There has been a move to counting crimes, and a move away from problem solving and problem-oriented policing. I have to say, there is minimal value to having one partner able to trump the rest. However, in cases of dysfunction, it will be a valuable asset for a police and crime commissioner or a deputy Mayor for policing to be able to say, “Hang on a minute. We have the ultimate mandate in this area. We don’t think things are working. This is how they ought to work.” Every time this provision is used, it will be a sign of failure, rather than success, but nevertheless it probably does add some value, so we will not oppose it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 72 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 73
Ethical policing (including duty of candour)
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
The enormous list of amendments in my name—it is time for everybody to strap in—is not necessarily a criticism of police forces, but is real recognition that women in our country do not trust the police. That is dangerous, because the women I work with have no choice but to trust the police. It is not a privileged position that they can take; they have to trust them, but they do not.
Clause 73 relates to the College of Policing’s code of ethics, but there is nothing at all about police-perpetrated abuse in it. Neither the code of ethics nor the standards of professional behaviour makes clear that police-perpetrated domestic abuse is contrary to the standards required by a police officer. Clause 73 should be amended to make it explicit that ethical policing also entails zero tolerance for violence and other forms of abuse against women and girls by police officers and staff. Amendment 135 does just that.
Why that is important should be pretty obvious. Conduct that constitutes domestic abuse or sexual violence should be clearly specified as being a breach of the code of ethics and of standards of professional behaviour, whether committed on or off duty. It is necessary to spell that out in legislation, because police forces still frequently take the approach that domestic abuse committed while an officer is off duty discredits the officer personally, but does not constitute a breach of the code of ethics or the standards of professional behaviour, as it occurred in the officer’s private life.
The Independent Office for Police Conduct’s guidance says:
“The Standards of Professional Behaviour and the obligations that they impose will be assessed in context, which includes whether they are on or off-duty at the material time. Police officers have a right to a private life”—
they do not have the right to be a domestic abuser, though—
“which must be factored into any assessment. Assessments of seriousness and public interest should include consideration of whether an off-duty behaviour discredits the police service.”
David Carrick was off duty when he raped all those women.
Forces are seizing on this in some cases to say that domestic abuse is personally discrediting for the officer, but not the police service. Jackie, an experienced police officer, was the victim of domestic abuse by her police officer husband. She reported the abuse to her force, but no criminal charges were brought, on the basis that there was not a realistic prospect of conviction because it was her word against her ex-partner’s. Misconduct proceedings were not pursued on that basis; the conduct alleged by Jackie had taken place while both she and her ex-partner had been off duty. It was therefore deemed to be part of their private lives. As a result, Jackie felt unable to continue working for the force. Meanwhile, her ex-partner had been promoted, and holds a leadership role in the force’s violence against women and girls strategic command.
Jackie’s case and others like it send a clear message about the force’s true attitude towards domestic abuse. Other officers have said that seeing how officers such as Jackie have been treated when they have tried to report domestic abuse speaks volumes, and that they would not report domestic abuse themselves, having seen how Jackie and others were treated by the force. Regardless of what the force says about operational pledges or other initiatives, the way it responds to allegations of police-perpetrated domestic abuse has a much greater impact on the willingness of other victims to come forward.
The relevance of abusive behaviour towards women to an officer’s suitability to hold the office of police constable and the impact on public confidence when perpetrators of domestic abuse hold positions in the police are being overlooked. Therefore, there needs to be a clear and unequivocal statement that domestic abuse committed by a police officer, whether on-duty or off-duty, will always discredit the police service if that officer is permitted to continue serving on that force.
Furthermore, subsection 2A(a) in amendment 135 refers to,
“sexual relationships with members of the public whilst acting in their capacity as a police officer”.
Section 1 of the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021—some of us were on that Bill Committee as well—amended part II of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 so as to enable the authorisation of CHIS. That includes enabling under- cover police officers to participate in conduct that would otherwise be criminal.
A number of groups, including the Centre for Women’s Justice, the End Violence Against Women coalition, Justice, Women’s Aid and Police Spies Out of Lives, are very concerned about that in light of the significant history of undercover officers engaging in deceitful sexual relationships during the course of their under- cover deployment. A specific prohibition against such relationships should be included in the police code of ethics, making it clear that any such relationship is a breach of the code of ethics and of the duty under the standards of professional behaviour in schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020—to
“behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.”
Amendment 136 aims to ensure that there is independent external oversight to the code of practice from bodies that represent the interests of the victims and survivors whom this code seeks to protect. The Bill currently sets out a range of organisations that need to be consulted regarding the code of practice relating to ethical policing. However, while this code is being implemented following serious failings by policing to adequately protect victims, there is no requirement to consult organisations that protect the rights of victims to ensure that the standards set out in the code are sufficiently robust.
In the previous debate, the Minister said how important partners were in ensuring that things worked well. Amendment 136 would ensure that the interests of victims were entrenched in the code of practice and the duty of candour. We have heard concerns about police marking their own homework, yet the current state of the Bill is like allowing them to set their own questions in the exam. The current provision requires police to act
“in an open and transparent way”.
That should start with openness to external scrutiny by individuals whose role it is to uphold and promote the rights of victims. By including named commissioners as statutory consultees, we can ensure that the standards set out in the code are fit for purpose.
I move on to new clause 48. Gaia Pope-Sutherland was 19 when she died. She was one of a significant number of young women and girls with cases against a man who had served time for child sex offences. Gaia had reported that she had been raped by him, but her case was dropped by the police and dismissed by the Crown Prosecution Service. Her family believed that that was because her case was presented in isolation from all the other independent allegations of violence and abuse. Detectives were said to have been aware of allegations made against this man, who was accused of grooming her as far back as 2014.
Gaia was already suffering from severe post-traumatic stress and living in fear of retaliation from the perpetrator, so the collapse of the case had a devastating impact on her mental health. That contributed to her disappearance and death from hypothermia shortly before the suspect was due to be released from a prison sentence for other child sex offences.
What happened to Gaia is heartbreaking. I have met many victims of sexual violence, and many of them have spoken about how it is not the violence that broke them but the failed state response—that when they turned to the institutions that were supposed to be able to protect them and deliver justice, they were met with incompetence or discrimination and a system that was uncaring and silencing.
Gaia’s heartbroken family have courageously taken up the campaign to change this. They have been pushing for the “Gaia principle”, which stipulates that any failure by a police officer to comply with existing policies and guidance will be considered a professional standards issue and escalated to misconduct in the event that the pattern persists. It is basically trying to make the police do their job. It urges that all police forces investigate sexual violence crimes in line with the national operating model developed from Operation Superior, and that officers be held accountable if they fail to do so.
New clause 48 is a step towards delivering that principle. It makes diligent consideration of all intelligence on a subject—previous convictions, reports or accusations—an unquestionable or overt part of what we expect of our police officers in their service. Repeat offending is a critical issue in the investigation of VAWG. The VAWG national strategic threat risk assessment notes:
“A relatively small number of highly prolific offenders are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime.”
The Femicide Census tells us that in 59% of intimate partner or relative homicide cases, a history of abuse towards the victim is evident. Research from Respect shows that a quarter of high-harm domestic abuse perpetrators are serial offenders, some having as many as six victims. Between 41% and 59% of Operation Soteria offenders were linked to more than one offence, and that is just the tip of the iceberg. One study sample revealed that 120 undetected rapists, defined as those whose offences met the legal definition of rape or attempted rape but who had never been prosecuted, were responsible for 1,225 interpersonal violence offences, including rape and child sexual and physical abuse.
The picture is clear: we know who these men are and what they are doing, but because of endemic police failure to investigate properly and a lack of co-ordinated professional curiosity, those known perpetrators are acting with impunity. New clause 48 makes the investigation of potential perpetrators a central part of policing. It is unbelievable that I have to say this—the country would think that this is happening—but that must be a part of the standards of their professional behaviour.
The police must live up to that and be held accountable for it. If a serving officer fails to do his or her job properly, they must face consequences and disciplinary processes, and if necessary they must no longer hold that role. That seems obvious, and it is extraordinary that we are debating it, but rape has an appallingly low conviction rate: a perpetrator is held to account in just 1.5% of rape cases. The devastating lived experience of families such as Gaia’s makes it clear that we cannot continue.
The new clause, based on the “Gaia principle”, will ensure that survivors of VAWG are no longer denied justice and left in danger because police investigators fail to investigate a suspect properly. As I said, it is named in memory of 19-year-old Gaia Pope-Sutherland from Dorset, who lost her life following these failures.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for explaining their very thoughtful amendments. We will obviously have a stand part debate a bit later, but in short, and for context, clause 73 places a duty on the College of Policing to issue a code of practice relating to ethical policing, which must include a duty of candour, delivering one of the points of learning set out by Bishop James Jones in response to the Hillsborough disaster, which Members of this House and this Committee—including you, of course, Dame Angela—have discussed extensively.
The Government and the House obviously take police integrity and accountability very seriously indeed, which is why the code of ethics and the duty of candour are so important. Amendment 63, in the name of the shadow Minister, asks for information to be set out that specifies what actions are to be considered ethical. Although the Bill is not yet in force, the College of Policing has acted pre-emptively—that is helpful for this Committee, as we have something to look at—and has already published and set out a statutory code of practice for ethical policing under section 39A of the Police Act 1996. It has met the statutory requirement that we are looking to legislate for in this clause already, even though the Bill is not yet in force. Once the Bill is in force, it will have to maintain that code and review it.
Jess Phillips
It would not pick up employment issues raised by one police officer about their police officer husband. The police currently operate on a criminal threshold in an employment environment, which is a dangerous precedent. We would not allow that anywhere else. We do not allow it in here. It would not have helped Jackie in her case. On looking at criminal records or other intelligence—we will come to the intelligence that they are not looking at in a moment—it needs to be explicitly stated that we do not want domestic abusers in our police force.
Chris Philp
We certainly do not want domestic abusers in our police force. To be clear, domestic abuse is rightly a criminal offence. If someone gets convicted of that, it will be on the police national computer. Even if there is not a conviction, because the victim does not want to proceed with a prosecution, the evidential threshold is not met or there is an acquittal or whatever, the police national database, as distinct from the police national computer, records intelligence and information more generally.
Even if there is no conviction, for whatever reason, information that is received gets recorded on the police national database. If there has been an allegation that has not been prosecuted and there is no conviction, that will still show up on the police national database and therefore be considered in the data washing exercise, even if there has not been a criminal conviction.
Jess Phillips
To what end? They will find that somebody made an allegation, but how many result in “no further action”? If they found that there were three allegations against a police officer by three different women, they went, “No further action.” To what end? We are washing it, but I want to put it on after it has been washed.
Chris Philp
It is in order to make decisions about whether the officer concerned meets the standards required for vetting. The hon. Lady made this point a second ago. The standard for employment should be much lower than the standard for criminal conviction. Obviously if there is a criminal conviction, the expectation is that the person will be dismissed. Where there are allegations that are concerning but have not been proved, we would expect that to adversely affect the officer’s vetting status.
We made a change last summer, I think, to say that an officer has to clear vetting not just once when they are first hired—this was a problem in the Carrick and Couzens cases—but throughout their career. If the data washing exercise brings out information that is not necessarily criminal but means that the officer does not meet the vetting standards, we expect action to be taken. I am speaking from memory here, but in something like 150 of those 461 cases, there is now a misconduct investigation, so not criminal. Nine of them are being investigated criminally. About 150 misconduct investigations have been triggered, which will pick up examples such as the one the hon. Lady just mentioned although they do not meet the criminal threshold.
To elaborate on that, the paragraph about discreditable conduct includes the requirement that police officers behave in a manner that
“does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence”—
“undermine public confidence” is an important phrase—and that is
“whether on or off duty.”
Each case is assessed on its own facts, but I expect— I am sure the hon. Lady would expect this, too—credible allegations, in particular credible repeated allegations, of domestic abuse, even if not prosecuted or convicted, to undermine public confidence in the officer concerned. The hon. Lady would definitely take that view and I would as well. I have not looked at all 150 cases individually, but I expect that a number of those recently uncovered cases include examples such as the one I have set out.
Critically, the data-washing exercise, that check, will now happen on an ongoing and repeated basis, and it will give a lot of assurance. [Interruption.] I apologise— I said 150, but actually 88 cases have been triaged for disciplinary investigation. It was not 150; I was mis-recollecting. It is 88 of the 461. But I hope that gives more confidence to the public, including women, particularly as the vetting will happen on an ongoing basis—we have funded that. Maintaining vetting clearance throughout an officer’s career, which could be 30 years, rather than just having it at the beginning, will help to rebuild confidence.
Jess Phillips
If the vetting has to be ongoing, where is that written into primary legislation? I do not doubt the good faith of the Minister—we have all said as much in Committee—but how can people like me have a guarantee that it will happen forever? Secondly, the Minister made a valiant effort to point out to the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North, where exactly all the duty-of-candour things appeared in the ethical code of practice for policing. But I have just had a quick scan of that, and it does not mention domestic or sexual violence once.
Chris Philp
Maintaining vetting throughout an officer’s career rather than just at the beginning of it is set out in the vetting code of practice, which was published by the College of Policing, I think, in July last year. The ongoing checking against the police national database is an operational practice. We have put funding behind it, so there is money to pay for it, and the relevant National Police Chiefs’ Council lead has publicly committed to doing it. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley is right that such vetting is not a statutory duty, but the Government have funded it and the police have said that they will do it, so Parliament will hold them to account to ensure that they deliver on that commitment and continue to do so.
The hon. Lady asked about the “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”, which was published recently. Some relevant information, which the Committee will want to hear about, is in that document. Two more documents are also relevant, one of which was published earlier this week. This is confusing, because three documents fit under the umbrella of the codes of practice.
The statutory document, under section 39A of the Police Act 1996, was published on 6 December and I quoted from it previously. Two more documents were published in the past few days: “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”—also issued by the college, and I can provide a copy—and “Ethical policing principles”. Those three documents should be taken together.
The first of the two new ones is relevant to amendment 135. It has some sections that answer the questions that have just been asked, including the one about inappropriate relationships. The “Guidance for ethical and professional behaviour in policing”, published only a few days ago, has a section on “Fairness and respect”, which includes things such as:
“protect vulnerable people and groups from behaviour that is abusive, harassing, bullying, intimidating, exploitative or victimising”
and
“avoid any behaviour that could cause unreasonable distress or harm, including any behaviour that might interfere with…colleagues’ ability to carry out their duties”.
