Criminal Justice Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Report stage
Wednesday 15th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 62—Sexual activity with a corpse.

Government new clause 87—Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor.

Government new clause 88—Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland.

Government new clause 89—Reviews of sentencing: time limits.

Government new clause 94—Cuckooing.

Government new clause 95—Cuckooing: interpretation.

Government new clause 103—Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child.

Government new clause 104—Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal.

New clause 2—Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children—

‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—

“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and

(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.”’

New clause 7—Occupation or control of another person’s residence for criminal purposes “Cuckooing”—

“(1) A person commits an offence if the person occupies or exercises control over the home of another person (V) in connection with the commission of a criminal offence or offences using any of the following methods—

(a) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour;

(b) abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment;

(c) fraud or other deception;

(d) the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability;

(e) the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has control over V.

(2) A person also commits an offence under this section if the person arranges or facilitates the activity set out in subsection (1).

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years,

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”

This new clause makes it an offence to exercise control over another person’s residence for the purpose of criminal activity by means of coercion, threats or abuse of a position of vulnerability.

New clause 8—Offence of enabling or profiting from prostitution—

“(1) A person or body corporate (C) commits an offence if they—

(a) facilitate, whether online or offline, or

(b) gain financially from

a person (A) engaging in sexual activity with another person (B) in exchange for payment or other benefit, or the promise of payment or other benefit, and the conditions in subsection (2) are met.

(2) The conditions are—

(a) that C knows or ought to know that A is engaging in, or intends to engage in, sexual activity for payment or other benefit; and

(b) that C is not a dependent child of A.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

(a) “Sexual activity”—

(i) means any acts which a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider to be sexual,

(ii) requires A and B to be in each other’s presence,

(b) “Facilitates” includes, but is not limited to, causing or allowing to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of sexual activity involving A.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”

This new clause would make it an offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person.

New clause 9—One-punch manslaughter—

“(1) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where they cause the death of another person (B) as a result of a single punch in the circumstances described in subsection (2).

(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—

(a) P administered a single punch to the head or neck of B;

(b) there was significant risk that the punch would cause serious physical harm to B;

(c) P was or ought to have been aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (b);

(d) P did not administer the punch referred to in paragraph (a) in self-defence; and

(e) B’s death was caused by—

(i) the impact of the punch, or

(ii) further impact or injury resulting from the single punch.

(3) In this section “serious physical harm” means harm that amounts to death or serious personal injury for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a minimum of seven years.”

This new clause is intended to create a specific offence of “One Punch Manslaughter”, with a minimum sentence of seven years.

New clause 12—Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services—

“(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—

(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),

(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,

(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and

(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.

(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—

(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or

(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B's usual day-to-day activities.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.

(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—

(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and

(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.

(5) A defence under subsection (4) requires A to have shown—

(a) sufficient evidence of the facts, and

(b) that the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”

New clause 16—Amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1988—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In each of the sections listed below, after “a road or other public place” insert “, or a private place adjacent to a road,”—

section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);

section 1A (causing serious injury by dangerous driving);

section 2 (dangerous driving);

section 2B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 2C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 3 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving).”

This new clause would extend the Road Traffic Act 1988 so that a range of driving offences can be committed in private places adjacent to roads as well as on public roads or in public places.

New clause 18—Definition of unauthorised access to computer programs or data—

“In section 17 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, at the end of subsection (5) insert—

“(c) he does not reasonably believe that the person entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data would have consented to that access if he had known about the access and the circumstances of it, including the reasons for seeking it;

(d) he is not empowered by an enactment, by a rule of law, or by the order of a court or tribunal to access of the kind in question to the program or data.””

New clause 19—Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990—

“(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—

(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or

(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”

(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—

(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or

(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””

New clause 24—Definition of exceptional hardship—

“In section 35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) In subsection (4)(b), the hardship that would be caused by an offender’s disqualification should be regarded as exceptional only if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would be experienced by a large majority of other drivers if disqualification were imposed on them.

(4B) In assessing whether the hardship arising from the offender’s disqualification would be exceptional a court may take account of—

(a) any circumstances relating to the offender’s economic circumstances or location of residence which would make it exceptionally hard for them to access essential services and facilities;

(b) any hardship that would be incurred by the offender’s family or others who are disabled or who depend on the offender to provide care for them; and

(c) any other circumstances which it believes would make the hardship exceptional.””

New clause 25—Offence of possession of guidance on creating child sexual abuse content—

“(1) Section 69 (Possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), omit from “to” to the end of the subsection and insert—

“possess, create, share or distribute any item that—

(a) contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually; or

(b) contains advice or guidance about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children.”

(3) In subsection (2)(b)(ii), after “sexually” insert—

“or about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children”

(4) In subsection (8)—

(a) after “sexually”” insert “(or “the sexual abuse of children”),

(b) omit “(but not pseudo-photographs)” and insert “, including pseudo-photographs”,

(c) after second “or Northern Ireland” insert—

““creation of content” includes using any tool to create visual or audio content;”,

(d) at end insert—

““tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.””

This new clause would expand the existing offence of possessing guides about abusing children sexually to include guides on creating child sexual abuse content, including through the use of artificial intelligence or machine learning.

New clause 26—Offence of simulating sexual communication with a child—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they—

(a) use;

(b) design;

(c) distribute; or

(d) provide access to

a tool to simulate sexual communication with a person under 16.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

(a) a communication is sexual if—

(i) any part of it relates to sexual activity, or

(ii) a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person's purpose, consider any part of the communication to be sexual,

(b) “tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to the same penalties as apply to an offence committed under section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

This new clause would create an offence of using, creating or sharing online or digital tools which simulate sexual communication with a child.

New clause 28—Complicity in joint enterprise cases—

“In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert “, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.”

This new clause would clarify the definition of “joint enterprise” (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.

New clause 29—Human trafficking—

“(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), for “arranges or facilitates the travel of” substitute “recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, coercion, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits”.

(3) In subsection (2), for “travel” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) or to V being exploited”.

(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).

(5) In paragraph (6)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.

(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).

(7) In paragraph (7)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.

(8) In paragraph (7)(b), for the first “the” substitute “any”.”

