Alex Norris
Main Page: Alex Norris (Labour (Co-op) - Nottingham North and Kimberley)Department Debates - View all Alex Norris's debates with the Home Office
(10 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank the Minister for that point of order.
Clause 10
Maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 10, page 7, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019—
(a) In section 39(7), omit paragraph (a) and insert “on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both)”
(b) In section 42(10), omit paragraph (a) and insert “on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”
This amendment would increase the penalty for delivering bladed products or articles to someone under 18 from just a fine.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Bardell, and to resume proceedings. They were very good-natured this morning, and I am sure they will be similarly good-natured this afternoon.
Clause 10, like clause 9, relates to the Government’s consultation on banning or restricting sale or possession of knives. As we did this morning, we support that important venture. Clause 10 increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of importation, manufacture, sale and supply, and possession of a weapon, flick knife or gravity knife. This is a welcome change that we support. We must send a clear message that those who commit such offences, whether to supply offensive weapons or to profit from them, are not beyond the reach of the law.
It is also welcome to see that these offences will be triable either way, and therefore to provide the police more time to investigate alleged offences without the pressure of the current time limit of six months for prosecution. It is right that we give the police the flexibility to ensure that they can gather the necessary evidence to secure convictions and ensure that the full impact of these changes can be felt. Clause 10, taken with clause 9, is very much a step in the right direction.
I want to use this opportunity to press the Minister, through amendment 54, on an area that I think is missing from the Bill: proper age checks for those who are buying bladed products. Again, similar to the debate we had on clause 9, it may be that the Government want to look at this issue in a different way. As it stands, age checks must be carried out on delivery of bladed products to ensure that those receiving such items are of the correct age, but too often we hear of incidents where that has not happened, and the consequences can be fatal. This is an area worth revisiting.
I refer back to the case that I raised this morning: the tragic murder of Ronan Kanda. During the trial of those convicted of Ronan’s murder, it was revealed that the weapons used in the attack had been bought online by the perpetrators. They were just 16 years old, so they should not have had those products. They used another person’s ID and collected from the local post office on the day of the attack. Those are breaches of the law in and of themselves, which led to a devastating breach of the law later that day. The age verification process clearly failed there, and just hours later there were tragic consequences. This is just one incident, but it is part of a wider problem, which, if we do not have really good controls on, could mean knives and blades falling into the hands of children who cannot have, or have not, thought of the danger to themselves and others that comes with such weapons. We know that a failing process creates that vulnerability. It is a weakness in the legal framework.
Amendment 54 therefore seeks to raise the penalty—from just a fine—for those who deliver bladed products or hand over bladed products or articles to someone under 18. It would increase that penalty, which I believe would create more rigour in the age check. That in turn should help prevent knives from falling into the wrong hands; it could address that weakness. This issue is perhaps a good reminder of the challenges that our shopworkers face, although we have tabled new clauses that I suspect might give us the chance to discuss that matter, so I will not do so today.
Being able to verify someone’s age and deny someone a knife they are trying to buy seems like a friction point to me, so it is right that there should be counterpart legal support, but that that really good quality verification must happen, or there is real danger. My attempt to have age checks carried out diligently is one way of doing it, but it is not the only way. Campaigners rightly want this change. If it is not to be this change on the face of the Bill, I hope we might hear from the Minister about how it can be strengthened and how we can ensure really good confidence in that verification process.
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out his amendment and his views, as he did this morning in such a thoughtful and considered way.
I turn first to the substance of the clause. It increases the maximum penalty from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment for the offences of possessing, importing, manufacturing, selling or supplying prohibited offensive weapons when they are sold to those under the age of 18. We take seriously the sale of knives to under-18s, so the increase in the penalty from six months to two years is important.
We do not want people under 18 to be sold knives; we have heard about all kinds of tragic examples of them using knives to commit homicide. On 27 September, a tragic case in my own borough, Croydon, involved a 15-year-old schoolgirl, Elianne Andam, who was brutally murdered with a knife at 8.30 in the morning. The alleged perpetrator was himself only 17 years old. Preventing such knives from getting into the hands of young people is critical. That is the purpose behind the clause.
The clause relates to selling knives to those under 18, but the amendment speaks to a slightly different point: delivering knives to those under 18. Delivering something is obviously different from selling it. If someone is selling it, they are a shop, a retailer, and the person responsible for the transaction. Acting as a delivery agent—whether the Post Office, FedEx, UPS or some such—means delivering a parcel on behalf of someone else, which is a slightly different responsibility. That is why the law as it stands sets out in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 some measures to address the issue. The delivery company must have arrangements in place, together with the seller, to ensure that the items are not delivered into the hands of someone under 18. The penalty for delivery is an unlimited fine.
Some new guidelines have been set out by the Sentencing Council. They came into force on 1 April 2023. Organisations now face fines with a starting point of between £500 and £1 million. That is a starting point, so they can be very substantial fines indeed when applied to a corporate body. Individuals can, of course, be fined as well. It is important to make it clear that corporate bodies can be liable for such fines, as I said a second ago, because they are obviously capable of paying much larger amounts of money than an individual.
Amendment 54 raises an important issue. The case that the hon. Member for Nottingham North referred to is relevant—I completely accept that—but I think that the changes made in the Offensive Weapons Act and the Sentencing Council guidelines that came into effect less than a year ago strike the right balance on the delivery of such items. For the sale of items, however, we are increasing the custodial maximum up to two years.
In addition, the provisions of the Online Safety Act, which will be commenced into full force once the various codes of practice are published by Ofcom, will place duties on things such as online marketplaces, which historically have not been regulated. Online marketplaces have been facilitating, for example, the sale of knives to young people or the sale of illegal knives—the kind of knives that we are banning. Those online marketplaces will fall into the remit of the Online Safety Act, so the online space will get clamped down on a great deal.
On the sale, it could be either an individual who makes a sale and/or the business. A defence of coercion is available generally, however—I am not sure whether it is in common or statute law. If a shop worker were coerced into selling something, or compelled to do so in some way, that might be a defence if they were accused. Coercion certainly would be a defence in that case.
The increase in the maximum sentence up to two years makes a lot of sense. I have referred to the provisions in the Online Safety Act. On delivery—when someone is simply delivering as opposed to selling—the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 broadly strikes the right balance, but I certainly agree with the shadow Minister that anyone involved in the supply or delivery of knives has a very strong moral obligation, in addition to the legal ones I have set out, not to supply under-18s, because we have seen very tragic consequences, such as the cases in Wolverhampton and Croydon, and tragically many others as well.
I am grateful for the Minister’s answer, which has given me a significant degree of comfort. The point we will hold under review is the nature of delivery companies and the nature of their employment. Some of that is third party and some involves self-employment, which has been a matter of debate in this place on many occasions. I fear that that weakens to some degree the chain of accountability. Nevertheless, very significant fines are in place, as the Minister said. I wonder whether a custodial sentence backstop would strengthen the provisions a little further, but given that the current guidelines are relatively new, as the Minister said, we ought to give them time to work.
The point about online marketplaces was important and has been of interest to the shadow Home Secretary. We are very keen that that should happen as soon as possible. We are grateful for that assurance from the Minister. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Encouraging or assisting serious self-harm
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 11, page 8, line 23, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
This amendment and amendments 24 and 43 extend the offence under this clause to Northern Ireland.
The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.
As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.
There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.
I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley for offering a powerful dose of reality about what is happening and the risks. We know that abusers will find every possible gap and try to use them to perpetrate their abuse and these heinous crimes. We must follow them and close those gaps the best we can—or, even better, get ahead.
Clauses 11 and 12 make good the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 2021 “Modernising Communications Offences” report. The Minister described that as important and I echo her comments. The clauses also finish what was started during consideration of the Online Safety Bill. We supported it at that point, and the Bill was well scrutinised, so I will not rehash that debate.
The Government amendments extend the provisions to Northern Ireland. I wonder whether there is a different story about Scotland, because most of the Government amendments expand provisions to Scotland as well as to Northern Ireland. I would be interested in the Minister’s comments on that.
I will finish on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made about institutions. Throughout my time in Parliament, the issue of conversion therapies has been at the forefront. We wish that we were getting on with banning them today—goodness knows how much longer we will have to wait—but we know that very harmful self-harm practices can be part of those therapies. Will the Minister say, in responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, how accountability will fall in cases like that? That is important; if there is a gap for a certain organisation, perhaps we need to return to this. It might be that we will be assisted by the provision in clause 14 that, where a significant senior person in an organisation commits a crime, the organisation can be held accountable. Perhaps that is the way to close the gap—I do not know. I will be interested in the Minister’s view.
My hon. Friends the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Minister have made excellent points. Once we go into this, we start to find that there are areas we need to think out a bit more clearly. We may have to come back to this in due course, potentially in future legislation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley prompted me to think about the headteacher who committed suicide following an Ofsted inspection. The coroner’s court directly attributed that—partly, at the very least—to the institutional impact that that organisation had on her. Does my hon. Friend the shadow Minister agree that these are very important matters that we have to think through? Once we have let this issue out of the bag, so to speak, we have to very carefully consider the implications further down the line in terms of institutional abuse, because that is what it amounts to.
I am really grateful for my hon. Friend’s contribution. I think that is exactly right. We will hear from the Minister in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley where the Government settle on that point. Certainly on the face of the Bill, institutions are left out. I do wonder whether clause 14 would give us the opportunity to reconnect institutions. I suspect that is not the motivation behind that clause, but it may work in that way. Those are pertinent questions that I am sure the Minister is about to address.
A number of very good points have been made and I will try to respond to all of them. On Scotland, the offence relates to devolved matters, but Scottish Ministers have decided that the broader offence should not extend to their jurisdiction. They are sticking with section 184 of the Online Safety Act for now. That is why the amendment does not extend the offence to Scotland.
Let me turn to the point that the shadow Minister and the hon. Members for Birmingham, Yardley and for Bootle all made about the ambit of clause 11(1). If I may recap what I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, I think it is absolutely possible that some forms of domestic abuse will fall under the provisions of clause 11. She gave a good illustration of where that might occur. As I have said already—I hope I satisfied her with my answer—I think there is almost no circumstance where the clause would not be read or even pleaded in tandem with the Domestic Abuse Act. It will be a compound offence, and the charge sheet will have more than a section 11 offence if it occurs in the context of an intimate relationship or a former relationship. Conversion therapy was raised, and I think it is possible that that could fall within the ambit of clause 11 too. It is quite obvious how that could be the case.
Clause 13 is right and is a welcome addition, so I do not have much to say about the two lines that form it. I will keep my powder dry for my amendments to the schedule that the clause introduces, which is where the action is.
New clause 20 is a welcome addition to the debate and would be a welcome addition to the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley says, some people get forgotten in our discussions. The point of having a diverse Parliament that represents the country that we serve is that we try to work that out, but we all have a responsibility to step up and meet the moment. I will be interested to hear what the Minister says about the new clause. When we talk about intimate photos or films, the question is: to whom is it intimate? The new clause—and we—say that it is intimate to the person who has suffered that photo or filming, and who is being threatened with the sharing of those images. It is intimate to them, rather than to the perpetrator. Nothing could be clearer than that in the horrible case that my hon. Friend raises. We support the new clause, and I hope that the Minister does, too.
I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.
We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.
One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.
I have probably gone as far as I can. There are no circumstances in which Georgia Harrison’s case would not be covered by the provision that we are discussing. The other person can be a current partner or an ex, or there can be no relationship. [Interruption.] I know that the hon. Lady is talking about a different category of case. I wonder whether one of the problems in the case that she raises is the adequacy of the police response, rather than whether an offence exists for it. It is difficult, in drafting legislation, to create a category of offender when an image would not be recognised as being intimate by everybody in the United Kingdom. On that basis, with great respect, I am afraid that we would have to reject her new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained intimate photograph or film
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A publishes, hosts or makes viewable a photograph or film of another person (B) which has been obtained (1) unlawfully under sections 66A, 66AA, 66AC or 66B, subject to the provisions of sections 66AB and 66C.
(2) For the purposes of this part, “publishing, hosting or making viewable” includes—
(a) physical or online publication, and
(b) uploading to a user-to-user service,
(c) in relation to owners or administrators of a user-to-user service, allowing public access to a photograph or film uploaded by another person, and
(d) maintaining or providing for the presence or availability of a photograph or film by any other means or in any other place, whether or not such service or access is conditional on the payment of a fee.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make it an offence to make publicly available, either through publishing or online hosting, intimate photographs or videos which have been obtained unlawfully.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 57, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Faking intimate photographs or films using digital technology
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A intentionally creates or designs using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person (B) in an intimate state for the purposes of—
(a) sexual gratification, whether of themselves or of another person;
(b) causing alarm, distress or humiliation to B or any other person; or
(c) committing an offence under sections 66A or 66B of the Sexual Offence Act 2003.
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) A had a reasonable excuse for creating or designing the image or film, or
(b) that B consented to its creation.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make the creation of ‘deepfake’ intimate images an offence.
Clause 13 and schedule 2 are important steps forward in tackling the abhorrent practice of taking intimate photographs without consent. As we have heard, the Bill introduces new offences to criminalise taking or recording intimate photographs or film without consent, and as the Minister said, an offence of installing equipment to enable the taking or recording of intimate photographs or films with the intention of committing an offence. As we have heard, these measures build on the progress made by the Law Commission’s review of legislation on the non-consensual taking and sharing of intimate images; we should thank it for its important work.
As the Government have said today and previously, their intention is that the provisions will put in place a clearer and more comprehensive legal framework that will broaden the scope of intimate image offences, so that all instances of intentionally taking or sharing intimate images without consent are criminalised, regardless of motivation. We very much support that. My amendments are an attempt to improve that and to ensure that the police and courts have the right tools at their disposal to bring the perpetrators of such terrible acts to justice.
I am very sympathetic to the hon. Member’s point about deepfake intimate images, but I wonder why he does not extend the provision further to what might be embarrassing images. We are in a room full of politicians who are about to go into a general election. Deepfake images of prominent politicians at rallies, for example—such as a leading left-wing politician being seen at a far-right rally in a deepfake—would be just as damaging to people in public positions, without necessarily being intimate. Does the hon. Member feel that the amendment could extend to that?
The hon. Member for Wyre Forest makes a very good point. The reason that I stopped short of doing that is that I was trying to stay within the “intimate” framing, but he is absolutely right. As we go into an election year, we will see, both in the States and over here, that being a real challenge to our democracy and to how we conduct campaigning. This provision would certainly not be right for it, but a new clause might be. That is good inspiration from the hon. Member, and I am very grateful for it.
The Committee heard about this during the evidence sessions for the Bill. Dame Vera Baird, the former Victims’ Commissioner, made the point very powerfully. She said that this use of deepfakes
“needs making unlawful, and it needs dealing with.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 62.]
Indeed, she said she could not understand why they had not been banned already, and I agreed with her on that point. Amendment 57 is designed to address that. It will make it an offence for someone to intentionally create or design
“using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person...in an intimate state”,
whether that be for “sexual gratification”,
“causing alarm, distress or humiliation”
or offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
The amendment is an important addition to what we have. Some important progress was made with the Online Safety Act 2023, but I think this finishes the job. I am interested in the Government’s view on whether where they went with the Online Safety Act is where they intend to finish, as opposed to going that little bit further. I will close on that point, but I will be very interested in the response.
I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.
Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.
The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.
The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.
However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.
Now I have to work out something to say. There was certainly a degree of bravery in saying to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that there is a belief that there is a robust regime in place— I thought I could hear steam coming out of her ears. It is a given that we all share a view, but that does not mean that that is necessarily reflected in output at the moment. [Hon. Members: “Keep going!”] It is very important that what is in the Bill reflects what we are trying to solve, and I am concerned that at the moment it does not, but the Minister clearly takes a different view.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.
I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.
I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.
First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point about copyrights, which was absolutely bang on the nose. We should not give any succour to any platform telling us that this is too hard to do. All we need to do is, on Saturday, sit with our phones at about 3.15 pm and wait for someone to score in the premier league. We will be able to see that goal for about 90 seconds—someone will share it because it is watchable in other countries. Within 90 seconds, however, we will no longer be able to watch it and it will say, “This is no longer available due to a breach of copyright”. That is how quick it is—no more than 90 seconds. This absolutely can be done when the stakes are considered high enough.
I am grateful that my hon. Friend was willing to share her personal experience—I did not know whether she would choose to or not. Again, what she has to put up with is extraordinary and would test any human being. I am often amazed by her strength to carry on, but those people do not know the person they are taking on. But that is no excuse and gives no cover. This penalty is being exacted on her for a supposed crime: yes, it is for being a prominent person in politics and yes, it is for holding strong views on the left of politics. But the real crime, at root, is that she is a woman. I do not have a public platform like my hon. Friend’s, I am absolutely delighted to say. If I did, my treatment would be entirely different because I am white and I am a man. This again has to be seen through a gendered lens, and we have a responsibility to protect women in this regard.
I will refer to a couple of points that the Minister made. First, on hosting, we will see about this robust regime. I would be keen to know either today or at another point how soon these provisions are going to be turned on. They need to be turned on and used, otherwise they are of absolutely no use to anyone. We will see. It is reasonable for her to want that regime to have its chance to operate. I accept that and withdraw amendment 56 on that basis. But we will see and we will certainly come back.
Similarly, on deepfaking, I know the Law Commission chose not to go into this space, but its report was not carved on tablets of stone. We are allowed to go further if we think that the case is there. [Interruption.] I do not share—my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley is going to have steam coming out of her ears soon—much of a concern around overcriminalisation in this space. That just does not connect to reality. [Interruption.]
—informative and important. I would be very grateful if she could save them up and use them in her interventions so that we get them on the record, rather than overhearing them from a sedentary position, if she would be so kind.
My hon. Friend is not operating “Weekend at Bernie’s”-style—I promise. That is a dated reference. She talked about people being the same age, so maybe that will be the test of that.
We will welcome the point around children, but it must be seen in the context of what my hon. Friend said. The Minister has said she is satisfied on both points. We say, “We will see whether that holds”. We need those provisions to be enacted and to see the laws on the statute book used properly on deepfakes, otherwise we will have to return to this point. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
A mendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 48 in schedule 2, page 85, line 32, at end insert—
“Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52)
1 In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert—
‘177DA Photographs and films to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences
(1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66AA(1), (2) or (3) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (taking or recording of intimate photograph or film).
(2) The photograph or film to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purpose of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).’”
This amendment amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the amendment to the Sentencing Code made by paragraph 19(2) of Schedule 2 to the Bill.
I hesitate to say that these are technical amendments; given the shadow Minister’s comments this morning, I do not want to unduly provoke him. However, this series of amendments simply extends some of the measures within the Bill to the service police —the military police—of all branches of the armed forces and to the service justice system. The relevant measures are: the power to seize bladed articles, contained in clause 18; the power to enter property to seize stolen goods without a warrant, contained in clause 19; the power to compel an offender to attend their sentencing hearing, contained in clause 22; and making grooming a statutory aggravating factor for sexual offences against a child, contained in clause 23.
Amendment 48 to schedule 2 also ensures that the offences relating to intimate images provided for in the schedule also fully read across to the service justice system. Our armed forces do incredible work, of course, but we must ensure that the law applies to those serving in uniform as much as to members of the public. That is why we are proposing these important—although also technical—amendments.
We are getting to the witching hour on a Thursday, but the Minister tempts me around technical amendments. The point that I was making earlier was merely about whether we were using the same definition. I would also perhaps dispute that a technical amendment could be “important”, because I think that, at that point, it would cease to be technical. However, as I say, I think that that is a distinction of classification rather than substance, and that these are sensible amendments—although I would not say that they were technical. There are other issues that will come up in those later clauses that the Minister mentioned, but we will debate them, I am sure, in due course.
Amendment 48 agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14
Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The identification doctrine is a legal test used to determine whether the actions and mind of a corporate body can be regarded as those of a natural person. The concept has existed in common law since 1971, but, since then, companies and corporations have grown in size and complexity, which has made it more difficult to determine who a controlling mind might be. That means that employees of large corporations with significant control over business areas are none the less not considered sufficiently controlling under that common-law legal test originally dating from 1971. Therefore, the corporations for which they work might not be held criminally liable where we think they should be.
Substantial progress was made to address the issue in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, which put the identification doctrine on a new statutory footing, making provisions to ensure that corporate liability can exist where a senior manager commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority. However, because of the scope of that Act, it only applied to economic offences.
During the passage of that Act through Parliament in the last calendar year, the Government committed to expanding the statutory identification doctrine that I have just described—the expanded version that applies to large companies and the many senior managers in them—to all kinds of crime. Clause 14 makes good on that Government commitment by repealing the relevant sections of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 and replacing them with the identification doctrine applying to all crime and not just economic crime.
I am sure that all of us here want to make sure that when large corporates commit offences, they are held to account and prosecuted. The common law provisions, dating back to 1971, are too restrictive. They do not go wide enough or reflect the fact that modern-day corporations have quite a few senior managers taking decisions. The clause takes what has been done already for economic crime and applies it to all criminal law. On that basis, I hope it commands the immediate and enthusiastic assent of the Committee this afternoon.
I am not sure what “immediate” means in that context—must I instantly print off clause 14 and staple it to my back? Nevertheless, we support the clause. We supported similar provisions in the passage of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and this finishes off the job. It is actually very pertinent to the week we have had in Parliament, because it is safe to say that this week has been dominated by the outrage about the Post Office/Horizon scandal. There is a legitimate expectation among the public and in this place that when such things happen, individuals and entities will be held accountable, so I do not think we will find much to disagree with. Obviously, the provisions will not apply in the case of the Post Office/Horizon scandal, but they will do so in the future.
The Post Office/Horizon scandal is exceptionally important. There will be others that come through and find their moment, for whatever reason—whether they relate to Hillsborough, Primodos, sodium valproate, surgical meshes or anything covered by the Cumberlege review. We need much quicker action. The Post Office/Horizon scandal is ongoing, presumably because the major elements of perpetration have already taken place. They would not be in scope of the Bill, so I would be interested in the Minister’s views. Other than that, I am happy to give the clause our support.
In common with most legislative provisions, these provisions are prospective, rather than retrospective; we legislate retrospectively only rarely. I understand that some Post Office-specific measures may be brought before Parliament. There will be ample opportunity to debate them and to seek to right the very grave injustice that has clearly been committed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)