Clearly, exploitation, which obviously includes domestic abuse, is covered, but so are other things such as victimisation, harassment and abusive behaviour.
Jess Phillips
Does the document say whether that is on or off duty? Does it include officers’ own personal relationships or does it just apply to members of the public?
Chris Philp
The document talks about treating everybody in those ways. It also goes on to talk about relationships, which obviously can happen inside and outside policing. It also talks about—I think this was the topic of amendment 135—ensuring that there are appropriate boundaries between police officers’ professional roles and personal relationships. It particularly talks about recognising
“the need to manage…relationships with the public because of the existence of a power imbalance”,
respecting “personal and professional boundaries” and maintaining
“the integrity and rights of those we come into contact with”.
Critically, it also states:
“do not use our professional position to pursue a sexual or improper emotional relationship with a member of the public”.
I think that speaks directly to the concerns raised in paragraph (a) in amendment 135, which expressly references the same thing. That is in the document that I just mentioned.
What the whole group of amendments tabled by the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley calls for is covered in these documents, which have been published by the College of Policing under section 39A of the Police Act 1996. If there are gaps in them, obviously they can be updated.
Someone—I think it was the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—asked, “Why not set it all out in the Bill?”. The documents are quite long—29 pages, 10 pages and something like 30 pages: there is a total of 60 or 70 pages of guidance. It is rather difficult to put that much detail into the Bill. What the Bill is doing is compelling—not asking—the College of Policing to publish these documents. The detail is obviously in the documents, and I hope that the Committee can see, from the examples that I have given having rifled through the documents, that they address the topics that one would want to see addressed.
Jess Phillips
I thank the Minister for giving way again; it is good to have this debate. I must say, as an expert in this field, that what the document says is not good enough. That brings me to amendment 136—which specialist agencies who work with victims of domestic violence did the College work with to write this? It is not good enough, I am afraid to say. I can take that up with the College of Policing, but that is also not the mechanism.
Chris Philp
There is obviously a duty to consult various bodies in preparing the code of practice. I know that the College of Policing and its chief executive, Chief Constable Andy Marsh, engages extensively with a number of people. The hon. Lady lists in amendment 136 the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses, and the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. I do not know whether the College of Policing expressly consulted those people in preparing the codes of practice, but I can undertake to ask its chief executive and find out.
I appreciate that the hon. Lady has probably not had a chance to read the documents, because two of them got published only earlier this week. Once she has had a chance to look at them, if, based on her experience and work in this area, which I know is extensive and long-standing, she thinks that some things have not been properly addressed, I am happy to commit to raising them directly with the College and ask that they be addressed in the next iteration of the documents. I am definitely happy to do that whenever the hon. Lady is ready; if she can set down what she thinks is missing, I will raise those issues.
I am told that the three organisations that I just read out, which appear in the hon. Lady’s amendment, actually were consulted routinely on the documents. However, as I said, if, once she has had the chance to read the documents, she finds in them things that are not properly constructed, I will definitely raise them with the chief executive of the College on her behalf. She can obviously do so directly, but I will certainly do so reflecting her advice as well.
I essentially agree with the spirit of all the amendments. However, because of the detail published relatively recently, on 6 December and in just the last few days, my view is that what is being asked for has been essentially incorporated into the documents. As I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, if she especially or any members of the Committee feel that things are missing, I will absolutely take them up with the chief executive, should a view be formed that changes would be useful and appropriate.
Alex Norris
This has been a really important debate, and I am grateful for the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. The Minister’s very full answer was much appreciated by us all. Interestingly, my hon. Friend and I focused on two different issues, but they have the same principle at root: the public must be able to expect that public organisations—in this case, the police—are candid, transparent and making their best efforts to do the best job in all circumstances. That should be obvious, but we know that too often that has not been the case, and Hillsborough brought that into sharp relief. Alongside that, in the cases mentioned by my hon. Friend there is a more numerous although less high-profile drumbeat of mundane failure, which has been almost baked into the system. Those will never be the subject of a high-level inquiry; instead, there are people dying in doorways, unaccounted for, unknown and unseen. We should believe that we can do better than that.
I am grateful for what the Minister introduced in relation to the work of the College. I was going to say this in the next debate when we talk about vetting, but we have full confidence in and we believe in Chief Constable Andy Marsh. He is excellent; he has engaged with us on the Opposition Benches and he is always very good, so no point that I make is against either him or the College. The question, for us, is about the degree to which we are comfortable with subcontracting important judgments about how one of the most crucial public services operates to other organisations that we cannot scrutinise in the same way as the Minister and the Home Office. There are times when that is very much the right thing to do, and when we cannot and should not seek to operate those things remotely from here; we would not have the time and it would not be appropriate.
Chris Philp
We both have confidence in the College and Chief Constable Andy Marsh—in fact, now is a good time to thank him for the work that he and his colleagues at the College have done. On the subcontracting of important things to the College of Policing, I should say that the statutory code must be approved by the Home Secretary prior to its coming into force. That gives not parliamentary approval, but at least some level of democratic oversight on what goes into it.
Alex Norris
If I am honest, that level of oversight might not give much comfort to us in the Opposition, but never- theless that at least gives the code a statutory footing, which is in itself very much valued. We must make the judgment of when we are happy for others to make those decisions and when we believe that it is our responsibility to set a tone. That remains the case, particularly around candour; I will come on to amendment 149 in a second.
I turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. One of the most important things we can say—and I hope that the Minister will say this at some point; I do not think that he has said it yet and it is really important for the amendment—is that we believe that off-duty conduct is relevant to establishing the character and suitability of officers. My hon. Friend’s amendment mentions a couple of cases where standards that we would routinely expect to be met have not been, whether that is in a domestic abuse or sexual violence situation or related to the point around spy cops. We ought to send a stronger signal on that.
I confess that I have not yet had the chance to see the documents that have been published in recent days. I hope that they pass the test that the Government’s own documents often fail around gender. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the Government managed a whole Domestic Abuse Act without mentioning women. We cannot lose sight of what is happening here—it is not exclusively male perpetrators and women victims, but that is largely the case. This is a gendered crime, and we ought to treat our regulation in that way.
I heard the Minister’s point about amendment 136. While we have to admire the College of Policing’s diligence in publishing the code prior to its becoming a statutory requirement, if the consultation has not happened yet there will be a period of time when that work could take place, prior to the Secretary of State signing it off, and for it to be understood that the commissioners mentioned in the amendment would be routinely consulted during the development of the process. The insight that those individuals have on those cases, as we saw in the evidence sessions, is hugely valuable.
I turn to new clause 48. As my hon. Friend said, the public should be able to expect that relevant intelligence is always considered; it is not. The Gaia Pope-Sutherland case is absolutely devastating. If the Bill is not the place for this detail, we need to hear a strong signal that it is what we expect of policing—what the public expect and should be able to expect.
On amendment 63, I think the Minister is right. I am happy to withdraw it as it is covered by the document he mentioned. I cannot quite share his view on amendment 149. We should not misconstrue that what is in the Bill now means that police officers are obliged to act with a duty of candour. What is in the Bill is that chief officers have a duty; what is in the College of Policing’s guidance, at paragraph 4.5, is that that duty to act with openness and—I forget the other word—is then pushed to other officers.
Alex Norris
Openness and candour. But that does not have a statutory underpinning. There is carrot but no stick—that is the point I am trying to make. The code covers chief officers. It will not really cover their staff—not so that we can have confidence that the job has been done with regard to the duty of candour. There is still a gap.
As I have said, I have doubts about whether the Bill is the right vehicle for the change that the Opposition seek on duty of candour, so I will not press that point to a Division yet. But the issue will come back at later stages and in other legislation as well. We certainly do not think that the job has been finished.
Jess Phillips
On amendment 135, the Minister offered to sit down and talk to me about what needs to be in the document. On reflection, I will not press the amendment, in the expectation that that will happen before the Bill goes to the other place. We shall see how we feel about the matter then.
Chris Philp
On a point of order, Dame Angela. Could I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, through you, to make contact with me with her thoughts when she has looked at the document? I would be grateful.
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 30th January 2024
(9 months, 4 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2024 - (30 Jan 2024)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Latham, as we commence our final day of line-by-line consideration of the Bill. [Interruption.] I see that colleagues are very enthusiastic about undertaking the last lap.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, who would ordinarily have moved this Government new clause, has just arrived. With your permission, Ms Latham, might I hand over to her so that she can speak to it?
The Chair
Yes, but let me correct the Minister: it is Mrs Latham, not Ms Latham. Having been married nearly 56 years, I do not think “Ms” is right.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I apologise to the Committee for being late—I had left something behind.
The new clause amends a number of existing criminal offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Currently, it is an offence for a person intentionally to engage in sexual activity where, for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification, they do so when a child is present and they know or believe that the child is aware that they are engaging in the sexual activity. There are similar offences that target such behaviour where the victim is an adult with a mental disorder.
We have listened carefully to those on the frontline, who have identified a small category of cases involving this type of behaviour where there was insufficient evidence that the perpetrator knew, believed or intended that the child, or the person with a mental disorder, was aware of the sexual activity, most typically because the child was asleep. The new clause will expand the criminal law so that successful prosecution does not depend on the alleged victim’s awareness of the sexual act or the defendant’s intent. It will capture cases where, for example, a defendant masturbates over a sleeping child for the purpose of sexual gratification and subsequently seeks to argue that they did not believe the child was aware of the activity and did not even intend that the child should be aware of the activity. The new clause therefore alters the mental elements of the offences.
I thank the National Police Chiefs’ Council, a number of individual police forces and the Crown Prosecution Service for bringing to the Government’s attention these troubling cases, which have informed our response and led us to conclude that we should amend the existing offences to protect vulnerable adults and children. The amended offences will retain the need for a link between the child’s presence or observation and the perpetrator’s sexual gratification. That requirement is critical because of the risk of over-criminalising those who engage in sexual activity with no malicious intent where a child may be present, such as parents sharing a bedroom.
We want to ensure that these behaviours are prosecuted, not just to bring offenders to justice but, importantly, to enable the management of offenders and to prevent further escalation where there is the potential for a more serious sexual offence against children or vulnerable adults.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Latham, for the Committee’s final day.
The new clause is a welcome addition to the Bill. Clearly, experts have identified that the person B knowledge gap is really important and is creating risk with respect to those who seek gratification in this way. It is right that that loophole is closed. My only question for the Minister is about the sort of scale we are talking about. She mentioned a small number of cases. Do the Government have an estimate of the number of cases that the measure is likely to apply to?
Laura Farris
I do not have any indication of the number of cases, but we have heard from the police that there have been problems with getting a prosecution where they cannot prove intent.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 46 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 47
Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction
“In the following provisions for “6 months” substitute “the general limit in a magistrates’ court”—
section 1(6)(a) of the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 (unlawful sub-letting: secure tenancies);
section 2(7)(a) of that Act (unlawful sub-letting: assured tenancies and secure contracts);
section 30(3)(b) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (breach of certain orders or requirements);
section 339(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2020 (breach of criminal behaviour order);
section 354(4)(a) of that Act (breach of sexual harm prevention order);
section 363(2)(a) of that Act (breach of restraining order).”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that the maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences, on summary conviction, is the general limit in a magistrates’ court.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children
‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—
“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.””—(Jess Phillips.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mrs Latham. I welcome the new clause tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham and outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. New clause 3, as we have heard, seeks to remove the parental responsibility of people convicted of sexual offences against children and I welcome the tremendous cross-party support it has received. The new clause’s core aspect is the welfare of the child. I am one of those whose ambition in being elected to this place was to work for the benefit of young people, and the new clause does that.
The proposal would go some way to strengthening the law around the welfare of a child whose parent has been convicted of sexual offences against children. There are very limited cases where the court has allowed an application to terminate a person’s parental responsibility. They include a 1995 case in which the court terminated the parental responsibility, acquired by a parental responsibility agreement, of a father who had been sent to prison for causing serious injuries to his child.
In 2013, the court removed the parental responsibility of a father who had been imprisoned for sexual abuse of his child’s half-sisters. In a further case in 2013, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who was serving a prison sentence for a violent attack on the child’s mother. Finally, in a 2021 case, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who had a significant offending history, including sexual offences against children. In other words, this is already happening.
On Second Reading, I spoke about the need to amend the Bill so that offenders who have sexually harmed children and are sent to prison as a result lose the ability to control their own children from behind bars. That measure is long overdue and will ensure all children are safe from those dangerous predators, including their own parents. The key problem to address is: how can a man—it is usually a man—considered too dangerous to work with or be around other people’s children be allowed to have parental responsibility that effectively makes him responsible for all manner of decisions affecting their child’s life, but which may not be in the best interests of the child? Why should any child be subject to any form of control by a convicted sex offender who is unlikely to be part of their lives for years ahead, and possibly forever?
In response to a question on the proposed new clause, Dame Vera Baird told Committee members that she had reservations about the definition of a sexual offence in the context of the Bill as she felt it might be too wide. That said, I hope the Government will at least support the new clause in principle and perhaps return to the issue on Report so that we can take another step in the quest of all of us here to protect children. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Laura Farris
The new clause seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. We understand fully the motivation in bringing the new clause. We have discussed it and I respect the remarks that have been made. I want to confine my remarks to the contours of the current system and where that fits in relation to Jade’s law, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has already alluded to, and how that was introduced in the Victims and Prisoners Bill.
Starting with the current state of the law, the paramountcy principle is the cornerstone of the family justice system. There must be full consideration of the best interests of the child as a starting point. The hon. Member for Stockton North has just given an example of a number of cases where the parent had committed a very serious sexual offence and the family court acted accordingly to suspend parental responsibility.
Jess Phillips
Perhaps the Minister would like to see my email account, which has a folder specifically for the thousands of cases from the family court where the cornerstone is absolutely not the safety of the child. There are lots of cases where that does not happen—far more than the handful that have been referred to.
Laura Farris
I noted what the hon. Lady said in her opening remarks, but I will go through the legal landscape before I come to other issues. As I say, we are carefully considering the force of the new clause.
In cases in which a parent has been convicted of a child sexual offence, the family court has the power to strip out parental responsibility. That decision is made only after careful consideration of the best interests of the individual children, to ensure that their needs are the driver for action. Decisions about suspending or restricting parental responsibility have significant ramifications for children, which is why judges prefer to consider each case on its individual merits and make a decision that is specific to the best interests of that child.
We must not conflate suspending an individual’s parental responsibility with a punishment. It is a step that is taken to protect the child from harm, and because of that it must be taken when it is in the best interests of the child. The new clause, as drafted, makes no provision for the consideration of the best interests of the child. For that reason, we think it engages article 8 consideration under the European convention.
