Maria Miller
Main Page: Maria Miller (Conservative - Basingstoke)Department Debates - View all Maria Miller's debates with the Home Office
(7 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberIntimate image abuse is an important issue to be dealt with. Can the Minister explain why she has not approached it in the same way as her colleagues approached it in the Online Safety Bill? It was a long-fought battle to have the Online Safety Bill recognise consent as pivotal, yet she has chosen not to take that approach at this stage, which I think many will find disappointing.
I want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.
Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.
I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.
We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.
I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.
We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that
“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”
We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.
I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.
On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.
I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.
The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.
On new clause 86, does the hon. Gentleman share the concern of many women outside this place about the almost backward step the Government have taken by not focusing on a base offence relating to people giving consent to their images being used? I thought we had won that argument, but that seems to have evaporated. That was central to the Online Safety Act 2023. Why is he not pressing for that change, as others are outside this place?
The right hon. Member makes a strong point, and it is up to the Government to respond to it. We believe that we should extend all protections to women in all circumstances.
We welcome amendment 160 in the name of the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee, the right hon. Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). The Online Safety Act made significant progress on intimate image abuse, or revenge porn, which is an abhorrent crime, and it is right that, through this Bill, we continue the good work done through that Act. We therefore support amendment 160, which would make offence relating to non-consensual intimate photographs or films priority offences under the Online Safety Act. That will ensure that this heinous practice is treated seriously and dealt with proactively, so that the harm it causes is reduced.
New clause 87 makes it an aggravating factor if an offence of manslaughter involves sexual conduct, and does the same for the corresponding service offence. The Government had support from across the House when they restated in statute, in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, that
“a person is unable to consent to the infliction of harm that results in actual bodily harm or…their own death, for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification”.
It will therefore not surprise the Government to hear that the new clause has the support of Labour Members. We are all aware of the high-profile cases in which women have been killed as a result of allegedly consensual sado-masochistic acts of violence during sex. We share the Government’s ambition to do more on the issue, in recognition of the serious public concerns about these horrific cases.
Amendment 57, in my name, would ensure that when courts ordered a defendant to attend sentencing, they first satisfied themselves that that would not put their staff at risk. Government amendments 149 and 150 lower the threshold for the availability of the new power to order an offender to attend a sentencing hearing, so that it applies where an offence is punishable with imprisonment for 14 years or more.
Clause 28 comes in the wake of a dismaying trend of high-profile criminals opting not to attend their sentencing hearing. Former neonatal nurse Lucy Letby did that in August last year. She refused to attend her sentencing hearing for the murder of seven babies, and the attempted murder of another six entrusted to her care. Having also refused to attend via video link, she remained in the cells below Manchester Crown court as bereaved family members delivered victim personal statements, and the judge passed a whole life order in her absence. In April last year, Thomas Cashman exploited the same procedural rule by refusing to attend his sentencing hearing. He travelled to Manchester Crown court, but declined to leave his cell, claiming that he had been provoked by court officials. He received a sentence of life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 42 years, for the fatal shooting of nine-year-old Olivia Pratt-Korbel in her home. We share the view that, wherever possible, defendants ought to hear the victim impact statements setting out how victims and families have been affected by the crime.
In Committee, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), accepted that
“the judge now has discretion to make such an order, but we have found that it is not evenly or always applied”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 16 January 2024; c. 244.]
as in the case of Lucy Letby, where the judge did not compel her attendance. The Minister said that putting the measure in the Bill would ensure a power in statute for a judge to compel a person to attend their sentencing for any serious offence for which the maximum sentence is a life sentence. The Government’s pages of amendments include those to clause 28, and we are supportive of all efforts to improve the Bill’s workability. I said in Committee that there is nothing in the Government’s explanatory notes about the resources needed to deliver the policy. Likewise, there was little if anything about how the staff who would be at the sharp end of delivering a defendant to court will be protected. The charity Justice raised the concern with me that the policy puts staff at risk; it is questionable whether the discretion to use force in proposed new section 41B(4) of the Sentencing Code is real, or merely apparent, in view of proposed new section 41B(6).