This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.

New clause 32—Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability—

“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute “Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales”.

(3) In section 28—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity””;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from “based on” to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—

—

(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;

(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;

(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;

(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or

(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or”;

(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from “hostility towards” to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—

—

(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;

(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;

(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;

(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or

(v) persons who are transgender.”;

(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of “membership” leave out “racial or religious” and insert “relevant”.

(4) In section 29—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(5) In section 30—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(6) In section 31—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(7) In section 32—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.”

This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

New clause 33—Taking of dog without lawful authority—

“(1) A person commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the person takes or detains a dog in England—

(a) so as to remove it from the lawful control of any person, or

(b) so as to keep it from the lawful control of a person who is entitled to have lawful control of it.

(2) No offence is committed if the person taking or detaining the dog is connected with any of the following—

(a) any person entitled to have lawful control of it;

(b) where it is removed from the lawful control of a person, that person.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum summary term for either-way offences or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).

(4) In this section—

“connected person” : a person is connected with another person if—

(a) they are married to each other,

(b) they are civil partners of each other,

(c) one is the parent of the other, or

(d) they are siblings (whether of the full blood or the half blood);

“detaining” : references to a person detaining a dog include the person—

(a) inducing it to remain with the person or anyone else, or

(b) causing it to be detained;

“maximum summary term for either-way offences” , with reference to imprisonment for an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 comes into force, 6 months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 12 months;

“taking” : references to a person taking a dog include the person—

(a) causing or inducing it to accompany the person or anyone else, or

(b) causing it to be taken.”

This new clause makes provision for the creation of an offence of taking a dog from the lawful control of another person.

New clause 35—Offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision—

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable—

(a) if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a fatal injury—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years;

(b if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a serious non-fatal injury—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;

(c) in any other case—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.””

This new clause would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision to create more serious penalties for failing to stop after collisions which result in death or serious injury.

New clause 36—Time to report road collision—

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, omit subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) In complying with a duty under this section to report an accident or to produce such a certificate of insurance or other evidence, as is mentioned in section 165(2)(a) of this Act, it is an offence for a driver—

(a) not to do so at a police station or to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable, and

(b) not to do so within two hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to reporting an accident, or within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to the production of a certificate of insurance or other evidence.””

This new clause would amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to reduce the time within which a driver must report a road collision in which they were involved from twenty-four hours to two hours, and make it an offence not to report an accident.

New clause 38—Senior manager liability for neglect in relation to offences committed by bodies corporate and partnerships—

“(1) Where an organisation commits an offence under section 16, a person (“S”) also commits an offence if—

(a) S was a senior manager of the same body corporate or partnership at the time the offence was committed under section 16; and

(b) S failed to prevent the offence from being committed, or was negligent such that an offence was committed.

(2) It is a defence for S to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed.

(3) In this section, “body corporate”, “partnership” and “senior manager” have the meanings given in section 16.

(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of 12 months;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and an unlimited fine.”

New clause 43—Offence of creating or sharing misleading content—

“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—

(a) create, using any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning; or

(b) share, distribute, or otherwise provide access to,

visual or audio content which shows or represents, or appears to show or represent, another person (“R”), where conditions A, B and C are met.

(2) Condition A is that the words, actions, beliefs or behaviours shown or represented in the content have been artificially created or manipulated.

(3) Condition B is that the content has been created or shared for the purposes of—

(a) misleading a person viewing or hearing the content as to R’s real words, actions, beliefs or behaviours;

(b) causing offence, alarm, distress or humiliation to—

(i) R; or

(ii) any other person; or

(c) influencing the voting intention or activity of another person.

(4) Condition C is that R has not consented to the creation or sharing of the content.

(5) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”

New clause 44—Sexual exploitation of an adult—

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.

(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and

(b) at end insert—

“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”

An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.

New clause 45—Loitering and soliciting: repeal—

“Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.”

An amendment that repeals soliciting and loitering as an offence.

New clause 46—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions: Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution—

‘(1) Section 92 of the Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence in circumstances where—

(a) the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, or

(b) the offence was committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959,

may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.”

(3) In subsection (2) after first “caution” insert “received in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)(a)”.’

A new clause that allows a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions received under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959.

New clause 47—Grooming as an aggravating factor—

“(1) After section 72 of the Sentencing Code (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—

“72A Grooming

(1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence which is aggravated by grooming.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by grooming as an aggravating factor, and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.””

Grooming to be seen as an aggravating factor in certain cases where the victim is an adult.

New clause 48—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—

“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—

“(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.””

An amendment to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

New clause 49—Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases—

“(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.

(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.

(4) After subsection (8F) insert—

“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—

(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,

(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and

(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).

(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”

(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New clause 50—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—

“(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,

(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and

(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.

(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.

(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—

(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or

(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.

(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and

(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.

(5) For the purposes of this section “relevant characteristics” means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.

(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.

(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].”

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New clause 55—Offence of child criminal exploitation—

“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—

(a) recruit or attempt to recruit, or

(b) ask or compel another person to recruit or attempt to recruit,

a child (“C”) for the purpose of C’s involvement in criminal activity.

(2) An offence is committed under subsection (1) regardless of whether C—

(a) engages in criminal activity, or

(b) is prosecuted for or found guilty of a criminal offence.

(3) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that P did not know that C was a child.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) if the offence for which C was, or was attempted to be, recruited was murder, to imprisonment for life,

(b) if C was, or was attempted to be, recruited for any other offence, to the penalty to which a person guilty of that offence would be liable.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

“child” means a person under the age of 18;

“criminal activity” means any activity or conduct which constitutes a criminal offence;

to

“recruit” includes by direction, inducement, incitement, coercion or compulsion.”

New clause 57—Offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

“27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.

27C Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.”

(3) In section 28 (dangerous cycling), after subsection (3) insert—

“(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist includes that their cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations made under section 81 of this Act.”

(4) After section 32 (electrically assisted pedal cycles), insert—

“32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32

(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32 of this Act, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—

(a) a pedal cycle,

(b) an electrically assisted pedal cycle, and

(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—

(i) an electric scooter,

(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and

(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.”