Members are of course aware that the Government recently tabled an amendment to the Victims and Prisoners Bill that will automatically suspend parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of the murder or the manslaughter of the other parent. We wish to make clear that distinction. In many cases in which one parent has killed the other, the children involved will have no one left to exercise parental responsibility, apart from the killer of their other parent. In such circumstances, we think that it is right that whoever is left caring for the child, whether that be a grandparent or even the local authority, is spared the onus being on them to commence family proceedings to restrict the offender’s parental responsibility.
Where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and apply to the family court.
Jess Phillips
Does the hon. Lady think it is okay for a woman who has been abused and had her husband convicted of paedophilia to pay £30,000 in order to keep her children safe?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. That case has caused concern, and we have been looking carefully at the legal aid position, which I will come on to.
As I was saying, where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and make the application to the family court—I will come to legal aid in a moment—for the well-established method of restricting the offender’s parental responsibility.
Lord Meston, a family court judge who sits in the House of Lords, made a speech on the Victims and Prisoners Bill in which he warmly welcomed the inclusion of Jade’s law as a way of automatically restricting the rights of the other parent. I just say this in passing. He was invited to consider whether there should be the automatic suspension of parental responsibility if another kind of crime was committed. He said something that we have noted as part of our thinking:
“However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders”
in different cases. He continued:
“The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.” Lords—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 December 2023; Vol. 834, c. 2094.]
That is not determinative of our thinking, but it is the reflection of a family court judge who sits in the other place. That is what he said in relation to Jade’s law while, of course, welcoming it.
The automatic nature of the new clause would mean there would be no space for the court to consider the wishes of the other parent or the wishes of the children as to whether the matter should be brought to a family court.
Jess Phillips
The new clause clearly states that the other parent can apply to the court to have their wishes heard, but it is not the responsibility of a completely innocent mother, in most cases, to have to protect her child from a sex offender.
Laura Farris
I accept that the new clause gives the other parent the right to return to the family court, but effectively it could force a child to make applications to the family court to have their wishes considered.
Laura Farris
Because there has to be an application for the reinstatement of parental responsibility. That is what the new clause states at proposed new section 2A(2).
Jess Phillips
The hon. Lady said that a child would have to make an application to the family court. How is that the case?
Laura Farris
The child would have to advance what their best interests are to the family court, if parental responsibility has already been suspended.
Laura Farris
We have carefully considered the case in Cardiff. I want to make it clear that legal aid is available for a prohibited steps order and specific issue order in specific circumstances, subject to means and merits tests and evidence requirements relating to domestic abuse or the protection of children being met. Where the subject of an order has a relevant conviction for a child abuse offence, it is likely that the application would satisfy the relevant evidence and merits criteria. We are looking into why that was not the case for the lady in Cardiff.
Jess Phillips
Could I also open all the other cases with the Legal Aid Agency? The vast majority of people I encounter—there are thousands, and I have sat in the family court for hours—have not been able to access legal aid. Every one of them is a victim. Perhaps the Minister could look into that.
Laura Farris
That warrants a response, and the hon. Lady will get one.
My final point, to which the hon. Lady alluded in her opening remarks, when she said she hoped the provision might go wider, is that one of the conceptual difficulties with the new clause is that it would seek to remove parental responsibility in cases of serious child sexual abuse, but it is silent on, for example, child murder. Or what about perhaps a serious case of terrorism, where we could advance a plausible argument? We think there are issues around the scope of the new clause.
Jess Phillips
I could not agree more—the scope needs to be much wider—so will the Minister and the Government, by Report stage or in the Lords, finally act on the harms review by tabling amendments to the Bill that we can all be proud of?
Laura Farris
As I say, we are looking at the definitional issues. We are also looking carefully at the paramountcy principle, which underpins the way in which cases are approached in the family court. The new clause has a worthy aim. We have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. At present, we do not think the new clause is the right way to do that, and we urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
Jess Phillips
For nearly 10 years I have had Ministers stand in front of me and say, “We are a bit worried about” some legal word or other. How many children have died because of family court proceedings in the 10 years that we have been trying to raise the alarm? The family courts in our country will be the next Rotherham or Rochdale. State-sanctioned child abuse is going on and we all just turn a blind eye. The things that I have seen in courts are harrowing. I have watched children being removed from their loving mothers and placed fully in the care of paedophiles—proven child abusers. For me, we cannot casually sit here and pretend that that is okay.
Funnily enough, one of the people I started this campaign with, all those years ago, was the current Justice Secretary. Why is it taking so long to do something about the family courts in our country? They are actively dangerous, everybody knows it and nobody is doing anything about it. It is like the Post Office; I will not be one of those people who sat by and did nothing.
I will not press the new clause to a Division, because its scope is not wide enough and does not deal with half the harms that I see. If the Minister wants to take away the parental responsibility for children from terrorists she can knock herself out—I will support it. I will support any movement towards progress in the family court, because I have seen none. I look forward to the Government coming forward with an all-singing, all-dancing proposal that will make children safe. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I will be brief. As the hon. Gentleman said, this is a distressing new clause, but the Opposition believe it is very much necessary. I was briefed on it last week by the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, and I was really shocked by what he had to tell me about the murderer David Fuller. The facts have been outlined to the Committee today. Fuller was of course jailed for murder, but that someone could carry out the assaults that he did on dead people and not be prosecuted beggars belief. None of us can comprehend the distress caused to the families of the deceased people Fuller violated. It is important that we ensure that anyone who acts as he did is suitably punished.
I note that the hon. Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock does not intend to press the matter to a vote, but I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to his cause and that of the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. I reiterate our support for the new clause and ask the Government to bring forward a new clause, perhaps on Report, to deal with this most horrendous crime.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock for his speech. I am grateful for the opportunity—
The Chair
Order. May I intervene? I have been passed a note to say that the mics in the room are for the audio recording of proceedings, not for amplification in the room, so Members should be advised to speak up if others are having difficulty hearing. I understand that when somebody has their back to the people they are speaking to, it is very difficult to hear, so would the Minister mind speaking up a little?
Laura Farris
Thank you, Mrs Latham. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak about the new clause. I hope people can hear me this time.
It is actually quite rare in this place that we find that there is a crime that is not reflected at all in the law. This is one of those examples. It follows the truly disgusting offending by David Fuller. I want to start by acknowledging the experience of his victims’ families and how distressing it has been for them. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells for their work on this matter.
The Government have been reviewing the sexual penetration of a corpse offence in section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which currently carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment following conviction on indictment, and we agree that there is a gap in the law. Section 70 applies only to sexual penetration of a corpse, so any form of sexual touching falling short of penetration is not currently a criminal offence. The Government have therefore concluded that the criminal law should be expanded to include non-penetrative sexual activity with a corpse.
The Government have also concluded that the current statutory maximum does not adequately reflect the harm caused by an offence of this nature, and that it should be increased from two years’ to five years’ imprisonment. We therefore support my right hon. and hon. Friends’ laudable aims in tabling their new clause.
In the interests of completeness, I will set out why we cannot accept the new clause as drafted. It would not repeal section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act but would create a new offence, in proposed new section 70A, with a higher maximum penalty than the behaviour already covered by section 70. It would also introduce the concept of interference with a corpse. With respect, we say that is unnecessary, because touching is already defined in section 79(8), and we think that section can be expanded and read across to apply to victims in the circumstance we are discussing. Introducing a new concept of interference, which could arguably be interpreted differently, could lead to confusion in the prosecution of the offence, which we think is not necessary.
In addition, the offence in the new clause as drafted does not require the offender to know or be reckless to the fact that what is being interfered with is a dead body. We think the mental element of the offence is important so that we capture those who are genuinely committing a criminal offence.
Again, I thank all the Members who have spoken on this matter, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells and my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford who have been to see me. They continue to make efforts on behalf of their constituents who have been so badly affected by this uniquely disgusting and horrific crime. We support the intentions behind the new clause, and I look forward to working with hon. Friends to find a way to bring forward the necessary legislation in this Bill. With that reassurance, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his new clause.
Stephen Metcalfe
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Complicity in joint enterprise cases
In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanors) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert—
“, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.—(Peter Dowd.)
This new clause would clarify the definition of ‘joint enterprise’ (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I begin by paying tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle on the new clause, and the ongoing work of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), who we have already heard has introduced a private Member’s Bill to the House on the same issue. I am sure that Members across the Committee will share my admiration and respect for the campaigners from JENGbA, who have been tirelessly working on challenging injustices in joint enterprise convictions for well over a decade.
As we have just heard, the new clause mirrors the Joint Enterprise (Significant Contribution) Bill, which we hope will receive its Second Reading on Friday 2 February. I would prefer to see the Government making commitments on this matter, as it is a complex area of law and practice and any reforms will need careful consideration and monitoring to ensure that they are working, especially after the unexpected absence of change following the Jogee decision in 2016, which I will come back to later.
I am glad that the new clause has been tabled to enable a discussion in Committee, because the issue deserves more parliamentary time. Even though we have had many criminal justice Bills before this House in the past 10 years, all while alarms have been raised about continuing problems with joint enterprise law, Parliament has not engaged substantially with the issue for some time. During my tenure as shadow Justice Minister, I met the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and the PCS, among others, and heard about ongoing challenges with joint enterprise convictions, despite the decision in Jogee and the very active collaboration between campaigners, legal practitioners and academics over the last decade. So I will be very interested to hear from the Minister about the work her Department has been doing in this area and, indeed, about any ongoing engagement it has had with campaigners, experts and practitioners who are collaborating on reform in this area.
The processes of prosecution and conviction in our criminal justice system should be fair, transparent and accountable, but joint enterprise law can be vague and confusing, and it can lead to apparently unjust outcomes. Some examples of individuals who are potentially at risk of being prosecuted under joint enterprise have been provided by Dr Felicity Gerry KC, who was the lead counsel in the case of Jogee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle has already outlined them to the Committee.
In 2016, when the Supreme Court ruled that the law of joint enterprise had taken a “wrong turn” for over 30 years, it restored the proper law of intention so that those who intended to commit or assist a crime, rather than those who might have foreseen it, could be properly convicted under joint enterprise law. These are all based on real cases, and as I have said, my hon. Friend has given the example of the taxi passenger getting out and becoming involved in a stabbing, or the woman who pulled somebody’s hair while trying to defend her boyfriend who may well have carried out a serious offence. Those individuals were charged under joint enterprise law, and they were at risk of extremely lengthy sentences, as if they were the primary offender, even when it is very difficult to discern how they contributed to the crime in question. Joint enterprise law has been used to convict young people who have not been present at the scene of the crime, and young people who listen to certain kinds of music, and there is a risk that such a trial focuses on character and culture, not contribution to a crime. My hon. Friend spoke about that in some detail. It is clear that joint enterprise law needs to be reformed in some way.
Last September, the CPS finally recorded and published a set of pilot data about joint enterprise cases, as a result of legal action by Liberty and JENGbA. While the results were shocking, they were, sadly, not surprising, as they confirmed much of what has been said by joint enterprise reformers for years. The data revealed that over half of those involved were aged under 25. Some 30% of the defendants in the cases were black, compared with the 4% of black people in the wider population, and black 18 to 24-year-olds were the largest demographic group identified in the pilot data. The data illustrated what we already knew about joint enterprise, which is that there is a serious racial disproportionality in its use.
The CPS pilot data suggests that black people are 16 times—I repeat, 16 times—more likely than white people to be prosecuted for homicide or attempted homicide under joint enterprise laws, which is a very significant divergence. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister the results of the data analysis, particularly about what she believes are the reasons behind the shocking disparities, given that the CPS has said that no conclusions about its decision making can be drawn from the pilot data. At the very least, we have to ask questions about the possibility that this level of divergence is at least in part caused by discriminatory practices in our criminal justice system. Looking at those figures, is the Minister confident that the framework for joint enterprise prosecutions is fit for purpose?
It has taken a number of years for the CPS to finally publish data on this important issue, but now that we have it, we must ensure that the Ministry of Justice is using that data to explore how it can best improve practice. I would also be grateful if the Minister could share any other plans for data collection and analysis in relation to the application of joint enterprise law, and anything she is aware of in the Ministry of Justice, the CPS or other Government body that is happening to progress this.
I was personally quite surprised at the scale of joint enterprise prosecutions, with the CPS data showing 680 defendants in 190 cases of homicide or attempted homicide across six of 14 CPS areas in just six months. That number is considerably higher than I would ever have anticipated. If the Minister has any thoughts on the number of prosecutions, I ask her to share them with the Committee. The high level of joint enterprise prosecutions demonstrates that at the very least it is an issue deserving of considerably more active consideration by parliamentarians and the Government.
Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could speak to any discussions that she has had in her Department about the recent Fiaz case, in which the Court of Appeal suggested that a jury need not be specifically directed by the judge to consider the legal significance of a defendant’s contribution towards an offence. Dr Gerry has argued that the case highlights the need for additional legal clarity, as judges do not always direct juries to consider the significance of a defendant’s contribution toward an offence. Does the Minister also recognise the need for additional clarity in that area, and has her Department considered any means by which that may be achieved? It is an area with substantial cross-party recognition that more needs to be done to increase the fairness, transparency and accountability of prosecutions, and I look forward to hearing the Department’s position on the matter.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for Bootle for tabling new clause 16, which would amend section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 to provide that a person must have made a “significant contribution” to an offence committed as part of a joint enterprise to be indicted or punished as a principal offender. Its effect would be that the prosecution would have to identify the precise nature of the defendant’s role in aiding, abetting, procuring or counselling the commission of a crime committed in order to prove that the defendant had made a significant contribution—a threshold that need not currently be met.
Joint enterprise is a common law doctrine used in a variety of situations, most commonly to describe a situation in which two or more individuals have a common purpose to commit any criminal offence, or a secondary party encourages or assists the principal offender to commit an offence. It is a long-standing principle of criminal law that in either of those situations, both or all of the offenders may be held equally responsible and could be subject to the same penalty.
The hon. Member for Bootle has set out a number of examples, but I will start with a high-profile one. Members of the Committee may well recall the Victoria station attack in 2010, when a group of young men chased another young man over the ticket turnstile and down the escalator, where they set upon him. In the course of that attack, the young man was kicked in the head and torso repeatedly and was stabbed, and he died. At the end of it, the cause of death was multiple injuries, but it was impossible for the coroner to say who had struck the fatal blow with the knife or who had administered the fatal kick to the head. The whole group of assailants was put on trial; a number were convicted of murder and a number were convicted of manslaughter. That was classic joint enterprise, where they went with a common purpose to attack seriously an individual, and it could not be identified who had made the significant contribution, but the young man—the victim—was killed.