I rise to speak to amendment 160, tabled in my name and supported by members of the Women and Equalities Committee, and other colleagues across the House. I will endeavour to be as brief as I can and I reassure everybody that the amendment is on the order paper for today.
I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for her comments on deepfakes. There has been a problem: someone like Taylor Swift can get a deepfake made using their image taken down very quickly, but for ordinary women, or indeed men, from across the UK, who are not famous and do not have a platform, it is very difficult to get deepfake imagery removed. I welcome the steps the Government are taking on that.
I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), for his comments about the amendment. I was not aware that the Opposition were planning to support it, so I thank him for that. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to pay close attention to what I and other members of my Select Committee will say about the amendment. I recognise that the amendment comes at the eleventh hour, on Report, for which I apologise to my hon. Friend. The reason for that is specifically because of the evidence the Committee heard last week, both in private and in public, from victims of revenge porn.
I welcome the changes that have been brought in under the Online Safety Act to support victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse. However, from the evidence we heard, it is clear that the legislation, in its current form, does not go far enough. It does not give Ofcom the teeth it needs to effectively tackle the fast-spreading, uncontrollable virus that is non-consensual intimate image abuse. It does not force platforms to remove harmful content in its entirety, or require internet service providers to block access to it. In short, it does not make the content itself illegal. The sharing of it is illegal but, even if there is a criminal conviction, the content itself is not regarded as illegal content.
Last week, the Women and Equalities Committee heard from a number of survivors of non-consensual intimate image abuse. In sharing their experiences with us, they have spoken of the catastrophic damage the abuse has had on their lives, confidence and relationships. They told us of their fear of applying for jobs, meeting new people or daring to have any social media presence at all. With all their cases, there was a common theme: even though they had secured a conviction against their perpetrator, their non-consensual content continues to circulate on the internet. Despite relentless work by organisations, such as the Revenge Porn Helpline, to report the content and get it taken down, there is no legal obligation for platforms to remove it.
I thank my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee for making an excellent point, which supports the point I made earlier. If the Bill had a consent-based creation offence in it, that would outlaw the images that the people she is talking about find so difficult to get off the internet. Surely the Bill provides the opportunity to introduce a consent-based creation offence, rather than the current proposal that potentially provides lots of loopholes, particularly to online apps, to use intention to try to evade the long arm of the law.
My right hon. Friend’s point is exactly right that the issue is consent. In my view, when images are non-consensual, they should be regarded in the same way as if the individual had been digitally raped.
There are also many thousands of cases where a conviction has not been achieved or even sought, where the victim just wants the content taken down or blocked. They too are being denied that peace of mind due to gaps in the current legislative framework. The amendment calls for non-consensual intimate photographs or film to be added to the list of “priority offences” in the Online Safety Act, thus making it “priority illegal content”. The amendment would ensure that non-consensual content, regardless of whether or not a conviction had been achieved, would be, by its non-consensual intimate nature, illegal. It would place duties on platforms to remove it, and require internet service providers to block access to non-compliant sites and platforms, including those hosted outside the UK.
That is precisely the way in which child sexual abuse material is handled. Children cannot provide consent and the adults in these images have not provided their consent for them to be taken, shared or both, so why should the content be treated so differently? Indeed, when the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) put it to my hon. Friend the Minister during her recent appearance before my Committee, that adult content should be handled in the same way as child sexual abuse material, via a registry to identify, classify and therefore allow for the removal of non-consensual intimate images, the Minister said it would be “a very good idea”. In order to do that, we need to make the content illegal.
