Criminal Justice Bill

Roger Gale Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 15th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 62—Sexual activity with a corpse.

Government new clause 87—Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor.

Government new clause 88—Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland.

Government new clause 89—Reviews of sentencing: time limits.

Government new clause 94—Cuckooing.

Government new clause 95—Cuckooing: interpretation.

Government new clause 103—Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child.

Government new clause 104—Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal.

New clause 2—Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children—

‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—

“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and

(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.”’

New clause 7—Occupation or control of another person’s residence for criminal purposes “Cuckooing”—

“(1) A person commits an offence if the person occupies or exercises control over the home of another person (V) in connection with the commission of a criminal offence or offences using any of the following methods—

(a) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour;

(b) abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment;

(c) fraud or other deception;

(d) the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability;

(e) the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has control over V.

(2) A person also commits an offence under this section if the person arranges or facilitates the activity set out in subsection (1).

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years,

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”

This new clause makes it an offence to exercise control over another person’s residence for the purpose of criminal activity by means of coercion, threats or abuse of a position of vulnerability.

New clause 8—Offence of enabling or profiting from prostitution—

“(1) A person or body corporate (C) commits an offence if they—

(a) facilitate, whether online or offline, or

(b) gain financially from

a person (A) engaging in sexual activity with another person (B) in exchange for payment or other benefit, or the promise of payment or other benefit, and the conditions in subsection (2) are met.

(2) The conditions are—

(a) that C knows or ought to know that A is engaging in, or intends to engage in, sexual activity for payment or other benefit; and

(b) that C is not a dependent child of A.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

(a) “Sexual activity”—

(i) means any acts which a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider to be sexual,

(ii) requires A and B to be in each other’s presence,

(b) “Facilitates” includes, but is not limited to, causing or allowing to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of sexual activity involving A.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”

This new clause would make it an offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person.

New clause 9—One-punch manslaughter—

“(1) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where they cause the death of another person (B) as a result of a single punch in the circumstances described in subsection (2).

(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—

(a) P administered a single punch to the head or neck of B;

(b) there was significant risk that the punch would cause serious physical harm to B;

(c) P was or ought to have been aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (b);

(d) P did not administer the punch referred to in paragraph (a) in self-defence; and

(e) B’s death was caused by—

(i) the impact of the punch, or

(ii) further impact or injury resulting from the single punch.

(3) In this section “serious physical harm” means harm that amounts to death or serious personal injury for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a minimum of seven years.”

This new clause is intended to create a specific offence of “One Punch Manslaughter”, with a minimum sentence of seven years.

New clause 12—Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services—

“(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—

(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),

(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,

(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and

(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.

(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—

(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or

(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B's usual day-to-day activities.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.

(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—

(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and

(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.

(5) A defence under subsection (4) requires A to have shown—

(a) sufficient evidence of the facts, and

(b) that the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”

New clause 16—Amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1988—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) In each of the sections listed below, after “a road or other public place” insert “, or a private place adjacent to a road,”—

section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);

section 1A (causing serious injury by dangerous driving);

section 2 (dangerous driving);

section 2B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 2C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);

section 3 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving).”

This new clause would extend the Road Traffic Act 1988 so that a range of driving offences can be committed in private places adjacent to roads as well as on public roads or in public places.

New clause 18—Definition of unauthorised access to computer programs or data—

“In section 17 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, at the end of subsection (5) insert—

“(c) he does not reasonably believe that the person entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data would have consented to that access if he had known about the access and the circumstances of it, including the reasons for seeking it;

(d) he is not empowered by an enactment, by a rule of law, or by the order of a court or tribunal to access of the kind in question to the program or data.””

New clause 19—Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990—

“(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—

(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or

(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”

(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—

(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or

(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””

New clause 24—Definition of exceptional hardship—

“In section 35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) In subsection (4)(b), the hardship that would be caused by an offender’s disqualification should be regarded as exceptional only if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would be experienced by a large majority of other drivers if disqualification were imposed on them.

(4B) In assessing whether the hardship arising from the offender’s disqualification would be exceptional a court may take account of—

(a) any circumstances relating to the offender’s economic circumstances or location of residence which would make it exceptionally hard for them to access essential services and facilities;

(b) any hardship that would be incurred by the offender’s family or others who are disabled or who depend on the offender to provide care for them; and

(c) any other circumstances which it believes would make the hardship exceptional.””