I say with great respect that R v. Jogee, which went before the Supreme Court in 2016 and to which the hon. Members for Stockton North and for Bootle both referred, was not an ordinary case. It was not even close to being an ordinary case. The Supreme Court reviewed 500 years of common-law jurisprudence on joint enterprise, and not only changed the law but issued really important guidance. I would like very briefly to talk the Committee through the framework that the Supreme Court applied, because it will help to explain why the Government will not accept new clause 16 today.
The Supreme Court said that it circumscribed the ambit of the offence and removed, as a matter of common law, the principle of parasitic accessory liability. To give an example that is sometimes given in case studies, if two people go to a farm with the purpose of stealing some farm machinery, and the farmer approaches them, and then person No. 1 pulls out a weapon and uses it on the farmer, that would not be decisive evidence that person No. 2 intended to kill or cause serious harm. That would previously have been the case under the principle of parasitic accessory liability, but the Supreme Court said that that went too far. In plain English, it said that joint enterprise cannot be inferred from the fact that it was foreseeable that a secondary offence would take place; there has to be an intention to assist. It said that the existence of foreseeability was something that the court should treat as evidence of intent, but was not necessarily decisive of it.
The judgment concluded by saying that joint enterprise essentially requires two elements. The first is a conduct element: the accessory must encourage or assist the crime committed by the principal. Secondly, the prosecution must show that the mental element existed, in other words that the accessory intended to encourage and assist the commission of the crime committed by the principal.
I have done a bit of a review of the case law—although I question whether it is helpful or unhelpful to go through case law during a Bill Committee in which nobody has the opportunity to read the case report—and am satisfied that there have been examples of case law since the Jogee case that show that approach being fairly applied. One example is of a group of young men who undertook a burglary on a care home. One person was tasked with searching the rooms before the others went in. In the course of events, one of the residents of the care home was brutally attacked. The young man who had done the search went in to try to stop it; he established that in court. He was convicted of burglary but not of the secondary attack, because that had not been his intention as part of the joint enterprise exercise.
Jess Phillips
Can the Minister tell me what protections are in place for the woman in the case that I outlined? She was considered to be an accessory to a crime. She was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour, and the crime was a part of a pattern of domestic abuse.
Laura Farris
In that circumstance, the defence of duress would be available to the victim in the ordinary way.
Jess Phillips
Currently, that is absolutely not what is happening in our criminal courts. It is currently no defence for victims of domestic abuse in these cases to say, “I’m a victim of domestic abuse: that’s why I ended up here.” The Minister is saying that there is the defence of duress; I am saying that it never gets used. It does not stack up, and this is not happening in reality. She has spoken of her pride in the Government over coercive control. Does she think that there need to be specific elements, within this conversation about joint enterprise, to protect people who are coerced into such behaviours?
Laura Farris
We will come on to some amendments of that nature and I will deal with them in due course, but the defence of duress is a standard defence in the criminal context. [Interruption.] These are the criminal defences that get advanced.
In response to the hon. Member for Bootle, this is an area of the law that is intrinsically linked with other inchoate offences such as encouraging or assisting a crime. We think that it is too difficult to require the prosecution to prove a significant contribution; as we say, the very important case of Jogee has set clear parameters for both the conduct element and the mental element, which we think creates the correct framework of common law. For those reasons, the Government are unable to support the new clause, and we ask the hon. Member for Bootle to withdraw it.
Alex Cunningham
I shall be brief. My hon. Friends the Members for Bootle and for Swansea East have addressed new clauses 17, 18 and 49, and I pay tribute to them and to my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney for the work they have done on road traffic incidents. All three new clauses illustrate the need for a sentencing review for serious road traffic offences, and Labour is committed to doing that alongside sentencing for other serious crimes across the system.
The Minister and the Committee heard the tragic accounts outlined by my hon. Friends, including that of a runaway car that killed a young child. Sadly, in that case, there could be no justice for the child or her family as no offence related to the circumstances of her death. Surely that cannot be right. I am sure the Minister agrees that we have a duty to act in all three areas outlined in the new clauses. Has she examined the impact of those measures on cost, particularly in relation to the additional cost of prison places? If she has not, will she consider doing so before Report and share that information with the Committee, so that we are better informed? If she cannot support the new clauses today, I would be obliged if she told us what action, if any, her Department is considering for such offences and whether the Government plan to address them in the Bill at a later stage, or perhaps during Committee of the whole House on the Sentencing Bill, which I believe is due within the next few weeks.
There can be no doubt that the new clauses would close loopholes in the law that currently prevent families of loved ones killed in tragic circumstances from achieving either justice or closure. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Members for Bootle and for Swansea East for compellingly setting out the impact of various forms of driving offence that are raised in our surgeries. When we talk about driving offences, there is often a narrow focus on things such as drink-driving for which the penalties are serious; we do not talk enough about things such as causing death by dangerous driving, which can be unbelievably reckless and irresponsible and cause the most serious harms.
The hit and run that the hon. Member for Bootle so powerfully described was an extension of dangerous driving. Whether panic, cowardice or other offences that the perpetrator is concerned about come to the fore, such incidents are absolutely devastating for the families of the victim. I therefore pay tribute to those hon. Members for the way in which they presented the new clauses.
It was helpful to hear that the hon. Member for Bottle is not wedded to the language he has used in his new clause. I had some remarks to make about that, but I will not spend too much time on that because of his indication. I do not know whether this applies to the hon. Member for Bootle too, but I understand that the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney is having conversations with the Department for Transport. I hope the hon. Member for Bootle will allow time for those conversations to happen and for us to engage with them before the Bill comes back. With all that in mind, I will lay out the framework for how we deal with the hit and run issue and I will then come on to the other points and where the Government’s thinking lies at present.
Laura Farris
Hon. Members will know what I mean: those things that are not cars. There is, therefore, quite a lot of classification. We have a two-part system.
Mark Garnier
I am slightly confused. I get all the stuff about not being insured and not needing a driving licence, but surely if a person clobbers somebody with a quad bike and causes them injury, there has to be some recourse?
Laura Farris
My hon. Friend is correct, but that would be a civil action for negligence, for which remedies would be available. We treat private land separately, but I think the was saying something rather different, about where private land becomes public land. When the index offence takes place, it relates to a motor vehicle on public land; we are not dealing with particularly difficult definitional issues. I undertake to take that point away; I had not understood it from the motion and the explanation of the hon. Member for Swansea East, so it might require some further thought. I hope conversations are happening in the Department for Transport, but I will ensure that that point is included in the Department’s thinking.
I point out, in the interest of completeness, that there is a broad definition of land that is defined as “private”. Some complications may exist around the classifications of private land, such as that used for military, commercial or other official purposes or land that is exempt from legal proceedings for offences committed there. There is a legal framework in place. Accidents on private land are covered by civil law and compensation—I talked about negligence in relation to a quad bike. In extreme cases such as gross negligence manslaughter or breaches of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the criminal law may be engaged too. With all that in mind, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the motion.
Peter Dowd
I hear what the Minister says, and I will withdraw the motion. It was a probing amendment in an attempt to give consideration to this issue, which affects so many people—our constituents—day in, day out; I gave the figures. As I said, I recuse myself from giving examples, because they are dreadfully distressing for people and I do not want to distress Members any more than I need to. I recused myself from giving examples, of which there are so many, but I hope the Minister hears the spirit of what I tried to say. It is not about people wanting vengeance; it is about getting an element of justice. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to these matters, because at some point they will come back.
I acknowledge and accept that this is not a transport Committee, but my proposals are within the scope of the Bill, so the Government have the power to pursue them if they wish. I ask the Ministers to take them away and think about them. I will be in touch with the Department for Transport, although, as I mentioned earlier, Departments are often packed out with work. None the less, this issue is of such import—it impacts on the lives of our constituents day in, day out—and we and the Government must consider it very carefully as early as practically possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Use of another person’s dwelling place for criminal purposes: cuckooing
“(1) A person ‘P’ commits an offence if—
(a) P makes regular use of or takes up residence in a residential building lawfully occupied by another person ‘R’,
(b) P uses the residential building as a base for criminal activities including but not limited to—
(i) dealing, storing or taking unlawfully held controlled drugs,
(ii) facilitating sex work,
(iii) taking up residence without a lawful agreement with R in circumstances where R is under duress or otherwise being coerced or controlled, or
(iv) financially abusing R.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘building’ includes any structure or part of a structure (including a temporary or moveable structure), and
(b) a building is ‘residential’ if it is designed or adapted, before the time of entry, for use as a place to live.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would make cuckooing an offence. Cuckooing is where the home of a vulnerable person is taken over by a criminal in order to use it to deal, store or take drugs, facilitate sex work, as a place for them to live, or to financially abuse the occupier.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Jess Phillips
I support the shadow Minister’s every word and point out, as he has done, the level of cross-party support for a change to this particular piece of law. In some way, I hope to outline some of the reasons why not many cases of cuckooing have been brought forward. I saw a case of a young woman, who was exploited from childhood into adulthood through the care system—and then in her own private property; men would come around to rape, sexually assault and sell her in her own property. People might, perfectly reasonably, say, “Why wouldn’t you call the police?” Well, there were kilos of cocaine and heroin left in her property, and she was absolutely convinced—nothing that I could convince her otherwise—that she would be criminalised if she called the police to her home. In other cases, there might be a cannabis farm in the ceiling, for example, and people are convinced that they will be criminalised.
Without doubt, there are more people in our prisons who have been victims of human trafficking than there are human traffickers. Certainly, for those charged under any of the crimes in the Modern Slavery Act, there will be many more people in our prisons who should actually have been saved by the provisions in that Act that say that criminalisation should not occur—yet it does, every single day; we continue to criminalise people in that manner, even when they are the victim of the crime. The vulnerable people in these cases know that, so they do not report the crimes.
We have had lots of discussions about finding weapons that are not just a kitchen knife in people’s houses. If authorities were to go into the home of a young woman who had been in the care system and had been difficult at times, and they found lots of drugs and weapons, do we honestly think that she would not be convicted of that crime? If we do, we are not living in reality at all. It is vital to have an understanding of what happens in these cuckooing cases. We need to recognise it to try to overcome some of the criminalisation, and the threat of criminalisation, that already exists.
I have met girls who have had photographs taken of them holding guns that have been used in fatal injuries, as a threat to them that they will be put up for that crime. When somebody has been groomed that well, they will believe it, no matter what I say—even if I say, “I will stand next to you in the courtroom and I will make sure this doesn’t happen.” It does happen. Recognising in law that this crime is specifically about taking over a home, and leaving incriminating evidence around the place, is really important in changing that.
Chris Philp
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Latham. I thank the hon. Member for Stockton North for the thoughtful and considered way in which he moved the new clause. He and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley both expressed sentiments about protecting vulnerable individuals from the practice known as cuckooing, and I will start by saying that the Government are just as concerned as they are. We are united in our shared desire to protect vulnerable people from the exploitation that they both described, so we are unanimous in our objectives in this area.
As the hon. Member for Stockton North said, most commonly the practice of cuckooing is associated with drug dealing, but it can be associated with other forms of criminality. I will raise a couple of points about his new clause. First, as it is currently drafted, there would be no requirement for there to be any coercion. For the proposed new offence to be made out, it would simply be sufficient for somebody—the perpetrator or alleged perpetrator—to occupy a residential building lawfully occupied by another, and then to commit a criminal offence.
The new offence of cuckooing would be made out even if there was no coercion and, in fact, even if it was done consensually. If the person who owned the house gave their free consent, without coercion, to the alleged perpetrator, the new offence proposed by the new clause would be committed. As I say, there is no requirement in the drafting for any form of coercion or even non-consent, whether or not there was coercion or exploitation. The way it is drafted goes beyond what I would expect in a cuckooing offence, where I imagine there would be some form of coercion, and non-consent by the person who owns the property.
Alex Cunningham
Subsection (1)(b)(iii) includes
“taking up residence without a lawful agreement with R in circumstances where R is under duress or otherwise being coerced or controlled”.
It does address coercion.
Chris Philp
With respect, those sub-limbs of paragraph (b) say “or”. It is only one of those requirements that needs to be met, not all of them. Although it is true that in the hon. Member’s drafting, subsection (1)(b)(iii) does require coercion or duress, the other sub-limbs—(i) and (ii) in particular—do not require duress. If that had been an “and”, it would be different. That would require all the conditions to be met, including criminality and duress. However, because the end of the line in sub-paragraph (iii) says “or”, that is only one possible sub-limb that can be met. The other sub-limbs, which the criminal offence includes but is not limited to, could be engaged as well. For example, if somebody was dealing drugs, that would engage paragraph (b)(i) even if there was no control or coercion. I think the Committee can see that because of that word “or”—
Wednesday 15th May 2024
(6 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberCriminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 15 May 2024 - (15 May 2024)
18:31 - The House divided: - Ayes: 167 / Noes: 275 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:48 - The House divided: - Ayes: 171 / Noes: 272 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:02 - The House divided: - Ayes: 17 / Noes: 268 - Question accordingly negatived.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: RTA Section 27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years of a fine or both. RTA Section 27C Causing death by careless of inconsiderate cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) 12 months (in England and Wales) or 6 months (in Scotland) or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both.””
Government new clause 62—Sexual activity with a corpse.
Government new clause 87—Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor.
Government new clause 88—Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland.
Government new clause 89—Reviews of sentencing: time limits.
Government new clause 94—Cuckooing.
Government new clause 95—Cuckooing: interpretation.
Government new clause 103—Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child.
Government new clause 104—Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal.
New clause 2—Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children—
‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—
“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.”’
New clause 7—Occupation or control of another person’s residence for criminal purposes “Cuckooing”—
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person occupies or exercises control over the home of another person (V) in connection with the commission of a criminal offence or offences using any of the following methods—
(a) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour;
(b) abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment;
(c) fraud or other deception;
(d) the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability;
(e) the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has control over V.
(2) A person also commits an offence under this section if the person arranges or facilitates the activity set out in subsection (1).
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years,
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”
This new clause makes it an offence to exercise control over another person’s residence for the purpose of criminal activity by means of coercion, threats or abuse of a position of vulnerability.