It is important to note that intimate imagery does not just refer to photos and videos that are sexually explicit. Indeed, as we heard from David Wright, chief executive of South West Grid for Learning, which runs the Revenge Porn Helpline, within certain countries and cultures, being photographed with an arm around somebody or being filmed without a hijab can have catastrophic implications for a woman. That is why it is so important that any legislative change uses the term “intimate”, not “sexual”, when referring to non-consensual content.
Last week, we heard evidence from Georgia Harrison, who famously was the victim of revenge porn perpetrated by her then partner, Stephen Bear, who later received a criminal conviction for his actions and was sent to prison. Georgia made the point repeatedly that what happened was like “a house fire”, because when the images went up they spread very quickly. The solution was to get them taken down as quickly as possible so that they would not proliferate. The Committee described it as being like a virus that spreads out of control. The issue is not just about Georgia Harrison or famous women who have a platform they can use to ensure their voice is heard.
We also heard from an anonymous victim of Operation Makedom. In that case, the perpetrator had many thousands of victims. He received a 32-year prison sentence, but that young woman is too afraid to have any sort of social media presence because she is terrified that her image will be seen and put through reverse image searches so she will be identified as a victim. Thousands and thousands of the Operation Makedom images still proliferate online and nothing can be done about that because the content itself is not illegal. It remains online and accessible for people in the UK, despite that 32-year prison sentence. That cannot be right. We will be letting down the victims of that abuse, and all other cases of non-consensual intimate image abuse, if we fail to act.
My final point to the Minister is that we also heard about the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and the fact that intimate image abuse is not on its list as a violent crime. When someone applies to the authority, expecting or hoping for some small nugget of compensation—a message in effect that they are a victim, they can put the blame and shame to one side, and they have been a victim of a criminal act—that is not even there for them. I have no doubt that is because the list of violent criminal offences was dreamt up many moons ago and intimate image abuse simply has not been added to it. It should be added to the list. As I said earlier, for a woman, or indeed a man, who has had their intimate images put online, circulated freely and proliferated all over the place, that is like digital rape. It is a rape that continues day after day, to be brutally honest, with no end in sight.
Those are the reasons why my Committee has tabled this amendment and why we urge Members to support it and give it serious consideration. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to make some comments from the Dispatch Box that might indicate how the MOJ can incorporate such provisions into existing law. If the message coming back to me is that the content is already illegal, I must say that it is not. We must find better ways of getting it down from online platforms.
Before speaking to new clauses 25 and 26 in my name, I want to say that it was a huge honour and privilege to serve in Committee, where we did a huge amount of work on the Bill. We can all see elements of the Bill that affect our constituencies. In Chelmsford, outlawing the scanners that thieves use to intercept car key signals so that they can drive away with our vehicles is welcome. Essex’s police and crime commissioner has campaigned for the new knife crime laws. Along with others, I have campaigned and lobbied the Minister for the amendments she tabled on spiking. I also support the amendments before us today on a huge range of matters, including the ones on dangerous cycling, cuckooing and revenge porn.
This shows the Bill’s incredibly wide scope, which provides an opportunity to update crucial laws in so many areas. Faint-hearted or cowardly Ministers would not have given us a Bill with such broad scope. They would have shied away from it, fearing having so many amendments and so many areas of controversy. They would have feared colleagues tabling amendments to play political games, and they would not have taken the risk. Ministers have done the right thing by introducing a Bill with such broad scope. They recognise that even the best laws sometimes need a fresh pair of eyes, because situations change, and they want our laws in this country to be the best they can possibly be. I thank them for not shying away from the work and for being so brave in allowing these discussions to happen.
My amendments are far from playing political games. They propose extremely important laws to protect children from the vilest of vile crimes—child sexual abuse and, particularly, online child sexual abuse. There is a good reason why, for so many decades, it has been illegal for people to have images of child sexual abuse on their computer, because we know that people who look at this sort of content are more likely to step from the visual world into the real world to abuse children. I would argue that people who abuse children in the virtual world are even more likely to go on to abuse real children.