New clause 25—Offence of possession of guidance on creating child sexual abuse content—

“(1) Section 69 (Possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), omit from “to” to the end of the subsection and insert—

“possess, create, share or distribute any item that—

(a) contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually; or

(b) contains advice or guidance about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children.”

(3) In subsection (2)(b)(ii), after “sexually” insert—

“or about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children”

(4) In subsection (8)—

(a) after “sexually”” insert “(or “the sexual abuse of children”),

(b) omit “(but not pseudo-photographs)” and insert “, including pseudo-photographs”,

(c) after second “or Northern Ireland” insert—

““creation of content” includes using any tool to create visual or audio content;”,

(d) at end insert—

““tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.””

This new clause would expand the existing offence of possessing guides about abusing children sexually to include guides on creating child sexual abuse content, including through the use of artificial intelligence or machine learning.

New clause 26—Offence of simulating sexual communication with a child—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they—

(a) use;

(b) design;

(c) distribute; or

(d) provide access to

a tool to simulate sexual communication with a person under 16.

(2) For the purposes of this section—

(a) a communication is sexual if—

(i) any part of it relates to sexual activity, or

(ii) a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person's purpose, consider any part of the communication to be sexual,

(b) “tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to the same penalties as apply to an offence committed under section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

This new clause would create an offence of using, creating or sharing online or digital tools which simulate sexual communication with a child.

New clause 28—Complicity in joint enterprise cases—

“In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert “, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.”

This new clause would clarify the definition of “joint enterprise” (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.

New clause 29—Human trafficking—

“(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), for “arranges or facilitates the travel of” substitute “recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, coercion, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits”.

(3) In subsection (2), for “travel” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) or to V being exploited”.

(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).

(5) In paragraph (6)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.

(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).

(7) In paragraph (7)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.

(8) In paragraph (7)(b), for the first “the” substitute “any”.”

This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.

New clause 32—Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability—

“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute “Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales”.

(3) In section 28—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity””;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from “based on” to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—

—

(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;

(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;

(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;

(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or

(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or”;

(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from “hostility towards” to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—

—

(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;

(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;

(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;

(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or

(v) persons who are transgender.”;

(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of “membership” leave out “racial or religious” and insert “relevant”.

(4) In section 29—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(5) In section 30—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(6) In section 31—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.

(7) In section 32—

(a) for the heading, substitute “Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;

(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.”

This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

New clause 33—Taking of dog without lawful authority—

“(1) A person commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the person takes or detains a dog in England—

(a) so as to remove it from the lawful control of any person, or

(b) so as to keep it from the lawful control of a person who is entitled to have lawful control of it.

(2) No offence is committed if the person taking or detaining the dog is connected with any of the following—

(a) any person entitled to have lawful control of it;

(b) where it is removed from the lawful control of a person, that person.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum summary term for either-way offences or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).

(4) In this section—

“connected person” : a person is connected with another person if—

(a) they are married to each other,

(b) they are civil partners of each other,

(c) one is the parent of the other, or

(d) they are siblings (whether of the full blood or the half blood);

“detaining” : references to a person detaining a dog include the person—

(a) inducing it to remain with the person or anyone else, or

(b) causing it to be detained;

“maximum summary term for either-way offences” , with reference to imprisonment for an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 comes into force, 6 months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 12 months;

“taking” : references to a person taking a dog include the person—

(a) causing or inducing it to accompany the person or anyone else, or

(b) causing it to be taken.”

This new clause makes provision for the creation of an offence of taking a dog from the lawful control of another person.

New clause 35—Offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision—

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—

“(4A) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable—

(a) if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a fatal injury—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years;

(b if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a serious non-fatal injury—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;

(c) in any other case—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;

(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.””

This new clause would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision to create more serious penalties for failing to stop after collisions which result in death or serious injury.

New clause 36—Time to report road collision—

“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, omit subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) In complying with a duty under this section to report an accident or to produce such a certificate of insurance or other evidence, as is mentioned in section 165(2)(a) of this Act, it is an offence for a driver—

(a) not to do so at a police station or to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable, and

(b) not to do so within two hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to reporting an accident, or within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to the production of a certificate of insurance or other evidence.””

This new clause would amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to reduce the time within which a driver must report a road collision in which they were involved from twenty-four hours to two hours, and make it an offence not to report an accident.

New clause 38—Senior manager liability for neglect in relation to offences committed by bodies corporate and partnerships—

“(1) Where an organisation commits an offence under section 16, a person (“S”) also commits an offence if—

(a) S was a senior manager of the same body corporate or partnership at the time the offence was committed under section 16; and

(b) S failed to prevent the offence from being committed, or was negligent such that an offence was committed.