New clause 8—Offence of enabling or profiting from prostitution—
“(1) A person or body corporate (C) commits an offence if they—
(a) facilitate, whether online or offline, or
(b) gain financially from
a person (A) engaging in sexual activity with another person (B) in exchange for payment or other benefit, or the promise of payment or other benefit, and the conditions in subsection (2) are met.
(2) The conditions are—
(a) that C knows or ought to know that A is engaging in, or intends to engage in, sexual activity for payment or other benefit; and
(b) that C is not a dependent child of A.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “Sexual activity”—
(i) means any acts which a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider to be sexual,
(ii) requires A and B to be in each other’s presence,
(b) “Facilitates” includes, but is not limited to, causing or allowing to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of sexual activity involving A.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”
This new clause would make it an offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person.
New clause 9—One-punch manslaughter—
“(1) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where they cause the death of another person (B) as a result of a single punch in the circumstances described in subsection (2).
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) P administered a single punch to the head or neck of B;
(b) there was significant risk that the punch would cause serious physical harm to B;
(c) P was or ought to have been aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (b);
(d) P did not administer the punch referred to in paragraph (a) in self-defence; and
(e) B’s death was caused by—
(i) the impact of the punch, or
(ii) further impact or injury resulting from the single punch.
(3) In this section “serious physical harm” means harm that amounts to death or serious personal injury for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a minimum of seven years.”
This new clause is intended to create a specific offence of “One Punch Manslaughter”, with a minimum sentence of seven years.
New clause 12—Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services—
“(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—
(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),
(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,
(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and
(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.
(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—
(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or
(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B's usual day-to-day activities.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.
(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—
(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and
(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.
(5) A defence under subsection (4) requires A to have shown—
(a) sufficient evidence of the facts, and
(b) that the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”
New clause 16—Amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1988—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In each of the sections listed below, after “a road or other public place” insert “, or a private place adjacent to a road,”—
section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);
section 1A (causing serious injury by dangerous driving);
section 2 (dangerous driving);
section 2B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);
section 2C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);
section 3 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving).”
This new clause would extend the Road Traffic Act 1988 so that a range of driving offences can be committed in private places adjacent to roads as well as on public roads or in public places.
New clause 18—Definition of unauthorised access to computer programs or data—
“In section 17 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, at the end of subsection (5) insert—
“(c) he does not reasonably believe that the person entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data would have consented to that access if he had known about the access and the circumstances of it, including the reasons for seeking it;
(d) he is not empowered by an enactment, by a rule of law, or by the order of a court or tribunal to access of the kind in question to the program or data.””
New clause 19—Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990—
“(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or
(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”
(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or
(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””
New clause 24—Definition of exceptional hardship—
“In section 35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) In subsection (4)(b), the hardship that would be caused by an offender’s disqualification should be regarded as exceptional only if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would be experienced by a large majority of other drivers if disqualification were imposed on them.
(4B) In assessing whether the hardship arising from the offender’s disqualification would be exceptional a court may take account of—
(a) any circumstances relating to the offender’s economic circumstances or location of residence which would make it exceptionally hard for them to access essential services and facilities;
(b) any hardship that would be incurred by the offender’s family or others who are disabled or who depend on the offender to provide care for them; and
(c) any other circumstances which it believes would make the hardship exceptional.””
New clause 25—Offence of possession of guidance on creating child sexual abuse content—
“(1) Section 69 (Possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), omit from “to” to the end of the subsection and insert—
“possess, create, share or distribute any item that—
(a) contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually; or
(b) contains advice or guidance about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children.”
(3) In subsection (2)(b)(ii), after “sexually” insert—
“or about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children”
(4) In subsection (8)—
(a) after “sexually”” insert “(or “the sexual abuse of children”),
(b) omit “(but not pseudo-photographs)” and insert “, including pseudo-photographs”,
(c) after second “or Northern Ireland” insert—
““creation of content” includes using any tool to create visual or audio content;”,
(d) at end insert—
““tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.””
This new clause would expand the existing offence of possessing guides about abusing children sexually to include guides on creating child sexual abuse content, including through the use of artificial intelligence or machine learning.
New clause 26—Offence of simulating sexual communication with a child—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) use;
(b) design;
(c) distribute; or
(d) provide access to
a tool to simulate sexual communication with a person under 16.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) a communication is sexual if—
(i) any part of it relates to sexual activity, or
(ii) a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person's purpose, consider any part of the communication to be sexual,
(b) “tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to the same penalties as apply to an offence committed under section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This new clause would create an offence of using, creating or sharing online or digital tools which simulate sexual communication with a child.
New clause 28—Complicity in joint enterprise cases—
“In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert “, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.”
This new clause would clarify the definition of “joint enterprise” (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.
New clause 29—Human trafficking—
“(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for “arranges or facilitates the travel of” substitute “recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, coercion, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits”.
(3) In subsection (2), for “travel” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) or to V being exploited”.
(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).
(5) In paragraph (6)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.
(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).
(7) In paragraph (7)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.
(8) In paragraph (7)(b), for the first “the” substitute “any”.”
This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.
New clause 32—Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability—
“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute “Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales”.
(3) In section 28—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity””;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from “based on” to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—
—
(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;
(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;
(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;
(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or
(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or”;
(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from “hostility towards” to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—
—
(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;
(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;
(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;
(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or
(v) persons who are transgender.”;
(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of “membership” leave out “racial or religious” and insert “relevant”.
(4) In section 29—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(5) In section 30—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(6) In section 31—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(7) In section 32—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.”
This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
New clause 33—Taking of dog without lawful authority—
“(1) A person commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the person takes or detains a dog in England—
(a) so as to remove it from the lawful control of any person, or
(b) so as to keep it from the lawful control of a person who is entitled to have lawful control of it.
(2) No offence is committed if the person taking or detaining the dog is connected with any of the following—
(a) any person entitled to have lawful control of it;
(b) where it is removed from the lawful control of a person, that person.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum summary term for either-way offences or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).
(4) In this section—
“connected person” : a person is connected with another person if—
(a) they are married to each other,
(b) they are civil partners of each other,
(c) one is the parent of the other, or
(d) they are siblings (whether of the full blood or the half blood);
“detaining” : references to a person detaining a dog include the person—
(a) inducing it to remain with the person or anyone else, or
(b) causing it to be detained;
“maximum summary term for either-way offences” , with reference to imprisonment for an offence, means—
(a) if the offence is committed before the time when paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 comes into force, 6 months;
(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 12 months;
“taking” : references to a person taking a dog include the person—
(a) causing or inducing it to accompany the person or anyone else, or
(b) causing it to be taken.”
This new clause makes provision for the creation of an offence of taking a dog from the lawful control of another person.
New clause 35—Offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision—
“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable—
(a) if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a fatal injury—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years;
(b if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a serious non-fatal injury—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;
(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;
(c) in any other case—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;
(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.””
This new clause would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision to create more serious penalties for failing to stop after collisions which result in death or serious injury.
New clause 36—Time to report road collision—
“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, omit subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) In complying with a duty under this section to report an accident or to produce such a certificate of insurance or other evidence, as is mentioned in section 165(2)(a) of this Act, it is an offence for a driver—
(a) not to do so at a police station or to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable, and
(b) not to do so within two hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to reporting an accident, or within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to the production of a certificate of insurance or other evidence.””
This new clause would amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to reduce the time within which a driver must report a road collision in which they were involved from twenty-four hours to two hours, and make it an offence not to report an accident.
New clause 38—Senior manager liability for neglect in relation to offences committed by bodies corporate and partnerships—
“(1) Where an organisation commits an offence under section 16, a person (“S”) also commits an offence if—
(a) S was a senior manager of the same body corporate or partnership at the time the offence was committed under section 16; and
(b) S failed to prevent the offence from being committed, or was negligent such that an offence was committed.
(2) It is a defence for S to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed.
(3) In this section, “body corporate”, “partnership” and “senior manager” have the meanings given in section 16.
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of 12 months;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and an unlimited fine.”
New clause 43—Offence of creating or sharing misleading content—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—
(a) create, using any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning; or
(b) share, distribute, or otherwise provide access to,
visual or audio content which shows or represents, or appears to show or represent, another person (“R”), where conditions A, B and C are met.
(2) Condition A is that the words, actions, beliefs or behaviours shown or represented in the content have been artificially created or manipulated.
(3) Condition B is that the content has been created or shared for the purposes of—
(a) misleading a person viewing or hearing the content as to R’s real words, actions, beliefs or behaviours;
(b) causing offence, alarm, distress or humiliation to—
(i) R; or
(ii) any other person; or
(c) influencing the voting intention or activity of another person.
(4) Condition C is that R has not consented to the creation or sharing of the content.
(5) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
New clause 44—Sexual exploitation of an adult—
“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.
(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and
(b) at end insert—
“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”
An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.
New clause 45—Loitering and soliciting: repeal—
“Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.”
An amendment that repeals soliciting and loitering as an offence.
New clause 46—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions: Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution—
‘(1) Section 92 of the Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence in circumstances where—
(a) the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, or
(b) the offence was committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959,
may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.”
(3) In subsection (2) after first “caution” insert “received in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)(a)”.’
A new clause that allows a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions received under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959.
New clause 47—Grooming as an aggravating factor—
“(1) After section 72 of the Sentencing Code (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—
“72A Grooming
(1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence which is aggravated by grooming.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by grooming as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.””
Grooming to be seen as an aggravating factor in certain cases where the victim is an adult.
New clause 48—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—
“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—
“(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.””
An amendment to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.
New clause 49—Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases—
“(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(4) After subsection (8F) insert—
“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,
(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and
(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).
(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”
(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”
Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.
New clause 50—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—
“(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—
(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,
(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,
(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and
(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.
(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.
(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—
(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or
(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.
(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—
(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,
(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and
(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.
(5) For the purposes of this section “relevant characteristics” means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.
(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.
(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].
(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].
(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].”
Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.
New clause 55—Offence of child criminal exploitation—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—
(a) recruit or attempt to recruit, or
(b) ask or compel another person to recruit or attempt to recruit,
a child (“C”) for the purpose of C’s involvement in criminal activity.
(2) An offence is committed under subsection (1) regardless of whether C—
(a) engages in criminal activity, or
(b) is prosecuted for or found guilty of a criminal offence.
(3) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that P did not know that C was a child.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) if the offence for which C was, or was attempted to be, recruited was murder, to imprisonment for life,
(b) if C was, or was attempted to be, recruited for any other offence, to the penalty to which a person guilty of that offence would be liable.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
“child” means a person under the age of 18;
“criminal activity” means any activity or conduct which constitutes a criminal offence;
to
“recruit” includes by direction, inducement, incitement, coercion or compulsion.”
New clause 57—Offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—
“27A Causing death by dangerous cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section “serious injury means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.
27C Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.”
(3) In section 28 (dangerous cycling), after subsection (3) insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist includes that their cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations made under section 81 of this Act.”
(4) After section 32 (electrically assisted pedal cycles), insert—
“32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32
(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32 of this Act, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—
(a) a pedal cycle,
(b) an electrically assisted pedal cycle, and
(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—
(i) an electric scooter,
(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and
(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.”
(5) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(6) In the table in Part 1 of Schedule 2, after the row beginning “RTA section 27” insert in columns 1 to 4—
New clause 59—Ban on “ninja swords”—
“(1) The Secretary of State must exercise their powers under section 141(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to amend the Schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1, after sub-paragraph (t) insert—
“(u) the weapon sometimes known as a “ninja sword”, “katana” or “ninjato”, being a single-edged straight blade of up to 60cm in length with a long hilt or guard”.
(3) Regulations laid under subsection (1) must—
(a) be laid within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act,
(b) be laid following consultation on the definitions of possession for sporting use and possession of antiques, and
(c) include, subject to the results of the consultation under subsection (3)(b), exemptions for sporting use and for possession of antiques.”
New clause 60—Senior manager liability for illegal sale of bladed articles—
“(1) A person “P” commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of an internet service “C”,
(b) C commits an offence under—
(i) sections 141A or 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or
(ii) sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “internet service” has the meaning given in section 228 of the Online Safety Act 2023;
(b) “senior manager” means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities.
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”
New clause 61—Classification of Fenethylline as a Class A drug—
“In Schedule 2 (Controlled Drugs) to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, after “Etryptamine” insert “Fenethylline”.”
This new clause would add Fenethylline – also known by the brand names Captagon, Biocapton, and Fitton – to the list of Class A drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
New clause 91—Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A water or water and sewerage company (“C”) commits an offence where C has—
(a) failed to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years; or
(b) experienced an increase in—
(i) total pollution incidents per 10,000km2, or
(ii) serious pollution incidents
for three consecutive years.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
“water or water and sewerage company” means companies which are responsible for the provision of water, or water and sewerage, services and which are regulated by Ofwat and the Environment Agency;
“pollution performance commitment level” means the level of performance on pollution that the company has committed to deliver, and which is reported against by Ofwat in its annual water company performance report;
“total pollution incidents per 10,000km2” and “serious pollution incidents” mean the relevant figures under those headings reported by the Environment Agency in its annual environmental performance report.
(3) If guilty of an offence under this section, C is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
New clause 92—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (“C”),
(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
“senior manager” means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;
“water or water and sewerage company” has the meaning given in section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels].
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
New clause 93—Compensation orders: loss suffered by victim—
“In the Sentencing Act 2020 after section 138 insert —
“138A Loss suffered by victim of offence of coercive and controlling behaviour
(1) Subsection (2) applies where the court is determining whether to make a compensation order against an offender in respect of an offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).
(2) The court must have particular regard to the desirability of compensating the victim of the offence for injury, loss or damage, including economic loss, resulting from the offence.””
Government new schedule 4—Cuckooing: specified offences.
New schedule 1—Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply—
“Schedule
Common Law Offences
1 False imprisonment.
2 Kidnapping.
3 Manslaughter.
4 Murder.
5 Perverting the course of justice.
6 Piracy.
Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100)
7 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—
• section 4 (soliciting murder)
• section 16 (threats to kill)
• section 18 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm)
• section 20 (malicious wounding)
• section 21 (attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle in order to commit or assist in committing an indictable offence)
• section 22 (using drugs etc to commit or assist in the committing of an indictable offence)
• section 23 (maliciously administering poison etc so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm)
• section 27 (abandoning children)
• section 28 (causing bodily injury by explosives)
• section 29 (using explosives with intent to do grievous bodily harm)
• section 30 (placing explosives with intent to do bodily injury)
• section 31 (setting spring guns etc with intent to do grievous bodily harm)
• section 32 (endangering safety of railway passengers)
• section 35 (injuring persons by furious driving)
• section 37 (assaulting officer preserving wreck)
• section 38 (assault with intent to resist arrest).