New clause 25 would update our laws on paedophile manuals to include AI-generated material. New clause 26, which would also update the law for the rapid evolution of AI, would make it illegal to use digital tools such as bots or avatars to simulate sexual communication with a child. This would include acts such as creating a bot or avatar to rape a child in the digital world.
I thank the Internet Watch Foundation for its work on these new clauses, which are supported by the police lead on child sexual abuse and others. Artificial intelligence is developing extraordinarily rapidly. There has been an explosion in AI content, and the consequences of that in the dark world of child sexual abuse are devastating. AI-generated images are becoming so widespread on the internet that when the IWF conducted a snapshot study between September and October of just one dark web forum, it discovered that more than 20,000 AI-generated images of child sexual abuse had been uploaded in just that one month on that one forum. These images are now so realistic that it is incredibly difficult for law enforcement agencies to tell the difference between real images of real children, who need real safeguarding, and those that have been generated using AI.
I turn to new clause 26. Under section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is an offence to communicate sexually with a child. The new clause creates a new offence of simulating sexual activity with a child; this includes using, creating or sharing bots or other tools to simulate sexual communication with children. I am told that in online paedophile communities there is always a desire to utilise technology to bring the fantasies of child sexual abuse closer to a reality. The evolution of AI technology is seen as the ultimate solution—it is grim; it allows child abusers to feel as close to the sensation of interacting with and abusing a real child as possible without actually committing the physical act of abusing a child. However, just as we know that a person who regularly views image of CSA is more likely to sexually abuse a real child, it is absolutely clear that a person who abuses a virtual child, or directs an online companion or bot to do so, is much more likely to go on to abuse a real one.
My right hon. Friend is dealing with an issue that demonstrates the type of issue pervading all of this Bill. Again, I pay tribute to all the people who served on the Bill Committee and dealt with such a difficult range of issues, as they have done a great service to our House.
On behalf of all of us who served on the Committee, I thank my right hon. Friend for that. I should say that the Ministers and shadow Ministers did a huge amount of work on the Bill.
To put it simply, the online act of abuse lowers the bar to physical offending. There is huge concern regarding the development of AI chatbots and the ease, speed, and quality with which text-to-image-based generative AI tools have been developed. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that this is becoming a risk to massive numbers of children. The National Crime Agency estimates that approximately 680,000 to 830,000 people in the UK—between 1.3% and 1.6% of the adult population—pose some form of sexual threat to children.
Android and iOS app stores have a plentiful supply of AI companion apps. They enable the user to create an imaginary online friend, to choose what that friend looks like and to direct what they do. The three largest apps have already received well over 1 million downloads each. Within minutes of downloading one of these popular apps, law enforcement operatives were able to have an interactive communication with an AI chatbot discussing the abduction, sexual abuse, torture and murder of an eight-year-old girl.
Furthermore, through monitoring offender discussions online, we know that technically capable users are actively building AI chatbot companions specifically for the purpose of having realistic, paedophilic role-plays involving AI child avatars. Ian Critchley, the national police lead on child protection, has warned that the metaverse creates a
“gateway for predators to commit horrific crimes against children”.
There are many stories of child avatars having been subjected to the most hideous of rapes. In evidence to the Education Committee, of which I am a member, the Children’s Commissioner described a child who had
“virtually experienced being raped and sexually abused.”
She said that we must not think that that type of rape is not traumatic, just because it happens in an online world. It is traumatic. It is abuse, and it can be part of grooming. She warned us legislators to
“not underestimate the safeguarding issues”.
The speech from the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) has served to demonstrate the extraordinary breadth of the Bill. I have sat heard this afternoon about the incredible work done by my colleagues, on both sides of the House, on an immense range of issues, and I think that that must underline to our constituents how hard many Members work on very, very difficult matters. The right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) has called on us to be persistent. She will think that I am a very persistent Member of Parliament when it comes to the issue of intimate image abuse, which I have been talking about for nigh on a decade. She is right: we have to be persistent, because it pays off.