(5) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(6) In the table in Part 1 of Schedule 2, after the row beginning “RTA section 27” insert in columns 1 to 4—

[Laura Farris]

I have heard what was said by the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) and made a careful note. The fact that this debate is split over two days may have contributed to that, but I have listened carefully and will take that point away.

It is an honour, again, to open this debate and bring this important Bill back to the House on Report. Its focus is on countering developing criminal threats, intercepting serious organised crime, and protecting vulnerable victims. I thank Members across the House for their constructive engagement on the Bill, as well as the police, leading academics, practising lawyers and campaign groups, some of whom appeared before us in Committee. They have all contributed to the Bill’s development. There are many topics to discuss today, and I look forward to hearing the views of Members.

The Government are bringing forward a number of amendments that we believe are appropriate and necessary to punish offenders and enhance the protection that victims deserve. Briefly, I will explain the key Government amendments, starting with those about which I anticipate there will be no dispute: namely, the extension to Northern Ireland of our new spiking measures in clause 13, and the statutory aggravating factor for grooming activity in relation to child sexual offences in clause 30. New clause 88 provides for equivalence in sentencing for terrorist offenders between England and Wales and Northern Ireland, as a consequence of the irregularity that was identified in the case of R v. Perry.

Government new clause 89 extends the time limit for the unduly lenient sentence scheme, and will extend the overall time limit to six weeks. A request must still be submitted by any prospective appellant to the Attorney General’s Office within the usual 28 days, but the Attorney General’s Office will have an additional 14 days to consider whether the case is appropriate for submission to the Court of Appeal. In recent years the number of cases referred to the Law Officers has increased, in part due to a better awareness of the scheme. We consider it to be in the interests of justice that each application is given due care and attention, even when it is submitted close to the 28-day deadline, and we believe that the new clause is a proportionate way of achieving that.

On attendance at sentencing hearings, a change has been initiated already in the legislation in response to public concerns about high-profile cases, such as those of Lucy Letby, Jordan McSweeney and Thomas Cashman, all of whom refused to attend their sentencing hearing.

[Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that such cases, which have rightly gained a huge amount of public traction, are ones where it is appropriate for the Government to be making further announcements and putting in measures at this stage?

[Laura Farris]

I agree with that sentiment entirely. We are already creating an express statutory power at clause 28 to compel an offender to attend the sentencing hearing if they have been convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is life, but we have also listened to those concerned about offences that might not be caught by that power. I confirm that the Government has tabled amendments 148 to 150 to extend the measure to all offences that might attract a maximum sentence of 14 years or more.

[James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor, the Minister and other Ministers for listening to the case I made on Second Reading for extending the power. I had a case in my constituency where an offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a child under 13, which carries a 14-year sentence. They hid away in their cell and did not come to court. Under the original provisions, they would not have been captured, but under these amendments they will be, and I welcome that.

[Laura Farris]

I thank my hon. Friend, because the speech he gave on Second Reading played a major role in the changes we are introducing today. I reassure him that the change brings into scope most sexual assault cases, terrorist cases and racially aggravated offences, and I confirm to him that the specific case he raised on Second Reading would have been brought into scope by the change for which he has campaigned. I remind the House that the sanction for non-attendance at a sentencing hearing is up to a maximum of another two years in custody.

Government new clause 86 creates an offence of creating a sexually explicit deepfake of an adult without their consent. Members will be aware that the sharing of intimate images, whether real or fake, is already proscribed under the Online Safety Act 2023. We consider that we cannot complete the task of protecting people, principally women, unless we add the creation of pseudo-images or deepfakes to that package of protection. We are the first national legislature to take this step—if I am wrong about that, we are among the first—and we do so because we recognise the inherent risk posed by the creation of these images, both to the individual depicted and to society more widely.

[Caroline Nokes (Romsey and Southampton North) (Con)]

I know that the Minister will have given thought to this, but does she agree that there is a problem not just with deepfake sexual images, but more widely with deepfake images that purport to show individuals and potentially even Members of this House doing and saying things that they have not and that have no sexual connotations whatever?

[Laura Farris]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that point. We are encountering a rapidly changing world of deepfake images that can be used for the purposes of manipulating voices to try to influence political attitudes and choices. I have to make it clear that the new clause is confined only to the creation of sexually explicit images. However, it is my hope, humbly expressed at this Dispatch Box, that it may provide a gateway and lever for the development of more law in this area, and I thank her for her intervention.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

I particularly thank the Minister for this new clause. It obviously only covers adults, because producing sexual content of children is already illegal, but I am told that since the Government announced their intention to move the new clause, Apple and Google have already removed from their app stores a number of apps that were enabling users to produce deepfake nudes. Those applications have been used to create indecent images of children, as well as of adults. Disabling those apps has already helped to keep the public safe and to significantly improve the safeguarding of children. Just by tabling the new clause, the Government have already forced the industry to act in the UK.

[Laura Farris]

That is music to our ears. It was not lost on us that, within days of making the announcement, two of the major deepfake or nudify sites had blocked access to UK users in anticipation of the fact that even the act of using that site would become a criminal offence under our impending legislation.

[Greg Clark (Tunbridge Wells) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her personal championing of this new clause. As she knows, the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee recommended it, and we benefited from a seminar conducted with the campaigners that Glamour magazine brought together to bring the experience of people right across the country to a focal point. They deserve credit for having brought this issue to the House, as does the Minister for championing it so brilliantly and bringing the new clause today.

[Laura Farris]

I have to thank the team at Glamour magazine, because they led an excellent campaign. I was halfway through trying to make the change myself when I became aware of it, but I read the material that they put out. It totally chimed with our objectives, and I know that my right hon. Friend welcomed the team to Parliament just a few weeks ago.

[Dame Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)]

Intimate image abuse is an important issue to be dealt with. Can the Minister explain why she has not approached it in the same way as her colleagues approached it in the Online Safety Bill? It was a long-fought battle to have the Online Safety Bill recognise consent as pivotal, yet she has chosen not to take that approach at this stage, which I think many will find disappointing.

[Laura Farris]

I want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.

Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.

I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.

We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.

I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.

We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that

“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”

We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.

I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.

On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.