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3)
8 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Explosive Substances Act 1883—
• section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property)
• section 3 (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property)
• section 4 (making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances).
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (c. 34)
9 An offence under section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (child destruction).
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12)
10 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to children).
Public Order Act 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 c. 6)
11 An offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (control etc of quasi-military organisation).
Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)
12 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).
Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27)
13 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—
• section 5 (possession of prohibited firearms)
• section 16 (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life)
• section 16A (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence)
• section 17(1) (use of firearm to resist arrest)
• section 17(2) (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for specified offence)
• section 18 (carrying firearm with criminal intent).
Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)
14 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—
• section 8 (robbery or assault with intent to rob)
• section 9 (burglary), where the offence is committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, or to do unlawful damage to a building or anything in it
• section 10 (aggravated burglary)
• section 12A (aggravated vehicle-taking), where the offence involves an accident which causes the death of any person
• section 21 (blackmail).
Criminal Damage Act 1971 (c. 48)
15 The following offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971—
• an offence of arson under section 1
• an offence under section 1(2) (destroying or damaging property) other than an offence of arson.
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)
16 An offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state).
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2)
17 An offence under section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (indecent or obscene articles).
Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28)
18 An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking).
Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36)
19 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation Security Act 1982—
• section 1 (hijacking)
• section 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft)
• section 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft)
• section 4 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).
Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)
20 An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).
Child Abduction Act 1984 (c. 37)
21 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—
• section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc)
• section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).
Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64)
22 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—
• section 1 (riot)
• section 2 (violent disorder).
Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33)
23 An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).
Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52)
24 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988—
• section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving)
• section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs).
Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31)
25 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990—
• section 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes)
• section 9 (hijacking of ships)
• section 10 (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms)
• section 11 (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety)
• section 12 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation)
• section 13 (offences involving threats).
Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570)
26 An offence under Part 2 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (SI 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system).
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40)
27 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—
• section 4 (putting people in fear of violence)
• section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)
28 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 —
• section 29 (racially or religiously aggravated assaults)
• section 31(1)(a) or (b) (racially or religiously aggravated offences under section 4 or 4A of the Public Order Act 1986).
Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)
29 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000—
• section 54 (weapons training)
• section 56 (directing terrorist organisation)
• section 57 (possession of article for terrorist purposes)
• section 59 (inciting terrorism overseas).
International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17)
30 An offence under any of the following provisions of the International Criminal Court Act 2001—
• section 51 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes)
• section 52 (ancillary conduct).
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)
31 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001—
• section 47 (use of nuclear weapons)
• section 50 (assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas)
• section 113 (use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate).
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)
32 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—
• section 1 (female genital mutilation)
• section 2 (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia)
• section 3 (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia).
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
33 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
• section 1 (rape)
• section 2 (assault by penetration)
• section 3 (sexual assault)
• section 4 (causing person to engage in sexual activity without consent)
• section 5 (rape of child under 13)
• section 6 (assault of child under 13 by penetration)
• section 7 (sexual assault of child under 13)
• section 8 (causing or inciting child under 13 to engage in sexual activity)
• section 9 (sexual activity with a child)
• section 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)
• section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons)
• section 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence)
• section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming)
• section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child)
• section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)
• section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child)
• section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act)
• section 25 (sexual activity with a child family member)
• section 26 (inciting a child family member to engage in sexual activity)
• section 30 (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)
• section 31 (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity)
• section 32 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)
• section 33 (causing a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to watch a sexual act)
• section 34 (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)
• section 35 (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception)
• section 36 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a mental disorder)
• section 37 (causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception)
• section 38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)
• section 39 (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity)
• section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder)
• section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act)
• section 47 (paying for sexual services of a child)
• section 48 (causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)
• section 49 (controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography
• section 50 (arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)
• section 61 (administering a substance with intent)
• section 62 (committing offence with intent to commit sexual offence)
• section 63 (trespass with intent to commit sexual offence)
• section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration)
• section 65 (sex with an adult relative: consenting to penetration)
• section 66 (exposure)
• section 67 (voyeurism)
• section 70 (sexual penetration of a corpse).
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
34 An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm).
Terrorism Act 2006 (c. 11)
35 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—
• section 5 (preparation of terrorist acts)
• section 6 (training for terrorism)
• section 9 (making or possession of radioactive device or material)
• section 10 (use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes)
• section 11 (terrorist threats relating to radioactive devices etc).
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c. 30)
36 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015—
• section 1 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)
• section 2 (human trafficking).
Ancillary offences
37 (1) An offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed in this Schedule.
(2) An offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence listed in this Schedule.
(3) An offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence listed in this Schedule.”
Amendment 69, in clause 9, page 7, line 36, at end insert—
“(3) The Secretary of State must, within two years of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, publish a report on convictions for the offence introduced by this section.
(4) In preparing the report under subsection (3) the Secretary of State must consult with whichever individuals or bodies the Secretary of State sees fit.
(5) The report under subsection (3) must include—
(a) the number of convictions for offences under section 139AB of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in each year for which this section has been in force;
(b) the types of relevant weapon involved in such offences;
(c) details of how the individual came into the possession of the relevant weapon, including details of whether any laws relating to the sale or delivery of bladed or other offensive articles were breached; and
(d) recommendations on whether, in light of the findings of the report, further review is needed on existing laws and processes relating to the sale or delivery of bladed or other offensive articles.”
Amendment 32, in clause 13, page 10, line 15, after “Administering” insert “or attempting to administer”.
Amendment 33, page 10, line 19, after “administers” insert “or attempts to administer”.
Amendment 34, page 10, line 20, after “administration” insert “or attempted administration”.
Amendment 35, page 10, line 23, after “causes” insert “or attempts to cause”.
Amendment 36, page 10, line 25, after “administration” insert “attempted administration”.
Amendment 37, page 10, line 26, leave out from “life” to end of line 27 and insert
“, inflicts grievous bodily harm on them, or causes them annoyance or humiliation, and”.
Government amendments 142 and 143.
Amendment 38, page 11, line 3, leave out from “Administering” to end of line 4 and insert
“or attempting to administer etc harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve, annoy or humiliate”.
Amendment 39, page 11, line 6, after “administers” insert “or attempts to administer”.
Amendment 40, page 11, line 7, after “causes” insert “or attempts to cause”.
Amendment 41, page 11, line 9, leave out from “aggrieve” to end of line 10 and insert
“, annoy or humiliate the other person, or for the purposes of the entertainment of the person or any other person.”
Government amendments 144 to 150
Amendment 57, in clause 28, page 34, leave out lines 34 and 35 and insert—
“(4) The court may, as part of an order under subsection (2), add conditions about the use of reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate, to give effect to an order under subsection (2).
(4A) Conditions referred to in subsection (4) may only be added if the court is satisfied that there are sufficient, properly trained and equipped staff available to give effect to the order, and the conditions added to it, safely.”
This amendment would ensure the courts satisfies itself that staff would not be put at risk when ordering a defendant to attend sentencing.
Government amendments 151 to 153
Amendment 58, in clause 33, page 39, line 14, at end insert —
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”
The amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Amendment 59, in clause 35, page 40, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement made between the United Kingdom and a foreign country.”
This amendment would require the Controller to make a report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement between the foreign country and the UK.
Amendment 60, page 41, line 3, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would ensure that the prisons inspectorate must conduct the duties specified in new section 5A(5D) of the Prisons Act 1952 and ensures its consistency with the legislative basis for its role in England and Wales.
Amendment 61, page 41, line 4, after “prisons” insert “and escort arrangements”.
This amendment would ensure that HM Inspectorate of Prisons can inspect escort arrangements under which prisoners are transferred to foreign prisons. This would bring the legislation into line with inspectorate’s powers in relation to UK prisons and escort arrangements under amendments to the Prisons Act made by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (s.46) and ensures scrutiny of an area of evidenced risk.
Amendment 62, page 41, line 8, at end insert—
“(4) In section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, after subsection 2(c) insert—
“(d) the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention in a foreign country pursuant to a warrant issued by the Secretary of State under section 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (warrant for transfer of prisoner to or from foreign prison).””
This amendment would clarify how the government intends to apply its obligations under Article 2 (right to life) of the Human Rights Act, through ensuring the duties of the coroner also apply to any death involving a prisoner subject to a transfer agreement with a foreign country.
Amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 105, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Faking intimate photographs or films using digital technology
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A intentionally creates or designs using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person (B) in an intimate state for the purposes of—
(a) sexual gratification, whether of themselves or of another person;
(b) causing alarm, distress or humiliation to B or any other person; or
(c) committing an offence under sections 66A or 66B of the Sexual Offence Act 2003.
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) A had a reasonable excuse for creating or designing the image or film, or
(b) that B consented to its creation.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make the creation of ”deepfake” intimate images an offence.
Amendment 160, page 110, line 14, at end insert—
“Online Safety Act 2023
21 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), after paragraph 31 insert—
“Non-consensual intimate photograph or film
31A An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
(a) section 66A (sending etc photograph or film of genitals);
(b) section 66AA (taking or recording intimate photograph or film);
(c) section 66AC (installing etc equipment to enable taking or recording of intimate photograph or film);
(d) section 66B (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film).””
This amendment makes non-consensual intimate photographs and films “priority illegal content” and so subject to duties to prevent individuals from encountering such content and to minimise the length of time such content is present (as is currently the case for child sexual exploitation and abuse content).
Government amendment 161.
Government amendment 163.
Government amendments 154 to 157.
Government amendment 70.
Government amendments 158 and 159.
Laura Farris
I have heard what was said by the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) and made a careful note. The fact that this debate is split over two days may have contributed to that, but I have listened carefully and will take that point away.
It is an honour, again, to open this debate and bring this important Bill back to the House on Report. Its focus is on countering developing criminal threats, intercepting serious organised crime, and protecting vulnerable victims. I thank Members across the House for their constructive engagement on the Bill, as well as the police, leading academics, practising lawyers and campaign groups, some of whom appeared before us in Committee. They have all contributed to the Bill’s development. There are many topics to discuss today, and I look forward to hearing the views of Members.
The Government are bringing forward a number of amendments that we believe are appropriate and necessary to punish offenders and enhance the protection that victims deserve. Briefly, I will explain the key Government amendments, starting with those about which I anticipate there will be no dispute: namely, the extension to Northern Ireland of our new spiking measures in clause 13, and the statutory aggravating factor for grooming activity in relation to child sexual offences in clause 30. New clause 88 provides for equivalence in sentencing for terrorist offenders between England and Wales and Northern Ireland, as a consequence of the irregularity that was identified in the case of R v. Perry.
Government new clause 89 extends the time limit for the unduly lenient sentence scheme, and will extend the overall time limit to six weeks. A request must still be submitted by any prospective appellant to the Attorney General’s Office within the usual 28 days, but the Attorney General’s Office will have an additional 14 days to consider whether the case is appropriate for submission to the Court of Appeal. In recent years the number of cases referred to the Law Officers has increased, in part due to a better awareness of the scheme. We consider it to be in the interests of justice that each application is given due care and attention, even when it is submitted close to the 28-day deadline, and we believe that the new clause is a proportionate way of achieving that.
On attendance at sentencing hearings, a change has been initiated already in the legislation in response to public concerns about high-profile cases, such as those of Lucy Letby, Jordan McSweeney and Thomas Cashman, all of whom refused to attend their sentencing hearing.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that such cases, which have rightly gained a huge amount of public traction, are ones where it is appropriate for the Government to be making further announcements and putting in measures at this stage?
Laura Farris
I agree with that sentiment entirely. We are already creating an express statutory power at clause 28 to compel an offender to attend the sentencing hearing if they have been convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is life, but we have also listened to those concerned about offences that might not be caught by that power. I confirm that the Government has tabled amendments 148 to 150 to extend the measure to all offences that might attract a maximum sentence of 14 years or more.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor, the Minister and other Ministers for listening to the case I made on Second Reading for extending the power. I had a case in my constituency where an offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a child under 13, which carries a 14-year sentence. They hid away in their cell and did not come to court. Under the original provisions, they would not have been captured, but under these amendments they will be, and I welcome that.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend, because the speech he gave on Second Reading played a major role in the changes we are introducing today. I reassure him that the change brings into scope most sexual assault cases, terrorist cases and racially aggravated offences, and I confirm to him that the specific case he raised on Second Reading would have been brought into scope by the change for which he has campaigned. I remind the House that the sanction for non-attendance at a sentencing hearing is up to a maximum of another two years in custody.
Government new clause 86 creates an offence of creating a sexually explicit deepfake of an adult without their consent. Members will be aware that the sharing of intimate images, whether real or fake, is already proscribed under the Online Safety Act 2023. We consider that we cannot complete the task of protecting people, principally women, unless we add the creation of pseudo-images or deepfakes to that package of protection. We are the first national legislature to take this step—if I am wrong about that, we are among the first—and we do so because we recognise the inherent risk posed by the creation of these images, both to the individual depicted and to society more widely.
Caroline Nokes (Romsey and Southampton North) (Con)
I know that the Minister will have given thought to this, but does she agree that there is a problem not just with deepfake sexual images, but more widely with deepfake images that purport to show individuals and potentially even Members of this House doing and saying things that they have not and that have no sexual connotations whatever?
Laura Farris
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that point. We are encountering a rapidly changing world of deepfake images that can be used for the purposes of manipulating voices to try to influence political attitudes and choices. I have to make it clear that the new clause is confined only to the creation of sexually explicit images. However, it is my hope, humbly expressed at this Dispatch Box, that it may provide a gateway and lever for the development of more law in this area, and I thank her for her intervention.
Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)
I particularly thank the Minister for this new clause. It obviously only covers adults, because producing sexual content of children is already illegal, but I am told that since the Government announced their intention to move the new clause, Apple and Google have already removed from their app stores a number of apps that were enabling users to produce deepfake nudes. Those applications have been used to create indecent images of children, as well as of adults. Disabling those apps has already helped to keep the public safe and to significantly improve the safeguarding of children. Just by tabling the new clause, the Government have already forced the industry to act in the UK.
Laura Farris
That is music to our ears. It was not lost on us that, within days of making the announcement, two of the major deepfake or nudify sites had blocked access to UK users in anticipation of the fact that even the act of using that site would become a criminal offence under our impending legislation.