I want to touch briefly on some of the amendments and new clauses that have been discussed today before I turn to new clause 86. Let me first reiterate my support for new clause 2—tabled by the Mother of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—which deals with the question of parental responsibility after rape. It is an important new clause, and I hope that Ministers have listened closely to what has been said. Let me also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Burton (Kate Kniveton), who has spoken out movingly on this issue.
The amendments on spiking tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) are a testament to persistence, and he deserves all our gratitude not only for the work he has done in getting his proposals to this stage, but for keeping us all so well informed about the work that he is still doing. Amendment 160, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes)—the Chair of the Select Committee—has picked up some of the issues that I shall be talking about, namely the way in which we treat non-consensual sexual images. The Government need to do more work on this: “must try harder” is my suggestion.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), whose name is attached to new clause 62, made an extremely moving speech about his proposal for legislation to deal with that most appalling of crimes, the sexual abuse of people who have died and are in the safety of a mortuary. New clauses 25 and 26 were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), and I hope that Ministers listened carefully to the compelling case that she made about the rapidity with which the online world is moving and the need for us to keep the law up to date.
Let me now turn to new clause 86. I am pleased that the Government tabled it, although they knew that this matter needed to be addressed following the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023. The new clause shows that they continue to understand the importance of classifying the making of intimate images without the permission of the person in the picture as a sex crime. Yet again, however, we are trying to tackle it as though it were more about why the pictures were taken, rather than about the fact that they were taken in the first place. That is the wrong approach, and it is as wrong now as it was when we debated this issue in the Online Safety Bill. I thought that we had dealt with that argument, but clearly we have not.
It was out of scope of the Online Safety Bill to make the making and taking of an intimate image without consent a crime, so I really welcome the fact that the issue is being dealt with now. The Online Safety Bill tackled the distribution of those images, but we argued successfully during the passage of that Bill that when it comes to sexual offences—new clause 86 creates a sexual offence—our law needs, first and foremost, to be about consent. It must be about whether there is consent or not, not about whether the perpetrator intended to cause distress or alarm. Despite the response to my intervention earlier, it remains unclear to me why new clause 86 is not constructed in the same way as the provisions in the Online Safety Act 2023, given that it will work hand in hand with them.
So, what are we talking about? We are talking particularly about whether it should be a crime for somebody to take or make an intimate sexual image of another person without their consent. At the moment, the Bill says that it will be a crime only if the Crown Prosecution Service can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person taking or making the picture had the intention to cause the victim alarm, distress or humiliation. Mention was made earlier of online rape, and that is the terminology that many of the victims use. The victims I have spoken to are still a victim of that crime, whether or not the perpetrator had the intention to cause them alarm, distress or humiliation.
Even more concerning is the fact that the Government already know from evidence that many of the people who create these images do so not to do harm, cause distress or alarm their victims; they do it for money. Oddly, they sometimes do it for fun. They do it for their mates. They do it because they have a collection of similar pictures. All those people who have had nude images created or taken are no longer victims if a good lawyer can prove that the person taking the image had no intention to cause alarm, distress or humiliation. That has to be wrong, and I call on the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is sitting on the Front Bench, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), to think again. They have not got this right.
The harm lies in creating the sexually explicit image without consent. The Bill sets out that that is not the way the law will treat this, and that someone will have to prove an intention. There needs to be a motive of the perpetrator proving sexual gratification. As all the lawyers in this room know—I am not one of them—that is incredibly difficult. A consent-based approach would focus on the core wrong of non-consensual sexual conduct. Motives are not required in most sexual offences.
Mention was made earlier about the way in which some organisations have removed nudification apps from their websites. I am concerned that they might work out that if they stated that their motive was just to make money, they would not be breaking the law if they allowed those nudification apps to continue to be available. I am also concerned as to whether the Government have talked to Ofcom, the regulator, about how it will be able to limit the appearance of these images, given the way in which the law is currently framed.