I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.

I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.

The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see in the Public Gallery some of the families who have championed this issue in the west midlands. Am I right in thinking—I really hope that I am not—that this measure covers only those convicted of the rape of a child, not other sexual offences against a child and a child aged 13 or over?

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Member is correct. I simply want to say again that this is a novel power that we are extending to Crown court judges, who typically do not have any knowledge of family law matters or a family law background. Once again, we think it is right that we take an iterative approach. There was a dialogue between the Mother of the House and the Lord Chancellor on this point, and she agreed with the approach. I do not want to put words in her mouth, and I am keenly aware of her absence when she should be speaking to her new clause, but I believe that she is satisfied with where we have got to. I commend the new clause and urge all colleagues to give it their support.

I turn next to new clauses 94 and 95 and new schedule 4. I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his excellent campaign and dedication to crafting a new offence. I must also mention my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), who also came to see me and made a really compelling argument.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I am grateful for that. The key bit about cuckooing is that the police have never been able to arrest somebody because they have taken over a house; they have to prove that there are criminal activities inside. This new offence will therefore break new ground and protect people.

There is an important point about coercion. Will the Minister guarantee that in the guidance notes attached to the Bill it will be clear to the police that they should be checking that victims are not being coerced into saying that they have given their consent? It is important for the police to know that.

[Laura Farris]

That is an excellent suggestion. I confirm that and thank my right hon. Friend once again.

Before I conclude, I would like to address a number of other matters that have been raised by hon. Members and tabled as amendments. I start with the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Dame Tracey Crouch)—

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

Before the Minister moves on—I apologise if she has addressed this and I missed it—could I get from her an explanation about Government new clause 102, which seeks to remove the protections of the Human Rights Act by effectively excluding the defence of lawful or reasonable excuses? This is now the fourth piece of legislation that the Government have introduced that will remove the protections of the Human Rights Act. We understand the reasons why they could not proceed with a Bill of rights, but surely if they are to remove human rights protections, that should be done in a proper, considered manner and not through salami slicing such as this.

[Laura Farris]

I will have to double-check that new clause, but I simply say that, with two exceptions, all the convention rights are qualified rights, which can be restricted in reasonable circumstances. I promise that I will check that and come back to the right hon. Gentleman in winding up the debate, if I may.

I was in the process of paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) for the outstanding representation that they have given to their constituents who were affected by David Fuller’s acts of depravity. That is reflected in new clause 62, which the Government support, on the offence of necrophilia.

It is perhaps a rare thing in 2024 that an offence can be identified that Parliament has not previously considered, but such was the extent of Fuller’s offending that we have had to do so. The Government are pleased to confirm that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 will be amended by the Bill to capture the sexual touching of a corpse with a new maximum sentence of seven years for penetrative offences and five years for non-penetrative acts.

[Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her kind comments. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) will try to catch the Deputy Speaker’s eye later to speak in more detail on this, but let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Minister for taking a lot of time to work through this amendment thoughtfully and correctly, to provide greater protection and give some comfort to the families of the victims of David Fuller that justice has been thought about. She has listened sensitively and carefully to the comments of our constituents.

[Laura Farris]

I thank my hon. Friend for her comments. They were truly appalling crimes, and I had the constituents of both my hon. Friends in mind when I thought about how to develop the law. We cannot change what happened in the past, but I hope we can send the clearest possible message in future.

I want to come to a couple of other matters, though I will not pre-empt what hon. Members might be inclined to say. First, I want to talk about new clause 9, on one-punch manslaughter. I pay special tribute to my hon. Friend, and my friend, the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison). This was not an ordinary campaign for her, but one born out of the deep tragedy of her childhood. I know that she will speak to the new clause, and I will respond in detail, but I hope she will not mind my saying that I think her dad would feel very proud of how she has conducted herself on this issue, and would be pleased with the changes that we are making.

I come to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) on prisoner transfer to overseas prisons. I want to set out the Government’s position in general, and in particular in relation to the transfer criteria. The Government agree that not all prisoners will be appropriate for transfer to rented prisons overseas—indeed, the hon. Member has set out some very sensible principles in his own amendment. I would like to give him three points of reassurance. The proposal for foreign prisoner transfer will extend to approximately 600 prisoners—equivalent to just under half of 1% of the entire prison estate. I can confirm that we will not negotiate a prison transfer agreement with a women’s prison.

We will conclude a deal only with a country that can demonstrate that its prison conditions and capabilities meet the applicable human rights standards. The Secretary of State retains responsibility for each prisoner, which ensures that any transferred prisoner retains all their rights under the European convention on human rights, irrespective of where they may be transferred. However, we believe that legislation is the best place for negotiating further terms, with the appropriate involvement of experts. The Lord Chancellor has already confirmed that the use of these powers requires a valid international agreement, and any such agreement would be put before Parliament as a treaty, subject to ratification procedures contained in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for those reassurances, but some of us have marked misgivings about the whole concept, which speaks a little more of gimmickry than anything likely to ease the real pressures on our prisons. That said, I can see that it might be a tool in the box. Could she help me on two matters that the Law Society has raised? If the agreements are used, what arrangements will ensure that prisoners are able to access legal advice in a proper way, perhaps in relation to appeal or other proceedings? That is essential to ensure a fair approach. How will they be able to participate remotely if necessary in any ongoing legal proceedings? Secondly, what is to be done about family visits? As the Minister will know, the retention of family ties is particularly important, and recognised universally as a key factor in rehabilitation and preventing reoffending. We would not want to disrupt those opportunities for anyone being transferred.

[Laura Farris]

I thank my hon. and learned Friend for his sensible intervention, which engaged two issues: article 6 considerations on the right to a fair trial, and article 8 considerations on the right to respect for private and family life. We are keenly aware of those obligations. I am sorry that I cannot give more detail on that, only the extra reassurance that the Lord Chancellor has insisted that prisoners will retain all their rights under the convention. These will be principal considerations. I will ask the Lord Chancellor to write to my hon. and learned Friend to flesh out some of those responses.

[Ruth Edwards (Rushcliffe) (Con)]

My hon. Friend has given a wide-ranging opening speech, but I want to press her on one more issue: spiking. First, I thank her for recognising the importance of creating an offence to cover it. We had a spate of spiking attacks in Nottingham, and the stories of the young people affected were chilling. I seek her reassurance that we will create the most robust possible legislation in this area, and that she will look kindly on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who has led a fantastic campaign to get spiking recognised in law. It is so important that we cover all the intentions that someone might have when they set about spiking someone, even if it is that they thought it might be a bit of fun. It is certainly not fun for their victims, and it is important that we do not create a loophole where offenders might be able to wriggle off the hook.

[Laura Farris]

I hope that I can provide my hon. Friend, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) with some reassurance. The offence is drafted to cover all possible outcomes. We looked very carefully at the wording. I want to provide some specific reassurance about “attempt”, which I know my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester is concerned about; it is in his amendment. It is not necessary to put a separate offence of attempting to spike in the Bill, because it is captured as an inchoate offence under section 1(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which covers all forms of attempt of a crime that is on the statute book. I hope that provides some reassurance.

I thank Members on all sides of the House for their engagement in the Bill, their joint commitment to its successful development as legislation that enhances our criminal justice system, and that delivers robust protection, appropriate penalties and a better framework of justice for the public. Our Government amendments achieve that, and I will respond in due course to Members’ views. I commend the amendments and new clauses to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the Opposition spokesperson.

--- Later in debate ---

There has been good progress with the Bill. It is better for what it does not include, in some cases; we will come to that on day 2. Much of what it does include has been improved, but it highlights the complexities that face the criminal justice system as a whole. We always have to be careful not to tinker when sometimes we need a more holistic approach and, of course, the resource to go with it, which is the other key thing that we need. I am grateful to all those who spoke in the debate, and to the Minister for the constructive tone that she has adopted throughout.

[Laura Farris]

This has indeed been a wide-ranging debate—we use that phrase too often in this place, but it is true today—and it is a pleasure to bring it to a close. I am grateful to all hon. Members who took part. In the time available to me, I will seek to respond on as many of the non-Government new clauses and amendments as I can, and to answer questions. If I fail, please give me a nudge. I will then write to hon. Members or catch up with them at some point and give them a response.

I will begin with new clause 9, picking up where I left off. I was addressing my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) and her excellent campaign. Let me set out the steps that the Government are taking. She alluded to them in her excellent speech, but I will confirm what they are. We have worked with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for homicide, Kate Meynell, to appoint a named lead for one-punch homicides. That person will carry out an initial scoping exercise to properly establish how many of these cases are occurring, and to understand whether there are barriers to investigation and prosecution for these offences. I take my hon. Friend’s point that we should consider how the offence is communicated to the family, given the particular issues that arose in her case.

We will also build on action already taken, including the three-month Walk Away campaign that was launched in December 2023. That dovetails very neatly with the work of One Punch UK. I know that that is something my hon. Friend will be involved in.

We will establish a lower-culpability manslaughter homicide service practice review, led by Victim Support, which delivers the homicide service. The review will consider cases of manslaughter where there is lower culpability, and I look forward to working with my hon. Friend and getting started on that. We will also conduct individual sentence reviews into particular cases where there is an objection to the end of the sentence, and we will look at the sentencing remarks. She gave the names of a number of campaigners in her speech, and I look forward to picking those up with her.

I will comment briefly on new clause 28, relating to joint enterprise, which was raised by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, and by others. The new clause would caveat and curtail the law of joint enterprise only to those who had made a significant contribution. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside knows that joint enterprise is there so that those who act as the burglary lookout, who provide the weapon in the murder or who drive the getaway vehicle do not escape the consequences of their crimes, which shatter lives.

It is already the case, following the Supreme Court decision in R v. Jogee, that the person must have helped or encouraged the commission of the offence and intended to do so. I have considered a number of examples of cases where there have been convictions on this basis in recent years, such as the boy who sent a WhatsApp to his colleague to encourage her to conduct a fatal attack or the 14-year-old lad who stood on the edge of a woodland as lookout while his friends gang-raped a girl. They are very painful cases. I will simply say this: I think that people who participate in crime, even on the periphery, should not escape liability, and I do not think anyone can advance a credible argument that they should. We on the Government side still think that those people ought to be locked up.

[Kim Johnson]

I admit that, and I have not said that we should get rid of joint enterprise, but we know that thousands of young people and children have been incarcerated for something they have not done. The law is not being used in the way it should be, as the hon. and learned Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) mentioned in respect of the Jogee case. We took a wrong turn and we have taken another wrong turn. We need to get it right.

[Laura Farris]

I am going to respectfully differ from the hon. Lady. I am happy to have another conversation with her about it, but I am afraid that even those on the periphery often have their hands all over the crime.

I will return briefly to new clause 59 on bladed articles, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris). The issue of ninja swords was raised by the other shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham). I want to provide reassurance that both straight-bladed ninja swords, which the new clause is directed at, and curved swords are covered. Curved swords were banned by the Government in 2008, and he will know that possessing a sword or any knife—even a kitchen knife—in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence, punishable by up to four years in prison.

The reason why straight swords are more difficult to ban is that some of them are held by military historians and for commemorative purposes. However, I wanted to provide reassurance to those on the shadow Front Bench that the Policing Minister engaged recently with the NPCC lead on knife crime, who reassured him once again that the NPCC was not seeking a ban on the use of straight-bladed swords. In fact, of all the knife crime fatalities in the last year, around 1% were caused that way.

What the NPCC is asking for is a clampdown on the online sale of knives to under-18s, which we are doing under the Online Safety Act; the power to seize knives in a private place if the police think they will be used for a criminal purpose, which is already in the Bill; and a ban on machetes and zombie knives, which we are bringing in in September. I wanted to provide that reassurance.

New clauses 25 and 26 were introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), who I cannot see, but I am sure—

[Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)]

She has just popped out.

[Laura Farris]

She has just popped out. She made an outstanding speech, which illuminated and identified yet more of the nefarious ways that child abusers find to conduct some of the most serious offences against children. She knows, as was clear in her constructive speech, that artificial intelligence raises unique problems. I agree without hesitation with the force of what she said, and about the identification of an offence as she has presented it. I recognise that it is our duty as parliamentarians to future-proof our legislation, and I thank her for her detailed work on this issue. I commit to working with her and to trying as best we can to get something ready for Report in the other place.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Elliot Colburn) for the sensitive and thoughtful way in which he approached the Law Commission’s report and the issue of hate crimes, and for his new clause 32 to introduce protected characteristics to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Of course, I have read the Law Commission’s excellent report on this matter, and I can confirm that a response to it was always forthcoming this year. I want to make two slight qualifications that might explain some of the delay.

Many Members will be aware that the Law Commission did not recommend making sex a protected characteristic for hate crimes, and may remember that there was a campaign to make misogyny a hate crime, which the commission rejected. That required careful thought, because not all the protected characteristics have been treated in the same way. Another issue is the implementation of the hate crime legislation in Scotland, which has been both highly contentious and, I am afraid, somewhat chaotic. Of course, we wish to avoid replicating those mistakes. However, I want to provide reassurance by saying that our intention is to deal with this matter—subject to all the normal approvals—in the House of Lords, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington will come and work with me on it.

The other excellent speech that I want to refer to was that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). She alighted on two important issues—cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse—that are not on the priority offences list in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023. That is not because we did not consider them important or sinister offences—she will need no persuading, given everything that we have done on intimate image abuse, that the opposite is true. The fact is that they were not on the statute book, or certainly had not been commenced, when we passed the 2023 Act. I know that the Secretary of State is well aware of that, particularly in relation to both those issues. I know that my right hon. Friend is conducting an urgent review as we speak, and I am sure that, in the weeks ahead, I will be able to update her on where we are on this. I do not want her to think for a moment that we are dragging our feet.

[Caroline Nokes]

I appreciate that my hon. Friend is seeking to give me an assurance from the Dispatch Box, but it is perhaps not quite as fulsome as I would wish. She says that the priority offences register can be reviewed. It would be very helpful if we had a specific timescale by which the measures could be added. That would give reassurance to all victims that such images will be made illegal in their in own right, and that Ofcom and internet service providers will work together to take them down. We already have the criminal offence, so the perpetrators can go to prison, but the victims want the images—the repeat offence—to be removed from the internet.

[Laura Farris]

I listened very carefully to what my right hon. Friend said, and I agree with every single word of it. Some of this sits with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, as she knows, so I would need to have a conversation with the relevant Minister, but I feel as strongly as she does on this matter, and I assure her from the Dispatch Box that I will use my best endeavours.

The road traffic amendments, which I will talk about briefly, were beautifully presented during the Committee and again today. I have spoken a few times with the Members who tabled them, who are well aware that those matters sit with the Department for Transport. I understand that they have had engagement with the Department and that an important review of this issue has certainly been contemplated.

[Vicky Ford]

I apologise to my hon. Friend—I was briefly out of the Chamber, discussing my amendments with the Home Secretary. It is clear that AI technology is moving incredibly quickly in a vile, disgusting way that is putting children at risk of sexual abuse. Could my hon. Friend repeat the commitment she has given: that she will work with me on the two areas that my amendments have highlighted, and will work with me, the IWF and others to ensure that the issues we have pinpointed are addressed as the Bill goes through this House and the Lords?

[Laura Farris]

I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention, and I am sorry that we somehow did not manage to overlap when I made my comments about her. I thought her speech was outstanding, and I agree without hesitation: she is quite right to say that we need to future-proof our legislation. As I said, I think we are the first country—if not, we are one of the first—to put an offence on to the books relating to the creation of deepfakes, which shows that we are alive and very responsive to this issue. I will make the commitments that my right hon. Friend has requested.

[Vicky Ford]

To be clear, is the Minister giving a cast-iron guarantee that we will address these issues of paedophile manuals and using a chatbot to communicate sexually, including raping a child through a chatbot, by working with the IWF and others to ensure that the laws are clear, and that if necessary, there will be amendments in the Lords?

[Laura Farris]

Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that commitment.

I was interrupted, but I was briefly paying tribute to the very passionate speeches that have been made about road traffic accidents. These are not small matters—the case of the little girl in the constituency of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones) is such a painful one, and I know that the Transport Secretary and other Ministers have been very affected by it. As the hon. Member knows, this matter is not straightforward for reasons that we have discussed, but I hope progress will be made on it in a way that helps his constituent.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made an excellent speech on the offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling. It is not in dispute that whether a vehicle is a car, an electric scooter or a bicycle, if it is operated in a certain way, it is effectively a dangerous weapon on the road. We are supportive of my right hon. Friend’s amendment, and we will be bringing it back in the Lords; we will be changing it in the Lords, as he knows, but we are accepting it.

I think I have covered all the amendments that have been selected.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I assume that my hon. Friend meant that she will accept the amendment when I move it.

[Laura Farris]

Yes, I did mean that.

The final amendments that I will speak to are new clauses 91 and 92, relating to a new criminal sanction on water companies.

[Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con)]

Everyone in this House wants to ensure that our water regulators have at their disposal all the tools they need to get on top of the sewage discharge issue, but as the Minister sums up, could she explain to the House whether Ofwat already has the powers being sought in the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron)? If the same powers were given to the Environment Agency, that would be more likely to lead to confusion and a lack of clarity about which agency is taking the lead on such prosecutions, which might lead to prosecutions falling through the cracks.

[Laura Farris]

My right hon. Friend is quite correct: that is the basis on which the Government cannot accept the amendments. Of course, everybody agrees that water companies should be punished as robustly as possible, but it is also the case that we have pre-existing offences that apply. Pollution incidents are already the subject of criminal sanctions available to the Environment Agency under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, and there is a serious risk of duplication, not least because—I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) will not mind my saying this—the sanctions he has included in his amendments are just more fines, and we already have a fines regime.

Let me set out very briefly the basis on which, in a principled way, we are saying no to the amendments. As the environment regulator, the Environment Agency can and does prosecute company directors and other senior officers under the relevant regulations. It has a power to fine, and there can be convictions for polluting rivers and coastal waters, where it can be proved that the offence has been committed. Expanding criminal liability would simply create a repetition of the existing powers. It is the Government’s view that the amendments would create a dangerous and unacceptable risk of double jeopardy across the two regulatory regimes that are administered by Ofwat and the Environment Agency.

The amendments would simply duplicate the existing sanctions, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) put it, for not meeting performance commitments. More seriously, they could undermine the robustness of the Environment Agency’s criminal sanction regime. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will understand why we do not want to see duplication in an area where there is already the capacity to prosecute, a criminal law regime and the sanction of fines, which is everything that his amendments seek.

[Jess Phillips]

I fear the Minister is coming to the end of her remarks, but she has not addressed my new clause 44. Does she have any comment on it?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for reminding me, but I had not forgotten. I listened carefully to her speech and I have read all her amendments, not all of which were selected, but some of which she has raised before. On the general defence, she will know that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the defence of duress in relation to women and the crime—

[Jess Phillips]

It is not that amendment.

[Laura Farris]

I know that the amendment has not been selected, but I want to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance on it, because we on this side of the House continue to think about the issues she has raised. She is aware of the Law Commission’s review of the defence of duress as it applies to murder. I want to provide her with an update and some reassurance that we will take the lessons that come out of that review, and consider it more widely, if appropriate, in alignment with the point that I think she made earlier in this debate.

On new clause 44, this is an important point between us, but the Government are resisting it not because there is any real dispute of principle, but because there is dispute of degree. There is a concern that by amending the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, as so drafted, we could unnecessarily narrow the scope of section 52 as it has been applied in the criminal courts and potentially add an additional element to be proved in relation to section 53 that could make prosecution harder. We disagree not on the principle but about whether it will have the effect she is looking for. I did listen carefully to her speech and the way that she has presented the argument on previous occasions.

[Richard Graham]

The safeguarding Minister will have been briefed by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire on the exchanges across the House on the key issue of spiking, which will make its first ever appearance in legislation if the Bill is passed. I asked specific questions, which I would be grateful if she returned to. Although my amendments will not be pursued, it would be reassuring for everyone in the country if she said that the spiking clauses now injected will cover attempts to spike as well as proven spiking, and will apply to spiking attempts that may not be considered harmful in substance but are incredibly harmful to the people they humiliate.

[Laura Farris]

Yes, I can confirm that those inchoate offences—attempt offences—are all captured in the 1981 Act to which I referred in my opening speech.

On whether naming the offence of spiking will improve police record keeping, I say to my hon. Friend that it will absolutely do that. It will remove the discrepancy between what might have been called date rape under the Sexual Offences Act and what would have been recorded previously as a poisoning act under the Offences against the Person Act. For consistency in recording, we are very pleased to make the change.

[Richard Graham]

I thank the Minister for giving way again. On that specific point, she is effectively saying that the data collected by the police will now be collected under the umbrella of spiking, so we will have much better data and know how widespread the problem really is, which I think everyone will be reassured to hear. May I also thank her, the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary for their fantastic and immediate support in getting this provision into the Bill, which I very much hope will pass through this Parliament before the next general election?

[Laura Farris]

It is not just the effect of the amendment that will improve police recording; one purpose of the amendment was to improve police recording and it will give, I hope, a much more accurate picture of the extent of the problem.

On the comments that my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) made regarding the creation offence related to deepfake images and intent, I will consider the point carefully. I would like to have further discussions on it.

[Dame Maria Miller]

I hope the Minister was listening to the Chair of the Justice Committee, who wholeheartedly agreed with the point I was making, namely that it would be entirely consistent with the sex offences law to remove intent from that measure and simply focus on consent. That is what we need to hear, and I hope the Minister will now agree at the Dispatch Box that she will consider that strongly.

[Laura Farris]

I certainly give my right hon. Friend that reassurance. I look forward to continuing our discussions throughout the passage of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 86 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.

New Clause 62

Sexual Activity with a Corpse

(1) In the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for section 70 substitute—

“70 Sexual activity with a corpse

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person intentionally performs an act of touching (with a part of their body or anything else),

(b) what is touched is a part of the body of a dead person,

(c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and

(d) the touching is sexual.

(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding—

(i) if the touching involved penetration of a part of the body mentioned in subsection (1)(b), 7 years;

(ii) otherwise, 5 years.”

(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in the following provisions for “sexual penetration of” substitute “sexual activity with”—

paragraph 152 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;

paragraph 35 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003;

paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015;

paragraph 38(ba) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.” —(Laura Farris.)

This new clause replaces the offence under section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with an offence that covers any intentional touching of a corpse that is sexual, and increases the maximum sentence of imprisonment for an offence involving penetration to 7 years and in other cases to 5 years. It is proposed to add the new clause after clause 15.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 87

Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor

“(1) In Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Sentencing Code (seriousness and determining sentence), after section 72 insert—

“72A Manslaughter involving sexual conduct

(1) In considering the seriousness of an offence of manslaughter involving sexual conduct, the court must—

(a) treat the fact that the offence involves sexual conduct as an aggravating factor, and

(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.

(2) This section has effect in relation to a person who is convicted of an offence on or after the date on which section (Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor) of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 comes into force.”

(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (8) (inserted by section 23) insert—

“(9)In section 72A of the Sentencing Code (manslaughter involving sexual conduct)—

(a) the reference to an offence of manslaughter is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is manslaughter, and

(b) the references to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence.”.”—(Laura Farris.)

This new clause makes the fact that an offence of manslaughter involves sexual conduct an aggravating factor (as well as making the same provision as regards the corresponding service offence.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 88

Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland

“(1) In Article 7 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1))—

(a) in paragraph (2) omit “Articles 13A, 14 and 15A and”;

(b) in paragraph (3) before sub-paragraph (a) insert—

“(za) Articles 13A and 14 of this Order;”.”

(2) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to convictions occurring on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Laura Farris.)

This new clause results in Article 7(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (requirement that term of sentence is commensurate with seriousness) applying to a sentence under Article 15A of that Order (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 89

Reviews of sentencing: time limits

“(1) Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (reviews of sentencing - supplementary) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 1 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case)—

(a) the existing provision becomes sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;

(b) at the end of that sub-paragraph insert “(“the relevant period”); but in England and Wales this is subject to sub-paragraph (2).”;

(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—

“(2) Where—

(a) the Attorney General receives a request to review the sentencing of a person, and

(b) the request is received in the last 14 days of the relevant period,

notice of an application for leave to refer the case in question to the Court of Appeal under section 36 may be given within 14 days from the day on which the request is received.

(3) For the purposes of this Part, a certificate of the Attorney General as to the date on which a request to review the sentencing of a person was received is conclusive evidence of that fact.

(4) Where more than one request to review the sentencing of a person is received, references in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) to a request are to the first request that is received.”

(3) In paragraph 12 (application of Schedule to Northern Ireland), after paragraph (d) insert—

“(da) paragraph 1 has effect as if sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) were omitted;”.”—(Laura Farris.)

This new clause provides that where the Attorney General receives a request to review a person’s sentence in the last 14 days of the current period for giving any notice of application for leave to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General may give such notice within 14 days from the date the request is received.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Cuckooing

“(1) A person commits an offence if they—

(a) exercise control over the dwelling of another person, and

(b) do so for the purpose of enabling the dwelling to be used in connection with the commission (by any person) of one or more offences listed in Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).

(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) consented to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b).

(3) Section (Cuckooing: interpretation) contains provisions about the interpretation of this section.

(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).

(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Laura Farris.)

This clause, together with NC95 and NS4, create an offence of exercising control over another person’s dwelling, for the purpose of enabling it to be used in connection with the commission of certain offences.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.



New Clause 95

Cuckooing: interpretation

“(1) This section supplements section (Cuckooing).

(2) A reference to “the dwelling of a person” is to any structure or part of a structure occupied by the person as their home or other living accommodation (whether the occupation is separate or shared with others), together with any yard, garden, grounds, garage or outhouse belonging to it or used with it.

(3) In subsection (2) “structure” includes a tent, caravan, vehicle, vessel or other temporary or movable structure.

(4) The circumstances in which a person “exercises control over the dwelling of another person” (B) include circumstances where the person exercises control (whether temporarily or permanently) over any of the following—

(a) who is able to enter, leave, occupy or otherwise use the dwelling or part of the dwelling;

(b) the delivery of things to, or the collection of things from, the dwelling;

(c) the way in which, or the purposes for which, the dwelling or part of the dwelling is used;

(d) the ability of B to use the dwelling or part of the dwelling for B’s own purposes.

(5) For the purposes of section (Cuckooing)(2), a person is regarded as “consenting” to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in section (Cuckooing)(1)(b) only if—

(a) they are aged 18 or over,

(b) they have capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to give consent to the exercise of control for that purpose,

(c) they are given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to consent,

(d) they give consent freely, and

(e) the consent is not withdrawn.”—(Laura Farris.)

See the statement for NC94.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 103

Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child

“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).

(2) In section 10A (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—

(a) for subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) This section applies where the Crown Court is sentencing—

(a) a person (“the offender”) who is a parent with parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for the murder or, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2), manslaughter of the child’s other parent;

(b) a person (“the offender”) who has parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape) against a child or under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13).”;

(b) in subsection (3), for “when sentencing the offender” substitute “with respect to the child”;

(c) in subsection (5)(b), for “offender is convicted of manslaughter” substitute “Crown Court is sentencing the offender for manslaughter”;

(d) in subsection (7), for “murder or manslaughter” substitute “offence”;

(e) after subsection (9) insert—

“(10) In subsection (1) “sentencing” is to be read in accordance with the Sentencing Code (see section 401 of the Code).”

(3) In section 10B (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—

(a) in subsection (1), for “parent” substitute “person”;

(b) in subsection (3)(b), for “parent is acquitted on appeal of the murder or manslaughter” substitute “person is acquitted on appeal of the offence”.

(4) In section 33(3A) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(5) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), in both places, for “parent” substitute “person”.

(5) In section 91—

(a) in subsection (5B) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—

(i) in paragraph (a), for “parent (“P”) with respect to a child (“C”)” substitute “person with respect to a child”;

(ii) in paragraph (b), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”;

(b) in subsection (5C) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”.

(6) In section 379 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (other behaviour orders etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) See section 10A(1) of the Children Act 1989 for circumstances in which the Crown Court may be required to make a prohibited steps order when dealing with an offender for murder, manslaughter or the rape of a child.””—(Laura Farris.)

This new clause expands the circumstances in which the Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order under section 10A of the Children Act 1989 (inserted by the Victims and Prisoners Bill) to cases where a person with parental responsibility is convicted of the rape of a child.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 104

Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal

“(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which section (Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child) comes into force, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 (duty on Crown Court to make prohibited steps order) during the period, and

(b) publish the report and lay it before Parliament.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations repeal either—

(a) section 10A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, or

(b) sections 10A and 10B of that Act.

(3) But regulations under subsection (2) may only be made during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the report under subsection (1) was laid before Parliament.

(4) The consequential provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (2) by virtue of section 86(1)(a) includes provision amending or repealing any provision made by an Act of Parliament or an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru.” —(Laura Farris.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 and confers the power to repeal those sections or their application to cases involving rape of a child (whether because of the report or otherwise).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 44

Sexual exploitation of an adult

(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.

(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and

(b) at end insert—

“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”—(Jess Phillips.)

An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

18:31

Division 151

Ayes: 167

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Labour: 148
Liberal Democrat: 10
Independent: 4
Plaid Cymru: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Alliance: 1
Green Party: 1
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 275

---

Conservative: 272
Independent: 2

New Clause 57

--- Later in debate ---

18:48

Division 152

Ayes: 171

---

Labour: 149
Liberal Democrat: 10
Independent: 5
Plaid Cymru: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Alliance: 1
Green Party: 1
Democratic Unionist Party: 1

Noes: 272

---

Conservative: 268
Independent: 2

New Clause 91

--- Later in debate ---

19:02

Division 153

Ayes: 17

---

Liberal Democrat: 9
Plaid Cymru: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 1
Independent: 1
Alliance: 1
Green Party: 1
Democratic Unionist Party: 1
Conservative: 1

Noes: 268

---

Conservative: 260
Independent: 2

New Schedule 4