Greg Clark (Tunbridge Wells) (Con)
I thank the Minister for her personal championing of this new clause. As she knows, the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee recommended it, and we benefited from a seminar conducted with the campaigners that Glamour magazine brought together to bring the experience of people right across the country to a focal point. They deserve credit for having brought this issue to the House, as does the Minister for championing it so brilliantly and bringing the new clause today.
Laura Farris
I have to thank the team at Glamour magazine, because they led an excellent campaign. I was halfway through trying to make the change myself when I became aware of it, but I read the material that they put out. It totally chimed with our objectives, and I know that my right hon. Friend welcomed the team to Parliament just a few weeks ago.
Dame Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
Intimate image abuse is an important issue to be dealt with. Can the Minister explain why she has not approached it in the same way as her colleagues approached it in the Online Safety Bill? It was a long-fought battle to have the Online Safety Bill recognise consent as pivotal, yet she has chosen not to take that approach at this stage, which I think many will find disappointing.
Laura Farris
I want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.
Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.
I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.
We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.
I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.
We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that
“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”
We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.
I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.
On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.
I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.
The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see in the Public Gallery some of the families who have championed this issue in the west midlands. Am I right in thinking—I really hope that I am not—that this measure covers only those convicted of the rape of a child, not other sexual offences against a child and a child aged 13 or over?
Laura Farris
The hon. Member is correct. I simply want to say again that this is a novel power that we are extending to Crown court judges, who typically do not have any knowledge of family law matters or a family law background. Once again, we think it is right that we take an iterative approach. There was a dialogue between the Mother of the House and the Lord Chancellor on this point, and she agreed with the approach. I do not want to put words in her mouth, and I am keenly aware of her absence when she should be speaking to her new clause, but I believe that she is satisfied with where we have got to. I commend the new clause and urge all colleagues to give it their support.
I turn next to new clauses 94 and 95 and new schedule 4. I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his excellent campaign and dedication to crafting a new offence. I must also mention my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), who also came to see me and made a really compelling argument.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I am grateful for that. The key bit about cuckooing is that the police have never been able to arrest somebody because they have taken over a house; they have to prove that there are criminal activities inside. This new offence will therefore break new ground and protect people.
There is an important point about coercion. Will the Minister guarantee that in the guidance notes attached to the Bill it will be clear to the police that they should be checking that victims are not being coerced into saying that they have given their consent? It is important for the police to know that.
Laura Farris
That is an excellent suggestion. I confirm that and thank my right hon. Friend once again.
Before I conclude, I would like to address a number of other matters that have been raised by hon. Members and tabled as amendments. I start with the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Dame Tracey Crouch)—
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
Before the Minister moves on—I apologise if she has addressed this and I missed it—could I get from her an explanation about Government new clause 102, which seeks to remove the protections of the Human Rights Act by effectively excluding the defence of lawful or reasonable excuses? This is now the fourth piece of legislation that the Government have introduced that will remove the protections of the Human Rights Act. We understand the reasons why they could not proceed with a Bill of rights, but surely if they are to remove human rights protections, that should be done in a proper, considered manner and not through salami slicing such as this.
Laura Farris
I will have to double-check that new clause, but I simply say that, with two exceptions, all the convention rights are qualified rights, which can be restricted in reasonable circumstances. I promise that I will check that and come back to the right hon. Gentleman in winding up the debate, if I may.
I was in the process of paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) for the outstanding representation that they have given to their constituents who were affected by David Fuller’s acts of depravity. That is reflected in new clause 62, which the Government support, on the offence of necrophilia.
It is perhaps a rare thing in 2024 that an offence can be identified that Parliament has not previously considered, but such was the extent of Fuller’s offending that we have had to do so. The Government are pleased to confirm that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 will be amended by the Bill to capture the sexual touching of a corpse with a new maximum sentence of seven years for penetrative offences and five years for non-penetrative acts.
Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)
I thank the Minister for her kind comments. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) will try to catch the Deputy Speaker’s eye later to speak in more detail on this, but let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Minister for taking a lot of time to work through this amendment thoughtfully and correctly, to provide greater protection and give some comfort to the families of the victims of David Fuller that justice has been thought about. She has listened sensitively and carefully to the comments of our constituents.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend for her comments. They were truly appalling crimes, and I had the constituents of both my hon. Friends in mind when I thought about how to develop the law. We cannot change what happened in the past, but I hope we can send the clearest possible message in future.
I want to come to a couple of other matters, though I will not pre-empt what hon. Members might be inclined to say. First, I want to talk about new clause 9, on one-punch manslaughter. I pay special tribute to my hon. Friend, and my friend, the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison). This was not an ordinary campaign for her, but one born out of the deep tragedy of her childhood. I know that she will speak to the new clause, and I will respond in detail, but I hope she will not mind my saying that I think her dad would feel very proud of how she has conducted herself on this issue, and would be pleased with the changes that we are making.
I come to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) on prisoner transfer to overseas prisons. I want to set out the Government’s position in general, and in particular in relation to the transfer criteria. The Government agree that not all prisoners will be appropriate for transfer to rented prisons overseas—indeed, the hon. Member has set out some very sensible principles in his own amendment. I would like to give him three points of reassurance. The proposal for foreign prisoner transfer will extend to approximately 600 prisoners—equivalent to just under half of 1% of the entire prison estate. I can confirm that we will not negotiate a prison transfer agreement with a women’s prison.
We will conclude a deal only with a country that can demonstrate that its prison conditions and capabilities meet the applicable human rights standards. The Secretary of State retains responsibility for each prisoner, which ensures that any transferred prisoner retains all their rights under the European convention on human rights, irrespective of where they may be transferred. However, we believe that legislation is the best place for negotiating further terms, with the appropriate involvement of experts. The Lord Chancellor has already confirmed that the use of these powers requires a valid international agreement, and any such agreement would be put before Parliament as a treaty, subject to ratification procedures contained in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for those reassurances, but some of us have marked misgivings about the whole concept, which speaks a little more of gimmickry than anything likely to ease the real pressures on our prisons. That said, I can see that it might be a tool in the box. Could she help me on two matters that the Law Society has raised? If the agreements are used, what arrangements will ensure that prisoners are able to access legal advice in a proper way, perhaps in relation to appeal or other proceedings? That is essential to ensure a fair approach. How will they be able to participate remotely if necessary in any ongoing legal proceedings? Secondly, what is to be done about family visits? As the Minister will know, the retention of family ties is particularly important, and recognised universally as a key factor in rehabilitation and preventing reoffending. We would not want to disrupt those opportunities for anyone being transferred.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for his sensible intervention, which engaged two issues: article 6 considerations on the right to a fair trial, and article 8 considerations on the right to respect for private and family life. We are keenly aware of those obligations. I am sorry that I cannot give more detail on that, only the extra reassurance that the Lord Chancellor has insisted that prisoners will retain all their rights under the convention. These will be principal considerations. I will ask the Lord Chancellor to write to my hon. and learned Friend to flesh out some of those responses.
Ruth Edwards (Rushcliffe) (Con)
My hon. Friend has given a wide-ranging opening speech, but I want to press her on one more issue: spiking. First, I thank her for recognising the importance of creating an offence to cover it. We had a spate of spiking attacks in Nottingham, and the stories of the young people affected were chilling. I seek her reassurance that we will create the most robust possible legislation in this area, and that she will look kindly on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who has led a fantastic campaign to get spiking recognised in law. It is so important that we cover all the intentions that someone might have when they set about spiking someone, even if it is that they thought it might be a bit of fun. It is certainly not fun for their victims, and it is important that we do not create a loophole where offenders might be able to wriggle off the hook.
Laura Farris
I hope that I can provide my hon. Friend, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) with some reassurance. The offence is drafted to cover all possible outcomes. We looked very carefully at the wording. I want to provide some specific reassurance about “attempt”, which I know my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester is concerned about; it is in his amendment. It is not necessary to put a separate offence of attempting to spike in the Bill, because it is captured as an inchoate offence under section 1(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which covers all forms of attempt of a crime that is on the statute book. I hope that provides some reassurance.
I thank Members on all sides of the House for their engagement in the Bill, their joint commitment to its successful development as legislation that enhances our criminal justice system, and that delivers robust protection, appropriate penalties and a better framework of justice for the public. Our Government amendments achieve that, and I will respond in due course to Members’ views. I commend the amendments and new clauses to the House.
Laura Farris
This has indeed been a wide-ranging debate—we use that phrase too often in this place, but it is true today—and it is a pleasure to bring it to a close. I am grateful to all hon. Members who took part. In the time available to me, I will seek to respond on as many of the non-Government new clauses and amendments as I can, and to answer questions. If I fail, please give me a nudge. I will then write to hon. Members or catch up with them at some point and give them a response.
I will begin with new clause 9, picking up where I left off. I was addressing my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) and her excellent campaign. Let me set out the steps that the Government are taking. She alluded to them in her excellent speech, but I will confirm what they are. We have worked with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for homicide, Kate Meynell, to appoint a named lead for one-punch homicides. That person will carry out an initial scoping exercise to properly establish how many of these cases are occurring, and to understand whether there are barriers to investigation and prosecution for these offences. I take my hon. Friend’s point that we should consider how the offence is communicated to the family, given the particular issues that arose in her case.
We will also build on action already taken, including the three-month Walk Away campaign that was launched in December 2023. That dovetails very neatly with the work of One Punch UK. I know that that is something my hon. Friend will be involved in.
We will establish a lower-culpability manslaughter homicide service practice review, led by Victim Support, which delivers the homicide service. The review will consider cases of manslaughter where there is lower culpability, and I look forward to working with my hon. Friend and getting started on that. We will also conduct individual sentence reviews into particular cases where there is an objection to the end of the sentence, and we will look at the sentencing remarks. She gave the names of a number of campaigners in her speech, and I look forward to picking those up with her.
I will comment briefly on new clause 28, relating to joint enterprise, which was raised by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, and by others. The new clause would caveat and curtail the law of joint enterprise only to those who had made a significant contribution. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside knows that joint enterprise is there so that those who act as the burglary lookout, who provide the weapon in the murder or who drive the getaway vehicle do not escape the consequences of their crimes, which shatter lives.
It is already the case, following the Supreme Court decision in R v. Jogee, that the person must have helped or encouraged the commission of the offence and intended to do so. I have considered a number of examples of cases where there have been convictions on this basis in recent years, such as the boy who sent a WhatsApp to his colleague to encourage her to conduct a fatal attack or the 14-year-old lad who stood on the edge of a woodland as lookout while his friends gang-raped a girl. They are very painful cases. I will simply say this: I think that people who participate in crime, even on the periphery, should not escape liability, and I do not think anyone can advance a credible argument that they should. We on the Government side still think that those people ought to be locked up.
Kim Johnson
I admit that, and I have not said that we should get rid of joint enterprise, but we know that thousands of young people and children have been incarcerated for something they have not done. The law is not being used in the way it should be, as the hon. and learned Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) mentioned in respect of the Jogee case. We took a wrong turn and we have taken another wrong turn. We need to get it right.
Laura Farris
I am going to respectfully differ from the hon. Lady. I am happy to have another conversation with her about it, but I am afraid that even those on the periphery often have their hands all over the crime.
I will return briefly to new clause 59 on bladed articles, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris). The issue of ninja swords was raised by the other shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham). I want to provide reassurance that both straight-bladed ninja swords, which the new clause is directed at, and curved swords are covered. Curved swords were banned by the Government in 2008, and he will know that possessing a sword or any knife—even a kitchen knife—in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence, punishable by up to four years in prison.
The reason why straight swords are more difficult to ban is that some of them are held by military historians and for commemorative purposes. However, I wanted to provide reassurance to those on the shadow Front Bench that the Policing Minister engaged recently with the NPCC lead on knife crime, who reassured him once again that the NPCC was not seeking a ban on the use of straight-bladed swords. In fact, of all the knife crime fatalities in the last year, around 1% were caused that way.
What the NPCC is asking for is a clampdown on the online sale of knives to under-18s, which we are doing under the Online Safety Act; the power to seize knives in a private place if the police think they will be used for a criminal purpose, which is already in the Bill; and a ban on machetes and zombie knives, which we are bringing in in September. I wanted to provide that reassurance.
New clauses 25 and 26 were introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), who I cannot see, but I am sure—
Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)
She has just popped out.
Laura Farris
She has just popped out. She made an outstanding speech, which illuminated and identified yet more of the nefarious ways that child abusers find to conduct some of the most serious offences against children. She knows, as was clear in her constructive speech, that artificial intelligence raises unique problems. I agree without hesitation with the force of what she said, and about the identification of an offence as she has presented it. I recognise that it is our duty as parliamentarians to future-proof our legislation, and I thank her for her detailed work on this issue. I commit to working with her and to trying as best we can to get something ready for Report in the other place.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Elliot Colburn) for the sensitive and thoughtful way in which he approached the Law Commission’s report and the issue of hate crimes, and for his new clause 32 to introduce protected characteristics to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Of course, I have read the Law Commission’s excellent report on this matter, and I can confirm that a response to it was always forthcoming this year. I want to make two slight qualifications that might explain some of the delay.
Many Members will be aware that the Law Commission did not recommend making sex a protected characteristic for hate crimes, and may remember that there was a campaign to make misogyny a hate crime, which the commission rejected. That required careful thought, because not all the protected characteristics have been treated in the same way. Another issue is the implementation of the hate crime legislation in Scotland, which has been both highly contentious and, I am afraid, somewhat chaotic. Of course, we wish to avoid replicating those mistakes. However, I want to provide reassurance by saying that our intention is to deal with this matter—subject to all the normal approvals—in the House of Lords, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington will come and work with me on it.
The other excellent speech that I want to refer to was that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). She alighted on two important issues—cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse—that are not on the priority offences list in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023. That is not because we did not consider them important or sinister offences—she will need no persuading, given everything that we have done on intimate image abuse, that the opposite is true. The fact is that they were not on the statute book, or certainly had not been commenced, when we passed the 2023 Act. I know that the Secretary of State is well aware of that, particularly in relation to both those issues. I know that my right hon. Friend is conducting an urgent review as we speak, and I am sure that, in the weeks ahead, I will be able to update her on where we are on this. I do not want her to think for a moment that we are dragging our feet.
Caroline Nokes
I appreciate that my hon. Friend is seeking to give me an assurance from the Dispatch Box, but it is perhaps not quite as fulsome as I would wish. She says that the priority offences register can be reviewed. It would be very helpful if we had a specific timescale by which the measures could be added. That would give reassurance to all victims that such images will be made illegal in their in own right, and that Ofcom and internet service providers will work together to take them down. We already have the criminal offence, so the perpetrators can go to prison, but the victims want the images—the repeat offence—to be removed from the internet.