So, there are two questions from me. Will the Minister urgently reconsider new clause 86 and bring it into line with the Online Safety Act? I have a simple idea for her, which is to amend the amendment so that it is consistent with the Online Safety Act in having a base offence that includes production of a sexual image, which can include the taking or creating of an image. Or, the Government could amend their proposed creation offence to make it consent-based, not intention-based. The former I think, is straightforward.
Secondly, I welcome the fact that some companies are taking pre-emptive action to remove their nudification apps, which I called for in the 2021 International Women’s Day debate, but they will quickly see that this incredible loophole means that, so long as they have the right legal defence, such nudification apps are entirely within the law. Will the Minister tell the House how the Government are going to make these nudification apps unlawful, and get rid of them once and for all, as people across the nation want?
I thank Professor Clare McGlynn again for assisting me in interpreting the intention of Government amendment 86. It was published on Thursday, so I apologise to the House for not being able to give a more detailed analysis—I have had it for only the past three days. I hope that, at some stage, Ministers will be in a position to explain their thinking and, I hope, change their mind. I know the safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury has put in writing that she wants to send a “crystal clear message” that making intimate image material is “immoral” and “a crime.” She needs to try harder to make sure the Bill does just that.
I rise to make a short speech in support of new clause 9, in the name of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison). I thank her for her kind words about my friends and constituents Maxine and Tony.
Maxine Thompson-Curl lost her son, Kristian David Thompson, in 2011. He was just 19 years old, and his life was taken by one punch. One punch can and does kill. To lose a loved one at a young age in such a senseless way, when they were simply on a night out, is a pain that I cannot imagine.
Since Kristian’s passing, Maxine has devoted her life to raising awareness, supporting others and campaigning for stronger sentencing. She has done this via her charity One Punch UK, which she runs with her husband Anthony Curl. Using her pain, love and grief, Maxine has always been relentless in educating people to stop, think and walk away instead of using their fists.
Although it is generally accepted that there is a concerning rise in one-punch attacks across the UK, there are no official figures on the lives lost and devastated by a single punch. What we do know is that, almost every time a precious life is taken in this way, it is reported that the perpetrator was intoxicated, and their sentence for taking the life of another is almost always extremely lenient. The average sentence is four years, and some walk away after just four months in prison. That is four months for taking somebody else’s life. Justice is an important cornerstone of our legal system. Although nothing at all can bring back a loved one, for many people an important part of being able to grieve is knowing that there are consequences for the person who took their loved one away from them.
New clause 9 would put an end to lenient sentences and would hopefully act as a deterrent, so that people think and walk away before using their fists. It would also mean that we have reliable data on the prevalence of one-punch attacks. In the first four years after similar legislation was passed in Australia, the number of one-punch deaths halved. One Australian attorney general has reported a massive reduction in violence since the legislation was introduced.
More than five years ago, the then Minister said that he was happy to look at my proposal in relation to one-punch sentencing, and I am pleased that the Government have looked at this new clause and agreed with the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland, but my constituents remain of the view that stronger sentencing is needed. It is indeed what they have campaigned on for many years. With that in mind, I carefully considered the Minister’s response to the new clause in Committee, and I am not fully convinced of her argument. She stated that one-punch attacks are already covered under manslaughter, but there is no mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter and therefore no minimum sentence for one-punch attacks. That is why we ask for that in the new clause. She stated that the Government wished to avoid “anomalies in the law”, and gave the example of someone being killed by a punch to their abdomen. She will know, as will other hon. Members, that a single punch to the head is likely to be more catastrophic than a single punch to the abdomen, as it can cause fatal damage to the brain; it can stop breathing, starving the brain of oxygen, and cause the victim to collapse and strike their head on a hard surface.
It is not just the effect of the amendment that will improve police recording; one purpose of the amendment was to improve police recording and it will give, I hope, a much more accurate picture of the extent of the problem.
On the comments that my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) made regarding the creation offence related to deepfake images and intent, I will consider the point carefully. I would like to have further discussions on it.
I hope the Minister was listening to the Chair of the Justice Committee, who wholeheartedly agreed with the point I was making, namely that it would be entirely consistent with the sex offences law to remove intent from that measure and simply focus on consent. That is what we need to hear, and I hope the Minister will now agree at the Dispatch Box that she will consider that strongly.
I certainly give my right hon. Friend that reassurance. I look forward to continuing our discussions throughout the passage of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 86 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 62
Sexual Activity with a Corpse
(1) In the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for section 70 substitute—
“70 Sexual activity with a corpse
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person intentionally performs an act of touching (with a part of their body or anything else),
(b) what is touched is a part of the body of a dead person,
(c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and
(d) the touching is sexual.
(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding—
(i) if the touching involved penetration of a part of the body mentioned in subsection (1)(b), 7 years;
(ii) otherwise, 5 years.”
(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in the following provisions for “sexual penetration of” substitute “sexual activity with”—
paragraph 152 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
paragraph 35 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003;
paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015;
paragraph 38(ba) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause replaces the offence under section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with an offence that covers any intentional touching of a corpse that is sexual, and increases the maximum sentence of imprisonment for an offence involving penetration to 7 years and in other cases to 5 years. It is proposed to add the new clause after clause 15.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 87
Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor
“(1) In Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Sentencing Code (seriousness and determining sentence), after section 72 insert—
“72A Manslaughter involving sexual conduct
(1) In considering the seriousness of an offence of manslaughter involving sexual conduct, the court must—
(a) treat the fact that the offence involves sexual conduct as an aggravating factor, and
(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(2) This section has effect in relation to a person who is convicted of an offence on or after the date on which section (Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor) of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 comes into force.”
(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (8) (inserted by section 23) insert—
“(9)In section 72A of the Sentencing Code (manslaughter involving sexual conduct)—
(a) the reference to an offence of manslaughter is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is manslaughter, and
(b) the references to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence.”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause makes the fact that an offence of manslaughter involves sexual conduct an aggravating factor (as well as making the same provision as regards the corresponding service offence.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 88
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
“(1) In Article 7 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1))—
(a) in paragraph (2) omit “Articles 13A, 14 and 15A and”;
(b) in paragraph (3) before sub-paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) Articles 13A and 14 of this Order;”.”
(2) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to convictions occurring on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause results in Article 7(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (requirement that term of sentence is commensurate with seriousness) applying to a sentence under Article 15A of that Order (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 89
Reviews of sentencing: time limits
“(1) Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (reviews of sentencing - supplementary) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case)—
(a) the existing provision becomes sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;
(b) at the end of that sub-paragraph insert “(“the relevant period”); but in England and Wales this is subject to sub-paragraph (2).”;
(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(2) Where—
(a) the Attorney General receives a request to review the sentencing of a person, and
(b) the request is received in the last 14 days of the relevant period,
notice of an application for leave to refer the case in question to the Court of Appeal under section 36 may be given within 14 days from the day on which the request is received.
(3) For the purposes of this Part, a certificate of the Attorney General as to the date on which a request to review the sentencing of a person was received is conclusive evidence of that fact.
(4) Where more than one request to review the sentencing of a person is received, references in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) to a request are to the first request that is received.”
(3) In paragraph 12 (application of Schedule to Northern Ireland), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(da) paragraph 1 has effect as if sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) were omitted;”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that where the Attorney General receives a request to review a person’s sentence in the last 14 days of the current period for giving any notice of application for leave to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General may give such notice within 14 days from the date the request is received.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Cuckooing
“(1) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) exercise control over the dwelling of another person, and
(b) do so for the purpose of enabling the dwelling to be used in connection with the commission (by any person) of one or more offences listed in Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) consented to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b).