(2) It is a defence for S to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed.

(3) In this section, “body corporate”, “partnership” and “senior manager” have the meanings given in section 16.

(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of 12 months;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and an unlimited fine.”

New clause 43—Offence of creating or sharing misleading content—

“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—

(a) create, using any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning; or

(b) share, distribute, or otherwise provide access to,

visual or audio content which shows or represents, or appears to show or represent, another person (“R”), where conditions A, B and C are met.

(2) Condition A is that the words, actions, beliefs or behaviours shown or represented in the content have been artificially created or manipulated.

(3) Condition B is that the content has been created or shared for the purposes of—

(a) misleading a person viewing or hearing the content as to R’s real words, actions, beliefs or behaviours;

(b) causing offence, alarm, distress or humiliation to—

(i) R; or

(ii) any other person; or

(c) influencing the voting intention or activity of another person.

(4) Condition C is that R has not consented to the creation or sharing of the content.

(5) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”

New clause 44—Sexual exploitation of an adult—

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.

(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.

(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and

(b) at end insert—

“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”

An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.

New clause 45—Loitering and soliciting: repeal—

“Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.”

An amendment that repeals soliciting and loitering as an offence.

New clause 46—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions: Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution—

‘(1) Section 92 of the Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

“(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence in circumstances where—

(a) the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, or

(b) the offence was committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959,

may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.”

(3) In subsection (2) after first “caution” insert “received in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)(a)”.’

A new clause that allows a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions received under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959.

New clause 47—Grooming as an aggravating factor—

“(1) After section 72 of the Sentencing Code (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—

“72A Grooming

(1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence which is aggravated by grooming.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by grooming as an aggravating factor, and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.””

Grooming to be seen as an aggravating factor in certain cases where the victim is an adult.

New clause 48—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—

“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.

(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—

“(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.””

An amendment to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

New clause 49—Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases—

“(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.

(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.

(4) After subsection (8F) insert—

“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—

(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,

(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and

(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).

(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”

(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New clause 50—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—

“(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,

(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and

(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.

(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.

(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—

(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or

(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.

(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and

(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.

(5) For the purposes of this section “relevant characteristics” means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.

(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.

(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].”

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New clause 55—Offence of child criminal exploitation—

“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—

(a) recruit or attempt to recruit, or

(b) ask or compel another person to recruit or attempt to recruit,

a child (“C”) for the purpose of C’s involvement in criminal activity.

(2) An offence is committed under subsection (1) regardless of whether C—

(a) engages in criminal activity, or

(b) is prosecuted for or found guilty of a criminal offence.

(3) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that P did not know that C was a child.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) if the offence for which C was, or was attempted to be, recruited was murder, to imprisonment for life,

(b) if C was, or was attempted to be, recruited for any other offence, to the penalty to which a person guilty of that offence would be liable.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

“child” means a person under the age of 18;

“criminal activity” means any activity or conduct which constitutes a criminal offence;

to

“recruit” includes by direction, inducement, incitement, coercion or compulsion.”

New clause 57—Offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling—

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

“27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.

27C Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.”

(3) In section 28 (dangerous cycling), after subsection (3) insert—

“(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist includes that their cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations made under section 81 of this Act.”

(4) After section 32 (electrically assisted pedal cycles), insert—

“32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32

(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32 of this Act, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—

(a) a pedal cycle,

(b) an electrically assisted pedal cycle, and

(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—

(i) an electric scooter,

(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and

(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.”

(5) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is amended as follows.

(6) In the table in Part 1 of Schedule 2, after the row beginning “RTA section 27” insert in columns 1 to 4—

[Laura Farris]

I have heard what was said by the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) and made a careful note. The fact that this debate is split over two days may have contributed to that, but I have listened carefully and will take that point away.

It is an honour, again, to open this debate and bring this important Bill back to the House on Report. Its focus is on countering developing criminal threats, intercepting serious organised crime, and protecting vulnerable victims. I thank Members across the House for their constructive engagement on the Bill, as well as the police, leading academics, practising lawyers and campaign groups, some of whom appeared before us in Committee. They have all contributed to the Bill’s development. There are many topics to discuss today, and I look forward to hearing the views of Members.