Laura Farris
I listened very carefully to what my right hon. Friend said, and I agree with every single word of it. Some of this sits with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, as she knows, so I would need to have a conversation with the relevant Minister, but I feel as strongly as she does on this matter, and I assure her from the Dispatch Box that I will use my best endeavours.
The road traffic amendments, which I will talk about briefly, were beautifully presented during the Committee and again today. I have spoken a few times with the Members who tabled them, who are well aware that those matters sit with the Department for Transport. I understand that they have had engagement with the Department and that an important review of this issue has certainly been contemplated.
Vicky Ford
I apologise to my hon. Friend—I was briefly out of the Chamber, discussing my amendments with the Home Secretary. It is clear that AI technology is moving incredibly quickly in a vile, disgusting way that is putting children at risk of sexual abuse. Could my hon. Friend repeat the commitment she has given: that she will work with me on the two areas that my amendments have highlighted, and will work with me, the IWF and others to ensure that the issues we have pinpointed are addressed as the Bill goes through this House and the Lords?
Laura Farris
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention, and I am sorry that we somehow did not manage to overlap when I made my comments about her. I thought her speech was outstanding, and I agree without hesitation: she is quite right to say that we need to future-proof our legislation. As I said, I think we are the first country—if not, we are one of the first—to put an offence on to the books relating to the creation of deepfakes, which shows that we are alive and very responsive to this issue. I will make the commitments that my right hon. Friend has requested.
Vicky Ford
To be clear, is the Minister giving a cast-iron guarantee that we will address these issues of paedophile manuals and using a chatbot to communicate sexually, including raping a child through a chatbot, by working with the IWF and others to ensure that the laws are clear, and that if necessary, there will be amendments in the Lords?
Laura Farris
Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that commitment.
I was interrupted, but I was briefly paying tribute to the very passionate speeches that have been made about road traffic accidents. These are not small matters—the case of the little girl in the constituency of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones) is such a painful one, and I know that the Transport Secretary and other Ministers have been very affected by it. As the hon. Member knows, this matter is not straightforward for reasons that we have discussed, but I hope progress will be made on it in a way that helps his constituent.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made an excellent speech on the offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling. It is not in dispute that whether a vehicle is a car, an electric scooter or a bicycle, if it is operated in a certain way, it is effectively a dangerous weapon on the road. We are supportive of my right hon. Friend’s amendment, and we will be bringing it back in the Lords; we will be changing it in the Lords, as he knows, but we are accepting it.
I think I have covered all the amendments that have been selected.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I assume that my hon. Friend meant that she will accept the amendment when I move it.
Laura Farris
Yes, I did mean that.
The final amendments that I will speak to are new clauses 91 and 92, relating to a new criminal sanction on water companies.
Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con)
Everyone in this House wants to ensure that our water regulators have at their disposal all the tools they need to get on top of the sewage discharge issue, but as the Minister sums up, could she explain to the House whether Ofwat already has the powers being sought in the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron)? If the same powers were given to the Environment Agency, that would be more likely to lead to confusion and a lack of clarity about which agency is taking the lead on such prosecutions, which might lead to prosecutions falling through the cracks.
Laura Farris
My right hon. Friend is quite correct: that is the basis on which the Government cannot accept the amendments. Of course, everybody agrees that water companies should be punished as robustly as possible, but it is also the case that we have pre-existing offences that apply. Pollution incidents are already the subject of criminal sanctions available to the Environment Agency under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, and there is a serious risk of duplication, not least because—I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) will not mind my saying this—the sanctions he has included in his amendments are just more fines, and we already have a fines regime.
Let me set out very briefly the basis on which, in a principled way, we are saying no to the amendments. As the environment regulator, the Environment Agency can and does prosecute company directors and other senior officers under the relevant regulations. It has a power to fine, and there can be convictions for polluting rivers and coastal waters, where it can be proved that the offence has been committed. Expanding criminal liability would simply create a repetition of the existing powers. It is the Government’s view that the amendments would create a dangerous and unacceptable risk of double jeopardy across the two regulatory regimes that are administered by Ofwat and the Environment Agency.
The amendments would simply duplicate the existing sanctions, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) put it, for not meeting performance commitments. More seriously, they could undermine the robustness of the Environment Agency’s criminal sanction regime. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will understand why we do not want to see duplication in an area where there is already the capacity to prosecute, a criminal law regime and the sanction of fines, which is everything that his amendments seek.
Jess Phillips
I fear the Minister is coming to the end of her remarks, but she has not addressed my new clause 44. Does she have any comment on it?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for reminding me, but I had not forgotten. I listened carefully to her speech and I have read all her amendments, not all of which were selected, but some of which she has raised before. On the general defence, she will know that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the defence of duress in relation to women and the crime—
Laura Farris
I know that the amendment has not been selected, but I want to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance on it, because we on this side of the House continue to think about the issues she has raised. She is aware of the Law Commission’s review of the defence of duress as it applies to murder. I want to provide her with an update and some reassurance that we will take the lessons that come out of that review, and consider it more widely, if appropriate, in alignment with the point that I think she made earlier in this debate.
On new clause 44, this is an important point between us, but the Government are resisting it not because there is any real dispute of principle, but because there is dispute of degree. There is a concern that by amending the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, as so drafted, we could unnecessarily narrow the scope of section 52 as it has been applied in the criminal courts and potentially add an additional element to be proved in relation to section 53 that could make prosecution harder. We disagree not on the principle but about whether it will have the effect she is looking for. I did listen carefully to her speech and the way that she has presented the argument on previous occasions.
Richard Graham
The safeguarding Minister will have been briefed by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire on the exchanges across the House on the key issue of spiking, which will make its first ever appearance in legislation if the Bill is passed. I asked specific questions, which I would be grateful if she returned to. Although my amendments will not be pursued, it would be reassuring for everyone in the country if she said that the spiking clauses now injected will cover attempts to spike as well as proven spiking, and will apply to spiking attempts that may not be considered harmful in substance but are incredibly harmful to the people they humiliate.
Laura Farris
Yes, I can confirm that those inchoate offences—attempt offences—are all captured in the 1981 Act to which I referred in my opening speech.
On whether naming the offence of spiking will improve police record keeping, I say to my hon. Friend that it will absolutely do that. It will remove the discrepancy between what might have been called date rape under the Sexual Offences Act and what would have been recorded previously as a poisoning act under the Offences against the Person Act. For consistency in recording, we are very pleased to make the change.
Richard Graham
I thank the Minister for giving way again. On that specific point, she is effectively saying that the data collected by the police will now be collected under the umbrella of spiking, so we will have much better data and know how widespread the problem really is, which I think everyone will be reassured to hear. May I also thank her, the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary for their fantastic and immediate support in getting this provision into the Bill, which I very much hope will pass through this Parliament before the next general election?
Laura Farris
It is not just the effect of the amendment that will improve police recording; one purpose of the amendment was to improve police recording and it will give, I hope, a much more accurate picture of the extent of the problem.
On the comments that my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) made regarding the creation offence related to deepfake images and intent, I will consider the point carefully. I would like to have further discussions on it.
Dame Maria Miller
I hope the Minister was listening to the Chair of the Justice Committee, who wholeheartedly agreed with the point I was making, namely that it would be entirely consistent with the sex offences law to remove intent from that measure and simply focus on consent. That is what we need to hear, and I hope the Minister will now agree at the Dispatch Box that she will consider that strongly.
Laura Farris
I certainly give my right hon. Friend that reassurance. I look forward to continuing our discussions throughout the passage of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 86 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 62
Sexual Activity with a Corpse
(1) In the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for section 70 substitute—
“70 Sexual activity with a corpse
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person intentionally performs an act of touching (with a part of their body or anything else),
(b) what is touched is a part of the body of a dead person,
(c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and
(d) the touching is sexual.
(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding—
(i) if the touching involved penetration of a part of the body mentioned in subsection (1)(b), 7 years;
(ii) otherwise, 5 years.”
(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in the following provisions for “sexual penetration of” substitute “sexual activity with”—
paragraph 152 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
paragraph 35 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003;
paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015;
paragraph 38(ba) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause replaces the offence under section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with an offence that covers any intentional touching of a corpse that is sexual, and increases the maximum sentence of imprisonment for an offence involving penetration to 7 years and in other cases to 5 years. It is proposed to add the new clause after clause 15.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 87
Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor
“(1) In Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Sentencing Code (seriousness and determining sentence), after section 72 insert—
“72A Manslaughter involving sexual conduct
(1) In considering the seriousness of an offence of manslaughter involving sexual conduct, the court must—
(a) treat the fact that the offence involves sexual conduct as an aggravating factor, and
(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(2) This section has effect in relation to a person who is convicted of an offence on or after the date on which section (Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor) of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 comes into force.”
(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (8) (inserted by section 23) insert—
“(9)In section 72A of the Sentencing Code (manslaughter involving sexual conduct)—
(a) the reference to an offence of manslaughter is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is manslaughter, and
(b) the references to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence.”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause makes the fact that an offence of manslaughter involves sexual conduct an aggravating factor (as well as making the same provision as regards the corresponding service offence.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 88
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
“(1) In Article 7 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1))—
(a) in paragraph (2) omit “Articles 13A, 14 and 15A and”;
(b) in paragraph (3) before sub-paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) Articles 13A and 14 of this Order;”.”
(2) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to convictions occurring on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause results in Article 7(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (requirement that term of sentence is commensurate with seriousness) applying to a sentence under Article 15A of that Order (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 89
Reviews of sentencing: time limits
“(1) Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (reviews of sentencing - supplementary) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case)—
(a) the existing provision becomes sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;
(b) at the end of that sub-paragraph insert “(“the relevant period”); but in England and Wales this is subject to sub-paragraph (2).”;
(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(2) Where—
(a) the Attorney General receives a request to review the sentencing of a person, and
(b) the request is received in the last 14 days of the relevant period,
notice of an application for leave to refer the case in question to the Court of Appeal under section 36 may be given within 14 days from the day on which the request is received.
(3) For the purposes of this Part, a certificate of the Attorney General as to the date on which a request to review the sentencing of a person was received is conclusive evidence of that fact.
(4) Where more than one request to review the sentencing of a person is received, references in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) to a request are to the first request that is received.”
(3) In paragraph 12 (application of Schedule to Northern Ireland), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(da) paragraph 1 has effect as if sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) were omitted;”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that where the Attorney General receives a request to review a person’s sentence in the last 14 days of the current period for giving any notice of application for leave to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General may give such notice within 14 days from the date the request is received.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Cuckooing
“(1) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) exercise control over the dwelling of another person, and
(b) do so for the purpose of enabling the dwelling to be used in connection with the commission (by any person) of one or more offences listed in Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) consented to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b).
(3) Section (Cuckooing: interpretation) contains provisions about the interpretation of this section.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Laura Farris.)
This clause, together with NC95 and NS4, create an offence of exercising control over another person’s dwelling, for the purpose of enabling it to be used in connection with the commission of certain offences.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 95
Cuckooing: interpretation
“(1) This section supplements section (Cuckooing).
(2) A reference to “the dwelling of a person” is to any structure or part of a structure occupied by the person as their home or other living accommodation (whether the occupation is separate or shared with others), together with any yard, garden, grounds, garage or outhouse belonging to it or used with it.
(3) In subsection (2) “structure” includes a tent, caravan, vehicle, vessel or other temporary or movable structure.
(4) The circumstances in which a person “exercises control over the dwelling of another person” (B) include circumstances where the person exercises control (whether temporarily or permanently) over any of the following—
(a) who is able to enter, leave, occupy or otherwise use the dwelling or part of the dwelling;
(b) the delivery of things to, or the collection of things from, the dwelling;
(c) the way in which, or the purposes for which, the dwelling or part of the dwelling is used;
(d) the ability of B to use the dwelling or part of the dwelling for B’s own purposes.
(5) For the purposes of section (Cuckooing)(2), a person is regarded as “consenting” to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in section (Cuckooing)(1)(b) only if—
(a) they are aged 18 or over,
(b) they have capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to give consent to the exercise of control for that purpose,
(c) they are given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to consent,
(d) they give consent freely, and
(e) the consent is not withdrawn.”—(Laura Farris.)
See the statement for NC94.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 103
Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child
“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 10A (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) This section applies where the Crown Court is sentencing—
(a) a person (“the offender”) who is a parent with parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for the murder or, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2), manslaughter of the child’s other parent;
(b) a person (“the offender”) who has parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape) against a child or under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13).”;
(b) in subsection (3), for “when sentencing the offender” substitute “with respect to the child”;
(c) in subsection (5)(b), for “offender is convicted of manslaughter” substitute “Crown Court is sentencing the offender for manslaughter”;
(d) in subsection (7), for “murder or manslaughter” substitute “offence”;
(e) after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) In subsection (1) “sentencing” is to be read in accordance with the Sentencing Code (see section 401 of the Code).”
(3) In section 10B (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “parent” substitute “person”;
(b) in subsection (3)(b), for “parent is acquitted on appeal of the murder or manslaughter” substitute “person is acquitted on appeal of the offence”.
(4) In section 33(3A) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(5) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), in both places, for “parent” substitute “person”.
(5) In section 91—
(a) in subsection (5B) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “parent (“P”) with respect to a child (“C”)” substitute “person with respect to a child”;
(ii) in paragraph (b), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”;
(b) in subsection (5C) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”.
(6) In section 379 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (other behaviour orders etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) See section 10A(1) of the Children Act 1989 for circumstances in which the Crown Court may be required to make a prohibited steps order when dealing with an offender for murder, manslaughter or the rape of a child.””—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause expands the circumstances in which the Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order under section 10A of the Children Act 1989 (inserted by the Victims and Prisoners Bill) to cases where a person with parental responsibility is convicted of the rape of a child.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 104
Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal
“(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which section (Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child) comes into force, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 (duty on Crown Court to make prohibited steps order) during the period, and
(b) publish the report and lay it before Parliament.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations repeal either—
(a) section 10A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, or
(b) sections 10A and 10B of that Act.
(3) But regulations under subsection (2) may only be made during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the report under subsection (1) was laid before Parliament.
(4) The consequential provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (2) by virtue of section 86(1)(a) includes provision amending or repealing any provision made by an Act of Parliament or an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 and confers the power to repeal those sections or their application to cases involving rape of a child (whether because of the report or otherwise).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 44
Sexual exploitation of an adult
(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.
(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and
(b) at end insert—
“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”—(Jess Phillips.)
An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.