(3) Section (Cuckooing: interpretation) contains provisions about the interpretation of this section.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Laura Farris.)
This clause, together with NC95 and NS4, create an offence of exercising control over another person’s dwelling, for the purpose of enabling it to be used in connection with the commission of certain offences.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 95
Cuckooing: interpretation
“(1) This section supplements section (Cuckooing).
(2) A reference to “the dwelling of a person” is to any structure or part of a structure occupied by the person as their home or other living accommodation (whether the occupation is separate or shared with others), together with any yard, garden, grounds, garage or outhouse belonging to it or used with it.
(3) In subsection (2) “structure” includes a tent, caravan, vehicle, vessel or other temporary or movable structure.
(4) The circumstances in which a person “exercises control over the dwelling of another person” (B) include circumstances where the person exercises control (whether temporarily or permanently) over any of the following—
(a) who is able to enter, leave, occupy or otherwise use the dwelling or part of the dwelling;
(b) the delivery of things to, or the collection of things from, the dwelling;
(c) the way in which, or the purposes for which, the dwelling or part of the dwelling is used;
(d) the ability of B to use the dwelling or part of the dwelling for B’s own purposes.
(5) For the purposes of section (Cuckooing)(2), a person is regarded as “consenting” to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in section (Cuckooing)(1)(b) only if—
(a) they are aged 18 or over,
(b) they have capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to give consent to the exercise of control for that purpose,
(c) they are given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to consent,
(d) they give consent freely, and
(e) the consent is not withdrawn.”—(Laura Farris.)
See the statement for NC94.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 103
Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child
“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 10A (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) This section applies where the Crown Court is sentencing—
(a) a person (“the offender”) who is a parent with parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for the murder or, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2), manslaughter of the child’s other parent;
(b) a person (“the offender”) who has parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape) against a child or under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13).”;
(b) in subsection (3), for “when sentencing the offender” substitute “with respect to the child”;
(c) in subsection (5)(b), for “offender is convicted of manslaughter” substitute “Crown Court is sentencing the offender for manslaughter”;
(d) in subsection (7), for “murder or manslaughter” substitute “offence”;
(e) after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) In subsection (1) “sentencing” is to be read in accordance with the Sentencing Code (see section 401 of the Code).”
(3) In section 10B (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “parent” substitute “person”;
(b) in subsection (3)(b), for “parent is acquitted on appeal of the murder or manslaughter” substitute “person is acquitted on appeal of the offence”.
(4) In section 33(3A) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(5) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), in both places, for “parent” substitute “person”.
(5) In section 91—
(a) in subsection (5B) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “parent (“P”) with respect to a child (“C”)” substitute “person with respect to a child”;
(ii) in paragraph (b), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”;
(b) in subsection (5C) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”.
(6) In section 379 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (other behaviour orders etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) See section 10A(1) of the Children Act 1989 for circumstances in which the Crown Court may be required to make a prohibited steps order when dealing with an offender for murder, manslaughter or the rape of a child.””—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause expands the circumstances in which the Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order under section 10A of the Children Act 1989 (inserted by the Victims and Prisoners Bill) to cases where a person with parental responsibility is convicted of the rape of a child.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 104
Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal
“(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which section (Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child) comes into force, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 (duty on Crown Court to make prohibited steps order) during the period, and
(b) publish the report and lay it before Parliament.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations repeal either—
(a) section 10A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, or
(b) sections 10A and 10B of that Act.
(3) But regulations under subsection (2) may only be made during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the report under subsection (1) was laid before Parliament.
(4) The consequential provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (2) by virtue of section 86(1)(a) includes provision amending or repealing any provision made by an Act of Parliament or an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 and confers the power to repeal those sections or their application to cases involving rape of a child (whether because of the report or otherwise).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 44
Sexual exploitation of an adult
(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.
(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and
(b) at end insert—
“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”—(Jess Phillips.)
An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.