The Government are bringing forward a number of amendments that we believe are appropriate and necessary to punish offenders and enhance the protection that victims deserve. Briefly, I will explain the key Government amendments, starting with those about which I anticipate there will be no dispute: namely, the extension to Northern Ireland of our new spiking measures in clause 13, and the statutory aggravating factor for grooming activity in relation to child sexual offences in clause 30. New clause 88 provides for equivalence in sentencing for terrorist offenders between England and Wales and Northern Ireland, as a consequence of the irregularity that was identified in the case of R v. Perry.

Government new clause 89 extends the time limit for the unduly lenient sentence scheme, and will extend the overall time limit to six weeks. A request must still be submitted by any prospective appellant to the Attorney General’s Office within the usual 28 days, but the Attorney General’s Office will have an additional 14 days to consider whether the case is appropriate for submission to the Court of Appeal. In recent years the number of cases referred to the Law Officers has increased, in part due to a better awareness of the scheme. We consider it to be in the interests of justice that each application is given due care and attention, even when it is submitted close to the 28-day deadline, and we believe that the new clause is a proportionate way of achieving that.

On attendance at sentencing hearings, a change has been initiated already in the legislation in response to public concerns about high-profile cases, such as those of Lucy Letby, Jordan McSweeney and Thomas Cashman, all of whom refused to attend their sentencing hearing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I hope that I can provide my hon. Friend, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) with some reassurance. The offence is drafted to cover all possible outcomes. We looked very carefully at the wording. I want to provide some specific reassurance about “attempt”, which I know my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester is concerned about; it is in his amendment. It is not necessary to put a separate offence of attempting to spike in the Bill, because it is captured as an inchoate offence under section 1(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which covers all forms of attempt of a crime that is on the statute book. I hope that provides some reassurance.

I thank Members on all sides of the House for their engagement in the Bill, their joint commitment to its successful development as legislation that enhances our criminal justice system, and that delivers robust protection, appropriate penalties and a better framework of justice for the public. Our Government amendments achieve that, and I will respond in due course to Members’ views. I commend the amendments and new clauses to the House.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the Opposition spokesperson.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

We are finally here, 18 weeks since Committee stage was completed. The Government are running scared, not just from us on the Opposition Benches but from their own Members. We very much welcome the huge piles of concessions made and the clauses withdrawn. I give credit to Members across the Benches for holding the Government to account. Surely, the Bill must be one of the best examples ever of how not to create new legislation, with dozens of Government amendments in Committee and now dozens more on Report, as well as many new clauses from Ministers. By Friday evening there were as many as 70 pages of them from the Government alone.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

Before we proceed, I would like to make a couple of observations. These are very serious and sensitive issues that deserve, and are clearly going to get, proper debate. In his closing remarks, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) indicated that there are two days for this debate. Earlier, an hon. Member intervened on the Minister to raise a subject that she had not commented upon. There was a good reason for that: it is listed not on the order paper for today but on the order paper for the second day. I ask hon. Members to make quite sure that, when they are discussing these issues, they are discussing those listed on the order paper for today, in the understanding that there will be a second day.

There are 18 hon. Members wishing to speak. I may have missed one, so there may be more. At the moment, we have plenty of time but may I gently urge conciseness rather than self-indulgence? That relates particularly to interventions, which should be interventions and not speeches.

I call the Chair of the Women and Equalities Committee.

[Caroline Nokes]

I rise to speak to amendment 160, tabled in my name and supported by members of the Women and Equalities Committee, and other colleagues across the House. I will endeavour to be as brief as I can and I reassure everybody that the amendment is on the order paper for today.

I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for her comments on deepfakes. There has been a problem: someone like Taylor Swift can get a deepfake made using their image taken down very quickly, but for ordinary women, or indeed men, from across the UK, who are not famous and do not have a platform, it is very difficult to get deepfake imagery removed. I welcome the steps the Government are taking on that.

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), for his comments about the amendment. I was not aware that the Opposition were planning to support it, so I thank him for that. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to pay close attention to what I and other members of my Select Committee will say about the amendment. I recognise that the amendment comes at the eleventh hour, on Report, for which I apologise to my hon. Friend. The reason for that is specifically because of the evidence the Committee heard last week, both in private and in public, from victims of revenge porn.

I welcome the changes that have been brought in under the Online Safety Act to support victims of non-consensual intimate image abuse. However, from the evidence we heard, it is clear that the legislation, in its current form, does not go far enough. It does not give Ofcom the teeth it needs to effectively tackle the fast-spreading, uncontrollable virus that is non-consensual intimate image abuse. It does not force platforms to remove harmful content in its entirety, or require internet service providers to block access to it. In short, it does not make the content itself illegal. The sharing of it is illegal but, even if there is a criminal conviction, the content itself is not regarded as illegal content.

Last week, the Women and Equalities Committee heard from a number of survivors of non-consensual intimate image abuse. In sharing their experiences with us, they have spoken of the catastrophic damage the abuse has had on their lives, confidence and relationships. They told us of their fear of applying for jobs, meeting new people or daring to have any social media presence at all. With all their cases, there was a common theme: even though they had secured a conviction against their perpetrator, their non-consensual content continues to circulate on the internet. Despite relentless work by organisations, such as the Revenge Porn Helpline, to report the content and get it taken down, there is no legal obligation for platforms to remove it.

[Caroline Nokes]

My right hon. Friend’s point is exactly right that the issue is consent. In my view, when images are non-consensual, they should be regarded in the same way as if the individual had been digitally raped.

There are also many thousands of cases where a conviction has not been achieved or even sought, where the victim just wants the content taken down or blocked. They too are being denied that peace of mind due to gaps in the current legislative framework. The amendment calls for non-consensual intimate photographs or film to be added to the list of “priority offences” in the Online Safety Act, thus making it “priority illegal content”. The amendment would ensure that non-consensual content, regardless of whether or not a conviction had been achieved, would be, by its non-consensual intimate nature, illegal. It would place duties on platforms to remove it, and require internet service providers to block access to non-compliant sites and platforms, including those hosted outside the UK.

That is precisely the way in which child sexual abuse material is handled. Children cannot provide consent and the adults in these images have not provided their consent for them to be taken, shared or both, so why should the content be treated so differently? Indeed, when the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) put it to my hon. Friend the Minister during her recent appearance before my Committee, that adult content should be handled in the same way as child sexual abuse material, via a registry to identify, classify and therefore allow for the removal of non-consensual intimate images, the Minister said it would be “a very good idea”. In order to do that, we need to make the content illegal.

It is important to note that intimate imagery does not just refer to photos and videos that are sexually explicit. Indeed, as we heard from David Wright, chief executive of South West Grid for Learning, which runs the Revenge Porn Helpline, within certain countries and cultures, being photographed with an arm around somebody or being filmed without a hijab can have catastrophic implications for a woman. That is why it is so important that any legislative change uses the term “intimate”, not “sexual”, when referring to non-consensual content.

Last week, we heard evidence from Georgia Harrison, who famously was the victim of revenge porn perpetrated by her then partner, Stephen Bear, who later received a criminal conviction for his actions and was sent to prison. Georgia made the point repeatedly that what happened was like “a house fire”, because when the images went up they spread very quickly. The solution was to get them taken down as quickly as possible so that they would not proliferate. The Committee described it as being like a virus that spreads out of control. The issue is not just about Georgia Harrison or famous women who have a platform they can use to ensure their voice is heard.

We also heard from an anonymous victim of Operation Makedom. In that case, the perpetrator had many thousands of victims. He received a 32-year prison sentence, but that young woman is too afraid to have any sort of social media presence because she is terrified that her image will be seen and put through reverse image searches so she will be identified as a victim. Thousands and thousands of the Operation Makedom images still proliferate online and nothing can be done about that because the content itself is not illegal. It remains online and accessible for people in the UK, despite that 32-year prison sentence. That cannot be right. We will be letting down the victims of that abuse, and all other cases of non-consensual intimate image abuse, if we fail to act.

My final point to the Minister is that we also heard about the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and the fact that intimate image abuse is not on its list as a violent crime. When someone applies to the authority, expecting or hoping for some small nugget of compensation—a message in effect that they are a victim, they can put the blame and shame to one side, and they have been a victim of a criminal act—that is not even there for them. I have no doubt that is because the list of violent criminal offences was dreamt up many moons ago and intimate image abuse simply has not been added to it. It should be added to the list. As I said earlier, for a woman, or indeed a man, who has had their intimate images put online, circulated freely and proliferated all over the place, that is like digital rape. It is a rape that continues day after day, to be brutally honest, with no end in sight.

Those are the reasons why my Committee has tabled this amendment and why we urge Members to support it and give it serious consideration. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to make some comments from the Dispatch Box that might indicate how the MOJ can incorporate such provisions into existing law. If the message coming back to me is that the content is already illegal, I must say that it is not. We must find better ways of getting it down from online platforms.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesman.