Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 3rd July 2018
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Monday 16th July 2018
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, treating people with respect and dignity, no matter what their disability or condition, are touchstones of our civilised society. Those are virtues that we all seek to promote, but sometimes, even with the best intentions, they do not always materialise. For that reason, the Government have now introduced legislation to reform and improve the current deprivation of liberty safeguards system. It is fitting that we do so in the month when we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the NHS, an institution founded on those and other virtues, which have sustained it as one of the most successful and respected health and care systems in the world.
Deprivation of liberty safeguards seek to empower and protect vulnerable people in our society by ensuring that any deprivation of the liberty of people who lack capacity is always in their best interests. It is a step that is never taken lightly and always with the intent to prevent harm to the individual. Even in cases where a person who lacks capacity is unable to make decisions, there is an express duty for all involved to consider their views and wishes as far as they can be determined. Despite the existence and undeniable necessity of these protections in our society, the deprivation of liberty safeguards system as it stands today is overly technical and legalistic, placing significant burdens on people and their families. It too often fails to achieve positive outcomes for those at the heart of this process, and we too often hear that individuals, families and their carers are experiencing a process that feels “done to them” rather than with their full consent and engagement. People’s voices, and those who care for them, are not being heard; this needs to change.
What is more, report after report has provided strong evidence of the strain the system is under and of unacceptable inefficiencies. It is costly and cumbersome, and in its current state is unable to process all the necessary applications to protect human rights. Last year, reports showed that more than 108,000 people were awaiting a deprivation of liberty safeguards application; again, this needs to change.
Many noble Lords have worked hard on this issue for years, and I would like to take the opportunity to thank them for continuing to shine a light on a system in urgent need of reform. In 2014, a House of Lords Select Committee published a detailed report which concluded that deprivation of liberty safeguards were “not fit for purpose”. Again in 2017, the chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for whose tireless commitment I am especially grateful—and I am delighted to see that her train got her here in time—reported that the current system was overly complex, excessively bureaucratic and costly. More recently, the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act: Interim Report, led by Professor Sir Simon Wessely, stressed the need for,
“an appropriate calibration between resources spent on delivery of care and those spent on safeguards surrounding the delivery of that care”.
We have listened and, following a Government commission, in March 2017 the Law Commission published a review of the deprivation of liberty safeguards and Mental Capacity Act. Over three years, the Law Commission sought views from a breadth of stakeholders, exposing the system’s struggles as well as looking at the process from a user’s perspective. The evidence, analysis and recommendations, drawn from across the system, have provided further impetus for reform. In March this year, the Government published their response to the report, accepting in principle the Law Commission’s model. Since the publication of the Law Commission’s review, the Government have continued to work closely with stakeholders and we have listened carefully to them to build on that model, streamlining it to focus on the crucial protections that this Bill seeks to mandate.
The Bill will reform the process so that it is less burdensome on people, carers, families and local authorities. Not only will it ease financial burdens throughout the system, creating significant savings of more than £200 million a year which will mainly fall to local authorities, but according to the Law Commission, it will also relieve local authorities of the significant legal liability burden of more than £408 million by removing the backlog of deprivation of liberty safeguards applications. It will introduce a simpler process with increased engagement with families and other carers, and afford swifter access to justice. It will ensure that any restrictions are proportionate and help to support cared-for persons to live as freely as they can by protecting their liberty. It will allow the NHS rather than local authorities to authorise the deprivation of liberty arrangements for its own patients, enabling a more streamlined and clearly accountable process in which the NHS has a clear role in helping to afford people their rights.
The Bill will make sure that consideration of restrictions on people’s liberties will be part of their overall care planning and considered from the earliest stages, rather than a bolt-on afterthought as under the current system. The Bill will also eliminate repeat assessments and authorisations when someone moves between a care home, hospital and ambulance as part of their treatment. In the words of Law Commissioner Nicholas Paines QC:
“This new legislation … will go a long way towards addressing the flaws of the current system and better protect the most vulnerable in our society”.
The president of the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, Glen Garrod, has also indicated support for the Bill, observing that:
“Once enacted, it is hoped that this law will help ensure the protection of liberty of all people who lack mental capacity more effectively and efficiently than under the present Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards”.
Finally, before beginning debate on the Bill, I want to recount the seminal case study that underlines the importance of the legislation before us. It illustrates the role that this law plays in our society when protecting and empowering people. It illustrates the need to put individuals, carers and family members at the heart of a system, and reminds us that the framework fundamentally exists to ensure that vulnerable people are cared for and looked after. A man—HL—came to live with Mr and Mrs E, his carers, under a resettlement scheme from Bournewood Hospital, where he had lived for 32 years. HL’s carers found it rewarding to see him benefit from living in a family setting. Gradually, he became more confident and progressed beyond all expectations. HL would attend a day centre once a week, to which he travelled with the centre’s transport.
However, on one occasion, the usual driver did not collect him from home. Rather than taking him straight to the day centre as normal, the driver took a different route. HL became increasingly agitated. The next thing Mr and Mrs E knew was that HL had been taken back into hospital and detained there. As HL cannot speak, he was unable to object. Mr and Mrs E were not allowed to visit him, apparently in case he wanted to leave with them. When HL returned after various legal proceedings he was “in a terrible state”, in the words of his carers. Eventually, a legal case brought to the European Court of Human Rights found that HL was being deprived of his liberty without the necessary legal safeguards. This ruling triggered the introduction of deprivation of liberty safeguards in 2009. The story emphasises the importance of this system and that a rights and person-centred approach is needed to deliver better public services for everyone. Up to 2 million people in our society have impaired capacity, so many of us in this Chamber will have had direct experience of it among our family and friends. It is essential that the system affords the necessary protections for the most vulnerable people.
To conclude, we have an opportunity to transform the deprivation of liberty safeguards process, improve access to human rights, support families, carers and individuals and reduce pressures on the health and care system. We have an opportunity to bring about change and I look forward to working with noble Lords to make sure that we use this opportunity to improve the welfare of some of society’s most vulnerable people. I beg to move.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, a recent report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights called for a statutory definition of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty. The Bill does not offer such a definition. If it did, we would have clarity for families and front-line professionals; without it, there is a risk. We are reminded in an excellent paper from the Library that the Law Commission, which reviewed the existing legislation, concluded that the deprivation of liberty safeguards failed to offer sufficient protection of the rights of those deprived of liberty. Indeed, all too often, according to the report, it had been “theoretical and illusory”.
The Bill widens the number of living arrangements that are covered by the current deprivation of liberty safeguards system to include any setting. For it to apply, an individual must be aged 18 or over, lack capacity to consent to the living arrangement and be of unsound mind. To be authorised by a council or hospital, the living arrangement must be “necessary and proportionate”. There are also proposals for consultation on the living arrangements and for a “pre-authorisation review”. Assessments under the proposals will be carried out by councils or hospitals unless the individual lives in a care home, in which case it would be carried out by the care home manager. The last criterion would include autistic people who live in residential care. In a response to the Law Commission, the National Autistic Society, of which I am a vice-president, welcomed the attempts to create a simplified administrative regime that could tackle the significant delays in the current system.
However, many concerns remain. In its current form, the Bill does not adequately secure the rights of autistic people. Under the current deprivation of liberty safeguards system, a deprivation of liberty needs to be in an individual’s best interests for it to be authorised. The Bill moves away from best interests. Why does it do that? Instead, to be authorised, a living arrangement must be “necessary and proportionate”. The new criteria risk losing sight of what is best for the individual and what the individual wants. Let us be wary of enacting legislation that pays scant regard to the individual, in particular an individual who, in the context of the Bill, is perhaps the most vulnerable in society.
There is a duty to consult on care arrangements. The Bill says that the purpose of this consultation is to ascertain the individual’s wishes. However, the list at paragraph 17(2) of Schedule 1 omits the individual altogether. Although an autistic person might lack capacity to decide about living arrangements, their preferences or wishes should be an important factor in any decision about their lives. I am not sure what a decision-maker is expected to do with the results of this consultation. It is not made clear whether this is part of a determination that an arrangement is “necessary and proportionate”. This needs to be clarified. I hope that it will be.
The National Autistic Society echoes concerns expressed by Mencap that this removes the rights of deputies or lasting powers of attorney to refuse the authorisation of a deprivation of liberty. Overall, the lack of inclusion of best interests, the lack of interest in trying to ascertain what the individual wants and the removal of the rights of deputies or lasting powers of attorney is most definitely a backward step in putting the individual at the centre of any decision-making process. The Bill surely should enshrine individuals’ best interests, as did the Law Commission’s proposals. The role of these interests within a determination about a deprivation of liberty must be clarified and I hope that it will be.
A pre-authorisation review is required in the Bill to agree to a deprivation of liberty. It says that this should be carried out by someone who is not involved in day-to-day care of the individual. However, the wording causes me concern. As drafted, it is not strong enough to secure independence. It will be carried out by an independent approved mental capacity professional only if it is reasonable to believe that the individual does not want to live in that arrangement. It is unclear how the reasonableness of this will be determined. The wording is too weak to secure the rights of autistic people who might lack capacity. Even more astounding, there is no duty whatever for the person carrying out a review to have met the individual whose case this person is reviewing. This simply cannot be right. The Bill must require independent reviews by an approved mental capacity professional in all circumstances.
If an individual resides in a care home the Bill’s requirements to carry out an assessment and consultation fall to the care home manager. While this would relieve some of the administrative burden on councils and hospitals, the National Autistic Society is concerned, and rightly so. First, the administrative burden will simply shift to care home managers, who are already stretched and may not have received the training needed to carry out these tasks. Secondly, the process in the Bill does not adequately safeguard against these assessments being, in effect, rubber-stamped by councils and hospitals, particularly while the duties around pre-authorisation reviews are so weak. This could lead to a conflict of interest, whereby care home managers are de facto authorisers of deprivations of liberty. The Government should consult more widely on this. Surely we need much more consultation.
The Bill requires that an authorisation can last up to 12 months. At the end of this period, it can be renewed for another 12 months or less. However, subsequent renewals may last for up to three years. Under the Care Act 2014, reviews of care and support plans should take place annually. Any deprivation of liberty should be considered within these reviews. It would be far more appropriate to allow for ongoing renewals of up to one year, to align more closely with care and support planning. I hope the Bill might be amended so that we can provide for 12-monthly reviews.
All individuals and their appropriate person should be able to access support from an independent mental capacity adviser with the right skills to challenge unnecessary deprivation of liberty. This is currently not in the Bill. Rights to independent mental capacity advisers should be extended to cover all individuals.
There is much to be concerned about in this Bill. I really hope the Government are in listening mode. They certainly need to be.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I am not saying that some Members of your Lordships’ House are not veterans on this subject, but I came in today with my hard copy of the Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards—Code of Practice. I may be the only person who has one, but I went back to look at it over the weekend in preparation for this. I am very glad to be taking part in this debate, alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, who will bring to it her fresh eyes: I think that that perhaps shows one of the great strengths of your Lordships’ House.
I start by saying that the legislation we are considering came about because a vulnerable adult, HL, was detained in a place he did not want to be and which his carers knew was not right for him. It turned out that he had fewer safeguards than someone who had been sectioned under the Mental Health Act, or who had been detained under the criminal justice system. As we dive into the detail of what is inevitably quite a technical Bill, I urge us all to keep that person, and the hundreds of thousands of people like him, in mind. As we look at a piece of legislation that is essentially more than a decade old we need to think about updating this legislation in light of changes in society. We know that by 2030 there will be 2 million people over the age of 65 who are ageing without children: they will not have close family members to look after their interests. I rather think that our acid test ought to be whether we think that what is being proposed will look after those people.
It has been apparent since 2007—we should bear it in mind that the legislation we are talking about was not part of the Mental Capacity Act but part of the mental health legislation—that the safeguards have been poorly understood and practised. That is because the two pieces of legislation do not work well together or, indeed, at all. The mental health legislation rests on the judgment and expertise of individuals, saying ultimately what they believe to be right for the safety of other people. The Mental Capacity Act is instead based around the principles of autonomy, empowerment and the importance of supporting decision-making. Mental health legislation is very strictly overseen by statutory oversight bodies. The Mental Capacity Act never has been and therefore it is not surprising that when it has been implemented, it has been implemented very patchily and has been reliant largely upon the dedication of interested professionals.
Noble Lords will have had a number of briefings which talk about the welcome extension of these safeguards to settings such as care settings. I do not have a problem with that; in fact, I welcome it. I think many care facilities, particularly those run by charities, which have long and dedicated experience in looking after people with learning disabilities, will implement this extremely well, but they will do so without sufficient oversight or a sufficient guarantee that if they do not do their job properly the people concerned and their carers will have the relevant access to information and right of appeal. If the Government had intended to sort out this fundamental issue that has been hanging around for 20 years, they would have waited until the current review of the mental health legislation, which is being carried out by Sir Simon Wesley and which is inevitably looking at DoLS, had been concluded, but they have not.
Unlike the Law Commission, which took great care to consult on its proposals, the Government have come forward with this piece of legislation on which there has been very little consultation. It is quite clear that the Government have gone through the Law Commission legislation and selectively picked pieces out of it, when in fact the Law Commission was trying to bring together a whole package of measures which, taken as a whole, would have been a robust defence of the liberty of individuals. So my first question to the Minister is: why this legislation and why now? Why not wait until the mental health legislation is reviewed? Why not have a consultation on which people with interests, such as the parents or the families of people who have been detained, could talk about what has gone wrong and what has not worked in the current system? I say to the Minister that if the hurry is about saving money, that is something your Lordships’ House will have to bear in mind as we scrutinise the Bill.
The Select Committee which reviewed the implementation of the Act, on which I sat, was concerned about very patchy introduction. We were right. We now have the figures, which show that in some parts of the country the waiting time for having one of these assessments done is longer than the time for which somebody is supposed to be detained. There is no doubt that this has to be changed. But the changes which the Government are choosing to bring in do not strike me as being sufficiently robust. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, began to outline some of the main areas of concern.
There is also concern about the limiting of legal aid. I hope that other noble Lords, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, will perhaps look at the limitation of legal aid. We are all in favour of having a system in which fewer people need to go to court fewer times, but when they do have to go to court they need to be able to be properly represented. Very few of them are in a position to represent themselves against local authorities or other authorities which have access to their own legal services. I would like us to look at that.
Secondly, the new definition of “proportionate” does not adequately reflect the best-interest tests that were in the original legislation. That is a severe problem. I understand, and noble Lords will appreciate, the desire to cut down on repetitious assessments and so on, but there is a danger that we might end up with decisions being made about a person’s capacity to make one decision which rest on information that was gathered for a wholly different purpose. That would not be right. I also think we have missed a trick in relation to the recognition that there are a number of people whose capacity to make decisions fluctuates. The Law Commission recommendation on that subject has not been picked up in the Bill.
Finally, I do not doubt for a moment that the Government have good intentions but there are several areas in which the detail of the Bill is deficient. We should also bear in mind the strong possibility that people who found themselves in the position that HL did all those years ago may not have the protection of the European Court of Human Rights in the future. Therefore, it is incumbent upon people in this Parliament to make sure that the human rights of those people enjoy greater safeguards than they have ever done in domestic legislation before. For those reasons, I conclude that the Bill before us is extremely flawed and deficient. I suggest that your Lordships bring their considerable experience and expertise to bear to change it radically before it goes to another place.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I must declare my interest, having chaired the National Mental Capacity Forum for almost three years, and having drawn attention, in March 2015, to the urgency of deprivation of liberty safeguards reform.
The Bill has had a long gestation period. Regarding the Bournewood gap—the history of which was outlined by the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—we tried to ensure compliance with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights in relation to those with impaired capacity who are unable to consent to their living and care arrangements. We should have been more vocal about our reservations when that legislation went through in 2008, because it focused on deprivation of liberty and seemed to ignore P’s security and empowerment.
The Cheshire West judgment of 2014 resulted in huge increases year on year in the number of people with impaired capacity identified as being deprived of their liberty in one way or another. Therefore, without the deprivation of liberty safeguards, their arrangements constitute an illegal deprivation. As the Minister said, last year more than 108,000 people were referred for DoLS assessments. Many of them are still waiting and more have joined that list. They are all illegally detained and the time delay for DoLS assessment has lengthened year on year. The bureaucracy of the current system is crippling, with six separate assessments needed, which can leave the person, P, feeling confused and unable to understand what is happening or why they are being asked personal questions by a stranger. The burden on adult social care is overwhelming. It would need around £2 billion injected just to clear the backlog, but that would still not solve the problem. The administrative processes themselves need urgent reform, and the vulnerable need better protection and better access to justice.
A little history is relevant here. The House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny Select Committee report of March 2014, which stated that the DoLS provisions are not fit for purpose, led to the Law Commission review that Tim Spencer-Lane has been leading. This is the widest consultation that the Law Commission has ever undertaken, travelling the length and breadth of the country to take evidence from as many as wanted to offer it, and I was privileged to be able to sit in on some of those sessions. The Law Commission’s consultation and draft Bill have fed directly into the Bill before us, as Tim Spencer-Lane has been working closely with officials. There has been continuity through the system, which I think is not widely known to people.
Chairing the National Mental Capacity Forum, I have asked many in health and social care how many people have had improved care as a result of DoLS. The estimates are usually around 4% and have ranged from around 3% to 8%, so for all this bureaucracy and expense, fewer than one in 20 has clear better outcomes from the current process. A placebo response for an intervention can be expected in about 20% of people. We would not allow a medical or surgical intervention that fared worse than placebo in improving outcomes, so why put people through these burdensome assessments when we have no evidence of benefit?
Around 2 million people with impaired capacity stand to benefit from the Bill. Importantly, when DoLS has improved care, it seems that this has been through a revised care plan. The best interest assessors who are bringing about improvements will need greater powers as independent mental capacity professionals to target prospectively those thought to be at risk and not depend on referrals from providers once a person is in care. Can the Minister explain how these professionals’ greater powers to protect those at risk will work and how this new system will relate to safeguarding and the processes around it?
This focus in the Bill is on the care plan, and it returns to the core principles of the Mental Capacity Act. Whether in hospital or a care home, those overseeing care are directly responsible for the care plan and for ensuring that, compliant with the empowering ethos of the Mental Capacity Act, the arrangements are the least restrictive option. The restrictions must be necessary and proportionate to ensuring that any deprivation of liberty is justifiable for P’s security, while allowing them as much independent and enjoyable living as possible. In developing a care plan, P’s wishes and feelings must be taken into account. P must be supported to take as many of the decisions over care as P is able to, and they must be involved. This builds on the important amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, introduced into the Mental Capacity Act 2005, establishing the place for an advance statement of wishes. That becomes particularly important for people with fluctuating capacity. Can the Minister provide assurance that this will be stressed in the code of practice whenever a best interest decision is taken, whether by health and social care staff or by a donee of lasting power of attorney for P?
The focus is on liberty protection irrespective of how care is funded, and that is welcome. Liberty protection safeguards are rightly so named and their portability makes sense because the care plan detailing how liberty is protected refers to P. Of course, the care plan must also be dynamic and revised appropriately. Will the Care Quality Commission be responsible for inspecting whether the liberty protection safeguards are dynamic and portable, with a review triggered if circumstances change, particularly for those with learning difficulties and other stable conditions, if an LPS has been signed off in the longer term for three years? In other words: if things change, everything changes.
Those who know P best—the family and those important to P—must be consulted, not sidelined as has happened sometimes with DoLS. Can the Minister confirm that the code of practice will signpost the involvement of expert assessment of those with speech and language difficulties, who are too often labelled as having impaired capacity because they have appeared unable to communicate?
The changes will allow social work staff to concentrate on the most vulnerable, freeing them up to provide person-focused training, so that on a day-to-day basis staff can support P better in making decisions and understand the importance of doing all that they can to involve P in decisions that need to be taken on his or her behalf.
In 2014-15, the year after Cheshire West, the cost to councils rose by more than £98 million, and it has risen further year on year. That backlog now needs £2 billion just to clear it. Will the Government undertake to review, after two years, that futile bureaucracy and duplication has been cut and tangible benefit to P increased?
The code of practice will be important in ensuring that care plans are properly devised and properly reviewed, both regularly and frequently. It will make care providers’ decisions more proportionate, through the emphasis on protecting liberty rather than risk-averse attitudes by providers. Concerns have been voiced about the care home sector’s ability to assess P, yet we rely on these staff day to day. I hope that there will now be mandatory training of all health and social care staff, not just care home staff, in all aspects of the Mental Capacity Act. Mandatory training is long overdue.
I hope that the Minister can assure the House that the code of practice will be developed quickly to address concerns that have been raised about the Bill. One of the most contentious is how liberty is defined, as has already been alluded to. It is important to differentiate disorders that have impaired a person’s liberty—post head injury; post meningitis; the dementias; learning difficulties; delirium, whatever the cause; the list goes on—from actions taken by those responsible for care that deprive P of liberty. Such actions must be justified as being the least restrictive options and designed to allow P’s liberty to be maximised and protected. Given the difficulties with a universally applicable definition, I hope that clarification can be included in the code of practice; that may be safer than trying to come up with something in the Bill.
The term “of unsound mind”, although current legal language—I recognise that it comes from the ECHR—is outdated and stigmatising and may benefit from better wording.
There is a concern that those aged 16 and upwards should be brought into the remit of liberty protection safeguards for consistency, even if they are in education, because transition can be a difficult time for those people and their families.
I hope that concerns about the Bill can be resolved rapidly, because this Bill is urgently needed. I remind the House of the five core principles of the Mental Capacity Act: capacity should be assumed until it can be shown why it is not present; all support must be given for decisions by P; people can make unwise decisions; when capacity is lacking, any decision must be in P’s best interests; and any such decision must be the least restrictive option.
This Bill is an add-on to the Mental Capacity Act; it does not replace it.
Baroness Barran (Con) (Maiden Speech)
It is a huge honour and privilege to address your Lordships’ House today. I would like to start by thanking your Lordships for the very warm welcome that I have received from everyone on all sides of the House. I am grateful to Black Rod and her team for their care and attention to detail, and particularly to the doorkeepers who have manoeuvred me to the right side of the Chamber with a tactful “Where are you planning to sit, my Lady?”, or gently explained that “Morning” and “Afternoon” take on a whole new meaning in your Lordships’ House.
My supporters, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, were superb at putting me at my ease during my introduction, and my noble friend Lord Sherbourne has been masterly in answering my questions with the utmost patience and encouragement. And encouragement is the word that best sums up the past two weeks. All your Lordships have been consistently, and at times almost fiercely, encouraging, and I feel extraordinarily lucky to be here.
Prior to joining this House, I worked for over 20 years in the City, founding one of the first European hedge funds, before going on to advise philanthropists and foundations on their charitable giving, as well as joining the boards of Comic Relief, the Henry Smith Charity and, most recently, the Royal Foundation.
Fifteen years ago, my life changed course when I asked several small charities what they thought was the biggest human problem that was the hardest to raise money for. They all gave me the same answer: domestic violence and abuse. As a result, the charity SafeLives was born on my kitchen table in 2004, with a focus on keeping victims and children safe in their homes wherever possible and holding perpetrators of abuse to account while still helping them to change. As chief executive, I worked with voluntary and statutory agencies across the fields of criminal justice, substance use, mental health, social care, children’s charities and the family courts. I was guided by many victims and survivors of domestic abuse, and today I pay tribute to their extraordinary courage.
Throughout, I have been supported by some exceptional mentors and have had the chance to try to tackle some truly important problems. I think I am safe in expecting that both those things will continue in this House.
Very high up on the list of important problems that this Bill seeks to address is that of when and how to deprive someone who lacks mental capacity of their liberty while upholding their rights. In preparing this speech, I spoke to several organisations working in this field: L’Arche UK, Shared Lives Plus and Gentoo. As a non-lawyer, I focused on the practical aspects of how the Bill will work and asked them all, “What works least well with the current Act in relation to deprivation of liberty safeguards, or DoLS?” One person smiled and said, “Try and imagine doing this. We put an automatic reminder on our calendars every month to write to the local authority to authorise the DoLS. We rarely, if ever, hear back. If we don’t do it, we’re penalised by the CQC in our inspection”. They all highlighted practical problems with apparently pointless bureaucracy, a lack of consideration of the feelings of friends, families and carers, a disconnect between the views of social care and health professionals, and a lack of capacity to provide independent mental capacity advocates. They spoke of their frustration at an opportunity missed to protect vulnerable people, with an apparently uniform and blunt approach.
I believe that the Bill goes some significant way to addressing those concerns. There is a clear intention to simplify the bureaucracy involved and to listen to the views of families, friends and those who know and care for the individual, while providing more skilled resource to resolve the most complex cases. Welcome, too, are other practical aspects—the portability of the authorisations between settings and the extension of their duration from one to three years.
However, the key to success with this Bill when it becomes law will lie in the quality of its implementation. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it is both helpful and necessary to give the responsible bodies and care providers absolute clarity, through the code of practice, about the Government’s expectations of them, particularly regarding those sections that aim to give agency and protection to those impacted by this legislation? I refer, in particular, to the training, qualifications and availability of IMCAs and approved mental capacity professionals as well as to the need to give timely responses when renewing authorisations and in the case of an appeal. This would give assurance to the family and carers of those lacking capacity that their rights and wishes will be upheld as well as their needs met.
The novelist and Nobel Prize winner Pearl Buck said:
“The test of a civilisation is in the way that it cares for its helpless members”.
I am sure that your Lordships will agree that this Bill and how it is implemented locally go to the very heart of that test.
Baroness Greengross (CB)
My Lords, it has been a real privilege to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, give her maiden speech. I enjoyed listening to her, and I think that we will all benefit enormously from her experience and her commitment to vulnerable people. I share that passion, so I hope we can do a lot of work together. She brings such a lot of important experience to this House. She has worked for many years to make a difference to the lives of a huge number of vulnerable people. I share her passion to eliminate domestic abuse and other forms of abuse and I hope that we can do some work together in future. I have worked in the field, particularly among abused older people, and the noble Baroness has done a lot of work among people of all ages. I have heard that she has four children and I have four children. I wonder whether there is a connection that brings our interests together because we know what bringing up a large family means. I wish her every success. I am sure that she will enjoy being in the House. I—like, I think, everybody listening to her today—look forward to working closely with her and gaining from her very valuable experience and commitment to people who are vulnerable and who need help and advice from her and from all of us.
I welcome the Bill, which has many positive features. It includes a lot more person-centred care planning, it attempts to reduce bureaucracy and it provides clarity around responsibilities for those closest to the delivery of day-to-day care. I acknowledge that there are omissions. Noble Lords who have spoken have pointed them out. We will concentrate on them as the Bill goes through our House.
Recognition that the system in its current form is overly technical and legalistic is long overdue. Indeed, in her letter to the All-Party Group on Dementia, which I co-chair, the Minister, Caroline Dinenage MP, remarked that the current system places too heavy a burden on people and their families and too often fails to achieve the positive outcomes that underpin the purpose of the process. I agree, and our committee will do all we can to help her make the Bill work and improve its outcomes, and I look forward to working with the Minister in your Lordships’ House to make that happen.
In 2013 our Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 found that its provisions were inadequate and left those deprived of liberty without adequate protection. The committee felt that the provisions were poorly drafted, overly complex and bore no relation to the language and ethos of the Mental Capacity Act. The safeguards are not well understood and are poorly implemented. With this legislation, the appropriate delicate balance has to be struck between the protection and empowerment of individuals, who may lack the mental capacity to make their own decisions about their care and treatment, and the duty of care to staff, other patients and the public at large that the state has to protect them from the behaviour of people who may not be fully responsible for their actions.
I am not fully certain that in the Bill, despite the Government’s best efforts, we have got the balance entirely correct. Noble Lords will be aware that I am committed to promoting human rights for vulnerable people, so I welcome anything that seeks to drive up standards and accountability in the social care sector. I have been contacted by a social worker and co-ordinator from south Wales who is concerned that the new scheme, with its significant increase in legally prescribed duties for social workers, has not been fully discussed with leaders in the care provider sector. Indeed, he feels that many care home staff are scarcely aware of it and will be very concerned about these changes as they may not be well informed enough to make the crucial decisions that will be needed. He feels that the lessons of the patchy implementation of the Mental Capacity Act to date have not been properly studied and that it may be that all we do is simply transfer the burden, backlog and chaos from statutory bodies to unprepared care homes. Could the Minister reassure us that, in his view, there has been appropriate consultation within the care sector?
I also share the reservations expressed by the charity VoiceAbility about the lack of weight given by the Act to the wishes, feelings and views of the cared-for person or their family and carers, with concerns about how compliant with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights the new scheme is. Under the Bill, the right to refuse a deprivation of liberty safeguard by a lasting power of attorney or a deputy has been removed, so we have concerns that the rights and safeguards for the cared-for person might be diminished by the Bill.
It is good news that £200 million a year will be saved by local authorities. However, we have to suppose that the increased role of NHS and independent sector providers will lead to increased costs elsewhere, while the new responsibilities being imposed on care homes, hospitals and CCGs will need some thought, resources and training. For example, the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists argues that assessors often do not recognise or know how to support communication difficulties. One can envisage that this could be a real problem if English is not the first language of the patient or their family.
As a vice-chair of the Local Government Association, I share its assessment that the transition to the new framework and its future framework implementation should receive additional resources to reflect the additional costs that may be associated with the change. I also share the view of ADASS that a period of transition is likely to be needed to enable hearth and care staff to adapt to the new system. I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us on these points, that an appropriate cost-benefit analysis of the changes will be in place and that the training and integration aspects have also been fully thought through and costed.
I have one or two other reservations. I do not think it unreasonable to ask the Minister to explain why, when the Bill so closely follows the recent proposals from the Law Commission, it differs from them in several significant respects. For example, the regime applies only to those who are 18 and over although the Law Commission argued that LPSs should apply to 16 and 17 year-olds because it feels that the current regime is inadequate and is failing to protect the rights of some young people. The Government said they accepted this recommendation in principle but would,
“need to consider in more detail this recommendation’s practical application and implementation”.
Turning to older people, I welcome the inclusion of a new special procedure for care homes within the scheme, which gives them greater responsibility for arranging the assessments of people who may lack capacity from dementia. As much as I welcome this change, I share Age UK’s concern that provision must be made to ensure that care home managers have the training and resources to be able to clear the significant backlog of assessments under the Bill’s provisions.
In my view, the Bill should set out a specific route for authorisations within a person’s home. Can the Minister assist the House by explaining how he sees at-home assessments working? I note that the new system retains the distinction that, where an individual who could be detained under the Mental Health Act objects to being detained, they cannot be made subject to an authorisation under new Schedule AA1. I also share the concern of the Alzheimer’s Society that the current interface between the Mental Health Act and the DoLS process for authorising deprivation of liberty within the Mental Capacity Act is a key issue for people living with dementia.
Lastly, the Bill makes provision for the introduction of approved mental capacity professionals, who must carry out the pre-authorisation review and determine whether the authorisation conditions are met. This role replaces the best interest assessors’ role under the Mental Capacity Act. However, the Bill and the Explanatory Notes do not detail which professionals could act in this new role and how they interact with other clinicians. I know that the General Medical Council sees potential for conflict between its regulatory standards and the proposed legal requirements. It has called for more clarity about doctors’ roles and responsibilities in such a challenging area. Perhaps the Minister could explain a little more about how and when the Government plan to firm up the status and context of this important role.
In closing, we must find a way to define deprivation of liberty more clearly. The JCHR’s view is that this is needed to clarify the application of the Supreme Court’s acid test, which sets out questions that must be considered when determining whether an adult who has been assessed as lacking the capacity to consent is being deprived of their liberty. Without a clear definition, there is a risk that the Bill will be unworkable, particularly in domestic settings. The development of the LPS must also be considered in the wider context of other issues within the health and social care system, such as the upcoming Green Paper on care and support reform and the independent review of the Mental Health Act.
The Government need to act speedily to ensure that the rights of this group of very vulnerable people are clarified and that their needs are met quickly. They are not in a position to wait any longer.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to be speaking in this debate, conscious that I am a novice in this area of mental health legislation but very grateful that there are so many other noble Lords across the House with deep expertise in it. To start on a positive note, I welcome the intent behind the Bill and believe that it goes some way towards ensuring that the current high levels of bureaucracy, workforce hours and cost that have been a part of mental capacity assessments since the Supreme Court ruling in the Cheshire West case are offset by a more balanced ability to plan and deliver timely care while still safeguarding patients.
However, I have real concerns about its timing and its interaction with the Mental Health Act, and because it is silent on some of the key recommendations of the Law Commission report. I hope that at the end of this debate, the Minister will provide some explanation for the variance with the Law Commission proposals and the unexpected timing of the Bill, which seems to have taken many by surprise.
A quick glance at the statistics reveals the scale of the problem. Last year, more than 200,000 DoLS applications were made—a number certain to rise. The average time taken to complete the assessments was 120 days, with a backlog of more than 120,000 cases. The Law Commission has estimated that the annual cost of all this might end up being close to £2 billion, so there is clearly a major problem here that needs fixing.
The proposals in the Bill, essentially allowing NHS staff rather than the Court of Protection to oversee when and where to deprive people of their liberty, on the face of it seem to strike a better balance between care planning and the provision of what has too often been a box-ticking procedural safeguards process. The Bill comes at the same time as the recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights only last week that a new legal definition of deprivation of liberty should be debated and defined, which could,
“produce greater clarity and would extend safeguards only to those who truly need them, whilst respecting the right to personal autonomy of those who are clearly content with their situation, even if they are not capable of verbalising such consent”.
All the briefings I have received from those working in the sector make it clear that the lack of such a new legal definition is a serious omission and risks jeopardising this legislation’s chance of successful implementation. That all adds up to my overall feeling about this Bill: that we risk acting with indecent haste before all the relevant pieces of the jigsaw are in place to allow a coherent and joined-up new system to be put in place—and I know that that new system is much needed. I note that Sir Simon Wessely, chair of the Mental Health Act review, said as much in a recent blog, drawing attention to the fact that at the moment some people lacking the capacity to consent to their admission for care and treatment will fall under the Mental Capacity Act and the proposed new liberty protection safeguards, and some will be detained under the Mental Health Act. But—and it is a big but—the boundaries between the two are not clear. My main concern about the Bill is that, in rushing ahead to fix the clear deficiencies of the DoLS procedures, we are creating further complexity in an area already beset with confusion and complexity. My view, like that of some other noble Lords today, is that it would have been far preferable to have a single, fully integrated Act covering both mental illness and mental capacity.
The interaction with the Mental Health Act is at the very least a messy one. There is a real tension between wanting to tackle problems with the current mental capacity law straightaway—I fully understand that—and the need to properly link it with plans to improve the Mental Health Act. I know that the JCHR has called on the Government to move quickly on reforming the Mental Capacity Act, but this should not prevent close consideration of the two pieces of legislation and how they relate to each other. In response to the Law Commission’s proposals, I noted that the Government stated that they would await the Mental Health Act review’s recommendations on interface issues, including how reformed DoLS would interact with the Act. I find that quite a confusing statement. Could the Minister say whether and how the Government plan to fulfil that undertaking?
I am also concerned, as are others, that the focus of the Bill is on deprivation of liberty alone, rather than the wider amendments to the Mental Capacity Act proposed by the Law Commission. In particular, the important recommendation to put particular weight on a patient’s wishes in any Mental Capacity Act best interests decision-making process is absent, as are any additional provisions about advanced consent. As I have said, I really feel—others have said it far more eloquently than me—that this is a missed opportunity to treat vulnerable people with the dignity and respect that they deserve in what we all agree is a very difficult situation.
I turn to the issue of including 16 and 17 year-olds in the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill, as originally proposed by the Law Commission. The main reasons for this are twofold. First, using parental responsibility to authorise Article 5 deprivation denies 16 and 17 year-olds the uniform statutory protections available to people aged 18 and older. Secondly, including 16 and 17 year-olds would create greater certainty and standardised practices for this age group than currently exist. It is all a bit technical but, as I understand it, presently Article 5 deprivation can be authorised by four different mechanisms: parental responsibility, a court order, a police protection order under the Children Act, or the Mental Health Act.
Front-line clinicians I have spoken to are often unsure which option to pursue. This can cause delays of a number of weeks while professionals argue with each other about the most appropriate option. In the meantime, the 16 to 17 year-old is in a legal limbo, often stuck in a paediatric ward or A&E while these debates take place. The situation gets even more confusing if two people with parental responsibility disagree or if the local authority shares parental responsibility—for example, for children on a care order. This is an opportunity to make the situation for 16 to 17 year-olds much better, and we should take it.
The Law Commission’s proposals also included the very interesting idea that we follow the lead of many countries and include in the Mental Capacity Act a framework allowing people to make formal support agreements. This would hugely benefit family members of the person under the liberty protection safeguards and value their input to the process. However, the wording in the Bill is unhelpfully convoluted, and will make it more difficult for staff, patients and their families to understand.
As the Bill stands, there is a heavy burden on care home managers to manage the applications. An individual would be reliant on the motivation, knowledge and skill of the care home manager to identify deprivation of liberty and to take appropriate safeguarding steps. Managers’ level of knowledge and experience will inevitably vary enormously, resulting in an individual’s human rights potentially being neglected if a manager simply does not recognise what constitutes a deprivation of liberty and takes appropriate action. As other noble Lords have said, a major training programme would be needed, as well as significant resources for implementation.
My final point relates to the phrase “unsound mind”, which I understand is still used because of the reference to the European Court of Human Rights. This is dated terminology which is offensive and stigmatising and has no clinical value. Imagine if you learned that this was an outcome of an assessment of your parent, partner or sibling. I stress again the importance of keeping the patient at the centre of our legislation, not the conventions or convenience of lawyers. Will the Government commit to removing the reference to “unsound mind” from the Bill?
In conclusion, I return to my concern about timing and the outcome of the review of the Mental Health Act, given that both Acts relate to the non-consensual care and medical treatment of people. The overlap between the two systems is one of the reasons that the current system is so complicated, and changes to address problems under one system will inevitably have unintended knock-on consequences for the other. What is needed is simplification and streamlining, rather than incremental, piecemeal reform. There is much to do to improve the Bill; I hope that the Government will be open minded and in listening mode.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I am hesitant to speak in this debate, having not been involved in earlier work on the Mental Capacity Act 2005. However, having worked in mental health services and as a Mental Health Act commissioner over a number of years, and having overseen the Mental Health Act appeals of Mental Health Act managers, I do have an interest in deprivation of liberty decisions and, in particular, the justification and proportionality of them.
This is clearly an important Bill, and I applaud the Government for bringing it forward. The DoLS scheme was clearly cumbersome, little understood and in many ways deficient. It is, however, far from clear to me that the new system will be as simple for patients and carers to use as the Minister seemed to imply in his opening remarks. As other noble Lords have indicated, a key issue will be the interface between this Bill and the review of the Mental Health Act, which I understand will report in the autumn of this year. Both relate to non-consensual care and treatment and may apply to some of the same people. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists says, it is the overlaps between the two systems which to some degree explain why the current arrangements are so complicated and why staff struggle to use them. Changes to address problems in one system will surely have unintended consequence for the other. Clarity will be needed about when a patient should be subject to one Act rather than the other. It will be vital that no patient should be deprived of their liberty under both Acts at the same time. I understand that this happens at present, and it is important that this situation be brought to an end. Can the Minister give the House some assurance about how the Government propose to achieve that end?
Another rather straightforward point, which was made by the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the GMC and with which I strongly agree—other noble Lords have mentioned it—is on the use of the term “unsound mind” in the Bill. The term, as others have said, dates back to the 1950s and is stigmatising and out of place today. The college suggests that this term be replaced by “has any disorder or disability of the mind”, which would certainly be greatly preferable. Will the Minister agree to bring forward an amendment to that effect? Perhaps he will be able to comment on that today.
As other noble Lords have said, it is difficult to understand why the Government have not extended the new scheme to 16 and 17 year-olds, as recommended by the Law Commission. Case law has established that the parents of a child under 16 can give consent to what would otherwise constitute a deprivation of that child’s liberty where the matter falls within the “zone of parental responsibility”, but a parent cannot give consent on behalf of a 16 or 17 year-old. Surely the Bill should apply to the young person themselves rather than assume that the parents will make decisions on their behalf. Again, maybe the Minister can explain this apparent contradiction this afternoon.
On the appeals process, under the DoLS system, appeals must be made to the Court of Protection, which can be complex, slow and expensive. Can the Minister explain why the Bill does not introduce any changes to that system? In particular, is there any reason why the appeals process should not replicate the system under the Mental Health Act, which seems to work pretty well? It is worth noting that the Joint Committee on Human Rights made the point that a tribunal system would be more efficient, accessible and cost effective, and would enhance the rights of the individual concerned to be directly involved in the proceedings. In addition, of course the Mental Health Act provides for a tribunal system, so we have a nice model to follow—and why not? Non-means-tested legal aid should be available in such cases but, again, it would be less costly to the taxpayer if tribunals were established to do that job.
The GMC has raised a concern about the lack of clarity in the Bill regarding precisely who should be consulted before an LPS authorisation is made. This apparently includes,
“anyone engaged in caring for the cared-for person or interested in the cared-for person’s welfare”.
Does this mean that both a GP and a hospital doctor should be consulted? Is that necessary? Surely the doctor who knows the patient best would be sufficient. How many others involved in the care of the patient should be consulted?
A particular issue in this context is the power of a decision-maker to decide who is consulted from the proposed list. Surely some are far more important than others. For example, if there is a holder of a lasting power of attorney with decision-making powers in relation to the care of the patient, surely that LPA must be consulted. Yet it seems that the decision-maker can decide whether that person is consulted. The same should apply to the next of kin, who surely must be consulted—it cannot be a choice.
An obvious gap in the Bill, as others have said, is any provision for a person to be able to consent in advance to specific care or treatment arrangements so that authorisation under the new safeguarding scheme could be avoided; it would also save a whole lot of resources and avoid delays for the individual. Advance decisions, with effective safeguards, would reduce bureaucracy and cost and enable more involvement of patients and their families. The Minister will be aware that advance decisions to prepare for end-of-life care are increasingly used—although as yet, not at all sufficiently. But where these advance decisions are in place, the problems for physicians and next of kin are greatly reduced in relation to decisions about whether life-prolonging treatment should be continued, for example. The need to respect the wishes of the individual is similarly important under this legislation. Can the Minister indicate whether the Government would object to including a system of advance decisions in the Bill, and if so, why?
In conclusion, is there any prospect that later stages of the Bill could be held over until the report on the review of the Mental Health Act becomes available, to try to ensure complementarity between the two? I also very much look forward, with other noble Lords, to hearing the Minister’s response to the points that have been made.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be present during this important debate to hear the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady Barran. We all wish her well in her contributions to your Lordships’ House. I refer to my interests in the register and to the fact that I am a carer and a deputy holding LPAs for vulnerable relatives.
I fully understand why my noble friend the Minister has a certain sense of urgency in bringing this legislation forward. As we have heard, there is clearly a problem that is hitting individuals and our health and care institutions, because of the backlog that is accruing. Clearly, there is a sense of urgency to try to resolve this. However, I begin by saying to my noble friend: it has to be resolved correctly this time. I say “this time” having served on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for the Mental Capacity Bill, having worked on the Bill when it went through the Commons, having served on the post-legislative committee in your Lordships’ House, and having worked on all existing mental health legislation that we are currently reviewing.
There was a recurring theme on all those committees—there are people around the House who were with me on those committees and who know that we seem to have been doing this for ever. We were only too well aware of the Bournewood gap, which my noble friend mentioned when completing his remarks, and we still have not plugged that gap. It is essential that we plug it this time. Recommendation 21 from the post-legislative scrutiny committee of this House considered that we had inadvertently created a new Bournewood gap and that that should be closed. I have to say to my noble friend that I do not think that the Bill as drafted closes that gap. It is a good attempt, but I would like to have seen some pre-legislative scrutiny on this rather small but important Bill.
Let me share this with the House. At the weekend, I received correspondence from the professional carers of HL in the Bournewood case, which I was involved in many years ago. In respect of the Bill before us, they say it is bizarre that the Court of Protection gives authority to deputies to exercise control over P’s accommodation and care provision. As this Bill stands, it prevents them having any real power in the process. Mr E goes on to state that their acid test is this: if HL v Bournewood happened today, would he be any better protected? As a House dealing with the Bill before it goes to another place, we have to make absolutely sure that we get it right this time.
Concerns have been expressed across the House on behalf of interested parties and the charitable third sector, particularly by my friend the noble Lord, Lord Touhig—he and I both serve as vice-presidents of the National Autistic Society. This brings forward another issue. A lot of noble Lords have spoken today about vulnerable people. That is who we are trying to address in this legislation to get it right. However, vulnerable people are on a spectrum and they all have different needs—they are all vulnerable but how one approaches them and resolves decision-making challenges for them is very different. For example, dealing with somebody very old who has been very disabled by a stroke and is in permanent residential or nursing care is very different from dealing with a 20-something year-old who needs residential care and is on the autistic spectrum. In the work that I have been involved in with younger autistic adults, it is often said that if you get the right person asking the right questions in the right way, those adults understand what the problem is and what the choices are. They have capacity but they have difficulty in knowing how to come to a decision for themselves about the right way forward. There is a world of difference between a professional going through that process and exercise with somebody and dealing with somebody who, as I just explained, might be very elderly or has had a stroke.
Then there is the question of communication. Across this whole spectrum of people are people with communication disorders. How they communicate, whether they need speech and language therapists to assist them or whether they are non-verbal but can still communicate, needs to be taken into account. For that process to take place and for that assessment and decision to be made, it is absolutely essential that time is given.
I know that many Members of both Houses—I am not sure how many—have taken part in training courses run by the Alzheimer’s Society in how to communicate with somebody who has advanced Alzheimer’s. To be frank, it is not all that different from how you communicate with people who are learning disabled or on the autism spectrum. When asking a question or putting information to them, you wait for them to process that information and give them plenty of time before they then express, in whatever way is appropriate for them, an answer to that question or indicate what their preference would be. That is not a cheap option. That type of assessment is not cheap or fast.
Although I understand the urgency to bring down this backlog and treat people individually, we must understand how some of these processes require very skilled people to carry out the assessment. They should be well-trained, experienced people, ideally who know the individual, although that is not always possible. These are the challenges in getting this legislation right.
I totally concur with many issues raised today. Best interests are very important and I am concerned that that phrase is not in this legislation. As someone who holds a lasting power of attorney for health and social care, I am only too well aware that my duties in law as a private individual—not as a professional—are that I should always assess and put that person’s best interests first. If I am doing the job properly, I should notate how I went about the process. Yet we are saying in this legislation that somebody who has that legal duty in respect of another individual does not have to take that into account. They will not be consulted and will not be at the heart of the decision-making as far as P is concerned when assessments and decisions are made. There seems to be a contradiction between two different legal requirements on people in the same Act. I hope my noble friend will address that because I am now very nervous, as somebody who holds this responsibility of lasting power of attorney for another that, somehow, putting their best interests first, which I am legally required to do, will not be taken into account when another area of law is challenging the validity of that responsibility. Again, we must get this right. We cannot leave this as a gap in the process, because it is very important.
Then there are the assessments themselves and the question of training and the quality of that training for the people who carry them out. We should make sure that, even if we save money publicly on reducing the backlog and the numbers, there will be an investment in training for people who currently do not have that training. Certainly, the post-legislative scrutiny committee understood only too well from the evidence that we took a few years ago that there is a paucity of people who really understand the legislation in terms of what they are meant to do as professionals. It was very patchy then and, from what we have seen, it does not appear to be any better now. Nothing has improved all that much.
I want to raise briefly the people who have registered advance decision-making rights to refuse treatment. I am grateful to Cardiff University for its briefing, which sets out the position and explains how this issue is affected by the legislation before us. It states that the Mental Capacity Act enabled people to make ADRTs to refuse in advance specified medical treatments at a time when they may lack capacity to give or refuse consent. The Act created for the first time a mechanism for a person to specify who they would like to make those decisions, which brings us back to lasting powers of attorney. Both provisions were meant to enhance respect for personal autonomy, so it is important that, whatever is in the Bill when it leaves this House, nothing in it should reduce in any way that respect for personal autonomy. Under DoLS there was a “no refusals” test, which meant that an authorisation could not be issued if the purpose of the deprivation of liberty was to provide treatment where the person had made an ADRT refusing it, or which an appropriately empowered attorney refused to consent to on their behalf. This meant that DoLS could not be used to trump the past expression of a person’s wishes and feelings about what would happen when they had had capacity. I hope my noble friend will look again and bring some clarity to this issue. The legislation we are discussing today really is not clear on how those advance decisions will be treated, not only in terms of their relevance but whether they will be recognised as they should be now.
I finish with a quote from evidence we took in our committee on a case that was prevalent at the time and remains a test case—that of Steven Neary. His father sent a letter to the committee. It is worth bearing in mind that we are not dealing just with numbers, money and legislation, but with real people living real lives and for whom there are lasting consequences. Steven’s father, Mark Neary, really fought the fight on his son’s behalf. After he had succeeded, he wrote to say, “Two years on, I still have to deal on a daily basis with the trauma Steven experienced as a result of the DoLS legislation being turned upside down by Hillingdon. It is painful to watch. Two years on, I still have to deal with my own feelings of anger, sadness and guilt that I was not able to protect Steven from the nightmare. Living with his and my feelings—I wouldn’t wish that on my worst enemy. That is why there is still so much to do in making sure that the Mental Capacity Act and DoLS truly protect the vulnerable people that the Act was designed for”. We must get it right this time.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Monday 16th July 2018
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
My Lords, the nod has come that we are resuming the Second Reading debate on the Bill before the House. Tea might be the preferred choice of those who are not remaining.
I start by joining other noble Lords in complimenting and congratulating the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, on her most distinguished and illuminating maiden speech. Plainly, she is going to be a great strength in the House.
I spoke in the debate just over three years ago on the Select Committee’s post-legislative scrutiny report on the 2005 Act. I focused principally on the perhaps somewhat surprising decision of the Supreme Court in the Cheshire West case, a decision by a narrow four-to-three majority vote, which came out six days after the Select Committee’s report. It was a decision which gave huge relevance to the issues arising and highlighted an urgent need to legislate afresh.
The critical concept then under question was what amounted to deprivation of liberty. The central question raised was what was required to authorise it. Put simply, Cheshire West hugely increased the number of cases in which people were to be regarded in law as deprived of their liberty, and it left in place the need for two distinct categories of authorisation. One was for people detained in hospitals and care homes who continued, and continue still, to require authorisation under the Schedule A1 procedures known as DoLS, deprivation of liberty safeguards. The other is for those, like the two particular patients under direct consideration in the Cheshire West case itself, detained in community settings whose placements presently require authorisation by the Court of Protection under a Section 16(2)(a) order.
By the time of the March 2015 debate here, the Government had already asked the Law Commission to look into all this. As eventually the Law Commission came to note in its March 2017 report, there were more than 14 times as many applications for DoLS in the year 2015-16 than in the year before Cheshire West two years earlier, 2013-14. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights records in its recent June 2018 report, 70% of the almost 220,000 such applications in the past year were not authorised within the statutory timeframe and, I quote from the report’s summary:
“Consequently, many incapacitated people continue to be deprived of their liberty unlawfully and those responsible for their care, or for obtaining authorisations, are having to work out how best to break the law”.
Indeed, paragraph 32 of the report says that,
“hundreds of thousands of people are being unlawfully detained”.
Your Lordships will of course agree that that is no light matter. There is therefore real urgency in processing the amending legislation before us.
In that context, I touch next on one particular recommendation made by the Joint Committee in paragraph 45 of its report, which has already been alluded to by a number of your Lordships, the recommendation that Parliament should set out a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty that clarifies the Cheshire West test and,
“would extend safeguards only to those who truly need them, whilst respecting the right to personal autonomy of those who are clearly content with their situation, even if they are not capable of verbalising such consent”.
For my part, while certainly not disagreeing with that recommendation, and while recognising that the majority of the court in Cheshire West may well be regarded as having inappropriately and needlessly—by which I mean going substantially further than required by the Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 5—gone too wide in their categorisation of deprivation of liberty, I would be disinclined to burden and complicate this current proposed amending legislation still further by including within it a statutory definition. Better, I would suggest, to cure the all too obvious existing problems of authorisations as speedily as possible.
As to that, I broadly support the approach in the Bill, which essentially comes to this: first, a proposed replacement Schedule AA1 to authorise deprivation of liberty by new, proportionate and less bureaucratic means; and, secondly, extending the safeguards into domestic settings—in other words, to apply to all those deprived of their liberty irrespective of where they reside, thus including those who were the specific subject of consideration in the Cheshire West case and therefore relieving some of the pressure on the Court of Protection.
I am in no position today to comment helpfully on the various detailed criticisms of the Bill made by several of your Lordships in the debate, nor even to deal with the availability or otherwise of legal aid to which the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, referred. That will be for Committee.
The last matter I want to touch on, although I do not think it could or should directly affect the form in which the Bill should reach the statute book, is what has been called the Mental Health Act interface. In its hugely impressive, very long, 259-page report of March 2017, the Law Commission, in chapter 13, under this heading, pointed out that,
“the non-consensual care and treatment of people with mental health problems is governed largely by two parallel legal schemes – the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act”,
the former providing for detention based on protection of the patient and the public, irrespective of mental capacity, whereas the Mental Capacity Act applies only to those who lack capacity, and provides for deprivation of liberty based on the person’s best interests. But, as it goes on to say,
“there is considerable overlap between the two regimes, and the relationship can be extremely complex”.
Chapter 13 concludes with Recommendation 39:
“The UK Government and the Welsh Government should review mental health law in England and in Wales with a view to the introduction of a single legislative scheme governing non-consensual care or treatment of both physical and mental disorders, whereby such care or treatment may only be given if the person lacks the capacity to consent”.
Following that report, in October 2017 the Government commissioned an independent review of the Mental Health Act 1983, an Act which I ought perhaps to confess was enacted principally and specifically to deal with an ECHR challenge which, as counsel for the Government, I had lost in Strasbourg the previous year.
As your Lordships know, the present review is being conducted by the most distinguished group. It is chaired by Professor Sir Simon Wessely, and its vice-chairs include our own noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and a much admired, now retired High Court Family Division judge, Sir Mark Hedley. Its terms of reference include recommending improvements in relation to rising detention rates.
In its interim report of 1 May this year, the independent review discusses the interface with the Mental Capacity Act. At paragraph 7.3 of the review, it states:
“We agree and support the urgent reform of DoLS to make sure service users receive the most appropriate care for their needs”,
also pointing out that,
“there needs to be an appropriate calibration between resources spent on delivery of care and those spent on safeguards surrounding the delivery of that care”.
The review, having noted the Government’s broad acceptance of the Law Commission’s conclusions, continues:
“The government has also indicated that it awaits our recommendations on the interface issues”,
and observes:
“It is likely that, if only for practical reasons, we will be unlikely to be recommending ‘fusion’ between the MCA and MHA in the short term, but will be considering this as a longer-term option”.
Finally, to return to the Joint Committee report of 29 June, the interface between the two legislative regimes is thoughtfully discussed in paragraphs 70 to 74, and recommendations are made in paragraph 74. The Mental Health Act review will clearly want to note those recommendations and the concerns expressed by the Joint Committee. Clearly, the resolution of the critical interface between the two legislative schemes is a work in progress, and we are likely to have to return to the Mental Capacity Act yet again in probably well over a year’s time.
In the meantime, I would strongly support the amending legislation now before us, although I recognise that it will need to be considered carefully in Committee. I repeat: this Bill is urgently required now to end the lawlessness consequent on Cheshire West.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, on her compassionate and informed maiden speech.
Many organisations working in the field of learning disability, the people who are the focus of my speech today, welcome the reform of the deprivation of liberty safeguards. Both the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny committee, of which I was a member, highlighted major concerns about the implementation of deprivation of liberty safeguards. I am grateful to several organisations for their briefings in advance of today’s debate, including Mencap, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists and others. I refer to my interests in the register. I speak also as the carer of an adult relative for whom I hold a lasting power of attorney.
Recommendation 37 of the post-legislative scrutiny committee suggested that,
“replacement legislative provisions and associated forms be drafted in clear and simple terms, to ensure they can be understood and applied effectively by professionals, individuals, families and carers”.
Some of the briefings received in the last few days remind us of the complexity of this legislative area and how easy it is to misunderstand it.
Any adult, regardless of any communication or cognitive impairment, has the right to make or be supported to make their own decisions wherever possible. The Mental Capacity Act supports this principle while also providing a legal framework, the DoLS, so that decisions can be made when someone lacks capacity. When the Government introduced those safeguards over 10 years ago, the rules required that they would allow a deprivation of liberty if the chosen restraints or restrictions worked in a person’s best interests. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Finlay for clarifying that best interests will remain integral to the amended Act. I look forward to confirmation from the Minister that that is indeed the case, as it has been a matter of some concern to the organisations briefing me. That takes us to the heart of what they were intended to do, but implementation of the Mental Capacity Act and the deprivation of liberty safeguards has been poor. The health and care sector does not have the training, awareness and skills to carry it out effectively. It takes a willingness and considerable skill to protect people’s liberty.
The impact assessment before the original safeguards were introduced estimated that 50,000 people may be eligible for them, but that the number of applications would be much lower because not all of those at risk would actually need to be deprived of their liberty to protect it. The assessment also held that numbers would fall after the initial year, as parties became familiar with the safeguards and, crucially, found ways to avoid deprivation of liberty happening. In fact, the opposite has occurred. In 2015-16, 105,000 completed applications were received, of which 73% were granted—86% in London. However, the impact assessment estimated that only 25% of applications submitted would be approved and justifiably deprived of their liberty.
The intention was that the safeguards would drive a change in practice that would seek to avoid deprivation of liberty occurring, but it has not happened. Will these new safeguards do better in preventing people being deprived of their liberty and protecting it, as originally intended? Or will they simply streamline the administrative processes and reduce the financial burden to the state of the authorisation process, while reducing the focus on an individual’s own choices and preferences? These are the fears that are being expressed.
We clearly want more than that. Our goals must be to improve care and treatment for people lacking capacity; to reduce restrictive practice; and to ensure that individuals in vulnerable circumstances, their families and carers have a say in their care. This is absolutely necessary, as people who lack capacity may be dependent on the good will of their carers for some of the most basic rights and freedoms, including, for example, the right to choose and spend time with their friends—rights which we all take for granted. This is an issue I am currently struggling with for the adult relative I mentioned earlier. There is an obvious power imbalance in these relationships. The Law Commission report suggested wider changes to the Mental Capacity Act than envisaged in the Bill, including giving more weight to the individual’s wishes and preferences and the establishment of supported decision-making. However, the Government’s impact assessment states that they have decided not to legislate for this,
“at this point, as we think there are other effective levers to deliver improvement in these areas”.
What are these other effective levers?
A key concern of the post-legislative scrutiny committee was the abject failure of many services to understand how to increase someone’s capacity by, for example, providing them with accessible information; patiently making up for limited educational opportunities by increasing their understanding; assessing their communication skills, as recommended by the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists in its briefing; and assessing their capacity to make a specific decision on more than one occasion. This is what supported decision-making involves and it takes time. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, explained how time-consuming this is when it is done well. Alongside the need to give individuals a voice about their own care is the need to give families and carers a voice. The principle of best interests in the Mental Capacity Act had much to say on consulting others involved in the individual’s care. I share the concerns expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about the Bournewood gap. Would HL have still been detained today, but legally, and would his carers’ views have still been overridden? In his evidence to the post-legislative scrutiny committee, Mark Neary said that he would not want any other family to have to experience the heartache and trouble he did. Will the role of families and LPAs be strengthened or weakened by this Bill? If strengthened, will the Minister reassure the House by explaining exactly how?
Some practitioners have suggested the introduction of support agreements, which would allow people with learning disabilities to nominate their own supporter or co-decision-maker, thus shifting power back to disabled people and those they rely on to help them make decisions. These would be a bit like lasting powers of attorney, only easier to make and more geared towards supporting the person to make decisions for themselves or jointly making decisions with a trusted person. Co-decision-making is very popular with grass-roots community organisations in Canada, and it is being adopted in Ireland, Australia, Texas, Israel and many other states and countries.
The responsibility for gathering the necessary proposed assessments, identifying whether a person is being deprived of their liberty, determining the person’s capacity, and determining whether the arrangement is necessary and proportionate and who should be consulted—all of this may be left to the same person: the care home manager. This puts a large responsibility on this individual and creates a potential conflict of interest. The person who may be responsible for the deprivation may also be responsible for assessing and gathering information. This hardly seems an appropriate way to balance the power differential, and I would like reassurance on this. Do care home managers currently have the skills to take on this responsibility? The impact assessment suggests that they will need half a day’s “familiarisation” with the new policy. That would not be sufficient.
My third area of concern is the ability to appeal decisions to deprive individuals of their liberty. The new role of an approved mental capacity professional is proposed—an independent, skilled assessor with a role similar to that of approved mental health professionals in the Mental Health Act. The expertise and independence of this role is a welcome addition to the safeguards, but it seems that AMCPs will only be called upon if the individual objects. Who judges if the person is objecting? Even access to an independent review would need to be facilitated through the care home manager, as would access to advocacy. We need to think carefully about this.
Finally, the appeal process will still be through the Court of Protection, but this process has been criticised as more complex and more difficult to access than the tribunal system in the Mental Health Act. The impact assessment suggests that only 0.5% of cases will end up in the Court of Protection. But given that a quarter to a half of patients detained under the Mental Health Act appeal to the tribunal system, can the Minister explain how the Government have arrived at such a low number? The review being chaired by Sir Simon Wessely is due out later this year and, as we have already heard, some proposals are expected to relate to the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act. Could the Minister clarify, as other noble Lords have asked him to do, whether the Bill will be further amended when the Wessely review is published or whether the final stages of the Bill will be delayed until we know the content of that review and its recommendations?
This amendment Bill may work out to be cheaper for the state, although there are worries about the increased burden on care providers. The role of your Lordships’ House in Committee will be to ensure that the proposed liberty protection scheme lives up to its name.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, this Bill should be a lesson to us all. It is designed to correct the disaster created by another piece of legislation, introduced not to address a common problem or by popular demand by a group, but at the instigation of the judiciary, addressing a problem we did not know we had. Unfortunately, it does not solve the problem, and this House’s ability to improve it will merely ameliorate the ongoing disaster.
The DoLS legislation, since its inception, was designed to plug the Bournewood gap, which the Minister described quite clearly. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, pointed out, because this legislation will no longer have the best interests of the patient at heart, it will do nothing to close better the Bournewood gap. It will leave that gap and will leave exposed the several related cases. Although the bureaucracy of the Bill apparently tries to address it, it does nothing of the sort.
The problem is that we are trying to combat an edifice of poor professional practice—in this I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, said. However, rather than improve professional practice by working in the way that families and professional carers work and talk to each other about what should happen to improve the situation of the individual, we have moved away from what health and social care considerations should look like and into a world of legalities. Legislation and regulation can never substitute for good practice. They can provide a framework within which good practice is enacted, but they are no substitute. That is where the DoLS legislation has been such a disaster. I respect that the virtue in this Bill is the intention to make things safer, more competent and more accountable, but theoretical legal advantages have led to a massively intrusive bureaucracy of paper schedules and rules, which this Bill diminishes but does not solve.
For the past three years, as a result of widespread concern about the adverse impact of the deprivation of liberty safeguards on the care and treatment of older people, I have been the convenor of an informal group of members of the Royal College of Psychiatrists Faculty of Old Age Psychiatry. The group was established to liaise with the Law Commission and other organisations to consider issues arising from the draft liberty protection safeguards and the original Law Commission’s draft bill, part of which—but only part—now comes to this House as a new Bill. I think everybody here agrees that the monstrous piece of bureaucratic machinery that is the deprivation of liberty safeguards has caused untold harm and cost a huge amount of money that has been diverted from finite clinical and social care budgets at a time when the country can ill afford it, and when the quality of care in hospitals and residential homes is barely adequate and often downright poor. The money pouring uselessly down the DoLS drain is a disgrace. The detailed problems were well articulated by the Law Commission in chapter 4 of its paper 372, published last year.
The Law Commission, through Tim Spencer-Lane and his colleagues, has done an enormous amount of hard work and consulted widely to produce improved and less bureaucratic procedures. However, it was constrained by its brief to take the judgment in Cheshire West as the starting point, which contained, in my view and that of many others, an unworkable definition of “deprivation of liberty”, which most people find extraordinary. That is my main concern about the Bill before us today.
Before I get on to the definition issues, however, I want to express my surprise and concern that some of the most far-seeing and progressive parts of the draft Bill produced by the Law Commission have been omitted from the Bill before us. As many others have mentioned, we have lost proposals that were either accepted or accepted in principle in the Government’s response to the Law Commission. The first relates to strengthening the place of the individual’s wishes and feelings in Section 4, any notion of which has been abandoned in favour of what is “necessary and proportionate”. These are vague words that may well imply that, in this age of austerity, the person will get care in a way that is convenient for the authorities making the judgment to impose and that does not take account of the individual’s expressed wishes or include a discussion about what they might wish. Although “best interests” is mentioned, when the crunch comes, it will be ignored.
I want to refer here to the description of a person as being of “unsound mind”. If that is old-fashioned now, and clinically irrelevant as a phrase, what will it sound like in 10 years, when it really will be past its prime? It is simply not a phrase that we should be using in the Bill.
Secondly, the proposal to strengthen the safeguards around Section 5 in relation to serious interference in people’s lives has been ditched. Thirdly, the proposal enabling advance consent to be given has been omitted, which was accepted in principle and would have had a real part to play in allowing people to say what arrangements they are happy to accept when it comes to a later stage in their life. Fourthly, regulation-making powers for supported decision-making schemes have been omitted. Again, all of these were thought at the time by the commission to be important steps necessary to strengthen the Mental Capacity Act in how it works across the board. There has been widespread approval of these provisions by families, professionals and lawyers—a unanimity that is quite rare. Can the Minister explain why these good things have been dropped when there was such an initial positive response? It is not as though there will be another chance. There will not be another Mental Capacity Act for some time, probably years, so now is our chance to improve it.
I return now to what is meant by “deprivation of liberty”. The Cheshire West Supreme Court judgment 2014, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, indicated, gave a significantly wider definition than had been previously understood both by public authorities and the lower courts to apply in the health and social care context. I will not repeat the argument of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale— a bird in a gilded cage is still a bird in a cage—but her logic, as always, is totally unassailable. However, it has been applied in cases that the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to review. Difficulty arises where everyone—patient, family members and professionals—are all either consenting to admission and the care and treatment as proposed or are not objecting, which also applies to patients in their own homes.
Approximately 750,000 people in the UK—I have heard a figure of up to 2 million, but I am talking about people who have definite and serious lack of capacity—lack the capacity to make major decisions, and the vast majority of these patients fall into “willing” or “not objecting” categories when it comes to their care. Two-thirds are living in their own homes. It is hard indeed to see in what way they are deprived of their liberty by being admitted willingly to a hospital, nursing home or hospice or being cared for in their own homes by family or professional carers whom they are happy to receive. Furthermore, when these Supreme Court criteria are applied to patients admitted to general hospitals, hospices and care homes as the Mental Health Act 2007 dictates, a ludicrous situation now arises. Before anything is done for the patients, a bureaucratic procedure is enacted to ensure that their rights are being considered, although in practice, nothing changes as a result. Lots of forms are signed and boxes ticked but little else.
Approximately one-third of older patients admitted to hospitals through A&E departments are suffering from transient confusional states consequent on physical illness, or mild cognitive impairments that intermittently, fluctuatingly or permanently affect their capacity to consent. The vast majority of such individuals—of 16 million annual hospital admissions, an estimated 3 million individual admissions—fall under the current jurisdiction. Because nobody is implementing this Act, they are currently being treated informally in their best interests with clinical staff relying on GMC guidance on decision-making and discussion with family and carers. The intrusion of an artificial safeguarding mechanism between those who did not know they were depriving someone of their liberty and those who did not know they were being deprived is a kind of Alice in Wonderland nightmare and ludicrously expensive to administer. We have in the Bill a system that will still be applied to tens of thousands of people and a pie-in-the-sky, almost delusional, impact assessment of its likely costs if it is implemented as drafted.
The result of the overinclusive definition of deprivation of liberty has resulted in very serious interface problems that other noble Lords have mentioned between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act, and the misuse or overuse of Mental Health Act legislation to detain elderly people on general wards to treat them for physical health problems, simply because sectioning someone is easier to hurry through than the DoLS procedures and easier than the proposed liberty protection safeguards. The use of the Mental Health Act usually rules out any subsequent placement in a care home because patients are rejected by the care home system if they have been sectioned, and leads to extra responsibility for Section 117 aftercare funding for the local authority. I can give the Minister a catalogue of cases where the misuse of the Mental Health Act and/or DoLS has resulted in poor care or a decision by relatives to reject a care plan because they do not want their relatives stigmatised by being sectioned.
The interface problem has led to widespread illegality by the misapplication of legislation. The Bill continues this problem and, while I understand the wish to wait for Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act to be complete, we are rather stuck with a gravely inadequate situation. Inevitably, problems will continue to arise at the interface between these two regimes unless we are serious about sorting them out.
The crucial thing for me is that the criteria for “deprivation of liberty” need to be changed before any new legislation is approved. It is pointless to wait to see what we can put into a code of practice. We cannot legislate on such a serious matter by leaving it to a code of practice; I simply do not think it will work. I do not believe it is reasonable to include admission and/or residence of incapacitated persons in homes and hospitals where there is no objection by the patient, family carers or professional carers, or to include private individuals living by personal choice in their own family homes, supervised by family members or professional carers. It really should apply only to those who express dissent or opposition, or where there is clear disagreement between those responsible for the care. I would like the Minister to explain why, given the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that supported the view that I and many others have just expressed—there is a need to revise the criteria—a change in the definition has not been included and whether the Government will consider bringing forward an amendment to address this problem before Committee?
No legislation should be enacted until it is clear that the law will improve the care of individuals subjected to it and genuinely protect them from abuse or unwarranted repressive conditions. We need to reinject some common sense into care relationships. Without better definitions and a serious reduction in the number of individuals being subjected to them, the liberty protection safeguards will continue to create anxiety in staff when there should be none and militate against the decent care that I believe everyone in this House agrees society should provide.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, this has been an interesting and hugely well-informed Second Reading of the Bill and I join other noble Lords in welcoming the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, to her place. I am sure that she will bring a new and welcome voice to the House on all issues. My noble friend Lady Barker gave us a helpful account—a history lesson, if you like—which put everything into context. It is worth saying to the Minister now that it is absolutely not the case that we all sat around a table and decided what needed to be said. We have come to our views all on our own, and if we are saying much the same things, it is because they need to be said and are true.
I, too, welcome the Bill. It aims to make the process of depriving a vulnerable individual of their liberty simpler and less bureaucratic. Everyone here would agree that society is judged on how it manages its members who are vulnerable and unable to speak for themselves. This Bill makes a fair attempt at this, but it is not the finished article and I would probably give it a C. The points I will make fall into two distinct categories: points concerning the process of the creation of the impact of the Bill once it is enacted, and the second concerning the legislation itself: what should be in it, what should be taken out, and which clauses could be better worded.
The people who will be affected by this Bill are likely to be old, have mental health problems, autism or a learning disability, or have more than one of these conditions. I should refer to my interests as set out in the register. I chair a learning disability trust caring for more than 2,000 people, many of whom in our care lack capacity. I thank all of those who have provided us with briefings, and it is clear that common themes came out of them. One was the issue of finance. There was a feeling that this is going to be an expensive exercise. There will be a need to train assessors in care homes, to which I shall return later, to train advocates and, of course, to train the trainers. All of this will need to be rolled across England and Wales. Will care providers have to fund this, or will one-off training grants be made available? Certainly the system is under so much stress at the moment that it is unlikely to have the slack in budgets for extra training.
Then there is the role of care home managers. For some this might seem fine and a natural extension of their role. For others it may go into completely new territory where they have no experience and no confidence. I am sure that the Minister appreciates that most people with a learning disability no longer live in a care home but with carers in a domestic supported living setting. It would be a very large ask for those carers to assess the mental capacity of the person they support. Most carers are on the national living wage and may not be professionally ready to make such assessments.
Can the Minister clarify where the AMCP—approved mental capacity practitioner—sits in the new system and from where their funding comes? Where liberty protection safeguards are put in place, could an affected individual have an appeal funded? Will legal aid be available? Will the Minister explain why best interests are not included and what has taken their place? At the useful briefing last week, I inquired about consultation. For a Bill of such importance and with such a potentially huge impact, can the Minister clarify what consultation there was with provider organisations in the sector, the LGA, ADASS and the public at large? Over the last few months, many of us have had really interesting conversations with Sir Simon Wessely about his work reviewing the Mental Health Act. We welcome that review, but would it not have made sense to have waited until Sir Simon finished his work and then have a single view of the issue?
The Bill did not start from cold: the House of Lords Select Committee reported in 2014 on its scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Many noble Lords speaking today took part in those committee sittings. There was also the Law Commission’s Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty report of 2017. They both made many fine recommendations and, along with many in the sector, I am surprised that a lot of work will need to be done in the summer to make the Bill finally fit for purpose. Among the areas I will be looking at in Committee is the issue of 16 and 17 year-olds. To include them in the legislation would align with the Mental Capacity Act. Can the Minister tell the House the rationale for not putting this transitional cohort in the Bill?
Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights uses the phrase “unsound mind”. The same paragraph also talks about vagrants. It was first drafted in 1950, nearly 70 years ago. It is not used professionally now and the profession believes that it has no place in a piece of modernising legislation; it creates unease among individuals, advocates and the sector alike. Article 5(2) calls for a detainee to be informed of the reason they are to be deprived of their liberty. Rather than having to refer elsewhere, how much more straightforward would it be to have this in the Bill? I support my noble friend Lady Barker’s view that any part of the Bill referring to the ECHR should spell out the impacts rather than cross-reference the Brexit debate.
Although not part of the legislation, the code of practice, once enacted, will make the Bill workable. Will the Minister clarify what progress has been made on writing a draft? Can noble Lords have sight of it? If so, when? This is a complex and important piece of legislation; I hope that the Minister is not expecting to complete it with just one day in Committee. We need to produce an A-plus Bill to send to the Commons. It may take more time than the Government want, but all the people affected by the Bill deserve better.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I am very pleased to be speaking in this Second Reading debate. Although we might be missing a few of our known experts in this rapidly organised debate, we can anticipate full participation in the next stages of the Bill. The debate thus far has been informed and passionate, as one would have expected.
The maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, was a model of its kind, and I welcome her to the House. She brings great experience. As someone who has been involved for 20 years in this House working on behalf of women and abused women and on domestic violence, I welcome her to our cohort of people across the House who campaign on these issues. I look forward to working with her in due course.
We have had some excellent contributions. Many noble Lords have been asking pertinent questions, starting with the ones from my noble friend Lord Touhig. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was very modest. She has a lots of practical experience dealing with these issues. Just because she was not here when we worked on the original legislation does not mean that she does not have a valuable contribution to make to this. I am also pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, back in her place. I am glad that she managed to fly home from wherever it was to take part.
I thank the Minister and the Bill team for organising the briefing we had last week. It was a packed meeting—and quite hot, it has to be said—and it showed the level of interest that there is in this small Bill. I also thank the many organisations and individuals that have sent us their briefs and their views on the Bill, and which are, at this moment, working to see how it might be best improved—Mencap, the LGA ADSS, Age UK, VoiceAbility, Sense, Alzheimer’s Society, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists, a doctor from Cardiff University called Lucy Series, who sent me an excellent brief, the National Autistic Society and so on.
This might be a small Bill, but it is one with potentially enormous consequences. It demands proper parliamentary scrutiny and, where necessary, amendments that will make it fit for purpose on its own terms. Anything short of this will be selling short the human rights of many thousands of vulnerable people in our country. As yet, like the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, I am not confident that the Government have made enough time available for proper consideration of this important piece of legislation. We have experts in these matters in this House. I was witness to and a participant in these discussions—not key to them, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was, but I was here—and I know from those debates how complex a challenge these matters are and that it is an issue that at the same time begs absolute clarity to serve justice for our most vulnerable fellow citizens.
I hope the Minister and the Bill team will know that we will be pressing for more time to be made available and that we will be doing it with all our support. Apart from anything else, the Minister needs to address the suspicion, which I have heard whispered, that the Government are seeking to hurry or bounce this Bill through the Lords in the summer to try to avoid the detailed and essential scrutiny that it deserves and that it would receive here. I am sure that that cannot be the case, but more time would probably dispel that terrible rumour.
As we can see, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill amends the Mental Capacity Act to replace the DoLS framework, which, as noble Lords know, authorises the deprivation of liberty of people who lack the mental capacity to consent to their care arrangements in hospitals, care homes or other settings. Quite rightly, DoLS has been widely criticised as excessively complex and bureaucratic, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, in his great speech. I was shocked to learn that 70% are behind time. That speaks for itself. Also it is costly and offers inadequate protection for human rights.
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling on Cheshire West, which offered a broader definition of the deprivation of liberty, there are now some 230,000 applications for the authorisation of DoLS in England and Wales each year—I keep hearing different figures and I am rather confused, but it is an enormous number and there is a huge backlog. Local authorities are unable to keep up with the volume of applications, leaving them, in the words of the Joint Committee on Human Rights,
“having to work out how best to break the law”.
So it is costing a huge amount of public money, that is rising, and it is not doing its job.
So this is undoubtedly a timely piece of legislation; notwithstanding some of the reservations that some noble Lords have about this, I am fairly convinced that this is an urgent matter. The question we have to address here in your Lordships’ House is whether the Bill will do the job it is asked to do.
The Law Commission was asked to review the framework between 2015 and 2017. It consulted widely and came up with the new framework, the liberty protection safeguards, which offer more flexible and less bureaucratic means of authorising deprivation of liberty, channelling resources into situations where there are conflicts or concerns about a person’s care arrangements. It also included proposed amendments to the MCA’s best interest test, highlighted by my noble friend Lord Touhig and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, among others, and to promote supported decision-making to bring the MCA closer in line with the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
The Law Commissioner, Nicholas Paines QC, said—and the Minister quoted him—that the deprivation of liberty safeguards are failing those they were set up to protect. He went on to say:
“We’re pleased the government agrees and we stand ready to work with them to implement these reforms as soon as possible”.
I have read the Government’s response to the Law Commission report, and it seems to accept the majority of recommendations contained—it is a 24-page document and I had some time at the weekend. However, the Bill we have before us today, while having the same title as the Law Commission’s proposed scheme, appears to have removed most or some of the important safeguards it proposed, as other noble Lords mentioned. That raises some serious questions, starting with whether the Bill complies with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and whether it moves the UK further away from compliance with the CRPD, instead of closer towards it. The Bill has major implications for the human rights of hundreds of thousands of people with dementia, learning disabilities, brain injury and mental health problems.
I am disappointed that there is no accompanying equality impact assessment. Paragraphs 16.1 and 16.2 of the impact assessment refer to equality matters. Basically, what they say is that there is no need for an equality impact assessment because,
“the new system will have beneficial impacts for older and disabled people”.
Surely that is a matter for examination, not something one can assume, particularly when we look at Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It seems to me that, if that is being diluted, it is very important that we have a proper, independent equality impact assessment, so I ask whether that can be supplied.
Noble Lords have raised many other questions during this debate. How does the Bill ensure that the cared-for person and those representing them have access to the information they need to understand and exercise their rights? Do the Government plan to secure the right of the cared-for person to participate in court proceedings concerning their liberty? Should the modern legislation—this was raised by many noble Lords—include outdated and stigmatising concepts such as unsoundness of mind? The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, is completely correct when she says that the Bournewood gap has not been plugged: I absolutely agree with her remarks on that. Why have the Government not taken forward the Law Commission’s proposals to bring the MCA closer in line with the United Nations CRPD? Why have the Government not chosen to require a written record of serious decisions that can be made under Section 5 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or introduce stronger procedural safeguards?
Perhaps one of the most significant proposals in the Bill is that care homes assume very significant new responsibilities for the undertaking and co-ordinating of assessments, and provide information about residents who may lack mental capacity to statutory bodies. The very helpful local authority DoLS co-ordinator who has written to several noble Lords says:
“I receive application forms from care homes, train care home staff and give advice about DoLS and MCA issues. Based on these experiences, I have concerns that at present, despite honourable exceptions, care home staff do not routinely have the knowledge and skills to assess mental capacity and consider whether restrictions are proportionate”.
We need to listen to his experience, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Hollins, highlighted. We need to ask what the mandatory training is going to be. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is completely right: half a day is not sufficient.
Finally, a major recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights is that there must be a statutory definition of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty in this context, but the Bill does not provide such a definition. The Bill team and the Minister have emphasised their consultation process and the organisations that support the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, referred to these. I am sure that is true. However, my inbox, like that of many noble Lords, is full of briefings which have serious concerns about the Bill. Our job in the coming period is to ensure that those are examined. Some clear themes of concern have been mentioned by noble Lords all the way through the debate. The Minister has two choices: either he can engage with the expertise and work with us all to improve the Bill, or he and the Bill team—I hesitate to use the example of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—could dig their heels in and resist change to their small and perfectly formed Bill. I would counsel the former path.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for an incisive, illuminating, at times technically complex but always wise debate, which has been a credit to the House. I will attempt to answer as many questions as I can. I will not try to cover all of them as we actually would be here all night, but I will have time to explore the major categories of issues. I hope noble Lords will indulge me as I do that.
I welcome my noble friend Lady Barran and congratulate her on a very passionate and moving speech. It is clear that she has already been a force for good in the world and we look forward to her bringing her singular qualities to the stage which she now fills with such great authority. I hope noble Lords also noticed the attendance for the first part of the debate of my honourable friend the Minister for Care, Caroline Dinenage, who obviously takes a close interest in this. She was at the briefing and we are working closely together to try to get the right Bill through this process.
I think the general tone of the debate was that there is a strong desire to reform the DoLS system and to end, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, pointed out, the lawlessness and the highly unsatisfactory current situation. My noble friend Lady Barran brought this to life. The truth is that the current system has overwhelmed local authorities and others. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, pointed out, Cheshire West has extended the definition to whom this should apply, such that the backlog of cases is now extraordinary. The only consequence of that is a denial of access to justice. The challenge we have in the Bill is to make sure that we do not have access to justice just in theory but that it actually happens, and it cannot happen if more than 100,000 people are getting it in theory but not in practice.
As somebody who was new to this before preparing for the Bill, the situation almost sounds too good to be true. We are going to extend the number of people who have access to safeguards but we are also going to stop the system being overwhelmed and save money. This is achievable because it is about introducing a proportionate system that reflects the needs and wishes of the people whom it is there to protect, rather than having a maximalist approach that in theory applies to everyone but in reality does not and is sometimes random in its application, which is clearly unacceptable.
As many noble Lords have pointed out, the system that we need to create must be patient-led. It needs to have proper oversight and to deliver that access to justice which we have discussed. Clearly, if, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, only one in 20 have benefited from the current system, it is highly inefficient. As many noble Lords also pointed out, there is a huge urgency here.
Many noble Lords pointed out the benefits of the new system. I will come to some of the challenges but, ultimately, this is about making sure that caring organisations take a more active role in the assessment of deprivation of liberty. Where they do so and integrate it into their care planning, we will provide a proper system of oversight and support for individuals deprived of their liberty in general but, specifically, for those who object, or whose families who care for them object. That is ultimately what we are trying to do and it is the intention of the Bill.
Several noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Greengross and Lady Thornton, asked about our consultations to date. There have been very wide consultations but this debate has shown that there is much work to be done over the summer, not just with noble Lords but with stakeholder groups, to ensure that we are not only explaining the consequences of what is proposed—I think there are still some misunderstandings about that—but able to demonstrate the benefits and, critically, learn how we can further improve what is proposed.
I turn to some of the issues raised. Several noble Lords including the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross and Lady Tyler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, talked about the absence of a statutory definition. I can tell the House that we are aware of that and are listening particularly to the recommendations of the Joint Committee. However, the debate demonstrated some disagreement over the right way forward. There are various options, such as definitions in the Bill or through a code of practice, but we clearly need to get to an answer in order to proceed.
We have talked about wanting a system that has the person’s wishes and best interests at the heart of the process. That was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and endorsed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay, Lady Greengross, Lady Meacher, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins. It is absolutely right for us to be clear that there is no watering down of the interests of the individual concerned through this process. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, pointed out, capacities can fluctuate; as the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, pointed out, they can also be varied—strong in one area and weak in another. Any system needs to take account of that and I can tell the House that it is absolutely not our intention to water down the role of a person’s expressed wishes. The best interest test still applies absolutely in the care setting, but the necessary and proportionate test is to account for those cases where a person may wish to do something regarding their liberties which is contrary to their best interests for their individual care. Striking that balance and making sure that there is proper oversight, with proper advice for people who are unable to enunciate their own wishes, is at the core of getting the Bill right.
As noble Lords have also pointed out, getting the Bill right is actually about getting a statutory code of practice right. It is out of date and there is a degree of urgency about improving it. I will return to that in a moment but, in talking about the statutory definition, I will finish on the power of attorney and the role of families. They still have primacy under the Mental Capacity Act, the principles underpinning which still apply. It will not be possible to deprive a person of liberty when the attorney acting on their behalf has stated that their best interests are served otherwise. I want to make that clear but it is something that we will need to explore and explain better. Attorneys will be part of the group that is to be consulted, and the Bill creates an explicit requirement for further consultation with families. Family members can also act as appropriate persons, so I think there is a greater strengthening of the role of those acting on behalf of a person deprived of their liberty in the process of scrutinising that and making sure that it is done appropriately.
Baroness Barker
If this matter is unclear to some of us who can claim to be fairly well informed on it, clearly, there has been a communication problem. Might I suggest to the noble Lord that it would be enormously helpful—as it has been in similar situations—to have a copy of the Act, as amended by the Bill, for us and interested parties to look at? Believe me, it makes the whole business a great deal clearer and easier to understand.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
That is an excellent suggestion. I should be clear: any confusion comes from a failure to communicate on our behalf, rather than there being any suggestion that noble Lords who are extremely expert on this do not understand what is proposed. There is a need to explain better exactly how all this will work in practice.
Obviously, the system depends on the quality and independence of the reviews, assessments and authorisations that take place; that issue was particularly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. There were also questions asked by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler, Lady Murphy, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, about the capacity of those carrying out assessments in local authority care homes, the NHS and so on to do them properly and in a way compliant with the law. I agree with noble Lords that in the coming weeks we will need to set out much more clearly how that independence support and those assessments will be staffed and provided, making sure that there are sufficient resources and proper training. I am reassured that training in the implications of the Mental Capacity Act is part of medical training, and that there are Health Education England resources for that. Clearly, all that will need to evolve as we go through this process and the Act itself is amended.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Greengross, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked about the interaction with mental health legislation and whether we should have delayed publication. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, described a tension between the two Acts. We are conscious of the interface—that is the term used—but there is an urgency to reform the system, notwithstanding its interaction with the Mental Health Act. We do not yet have a timescale on completion of the review and any subsequent legislation that might be required. There has been lots of talk about the work to reform—the committee, the Law Commission, the Joint Committee and so on—and we need to get on with this, cognisant all the time that subsequent changes may need to be made once we have the outcome of the Mental Health Act review. It is not in my gift to promise time for legislation in the future but we are cognisant of the need to make sure that our interface works, once we have the review itself completed.
Several noble Lords asked why the Bill does less than the Law Commission. We could spend a lot of time going through that, but I do not propose that we do so at this point. We can achieve non-legislatively several of the Law Commission’s proposals; it is made up of lawyers, so they prefer law but there are other ways of doing things. One of the key issues raised is the Bill’s not applying to 16 and 17 year-olds. There is clearly an important interplay here with the education, health and care plan process, but I have listened to noble Lords on the subject today and shall reflect on whether we can do something about it.
The code of practice was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Greengross, and my noble friends Lady Barran and Lady Browning. Getting it up and running quickly is critical. Detailed work is going on, and we need to be very specific in it to provide reassurance about how it will work. Unfortunately, I do not have a timetable yet for its production, but I will endeavour to get hold of one. We need to make sure that its implementation is properly resourced. The CQC will continue to inspect its implementation, so there will still be that quality oversight.
A few other issues were raised. Many noble Lords referred to “unsound mind” being an unhelpful and, frankly, out-of-date phrase. I do not disagree. The concern here is the interaction with the jurisprudence and the ECHR itself. If we were to move on that—I make no commitment at this point—we would need to think it through very clearly, but I would like to explore it.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, asked about legal aid. I can confirm that it is, and will still be, available on a means-tested basis. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and my noble friend Lady Browning asked about advance consent—an issue that the Law Commission also raised. Again, there is an important distinction to be made here between an advance decision to refuse treatment, which will continue to be respected and is untouched, and advance consent to a future deprivation of liberty. Although that was in the Law Commission report, officials engaged in the process indicated that this did not receive support from families. There was a concern that you could sign yourself up to being deprived of your liberty at some point in the future, so it did not garner support. Perhaps it was the wrong subset or sample of people; nevertheless, we need to consider the best way forward on that.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about the equality impact assessment. I do not have an answer at this stage about why it was not carried out but I will endeavour to get one.
To conclude, I hope that I have been able to summarise the main issues and topics. Clearly, there are some very big questions that still need to be answered, but I return to the point that my noble friend Lady Browning made, which is that we need to solve the problems this time. We cannot introduce another Bill or piece of legislation that just creates a problem three years down the line. It is not just about the Bournewood gap; it is about making sure that we avoid, and do not create, any other gaps. The words “nightmare” and “disaster” have been used to describe the current system, and that is why we need to act now, but clearly we need to act in such a way that we do not create another problem further down the line.
It has been clear from this debate that there is still much work to be done to provide the right kind of reforms that we all want to see. Looking at the Chief Whip, I am sure that we will have adequate time in Committee to make sure that the Bill is in the best possible shape. We saw a nod of the head from the chief, so that is good. This debate has demonstrated—the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said as much—that there is no group of people better qualified to improve this legislation and make sure that we get the right reforms. I look forward to engaging with noble Lords and others throughout the coming months to make sure that we can achieve that and deliver a Bill that provides for people deprived of their liberty the fair and proportionate access to justice that we all want to see.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 5th September 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-I(b) Amendment for Committee, supplementary to the marshalled list (PDF) - (5 Sep 2018)
“( ) After section 4A, insert—“4AA Compatibility with other provisions in the Mental Capacity Act 2005Nothing under section 4B of, or Schedule AA1 to, this Act permits the authorisation of any arrangements for enabling care or treatment of a person that give rise to a deprivation of liberty which conflicts with sections 1 to 4 of this Act, or a valid decision to refuse care or treatment by the donee of a lasting power of attorney or a court-appointed deputy or contained in a valid advance decision to refuse treatment.””
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I start by declaring my interest as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum. It is in that role that I have been able to have meetings over the summer in Wales with several people from different professional groups across all sectors.
I hope that the House will bear with me as I try to explain why I have tabled the amendment right at the front of the Bill. The key word on which I want to focus is “conflicts” in the third line of the amendment. The reason is that the Bill adds to the Mental Capacity Act, and the principles of that Act must be paramount. In some of the meetings that I have had, I have been worried that there is a view almost that the Bill is free-standing rather than that it is completely connected to and falls out of the Mental Capacity Act.
So whatever we do, and whatever legislation goes forward, we must be aware that first of all the presumption of capacity is being overturned, and that it has to be overturned on evidence that it is for a specific decision at a specific time. People may need support to make their own decisions. Indeed, when somebody has impaired capacity they do need support, because it may be that their capacity can be maximised and they could take that decision. I have been concerned that speech and language therapists have not been a core part of best interests assessors because, when people have expressive and communication disorders, a speech and language therapist can be absolutely essential. It seems strange to have them acting almost as translators for other people who are then best interests assessors or for other clinicians when they have the skill set themselves and want to be trained. Of course, there are also people such as the independent mental capacity advocates.
People need time and a calm environment—but, for support to be provided, they also need somebody who knows them. That might be a parent, a friend, a relative or their child. But it takes time, and we need to recognise that the time taken in supporting somebody is not going to be given by a health professional or somebody perhaps running a care home who is under pressure of time and lots of other responsibilities. So we have to interpret what we are doing in that sense and maximise the ability of the person to be empowered.
Of course, the Mental Capacity Act also allows people to make unwise decisions. We need to think about how we manage harm to others under the Bill, when people may have very specific areas where they lack insight and capacity and are at particular risk. That applies particularly, I would suggest, to those likely to commit sexual offences in society because they do not have the ability to have control when they are in a situation of temptation. They may need to have some restrictions on their liberty to protect others.
When capacity is not there, we are left with best-interest decisions. That consultation must include P. There are amendments that we will come to later that stress that the cared-for person must be involved and at the top of the list, and I have my name on one of those amendments. That consultation must include everybody concerned with P’s well-being, which brings me on to the latter part of my amendment, on where there is conflict with a valid decision to refuse care or treatment, which is probably self-explanatory. I will just say, however, that in some care settings it can be very difficult for people—for example in an emergency department—when somebody is just brought in, to know whether a decision to refuse care or treatment is valid, how it was drawn up and what was considered in the process.
The others who must be consulted are those who hold lasting power of attorney or are a court-appointed deputy for somebody who did not have anybody, so the court appointed them. We must recognise that, when somebody chooses a person to donate a lasting power of attorney to, it is a very difficult choice; it is somebody whom they trust deeply. The court-appointed deputy also has a duty to know the person well. But the person with lasting power of attorney may well have known this person for years and may have seen them through deteriorating health up to the point when the lasting power of attorney needed to be activated. I am concerned that, if the lasting power of attorney or the court-appointed deputy are not really given appropriate prominence in our process, we could find that the careful choice of a trusted person becomes effectively downgraded in the system when we are trying to consider what is in P’s best interests. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for using the term “P”. It is shorthand for the cared-for person.
The other part of that consultation—for which I hope we will give due credit to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—is the concept of an advance statement of wishes. Those of us who took through the old Mental Capacity Act—I say “old” because it was some years ago now—will remember the debates when the noble Baroness suggested that we needed a balance between an advance decision to refuse treatment and an advance statement of wishes. The more that I have spoken to professionals across all parts of health and social care, the more I have been struck by how the concept of an advanced statement of wishes has not been used adequately. That becomes important because we are talking about the care plan that will be the basis of our process. The care plan must be the way that somebody who lacks capacity for decisions is to be cared for, and that care plan must be flexible and must meet their needs, so the advanced statement of wishes can become very important in shedding light on somebody’s wishes and feelings.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 20, which is in my name on the Marshalled List and has been grouped with the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.
During the briefing we had with the Bill team and the Ministers, my notes tell me that the first clause is a key change to the new regime, and that it is concerned with the portability of deprivation of liberty. I understand that the noble Baroness’s amendment makes sure that Section 4B—on the deprivation of liberty necessary for life-sustaining treatment or vital act—and Schedule AA1 are compatible with the provisions set out in the rest of the Bill and that they do not conflict with a valid decision to refuse care or treatment. The noble Baroness raises some important and substantial issues right at the beginning of the Bill and raises issues of conflicts which will need to be resolved.
Amendment 20 in my name comes from paragraph 15 of proposed new Schedule AA1 in the Law Commission’s draft Bill, quoting it exactly. It prevents the responsible body authorising arrangements for the cared-for person to reside in, or receive care or treatment somewhere, if those arrangements conflict with a valid decision by a donee of a lasting power of attorney or of a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection. As I say, the wording is exactly the same as that in the Law Commission draft Bill.
Under deprivation of liberty, a deputy and attorney may object to any deprivation of liberty and effectively block it, pending an application to the Court of Protection. I can see no obvious reason for excluding this from the Bill. The Government claim that it is already in the main provisions under the original Act—in Section 6(6) —but this is only the case where the basis for the deprivation of liberty is in “best interests”. If the basis for DOL is risk to others, that would not necessarily be the case, and so for the avoidance of doubt it is important to include this clause. If we do not, the risk of litigation on this point is probably quite high.
Deputies and donees should be able to refuse a deprivation of liberty, so this amendment seeks to ensure that the views of those donees and deputies, who have been appointed by the cared-for person to make the decisions in their best interests—as was eloquently outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—are given appropriate weight with regard to where the cared-for person resides for care and treatment.
I am pleased to say that this amendment and what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, enjoys widespread support from the organisations who have found the time, even under the pressure we have all been under, to say that they support this. They include Mencap, VoiceAbility, Mind, the National Autistic Society, Liberty, Age UK, Sense and many others. The amendment looks at the clash or overlap between the different regimes that govern this area of law. I must ask why the Government did not adopt the Law Commission formulation. The Minister should be aware that I will return to that theme throughout Committee, because the Government seem to have cherry picked the Law Commission report, and some of the most important safeguards of liberty seem to have been omitted or watered down by the Bill.
Baroness Browning (Con)
My Lords, I refer to my interests in the register. I will pick up on two points that have been raised in the amendments, particularly the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.
At Second Reading, I too raised my concern about the status of attorneys with lasting power of attorney, particularly over wellness and health. These are some of the most personal decisions. In some ways, I am more concerned about that than about attorneys who have power over the money. Money always seems a rather black and white matter—it either is or is not a good idea. But there are many shades of grey over health and, in particular, well-being. I should like to link this with decision-making and the other point in the noble Baroness’s amendment, about the need for qualified speech and language support to interpret and make sure there is a clear understanding of what “P”’s interests really are.
When you look at certain people with certain disabilities, particularly those with communication disorders—such as autism, learning disabilities and, of course, dementia—it is not always the case that they cannot express a view. But getting to that view—unless it is a real, life-threatening medical emergency—takes quite a long time. First, particularly those with autism and a learning disability, the individual has to be comfortable and familiar with the person asking the questions, however experienced. It is no good sending a stranger in for a five-minute cup of tea and a quick chat and thinking that person will then disclose their innermost feelings. How many of us would?
The point is that getting to that view might often be about something known for many years by someone who has been appointed as an attorney with a lasting power of attorney. I believe the two things are linked in those cases. We know from the Alzheimer’s Society that such a lot can be achieved for the quality of life and well-being of people with dementia and Alzheimer’s by giving enough time, when asking a question, to allow the person to process the information before they give an answer. Brain function is very different in these people. They need time to process the question they are being asked and to process how they will communicate the answer; it can take quite a long time.
This point was picked up quickly by the Alzheimer’s Society which says, for example, on a very simple matter, that when people with Alzheimer’s in residential care homes are asked whether they would like tea or coffee and do not immediately reply, they are processing the question and that can take a long time. They might prefer coffee today, but because they had tea yesterday, the answer may be quickly assumed—“I expect you will have tea, you always have tea”—before they can even process the information and the way they will communicate the answer.
How much more complex it is, and how much more time is needed when people are being asked more complicated questions about potentially life-changing decisions. This cannot be left only to someone with speech and language experience, important as that is, and such people need to be experienced. But people with a lasting power of attorney, who might have held an LPA for many years, and who know the individual extremely well, are in a prime position to act as an interpreter when important decisions are being made.
I believe my noble friend is aware of my view on this already. Those of us who served on the original Bill and its pre-legislative scrutiny many years ago know that a lot of thought went into the existing Bill on LPAs. To have one part of a Bill give rights to an individual through their attorney but then to diminish that in another part of the Bill, through amendment, seems not only wrong but seriously, morally wrong. I hope my noble friend will address this point when he replies to this amendment.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and I give my strong support to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I pay tribute to the good sense that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, has just brought to our debate.
A theme that will run through our discussions and will come up again when we come to advance decision-making is that we must have more respect for those who have been trusted by an individual to make decisions on their behalf. We must encourage people to make plans and to think about the future, and we must ensure that those who make the very wise decision to appoint a lasting power of attorney are respected. As we have already heard, we do so in other parts of the Bill, and we should not remove that when we come to the question of deprivation of liberty. We must incorporate it in the general scheme of things. It seems absolutely crucial that we respect decisions made by people who have power of attorney and by the court’s appointed deputies. I strongly support the amendment.
Lord Cashman (Lab)
My Lords, I start with an apology, as I have not spoken on the Bill before. I thank, in particular, POhWER, the organisation of which I am a patron, for alerting me to the Bill and to its concerns, as well as the concerns shared by a wide range of groups, including Liberty, Age UK, Mencap and so on.
As other speakers have outlined, it is essential that we get this absolutely right, because we are talking about potential deprivation of liberty. According to those organisations, people with dementia or a learning disability are at risk under the proposed changes. Therefore, I speak in support of Amendment 1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and Amendment 20 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton. I believe that this amendment would ensure that the views of the donees and deputies already appointed by cared-for persons to make decisions in their best interests were given appropriate weight with regard to where the cared-for person resides for care and treatment.
I will say no more than that because there are experts on this issue in the Chamber. I sit willing to support but more willing to listen and learn.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for being slightly late. I was taken by surprise at the swiftness with which we concluded our previous business.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for many of the points that she made in her speech. It took a lot of work to get the concept of an advance statement on wishes into this legislation, and I, like her, regret that it has not been more widely adopted or accepted, particularly by the medical profession. She will know that when the Select Committee reviewed the legislation, one of the biggest disappointments was the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act had not been understood by the medical profession. She will perhaps remember that when representatives of different parts of the medical profession come to talk to us, they began by saying that in an A&E department it is extremely difficult to work out somebody’s advance decision. We knew that when we passed the initial legislation, but that legislation was not meant solely to take its lead from that; it was meant to apply to a whole range of matters just within medicine. It is a shame that the medical profession still relies on a very conservative interpretation of the existing legislation and takes a read-out from emergency situations when it really should not, as there is plenty of time to discuss with the person what is happening and to understand their previously stated wishes and feelings.
I am glad that the noble Baroness has raised this issue. She is right that at the heart of the Bill is a fundamental change from the Mental Capacity Act. There will no longer be a whole series of decision-specific assessments of people who lack capacity, and that is not something that I object to. Over the last few years while this legislation has been in place, we have quite often found people being subjected to unnecessary assessments. It is quite clear that when somebody has a medical assessment for advanced dementia, say, they will not have the capacity to make the same decision, even though they go to live in a different place. I accept that it is possible to make a decision of a lack of capacity and to carry that forward throughout a person’s care. What I am not clear about, though—given that people will be subject to fewer assessments, and therefore be less likely to have changes in their conditions brought to light—is the extent to which that will interplay with somebody’s statement of advance wishes. I would rather like it if the Minister, in his response, could talk about how that will work.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The safeguards on liberty and safeguarding have been thoroughly confused by many people. That is fundamental. Whether we turn this around from safeguards against deprivation of liberty or safeguarding the liberty of somebody, I do not think that anything I have seen in the Bill has yet addressed that fundamental misunderstanding. In fact, in some cases, it probably compounds it. I want to put that on record as we discuss the many issues the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has introduced so well.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her amendment and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, for their amendments. I am delighted that the noble Baronesses were able to make it on time so that we could start on our deliberations of what are clearly very important issues.
The purpose of these amendments is to clarify that a liberty protection safeguard authorisation cannot override a valid decision to refuse care or treatment by the donee of lasting power of attorney or a court-appointed deputy or contained in a valid advance decision to refuse treatment. The comment that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made at the start of the debate, about conflict and avoiding conflict by recognising valid decisions where they have been made, was very important. I hope that all noble Lords know that the intention of the Bill is to enhance the role and agency of those deprived of their liberty and those with an interest in the care and welfare of that cared-for person. That is why this debate on the first grouping of amendments is so important.
This debate gives me the opportunity to clarify and confirm that the Bill does not allow a decision to be made that conflicts with that made by a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a court-approved deputy’s valid, best interests decision. I am glad of the opportunity to do that. Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides for this, and the Bill does not change that. Therefore, an authorisation under the liberty protection safeguards could only be given if it was in accordance with a valid decision—namely, one that is authorised in the lasting power of attorney—by the attorney or deputy.
The Bill also does not change the current position regarding advance decisions to refuse treatment, and those will remain an important part of care planning. I absolutely recognise the important role that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and others in this House played in introducing that. I assure all noble Lords that there is neither the intention nor action in the Bill to water down the power and validity of those in any way. If a person has made a valid advance decision to refuse medical treatment, that treatment cannot be given and it would not therefore be possible to deprive someone of liberty in order to provide it. We intend to give further explanation of the legal position in the code of practice. I hope that that answers some of the key issues raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, in their comments.
Those comments were echoed by my noble friend Lady Browning, and she is quite right to discuss the importance of support for those with communication difficulties so that they are able to enunciate the kinds of decisions and indications of future treatment that would adhere to their own wishes. We will return to this issue later in Committee, particularly when we get on to the issue of IMCAs—the advocates—but she is right to reiterate the point made in the proposed amendments that those acting on behalf of the cared-for person, whether they are the family, have an interest in care or have been formally appointed to do so, are, in the end, responsible for taking those decisions on behalf of that person, and their decisions should be respected, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out.
The fundamental question that underpins these amendments is: why is the Bill not explicit on these issues when, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, the Law Commission’s Bill is? Because there is no change in the current position, there is therefore no reason to outline what is already the case. Nothing is changed about what is already in the Act by what is being proposed through this Bill. Therefore, there is no need to reiterate what is already the case and will not be changed. I hope through the course of this debate that we have aired this issue. It is one that the Government agree with and, in the way that the Bill is structured, I can confirm to the Committee that there is no change in the status quo about the validity of those decisions.
With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment. I recognise that there is great concern, not least among many of the campaign groups, service providers, commissioners and others who are implementing these rules and laws every day, and they need to know that there is consistency. As we move between now and Report, I am more than happy to meet with noble Lords and others to discuss these issues and make sure that we can give every reassurance so that they can be sure that the law as it stands today has not changed and will not change as a consequence of this Bill.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for his reassurance, which is quite clear. There can be no doubt that the views of the holder of the lasting power of attorney or the court-appointed deputy must be taken into account and respected. Given that the principle behind this Bill is the importance of good care planning, I am glad to have that assurance. Of course, it is the person who has lasting power of attorney who will be in a good position to oversee the ongoing care of the person to detect whether things have improved or got worse and whether some restrictions could be lifted and things changed.
I can provide a word of reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and I hope that it is not misplaced. I have challenged the deans of medical schools, with my forum chairmanship hat on, on two occasions now. I have also rather sneakily gone in to different clinical consultations semi-incognito—it is difficult to be completely incognito—and I have been impressed by the changes that I have seen in the last couple of years, particularly in care of the elderly settings where there was respect for the need to empower someone’s decision-making. I hope that, if things were revisited, they would now see a difference.
We talk a lot about liberty protection safeguards. With the confusion between safeguarding and deprivation of liberty, I wonder whether that is the right word and whether we should be talking about “liberty protection assessments” or something else. I worry when we look at the domestic setting that safeguarding where there is a problem and the role of a liberty protection safeguard—which is to enhance the living of the person to live as well as they can within the restrictions of whatever has happened to them—more than overlap. They will always overlap a little, but they are becoming a little muddled in the system.
Having said all that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I was not able to be present at the Second Reading and I have recently been apprised of concerns by the Residents & Relatives Association about care home residents without mental capacity who, they believe, are at risk of being let down by some of the proposed changes in the Bill. At Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, mentioned that the timing of the Bill had taken many by surprise and added to that the rather pick-and-mix approach of taking some aspects of the Law Commission proposals but not others, which means that extensive scrutiny is well deserved. Unfortunately, the scheduling of the first day of Committee so soon after we came back means that many of the briefings from key stakeholders have come too late and we have not been able to translate them into amendments. So I thought it might be useful if I used a debate on the first clause to discuss some of these issues.
In particular, let me make it clear that I do not disagree with the aim of the Bill. I support its general intent, and therefore the aims of Clause 1, but there are some real concerns, particularly with the Government’s decision to depart from the Law Commission proposals regarding the role of care home managers. There are some real concerns here: first, the conflation of care planning with significant deprivation-of-liberty decisions; secondly, the burden and risk being shifted to providers; thirdly, the inherent conflict of interest being placed on managers and providers in the design of the new system; and fourthly—this came up at Second Reading—the capacity and capability of the sector to implement the proposals.
These concerns emanate from the decision to move responsibility to form the new assessments from local authorities to the care provider. This means that, in effect, care managers will become responsible for organising and conducting the assessments necessary for the liberty protection safeguards, when they are responsible for that person’s care. The Department of Health’s argument is that all it is doing is taking the Law Commission’s proposition that care planning should be at the heart of the new model, but the Law Commission did not say that these assessments should be done by care managers. In any case, if we are talking about a preventative approach, and if the aim is for assessments to take place prior to admission, which I think it is, one has to ask how it can possibly be appropriate for the care home manager to do that job.
The reality is that care home managers will have the responsibility to make crucial decisions about restricting a resident’s freedom that were previously made by independent people. The assumption seems to be that the resident’s best interests will generally coalesce with that of the provider, but we know from experience that that is not necessarily so. The Relatives & Residents Association, which has a helpline that receives lots of calls from anxious relatives and friends, points out that currently, families can be in conflict with the care home when the resident and their next of kin or lasting power of attorney may wish to move elsewhere, about who may or may not visit, and about whom they may or may not wish to see. This sometimes results in relatives or friends being restricted or banned, or residents being given notice to quit by the care provider.
These examples alone ought to give rise to concerns about what could be described as draconian powers now being given to care home managers. The responsible body makes its decision having regard to the report by the care manager and supporting evidence, but there is no requirement that I can see to have regard to other evidence. Although the responsible body must be satisfied that the care manager has been through the process in the Bill, the impact assessment suggests that this will be merely a desktop exercise. I would be glad if the Minister could confirm that, or say just what it is that the local authority can undertake. At the moment, on the face of it there is a massive conflict of interest with no external checks if the manager reports that the person is not objecting. That would, for instance, open the door to collusive relationships between the home and relatives.
There is then the question of training, which was raised at Second Reading by a number of noble Lords. We have already heard that there were problems with people in the field understanding the requirements of the existing legislation. What is now being put forward is, in my view, in many ways a more demanding and wide-ranging process, certainly in the care sector. Despite the statement in the Government’s impact assessment that they have engaged with service providers, it is noticeable from the briefings we have received in the past two days from many care providers that they too are very concerned about the responsibilities being placed upon them. The consultation seems to have been selective, in that the people who were consulted do not appear to speak on behalf of the sector. Again, it would be useful to nail this one as we go through our debates.
The impact assessment assumes a zero cost to homes and that half a day’s training will suffice. Surely the Government cannot be serious about that. Are they really saying that these new responsibilities can simply be subsumed into the everyday business of care homes at the moment? That surely gives the lie—the concern is that the deprivation of liberty in relation to people covered by this amendment Bill is not being taken seriously enough.
Over the weekend I read a briefing from a national group of regional deprivation of liberty safeguard leads, who should know a thing or two about this. They point out that, as we know, the provisions relating to care homes were never part of the original consultation, and that at no point have local authorities had an opportunity to road test how taking on such a significant assessment role would work in care homes. They say that this is all the more important because the Bill leaves the detainer determining whether the conditions for detention are met, and again, this potentially creates a conflict of interest and risks a return to the state of arbitrary detention.
In summary, it is not appropriate to give care home managers these new and inappropriate responsibilities for vulnerable and often isolated residents for the following reasons. First, they clearly require the care home manager all too often to be judge and jury about decisions in which they were involved, and in which the viability of whose business may depend on income received from detained patients. Secondly, the state of the sector surely gives rise to concern. I know that there are some fantastic care homes, but one in five has no registered manager in post, despite this being a mandatory requirement, while turnover is estimated to be a massive 27%—and they need only half a day’s training. That is simply not believable.
I question whether care managers have the background, time or training to carry out this onerous role. I also question why care home residents, who are surely part of the community, are being treated differently from peers living in their own homes who may be equally vulnerable. This is worth a more general debate, although I recognise that there are amendments to come. However, the Government need to think again and at least explain in rather more coherent terms why they think it is reasonable for care home managers to carry responsibilities which have built into them clear conflicts of interest.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I will resist the temptation to rerun Second Reading, but I thank all the organisations which have provided us with informative briefings as well as all the individuals, academics and carers who have done so—you all know who you are.
This rather ugly Gorgon of a Bill matters. It matters to those who are vulnerable and will unknowingly place their future in its hands. It matters to diligent professionals from both the NHS and care services. They do not know it, but it matters to the general population, too—many will become carers one day.
I wish someone had had the courage to tear it up and write a Bill that was clear, compassionate and contemporary—but they did not. Because we care we will spend the next few days in Committee and beyond, trying to make it fit for purpose. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, has given us the briefing around which we shape this debate on Clause 1 stand part and for which I thank the Relatives & Residents Association. It covers the role of the care manager, the centrality of the cared-for person and their views, best interests and advanced wishes; an understanding of what deprivation of liberty is, access to information and, indeed, cost.
It is worth mentioning that there are amendments from all over the House that cover each of these areas. Like others, I am concerned about the role of the care manager as assessor. Over the last few years I have met many kind, efficient care managers, both professionally and in my role as a carer. As professionals, they run hotel services, ensure that care needs are met and rosters are filled and deal with people who lack capacity with compassion. But experts in mental capacity they are not and I am concerned that they are given such a key role in this Bill. As chair of a not-for-profit organisation that cares for people with learning disabilities in residential settings, I know how hard it is to do this on the money that local authorities give us.
An efficient home is a full home. The person who determines whether someone should enter that setting or go somewhere else should, under no circumstances, be the manager. The conflicts of interest, no matter what checks and balances are in place, will always be there and that is the same for the private sector, not-for-profit and even, where it still exists—and I believe it does in parts—the public sector. Training and awareness should minimise this but we must be on our guard.
Everyone accepts that the 2005 Act has become not really fit for purpose and that this is a patching exercise. Everyone accepts that DoLS has run its course. Many believe that what we are trying to amend is drafted to save costs and that goes back to the briefing that this debate is based on—people live longer, care costs increase and these processes are not cheap. Can the Minister confirm that these amendments are all drafted to be the most effective way to deliver a better service and not as a cost-cutting exercise?
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, mentioned consultation, which is something that we on these Benches are concerned about. My understanding is that consultation did go on but it was with individuals grouped together—they were like focus groups of care home managers, social workers and so on. There was no consultation of the organisations, the umbrella bodies. I phoned many organisations before putting my thoughts together and tabling my amendments. All of them came back to say that they are going to see the department this week or next week but that they have not spoken yet. I think that is disappointing.
Much as there might be a temptation to scupper this Bill by supporting Clause 1 stand part, I know that it is for now the only alternative. I will do that in the hope that the Minister tells his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care that it is barely good enough and that future patching of legislation is not acceptable. The people we are discussing really deserve better.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in his endeavour to raise this important issue about care homes. I know we will return to it. This is a very good example of where I had not really thought about the twin-track approach to raising the safeguarding issue. I understand completely how this came about as an attempt to try to improve on the monstrous bureaucracy of DoLS. This is a very good example of that, to which I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, alluded. We have a monstrous Bill at the moment. I remember discussions at the Law Commission with the Royal College of Psychiatrists as to how we might make it more streamlined and reduce costs, which in my view is pretty crucial if we are to target the right people. That led to the production of a process to involve care home managers which, on the face of it, looked as though it would cut bureaucracy.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister and his team for their engagement with Members across the House, which has been very helpful. I strongly support the attempt, on the initiative of my noble friend Lord Hunt, to have this clause stand part debate.
In the past day or so, I have spent some time looking at advertisements for care home staff and managers. They vary greatly; there is no standard at all. One advert for the role of a care home manager said, “You will assume all aspects of responsibility for your care home and have exceptional man management skills”. A minimum of two years’ experience of managing a care home, with no other qualifications, was the only candidate requirement. Another advert said that there was an opportunity for someone seeking to develop their career who must have a solid residential care background on applying. It said that applicants should have a full working knowledge of CQC requirements, possess leadership and organisational skills, and be either qualified in or working towards an NVQ level 5 in social care management, a QCF 5 or equivalent. It took more of an interest in qualifications and was a bit hit-and-miss on whether the person should be fully trained. It said that candidates should have three years’ experience of social care and it would be preferable if they had some previous management experience.
A third advert offered an exciting opportunity for a care home manager with a view to becoming a registered manager if the applicant was not one already. The skills and qualifications needed were an NVQ level 5 in leadership and management, or to be working towards that. Again, that does not mean being qualified with all the necessary education and training. A fourth advertisement sought candidates with proven home management experience, strong marketing, commercial and business acumen and a clear and thorough knowledge of CQC standards. Your Lordships should note that possessing knowledge of CQC standards came third after marketing, commercial and business acumen.
My point is that this demonstrates that there is no agreed national standard for care home manager training. With this Bill, we are proposing to give them a huge new responsibility that will affect the quality of life of many vulnerable people in our society. This really needs to be revisited. We are taking a big risk with people who have no one else to defend them if we do not start defending them here.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, to intervene fairly briefly, it is important that we remember that the current DoLS system has effectively fallen over. We have 108,000 people currently waiting to be assessed, so we have to do something. We cannot leave it running so there is an urgency to come up with some way forward. I remind the Committee that, whenever somebody is in a place of care such as a care home, the deprivation of liberty safeguards application—form 1—is a request for standard authorisation and has to be completed and sent in. That form asks about the purpose of the standard authorisation, and for a relevant care plan to be attached. It also asks why less restrictive options are not possible, and other things. So a degree of assessment is already going on at the care home and these forms are sent in. They are then sent to somebody to authorise them.
I worry that, in some of the briefings that we have had, it looks as though the care home manager will be able to authorise in totality, whereas, as I understand it—the Minister may correct me if I have this wrong—the care home manager will still be required to have the responsible body authorise. That responsible body will be able to look—and one would want them to look—at objections that may come forward from somebody. It is to be hoped they will go and visit if they feel there is a discrepancy between the care plan submitted and the original care and support plan that came from the local authority, which may have been involved in the pre-placement assessment that went on.
The idea behind these new approvals is that there is portability: the person may reside in one place, then be moved to hospital, go to outpatients, spend time in hospital and then come back to the care home. Within that portability, however, there is a requirement to review, if the circumstances change. We will come later to amendments that look at discrepancy between the care plan and the care and support plan as submitted. In other words, these are things that should trigger red flags in the mind of the authorising body, rather than the authorising body just being a rubber-stamping exercise, which is, I think, a misunderstanding that there may have been. If it is a rubber-stamping exercise, there are all kinds of dangers in that. Somehow, we have to filter out those people who really need an in-depth assessment and review from those people where the current processes are just burdensome, time-consuming and not contributing to improving their care. That filtering is really difficult. I offer that in the debate at this stage because it is worth looking at these forms, which I hope will be improved because there is not that much room to write on them.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I make a brief intervention, primarily to underline the importance of two points that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, made when introducing his amendment. Like my noble friend Lady Jolly, I fear we have no alternative other than to carry on and scrutinise this Bill. The reasons for doing something have just been set out very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but I retain two really key concerns which I raised at Second Reading.
The first—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—is that of timing and understanding the relationship with the review of the Mental Health Act. I understand that it is due in the autumn—I am not quite sure when—together with amendments to the Mental Capacity Act, given that both Acts relate to non-consensual care and treatment. It seems that the overlap between the two systems is one of the reasons why the current system is so complicated, and why so many staff struggle with it. Frankly, it is why I struggle with it so much. There must be real concerns that changes to address problems under one system will have unintended consequences for the other. Clarity is needed from the Government over when patients should be subject to one Act over the other, so that, in the words of Sir Simon Wessely, chair of the Mental Health Act review,
“arguing over the framework does not get in the way of delivering the care that the person needs”.
I could go on at length—I will not, your Lordships will be pleased to hear. I have just one more thought on this. In addition to the need for clarity on when the Mental Capacity Act or the Mental Health Act should be used, it is really important that patients do not find that they are deprived of their liberty by both Acts at the same time. There are examples of this happening, particularly when a patient has both a mental disorder and an unrelated physical disorder.
That is my first point. My second point, which was made very cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is about the consultation that is taking place with the sector. Like everyone else, I have received a large number of briefings in the past few days. Frankly, it has been difficult to take them all on board. I have done my best. I was particularly concerned by a survey that was published only a couple of days ago by an organisation called Edge Training. I do not know it personally, I do not know exactly what else it does, but I do know that it was a survey of 900 people and nearly half the respondents were best-interests assessors, with the rest being primarily social workers, health professionals and independent mental capacity advocates. I will not go through what they said, other than to say that there were really very high levels of concern—80% this and 90% that—particularly in relation to the new roles being placed on care home managers, the potential conflicts of interest, plans to charge care home managers with deciding whether it is in a resident’s best interests to have an advocate if they lack capacity to request one, and the lack of a specific requirement to consult the person themselves about a proposed deprivation of their liberty.
My conclusion from all this is that the sort of consultation that should have gone on with the sector for a change such as this, which really has to work—this is not political, it is about something that has to work on the ground and people who do this have to understand it and feel that it does work—cannot have happened to the extent to which I think it should have happened, and that has real importance for the pace at which this can be taken forward and the consultation and implementation timescale.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I just want to share the thoughts that I had over the summer, when we had a very long time to look at this proposal. I have been wrapping my head in wet towels looking at this legislation, trying to work out what it is all about, and to answer a key question: why this Bill now? I am still not happy that I have the right answer.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, referred to the Mental Capacity Act as a “monstrous” Act—the DoLS part of it. But let us be fair, when the Select Committee did its review, we found that the Act was held in quite high regard; the problem with it was that it was not properly understood and that had caused problems with its implementation. It is true that we said in the Select Committee report that there needed to be an absolute root and branch review of DoLS, but we prefaced all our recommendations for the review of the Act on one other premise, which has been ignored by the Government. We said that one of the reasons that we saw for the failure of the Act to be properly implemented was that there was no central ownership of the Act and no single body responsible for its implementation. The Government have chosen to ignore that. Instead, they have shoved responsibility for the MCA on to the CQC, where it does not get specialist attention. There is nothing like the attention paid to the Mental Capacity Act that there is to the mental health legislation, and yet if it is not properly implemented, people can be deprived of their liberty.
Baroness Thornton
I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this clause stand part. It was necessary for a number of reasons. I am also grateful for the contributions that have been made because they bear out the reason why it was important to put down this debate. The first reason has been alluded to by many noble Lords and is the very unsatisfactory scheduling of the Bill. It means that noble Lords and stakeholders have not had sufficient time to consider the Bill and all its amendments for today. The vast majority were put down last week, and the Marshalled List became available yesterday. It was difficult for anybody to see whether the tabled amendments probed the Bill sufficiently and made all the improvements that noble Lords deemed worthy of consideration.
There is a lesson here about scheduling: if you have the Second Reading immediately before a recess, a sufficient number of sitting days must be given to allow noble Lords to table amendments and have the necessary discussions with stakeholders and each other. Getting almost 100 amendments tabled from a standing start when the House rose is pretty good going, and I congratulate noble Lords across the House for that. Some of us were emailing each other and the Public Bill Office from the poolside or the middle of fields during the Recess. However, people are playing catch-up, which does not bode well for a thorough-going scrutiny.
I congratulate the Bill team for managing to talk to noble Lords during the Recess, but in some ways they must have had an unsatisfactory time as well because we did not have the full list of amendments until Friday evening. As many noble Lords have said—it is clear from my mailbox too—in the last two or three days stakeholders are also playing catch-up and are expressing great concern about some aspects of the Bill. In a way, the frustration that that has raised is why my noble friend has tabled his amendment to oppose the clause stand part. That allows us not only to mention things that are not covered in amendments but to raise these points.
From my point of view, and from these Benches, depending on what the Minister says in his reply, we might need to raise issues of scheduling and time to consider some of the serious implications of the Bill, and possibly table amendments at the next stage that address some of the concerns raised in this debate—particularly the issue of care home managers. Notwithstanding the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—she may well be right about people understanding the processes in the Bill—that does not alter the fact that we do not know who will authorise or whether it will work.
This links to my second point, which is about consultation. I would like to know where the care home manager’s role in this came from. It happened between the Law Commission draft Bill and this Bill. Suddenly, the care home manager is it, and I think that that might probably have been a surprise for some people—certainly for the noble Baroness, who did not hold back in her views about care home managers. On the consultation issue, it is clear from the Law Commission report that it did extensive consultation, leading to the creation of its draft Bill. There were something like 83 nationwide events and 583 written responses from interested persons and organisations. Some of those events were very significant indeed, with many stakeholders. Where did the issue of the role of care home managers come from? I should like the Minister to share that with us, as he must be aware of the level of disquiet about the expectations and the responsibilities that would have to be assumed by care home managers for the assessment required to authorise the deprivation of a person’s liberty when the person lives in their care home.
I also want to know the view of the CQC on this proposal. What is the view of the care providers, the ADASS and the LGA? They are all key stakeholders in that decision. I should be grateful to have the Minister’s take on the view of those important organisations on this proposal. I could not find the issue among the material circulated by the Minister or, indeed, in the letter he sent, which I found useful and informative.
My noble friend has done the House a favour in raising these issues and allowing a large number of questions to be asked at this stage, which might inform the next day’s discussion in Committee, the next stage of the Bill and perhaps also the discussions that we will need to have in the coming weeks.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I start by agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that of course extensive scrutiny is deserved for legislation of this kind, which we have achieved both at Second Reading and, for those who could not be there, in the second Second Reading debate that we have just had. That scrutiny is obviously reflected in the 100 or so amendments that have been tabled. It is worth using this opportunity, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, did to some extent, to remind ourselves why we are here pursuing this legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked why now? Well, in 2014, the House identified that the DoLS system was not fit for purpose and the Government tasked the Law Commission with completing its report into DoLS. It recommended that the current system needed to be replaced as a matter of pressing urgency. I will come on to the point about the discrepancies between the two approaches but, nevertheless, that was its view. The Government stated that we would do this as soon as parliamentary time allowed—part of the issue around scheduling is indeed “when parliamentary time allows”. It is important to use opportunities when they arise to do important things, even if it means that people have to work during the summer or holidays. I realise that that is not always ideal, but the scheduling, for example, of Committee over a long period—and we will then need to think about Report—should give lots more time for these kinds of discussion. I reassure noble Lords that we want to have and are open to those discussions.
The model that we have created is based on that developed by the Law Commission and, like the Law Commission, we want to increase the protection of some of the most vulnerable people in society, to protect their rights, not just in theory but in practice, and to improve access to justice. I confirm to noble Lords that we have worked and continue to work with a range of stakeholders to build on the Law Commission’s model and to produce a streamlined system. “Streamlined” is an important way of describing this, because the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Barker and Lady Murphy, talked about cost-cutting. This is in fact about creating a system that has the effect that we want with the budget that it is given; that is the point. As we know from the backlog, lots of people are being denied access to justice because of a system that is disproportionate in its application. That is what we are trying to solve, so that those cases that really do deserve the highest level of scrutiny are able to receive it. That really is at the heart of what we are trying to do. I emphasise that Nicholas Paines, the Law Commissioner who led this review, said that this Bill,
“will go a long way towards addressing the flaws of the current system and better protect the most vulnerable in our society”.
I would not claim at this point in the proceedings that it is perfect. I am sure that we can improve it, but it is important that we are doing it, that we are doing it now and that it has support from the Law Commission itself.
More recently, the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act: Interim Report, which was referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and led by Simon Wessely, stressed the need for an,
“appropriate calibration between resources spent on delivery of care and those spent on safeguards surrounding the delivery of that care”.
That is what we are trying to achieve through this process. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, who was quite right to talk about the interaction and interface between the two Acts and how they operate that, while we are taking this opportunity to act now while we can, if there are future recommendations that mean there have to be further changes, we would be open to those. This will not be the last opportunity to make sure that the interface between the two Acts, once the reviews have been completed, could be amended, if that is what is necessary. It is important that we have acted now and that those 108,000 people currently in the backlog will have swifter access to justice—that is the main argument. That is my Second Reading speech summarised and repeated.
From what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has said, I do not think that he wants to remove this clause, not least because it would remove the new system while not stopping the repeal of the current system, and nobody wants that. At the heart of what the noble Lord spoke about is this focus on care homes, which I think is worth dwelling on. The system has been carefully designed to ensure that there is independence and proper accountability. Care homes will not authorise any applications. That will fall to a wholly independent responsible body—the local authority.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I am grateful to the Minister, although I am reeling from the shock that he thinks that I called for a second Second Reading debate to take place on a Clause 1 stand part discussion.
I of course agree that the current system is not fit for purpose. I agree with the Minister and with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords. I agree with the need for a streamlined system, but it has to be the right system. I say to the noble Baroness that one of the briefings that I received was from 39 Essex Chambers, which is pretty expert in this area. It was a very interesting piece by Victoria Butler-Cole which sets out seven changes to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill that the courts are likely to make unless Parliament gets there first.
We have to be very careful that in wishing to support the Government to get a streamlined process through we do not build in mistakes and errors that, rather like the Cheshire West decision, will lead to the court, and then to further legislation. In her piece, Victoria Butler-Cole says that the Court of Protection has a record of rejecting capacity assessments conducted by consultant psychiatrists with years of training in mental health and specifically in relation to the MCA. The Bill permits care home managers to assess capacity in this context. There is no way that will withstand scrutiny by the court, and there are likely to be even more cases in which assessments of incapacity are overturned as care home managers with little or no relevant training are required to carry out what can be a complex task. That seems to me to be the problem.
I know that this has to be signed off by the local authority. The impact assessment makes it clear that in the vast majority of cases that will be a desktop exercise. That does not fill me with confidence that these assessments will be scrutinised effectively by local authorities which themselves are very hard pressed. That is why I think that, when it comes to the detailed amendments, this is a very important part of this legislation. We need to be very careful to ensure that this is going to work effectively.
On training, the noble Lord has made some very welcome comments, but I refer to the fact that there is an annual turnover of 27% in this sector among the people who are going to have to do this work. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that I was trying to be polite. This is a very vulnerable sector, with low-paid people who have low qualifications being asked to deal with issues to do with the fundamental liberty of people in this country.
My gut feeling is that it will not do. This cannot be left to care managers. The Government will have to look again at the Law Commission’s assumption that local authorities would do the work. I of course do not wish to prevent Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I hope that it is permissible for me to rise again. For the avoidance of doubt, will the Minister confirm that I understood him correctly? Is he saying that the role of the care home manager has not changed? I understand that, under the existing law, a care home manager may request that somebody’s capacity be assessed, but that assessment is not usually done by them. That assessment is done by somebody else. Is he saying that that is not going to change? I am sorry, but I think it very important that noble Lords understand what the Minister says.
Baroness Thornton
I understood that the Minister said “escalate”, which means that something changes. Perhaps when he is answering the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, he could also explain the word “escalate”.
The Government may need to think about carrying out some form of assessment of the appropriateness and suitability of care home managers to undertake this task. If that has not been done, perhaps it needs to be done in the next month or so.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
In answer to the noble Baroness’s question, the point that I was making is not that the role of the care home manager will not change but that they are not being asked to do something of which they have absolutely no experience or responsibility for at the moment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, care home managers are already required to make applications and to consider capacity and restrictions, so they already have a role. The distinction is that, as the Bill sets out, the assessments can be made within the care home itself—of course, not by a person with direct responsibility for care. That is one of the issues, of avoiding conflict of interest. In all cases, those will be authorised by the local authority. If there is any reason, through that authorisation, for concern—for example, of conflicting views between the person cared for and their family—then the AMCP, the mental capacity professional, will have the opportunity to decide on the right course of action. That is what I meant by escalate—not that there is a choice of whether to escalate authorisation to the responsible body, as that will happen in all cases, but that there is a further opportunity for consideration by an AMCP if there is any sense of this happening. We will explore in more detail in future groups whether there is a reason for further investigation, including, of course, speaking to the cared-for person, their family and others.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
With regard to what is going to be a desktop exercise, the question then arises as to how the local authority will know that there are concerns. On conflicts of interest, it seems that the job of the care home manager is to make sure that their home is filled. There is a fundamentally wrong issue here. The initial assessment will be done by someone with a financial interest in its outcome. It is wrong.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Perhaps I may say that to some extent we are getting ahead of ourselves, because we will explore these issues in further amendments. There is clearly already a system in place, which will continue and will be enhanced, to make sure—whether it is through family members and others with an interest, or, as we have discussed before, through those with a lasting power of attorney—that those who have an advocate working for them are able to register their concerns, objections or whatever it is through the process. So it is not simply the case that the care home manager would be able to wrap up the entire discussion and not let any other point of view be heard—quite the opposite. And, as I said, we will discuss that in further detail.
On training issues, addressing the second point talked about by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, she is quite right. That is precisely why I said that it is important for us, the Government, to explain, on the basis of consultation with the sector, what will be required to make sure that those who will have these extra responsibilities will be able to exercise them properly. We will discuss that outside this Chamber. I know that noble Lords want to make sure that, where there is a proposed change, even if they still require some reassurance about the benefits of such a change, it will be implemented properly. Clearly, that has big implications for training, capacity and so on. So we will take that away and make sure that we are able to provide more detail on it.
Baroness Thornton
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, we are moving to the issue of changing “18” to “16” and applying the provisions of the Bill to 16 year-olds. I have four points to make.
First, this amendment is supported by the LGA and the ADASS. Secondly, the GMC is concerned that, given that the Mental Capacity Act applies to people aged 16-plus, excluding those below 18 from the liberty protection safeguards in the Bill may leave an important gap in the liberty safeguards. Thirdly, the Royal College of Psychiatrists has pointed out that case law has established that the parents of children under 16 may give consent to what would otherwise constitute a deprivation of a child’s liberty where the matter falls within the “zone of parental responsibility”, but it has been held that a parent cannot give equivalent consent for a 16 to 17 year-old. It therefore argues that the Bill should be extended to 16 to 17 year-olds to provide them with better safeguards, as they are not served well at present.
Finally, the Law Commission looked at this in some detail. It was part of its remit from the Government that it should consider,
“the position of young people aged 16 and 17 (but not children aged 15 or younger). Most of the Mental Capacity Act applies to people aged 16 and over. However, the DoLS only apply to adults aged 18 and over. There are several legal provisions that permit the deprivation of liberty of children … Under section 25 of the Children Act 1989, a child who is being looked after by a local authority can be placed or kept in secure accommodation in England, provided for the purpose of restricting liberty. The Mental Health Act can be used to detain a person of any age suffering from mental disorder for the provision of medical treatment. Beyond these cases, the deprivation of liberty of a young person can be authorised by the Family Court or Family Division of the High Court under their respective inherent jurisdictions or by the Court of Protection”.
There is of course a complicating factor: namely, that,
“the Strasbourg court has recognised the right of parents—in certain cases—to consent to restrictions placed on their child which would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty”.
That refers to the Birmingham case, which noble Lords may well be familiar with.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I support this amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has already said, the Royal College of Psychiatrists feels strongly that this would clarify decision-making. There may be issues arising from the fact that when the Bill was being put together we had not yet had the Birmingham judgment, which is why we are not quite there yet. However, having the four regimes that we currently have to choose from for this age group makes it very difficult to make appropriate choices. This would clarify it. It was strongly supported by the Law Commission in its first recommendations, and I support it.
Lord Cashman
My Lords, I too support Amendment 2 in the name of my noble friend Lady Thornton, and the consequential amendments. I am grateful to her for bringing her personal experience to this and reminding us of the young individuals involved. This amendment and the subsequent amendments are to be welcomed. By including 16 and 17 year-olds, it offers better safeguards to those who are not served well at the moment. The amendment would see 16 and 17 year-olds protected by the LPS. It would simplify the system, would bring clarity and ensure that their rights under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights were therefore protected. For those reasons and many more, I support this amendment and the subsequent amendments.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, I rise briefly to support this group of amendments. I strongly support bringing 16 and 17 year-olds within the scope of the Mental Capacity Act, and support the proposed amendments to the authorisation and safeguards scheme. I will raise a couple of points, and I would be grateful if the Minister were able to provide some answers or reassurance.
First, clarity will be needed on the role of those who currently have parental responsibility, and how that will fit in with the proposals that are being put forward. Secondly, we need to make sure that there is a fully co-ordinated and joined-up approach across a number of different pieces of legislation. I have already talked about the join-up between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, but I am conscious that, when we are looking at 16 and 17 year-olds, we need to look also at other legal mechanisms that authorise a deprivation of liberty, such as Section 25 of the Children Act 1989, and at how the model dovetails with legal frameworks for the provision of care and support, such as education, health and care plans under the Children and Families Act 2014. So I would ask for some reassurance that someone is looking at the join-up with other relevant bits of children’s legislation.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I would like to follow that up. Clearly, the Government accepted in principle that these provisions should extend to 16 and 17 year-olds but then entered the caveat that,
“changes will need to carefully consider wider rights”,
as the noble Baroness has said. The Government said then that they would consider these matters carefully before bringing forward legislation. The question I would like to ask is: how far has that work got, and is there a prospect of seeing legislation in the reasonable future in relation to it, or is this our opportunity? Other opportunities may not come for some time to come. I realise Ministers are reluctant to commit themselves to particular legislation, but it would be helpful to the House if the Minister could at least give some indication of the work that is now being undertaken and when it is likely to come to fruition.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, the Law Commission supports this and I certainly support the amendment as tabled by my noble friend Lady Thornton. Including 16 and 17 year-olds would offer some legal protection for organisations such as the National Autistic Society, of which I am a vice-president. We do a huge amount of work with young adults and strongly believe that this is important for them—for their work and for their future. This was raised during Second Reading by a number of people—I was one of those who raised the matter. The Minister indicated that he would look at it and, indeed, in a letter from him on 24 July, he said:
“During my speech I indicated that I would like to reflect on the matter of how the model could fit with 16 and 17 year old young people”.
Perhaps, when he gets up, he will have some good news for us.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I would like to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Murphy, for tabling these amendments, which seek to apply the liberty protection safeguards to 16 and 17 year-olds in the same way that they apply to adults. Noble Lords have been absolutely right to point out, as they did at Second Reading, that in the Government’s response to the Law Commission report, we accepted in principle that 16 and 17 year-olds would be included in the new liberty protection safeguard system. I know that noble Lords are motivated not just get to get this right in general but also, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, in relation to specific cases that are known to them, sometimes very close to home. I understand and sympathise absolutely with the desire to do that.
The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, is also right to say that it is something I said I would consider and would seek to bring further news. We are still considering this very actively. What is clear even from this brief debate is that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, pointed out, there are some critical interactions that we need to get right with other bits of the system. These include the role of parents, how the safeguards would apply to looked-after children, and interaction with processes such as the education, health and care planning processes for those with special needs and disabilities. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Thornton, reminded us, we need also to be mindful of the current court case.
At this stage, I repeat and underline our commitment to make progress and to offer the best possible protection for this group of vulnerable young people. Proper scrutiny and detailed thought is required, and that thought is ongoing. I recognise the arguments for including this group. Like all noble Lords, I want to make sure we get this right and get the interactions right, so that they do not end up being fixed subsequently by the courts, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out in a different context.
Our intention is to use the time between now and Report to continue having those discussions, both with noble Lords and with stakeholders throughout the sector, to make sure we can get this right. On that basis, having given the commitment that we will work hard to do what we can between now and Report to get the right outcome, I hope the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that. What can I say but, “Thank you, and let us hope so”?
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, the essence of this amendment is about language and use of language—in particular, the term “unsound mind”. I think we would all agree that language is important; it sends very important signals. Many noble Lords raised this point with passion at the Second Reading debate. I was pleased that the Minister’s helpful letter of 24 July referred to the debate about “unsound mind” and made clear that the Minister was sensitive to the points made and would welcome views. I guess this amendment is my way of putting forward my views.
The fact remains that, despite growing awareness and acceptance of mental illness, stigma and discrimination remain a regular experience of people with mental illnesses and their families and can put people off seeking help. We were given to understand that the use of the term “unsound mind” within the Bill was to ensure that it was in line with the ECHR—but this was written in the 1950s. Many people, both inside this Chamber and outside, have expressed serious concerns about the inclusion of this language in the Bill in 2018. Frankly, it perpetuates very unhelpful negative stereotypes. I would contend that the phrase “unsound mind” is out of place in today’s society; it is out of place in legislation being looked at in 2018; it is stigmatising and has no clear clinical meaning; indeed, I would say it is offensive to many.
Therefore, my amendment proposes that, in paragraph 2(2)(c) of Schedule 1 to the Bill, the term “is of unsound mind” is replaced by “has any disorder or disability of the mind”. This terminology is already a well-established term in the Mental Capacity Act and has proven to be compliant with the ECHR without, in my view, having anything like the same stigmatising connotations of “unsound mind”. A disorder or disability of the mind, I am informed by the Royal College of Psychiatrists, has a clear clinical meaning. It is well understood by clinicians and should be no more stigmatising than saying someone has a physical disability.
I am aware that the BMA, which supports not using the term “of unsound mind”, has put forward a proposition that this term should be reconsidered and experts and patient groups consulted to find an alternative to it. The BMA may be right, but I felt that, for my starter for 10, I wanted to put forward terminology that I thought was right. I am sure that others will be able to improve on it.
To conclude, above all this Bill must put the people most affected centre stage—that means some of the most vulnerable people in society, as we have already heard. In my view, it is simply not good enough to continue using terms that lawyers and drafters of legislation may find helpful—it might help them fit things in with other bits of legislation and other conventions—but which causes harm and distress to those we are all trying to help. I believe there is a real and welcome opportunity to change the narrative and discourse in a positive way, and this amendment is a way of taking that opportunity.
Lord Cashman
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to support this amendment. Language is crucial. Several times during the day I question whether I am of sound mind, and I think that the concept of unsound mind is extremely dubious. I welcome the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, because it seeks focus and clarity, substituting for “is of unsound mind” the words,
“has any disorder or disability of the mind”.
I believe that the Royal College of Psychiatrists has supported this approach. The BMA also suggests that there should be a different approach because the term “unsound mind” reinforces stigma and discrimination, and equally it is outdated. Its continued use merely perpetuates negative stereotypes of vulnerable people, particularly when we are trying to get over those stereotypes in order to get people to speak more openly at the beginning of their problems—our problems—with mental health issues. Therefore, it is a pleasure to support this amendment.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has produced a perfectly adequate descriptor which would substitute perfectly well for “unsound mind”. We always face this difficulty in discussing terms that relate to stigmatised disorders. We have to keep changing the language to keep it up to date and to refresh people’s thinking about what we are dealing with. “Unsound mind” went out in the 1960s and 1970s—I do not think that I have ever diagnosed anybody as being of unsound mind—and we must now have an alternative. We do not need the convenience of it remaining as it was back in the 1950s. Therefore, I support the descriptor given by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It is a very good one. We have used it before and it would be perfectly adequate. Let us ditch “unsound mind”.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee for long but it is important to recap on a bit of history. The original legislation that came before your Lordships’ House on this issue—the Mental Incapacity Bill—was subject to the first ever pre-legislative scrutiny. In going through that then very innovative procedure, Members of this House and another place did a couple of things which at that time were game-changing. One was that we invited people who lacked capacity to come and give evidence to us. But we went further than that. When we produced our report, we invited them back to discuss with them what we had listened to and what we had changed. One of the first and most important things that we did was to change the title from the Mental Incapacity Bill to the Mental Capacity Bill. We also, for the first time ever, produced an easy-read version of a Bill.
I strongly support my noble friend Lady Tyler because this feels like a real regression in thinking. I understand that the term is there because somebody somewhere believes that it has a legal meaning. We came up against those same arguments all those years ago and this House led the way in getting lawyers and counsel to change their minds. I do not see a reason for us not to do the same again.
I wish to add one point. I vividly remember listening to the people whom we invited back to talk to us after we had produced our report. At this point, there were only Members of your Lordships’ House in the room—the Commons were busy and had not turned up. I remember one particular gentleman who said, “When I first saw this, I thought it was really rubbish, but actually you’ve done quite a good job”. I have to say that in all my years in your Lordships’ House I do not think that I have ever received a more sincere accolade. That is not to belittle anybody’s contribution to this, but I think that my noble friend has made a very strong point.
Baroness Thornton
These Benches support the amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others have said, the reference to unsoundness of mind is offensive to those with learning disabilities, dementia and brain injuries and their families. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has just demolished all the legal arguments for including the phrase in the Bill, and indeed a lot of organisations, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, say that it out of place in today’s society. The GMC argues that it is not clear what added protection or benefit is achieved by using the term. VoiceAbility says that “unsound mind” is not used in modern psychiatry and that it could lead to debate in disputes. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will be as agreeable about this amendment as he was about the last one.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I do hate to disappoint. I thank the noble Baronesses for introducing this point. We discussed it at Second Reading and I have huge sympathy with the concerns about this kind of language. Frankly, it is not the kind of language that we use. As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, pointed out, she has not diagnosed anyone as being of unsound mind for decades. It is a throwback and we are in the process of destigmatising mental health issues, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, pointed out. That is an endeavour that we are engaged in earnestly together. However, it is important to distinguish between the operational language used in care and the language used in the courts, and I want to discuss that.
This is not just about semantics; it is about terms that have established legal precedent and a jurisprudence based on their interpretation. It is worth discussing the consequences of deviating from a term that is in current use because of its role and the fact that the phrase is used in the European Convention on Human Rights. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, pointed out, the term has not changed since the 1950s and the creation of the ECHR, and it has subsequently been used by the Strasbourg court. There is a risk, and it is worth recognising, even if it is one that noble Lords might be prepared to contemplate. The risk is that a different expression such as the one proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler—it is a perfectly reasonable starter for 10, as I think she called it—could create a gap for some people who need access to liberty protection safeguards but do not meet the criteria of having a disorder or disability of mind, although they would have met the criteria of unsound mind.
It is important to note that the Law Commission used this language. We have been accused of deviating from the Law Commission Bill but it used this language and we have copied it to ensure that the liberty protection safeguards are compliant with the ECHR and that there is no gap with people not being covered. This could include people with learning disabilities, brain disorders or disorders of consciousness. In essence, the problem here is not this Bill. In a way, the Bill has a problem because of the language that has not been changed since its creation in the ECHR.
Therefore, although I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment, new terminology would risk creating a gap for people between the ECHR and this proposed law, and we are all concerned to avoid such gaps. Any gap would require people to have recourse, instead, to the Court of Protection. Therefore, it is not the case that people would have no recourse; they would have recourse to the Court of Protection, but we know that the people being cared for and their families and carers can find that an intimidating and difficult process.
It is also important to note that the Court of Appeal has indicated that some people with certain forms of learning disability might not be considered mentally disordered under the definition put forward by the noble Baroness but would still be considered of unsound mind for the purposes of the convention. That is another reason why there is a risk of a gap. For example, there is a particular risk that some individuals with brain injuries, or certain disorders of consciousness, might fall within the gap.
At Second Reading I did say, earnestly, absolutely and honestly, that I wanted to take this away and consider it, because of the frankly unsatisfactory nature of the term when it comes to modern practice. We have also listened to the contributions of a range of stakeholders—a number of people are of course very interested in this, and not just in this House—and to the contributions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to see whether it is possible to use better language. I know this is not something the House will welcome, but I have concluded that, although the term is regrettable, there is a risk in using alternative language of creating a gap. Between those who would be captured under the definition suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler—or, indeed, potentially any other definition—and those currently captured under the terminology “of unsound mind”—
Baroness Murphy
I really struggle to understand where these gaps might fall. For example, these people who have brain damage, which gives rise to a mental disorder, or people who have transient episodes of epilepsy, which might lead to some fugue state—would they not also be included in mental disorder, under the definition suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler? I cannot see where these gaps might arise. Have they been identified by psychiatrists? If we look through the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or the International Classification of Diseases, if you prefer, I cannot understand where these gaps might arise.
Lord Woolf (CB)
If the real purpose is to ensure protection under the Human Rights Act for those we are concerned about, has the Minister considered whether that might not be achieved merely by stating that the category of people we are looking at should have the benefit of the relevant section of the Human Rights Act? When I say the Human Rights Act, I mean the convention.
Baroness Barker
The Human Rights Act was in force when the Mental Capacity Act was being debated. During the passage of that Act we considered very carefully what language we should use. Is the Minister saying that we got that wrong, and have there been cases of people who have fallen into the gap? If so, how many are there, and can he give the evidence by which the Government arrived at the conclusion they have now?
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
It might be complex to find the right nomenclature, but I heard the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, say that this was a starter for 10. I cannot see why we have to regress to 1959 language in the Mental Health Act without further exploration of whether we could redefine the term about perhaps affecting the mind, to take in that very small minority of people with severe physical illness that occasionally affects the mind. We have worked so hard to destigmatise both learning disability and mental health that it seems very sad that we cannot work a bit harder at this point on this issue.
Lord Cashman
I want to reaffirm the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. Surely it is not beyond the wit of drafters and our legal experts, when referring to the starter for 10 offered by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, to refer to the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence arising from the European Court of Human Rights? It seems to me that it is elegantly simple to take such an approach, reassuring the rights that relate to the “unsound mind” in relation to the new definition offered. I hope my intervention makes sense—it is not often best practice to speak on the hoof on such legal matters. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I have not made sense.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am glad that we have had a subsequent opportunity to discuss this. I would like once again to restate that I personally, and government Ministers, officials and others, do not find this comfortable language. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, did not mean it this way, but this is absolutely not a case of trying to take us back to the 1950s. In proceeding with this legislation, we have to make sure that people who currently get protection do not lose it. I know that we all agree that we do not want that to happen. If you like, that is the goal; the law is the means, if I may say so to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. The key is making sure that we have the terminology that will reflect that we do not want people falling through the gap. It is perfectly reasonable to ask, “What is the nature of this gap?”
The Court of Appeal in G v E said that a gap would arise. Our understanding and advice from lawyers is that current case law indicates that there might be individuals—I do not have specific details of the kind of conditions from which those people might be suffering. It is worth pointing out that the Court of Protection also uses the term “unsound mind” at the moment. It is a term that is clearly operable in a legal context but which has become inoperable in a medical context. That is the challenge we face and which we have explored in this discussion and at Second Reading.
We have given this very careful consideration. We need to be incredibly conscious of not creating that gap. However, I also understand that noble Lords would like to see more evidence of two things. First, there is the reality of the gap: who, what kinds of people and what situations? That is a perfectly reasonable thing to ask. Secondly, has there been further exploration of alternatives to what we all agree is an outmoded and regrettable phrase? I am absolutely prepared to commit to do that between now and Report, because I share noble Lords’ intentions that we should make sure both that we move with the times and that we do not remove protections from people currently entitled to them, or who would have been entitled to them, in the future. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness might be prepared to move on from her starter for 10 and withdraw the amendment.
Lord Woolf
In the list of people whose help the Minister is going to seek, may I suggest that parliamentary counsel be invited to consider whether it is possible, through the use of language in the Bill, to ensure that there is no gap?
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, particularly the last bit, which I found a tiny bit more reassuring. I thank everyone who has contributed. It has been an excellent short debate and we have benefited hugely from highly distinguished medical and legal expertise.
I understand that the Minister may have concerns around risks and gaps, but we need—and he has agreed to bring forward—examples and evidence of what these gaps and risks are and why they could not be dealt with by language that is perhaps slightly different from that which I proposed. There is a huge opportunity to be seized here. I have made it very clear that the wording I propose may well not be quite right. I am sure that others could come up with better wording that meets the Minister’s concerns, which I understand are legitimate. I am grateful that he said he will think further and come back with further evidence. I should like to put down a marker that I will wish to return to this on Report.
Baroness Murphy
(d) if living in a care home or supported accommodation, meets any one of the following conditions—(i) is under continuous supervision and is not permitted to leave the premises on their own, or(ii) is subject to the use of physical barriers to limit their access to particular areas, or(iii) is subject to the use of force, including physical, mechanical or chemical restraint, or(iv) is subject to constant close observation and surveillance.”
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, we have come to what I regard as the most important and possibly stickiest, most difficult issue that we face. It addresses the reason why we are all here today with a new Bill to try to solve the problem of the old one, which did not work. Why did the old DoLS not work? Because they were overbureaucratic, very expensive—we are talking about £2 billion a year and this is cheaper at £300 million, although someone said to me that this costing business is rather a science fiction at the moment—could not be implemented and were predicated on a judgment in Cheshire West that extended the previously accepted notion of deprivation of liberty. I wanted to have a first go at introducing a restricted definition of what constitutes deprivation of liberty for the purposes of this Bill.
I am primarily concerned not about the cost, but the risk. When tens of thousands of people are subjected to a procedure, those whose circumstances really need scrutiny and review—because they themselves or their families or professional carers are objecting to their care or placement—are not receiving the focus and energy of the safeguarding process because they are simply lost in the morass of processing so many cases. Already we know that the tick-box mentality has pervaded the existing procedures, and that is not because the people who are trying to implement them have not been doing their best. There are not enough of them. They are trying to rush around with a list as long as your arm and they cannot get through it.
I had heard that there are now 140,000 unassessed cases, although I think the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, mentioned 106,000. Noble Lords should think how long that list would take to deal with. With a mean length of stay in residential care of two years from admission to death, many elderly people with dementia—who, after all, are being cared for because of a terminal illness—will never be assessed before the great final assessment. By the way, I only hope that when they encounter Saint Peter at the pearly gates they do not find that a specially approved angel has been designated to assess whether heaven is in their best interests or not—it is quite possible. To return to more serious matters, it is crucial that we reduce the numbers that will be scrutinised by this system so that those who are truly at risk of abuse or of receiving less than adequate care are better safeguarded.
Of course, we could wait for another case to come before the Supreme Court for the penny to drop, but Parliament should surely provide a statutory definition of what constitutes deprivation of liberty in the case of those who lack capacity, in order to clarify the application of the Supreme Court’s acid test and bring clarity for families and frontline professionals. There is a risk that the Law Commission’s proposals—the safeguard principles have much merit—will become unworkable both in the domestic sphere, where we have hardly started to take people into the system, and with the potential expansion of the scheme into domestic care settings, which will become exceedingly invasive and difficult to operate. And that is in the context of care homes and joint living arrangements that are not being adequately met.
Many legal experts, including Lord Carnwath and Lord Hodge, found the decision in the case of Cheshire West puzzling. They said,
“nobody using ordinary language would describe persons living happily in a domestic setting … as being deprived of their liberty”.
In their evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Sir Nicholas Mostyn and Sir William Charles, retired Family Court judges, submitted that the proposed liberty protection safeguards are based on an acid test in which the starting point is legally wrong, and should be revisited. Sir Nicholas noted that,
“no case from Strasbourg has come close to saying that the case of someone of ‘unsound mind’ (as Article 5 puts it) falls within the terms of that article if they are being looked after in their own home”.
Further, he argued that,
“it is surely vanishingly unlikely that Strasbourg would disagree with the narrower test”,
that used to be used. He said that,
“it is after all completely consistent with its jurisprudence, which mandates a fact sensitive approach and which looks at the range of factors such as the intensity of the restrictions in question”.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights agreed with that point and introduced in its report the case of Mark Neary. I will not go into that case now because of shortness of time, but a number of cases were described where people were clearly being deprived of their liberty and families could not understand why it was happening. The new definition from Cheshire West cast a very wide net, capturing people who were content and those who had expressed de facto consent, albeit not valid consent for the purpose of the law. That has led to incredible family distress—people felt that their loved ones were being deprived of their liberty as a result of care plans—as well as resource issues. It sits at odds with the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, which emphasises respecting the autonomy and wishes of those with disabilities.
The question is whether an amendment could be introduced to solve this problem. The Scottish Government gave some thought to amending their own Act and suggested a number of principles that might be followed. First, if a regime looks like detention, it does not lose that characteristic just because the person does not display opposition. Secondly, if a regime does not look like detention but the adult displays opposition to staying there, that should be considered as placing significant restrictions on a person’s liberty. Thirdly, a person may be perfectly content to move to another place of residence, but may not agree with aspects of their care, which amounts to a significant restriction on their liberty. Fourthly, a person may remain in the same residential setting, but become subject to changes in aspects of their care that mean they become subject to significant restrictions on their liberty. We often see that in care homes where people are moved from a general unit to a specialist unit for dementia, or to an elderly mental care unit when they become “unmanageable”, with quite serious restrictions placed on them.
A person may be considered as having significant restrictions if: the adult is under continuous supervision and control and is not free to leave the premises; barriers are used to limit the adult to particular areas of premises; or the adult’s actions are controlled by physical force or the use of restraints, by the administering of medication for that purpose or by close observation and surveillance, which can be very intrusive. However, measures applicable to all residents in a given place that are intended to facilitate ordinary, proper management of the premises, such as security cameras at the front door and front door locks—the sort of things we might have in our own homes—should not necessarily be regarded as restricting liberty.
It is crucial that the first principle of the Mental Capacity Act be paramount in any decision. Whenever possible, a mentally incapacitated person should be listened to and their wishes respected. While short-term memory may be seriously diminished, the individual often still recognises the people around them and can express a wish. Where there is a clear agreement between an adult, their family and professional carers, I believe the state should keep its legislative nose out. This may not be the right amendment, and I look forward to listening to others whose ideas are also contained in amendments tabled in this group, but it seems we should concentrate our resources on those who are really at risk, where we are confident that we have the resources to concentrate training and interest on a smaller group.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, there is always a risk in your Lordships’ House when an amateur follows a professional. I feel that I have a bit of a starter-for-10 moment as well, because both the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and I tabled similar amendments, Amendments 4 and 5, to achieve the same sort of aim. I could take noble Lords through my arguments, which again are similar to hers, but time is of the essence, so it might be worth putting both of them before the Minister to ask whether the Government would consider bringing back an amendment that would put a clear definition of deprivation of liberty in the Bill. There has been a lot of pressure from various parts of the sector for this to happen. At the moment, only case law gives an indication of deprivation of liberty, so to have something in the Bill would be helpful.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group that does not sit terribly well with the first two—but so be it. I will be brief. These attempts to define a deprivation of liberty are nobly submitted, but I worry about potential unintended consequences from the wording. I will not go through them in detail, but I hope that the Minister will assure us that this is something we can take away and look at. One difficulty is that one person’s imprisonment—a deprivation of liberty—might not be a deprivation of liberty to another, so this may be very personal in some aspects.
On Amendment 81 in relation to a “vital act”, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, will take reassurance from me—I do not know whether the Minister will agree with this or not—that anything done must be in a person’s best interest. Part of that is that it is a benefit and not a burden—or it may be a burden, but the benefits outweigh the burden. That has to be a fundamental principle in clinical decision-making.
The reason I tabled Amendment 82, which relates to an urgent authorisation, is that, looking through, I was concerned about unintended consequences from the way the legislation was written. I could see two, possibly—but they may be misplaced anxieties. First, in a true emergency situation, as a consultant in emergency medicine said to me, you just get on and do what you have to do. You do not go and look at paperwork. So, in an emergency situation, you may have to restrict somebody’s liberty to do what you have to do, which is in their best interest. You do not do something that is not in their best interest—and the last thing we want to do is impose any more bureaucracy or paperwork.
So I suggest that, possibly in the code of practice and not in the Bill, it should be clear that an urgent authorisation is an authorisation to begin longer-term care, but in an acute situation, in a clinical decision, nobody would expect people to even begin this process until we get to about 48 hours. I say that because a clinical decisions unit will normally have people staying in it for under 24 hours, as they may even on an acute medical ward, before being moved to a longer-term in-patient unit where their longer-term care may be assessed. Of course, we have people who have a transiently impaired capacity because of illness and the treatment of that will restore their capacity, such as the diabetic whose diabetes is out of control through either hyperglycaemia or hypoglycaemia, and things such as hypocalcaemia as well. None of those should be included.
The concern at the other end was that an urgent authorisation could be used for example to take a confused person with advanced dementia where care at home had completely collapsed. Possibly their main carer at home had suddenly been admitted to hospital. They would then have to be moved into a nursing home placement at great speed, but that may not be what they want and they cannot consent to it. They would have to be moved to that place, be in a placement and be assessed there. There needs to be some time limit so that this cannot linger on for months or years, with somebody saying, “Oh, well, they are here under an urgent authorisation”, rather than a longer-term authorisation. That is why I tabled the amendment. I accept that it is not perfect, but I hope it is something we can look at. It may be that the code of practice can clarify those issues.
Baroness Thornton
I have added my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, precisely because I thought we needed to have this discussion. That was exactly right. I would hate to choose between the two amendments, but this sets out when deprivation of liberty occurs:
“Arrangements that give rise to a deprivation of … liberty”,
are when the cared-for person is placed,
“under continuous supervision and control”,
they are “not free to leave” and the responsible body believes that it is in the cared-for person’s “best interests”. That is worth putting on the face of the Bill if at all possible.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights made a strong argument in favour of a statutory definition. I read its report and it seems absolutely right that that is what we should do. I would be interested to hear what one of the lawyers in our midst might have to say about this: whether they think that it would be a useful thing to do and whether the stabs we have made at it so far are helpful. We are interested in this discussion but we realise that this is the beginning of the discussion rather than something that may be appropriate right now.
When listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, talking about her amendment, it occurred to me that this is one of those occasions when technology is important. When you have an emergency admission, you need to be able to input the name of the person into a PalmPilot, which will tell you whether a DoLS is already in place and whether a do not resuscitate order has been made. Recently I have had experience of exactly this situation with a family member. Because the information was not readily available in an emergency, we ended up where we did not want to be. I just add that to the debate because I know that the Minister and his boss are very interested in technology and its uses in the health service. This is another of those occasions where it might be useful.
Lord Woolf
Perhaps I may respond by giving one lawyer’s view on the matter referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. I should put on the record that I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and therefore was a party to the report, and of course I support it.
When the opportunity arises to deal with a situation where it is clear that a decision of the Supreme Court has had consequences which may never have been anticipated, it would sometimes be helpful if the judges had the opportunity to look at the matter again. If the sort of steps so ably advocated by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, were taken, I would suggest that serious consideration should be given to them as they could have a beneficial effect from the pragmatic point of view as well as on the point of principle.
I am sorry, but I ought to have added that I have a relative who could be affected by this legislation, and I declare that.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments, which have produced this discussion on the application of the liberty protection safeguards. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said that this goes to the heart of why we are here in the first place. I know that she has long-standing concerns about the DoLS system both in its application and the scenarios where it may or may not be appropriate, to whom it should best be applied and so on. I know that that is what has motivated her attempt in this amendment. She and others, including the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, have said that this is the start of a process.
The first amendment in the name of the noble Baroness addresses the circumstances in which the authorisations could be given in a care home or supported accommodation environment, and people deprived of their liberty as interpreted in the Cheshire West case. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, pointed out as a member of the committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has recommended introducing a statutory definition of the deprivation of liberty in its report The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards. I can tell him and all noble Lords that we are considering its findings closely. Many noble Lords have expressed a desire, whether in the form set out in the amendments in this group or otherwise, to explore the possibility of including a statutory definition in the Bill. Following this discussion, that is something I should like to consider further. It is worth stating, however, that there are risks in doing so because it means that to change a definition requires primary legislation. Noble Lords are much more knowledgeable about and aware of those risks than I am, but nevertheless it is something that warrants further consideration.
I am also sympathetic to the sentiment expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the state involving itself unnecessarily in family and private life while also being mindful of making sure, as we all are, that individuals are not denied the safeguards they need and that we are complying with our obligations under Article 5 of the ECHR. The effect of her amendment would be to limit the circumstances in which arrangements giving rise to deprivation of liberty in a care home or in supported accommodation can be authorised under the liberty protection safeguards, but of course that would mean that such arrangements would still have to be authorised by the Court of Protection. We have already discussed how that can be burdensome and expensive for families. It is for that reason that domestic arrangements were included in the deprivation of liberty safeguards. Given that, while in general I would like to have a further discussion around definitions, there is a problem with the definition that the noble Baroness has provided because of its application in that case.
Baroness Murphy
Perhaps I may just say that the amendment is my first stab at the issue with no help in creating it or any legal consultation. My next will be a lot better.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am sure it will be and I look forward to seeing it.
As she pointed out, the noble Baroness has a second amendment which makes the point that the steps taken to deprive a person of liberty, life-sustaining treatment or a vital act should be of benefit to that person, and of course we all agree with that. But as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, before any authorisation is made or arrangements take effect, a decision will first need to be taken that the care or treatment is in the person’s best interests in accordance with Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It is important to note that this amending Bill does not change it, so that will continue to be true if the Bill before us in this House is taken forward as it stands. The legislation is already clear that if actions are taken to deprive someone of their liberty in these situations, it must be to the benefit of the cared-for person. That was at the heart of the amendment spoken to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Thornton, so I want to take this opportunity to say that that provision continues to exist because the best interests test foreruns the subsequent necessary and proportionate test, which we will explore in a subsequent group.
On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about limiting the time for the duration of authorisation of the steps necessary for life-sustaining treatment or vital acts, the intention, as she will know better than me, is to move consideration of the deprivation of liberty to earlier in the planning stage. Nevertheless, there will be cases where it needs to be applied in an emergency situation. I do not need to bring that to light because other noble Lords have done so. Her amendment, which I think is probing, would require authorisations to be renewed every seven days. She will know that there are limited periods at the moment, but unfortunately they are not always adhered to. If we are honest, they can become a target rather than a limit, and I think that is what is happening. We need to make sure that we have a system which gives providers greater clarity but does so in a way that is more sophisticated than could be achieved in legislation. I therefore agree with her that the code of practice is the right vehicle for that because it will be able to outline the different circumstances and scenarios and thus give a much richer picture of the kind of situations and principles that ought to be considered.
This has been a very useful debate and, as I have said, I should like to take some time between now and Report to consider the opinion expressed by noble Lords and in the report of the Joint Committee about the benefits of a statutory definition. Having started that discussion, which is obviously the phrase of the evening, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his positive response to the ideas if not to the amendments themselves. We will return to this at the Report stage, as he has said, and I hope that we may have forthcoming from those associated with the Joint Committee on Human Rights some support at that point for the further debates in this area. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Barker
“(ba) the arrangements are in the best interests of the cared-for person, and”
Baroness Barker
My Lords, Amendments 7 and 8 in my name are yet another attempt to make some sense of this Bill. Perhaps they might not have been tabled had we been able to have more discussion over the Recess. As several noble Lords have already mentioned, there has been considerable disquiet about the non-appearance of best interest assessments in this Bill. Indeed, a number of noble Lords attempted to table amendments that, at the very least, like this amendment, were trying to probe where the best interests of the cared-for person would come into play.
This particular part of the Bill—Part 2 of Schedule 1 —is on “Authorisation of arrangements”. In putting down these probing amendments, I was particularly taken by the briefing given to us by the Law Society, which suggested:
“Remove the distinction between the ‘arrangements’ and ‘care and treatment’ as it will result in difficulties when applied in practice. For example, how would a person’s capacity to make medical treatment decisions or decisions about contact with others be distinguished from decisions about the ‘arrangements’ to provide that treatment or to prevent contact with others?”.
In light of that, at the very least we ought to be asking the Minister how this is going to work. I accept a number of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the clumsiness of the existing DoLS procedure, but the removal of best interest assessors is one that has caused a fair degree of disquiet among the different groups.
Amendments 7 and 8 are also meant to begin to probe a key provision in the Bill—the assertion that the arrangements need to be “necessary and proportionate”. There is no further explanation in the Bill about what the term “necessary and proportionate” might mean, who will make the decision and on what basis it will be judged and reviewed. This goes back to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that, given the increased role— let us say that—of care home managers, they will be making the assessments of what is necessary and proportionate.
No doubt I am going to be told that these amendments are either deficient or unnecessary, but they are here to begin to probe some very unclear but key parts of the Bill about the authorisation of arrangements. In that vein, I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I support the principle behind Amendment 8 in particular. Perhaps this is something the Minister will want to view as going in the code of practice, as I am not sure that putting this on the face of the Bill is necessarily the right place for it—although I completely understand the sentiment, which is to avoid serious risk. We live in a risk-averse system, and it is serious risk that we must be concerned with.
A case that I heard about in the last few days came to mind. An elderly lady with dementia became extremely agitated when it snowed. Because of her tendency to wander, she was not going outside unescorted. A conversation with her son revealed that she had been a meteorologist, so her view was that when it snowed she had to go outside and measure the depth of the snow and telephone the Meteorological Office. What they did was simply wrap her up really well, let her go out and measure the depth of the snow, give her a telephone and let her make a mock phone call to the Meteorological Office. She was very calm and happy. You do not want her to go wandering because she is near a main road and a railway line and all the other risks, but it was not a serious risk to let her out in the garden, well-wrapped up when it was snowing. That illustrates the granularity of the need to take appropriate decisions focused around the individual person.
Other cases that do concern me are those people who will become sexually disinhibited when exposed to great temptation. That struck me about a case I came across in a home for people with a history of sexual offences. There had been a DoLS in place for somebody not to go unescorted through woodland because, if he came across a young girl on her own in woodland, his sexual drive would overcome his rational behaviour—exposure to porn sites would also overcome his rational behaviour. However, the rest of the time, he could live well. Sadly, that DoLS was apparently overturned by the Court of Protection and, within weeks, he offended and ended up being imprisoned for his offence, but he had been living well with an enormous degree of freedom prior to that point. I think that the serious risk to the cared-for person has to be considered, because there the risk to him was that he would offend and, sadly, that came true.
I hope that the Minister will look sympathetically on the sentiment behind this.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, my Amendments 27 and 28 follow the same lines of argument that we have heard from the noble Baronesses but relate to paragraph 16, “Determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate”, on page 12 of the Bill.
I know the Minister will refer us back to Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act, which is very comprehensive in defining what “best interests” are. Clearly, the intention is that, because it is stated there as a principle at the front of the Act, that permeates through all of the issues that we will be discussing in this amendment Bill. There is always an issue when you have an amendment Bill. It is not incorporated in the principal Act and is quite difficult to follow. It will be difficult to follow for the practitioners who are going to have to operate the new provisions. This must relate, too, to the code of practice. We seek certain reassurances that it will be made clear to the people at the front line who are going to operate it that the best interests provisions in this amendment Bill will apply equally.
What is confusing is the wording “necessary and proportionate”. In a sense, the Government are saying there is a qualification—that things have to be necessary and proportionate. I wonder whether that is helpful. It is confusing that we have a qualification of necessary and proportionate, but in the principal Act it is “best interests”. Clearly, these are probing amendments, seeking to tease this issue out, but I wonder whether the Government could give further consideration to how we can ensure that everyone involved is very clear that the best interests apply.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, at Second Reading I expressed the hope that the Government were in listening mood. They certainly needed to be. To be fair, the Minister and his team are to be congratulated on the level of engagement that they have been willing to participate in to help us perhaps make a better Bill at the end of the day. But—there is always a but—the Bill might have had a smoother passage if the Government had published an equality impact assessment. They are yet to do so; perhaps the Minister can tell us why. Many concerns have been expressed in debate on other amendments, which might have been assuaged—and we might have made more progress—had such an assessment been available to us.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate for their desire to be brief, which I know was shared by others who have not been part of the discussions on the Bill, but it is also important to be comprehensive in discussing these issues because, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, the best interests of the people being cared for is what this is all about.
I know that this is an issue for noble Lords; it was raised at Second Reading and has been raised again in this debate. It is important to state that best interests decision-making for care and treatment remains fundamental to the Mental Capacity Act. In a way, it is the founding stone around which the rest is built. The liberty protection safeguards sit under the aegis of the Act. The Bill does not change that. One request made by noble Lords at Second Reading was for us to publish the Act as amended by the Bill. We have done that; I understand that it is in the Library. I can make sure that a digital copy is circulated, and I will make sure that it is sent to all concerned. Clearly, understanding the flow of how it is read in not just legislation but the code of practice is critical. I want to make that clear and I understand that important desire.
Under the current system, there are two different best interests tests: one exists under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act—the decision, usually made by a clinician, to provide care or treatment—and a second, separate, additional one falls within the tests required for the DoLS system. The Law Commission recommended that the DoLS tests be replaced with a necessary and proportionate test. In that sense, we are following where it led. Prior to a liberty protection safeguards authorisation being considered, the decision will need to be taken, normally by a clinician, that the care or treatment enabled by the arrangements is in the person’s best interests. As I said, that will apply under Section 4. Subsequently, it must be demonstrated that the arrangements to enable that care and treatment are necessary and proportionate. Of course, that is the single test applied by the liberty protection safeguards; it is a secondary test following a consideration of best interests.
The current requirement that the deprivation of liberty must be necessary, proportionate and in the person’s best interests is instead replaced by a single, primary best interests test in an attempt to avoid confusion and conflict—the word used by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, at the beginning of the debate—between two determinations. The focus of the second-stage test on what is necessary and proportionate is an attempt to remove this confusion. It is not an attempt to downgrade in any way the primary and prior importance of a person’s best interests being taken into consideration.
As well as giving that assurance, I want to pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that avoiding risk to the cared-for person will form part of the necessary and proportionate test. There is already a principle in the Mental Capacity Act to use less intrusive arrangements, which will continue to remain, unamended, an important principle in the new model. As was brought to light by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and other noble Lords, the application of “necessary and proportionate” requires a degree of granularity that makes it difficult to overdetermine in legislation, and that is the reason why the code of practice is so important. That is why it will contain a range of scenarios, principles, circumstances and so on of what the application of a necessary and proportionate test should look like.
I hope that I have been able to assure noble Lords, whose considerations I take very seriously, that best interests are foremost in our minds and will remain so in the legislation, unamended by the changes brought in by the Bill. Clearly, I want to make sure that this sentiment and its legal power are understood by all concerned, particularly if there is concern in the wider sector. As I said, I do not believe that a second test is necessary; as said by the Law Commission, it could be counterproductive. It is important that we make sure of a clear understanding of the primacy of the best interests test. I would like to explore that with noble Lords to make sure that it is properly understood by all; we can do that between now and Report. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister for his helpful response. As we begin to get to the heart of the debate, he will understand that he and the Bill team can perhaps see the Bill as a whole, but the rest of us are struggling to do so. Therefore, we have to test individual elements of it, perhaps to a greater degree than he may think is warranted. None the less, it was helpful of him to put those statements on record. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 5th September 2018
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-I(b) Amendment for Committee, supplementary to the marshalled list (PDF) - (5 Sep 2018)
Baroness Barker
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, we return to the topic that we were discussing before the break: the conditions that have to be met for authorisation of deprivation of liberty arrangements. During the dinner break, I reflected on what the Minister said in response to the previous Amendments 7 and 8, which were in similar territory. I understand entirely what he said about the best interests test being in the Mental Capacity Act and that being the first stage of assessment. However, on the secondary assessment for arrangements for either care and treatment or deprivation of liberty, the Minister seemed to suggest that there was a possibility of conflict between those two things or a misunderstanding of them. I will go back over some of that territory again; that may irritate the Minister, but it has been clear all afternoon that one of the main purposes that these proceedings in your Lordships’ House may serve is to enable people outside in the lobby groups, who, like us, have not been able to see a clear read-across from this Bill back to the original legislation, now to do so.
Amendments 9, 10 and 30 seek to reiterate or reintroduce concepts which will be very familiar to all those who took part in the deliberations during the passage of the Mental Capacity Act. Under that legislation, it was always to be made clear to a person who was possibly going to be subject to a deprivation of liberty, and to anybody involved in that decision-making, that the well-being, wishes and feelings of that person had to be taken into account, that any decision would be the least intrusive as possible, and that the arrangements being made for the person were the least restrictive, particularly with regard to where somebody should reside. That is for many people, particularly older people, perhaps one of the most contentious decisions. It is often one of the subjects on which there can be conflicting views between families and individuals or between professionals and individuals.
I have said before and—given that the one thing that has stuck out in the Bill is the enhanced role for care commissioners and, particularly, home care managers—I do not think it is unreasonable to go back again and satisfy ourselves that, when the authorisation of arrangements happens, these key parts of the Mental Capacity Act will again form part of the assessment. I hope, when we come to further amendments down the line, that they will be part of the record of decision-making. I do not make any apology for raising these amendments. I am sure the Minister will bat them back, but if he will do so with a deal of explanation then I think we will have served a purpose. I beg to move.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, Amendment 29 seeks to ensure that the views of those consulted are taken into account in determining whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate and, importantly, that particular weight is placed on the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person. I declare an interest as I also have a family member who is directly affected by the matters we are debating today; indeed, much of my Recess was spent trying to sort out his care needs taking into account his views.
While the Bill includes a duty to consult, I and many in the sector are concerned that, as currently drafted, the Bill does not adequately weight things towards the cared-for person’s wishes—the person who, of course, should be at the centre of all this. This also reflects the Law Commission’s advice about giving more weight to an individual’s own wishes and preferences regardless of whether they have been judged to have decision-making capacity—this is quite important. In a fairly recent case, Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B, the judge concluded:
“that an incapacitated person’s wishes and feelings should be assumed to be determinative of his best interests unless there is good reason to depart from the assumption”.
Earlier, the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, spoke importantly about the difficulties sometimes of communicating with and listening properly to people who have communication disabilities. I accept entirely that conversation with people who lack, or may lack, capacity can be challenging and requires additional communication skills, training and understanding. It is crucial that we get this right, because the consequences are significant and will lead directly to improvements or deteriorations in people’s health and independence.
It is often the case that the family are the most skilled at communicating with their loved ones and are, therefore, the ones most likely to understand their feelings and wishes. This may in some circumstances be communicated with subtlety and nuance. I declare another interest here as I chair the charitable community interest company Beyond Words. The wordless health and social stories that we create facilitate discussions and support decisions, but the discussions they facilitate are about people’s wishes and understanding; they support decisions that at the outset might appear too difficult or challenging.
Anything that enhances the understanding of the person—and of the carer, social worker or health provider—about what the person is thinking and might want takes time and skill. Sometimes people need special tools to help them. Effective engagement by support workers and carers with each individual can improve their understanding about the type of support the person requires and I hope will lead to less restrictive interventions being provided.
On this whole issue of who sits with, communicates with and listens to the person, I think many working in the care sector assume it will be an expert who comes in, yet the experts do not see that as being part of their job either. So there is a gap, where often nobody is actually doing the listening or communicating, because everybody assumes that it is somebody else’s job.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. As she eloquently said, the puzzle relates to paragraph 17 of new Schedule AA1 on consultation, which references those who must be consulted. The aim of the consultation is,
“to try to ascertain the cared-for person’s wishes or feelings in relation to the arrangements”,
but the paragraph does not specify that the cared-for person must be consulted. The Minister might just refer me to Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act and say that it is covered there, but so are the provisions in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) in paragraph 17(2)—they are all listed in the best interests test. Therefore, the puzzle is why the Government have decided that there should be no attempt, at least in statute, to seek the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings. We are already concerned that these measures are not focused on the interests of the cared-for person; they are about streamlining bureaucracy and saving money, and this rather lends to that suspicion. I hope that the Minister will be able to agree to the noble Baroness’s amendment, because it is a very important symbol of what this is really all about.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments tests the proportionate nature of the decisions being taken. Amendment 29 would put the views of the cared-for person at the centre of the assessment and ensure that adequate weight was given to their wishes and feelings. I have not been able to find in the Bill where that is expressed, and that is shocking and surprising. We have to see a clear statutory duty to consult the cared-for person, and the scope of that consultation must include their past wishes, feelings, values and beliefs. I invite the Minister to tell me whether he believes that the Bill as it stands achieves that, because I cannot see that it does. If this amendment is not agreed to, the Minister and the Bill team must think about how they can best make sure that the Bill reflects the need for consultation with the cared-for person.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
I thank noble Lords for tabling their amendments and for contributing to a debate that has continued the discussion that we had before dinner. It again gets to the heart of why we are here, which is to make sure that when people need to be deprived of their liberty, it is in their best interests to do so and that the restrictions are proportionate and necessary and so on.
I agree with the spirit of the amendments. It is important that we intend to, and do, safeguard the well-being, wishes and feelings of the cared-for person. Dealing with the first set of amendments, I take this opportunity to reassure noble Lords that the changes being sought are already required by law in several ways.
First, the European Court of Human Rights has made it clear that a decision on whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate must include consideration of the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings about the arrangements. It should also be noted that, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, wishes and feelings are already a part of the first-stage best interests decision-making under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act and I can confirm, as I have done already, that the Bill does not change this. Furthermore, wishes and feelings will also be considered as part of the “necessary and proportionate” test, and the code of practice will provide further detail about how that will work in practice.
Going even further, as has been referenced by several noble Lords, we have created in this Bill a specific requirement to ascertain a person’s wishes and feelings in relation to the proposed arrangements through the duty to consult with anyone with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare—first and foremost the person themselves, as well as their family, carers, friends, advocates, interlocutors or anybody with a substantive interest in their care. I believe that there is substantial legal protection, force and direction to make sure that the person’s wishes and feelings are considered first and foremost in any of these kinds of arrangements. As this debate has demonstrated, there are clearly lingering concerns that that is not the case, because of the existing framework, notwithstanding the enhancements through the duty to consult that we are introducing. However, I am eager to make sure that it is well understood, and to work with noble Lords so we can make clear that those responsibilities already exist, both in statute and—
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I understand the Minister’s argument, were it not for the fact that the amendment, in paragraph 17(2)(a) to (d), just copies what is already in the best interests clause. I would argue that, if we are going to copy four of those, why do we not copy the issue about the cared-for person being listened to? The Minister is arguing different points from amendment to amendment on this.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
We try to be consistent, but it is not always possible. The noble Lord makes a good point; it is something that I would like to explore further.
Turning to the matter of considering less intrusive arrangements, again this is incredibly important. Case law establishes that the test of whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate must also include consideration of whether less intrusive arrangements are available and have been fully explored. As we discussed in the last debate, it is already a principle under the Mental Capacity Act. The code of practice will provide further detail about how that will work in practice.
This has been a useful debate, continuing, in some ways, the previous debate on best interests. As we have all agreed, it is important that the person’s wishes and feelings are at the centre of arrangements being proposed. That is certainly our intention through the liberty protection safeguards scheme that we seek to introduce. I want to continue working with noble Lords over the coming weeks to make sure that there is clarity that that is the case. I hope that on that basis, the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister for that reply. We started with the mental capacity legislation, which is explicit in having the person at the centre of everything that happens. Yet we know from several reviews that have been conducted, including the review by the Select Committee, that the implementation of that legislation has been very patchy. To then be faced with a piece of legislation in which consultation with the person is not on the face of the Bill seems to be moving a long way from that original principle.
I have let the Minister talk about the code of practice repeatedly and I have not mentioned it so far, given that we have other amendments to debate. However, we found out with the Mental Capacity Act that reliance on the code of practice was one of the reasons why the Act was not implemented as well as it should have been. We will come on to that in far more detail, but there are some things that are so fundamental to the operation of this that we should know by now that leaving them to the code of practice is not acceptable. We can talk about implementation within the code of practice, but there are some things that need to be on the face of the Bill. For me, we really have hit that. If we are not even going to attempt to consult people, that for me is a red line, so I am pleased that the Minister has agreed to talk to us about that.
The points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, about the weighting of the wishes and feelings are also important. Those wishes do not sit on an equivalent level with the views of everybody else. They should be pre-eminent.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I take the points that the noble Baroness is making. Obviously we will discuss this further. But it is important to reflect on the new duty to consult. It is not a duty to consult everybody but the person, so it is not fair to say that there has not been an earnest attempt in the Bill to make sure that the person is fully consulted in the necessary and proportionate test, even if the noble Baroness does not like the precise way that that has been done. It is important to set that out.
Baroness Thornton
It is a spectacular omission not to mention the very person whose liberty is being restricted. I ask the Minister and the Bill team to remind themselves of Articles 5 and 8 of the UNCRPD, which mandate such consultations.
Baroness Hollins
This needs emphasis because of the culture of care that we have in this country. There is still such a paternalistic attitude towards the person, that not to emphasise it is to miss the point.
Baroness Barker
I thank noble Lords for their support. We will need to return to this and I am glad that the Minister has taken that point.
Another reason for tabling the other amendments to ensure that arrangements are the least intrusive and least restrictive option is that, as we will debate on later amendments, the Bill is somewhat deficient in the extent to which it requires that people should be given information on which to base the consultation.
I make no apologies for raising this again at this time. It is something that I hope we will discuss between now and later stages of the Bill. I hope that the Minister can understand the reasons for the concerns that lay behind the amendment. Having said that, at this point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hollins
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, Amendments 11, 12 and 13 deal with a perceived conflict of interest pointed out by numerous charities and care providers with regard to the role that care home managers are intended to play under the Bill. As drafted, the Bill places a new duty on care home managers to carry out the assessments and consultation prior to authorisation. My amendments would ensure that the duty for carrying out assessments resides with the responsible authority, with a retained duty to involve care home managers in carrying out those assessments.
I raise a puzzle that I have. I have been trying hard to get my head around some of the possible unintended consequences of the way in which we think about care homes and care home managers and the relationship between the different kinds of care and support that are provided. Some services, with great encouragement from local authorities, have been trying to convert their residential care homes into supported living houses. That has been the trend. Often, these new supported living houses are located on the same site as the remaining residential care homes or in the same area but with the same organisation running them and the same chief executive. Sometimes, the registered care home manager is not only the care home manager for the residential side but is also the manager for the supported living homes. They are located on the same site, close together and within the same organisation within the same management structure, but the organisation will have two different systems for authorising the provisions of the Act, which will be very confusing for it.
I wonder whether there might be a perverse incentive for adult social care to reverse its previously encouraged trend towards supported living, to reduce its administrative burden and to register more care homes. This seems to be a backwards step when, in times of personalisation, we want to move more people to settings that are not registered care homes, but are more supported and likely to take note of their personal wishes, if that is not too much of a conundrum. It is one of the real puzzles I have been struggling with over the Bill.
The whole ethos of DoLS was that those making the decisions about deprivation of liberty were independent of those providing care to the person, and that independent assessment is an important safeguard. More specifically, the new arrangements raise concerns that a number of stakeholders have pointed to. For example, it can be easier to care for someone by placing more restrictions on their freedom. It is harder to support them in the least restrictive way possible and to maximise their choice and freedom. We know that health and social care professionals are naturally risk-averse and, if there are some possible risks, they will often choose the perceived safer, albeit more restrictive, option over increasing liberty.
I believe the vision, which is great, is to integrate decisions about liberty protection safeguards and deprivation of liberty into care planning. This means that, at the point of making decisions about placement, decisions about restrictions are also considered, with a view to seeking the least restrictive option. This makes sense, but I do not see how this can happen if the care home is making the determination. It is already a done deal that the cared-for person is going to be in that care home. Their care manager will be looking at the arrangements within the care home. They are unlikely to say that the person would be better off and able to have more freedom in a different setting—for example, a supported living setting. There is a bit of a conflict of interest here.
Currently, the care provider feeds into the DoLS assessment, sharing their expertise as a provider. That is a different role and skill set from making decisions about necessity and proportionality. Consulting with relevant people is a different role from being one of those consulted. The assessments are complex and this new role is being placed on care managers who, by definition, have a different skill set. The sector is trying to deliver care for people who, in many cases, have complex needs and require intensive support to live as independently as possible. I am interested to know what conversations the Minister and officials have had with those upon whom this new duty would fall, as I suspect they will have raised many similar concerns.
Perhaps it is worth reflecting on the judgment by Lady Hale in the Cheshire West case. In speaking about the extreme vulnerability of the people concerned, she said:
“They need a periodic independent check on whether the arrangements made for them are in their best interests. Such checks need not be as elaborate as those currently provided for in the Court of Protection or in the deprivation-of-liberty safeguards (which could in due course be simplified and extended to placements outside hospitals and care homes). Nor should we regard the need for such checks as in any way stigmatising of them or of their carers. Rather, they are a recognition of their equal dignity and status as human beings like the rest of us”.
I wonder whether this paperwork exercise for non-objecting people is what she envisaged as an independent check. In his response, I would appreciate the Minister’s view on whether he sees a conflict of interest here and whether he agrees that the assessment should be carried out by someone independent of the care home, and who that should be. I wonder if we need to make more use of service brokers to do the care planning, listen to the person’s wishes and ensure that the decisions made lead to an effective care plan. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I have added my name to that of the noble Baroness. She has succinctly put forward the case for the removal of care home managers from this important position, and at this point, I am very supportive of that. While we debated this issue earlier, I want to come back to a point raised then. The argument was put that we ought not to worry because the local authority remains the body that approves authorisations; it will provide independent scrutiny and oversight. I have already referred to the fact that the impact assessment treats this essentially and mainly as a desktop exercise, but my advice from Professor Lucy Series of Cardiff University is that unless care home managers themselves indicate that an AMCP referral is required, all the responsible body will be able to make the decision on is the information supplied by those care home managers. She states that that is a very weak independent safeguard, and indeed it is when care managers have a financial interest in these decisions. That is why this arrangement simply cannot be allowed to stand.
The other thing I would point out to noble Lords is the evidence I received on Monday from ADASS, the association of Directors of Adult Social Services. Like everyone else, it supports the overall thrust of the Bill—there is no question about that—but it has some concerns relating chiefly to the expectation that care home managers will be responsible for the assessments required to authorise the deprivation of a person’s liberty. It says that it is in discussions with the Care Quality Commission and the Care Provider Alliance, which both have similar concerns. That answers the point raised by noble Lords about where the CQC stands in relation to this. I am not surprised that the CQC has concerns because of the very difficult challenges it faces in the care sector generally. One has to think carefully about whether adding to its responsibilities is the right course of action.
ADASS has stated:
“Whilst registered care providers have previously been required to assess individuals, to determine that they can meet the person’s needs and to undertake care planning, they have not been required to assess to protect people’s liberty. Planning Care and assessing whether deprivation of liberty is in a person’s best interest when they are unable to decide for themselves are very different things. ADASS therefore believe this to be a new activity, requiring new skills and resources. We have real concerns relating to a) care home capacity, b) care home staff competence, c) perverse incentives and potential conflicts of interest, d) additional cost (for training and additional capacity) and e) whether and how such costs will be resourced”.
Noble Lords who know those at ADASS will know that they do not make such statements without very good evidence. The noble Baroness is proposing in her amendment to take out the reference to care managers, and my assumption is that the role of assessing will be restored to the local authority, which of course was in the Law Commission’s original plan. From what I have heard, surely we have to stick to what the Law Commission proposed.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I have listened to the debate and have ended up feeling slightly puzzled. If we are looking at how we improve the quality of life of “P”, what they experience day to day in how they are looked after is what influences that quality of life—in other words, how well the care plan is planned and executed. It cannot be just about the planning phase but about how well it is executed and how that execution of the care plan is monitored, day to day and week by week. In a care home, the person ultimately responsible for care plans has to be the manager because you must have a vertical structure, even though the plans may well be written by staff at a different level. If a person is in supported living, someone will be responsible for overseeing the care and provision in that supported living arrangement by dint of it being supported. Therefore, that must also be planned for and it will not be a care home manager but somebody else overseeing their care.
I can see that there is enormous concern over care homes. We all know that there are some excellent care homes and we have all, sadly, encountered care homes that are not excellent, where one would have concerns about their ability. If we are trying to drive up a person’s experience and quality of life, and make sure that what is done is necessary—because there is no other way of managing them—there need to be restrictions proportionate to the problems that they pose. I add here that we must consult and make every effort to listen to the person. We have that in another set of amendments later.
It may be that our grouping of amendments at this stage is not right because there is so much that interweaves between them. The worry is that if we then say that the people on the ground and the care plan are not the main part of the assessment, we go back to somebody basically helicoptering in, doing an assessment, seeing how they are and going again and leaving approval—that may be for a year—without any pressure to constantly review. Later amendments seek to put pressure on to review whenever the situation changes—to make it a more dynamic situation that really reflects that people deteriorate. Fortunately, some sometimes improve but most of the time you are faced with deterioration.
The other problem is that local authorities are, we know, incredibly short of finance. We know that they already cannot cope with the burden of assessments that they are being asked to carry out. I cannot see how asking them to take back the role and possibly do three assessments rather than six will tackle the problem of the number of people needing to be assessed and thought about being far greater and not matching—I think it never will match—the resources available.
It is easy to say that we need more people to do this but realistically the number of trained and experienced people is just not there. We have to find another way forward. There is a tension because whoever does the assessment may have a conflict of interest, whether about funding the care or receiving the income from the care. Somehow we need a system that improves the quality of life of the person and is subject to scrutiny more often than just on the occasions that the assessment is done initially or when it is reviewed after a fixed time.
I wonder whether a group of us needs to go away, sit down and really try to work this through with worked examples. I should declare that at one of the meetings I had in Wales we used worked examples in different settings. When we started to work through it for supported living arrangements—that was the table I was on—it became easier to see how it could work and how the triggers could work. I am not saying it was a perfect solution. I think the intention of these amendments is superb but I worry that they might not solve the problem.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I was not going to intervene on this group of amendments but I have listened carefully to all the points that have been put and they have all been absolutely excellent. There is a tension here, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, just said. My main reaction, particularly when I read the letter from ADASS—I shall not read it out again; I have it in front of me—was of real concern. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, they are not the sort of people who say these things lightly. They do not scaremonger. They do not exaggerate. They make very carefully calculated judgments, as you would expect of people at that level. I read the letter with great concern.
I was equally concerned when I read the briefing, as mentioned earlier, from the Relatives & Residents Association. One phrase really resonated with me, about the association’s great concern that too often we were asking care managers to be judge and jury about decisions in which they were involved. That is how it was expressed. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made some excellent points. We have to find a way through. It would be genuinely helpful if, as in her proposition, there was time to think about those who will be most involved, as they must be, in care planning for these very vulnerable people, and a sufficiently independent element in arrangements so that people feel that care home managers are no longer judge and jury. I do not think we are there yet. I cannot articulate it at the moment but we must work together to secure a slightly different way forward.
Baroness Barran (Con)
I echo the appreciation of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, of the explanation of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, of the choices we face between the care home manager, who in the best cases will know “P” well, and the local authority assessor, who, as was said, might be parachuted in. It underlines the need for the now-familiar new paragraph 17(2) to be well thought-through and implemented. It is clear that the Bill’s intention is for this to be one of the critical safeguards of how this all works in practice, along with the scrutiny role of the responsible authority, which we will no doubt cover in detail.
Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, raises an important point about supported housing and care homes. It raised in my mind a slightly different question, which may have occurred to other noble Lords: do we need more clarity in the Bill on how it applies in domestic settings? For example, when someone who is normally cared for at home is in a care home for a short stay, perhaps because their carer is in hospital, what is the position in the home once the protection of liberty safeguards have been authorised? I wonder whether my noble friend could consider whether there is a need to clarify exactly the role of the safeguards in domestic settings and how they interface with the Care Act and other bits of legislation that would apply in such cases.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, I am very pleased to follow the noble Baroness. I think she made her maiden speech at Second Reading; it was an important contribution. She has sat through this debate and made a few important points. We certainly welcome her and look forward to further remarks from her as we proceed with our considerations.
I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, addressing as it does concerns expressed by me and other noble Lords at Second Reading. The Bill provides a different route of authorisation for a deprivation of liberty when a cared-for person lives in a care home. In this circumstance, it places a new duty on care home managers to carry out the assessments and consultation prior to authorisation. I echo the noble Baroness’s concerns that this creates a conflict of interest. We have already considered some of these aspects earlier but none of us needs make any apology for coming back to it because it is so very important. Care home managers will have an important insight into an individual’s needs and they should be included as a source of information, but a responsibility to carry out the assessment requires more than simply providing information. It is a different skill set from their expertise as a provider.
Furthermore, care home managers are not independent and although they are not responsible for granting the overall authorisation, the contents of those assessments will be key to local authorities’ overall determination. This is particularly important where there are concerns about weaknesses in the pre-authorisation review outlined in Clause 18. That clause does not, as drafted, secure the independence of the person carrying out the review. It does not ensure that a rigorous review is carried out. As it stands, it risks the pre-authorisation review. The overwhelming majority of care home managers would undertake their duties honestly and assiduously.
However, we have to face facts. This Bill, as drafted, leaves the door open for a dishonest assessment, and we have to speak plainly about it. That should concern this Committee as we are debating the system of legally depriving some of the most vulnerable people of our society of their liberty—nothing can be important than that. Furthermore, it is unclear what assessment the Government have made of the burden this would place on the care home managers. This will account for more of their time, which is scarce in any event. It will also add new complexities to their role; perhaps the Minister might want to further tell us how the Government envisage a proper training programme and what resources will go alongside it to allow them to perform these new duties.
The concerns I have outlined are widely held. They have been expressed not just by me but also by a number of charities. It should be noted that the amendment before us has the support of the National Autistic Society, of which I am a vice-president, Age UK, the Alzheimer’s Society, the British Institute of Human Rights, Liberty, Mind, Rethink Mental Illness, the Royal Mencap Society, Sense, and VoiceAbility —we could go on. They have also been expressed by the Law Society. Those concerns are also held by professionals.
A survey carried out on the Government’s proposals by Community Care and Edge Training & Consultancy asked professionals whether they agree with the proposals that care home managers would carry out assessments. An overwhelming majority—86%—disagreed. My goodness, we could have those votes in some elections. It is certainly a very powerful message. That question also provoked the highest number of written comments and these are relevant to our debate. One said: “This is the most obvious concern with the new proposals: there is a direct conflict of interest with the provider”. Another said: “Where is the independent viewpoint?” A third said: “This process will be a waste of time at all levels if the initial process is not completed thoroughly”.
It is right that we subject this aspect of the Bill to thorough scrutiny. It was not part of the draft Bill produced by the Law Commission and therefore has not been spoken about and debated at length, as have other aspects. It has gathered significant criticism too, and we should be prepared to listen to that criticism. Therefore, the noble Baroness’s amendment strikes a very sensible balance. It ensures the independence of the assessment process, it alleviates some concerns about the independence of the pre-authorisation review, and it also secures the important role of care professionals in providing vital insight into the individual’s needs. I echo the noble Baroness’s requests for the Minister to give us his views on the conflict of interest that arises from this clause, and whether we may instead consider ensuring that any assessment is carried out by someone independent of the care home. This is a very important matter which we will be coming back to a lot, I am sure.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for tabling these amendments and to all noble Lords who have given us the opportunity to explore what is obviously emerging as a critical part of the proposals in the Bill. As noble Lords have said, the amendments would remove the inclusion of care home arrangements from the Bill—that is, the duty of care home managers to arrange the various assessments—and instead substitute a duty on the responsible body to carry out those assessments while involving the care home manager in such cases.
In 2014, this House found that the DoLS process was bureaucratic and overly complex and that is what we are trying to address. We are trying to create a streamlined system that does not—the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, is right to warn that it should not—open the door to dishonest assessment, but rather make sure that everybody gets an appropriate assessment of whether their deprivation of liberty safeguards is in their interests, necessary, proportionate and so on. That is what we are seeking to do. I want to spend a bit of time going into this issue because I think there is a misunderstanding about what is proposed by the Bill.
Under the arrangements in the Bill, in care home cases, the care home manager would be responsible for arranging the assessments for the responsible body—not necessarily carrying out, but arranging; I will come to who carries them out in a moment. This would ensure that existing assessments and assessors who know the person best can be used where appropriate. Noble Lords have asked who will be carrying out these assessments. I will explain that in a moment.
Baroness Hollins
I asked about the difference between care homes and supported living and just that conflict.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I will briefly come to that. In supported living arrangements, the local authority, the CCG or the local health board would arrange the assessments. It would automatically be that body, as opposed to the supported living provider. I hope that will provide the reassurance the noble Baroness is looking for. It would be the commissioning body in that case.
Baroness Hollins
It may be that a lot of the thinking has been done around elderly people and people with dementia as opposed to people with learning disabilities. In the learning disability world, there has been such encouragement towards supported living that they are often within the same organisation, even within the same setting. It seems very strange that you would have a manager who ends up being responsible for a care home, where they have the responsibility, and for supported living, where somebody else has the responsibility.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for clarifying that. I will seek to understand the implications of the Bill for those cases, and I will make sure that I write to her and all noble Lords with an explanation of what is envisaged.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I hope the Minister will forgive me because we are now on an incredibly important part of the Bill. If we can get together and work through it, I wonder whether we need to look at a way that a specific person from the local authority—I gather that it happens in some parts of England and Wales but not everywhere—has a link to different care settings and gets to know them well. We are talking about the people we know about, but the people who are most vulnerable are those we do not know about, who have not been notified into the system. If that person knows a place and the quality of the care there, they may be inclined to have a lighter touch there than on places where there has perhaps been a turnover of staff, a change of management, and so on. They may feel that they want to do some face-to-face assessments to verify the quality of the care being provided—not in the CQC role, but in terms of the care delivered to the person who has impaired capacity.
I put that out there now because I am sure that this debate is being watched and monitored. It might be interesting to see whether we get any feedback on some of the points we have raised during the debate, because so many people have expressed concern and want to know what we are saying.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I shall give just a brief response to that. It is a good idea. The Government think that the proposals for care homes, how they will carry out commission-needs assessments and the process for reviewing and authorising where necessary are a critical part of creating a more proportionate system that does what it says it will do, rather than the current system, which says it will do a whole bunch of things and then does not actually do them. That is where we want to get to.
I am being robust, as it were, in defence of the model. I want to explain—I think noble Lords are enthusiastic about this—how this will work in practice with the kinds of people who are most likely to be in the most difficult situations, so there is a clear understanding of the safeguards that exist to prevent conflicts of interest, provide independent oversight, make sure there is advocacy to support, and so on. It is clearly the case that there is not yet that understanding, and we need it to proceed.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister for his explanation, which has been very helpful. Over the next few weeks, while he is seeking to give further clarification, I wonder whether it would be possible to explain this. One of the Government’s arguments is that the consideration of deprivation or the safeguarding of liberty should come much earlier in the care planning process. Most care is commissioned, most of it by local authorities. Can the Minister explain—perhaps not now at this late hour—how the commissioning of services will change to reflect the new system?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
There is a useful flowchart that exemplifies it and brings it to life. I will make sure that it is shared. I agree that we need to find ways of bringing it to life, and that is something we can do outside this Chamber.
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for his reassurance that the care home manager’s responsibility is only to arrange the assessments. The Mental Capacity Act is so important that we have to be sure that we do not make it worse. It is a good Act, and the main problem identified in the Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee was that it was not well understood. It is emerging that the stakeholders are not understanding what is intended. We should be trying to make it easier to understand and operate, not more complicated.
The noble Lord spoke of trying to legislate for a streamlined process. I am rather worried about legislating for some of these matters, and I am beginning to think that some aspects need to be in regulations rather than in the Bill, just to make things as simple as possible, but also amendable without having to come back to primary legislation. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“(aa) the information provided by the care home appears to be consistent with either the assessments under paragraph 15 or the care and support plan held by the responsible body,”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, this is really integrally linked. I have been trying to look at what would send a red flag, an alert, to an authorising body that this assessment needed to be looked into in detail and gone through with a degree of rigour—possibly with more time being able to be spent on it than can be spent currently—and that, in commissioning care, the local authority will have a care and support plan that defines what it is commissioning. It should have done a needs assessment and should commission against that and what it expects to be provided. What comes back on those assessments should mirror that care and support plan. What I have tried to do with this amendment is to highlight that, if there is not an almost identikit fit, that should not be given a margin of error but should trigger the need to visit that person and to look in detail at the care plan and its delivery. That might be the first sign that all is not well.
It may be that someone from the local authority visits and finds that the care and support plan, as commissioned, has been altered slightly because the person’s needs or ability to undertake activity have changed. It may be, in the best of circumstances, that something has been put in place that has enhanced the person’s ability to express themselves. I would use the example of music, where it has been found that by providing people’s favourite playlists, some people with really severe dementia are almost “unlocked” by the music—they are able to move in time to the music and their mobility and communication are better. Some people who have been unable to speak, even for years, recover some phrases and then, from that, begin to communicate verbally as well. And of course, we all know of people who appear to not be able to communicate but will then sing along to their favourite song, with all the words coming back again.
The purpose of the amendment is to say that, if there is not a close fit, that should be enough for the local authority to say that it is going to look at that in detail. That was the motivation behind my amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Touhig
This is a very small but very important amendment. Having spent 27 years in newspapers and publishing, I constantly came across issues and stories where people were having all sorts of difficulties, public services failed and systems failed because of lack of information. Certainly from my time as a councillor, as an MP and as a Minister, I passionately believe that we must be open and transparent and must share information. That is key to this part of the Bill, and we certainly strongly support the points made by the noble Baroness.
I do not intend to detain the House more than that, other than to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, may not be aware that, when I was a Wales Office Minister and she was a new Member of this House, she terrified my officials. They would come in and say, “Minister, it’s that Baroness Finlay again; she wants information on so and so”. She is pursuing her quest for information even today, which I think is very important and valuable. We strongly support her efforts in this area.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for tabling this amendment and to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for endorsing it. I will not detain the House other than to say that, clearly, the intention to make sure that there is not a discrepancy and, where there is, that there is a flag, is one that we share. We need to be alert to any issues of concern that would warrant further investigation, or indeed referral to an AMCP.
This is something that I think best sits within the code of practice, and I can confirm and commit that instructions along these lines will form part of the code of practice, as well as many other examples of where an authorising body should be seeing signs of concern. I am grateful for the opportunity to confirm that, and I hope that reassures everyone.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am grateful to the Minister and to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for his remarks in support—including his humorous ones. On the basis of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Monday 15th October 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-II(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, any restriction to a person’s liberty is a serious step that calls for a corresponding level of scrutiny. To do otherwise would devalue the currency of liberty. We must remember how this legislation will work in practice and that it is authorising one citizen to detain another, usually more vulnerable, citizen. This decision carries risks, not least the risk of undermining an individual’s self-esteem and dignity. Therefore it is imperative to ensure that only appropriate and experienced individuals are given the authority to assess capacity and plan the care programme for the cared- for person, with their best interests at the heart of decision-making.
I will speak to the amendments in this group that are in my name—Amendments 14A, 16A, 19C, 19E, 19F, 30C and 32C—which seek to probe an alternative to involving the care manager directly in the process and to align it more closely with the Care Act. Much anxiety has been expressed since Second Reading about the role of the care home manager because there has been concern that the manager is not an appropriate person to carry out or even co-ordinate assessments. There have also been concerns that the cost of providing adequate training would be high and that the proposed training of a few hours would prove grossly inadequate.
The Minister gave assurances on the first day in Committee when he explained that,
“the care home manager would be responsible for arranging the assessments for the responsible body—not necessarily carrying out but arranging”.—[Official Report, 5/9/19; col. 1882.]
He pointed out that care homes already play a role in arranging assessments because they are responsible for identifying deprivation of liberty and then notifying the relevant local authority which under current arrangements, will then send out a best-interests assessor to visit and assess. He pointed out that the assessments that the care home manager will have a duty to arrange will be carried out at the care assessment stage as part of early planning, often by social workers.
However, in discussion with stakeholders, concern has highlighted self-funders, who could risk getting a low level of protection in law and find that the cost of assessment is rolled into their care home costs. Whatever is decided, a care home manager will remain responsible for identifying those whose liberty is restricted and therefore will be responsible for triggering assessments. Nothing in the Bill permits searches to case-find anyone who has not been flagged up and therefore is illegally detained.
Unfortunately, the concerns expressed by stakeholders have not diminished, despite the many meetings at which reassurances have been offered. Those concerns include that the care home manager, even if not undertaking assessments directly, would have a power of veto and that the authorisation of assessments would become a paper exercise. There is also concern that the costs associated with making the assessment would be transferred from the local authority to the care home, but that the funding would not move from the local authority to the care home, leaving the person being assessed, if they are a self-funder, to carry the burden of additional costs.
Regarding conflicts of interest, although some care managers are excellent, not all have the appropriate background experience, and the local authority would remain liable in law for authorising the deprivation based on information from the care home manager. But we must not lose sight of why the Bill is here. The number of people waiting for assessments seems to be rising exponentially and is currently around 125,000 in England and Wales. Even if money was thrown at assessments now, there are not enough people and the current process is too complicated to ensure that they happen.
It is relatively easy to talk about a process, but we must focus on the individual. To the individual, it is not the assessment per se that protects their liberty but the way that they are cared for on a day-to-day basis. They can have the most thorough assessment in the world, but if it is a once-a-year process, they may spend the rest of the year with restrictions on liberty that go unnoticed. That is why a new process to protect liberty must link directly to the care plan that contains details of how the person’s freedoms will be enhanced and how they will be empowered within the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act to live as well as possible. Some may argue that you can have a well-written care plan that is not carried out, but later amendments would enable people to raise concerns and request a reassessment.
It is important to recognise that necessary and proportionate arrangements may restrict liberty in some areas in order to empower the person to live as fully as possible despite the restrictions that their disorder has imposed on them. In some care homes a great deal is done to enhance living through outings, personalised crafts and musical arrangements, or when residents are encouraged to pursue their interests while keeping them safe from obvious dangers. Sadly, in other care homes residents are left sitting in a circle around a blaring television. Their experience means either that they have a low quality of life or in effect feel imprisoned.
It is the day-to-day living experience that matters. The way the care is delivered to allow that experience should be enshrined in a good care plan that encompasses encouraging social interaction and contact with the family, and accepts a reasonable degree of risk while avoiding clearly identifiable major risks. It should specify what the protection of liberty arrangements are that need to be approved by the responsible body. Words matter. Perhaps we should drop the words “liberty protection safeguards” because they can be confused with safeguarding procedures and instead use the term “liberty protection arrangements”, which would probably be abbreviated to PoLAs to replace DoLS.
I know that Amendment 14A looks strange because it comes half way through a paragraph. Ideally the amendment would delete the whole of paragraph 13 in Part 2 of Schedule 1, but given that we reached the end of line 35 on day one of Committee, I believe that the amendment can start only at line 36. However, I hope that the other amendments I have tabled in this group make better sense if we understand that the whole of paragraph 13 should have been deleted.
We know that we cannot throw money at a failing system and that not everyone needs the full might of the current assessment process of DoLS. If care homes are not described differently, it may open the way for others to be required to do the assessments in all settings by the responsible body’s direction, which would mirror Section 42(2) of the Care Act, which states:
“The local authority must make (or cause to be made) whatever enquiries it thinks necessary to enable it to decide whether any action should be taken in the adult’s case (whether under this Part or otherwise) and, if so, what and by whom”.
That subsection was designed to safeguard by triggering an inquiry if there is a suspicion of unmet care needs, abuse or neglect. In the amendments I have tabled, I have tried to make the responsible body reflect the same arrangements so that it would either provide assessments or cause them to be provided. Many supported living settings are competent to do such assessments and many care homes could do them in routine cases by being asked for information by the responsible body without any power of veto resting with the care home manager.
I am grateful to Lorraine Currie, the professional Mental Capacity Act lead in Shropshire, for discussing this with me in detail. I hope that by more closely aligning liberty protection with the Care Act we might have a more streamlined process. I beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 17A, 19A, 30B, 30D, 32B an 32E are in my name. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, expressed very well some of the key challenges we face in scrutinising the Bill. My amendments would remove the role of the care manager in overseeing the determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate. They would also remove the care home manager from carrying out consultation to try to ascertain the cared-for person’s wishes or feelings on the arrangements. In both cases, the result of my amendments would be that responsibility falling to the responsible local authority.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, spoke about the issues facing the sector in trying to implement the current legislation. The problem seems to be that the Government, in their haste to respond to this and the undoubted challenge of the Cheshire West judgment, have come up with a streamlined procedure in which the human rights of the cared-for person are sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic convenience. The careful balance that the Law Commission put into the draft Bill has been overturned, safeguards have been removed and protections have been overridden. The analyses we have received have been very valuable, but the Law Society’s analysis is a succinct, devastating critique of the Government’s approach.
The proposal means that the very people with a vested interest in keeping cared-for people occupying beds in care homes have been placed in the driving seat in the process of overseeing the restriction of their liberty. According to the Bill, those cared-for persons have lost the right to participate in decisions affecting them, have no right to be consulted, have no right, like their relatives, to be told how to challenge a deprivation of liberty and have no right to request a review. On that latter point, they must rely on the interested person who, when you look at the Bill, remarkably turns out to be the care home manager; nor is there any obligation for the responsible body to meet the cared-for person before signing off on their deprivation of liberty. That is the background to why the amendments are so important and why the Bill’s basis is so flawed.
I cannot find an explicit duty to consult the cared-for person about their wishes and feelings. That is worrying in itself; it is a major defect in relation to the existing legislation. I also find worrying the extraordinary proposition that the care home manager should carry out the consultation. Essentially, they are judge and jury for the person’s liberty, since the consultation is about the outcome of the required assessment that the care home manager is responsible for arranging. As far as I can see, the care home manager will choose who will make that assessment and, presumably, pay their fees. They are also the gatekeeper for the appointment of an independent mental capacity advocate, which cannot happen without the care home manager saying that it is in the cared-for person’s best interests. However, we can see that the care home manager has a vested financial interest in these matters, as does the care home. On consultation, the Bill must be seriously rethought. That also applies to paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 on the determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate. Currently under the Bill, it falls to the care home manager to decide who should make the determination. This, of course, is a vital test and the determination of the arrangements relates directly to the practice under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I find myself in something of a dilemma because I have already said that I am very anxious about the role foreseen for care home managers in this Bill. I am also getting the heebie-jeebies about how we are criticising the Bill because of how we have got here in the first place. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, have already mentioned that we are here because at the moment we have a bad piece of legislation; it is not being implemented appropriately because we cannot afford it. The Law Commission, the Department of Health and the Ministry of Justice have tried to bring forward a piece of legislation that makes it a lot simpler.
We are used to having conflicts of interest in public sector services. Every time a GP refers somebody for a hospital appointment or surgery or prescribes expensive medication they have a financial conflict of interest, but we live with that because of the way that the system works. We are used to it—we take account of it day by day.
I am not going to oppose these amendments but we have to say to ourselves that the care home manager is there and we know that the local authority has not got the resources. Would it work better if we could give care home managers proper training? I do not know, but I know that we must at every stage think very carefully about the alternatives that we propose instead of the departmental proposals. We have to make the process simpler. We have to reduce the numbers of people who are subject to it. Perhaps if we reduced the number of people subject to it, we could put in place these better arrangements. Maybe then we can take out the care home manager. Until we do so I still have this great anxiety that we have not come up with an alternative that will really work.
Although I share the anxieties about how care home managers will discharge this responsibility, I have some anxieties about the alternatives. We have to make the process simpler and more affordable. I neither support nor oppose these amendments. We need to give some very careful thought to making sure that we do not end up with a more complex and difficult process than is implementable and affordable.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I was not planning on speaking to this amendment at all. I am certainly not an expert on the Mental Capacity Act, but it was suggested to me by BASW that the Bill will cover people in domestic situations. It questions whether those people could be taken out of the Bill. I very much follow the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that it might be a good thing to do something really well for people in institutions while maybe avoiding duplication for people in domestic situations. There is the safeguarding procedure, which, as has been suggested by my medic daughters, is already incredibly bureaucratic, but I will leave that to one side for the moment. If at least the people in domestic settings were left to be assessed by the safeguarding system, that would achieve something and reduce the number of people covered by the Bill. This is particularly true because, as we go along, more and more people will be looked after in domestic settings rather than in care homes.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, it is our job to look at how things will and will not work and what the alternatives are. The noble Baroness takes a perfectly legitimate position that says, “If this won’t work, what will?” In a way, that underlines a lot of the discussions we have been having in this House: we need some time to discuss this Bill and we have not been able to have that.
My name is to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. We are questioning the ability of the care home manager to be able to do this at all. The words that have been used to us by the stakeholders—we have now talked to dozens of stakeholders in the last month or so—are “capability” and “capacity” of care home managers. Professionals question the capability and local government and other institutions question the capacity. Those words are being used constantly while we discuss this issue.
It is also worth mentioning the voice of the care home managers themselves, which is starting to emerge. We recently had a briefing from a large group of care home managers who feel that they are not qualified to take on this role or to carry out assessments and that the administrative burden they could carry could mean that they will not have the capacity to take on the extra work to carry out liberty protection safeguard assessments.
There is some confusion here with what the Minister said during the first day in Committee and in the letter he wrote to us all following Second Reading. I admit that I am confused as to whether we are talking about initiating and carrying out assessments and what the powers of the care home managers are. It seems that the Bill team and the Minister have given us several different descriptions of what those roles might be. That has not helped our consideration of our concerns.
Mencap has stated that it believes that the views of the cared-for person have to be at the heart of this part of the Bill and that it should be refocused accordingly. The comments made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that that has not yet been achieved, and that the role of the care home manager makes it less rather than more likely. That has been said to us not just by Mencap but by many stakeholders. They are concerned that the cared-for person is not at the heart of the Bill. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government have got this aspect of the Bill right and whether they need to find a different way of delivering it.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I wanted to respond in part to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. The original legislation was brought in on the basis of agreement across all parties in the House; so, too, was the report which reviewed the workings of the Mental Capacity Act. There was a unanimous view that DoLS need to be revised; they are not working.
It is interesting that many of the criticisms that have come to light in recent months have been from people who do not defend the current system but who have grave concerns not just about capacity but about some basic assumptions being made—not just about the role of care managers but about how the arrangements will work in practice. There is a quite legitimate view that the legislation will not solve the problem nor necessarily deal with a backlog; it will just shove it somewhere else. We need to think our way carefully through that because, as I will go on to say in debates on later amendments, there is no doubt that there is a watering down in the legal protections proposed by the Government. The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are therefore right that we should examine in some detail exactly what the Government are proposing, because up until this point it has been quite difficult to understand it.
I thank the Minister for sending his letter of 4 October —he did so in the characteristically open and respectful way in which he treats this House. However, I want to ask a question which is germane to what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is trying to achieve in her amendment. The letter states:
“Care home managers will be responsible for arranging the assessments that are needed for the authorisation. In most cases, they will use assessments that have been completed by a social worker or a medical professional or others as part of the care planning process. This means we will reduce the duplication that exists in the current DoLS system and ensure that people access the safeguards they need”.
Exactly what assessments is the Minister talking about? DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. It would be very helpful if he could say that, because it is one of the fundamental assumptions that we are all working to and which may turn out to be incorrect.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, I want first to thank noble Lords for their amendments and for their contributions to the debate. Reflecting on our first day in Committee and on Second Reading, it seems to me that an enormous number of the questions with which we are dealing are about the creation or definition of a new role for the care home manager—a number of the amendments that we will consider today deal specifically with it. I shall deal with those and the many questions that noble Lords have asked.
Given that it has been more than a month since we had the first day in Committee, I would like to reflect on some of the other issues that were discussed on that first day to demonstrate that there has been some progress. I will also explain why, although we are undoubtedly dealing with some difficult and complex issues that we know we have to get right, I am confident that if we work together, we can do that. I am quickly going to pick three issues in respect of which there has been some progress.
The first issue that was raised is extending the scope of the Bill to include 16 and 17 year-olds. I said in Committee that we would look at that and I can tell noble Lords that we will bring forward proposals to include that group in the scheme. I will also reflect on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, about the role of the cared-for person being front and centre. In fact, that was the one obligation to consult that was not translated from the Law Commission report into the Bill. Clearly, if we want to get the improvements that we want to see, it is essential that that person’s wishes and feelings about proposed arrangements be at the heart of the model, so we will ensure that the Bill reflects this.
Baroness Thornton
I am very pleased to hear what the Minister is saying, but he and the Bill team need to talk to the stakeholders because they do not feel heard. In particular, they do not feel heard on this issue. I am counselling the Minister that it is not good that the stakeholders are coming to all of us and do not feel heard.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am sorry to hear that that is the perception. I know that the team is engaging with stakeholders and, clearly, we will do better. I take the noble Baroness’s advice very seriously. As I said, we will make sure that the Bill reflects the need to consult the cared-for person. We have also taken on board the comments about the phrase “of sound mind”, which is used in one of the amendments later on. That is one reason why we might want to reconsider it. I know that there is a great concern that the language is inappropriate and that creating a new definition might create a gap, but, having looked at this further, we think we would be able to change this language and carry out various other work to reduce the gap to a minimum. That is something that we intend to bring forward, so I hope that that will be welcomed by many people.
I only give those examples to demonstrate that we are making progress as we go along. Perhaps noble Lords will say that we should have done this beforehand, but we are where we are, and we are trying to fix a creaking system and are using our best endeavours to do that. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, the latest data suggests that the situation is getting worse, not better. There were a total of 227,400 DoLS applications received in 2017-18 and 125,000 people in the backlog, 48,000 of whom have been waiting for more than a year already. In 2013-14, when the House found the DoLS system in need of reform, there were just 12,400 applications. We know the reason for that leap, but it suggests that this problem is not sorting itself out and it is urgent that we address it. Clearly, that is what we are all endeavouring to achieve in this process.
It is for that reason that I come to the role of the care home manager. That is obviously a critical role to avoid duplication and to ensure that cases that are relatively straightforward can be dealt with at a level that is close to the person being cared-for can be integrated into care planning without involving referrals upwards-even though there will continue to be reviews by responsible bodies and the opportunity for the AMCP to intervene where there is any cause for concern. To make sure that this is a manageable process, it is integrated into care planning. I still believe that that is the right model. We need to determine how this model can be developed and delivered in a way that overcomes the very many concerns, many of which I have sympathy with, that have been expressed in this debate and will I am sure be expressed this afternoon in other debates. The onus is on the Government to lead that process and put as many of those concerns to bed as possible while, as I have said, protecting the model because it gives us a way out of the duplication and backlog that we have now.
I want to address some specific issues raised in regard to care managers. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others raised the point about care home managers being responsible for arranging assessments but not generally for conducting them. In response to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that will be the case for all assessments—DoLS assessments and assessments regarding care planning—and it will include determining whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. However, although those managers have a responsibility to arrange the assessments, the Bill allows for them to be conducted by others involved in the person’s care, who must have a medical qualification or be suitably trained, as will be explained in the code of practice. So while there is that responsibility to arrange the assessments, those assessments will be carried out by somebody other than the care home manager, except in nursing homes, for example, which might be run by a nurse with a suitable qualification. It would be somebody with the appropriate training to ensure that whatever kind of assessment it is, it can be carried out properly.
I understand that that still leaves a small set of assessments which a care home manager could both arrange and carry out, because they had suitable training. If noble Lords are still concerned about the appropriateness of that kind of activity, I would be absolutely willing to discuss how we can minimise any concerns about conflicts of interest. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, pointed out, such conflicts of interest happen all the time and we rely on regulation—
Baroness Thornton
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is quite right that people such as her good self have to manage conflicts of interest all the time and they do it superbly, but such a conflict of interest is actually to do with profit and earning money. It is to do with keeping capacity in the care home, which creates a profit for that company. It is quite different from a conflict of interest involving what kind of medicine a doctor might prescribe, for example. It is directly due to the fact that a care home manager’s job is to keep their care home as full as possible, so that it continues to make money. Some of them are in not-for-profits and some are in for-profits, but it is an absolutely different kind of conflict of interest.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
As the noble Baroness says, there are conflicts of interest of various kinds; the important point is that there are protections against any conflict of interest. Typically, those will be through the regulatory authorities, whether the professional bodies or the CQC, which of course inspects all care homes and has found that 80% of them provide good or outstanding care. I believe that there are systems within the current regulatory framework that will provide for that oversight and prevent conflicts of interest. There is also the fact that the responsible body will carry out the reviews and that there is an opportunity to refer to an AMCP.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, the Minister has made several points, each of which needs to be gone over with great care—but I want to take him back to one of them. In his letter of 4 October, he said that the Bill is explicit that a necessary and proportionate assessment must be completed by someone who is suitably qualified and that case law establishes who is qualified to conduct other assessments. However, that is not actually so. What the Bill says in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 is:
“The determination required by this paragraph is a determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate … The determination must be made by a person who appears—(a) to the care home manager, if the arrangements are care home arrangements, or (b) to the responsible body … to have appropriate experience and knowledge”.
So that wording does not say that it has to be a medically qualified person, and I am not sure whether case law establishes that a capacity assessment must be carried out by a nurse or a social worker. Under the Mental Capacity Act, you get best interest assessors who are not medically qualified; that relates to an amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I suggest to the Minister—and I will suggest this quite a lot—that it should be in regulations rather than in the code that the minimum standards for completing assessments should be made.
On the first day in Committee the Minister said:
"Care home managers are already required to make applications and to consider capacity and restriction. Effectively, the new model recognises what they are doing but also allows for a further escalation”.—[Official Report, 5/8/18; col. 1829.]
At the moment care home managers do not make many of the assessments. They do not do capacity assessments. They do not make decisions about whether somebody is objective. It is not up to them whether an advocate comes in to see somebody. It is taking the truth to its outer limits to liken what happens now to what is intended under LPS.
When the Minister uses the word “escalate”, what is clearly understood not just by noble Lords but by stakeholders is that many of the protections, such as access to an advocate or to an AMCP, have deliberately been weakened in the Bill from what they are under DoLS. So I do think the Minister is somewhat overstating the case. That is what has given rise to many of the fears that have been expressed by a remarkably wide range of stakeholders. I therefore take some issue with what he said.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
We believe that case law does establish that suitably qualified people need to be appointed. Clearly that is something we need to continue to discuss to persuade the noble Baroness that that is the case, but that is our understanding. As she pointed out, “suitably qualified” can include medical and other qualifications.
On care home managers’ capacity, they are of course carrying out some assessments. The intention is they will carry out more assessments. I agree with the noble Baroness on that point. The point that the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, raised was about the capability and capacity of this group of people to carry out these roles. On our previous day in Committee I committed to explain how we would ensure that that group of people had the requisite training and skills to carry out these kinds of assessments.
The noble Baroness made a point about weakened access. I want to update the House on our thinking about making sure that the person is consulted. We are trying to create a more proportionate system such that, where all those concerned with the care of a person are content that the arrangements have been properly put in place, it does not need to be escalated and reviewed by an AMCP or similar person. The problem we have at the moment is that the system takes every decision to the highest possible level. This is not about weakening access but about trying to have a proportionate system and also about making sure—we will debate this further tonight—that at every stage there are the right opportunities to seek advocacy support and to refer concerns so that an AMCP or responsible body can intervene and review a case if necessary.
Unless we find a way to deliver a more proportionate system we will simply be re-enacting the system we have now, which is not working. This is why I am so keen to work with noble Lords to make sure that we can determine the proper role and responsibilities of, and checks and balances on, care home managers so that we can get the system right and deliver a reform that saves money, enables more people to have their cases reviewed and enables us to make sure that people are protected, which is what we want to do.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
The Minister read out a list of safeguards that will still be in place despite the streamlined nature of the Bill. The issue I have with that is that the care home manager seems to act as the gatekeeper to many of them. I hear what he says about a streamlined approach, which I agree with, and I also hear what he says about the people who will do the assessment. But there is still a real issue about why the care home manager, of all people, is the person overseeing this whole process. If the Government are really willing to sit down and talk about how to achieve a streamlined programme but continue with some of the essential safeguards that are in the Bill at the moment, clearly the role of the care home manager has to be looked at seriously.
I am not really hearing from the Government whether they are seriously prepared to debate the fundamental construct that they have come forward with. It seems to me that they dreamed up an answer to the problem but did not consult fully—they had selective consultation where individuals were picked off—and the result is that they do not now have consensus support, and the Bill is in trouble because of that.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I say to the noble Lord, as I have said to all noble Lords from the beginning, that we are determined to reform the system so that it delivers what it ought to for people who are being deprived of their liberty. The Government believe that the care home manager, the person ultimately responsible for the care planning and delivery for individuals under their care, must have a central role in arranging assessments when someone has been deprived of their liberty.
I say to the Committee that, given that so much of the success of the Bill will revolve around our ability to define this role properly and to ensure that there are appropriate checks and balances and appropriate training so that it delivers the capacity and capability that noble Lords have talked about, I want to work with stakeholders and noble Lords to ensure that we can do that. I think that is both possible and desirable, but I also recognise that it is not something we have yet achieved. I hope that as we go through our deliberations today and next week, and as we look forward to Report, that is something that we will be able to deal with so that the consensus that the noble Lord talks about currently being absent is something that we can build. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I thank those who have spoken in this very interesting debate. The last part of the debate was extremely rich and I think we all need to go away and read it. I thank the Minister for giving us the assurance that things that had caused great concern, such as the issue of 16 and 17 year-olds, the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person and the stigmatising term “unsound mind”, will all be dealt with. I am sure I speak for everyone in the House and outside it when I say that looking at that is most welcome.
When we are debating this subject, we have to remember that we are not talking about a deprivation of liberty in care homes Bill; we are talking about a Bill that amends the Mental Capacity Act as a whole for people wherever they are. We have had a huge debate about care homes but it was partly about looking at people in other care settings. In the light of some points raised previously by my noble friend Lady Hollins about people in supported living environments, it seemed worth floating the question of whether there was a way to align more closely with the Care Act. Then of course there are domestic settings as well.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, we have to make it simpler and, if we can, decrease the number of people subject to the Bill because we cannot replicate the current system. If the current system were working and everyone had better care as a result of their assessments, we would not be here now. We are here because the current system does not work. I have been concerned that a great deal of anxiety has been expressed to us but not so many solutions. Some solutions have been very refined—they are tabled as amendments and we will be discussing them later—but we must not lose sight of the need for solutions that are elegant and applicable and that do not lock us into another system that will go on to fail as the current system has.
I was not aware that 48,000 people have been waiting for over a year for their assessment. We need to hold that figure in our minds because it is really worrying. I can see that the amendments that I have tabled do not do the job, but I hope they have opened the debate and forced us to think about other things. I thank the Minister for all the movement that there has been to date and hope we will have more movement as the day goes on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, with the leave of the Committee, I shall move Amendment 14B briefly, if the Minister will allow me. I apologise for my error: I claim jet lag, having just come back from Bahrain.
The amendments in the second group, which are all in my name, are designed to meet the statement and explanation made by the Minister that the care home manager would arrange assessments but not undertake them directly. They attempt to clarify in the Bill the assurance given by the Minister that the care home manager would arrange assessments on behalf of the responsible body. He pointed out that care homes already play a role. They are currently frightened by an increased level of responsibility and believe that they will be conducting assessments rather than having a co-ordinating role. The care home manager will always remain responsible for identifying people where there is a restriction of liberty.
In this set of amendments, the responsibility for performing assessments is clearly not with the care home manager, who has only an administrative role, making sure that the relevant assessments have been done and forwarded to the authorising body. They must be undertaken as part of care planning. I suggest that this would require pulling together medical assessments of the person’s condition, which may be from the GP in care of the elderly or from other specialist departments where that person has been. Sometimes, medical details may be obtained from people such as rehabilitation teams, where the person had a head injury. That becomes important because some aspects, such as frontal lobe damage, need a highly specialised assessment. You could not have a general practitioner assess some of these people, because it is beyond the scope of most clinicians.
The capacity assessment must be done by someone who is suitably qualified, and the care plan must consider the person’s wishes and feelings and the type of person they were before the illness struck. To use a simple example, a professional musician’s needs will probably differ greatly from those of an agricultural worker in terms of aspects of liberty that need to be enhanced, such as access to whatever instrument they played before, and how the environment needs to be adapted, such as allowing the agricultural worker to have much more time outside if that is what they need, to protect their ability to live well.
I have discussed this with a range of concerned stakeholders, and there are genuine concerns that if care home managers were to hold the responsibility to undertake assessments themselves, there could be conflicts of interest. Although some could be trained to a certain extent, others would need extensive training and would probably move on before they were able to undertake that role. There is general agreement that care home managers cannot do the assessments themselves, but they could have a co-ordinating role. Whatever the final pattern of assessment, many care home staff need better training in mental capacity overall. I feel a great burden of responsibility on my shoulders, as I chair the National Mental Capacity Forum.
In Amendment 30A, I require the assessment to be made by a registered professional who has responsibility for the care plan and appropriate experience and knowledge to lead the care planning process for the cared-for person. We must have a thorough debate about what the Minister was explaining to us on the first day of Committee, which I fear has been poorly understood by many outside this Chamber. In gratitude to the Committee for allowing me to speak to the amendments, I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment. It gives me the opportunity to return to the question I asked previously, to which I do not think we have yet got the right answer. It is about the nature of the assessment. The noble Baroness talked about the sort of assessments made under the Care Act—assessments to support somebody. They are not DoLS assessments, which assess whether someone is being deprived of their liberty. In what the Minister has said so far, in reference to care home managers, there is a failure to make that distinction. A DoLS assessment is a very serious assessment of whether someone has been deprived of their liberty. It can also be viewed in court. It is some stretch for a care home manager or someone in a community setting—making genuine operational assessments about supporting somebody—to make a decision that deprives that person of their liberty. We will come on to records of authorisation, but I have to say nothing the Minister has said so far has reassured me we are talking about an assessment system that would come anywhere near DoLS or be accepted by a court.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, if I may come back very briefly on that, the noble Baroness makes an important point. I worry that some of the DoLS assessments are very long and complex, yet make little difference to the lived experience of the person on the receiving end of care, so I hope they will become better tailored. A badly drawn-up care plan could also be presented in court if there was a dispute, not only the assessment forms. Some of the forms I have seen will have taken a great deal of time to complete; I wonder whether the detail replicates that obtainable elsewhere, and whether there is a problem of proportionality. Also, I worry that we should be looking at the minimum amount of restriction on liberty, rather than deprivation of liberty. If someone is imprisoned, the whole system has failed. They must be encouraged and empowered to live as well as they can while being kept safe from dangers that, without due care and attention, would probably end for some of them in their deaths—wandering on to a motorway or whatever.
Baroness Barker
I take the point made by the noble Baroness; she is absolutely right. There are some pretty awful assessments. I am not sure the Bill will stop that—I think she is rather wishful in her thinking if she thinks otherwise. She will have talked to practitioners, as I have. Sometimes DoLS work really well, particularly when trained assessors use the conditions. These can be something quite simple, such as the right to see a priest once a week or go out on a pass. I find myself in a slightly different position from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. As I sit in these debates I find myself becoming ever more defensive of DoLS because some of the case made against them is exaggerated. A lot of the reason for the backlog is not that the system is complicated but that there are not enough assessors out doing the work. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, but I still go back to the need for assessors who are trained, understand their purpose and carry it out in a proportionate and timely way.
Baroness Thornton
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done the Committee a great favour. The previous group of amendments was about whether care managers should do this at all. This group is about how they do it, which is a fair question to ask. I have three points to make, and they run like a stream through the Bill. The first is, if care managers have powers and responsibility, how will that work? Will they be qualified and, if so, how? As my noble friend Lord Hunt stated on the first day of Committee, many care homes do not even have registered managers. They are very small and are not capable of doing this. Secondly, who decides and who pays? I appreciate that the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, are exploring how care home managers would manage, but some amendments in this group actually water down even further the rights and responsibilities relating to deprivation of liberty.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
I have a fair degree of sympathy with the sentiment behind this group of amendments. It is right that the Committee looks at what an appropriate role for the care manager might be. We have not got it right yet and it is clear from the debate so far, and the representations received from the sector and from people who deal with this day to day, that there must continue to be some sort of more independent element in the assessment. It cannot simply all come down to the care manager. However, I equally have some sympathy with the idea which was partly behind the Bill. We need better integration between care planning and the difficult decisions that have to be made about deprivation of liberty.
That is why we must explore further what an appropriate role might be. I am not quite sure what it is. Is it simply making referrals or some sort of co-ordination? I share the concerns of other noble Lords about dilution of safeguards, conflicts of interests and all that, but equally we must make sure that the care manager has an appropriate role and is not left out of the picture. We are talking about a very important sentiment.
I welcome what the Minister said in response to the previous group of amendments about the position he has now come to on including 16 and 17 year-olds and putting the cared-for person at centre stage to ensure that they are part of the consultation. I particularly welcome what he had to say about changing the language of unsound mind.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank noble Lords for a concise but incisive debate on this group of amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, this is really about the role of those organising assessments for the deprivation of liberty and about who is responsible for pre-authorisation reviews. As has been mentioned by the noble Lords who tabled them, many of these amendments specify that pre-authorisation reviews must be completed by someone who is not employed by an organisation involved in the day-to-day care of the cared-for person or in providing any treatment to that person.
Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the schedule outline that, in all cases, arrangements must be authorised by the responsible body, which is either a local authority, hospital manager, CCG or local health board. It is our intention that only the responsible body, or an individual working on their behalf, will conduct the pre-authorisation review. Currently, senior social workers will often review DoLS applications when they are received. Similarly, we expect that, under the liberty protection safeguards, those for care home cases will be completed by a senior social worker. There are circumstances in which the responsible body is also the organisation that delivers the day-to-day care of treatment—and that is one of the concerns raised about conflicts of interest. This will usually be the case when NHS organisations are the responsible body, but it will also be the case for authorisations in local authority-run care homes.
Unfortunately—although I understand the motivation behind them—the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Thornton, Lady Murphy, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, would make it harder to satisfy the pre-authorisation review requirement where the responsible body also delivers the day-to-day care and treatment; this would be especially so for smaller NHS bodies such as some trusts and CCGs. It would mean such bodies having to hire people from outside organisations specifically for the role, which could introduce complexity and lead to delays.
Baroness Thornton
I hate to interrupt the Minister, but I think he might be answering the next group of amendments. I am not sure—perhaps he is answering both groups together—but it feels as though he is answering a speech I have not yet made.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I would like to intervene for a moment as I think this has been a valuable debate, even though short. I shall pick up on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, on conditions, which are incredibly important. She cited one example, and I return to the musician to whom I referred earlier. Most professional musicians will feel that their instrument is an integral part of their own personality. If they lose speech, they will communicate through their instrument, especially their mood—their feelings, responses and so on—so it is a terrible deprivation of liberty to separate a musician from their instrument.
If the musician plays a trumpet or another loud instrument and they are in a care home, it will be important to find somewhere they can go to play their instrument without disturbing everybody else. It sounds humorous but it is incredibly important to people. I was struck when I visited a care home some time ago and saw a man playing a piano. I thought he was a volunteer brought in to play—beautifully—to people. When he finished playing, I started to engage in conversation with him and it became clear that, while his recall for the symphony he had been playing from memory was superb, he could recall or discuss remarkably little else from which I could gain a modicum of sense. As a result, we had a bizarre conversation, other than about the symphony.
Conditions are absolutely essential. My hope would be that, in the code of practice, we require conditions to be put into the care plan that must be enacted on a daily basis. This should not be just a set of recommendations that could be ignored. My concern is that we link care planning to the delivery of care; that is extremely important.
I was grateful also for the support—albeit somewhat tentative—from the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I draw a distinction between the care manager and the care home manager. The care manager should be the person overseeing the direction of care planning; they could be the district nurse for somebody at home, or whoever runs the supported living environment on a day-to-day basis and looks at alterations in the care plan.
In a large care home, the care home manager often manages the building and the staff. They make sure that regulations are maintained and that the lifts work, dealing with all the things that happen on a day-to-day basis, but can have remarkably little contact with individuals. I do not want to sound disrespectful to care home managers when I say that I would envisage their co-ordinating role as much more like that of an administrative secretary, rather than as somebody who gets information directly from the person or the family. However, I would want them to make sure that the family had been consulted, that all the people who cared about the person had been spoken to and that that information was properly documented, with a package being put together for the local authority to inspect. I believe that the local authority will know which care homes on their patch are working well and which need an eye to be kept on them. I think I have half given my response to the Minister’s response.
Lord Cashman (Lab)
My Lords, before the Minister gets to his feet, I want to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for that clarification. Precisely those concerns about the role of the care manager and the care home were put to us when we met 30 or so representatives from the different services. They also dealt with the potential conflict of interest. As was said earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, there are always conflicts of interest in professional fields. Here, we are dealing with a conflict of interest around someone’s deprivation of their liberty, and we need to get it absolutely right. With that clarification, I say that the amendments make us think again about precisely how we can deal with the backlog and how we can be effective but give the individual the rights and protections they deserve.
Finally, I also thank the Minister for his early intervention and assurances around the inclusion of 16 and 17 year-olds and on the phrase “unsound mind”, which I raised during our first day in Committee. I hope that I have not detained him from his notes.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to Members of the Committee for their sympathy and for giving me breathing space. I was flustered by flipping forward and almost missing out this group of amendments.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the issue of concern is the distinction between the person who is responsible for somebody’s care and the person who manages a care home—they are of course different. What we are trying to get right here—I understand that this is what the amendments are exploring—are the relevant responsibilities of those people, bearing in mind that we want to integrate liberty protection safeguards into the process of care planning.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, knows huge amounts about this topic and I very much respect her opinion. She pointed out that DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. There are some overlaps. As she will know, there are similar questions or parts in both assessments concerning consent, for example, but she is right that they are different types of assessments. I want to explore whether her or indeed the Committee’s concern is that those assessments should not be carried out by care home managers or whether—a more positive view—they should be carried out by certain types of professional. Those are subtly different points. Perhaps I may give her the opportunity to respond in a moment, as I am really keen to explore this matter.
Clearly, we are trying to make sure that those who have the professional expertise to carry out certain types of assessments do so. Equally, we are trying to make sure that a co-ordinating body has responsibility for ensuring that these assessments are carried out in a proportionate way and are included with care assessments in an overall care plan, with people being answerable to the relevant regulatory bodies. If the noble Baroness would not mind, I would be grateful if she, along with other noble Lords, gave her perspective on that. I want to make sure that we determine the appropriate role of the care home manager.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister very much for that because it enables me to point out something that I am sure he and all noble Lords know—that, when it comes to deprivation of liberty, the body which is ultimately responsible for that in court is not the care home but the state body, which would be the NHS body or the local authority. The Minister said that responsible bodies currently receive from care homes the referral forms and then do a desk-top assessment of those. Yes, they do that; however, they do it in the knowledge that the person will be seen by a qualified person. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that that is not an automatic assumption that a responsible body can make because of the gatekeeping role of the care home manager.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
That is helpful, and I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will respond to those comments from her perspective. The noble Baroness goes to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, about making sure we get the definition of the role of the care home manager right and the various types of case studies. As the noble Baroness said, there are self-funders, those in local authority-funded homes, those in homes funded by the NHS and so forth. In a sense, that is the point I was trying to make in the first group of amendments as I realise that we have not clarified that to a sufficient degree so as to put people’s minds at ease that what we are proposing is appropriate and deals with people’s concerns or exposes those concerns as being well founded and then enables us to do something about it by the time we come back on Report.
I apologise again for the false start in my response. However, this has been a useful debate and I am keen to hear the reflections of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, as, I hope, she withdraws her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I thank the Minister; I am very grateful to him. If I have understood it correctly, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, supports my Amendment 30A, which requires that a registered professional—who, if they really get it wrong, would lose their registration—who has responsibility for the care plan and appropriate experience and knowledge, should make the determination. In other words, it is not good enough just to be a professional. I go back to the example of people with a head injury, who need a highly specialised assessment and overview so that a lead can be taken on the care planning process.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I will just finish, if I may. I completely share the concern about self-funders. They must have a care plan, because they are in receipt of care once they are in the system. It is appalling if there are people who are paying to be cared for in some kind of chaotic way without a proper, co-ordinated plan that they and their family can know about, so that everyone coming and going, be it out of hours or whatever, can understand what is happening.
I am beginning to think that there is not that much difference between us, and I agree that the current forms are inadequate. I apologise if, in the previous debates we have had, my comments about notification from the care home manager to the local authority were not well worded—on re-reading, I can see that, and I accept that I was wrong in the way that I worded it.
Baroness Barker
I do not want to get up the hopes of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, too strongly. She is a medic and therefore her go-to place is medical qualifications. There are some excellent best interests assessors who are not engaged in the care of the person. I wish to make that point. I shall keep coming back to the valid point of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the need to wind up with an affordable and manageable system. Noble Lords who have been involved in discussions with stakeholders will not be surprised to know that some of us think there is a way in which that could be done but it would involve reliance on advocates and assessors. Having said that, I agree with the noble Baroness.
Baroness Jolly
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I again refer noble Lords to my interests in the register. I am revisiting an area that we covered at Second Reading. Many of the issues we have been discussing, as we have just discovered, weave in and out of my comments, but this is about the appropriateness of the care home manager to carry out pre-authorisation reviews.
I should make it clear, given previous comments, that I recognise that DoLS needs replacing and that, in finding that replacement model, professionalism and expertise are important. This is not a personal, solo crusade—I do not fail to understand what a manger of a care home does and I recognise their professionalism in doing it. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, had it spot on when—it seems like hours ago—she used the description that they had used to her around the concerns about their capability and capacity.
Many of us have been supportive of this Bill, with briefings from and meetings with household-name charities, providers, royal colleges, academics, lawyers and interest groups. The two amendments in my name were drafted by a charity whose reputation for policy on older people is respected and admired—Age UK. It has several concerns about areas of the Bill and would welcome a meeting with the Minister to discuss them.
The cared for person’s interests are central to the Care Act, and I am delighted that the Government will bring forward amendments which will allow the voice of the cared-for person to be heard in this process, including 16 and 17 year-olds, and will do away with the term “unsound mind”. I join with all noble Lords in that.
At Second Reading, conflicts of interest were debated and we agreed that the cared for person’s interests must come first. However, this could be at odds with the care manager’s duty to keep their care home viable. Vulnerable people are at the heart of the Bill and how they are reviewed at a critical point in their care—the pre-authorisation review—sets the tone of the professionalism within their care. These reviews should be carried out by a trained professional—an AMCP—but, as currently drafted, only those objecting to the proposed arrangements will be provided with an AMCP. Generally, care home managers have not received professional training other than in running a care home—as the Minister mentioned, they may well have had that kind of training—and if they have, I would have no objection whatever to them carrying out the review.
However, many AMCPs have a first degree—possibly a masters—and professional training, with regular supervision and refreshers, and, whether they are social workers, mental health nurses, OTs or clinical psychologists, all will have the professional ethos and expertise instilled into them in their daily working. It is what they do. The proposed half-day familiarisation course does not really measure up.
This amendment will also protect the care home manager from accusations of conflict of interests or vested interests. It was a manager who made that point to me. I had not thought of it because I was looking at the issue from the point of view of managers considering their care home to be a business that needs to operate at 99% capacity for it to be effective. Managers have said that they would welcome an amendment similar to this one because it would give them some sort of cover. Perhaps I may remind the Minister that, in mental health legislation, an assessment made in a private setting must be carried out by an independent assessor. This amendment does not break new ground or indeed set a precedent.
While we are on the issue of finance, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, repeated a concern expressed in the sector about the costs of assessments and reviews being added to the bills of self-funders, which might be seen as a licence to print money. We know already that some care homes are charging £250 for a referral, but an assessment is a much more complicated piece of work and might well cost £1,000. People in the sector are concerned about this. Fee levels are not regulated, so I wonder whether the Minister could take the issue away and look at it. I welcome his willingness to listen and I look forward to his response. I beg to move.
Baroness Meacher
My Lords, I applaud the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, for tabling this amendment and I will add a few comments to those she has made. In my view, all pre-authorisation reviews should be undertaken by a professional who really understands the assessment of capacity. I accept that the amendment goes further than the Law Commission recommended, but it is not clear that the commission envisaged care home managers undertaking or being responsible for assessments and pre-authorisation reviews.
The whole point is that too often it is just assumed by everyone that somebody with limited capacity does not have a view or that they are content. Also, the person may not even have adequate information on which to base a view or make a comment. They may therefore not feel able to make an objection. It is not reasonable to expect care home managers to know about all the alternative and possibly less restrictive options available; why would they? As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, argued, the care home manager has a job to do in keeping costs down and filling beds.
It is not a criticism of care home managers to suggest that independent scrutiny is essential in all cases to ensure that those imperatives do not lead to an understandable failure to focus on the needs of the individual. Again, we should not expect care home managers to put the interests of the individual ahead of their business imperatives. I understand that many care homes close because they cannot cover their costs. They are desperate to fill their beds, and that is going to take priority. We just have to respect that that is simply how life is.
In the letter from the department to noble Lords dated 24 July following Second Reading, the Minister said that the local authority would undertake the authorisation itself, thus providing independent scrutiny and oversight. I think that the Minister will recognise, however, that if no concerns are raised during the pre-authorisation review, the local authority will be in a very poor position to question the conclusion of the care home manager. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, suggested that there might be a form of to and fro between the local authority and the care home manager, but I am not sure how meaningful that can be when all the work and the pre-authorisation review has been done. Given that, I would have thought that the local authority would just not be able to get at it.
Another concern is that it is in the gift of the care home manager to identify whether a person would benefit from advocacy. It seems that most of these people will, but the current proposals are unclear about who will pay for the advocate. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that issue.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, my Amendment 37A would preclude the care home manager undertaking the pre-authorisation review, which follows on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was saying. However, the Minister floated his answer to this point very recently. I thought I caught him saying that the pre-authorisation review can be done only under the auspices of the responsible body. Perhaps he can confirm that when he comes to speak because it is not clear in the Bill, as I see it. On page 10, paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 states:
“The responsible body may authorise arrangements, other than care home arrangements, if … a pre-authorisation review has been carried out in accordance with paragraphs 18 to 20”.
That relates to those cases where the care home manager does not have a role. Paragraph 13 of Schedule 1 simply states:
“The responsible body may authorise care home arrangements”,
if a number of qualifications have been met, including if,
“a pre-authorisation review has been carried out in accordance with paragraphs 18 to 20”.
I cannot see anything in the Bill that says that the pre-authorisation review cannot be carried out by the care home manager. If that is the case, it would be nice to see its inclusion in the Bill, which would provide some reassurance.
I know that we always stray here because we keep coming back to the issue of a conflict of interest. Has the Minister read the Law Society’s view, which we received over the weekend? The society described the fact that the care home manager has been put into a position of co-ordinating the way in which the Bill needs to be operated when a care home setting is involved as a “conflict of interest”. It stated:
“Vulnerable adults would be put at risk if care homes were given increased responsibility for decisions about their liberty”.
It also said that important safeguards “would be weakened”, stating that the,
“shift of responsibility for carrying out independent assessments of vulnerable people from local authorities to care providers”,
is not something that the Law Commission developed. However, we are working on the basis of a Law Commission draft Bill.
Although the noble Lord is as committed as ever to the care home manager having this key role, I am not at all convinced that this really is feasible. It will not be good enough for the Government to provide reassurance, which I doubt they can, about the training of care home managers and their capacity to carry out this responsibility, particularly in view of the big backlog that will have to be confronted, I suppose, by the care homes. I do not see any provision in the Bill for the current backlog to be dealt with under the existing legal requirements. There is a great deal of scepticism about whether this is going to work.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I have one amendment in this group and I wonder whether the group is focused on lines of answerability. Who is going to be responsible? If the person is in the community in any setting the responsibility will go or should go, as I understand it, to the local authority. If the person is in hospital then it would go to the hospital. However, we have a problem. A lot of people on continuing care funding are in the community. I am concerned that if the authorisation for those people sits with the clinical commissioning group rather than the local authority, we may end up with some people getting lost in the system. The standards and criteria against which the different assessments and processes are benchmarked and what is expected, particularly how the process is monitored, could be unclear. It will be much harder to monitor out in the community than in a hospital or in-patient setting.
Following on from our previous debate, I had a quick look at the requirements to be a best interests assessor. As far as I can see, to enrol on the course you must have had two years’ post-registration experience as an approved mental health professional social worker, registered with the Health and Care Professions Council, or be a nurse, a psychologist or an occupational therapist. The people who potentially will migrate to become approved mental capacity professionals are registered professionals. That is incredibly important and we should not lose that in any aspect of the Bill. If they are registered professionals they have a raft of professional duties that go with that.
This part of the Bill and the process is not terribly clear, and I worry particularly about people on continuing care out in the community, or those who may become self-funders, managing their own budgets for care.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I added my name to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. In view of my previous comments, people may be surprised that I did because it seems to be making life more complicated. In fact, I saw the more professional pre-authorisation process for the smaller group who will eventually be subject to this Act, I hope, as introducing something for the high-risk people who will be assessed by professionals. I like the role of the new AMCP, which sort of takes over from the best interests assessor, because I think it will be a well-qualified group. It would add some solid support if the care home manager’s role is to continue. I saw this, when I first read it, as a good way of providing some pre-authorisation backstop, if you like—a solid foundation on which we would have more confidence that the care manager role could work. I am still anxious about the care management work for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, mentioned, but this was one way that I saw of adding some professional expertise that would give confidence to the mental capacity community that we were taking this seriously.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I added my name to the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and to my noble friend Lord Hunt’s amendment. Pre-authorisation review is essential. We support these amendments because they propose that everyone should have access to an approved mental capacity professional. As drafted, my understanding is that the Bill gives that access only to those who object to the proposed arrangements. If everybody had access to an AMCP it would lessen concerns about the significance of the independence of the reviews.
Age UK has said:
“In respect of self-funders in private homes, there is an existing principle in mental health law that where an assessor has a financial interest in the decision to deprive someone of liberty there must also be an independent external assessor. A preauthorised review by an Approved Mental Capacity Practitioner … will bring this section of the Bill into line with this principle, which is currently reflected in the Conflicts of Interest Regulations to the Mental Health Act. Without such a requirement a significant conflict of interest for the care home manager is likely to arise”.
I will not say more because I think that we have explored that issue.
There also seems to be an assumption that care homes will already have existing written capacity assessments and that staff will have the knowledge to carry out such an assessment. As we have already discussed, that is clearly not the case.
This is a significant group of amendments. The Minister needs to take heed that we are, in a way, returning to some of the fundamentals that underpin the legislation. We on these Benches have listened carefully to stakeholders and are fairly sure that the Government have not got it quite right. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, in this House we have always proceeded on mental capacity issues on a consensus basis. We would much prefer that that was the case because we have come up with solutions to these very difficult, knotty, complex problems that cut across health, justice and liberty, and take account of things such as the United Nations and the European Union’s rights of the individual. This House is famous for doing that—I wanted to say that at some point this afternoon. This group of amendments lends itself to that because if we get the pre-assessment regime right then a lot of other things will flow from it that will lead to the right decisions and minimise the risk of local authorities, health authorities and CCGs ending up in court because the right procedures have not been taken and the rights of the individual have not been managed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, mentioned the qualifications needed to be an assessor. We have had several briefings from BASW, for which I am very grateful, that explain how well qualified the people involved in this process are. That of itself creates a problem for care home managers to undertake these issues.
I will paint a scenario for the Minister. If the local authority is the responsible body and therefore will end up in court if this does not work out—it will be expensive and time-consuming and behind it will be an individual who has not been treated properly—it seems quite likely that the local authority will be very risk-averse to the tick-box system that the Bill suggests to assess whether the right procedure was gone through in the assessment process.
Does the Minister agree that we might actually increase the bureaucracy and delays in the system, simply because we did not get the pre-assessment right? That could create one of two things: either a local authority will keep referring back the assessments for reprocessing or it will let through assessments which do not do the trick and therefore bear the risk of ending up in court because somebody’s individual rights have not been properly taken into account. Not only is this an issue of doing right by the individual but there is possibly a compelling case for why it is important to get the pre-assessment right. If we do not, the Bill fall shorts on Article 5 of the ECHR. Had the Government followed the Law Commission’s draft Bill, which contained these safeguards, I think that we would not be having this debate in this form.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group. I am grateful for what has again been a high-quality and well-informed debate.
I want to deal with the main issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, at the beginning of her comments, which is the subject of the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. The amendment would clarify in the Bill that a pre-authorisation review cannot be completed by a care home manager, who would be excluded from such a role. I am happy to assure all noble Lords that the role of care home managers in the new system is to provide the statement to the responsible body and, where necessary, to arrange assessments—as we have discussed. Their role is not to authorise arrangements. It would not be appropriate for care home managers to complete pre-authorisation reviews. I assure the Committee that we will make sure that the Bill reflects this. I hope that is at least one brick in the road towards defining the proper role for care home managers. In these amendments we are discussing the degree of independence and making sure that we minimise conflicts of interest.
A later amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, specifies that the person who completes a pre-authorisation review should also be qualified as a medical practitioner, nurse, social worker, speech therapist, occupational therapist or other profession as may be specified in regulations. I assure noble Lords that we would expect people from those professions to take on this role. That will be specified in the code of practice.
There is also a specific requirement that the pre-authorisation review be completed by somebody not involved in the day-to-day care of the person or delivering treatment to them. That is another safeguard.
Amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly, Lady Thornton, Lady Murphy, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, would make sure that smaller NHS bodies sought external people to carry out reviews. I understand the motivation behind them, but I am concerned that they would introduce complexity and lead to delays. The issue is resolvable within the system proposed because of the independence and quality of AMCPs, or approved mental capacity professionals—referred to the by noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Finlay. They will consider all applications to authorise a deprivation of liberty where it is reasonable to believe that the person objects to proposed arrangements, or in other complex cases. Reflecting on a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, we may need to provide more detail and studies of the kind of cases that we are talking about or envisaging, where an AMCP would be involved in the review. I take very seriously the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about the consequence of that, given that the responsible body will have the legal duty to ensure that it is carried out properly. I find that reassuring because it will not be a tick-box exercise: it will need to make sure that the assessments have been carried out properly. That was one of the questions put by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, when she asked about the access of the responsible body to such assessments. It will mean that that body will probably err on the side of caution, but it will also mean that we will have a more proportionate system than we do now. That is to be welcomed. Those AMCPs, as has been pointed out, could be salaried professionals within a local authority; they might even be close to commissioners, but their role will be independent, just as best-interests assessors are independent, and they will be responsible to their own professional bodies. That is something in the system on which we can rely.
The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and other noble Lords mentioned advocacy, and I know that we will be turning to that later. It is important to state—not only as I did at the beginning of the first group about making sure that the person involved is properly consulted—that they have the right to request a review, that they have access to representation from an independent mental capacity advocate or another appropriate person, and that ultimately those responsible for their welfare and care can challenge the authorisation in the Court of Protection.
I know that there are a couple of outstanding issues. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked if we could look at fee levels and that is certainly something that I will look at. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked how IMCAs are paid for. That is currently allowed for in the Mental Capacity Act and that is not changed by this Bill, but I will write to her to clarify that.
I hope that this response—particularly about the role that care home managers will not play in preauthorisation reviews—provides reassurance that we are conscious of the need to provide that independence in the system to reduce, and indeed remove, conflicts of interest and perceptions of conflict of interest wherever possible. As ever, as has been the theme of today, I continue to want to work with all noble Lords to ensure that we determine that the system, which still has great merit, is able to respond both to the needs of the people who are being cared for and to any concerns on behalf of those people from their families and stakeholders that there are conflicts of interest. I believe that the pieces of the puzzle are coming together, but I am conscious that we need to continue working together to complete it. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment. I look forward to further discussions on this topic to make sure that we are able to introduce as much independence as possible into the system.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the Minister for his remarks. The only point I would like to make at this stage is about the use of the code. The code offers something that might not be permanent, whereas anything that goes into legislation is permanent, so I would just be wary of that. I will study Hansard carefully, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Monday 15th October 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-II(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the second marshalled list (PDF) - (12 Oct 2018)
Baroness Jolly
“(3) Where any interested party objects to the determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate, an Approved Mental Capacity Professional (AMCP) must be engaged and the AMCP may, where they deem it necessary, refer disputes to the court.”
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, a cared-for person has rights, and it is the duty of all those dealing with that person to understand those rights and to ensure that they are respected and recognised. I am certain that the rights of a cared-for person should be at the heart of liberty protection safeguards. One way to ensure this is to provide an automatic referral pathway to an AMCP in those cases of dispute, objection or disagreement that cannot easily be resolved. We know that a group of cases referred to court has been pivotal in ensuring that people’s rights are upheld in the field of mental capacity. These cases provide AMCPs with the authority to refer to the court. If this authority is on the face of the Bill, it will provide an added level of reassurance that the interests and wishes of the cared-for person will be fully considered.
Cared-for people are found in many different settings in this context—in hospitals, care homes and, indeed, their own home—whether they are supported by friends and family or by a care provider. I believe that this amendment will have particular relevance in cases involving potential deprivations of liberty within the cared-for person’s own home. Although the Minister’s letter addressed after Second Reading stated that all applicants will be subject to an independent review before authorisation, the Bill as it currently stands does not reflect this—nor the ability of the AMCP to refer to the court any issues that have evaded amicable resolution. I wonder whether the Minister will look at this when he sums up, and bring back some government amendments on Report to resolve these omissions.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, some amendments in this group are in my name. The purpose of putting these amendments down is to enable a debate about the extent to which the Bill relies on family members to take responsibility for escalating up and—as it seemed to us when we started to read the Bill—challenging care home providers, as well as challenging any deprivation of liberty. We know from the experience of Mark Neary that he relied heavily on provisions of the Mental Capacity Act—particularly covering review procedures—to equip him with what he needed to challenge what was being done to his son. It seemed to us that, because of the way the Bill was written, there was a greater expectation that it would fall to relatives to bring matters before the court, which is not easy to do.
We realise that going to court is an expensive and time-consuming business. We do not want to refer cases to court where there is no need to do so—we want to rationalise—but in our view this part of the Bill is inadequately written. It does not contain sufficient safeguards, and therefore we wanted a debate on these matters to probe exactly what support family members will have where there is a need to challenge decisions made under LPS.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I have Amendments 47 and 50 in this group. They are concerned with the point at which court proceedings are triggered. It is appropriate that there is an ability to appeal, but it is also important that courts are not inundated and that disputes are resolved outside court as much as possible. Going to court should be the last port of call, but it should be accessible and should occur only when other interventions such as mediation have failed.
Sadly, sometimes cases need to go to court, which is why I have worded an amendment to allow the AMCP to consider going to court as part of their role. However, the AMCP must also be able to verify information and meet independently with the primary source—that is, the cared-ford person. That might mean setting up a meeting well away from other people who have previously been involved so that they can form their own view on whether there are other avenues that might be pursued before resorting to the court.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
I have added my name to Amendment 49 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. My concern is that a failure to meet the person directly might lead to a desk-based review, which would not enable the necessary scrutiny of the appropriateness of the care arrangements.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I support Amendment 45 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and Amendment 47 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to which I have added my name. These amendments strengthen the human rights-based duties of the approved mental capacity professional.
As it stands, the Bill weakens considerably the abilities of a person or their family or friends to exercise the convention right, under Article 5.4, of any detained person to take their case speedily to court. I think that all noble Lords understand perfectly well how this has come about. Paragraph 36 of Schedule 1 seems to indicate that an IMCA will be appointed only if the care home manager gives the relevant notification. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify in what circumstances an independent mental capacity advocate would not be appointed under the new system.
At Second Reading, I raised my concern that the Bill was going ahead before we knew the outcome of the Mental Health Act review. The Law Commission urges the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals to review the question of the appropriate judicial body to determine challenges to authorisations of deprivation of liberty under the Bill. The Law Commission also urges the establishment of a single legislative scheme governing non-consensual care or treatment of both physical and mental disorders where there is a lack of capacity.
At that point I have to delete chunks of my speech, having just had a meeting with Sir Simon Wessely, head of the Mental Health Act review, and Judge Mark Hedley, a former head of the Family Division, who knows all about mental capacity and everything associated with it. The Mental Health Act review will recommend that there should not be a bringing together of the Mental Health Act and this legislation. Therefore, I hereby withdraw my concern expressed at Second Reading.
As I said, following that meeting, I have deleted chunks of my speech, and I am not quite sure where I can pick it up again. Basically, they agreed with me—we agree about everything, in fact—that appeal to a court should be an absolute last resort. It goes without saying that court cases are incredibly time-consuming, stressful and expensive. It has to be seen as a failure of the system if recourse to a judge is needed. I certainly have a great deal of sympathy with the argument that, as far as humanly possible, we need to focus all the resources we can on the care of individuals, whether in the community or elsewhere.
We know that, if a court demands reports, the care of the patient has to come second to those reports being produced. This comes at a time when 10% of psychiatrists’ posts are not filled and vast numbers of all doctors’ and nurses’ posts are not filled, and it is proving more and more difficult to recruit—we will not mention the reason why. It seems to me, following discussion with Simon Wessely, that it is crucial to get the process right to minimise the need to access the courts. That is what his Mental Health Act review will concentrate on, albeit it will be a lot more liberal and professional than the current Act. It is an excellent process so that we can reduce the need for access to the courts.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 31 and 48 from the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. Apart from supporting the amendments and regarding the approved mental capacity professional as an issue of great importance in the Bill, I did so to be able to ask a few questions.
It might be simply that I do not understand, but my concern is this: how will the person who cannot object, but who needs to object, do it? The Bill states that people can automatically access the approved mental capacity professional if they object, but what happens for the person who cannot object but probably ought to? Who decides that a person’s family or those around them will be consulted to make sure that, if there is a need for an objection, it is heeded, which then puts them in the right place to access the AMCP? Those concerns have been expressed by lots of our colleagues in different ways. It is still not clear to me how that will happen. How will that person be protected under those circumstances?
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for initiating this discussion about approved mental capacity professionals and providing me with an opportunity, for the first time ever, to respond to amendments to a Bill.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
I thank my noble friend for that intervention. I have been hugely impressed by the commitment on all sides of the House to interrogate this Bill to make sure that it is fit for purpose and does the right job for the people we all seek to serve.
The amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Finlay, would have the effect of requiring that, in each and every case referred to an approved mental capacity professional, the AMCP would have to explicitly consider whether the case should be referred to the Court of Protection. We are clear that if a person wants to challenge their authorisation in the Court of Protection they have the right to do so. However, part of the reason we are creating the approved mental capacity professional role is so that cases where the person is objecting to the proposed arrangements can be considered outside having to go court, which we expect to be in line with the people’s wishes. It is always good to remind ourselves—as has been done many times during today’s business—of what we are trying to achieve and what we are trying to avoid. If we can avoid going to court, as has already been said, but serve people well, then we will have achieved something.
I am conscious that we do not want to create a situation where approved mental capacity professionals defer their responsibility to the Court of Protection and individuals have to undergo court procedures unnecessarily, particularly as we know this can be burdensome for people. In the short debate about this group of amendments, we have all agreed that we should avoid court at all costs, not only fiscally but because of the burden, stress and blockages that it puts into the system. However, I would like to reassure noble Lords that the responsible body has a responsibility to ensure that individuals who want to bring a challenge, in line with their Article 5 rights, have access to the Court of Protection, and the approved mental capacity professional would be important in identifying where this will be the case.
The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, would have the effect of requiring the approved mental capacity professional to meet with the cared-for person unless there is agreement with consulted persons that it is not necessary or appropriate to do so. We are clear that our intention is for approved mental capacity professionals to meet with the cared-for persons in almost all cases. Exceptions would be extreme circumstances, such as if the cared-for person is in a coma or clearly expresses a wish that they do not wish to meet with the approved mental capacity professional. I am sure that noble Lords agree that in these exceptional cases it is right that the approved mental capacity professionals do not meet the person.
To reflect this, we have imposed a duty to meet the person where it appears to the approved mental capacity professionals to be appropriate and practical to do so. I understand that the intention of the amendment is to limit the circumstances in which an approved mental capacity professional does not meet with the cared-for person. However, I am conscious that there could be situations—for example, where the AMCP and all consultees bar one agree that it was not necessary or appropriate to meet the person. However, if one consultee did not agree, it would mean that one consultee would effectively have a veto and the AMCP would be required to meet the person. We will ensure that guidance regarding that rare circumstance where it is not practical and appropriate is included in the code of practice.
The amendment of the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, requires the person completing the pre-authorisation review, where this is not an approved mental capacity professional, to meet with the cared-for person regardless of whether this is appropriate or practical. We appreciate that there may be circumstances—
Baroness Thornton
I am not sure whether my question has been answered so I will repeat it. Does this mean it is automatic that the cared-for person will see the AMCP? Is that what the noble Baroness is saying? She has started tying me up in knots. Will it be automatic? Except, obviously, in the cases that have been mentioned, is that what will happen?
Baroness Stedman-Scott
Let me confirm that they will not automatically meet with the AMCP.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
I was saving my answer to that question for the end of my speech, but as the noble Baroness is pushing me, I shall respond now. Since I have been in this House I have always been advised that when you do not know something, you fess up to it. So I have to tell the noble Baroness that I cannot answer that question right now unless someone to my left has a magic piece of paper that will get me out of jail free on this one. More seriously, I will come back to the noble Baroness because it is a very pertinent question, if that is acceptable to her.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
We will ensure that guidance regarding the rare circumstances where it is not practical or appropriate is included in the code of practice. The amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, requires the person who completes the pre-authorisation review, where they are not an approved mental capacity professional, to meet with the cared-for person regardless of whether it is appropriate or practical.
We appreciate that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for the reviewer to meet the person, and the Bill does not prevent this happening. Indeed, in some cases it would be our expectation that this would happen, and further detail on this will be provided in the code of practice. However, in many cases the circumstances will be straightforward. For example, where someone consented to be in a care home but subsequently lost capacity, a meeting with the cared-for person would not challenge the outcome and it would not be proportionate to require that person to undergo the process again. The Bill provides that, prior to an application being authorised, it must first be reviewed by somebody who is not involved in the day-to-day care and treatment of the cared-for person. Where this is not an AMCP, the person who completes this review must review the information and determine whether it is reasonable for the responsible body to conclude that the authorisation conditions are met.
DoLS leads in local authorities have told us that they are already giving a great deal of thought to what they will need to see to be satisfied that the conditions are met for a liberty protection safeguards authorisation. We would do well to wait and see what the detail of that is. We will set out further guidance on this matter in the code of practice, but it is not right to require on the face of the Bill the reviewer to meet the cared-for person in every case. The Bill carefully balances the requirements necessary for authorisations across all the people involved: the cared-for person, their carers and their families, along with the healthcare workforce.
I now have a piece of paper, so I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that, yes, it is automatic for the AMCP to meet the person. The AMCP makes the decision on whether it is or is not appropriate or proportionate, which I believe I said earlier. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, has made sure that we understand that what is important in this are the rights of the individual. Those are at the heart of what we are doing. She was particularly concerned about people in care homes. The system that we are bringing forward and trying to fine-tune will certainly make sure that they are given the due consideration they need. I will not repeat the points that have been made about going to court, which incurs all manner of personal and fiscal costs as well as bureaucratic costs. An appeal to the court on these things should be a last resort, because I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that such action would mean that there has been a failure in the system, which is something that we are desperately trying to avoid.
I hope that I have answered all the questions, but I know that noble Lords will tell me if I have not. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the Minister for her response. We have had a short but interesting debate and I expect that many of us are keen to talk to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, because we are all quite interested in the conversation that she has just had with Sir Simon Wessely. I understand that there is no desire on his part to combine both Bills, although I feel that there should be some learning for this Bill from his deliberations. However, I will read Hansard carefully and reconsider the matter before Report.
(A1) The main purpose of the consultation required under this paragraph is to try to ascertain the cared-for person’s wishes or feelings in relation to the arrangements and the likely impact of the arrangements on the cared-for person’s wellbeing.”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, this group of amendments takes us to the heart of the duty to ascertain the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person. For that reason, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for adding his name to my amendment, which would rename this part of the Bill, changing a consultation to a duty, and move up this paragraph from lower down:
“The main purpose of the consultation required under this paragraph is to try to ascertain the cared-for person’s wishes or feelings”.
That must be paramount. If we do not make arrangements that fit with and respect the known wishes and feelings of a person—or we make arrangements that cut across the feelings of others and cannot justify them very carefully—we will have failed completely in what we are trying to do. We should be empowering people to live as they want to live as much as possible while accepting that we need some restrictions in place.
That is why this group of amendments would also move the cared-for person to the top of the list of people to be consulted and make it clear that the professional responsible for the care plan needs to undertake the consultation. That will then inform what is happening and how the care is to be organised on a day-to-day basis and in the longer term, as well as ascertain whether the restrictions that may be put in place are necessary and proportionate in the light of knowing the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings.
It is important to remember that people do not object only actively. They may signal objection by becoming more withdrawn or less active. They may start eating less or there may be changes in toileting and so on—all of which can signal that someone is unhappy. All these changes should be considered in thinking about whether somebody is objecting in the broadest sense to whatever has been provided for them. They may well signal that their wishes and feelings are not being adequately respected. I beg to move.
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, I welcome the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, which seeks to ensure the wishes and feelings of the person are at the heart of decision-making. My Amendment 33 follows this principle by adding the cared-for person to the list of people with whom the assessor is required to engage before arrangements can be authorised.
Self-advocacy groups and charities supporting people with learning disabilities and their families have shared their concerns that the Bill does not require sufficient regard to be paid to their views in particular. I will quote some views expressed by Learning Disability England, a membership organisation:
“Disabled people and their families are especially worried that there is no requirement to consider the person’s own wishes. That is how the institutions were … We do not want to go back to the days of the institutions … There is a risk that we take away people’s independence and give power to people that may not be doing a good job”.
Consulting with people who lack capacity can be challenging and requires quite advanced communication skills. It is crucial that we get this right as the consequences are significant and lead to other improvements or deteriorations in people’s health and independence. I declare an interest here as chair of the Books Beyond Words community interest company, which develops resources and pictures to help doctors, nurses, care staff and others to communicate more effectively with people with learning disabilities and others who find pictures easier than words and to support decisions which, at their outset, appear too difficult or challenging.
Amendment 35 is designed to oblige those carrying out the assessment to explore less restrictive alternatives thoroughly. This would need to take into account the cared-for person’s family and others who know them well and have an interest in their welfare, who are likely to have important information and expertise to share about the person’s needs and what good support, which maximises their freedom, might look like.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I have added my name to two of these amendments. We heard earlier that the Minister has agreed that the Bill at some point in the future will reflect the need to consult the cared-for person. This is clearly a great advance and sets the context for the debate on this group of amendments. I particularly commend the suggestion that the consultation should be not just about what the assessment has concluded should be done to the cared-for person—I fear that the sense of the Bill at the moment is “done to”—but what the alternatives are.
This is where I come back to one of our problems with the architecture of the Bill. So much responsibility is given to the care home manager who, inevitably it seems to me, must think about residence in a care home as being the only option because their job is to make sure that occupancy is of the highest level in order to maximise the viability of the home. It would be good to know how the Government think with this Bill and the new arrangements we are going to ensure that the alternatives are properly looked at before someone’s deprivation of liberty is actually authorised.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, can I take this opportunity to ask the noble Baroness some questions? Can she confirm my understanding that this duty to consult does not come under Article 4 of the Mental Capacity Act? As I read the Bill, the responsible body or the care home manager is under a duty to consult only in so far as they deem it to be practicable or appropriate to do so. They make that decision. Is that correct? Under DoLS, if somebody was “unbefriended” and if there was nobody to consult, that automatically triggered the right to an advocate. I do not believe that is the case under the Bill. Finally, this duty to consult is a stand-alone one. What happens as a result of that consultation? For example, it does not make it clear that if a family—like Mark Neary—objects to a placement, it does not trigger the need for an AMCP or another assessment. Yes, there is a long list of people but, as I understand it, there is no nearest-relative rule as there is under mental health legislation. There is no sequential order. My basic question is: what happens as a result of this duty to consult? It is not clear to me that anything necessarily happens.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, I support this group of amendments in particular because many cared-for people can express their wishes in the ways people have said. I want to give your Lordships an example from when I was working as an in-reach mental health nurse into a range of homes for people with learning disabilities. There was a young man who was extremely happy in the home in which he had been placed because it was near his parents. They used to visit regularly and they used to be able to take him out together and accompany him, because he was not safe to be out unaccompanied. When his parents died he showed all the signs and symptoms that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, outlined, which the staff put down to the fact that he was distressed that his parents had died. Actually, that was in part true, but he was terribly sad that his sister could visit him only once a month because she lived 200 miles away. She was very willing to visit him more and to take him out accompanied but could not do that unless he changed his home and moved nearer to her.
This actually had a successful outcome, so it is not a depressing story, but Amendments 32 and 35 in particular would make it a duty for the care home in which such a resident was living to think again. This particular young man was a very high fee payer paid by the council because his needs were very complex. There was not much in it for the care home to arrange for his transfer because it would be quite difficult to fill the place at the same cost outside. I want to bring reality into the Committee in relation to these two amendments and explain why I am so supportive of us considering them in a positive vein.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, deserve an answer. I am sure that if the Minister cannot provide one tonight we will get one because she raised some very important points. The example that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins of Tavistock, just gave gives us a practical idea of how these amendments might apply if they were part of the Bill.
Amendments 32 and 34 underpin the absolute need to discover the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person. Mencap summed it up pretty well in the briefing that it sent to noble Lords when it said that the views of the cared-for person should be at the heart of this clause. That point was made by my noble friend Lady Thornton during the debate on the first group of amendments today.
Putting the focus on ascertaining the wishes and, just as importantly, the feelings of the cared-for person is central to this, as is right and proper. I and others spoke about this at Second Reading and, frankly, we hope that the Government will respond positively to these proposals. Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would address this by adding the cared-for person to the list of those who must be consulted, and Amendment 35 would ensure that views were sought on whether any less restrictive alternatives were available—all good sense.
When faced with legislation like the Bill and the issues it raises I often think, “If this Bill was about me, what would I want?” Most certainly I would want the protection and defence of my basic human rights that these amendments offer. Is this not something that every noble Lord in this House would want? If it is, we should ensure that it is there.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
I thank all noble Lords for their important contributions to these amendments. I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about the importance of ascertaining the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings when consulting as part of the liberty protection safeguards processes. Sometimes it is more important to listen to what is not said or expressed over and above that which is said. Watching people’s behaviour and demeanour can tell us a lot about how they are feeling. The noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, gave us a good example of somebody who lost their parents and was terribly distraught about it, although what was causing him most angst was being able to see his sister only for short periods because of the distance travelled. We must make sure, in taking through this Bill, that we do everything we can to read those signs and that people are empowered to make the best decisions.
On care home managers completing the consultation and how we ensure that alternatives are considered, I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that a wide range of people are consulted. Previous consultations conducted by professionals often relied on things that were not meaningful or in the best interest of the individual. We want the least restrictive as a principle—a requirement of Article 5 in case law—that must be considered and will be set out in the code of practice. The code of practice will be very important.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that the care home manager would consider whether a decision was appropriate and the decision would be reviewed by the responsible body. Any family member, IMCA or appropriate person could challenge a decision not to consult the cared-for person. The Government are committed to making sure that the consultation around the cared-for individual is at the heart of everything. We must move heaven and earth to make sure that we understand exactly what they want and that the consultation is respectful in every way.
The Bill already outlines that the main purpose of the consultation is to ascertain the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings. This is to ensure that the liberty protection safeguards are consistent with the focus of the rest of the Mental Capacity Act, which places the wishes and feelings of the person, even if they lack capacity, at the heart of the process.
The noble Baroness is also right to highlight the importance of considering the impact of the arrangements on the person’s well-being. Similarly, we are also clear that we expect the impact of the arrangements on the person to be addressed when undertaking consultation. However, the purpose of the consultation would be to consider the impact from the person’s point of view. This is crucial to how the Mental Capacity Act works.
The concept of well-being is not mentioned in the Mental Capacity Act. It is a legal concept which has particular meaning under the Care Act and the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act. We are concerned that it would cause confusion if this concept were inserted into the liberty protection safeguards.
However, the liberty protection safeguards will be in place to support living and will be positive for a person’s well-being. The accompanying code of practice will outline how the model works within wider care provision, including the Care Act, which has duties in relation to promoting well-being.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Finlay, explicitly requires that the cared-for person be consulted. Noble Lords raised this issue on our previous day in Committee and I know that there is enthusiasm for this proposal, as it is felt that it will more clearly place the person at the centre of the determination of their wishes and feelings.
The Government have also heard very clearly that noble Lords felt that the person themselves must be consulted. Again, I agree. If we are to secure the improvements that we want, it is essential that the person and their voice, wishes and feelings about any proposed arrangements are placed at the heart of this model. We will make sure that the Bill reflects this. I am grateful for the expert views of noble Lords in helping to improve the Bill to put this beyond doubt.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that it is important for those deciding whether an authorisation for deprivation of liberty should be given to consider whether any less restrictive options are available. Considering less restrictive alternatives is also an important aspect of the wider Mental Capacity Act. For example, the fifth principle of the Act requires decision-makers to have regard to less restrictive options. Nothing in the Bill changes this. The code of practice will set out how the liberty protection safeguards will work within the wider framework of the Mental Capacity Act and the care landscapes more widely.
Respectfully, therefore, I maintain that there is no need to add the words suggested by the amendments because they already form an integral part of the assessment process. We have made clear that the main purpose of the consultation duty is to ascertain the person’s wishes and feelings in relation to the authorisation, and this can include the person’s views about acceptable levels of restrictions.
For example, a person might wish to receive care in a care home where they have freedom to spend time in the community rather than in a care home where there is less freedom to do this. This might be because the conditions are less restrictive. This is an essential part of the liberty protection safeguards and is delivered through the assessment process. The noble Lord, Lord Touhig, made a very valid point when he asked whether we would want this for us. We must make sure that we treat people and respect them in the way we would like to be treated and respected ourselves.
I hope I have been able to provide a satisfactory explanation, but if there are outstanding concerns, I am happy to discuss them further. I trust that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I must admit that during the Minister’s very positive response, my hopes were up that she was going to accept the amendment and the change of title of this paragraph in the new Schedule. The reason I say that is that words matter: they set the tone. It would be very useful to be able to discuss this further so that we might take out the word “Consultation”, which has connotations of medical consultations and other things, and that we might state on the face of the Bill as a heading that there is a, “Duty to ascertain the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, reminded us of the importance of wishes and feelings and that we should not slip back in time to old-fashioned, awful institutional care. The well-being Act in Wales was behind some of the wording as well, and the reason for moving that part of the Bill higher up.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked some very valid questions. Best-interest decision-making should be a process, not a one-off, and for that process to happen, it is very important that the person is consulted because their previously expressed wishes and feelings might no longer be their wishes and feelings now that they are in a different situation, but they might need help expressing those wishes and feelings as they are now. That process should also include their beliefs and values, some of which they might still hold on to and some of which they might have abandoned over time. There are other factors that the person might be likely to consider if they were able to consider them: their current views and past views might be expressed by others who know them well and care about them.
I hope that we can pursue the discussion further, but, at the moment, although I will withdraw the amendment, I would like to reserve the right to come back to this on Report, because unless we get wishes and feelings up there, in bold type as a heading, we might well find that, inadvertently, we fail the very people for whom we are arguing. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hollins
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, my Amendments 38, 39, 40, 41 and 43 would add in families, friends and carers. They build on and support Amendments 15 and 16, which were debated earlier and tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly. They would require that every cared-for person has access to an approved mental capacity professional, regardless of whether the assessor considers that the cared-for person might object to the care and treatment proposed.
Not everyone will be able or willing to risk expressing an objection to those currently providing their care. It can be very hard for a person to object to care given by a staff member on whom they may be totally dependent, and may feel obliged to agree with, when they view them, correctly, as somebody who has power over them. I suggest that for some people this will not be an easy judgment even if they are trying to object, particularly if they have difficulty communicating. It is often the case that family members are the most skilled at communicating with their loved ones, as I suggested earlier, and are therefore most likely to understand their feelings and wishes—feelings which may be communicated with subtlety or nuance, and which are unlikely to be confided to unfamiliar people or people perceived to have power over them.
In those situations where someone is not able to communicate their objections, it is vital that their family and others with an interest in their welfare are able to object for them and to trigger a referral to an AMCP—someone whom they can be confident has the right expertise. Otherwise someone with profound communication impairments might not be able to object while those close to them have serious concerns about the arrangements, yet are not able to request an AMCP. Those with the most profound impairments must not miss out on the involvement of an AMCP in this situation. In the 2014 report from the House of Lords post-legislative scrutiny committee, Nicola Mackintosh spoke about the compliant nature of many incapacitated adults. She said that,
“if you have a vulnerable person detained in a care home who is physically or verbally expressing a wish to leave, those cases are more likely to be raised before the court than cases involving a compliant, incapacitated person. That was the case in the Bournewood case. I do not think the DoLS scheme has cured the illegality”.
I do not think that the Bill, as amended, will fill the Bournewood gap. My Amendment 44B has identified a similar issue to that in Amendment 44A, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. It has been tabled to protect the rights of people detained for treatment in assessment and treatment units, and other hospital settings, for treatment for mental disorder. It would include NHS and independent hospitals. These are often the most restrictive settings where the liberty protection arrangements will apply and there are serious concerns about the rights of patients with learning disabilities who are placed in these settings.
However, due to the rules governing the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental Health Act, which this Bill leaves largely untouched, these patients will not receive any independent assessment by an AMCP. The reason for this, as I understand it and put as simply as possible, is that the Mental Capacity Act cannot be used to authorise a detention if the person is viewed as objecting to their detention; the Mental Health Act must then be used. This means that patients detained in hospital under DoLS or its successor, the LPS, will by definition be regarded as not objecting by those responsible for their detention. This would include people such as HL in the Bournewood case, who may not be capable of expressing an objection or whose behaviour is hard to interpret by those who do not know them well.
Under the Bill, a person will qualify for an assessment by an AMCP only if there is reason to believe that they are objecting, so for this group a specific trigger is needed to ensure that their detention is scrutinised by an independent, specially trained professional to ensure that it is justified, having regard to the alternatives. Last year there were 4,670 DoLS applications for patients in this category. I hope the Minister will agree that it is important for people in these settings to have access to an AMCP automatically.
I have also had some communication with Professor Sir Simon Wessely today, but I did not achieve the same certainty as my noble friend, who is not in her place. I hope that the Wessely review will remove the learning disability exemption in the Mental Health Act, which allows people with a learning disability to be detained if their behaviour is abnormally aggressive and so on, and that instead their detention will be on the same grounds as for any other person. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
There are two amendments in my name in this group. Amendment 44 is designed to probe an issue that is clearly worrying lots of noble Lords: that the condition that triggers an AMCP is that the person is objecting to their care in a particular place. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, is always very good at helping us to understand legislation from the point of view of people with learning disabilities. My background and my chief concern is with older people with dementia who are probably disproportionately likely to be overlooked by this provision because they will not necessarily be vocal.
I return to the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton: why would you object if you do not know what you are objecting to? What will happen if you do object? Will you receive any help? Currently, best interests assessments are required for DoLS detentions but, as I understand this, where a person does not object they do not get to see an AMCP. If they are in a care home, it is the care home staff, but in hospital and community settings the responsible body can use evidence from other assessments to make a determination for somebody. What is the evidence base for this? Do we know how many people currently object to their care and treatment? Why is that considered a sufficiently robust basis on which to make this a criterion in law? There is something deeply flawed and deeply wrong about this.
Amendment 59 may seem a bit strange on the face of it. It inserts a requirement to keep a record of refusals of authorisations. One of the things that the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House found was that the evidence base for DoLS is very sketchy. I have to make it clear that the Select Committee’s report was put together and came out just around the time of the Cheshire West ruling. In the light of that ruling, the number of applications shot up. We have never had a robust evidence base for the way DoLS work. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, that this is not going to close the Bournewood gap, but we should at least try to cover up some of the deficiencies there have been in the past. Therefore, trying to get together some basic stats and information, including how many times things like DoLS have been refused, is important.
I know, as will other noble Lords, that among professionals, or rather among stakeholders, there was a big discussion prior to Cheshire West about whether having lots of DoLS applications was an indication that in fact you were a good provider or whether that would somehow be indicated by the fact that you had none. That is not the right calculation; you can argue it either way.
We still need to get to the bottom of the transparency of the decision-making around this. That was my reason for tabling what might seem to be a rather strange amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I beg your pardon; I have an amendment in this group as well. Oh dear, I seem to have spattered them in every group.
I have a real concern that triggering a review that is based on whether or not the person is thought to be objecting is far too narrow, and that anyone who has concerns about that person should be able to trigger a review independently—whether that is family, friends or somebody working in the place where the cared-for person is supposed to be being cared for.
I have an interest, or at least an experience, to declare: some years ago I was asked to help the police look at a care home where they had serious and justified concerns. The alert had come from somebody working at an extremely junior grade within the care home, not from anybody senior or from a professional. Following that, I was asked to review the case notes in detail. The people concerned all had severely impaired capacity and, often, an inability to express themselves—but, by meticulously looking at the case notes, one could see trends, and when I mapped them against the staff off-duty rota the trends became clearer.
I am very concerned that, if we leave this just as it is written, we will not allow the very people who have contact, possibly on a day-to-day basis, to put up a red flag about what may be happening in one person’s life. It may be that nine out of 10 people in an institution are very happy, but if one of them is not and one member of staff has got to know them and sees subtle changes in their behaviour, that member of staff must be empowered, with the cover of anonymity, to trigger an independent review, because that may be the only way to protect the cared-for person.
I put in my amendment that a review should be triggered if,
“the rationale … is based on the risk to others”.
The concept of “risk to others” is quite difficult to justify being in this Bill rather than in the Mental Health Act as the sole rationale for using the Bill, so I think that it becomes an exceptional circumstance that warrants that type of review. Similarly, if the restrictions are on contact with named persons, I worry that there could be a bias from the staff towards the named person. When somebody is very upset, they may appear to be an aggressive or angry visiting relative and may be a bit more difficult to handle—but actually it may be that that is simply the way that they are expressing their anxiety and their emotions towards the person who is now deteriorating and want to do their best for them. I worry about excluding a close relative without great justification; it should not be undertaken lightly.
Baroness Barker
When the Minister responds, will she confirm the point made to us by a number of stakeholders that harm to others, rather than harm to self, which is the basis of decision-making in best interests, is included in the Bill—because it is not explicitly ruled out and it was in the Law Commission’s proposals. If that is the case, that is a very significant change. The number of people included may well differ solely for that reason.
Baroness Thornton
That is a very good point. I will speak to my Amendment 44A, which is in this group. My amendment provides for a pre-authorisation review to be carried out by an approved mental capacity professional if the cared-for person is in an independent hospital and receiving mental health assessment or treatment. Where a person is in an independent hospital for the purposes of assessment and treatment for mental disorder, they may need to come under the liberty protection safeguards, and there must be an independent assessment by an AMCP.
I am concerned about the lack of independent assessment and oversight to guard against conflicts of interest in these settings. It is an issue that I know that organisations supporting people with learning disabilities and autism—Mencap and others—are also very concerned about. It is recognised that too many people with a learning disability and autism are stuck in assessment and treatment units and other in-patient settings due to the lack of the right support in the community.
Following the learning disability abuse scandal at Winterbourne View hospital, the Government and NHS England promised to tackle this issue and reduce the number of people with a learning disability and autism in these settings. Through their Transforming Care programme, they have committed to developing the right community support to reduce the number of in-patient beds. However, to date there has been little reduction in the number of people in these settings. Often, high levels of restrictive practices are used in these settings. It is recognised that children, young people and adults with a learning disability and/or autism in in-patient settings are at risk of overmedication, restraint and being kept in solitary confinement, as we have seen in the press in the past couple of days.
The average length of stay for assessment and treatment is nearly five and a half years. The Learning Disability Census 2015 stated that 72% of people in in-patient units had received antipsychotic medication, but only 29% were recorded as having a psychotic disorder; 56% had experienced self-harm, an accident, physical assault, hands-on restraint or being kept in seclusion. A recent shocking BBC “File on Four” programme revealed highly restrictive practices in these settings. It had obtained information that there had been a large increase in the use of restrictive practices between 2016 and 2017. This is of great concern.
According to the latest NHS digital data, 2,375 people with a learning disability or autism are in in-patient settings. Of those, 1,045 are in independent hospitals. The data show that currently, most are detained under the Mental Health Act, but of course there are people who are under DoLS in these settings, and who will be under the liberty protection safeguards in these settings in future. It is vital that there are robust independent assessments for people in these settings who may fall under the liberty protection safeguards. It is therefore essential that there is a requirement for an AMCP to undertake an independent assessment in these situations.
Can the Minister clarify: under the liberty protection safeguards, who will be responsible for signing off the LPS authorisations for people in independent mental health hospitals?
Baroness Stedman-Scott
My Lords, many exam questions are coming out this evening. Let us hope we can answer them to your Lordships’ satisfaction.
Baroness Thornton
We want to ensure that the noble Baroness gets the full context of what it is like dealing with amendments in Committee.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
I appreciate that very much; I am touched and can confirm that you have passed that exam with flying colours.
This is clearly another important element of the Bill, and I thank everyone for their contributions. I pick up the point about independence in the system, and have always been of the view that when you have situations like this, some independence is greatly helpful. Without wishing to make you laugh or belittle what we are trying to do, I say that I have just spent some time in the States and was subject to the awful rigours of President Trump and the Kavanaugh situation. I can tell you there was no independence there whatsoever. So I am absolutely at one with all noble Lords about independence when making judgments and trying to help people improve their lives.
I think the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, made a terribly important point. Where somebody is having something explained to them and does not feel comfortable objecting, or feels the environment is not right—I doubt there is one of us who has not been in that position at one time—it is horrible. We have to make sure the environment is correct and healthy for people to do so.
I think the points the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made, in referring back to the evening exam question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton—how do people know?—have to be answered. I take on board the point raised and think we must get to the bottom of that. However, I can tell you that approximately 30% of people do object to their DoLS review, if that is helpful. Also, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raised an important point about evidence base. In a job once, someone wanted me to get the evidence for what we thought we were doing, and I was terribly nervous about it because I thought I would be out of a job. Actually, when we got an independent group in to look at it, we were just blown away by the evidence, which you could not argue with. I know it is costly to gather evidence, and I have no idea if it is practical or realistic here, but I have no doubt the case will be stronger one way or the other for having some evidence. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made numerous excellent points today, but the independence and the review is what is resonating in my mind. I am glad to confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that harm to others is included.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister very much for saying that. It is a very significant point she has just made, and perhaps one that noble Lords may have to come back to at a subsequent stage.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
The noble Baroness is pleased with me; that makes me worried.
The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, would mean that the referral to an approved mental capacity professional would also be required in the following circumstances: if any person interested in the person’s welfare does not wish them to receive treatment at the place, if any other person interested in the person’s welfare makes a request, or if there is reason to believe that an approved mental capacity professional should carry out the review. I am assured that the Bill is already explicit—where it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not wish to reside or receive care or treatment at a place, an approved mental capacity professional must consider their arrangements. If an objection is made on the person’s behalf by a family member of the person or someone who is interested in their welfare, we would generally consider this to constitute a reasonable objection. We will provide detail—including examples—of when an approved mental capacity professional should complete a review in the code of practice. We plan to set out in detail where this would apply in the code of practice but it will include complex cases such as arrangements proposed for people with acquired brain injuries, and people in independent hospitals receiving mental health treatment.
While I understand the intention of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, the effect would be that any objection by any person with an interest in the person’s welfare would trigger a referral to an approved mental capacity professional. In short, this would mean that anyone could trigger a referral. An acquaintance from social media or a distant relative would be able to raise an objection. While this might be appropriate in some cases, there may be others where it would not represent the person’s wishes and feelings. As currently written, the amendment would undermine the purpose of the duty, which is to ensure that the views of the person are central to the process. I am sure that noble Lords agree that a focus on the views of the cared-for person is vital. That is why the Government have made this core to the new model.
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would require a referral to an AMCP when others have expressed concerns, when an authorisation is being justified because of risk to others, or when the arrangements involve restrictions on contact with named persons. I thank her for raising these points and we will consider this carefully for the code of practice. I also hope I can provide reassurance that the Bill only enables authorisation of arrangements that give rise to a deprivation of liberty necessary for the purpose of receiving care or treatment. We would not ordinarily expect the liberty protection safeguards to be used to authorise a restriction on contact and we will make this clear in the code of practice. I am also sure that the noble Baroness is aware that risk to others is being considered as part of the Mental Health Act review.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, wants to ensure that an AMCP conducts the pre-authorisation review for everyone in an independent hospital receiving a mental health assessment or treatment. I am sympathetic to this and wish to consider the matter. Such cases should be referred to an AMCP. Detail of this will be provided in the code of practice.
We have tried to respond to all the points made by noble Lords this evening, but there is more to do. If it is acceptable to your Lordships, we should carry on talking about these issues. The Government are absolutely committed to doing this. On that basis, I hope that I may have passed the exam set by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, will be able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on the amendments in this group and asked very astute questions. I am grateful to the Minister for her optimistic response, but I am not completely reassured. I disagree with her interpretation of my amendment’s intentions. I reserve the right to bring this matter back on Report after further consideration. I will certainly read Hansard carefully and look forward to any other communication which may be forthcoming from the Minister’s office. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hollins
“Clinical ethics committees
20A(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument make provision for all NHS bodies to have access to a clinical ethics committee.(2) The main objective of a clinical ethics committee is to provide advice on clinical ethics to professionals on matters relating to Schedule AA1.(3) The regulations in sub-paragraph (1) must make provision for the membership, funding and constitution of the clinical ethics committee.(4) The regulations in sub-paragraph (1) may make provision to require certain cases to be referred to a clinical ethics committee, such as in cases where a dispute has arisen.(5) The Secretary of State must review the operation of clinical ethics committees and prepare and publish a report on the outcome of the review before the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which this paragraph comes into force.(6) A subsequent report must be published before the end of each period of three years beginning with the day on which the previous report was published.(7) The Secretary of State may arrange for some other person to carry out the whole or part of a review under this section on the Secretary of State’s behalf.(8) The Secretary of State must lay before both Houses of Parliament the reports published under this paragraph.(9) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this paragraph may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, these amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and myself are about mediation, conflict and decision-making. It is a complex area and made more complicated now that the Bill is being extended to 16 and 17 year- olds. Rather than taking time in your Lordships’ House this evening, I believe the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, would prefer to discuss this matter with the Minister and decide whether the Bill is the right place to progress this issue. I am grateful to the Minister for already having agreed to discuss it. I reserve the right to return to this on Report if no progress is made.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
We have had a discussion about the issues under consideration here, which are in some ways prompted by the experience of the Gard family and their son Charlie; we are all aware of the tragic circumstances at the end of his life. We agree with the noble Baroness and my noble and learned friend that these are incredibly important issues, and we are grateful to them for tabling the amendment. However, I think this would be best pursued outside of the confines of the Bill. I give her my commitment to do that; I am keen to work with her and with all noble Lords who have a particular interest in this issue, to ensure we come to the right conclusion. On that basis, I am sure she will withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hollins
I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(aa) any arrangements that are not authorised or are authorised subject to conditions,”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
This group of amendments relates to the authorisation record. I have added an additional criteria in Amendment 50B because there may be arrangements put in place after an initial authorisation has begun—or that were subject to conditions—and parts of the authorisation may need early review. Amendment 62A is designed to ensure consistency—the care home manager will not do the assessments but will arrange them. Amendment 58B relates to renewal; if part of an authorisation no longer has effect it must be reassessed from scratch, not simply renewed. Amendment 58C requires that original evidence is submitted, not a second-hand report. It would allow the responsible body to see the authentic assessment rather than an interpretation of any original material.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I am afraid that I think some of the amendments standing in my name have been wrongly grouped. I am sorry; I have been busy this afternoon going through everything else and I am now a bit stuck regarding the procedure and what I should do. I will speak to them, although I am rather reluctant to start this group.
Baroness Stedman-Scott
My understanding is that the noble Baroness does not have to speak to them.
Baroness Barker
But am I right in thinking that if I do not speak to my amendments today, they will automatically fall?
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
It might be of assistance if I intervene here. If the noble Baroness is referring to amendments in the group beginning with Amendment 58A, I understand that if she does not speak to them now, they can be dealt with in the next group.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am no expert in parliamentary procedure but my understanding is that, as they come after the amendment we are considering now and indeed the one that we would consider next, they can be retabled.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for initiating this discussion. Clearly the purpose of her amendments is to make sure that an authorisation cannot be renewed if it wholly or in part ceases to have effect. In some cases, an authorisation will not be renewed if in part it is no longer valid, but there might be other cases where minor changes to the restrictions are needed and that should not prevent an authorisation being renewed. We want to provide further detail in the code of practice and I would appreciate the opportunity to work on that with her.
The noble Baroness has also tabled amendments outlining that authorisation records should detail when arrangements are not authorised or if they are authorised with conditions, and that in care home cases responsible bodies should consider other relevant information, as well as information provided by the care home manager. I can tell her that in some cases if arrangements are not authorised, it might be useful to include them in the authorisation record. However, given the debate that we had on the previous grouping about the general trend towards the inclusion of data or information within records that are then made available to patients, their families and so on, I want to reflect on whether they should always be included and I will come back to that on Report.
The Bill allows the responsible bodies to consider information other than that provided by the care home manager, and further detail on the circumstances and kinds of information will be provided in the code of practice. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured and will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am most grateful to the Minister for that clarification. I agree that some parts of this would be better in the code of practice than in the Bill, particularly because they might need modification as experience develops. If they are in primary legislation, we are effectively stuck with them for a time, whereas otherwise they can be altered. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Monday 22nd October 2018
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-III(a) Amendments for Committee, supplementary to the third marshalled list (PDF) - (19 Oct 2018)
Baroness Barker
“23(1) An authorisation ceases to have effect—(a) at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day it first had effect,(b) at the end of such shorter period determined by the responsible body at the time it determines that the conditions for authorisation are met,(c) on such earlier date than the date given by paragraph (a) as the responsible body may from time to time determine,(d) if the authorisation is renewed in accordance with paragraph 37, at the end of the renewal period, or(e) when a suspension comes to an end as described in paragraph 41(2)(b).(2) An authorisation also ceases to have effect if, at any time, the responsible body believes or ought reasonably to suspect— (a) that the cared-for person has, or has regained, capacity to consent to the arrangements which are authorised,(b) that the cared-for person is no longer of unsound mind, or(c) that the arrangements are no longer necessary and proportionate.(3) But an authorisation does not cease to have effect for the reason described in sub-paragraph (2)(a) if—(a) the capacity assessment which was relied on in determining that the condition in paragraph 14(a) is met states—(i) that the cared-for person’s capacity to consent to arrangements is likely to fluctuate, and(ii) that any periods during which the person is likely to have capacity to consent is likely to last only for a short period of time, and(b) the responsible body reasonably believes that the gaining or regaining of capacity will last only for a short period of time.(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations prescribe a definition of “fluctuate” and “short” for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a)(i), (ii), and (b) above.(5) In a case where—(a) an authorisation relates to arrangements which provide for the cared-for person to reside in, or to receive care or treatment at, a specified place, and(b) at any time, the responsible body believes or ought reasonably to suspect that there is a conflicting decision about the cared-for person residing in, or receiving care or treatment at, that place,the authorisation ceases to have effect in so far as it relates to those arrangements.(6) There is a conflicting decision for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(b) if there is a valid decision of—(a) a donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the cared-for person, or(b) a deputy appointed for the cared-for person by the court,that the cared-for person should not reside in, or (as the case may be) receive care or treatment at, the specified place.(7) If at any time an authorisation relates to arrangements which conflict with requirements arising under legislation relating to mental health, the authorisation ceases to have effect in so far as it relates to those arrangements.”
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I am glad to be the first speaker on our third day in Committee. We are under some time pressure this evening because of earlier business. But, having spent yet another weekend going through the Bill, trying to understand its full intent, I have to say that it really is a shockingly bad Bill. Therefore, whatever pressure may be brought to bear, we should spend adequate time going through all the amendments before us. I will not speak at great length and I know that other noble Lords will be very disciplined, but there are some very serious issues and the potential for harming some of the most vulnerable people in our society if we get this wrong is great. Therefore, I make no apology for initiating what I hope will be a series of quite searching debates.
Amendments 55, 56 and 58 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Tyler. They deal with one of the most serious issues at the heart of this legislation—although you would not really know that just from reading it—which is the interaction with the Mental Health Act. I do not need to repeat what was said at earlier stages about the interaction of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act because there are many people here who understand that and have discussed it as many times as I have. But I will say one thing as a result of contributions made by some noble Lords last week about Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act. People reading the Hansard of our debate last week might well have come away with the understanding that, if a person has mental health issues, they are dealt with by the Mental Health Act, and if a person lacks capacity, they are automatically dealt with by the Mental Capacity Act. But that is not true, in two particular ways.
One is that a person may have a mental health condition but may also have a physical condition, and the question is: what happens about their capacity to make that decision? It is not a decision covered by the Mental Health Act, even though they may be residing in a secure unit. Secondly, there are some people who are wrongly detained under the Mental Health Act: increasing numbers of older people with Alzheimer’s are wrongly diagnosed and detained. Therefore, as was recognised when the mental capacity legislation was initially developed, it is very important that we get these two pieces of legislation and their interaction right. That will explain to the Minister why, when we had the initial briefing on this from civil servants, some of us were rather astonished that there was no mention of the Mental Health Act at all until we brought it up.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
I must advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 56 for reasons of pre-emption.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lady Barker said about this important set of amendments. Briefly, they look at the interaction between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, which has not been properly thought through at all in how the Bill has been brought forward. The amendments focus in particular on people with fluctuating conditions. We have had a bit of discussion about such people but not nearly enough to understand what the real implications will be for people who may have a severe mental illness that fluctuates. They may have a range of other physical conditions requiring treatment and care. There may be times when they are in a position to give consent to treatment and times when they are not. We really need to think much more about how that is to be dealt with in the new system.
My concern, if I may summarise it, is that this complex interaction between the two Acts will result in a two-tier system, with a considerable imbalance in rights and safeguards between the regimes of the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act. To pick out one example, I understand that under the Mental Capacity Act everyone is entitled to make a legally binding advance decision to refuse various future medical treatments, but that decision can be overridden under the Mental Health Act in most circumstances. It is complicated. There are people covered by both Acts; it is not a question of having the Mental Health Act and people covered by it over here and having the Mental Capacity Act and people covered by that there.
We really need to think this through and satisfy ourselves that any new system deals with that and, frankly, makes the most of the opportunity to streamline these regimes, in particular to take account of people who are covered by both. I would be particularly pleased if the Minister, in responding, would say something about the needs of people who are severely affected by mental health issues and whose capacity may fluctuate, and about how that has been taken into account in the drafting of the Bill.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I feel that I should contribute to this debate although I have no speech prepared because, in the discussion with Sir Simon Wessely that I referred to last week, I challenged him about this issue. I asked what we were doing by debating this Bill before his review came out. He was clear and while I cannot say what he is proposing, maybe I can indicate the sort of areas he is looking at. These may help to illuminate the clear differences in certain ways between the two sets of debates and legislation.
For example, he is looking at the role of the Ministry of Justice in relation to people under restriction orders. There are specific mental illness issues in that area. He is looking at how community treatment orders operate—there might be less use of such orders—and how detentions in hospital for people with psychotic illnesses operate, and so on. Those areas are, in general, probably quite distinctive to the Mental Health Act. The bit where I feel there really is a potential overlap is in the area of mental health tribunals, which I will raise when we come on to deprivation of liberty concerns in the context of specific domestic situations. I will have a proposal to make then. I will not go into it here, as it would not be appropriate.
Sir Simon Wessely’s position is clear: he feels that the Mental Health Act needs reform and I think he will have very interesting proposals to make about that. We also all agree that the DoLS system needs reform and we are discussing how that should be done. What he is doing and what noble Lords are trying to do here are both quite complex sets of reforms. Sir Simon Wessely’s view—I hope that he would agree with me—is that these two sets of reforms need to be in place for quite a period. He talked about a decade, actually. There is also the Northern Ireland situation; there are proposals for some bringing together of these things there. There is of course no Government in Northern Ireland but Sir Simon Wessely wants that Northern Ireland Government to be formed and for them to be the pilot of all this and see how that works over a period of years. We would then come forward with some proposals, as and if appropriate, for bringing these two pieces of legislation together.
I hope that I have represented Sir Simon Wessely properly. It is important for us all to be aware that we do not have the support of the person in charge of the review of the Mental Health Act when we say, “Come on, what are we doing by having this first? Surely it should all be done at once”.
Baroness Barker
I want to make it clear to the noble Baroness that I am not talking about bringing these two pieces of legislation together. I know some people have suggested that that should be done, but I am not asking for that. I am simply suggesting that this legislation, which makes a substantial change to what has been the basis of decision-making about best interests on the basis of harm to self, is now going to include harm to others. We were told back in the summer, when the Minister sent us a letter, that the Government were waiting for the outcome of the Mental Health Act review to see what the impact would be. We are now being told, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, confirmed, that that basis of decision-making is changed by this legislation. It is linked to the necessary and proportionate assessment that people will have to make. I think that is a major change that will perhaps result in the detention of quite a number of people. I do not think it is unreasonable for the Government to wait until Sir Simon Wessely has published his report to ensure that the two pieces of legislation are not drifting further apart.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I am the world’s greatest pragmatist in this matter. I am very sympathetic to what the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, are saying. This Bill is by no means perfect. It has huge gaps and we would not have started from here, but the reality is that this Bill will be with us for the rest of the autumn and I believe that Sir Simon Wessely’s report will be submitted to the Government around 12 December, so it is likely to come before Third Reading and before we finish the Bill. We will be able to see if there are great big gaps. I do not think the two things will overlap very much. We might be helped out, particularly on amendments on advanced directives, and in that context we can perhaps make ourselves closer to what Sir Simon Wessely recommends, but I do not think there is anything to address, except that the current Bill is not working. We have all those people waiting for an assessment who will never be assessed. We need some legislation in place. There is some urgency. I know we would like a perfect Bill, but we are not going to get one. What we need is an implementable Bill which makes assessments doable for people who need them and so that we can get some process in place. The Bill is not perfect. We would not start from here, but we have this Bill and we should continue with it.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
I shall continue on the theme that my noble friend Lady Murphy has set out. Last week, I chaired the National Mental Capacity Forum leadership group. One of the people there said that:
“While there was an initial knee-jerk reaction amongst care providers and the local council, if you consider the”.
liberty protection safeguards,
“in more detail you quickly come to understand that it is actually quite an innovative solution”,
because there is such a backlog and so much difficulty in trying to get anything in place.
I am concerned that we are trying to draw clear lines between different types of illnesses and conditions when it is pretty impossible to do so. There are mental health conditions that impair your capacity, even though you may be compliant with treatment, there are physical illnesses that result in impaired capacity, and there are illnesses—Lewy body dementia is one of them—where part of the illness means that you may be a risk to other people. Huntington’s disease is similar and a horrible disease to have. Trying to draw clear lines between those different groups is difficult.
I looked at the amendment and for a definition of “fluctuate” and “short”. I tried to think how I would define “fluctuate” or “short” in a clinical context, and I could not because “short” might be short to some people and long to others and fluctuation can be all kinds of directions and with different degrees of severity. The difficulty we are grappling with here is that we are trying to write something in legislation that will be literally black and white: black words on a white page. The people we are dealing with are incredibly individual and have very different needs. That is why, returning to our previous debate, the stress on wishes and feelings and on consulting people who know the person becomes incredibly important. We will go on to talk about ways that people can call for external scrutiny because, if they care about the person, they need to be able to do that.
Baroness Barker
I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Mark Neary had to resort to the law, not to a code of practice, to get his son out of a place where he should never have been detained. We need to have further discussions about what needs to be in the Bill and the role of regulation and the code of practice. I think she has a fundamentally wrong take on this. This is about legal protection for very vulnerable people. That sometimes has to be in a brief outline in law. It has to be stated in the Bill that a person has to be spoken to face to face. We can then go on to put a load of stuff in the code of practice about how we do that.
To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I think this is a terrible Bill containing huge holes and some real problems. If the Government take the tack they took last time, we may be able to improve it substantially, but we are in danger of putting one bureaucracy in place of another bureaucracy, and the only difference between the two is that there are far fewer protections for the most vulnerable people. We would be somewhat negligent to go ahead on that basis. I cannot approach the Bill in that way.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, for tabling this amendment. I agree with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the state of the Bill. I am rather—“disappointed” may not be quite the right word—surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who has brought discipline to the House to focus on good legislation and how it should work, is suggesting that we have to have something, so this is it. I really hope that that is not the case and that this Committee will have revealed to the Minister, and particularly to the Bill team, that many elements in the Bill need clarification, need to be changed and can be improved. That is our job, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is highlighting but one of those elements. In fact, the amendment that I am due to talk about next refers to the difficulties that the Bill has brought and the differences between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.
The last month or so has been very revealing. The Bill was sold to us as something really quite simple that was going to streamline things, get rid of the backlog, save some money and so on, and it really needed only one day in Committee. That is certainly how it was sold to me on these Benches and, I am sure, to other people in the House. In fact, what has happened over the last couple of months is that all the stakeholders and people who are writing to us are saying, “No, this will not do. This Bill does not work. It is dangerous and difficult”. It needs clarification, and these amendments highlight the areas that need it. We are going to move on to other areas that need clarification and which will certainly need amendment. This is an important and legitimate question to ask about the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords—I keep saying “noble Lords” but it has really been noble Baronesses, so I will switch my language—who have both tabled amendments in this group and spoken to them.
Before I come to the substance of the amendments, I shall say two things. First, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that there is an urgency. To use the words of the Local Government Association, “the current system is unable to ensure there is adequate protection for human rights”. That is the reality of the situation that we find ourselves in at the moment.
Secondly, views about the perfection or otherwise of the Bill will vary across the House, but I hope that in the two days of Committee prior to this one I was able to demonstrate that the department and Ministers are absolutely committed to improving the Bill in any way that we can during its passage through Parliament, especially in this House where there are so many experts. I really think we have made some progress. I realise that that will not be enough to satisfy everyone and there is clearly much more to come—care home managers are clearly a big area of work that we need to focus on—but we have made some progress. I encourage noble Lords to continue in that mindset because I think we can reach a good outcome that deals with the fact that, as Age UK says, the system leaves,
“many highly vulnerable older people languishing without any legal protection at all”,
something none of us can accept. We stand ready to undertake that work, as noble Lords know, and I know they do so too.
I turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 55, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, outlines the circumstances in which an authorisation ceases to have effect, particularly noting that authorisations should end if they conflict with a valid decision of a court-appointed deputy or a donee of a lasting power of attorney. The amendment also states that an authorisation would not cease to have an effect if a person’s capacity fluctuated, and would create regulation-making powers to define what constitutes fluctuating capacity.
Section 6(6) of the Mental Capacity Act already provides that action cannot be taken that conflicts with a lasting power of attorney or a deputy’s valid decision, and I can confirm that the Bill does not change that. This means that an authorisation can only be given if it is in accordance with a valid decision, so I hope I have provided reassurance on that front.
I can also confirm that if it emerges that an authorisation conflicts with a decision of a donee of a lasting power of attorney or by a court-appointed deputy, a review should be arranged under paragraph 31 of the Schedule. In particular, it will need to be considered if the attorney or deputy has valid and applicable powers to make this decision, and if the deprivation of liberty authorisation continues to be necessary. That means that in the event of such a conflict, the authorisation ceases to have effect. I hope that provides reassurance to the noble Baronesses on that point.
The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, focused particularly on fluctuating capacity. I agree that an authorisation should not necessarily cease to have effect if a person’s capacity fluctuates and there are short periods of lucidity. That is currently the case under the DoLS system and I can confirm that it will continue under the liberty protections safeguards. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, brought to life, it is very difficult to define either “fluctuating” or “short”, particularly in legislation. For that reason, we do not think regulation-making powers are appropriate; we believe this would be better dealt with through a code of practice, which would allow for more detail and more regular updating but would also allow the use of case studies to bring examples to life. We plan to give much more detailed guidance in the new code of practice, and I reassure noble Lords that we will be working with the sector in order to produce it.
Amendments 56 and 58 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, relate to the thorny issue of the interaction between mental health and mental capacity legislation. They would mean that an authorisation had effect in relation to arrangements that were not in accordance with mental health requirements. As noble Lords know, mental health requirements are conditions placed on Mental Health Act patients living in the community. Currently, DoLS authorisations no longer have effect if a person is subject to arrangements or conditions under the Mental Health Act and that authorisation would be in conflict. This means that the terms of a DoLS authorisation cannot conflict with those of, for example, Section 17 leave of absences. The Bill has been drafted to reflect the interaction that currently exists between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.
The review of the Mental Health Act has been mentioned in this debate. The review, chaired by Sir Simon Wessely, has been considering, among other things, the interaction between these two pieces of legislation. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has sincere concerns about the nature of that interaction and about why we are bringing forward this legislation now. My short answer is that urgent reform is needed for the reasons that we have set out, including the quotes that I have given. The contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, was helpful, and I have put in my notes that I need to speak to Sir Simon Wessely myself to understand his perspective. However, if I have understood correctly, regardless of the timing of his report, the process of implementing his proposals will take some time to do properly. In our view, it is not right to wait until that has been perfected before we try to deal with many of the issues under consideration in the Bill in the light of the current inefficiencies of the DoLS system. It is for that reason that we want to push ahead. As I have said, I will take it upon myself to speak to Sir Simon Wessely and get a real understanding of his expectations on timing, and to try to understand from his point of view the scale of the interaction between these two pieces of legislation so that we really know what is at stake.
I think the noble Baroness herself said that the amendments are essentially probing. She will know that the effect of them would be that two authorisations could be live at the same time. I am confident that that is not what she is proposing, not least because it would have the perverse effect of requiring people to be in two places at once, so I know she was using this as an opportunity to discuss this question. As I said, it is important that we move ahead for the reasons that we have discussed, notwithstanding that the Government will of course consider incredibly carefully the findings in Sir Simon Wessely’s report and what action is required to implement his recommendations.
On a couple of occasions the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, referred to the consideration of harm to others. I am told that harm to others can be considered under the current DoLS system, so what is proposed is not a change from the current system. However, I will pick that point up with her offline so that we can really get to the bottom of it and ensure complete clarity to a degree that satisfies her. I hope that on that basis, the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw the amendment, and I look forward to discussing more of these issues throughout the evening.
Baroness Barker
I thank all noble Lords for taking part in that debate, which was a useful exchange of views and information. The Minister is in some difficulty, because the two organisations that he cited are on record as saying that they do not support the Bill in its current form. I remain of the view that we run the risk of attempting to deal with an underfunded, under-resourced system by putting in place another underfunded, under-resourced system which dilutes the protection of vulnerable people.
Ahead of debates on other groupings, I simply ask how many times the Mental Capacity Act and DoLS codes of practice were changed. How many times were they amended? I do not disagree that a code of practice is a good place in which to put examples; I do not think it is a substitute for having well-drafted legislation and regulations—regulations can often be changed.
I will read Hansard with great care, but I reserve the right and hope, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who is not in her place but is equally concerned about these matters, to return to the matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Thornton
Baroness Thornton
The amendment would reduce the maximum time for which an individual can be held in detention without renewal from three years back to 12 months. The Bill would allow responsible bodies to renew an authorisation of deprivation of liberty in some cases for up to three years, while simultaneously reducing the safeguards that a renewal process would require. The amendment would shorten that three-year period to a maximum of 12 months.
Why is that important? Tripling the potential length of an authorisation period to three years creates a stark difference between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, apart from anything else, and moves away from best practice in other countries. Paired with the new LPS renewal process, which weakens safeguards designed to prevent lengthy detentions, a three-year authorisation will be likely to face legal challenge.
At its core, the new LPS system is intended to safeguard vulnerable people who have been deprived of their liberty on mental capacity grounds. The possibility of a three-year period of detention with limited safeguards gets the balance wrong between safeguarding vulnerable individuals and the desire to reduce the bureaucracy of the system.
Strasbourg case law confirms that a lawful deprivation of liberty for the purposes of Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR must include both “limits in terms of time” and “continuing clinical assessment of the persistence of a disorder warranting detention”. Therefore, in order to comply with Article 5, any system must contain, first, a provision for the termination of the authorisation after the maximum time has expired and, secondly, an ability to terminate an authorisation before the time limit has expired if the deprivation of liberty is no longer necessary.
A three-year renewal limit is likely to pose problems for responsible bodies, especially in cases concerning conditions such as learning disabilities, acquired brain injuries and other non-degenerative mental impairments. The courts are likely to intervene to interpret those paragraphs concerning renewals—paragraphs 27(a)(ii), 28(b)(ii) and 29(1)(b)—as narrowly as possible. Capacity assessments are time specific, and a three year-old capacity assessment cannot be relied on as accurate evidence for detention. Therefore, we propose to reduce the three years to 12 months.
It is notable that a 2017 paper comparing mental health legislation in five different jurisdictions—Canada, Australia, Scotland, the Republic of Ireland and England and Wales—states that renewal orders vary in different jurisdictions,
“with the time periods for subsequent orders being longer in duration up to a maximum of 12 months, except in Ontario (3 months) and Victoria (6 months)”.
The Law Commission states that a three-year period should be considered only in the context of robust safeguards and constant review. Given the weakening of the safeguards throughout the rest of the Bill, it would be inappropriate to triple the length of time for which an authorisation can last.
In his opening remarks on the Bill, the Minister stated:
“It is essential that the system afford the necessary protections for the most vulnerable people”.—[Official Report, 16/7/18; col. 1061.]
The Bill as currently drafted would in this respect not deliver that protection. I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I have three amendments in the group designed to remove any ambiguity about authorisations, in that an authorisation would fall if it partly fell—in other words, if the person’s condition had either improved or changed to such an extent that the plan in place was no longer applicable, even in part, that would warrant a complete review. I accept that it would have to be a light-touch revision, because some things might not have changed, but I am not comfortable with simply allowing it to be reviewed and people to say that these parts of the condition no longer apply.
Amendment 58C is to stress the need for evidence to be supplied to support statements. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide me with some assurance. That evidence might come from photographs, video recordings of behaviour or whatever. That may be quite different to the written word. I worry that one person’s observed written word may not adequately portray a picture, particularly where the cared-for person has become withdrawn. Someone might interpret that as their being compliant, when actually they may be deeply unhappy. A broader direct recording of the person could be helpful.
I tabled Amendment 62A because I was concerned that the care home manager might be in the process of arranging for adaptations to be made to meet the cared-for person’s needs in line with that person’s wishes and feelings, and that the Bill’s wording does not provide enough flexibility to consider the arrangements to meet the individual’s needs.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Baronesses for tabling their amendments about renewals. I deal first with Amendment 58A, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which, as she said, would have the effect of meaning that authorisations cannot be renewed for longer than 12 months. As she pointed out, this would go against the Law Commission’s recommendation, which was that there could be circumstances under which renewals took place for up to three years, particularly following an initial review after up to 12 months and if it was unlikely that there would be a change in the person’s condition.
These three-year renewals are in place so that those who are in a stable condition and unlikely to recover are not subjected to annual assessments. The Bill does provide the safeguard—referred to by the noble Baroness—which ensures that an authorisation would need to be reviewed if there is a change. We would also want to make sure that there are appropriate reviews of arrangements when annual reviews under the Care Act take place. It would be up to the responsible body to set review periods. In care home settings, the care home manager must report to the responsible body on any reviews that have been carried out. As the Bill stands, there are significant safeguards to prevent abuse or lack of care of the vulnerable person.
All that being said, I know how strongly noble Lords and stakeholders feel about this issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, made a valid point about aligning the review process with the terms set out under the Care Act. I would like to give further thought to this, particularly in the context of the discussions which will be taking place about the proper role of the care home manager. There is clear concern about a proper system of oversight and regular review where responsibility has been devolved to the care home manager. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will follow that up after this debate.
Amendment 58B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, considers an authorisation ceasing to be renewed if it has lapsed wholly or in part. We will want to give further consideration to that. As discussed earlier in Committee, there are circumstances under which one might be happy for an authorisation to continue after a very minor change. That might be the proper process to align this to, and I want to give further thought to this.
Amendment 58C asks that, when deciding whether to renew authorisations in care home cases, responsible bodies should consider other relevant information, as well as that provided by the care home manager. I can confirm that the Bill does allow responsible bodies to consider information other than that provided by the care home manager. That would, inevitably, be in other formats too. We will set out more detail on that in the code of practice.
Amendment 62A would add the word “arranging” to the scenarios in which the care home manager was required to notify the responsible body that an IMCA should be appointed. The amendment intends to make sure that that happens at the earliest stage, including when the assessments are being arranged. That is what the word “proposing” in the Bill achieves. We are satisfied that the language currently in the Bill means that care home managers would be looking at this issue when they are beginning to propose an authorisation, which is the earliest point at which planning for, arranging or bringing together the assessments would take place. I would be happy to demonstrate what underpins our belief that this is the case. I do understand what the noble Baroness is driving at; it is something which we are trying to achieve.
On that basis, I hope that the noble Baronesses are willing to withdraw or not move their amendments.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for his answer. I am encouraged that we are going to continue the discussion on this issue. Apart from anything else, I will need quite a lot of convincing that the Bill provides the right kind of protections to allow a period of three years, as currently stated.
On the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I was reminded when reading the letters the Minister has written to noble Lords, and the record of the previous two days in Committee, that we need to clarify the meaning of “care home manager”. Or is it “care manager”, an expression which he has also used? I do not want an answer to that now, but I put it on the table as one issue which we need to clarify in our discussions and in the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(c) for a named person to be in charge of training and revalidation of Approved Mental Capacity Professionals,(d) for honorary contracts with neighbouring local authorities and health bodies as required.”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I do not want to detain the Committee by revisiting too much of our debate on day 2, when the Minister stated that the local authority would decide for itself how to organise and manage how AMCPs will operate. My concern is that they must be trained to a uniformly high standard. Such training should include assessment in all the key domains of responsibility. They should be registered as an AMCP and subject to revalidation over time. These people will, potentially, hold an enormous amount of power over somebody who is vulnerable.
I am also concerned that, unless those professional standards are in place, we will have a problem with quality control. In the event of a concern being raised about an AMCP, it is important that they are formally registered with the local authority. I also raise the question of how they will be indemnified and who will be responsible for their appraisal and supervision. They must have honorary contracts with adjacent local authorities to enable them to act, because some local authorities have relatively confined geographical areas. Given that these should be professionals, they should be listed with their professional body as having specialised training and skills. Another reason for this is my worry that, if they are going to function in hospitals, and unless they have a formal honorary contract from the local authority and are registered, we may end up with a two-tier system between local authorities and hospitals. I am not sure how that is going to work.
Amendment 61A seeks to expand the range of people who can train to become an AMCP. I declare an interest as president of the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy; I was at its annual conference at the weekend. I did not add physiotherapists to the list when I wrote the amendment, because I had not had a chance to consult them. However, it was evident, from many inspirational presentations, that physiotherapists working in head injury, acute trauma and stroke units, and in mental health services, can often be key to rehabilitation and restore people dramatically to a degree of independence that others had not envisaged. They felt very strongly that they did not want to be excluded; they have a lot to offer and are keen to train up, which seems very sensible.
I have also come across a few—not many—doctors who have retired from their main clinical practice but remain on the medical register, still work in some capacity or another, and, in later life, have developed an interest in people with impaired capacity. They have years of experience behind them, particularly in old-age psychiatry and so on, and would like to train as an AMCP. The criteria on which to select people should be their motivation, personal skills and background experience. We should not judge them by their original clinical degree qualification, because that is arbitrary. It does not mean that just because you are a nurse, a clinical psychologist or a social worker you would be perfectly fitted to this role; nor does it follow that because you are a speech and language therapist or a physiotherapist or whatever, you would not be suitable to take on this role and these responsibilities.
I therefore hope that the Minister might be able to expand a little, or perhaps not even discuss it here but think again, on how we will ensure that the people who carry this responsibility are trained to a uniformly high standard, are properly indemnified, can be identified, are able to function properly and can be held to account for the way in which they take decisions and advise. I beg to move.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
I would like to add a few more points on training. An awful lot of people in an awful lot of new roles will require training to get whatever system that we are going to end up with up and running at pace. Which organisation will be responsible for setting up the programmes for ensuring the delivery of good-quality training? Who has the responsibility to ensure that nothing is implemented until all the appropriate professionals have received their training? There is nothing worse than determining a date to fire the gun if you discover that all the people who are going to run the system are not yet trained. Can the Minister confirm that all this will start with plenty of time before the rollout of this new system? We expect that training should be effective and ongoing. Who will assess the trainers? What is the process for ensuring quality and a national standard? We may well be able to twist something that currently exists and make it work, but I do not have that knowledge. Can he also confirm that, as part of this training, the rights of the individual will be reinforced? Will the training clarify the role that each of these professionals within this new system is going to have in ensuring that an individual’s rights are observed and respected?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I want to follow up the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, by referring to the recent CQC annual report, which had a section on the implementation and practice in relation to DoLS. The report laid out a number of key concerns about care home and hospital providers that are actually using DoLS at the moment in relation to the Act itself. There is a huge variation in practice and this variation is commonly linked with a basic lack of understanding of the law, which is complex and difficult to understand. The report says that the result is that there are unnecessarily restrictive practices that can result in the loss of freedom and, in some cases, the loss of people’s human rights. The problems are reinforced by limited staffing levels, a lack of time to complete applications and inadequate staff training.
I am aware, of course, that the intention of this Bill is to streamline some of those procedures, although I think that, because the safeguards have been drastically reduced, we might be landing ourselves in future problems once the courts begin to hear some of the cases that will arise. The point is that it is quite clear that, at the moment, effective training is not taking place among many of the organisations involved in the operation of DoLS. The risk is that the same will happen in relation to the new legislation. We need some guarantees that there are going to be resources and a concerted training programme to ensure that we mitigate that impact.
Baroness Thornton
I will add to the questions that have already been asked of the Minister: who is going to pay for this? Training is very expensive and I was waiting for the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, to ask that question but she did not, so I am asking it. As I recall from the impact assessment, I am not sure that there is a large sum of money in there for the amount of training that might be necessary to ensure that this Bill is properly enacted.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling these amendments and precipitating this discussion. I will move straight on to the substance of the amendments. Amendment 61 provides that local authorities must make arrangements for a named person to be in charge of training and revalidation of approved mental capacity professionals and that local authorities must make arrangements for contracts with neighbouring local authorities and health bodies as required.
On the issue of approvals and training, the Bill is clear that local authorities must approve individuals to become AMCPs, and regulations under paragraph 33 will make provision around training, qualifications and other eligibility criteria. The question of what kind of training there should be and who pays is something that we discussed at some length on the last Committee day. That was more in relation to care home managers, which was primarily the focus of the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The same read-across applies to AMCPs as well. On that occasion, I committed to bringing forward more details of what the training would look like. I also confirmed that, in England, Health Education England and ADASS would be responsible for working with Skills for Care, and Social Work England. Those are the bodies that would be responsible for overseeing and designing the training. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked about the rights of individuals. Of course, that would be the centrepiece of any training programme to make sure that those rights are properly respected.
On the specific question about local authorities naming an individual, I say that the Bill does not prevent them doing so. It is something that they are able to do and, in our view, it does not need to be set out in primary legislation. There is no such requirement for best-interests assessors or approved mental health professionals, I understand, and that has not caused any difficulties in practice. To that extent, we can mimic the arrangements in place there.
Making arrangements with other local authorities is again not precluded by the Bill. Clearly, that is something that local authorities will want to do, depending on the arrangements they have commissioned in care across different authorities. I can confirm that we will provide guidance on this in the code of practice.
Amendment 61A adds to the criteria that must be met for a person to become an AMCP. They must be,
“a registered professional, with a minimum of three years clinical experience”.
A list sets out whom that could include; that list has been added to by one tonight, which in some senses exemplifies the nature of the problem. I completely agree with the noble Baroness: we need to set out not only the kind of professionals but the kind of qualifications and experience. There has to be a balance and a mix between all of those. That will be set out in regulations. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked about the proper place to set out the rigidity or robustness, and we believe that the appropriate place would be in regulations, which provide a degree of flexibility that would not apply if we enshrined this in primary legislation. That is why we are proposing the approach of defining the groups that should be acting as AMCPs.
Baroness Barker
How many cases have been taken to the Court of Appeal on the basis of regulations not being observed, as opposed to something in an Act? I do not expect an answer now, but I would like to know.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am afraid that I do not know, but I will write to the noble Baroness and circulate the letter to all noble Lords.
To conclude, I hope that I have provided the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, with the reassurances that she was looking for and that she will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I learned some years ago not to have lists in the Bill, and I have fallen over my own list on this amendment. I am most grateful to the Minister for the reassurances that he has given. A lot of work will need to be done so that we make sure that training is there for the right people at the right time, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, in this group of amendments we begin to get into the issue of IMCAs and how that whole system will operate. In Amendment 63 I use the words,
“there is reason to believe”,
because I feel strongly that anyone who is concerned about the cared-for person—whether they are family, a friend who knows them well, a care assistant in the care home, if they are in a care home, or somebody who is coming into wherever they are being cared for, such as supported living—must be able to raise them independently, if necessary anonymously, and to request that an IMCA is appointed to go and see what is happening.
In Amendment 64 I removed the word “only” because I was attempting to remove the veto from a care home manager. The potential veto of a care home manager has caused so much concern in debate, and a great deal of anxiety in the briefings that have come through to us. I stress that advocacy—we will come on to that overall—needs careful monitoring, too, and people who act as advocates need support and supervision. Not just anybody can be an advocate, and we have to be careful that we do not exclude family and those who know a person well by having an advocate come in when in fact a family member who has known them for years may be in a much better position.
Also, we have to have a way of screening out advocates who, for whatever reason, may not be the right people to do this at the time. Unfortunately, it is inevitable and part of human nature that people will want to work in a field if they have had some experience of being on the receiving end. But certainly, when you look at bereavement counsellors and so on, they need to have a clear period before they are selected, and they need to be carefully selected and screened, and supervised. We are talking about extremely vulnerable people here, and the last thing we want to do is somehow to open the door to them being vulnerable at somebody else’s hands through our best intentions. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, this is again a rather fundamental indicator of some of the things that are badly wrong with the Bill. The words “best interests” appear in it three times, and twice they are used in relation to a care home manager being able to restrict access to advocacy. As the Bill stands, referral to advocacy is controlled by a relevant person, either the responsible body or the care home manager, and an advocate must be appointed if a person has capacity and requests an advocate—that is quite rare, and I have to say that under the Bill it would be something of a miracle, because they do not have the right to information about not only their current circumstances but about other less restrictive options. The Minister’s statements on information last week, when he referred to GDPR, were so strange that it has taken me a considerable time to work out that he had completely misunderstood that under the current system people have a right to information. They have the right not to request information but to be provided with information, which this amending Bill severely restricts.
However, the second condition is by far the most worrying. Somebody can request an advocate if the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is,
“satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the … person’s best interests”.
I invite noble Lords to think what would have happened if those words had been in law during Winterbourne View. That is why I am quite happy to use the word “shocking” about the Bill, as this is unacceptable. My amendments would try to get rid of the abuse of the term “best interests” to limit vulnerable people’s access to support. The Minister knows that under the DoLS system, by and large, if somebody requests an advocate, it is up to the relevant body to try to do their best to find one, or that they find an appropriate person. I refer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that under case law at the moment, local authorities have the right to override if an appropriate person is not doing their job properly on behalf of the person. That too will be undermined by the Bill.
The Minister will also know that if somebody has no relatives and nobody else in the world—they are “undefended”, to use that rather archaic but useful and clear term—they have an automatic right to advocacy. I know that much will be made of advocacy being expensive, advocates being a resource that is not readily available, and that people who do not need advocacy will be unnecessarily interviewed. I am quite happy to talk at length to the Government about ways in which advocates or advocacy resources could be better used and better targeted—but absolutely not by drawing it like this, putting this sort of hurdle not even in a code of practice but in a Bill.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, we on these Benches very much agree with the purport of these amendments, which again bring to light some of the ambiguities in the Bill and some of the rights that are not properly respected by it. Over the next period the Minister will not only need to give us a theoretical answer but have to answer things such as the question about Winterbourne View, and look at the hard examples of real experience which some of us have been receiving in our postbags over the last month. We will need to return to this over the next few weeks, and possibly even at the next stage.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to all the noble Baronesses for their amendments and for speaking in the debate on this group. Let me begin with a statement of principle. I accept the challenge from the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that we need to move from principles to practicalities, or in our case to the appropriate legislation. There is genuinely no attempt in the Bill to restrict people’s access to independent advocacy. As has been clearly voiced, not only in this Chamber but elsewhere, there is a concern that that will be the effect of what is proposed, and that is something that we need to deal with. But let me say at the beginning that that is not the intention. It must be the case that anybody who needs support to navigate these difficult and complex situations must be able to find the right support for them. I will explain why the Bill is as it is in a moment, but let me at least give that statement of principle at the beginning.
I will deal now with the specific amendments in this group. Amendments 63 and 64 aim to ensure that the Bill is robust on the appointment of the IMCA. I completely agree that it is vital that the care home manager notifies the responsible body that an IMCA should be appointed. That is required by the Bill. However, I know that there is great concern about the impartiality of this person and a requirement for strengthening in this regard. It is also our position that a responsible body will be able to appoint an IMCA if there is a request by, for example, a family member or the person themselves, or if there is a disagreement with the notification given by a care home manager. I am considering how we can make the Bill clearer in that regard. As we home in on the issue of the incentives for the care home manager to follow best practice, as we would want, I am aware that we need to do more work on this to get it right.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, that is a very helpful comment but will the Minister pick up the point that part of the problem is that the care manager is not only the co-ordinator but often the gatekeeper to the protections that noble Lords wish to see included? Take, for instance, the definition of “relevant person”. It seems to me, looking at this afresh, that far too much authority is being given to the care home manager in relation not just to co-ordination but to the protections.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Lord for that intervention. The debate we had last week was very much around the proper role for the care “home” manager—I take on board the rejoinder from the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, about the specificity of terms. I do not want to rehash that debate, save to say that the care home manager model is the right one going forward, while recognising, as I did last week—here I agree with the noble Lord’s point—that there are a lot of concerns about conflicts of interest, training, the degree of responsibility and other things.
In this case, we are talking about notification of the appointment of an IMCA, where there is real concern that there is an element of marking your own homework. That is not what we are trying to achieve: we are trying to achieve the consideration of deprivation of liberty at the earliest possible point in care planning by somebody who is responsible for organising—although in lots of cases not personally delivering—that care. We are trying to deliver a more proportionate system than the one that we know is currently failing. As I committed to in last week’s Committee debate, I want to get that right. If we cannot get it right, the risk is that we end up replicating the system that we have now, which would be in nobody’s interests. I hope that, by restating that, I have satisfied the noble Lord.
Amendments 68, 71 and 72 relate to the criteria for appointing IMCAs. The Bill currently states that an IMCA should be appointed if a person has capacity to consent to being represented and supported by an IMCA and makes a request to the relevant person, and there is no appropriate person available. It also states that a cared-for person should be supported by an IMCA if the person lacks capacity to consent and being represented by an IMCA is in their best interests and there is no appropriate person in place.
I recognise the concern expressed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, about the term “best interests”. Let me state again the intention that, in the vast majority of circumstances, we expect it would be in a cared-for person’s interests to receive representation and support from an IMCA or appropriate person. However, there may be a small number of circumstances where that is not the case. For example, if a person is adamant that they do not want this sort of representation, and has refused advocacy support in the past, it would not be right to impose such an advocate on them. If we remove the best interests consideration, we risk a situation where responsible bodies can override the past and present wishes of the person.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister for that explanation. Given that the Bill as drafted is essentially a “get out of jail free” card for bad care home owners, the Government must have a really good evidence base to have come forward with a proposal as sweeping as that. I wonder whether the Minister can share with us the evidence that has led to the Government putting this in the Bill. It really should be quite convincing, given that it has got to this stage. It would be helpful if he would let noble Lords see that evidence.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am happy to discuss the issue with all noble Lords, as I have said in the past. I return to where I started: the intention of this approach is to make sure that independent advocacy is not imposed on someone who genuinely does not want it. It is not to provide a “get out of jail free” card for poor care home managers. If that is a concern, I take it very seriously, but it is not the intention of the Bill. However, if it is the case, something needs to be remedied. Let me assure noble Lords that I will make best efforts to do so as we move forward from Committee.
This has been a very useful discussion. In some sense it has provided a degree of continuity from our discussion last week, while moving on to the issue of advocacy, which we will clearly explore further. I hope that, with the reassurances I have given at this stage, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, this debate has been extremely interesting and, in many ways, gets to the nub of some of our concerns. In looking at the Bill, one thing I have tried to do is to benchmark its procedures to see how they would work. I was involved in prosecuting appalling care in EMI homes. I am trying to see how we could have discovered sooner that there were problems there.
I share the concern about the care home manager having too much power. Having said that, I have found the Minister’s answers today reassuring, as they were on the second day in Committee. I suggest, however, that the number of objectors will be very few, because many of these people have such impaired capacity and are not in a position to object—it may be other people who speak up on their behalf.
Baroness Barker
I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, agrees that, when you watch well-trained advocates at work, you see that they absolutely understand if their presence is upsetting somebody. They are not routinely attempting to force themselves on to people who definitely do not need their help. The question of whether somebody wants their help or not is a more nuanced professional judgment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I agree with the noble Baroness that when they work well, they can work extremely well. As I said earlier, I would also caution against the family and other people being potentially pushed aside, and people being not adequately supervised or monitored.
We have a great deal to consider outside the Chamber tonight. I am grateful to the Minister for being in listening mode so far. This group of amendments and the next are the ones that we will need to have a big discussion about. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I feel that I should apologise for leading on this group of amendments, but it was by chance that my number came up. It was not my choice: I did not ask to lead on it.
The role of Amendment 65, which is the one that I really want to speak to, is to state clearly that we must strengthen the voice of anyone who has any concerns so that they can speak up on behalf of the cared-for person. I note that my noble friend Lady Hollins’s Amendment 66 provides powers to the voice of the responsible body and would mean that the responsible body must listen to representations. Amendment 67 strengthens the word “must”. There is a great deal in these amendments. I will not take the time of the Committee by speaking to other noble Lords’ amendments, other than to say that this group of amendments contains a great deal of rich wisdom. I beg to move.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the appointment of an advocate, or appropriate person, to support the cared-for person in exercising their rights. The appointment of an independent mental capacity advocate and the identification of an appropriate person rely on care home managers being able to arrange a capacity assessment and a best-interests decision and on them notifying the responsible body. I noted the Minister’s assurance on our last day in Committee that care home managers will not be making an assessment themselves. But how will errors be identified and what will happen if the care home manager gets it wrong? Will the Minister tell the Committee how that will be detected on the basis of a paper-based review by the local authority when the paper has been supplied by the care home manager? The responsible body should not rely simply on what the care home manager thinks.
My Amendment 66 gives the local authority discretion to appoint an appropriate person or IMCA without notification from a care home, with whom there may be a conflict of interest, if the responsible body has reason to believe that such representation and support is needed for the cared-for person. Reasons to believe might include notification by an AMCP or a third party, or local authority social services involved in care planning.
The provision of advocacy can have a transformative effect and be the first time that the cared-for person’s views, and those of their family, are forcefully represented to decision makers. A failure to listen to people or to give weight or credence to what they say lies at the heart of many of the tragedies that have shamed social care and health services over recent decades. For that reason, it is vital for people to get the support that they need to express their views and exercise their rights, either through the appointment of an appropriate individual, often a family member, or an independent mental capacity advocate.
As they stand, Clauses 36 and 37 of the Bill are confusing and poorly drafted, with inconsistencies. For example, the Bill states:
“An IMCA should be appointed if the cared-for person … has capacity to consent to being represented and supported by an IMCA, and … makes a request to the relevant person”—
but IMCAs are instructed to support and represent only people who lack capacity. My Amendments 67, 69, 70, 73, and 74 add emphasis and aim to address these inconsistences and ensure that every cared-for person has access to support from either an appropriate person or an IMCA who is both willing and able to help them understand and exercise rights of challenge.
As it is drafted, the Bill leaves open the possibility of circumstances where a person may have neither an IMCA nor an appropriate person and therefore no means of being able to exercise their rights under Article 5(4) of the European Charter of Human Rights. Rulings such as the AJ v A Local Authority judgment, in paragraph 35, stipulate:
“Article 5(4) may not be complied with where access to a court is dependent on the exercise of discretion by a third party, rather than an automatic entitlement … Where a person lacks the capacity to instruct lawyers directly, the safeguards required may include empowering or even requiring some other person to act on that person’s behalf”.
My amendments therefore remove best interests from the criteria for appointment of a representative, as this should play no role in determining whether people are able to exercise their rights of challenge. Will the Minister explain the basis on which he believes that Part 5 of the Bill as drafted is fully compliant with this ruling and with ECHR Article 5?
I am also concerned about the potential conflict of interest if those responsible for arranging and providing care, such as care home managers, also act as gatekeepers to the person’s ability to exercise their right of appeal through best-interest assessments. There should be a clear route for the cared-for person to be able to appeal and to get the support that they need to do this. We know that access to justice is already a serious problem under the current system. The appeal rate is below 1% and cases such as that of Steven Neary and others show how hard it is for families and detained people to challenge public bodies where they object to the arrangements. I understand that the Government estimate that the new arrangements will reduce the appeal rate even further to 0.5%.
My Amendments 76 and 77 recognise the considerable responsibilities being placed on an appropriate person. In some circumstances, an appropriate person such as a family member who knows the person may well be best placed to assist the cared-for person, but may need some assistance. Making sure that an IMCA is involved in these cases would enable them to fulfil this role with support.
Nothing in the Bill details the functions that the IMCA will perform. It would help the Committee if we understood why this has not been addressed. The Law Commission’s draft Bill provided powers to strengthen regulation provision—Section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act—around how an IMCA is to discharge the functions of representing or supporting, including challenging decisions and facilitating a person’s involvement in relevant decisions. The experience of DoLS over the last nine years has shown us the need for clarity on when the representative—an IMCA or lay person—can or needs to challenge the authorisation.
My Amendment 79 recognises this and reinserts regulation-making powers into the Bill, extending it in the case of an IMCA appointed under the LPS to make provision as to how that advocate is to support the cared-for person, and where relevant the appropriate person, in exercising the right both to make an application to court and to request a review. This provision is necessary to secure a person’s rights under Article 5(4).
The Bill recognises that the role that the appropriate person undertakes provides a vital safeguard for the cared-for person for the purposes of Article 5 of the ECHR, but the Bill fails to place a duty on the responsible body to keep under review whether the appropriate person is undertaking their functions. This is an important safeguard under the DoLS, where the relevant person’s representative role—essentially an identical role to the appropriate person—has a duty to maintain contact with the cared-for person. My Amendment 80 places a duty on the responsible body to keep under review whether the appropriate person is undertaking their functions and, if they can no longer fulfil them, to appoint another appropriate person or IMCA at that point.
The Minister has given reassurances, a number of times, that issues within the Bill will be addressed through the code of practice. The requirement to act needs to be in the Bill. How it is done and implemented could be set out in the code of practice. I hope that the Minister will accept that these amendments address serious and fundamental issues that need to be resolved within the Bill.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 78, but I should like to say a word in support for the amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to which I have added my name. These amendments concern the arrangements for the appointment of independent mental capacity advocates and they sensibly seek to ensure that an IMCA must be appointed if the appropriate person would have substantial difficulty helping the cared-for person to understand their rights, involving them in decisions and assisting them to exercise rights of challenge if they wish to do so without the support of an IMCA. I want to make it clear that relevant rights include the right to make an application to the court and the right to request a review of the arrangements. The responsible body must ensure that cases are referred to the court when a cared-for person’s right to a court review is engaged.
The concern is that at the moment, referral to advocacy is controlled by the relevant person, who is the responsible body or the care home manager. An advocate must be appointed if the person has capacity and requests an advocate, which is likely to be very rare, or the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the person’s best interests. The problem, which we have now debated a number of times, is that the right to advocacy seems to be more limited than under DoLS, and it is at the discretion of the relevant person not to refer if it is not considered to be in the best interests. As has been commented on, there are only three references to best interests in the entire Bill, and two are used at the discretion of the care home manager or the responsible body to actually limit the right to an IMCA. We have to build in some more safeguards, including referral to the Court of Protection. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which looked at the original Law Commission work, said that the responsible body should be under a clear statutory duty to refer cases where others fail to do so.
I was interested to receive over the weekend an email from the carers for HL in HL v UK ECHR 2004, otherwise known as the Bournewood case. They have always been critical when they observe bad practice and the failure to uphold a person’s rights. They say that reading the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill and following its passage through the parliamentary process so far has been depressing and leaves them feeling extremely frustrated and angry that the work they started in 1997 and the protections for the person that came about from that work are now being thrown away by this Bill. The lack of any of the protections they argued for individually and collectively, which at least had a fair hearing when they gave oral evidence to the JCHR and, they believe, were mostly reflected in its recent paper, appear to have been completely ignored, as has most of what the JCHR had to say. They say that anything less than the JCHR recommendations, along with nearly all of the proposals from the Law Commission, would be a reduction in the value of a person’s individual rights and against the concept of the MCA and even of the existing DoLS.
Interestingly, their acid test is this: if HL against Bournewood happened today under these proposals, would he be any better protected than in 1997 or under DoLS? They say that given the attitude of the professional employed by the hospital managing authority at the time, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill places more control in the hands of those very professionals and shows less consideration of HL and those who were trying to get him out. In its current form, it is a monumental failure. I know that the Minister thinks that this is an exaggeration, but coming from the carers of HL, it suggests that there are real and genuine concerns about where the Government are going. My fear, as I said last week, is that essentially we are seeing a streamlining of the bureaucratic process and many of the safeguards are being reduced. That is why access to the Court of Protection is so important.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 75. I do not wish to rehearse the arguments we had on the previous group but I want to put one question to the Minister. Why in paragraphs 36 and 37 do we suddenly see the term “relevant person” being introduced? It is quite confusing and I shall need to go back and look at Hansard. I do not want to make a wrong accusation, but I think there is confusion about the terms “relevant person” and “appropriate person”, when in fact they are two completely different things. My understanding is that a “relevant person” is either the responsible body or a care home manager, so why do we not talk about that? If that is what is meant, let us be up-front about it.
Amendment 75 asks why the appropriate person as we know them under the Mental Capacity Act has to have capacity to consent to being supported by an IMCA if the purpose is not just to put another hurdle in the way to make sure that these people—let us bear in mind that they do not have a right to be given information under this Bill—have to make a request of the care manager or the care home manager. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is right to say that the Minister has talked about care home managers and care managers; they are different, but all of them have a potential vested interest in making sure that someone does not have access to an IMCA. That, I think, would be a gross dereliction.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments go some way to ensuring that a cared-for person is not left without an independent mental capacity advocate or the support of an appropriate person. Much of the Bill as it stands represents what I think is a real assault on human rights. For heaven’s sake, we should be listening to the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt. He has shared with me the email from the carers of HL and it is very powerful. My father was a miner and he would have said, “This is the experience from the coalface”. We can take this as an important contribution to understanding the difficulties that families face when they have to deal with the issues we are discussing.
Amendment 66 would give a local authority discretion to appoint an appropriate person or an independent mental capacity advocate without notification from a care home. Mencap and others have argued most powerfully that this amendment would minimise the risk of conflict of interest. That is important, as we have seen in other debates. It would mean that a care home arrangement could be more easily challenged and subject to scrutiny. Is not challenging and scrutinising what we do every day in this House? We challenge and scrutinise legislation brought forward by the Government; that is our role. Why would we deny that opportunity to the vulnerable people we are talking about in this Bill?
As it stands, the process for deciding whether to appoint an appropriate person or advocate requires a series of capacity assessments and best interest decisions made by the responsible body or the care home manager, even though both convention and domestic law have made it clear that there is no place for best interests in Article 5 appeal rights. Unless we effect change, this Bill will pass into law and we will see a cared-for person without the appropriate support of either an independent mental capacity advocate or an appropriate person—and that at a most crucial time in their life. That cannot be right. Amendments 76 and 77 are important if we are to ensure that the appropriate person gets the support they need for the role they have undertaken. We have had several long and important debates during the passage of the Bill. These amendments are reasonable and surely the Government must now start to listen.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank all noble Lords who have put their names to these amendments and given us the opportunity to carry on what has been a very good discussion so far about the important role of IMCAs and, indeed, appropriate persons as well. I shall deal first with Amendments 65, 66, 67, 69, 70 and 76 as they relate to the circumstances under which a person can request an IMCA and under which an IMCA can be appointed.
As I said in the previous debate, it is our intention not to have any reduction in advocacy or support as a consequence of the Bill. Indeed, it is our position that a responsible body should be able to appoint an IMCA if there is a request by a cared-for person or family member and either a care home manger has not provided notification or the responsible body disagrees with the notification given. As I also said then, I recognise concerns that the circumstances under which an IMCA can be appointed would be narrowed as a consequence of the Bill, which is not something we want to happen. I do not want to rehearse the entire debate we had last time other than to say that it was a good one. I have assured noble Lords about what I want to take away from that, which is to consider the appropriate way in which we can go forward with the role of the care home manager while making sure that all concerns about restrictions to advocacy and so on are adequately put to bed.
I want to make a point on Amendment 75, which falls into this set of amendments, about why the term “relevant person” is used. I am not quite sure why, specifically; rather, I have an idea, but I do not want to get it wrong. It would be safer for me to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about why that phrase is used and circulate it to noble Lords. Certainly, this is already a complex piece of legislation with lots of terms and jargon; for goodness’ sake, let us not increase that, if at all possible.
I want to take up the challenge from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, on rights to information. During the previous debate, I tried to make it clear that we will set out the right to information but rights to information—not rights to request it—have been strengthened by a variety of legislation, some of which has nothing to do with the care of people lacking capacity. I also said last time that we are reviewing the Bill to see if it needs to be revised to achieve the outcome that the noble Baroness wants. I know that she is concerned about this, but work is under way to try to resolve this issue.
Moving on, we have not previously discussed the term “appropriate person”, which relates to Amendments 73, 74, 77 and 80. This is a good opportunity to speak about the important role of the appropriate person in the new model. As noble Lords know, under the DoLS system the relevant person representative—we are getting into difficulties of language—can be a family member, a paid role or even an advocate. That can unnecessarily give rights to two separate advocates. There has been confusion about the purpose of the RPR and how it differs to advocacy. Our intention is that the appropriate person role will be clearer, not least because it is a familiar part of the Care Act, where the appropriate person facilitates the person’s involvement in the care process.
Obviously, that person provides a vital safeguard for the cared-for person. They are appointed to represent and support the cared-for person, ensuring that the person’s rights are protected and that the person is fully involved in decisions. As I said, that is already established under the Care Act for the purposes of caring. The role of appropriate person can be fulfilled by a family member, someone close to the cared-for person, someone with lasting power of attorney or a volunteer. I know from previous discussions how keen noble Lords are to make sure that the voice of the person is central to discussions about their care and the deprivation of their liberty. Clearly, the appropriate person has an essential role here.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, asked specifically about the question of a right to act. It is all very well appointing somebody—they also have to be willing to be appointed—but when appointing an appropriate person or recognising one, the responsible body has to be confident that the appropriate person is prepared to act. Indeed, that is part of their appropriateness. Otherwise, an IMCA should be appointed. That satisfies the noble Baroness’s question at the beginning about an appropriate person being appointed, but not about what happens if they lapse or the process by which they, or their appropriateness, would be reviewed. As it stands, I will need to reflect on that further to explain it to her. The process may well happen through the regular reviews, but I need to take that question away and think about how we provide reassurance that the appropriate person is in a position to act and wants to do so. Clearly, if an appropriate person, not an IMCA, was appointed but not prepared to act, the cared-for person would lapse into a situation where they did not have somebody in their corner, which we are all trying to avoid.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, this has been a fascinating debate. I listened very carefully to the speech of my noble friend Lady Hollins. Her experience shone through, and there was much wisdom in her comments. I worry that perhaps in this and the previous group of amendments we have not adequately focused on the need to support the cared-for person as much as possible in making their own decisions and in supporting them. I can envisage a situation where the appropriate person has limitations for whatever reason and it would seem very sensible that they were then able to request an IMCA be appointed.
However, just on the other side of it, we must not forget the enormous burden out there already. Only last week I spoke with a brain injury case manager, Dr Mark Holloway, who works with a care home. He said he is currently managing 13 cases of clients with acquired brain injury who are awaiting DoLS approval from the local authority. Despite the efforts of the care home staff and their solicitors, they have not been able to get this through. We must not lose sight of the fact that the current system is, quite frankly, completely failing. He was saying that they have worked very hard to make sure that it is the least restrictive option, but he is concerned at the lack of scrutiny of their decision-making. In their efforts to acquire DoLS authorisations, the care home staff have sought and paid for expert legal advice on multiple occasions to support them constructing clear and evidenced capacity assessments. He stresses the difficulty of assessing capacity in acquired brain injury and the need to assess function: not just what is said but how the person is actually functioning—what is done and the complexity of it.
I hope that we will return to the issues behind this set of amendments, because in a way I do not feel that we have done justice to the subject tonight. It does need a bit more discussion outside this Chamber. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Thornton
My goodness, we are back in the Bill, out of the appendix. I am formally moving that Clause 2 do not stand part. However, I will address my remarks to the two amendments in my name in this group. They concern advance consent. This amendment comes from Clause 6 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill, and inserts two new sections into the Mental Capacity Act: advance consent to certain arrangements, and the effects of advance consent. These sections provide for a person to consent in advance to specific arrangements to enable care and treatment that would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty.
To give advance consent, the person must have the capacity to consent to specified arrangements being put in place at a later time that otherwise would be considered deprivation of liberty. They must also clearly articulate the arrangement to which they are consenting. Provisions in this amendment relating to advance consent are similar to those relating to advance decisions to refuse treatment which appear in Sections 24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and my noble friends Lord Touhig and Lord Hunt for supporting this amendment, and I think it is important that we probe this particular issue. On previous Committee days and in discussions with stakeholders, one of the recurring sentiments was that the well-being of the cared-for person should be at the front of this legislation, and it seems that advance consent is definitely a crucial issue in putting the cared-for person at the heart.
Amendment 85 concerns unlawful deprivation of liberty. Again, this amendment comes from Clause 7 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill and would insert two new sections into the Mental Capacity Act on unlawful deprivation of liberty and on proceedings and remedies. These sections would provide a route for an individual deprived of their liberty in a private care home or hospital to seek redress where proper authorisation under this Bill and the Mental Health Act, or an order of court, has not been obtained. This amendment seeks to define the private care provider. Again, we have been concerned about how the Bill will be applied to those in a private care setting or hospital. It seeks to probe how they should be affected by the Bill.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, Amendment 84, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is possibly one of the most important amendments we have tabled to the Bill. It has become so much more important over the last 20 or 30 years to try to encourage people to make decisions in advance about what should happen to them and to encourage them to think about what will happen in the event of things going wrong—to think about things such as lasting powers of attorney and advance decisions on mental health services. I understand that Sir Simon Wessely will recommend some changes that are very similar to this to go into the new mental health legislation. It would be good, bearing in mind our previous discussions, if we could feel confident that the same sort of approach was being taken in this Bill.
Advance decision-making in legislation has proved quite difficult to implement, because you have to have a widespread campaign of understanding how people can make these decisions. It also has to have the individual making the decision accept that things will happen to them that they are not expecting, which is sometimes very difficult. That is why it so difficult to get people to sign up to insurance against long-term care; they simply do not believe that it will ever happen to them. It is very difficult to get these bits of legislation implemented and widespread, but we have to start somewhere. This is such an important piece to try to get into a Bill, to start people thinking about their future and what is acceptable. This would be a very important thing for the Bill.
I would also like to see Amendment 85 implemented. It is something that the Law Commission had in originally. I am not quite sure why it came out. It sort of just disappeared in the transcription somewhere. It is an important safeguard. We tend to forget all those Victorian cases a couple of hundred years ago when people were quite regularly held in circumstances against their wishes and unlawfully deprived of their liberty. It is as well to be reminded that it can, and probably does, still happen quite frequently. To have something on the statute book would be helpful, so I support the two amendments.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I am afraid I will take a different view. Amendment 84 is potentially incredibly dangerous in the context of the Bill. I can understand why people with a mental health disorder who know exactly what is likely to happen to them when they relapse and know what treatment they do and do not want can make an informed decision based on their previous experience of their illness and episodes. Here, however, we are asking people to provide advance consent to their liberty being deprived in a situation that they do not know about and have not experienced. The evidence from advance care planning—I have a recent paper from Ontario—showed that people’s knowledge was very poor. There were decision conflicts and when they were re-interviewed later they had re-evaluated their decisions in the light of further information and as things had moved forwards.
The problem is that the cared-for person’s experience of care is based on human interaction. They cannot predict who will be the carer at some point in the future, nor how that interpersonal chemistry will work. I am concerned that there is a real danger that someone could be locked in to having to live with what they said previously. There is a lot of evidence from the world of care planning that people do change their preferences. Indeed, as an illness progresses, they may change them very radically.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, this is a fascinating discussion which will be familiar to the noble Lords who took part in previous legislation on mental capacity and on mental health. The thing I am most heartened by is the prediction made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, of what Sir Simon Wessely might do in his review of the Mental Health Act. Way back when the law was reviewed in 2005—I think it was then but I am hopeless with dates—I was one of a number of Peers who argued the case that people with fluctuating mental health conditions should be able to say, at a point when they had capacity, “At some future point, if I have an episode, it is likely that I may refuse treatment but, right at the moment, now that I am well, I wish to say that I want you to ignore that”. That was resolutely turned down by the small bunch of forensic psychiatrists who were behind that change to legislation. So I am glad that the world of mental health is moving to catch up with other parts of medicine, where greater involvement of patients and exercise of patient choice is something to be encouraged and not dismissed.
Many of the arguments that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, put forward were arguments which were put up against the original proposals of the Mental Capacity Act. I believe that, were this to be in legislation, we should be able to put a lot of safeguards around it. At this stage, I encourage the Minister to take these proposals and put them into the future discussions that will take place on the Bill.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I do not want to prolong this too much but I will ask the noble Baroness: has she in any way lost confidence in the proposal that she put forward when the Mental Capacity Act was a Bill before us? It was for an advance statement of wishes, which has, when properly used, been a very powerful tool to make sure that somebody is listened to. My concern has been that our discussion to date has been about the wishes and feelings of the person as previously expressed. From the way she was talking, I am concerned that it sounds as if she might have lost confidence in the ability of that—because, as I have said, I have a real concern that tying somebody legally to enforcing something which was said in advance could potentially be really dangerous.
Baroness Barker
No, I have not lost confidence in that; I simply wish to undertake further discussion, given that—I say it again—it looks entirely likely that mental health legislation may be changing. I think, in light of that, that it is a wise discussion to have.
Baroness Murphy
May I just add that I think it is important to read all the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton? She provides for any opportunity, any chance, that the individual may indicate that they have changed their mind, at which point those things come to an end, essentially. They have to be quite specific that if there is any doubt in somebody’s mind that this is no longer something that can be continued, that there is anxiety about them being implemented, then it comes to an end. So I think those things can be taken care of.
Baroness Hollins
My Lords, these amendments are examples of the long and complicated amendments which I think could end up going wrong, because they are trying to cover quite a lot, which will probably become gold-plated and give rather too much weight to the legal profession. I do not think that what Sir Simon Wessely planned to do is relevant here, because it is not really about mental illness but about dementia. If that is the case, people may not be in a position to change their mind at a later date, so these amendments are very complicated and probably rather unwise.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for introducing this clause stand part debate. We had a chat earlier, so I shall not formally respond to her but instead deal with the amendments as laid, if that is all right with everybody. Clearly, these are very important issues that need to be dealt with properly.
Amendment 84 would allow individuals to provide advance consent to arrangements enabling care or treatment that would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty. As noble Baronesses have commented, the Law Commission recommended that provision should be made in the Bill to allow this. This would mean saying that cared-for people entering certain settings, such as hospitals and end-of-life care, where the arrangements are predictable and time limited, would not be required to undergo additional assessments if they needed to be deprived of their liberty. In the Government’s response to the Law Commission, we agreed that people should have choice and control over future decisions being made on their behalf, but we said that we needed to look at the detail of this specific proposal. I understand that there is enthusiasm among some noble Lords for such a recommendation, particularly, as has been said, as a way of alleviating unnecessary assessments for those in palliative and end-of-life care.
On palliative care, before I get on to more general concerns, I think it is important to note that the Government have issued some guidance about consent in the context of palliative care in the last few weeks of life. I realise that this talks only about one part of the time period that we might be talking about. The guidance says that if an individual has capacity to consent to arrangements for their care at the time of their admission, or at a time before losing capacity, and does consent, this consent would cover the period until their death, hence there is no deprivation of liberty. However, the guidance is also clear that this consent would no longer be valid if significant extra restrictions were put in place, after this point, to which the person had not consented. So there is a situation that pertains to people right at the end of life and provides some opportunity for challenge if restrictions change.
If we extend that time period out, not just to weeks but to months and years, it has been brought to light in this debate that, while there is a desire to make sure that a person’s advance consent is taken seriously and given legal force, concerns have also been raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about extending the application in such a way that it could actually deprive people of their protections and human rights. These are clearly concerns that we need to take seriously.
Concerns have also been expressed to the department, in engagement with stakeholders, that the inclusion in statute law of advance consent to being deprived of liberty might imply that there is an expectation that people should have an advance statement of wishes in place, and that people may be pressured into making an advance statement. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that in some ways planning for the future may be a good thing but, equally, we do not want to force people to plan for the future when their desire is not to. We protect the right of people to make bad decisions; that is an important part of a person having a sense of agency and autonomy. Concerns have been expressed that that would be put in danger and people would feel pressured to do something that they might not wish to do.
Clearly, the Law Commission made this recommendation with highly laudable aims. However, we have concerns and are not yet convinced of the merits of the amendment. We have tried to deal with some of the issues around integrating planning through the creation of a system based on the production of a care plan. We have talked about the inclusion of a statement of wishes. I would like to know more about the proposal of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about advance statements of wishes. I would like to follow that up and understand it a bit better. The process we are envisaging would allow the inclusion of advance decisions to refuse treatment as part of future care planning. That is not affected by what we are discussing here but that would be allowed. We are not convinced of the merits of the amendment—indeed, we have some concerns about the implications of it—but I would be keen to understand a bit more about previous discussions of this topic and whether there are other ways to provide that sense of agency for the person who will be cared for without producing undue pressure on them or legal force in a way that would go against their interests and, in legal terms, their human rights.
Amendment 85 would create a new civil court remedy against some private care providers, including non-NHS hospitals and private care homes, if they have deprived someone of their liberty unlawfully. Again, this provision was proposed by the Law Commission. However, we do not believe that a new legal remedy is required. There is already an ability to seek damages under the Human Rights Act on the basis of a breach of Article 5 and usually Article 8. This is available in private cases, where a private care provider is depriving a self-funder of their liberty unlawfully. A remedy could be sought against the public authority responsible for the deprivation. Obviously, we need to hold private care providers to the same standards that we hold public care providers to. There are already a number of mechanisms that allow for this, and the law provides for them. There is the criminal offence of false imprisonment, as well as the existing law of false imprisonment for civil claims. So people can already bring legal action against private care providers.
On top of this, the Care Quality Commission in England and the Care Inspectorate Wales would also ensure compliance with the liberty protection safeguards. Clearly, they have a range of enforcement actions available to them that apply to the public and private sector alike. Furthermore, as commissioners, local authorities will—and do—have a role in ensuring that private care providers fulfil their legal duties. The Government believe that sufficient levers are already in place and that the creation of an additional civil route could increase care providers’ insurance costs at a time when, as we all know, we are working hard to make sure that there is funding in the system to provide adequate and good-quality social care to everybody who needs it.
I understand and agree with the desire to hold private providers to the same standards that we hold public providers to, but we believe there are existing remedies within the system and there is no need to require or implement new ones. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will not move her amendments.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that detailed response and the noble Baronesses, Lady Murphy and Lady Barker, for their support. I did not intend to alarm the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I thought we might be veering into discussions the House has had on many occasions about advance consent for various things. I do not think we want to go there, but I was beginning to get the feeling of “Doctor knows best” when we were having that discussion.
I am not certain that the care plan works. The Law Commission had very good reasons for putting what are now Amendments 84 and 85 into the draft Bill that it brought forward, which were to do with the fact not that its people are lawyers but that it had consulted very widely with stakeholders and people involved in the care system. These are the conclusions that it came to, so I will read carefully what the Minister has said about this. Maybe we can include these amendments in our discussions and decide whether we need to pursue them further at the next stage of the Bill.
Baroness Thornton
“Restriction on power of attorneys and deputies
After section 29 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 insert—“29A Deprivation of libertyNothing in this Act authorises a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy to consent on behalf of a person to arrangements which give rise to a deprivation of that person’s liberty.””
Baroness Thornton
Amendment 83 concerns the power of attorney and restrictions on it. This amendment comes from Clause 3 of the Law Commission’s draft Bill. I said right from the outset that in Committee we would test the Bill against those issues that the Law Commission had decided to put into the draft Bill and ask why they had been dropped. Many of them are absolutely at the heart of the safeguards that are necessary for vulnerable and cared-for people. The amendment would insert a new section into the Mental Capacity Act, which expressly prevents,
“a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy”,
appointed by the Court of Protection from consenting on a person’s behalf,
“to arrangements which give rise to a deprivation of … liberty”.
This is the position in the current law but this statement makes it explicit. I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I have three amendments in this group, which are there simply because the topic is lasting power of attorney. I do not have an argument with Amendment 83 at all. It is absolutely right that the person’s best interests must be considered and that someone cannot just give consent on their behalf.
The amendments that I have tabled are designed to solve three current problems that we have with lasting powers of attorney. The first, Amendment 83ZA, relates to the identity documentation that somebody must produce to show that they are the donee of a lasting power of attorney. These are bulky papers which have to be registered and stamped by the Office of the Public Guardian, and then produced. For many people who are donees, those papers may be at their home; that may be a long way away from wherever the cared-for person—the donor—is. When that donor has lost capacity, the donee can either carry the sheaf of papers around with them all the time or just hope to be going via their home filing cabinet to pick them up before they go to see the person.
I hope that we might move toward something a bit more modern in electronic identification—something like the driving licence, which is a small card on which you can have a registration number. You could also have a picture of the donor as well as one of the donee, which would allow a second layer of recognition. That would also, I hope, focus the mind on the fact that the donor must be at the centre of all the decision-making. Its validity could easily be checked against a number, so that if it had been updated—and for some reason the previous form had not been returned—a simple check with the Office of the Public Guardian might verify its status.
Amendment 87G is designed to solve another problem that has been arising: that a person may appoint several people to hold their lasting power of attorney in the event that they lose capacity. However, as time goes on it has happened that they lose confidence in one of those people, for whatever reason. Maybe there is a dispute in the family or they feel that the person is no longer able to take a decision in their best interest, for whatever reason, and they want to revoke having that person as a donee. The problem is that it is quite a complicated process and they have to go back to square one. This amendment is designed to make it much easier for them to state that they no longer want one person listed but they want the others to remain. I have discussed this with the Public Guardian, who sees it as a problem at the moment that the revocation of a donee is difficult.
Amendment 87E arises out of a problem which is also beginning to occur. I should declare an interest here because it is a problem that is close to my heart: a member of my family has severely impaired capacity and her spouse, who is the only person who can act on her behalf, is becoming older. There is concern about what happens if he cannot act on her behalf and take decisions. At the moment, it is only when the donee loses capacity that others can go to the Court of Protection for a court-appointed deputy. The aim of this amendment is to allow the donee to make some provision so that, in the event of their losing capacity—either temporarily if they have a fall with a fracture, a head injury or have pneumonia, or permanently so they become frail and possibly demented—they can make provision ahead of time in the cold light of day. The alternative is the family, with one family member who lacks capacity and the person who was taking care of their affairs now acutely ill and in crisis, having to go to the Court of Protection to get a court-appointed deputy, which can take some time.
I have discussed this with the Court of Protection, which wants to be helpful in moving things forward, and with Alan Eccles, the Public Guardian, who is extremely sympathetic to the problem and can see that people who took out a lasting power of attorney, or prior to that an enduring power of attorney, and never expected to live as long as they have could now find that the donee is at greater risk of becoming frail than they anticipated. Donors are outliving their prognosis not just by months, but by years and possibly decades.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
It strikes me that Amendment 87E would apply not only to this Bill but to other Acts. Does it fit here? I understand the principle of what my noble friend is saying.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
It could have wide-reaching consequences, but a lot of people who have lost capacity and are in a state of high dependency are already in nursing homes, so they are already being cared for in the system and may be subject to deprivation of liberty. Some of them have long-term continuing funding for their care, but they have been there for a long time and the donee, who is managing all their affairs and advocating on their behalf, is very concerned about their welfare in the event of them failing.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for tabling amendments in this group. I am very aware of the complexity of this issue. For a lay person such as me, some of the terminology can be confusing. I will do my level best to be as clear as humanly possible, but if I fail in that endeavour I will write to noble Lords and explain better what I am attempting to explain now.
The effect of Amendment 83, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said, would be to confirm in law that a donee of a lasting power of attorney or a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection was unable to consent on a person’s behalf to a deprivation of liberty. If they could provide such consent, the person would not be considered to be deprived of their liberty and no safeguards would need to be provided.
The Law Commission report stated that it was already the position in law that a donee or deputy could not consent to a deprivation of liberty. We confirmed in our response to the Law Commission’s report that the Government agreed with its view on the current legal position, and the Bill does not change the current situation. While the Bill creates a duty to consult with any donee of the lasting power of attorney or a deputy, it does not enable a donee or deputy to consent to the deprivation of liberty on behalf of the cared-for person. In other words, under this Bill the cared-for person would still be deprived of their liberty in those circumstances and would still need to be provided with safeguards to satisfy Article 5, which is of course the whole purpose of DoLS and liberty protection safeguards. In that sense the amendment, with which we agree, would serve only to duplicate existing legislation and is not necessary. I hope I have provided an adequate explanation to noble Lords, but obviously I am willing to set out in more detail exactly why we believe the current situation is not changed by the Bill as it stands.
I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Amendment 83ZA would require the Office of the Public Guardian to provide documentation, which may be in electronic form, to identify the donor and donee or donees of a lasting power of attorney and to recall the documentation if the donee’s power is revoked. As the noble Baroness pointed out, this is designed to make it easier for attorneys to provide proof of the existence of a registered LPA. It is right that there ought to be a robust system of proving that there is a valid power. My understanding is that the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Public Guardian are actively considering how to offer a digital means of providing evidence of a valid LPA, and we expect to bring forward proposals in due course. I am happy to pursue that further with colleagues in that department and that office to understand greater details of their plans and to share those with noble Lords if they are forthcoming, which I hope that they will be.
Amendment 87E, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would allow the donee of a lasting power of attorney to nominate someone to replace them if they were no longer able to fulfil their duties—I think that means if the lasting power of attorney was no longer able to fulfil their duties—while Amendment 87G would allow a replacement attorney to be nominated by the donor at the time of registering the LPA to take over the power if the donor decides to remove the power from the donee.
I do not need to reiterate to noble Lords just how critical it is to get the law and the rules in this area right; as the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, pointed out, the rules around this would not apply only to this Bill. It is worth pointing out that there is provision in the original Mental Capacity Act to allow a person making a lasting power of attorney to nominate a replacement in the event that their attorney is unable to continue, but I think the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting at is that there is a slight chicken and egg situation here: at the point where they no longer have capacity but the person whom they have previously appointed is no longer able to fulfil their role or the cared-for person no longer wants them to do so, they cannot go back in a time machine and appoint someone else—in other words, they cannot know what they do not know. I have just made things really clear by getting all Donald Rumsfeld about it all.
Having said all that, I want to consider if there is a way of unlocking that paradox, but clearly the implications of that would go well beyond the remit of what we are discussing here. I do not want to make any promises that it is not in my power to keep. I would appreciate the opportunity to explore this further so that we can consider how to give the donor more opportunities to have a sense of choice and agency as they think ahead to the future. I would have thought that we must be able to provide for that without creating extra complications. I look forward to taking that up with the noble Baroness and other noble Lords who are interested in the topic. On that basis, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that detailed answer. As usual, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has raised some interesting challenges. In my family, someone who had enduring power of attorney died at the point they were needed. We were in a ridiculous and complex situation—resolved by good will, but the law did not help us. This is therefore a serious matter.
I understood what the Minister said about the power of attorney, and I will read his response. It sounded to me as though it was probably reasonable, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Thornton
“21ZB Presumption of P giving evidence(1) This section applies where an authorisation under Schedule AA1—(a) has effect, or(b) is to have effect from a date specified under paragraph 22 of that Schedule.(2) P shall be presumed to give evidence in Court of Protection proceedings.(3) This presumption may be rebutted, having regard to P’s rights, including by evidence that P—(a) is not competent to give sworn evidence; or(b) does not wish to provide evidence (in whichever form) to the court.(4) Evidence from P shall be secured in any form that the court and the parties consider appropriate having regard to P’s circumstances and may include the following—(a) sworn evidence given orally in court;(b) unsworn evidence given orally in court;(c) unsworn evidence given outside of the court;(d) a written statement;(e) pre-recorded evidence.(5) The appropriate authority may make regulations outlining the measures that will be available to support P to give evidence in proceedings.”
Baroness Thornton
The Minister will be familiar with this amendment because it stems from Inclusion London, which drafted it. I know that it has written to him about it. It is run and controlled by disabled people, is very concerned about the Bill and wants this issue discussed.
The amendment concerns ensuring the effective participation of P in the Court of Protection proceedings. It gives P the presumed right to give evidence and sets out a number of ways in which that might happen. The organisation has copied me in to a letter to the Minister. It writes that one of the key challenges to date has been securing P’s meaningful participation in Court of Protection proceedings, something acknowledged in the 2018 Joint Committee on Human Rights report, The Right to Freedom and Safety: Reform of the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards. Participation is an important issue for a number of reasons, including that it is more likely to place the person at the centre of the decision-making process and may change the outcome of the case. Research suggests that P rarely participates in or gives evidence in proceedings. In the light of the Government’s emphasis on providing protection for people who may lack capacity, it is asking us to consider the amendment.
This seems a reasonable point, and I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response. I beg to move.
Baroness Meacher
I will speak to Amendment 87C and apologise to the Committee for being unable to remain in the Chamber earlier—I had two commitments that I had to fulfil. I emphasise that it is a probing amendment; it will certainly need rewriting at Report if we bring something back. I thank Godfred Boahen of BASW, whose briefing was an enormous help in preparing my remarks.
Our aim is to stimulate a debate about the processes to deal with deprivation of liberty issues which arise in domestic settings. There is a case for enhancing the assessment processes in those situations. As it stands, the Bill makes no mention of people in domestic settings where deprivation of liberty is at issue. It is not clear—to me, anyway—what the Government have in mind and I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify the position. The Bill leaves vulnerable individuals in domestic settings where there is an issue of deprivation of liberty with no judicial protection, except through an appeal to the Court of Protection, a process which is onerous, costly, stressful and slow. That also leaves this group of people without access to a mental capacity professional in the event of an objection to the proposed care plan. The amendment assumes that, where a deprivation of liberty arises in a domestic setting, this would be considered, as now, under either the care planning or the safeguarding provisions of the Care Act 2014, but with two important reforms, which I will come to. Thus domestic settings would not come under the processes set out in the Bill.
Before referring to the proposed reforms, I need to clarify the two key processes involved under the Care Act, or the reforms would not make a lot of sense to anybody. First is the prospective model, as proposed by the Law Commission, when a deprivation of liberty is considered during care assessments and planning. The care planning processes apply here. During a Care Act assessment of needs, professionals will ascertain the likely impact of a care plan on the liberty of an individual, whom I will call P. The idea is that, in some cases, the state has prior knowledge that a deprivation of liberty will occur and has therefore taken the necessary steps to authorise it alongside establishing conditions to safeguard P’s human rights. This could be achieved through an amendment to the Care Act guidance, not a legislative change.
The great attraction of this approach, as the Law Commission recognised, is that the safeguards are implemented in a way that minimises intrusion into private and family life. The Law Commission argues that:
“In most cases arrangements could be authorised in an unobtrusive and straightforward manner through a care plan and without a perception of State intrusion into family matters”.
In domestic situations and with the involvement of professional local authority employees in organising and undertaking the care planning, only where the care plan is contrary to the wishes of P would the involvement of the mental capacity professional be warranted. At present, the Bill does not make it clear that the MCP would be brought into domestic settings in any circumstances. This is one of the two areas in the Bill that need clarification. I am impressed that the Law Commission thinks that this approach strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of the person to be protected, and the rights to private and family life under Article 8.
The second model for the deprivation of liberty in domestic settings is the retrospective model, where the safeguarding procedures under the Care Act 2014 come into play. Under Section 42(1) of that Act the safeguarding procedures apply to an adult who satisfies three conditions, which I do not need to go into. The safeguarding process involves P from the very beginning. There are certain crucial points about these processes: their desired outcomes should be considered; professionals have to balance P’s capacity against their best interests and the public interest; and the safeguarding provisions draw significantly on the best-interests principle of the Mental Capacity Act. If deprivation of liberty is an issue, then the Care Act safeguarding provisions and the Mental Capacity Act best-interests principle can be applied to generate a care plan which safeguards P’s interests while providing care and protection.
Within the safeguarding provisions an independent advocate is appointed when appropriate. What is currently lacking is access to a mental capacity professional in the event that P has concerns about or objections to the care plan. An amendment bringing the MCP into safeguarding in domestic settings is needed to align people in such settings with those in others.
My last point relates to the requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights that if P is deprived of their liberty, they must have access to a court. I have already referred to the current arrangement for access to the Court of Protection as the only court route. I urge the Minister to consider seriously the possibility that mental health tribunals could be adapted to become mental health and capacity tribunals to include those in domestic settings where P is objecting to the care plan.
Mental health tribunals already consider whether and how their judgments and the conditions they impose on patients might amount to a deprivation of liberty. Additionally, they have experience of the issues involved in deprivation of liberty considerations in domestic settings. This would not be something outside their competence, and that is very important. It would be too radical to introduce something entirely different. Such tribunals are local and would be speedier, less costly and more accessible for families who are themselves often vulnerable. They are less imposing and therefore less stressful for those involved.
Consider the case brought to my attention recently of an 85 year-old woman looking after her 89 year-old husband, who had severe dementia. She felt she could only cope by keeping her husband in one room. The idea of taking that case to the Court of Protection just feels unreasonable. It certainly needs sorting out in some way, but not that way. In line with the estimated number of appeals to the tribunals, clearly, the number of tribunal members would need to increase. However, as well as having advantages for those involved, this reform would surely be less costly than the current Court of Protection process. I hope we can have a short but constructive debate today and that the Minister will meet us to discuss the best way forward. It might not be exactly what I have suggested, but we really need to think this through carefully. I beg to move.
Baroness Murphy
My Lords, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lady Meacher, but I will sound a few words of caution. As I understand it, cases in domestic settings are not included under the current DoLS arrangements. However, there have been several cases where Cheshire West has been quoted in instances where domestic settings have been challenged—with, in my view, some ludicrous outcomes. These have put people who were doing their best by their relatives, as they saw it, in the invidious position that they could no longer continue to care.
I have a case that is similar to that of my noble friend Lady Meacher, where a man was looking after his elderly mother at home. She wandered on most nights, and he put some gates at the top of the stairs to stop her falling down the stairs. That allowed him to get a good night’s sleep and she did not go downstairs. It is a very difficult issue: there was the question of whether she could have gone over the gates and come to more harm. He was also told by the professional carer who was helping him—from a private care provider—that he could not do this because it was illegal. Under the legislation, it was now not possible for him to do that, nor could he put a lock that she could not undo on the outside door. He would have to accompany her if she wanted to go out and come back. The implication is quite clear: he actually gave up caring for her because, as he said, if he could not look after his mother in his own home, he was not going to be able to have a life that was possible for him to live. I have no doubt in my mind that that elderly woman would have given her last sixpence to stay at home being cared for under her son’s restrictions, rather than go into a care home with strangers. She would probably have had her liberty restricted anyway under some new procedures.
We have to come back to this numbers game, because we want a situation where it is only in cases involving people being treated inappropriately, with cruelty and thoughtlessness, where we want to expose something that is just unacceptable. When we are challenging arrangements that would, if they were for a person of a different age, for example a parent protecting a child—when we are putting in the same things because somebody is mentally incapacitated, it is quite wrong.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock
My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Meacher and the comments that my noble friend Lady Murphy just made. She said that she can speak only for the 900,000 people in this country with dementia—but that is a high proportion. I want to share with noble Lords that everything she said I agree with, as part of a multidisciplinary team but also because over 20 years ago she was my external examiner for my PhD—and I passed. The subject was about supporting people with dementia in the community, so this is close to both our hearts.
I will add a little to this debate. I support the amendment for two reasons. First, at the very least we need to think again about the Bill’s application to individuals in domestic settings; and, secondly, we need to think carefully about how domestic care arrangements can be authorised under a liberty protection safeguard and oversight properly maintained over the period of care—which may be for many years, because I agree that things change over that period. One of the things that can happen is that carers who are very good when you first see them are at the end of their tether three years later and can no longer manage. That is why the Law Commission suggests that the LPS should be integrated into care planning arrangements—but that does require regular review.
It may be feasible to amend the Bill so that the LPS could apply with the safeguarding professions of the Care Act, as my noble friend Lady Meacher has already said. Certainly there is a need to ensure that those who lack capacity are safeguarded when they are being looked after in domestic settings, as, sadly, we know that in a very small minority of cases deprivation of liberty occurs through carers’ lack of knowledge of alternative methods to maintain safety, and in even rarer cases in fact becomes a form of abuse. However, the current Bill, if enacted with a zealous approach by professionals, could become a serious intrusion into families’ rights to provide individualised, possibly slightly idiosyncratic care for their relative, which may be fully consistent with how both parties wish to behave within the confines of their family unit and own home. I therefore hope that we will be able to work with the Minister, and the Bill team as appropriate, to improve the Bill to better balance the rights of people being cared for by relatives in their own home, without unwarranted intrusion into the way in which families support and care for relatives with limited mental capacity, while ensuring that deprivation of liberty is appropriate to safeguard the individual.
Baroness Barran (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for tabling this amendment, which I support. I will keep my remarks very brief and make just two points.
The first point is about the spirit of the amendment. Clearly it aims to avoid broadening the scope of the legislation to apply to people who lack capacity and are living at home but who may need their liberty to be restrained. My comments relate to the 450,000 people mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy: those for whom there may be no formal care plan in place. I want to consider how issues relating to safeguarding and deprivation of liberty would be identified; namely, how do we uphold the rights of vulnerable people in those situations?
If we think in practical terms, there are potentially two routes to safeguard those cared-for people: one is the Mental Capacity Act and the other is the Care Act. I strongly agree that the Care Act 2014 is the route that we should go down. In almost every family, there will be multiple health professionals involved, either by going into the home or through appointments. They are equipped to identify both the safeguarding and the deprivation of liberty issues. It is through the Care Act that we can have the most human and proportionate response for those families.
Secondly, I want to deal with the point behind what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, alluded to: cases where somebody is being cared for at home but then perhaps their carer has a fall and has to go into hospital, and the cared-for person then briefly goes into a care home and is therefore subject to liberty protection safeguards. What is the status of those safeguards when that person returns home? It would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify that.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said, these arrangements might be idiosyncratic, but almost all of us have had experience of them and we value them greatly.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I want to make a couple of quick points. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is of course right that the whole issue of DoLS and the community is known to be a problem. However, the examples she gave seem to me to be examples of people not understanding the DoLS legislation and applying it wrongly, rather than the legislation necessarily being wrong. It is always important to make the case for the rights of families to reject undue intrusion, but I want to share with her the case of a young man with whom a learning disability organisation was working. The organisation achieved great results and he did really well. Prior to his involvement with the organisation, he would sit all day in a part of the living room that had been bricked off by his parents, with his own chair, his own television and being fed through a hatch. That was in a domestic setting. I need not tell the noble Baroness that we need to be quite careful when drawing up legislation.
It is a great shame that we have been presented yet again with a piece of legislation that came out of nowhere when we could have had a proper consultation. The people who are out working in the field at the moment having to administer DoLS understand many of the problems. They know that issues that arose partially from the application of the Cheshire West ruling and the High Court judgment have caused a problem. But amending a really bad Bill is not the way to deal with this problem.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
I want to make a couple of points, but I first draw the attention of noble Lords to my interests in the register relating to learning disability. It is interesting how to read this amendment. I looked at it and thought about individuals in domestic settings, and the charity that I chair does just that. We put four or five individuals into a domestic setting. A proportion of them will have a DoLS. If noble Lords go into the house, it looks just like an ordinary home. Each resident pays rent and would consider it very much their home. Carers offer 24-hour support and locks are well and truly in evidence. Over the weekend, I asked our director of operations what proportion of the people we support were subject to DoLS, and she said thousands. It is just the norm.
I understand that the noble Baroness’s intention was to take this into a family setting where there is mum, dad and a child who may well be an adult—certainly, we see parents in their 80s caring for their children with a learning disability who may be in their late 50s or late 60s, and the parents are at their wits’ end. All that fits with this amendment so, whatever its merits, the wording needs to change but it is certainly worth pursuing.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for leading this debate. Obviously, the bulk of the debate focused on Amendment 87C, which would exclude people residing in domestic settings, and we have discussed the merits of that approach. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, gave a thorough exploration of alternatives to the LPS system in a domestic setting. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, gave a passionate defence of the role of families in caring, which was perhaps accentuated by the noble Baroness, Lady Wilkins, talking about the need to avoid overzealous application of any new provision of deprivation of liberty safeguards. My noble friend Lady Barran talked particularly about the group of people who lack a care plan and their interaction with the care system if they go temporarily into a care home. For me, all that brought home that we have further work to do on the appropriate system that applies in a domestic setting, to put it shortly.
It was helpful that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, told us the story about the vulnerable person. We all agree that something needs to happen in that case to check the actions of the family or help the family to do better. They may just not know what to do or be at their wits’ end—who knows? We can imagine how easy it is to fall into those situations not out of intention but out of pressure and circumstance. That debate highlighted how important it is to get that right. I absolutely want to avoid intrusion where it is not necessary, but equally we need to ensure that those people deprived of their liberty receive the proper protections due to them under Article 5 of the ECHR. This is an issue that clearly needs more work. The amendment was not designed to perfect the solution but rather to start the conversation, and it is absolutely one that we will take through with noble Lords.
I turn briefly to Amendment 83B, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which seeks to introduce a legal presumption that a person should give evidence in all Court of Protection proceedings. Obviously I agree with her about the importance of this issue. She called it a reasonable point and I think it more than reasonable. It is essential that in any court proceedings a person’s rights are protected and that the cared-for person has the opportunity to give evidence to the court in any case concerning the deprivation of liberty. I am happy to be able to confirm that this is already reflected in the Court of Protection rules. The court’s overriding objective under the rules is to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. They expressly include ensuring that the person’s interests and position are properly considered and that the parties are on an equal footing. A new set of rules was introduced less than a year ago. They include changes to ensure that a person is able to participate in proceedings. Specifically, rule 1.2 requires the court to consider in every case how best to secure the cared-for person’s participation. It sets out a range of options including the cared-for person addressing the court directly, indirectly or with support from a representative, a litigation friend or an accredited legal representative. I hope that that provides the noble Baroness with the clarification that she was looking for and that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Meacher
I thank the Minister very genuinely for an encouraging and positive response. I recognise that this matter of deprivation of liberty in domestic settings needs to be addressed and that we need to have a conversation about exactly how it should be done. I also thank my noble friends Lady Murphy and Lady Watkins and the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for putting their names to my amendment, albeit that it still needs a lot of work. I am grateful for their helpful comments, along with those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Barker. I look forward to discussions with the Minister and others.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that helpful answer. The grouping is slightly odd, but I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, has joined in; I notice that she has been sitting in her place for the whole of our proceedings. We have had a useful discussion and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Jolly
“Requirements before commencement
(1) Before all provisions of this Act other than those which come into force on its passing can come into force, the requirements under subsection (2) must be met. (2) The requirements are as follows—(a) the Secretary of State must publish an updated code of practice giving guidance for decisions made under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that are amended by this Act; and(b) the Secretary of State must publish a response to the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act, chaired by Professor Sir Simon Wessely.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the publications required by subsection (2) before both Houses of Parliament.”
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 87, 93 and 94 and address the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Tyler and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig. Amendments 93 and 94 are simply enabling provisions.
Amendments 86 and 87 would require that, before the implementation date of this legislation, the Secretary of State should lay before both Houses of Parliament a copy of the updated code of practice giving guidance as well as a response to the review of the Mental Health Act that Sir Simon Wessely is carrying out. We have been half guessing in our discussions what might or might not be in it.
The Bill is not particularly easy to read and it is certainly not a guide for practice, and the ensuing Act will not be easy to read either—unlike the Care Act. The code of practice is absolutely critical to take professionals through what the legislation will entail and what they will have to implement in their practice. To that end, I have a little list. I wonder whether the Minister can indicate or confirm whether these issues will be covered in the code: the basis for detention and when the “necessary and proportionate” test applies; the role of IMCAs and appropriate persons; the professional qualifications and training of those undertaking pre-authorisation reviews; when an AMCP referral should be made; and obligations to provide information to the person and their family about the authorisation. The Minister may not have the answers on his person or from the Dispatch Box right now, but perhaps he could write to me and make that clear.
To make this happen, we would need subsection (2)(a) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 86 and a year’s wait. Many noble Lords have spoken both on and off and in Committee about the Mental Health Act. In our previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, referred to the work of Sir Simon in reviewing that Act along with the Act we are trying to amend now. Between them, the two Acts define, among other things, the care and rights of the most vulnerable—those with mental health conditions and those lacking capacity—who are unable to make decisions about their care. Sometimes, but not always, there may be an overlap. It would not be prudent for the Bill to end its passage through Parliament without us learning the findings of the Wessely review and determining whether it is necessary to amend the Bill further—hence the need for subsection (2)(b) of the new clause proposed by Amendment 86. Earlier today, the Minister spoke about pushing ahead. I understand the need for urgency, but I fear that if we pass the Bill in haste, we may end up repenting or regretting at leisure. That is just me being slightly cautious.
Amendment 87 calls for the Secretary of State to,
“lay a copy of the report before both Houses”.
He or she—who knows who it will be by then—is being asked to look at how the Act is working and whether they are confident that there is an improvement in the process surrounding the deprivation of liberty. We have all discussed this issue; the Minister will have detected the Committee’s concern about this area of the Bill. Basically, I am calling for the Secretary of State to report back on the impact of the Act and ensure that the code is well and truly in place before we start to use the Act in earnest.
I added my name in support of my noble friend Lady Tyler’s amendment, which seeks to ensure that regulations are scrutinised and debated in both Houses. It would also ensure that consultation takes place outside Parliament, which is critical. It is fine for us to debate these issues here—clearly, some people have more experience and understanding than others—but I get many letters from not just individuals who are, or would be, affected by the Bill but the sector, saying, “Keep the Government’s feet to the fire. Make sure we get the very best Bill we can”. I do not doubt at all the Minister’s intention to achieve that end, but the devil is in the detail and there is a lot of it. We must make sure that we get this right through primary legislation. As I said, there is much expertise but we all welcome the opportunity to look at the detail of regulations, both accompanying primary legislation and in any future proposed changes.
Under DoLS, a number of important things were set out in regulations, particularly: who best interests assessors were and how they were to discharge their duties; the timeframe for carrying out assessments; the type of information that would need to be collected; and details of how disputes might be resolved. As my noble friend Lady Tyler will highlight, this is not just about ensuring that regulations are debated; it is about how those in the sector—families and vulnerable people themselves, I would suggest—are consulted and involved in getting the detail right in both initial regulations and any subsequent changes down the line.
To bring this matter into sharper focus, I wonder if the Minister might be able to confirm what he thinks might go into regulation? I hope he would also confirm that regulations laid accompanying this Bill, and any amendments down the line, are subject to the fullest scrutiny both in this House and in the sector. This will mean a decent time gap will have to be found between the laying of the regulations and the debates in both Houses.
I welcome Amendment 92, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, which would see another two independent reports commissioned by the Government. They would be laid within two and four years of implementation, to provide a valuable update as to how implementation was proceeding and highlight areas for improvement. We will need to monitor the implementation of the Act, however it may end up, really closely. We are dealing with the most vulnerable in our society.
These amendments are based on the PIP independent reviews, which have proven successful in highlighting problems. While I am sure many in this House would agree that there are still things to improve in terms of personal independence payments, the oversight provided by the independent reviews has been invaluable in terms of recommending important changes aiding implementation. There are many important issues to review: best interests decisions—ensuring that they are just that, and not based on commercial or other considerations; a monitor of advocacy offered and its uptake; the involvement of P—the cared-for person—and not just professionals, but also those who care for P, and the families of P. I am happy to support those particular amendments, and beg to move.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I have three amendments, starting with Amendment 87A. It sets out a number of requirements before the Act can come into force, embracing a set of independent reports that I would like to see commissioned by the Secretary of State. They address work on the rewording of the expression “unsound mind”; the availability of independent advocacy; appeals on behalf of cared-for persons; the availability of legal aid and support for cared-for persons participating in court proceedings; and short and long-term costs for implementing provision bills for local authorities, the courts and the health service. I recognise some of these points have already been discussed, on the second day of Committee in particular, and the Government are bringing forward amendments so the Bill reflects the need to consult the cared-for person. The Minister also agreed to look further at the expression “unsound mind”, which many believe is stigmatising and outdated language.
I hope the Government might just go further. This amendment is based on the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and reflects some of the issues it would like to see covered in legislation. I will not comment in detail, but I want to come back to the role of the Court of Protection. We discussed this on the second day of our proceedings, and I think the Committee was informed by the view that recourse to the Court of Protection should be avoided wherever possible, because of the stresses and strains involved and the cost. I am certainly conscious that we do not want to create a situation where mental capacity professionals defer their responsibility to the court, and individuals have to undergo court procedures unnecessarily.
According to Dr Lucy Series of the School of Law and Politics at Cardiff University, while the cost and stress of applications to the Court of Protection is undeniable, research by Cardiff has shown that the Government have taken the decision not to reform the Court of Protection, which would make it less costly, less stressful and more like the tribunal approach that many noble Lords would like to see. It is instead being managed by, essentially, restricting access to justice. A week ago, the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said that,
“if a person wants to challenge their authorisation in the Court of Protection they have the right to do so”.—[Official Report, 15/10/18; col. 371.]
However, the practicalities are that people may experience extreme difficulty initiating a court action without assistance, as will their families. The evidence on this matter was very clear to the House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act and the Law Commission. I hope that the Government will consider it.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group and my name is attached to four others. It is a little unfortunate that we are coming to this important group of amendments, which affect the Bill as a whole—there are some very important implementation issues—quite so late in the day when the appetite for debate is understandably somewhat limited.
My Amendment 88 seeks to do two things. It seeks, first, to enhance scrutiny of regulations in Parliament and, secondly, to ensure proper consultation if the Government seek to amend regulations later on down the line. According to the Explanatory Notes, as drafted the regulations are subject to the negative procedure, except where the Secretary of State wishes to change primary legislation, in which case the affirmative procedure applies. My amendment proposes a different approach, whereby the positive procedure applies in both cases. That would mean that, should the Government wish to amend regulations, such a change would automatically trigger scrutiny in both Houses. Why do I think this is important? Fundamentally, depriving someone of their liberty is a very major and fundamental action which warrants strong safeguards and scrutiny. I think it is absolutely vital that we closely monitor the implementation of this legislation and debate any proposed changes that the Government may wish to introduce.
The second part of my amendment—which I think is equally important—means that, before laying a regulation, the Government must consult with stakeholders on its potential impact. Again, given that this legislation concerns extremely vulnerable people, it is absolutely vital that we get it right—that is both primary legislation and the detail of any regulations. One of the threads throughout our debate in Committee, both today and in our two previous sessions, has been that, while the Law Commission consulted widely on its draft Bill, the Government’s Bill, which we are now discussing—and which is very different in a number of important aspects—was introduced with very little consultation with those who work in the sector. It is absolutely vital that we hear from mental health practitioners, legal professionals, charities and those representing vulnerable people.
Amendment 87F is a probing amendment and it is to highlight the current unsatisfactory situation, which I gather is causing real concern to clinicians in relation to when they are obliged to complete court reports requested by the Court of Protection. This issue was drawn to my attention by the Royal College of Psychiatrists and I draw the House’s attention to my interests in the register. Currently, Section 49 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 authorises courts to,
“require a local authority, or an NHS body”,
to prepare a report on such matters,
“as the court may direct”—
generally, the relevant person’s mental health or mental capacity.
I understand that drafting such a report requires a senior clinician to review previous reports, examine the patient, talk to family members or carers and carry out necessary tests. Notably, it often relates to a patient who has never been under the care of that clinician or even the hospital trust employing them. I have been told that the average time required to complete such a report—although it varies—would be around 10 hours, which does not include the extra time required if the clinician is required to attend court in person to give evidence.
The nub with the concern here, which has been raised by many clinicians, is that an unknown quantity of clinician time is being taken away from front-line patient care. As there is no national data, as I understand, on this, it is unclear how much. Again, as I understand it, CCGs and NHS trusts are not being paid for or equipped for their staff to be required to spend their time in such a way, and the very short timeframe often set by the court can lead to very considerable disruption of clinical priorities and patient appointments being changed at the very last minute.
I emphasise that I have no problems with the Court of Protection needing reports and expert advice—it is just that the system for getting it does not seem right to me, with the NHS being required to provide these reports in such a way. Frankly, there is cost shunting on to the NHS, but it is also having no regard for the impact on wider patient care. The Minister has said that he will be talking to the MoJ about a number of things. It would be very helpful to hear how the MoJ thinks this system could be better managed so it does not have such a deleterious effect on wider patient care. The purpose of this amendment is to get the Minister to explain and outline the Government’s thinking in this area.
Finally, Amendments 86 and 93 require two very crucial documents to be laid before Parliament before the provisions of the Act can come into force: the code of practice and the Government response to the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act. It is really where we started off this evening—certainly where I started off was looking at the interaction of those two pieces of legislation.
The one point I will make is that whatever recommendations the Mental Health Act review ends up making, it is clear that as long as we have separate legislation to govern mental illness and mental capacity, we absolutely must consider the interaction between those two frameworks. In terms of implementation, the early introduction of the Bill prevents the review from making suggestions that touch on the scope of the LPSs we are discussing. Therefore, it is crucial that the Government respond to the review’s recommendations before the LPSs that we are talking about at the moment can come into force.
Baroness Barran
I am sorry to take noble Lords back a step to Amendment 87D, which is in my name and is really a probing amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her very warm support—she has unfortunately had to run for a train, but I am grateful to her.
It seemed to me, in thinking about this amendment, that there are a couple of points in the process of authorising liberty protection safeguards where there needs to be real rigour to check that the best interests of the cared-for person lacking capacity are upheld and that the least restrictive option is found in terms of depriving them of their liberty. We spent a lot of valuable time looking at the role of the care home manager in relation to this. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, was also alluding in part, in her Amendment 66, to the second actor in this, namely the responsible body. My amendment explores the role of the responsible body.
The first part of the amendment seeks to address the role of the responsible body, which, as I understand it, is effectively a safety net in the process. The aim is to encourage the responsible body to identify cases where it is more likely that those two key considerations have not been upheld. The second part of the amendment sets out a course to follow if that is the case. What I have been trying to imagine is what it is like to be sitting in the responsible body, the local authority or the hospital, with a pile of LPS forms to authorise. How can we keep the person doing that alert and using their discretion appropriately?
In the first part of the amendment, what I am getting at is a way to set clear criteria for the responsible body to follow, such that if the criteria were met it would trigger a review of the applications in more detail. I do not have a definitive list of what those criteria might be but, for example, one might imagine that if the care home in which the cared-for person was going to reside had been rated as inadequate by the CQC, it might be a prompt for a further review, if that care home manager had arranged the assessment.
Other possible criteria might involve what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, referred to as “unbefriended” people. I am much sure whether this is technically unbefriended, so forgive me, but if someone has no friends or family and a carer has some kind of indirect financial interest in the outcome of the decision, that might be another case of where these criteria might trigger further review. The assumption would be that this amendment would apply whatever the source of funding for the cared-for person. There may be other criteria that would be more helpful, and I am sure that noble Lords who are more experienced in this area than I am will think of what these might be.
In the second part of the amendment, I have simply suggested that, if there is cause to examine an application more closely, it should follow the pathway set out in paragraph 18 of new Schedule AAl. Obviously, if this route is taken, consideration needs to be given to resources, since we do not want to create a conflict of interest for the responsible body—the mirror image of some of the conflicts we have talked about for the care home manager. We certainly want to avoid a situation where there is a financial disincentive to review those cases which genuinely warrant a review.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, this group of amendments covers a range of things that need to be done before the commencement of the Act, and steps that should be followed later, as proposed by my Amendment 92. Noble Lords have made powerful arguments in favour of their amendments. In view of the lateness of the hour, I will confine my remarks to Amendment 92, tabled in my name, with the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Jolly.
Amendment 92 would see two independent reports commissioned by the Government to be laid before Parliament within two and four years of the Act becoming law. The reports would provide a valuable update on how implementation was proceeding and would highlight areas for improvement. It has often been said that the Mental Capacity Act is a good piece of legislation that has been poorly implemented. If we want to see this Bill strengthened in all the areas we wish it to be, we will also need to monitor its implementation extremely closely, not least because the legislation affects some of the most vulnerable in our society and concerns their freedoms. Hundreds of thousands of people across England and Wales will be affected.
The amendment is modelled on the independent reviews that have accompanied the introduction of personal independence payments. The proposed report could look at a number of things: first, that decisions on whether someone’s liberty is restricted are truly being made in the best interests of the individual and not in the interests of providers or commissioners; secondly, that training is effective and ongoing and reinforces the rights of the individual; thirdly, that families and carers are involved and consulted as appropriate; and, fourthly, that advocacy is available to all who need it and is delivered effectively and impartially. Some very powerful arguments have been made in this short debate. I hope that the Minister will listen and that the Government will respond positively.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group. We have had a wide-ranging debate on areas where they would like to see various enactments, changes, reports and so on, before commencement and following implementation. I will attempt to deal with them thematically.
Amendment 86 requires that before commencement the Government must publish the code of practice and our response to the Mental Health Act review. Amendments 93 and 94 update Clause 5 to reflect this. I am happy to confirm that the Government will have published both of these before the new system commences.
Amendment 87 requires that the effectiveness of the Act is reviewed and a report laid in Parliament within a year of the Bill coming into force. As the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, just pointed out, Amendment 92 requires the Secretary of State to commission two independent reports on the operation of the new liberty protection safeguards scheme two and four years after the new system comes into force. Again, I am happy to assure noble Lords that the Government routinely conduct post-legislative scrutiny for all new Acts. The relevant guide says that within three to five years of Royal Assent the Government will be required to submit a memorandum to the relevant departmental select committee with a preliminary assessment of how the Act has worked in practice. I am happy to confirm that the Bill will receive such scrutiny and the Health Select Committee will be informed.
Amendment 87A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, details requirements regarding a number of topics. As he pointed out, a number of these have already been addressed in our debates, including unsound mind, issues around advance consent, the availability of non-means-tested legal aid, and others. We have had a debate on the rules and guidance around IMCAs, which we are clearly going to take forward. He focused on tribunals. The Government are reviewing the courts and tribunals system but that review has not concluded. We are not proposing to change the position on the Court of Protection hearing challenges to liberty protection safeguards in the Bill precisely because there is not yet an opinion or a policy change from the Government with regard to a proposed new system. He also asked about the cost implications, which are outlined in our impact assessment, as he will know.
The noble Lord’s second amendment, Amendment 87B, seeks to make the CQC the regulator for the liberty protection safeguards. The Bill allows for bodies to be prescribed to report and monitor the scheme and it is absolutely our intention that the CQC takes on this role in England. It clearly has an important role in oversight of the new system, although we are concerned that his amendment would introduce additional layers of regulation. It should also be pointed out that the CQC is an England-only organisation; in Wales, the overseeing regulators are expected to be Healthcare Inspectorate Wales and Care Inspectorate Wales, which will both take on this role.
Amendment 87D was tabled by my noble friend Lady Barran and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. It would require responsible bodies to consider criteria to be published by the Secretary of State around best interests and the least restrictive option before authorisations are approved under the liberty protection safeguards. These are of course absolutely key principles of the Mental Capacity Act, and responsible bodies will have to consider them as part of any authorisation. As I have set out in previous debates, these factors already form part of the necessary and proportionate assessments, as well as other factors such as considering the wishes and feelings of the person. We will explain in the code how this assessment should be carried out and the factors that assessors should have regard to. I am grateful to my noble friend for some suggestions in that regard and I have just confirmed that the code would be published before commencement of the new scheme.
Amendment 87F, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, would remove the power of the Court of Protection to call for reports from local authorities and NHS bodies in cases relating to a cared-for person under the schedule. We think it is important, as I am sure she does, that the Court of Protection has access to such information but I heard the story that she told about an undue burden. I am certainly happy to commit to her that I will speak to colleagues in the Ministry of Justice to see whether there is any way that this process can be improved without removing the ability of the court to access the information it needs to make proper determinations.
Amendment 92A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, seeks to ensure that the liberty protection safeguards do not apply to any existing or pending DoLS authorisations. I can confirm that existing DoLS authorisations can continue until they are due for renewal or review. Clearly, depending on the final outcome of the Bill, the frequency with which those are renewed or reviewed will mean that there will be a steady stream of DoLS authorisations coming under the liberty protection safeguards in future, for those that are rolled over. Careful work will clearly need to be done with the sector to ensure that a tsunami of new authorisations does not happen but allowing for authorisations to continue under the previous system, until they can reach review or renewal, should go some way toward mitigating that risk.
Finally, Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, states that regulations should be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure and a consultation requirement. We have of course asked the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its opinion on the regulation-making powers within the Bill and it has accepted that the negative procedure provides appropriate parliamentary oversight. As the Committee knows, we go against the DPRRC’s recommendations at our peril.
I apologise for detaining the Committee for six or seven minutes but I wanted to be thorough. I hope that I have been able to give the reassurances that noble Lords were looking for about the safeguards that we will put in place before commencement and the reviews of effectiveness to ensure that the system is working as intended. I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not move their amendments.
Baroness Jolly
I thank the Minister and others who have spoken on this group. We all want to ensure that the new mental capacity Act—presumably of 2019—works and that the Department of Health and Social Care monitors its implementation. I know that we on these Benches look forward to working with the Minister and others between now and Report to ensure that the Bill is actually fit for purpose. I gently suggest that a longer time gap than is usual between Committee and Report might be needed. I guess that those conversations might need to be held with the usual channels but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Thornton
“Compatibility with European Convention on Human Rights
So far as it is possible to do so, all provisions under this Act must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Article 5 (Right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
Baroness Thornton
This is the last amendment, and I will be very brief. It is quite appropriate that the last amendment we consider is about Article 5 of the ECHR, which is about the core of the Bill: people’s liberty and the deprivation of it. I have four things to say. The reason this amendment is so important is because it addresses the things that we have found lacking in the Bill which we feel need to be addressed. They are: the availability of information; advocacy and the fact that people need to have access to champions; representation; and the conflict of interest that arises when a detainer is required to assess a detainee. Particularly where a financial interest is in play, it is obvious that it has to be addressed if the proposals in the Bill are to be Article 5 compliant, which they need to be. That is the test that we need to apply to the Bill all the way through. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness has given us this opportunity to discuss a really important matter, albeit that it is late at night. I noted what the Minister said at various times throughout the debate about reliance on the code of practice. He will know that, as we have been trying to make clear all the way through the debate on the Bill, if some rights are not statutory rights in the Bill, then compliance is inn question. I rather suspect that the Bill that was presented to us was not compliant. I do not see how a Bill which, on the face of it, would enable somebody to be detained without being met and assessed by a professional person could be compliant.
There are a number of key matters which the Government are, at the moment, talking about putting into the code of practice—perhaps, possibly on a good day, into regulations—but which need to go back into the Bill. If they do not, the responsible body will not have the statutory responsibility to see that they are carried out. They are: the basis for the detention and the necessary and proportionate test and when that test applies; the role of IMCAs and access to appropriate persons; professional qualifications and training for people undertaking those pre-authorisation reviews; where an AMCP referral should be made; and the obligation to provide information to the person and their family about authorisation. All those things are important.
I say from these Benches that if we do not have considerable movement towards putting those things into the Bill, however briefly, the Bill will still be in trouble when we come to Report.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, I have spoken several times in Committee about my concern that the Bill as it stands is an assault on human rights. I have also mentioned in past debates that I am proud of the reputation of the all-party British delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, so ably led by Sir Roger Gale, which has a proud record of defending human rights in that body. Article 5 of the ECHR protects our right to liberty and security. It focuses on protecting individuals’ freedom from unreasonable detention as opposed to protecting personal safety. As a result of Article 5, your Lordships and I have a right to personal freedom. That means we must not be imprisoned or detained without good reason. The Bill before us is about the quality of life, and the care and the respect of some of our most vulnerable fellow citizens. This amendment is about giving our fellow citizens, who may not have the capacity to defend themselves in the way that we take for granted, the same rights that we enjoy.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, this is a good way to finish our Committee proceedings. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for tabling the amendment, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for speaking to it.
Clearly, not only ought it to be the case that the Bill is compliant with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but it is also important to make it clear, as I did at the point of the introduction of the Bill, that its provisions are compatible with Article 5. As noble Lords will know, and as becomes painfully clear when you become a Minister and you see your name on printed Bills giving these kinds of reassurances, that is a process that we need to go through before introducing legislation. Clearly, there are still concerns about whether the Bill can be improved in giving force, as the noble Lord pointed out, to the rights under Article 5. Nevertheless, it is my view that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR.
Furthermore, because of Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1988, primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with convention rights. It is already the case that the Bill must be read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with Article 5. My concern with the approach here is therefore not so much one of repetition but one of partiality because it only talks about Article 5. There is therefore a risk that if we implied that this legislation had only to comply, or had a special duty to comply, with Article 5 of the convention rather than the whole convention, that would not reflect our responsibilities under the Human Rights Act. Indeed, it could downplay critical protections that exist in the ECHR, such as the Article 8 rights to family and private life. So while I understand the motivation behind tabling the amendment and using it as an opportunity to rehearse some of the desire to improve the actions that will safeguard the liberty and security of the person, I do not think it is right to put such a clause in the Bill precisely because the Government have a broad responsibility to ensure not only that the Bill is compliant but that it is read and given effect to in a way that is compatible with all convention rights.
I hope that has provided reassurance to noble Lords that our intention, and indeed our obligation, is to provide not only for those Article 5 rights but for all other rights that apply under the ECHR. I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that answer, and for his recognition that the reason for tabling the amendment at this point in the Bill was to allow us to say that these were the issues we needed to address, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and my noble friend Lord Touhig outlined. I am pleased that the Minister has acknowledged that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 21st November 2018
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-R-I(Rev) Revised marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (20 Nov 2018)
18:24 - Division on Amendment 27 - Ayes: 202 / Noes: 188 - Amendment 27 agreed.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“Part 8 contains transitory provision.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, before I introduce this first group of what I hope are uncontroversial and technical amendments, I want to express my sincere thanks to all noble Lords who have been involved in a good deal of hard work between Committee and today in order to get the Bill into better shape. When we set out on this process at Second Reading, noble Lords had some concerns about the Bill, which crystallised in Committee. I think we have made a good deal of progress since then, which could not have happened without their contribution. I hope we are able to make similar degrees of progress today.
The amendments in this group straightforwardly make technical changes to the Bill. Amendment 1 reflects that transitory, or temporary, provision related to 16 and 17-year olds will be included in a new Part 8 of the schedule. Amendment 10 inserts a definition of “clinical commissioning group”. Amendment 148 removes an unnecessary provision regarding statutory instruments from the Bill. Clause 5(3) reflects that regulations under Clause 5 will be made by statutory instrument. However, Clause 5(7) already provides that regulations under Clause 5 are to be made by statutory instrument, so the words in Clause 5(3) are superfluous. I hope everyone can follow that—I promise it is straightforward and technical. On that basis, I beg to move.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
“(1A) For the purpose of paragraph 2(1)(b), arrangements which give rise to the deprivation of the cared-for person’s liberty are those in which—(a) the cared-for person is subject to confinement in a particular place for a not negligible period of time; and(b) the cared-for person has not given valid consent to their confinement.(1B) For the purpose of paragraph 2(1A)(a), a cared-for person is subject to confinement where—(a) the cared-for person is prevented from removing himself or herself permanently in order to live where and with whom he or she chooses; and(b) the dominant reason for the deprivation of liberty is the continuous supervision and control of the cared-for person, and not treatment for their underlying condition.”
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my interests in the register. Concern has been raised repeatedly throughout this Bill, both in this House and outside, that there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a deprivation of liberty. That is what this group is about. My amendment is designed to provide practitioners, families and the cared-for person with an agreed interpretation that is unambiguous as to where deprivation of liberty is enacted and a clear sense of understanding of to whom it should actually apply. Including a definition in the Bill would allow guidance and information to be developed for families and practitioners to allow them to make what I would call a real-world assessment of whether the care arrangements they are putting in place when their loved one lacks capacity amount to a deprivation of liberty. In many cases this will allow them to steer clear of depriving someone of their liberty, quite often unwittingly, because the line would be that much clearer.
I welcome the report on the Bill from the Joint Committee on Human Rights which was published on 26 October. It addresses clearly the need for a definition of the term “deprivation of liberty”, and of course raised other concerns as well. Unless we have a clear definition which is supported by parents, families will be at risk of the courts interpreting their personal situation in different ways. I know from the many briefings and correspondence I have received that this is strongly supported by the sector. Having looked at the report, noble Lords will be aware that the definition I have proposed is derived from the JCHR report. I believe that in fact two definitions are offered in the report and later we will hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is proposing the other definition. I am sure that he will put forward good arguments for doing so, given that he was a very distinguished member of the Joint Committee.
I have gone for the definition that I am proposing because I think it is simpler and easier. I think it best captures the recommendations made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, in the Cheshire West case. She was clear that a definition was necessary in future primary legislation. As we have noted many times during the passage of this Bill, the test, which was referred to in the Joint Committee’s recommendation, references the case taken by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, Cheshire West and Chester Council v P in 2014. The key sentence she noted was that the person concerned,
“was under continuous supervision and control and not free to leave”.
Unless we have a statutory definition in the Bill, I strongly suspect that the question of what actually constitutes a deprivation of liberty will continue to have to be determined by reference to Article 5 of the ECHR and indeed will continue to come back to court for further clarification.
I shall say briefly that while it would be possible to include a definition in the code of practice rather than in the Bill itself, I do not think that that will satisfy a court. The best form of protection would come from the inclusion of a definition in the Bill itself. We are looking at this issue again in primary legislation partly because recent court rulings, including the Cheshire West case which I have already referred to, have radically changed who deprivation of liberty applies to and, frankly, have substantially increased the number of people it covers; hence the reasons we are here.
I hope very much that the Minister, who has listened carefully and, if I may say, responded constructively to many of the arguments that have been put forward both in Committee and since, will have something positive to say on this point. I recognise that the definition could do with some more work and I am sure that the Bill team could look at it and come back at Third Reading. However, if there are any fears of unintended consequences, my view is that a well-drafted definition will pose considerably less risk than having no definition at all, which leaves patients and practitioners exposed to different legal interpretations and subsequent consequences.
I conclude by saying that without a definition in the Bill, any future interpretation by the courts could lead to a wide range of outcomes for cared-for people and their families which could undermine the very essence of the new LPS scheme. That is what this Bill is all about. It seeks to provide clarity, but without a definition it simply will not do so. I beg to move.
Lord Woolf (CB)
My Lords, I am very grateful for the expectation about my contribution to this debate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, just referred to. I am only too conscious that I shall disappoint her, but I will do my best.
First, I must disclose an interest. I have a relative whom the Bill may affect. I am also a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, was quite right in everything she said about the committee’s report, which has something useful to say in connection to this. I hope the Minister will agree with that. I see him nodding his head and telling me that it is so.
I shall focus on the second amendment proposed by the committee, which supplements the one moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It is designed to limit the unintended harm caused as a consequence of the Cheshire West case, which is not easy. That harm takes two forms: first, it has resulted in a huge increase in the number of people who will be caught by the Bill; secondly, it means that people who do not need the precise benefits normally available to those in their position are dragged into that protection to their disadvantage.
I shall try to describe the persons concerned. They are people who have problems that would fall within the context of the Bill, but are residing, possibly in their home or some other institution, somewhere where they are perfectly content and well looked-after. There is no problem in their case. I do not think it necessary to expand the burdens on the Treasury caused by people in their condition by including them, unless it can be shown that there is a real necessity. Although the language of the amendment proposed by the committee, to which I am speaking, is complex, if one reads it carefully it does not give rise to any difficulties, but it could have the ameliorating effects to which I have referred. For those reasons and those the noble Baroness has given, I commend this amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I should like to comment on these amendments. Before I do that, I thank the Minister on behalf of everyone for listening, as well as for his willingness to meet Peers and to move on the things that had caused enormous concern to many of us.
I have a couple of concerns regarding these amendments. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for trying to get us back to a definition. I completely agree that if we do not have a definition, the matter will go to court and we will end up back in a circle that we do not want to be in. The problem I see is the non-negligible period, which will be really difficult to define. If somebody is in a confined space for even 10 minutes or a quarter of an hour, that could be absolutely terrifying for them and completely unjustifiable. We have a difficulty in trying to use time as a measure, but I understand why it is there as well.
In his amendment, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, certainly includes the principle of consent, which means that there should be information that the person has capacity and that their care and treatment are voluntary. I was a little worried, however, that his proposed new paragraph 2(1B)(d) in the amendment, which would require two clinicians to confirm in writing, rather ran counter to the principles set out in Part 1 of the Mental Capacity Act itself, Section 1(2) of which states:
“A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity”.
It almost turns itself on its head if you must have somebody to verify that they have capacity.
I note that in his letter to us, the Minister stressed the importance of supporting liberty as much as possible and valid consent wherever possible. Would the Minister be prepared to say that we can work on this between now and Third Reading? If we can reach a definition that seems right by then, we will have done the whole community a great service.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for bringing forward the amendments. I can see that the Government have a decision to make about which way to go on them.
Listening to the Joint Committee on Human Rights is always a good idea. We discussed a statutory definition during the previous stage of the Bill, when the Minister repeated that he,
“should like to take some time between now and Report to consider the opinion expressed by noble Lords and in the report of the Joint Committee about the benefits of a statutory definition”.—[Official Report, 5/9/18; col. 1849.]
I understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is thanking the Minister already but it may be slightly premature. I know what she means, but let us wait until the end of the next day and a half. It is important that the Minister shares with us now where that thinking has led him.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, I am more than happy to do so. I express my gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for tabling their amendments and for precipitating this incredibly important debate. As has been set out, Amendment 2, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, states that the liberty protection safeguards apply only to,
“arrangements which give rise to the deprivation of the cared-for person’s liberty”,
when,
“the cared-for person is subject to confinement in a particular place for a not negligible period of time … and … the cared-for person has not given valid consent”.
The amendment explains that someone is confined when they are,
“prevented from removing himself or herself permanently … and … the dominant reason for the deprivation of liberty is the continuous supervision and control of the cared-for person, and not treatment for their underlying condition”.
Amendment 4, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, also states that a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of liberty protection safeguards is where,
“the cared-for person is subject to confinement in a particular place for a not negligible period of time … and … the cared-for person has not given valid consent to their confinement”.
The amendment goes on to define “valid consent”, stating in particular that valid consent has been given when,
“the cared-for person is capable of expressing their wishes and feelings … has expressed their persistent contentment with their care and treatment arrangements … there is no coercion involved in the implementation of the … arrangements”,
and it is,
“confirmed in writing by two professionals, one of whom must not be involved in the implementation of the cared-for person’s … arrangements”.
The intention behind the amendments is to create a statutory definition of the deprivation of liberty, as has been discussed. I note that the amendments were influenced by the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I both applaud and welcome. We are aware, and the Law Commission’s consultation confirmed, that there is real confusion on the ground over the application of the so-called acid test and determining whether a person has been deprived of their liberty. In some cases, that has led to blanket referrals and applications for authorisations being made where there may be no deprivation of liberty at all.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, I promised to think about this issue and we have given it a great deal of thought. Like other noble Lords, we have reached the conclusion that deprivation of liberty should be clarified in statute. However, we want to get the definition right and make sure that it is compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR. I agree that the aims of the amendments are laudable. As I said, the Government support providing clarity in the Bill. However, as I am sure all noble Lords appreciate, this is a complex and technical issue, and we have to make sure that any amendment is compliant with Article 5.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out one particular concern around the use of the term “not negligible … time”. The point I want to make is much more technical, but it serves to introduce how difficult this issue is. I hope noble Lords will bear with me as I explain it; it is incredibly important. We believe that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, would not have the intended effect of defining deprivation of liberty, but would instead limit the application of liberty protection safeguards to those who fall within the respective definitions.
Section 64(5) of the Mental Capacity Act defines “deprivation of liberty” as having the same meaning as in Article 5. The definitions in the amendments would not change this. Deprivations of liberty that fall outside those definitions would still be deprivations of liberty under Article 5, and would still need to be authorised in accordance with Article 5. However, because the liberty protection safeguards would not apply, authorisation would instead need to be sought in the Court of Protection, which, as we know, can be a cumbersome and distressing process for persons and their families, and would have significant cost implications for public bodies and the court system
Furthermore, the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, although closely resembling the proposal put forward by the JCHR, also seeks to determine what valid consent would mean, and we are worried that that would not work in the way intended, because the definition is very broad. Its consequence could be that a significant number of people currently subject to DoLS authorisation would be caught by the definition and excluded from the liberty protection safeguard system, and tens of thousands of people might need to seek authorisation from the Court of Protection. Again, I do not believe that anyone would want to see that outcome. I notice that the noble and learned Lord is shaking his head, so clearly there is some disagreement on this point. I use it, however, to illustrate that there is a concern that we get this right.
Lord Woolf
I was shaking my head because I do not want to see what the Minister suggested might be a consequence.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I will come to that. I am using that technical point to illustrate that there are concerns with the amendments as laid. We recognise the importance of this issue and the strength of feeling on it in the House. As I have said, I see merit in the argument for having this defined in statute, and I am sympathetic to that point of view. I can therefore give noble Lords some assurance, and confirm today not only that we are working on this matter, but that we intend to bring forward an amendment in the Commons to give effect to a definition. We want to work with all noble Lords and other stakeholders, and of course the JCHR, to ensure that we can table an effective amendment that achieves our shared aims and gains the level of consensus that we all want to achieve, and that we shall be able to lay it and have it agreed during the Commons stages of the Bill. I hope that in providing that commitment, I have been able to reassure noble Lords of the strength of our intentions. We absolutely want to do this, and we want to get it right. I still think it will take a bit more time, but I know that, working together, we can achieve that.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I thank the Minister very much for his response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Tyler and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I acknowledge that he has listened to the arguments made in this House over the past few weeks. I understand why he cannot make a commitment to come back within the timescale of the Bill in this House. This is an important matter, and many different people have a great deal of expertise, practical knowledge, legal knowledge and so on, to put into the process of coming up with a definition, which will be extremely difficult.
Would the Minister therefore be so good as to write to noble Lords as soon as he can, setting out the timetable of the work the department intends to undertake and the people they intend to involve in discussions, which I hope will include practitioners, stakeholders and academics, medical experts and so on, as well as Members of your Lordships’ House who have reviewed the operation of the current law and found it deficient? Could he do that as soon as possible so that, when we come to consideration of Commons amendments when the Bill comes back to this place, we will be able to give this subject the attention it merits rather than the rather perfunctory consideration that we usually have to give to arguments that come back to us within a very technical parliamentary framework?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am happy to give that commitment, bearing in mind that there is always uncertainty about the timing of Bills’ progress but, in terms of the work we will do to come up with the definition, I am more than happy to do that and to include estimates—I see the Chief Whip coming into the Chamber—of the timing of the further parliamentary stages.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
I thank the Minister for his full and helpful reply. This has been a good and important debate to start this afternoon’s debate. I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to look at this. He has twice confirmed the Government’s position, which is that it is important that the definition is clarified and contained in the statute. That was the purpose of my amendment. He is right to say that this is complex and technical and that we need to get it right. I fully understand that that needs a bit of time. Although at one stage I hoped that this might be able to come back at Third Reading, I fully understand why he said that the Government will lay an amendment in the Commons stages, and I support my noble friend Lady Barker in her request for a letter setting out the timescale of the work and who will be involved. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Meacher
“(1A) This Schedule does not apply to deprivation of liberty processes in a domestic setting, arrangements for which must be undertaken under the Care Act 2014.(1B) This Schedule does not apply to deprivation of liberty processes where a dominant reason for the deprivation of liberty is the treatment of an underlying condition covered by the Mental Health Act 2007, except in exceptional circumstances.”
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Murphy, who added her name to this amendment, apologises because she unfortunately cannot be here as she is not in the country.
Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for really listening to the serious points that have been made by noble Lords across the House and for taking things forward substantially since we started this work.
The two issues that I want to raise are, first, that it may be unhelpful to include within the LPS system cases where there may be a deprivation of liberty in a domestic setting and, secondly, that it may be helpful to all concerned if the Bill makes it clear as far as possible—and I know this is difficult—where the boundary lies between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act. I will discuss these issues in turn. Their only common feature is that they concern two groups of people whose deprivation of liberty issues might best be dealt with outside this Bill.
Turning to the question of people in domestic settings, we should probably start with the Supreme Court’s judgment in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council, which has been referred to many times, which set the acid test of when a deprivation of liberty is occurring. Importantly, it lowered the threshold so that deprivations of liberty can also occur in domestic settings. This is absolutely right. It is perfectly possible to envisage cases where abusive relatives may be depriving a family member of their liberty in an inappropriate, disproportionate and even cruel way. A system to deal with such situations is absolutely necessary—I am not questioning that for one minute—and that system must ultimately have a process involving access to a court to determine disputes. The question is what system is appropriate for such cases and how far it can go to try to avoid references to court wherever possible, because these things can be very distressing for relatives and others involved.
Your Lordships will be aware that some informal carers consider the LPS system to be too expensive and an intrusion on family life. My noble friend Lady Murphy and I are—I was going to say “inclined” to agree with them, but we actually very much agree with them. Which system would provide a proportionate and effective protection of the liberty of people in domestic settings is what this amendment is all about.
The British Association of Social Workers, which represents the best interest assessors and others involved in deprivation of liberty cases at present, proposes that a new statutory definition could exclude home situations and domestic arrangements from a deprivation of liberty, thus removing the current expensive practice whereby the Court of Protection has to authorise these to make them lawful. In this scenario, the safeguarding provisions of the Care Act 2014 would be drawn on to protect people’s liberty within domestic settings.
We hope that between the Lords and Commons stages of the Bill—I do not think anything can be done before Third Reading—the Government will consult on this question and come up with very clear amendments to this Bill and to the Care Act 2014 regulations in order to establish a proportionate and effective system to deal with liberty issues in domestic settings. Both will be necessary.
I will give an example to clarify the real importance of proportionality. Under the safeguarding procedures, an 85 year-old caring for her 89 year-old husband with severe dementia, who feels she can manage only if her husband stays in one room, will have a stream of people calling to assess the needs and potential risks which might be involved. Nine different people may be coming to the house—the poor woman does not know who they are or what they are there for. In our view, she should not have to deal with yet more bureaucracy if it can possibly be avoided. It can be avoided if the safe- guarding professionals are able to assess the deprivation of liberty issue alongside—and within the same visit as—the other assessments. The Government will need to consider the definition of “domestic setting” and to determine whether this includes supervised living arrangements, which, of course, are not care homes. Again, that is a matter on which we need to defer to the Government to work out between the two Chambers.
I turn now to the dividing line between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act, as amended by this Bill. Unlike DoLS, which are always based on the best interests of the individual, LPS may result in a person being deprived of their liberty, primarily where there is a risk of harm to others. In such cases, the best interests of the others who may be harmed must be taken fully into account, even at the risk of limiting the liberty, and indeed the best interests, of the individual who may cause the harm—one wants however to avoid that as far as possible. The two groups who come to mind are those with Lewy body dementia, and a small number of people suffering from autism. Sub-paragraph (1B) of our amendment would result in such cases being assessed under the Mental Health Act apart from in exceptional circumstances—I was persuaded that that was an important sub-paragraph to include within any amendment. These assessments would be done by people with experience of assessing risk resulting from disorders of the mind. They would be well equipped to assess deprivations of liberty and their necessity in these particular cases.
In my discussions with Sir Simon Wessely, who is leading the Mental Health Act review, and quite separately in a meeting with two of Sir Simon’s colleagues on the review, I came away clear that it would be helpful to flag up the need for further work on this issue. The Law Commission had proposed that,
“risk of harm to others”,
should be an additional possible reason for detention under their “necessary and proportionate” test, and this was explicitly written into their draft Bill. Interestingly, the Government omitted the relevant text from their Bill.
Recently, the Government said in passing that “risk to others” will be a basis for detention, but this will be set out in the code of practice. I hope the Minister will agree that this really is unsatisfactory, unless the code of practice sets out that detention on grounds of risk to others will not be dealt with in this Bill. One could probably do that in the code of practice, but not the opposite. Is that in fact what the Government have in mind?
This is the issue where the outcome of the Mental Health Act review could relate directly to this Bill. The review reports on 12 December, and no doubt the Government will know the conclusions some days before that. I urge the Minister to try to ensure that work is done to produce an amendment to this Bill, clarifying the position of these relatively small groups of people who might best be assessed under the Mental Health Act rather than under this legislation.
The issue of stigma was raised earlier, but even the Royal Family are trying to address stigma with regard to mental illness. One should not put groups of people under the wrong legislation as a method of dealing with stigma, as it will not deal with it.
As the Minister made clear in our meeting, the best interests test is clearly set out in the Mental Capacity Act, and that carries forward into the Bill. That is absolutely right and important, but this is the most powerful argument for excluding “risk to others” as a criterion for deprivation of liberty under the Bill. These two situations—deprivation of liberty issues in domestic settings and deprivation of liberty due to a risk to others—require an appropriate judicial body for determining challenges to authorisations of deprivation of liberty. The judicial body needs to be accessible to enable participation in the proceedings of the person concerned, the speedy and efficient determination of cases, and the desirability of including medical expertise within the panel deciding the cases, when that is necessary—but not when it is not, which is important.
I hope that the Government will consider widening the scope of mental health tribunals to include a limited number of mental capacity cases as discussed here. The tribunals could be named mental health and capacity tribunals. In many cases, the judge of such a tribunal could determine the case on the papers without the involvement of the full tribunal. Sir Simon made the point to me that we do not have sufficient psychiatrists in this country, and we do not want a great backlog to build up simply because there are not the people to do the job. He seems to think that we have an abundance of judges—that would have to be checked; I do not know about that. These two important issues have not been given adequate attention. I beg to move.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, we on these Benches recognise that the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Murphy, have been persistent in raising these issues throughout the course of the Bill. They are absolutely right that these issues have to be addressed and that they are not covered adequately; the briefings we have had suggest that they are not. The reason that possibly we have not been able to develop enough of a head of steam on this is that we have been focusing on other issues in the Bill, which we will come to. The Minister may not be able to resolve this immediately, but I hope that he will recognise its importance and bring forward a solution.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I express my gratitude to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Murphy, for tabling this important amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, pointed out, the effect of the amendment would be to ensure that liberty protection safeguards do not apply to a deprivation of liberty in a domestic setting, and that these should be dealt with under the Care Act. It further states that the schedule does not apply where the dominant reason for the deprivation of liberty of a person is for an underlying condition under the Mental Health Act.
The effect of the amendment as tabled would mean that people deprived of their liberty in domestic settings could not have that authorised through the liberty protection safeguards or the Court of Protection. Instead, their case would fall to be dealt with under the Care Act 2014. I appreciate that the intention is that in most cases deprivation of liberty would be avoided through care planning and safeguarding under the Act. But nevertheless, in some cases there will need to be an authorisation of a deprivation of liberty in domestic settings.
I absolutely sympathise with the noble Baroness’s intention to reduce wherever possible intrusions into family life; as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, that has perhaps not been given sufficient time during the passage of the Bill so far, although it is nevertheless a significant issue. However, we have a concern with regard to the amendment as laid in that the Care Act does not in itself provide adequate Article 5 safeguards, and to rely on such a process could result in a real risk of incompatibility with convention rights.
Baroness Meacher
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for her helpful comments and the Minister for his considered and careful response and for his commitment to give really serious consideration to both of these issues in the gap between the deliberations of this House and those of the other place. I sincerely want to thank the Minister for all that, and on that basis I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, as we move on to this group of amendments, which deals with the extension of liberty protection safeguards to 16 and 17 year-olds, I thank all noble Lords for reminding us from Second Reading onwards of the absence of this provision when compared with the Law Commission’s report. Of course, we had accepted in principle that we wanted to move on this issue, but we needed to resolve some complexities about how it should apply. We have now done so and have brought forward amendments. I am grateful to all noble Lords, stakeholders and others who have contributed to this process.
Let me just outline in more detail what these specific amendments cover. Amendment 5 extends the liberty protection safeguards system to 16 and 17 year-olds.
Amendments 20 and 22 take into account the different legislative arrangements already in place for cared-for people aged 16 to 17. This group of young people are likely to have either an education, health and care plan—an EHCP—in England, or an individual development plan—an IDP—or statement of special educational needs in Wales. Amendment 21 provides that, for those cared for in the community, the same local authority that maintains their plan will act as the responsible body for liberty protection safeguards. If the person has neither of these plans, the responsible body will be the local authority that is providing accommodation for the person, or otherwise named in a care order; in any other cases, it will be the local authority for the area in which the arrangements for that young person are mainly undertaken. This provision aims to provide continuity for the person and to make the process less burdensome for them and their family. The local authority in these cases will know them best and have more knowledge of their circumstances and will therefore be able to make sure that the arrangements are the most appropriate.
Those aged between 18 and 25 and in the scope of LPS may also have an education, health and care plan or an individual development plan. Amendment 19 clarifies the responsible local authority for this group. Amendments 7 and 18 state that the responsible body for those aged 18 to 25 should be the same local authority that maintains the education, health and care plan or individual development plan. This will provide clarity and consistency in their arrangements too.
Amendment 22 has the effect of clarifying who the responsible local authority is if none of the other specific provisions applies for those aged 16 and 17. Those 16 and 17 year-olds who are cared for mainly in hospital settings will have the same responsible body as those who are 18 or over, which is the NHS trust, local health board or CCG.
Amendment 23 defines education, health and care plans and individual development plans.
Amendment 134 makes provision in Wales for the transition to the new system, to support children and young people with special educational needs or additional learning needs. We are continuing to consider, in conjunction with the Welsh Government, whether all the cohorts in Wales are captured under the current amendments. If there is a need to do so, we will come forward with new amendments in the other place in order to capture other cohorts, if they are identified.
Although liberty protection safeguard authorisation records will be stand-alone documents, we have listened to advice from noble Lords and will make it clear in the code of practice that information in the LPS authorisation that is relevant to meeting a young person’s special educational needs or additional learning needs should be included in their EHC plan or IDP—sorry for the acronyms.
Over recent months, we have worked together across government and with stakeholders to develop these amendments so that the new system complements and strengthens existing safeguards for 16 and 17 year-olds who lack capacity and who must be deprived of their liberty for care and treatment purposes. I hope that these government amendments address the concerns raised by noble Lords. I thank them again for raising them and for contributing to the development of these amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, we have had some very useful and, more often than not, constructive engagement with the Government during the passage of this Bill. The success of our collaborative working is certainly demonstrated in these amendments extending the provisions to 16 and 17 year-olds.
In the very early days of its thinking on this point, the Law Commission commented on the poor knowledge among health and social care professionals about how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 applied to 16 and 17 year- olds. A subsequent report stated:
“There are likely to be a range of issues that are specific to young people that will need to be included in guidance and/or codes of practice”.
The report went on to argue the need for dedicated training for professionals working with this age group and highlighted areas such as children’s services, mental health services, children and adolescent mental health services and adult mental health services, as well as schools. As an aside, my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen is currently writing a report for the Council of Europe addressing the health needs of adolescents in Europe, and I look forward to reading it.
On this very important matter, the Minister and his team should be congratulated on recognising that 16 and 17 year-olds are vulnerable to slipping through the gaps that the Bill would create for them if they were not included. This is a vitally important change to the Bill—many of the stakeholders consulted listed this as one of their main concerns. Extending the age to cover 16 and 17 year-olds will ensure that some of the most vulnerable young people can access adequate help and be empowered. On this side, we strongly support the amendments.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, the amendments in this group have been tabled to remove the references to “unsound mind” from the Bill. As was made very clear in discussions at Second Reading, in Committee and outside this House, we all agree that the expression “unsound mind” is outdated and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, reminded the House, it is not clinically relevant. Noble Lords have made it clear that they want to change this language and that it should not be used in the Bill.
It is worth remembering that “unsound mind” is the language used in Article 5 of the ECHR. It was included in the Law Commission’s draft Bill and we brought it over to our Bill because we were concerned about creating a gap in which some people who were entitled to Article 5 safeguards would not have access to the liberty protection safeguards and would have to have their arrangements authorised in the Court of Protection. The Government took the view that it would be unfair to deny people access to the protections provided by the liberty protection safeguards, particularly as we know court processes can be cumbersome for them and their family. However, noble Lords and the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended that further thought be given to replacing “unsound mind” with a medically and legally appropriate term and this is what we have done.
The Government have reflected on the debate in this House, particularly the expert legal insight provided by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—who is not in his place at the moment—whom I thank. Having done this, we are comfortable that we can use alternative language that is unlikely to create a significant gap. If people do fall out of this definition, they will still have recourse to the Court of Protection to authorise deprivations of liberty, although we expect the number of these cases to be very few. To achieve this, Amendment 6 removes the reference to “unsound mind” from the arrangements to which the liberty protection safe- guards apply and replaces it with “mental disorder”. Amendment 12 provides that “mental disorder” has the same meaning as under Section 1(2) of the Mental Health Act which is,
“any disorder or disability of the mind”.
This is also consistent with the approach under the current DoLS system and is therefore well understood by practitioners.
We considered other approaches, such as using the definition of a lack of capacity in Section 2 of the Mental Capacity Act, which refers to an,
“impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain”.
However, we concluded that this definition was too broad for the purposes of Article 5(1)(e), which permits the deprivation of liberty only on the basis of unsound mind. For example, the Section 2 definition could mean that people who are unconscious or have a brain injury, without psychiatric symptoms, might be able to be deprived of their liberty under the liberty protection safeguards scheme.
Amendment 12 removes the definition of “unsound mind” from the Bill. The noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Jolly, have tabled Amendments 25 and 50, which instead use the phrase,
“has disorder or disability of the mind”.
These words are also taken from the definition in the Mental Health Act and I believe the amendments are intended to have the same effect as the Government’s. Now that the Government have moved on this, I hope they will feel that to be the case. Finally, Amendments 14, 26, 51, 131, 132 and 133 update other parts of the Bill to reflect the removal of “unsound mind” and the substitution of “mental disorder”.
I end by thanking noble Lords for the robust debate on this issue. I have very much had my mind changed on this and give reassurance that people will not fall through the gap. We have got to a good position, which provides the kind of protection that we want while also getting rid of a phrase with connotations that none of us is happy with. On that basis, I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
My Lords, I need to inform the House that, within this group, Amendments 25 and 26 appear to be alternatives. Amendment 26 will be moved only if Amendment 25 is withdrawn or disagreed to.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, I support this group of amendments. One or two offer a slightly different definition or slightly different words but the key point for me, having moved a similar amendment in Committee, is that we have now removed the phrase “unsound mind” from the Bill. I know this is welcomed here and will be hugely welcomed by many in the sector. It means we will get rid not only of a very old-fashioned and stigmatising term but one on which there were also concerns—as I understood from my conversations with the Royal College of Psychiatrists—that it had no real clinical meaning. The term “mental disorder”—or the few more words added by other amendments—not only brings us in line with the Mental Health Act, which is good, but I am advised that it will also help to provide diagnostic clarity. That has to be a good thing too. I support this group of amendments.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, I support this group of amendments and I am delighted that the Minister has had his mind changed. Not using this phrase will change how people feel about their relatives who may be suffering from mental disorders. I am also optimistic that, in the longer term, using such modern nomenclature will make mental health professions more attractive to young people.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I also welcome these amendments; removing “unsound mind” is a major step forward. I have a couple of questions for the Minister and I hope he can clarify. I may have misheard him but I understood him to talk about head injury. It would be helpful if he could clarify that he was referring to acute head injury—or acute brain impairment of any sort—as opposed to long-term damage such as frontal-lobe damage, which can happen when you have had a major brain injury. This can result in very long-term problems and difficult behaviours, which may mean that people currently need to be assessed as subject to deprivation of liberty. Could he clarify that we are not discounting a whole group of people who, it is generally felt, benefit from being properly assessed and safeguarded?
I would also like confirmation from him on another group. In January 2015, the then Mental Capacity Act deprivation of liberty safeguards policy lead in the Department of Health wrote out quite widely. There had been a concern about people who were nearing the end of life, including palliative care patients and patients in hospices. It was made clear in this letter that if somebody had consented to a care package and then went on—as part of their disease process when they were dying—to need some restrictions, and possibly to be moved to another place of care, that would not fulfil the acid test as such; neither would it in the case of people who were being nursed in a side room who were not under continuous supervision and control. The reason was that, in palliative care cases, there is often a time when the family cannot cope as the patient becomes unconscious, is moved to a hospice or develops another condition that had not been anticipated. It would be an inadvertent consequence if this letter from January 2015 no longer stood. It has been important and has made care easier. It was following this letter that we were able to change the regulations for what had to be referred to a coroner. That made a major difference, because families found it terribly traumatic to find a relative subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguard having to be referred to a coroner. I simply seek clarification on those two issues, but I in no way question the importance of removing “unsound mind” from the Bill. I hope this is the beginning of us seeing the end of that term, which is stigmatising.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I welcome the replacement of “unsound mind”, but I ask the Minister to consider adding a safeguard to ensure that no one has their liberty denied because of a mental disorder without first being seen by a qualified doctor. It is essential that individuals are assessed for a mental disorder and not another condition presenting as a mental disorder, such as delirium or the side-effects of medication, which are common among older people. It is important that consideration is given to whether the disorder can be managed without depriving the person of their liberty. This requires assessment not only of their mental state but of their past and current physical health and medication. The assessment is a core part of this process. It has great significance because it relates to the deprivation of a person’s liberty. Who can carry this out should be stipulated in the Bill rather than in a code of practice. I ask the Minister to reconsider bringing forward an amendment to add this requirement to the Bill.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness on the assessments. The Minister’s amendment is very welcome, but clearly the assessment is crucial. My understanding is that in previous debates, as the noble Baroness suggested, he said that the code of practice will set out which competencies will be needed to carry out this assessment. Like the noble Baroness, I ask him to consider, perhaps between now and Third Reading, whether this might be better put in regulations than in the code of practice. I always worry a bit about the use of “competencies”. It is a word now used in many recruitment processes, but what exactly does it mean? Will it be done by a registered medical practitioner with sufficient expertise in this field? If not, what is the justification? The change the Government have made is enormously welcome, but it is very important that we are confident the assessment will be carried out appropriately.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, this group of amendments is most welcome. The term “unsound mind” is offensive in the extreme and historically has been used as a form of abuse to demean the dignity of the person to whom it is applied. These amendments mean that this old-fashioned term will no longer be in the Bill and that a phrase with no clinical meaning is rightly removed. Using the same term as the Mental Health Act, “mental disorder”—this link is explicitly made by the Government in Amendment 12—provides better diagnostic clarity.
Amendments 25 and 50 in the names of my noble friend Baroness Thornton and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, change “unsound mind” to,
“any disorder or disability of the mind”.
The Minister responded to those points in his opening speech. This is the language currently used under the DoLS in the Mental Health Act and it is to be welcomed.
Perhaps I may share with the House my personal experiences. My late mother suffered two nervous breakdowns in her life. One occurred before I was born, when she was put into an institution, where I do not think she was well treated. Later, she suffered a further breakdown when I was 16 and I had to take the lead, coping with and co-ordinating help and support for her, my father and our family. The consequences of her breakdown that I witnessed were traumatic not only for my mother, who was a loving, kind and thoughtful individual, but for our family, who witnessed times when she seemed to grow away from us.
My mother made a recovery and we all came through it, thanks to the devotion and understanding of our family doctor, our wider family and friends. However, our family experience has given me an understanding of some of the consequences of mental illness for individuals and their families. Families who experience what mine went through need support and understanding to cope, which is why I welcome the amendments.
I have said that the term “unsound mind” is used to cover many things. It is one that personally I find offensive, and I rejoice that those words are being removed from the Bill.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank all noble Lords for their support for these amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for sharing with us that story. It brings into sharp perspective the consequences of language and culture in the way that people are treated. We are trying to move to a more compassionate and comprehensive system of helping people who reach mental health crises. I appreciate him sharing that story, which was very moving.
Perhaps I may deal quickly with the questions raised by noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked whether long-term brain injuries would be included. The answer is that they would. The reference that I made was to the potential short-term impacts, which we would not necessarily want to capture in this definition. On her question about palliative care, my understanding—I will certainly confirm it, as I have not seen the letter—is that it still applies. I think that is the reassurance she was hoping to get.
In relation to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the assessment of a condition by a doctor, case law requires that such an assessment should be carried out by somebody who has objective medical expertise. In practice, that means a registered physician. Therefore, that reassurance already exists in jurisprudence, but I accept the importance of the point raised—that, perhaps except in an incredibly rare emergency, that kind of diagnosis should always be made by somebody with that level of competence or skill qualification, however you want to define it. I will write to noble Lords explaining the position as it stands in law and why we think that it gives the protection and reassurance they are looking for. We can then perhaps follow that up with a discussion if there are any remaining concerns. I certainly agree that this is an important issue.
I hope that I have dealt with noble Lords’ questions and I thank them again for their support and the challenge that has got us to this point of moving forward.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, we now come to the largest group of amendments on the issue that has perhaps taken up most of our attention in the progress of the Bill so far, and quite right too.
The government amendments in this group relate to ensuring that care home managers have an appropriate role in the liberty protection safeguards system that we are seeking to implement. You would have to have had ears of cloth not to have heard the concerns raised by noble Lords and stakeholders throughout the passage of the Bill about the proper role of care home managers. I agree that we must be absolutely clear at this stage in legislation about what is the right role for those care home managers. I also agree that there should be no scope for any conflict of interest—not when we are talking about the safety and care of very vulnerable people—and that we should ensure that all assessments are completed by those with the appropriate experience and knowledge. Furthermore, people should always have confidence that they will have access to independent support and representation.
I will shortly address the specific amendments in this group. Before I do so, I would like to draw noble Lords’ attention to other germane government amendments, which we will deal with on the second day of Report but which are important to consider in the round with the amendments in this group. Those include proposals that we have made to ensure that only responsible bodies can arrange the pre-authorisation review and that care home managers will be explicitly excluded from completing the pre-authorisation review. This is important because pre-authorisation should not confirm poor care planning or perpetuate a system where someone is receiving care in an inappropriate setting. The amendments that we have laid and which we will deal with on the second day will counteract any incentive the care home manager might have to ensure that a resident stays in a care home inappropriately. We are also determined to make sure that the care home manager cannot act as a gatekeeper to the IMCA appointment, and we have laid amendments accordingly.
There has been a great deal of discussion about the role of care home managers in authorisation. I have strongly and deeply considered noble Lords’ concerns in the context of what we know works now in the current system. There is a desire to make sure that the liberty protection system that we intend to introduce builds on what works and changes what does not. Under the current DoLS system, care home managers have the role of identifying that someone may lack capacity and need restrictions as part of their care. In practice, they must complete form 1, which brings together all of the current assessments for a person. This is then sent to local authorities, which appoint a best-interest assessor to conduct a further assessment ahead of providing the authorisation. This is an appropriate role for care home managers to undertake, and is the role we are proposing and clarifying through our amendments.
Amendment 30 requires the responsible body to make a decision on whether it is content that it is appropriate for the care home manager to carry out the relevant functions prior to authorisation, including arranging assessments and carrying out consultation. Amendment 90 applies this decision to reviews as well. This is an important change because it provides additional protections in cases where there may be concerns about a particular provider and its capability for conducting its role, and it allows responsibility to take on all the relevant functions in these cases. There may also be cases where there are no concerns about quality of care, but there may, for example, be particularly strong social worker involvement and it may make sense for them to take on those functions.
This power to remove the care home manager from the process can be enacted at any point, and we would expect it to be done at the earliest possible point, particularly if there are concerns. We will use the code of practice to set out the detail so that it is applied consistently by different local authorities, with clear criteria for the responsible body to make a decision on whether to retain responsibility for the relevant functions. In the case of care home residents, this significantly strengthens the role of local authorities in terms of oversight, intervention and supporting the quality of the operation of the scheme. If the responsible body has decided that the care home manager should be responsible for providing the statement and carrying out the other functions, the care home manager will bring together the information, evidence and assessments needed for the responsible body to make a decision on whether to authorise the liberty protection safeguard. In many cases, this will bring together recent valid assessments that can be used for this purpose.
As has been said previously, care needs change over time. We recognise that putting hard and fast rules on the validity and timeliness of assessments would not recognise the reality of what happens. That is why we will set out in the code of practice what we would expect to see in terms of valid and up-to-date assessments. The Bill also enables the responsible body to step in, if they are not confident in the validity of the assessments, by refusing to authorise the arrangements. Let me be clear that all the assessments would involve consultation with the person. In addition, the Bill will require the care home manager, or the responsible body, to complete the consultation with the person and other interested persons.
Some noble Lords have stated their concern that there is a potential conflict of interest if care home managers were to conduct assessments. The Government agree that there is a potential financial conflict if care home managers were to complete assessments for people in their own care homes, particularly when it comes to considering whether there are less restrictive alternatives. Amendment 52 explicitly excludes care home managers or others from undertaking the assessments if they have a specified connection to the care home, in particular if there is a financial connection. This will be set out in regulations. We will use the regulations to ensure, in England, that care home staff are not able to conduct assessments where they have a potential financial conflict of interest and the Welsh Government will have the power to do the same. Doing this in regulations allows us to provide the necessary detail, given the complexity of the care home sector, to ensure that there are no loopholes. For example, we would not want someone who works in another care home run by the same company to conduct the assessments.
Noble Lords have rightly asked questions about who undertakes the assessments and in particular why there were no clear requirements on the expertise of those who undertake capacity and medical assessments. That refers tangentially to the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, before. Although that is already provided for in binding Article 5 case law, I have been persuaded that more clarity is needed. Amendment 52 clarifies that capacity and medical assessments must be carried out by someone with appropriate experience and knowledge. Capacity assessments should be completed by a registered professional such as a nurse, social worker or occupational therapist, and medical assessments must be completed by a physician. We will set out in the code of practice the experience and knowledge that we would expect to see for those undertaking assessments.
On the point about experience and knowledge, Amendment 53 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, would have the effect of requiring that the person who conducts the assessment has the appropriate skills and knowledge. The noble Baroness is absolutely correct that the person who completes the assessment should have the necessary skills to be able to conduct the assessment. Amendment 52 already provides for that within the description of experience and knowledge and we would expect that to cover the necessary skills. We will define that in the code of practice so that it explicitly describes the skills, using the term “skills” and describing the kinds of skills that ought to be required of the person carrying out assessments.
There are also some minor amendments that clarify definitions of care home manager and responsible bodies. Amendment 8 updates the definition of care home manager. Amendment 9 corrects the definition of care home manager in Wales. Amendments 11, 15 and 24 set out a definition of English and Welsh responsible bodies. Amendment 17 removes the definition of local health board as it is now superfluous.
I hope that noble Lords have had a reasonable chance to examine all the government amendments in this group. They have been carefully crafted to reflect to the best possible extent all the concerns set out by noble Lords at Second Reading and in Committee to remove any concerns about conflict of interest and make sure that care home managers are not, to coin a phrase, marking their own homework. They have an important role in organising assessments, but it is effectively an administrative function with proper oversight, and assessments will be carried out by those with the proper qualifications, expertise, skill and knowledge. I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, there is a tone of disappointment because I welcome all the government amendments, but the role of my amendment to government Amendment 52 was twofold. First, I am disappointed that speech and language therapists were not in that list read out by the Minister, because we had a debate about the importance of communication skills. When communication is impaired, particularly with disorders that affect any part of the speech or throat cycle, it is very difficult to assess someone’s capacity.
I included skills because I worry that experience and knowledge are sometimes just not enough. If the Government insist on “skills” going into the code of practice, I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that the skills will be assessed and reviewed at appraisal, and that they demonstrate an understanding of the impact of fear—being frightened—on the way the person behaves.
The assessors must have a high level of communication skills and awareness of all the different ways that communication can be enhanced. I hope that they would also have an awareness of the impact of different types of medication on someone’s capacity, because sometimes changing the medication can really improve a person’s ability to make a decision for themselves.
Amendment 53 links to Amendment 74, which is in my name and will come up later. I am concerned that, without strong reassurance, some of these issues could slip by and we could inadvertently end up having superficial assessments of some people and not the thorough and in-depth ones they deserve. The whole principle of the Mental Capacity Act is to empower people to make their own decisions, and we are talking about trying to have the least restrictive option so that we can enhance a person’s liberty as much as possible. If that assessment is not meticulous with the appropriate skills, the wrong judgments could end up being made.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I realise that in the last group I mentioned general medical practitioners. I ought to inform the House of my forthcoming appointment to the General Medical Council.
We have had a lot to read in the last few days, and are clearly going to have to take a lot of this on trust, but the thrust of the amendments is welcome, and I am grateful to the Minister for tabling them. As he said, they strengthen the role of local authorities and give them a clear remit to intervene where they feel that, for one reason or another, the care home manager cannot discharge the responsibilities given in relation to the authorisation application appropriately.
In the letter that the Minister sent to a number of noble Lords, he set out factors that might be considered by the local authority as a responsible body. These would be:
“Whether the person has a care plan with the responsible body … local intelligence about a local provider of care homes”,
which would suggest that the responsible body takes over the process;
“insight from local commissioners or concerns about performance … sustained absence of a registered manager”—
or presumably when the turnover of managers is high, as it can be; and—
“an increase in concerns raised by residents, their carers or families … a new service or category of care provision, and/or … provision of poor or incomplete statements”.
To me that sounds very comprehensive and welcome.
What arises from this is that the responsible body will have to make a considerable judgment and, to make it, will need a very clear understanding of the care homes in its area. Could the Minister say a little about how he thinks that local authorities might be supported in that role? Clearly, they now have a major role which they have found it hard to discharge, for reasons that have been discussed. It is important they are able to do this in a consistent way.
The Minister mentioned the code of practice. It is a statutory code of practice, which I think means that it must be followed unless the local body has very good reason not to do so. It would be interesting to know what plans the department has for checking with the local authorities—not in a heavy-handed way—how well it is going after time and implementation, and seeing whether there is consistency across the country as a whole.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I too welcome the Government’s change of mind. They started with a very different understanding from ours of the current roles of care home managers, local authorities, best-interests assessors and DoLS assessors. I think we still have a difference of opinion about how life works in practice, but these amendments show a considerable movement, if not complete agreement on that part, and therefore we welcome them. I feel it is right to remind the Minister that when the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House did the post-legislative scrutiny on the Mental Capacity Act and its workings five years after its implementation, there was an overwhelming lack of information and data both in local authorities and throughout the health service. I rather think that we have been perhaps unnecessarily preoccupied in this Bill with who carries out a particular function rather than looking at the way those functions could possibly be streamlined and better audited.
I do not think that the work of a local authority best-interests assessor or a DoLS lead, however they may be termed under the new scheme, is actually going to change that much, but I welcome the attempt here to meet us half way, and I thank the Minister for that. Well, perhaps it is more than half way in terms of our assessment that what was being asked of care home managers was beyond their capacity to deliver. Big questions still need to be asked about their role in the overall scheme. If we had not spent quite so much time on this, we might have been able to look more closely at greater efficiencies in terms of reporting and so on. For the moment, however, I welcome these amendments.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, I too welcome the amendments and I thank the Minister and his team for the meeting we had earlier this week. He will recall that I raised my concern about different regimes operating in different parts of the country. A responsible body in my borough might decide that it alone would take responsibility for putting together applications, while in the next-door borough the care home manager and so on might be involved. I wanted to look at how we could get to a common approach right across the country. The Minister has helpfully sent us an excellent letter in response to the points I and others raised. In it he states:
“We wish to work with a wide range of stakeholders on developing the code of practice”.
Is he yet in a position to tell which stakeholders he will be consulting? Perhaps he could write and tell us at a later stage, because it would be awful if we left someone off who could make a valuable contribution to this work. The Minister goes on to say:
“We are beginning to develop a programme for the new Code of Practice for the Liberty Protection Safeguards, working alongside the Ministry of Justice. The MoJ is also about to start a project to review the Code of Practice for the wider Mental Capacity Act too, so we will have the opportunity to work on both”.
How does he plan for the two departments to consult between them with stakeholders when looking at the code of practice? Will he consider whether it would be worth setting up a group of interested parties who could act as a sounding board? As the code is developed, similar to what we have done with the Armed Forces covenant, we could bounce ideas off a group which might have an interest and make a contribution. Perhaps we could do something along the same lines. That might ensure that when in the end we get the code of practice, it will have widespread support and be of great benefit to those who we are concerned about.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling this suite of amendments which, as they say, change the position of care home managers from the original proposal to give them a significant role in applying the liberty protection safeguards—the scheme that is to replace DoLS in care homes. As the Minister said in his comprehensive introduction of this large group, they are a combination of technical amendments and others which are very important indeed. The amendments headed by government Amendment 30 are particularly relevant because they give the responsible body the ability to decide in certain circumstances to take over the authorisation functions in care homes in certain settings. The Government have said that they will set out the details in the code of practice. I shall return to the issue of the regulations and the code of practice in a moment.
Government Amendments 52 and 66 are equally important because they deal with conflicts of interest. The Government have said that the regulations will set out in detail the prescribed functions. I just want to ask a technical question. We do not quite understand why Amendment 78 has been severed from Amendment 73, which it seems to sit with; they are kind of twins and need to be taken together. I realise that we will be dealing with Amendment 73 next week, but they are very important amendments which give regulation-making powers, allowing the appropriate authority to make provisions about what constitutes a connection with a care home. They are also about conflicts of interest.
Amendment 90, as the noble Lord has said, gives the responsible body the ability to decide on the renewal of authorisation functions in care home settings. Listening carefully to what the Minister said when he introduced these amendments, one of the issues they raise is what goes in regulations and what goes in the code of practice. This has been a theme that we have discussed all the way through. It seems to me very important—and I seek reassurance from the Minister on this—that what goes in regulations is matters relating to powers and protection of the individual, and what goes in the code of practice is how those are carried out. Both are very important documents and it is important to address this, so that the right things go in regulations and the issue is comprehensively covered.
It is clear from the debates we have had throughout consideration of the Bill that we welcome the change of heart on policy. Some clarification and explanation will still be required as we move forward, but this suite of amendments does address the important issue of conflicts of interest in the powers of the care home manager and puts the interests of the cared-for person at the heart of the Bill, as they should be. It was clear from the beginning that this issue is of huge concern to all stakeholders on the Labour Benches, as well as across the House. That is why we submitted the suite of amendments early after Committee—strong amendments which addressed and fundamentally changed the role of the care home manager.
Noble Lords will see that the next group of amendments in the list are mine and are supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins. I thank them most sincerely for their support very early in this process. We went through the Bill and removed reference to, or significantly changed the role of, the care home manager. This group starts with Amendment 13, which I would like to assure the Minister, as I did the Bill team, I will not be moving today. These amendments were designed to specify the responsibilities of what we called the “nominated body”—in other words, a qualified body nominated by the responsible body in relation to the authorisation of care home arrangements. That suite of amendments makes it clear that the care home manager’s role is to co-ordinate the required information, determinations and assessment, rather than to carry them out. I am very glad that the Minister used almost exactly those words. What we call the nominated body will be designated by the responsible body. All the subsequent amendments in this group take powers away from the care home manager and replace them.
I was in the Minister’s place many years ago. Seeing these amendments coming down the track with support from across the House—and, indeed, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, which were sometimes even more radical in their intent—the Minister, the Bill team and his advisers were very wise to take a second look when one considers that all the stakeholders took the same view, without exception, I think. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, in that I regret that we met such obduracies, which is what they felt like from our point of view, from the Government in the early stages of the Bill about the role of the care home manager. That meant that we did not spend enough time on other issues that we should have addressed. We did not spend enough time on CCGs, the NHS and the place of local councils in delivering the new arrangements, as my noble friend Lord Hunt mentioned. We did not spend enough time examining the funding and resourcing of the new arrangements. The Minister got off quite lightly on those issues; I am sure that my honourable friends in the Commons will make up for where we lack in this area.
The test of the amendments is whether they fulfil the aims of the suite of amendments we tabled all those weeks ago. We are applying that test today. Can the Minister confirm that the government amendments would give the responsible local authorities the option of giving these roles to the care home manager or taking the responsibilities on themselves and, most importantly, that the care home manager will no longer be responsible for notifying the responsible body whether an IMCA should be appointed in any case? In Amendment 78, it seems that care home managers would not be able to commission anyone with a prescribed connection to the care home. That is to be welcomed.
As far as we are concerned, these amendments are lacking on the issue of—is it the AMPS?
Baroness Thornton
Thank you. I always get those initials wrong. We will discuss that issue tomorrow. As far as we are concerned, the amendments go a long way to meeting the issues that we have raised throughout the previous stages of the Bill. I am grateful for that and I offer them our support.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful for noble Lords’ support for this group of amendments. I might say that I recognise a juggernaut when I see one coming, but this was about not just the force or number of the amendments—or, indeed, the length of them—but the force of the argument. During this process, we have established the critical point that the care home manager has an important role in the new system, because we want to provide a more proportionate and flexible system, but equally that cannot put them in a position where they have too much power. That would compromise the rights of the people being cared for, who are obviously very vulnerable. The amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Thornton, gave us some idea of where noble Lords were headed and gave us some sense of shape and direction about where we ought to go to. We have made great progress, and I thank noble Lords for not just their input but their patience throughout this process. It has been trying and challenging for all of us at times, but we have made some great changes that will put the system on a much better footing.
I want to deal with the specific issues raised by various noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about speech and language therapists. In describing the amendments, I talked about professions “such as” those; she is right that I did not name them specifically. We need to consider which professions are included; clearly, we will want to consult relevant groups and noble Lords on that. Of course, we will make sure during that process that such professionals have the knowledge, skills and expertise that the noble Baroness is looking for. On skills, I recognise that she is disappointed; I hate to disappoint her. I think that this is an issue of semantics. Offline, I can provide assurance on what she is looking for, which is not a superficial case of whether these professionals have a certain degree or are a member of a certain professional body so that boxes can be ticked and we can go ahead. That should be avoided because it will not serve us very well.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about the role of local authorities. In the amendments, we have made it clear that the local authority has a prior role in making a judgment about the providers in its area. That was not clear in the Bill before—the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about that role as well—and it is an incredibly important judgment, because local authorities will need to be in a position to look across their provider network and see who they are clear and confident will be able to make such decisions and who will not. To take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, that will be set out in the code of practice. I will come to his point about stakeholders later. The most important thing is that this is a prior power, to be exercised by the responsible body.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“( ) in relation to Wales, the person who manages the care home service, within the meaning of Part 1 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016 (anaw 2), at the care home, by virtue of regulations made under section 28 of that Act;”
““clinical commissioning group” means a body established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006;”
““English responsible body” has the meaning given by paragraph 10A;”
““mental disorder” has the meaning given by section 1(2) of the Mental Health Act;”
Lord O'Shaughnessy
““Welsh responsible body” has the meaning given by paragraph 10B.”
Baroness Barker
“(aa) if the arrangements are carried out in an independent hospital, the designated NHS trust;”
Baroness Barker
My Lords, following our previous discussion, we turn to an area that has not received sufficient attention because we were so focused on care homes and care home managers. My Amendment 16 addresses the position of independent hospitals. I think independent hospitals in Wales might in part be addressed in Amendment 16A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and grouped with my amendment.
In the process of talking to stakeholders over the past few weeks, it became clear that many of the concerns that we have expressed over conflicts of interest for care homes also apply to independent hospitals, and therefore it seemed to us important to state in the Bill that where a person is deprived of their liberty and is in an independent hospital, the CCG or the local health board is the responsible body as, as we have discussed in great depth and tortuous detail over the past few weeks, is the parallel case for care homes and local authorities.
It is unfortunate that we missed this and have not discussed it as much as we should have. People deprived of their liberty in independent hospitals perhaps have the worst of both worlds. They do not have the protection of the Mental Health Act and they are perhaps less likely to come to the attention of an external body, such as a local authority, because their care is unlikely to have been through the care planning process. Therefore, they could be at a greater point of vulnerability. They may also be more likely to be deprived of their liberty because the deprivation may be something to do with medication. That is why I tabled this amendment, so that we could perhaps return to this at Third Reading. It is important that the Government make clear their intention that there should be clarity about the position of people held in these establishments, and that they do so swiftly and in sufficient detail. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker
My Lords, Amendments 16 and 16A appear to be alternatives, so Amendment 16A will be moved only if Amendment 16 is withdrawn or disagreed to.
Baroness Meacher
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment and I very strongly support it. Having been a Mental Health Act commissioner for many years and having visited independent hospitals as well as NHS hospitals and other establishments, I remember those independent hospitals as being the most alarming environments that I ever visited. Very often, the biggest problem was indeed the conflict of interest. People would get into those hospitals and be treated, and that was all good, but whereas in an NHS hospital the pressure all the time, from the day of arrival, is to plan the exit and aftercare in the community, once those hospitals had got the person better they had a lovely ride. The patient was there and was no trouble, no longer had symptoms and was miles—maybe hundreds of miles—from their family. They did not get visits. The conditions in which those people were held were shocking, and the degree of the deprivation of liberty was often deeply shocking. Did they go out in the grounds? Probably not. Did they go out for walks? Probably not. Any kind of a sense of liberty could be lost, not just for days, weeks or even months, but for years. We would do our tiny best, but the fact was that we might get round to one of those hospitals every two years. It was inadequate to say the least. I therefore urge the Minister to take this very seriously. We are worried about care homes, which are probably local and have the family nearby, if there is one. They can be a problem, but this is on another scale and of another degree of severity, so I strongly support this amendment and urge the Minister to consider it.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I, too, have put my name to this amendment. My noble friend Lady Meacher has laid out very clearly some of the problems and conflicts of interest that can arise. One of the difficulties is deciding which will be the responsible body. If the place where somebody is treated is quite a long way from whoever commissioned their care, it can create real problems for a local authority or a clinical commissioning group, which might be funding outside the range of common care for somebody to be some distance away. That is why we have to decide which is to be the responsible body, and that responsible body must take those responsibilities seriously. The advantage of the responsible body being a designated NHS trust is that the private hospital is likely to have consultant-level staff who are likely to have an NHS contract somewhere at another trust, which may be nearby, or if they are part of a specialised group they will be subject to a degree of oversight, appraisal and so on within that specialist area. They are less likely to have local GPs who would be answerable to clinical commissioning groups. One just does not know. They have to go to one or the other. The most dangerous of all would be to have what one might term a mixed economy of a responsible body in some situations and a clinical commissioning group or local health board in another.
In Wales, things are a little different because the local health board covers the hospital sector and the community, so we have clearly defined geographical boundaries with much easier lines of answerability. My feeling is that we need to plump for one. I hope that the Government will, and I can see that there may, on balance, be advantages in saying the designated NHS trust is the responsible body.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I shall speak to my amendment, which is in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said that the Government need to opt for something here to solve this problem. Mencap, in particular, and VoiceAbility have been very exercised by this because, as noble Lords have said, there is a conflict of interest when an independent hospital can be responsible for authorising deprivation of liberty for people in the hospital for the purposes of assessment and treatment of a mental disorder. My amendment names the CCG or local health board as the responsible body to remove that conflict of interest.
Since the Winterbourne View learning disability abuse scandal in 2011, the Government have been trying to reduce the number of people in these settings but, it must be said, largely without success. There remain 2,350 people with a learning disability and/or autism in these settings who in many cases could, with the right support, be in the community, but half of them are in independent hospitals. The independent hospital sector is expanding—to the horror, it must be said, of very many people. The average cost of a placement in an assessment and treatment unit for people with a learning disability is £3,500 a week. It can be as high as £13,000 a week. The average stay is of five and a half years. This is really not acceptable. Many noble Lords may have seen the excellent piece by Ian Birrell in the Mail on Sunday—not a newspaper I would normally read—which looked at the companies and the significant profits they make from these very lucrative contracts. The article details two giant US healthcare companies, a global private equity group and a Guernsey-based hedge fund, as well as two British firms and a major charity. The point is that these bodies are responsible for deprivation of liberty, and that can neither be acceptable, nor indeed what the Government intended. The Minister needs to provide us with some solution to this problem.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, I first thank the noble Baronesses for tabling their amendments and giving us the opportunity to debate, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pointed out, an incredibly important issue. We have heard examples of individuals and institutions where there have been tragic cases of people deprived of their liberty in independent hospitals, and these amendments have given us the opportunity to think about the best way forward to make sure there is proper oversight and authorisation in such cases.
Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay and Lady Meacher, makes the designated NHS trust the responsible body in independent hospital cases. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would make the CCG or local health board the responsible body where a person is accommodated in an independent hospital for the assessment of mental disorder.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and other noble Baronesses pointed out, stakeholders have raised this issue on many occasions. They have raised concerns about the level of scrutiny in these independent hospital cases. The Bill, as it stands, provides that in most cases the managers of independent hospitals are responsible bodies, meaning that they authorise arrangements carried out mainly in hospitals. The amendments seek to address this by changing the responsible body, and I have great sympathy with their intention.
We know that those in independent hospitals often have particularly complex needs, especially those being assessed or treated for mental disorders. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said we need a solution, but I think there is a different solution, which could improve—if I dare say so—on the amendments tabled by the noble Baronesses. Rather than changing the responsible bodies, it would be even better if we required an AMCP to complete the pre-authorisation review in such cases. We know that the AMCP is a registered professional, accountable to their professional body, and that they would meet the individual, and any other interested parties, in person. The Government believe that independent hospitals would benefit from AMCP involvement, and therefore our intention is to bring forward an amendment, or amendments, as required, in the Commons to deal with this issue and make sure that there is such a role for the AMCP in all deprivation of liberty cases.
Baroness Thornton
If I might set this in the vernacular, one of the reasons that we have been so concerned about the conflicts of interest and powers for the care home manager is that we wonder how anyone can be sprung, as it were, from the situation in which they find themselves. How would an AMCP do that? How could they be liberated from the situation they are in if the deprivation of liberty power remains with the chief executive or manager of the private hospital?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
The reason is that although the deprivation of liberty would take place in that institution, every single case would be examined by an AMCP. The pre-authorisation review and scrutiny would be carried out by the AMCP. They would have the ability to examine the case, to speak to the person and all other relevant interested persons, and to challenge, if necessary, the circumstances of the deprivation of liberty or the care that had been put in place.
To take the hierarchy of decision-making in a care home, for example, the arrangements are made by, but not carried out by, the care home manager. They are referred to the responsible body for preauthorisation review, and if there are concerns of a problem at the level of the responsible body—an objection on behalf of the person or on behalf of somebody who cares for or is connected to them—it would go immediately to the AMCP. In a sense, this vaults the decision-making process beyond the responsible body and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, there are particular issues over which body ought to take responsibility and go straight to, effectively, the last port of call before the Court of Protection. It provides that degree of oversight and challenge in these cases.
Baroness Meacher
A concern is that a lot of these people lose touch with their communities and families—they are often a long way from them. Is the assumption here that if somebody objects, then the AMCP would get involved, but that otherwise the hospital management might remain responsible?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
That is a perfectly reasonable question, but the AMCP would absolutely look at every case. There would not need to be an objection raised. I was just explaining the hierarchy for non-independent hospital cases. It would be, in a sense, going to the second-highest port of call for scrutiny that we are considering in other cases to highlight the seriousness of it. There would not be that gatekeeper point which the noble Baroness is worried about.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
How would we be clear that we knew about all the people who had a deprivation of liberty, if we are depending on that independent hospital to notify and call in an AMCP? That AMCP may be one with whom they end up having an uncomfortably close or cosy relationship. How could there be a degree of independence, when the person signing it off as the responsible body would still be the one with a vested interest in keeping their beds full and their income going, which was the very thing that concerned us about the care home? Is the Minister prepared to meet us and discuss this outside? I understand the intention to have everyone assessed by an AMCP, but I am worried that if we leave it to go to the Commons, some of the concerns that have been raised here may not get carried over.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Absolutely—I would be more than happy to do so. I have tried to demonstrate our intention to deal with the issue, but we remain open-minded about the best way to do it. We have concerns with the amendments as laid—we were trying, if anything, to turbo-boost the approach. I recognise that the noble Baroness is concerned about an overfamiliarity between individuals, which she is trying to make sure that we avoid. There may be other concerns with the model that we are considering. I am more than happy to take that offline, and that would be a very fruitful discussion.
Baroness Barker
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will need to think about long and hard. One thing that noble Lords will have to take into consideration is whether an AMCP would have the power to refer a case to the Court of Protection if they felt it necessary. That would be a big factor. I listened very carefully to the Minister, who used the term “hospital manager”. He will know that it has a particular meaning in the Mental Health Act. I have no crystal ball, and neither do other noble Lords, but were the role of the hospital manager in the Mental Health Act to be something on which the forthcoming review sought to make a decision, then would this not be another case for our looking in detail at the synchronisation between this legislation and the Mental Health Act? I welcome the Minister’s response. There is a bit more work to do, and considerable constructive welcome for continued work. With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“(za) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;(zb) if there is an individual development plan for the cared-for person—(i) the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan, or(ii) if the plan is not maintained by a local authority, the local authority whose area the cared-for person is in;”
“(4A) In paragraph 6(c), “responsible local authority”, in relation to a cared-for person aged 16 or 17, means—(a) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;(b) if there is an individual development plan for the cared-for person—(i) the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan, or(ii) if the plan is not maintained by a local authority, the local authority whose area the cared-for person is in;(c) if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies and the cared-for person is being provided with accommodation—(i) under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, or(ii) under section 76 of the Social Services and Well-being (Wales) Act 2014 (anaw 4),the local authority providing that accommodation;(d) if none of paragraphs (a) to (c) applies and the cared-for person is subject to a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 or an interim care order under section 38 of that Act, the local authority that is responsible under the order for the care of the cared-for person;(e) if none of paragraphs (a) to (d) applies, the local authority determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (5).”
“(7) In this paragraph—“Education, Health and Care plan” means a plan within the meaning of section 37(2) of the Children and Families Act 2014;“individual development plan” means a plan within the meaning of section 10 of the Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018 (anaw 2).”
“10A_ “English responsible body” means—(a) a hospital manager of a hospital in England;(b) a clinical commissioning group;(c) a local authority in England.10B_ “Welsh responsible body” means—(a) a hospital manager of a hospital in Wales;(b) a Local Heath Board;(c) a local authority in Wales.”
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Baroness Barker
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I have good news for the Minister. After all these weeks, I have finally accepted his argument that the best-interests principle in the Mental Capacity Act remains and applies to all decisions made under the Bill. I now agree with him that it is therefore not helpful to reiterate the term “best interests”, as we suggested in previous amendments at a previous stage. The even happier news is that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, agrees with me on that.
However, I am afraid that peace and harmony may not have broken out completely. Noble Lords will recall from previous debates that we have argued that the requirement that an arrangement be “necessary and proportionate” seems to be a weakening of the protections for an individual, sitting as it does with no direct connection back to those earlier best interests. We all agree that deprivation of liberty is a very important matter, and the law needs to be in compliance with Article 5. That is why we think the Bill contains a deficiency, because lawful detention is not considered directly in relation to best interests. Therefore, through these amendments, which relate both to the authorisation and the determination, we have attempted to reiterate the current wording of the DoLS legislation regarding a determination being necessary and proportionate in relation to harm to the person. In other sets of amendments and at previous times, we have had discussions about whether decisions are taken on the basis of harm to the person whose liberty is being deprived, or of harm to others. We have tabled this amendment to make it clear that it is harm to the person, and that the proportionality relates to the potential harm to that person if they are not deprived of their liberty.
Much of today’s discussion about deprivations of liberty in domestic settings originates in the failure of many professionals, in making judgments, to remember the part of the safeguards which states that deprivations of liberty must be the “least restrictive option”. It is not wrong to deprive somebody of their liberty, but it must be the least restrictive option to avoid harm to that person. We have therefore concluded—again, in discussion with stakeholders—that this amendment to the Bill would lead to greater clarity.
I can hear the words “code of practice” coming to the fore. One point on which we have never had an agreement is reliance on the code of practice. Very few pieces of legislation have a code of practice, and in health there are only two: this Act and the Mental Health Act. Anything which resides in a code of practice rests upon statute in order to be lawful. When there are arguments about whether a deprivation of liberty is lawful, those arguing the case, particularly judges, do not go to the code of practice but to the statute. What is contained in the statute may be minimal, as this is; we are simply talking about a sentence which says that that action must be “necessary and proportionate” with regard to the harm to that person. A code of practice can go on for pages and pages and include numerous examples, as it should, so that practitioners know where they are. But it does not and never will carry the legal force which comes from the wording in the Act.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I endorse the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, in moving this amendment. One of the reasons that it should be in the Bill is that we have been trying to have the cared-for person at the heart of our deliberations, and the wording here is completely compatible with other parts of the Mental Capacity Act.
There is a terrible tendency when people look at the least restrictive option to also think about what might be convenient for them. The least restrictive option might not be the easiest, and might mean that staff have to behave in quite a different way. By wording these two amendments in this way, we are looking at the risk of harm to the person specifically, and are keeping the person at the heart of this. There always will be a risk that decisions will be contested in court and will need to go to court, and an application to the court may be judged specifically against that test, because it is in the Bill. If it is in the code of practice, there is a real danger that it could be downgraded.
Baroness Thornton
I put my name to this amendment, and we on these Benches very much support the intention behind the amendments in this group.
I bow to the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has lived and worked with this for a very long time indeed, has reviewed the Mental Capacity Act and was very influential in the way it was formed. There has been a lot of discussion with stakeholders about this group of amendments and how we can best express “necessary and proportionate” in a way that will strengthen the Bill and prevent harm to the cared-for person. These amendments do that, providing clarity. Again, as I mentioned in the previous debates, because this is to do with protection and powers, it has to be in the Bill and not the code of practice. I hope that the Minister will agree to the amendments, because it is probably the best way forward, and that he will end this discussion in harmony and agreement.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
As the noble Baroness knows, I am all for harmony and agreement.
I thank the noble Baronesses for laying these amendments, and I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about her gracious acceptance of the role of the best-interests test. I recognise that she has some serious concerns about this legislation, which I take seriously. I have been determined to work closely with her, and I am grateful for her reciprocation in that process as we have moved ahead.
These amendments seek to specify that the necessary and proportionate assessment must be undertaken by reference to whether an authorisation is needed explicitly to prevent harm to the person. We know that an assessment of whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate is key to ensuring that liberty protection safeguards will afford people their protections and human rights, and is a requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights. There are many factors which would need to be considered in the necessary and proportionate assessment, including the wishes and feelings of the person, whether any less restrictive measures can be put in place and the risk of harm. That is the issue that is the subject of these amendments.
Importantly, these amendments raise the issue of considering risk of harm to the cared-for person during the assessment by including that expressly and explicitly in the Bill. However, my concern is that that may be at the cost of other factors that ought to be properly considered during the assessment process. If these amendments are passed, one of the factors which may not be properly considered in the assessment process is the risk of harm to others, which the Law Commission said should be explicitly considered within a necessary and proportionate assessment, as well as risk to self. There are cases currently under the DoLS system where the risk of harm to others is an important factor in the justification for deprivation of liberty, such as a person with Lewy body dementia who may need restrictions in order to prevent harm to people in the community.
Furthermore, ensuring that no harm could come to a person is in some cases intertwined with ensuring that no harm comes to others. For example, there could be a retaliatory attack as a result of harm caused by a person to someone else. These amendments would mean that by focusing solely on harm to self in the Bill, it could be more difficult for assessors to make those balanced decisions. I therefore have some concerns about the amendments tabled by noble Baroness, as they could perpetuate the current confusion surrounding cases that involve some degree of harm to others. They could also lead to an increased use of the Mental Health Act, since the liberty protection safeguards might be interpreted as being ruled out in all harm-to-others cases. We would not want to see the Act used in this way.
Therefore, in the spirit of consensus and moving forward, I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended—or whether the Government could support such amendments—to explicitly set out inclusion of the risk of harm to the person. I am afraid I am going to disappoint noble Lords by saying that it would be better set out in the code of practice. I emphasise that we have considered the issue in detail, and we believe that the code of practice has sufficient force. On that basis—although I know that she will not do so—I encourage the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister for his reply. The problem that I have is that it leaves the guidelines for decisions to deprive people of their liberty because of harm to others in a code of practice, not the legislation. I do not believe that that is the right place in which to make that law. I absolutely accept that it is sometimes necessary to make a decision about a deprivation of liberty, and that part of that decision-making might be about the risk the person poses to others. However, that should not be determined in legislation fashioned on a set of principles and practices that are about harm to self, which is what the Mental Capacity Act is all about. A substantial judgment that will impact on people’s lives is buried away in a place where it is very unlikely ever to rise sufficiently up the scale of legal concerns or ever to be tested in court. That is my problem; that is what I think is wrong. It is therefore important that we in this House make a statement now to the Government about the importance of this issue, so I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Barker
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 27th November 2018
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 117-R-II Second marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (23 Nov 2018)
15:45 - Division on Amendment 29 - Ayes: 277 / Noes: 192 - Amendment 29 agreed.
“Rights to information11A(1) Prior to the authorisation process, the cared-for person must be fully informed of their rights.(2) The responsible body must take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the cared-for person and any appropriate person or Independent Mental Capacity Advocate representing and supporting them understand the possible outcome of the assessments, the reasons why the cared-for person may be deprived of their liberty and their rights—(a) to request an Approved Mental Capacity Professional’s assessment and review of the arrangements,(b) to advocacy, and(c) to challenge the authorisation in court.(3) If an Independent Mental Capacity Advocate is appointed under Part 5, the advocate is to take such steps as are practicable to help the cared-for person and the appropriate person to understand the following matters—(a) the steps involved in the authorisation process,(b) the purpose, duration and effect of the authorisation,(c) any conditions to which the authorisation is subject,(d) the reasons why the cared-for person met the qualifying requirements in question,(e) the right to object to the authorisation and the right to request a review by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional,(f) the outcome of a review of the arrangements,(g) the relevant rights of the cared-for person,(h) how the cared-for person may exercise relevant rights.(4) In this paragraph, “relevant rights” includes the right to make an application to the court to challenge an authorisation decision in court under section 21ZA and the right to request a review of the arrangements.(5) The responsible body must ensure that cases are referred to court when the cared-for person’s right to a court review is engaged.”
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
In moving Amendment 29, I shall speak also to Amendment 86, having added my name to both. My noble friend Lady Hollins originally tabled this amendment, which is associated with rights to information. She is unfortunately unable to be here, so in her absence I will articulate the points on behalf of us both, without repeating many of the arguments made at Second Reading. The amendments are supported by many third sector bodies, including the Royal Mencap Society, Mind, Rethink Mental Illness, the Alzheimer’s Society, Disability Rights UK, Inclusion London, Liberty, VoiceAbility, the National Autistic Society, Sense and others.
As it stands, there is a fundamental imbalance in the proposals, with the power in many cases lying with health and social care providers and the responsible body. These amendments seek to partially redress that balance, in part by ensuring that critical information is provided to the individual concerned, the person being cared for, and those advocating on their behalf.
Under the first part of Amendment 29, the individual would receive information about their rights in advance. This is critical, as is having someone—an appropriate person or advocate—to explain things to the person in a way meaningful to them. VoiceAbility, which provides advocacy for people who may lack capacity and their families, has received feedback from families that having information clearly explained to them up front can help dispel many misunderstandings and myths that can escalate to the person being cared for being very unsettled.
Knowing the reasons why you were detained, and what you can do about it if you are not happy with your conditions or placement, is important. Similarly, the knowledge that you can ask for a review or challenge the decision can help to reduce the stress and anxiety that many people face—even if the person does not at the outset wish to exercise their rights to review or challenge.
Information should, of course, be provided in an appropriate format, which is clear, easy to understand and takes account of any communication difficulties that individuals or their families have. Providing people with just written information is not enough. Some people may require easy-read information in jargon-free, plain English. Others should have the opportunity to speak to somebody and ask questions. Some families may need a translator, and some individuals may need sign language such as Makaton to fully understand the situation they find themselves in. There is very limited knowledge about DoLS and even less about the proposed LPS, and it is therefore critical that people understand the process they are entering.
The Bill requires the responsible body to complete an authorisation record containing important information for the cared-for person. It does not, however, require that this information be automatically provided to the cared-for person, their family or an advocate. The second part of Amendment 29 and Amendment 86 address this by ensuring that the responsible body provides the cared-for person and any advocate with information about the outcome of the authorisation, what it means and the reasons why their liberty may be deprived. As before, this must be provided in a format that is appropriate for them and easy to understand. It must also detail the person’s rights to challenge the assessment and request an intervention from an approved mental capacity professional, their right to advocacy and how to challenge the authorisation should they so wish. People often feel disempowered in this situation, and in many cases simply accept inappropriate provision without understanding that they can challenge it. Finally, these amendments would ensure that information is provided relevant to the process of how to challenge their individual assessment and, in turn, the fact that their liberty is being deprived.
Advocacy must play a central role in this Bill. The amendment recognises this by spelling out the functions of an IMCA at this critical juncture for the cared-for person. This includes helping the individual to understand the process, the assessment itself and the result of that assessment, as well as how they can exercise their rights of challenge.
I hope the Minister recognises that these amendments are an important addition to ensuring that people are empowered throughout the process. I look forward to his response. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, my name is attached to some of the amendments in this group, most notably Amendment 88. I endorse everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said in her introduction. It is paramount that those detained under this legislation, and their friends and family who care for them, must know in exact detail that they are being detained under a law that stipulates that their detention should be the least restrictive option for their care and what their rights are.
In speaking to my amendment, I wish to return to a theme I have spoken to throughout our discussions: the role of a code of practice. As I said in our previous discussions on the right to information—as set out in cols. 335-38 of Hansard on 15 October—there is a fair amount of unease and disquiet among stakeholders about the Government’s understanding of the duty to provide information and its place in legislation. It is important to state again that statutory codes do not exist without a statute, and the majority of laws do not have a code of practice. Codes are there only for when non-legal people are using a law directly. No one expects non-legal people to read or necessarily understand a statute and so a code is provided. Such a code follows what is in statute and sets it out in lay terms and at length. But it would not exist if the obligation in law was not clearly set out.
We have had some case law about the Mental Capacity Act code of practice. In 2018, in the case of An NHS Trust and others (Respondents) v Y, the Supreme Court said:
“Whatever the weight given to the Code by section 42 of the MCA 2005, it does not create an obligation as a matter of law to apply to court in every case”.
In the Mental Health Act code, which has been in force for a very long time, and to which the original drafters of the Mental Capacity Act looked when drawing up the legislation back in 2005, there is an explicit duty on hospital managers to provide information to a person who is detained and to the relevant interested persons responsible for their welfare.
No doubt the department will stick to its line that a code of practice is adequate. However, for the reasons I have outlined, which I think are compelling, we do not. I therefore simply wish to indicate that if the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is minded to push her amendment to a vote, she will have support from this side of the House.
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I too support Amendments 29 and 86 and others in this group.
It is essential that the cared-for person and their appropriate person and/or advocate are provided with information about the reasons for the cared-for person’s detention and their rights to review and also to challenge. It is a fundamental human right under Article 5 of the ECHR. Both the Mental Health Act and the DoLS contain clear obligations to take steps to help the person understand their situation and their rights; and the DoLS set out a clear statutory list of those entitled to copies of the authorisation and the assessment.
Despite this, the Bill is silent on these rights to information. The Minister has suggested that the person could request the information by making a subject access request under the GDPR. I agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which does not accept this as an adequate substitute. This misunderstands the obligation, which is a right to be informed, not a right to request information. It is highly unrealistic to expect a person subject to the LPS to think that they would know to make this request and be able to do so.
Meanwhile, the person’s family would have no obvious rights to this information unless, of course, they held a lasting power of attorney or deputyship, and most will not. At the moment, requests for personal data are managed through the MCA code’s guidance, with data being disclosed only if it is in the best interests of the person. In practice, families, and even advocates, are often shut out of decision-making and consultations about the person, and can experience obstruction in trying to access vital information like this. The Bill should be compatible with the ECHR, not on promises of what might possibly be in the code—as my noble friend Lady Barker has just stated.
The Minister has confirmed that the code of practice is statutory and that it must be followed unless there is good reason not to do so. However, this is not the main problem. In some places the code is being asked to effectively establish rights and duties instead of explaining or elaborating on them. Duties to provide information about the authorisation and clear-cut rights to obtain copies of the authorisation documentation are an important example. A code cannot be used to achieve this.
I remind the House of a recent example in which the MCA code of practice said that certain very serious decisions—such as withdrawal of artificial nutrition or hydration—could be taken only by the court of protection. Peers were reassured in Parliament that that was the case and shown a draft copy of the code of practice, which stated it clearly. However, the Supreme Court ruled this year that that was not the case in law and that the MCA code of practice not only misstated the legal situation but could not establish a duty where none had existed. Consequently, if there is a need for a hard-edged duty or right, that needs to be put into legislation, not in the code.
I therefore urge the Minister that in this Bill we must have the provisions to provide the person with information about their situation and their rights, and also clear statutory entitlements to copies of the relevant documentation for those supporting and representing them.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, Amendments 49, 85 and 87, which are in my name, complement Amendment 29—which, like others, I strongly support. Information to the family and those who care deeply about the welfare of the person is the cared-for person’s safeguard against exploitation or bad care or simply having their needs ignored. It is paramount that families have a role to play in the care planning of their relatives, not least by giving them the option to stay fully informed and to object to the proposed plans if they are unsatisfied.
When an assessment happens at one point it is easy to collate all the information, get it signed off and then forget that every day until the scheduled review is a day to be lived by the cared-for person. If the conditions laid out in the authorisation are not adhered to, if the person is not empowered as much as possible to be both mentally and physically active, gradual inactivity and a slipping decline set in.
The care itself is important. Certainly, quality of care will vary between care homes and within them, but monitoring the care plan is central to ensuring that the cared-for person’s dignity is maintained. Their quality of life depends on how they are treated day in, day out, as well as whether they receive care in a way that enhances their personal dignity or, shamefully, they are treated as though they are of less worth. It is therefore imperative to ensure that the cared-for person is placed at the heart of the LPS authorisation process, which is why I want all those consulted in the initial process, as laid out in paragraph 17(2), to be able to access easily the care and support plan. Being able to apply for it is not enough; many people may not even know that they are able to apply to look at it. Relatives will notice if the care plan states that something is not happening and question why.
The care plan and authorisation record must be available to the cared-for person, enabling them to keep track of what is supposed to be happening. For those with fluctuating capacity or less severe impairments, the sense of control and empowerment that this would give is completely in line with the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act. Where the cared-for person cannot monitor their care plan, they can still know, even in their short-term memory, whether they are getting what they should get. Those with specific responsibilities for the cared-for person’s welfare—such as the nominated representative, the donee of the lasting power of attorney for health and welfare or the court-appointed deputy—must have both the authorisation statement and the accompanying care plan.
The care plan must also be provided to the care team in the cared-for person’s place of residence, because where such a place is supported living, I am concerned that those who provide support and are not on a professional register may find that they are not given all the details. I strongly support Amendment 29, introduced so clearly by my noble friend Lady Watkins. People must know what their rights are and what will happen. This will not be costly; it will be far less costly than the court cases that are likely to come if the requirement to provide information about all aspects of the process and plan is not in the Bill.
Amendment 87 deals with what to do in the event of a dispute. It requires an AMCP to be appointed to explore the reasons for the dispute and assess the situation independently. If agreement cannot be reached, independent mediation must be sought before resorting to the adversarial processes of going to court. A group of family law solicitors has been working for over a year to develop a system of mediation to be used before a court proceeding in the Court of Protection. This type of dispute, where everyone agrees that a solution must be found in the interests of the cared-for person, lends itself well to mediation; it would be swifter, cost less than any court action and be far less traumatic for all concerned. If the principle of dealing with dispute is not in the Bill, can the Minister reassure the House that it will be dealt with in the code of practice?
Before I finish, I urge the Minister to recognise the strength of feeling about people needing to be given information about their rights. If he will not accept these amendments, will he agree to bring the lead amendment in this group back as a government amendment at Third Reading? Requiring adequate information-giving must be in the Bill; it cannot be left to the code of practice, nor deferred to the Commons stages. This is one of the most essential planks in ensuring that the care that should be given is given.
Baroness Wheeler (Lab)
My Lords, we on these Benches strongly support the key amendments in this group. Amendment 29, to which my noble friend Lady Thornton added her name, would ensure that the responsible body has a duty to make sure that the cared-for person or the person representing them in an advocacy, professional or other capacity fully understands the rights of the cared-for person for whom deprivation of liberty is proposed, and the rights to challenge. Those rights also include specifically the rights to an independent and professional assessment, to a review of the LPS arrangements, to advocacy and support and to be able to challenge the LPS authorisation in court.
The noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, made a strong case for rights to information to be on the face of the Bill, ably following on from the interventions of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, during its previous stages. She spoke on the importance of this issue, particularly in respect to people with learning difficulties, and the need, wherever possible, to take steps to increase the cared-for person’s capacity to understand what is happening to them and to have as much involvement as possible to help them determine their wishes and feelings.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, I first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for introducing this group of amendments, both for her own speech and for representing the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, as she does. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments clearly relate to providing information to the cared-for person, which is a critical issue that we have debated throughout this Bill.
Amendments 49 and 85, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, require that the authorisation record must be provided to the cared-for person, or their representative, their donee of lasting power of attorney, or a court-appointed deputy, and also to the team providing care in the person’s place of residence. Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, specifies that the authorisation record must also include details of how the deprivation of liberty, or its effect on the person, will be reduced. I will deal with Amendment 29, the first amendment in this group, shortly.
I introduce these amendments in order to talk about less restrictive care. Less restrictive care is a central aspect of the new liberty protection safeguards, as a result of the necessary and proportionate assessment. This was emphasised by the Law Commission in its final report, which concluded that,
“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.
Less restrictive care is also a vital principle of the Mental Capacity Act—as set out in Section 1(5)—and therefore should be considered at all stages of the process. It is already considered as part of the current DoLS system.
Given the abiding role of “best interests”, as discussed in the last day of Committee, as a principle of the Mental Capacity Act, it does not need to be restated in the Bill. Indeed, our belief is that the liberty protection safeguards scheme will drive less restrictive care, as it will require the responsible body to specify a programme of regular reviews. This review should be triggered if there is a significant change in the cared-for person’s circumstances. Critically, this means that if there are practicable, less restrictive alternatives available, the authorisation will cease to have effect as the arrangements will no longer be necessary and proportionate.
Amendment 86, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, would require the responsible body to ensure that the cared-for person, appropriate person and IMCA, or independent mental capacity advocate, are given a copy of the care plan as soon as possible and those consulted with should be provided with a copy unless there is good reason not to do so. As has been mentioned, this was discussed at every stage of the Bill, in the Chamber and outside it. I agree that it is vital that relevant people are given full information about the authorisation and the rights of a cared-for person, including rights to review and to challenge authorisation.
The key point, and the reason why we do not support these amendments, is that this is already the case in law, which clearly provides that people must be given appropriate information. This is required by Article 5 of the ECHR, as enacted into UK law by the Human Rights Act. Article 5(2) sets out that everyone deprived of their liberty must be informed promptly and in a language that he or she understands. This should set out the reasons for the deprivation of liberty. Where a person has been informed of the reasons, he or she may apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in accordance with Article 5(4). It is plain from the wording of Article 5(2) that the duty on the state is to proactively provide specific information to the individual or their representative. Whether the information provided is sufficient must be assessed depending on circumstances, but, as a minimum, people must be given information in simple, non-technical language that they can understand.
It is also worth noting that the Law Commission’s draft Bill did not explicitly outline what information should be provided. The Government took forward the Law Commission’s approach, as we have been encouraged to throughout by noble Lords, because we are satisfied that Article 5 makes it clear that a person has the right to information. So while I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended to explicitly state what information should be provided, I believe that it would be better to set out specific details in the code of practice.
On the specific point from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about statutory codes of practice having to sit within a framework of law, the Human Rights Act, which enacts the ECHR into British law, provides the route into law. Therefore, I believe that the code of practice is the appropriate place and has that anchor in statute. Furthermore, it is appropriate to set this out in the code of practice because it will allow us to fully and accurately capture the detail of all the people who should be provided with information, exactly what information should be provided and how, and to be able to amend it without having to amend primary legislation over time.
One of the problems with the original DoLS legislation is that it is overly prescriptive. Indeed, this House found in its post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act that the provisions for DoLS were “overly complex”. These amendments set out, for example, who should be provided with the authorisation records, but they exclude others who might need the care plan, such as members of the care team providing support in the community, not in the person’s place of residence. We believe it is precisely that level of detail that is better set out in the code of practice.
Amendment 29, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, specifically seeks to address this point. This amendment outlines that a person must be fully informed of their rights and ensure that appropriate persons and IMCAs understand their rights and duties. Further to this, Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, would require the cared-for person and their representative to be informed, in addition to any person likely to be carrying out the arrangements, if their authorisation ceases to have effect.
I absolutely agree that it is vital that people are informed of their rights. Let me be clear that this Bill does not take away or amend any rights. Article 5 is already clear that people have a right to information. However, we want to use the code of practice, rather than the Bill, to outline how this applies. As I said, this is so that we can provide a level of detail there that would simply not be appropriate in the Bill. We would also use the code to detail, for example, the role of the IMCA and/or the appropriate person’s role in the provision of information and ensuring that people are supported in understanding their rights.
In closing, I want to address Amendment 87 which supports, as it were, this set of amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, Amendment 87 would require an approved mental capacity professional to complete an investigation where the relevant parties disagree over any aspect of an authorisation. If agreement is still not reached, it would require independent mediation. I agree with her that it is vital that the new system of liberty protection safeguards ensures that the voice of the person is heard and that there is an appropriate level of scrutiny in all authorisations. That is why we have been explicit that the person must be consulted with, as we will discuss later, and why, as a result of government amendments brought forward after listening to noble Lords, if there is no appropriate person acting as a representative, there is now in effect a presumption that an IMCA should be appointed. Again we will discuss that later. It is also why we have tabled amendments to remove conflict of interest and to make clear who should and who should not carry out pre-authorisation reviews.
So while the Government recognise the important role that mediation plays within the NHS, we do not believe that it is necessary to make it a compulsory feature of the system. There are fantastic systems of mediation already available, through private, public and charitable sectors; indeed, the noble Baroness gave us an example of a further initiative in this area. It is worth noting, on this point, that the Mental Capacity Act code of practice already provides guidance about mediation. In answer to her specific question, while we do not think it is necessary to have it in the Bill, I can confirm that guidance on the use of mediation will be in the code of practice and we will make sure that that is as up to date as possible and comprehensive in taking account of new schemes.
I will finish by saying that while I applaud and recognise the importance of the right to information, not just for the cared-for person but for everybody representing them, the Government’s view is that this is already adequately accounted for in law, so we do not need to set it out in the Bill. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to do so, by not being able to be comprehensive of every category of person. For that reason, I fear that we are not able to support these amendments.
Baroness Barker
Can the Minister confirm that, if the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is passed, it does not preclude the Government from setting out anything they like in the code of practice, at considerable length, to explain the detail of what information should be conveyed to whom and how? Does he agree that it might be helpful to have her amendment in the Bill, if only to bridge the rather large chasm between Article 5 rights and the code of practice? Would her amendment not be rather helpful?
Lord O’Shaughnessy
On the noble Baroness’s first point, of course there is nothing to stop us setting out anything in the code of practice. The concern would be whether there would be a clash between what was set out in the Bill and what was set out in the code of practice or in Article 5. That is one of our concerns and it is for that and other reasons that unfortunately we are not able to support that amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
Does the noble Lord agree that one of the differences here between Article 5 rights normally and this group of people is that these are people who lack capacity to make their own decision, which is why they are being deprived of their liberty? They are particularly vulnerable and unable to speak up for themselves and depend on others. Therefore, if we have something in the Bill—and it may be that the wording in Amendment 29 is not right—brought back by the Government at Third Reading, we would know that there is an explicit right to information to be given to people when they lack capacity, as well as giving it to people when you have done everything to confirm that they have capacity for it.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I recognise the point that the noble Baroness is making. As I said, our belief is that the rights that currently exist, and are in no way amended or reduced as a result of the Bill, provide what she is asking for. Unfortunately, I am not able to give a commitment that we will be able to return to this issue at Third Reading.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock
I thank the Minster for his reply and thank all noble Lords who have spoken in support of this group of amendments. I do not believe that the Minister’s reply gives us sufficient security that if the information is contained only in the associated code patients and their families will be protected in the way that we have outlined. We firmly believe that the issue of information and, in particular, its provision in advance need to be in the Bill. It is therefore important that the House makes a statement to the Government about this issue, so I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“11A_ The responsible body may authorise arrangements—(a) under paragraph 12, if the conditions in that paragraph are met, or(b) under paragraph 13 if—(i) the arrangements are care home arrangements,(ii) the responsible body decides that authorisation should be determined under that paragraph instead of under paragraph 12, and(iii) the conditions in paragraph 13 are met.”
The Senior Deputy Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)
I should notify the House that if Amendment 31 is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 32 by reason of pre-emption.
Amendment 31
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government for having changed the role of the care home manager. All the changes in the Government’s amendments have been welcomed. Almost all of my amendments in this group have fallen away, but I seek reassurance from the Minister that the authorisation process will include inspection of the proposals and conditions as set down in the care and support plan. This is because the necessary and proportionate test can be understood only in the context of the way that the care will be provided and how it will meet the wishes and feelings, as well as important information gleaned from the consultation process. The helpful diagram that was attached to the Minister’s letter of 15 November shows the factors, but I am unclear how they will be contextualised for the authorising body without the authorising body having access to a copy of the care and support plan. It is for that reason that I decided to speak to this group of amendments. I hope the Minister will be able to give me reassurance. This is about the process whereby the authorising body will know that it has accurate information that will affect the day-to-day care of the person. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I do not intend to pay much attention to many of the amendments in this group because the Government made significant moves last week in relation to the role of the care home manager.
In relation to Amendment 121, I take this opportunity to raise again an issue I mentioned during our deliberations last week. There has been a great deal of talk about the Bill and the code of practice, but there has been very little said about regulations under the Bill. In particular, very little has been said about the functions of IMCAs in representing and supporting people under the schedule which are a bit different from the role of the IMCA in other circumstances under the rest of the Mental Capacity Act. Unlike DoLS, the Bill does not make detailed provisions for this or any regulations.
Can the Minister confirm whether amendments will be forthcoming in this area in relation to the functions of IMCAs? Specifically, will the Government look at amendments in relation to Section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act to place a clear duty on the responsible authority to make arrangements to enable IMCAs to be available and to represent and support cared-for persons under paragraph 36 of Schedule 1 to this Bill and in addition to support the appropriate person to fulfil their functions under paragraph 37? Can the Minister also confirm that the existing regulation power under Section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act will be extended to reflect the IMCAs’ function under the schedule?
A particular concern that has been raised with us by stakeholders is that there is no current reference in paragraph 36 to maintaining contact with the cared-for person and supporting their rights under the schedule. Given that the intention is that under the Bill authorisations will be made for much longer periods than was intended under the original Bill—longer than 12 months—it is rather important that someone who is acting in the role of an IMCA continues to have an ongoing involvement with that person. I understand why on this occasion it may not be entirely appropriate to put that in the Bill, but it is an issue of such significance that it might well come under the aegis of regulations.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Baronesses for speaking to the amendments in this group. Before I deal with their questions, I say to the House that I take note of the significant margin in the vote on the previous group of amendments. That is something that the Government will reflect on.
I am grateful for the recognition by the noble Baronesses of the progress that we made on the last day of Report in defining the care home manager much better. I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to that process; we have made progress.
I turn to the specific questions posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. She asked about determining that arrangements are necessary and proportionate and inspecting proposals, conditions and indeed the care plan. The preauthorisation reviewer—as we are about to discuss, we are tightening up who can carry out that role—will thoroughly scrutinise arrangements and need to satisfy themselves that they are necessary and proportionate. It is also worth saying that in making the determination they have the power, if they so wish, to meet the person to determine that, which clearly is important. There is another critical matter, although we will come to this when we talk about conditions so I do not want to pre-empt that discussion too much: in making an authorisation, the responsible body can also then set a timetable of regular reviews to take place so that there is a process of ongoing review to ensure that the “necessary and proportionate assessment” test is always being passed.
We also said—this deals slightly with one of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was making—that if the responsible body is not satisfied that the care home manager is capable of fulfilling this function, they can take on the role of organising assessments themselves. That is, to use the phrase that we coined last time, a backstop that provides some reassurance that any variable quality in provision should not affect the process by which assessments are made and organised and the preauthorisation reviews carried out.
It is absolutely the case that responsible bodies will be able to demand to see care plans and care and support plans as part of their deliberations. That is something that they can ask for, and we would expect that they will be provided because the whole point of the process that we are trying to move to is that decisions on and circumstances around deprivations of liberty are actually integrated into care planning and therefore ought not to be divisible in that sense. I hope that that provides reassurance, but if I can provide more by follow-up, I shall be happy to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked some specific questions, which I shall need to consider, on the regulation-making power. I do not want to get that answer wrong without considering it, but we can meet in the coming days to ensure that she is reassured on that. A group of government amendments about IMCAs that we will discuss later provides greater reassurance on their role, in that, if they are agreed to, there will be a presumption in favour of an IMCA, removing the gatekeeper role that we have discussed. Also, the preauthorisation review will be carried out only by a responsible body, which must apply that presumption of access to an IMCA, so there will be much greater rights to advocacy on an ongoing basis.
The noble Baroness makes an excellent point about maintaining contact. As we move to a system of regular reviews, it is important to make sure that someone is alongside the cared-for person who can flag up any problems—for example, that a less restrictive care option is available, or that there is an objection. As we discussed, passive objections can materialise many weeks or months later. That ongoing role is clearly very important, whether it is for the IMCA or the appropriate person, the family member, or whoever. I give her the commitment that we will determine that in the code of practice.
I hope that I have answered the questions from both noble Baronesses and that on that basis, the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am most grateful to the Minister for that clear reassurance. I reiterate our gratitude that the Government decided to change the role of the care home manager, making most of the amendments in this group redundant. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the vital preauthorisation review process in the liberty protection safeguards system, which we have discussed on many occasions. Our intention, which is now clarified by the amendments, is that every application will undergo a preauthorisation review arranged by the responsible body and conducted by someone who is not involved in the day-to-day care or treatment of the person. That must happen before any authorisation can be given.
As we know, this review is essential, not only because every application will undergo one, but because it provides an early opportunity to address situations where someone may be receiving poor care or care in an inappropriate setting, or who are subject to poor care planning. This preauthorisation review, arranged by the responsible body, provides separation between those who will authorise the arrangements and those who carry them out.
Amendments 34 and 40 clarify that the preauthorisation review must be arranged by the responsible body. This was always the Government’s intention, but we are now being explicit about it. These amendments serve to reinforce the role of the responsible body under the liberty protection safeguards system, ensuring that all proposed arrangements undergo independent scrutiny.
We also expect the individual completing the preauthorisation review to consider issues which should act as red flags, such as if there has been inadequate consultation or a provider is seeking authorisation for particularly restrictive arrangements. This provides further protection for cared-for people in cases where the application falls short or has not been as thorough as it ought to have been. We will also expect the person completing the preauthorisation review to meet the person where necessary.
We are determined to work with the sector and set out the detail of how this is applied in a code of practice. This will set out when we expect preauthorisation reviewers to take further action and ensure that the code is consistently applied by different local authorities—an issue that has been raised before. Building on amendments tabled last week, this significantly strengthens the role of local authority oversight and intervention, and ensures the good quality of the new scheme.
Noble Lords will note that the amendment states the responsible body must “arrange” rather than “conduct” the preauthorisation review. The reason for this is to ensure that the person undertaking the review is not doing so as a representative of the responsible body. They must make their own professional decision. This is particularly important in cases where the responsible body also provides the care: for example, where the NHS is the responsible body.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I think the Minister deserves our congratulations on having met all the conditions that we around the House said we believed were important. I am sure that the Government always intended to have some of these matters as part of the legislation, but making them explicit in the context of the Bill is helpful. Not least, it will be helpful to care home managers themselves, who will welcome the protections from unjust accusations of undue influence in future. On behalf of these Benches—and, I should imagine, others—we welcome that.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and welcome these amendments. As the Minister said, they are very important and deal with the issues of conflicts of interest and the preauthorisation review. I congratulate the Minister on navigating us to this point, and certainly we will be supporting the amendments.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for their support. Of course, navigation of any ship requires a good crew, and I feel that we have one. I am very grateful for that support.
“12A The responsible body may not authorise arrangements if an Approved Mental Capacity Professional has concluded that the arrangements should not be authorised.”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, Amendment 35 is a failsafe mechanism that will save a great deal of court time in the future and make it clear where the process has halted if things go awry. The failsafe is that an approved mental capacity professional—AMCP—can veto authorisation if the AMCP has grounds to object. However, it is important that the AMCP cannot authorise arrangements. In other words, the default position is to preserve liberty and not to impose restrictions on a person without a very sound reason. It is important that we are explicit about the extent of the AMCP’s powers, whether on the face of the Bill or in subsequent regulation, as we will need to be more prescriptive about these powers in the statutory code of practice than we have been to date, for the sound reason of flexibility and the independence of the AMCP.
The reason I tabled the amendment and feel it should be in the Bill is that there is a risk that local authorities facing financial stringencies might be inclined to authorise arrangements that are less costly, thereby revealing an inherent conflict of interest where a local authority is funding a person’s care. We have had many debates about conflicts of interest in relation to care homes but we must remember that in a whole-health and social care system which is under financial pressure, all kinds of little conflicts and pressures can creep in.
The other amendments in this group specify the different criteria whereby an approved mental capacity professional must conduct the review. I am not going to go through each line of these amendments—they are quite self-explanatory—but they show the importance of that degree of independence before taking the major step of imposing restrictions on somebody’s liberty and conditions under the new liberty protection safeguards process. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 77 in my name, which was drawn up because of the experience of many relatives. I make particular reference to the case of Stephen Neary, where relatives had to deal with local authorities which were telling them wrongfully what their position was in law. A great deal of responsibility was put on to the relatives to oversee the right interpretation of the law. This amendment seeks to ensure that, where they are acting in the best interests of someone who is cared for, relatives would be able to meet an AMCP and trigger their involvement. In our earlier discussions, there was an underlying sense on the Government Benches that the involvement of professionals can often be an unwelcome intrusion into families. In fact, many of them do not find that at all. Many find that the first occasion when they come into contact with a professional is the point at which all sorts of information and understanding becomes available to them in support of their loved ones.
Although I am not seeking to press this amendment today, I hope that the Minister might think about it and, if he is disposed to do so, make some supportive statements.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 46, which is in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. It provides that the care home manager, or any person interested in the cared-for person’s welfare, is responsible for being satisfied that an AMCP should carry out a pre-authorisation review. The Committee has already discussed this and the important safeguards which we will be seeking come under Amendment 76A. Some of the important matters raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, have been addressed by the Minister in the Government’s amendments. I look forward to his reply.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for tabling these important amendments. It is critical to get right the role of approved mental capacity professionals and when they should review cases under the liberty protection safeguards system. AMCPs will be a vital part of the system. They will be qualified, knowledgeable and experienced professionals. It is intended that they will act independently, both of the care provider and the responsible body, and that they will make a determination on proposed arrangements after meeting the person and reviewing relevant information.
Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, explicitly prevents the responsible body overriding a determination of the AMCP. The responsible body is responsible for approving the authorisation, but an AMCP is required to complete the pre-authorisation review if it is reasonable to believe that the person objects to the arrangements. The AMCP can also conduct the pre-authorisation review in other cases. Where an AMCP conducts the pre-authorisation review they will determine whether the authorisation conditions are met.
The critical issue here is the consequences of the AMCP determining that the authorisation conditions have not been met. We are absolutely clear that the responsible body should follow the AMCP’s determination, and indeed any responsible body that did not do so would be taking on a significant legal risk. The responsible body might believe that it has a good reason to disagree with the AMCP’s assessment, but in that case the proper course of action would be to discuss this with the AMCP. If the responsible body then tried to override the AMCP’s decision, we would expect the AMCP to raise concerns—first, with the responsible body itself. If the local authority is the responsible body, the concern can be escalated to the Local Government Ombudsman, and if a CCG is the responsible body, it can be escalated to the regional director of commissioning in NHS England. Concerns regarding NHS organisations and independent hospitals can also be raised directly with the CQC in England or Health Inspectorate Wales. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords are reassured that mechanisms are in place to stop any unjustified behaviour on behalf of responsible bodies.
Amendment 77, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker, Lady Finlay and Lady Jolly, makes explicit that a pre-authorisation review must also be conducted by an approved mental capacity professional if relatives or those with a genuine relationship to the person object to the arrangements, if there is restriction on contact, if the care home manager or responsible body considers the case to be exceptional, or if the arrangements are for mental disorder or the arrangements include covert medication.
The Government agree that families and carers play an important role in liberty protection safeguards. As the people who know the cared-for person best, they will often know what the person’s wishes and feelings are and whether they do, or would, object to what is being proposed. The Bill already states that a pre-authorisation review must be completed by an AMCP if there is a reasonable belief that a person objects to residing in or receiving care and treatment at a particular place. We are clear that an objection raised by someone with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare can also give rise to a reasonable belief that the person objects, and this will be confirmed and clarified in the code.
We all agree that deprivation of liberty is a serious matter, especially when accompanied by measures such as high levels of restriction, covert medication and restrictions on contact. Such measures should be put in place only following a best-interests meeting and in some cases will require a court application. This is confirmed in the current MCA code of practice and will continue to be a key aspect of the new code.
I agree that in some circumstances such cases should be considered by an approved mental capacity professional. The Bill expressly allows for a pre-authorisation review to be completed by an AMCP in other cases, as is clear from paragraph 19(1). However, although the Bill is clear about how the lodging of an objection will lead to a review by an AMCP, I have heard clearly from noble Lords and stakeholders that there is a concern about referring appropriate cases to an AMCP. I hope that noble Lords will be glad to hear that I have been persuaded that we need to clarify on the face of the Bill that other cases can be referred to an AMCP.
In the previous day on Report, I stated that we would revisit, in the Commons, the issue of referral to AMCPs, specifically regarding those in independent hospitals. I can now confirm we will be looking at this issue more widely, including the specific concerns raised in the debate and in the amendment, as part of our considerations for government amendments in the other place. I look forward to working with all noble Lords to make sure that we get this right.
I turn briefly to Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Barker. The amendment would mean that in care home cases the statement to the responsible body must indicate whether any person interested in the person’s welfare is satisfied that the person does or does not object. I understand that the intention here is to create a mechanism for those with an interest to be able to raise objections. I have already said that the Bill specifies that the statement must reflect any consultation that has been completed with those with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare, and our later amendments will also make it explicit that that includes the person themselves under the “duty to consult” government amendments. The IMCA and the appropriate person will also have a role in reflecting these concerns.
To conclude this group of amendments, Amendment 104 states that a review is triggered if a person with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare has raised concerns. As I said, that will be the case. Amendment 109 would change the Bill to reflect the effects of Amendments 34 and 104.
I hope that in answering points raised on these important issues, I have been able to give two kinds of reassurance. The first is that the process of triggering a review will be clearly set out. The Bill as it stands, as well as amendments that we are making, will mean that anybody with an interest in a person’s welfare will be able to trigger a review and that will lead to a consideration by an AMCP. Secondly, in the rare cases where there is a dispute between an AMCP and a responsible body, there will be avenues to escalate such a disagreement to mediation and resolution.
Furthermore, we are determined to get the role of the AMCP right. We think it is necessary to go beyond specifying that those in independent hospitals can see an AMCP and to think of other cases as well, and we are intending to bring forward amendments at the Commons stages of the Bill. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baronesses are looking for and that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I think I can speak on behalf of all noble Baronesses who had their names on these amendments. We are most grateful to the Government for listening and find all that the Minister said in his speech in response to this group of amendments reassuring and positive. We look forward to working with the Government as these new criteria evolve. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, the amendments in this group provide clarification regarding the form of the statements provided by the care home manager to the responsible body. I thank noble Lords and others outside the House who highlighted some issues that these amendments attempt to address.
Amendments 41 and 96 outline that the statements provided by the care home manager to the responsible body under paragraphs 14 and 28 must be in writing. This issue was rightly raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and others at Second Reading and in Committee. It has always been the Government’s intention that the statement be a written one, and I gave assurances to noble Lords during Committee that the Bill would be updated to be explicit on this.
Passing these amendments, although they are simple and straightforward, is important, because it will mean that care homes are not able to provide statements over the telephone, as sometimes happens now. This is a valid concern about the future system. The amendments will help to ensure the quality of assessments and pre-authorisation reviews, and that there will always be a written record of the basis for decisions. It is vital that statements be in writing in order for a thorough pre-authorisation review to be completed and for proper evidence of assessments and consultation to be provided.
Under the current DoLS system, care homes are required to complete a “form 1” when making an application. We envisage that under the liberty protection safeguards there will be a similar form, updated and tailored to the new system. I hope this amendment makes it clear to all noble Lords that the Government do not want to see any weakening of safeguards as a result of our reforms.
Amendments 47 and 59 clarify that the necessary and proportionate test is based on an assessment, and that the care home manager’s statement under paragraph 14 must be accompanied by a record of that assessment and a record of the medical and capacity assessments. This was always the Government’s intention. Its omission was a simple drafting error, for which I apologise and which we are now rectifying.
I hope noble Lords will be able to support these minor but vital amendments, which will clarify how the system works in practice. I beg to move.
Lord Touhig (Lab)
My Lords, at Second Reading I said that there was much to be concerned about in this Bill and that I really hoped the Government would be in listening mode. For the most part, the Government have listened and have made improvements, thanks to the willingness of the Minister and Bill team to listen and to the hard work and commitment of noble Lords on all sides of the House, who have pursued improvements with all the energy they could command.
Government Amendments 41 and 96, requiring a care home manager to provide a written statement to the responsible body to authorise and renew arrangements, seem pretty obvious. Most of us would think that it is common sense to provide a statement in writing, but my late mother would often lament that I would find that, in life, sense is not that common. We certainly welcome these amendments.
The same applies to Amendments 47 and 59, which will ensure that the determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate is to be made in an assessment, and that a record of this assessment must accompany the statement from the care home manager to the responsible body before an order to authorise arrangements is made. This is also most welcome. On this side, we certainly welcome these amendments.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I also welcome these amendments and want to make a brief observation. Since the summer, like many other noble Lords, I have spent a great deal of time talking to practitioners and stakeholders. If one were to try to thoroughly amend and improve the DoLS and LPS systems, you would start not with the role of the care home manager but with the paperwork and the bureaucracy. Before the code of practice is written, the Government would do well to spend some considerable time talking to local authorities and practitioners about paperwork and communication, because that is perhaps the biggest cause of the backlog of people who have yet to have a proper assessment.
I hope that the Minister will take on board what noble Lords have said on this matter. It is not a commitment to the current way of doing things; rather, although noble Lords are committed to ensuring that people are sufficiently informed, we are not averse to changing and modernising the systems to make them work more efficiently.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for their support for these amendments.
I want to reflect on the last point made, which is very important. The reference is to a written statement, which tends to bring to mind a piece of paper, but of course what we are really talking about are digital records. A great deal of thought has to be put into whether a paper system—or digital records—passing back and forth is the best way to go about this, or whether we can make a technological intervention. That is particularly true if we want these authorisations to be much more dynamic, so that their consistency and application can be assessed over time. There might be technological interventions we can make to make that process easier. I take that advice on board. We will absolutely talk to local authorities, cared-for people, their representatives, charities and others in making sure that we do it right. Noble Lords will be aware that the Secretary of State is a true technophile, and I imagine he would relish the opportunity to inject a bit of innovation into this area to make everyone’s life easier. I will take that point forward.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“(1A) An assessment must be carried out by a person who appears to the relevant person to have appropriate experience and knowledge.(1B) But if the arrangements are care home arrangements and authorisation is being determined under paragraph 13, an assessment may not be carried out by a person who has a prescribed connection with a care home.(1C) Regulations made by the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (1B)—(a) may make provision about a connection of any kind (financial or otherwise), and(b) may make different provision for assessments under paragraph 15(1)(a) and paragraph 15(1)(b).(1D) The “appropriate authority” means—(a) where the assessment is in relation to an authorisation by an English responsible body, the Secretary of State, and(b) where the assessment is in relation to an authorisation by a Welsh responsible body, the Welsh Ministers.”
Lord O'Shaughnessy
The Deputy Speaker (Viscount Ullswater) (Con)
I remind the House that having agreed Amendment 54, I cannot call Amendment 55 for reasons of pre-emption.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“( ) In this paragraph “relevant person” means—(a) the care home manager, if the arrangements are care home arrangements and authorisation is being determined under paragraph 13, or(b) the responsible body, in any other case.”
Baroness Barker
Baroness Barker
Baroness Barker
My Lords, Amendments 61 and 67 return to two issues that I and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised at earlier stages in our debates.
Amendment 61 pertains to what happens when the circumstances or condition of a person deprived of their liberty change. As we have said on previous occasions, that may be someone with dementia whose condition deteriorates or, as in the cases cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, it could be someone with a brain injury whose condition improves and who regains some of their capacity. It is the intention under the Bill that deprivations of liberty will last considerably longer than under current circumstances.
I seek an assurance that there is an ongoing duty on care home managers and those responsible for arranging and carrying out assessments to revisit people whose conditions are likely to change to ensure that their detention is still the least restrictive option.
In Amendment 67, I use the word “conditions” in a completely different sense. As has been said, under DoLS people carrying out assessments and authorisations have the right to say that it would be in order to detain someone and deprive them of their liberty provided that certain conditions are met. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has given us memorable examples of what those conditions might be. However, in truth, the most common condition concerns medication and reviews of medication.
The Government have consistently said that the Bill does not alter that—and that, as ever, the matter will be dealt with in the code of practice—but I am simply asking for a statement from the Minister setting out the legal force by which it will be possible in future for those who are responsible for depriving people of their liberty to do so on the basis of conditions which must be met. The importance of those conditions— particularly when we talk about DoLS in the community —is that they can make something a least restrictive option and therefore admissible.
It is for that reason that I have returned to these two amendments today, and I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I have added my name to Amendment 61 because it is important that we recognise that no one has a crystal ball—we cannot predict what is going to happen. Even people we think might be seriously impaired, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, can sometimes improve and it can be quite unexpected.
It is inconceivable that the course of a person’s illness will match the timetable of annual reviews—that is not the way bodies behave when they have an impairment; if someone does not improve within an expected time frame, they must be reassessed. Otherwise, there is a real possibility that they will languish with inappropriate restrictions on their liberty when such restrictions are no longer necessary or proportionate. In fact, in the case of medication reviews, they may have become inappropriate because they may be on medication that is unnecessarily a sedative.
Of course, those who deteriorate will also need phased authorisations and reviews. Without the Government laying out explicitly this degree of uncertainty in the timeframe and the fact that wherever there is expected to be uncertainty, it should be specified, I fear that there will be pressure to define the amendment’s principle by going to court. We will then end up with a court precedent that is not necessarily applicable to a lot of people, but which they will get caught up in anyway. We will end up with a risk-averse response. I hope the Government will be able to accept, if not the actual wording of the amendment, the principle that the timeliness and the timeframe need to be specified wherever possible to avoid that confusion.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I was pleased to add my name to Amendment 67 in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Jolly, because it would allow the responsible body to specify the set of conditions on the deprivation of liberty to determine that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate and that those conditions are complied with.
Throughout the Bill’s stages, the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, have been consistent on the importance of conditions. Of course, these things make the deprivation of liberty from the patient or cared-for person either tolerable—that is, understandable—or really horrible. I have been very impressed by some of the examples explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. It is important that these conditions are not only set, but met, monitored and changed when circumstances change. We seek assurance that the legislation, regulations and conditions will make that happen.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I reinforce what has been said about the importance of conditions and the difference that they can make to both quality of life and the tolerability of the regime to which the looked-after person is subject. I read about how some of the conditions might be things such as helping the looked-after person to sit in the care home’s garden every day or be taken out once a week, as well as how vital these conditions are to ensuring that the decisions taken are the least restrictive. We can all relate to these important things. It is important that there is provision for such conditions to be set out.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Baronesses for introducing their amendments and giving us the opportunity to discuss this important issue. I will set out why the Government have taken a different approach and attempt to explain it.
It is not that we do not think conditions are important. The use of conditions should be baked into the care plan and the arrangements put forward for authorisation, rather than being added only at the point of authorisation. This is not to say that the conditions—let us call them the elements of the arrangements—pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and other noble Baronesses are not critical. Obviously, they are critical to making sure that the elements are the least restrictive. This is about when they are put in place in the care planning and authorisation process. I shall explain our approach, which I hope will satisfy noble Lords, but we can see whether further discussions are required.
I will deal with the amendments in order. Amendment 61 states that it should be determined by the responsible body,
“that the arrangements will continue to be necessary and proportionate for the period of time for which the arrangements are sought”.
We absolutely agree that this should form part of our model and I confirm that this will be considered by the responsible body.
Furthermore, under the Bill, the responsible body is required to specify a programme of regular reviews at the point of authorisation. In a sense, it gets to specify at the point of authorisation how frequently reviews should take place, to seek whether changes in arrangements or other changes have taken place. This means that the care home manager—or the responsible body, if it is carrying it out directly—will be continually required to consider whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. That is baked into the system we are introducing.
Amendment 67 specifies that conditions can be put on authorisations and, of course, conditions exist under the current DoLS system. However, with the backlog, by the time they come into force, it is often too late, because the person has been subject to the arrangements for some time before the conditions can be applied. In developing the liberty protection safeguards system, we have taken a different approach; for that reason, conditions have not been included in the Bill. Again, it is worth pointing out that this is consistent with the approach adopted by the Law Commission, which concluded that conditions, as currently provided for under the DoLS system, were not necessary under its new scheme. The Law Commission’s final report states on page 112 that, instead of DoLS conditions, the scheme,
“focuses on particular arrangements and what will be authorised are very specific arrangements. Further, it is only arrangements which result in the minimum amount of deprivation of liberty possible that will be authorised, otherwise the necessary and proportionate condition will not be met. So the arrangements will need to be described in a way which builds in any conditions”.
In other words, arrangements under the Bill can be detailed in such a way as to have the same effect as conditions. For example, the authorised arrangements could include enabling the person to be taken out on trips with one-to-one support, or their care plan could specify that additional staff should be provided to enable the person to be taken out more frequently.
It is our view that doing this provides greater protections for the person. This approach means that conditions—or, if noble Lords prefer, specific arrangements—are considered as part of care planning, before an authorisation is sought, rather than being bolted on afterwards. Rather than being something that happens after the person is deprived of liberty, they would be an integral part of care planning, with the proposed arrangements submitted to the responsible body for review.
Notwithstanding this approach, I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is keen to have a statement from me about current practice, under which a DoLS lead, or best-interests assessor, can insist that deprivation of liberty is authorised only if stated conditions are made. We are not proposing to change the ability of the responsible body, whether the responsible body itself or an AMCP, to make conditions as part of an authorisation. It will still be possible for that to happen. We are trying to ensure that the decision on appropriate conditions is made earlier in the care-planning process, so that they are incorporated into the arrangements that are then put to the responsible body for review, rather than being added when the review takes place. Failure to comply with these conditions, specifically because they have been within the authorisation, would mean that the authorisation would cease to have effect, and must be reviewed. There we come to the ongoing important role that appropriate persons, IMCAs and others will have, in making sure the person is supported, so that if there are any changes in their condition, or their circumstances, a review is triggered.
I recognise this is a fiendishly complicated thing to describe, and I have probably done a fairly inadequate job of it. However, I strongly believe that, in making this change, we are not trying to remove conditions, but move the concept of applying conditions to earlier in the care-planning process. That is the right thing to do. The responsible body will continue to be able to add subsequent conditions if it feels it is necessary for an authorisation. I genuinely believe that is a better system. Clearly, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. On how this will happen in practice, there will need to be clear guidance and training to make sure that people are trained to do this, both at the care home, and in other NHS bodies, and to make sure that reviewers are capable of assessing such arrangements and making their own subsequent conditions, if they feel it is necessary. That guidance and training is something we aim to provide, of course.
I hope I have explained why we take the point the noble Baronesses made in tabling these amendments very seriously, and shown that the system allows for it. It puts this consideration earlier in the planning process, we hope with better effect. We have been guided by the Law Commission’s approach in this way. I hope this has been persuasive, but if further discussion and elaboration is needed, I would be more than happy to give it following today’s debate.
Baroness Barker
I thank the Minister very much for his response. We are arguing not about two opposites but about a gap that I am trying to close, the answer to which lies in why conditions happen. They happen not necessarily because of any failure of care planning, which I think the Minister is talking about, or to improve care planning, but because in real life people end up being cared for in a particular place. Things to which they object or limitations in their care become apparent at the point at which someone goes to do the authorisation.
I am all in favour of improving personalised care planning and so on, but the one thing that DoLS and best-interests assessors have been absolutely united in saying is that this makes a practical difference when they go to see people. I am very happy that the Minister said that it would still be the responsibility of a responsible body to make sure that conditions are being met, and that, if they were not or if it became apparent that further conditions needed to be put in place, they would still be able to do so. With that reassurance, I am content that we have probably closed the gap that I was trying to close. On that basis, I am willing not to press the amendments.
Baroness Barker
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“( ) When making a determination under this paragraph regard must be had (amongst other matters) to the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings in relation to the arrangements.”
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, before introducing these amendments, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for accepting my explanation on the previous group. I am conscious that we need to explain this in more detail, but I am grateful to all noble Lords and to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for not pushing this point. This is something that we can clarify to get to a better system.
The amendments in this group are clearly central to the Bill, because they are all about putting the cared-for person at the centre of the new liberty protection safeguards. Noble Lords have been at pains to highlight a concern that the cared-for person is not listed explicitly as a person to consult. That has clearly always been our intention, but it is nevertheless quite right that that should be explicit in the Bill.
Amendment 71 clarifies that the cared-for person must be consulted as part of the consultation under new paragraph 17. Amendment 63 sets out that the person’s wishes and feelings must be considered as part of the determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate. Amendments 110 and 111 update other parts of the Bill to reflect the new explicit consultation requirement and to make some other minor drafting changes.
The consultation required by the Bill is important in establishing the cared-for person’s wishes and feelings, and identifying objections to the arrangements. It is also an important way of involving the person and their families in the process, and making sure that the liberty protection safeguards authorisation is something that happens not just to them, but with them. It has always been our position that the person should be consulted, but it is quite right that we set this out explicitly. Through these amendments we have also been explicit that the person’s wishes and feelings must be considered as part of the necessary and proportionate determination.
Briefly, Amendment 68, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Jolly, would also ensure that this point is considered. I hope they will feel that the Government’s amendments have dealt with their issues and that they will feel happy not to press their amendments.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am looking to the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, because I am sure she will agree with me. I am grateful and happily give way to the government amendment, which does what we wanted to do. We will not do anything with our amendment. I thank the Minister for his clarifications.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I thank the noble Baroness for her agreement. I beg to move.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“(3) If the arrangements are care home arrangements and authorisation is being determined under paragraph 13, an assessment may not be carried out by a person who has a prescribed connection with a care home.(4) Regulations made by the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (3) may make provision about a connection of any kind (financial or otherwise).(5) The “appropriate authority” means—(a) where the assessment is in relation to an authorisation by an English responsible body, the Secretary of State, and(b) where the assessment is in relation to an authorisation by a Welsh responsible body, the Welsh Ministers.”
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“(za) the cared-for person,”
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
I remind the House that if Amendment 73 is agreed I cannot call Amendment 74 because of pre-emption.
Amendment 73
Lord O’Shaughnessy
(a) a person who is involved—(i) in the day-to-day care of the cared-for person, or(ii) in providing any treatment to the cared-for person, or(b) a person who has a prescribed connection with a care home.”
(c) there is dispute between the responsible body and the registered health or social care professional who has carried out the review under paragraph 20.”
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I declare an interest. Some years ago I was involved in helping the police prosecute people who were responsible for care but who were delivering terrible abuse in what was then termed an EMI home. A care assistant, encouraged and supported by her friend who worked on the domestic side, thought, “This wouldn’t be good enough for one of my relatives”. As we explored the cases, families in their statements commented on all they had noticed but said they did not feel able to raise concerns, let alone complain. They feared that their relative in the home would be victimised if they said anything or raised any questions. It was case records that revealed repetitive patterns of entry that gave the clues to support the statements that relatives gave to the police and provided evidence against those abusing these people, which led to a successful prosecution. The Minister has already said that the triggers for an AMCP review will be expanded. We look forward to working with him and officials on this. That should cover Amendment 76 when there is a dispute. Amendment 74 has, of course, fallen through pre-emption.
I shall focus on Amendment 76A, because it supports the whistleblower and ensures an independent review. Without that, we will fail those who need protection and leave whistleblowers with no option other than to stay silent and say nothing—or, if they can pluck up the courage, go to the CQC or the police, with all the disruption, expense and risk of losing their job that that involves. It would also mean a delay in alerting when things are not as they should be. The other amendments in this group concern other ways of triggering a professional expert review. I know that we have legislation designed to protect whistleblowers, but for domestics—cleaning and kitchen staff—and care assistants, who are often those who spend most face-to-face time with people, who need the job and may not be able to find alternative employment where they live, it takes enormous courage to say that things are not right. Sadly, it is more courage than many people can pluck up.
A Guardian report, published on Friday, cites examples of “terrible indignity and neglect” in for-profit care homes across the country. Whistleblowers have risked their jobs and livelihoods to report cases of,
“inappropriate and disproportionate use of physical restraint”,
on residents with autism, and carers failing to manage medicine safely. In this article, Eileen Chubb, founder of Compassion in Care—a charity that campaigns on behalf of whistleblowers for better levels of care—was quoted as saying:
“We have seen first hand the appalling consequences of poor care … company after company making millions whilst on the frontline vulnerable people are left without the basics to sustain life”.
Carers who break the silence surrounding abuse, such as the whistleblowers at the home cited, deserve protection.
Even if a care home is a good home and receives a good rating from a CQC inspection, relatives may visit only intermittently and may not be aware that the care that they think is being given to their relative just is not happening for them. They will not be aware of the minute-to-minute, hour-to-hour aspect of a person’s care. It is the staff there for hours on end who can benchmark that care. They may realise that the person has become increasingly withdrawn and increasingly less communicative, and perhaps cries at night and seems very unhappy. The staff must confidently be able to ask for a review without prejudice.
This amendment will play an important role in giving protection both for residents and for those who call for a review. It calls for a review because it is far less threatening for somebody who has a concern to be able to ask for an independent review from an AMCP who can come in and assess what is going on—they do not feel that they need the body of evidence to make an accusation of malpractice. That is why this should be in the Bill, even if all the other ways of triggering a review are consigned to the code of practice. I feel quite strongly that when staff feel that something is not right and want to say so but their seniors are not recognising it, they must have the ability to protect the cared-for person, because the cared-for person is so vulnerable. I beg to move.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, right from the beginning of this Bill—at Second Reading and in Committee—concerns have been expressed across the House about how the interests of the cared-for person can be ensured through the process of using the AMCP when that person is at their most vulnerable and may not be articulate at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, articulated exactly what we are saying. Amendment 76A, in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, is an essential fail-safe that we believe needs to be in the Bill.
Like the Minister, we have sought across the House to prioritise the issues that we thought were most important for the cared-for person. I think we have come through rather well in improving this Bill together, and mostly without having to resort to Divisions. I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 76A, because it is certainly in line with the aspirations that he has expressed to the House about safeguarding the cared-for person. If he is not prepared to do that, certainly on these Benches we hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will seek the opinion and support of the House, because it is certainly there.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, it has been a concern of all noble Lords who have taken part in discussions on the Bill that a person could be deprived of their liberty without seeing an appropriate professional at any time. We have argued back and forth about the extent to which access to an appropriate professional should be universal, automatic or whatever.
With this amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and those of us who have attached our names to it are trying to ensure that where the people who are most closely associated with a person have a genuine and deep concern—I imagine it would be a shared concern—but not necessarily a formal role, they can alert a professional to come in and make an assessment. We are trying to close a loophole that we think is still there.
If we can do that, we will be well on the way to doing what the Minister has indicated the Government are trying to do: to make the most effective and efficient use of professional resources amid a level of demand which we know cannot currently be met. We have moved some way from what we would ideally like to see and this amendment represents something of a compromise. I hope we can reach agreement on this last part of the link.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for tabling these amendments and giving us the opportunity to debate this very important issue. I will come to Amendment 76A last, because clearly that is the one about which there has been the most debate and, in a sense, has the most import. First, I will deal briefly with the other amendments in the group.
Amendment 81 would require the person who conducts the pre-authorisation review to be a,
“registered health or social care professional”,
with appropriate skills, knowledge and experience. I think and hope that we dealt with that adequately on our previous day on Report. Those qualifications will be set out in the code of practice. Indeed, we might want to go more broadly than we have done historically on this.
Amendment 76 would require that where there is a dispute between the responsible body and the professional who completed the pre-authorisation review, it would automatically go up to an AMCP. I agree that in some cases that would be the right and prudent thing to do. In other cases, it may be able to be resolved between the two parties. Again, we dealt with that before and it is something I want to consider in our deliberations about the kinds of cases that an AMCP would look at.
The debate on Amendment 76A has been helpful in bringing out the core concern here: the role of whistleblowers. We have talked about the cared-for person, their family members, the appropriate person, IMCAs and others, but this is about the people who are doing the caring or who are employed by the organisation or organisations that are doing the caring. It is absolutely right—indeed, the Bill requires—that an AMCP must conduct a pre-authorisation review if there is a reasonable belief. Clearly, a note of concern being raised by a staff member would qualify because they would have understanding and knowledge of the care of that person.
Last week we had a Statement on the Gosport inquiry, in which the health system not listening to whistleblowers was critical in these issues not being dealt with for years and people losing their lives as a consequence. As the Government said in response to that, we are working with BEIS—the department with responsibility for such legislation—to see if there is anything we can do to strengthen the rules around whistleblowers. I take very seriously the concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. As I said, with Gosport and indeed many other instances, whether they involve one person or, sadly, dozens of people, this kind of issue crops up again and again. I understand its importance.
The concern I have at this point actually relates to the drafting. Because it would provide an automatic trigger, rather than one that gave some consideration to the seriousness of the case, there is a risk that it could be abused or that frivolous cases could be raised and put to an AMCP when it was not really justified. That is, in a sense, an issue with the drafting
I want to deal with this if we can. My suggestion, if noble Lords are willing, is to meet between now and Third Reading to discuss this topic—as well as any others we want to discuss, of course—to work out the right approach. This would enable us to get to the bottom of it, work out what is right and think about that in the context of other whistleblowing issues, of which we are all aware. It would ensure that if we all agree on the need to legislate, we can agree on what that ought to look like. Again, I emphasise the importance with which I regard this issue. I hope and believe that we can do something in the coming days to deal with it in a way on which we all agree, while having the effect that we want. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am most grateful to the Minister for realising the seriousness of this issue and that our current whistleblowing policies are inadequate. I do not share his concern about vexatious reporting because if you got such reporting from a staff member, it would be pretty obvious pretty quickly. The review would have happened and if one person is better protected, it is far safer than many people being inadequately protected. I accept that my drafting—I am grateful to the Public Bill Office—may not be perfect and because the Minister will come back to this at Third Reading, we will have a meeting and then be able to bring back an amendment.
Baroness Thornton
May I seek clarification from the Minister? He said that he would come back to Amendment 76A. Is this about Amendment 76 or Amendment 76A?
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for clarifying on the record that we are talking about Amendment 76A. With the caveat that the meeting will include all of us who have been involved in and feel so concerned about this matter, I will withdraw the amendment, knowing that we will bring something back at Third Reading in this House and not leave it to the code of practice or the Commons. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“( ) Regulations made by the appropriate authority under sub-paragraph (1)(b) may make provision about a connection of any kind (financial or otherwise).( ) The “appropriate authority” means—(a) where the pre-authorisation review is in relation to an authorisation by an English responsible body, the Secretary of State, and(b) where the pre-authorisation review is in relation to an authorisation by a Welsh responsible body, the Welsh Ministers.”
Baroness Thornton
“(za) meet with the cared-for person,”
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, the next three amendments form a suite and, following our discussions with stakeholders, these are issues that we would like to discuss. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and I have shared the tabling of these amendments, which do not directly address the central and overarching question of where so much of the care home manager’s responsibility will lie. In a way, we have addressed that issue and amended the Bill accordingly. The amendments concentrate on strengthening the rights of the cared-for person, which have to be at the heart of any system for giving and reviewing authorisations, by ensuring that their voice is heard within consultations at every stage of the process. Amendment 82, which is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, would start this process by ensuring that there is a meeting “with the cared-for person”. I beg to move.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Before I address this amendment, I again thank noble Lords for their willingness to talk further on Amendment 76A so that we can reach the right conclusion.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, quite rightly talked about the role of Amendment 82 being to make sure that the cared-for person has rights and that they are at the centre of the authorisation process. Of course, that is absolutely right. The reason why we have not taken the approach that the reviewer should meet all people in the system is because we want to provide a more proportionate system that nevertheless contains significant safeguards so that if there are any concerns about the nature of a review then not only would the reviewer, whether a responsible body or an IMCA, meet the person but there are opportunities for escalation beyond that.
Let me be absolutely clear that in cases where the person objects to the arrangements, the Bill already requires AMCPs to meet the person, where practicable and appropriate, when they complete the preauthorisation review. This amendment would require a face-to-face visit in all preauthorisation reviews, not only those completed by an AMCP, regardless of whether it is appropriate or practicable to do so.
I of course appreciate there will be circumstances where it is right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the person, even in cases where the review is not completed by an AMCP. That is not precluded by the Bill. Indeed, it would be our expectation in some cases that that would happen. For example, if the person completing the preauthorisation review is concerned that adequate consultation has not taken place or if there is a question over the validity of any of the assessments provided, we think it right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person. Details about that, including scenarios, will be set out in the code of practice.
However, we also want to make sure that the system is proportionate. One of the problems we have at the moment is that it is not proportionate, and that is why we have a backlog. There are straightforward cases. For example, when someone who consented to living in the care home subsequently loses capacity and there is no reason to suspect that they would object to continuing to live in the care home, a meeting with the cared-for person would be very unlikely to change the outcome. In such cases, the person may have already undergone an assessment process and the person will also have access to representation—we are about to come on to IMCAs. Unless there are concerns about the validity of the assessments, it would not normally be necessary or proportionate to meet the person who, after all, had agreed to live in the care home.
A further potential effect of this amendment would be to require the person completing the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person, even if the person refuses. This is a topic we have discussed before. We do not think it goes with the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act, particularly in cases where someone has expressed a desire not to do so. It is important to stress that that is not just our conclusion but is also the conclusion of the Law Commission after its work. We believe that a targeted approach will be much more effective in making sure that those safeguards are in place.
While I understand the noble Baroness’s desire for reassurance that the cared-for person will be met, I do not think it would be appropriate in all cases. We have been clear during the passage of the Bill in the amendments that we have laid, and as we will specify in the code of practice, that there will be many circumstances when it is appropriate to do so but equally there will be circumstances when it is not appropriate. Therefore, we do not think it would be right to have a blanket application of this approach of the preauthorisation reviewer meeting the cared-for person. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will feel reassured and will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Barker
During our deliberations the Minister has several times talked about people being forced to meet an IMCA or an AMCP when they do not want to. We have asked him to supply evidence of that. He has not yet done so, even though we are at this stage in our deliberations. Clearly this is a matter that may well return at a further stage in the Commons. I ask him again please to write to noble Lords with that evidence.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that clarification. It is a question that we felt was worth asking, and I suspect that when the Bill goes to the Commons people will pursue it. I do not think the argument that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, put forward, that there are people who do not want this and they should not be forced into it, is really the point; the point was about this not happening because it was obstructed by the people taking care of the person. That is the matter that needs clarification. So, on the basis that that will be clear—
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Before the noble Baroness withdraws her amendment, I would like to say that that is an important point. I am not suggesting that there are going to be hundreds of cases where individuals do not want to see someone, but it is clearly a possibility. I think we need a more proportional system in order to deal with the backlog and ensure that people are protected, but it also has to have a set of safeguards, whether that is access to representation, making sure that conflicts of interest do not exist among care home managers and, as we are going to discuss in the coming weeks, under what circumstances an AMCP would automatically be activated, in which case of course the meeting would take place. It is those circumstances that ought to give the reassurance that it is not necessary in all cases, rather than saying that there are hundreds or thousands of these kinds of cases where people are refusing. I think that will be the exception rather than the rule.
Baroness Thornton
I thank the Minister for that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Barker
“(d) there are practicable less restrictive options that would meet the authorisation conditions”
Baroness Barker
This amendment follows on in some way from the previous discussion. It relates to a practical issue. We keep returning to the fact that authorisations are going to be made, potentially for a longer time—they can be renewed for up to three years —yet there is not much in the way of safeguards for those people for whom the initial authorisation and the process of review is no longer the least restrictive option. This again uses the importance of putting something in the Bill rather than sticking it in the back of a code of practice to ensure that in the process of reviewing an authorisation and bringing it to an earlier conclusion there is information about less restrictive options for that person that would meet the authorising conditions.
This is mostly the case for people who are discharged from hospital into a care home and whose care is then very often not reviewed. At that stage their care may be taken into consideration along with the sale of their own property. That is why it is important that we consider this issue as the Bill goes through, so that by enabling there to be longer authorisations for most people we are not putting a subgroup of people in jeopardy by not having this requirement to continue to look at less restrictive options. I beg to move.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I support the amendment. I would like to put an illustrative example before the House, although I know this is Report so I will be very brief. I heard recently about someone who had sustained a head injury, living in a place where he received care, who got very aggressive whenever people suggested that he should attend to his own personal hygiene or tidy up. Any type of reasoning or persuasion completely failed. The solution was not to restrict what he did at all but rather just to walk in, put a vacuum cleaner in the room and go out again. He seemed to then go into an automatic mode of vacuuming, cleaning up, tidying up and then washing, and everything was sorted, including his personal hygiene.
I mention that because it is important for us to realise, when we are thinking of restrictive options, that sometimes you need to be imaginative to find the least restrictive option for people. Letting people out a certain amount can be far more effective than being so risk-averse that you limit what they can do.
Baroness Thornton
Yet again, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, brings us a helpful example. I put my name to the amendment and we support it. It is part of a suite of amendments about keeping the cared-for person as far as possible empowered to make their own decisions, which must be intrinsic to the Bill. The amendment would ensure that the least restrictive method is always used.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment and the other noble Baronesses who have spoken to it. The example given was very illuminating, and I rather like the idea of that happening automatically if you leave a vacuum cleaner in someone’s room. I might try that with my children and see what happens.
The key point here is that we want the least restrictive arrangements necessary to provide for the person’s ongoing care. That is the animating idea behind the liberty protection safeguards system. We believe that the effect of the amendment is catered for through the “necessary and proportionate” test. Let me explain that. When the Law Commission published its final report on this, it concluded that,
“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.
So consideration of whether an ongoing restriction continues to be necessary and proportionate is already baked in.
As I said, the nature of the authorisations to be given by the responsible body under the new system will instigate a system of regular reviews. To give an example, it might stipulate a review for someone with fluctuating capacity, where there is reason to believe that a review might be required after a period. The system being set up enables regular reviews in a way that provides greater specificity than is the case now.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was concerned that, as the length of an authorisation was extended, although that might be all right for some people, it might not for others. That is a fantastically important point, but in the process of authorisation the responsible body will be able to stipulate more frequent reviews. Our hope would be that that would come from the care home manager or other person organising the arrangements in the process of their care planning, because they will have worked out, by looking after that person, that there is reason for regular review, but it could equally be something that the responsible body attaches as a condition to the arrangements.
The effect is that when less restrictive alternatives are practically available, the authorisation ceases to have effect. It is no longer applicable. As I said, that could be determined by continuous review, regular review or be flagged by anyone—a staff member, a family member or others—with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare, which would trigger an updated review of the situation to see what less restrictive care was available.
Although I absolutely agree with the intent behind the amendment, the “necessary and proportionate” test is already in the Bill. It provides precisely the effect that the noble Baronesses seek. Indeed, because of the way we are dealing with specific arrangements in the authorisation process, it is something for which the responsible body can stipulate a system of regular reviews. I hope that, on that basis, they will be reassured that we are conscious of the importance of this issue but believe that it is dealt with in the Bill as amended, and that the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing the amendment.
Baroness Barker
I thank the noble Lord very much for those statements. He will understand that, given the state in which this Bill arrived in your Lordships’ House, there was a great deal of genuine concern among stakeholders that the people making the decisions—largely, care home managers—might not be in a position to know what would be a less restrictive option for somebody: to be either in their own home, or supported in the community. In this Report stage, it has been useful to go back over that ground and to put more clarification around the frequency and timing of reviews. That will be a tremendous test for this new system, given the way in which it has been set up for there to be a period of two-year renewals. Nevertheless, at this stage, I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“26A_ The responsible body may renew an authorisation—(a) under paragraph 27, if the conditions in that paragraph are met, or(b) under paragraph 28 if—(i) the authorisation relates to care home arrangements,(ii) the responsible body decides that renewal should be determined under that paragraph instead of under paragraph 27, and(iii) the conditions in paragraph 28 are met.”
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Lord O’Shaughnessy
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
If Amendment 99 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 100 to 102 on grounds of pre-emption.
Amendment 99
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Baroness Thornton
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, Amendment 103 is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. It would ensure that the reviewer must carry out a review of authorisations if a reasonable request is made by a person with an interest in the welfare of the cared-for person. This is part of the suite of amendments that stakeholders have put to us about making the cared-for person the heart of the Bill. Care England, along with many others across the sector, wants to be assured that the cared-for person’s voice is heard within the consultations at every stage of the process. This amendment would ease those concerns of the various stakeholders.
Like amendments in previous groups, this amendment would ensure that the cared-for person’s best interests are kept at the forefront of the Bill and not forgotten, and it would play a key role in protecting the cared-for person’s rights. If someone with a cared-for person’s best interests feels that the authorisations are in need of being reviewed and reconsidered, this must happen and therefore would help to protect the cared-for person. I beg to move.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment. Obviously, it is worth having an opportunity to restate that we clearly agree with her that it is necessary that anybody with an interest in a cared-for person’s welfare is able to trigger a reasonable request or, indeed, an objection on their behalf that constitutes a reasonable belief. That is something that we have discussed in terms of people who are supportive, such as family members, appropriate persons, IMCAs, and so on. Clearly, we have agreed to talk further about the role of whistleblowers and staff members.
I can reassure the noble Baroness that what she is asking for is already contained in numerous places in the Bill. The amendment deals specifically with paragraph 31(3)(b) of Schedule AA1. It is implicit in the description,
“person with an interest in the arrangements”,
that that includes people who have an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare. That is the purpose of the Bill. As I have made clear, any objection from someone who has an interest in the person’s welfare constitutes a reasonable belief, as set out elsewhere in the Bill. I am grateful for the opportunity to return to this issue and hope that I have reassured the noble Baroness that this is absolutely included in the definition.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
Before the Minister sits down, will he confirm that “interests” does not include the interests of the care home manager, where it may be a cheaper option, and that the interests of the cared-for person are definitely at the centre of the clause as written? I want to be absolutely sure that it cannot be misinterpreted in the future to mean “interests” in a much broader sense than the interests of the cared-for person.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
That is a very valid question. We have tried to deal with the conflict issues in other amendments. It is absolutely not the intention that that ought to be misused for the purpose referred to by the noble Baroness. I will need to get specific clarification about the implications of this, but I can reassure her that that is not the intention of it. If it needs to be clarified in a letter to noble Lords and, subsequently, in a code of practice then that is what we will do.
Baroness Thornton
This is probably one of the occasions when one can say that this really needs to be clarified in the code of practice. I thank the Minister for his reassurances and for getting them on the record. I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
My Lords, I come to the critically important issue of IMCAs—independent mental capacity advocates. These amendments relate to the appointment of such people. Representation and support, whether from an IMCA or an “appropriate person”, is an important safeguard and is vital to ensuring that a cared-for person’s human rights are protected throughout the process when they are deprived of liberty.
Many people will be best supported by an appropriate person. This will tend to be a family member or someone who is close to the person. They will often know them, and their wishes and feelings, and are in the best position to provide that person with support and representation. They must, of course, be willing to undertake such a role. However, we know that others will not be in this position and will benefit from having an IMCA to provide that support and representation. For those people, it is vital that they can access an IMCA without impediment and these amendments address this
Amendments 112 and 113 remove the requirement for care home managers to notify a responsible body whether or not an IMCA should be appointed. Amendments 116 and 118 mean that appointment of IMCAs in care home cases is not contingent on notification from the care home. In Committee, I committed to review whether the Bill could make clearer that the care home manager should not act as a gatekeeper to an IMCA appointment. I have done this and these amendments achieve that goal. The responsibility for appointing an IMCA will therefore clearly lie with the responsible body and must be considered from the point that the arrangements are proposed. The responsible body can take into account any evidence in deciding whether an IMCA should be appointed, including a request from the person themselves, a family member or other interested person.
Amendments 122 and 124 in effect introduce a presumption that an IMCA should be appointed if there is no appropriate person, with a very limited exception when having an IMCA would not be in the person’s best interests. Noble Lords and others have raised concerns that the Bill as currently drafted introduces a test that could act as a block on IMCA appointment. The Joint Committee on Human Rights also expressed concern about this issue. Our intent is to ensure that people are properly protected, and we see the role of the IMCA and the appropriate person as essential to the integrity of the system in advocating for and supporting cared-for people and their rights.
We have been pleased to listen to stakeholders and to noble Lords and have amended the Bill accordingly to make sure that, when no appropriate person is in place, an IMCA is appointed unless that is not in the person’s best interests. Circumstances where it would not be in a person’s best interests to have an IMCA would be very rare, as we have discussed, but that might be the case if, for example, a person’s past and present wishes and feelings clearly indicated that they did not want one. We will use the code of practice to outline when these very unusual exceptions would apply.
Turning to the other amendments in this group, Amendment 117, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Jolly, would have the same effect as government Amendment 116. In the light of that, I hope they will feel that that deals with the issue they were concerned about. All the other amendments in this group update the Bill to reflect our proposed changes to the IMCA role.
I hope that our amendments have addressed the perfectly understandable concerns of noble Lords on this topic. I am very grateful for their input to making sure that we have been able to move forward on this issue. I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, like all other noble Lords, I welcome the Government’s change of heart on this matter and am glad that they have understood the very real concerns about conflict of interest in relation to care home managers. However, I would like to take this opportunity to raise one other potential conflict of interest to which we have not really had time to pay much attention, and that is within the responsible body. The responsible body may well be the local authority which is funding somebody’s care home place. During meetings, stakeholders have been very concerned that the person within the responsible body who makes these decisions should not be within the commissioning part of that body, as there is the potential there for another conflict of interest.
Some further work will have to be done—I suspect either in regulations or in a code of practice—to make sure that we do not enable another conflict of interest to take place which is probably more important than a conflict of interest relating to a care home manager. It is just a case of being sure that all the decisions—although principally these decisions—are taken by a person within the responsible body but not within the financial decision-making parts of it.
Baroness Thornton
I have an amendment in this group which covers the same ground that we have been talking about for the last 20 or so minutes. It is probably not essential to pursue this amendment because the government amendments on this matter seem very comprehensive.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I am sorry that I did not mention the noble Baroness’s amendment—there are so many in this group—nevertheless, I am grateful for her acceptance that we have been able to meet the perfectly justified concerns discussed inside and outside the Chamber during the passage of the Bill.
Perhaps I may deal quickly with the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, who asked about conflicts of interest within a responsible body. We would certainly expect authorisation and the IMCA appointments to be in a separate part of the commissioning body. Government Amendment 73, which deals with who should not carry out reviews, includes, in paragraph (b),
“a person who has a prescribed connection with a care home”.
The process of commissioning a care home place for somebody should perhaps be a category that we ought to consider under that provision, and I shall need to reflect on that. That might be the right route to follow, as clearly we do not want to move the conflict of interest to a different part of the process. I will look into that and we will consider how to deal with it. I think we now have the statute to enable us to do so. I will come back to noble Lords on that point. I thank them for their contribution to the development of these amendments and their support for them. I beg to move.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord O'Shaughnessy
“(a) “medical treatment” has the same meaning as in the Mental Health Act (see section 145(1) and (4)), but”
“PART 8TRANSITORY PROVISION52_ Until the repeal of section 324 of the Education Act 1996 made by paragraph 4(1) and (9) of Schedule 1 to the Additional Learning Needs and Education Tribunal (Wales) Act 2018 (anaw 2) comes fully into force—(a) paragraph 10(1)(zb) has effect as if there were substituted—“(zb) if the cared-for person has an individual development plan or a statement of special educational needs—(i) the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan or statement, or(ii) in the case of an individual development plan which is not maintained by a local authority, the local authority whose area the cared-for person is in;”,(b) paragraph 10(4A)(b) has effect as if there were substituted—“(b) if the cared-for person has an individual development plan or a statement of special educational needs—(i) the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan or statement, or(ii) in the case of an individual development plan which is not maintained by a local authority, the local authority whose area the cared-for person is in;”, and(c) paragraph 10(7) has effect as if at the end there were inserted—““statement of special educational needs” means a statement within the meaning of section 324 of the Education Act 1996.””
Lord O'Shaughnessy
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
“Requirement before commencement: consultation
Before any provisions of this Act other than those which come into force on its passing can come into force, the Secretary of State must publish a report listing the names of organisations consulted by the Government in preparation of the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill since 13 March 2017.”
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I have three substantive amendments in this group, Amendments 140, 141 and 143. Amendments 145, 146 and 147 are linked to and consequential on the first three.
Amendment 140 states that before the Act comes into force, the Secretary of State should publish a report listing the names of organisations consulted by the Government since March 2017 in preparing the Bill. I am very surprised that the Government have refused to list the organisations they consulted. I understand they refused an FoI request because it would be too expensive, which is difficult to understand. I think the Government and the Department of Health and Social Care are clearly embarrassed about the consultation they undertook. It was clearly one of those selective consultations, and I am afraid it reflects the rushed nature of the Bill.
The Law Commission undertook extensive work and published a draft Bill. Instead of discussing that with stakeholders and having the proper pre-legislative scrutiny for a mental capacity Bill, the Government essentially cherry picked the Law Commission Bill, did a rushed consultation, ended up in trouble and have now had to produce a load of amendments to try to put the Bill as right as possible.
I am grateful to the Minister and his officials for what they have done, but I do not think anyone believes this is a good Bill that will work in practice. I am sure the reality is that another Bill will have to be produced when it is found that this Bill, too, cannot be implemented effectively in the field, for all the reasons we have suggested. A Bill in this kind of area, particularly when it starts in the House of Lords, cries out either for pre-legislative scrutiny or at least—as the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has suggested on a number of occasions—a Select Committee process to engage with stakeholders and question officials before it reaches Committee in your Lordships’ House. It is a matter of regret that this did not happen. I am sure this will come up again in the Commons, and I still think we ought to know for the record which organisations were consulted on the Bill.
Amendment 141 relates to outstanding applications under the current legislation, which I raised in Committee. We are told that the reason for the Bill is the huge backlog of applications that have not been dealt with at all. The question is: what will happen to them? In Committee, the Minister said that,
“existing DoLS authorisations can continue until they are due for renewal or review”.—[Official Report, 22/10/18; col. 758.]
I well understand that; it is sensible. When they come up for review or renewal, they will then need to be dealt with under the provisions of this Bill, once it is enacted. But I want to know what will happen to the tens of thousands of applications that have simply not started. Because they have not been started, will they have to be dealt with under the existing legislation, or, if not, how will the sector cope with these thousands of applications under the new system?
All evidence suggests that, when you start a new process and then immediately put on to it all the people who have not been through the old process, it leads to chaos, because the system cannot handle it. I have mentioned my wonderful experience as Minister for the Child Support Agency. Mrs Thatcher invented the CSA, thinking she could reduce benefit payments because, in essence, benefits were being paid in circumstances where people were not paying maintenance to their partner who was looking after the children. She had the great idea that, by bringing in the CSA and making everyone on benefits go through the system, suddenly a lot of money would be produced. Of course, what it produced was absolute chaos. On the vesting day, everyone who was claiming benefits in those circumstances was immediately expected to come on to the system. I want to make sure that we avoid a similar situation here—as well as wanting to share with noble Lords a second time my angst with the CSA.
Amendment 143, my third in this group, relates to the code of practice. We have talked about this code on many happy occasions during our debates. Will the Minister explain how he sees the timing for the code, and confirm that it will have to be laid before Parliament? Finally, I hope the Minister will accept my amendment. He has put so much emphasis on the importance of the code; surely it should be approved by affirmative rather than negative resolution. I know that the Minister has given quite a bit on this Bill recently; I hope he might just give on that. I beg to move.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 142 and 144. My substantive Amendment 142 requires that the code of practice to the Mental Capacity Act and the government response to the independent review of the Mental Health Act must be laid before Parliament before the provisions of the Bill come into force. I shall focus on the latter, as we have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the code of practice.
The independent review of the Mental Health Act is due to report its final recommendations on 12 December. I know this because last week I attended a helpful briefing given by Sir Simon Wessely to interested parliamentarians, in which he outlined his broad findings. However, until that review is published, we cannot know how its recommendations will impact precisely on this Bill.
We know that the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act are the only two pieces of legislation that allow a deprivation of liberty for the purposes of care and treatment and that, as such, there will inevitably be cross-over between the two. I thank the Minister for confirming in Committee that these documents would be produced before the Bill is enacted. However, I am concerned that the Bill could have completed its parliamentary passage by the time the Government respond to the independent review. Therefore this important debate is taking place in a vacuum of information on how people with severe mental illnesses could be affected by the proposed LPS.
Sir Simon Wessely has indicated that his review will not consider the full fusion of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, which some people were advocating a while back, but there are none the less many outstanding questions on the interaction of the Bill with the Mental Health Act and, frankly, until it has reported they are impossible to answer.
Under the Mental Health Act, there is no capacity test and the capacity-based principles of the Mental Capacity Act do not apply to mental health care or treatment provided under the Mental Health Act. People without capacity are nevertheless detained and treated under the Mental Health Act. We know there has been a dramatic rise in recent years in the number of those aged over 65 being treated under the Mental Health Act. Indeed, the Care Quality Commission has highlighted that both the broadening of the definition of deprivation of liberty in the light of the Cheshire West judgment and the associated overburdening of DoLS, which is what we are talking about, are likely to have played a role in this.
As a result, there are still crucial questions about how the independent review of the Mental Health Act will address people who lack capacity and what the implications may be for those who fall under the LPS regime depending on where the dividing line between the two Acts is drawn. It is an incredibly complex picture.
Let me say a couple of words finally to highlight and paint a picture of that complexity. It is not possible for a person to be subject to the LPS when they are already detained under the Mental Health Act, even if they lack capacity. However, it is possible for people who are in hospital to be subject to the LPS if they are not detained. The LPS was not primarily designed for people with severe mental illness whose conditions are likely to fluctuate, improve or be contested more frequently than, for example, dementia. While I have focused on the needs of those with severe mental illness under the LPS, many of the same points apply in the opposite direction.
I could go on but I will not. I hope these illustrations of how the Mental Capacity Act is applied to mental health patients, and the Mental Health Act to people without capacity, in these two overlapping legislative frameworks have shown the necessity for this amendment so that the two can be finally considered together, a point which I and many other noble Lords have raised consistently since Second Reading.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I feel sorry for the Minister that after so much agreement we are now criticising the Bill. However, the reason we have reached a happier state than the one we started off in in July is due to the work of a great many people, including the Minister and the Bill team.
I have put my name to several amendments in this group—I support my noble friend Lord Hunt and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in what they have said—and I shall speak to Amendments 143A and 147A.
In a way, the amendments are part of what should have happened before the Bill reached us; that is exactly right. It is important to note that a coalition of organisations is concerned about what is and is not in the Bill and how it will be implemented. For the record, we have discussed the Bill with at least 44 organisations in the very short time we have had to consider it. They include Mind, the Alzheimer’s Society, Liberty, Learning Disability England, Disability Rights UK, the Relatives & Residents Association, the Care Provider Alliance, VODG—the voluntary sector’s disability group—and many others. We must pay credit to both them and the noble Lords who have worked so hard on this for the fact that we have come to a point where the Bill has significantly changed and been improved.
Echoing what my noble friend said, the amendments ask that the revised codes of practice for the Mental Capacity Act take account of Schedule 1 to the Bill and, prior to the provisions in the Act coming into force, that the code be revised by statutory instrument using the “made affirmative” procedure. Amendment 143A states:
“Before any provisions of this Act other than those which come into force on its passing come into force … the Secretary of State must publish a report detailing which of the provisions of the Act will be consulted on, by whom and by when … publish his or her consideration of the conclusions of the Independent Review of the Mental Health Act … conduct further consultation with vulnerable people, families, charities, providers … publish an equality impact assessment on the impact of the provisions of this Act”.
I would like the Minister to say that the Government have done the equality impact assessment but I have missed it somehow. However, it seems that the Government are duty-bound to consider the impact on people with protected characteristics under the Equality Act. An equality impact assessment is the established way of the Government showing that they have considered the impact on vulnerable groups. That Act begs that this process should have been gone through in preparation for the Bill. I hope that a full equality impact assessment will be conducted and made available to the Commons when it considers the Bill.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, I had not fallen asleep. We are nearly there. I put my name to Amendments 140 to 147A because they are important, although I suspect that they will not make it into the Bill. It is important to have these discussions at this stage.
In Committee, I tabled amendments on the review of the Mental Health Act and the code of practice. I still support them. The request for an equality impact assessment in Amendment 143A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is the right thing to do. The amendments ask the questions but the issues are still real and important. The amendments also relate to how a future Bill could be handled. Indeed, it helps us to look back to other Bills; I cite the Care Act, for example, where a Committee of both Houses went through the Bill over a prolonged period to ensure that by the time it hit your Lordships’ House, it was worth reviewing.
The Minister has done a very good job of pulling this all together so far; Third Reading is still to come. I understand full well that he will not put any of these amendments in the Bill, but he should take seriously the concerns that they raise from Members of your Lordships’ House.
Lord O'Shaughnessy
I apologise for pre-empting the noble Baroness. I take the points raised in these amendments seriously, and I will attempt to deal with them as we go through. I applaud noble Lords for the contribution they have made in improving the legislation before us, but of course it is one thing getting the legislation in better order and another thing putting it into practice. I think that is what has inspired the amendments in this group. I will attempt to deal with them as comprehensively as I can and explain why we will not be accepting them in practice—as the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, pointed out—although we are dealing with them in spirit.
Amendments 140 and 146, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, require the Government to publish a list of every organisation we have consulted with. The noble Lord expressed concern about our response to his FOI request; as I understand it, there were some technical reasons why that did not elicit the information he was after. However, I hope the noble Lord will have seen the letter I sent following Committee, explaining that we have held over 50 engagement events since March 2017. I outlined the broad range of organisations that the Government have engaged with. That letter has been put in the Library and will be published online in due course.
I will not detain noble Lords by going through that list, but of course I am more than happy to circulate it again; indeed, it has obviously developed over time. We have engaged with care providers, a range of third-sector organisations, the royal colleges, stakeholders in local government, the NHS and the social care sector, and, critically, people who themselves have impaired capacity. That builds on three years of engagement conducted by the Law Commission in drawing up its draft Bill.
Nevertheless, I accept there is concern that we have moved too swiftly and that we have not always taken concerns on board. I know we have come in for some criticism for that, but we moved ahead with this Bill because of the urgent need for reform and because the system is not working. While I do not pretend our approach has been perfect, I and the Government feel it has been necessary to move ahead at pace.
The point I want to emphasise is that, in doing so, we have listened and acted. I am grateful to noble Lords for recognising the changes made as a consequence of challenges and ideas from them and other stakeholders. I also applaud the Bill team for responding and providing government amendments. I am pleased we have been able to move on some incredibly important topics, such as “unsound mind”, 16 and 17 year-olds, the point about IMCAs, thinking about when reviews should be considered by AMCPs, and so on.
As I said, in retrospect and as a lesson for the future, things could perhaps have been done differently. However, I believe we are in a much better place than we were at the start of the process as a consequence of our deliberations.
Amendments 141 and 147, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, would require us to publish a plan to ensure that all outstanding deprivation of liberty safeguards applications are settled. The noble Lord is right to worry about this issue and give us the cautionary tale of a too-abrupt switch to a new system and the chaos that can ensue.
On commencement of the new system, existing deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisations will continue until they expire, at which point a liberty protection safeguards authorisation will need to be arranged, or the person should be provided with alternative arrangements that do not amount to a deprivation of liberty—we are seeking less restrictive care wherever possible. Given the length of time for which these authorisations exist, that will provide for a degree of staggering of the case load through the implementation of the new scheme.
On the backlog itself, many local authorities are already working to clear this. Some innovative working models have been introduced and I would be happy to write to noble Lords about them. We are working closely with the LGA and ADASS, as well as the Welsh DoLS network, to provide examples of best practice so that we can move through that backlog and into the new system. There will of course be some outstanding cases as we move from one system to another, particularly if an application is made shortly before the date the new system comes in. We will need special arrangements in place for those, but I reassure all noble Lords that we are working closely with all the people and organisations who will be responsible for implementing the new system to ensure a smooth transition.
Baroness Barker
I just want to be clear: am I right that the code of practice would not be amendable when any debate came? Would it come before this House simply for information purposes?
Lord O'Shaughnessy
That would be correct at the point at which it came before the House, but it would be published for consultation before then. There will be an opportunity for everybody—noble Lords, Members of the other place and stakeholders—to consider a draft and to recommend changes. The final product would be laid before Parliament.
We discussed the Mental Health Act review a little bit last week. We await its conclusions. Many of us have had conversations with Sir Simon Wessely about what it is likely to conclude, and about the interaction between the Mental Health Act and the mental capacity Bill when enacted. Since we are expecting its recommendations in the middle of next month—I think the scheduled date is the 12th—we will have an opportunity to consider the review’s recommendations before we move to the new system. Indeed, given that those recommendations will be out at about the time the Bill moves to the Commons, they will clearly be the subject of debate there. The Government will need to respond to those findings as we go through the Commons stages.
Amendments 143A and 147A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would require the Government, before the new system could come into force, to conduct public consultation on the Act with vulnerable people and other stakeholders and publish a report on its findings, as well as to publish their response to the Mental Health Act review and an equality impact assessment. I hope that I have dealt with the issue of public consultation, as well as consultation on the code and, equally, on the Mental Health Act review. The noble Baroness is quite right to bring the equality impact assessment to the House’s attention. It was prepared prior to introduction and required amendment following input from the Welsh Government. It will now need to be amended further to reflect the changes made in the Bill. I can commit to publishing the equality impact assessment before the Bill makes it to the Commons so that there will be ample time for consideration before it is debated there.
If the House will allow me, I will finish by thanking all noble Lords for their perseverance and patience during a sometimes difficult and challenging debate. We know that we all want to achieve the same end to our journey; there has been disagreement at times on the right way to get there. I am deeply grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. The Bill has been immeasurably improved already in its passage through this House. That is a very good thing in itself and will have a very positive impact—notwithstanding the slightly gloomy prospect given by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—when it goes to the other place and on to implementation.
Once again, I extend my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords. I hope that I provided reassurances on the amendments in this group and that they will feel able not to press their amendments.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. After such an uplifting response from him I do not want to drag us down again into negative thinking as we move on to Third Reading. I will just say that the problem with selective consultation is that it disfranchises some key respondents, and the problems we had over the summer were a consequence of that; it is a lesson to be learned for the future. I am grateful for the information about the work that has been done on the backlog. It will be important that the sector is clear as to which application falls under which part of the law. It is also very good that we will see the draft code in good time. Will the Minister arrange a briefing for noble Lords, rather than just going through a formal process? That would be extremely helpful.
Finally, Sir Simon Wessely’s review is clearly very important. It is obviously important that there be consistency, and the only thing I would say is that there are lessons for all of us for a future Bill in the way this Bill has been dealt with. There is no doubt in my mind that the issues raised by Sir Simon’s review lend themselves to pre-legislative scrutiny. Pre-legislative scrutiny is not fashionable any more, but my experience with the Mental Health (Amendment) Bill 2007 suggests that it doesn’t half pay off in terms of coherent legislation.
With that, I am very grateful to the Minister for his very full response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 11th December 2018
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 147(a) Amendment for Third Reading (PDF) - (5 Dec 2018)
Lord O’Shaughnessy
“(2A) In determining whether either of paragraph (a) or (b) of sub-paragraph (2) applies, the responsible body must consider the views of any relevant person about the wishes of the cared-for person that are brought to the responsible body’s attention.(2B) In sub-paragraph (2A) “relevant person” means a person engaged in caring for the cared-for person or a person interested in the cared-for person’s welfare.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O’Shaughnessy) (Con)
My Lords, throughout the progress of this Bill both the Government and noble Lords have been keen to improve the protections and safeguards contained within the reformed deprivation of liberty safeguards system so that the welfare of the cared-for person is always of paramount importance. It is that principle which lies behind the amendment I have laid for debate today.
The amendment makes it clear that any relevant person who identifies that a cared-for person is objecting to arrangements is empowered to raise the matter with the responsible body and can trigger a review by an independent AMCP. Furthermore, the amendment specifies that the responsible body must consider the views of anyone engaged in caring for the person or a person who is interested in their welfare. Importantly, this amendment is explicit that staff of all kinds can raise concerns, as well as others with an interest in the person’s welfare, and it will support staff and others, such as families or carers, in their ability to do so. I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay, Lady Thornton and Lady Barker, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford for highlighting this very important issue on Report, and for working with and meeting me to agree a way forward.
The amendment that the Government are proposing makes it easier for inadequacies in care provision to be addressed more swiftly. Recent issues with Gosport, Winterbourne View, Mendip House and, sadly, many other cases have highlighted how important it is that family, friends and staff feel empowered to raise concerns, and for action to be taken as a result. The amendment means that if a member of staff or a family member thinks that the person is objecting and that that is not being properly considered, they can raise it with the responsible body. That body, which of course is legally responsible for authorising a deprivation of liberty, will be able to use that to judge whether an AMCP should therefore complete a pre-authorisation review. Being able to raise such concerns directly with the responsible body is particularly important as it means that staff and others can raise concerns without having to go through those who may be directly involved in the care or treatment of the person. That will enable people to feel supported and more confident to take such action.
The Bill already requires that an AMCP completes the pre-authorisation review if it is reasonable to believe that the cared-for person does not want to reside or receive care or treatment at a place. However, I agreed with noble Lords on Report that we should have something in the Bill which is explicit about the sorts of things the responsible body must consider when making this determination so that staff and families feel supported in speaking up. That is what this amendment achieves. I should add that the Government are committed to ensuring that the measure created by the amendment forms part of the necessary training and support ahead of the implementation of the new system.
Noble Lords will note that this amendment relates to the pre-authorisation review process. We understand that it will also be necessary to make sure that the ability to trigger an AMCP review is in place as part of the ongoing review process. Due to time constraints, we have not been able to table an amendment on this subject now, but I commit that the Government will return to this issue at the Commons stages of the Bill.
I again thank noble Lords for raising this issue and for working with the Government to produce this amendment. I hope the amendment satisfies the demands that noble Lords rightly made to give family and staff a higher profile in raising issues and to include that in the Bill. I beg to move.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
My Lords, I hope the House will indulge me for one or two minutes. I welcome the amendment and have no objections to it at all. However, I note that the Government have not come forward with amendments in relation to three other issues. The first is the risk to others and the interface with the mental health review. It would be helpful if the Minister could give us an assurance that the Government will not seek in the Commons to clarify the interface between this legislation and the mental health review. There is talk of using “objection” as the key criterion, but in my view we also need to consider the risk to others as a possible principle to be considered. Can we have an assurance that the Government will not seek to resolve this issue during the progress of this Bill in the Commons?
The second issue concerns independent hospitals, which we have debated. Although I certainly do not wish to reopen that debate, can the Minister give us an assurance that work will be done in preparation for the Commons stages on the very serious situation in which many people find themselves in independent hospitals? These hospitals are often remote and—if I may say so—not well run. People are incredibly vulnerable in them, often far more so than in homes. An assurance that that will be addressed in the Commons stages would be helpful.
The third issue regards domestic situations. Whatever the Government decide to do in the Commons, can they bear in mind the importance of trying to limit the levels of bureaucracy and, ideally, of not continuing to use the Court of Protection? Again, many very vulnerable carers caring for very vulnerable people do not have the resources to deal with a lot more bureaucracy—they already have a hell of a lot to deal with. Can the Minister respond on that point?
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I share my noble friend’s concerns about the impact and relevance of Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act. It is particularly concerning that the Bill will now proceed to the other place without careful consideration in your Lordships’ House of how it will interface with Sir Simon’s recommendations, which were published in his review only last week. His proposed new dividing line, which identifies whether the Mental Health Act or the Mental Capacity Act should be used in a given situation, will be based on whether P objects or, in the case of people with learning disabilities, whether P’s behaviour puts others at risk. The Mental Capacity Act, as it will be in its currently amended form, has a direct bearing on any changes to the Mental Health Act, and vice versa.
Given this new dividing line, does the Minister expect more or fewer people with a learning disability to move across from the Mental Health Act to the new LPS system? What research is the department doing to explore this, and what impact will the change have on the number of people with learning disabilities and autism detained in assessment and treatment units? Is there a risk that the gains made by the transforming care programme will be reversed? Related to this, and given the uncertainties, will the Government commit to extending the transforming care programme, which is otherwise due to close later this year?
My final point is that the Wessely review specifically recommends that the periods between reviews of renewal decisions should be reduced in the Mental Health Act. This Bill as it stands would allow a responsible body to detain a person for up to three years without renewal review. Surely the Government will want to take this issue equally seriously with respect to the Mental Capacity Act.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I support this amendment. It is well thought through and I am glad that the Government have brought it forward. However, like my noble friends Lady Hollins and Lady Meacher, I have some very serious doubts about the continuance of this Bill as it goes to the Commons. We have already raised our anxieties about how it fits in with the Wessely review, and we have come to the end of our deliberations—when the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, normally congratulate each other on the process that we have gone through—but in fact we are leaving this Bill with the very same problems with which it came to this House.
The Bill came before Parliament because of the totally unviable nature of the current legislation. However, we do not have a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of this legislation and we now intend, as the Bill goes to the Commons, still to intrude on people living in their own homes. We are talking about a Bill that affects about 1 million people. It is currently projected to cost £2 billion a year but, with our amendments that introduce some improvements, it will cost considerably more.
Will the Commons really tackle the key issues? We have not seen the wood for the trees—that is the problem. We have tackled some really important minor issues but not the major issues that will make the legislation implementable in the care system. Can the Minister tell us what will happen next?
Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the amendment and declare my interests as set out in the register.
I too would like to talk about the application to adults with learning disabilities, autism or dementia who also have a mental health diagnosis, and I would also like to talk about what other noble Lords have mentioned—the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act. As the Minister will have seen, Sir Simon’s review redraws the dividing line between when a person should be detained under the Mental Health Act and when they might fall under the Mental Capacity Act.
Given that the proposed new dividing line is “objection” —in other words, those not objecting fall under the Mental Capacity Act—the role of the advocate in articulating the wishes of the individual becomes paramount in ensuring that the individual is treated under the appropriate legislation. With that in mind, I have a couple of questions for the Minister. Does he agree that advocates will need to receive sufficient support and training to understand this new dividing line, as and when it comes into being? Can he also clarify who will be responsible for ensuring that the training takes place and from whose budget the funding for it will come?
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government for adopting the principle of the amendment that we put forward on Report and for recognising its importance. I am glad to see that this will be in pre-authorisation reviews and to hear the assurances that it will act as a trigger for all types of reviews and will be put into the Bill when it goes to the other place.
I also recognise that the Minister has touched on staff induction, which will need to include training on liberty protection safeguards and cover when the review should trigger further action. However, I seek a categoric assurance from the Minister that the code of practice will state that staff will have the full protection of whistleblower legislation whenever they raise a concern, even if, for whatever reason, it does not proceed to initiating a review. I was grateful that during our meetings the Minister openly discussed the possibility of vexatious triggers, although I estimate that these would be very few and that triggers for reviews would involve legitimate concerns about a person’s welfare.
I also seek assurance that in its inspections the Care Quality Commission will be asked specifically to check that all staff know that they can request a review to be triggered and that they know that they will be protected. In addition, the responsible body, whenever asked to undertake a review, will need to keep a register of all such requests so that an emerging pattern of several requests coming from an institution will trigger a more major review into the type of care provided for everyone there.
One of the difficulties I anticipate arising at the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act is over the principle of objection. Among this cohort of people, objection may not be active; it may be passive. Sitting quietly, being withdrawn and being unhappy should be enough objection for people to consider whether the person should have been placed somewhere different or whether the conditions of their liberty protection safeguards should be altered. I have the impression that the type of objection envisaged in the Mental Health Act review was much more active than this type of passive objection, which could be interpreted as consent.
The other worrying aspect relating to this Bill and to the entire mental health review is the acute shortage of accommodation for people, both in the short and long terms. There is a shortage of suitable accommodation for people in crisis and of long-term accommodation that can meet people’s needs. Some are therefore accommodated in places not really adequate for their needs, but there seems to be no other option.
I repeat my gratitude to the Minister for having listened and brought forward this government amendment, and for all the other amendments that have gone into the Bill and brought about substantive changes. I look forward to hearing those reassurances in his response.
Baroness Watkins of Tavistock (CB)
My Lords, I concur with what other noble Lords have said and ask the Government to take one more look at the remaining conflict of interest relating to independent hospitals. It appears they will be able to employ their own AMCPs and, as the responsible body, authorise the deprivation of liberty of people in the hospital. This could pose a huge conflict of interest. The team has taken a great deal of trouble to remove this in the care home setting, and it seems it would be relatively straightforward to do so for independent hospitals. I fully support the amendments outlined today.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward this amendment and for having taken the time and effort to discuss the thinking of the department with many of us. I pay tribute to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. They were rookies—this was their first ever Bill—and they have done a tremendous job, not least because it is a fairly open secret that many of us think this is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House. I seriously mean that; we have said it several times. Together, they have enabled all of us in this House to play a very responsible role in turning some very bad legislation into legislation that is still in many regards highly deficient, but not as bad as it was.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, inevitably we failed to see the wood for the trees. We were so busy dealing with big defects in what was presented to us that we did not really get the chance to stand back and look at what would be an efficient overall system. It is for people in the House of Commons to look at what remains to be done to improve the Bill as it comes to them.
Part of it is that we spent so much time looking at the role of care home managers, we did not get around to thinking about how AMCPs, IMCAs and appointed persons could work together more efficiently to ensure that the most vulnerable get the most attention. It is unfortunate that Sir Simon Wessely’s review came to us only last week, with, at its very heart, the important issue of objection, the implications of which we should have been able to discuss in this Bill. I am sure we will need to return to that.
On this amendment, I thank the Minister for widening the triggers to include the involvement of an AMCP. But I want to flag up to those who will look at this in future the change in the role of care home managers and the role they will continue to play in renewing deprivations of liberty for up to three years, which is a big concern.
I also want to return to an issue that has been raised before: why, in this Bill, do we continue to deploy the best interest argument when it comes to ensuring that somebody has an IMCA? Several times we have asked to see the evidence base for creating that hurdle to access an IMCA, and the Government have yet again not given us any. A lot of people, particularly older women with dementia, will not get an IMCA because they will not be deemed to be objecting.
Perhaps the Bill’s biggest deficiency, and one we have not discussed much, is that practically nothing is in regulation; large swathes of it will be left to a code of practice. If one goes back to the Mental Capacity Act, however, one finds regulations that relate primarily to those who will be enacting this legislation. Regulatory conditions are applied to those who can be an AMCP, and to what their training has to be, and to those who can act as an IMCA, and to their ongoing duties to maintain contact when people move and to step in when the appropriate person, for some reason or another, ceases to fulfil the obligations it was initially assumed they would.
I say to those who will look at this in the House of Commons: the Government must be required, apart from anything else, to come forward with a great deal more detail than we have been able to elicit from them. With that, I welcome what is before us today.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming this amendment, which we will of course support. It is a little disappointing that we have not made all the progress that we wished around the AMCP. We are half way there with the pre-assessment regime in this amendment and have a commitment that the other part will be undertaken in the Commons. As the Minister and other noble Lords will be aware, the Bill has to end its passage here anyway, so we will be able to see whether those commitments have been fulfilled to ensure that the safeguards are in place.
As we discussed on Report, and in the helpful meeting with the Bill team, the amendments we were seeking—to ensure that the care home manager is not responsible for decisions about independent consultation —have been responded to. However, I am not sure we are quite there yet.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, pointed out, a question remains about independent hospitals employing their own AMCPs and whether that is a conflict of interest that needs to be dealt with by the Bill. As other noble Lords have said, we need to ensure that if the person who expresses concern is a member of staff, they will be protected under the whistleblowing regime. I accept that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, that would not necessarily be included in the Bill, but it simply has to be there, otherwise this will not work.
The noble Baroness said that we are going to congratulate each other, but I shall do that next.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
I am grateful to noble Lords for their acceptance of the amendment. It was tabled as a result of noble Lords’ input and their best endeavours to resolve the situation. It goes part of the way there, as we have discussed, and the Government are committed to solving it as the Bill moves to its Commons stages. There were specific questions on the amendment that I want to deal with. There were subsequent issues but I will deal with the Mental Health Act issues now. I shall leave the other issues until my closing speech because they anticipate what I will say when we come to the final part of the Bill’s passage.
On the amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about the code of practice and ensuring that protection is set out in whistleblowing legislation. We will make sure that we do that. As she will know, and as I have discussed before in the House, the Government are committed to doing more on that in the follow-up to the Gosport scandal. That is important. She also made excellent suggestions about the role of the CQC, its inspection framework and making sure that those provisions are well understood, and about helping to train responsible bodies to look for patterns. That is excellent advice, which we shall make sure is reflected in both the code of conduct and the regulatory regime. I think those were the only questions on the amendment.
Perhaps I may mention the Mental Health Act review before I finish on the amendment and move on. Clearly, it is an important piece of work. There are 152 recommendations and it is right that we take time to consider the right way to respond to them. The Government have already taken on board two of those recommendations, but there are many more to consider. One of the questions in front of us, which we have talked about to some degree during the stages of the Bill—and which will clearly come to the fore in the Commons stages—is: what is the right vehicle to deal with the interface between the suggestions that Simon Wessely has made?
There is a difference of opinion in this House about how that should be done. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others have a contrary view, but we need to solve the problem in front of us—which is that the deprivation of liberty safeguards system is not working—and then, when we have decided what the right thing to do is, to improve the Mental Health Act and its interface with the Mental Capacity Act at that point. It would be precipitous to try to do that now, before we have had an opportunity to consider it properly. In saying that, I do not mean it is not important—quite the opposite. It is so important to get it right that rushing through it could store up problems of a kind that we do not want.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked about advocates, their training for the new dividing lines and various other questions. We will have to work through these matters as we consider the right way forward in the Bill. I disagree with the suggestion of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, that we should reconsider whether the Bill goes ahead because it is not intended to, and does not, reflect these issues. The Bill needs to go ahead. We know that it will not solve all the problems before us and we will probably need to act again. However, noble Lords will know that it is not always straightforward to get legislative time—let alone at the moment—and we need to take advantage of the opportunity that we have to do something good now and seek to do further good when the opportunity presents itself.
I will reserve my other reflections until my closing speech, when I will attempt to deal with them. Otherwise, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to and support for this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord O’Shaughnessy
My Lords, I will use the opportunity of my closing speech to offer my sincere thanks to all those in the House who have contributed to the passage of this Bill. I hope that I will not miss out any names from this list, but I want to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly, Lady Tyler, Lady Barker, Lady Wheeler, Lady Finlay, Lady Hollins, Lady Murphy, Lady Watkins and Lady Meacher, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Touhig, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for their contributions. I also thank my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott for her steadfast support. In her first time at the Dispatch Box she was stupendous and set a high bar for future performances. Lastly, I thank my noble friend Lady Barran, who gave us an excellent maiden speech during the passage of the Bill, and congratulate her on her promotion to the Whips’ Office.
I believe that, by working together constructively over the past six months, we have much improved the Bill. In doing so, we have provided a system that will protect much better the 2 million people in our society who have impaired capacity. As noble Lords have brought to life during the passage of the Bill, that is something of which many of us have personal experience. I think that there is broad agreement that the current system does not work and needs to be changed, to put the cared-for person at the centre of it. I also believe that during the passage of the Bill through this House, and in response to suggestions and ideas from noble Lords, we have made some significant improvements. Once again I beg to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. We have not made just superficial changes: rather, some really important changes have been made.
The Bill will now apply to 16 and 17 year-olds as well as those aged over 18. We have carefully designed a role for care homes while eliminating conflicts of interest and being clearer about their role in the system. We have been explicit that the person completing assessments must have appropriate skills and knowledge, and a statement to the responsible body must be written. The Bill no longer contains the outmoded and unwanted references to “unsound mind” and we have also strengthened the provisions around appointing IMCAs, including a presumption that they now will be appointed. I hope that in practice that deals with the concern just expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. We have also made sure that the cared-for person must be consulted so that their voice is heard in every case, and today we have amended the Bill to enable families and staff whistleblowers to raise concerns much sooner and for those concerns to be acted on.
I should also say that the House has made its own opinion known in defeating the Government on the issue of specifying that arrangements should be necessary and proportionate in order to prevent harm to self, and I can confirm that the Government will not seek to change this position in the Commons. The Government will also carefully consider the amendment passed by noble Lords on rights of information being provided to the person.
The Bill will now move forward to the Commons and I can give some reassurance about several of the issues that noble Lords raised in the last debate. As I say, we have committed to make sure that the amendment passed today will be reflected in the sense of being able to raise concerns at the review stage. We will also provide clarification about referrals to AMCPs, including independent hospitals. That was a commitment I gave on Report and I am very happy to repeat it. It will look not only at independent hospitals but at whether there are other circumstances, and what they ought to be, when a referral to an AMCP ought to be direct.
I should also say a word in response to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Hollins, about the definition of deprivation of liberty. Again, I can confirm that this is something we intend to deal with in the Commons. I hope the noble Baronesses will be reassured on that. We have achieved a lot, and even if there is more that we wanted to achieve, the contributions of noble Lords have directly influenced the changes that we intend to make in the Commons. So, although it is for those in the other place to pass the amendments, noble Lords should be congratulated on their role in designing them. I hope that they will get support when we move them in the other place.
A further question was asked about the flexibility of reviews by, I think, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Barker. We will need to consider that. It is worth pointing out that it is a flexibility, not a timeframe, and that it is meant to allow for continuity in situations where the circumstances of the person are not changing. Clearly, safeguards in the system will allow for much quicker reviews if there is a reason for them. Indeed, the amendment we passed today is another way in which such a review could be triggered. So I will certainly take on board the noble Baronesses’ points about flexibility, but I think that there are enough safeguards in the system.
I hope that I have answered all noble Lords’ questions. I am sure that the conversation will continue. There is much work still to do. I thank the hard-working policy team for their engagement in this process, as well as all the stakeholders who have contributed, given us their thoughts, challenged us at times and as a consequence made this legislation better.
I want to end with some reflection. We know that these are difficult and divisive times in our country and in Parliament, but we have shown through the passage of the Bill that we can work together to improve legislation, reform public services and protect vulnerable people. We should all bear that in mind as we move through the days and weeks ahead. With that, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and I beg to move.
Baroness Barker
My Lords, I do not want to detain the House but I have one or two important things to say. First, the House owes a debt of gratitude to the ministerial team for their work in getting us to this point. The noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, should take a great deal of the credit for enabling all the things he listed as achievements of the House, going forward. Obviously, the Bill leaves us in a much better state than when it arrived.
There was one contribution by a Member of your Lordships’ House that we have not acknowledged but should: that of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. She has not been able to take part in many of our debates but she made an important contribution when she stood up and said that the Bournewood gap still exists. For all our work, it does, and it will continue to exist until such time as we sit down and really consider mental health and mental capacity legislation, including who makes the decisions about who comes under what piece of law. Until we sort out that gap, people will still be deprived of their liberty. We can call it by a different name, but they will be.
I will ask the Minister to reflect on one thing. Nobody came to this legislation believing that DoLS had to be preserved. Everybody knew that it was wrong. Everybody understands that we need to make greater and better use of the limited professional resources for overseeing the lives of people detained for one reason or another. We should listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and reflect on what else Parliament may have to do over the next five, six or seven years to make sure that the gap is addressed once and for all so that people are not wrongfully detained.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
My Lords, I will very briefly add my thanks to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the Bill team, for listening. I also thank everyone from outside who brought their own experience, either individually or as part of a professional group, a voluntary sector group or the care home sector. I thank personally those in the Welsh Government who arranged meetings for me and also brought expertise, coming from a different health service framework. That was important because this legislation must apply across England and Wales. So I add my thanks to others.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, I hope this is the final remark. This is indeed the place where, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, we all say how wonderful we are; and I think we probably are. The Minister has set the homework that the Commons needs to undertake to get this Bill into even better shape; it needs to consider length of renewal periods, the interface with Simon Wessely’s review, the role of IMCAs, remaining conflicts of interest, impact assessments and implementation, and indeed, the issue of the definition of deprivation of liberty, which the Minister has undertaken to tackle. It also needs to discuss money, budgets and so on, as we have not done so during the passage of the Bill.
I have a few thanks to add to those of other noble Lords. First, I thank the organisations that have given us so much support during the passage of the Bill. If noble Lords cast their minds back to the summer, we were thrown into this Bill at very short notice, as were those organisations. I thank Mencap, VoiceAbility, Mind, the National Autistic Society, the Alzheimer’s Society and the Relatives and Residents Association. I must also mention Lucy Series at Cardiff University, who provided some fantastic briefing.
I thank colleagues from across the House who put things on hold over the last few months to respond to the challenge of this Bill. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, and I were exchanging emails while we were on holiday at the end of the summer. I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their work. I thank the Minister for listening and for always being available. If I am honest, I think that members of the Bill team might have been on a bit of a learning curve about how to deal with legislation in the Lords, but they eventually seemed to get it. We are much nicer here when it comes to dealing with Bills—but Bills are hard work for everybody involved. Finally, I thank my own team. In the Chamber I thank my noble friends Lord Hunt, Lord Touhig and Lady Wheeler, as well as my noble friend Lord Cashman for his support in the early days. Outside the Chamber I thank Molly Critchley and Bernadette Daly, who have been absolutely brilliant. We will meet our Commons team tomorrow to talk about what we think they need to do.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 18th December 2018
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 147(a) Amendment for Third Reading (PDF) - (5 Dec 2018)
18:59 - The House divided: - Ayes: 229 / Noes: 304 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Matt Hancock)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Every Member of this House will agree that we have a duty of care to the most vulnerable in our society, and that everybody deserves to be treated with dignity and respect, no matter what their physical or mental condition. I hope that the House will also agree that liberty is a fundamental right, and that no decision on the deprivation of liberty can ever be taken lightly. Such decisions can be taken only to protect society or individuals. There are currently 2 million people in this country who have impaired mental capacity. Care homes and hospitals often have to take decisions to restrict people’s movements in order to protect them. That could involve preventing elderly people with dementia from moving, or stopping vulnerable people getting access to things that they could use to self-harm. The present deprivation of liberty safeguards are meant to ensure that people who lack the capacity to make decisions for themselves are not deprived of their liberty unfairly or unnecessarily, but the current system is broken and needs to change.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)
What assurances can the Secretary of State give us that local authorities will be given sufficient resources to allow them to process all deprivation of liberty cases?
Matt Hancock
The resource question is an important one, and so too is the process. The question of resources and the question of what the process is go hand in hand. There has been an increase in the amount of resources given to local authorities to enable them to deliver in this area, but the question will undoubtedly arise again as we run up to the spending review.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
I visited a police station a couple of weeks ago, and I found that the police lacked adequate training to deal with some of the cases that they were coming across. Has the Minister had any discussions with the Home Secretary about that?
Matt Hancock
Yes, I have. This is an incredibly important point. The deprivation of people’s liberty in a police cell when there is a lack of mental capacity—or, in certain circumstances, when there is a serious mental illness—happens far too often. The purpose of police cells is to detain criminals. Providing a system in which such people do not have to be held in police cells is absolutely critical and part of our plan.
Several hon. Members rose—
Matt Hancock
I want to make a little bit of progress.
For many reasons, the current system is broken. Too many people do not have the protections they need because of a bureaucratic backlog. There are currently more than 125,000 people waiting to be processed, and nearly 50,000 people have been waiting for over a year.
Matt Hancock
I will give way to the right hon. Gentleman, who did a huge amount of work on this as a Minister in the Department.
Norman Lamb
I thank the Secretary of State for giving way. I share his view on the extent to which the current system is broken. He will be aware that the Bill came under substantial criticism in the House of Lords, and that substantial improvements were made to it there. There is a recognition, however, that there is still a long way to go. Will he commit to working with the Opposition parties and to meeting us and interested parties beyond Parliament to ensure that by the end of this process we have an agreed Bill that will actually improve people’s safety?
Matt Hancock
Yes, absolutely I will. I know that the right hon. Gentleman met the Minister for Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage), yesterday to discuss this question. Of course this ought to be a collaborative process. Improvements were made to the Bill in the other place—I shall talk about those in a moment—but we recognise that further improvements could still be made. Ultimately, there is a careful balance to be struck between the need to protect people who do not have the full mental capacity to take care of themselves and the need to ensure that we do not deprive people of their liberty unnecessarily. That is a careful balance, and we should take this forward on the basis of open discussion and deliberation, rather than of a party political ding-dong.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
The Secretary of State is clearly right about the system being broken, and one aspect of that is the shockingly low rate of appeals under deprivation of liberty orders, which currently stands at about 1%. Although the case law has become clearer, in most situations there is a positive obligation on advocates to progress cases to court where somebody is objecting to their deprivation of liberty, either directly or even through their behaviour. In contrast, 47% of detention decisions under the Mental Health Act 1983 are appealed. The Bill’s impact assessment predicts that the number of appeals will halve under the new procedure. Given the amendments that were made to the Bill in the Lords, does the Secretary of State think that the Government should now review that figure?
Matt Hancock
All such considerations should be taken into account and looked at in Committee. We made changes to that area in the Lords, and we are determined to reach the right balance, but I take the hon. Gentleman’s important point seriously. Like anyone who has read the Bill, he will know that it makes a significant improvement in this area. Rather than cases being immediately passed on to the courts, there is a process in place both before the deprivation of liberty where that is possible, which is a big improvement, and then later on when the deprivation is questioned. I accept the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, but the Bill makes significant progress, and if he has suggestions for how the details may be nuanced still further, we are all ears because this is very much a collaborative process.
Lyn Brown (West Ham) (Lab)
I am surprised that this Bill and the reforms to the Mental Health Act are not being considered at the same time. As I understand it, this Bill would allow clinicians and managers to detain somebody for up to three years without a renewal decision, which is much longer than is recommended for community treatment orders by the Wessely review. If both reforms are implemented, patients detained under the Mental Health Act could have the security of a shorter review period than those detained under this Bill. Will the Secretary of State tell me whether that is the Government’s intention or simply a mistake?
Matt Hancock
The hon. Lady is not quite right about the three-year period, because there are review points, meaning that it involves a twice-possible one-year extension, so she is not quite right about the relationship between that and what happens under the Mental Health Act. However, she makes an important point about the links between the Mental Capacity Act 2005, this Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill and the mental health Bill that we propose to bring forward.
We considered putting the two Bills together, but we did not do that for two reasons. First, it would simply be a big Bill that included two separate regimes, and we would not want the full Mental Health Act powers to be applied across the board, and I think there is a broad consensus behind that. Secondly, the view of Sir Simon Wessely, who ran the review into the Mental Health Act, is that we need to get on with this while taking the time to get the Mental Health Act update right. Combining the two was seriously considered, and I considered it again when I became Health and Social Care Secretary and asked for further advice, but we came to this conclusion, which I hope the hon. Lady will support.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I do not disagree with Sir Simon Wessely’s conclusions about that, but the review does contain suggestions that could be transferred into this Bill. For example, the use of tribunals instead of the Court of Protection in some cases would make them a lot simpler, cheaper and better for the person involved.
Matt Hancock
The right hon. Gentleman is quite right. To start to deal with the serious number of cases that we need to make progress with, the interface between this Bill—hopefully on the statute book by then—and the Mental Health Act provisions will be considered as we develop the draft mental health Bill. The truth is that the current system causes unnecessary suffering, and the case for reform could not be more urgent. That is why we are bringing forward this Bill now. Age UK, the UK’s largest charity working with older people, says we have a crisis in the current system that is
“leaving many older people with no protection at all… If we lose this opportunity we’re unlikely to get another one in this Parliament and it is profoundly unfair on the older people and their families…to have to wait any longer…doing nothing is not an option.”
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby) (Lab)
Has the Secretary of State had any discussions with the Justice Secretary about the application of the measures in this Bill upon those who are serving prison sentences, particularly indeterminate sentences?
Matt Hancock
I have had some discussions on that subject, and I am happy for the hon. Lady to take up that point in more detail either directly with me or with the Minister for Care, or in Committee, because there are significant interlinkages between the two areas.
The Bill builds on the extensive work and recommendations of the Law Commission. It has been fully scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and then improved by the other place, as has been discussed. I am grateful for all that work. Ultimately, it is about striking a balance between liberty and protection.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
My right hon. Friend mentions the Law Commission and its suggestions. What he proposes does not quite tally with all the Law Commission’s recommendations. Where are the differences?
Matt Hancock
We built the Bill on the basis of the Law Commission report, but we have put some differences into the Bill. For instance, we think the principle of prioritising people over process is important, and we have strengthened that compared with the Law Commission’s recommendations. The Law Commission improves the law but does not make policy decisions. On top of the Law Commission’s work, which is incredibly helpful, we have made further policy decisions to ensure that people are put more foursquare at the heart of the process. It is true that the Bill and the Law Commission’s recommendations are not exactly aligned, but I would strongly defend our further improvements.
Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)
I have the privilege of chairing the all-party parliamentary group on speech and language difficulties. The Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists is concerned about the conflation of mental capacity with speech and language difficulties. It is important we have provision so that people with speech and language difficulties are appropriately assessed and are not banged up because they are thought to be dangerous. There should be enough training in light of the fact that 60% of people in the criminal justice system have speech and language difficulties.
Matt Hancock
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the importance of getting highly trained social workers to make these judgments and about the importance of making sure such training is provided for and embedded in the Bill. He speaks powerfully, and I agree with how he puts it.
The Bill introduces a new liberty protection safeguards system, and it makes the authorisation simpler and more straightforward. It removes some bureaucracy and duplication, and it makes the system easier to navigate for individuals and their family. People will get their rights protections sooner, there will be greater independence when decisions are taken to restrict liberty, and the NHS and social care providers will be given a bigger role in the decision-making process so that people under their care receive the right care and their rights will be protected. It will introduce an explicit duty to consult the person being cared for and to consider their wishes and feelings.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
An appropriate person will be appointed when dealing with vulnerable people. Who are these appropriate people, and what will be their role?
Matt Hancock
An appropriate person will have greater involvement in any decision to restrict liberty, so their role is essentially to speak for those whose liberty is potentially being restricted. We have framed this in terms of an “appropriate person” because in large part this will be a family member or a carer, but that cannot always be the case.
Matt Hancock
It could easily be a carer, yes. Some people have no family and in others cases the family are not the appropriate people to be the spokesperson for those who are mentally incapacitated. The appropriate person—the families and carers—will have greater powers to intervene or to object. Crucially, where there is no family or an appropriate person to advocate for the individual, the person has the right to an independent mental capacity advocate. So in all cases there should be a person whose role in the system is to advocate on behalf of the person whose liberty is being restricted.
Paul Blomfield
Does the Secretary of State accept that that access to an advocate should not be necessarily subject to a best interest test, as is being proposed, but should be a right?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. Just to help everybody, let me say that we have 11 speakers, we still have to hear from the Opposition shadow Minister and we have the wind-ups. So I hope we can take that into account, although I recognise that the Minister is being very generous.
Matt Hancock
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. These are very important points—
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. Perhaps I will have to set it out differently. What I am trying to say is that we have 11 Members to speak and we could try to give them some time. Important as this and giving way all the time is, it is very important that we hear from other people.
Matt Hancock
Noted. Returning to the point made in the intervention, of course if there is an objection, there is a right in this case. So there is an escalation process in the event of an objection.
Before I end, I want briefly to deal with the Opposition’s reasoned amendment, because I hope we are able to show in this debate that all the points they raise have been considered. I hope the House will not mind my taking a moment to address each one briefly. First, they make the claim that somehow the Bill has been rushed through and insufficient pre-legislative scrutiny has been carried out. The Bill follows the Law Commission spending three years developing the new model, consulting extensively. The Joint Committee on Human Rights then conducted an inquiry and pre-legislative scrutiny. The Local Government Association, Age UK and Sir Simon Wessely have all backed the new legislation now. The LGA says:
“The Bill provides a vital opportunity for long-awaited reform”
and it needs to be passed. So we need to get this Bill on the statute book, because every extra delay risks depriving someone of their liberty and their right to freedom unnecessarily, and I do not want to see that happen.
Secondly, the amendment claims that the Bill
“enshrines a conflict of interest in relation to independent providers of health and care services”.
Again, that is not the case. Every authorisation must be reviewed by somebody who does not deliver day-to-day care and treatment for the person in question. We plan to go further by tabling Government amendments that will require authorisations in independent hospitals to be reviewed by an external approved mental capacity professional. Finally, the reasoned amendment claims that it is concerned about clearing the backlog in the current system. Well, so are we, and that is what this Bill does. Anyone concerned about the backlog and the current system should back the Bill with enthusiasm.
The claims that this Bill does not put the interests of the cared for person first or address the interface with the Mental Health Act have been addressed already. The very reason we need this legislation is so that we can put their interests first, because they cannot afford to wait for the recommendations of the Mental Health Act review to come into effect, in a Bill that will inevitably take time to develop, because of the need to do this on a consultative and broad basis. While welcoming the probing, I very much hope that the Opposition and every Member of this House will support this Bill, because it strikes a careful balance between liberty and protection. It offers vulnerable people a brighter and better future. We have listened to concerns and we continue to be open to ideas. We have sought to amend and improve the Bill as it has progressed through the other place, and we will make further amendments in this House. I therefore hope that this opportunity to change the system for the better is one that the House recognises. I also hope it will recognise that doing nothing is not an option. That is why I am proud to commend the Bill to the House.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab)
I beg to move an amendment, to leave out from “That” to the end of the Question and add:
“this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill, notwithstanding the need for reform to the current system of mental capacity assessments and while acknowledging the improvements made to the Bill by the House of Lords, because the Bill underwent no pre-legislative scrutiny, it does not put the interests of the cared-for person at the heart of the Bill, it enshrines a conflict of interest in relation to independent providers of health and care services, it fails to provide measures to reduce the substantial backlog of Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards Assessments and it fails to recognise explicitly the interface with the Mental Health Act when determining which legislation should be used to authorise care or treatment arrangements.”
The issue before the House today is one of fundamental importance to us all: the individual liberty of vulnerable people. Today, we are being asked under which conditions it is right to deprive vulnerable people of that liberty when they need care and treatment and cannot give their consent, and what protections should be in place when their liberty is taken away.
The proposals in the Bill to replace deprivation of liberty safeguards have the scope to affect the rights of a large portion of the 2 million people in the UK thought to lack capacity to make their own decisions. Among them are people with dementia, learning disabilities, autism and brain injuries. Whether to deprive some of the most vulnerable people in this country of their liberty should be an issue that we treat with the utmost respect, thought and care. However, I am afraid the Government’s approach to this immensely important issue has shown few of those qualities.
The reform of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires methodical planning, but the truth is that the Bill has been rushed through without proper scrutiny, despite the best efforts of many people who are concerned about its contents and have been working to change it for the better. The fact that the Bill has less than two hours for Second Reading and was brought forward with just two sitting days’ notice speaks volumes of the speed that the Government are adopting in respect of the Bill, and will raise further concerns among those who care about these matters.
The process of reforming the 2005 Act began when the Law Commission produced a draft framework for new liberty protection safeguards to replace the existing deprivation of liberty safeguards. That came after two years of painstaking work and wide consultation ended last year. The Government accepted the commission’s proposals at the time they were produced, but the Bill that was introduced to the House of Lords has diverged substantially from the original recommendations— an issue on which the Secretary of State answered a question earlier. At the outset of the process, the draft Bill published by the Government was subject to no prelegislative scrutiny whatsoever, meaning that important stakeholders were not consulted about its contents.
During the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords, my colleagues and I heard many concerns about it from interested stakeholders, from charities representing people with dementia, learning disabilities and autistic people through to directors of adult social services, organisations representing social workers, and social work professionals involved with the current system. They have been unanimous in their agreement that the Bill is deeply flawed, that there has not been adequate time for consultation, and that the proposals in the Bill could cause more problems than they solve.
The Secretary of State quoted a smattering of organisations; let me read him this list: the Relatives & Residents Association, Mencap, the National Autistic Society, Mind, Rethink, the Alzheimer’s Society, VoiceAbility, Disability Rights UK, POhWER, the British Institute of Human Rights, Sense, Liberty, Learning Disability England and Inclusion London have all called for the Bill to be paused so that further consultation can take place. But as we can see today, that call has not been heeded.
Mr Dhesi
Does my hon. Friend agree that, given that Sir Simon Wessely’s review has only just been published, the Government should consider pausing the Bill to look into the interplay between it and the recommendations on the Mental Health Act? Otherwise, we risk creating legislation that fits together very poorly.
Barbara Keeley
Absolutely, we do, and that is a real concern. The Opposition’s concern is that we do not want to end up with a flawed piece of legislation replacing another flawed piece of legislation, and then to have to change it again.
It is worth noting that until yesterday the Government had not even published an equality impact assessment, more than five months after the draft Bill was first presented. Before that, the Government’s only published impact assessment was concerned solely with the cost savings that the new system would bring. That initial impact assessment is now woefully out of date, given the number of amendments made to the Bill in the House of Lords—I understand that more than 300 amendment were tabled. I pay tribute to the work of many peers in the House of Lords, including my colleagues on the Labour Front Bench, who worked to try to improve the Bill, despite the hurdles placed in front of them by the Government. Nevertheless, fundamental problems with the Bill remain that simply cannot be rectified by amendments.
We cannot support the Bill in its current form because, quite simply, it proposes to replace one deeply flawed system with another. I will come onto the flaws in the Bill in due course, but, first, I wish to address the need for substantial reform of the Mental Capacity Act, which we accept. We recognise that the deprivation of liberty safeguards system is deeply complex and bureaucratic, as the Law Commission identified in its report last year. Concerns about the deprivation of liberty safeguards predated even the Law Commission’s report, and we know that a House of Lords Committee declared the DoLS not fit for purpose in 2014.
The scope of DoLS is too narrow, applying only in care homes and hospitals. Authorisations outside care homes and hospitals have to be done through the Court of Protection, which is costly and cumbersome. It is clear, as we have already heard in this debate, that the explosion in the number of DoLS applications after the Cheshire West judgment left the system struggling to cope. The latest figures, as the Secretary of State has said, show a backlog of 125,000 applications. That, of course, leaves the person subject to the application potentially unlawfully deprived of their liberty. If the Government want to resolve that backlog, as they profess to, then the way to do it is to provide local authorities with the resources they need to process all the applications they receive. The Government should not be trying to hide their failure to fund local government behind a streamlined process that does not protect vulnerable people.
Although the deprivation of liberty safeguards need reform, and I agree that they do, the Bill deals with none of the challenges that have been outlined and creates some new problems that cannot be solved simply with further amendments. I am afraid we feel that the Government cannot be relied on to make the necessary changes during the remaining legislative stages given the resistance that they showed to making important changes in the House of Lords. On the contrary, the transformative spirit of the Law Commission’s draft Bill has been squashed, and the measures that would place the best interests of the cared-for person at the heart of the new system have been reduced.
The Government should have enacted the Law Commission’s proposals in full through the 15-clause Bill that was drafted, but instead we have this five-clause Bill. Why did they not simply bring forward the Law Commission’s proposals? The inescapable conclusion that we have come to from reading the Bill is that the Government are more interested in cost saving than in the best interests of cared-for people. This is a crucial point, because there can be disastrous consequences when the best interests of cared-for people are not taken into consideration.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
I say this in a spirit of co-operation on such an important issue. The Labour party amendment is to decline to give the Bill a Second Reading. Instead of trying to change the Bill and bring in some of the Law Commission’s recommendations, why, with nearly 200,000 people waiting to have a DoLS assessment, have the Opposition proposed an amendment to reject the Bill out of hand?
Barbara Keeley
That is a question that the hon. Lady needs to put to her own party. What has happened up to this point is that the Government have been asked repeatedly to pause, to carry out more consultation, and to consider redrafting the Bill. There is a list of 40 organisations that have asked for a pause and a redrafting of the Bill. This is a familiar situation from health and social care legislation—it has happened before in this House. The Government could have considered a pause, and the Minister for Care, the hon. Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage), knows that I have discussed that with her. The whole question really falls back on the Government.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
My hon. Friend refers to what happened in 2012 with the Health and Social Care Bill. We had to have a pause halfway through its parliamentary stages because it had not been thought through properly. I worry that we might end up having the same thing happen again if the Government do not take heed of what the shadow Minister is so clearly setting out.
Barbara Keeley
I thank my hon. Friend for saying that, and it is the case.
Let me give an example. Just last week, the BBC’s “Victoria Derbyshire” programme exposed the horrific case of Rachel Johnston, a woman with learning disabilities who died after having an operation to remove all of her teeth. Rachel had a long-standing and extensive dental problem, but, clearly, could not consent to the dental work. Rather than doing the surgery in several treatments, the dentist opted to remove all her teeth in one operation, using the Mental Capacity Act to authorise the use of a general anaesthetic because he deemed it to be in her best interest. After being discharged, Rachel bled profusely from her gums, developed breathing difficulties and later died. How on earth can that treatment have been in her best interest? That case shows a need for greater safeguards, not fewer safeguards. We should not allow medical professionals to make decisions without considering the best interests or wishes of people who lack the capacity to consent to treatment.
I recognise that, as the Secretary of State mentioned, the Government conceded in the House of Lords that the cared-for person must be consulted, but there are still worrying aspects of the Bill that undermine that principle. We should ensure that individuals have access to an independent advocate. That is a vital safeguard that allows people to challenge authorisations, and it should be the default. The manner in which the independent mental capacity advocates can and should be appointed remains ill-defined and even contradictory.
The Minister in the House of Lords, Lord O’Shaughnessy, seems to have dismissed concerns raised about the application of a best interest test before the appointment of an advocate. The role of an advocate is essential to allowing individuals to access appeals and review their rights. Access to support from advocates should not depend on best interest tests, and the provisions in the Bill are far weaker than those proposed by the Law Commission. Yet despite that being pointed out in the debate in the House of Lords, the Minister there seemed unwilling to listen to advice, merely saying that it would work “in practice”. That is simply not good enough. These factors amount to a severe undermining of the concept of the individual’s best interests, which should be at the heart of the Bill but is sorely lacking.
I will now address the backlog of deprivation of liberty safeguard applications, because at the outset the Government presented the Bill as a cost-effective way of reducing it. On Second Reading in the House of Lords, the Minister claimed that the Bill would relieve
“local authorities of the…legal liability burden of more than £408 million by removing the backlog of…applications.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 1060.]
But he made no mention of how that would happen. Our conclusion is that by attempting to place the onus for assessments on care home managers, the Bill would remove the responsibility from cash-strapped local authorities.
The Government initially tried to pass responsibility for assessments on to care home managers, and that was clearly intended as a cost-cutting measure. That was amended in the House of Lords, but care home managers will still decide whether an assessment needs to take place and will also identify whether the person being cared for objects to a liberty protection safeguard for their own care and treatment. The British Association of Social Workers has said that this presents a potential conflict of interest for care homes, as they need to maintain occupancy and may not readily identify an objection by the cared-for person.
The BASW has a further concern about the grounds on which the responsible body would decide whether it or the care home manager would make the necessary arrangements for an LPS authorisation. There is a significant risk of a two-tier system, whereby local authorities under financial or waiting list pressures would default to care home managers completing the new duties, and other local authorities under less strain would do the assessments themselves. I think we have enough of a postcode lottery in care without adding to it through the Bill.
Care England, which represents the network of care providers, says:
“There is a lack of clarity about the role of the Care Home Manager...the separation of roles between care homes and community care provision seems designed to increase rather than reduce confusion and complexity.”
Indeed, the body is so concerned by this Bill that is has also said:
“This ill-considered Bill risks storing up a range of problems of a kind that we do not want and should be slowed or returned for redrafting.”
There remains a further dangerous conflict of interest at the heart of the Bill because of the role that independent hospitals are given in the assessment process. Despite debate in the House of Lords regarding the role of independent hospitals, under the Bill they would still be allowed to appoint their own approved mental capacity professionals. That would allow independent hospitals the responsibility to authorise deprivation of liberty for people in that same hospital for the assessment and treatment of mental disorders. That is plainly wrong.
Barbara Keeley
The Minister says no, but Lord O’Shaughnessy in the House of Lords would not consider amendments tabled by two parties to deal with that issue. It is plainly wrong and represents a very clear conflict of interest.
Moreover, the Bill currently allows for the deprivation of someone’s liberty to be authorised for up to three years without review after two initial periods of 12 months, as the Secretary of State said earlier. It cannot be right to have that period of three years without renewal. The Bill is reducing the protections afforded by the current DoLS system, which operates a maximum period of 12 months before renewal.
Dr Dan Poulter (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)
The hon. Lady is outlining, with some good reason, the fact that there may be fewer safeguards and fewer opportunities for people to review or appeal under this Bill than when someone is sectioned under the Mental Health Act. She has a point about the need to look into that point, and to look more broadly at how this Bill sits alongside the Mental Health Act, given Simon Wessely’s review. Does she agree that a pause would be helpful to consider the interface of those pieces of legislation?
Barbara Keeley
Very much so. I will come on to that shortly, but I will not leave the point about independent hospitals, because it is important.
We know only too well from media reports, and the Secretary of State does too, of the torrid situation in independent hospitals that detain people with autism and learning disabilities under the Mental Health Act, and the measures in this Bill could have disastrous and far-reaching consequences. I have raised at the Dispatch Box on several occasions the appalling treatment of people with autism and learning disabilities in assessment and treatment units. I have described the situation as amounting to a national scandal, and I believe that it is still so. As many as 20% of people in these units have been there for more than 10 years. The average stay is five and a half years. The average cost of a placement in an assessment and treatment unit for people with a learning disability is £3,500 a week, but the costs can be as high as £13,000 a week or more.
As the journalist Ian Birrell has exposed in The Mail on Sunday, private sector companies are making enormous profits from admitting people to those units and keeping them there for long periods. Two giant US healthcare companies, a global private equity group, a Guernsey-based hedge fund, two British firms and a major charity are among the beneficiaries of what campaigners have seen as patients being seen as cash cows to be milked by a flawed system at the expense of taxpayers. According to a written answer I obtained from the Department of Health and Social Care, in the past year alone the NHS has paid out over £100 million to private companies for these placements. Shamefully, the Government cannot reveal how much they have spent since they came to power, because they claim that they did not record the expenditure before 2017. It cannot be right that the Bill potentially gives private companies the power to lock up vulnerable people for years at a time to feed a lucrative and expanding private health sector.
I would like to draw attention to one more issue that the Bill does not address—we have already discussed it—and that cannot be papered over by amendments. The Government commissioned Professor Sir Simon Wessely to lead a review of the Mental Health Act, which is of course long overdue for reform. However, as the hon. Member for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) said, there is clearly a complex interface between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act. Professor Sir Simon Wessely has made the point that there is now a worrying trend of people, particularly with dementia, being detained under the Mental Health Act when their deprivation of liberty should be dealt with under the Mental Capacity Act. His review recommended imposing a new line of objection to determine who should be treated under which legislation, but, as the hon. Gentleman said, there has been no engagement with these recommendations, which were finalised as this Bill was going through the House of Lords.
In our view, the Government must commit to a review of the interface between the two Acts, with full consultation, which has, to date, been sorely lacking. It is one thing to say that Sir Simon had a conversation with the Secretary of State about this, but that is not full consultation. The consultation must look at both hospital and community settings and provide clear and accessible rights of appeal.
Matt Hancock
Of course the interface between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act will be considered, but Sir Simon himself favours bringing forth the Mental Capacity Act renewal now and then dealing with the Mental Health Act later. As with all of the hon. Lady’s other considerations, that has been taken into account, and this is the best way forward.
Barbara Keeley
Well, clearly we do not agree.
The reform of the Mental Capacity Act began as an attempt in good faith to reform a flawed piece of legislation that fails to protect the human rights of some of the most vulnerable people in this country, but it now threatens to infringe those rights further through this Bill. We simply cannot afford to rush an issue of this magnitude where individual liberties and human rights are at stake. Indeed, the Minister in the House of Lords himself admitted:
“We cannot introduce another Bill or piece of legislation that just creates a problem three years down the line.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 1110.]
But that is exactly what this Government are trying to do today. We will fail some of the most vulnerable people in society if we allow the creation of flawed legislation that needs to be replaced in just a few years. We must get this right. That is why the Government must pause the Bill, and why I urge hon. Members to vote for our reasoned amendment and ensure that Ministers get the message loud and clear.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
I must now introduce a six-minute limit on speeches.
Anne-Marie Trevelyan (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (Con)
It is an honour to speak in this Second Reading debate on a subject of real importance to some of my most vulnerable constituents across north Northumberland. I want to focus on one cohort of those for whom the Bill is important: those in care homes.
I first became aware that the deprivation of liberty safeguard system was not fit for purpose as a new parliamentary candidate some years ago, while visiting the excellent care homes across my rural constituency—the small, family-run care homes based in sparsely populated areas that elderly constituents have made their home, some by choice, many placed there by Northumberland County Council and some whose family could no longer care for them at home.
One of the first issues raised with me on those visits—even then, when the deprivation of liberty system had just been put in place for those who were unable to consent any more—was that the system was proving burdensome and not family or vulnerable person-centric, and that our local authority had become rapidly overwhelmed by the unnecessary layers of bureaucracy, with six separate assessments clogging up the system but failing to ensure protection and reassurance.
The care home managers in my wonderful small and otherwise person-centric care homes were drowning in paperwork and new requirements but could not get the answers they needed quickly from county hall or doctors. It seemed to all those whose careers—indeed, vocations—it is to run care homes that the bureaucracy was simply adding complexity without positive value or outcomes. Much of the work was simply going over the same ground already covered by local authority officials when the decision to place vulnerable elderly constituents into the care home had been made originally.
Busy managers felt they were simply going round in circles, but they were especially concerned by the distress that the system was causing their residents—not only those to whom the deprivation of liberty assessment related, but others with greater capacity who had to watch their co-residents’ anxiety increase and were concerned that when they became that frail, all that would happen to them too.
This Bill is a welcome piece of legislation to provide important safeguarding for our most vulnerable elderly and young adults with severe learning disabilities or autism, to ensure that the system functions better and to reassure us all. Whether it is members of our family or our constituents, we need to have confidence that where restrictions are deemed necessary by the carer of a vulnerable person, the checks in place are streamlined and effective. Good Government policy delivers on its aims. The original 2005 Act failed to do that.
It is encouraging that the Bill will strengthen the protections and rights of vulnerable adults who lack mental capacity and have their liberty deprived. It will introduce a simpler process that involves families more and gives swift access to assessments, which is really important and has been a problem. It will be less burdensome on people, carers, families and local authorities, and it will allow the NHS, rather than local authorities, to make decisions about their patients, allowing a more efficient and clearly accountable process—something that many GPs have raised with me consistently over the years.
The Bill will consider restrictions of people’s liberties as part of their overall care package, which should be a self-evident truth but has not been under the historical legislation, and it will get rid of repeat assessments and authorisations when someone moves between a care home, hospital and ambulance as part of their treatment. We have few ambulances in north Northumberland, and this has been a huge burden for the paramedics who have to deal with these difficult and complex cases. There is enormous frustration, because there is a sense that people are not getting patient-centric care, which is what everybody looking after them wants to achieve. These proposals go a long way towards creating a system that can be trusted by our constituents, and I look forward to working with the Minister to ensure that the Bill reaches the statute book quickly.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
First, I declare my interest as chair of the all-party group on social work. This very Bill was the subject of our most recent meeting, when we heard from those working in this sector. These are no doubt some of the most important issues we could be debating and legislating on, and judging by the attendance at the all-party group meeting, it could not be more important to the policy makers and professionals in the field. This legislation governs the rights of individuals and the people who can deprive them of one of their most basic fundamental rights—freedom.
Some of the people attending the all-party group felt the Bill had made some progress with the amendments in the House of Lords, but it is fair to say that the Bill is simply not yet good enough. I really think that the Government need to pause, think again about the implications of the plans that Ministers are putting before us today, listen to the countless charities, other organisations and professionals that work with the legislation every day and then come back with a Bill that is fit for purpose.
This cannot and must not be a basic political argument between the Government and the Opposition; it is a debate between law makers and the people, some of whom at a particular time in their life can be subject to some of the most restrictive legislation we have. It saddens me that this could be another Government measure to cut the costs of associated assessments under the current Act.
There is a wealth of briefing material, from organisations as diverse as the Law Society and the Royal College of Nursing, outlining concerns that need to be discussed and addressed through the legislation. There are serious issues with potential conflicts of interest, but I think the Minister knows that. Imagine a scenario in which a care home manager is making a decision on someone’s life but has a financial interest in making a judgment either way. The Royal College of Nursing shares my concerns on this. Care home managers may feel under pressure in their workplace, meaning that they may make decisions that are not always in the best interests of the person they are caring for. There should not be any vested interest—only an interest in the wellbeing and freedom of the person concerned. Issues have already been raised about private hospitals. A private hospital could authorise deprivation of liberty, knowing that it would benefit financially from that. I know that the vast majority of people are honest and work in the best interests of those they care for, but such judgments should be made by a genuinely independent person.
My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) mentioned the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists. There is a real and genuine risk that people may be wrongly deemed to lack mental capacity because any communication needs they have are not properly recognised. Nothing short of full staff training on communication needs—for everyone in the system—would be satisfactory as a measure to ensure that people are being assessed correctly and that any additional needs are addressed.
Rebecca Pow (Taunton Deane) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman is making a very sound point. Given the importance of communication and of being able to assess people correctly, does he agree that it may be beneficial to add speech and language therapists to the list of approved mental capacity professionals, which would benefit some of the people being assessed?
Alex Cunningham
That is not something that has previously come to my attention, but I am sure the organisation would very much like to look at that possibility.
Following on from that, there must be a suitably qualified person carrying out the assessments and they must also be independent. A skilled approved mental capacity professional should be involved before a person is placed in an institution, not just when there is an objection or a trigger. There needs to be further clarity on the role of independent mental capacity advocates. Considering that the Bill in its current draft would allow responsible bodies to detain someone without renewal for up to three years, leaving people deprived of their liberty for inappropriate lengths of time, it is essential that there is genuine independence when it comes to such an assessment.
Dr Poulter
The hon. Gentleman is making some very good points. I am sure he is aware that, for a section 2 or section 3 admission to be approved under the Mental Health Act, there needs to be a second-opinion doctor—it is good practice for that doctor to be independent—and a social worker to ensure that the section admission takes place. It therefore seems extraordinary to me that, in a similar situation where there is an issue of capacity to be decided, there is not the safeguard of a second opinion, given that the decision may last for three years.
Alex Cunningham
I would certainly bow to the expertise of the good doctor and acknowledge exactly what the hon. Gentleman says. These second opinions and safeguards are absolutely essential, and I do not see such cover in the Bill at the moment.
Another concern I want to highlight is the lack of consultation and clarity about extending the scheme to 16 and 17-years-olds, and the risk that the new scheme will make it easier for authorities to remove young people from the care of their families, despite the family objecting. The Government must go back and give careful thought and consideration to the risk that 16 and 17-year-olds could see their liberty restricted inappropriately.
This issue has already been mentioned, but I too am concerned about the fact that there is no real acknowledgement of the interface between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, although the Secretary of State said it would be considered. I am no expert in this area, but does the Minister not agree that, as the Wessely review on the Mental Health Act has only just been published, the Government should pause the Bill to look at its recommendations properly, rather than risk creating legislation that does not fit together? Professionals must be able to understand the differences in regime and to clearly decide which is most appropriate.
We are dealing with changes to the law that any of our relatives, or even ourselves, could be subjected to in the future. We cannot just bounce this through the Commons and potentially hand substandard powers to a group of people who could rule the roost over an older person, a middle-aged person or a teenager, with nothing at all that their families could do about it.
There are plenty of people out there who are experts in this field; they could have been consulted and heard if there had been pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill. I have some questions and concerns that have been raised by some of the organisations out there. From Inclusion London: does the Minister agree that the Bill makes it clear that deprivation of liberty cannot be used as a way to deliver care in the cheapest way possible? From the Royal College of Psychiatrists: can the Minister confirm that the Bill will not prevent psychiatrists from being called away from frontline services? From Mencap: what reassurances can the Minister give that all conflict of interest is removed from the Bill? There is plenty in there. From the Law Society: will the Government consider the interaction between the Bill and the Mental Health Act, as set out in their recently published review? Will they take the time to do that properly?
There are many other questions from many other organisations, and I hope that we have real time to address them if the Bill gets into Committee. I gather that the programme motion suggests that the Bill should come back towards the end of January, and there will not be a lot of time in January to consider the real issues. I just hope that the Minister will listen to that point.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
Let me start by welcoming the Second Reading of the Bill and by declaring an interest as a registered nurse who has used the current legislation in clinical practice. I therefore welcome the provisions in the Bill, which amend and reform the current legislation.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 was a groundbreaking piece of legislation, which, for the first time, provided safeguards not just for those without capacity, to enable decisions to be made about their care, but for healthcare professionals, families and friends who were having to make the most difficult decisions in the most difficult circumstances.
In terms of the deprivation of liberty aspects of the legislation, there is no doubt that, after 10 years, reform is urgently needed. The DoL system has become too cumbersome and too bureaucratic, and it is not responsive enough to patients’ changing needs. I therefore fully support the Law Commission’s report last year, which recommended that DoL be repealed and replaced. The Bill delivers those reforms.
There was a huge amount of debate in the House of Lords, and many amendments were tabled. The Government were in listening mode and accepted many of those amendments. Therefore, it is disappointing to see the Opposition amendment before us today, which simply states that we should decline to give the Bill a Second Reading. There will be plenty of opportunities in Committee and on Report for Members to lay down amendments about the concerns they have. This is such a serious issue, and there is such a backlog of cases; we are talking about the most vulnerable people in our society, and to leave them waiting for assessment or languishing with a DoL system in place that is clearly not working—we have a huge body of evidence that shows that—is irresponsible. If Opposition Members have concerns—many of them have raised genuine concerns today—I urge them to table amendments to address them, and not simply to reject Second Reading out of hand.
At the Lord’s Committee stage, concerns were raised, and the Bill has been amended accordingly. There are four measures, in particular, that I welcome. First, the scope of the Bill was extended to 16 and 17-year-olds. That is a welcome move, which will ensure that they are covered by the new legislation. In addition, I welcome the fact that family and friends will be able to trigger a review if there is an objection. That possibility does not exist in the current legislation. I also welcome the fact that the person we are discussing will be part of the consultation. Although they cannot make an informed choice, because they lack capacity, it is important to continue that dialogue with them, because they are the most important people in the whole process. I welcome the introduction of safeguards in relation to conflicts of interest and care home providers undertaking assessments. That was recognised as a genuine concern and the Bill has been amended as a result.
I still have a concern about independent hospitals. It would have been helpful if Opposition Members had tabled an amendment to reflect that concern. We want to ensure that the proposed legislation covers patients who move between various sectors—independent hospitals, care homes or NHS hospitals—in all scenarios. There is a feeling that there is a gap that still needs to be bridged and perhaps that could be considered in Committee.
I want to make a final point, Madam Deputy Speaker, on what I know is not the responsibility of UK Government Ministers. I sit on the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. Only last week, the Committee heard evidence from mental health professionals about people who lack capacity in Northern Ireland. There is actually no legislation in Northern Ireland, compared to the rest of the UK, on mental capacity. While there is no Northern Ireland Assembly and no Northern Ireland health Minister, that will remain the case. It is a huge concern that while UK Ministers are amending current legislation to make it more adaptable and responsive to patients’ needs, vulnerable patients in Northern Ireland have no legislation to cover them. There are healthcare professionals working in Northern Ireland who do not have safeguards to protect them. I urge Ministers to have discussions with the Northern Ireland Office and Northern Ireland Ministers to see whether something can be done until the Northern Ireland Assembly is up and running.
As a healthcare professional who has used the existing legislation, I am encouraged by the changes proposed in the Bill. I welcome the reform of the legislation to protect the most vulnerable, to protect healthcare workers in that setting, and to protect family and friends. I welcome further debate in Committee.
Norman Lamb (North Norfolk) (LD)
I want to start by reinforcing the point that the Bill deals with an issue of profound importance: the deprivation of a citizen’s liberty and the circumstances in which that can be done. That is why it is so vital that the measures are properly and closely examined and scrutinised. This is particularly important when dealing with people who potentially cannot object to the deprivation of their liberty. There is a real need for robust safeguards to be in place to ensure the least restrictive care possible in all cases and to restrict liberty only if that is genuinely in the best interests of that individual.
The system that the Bill seeks to reform is clearly not fit for purpose. The Joint Committee on Human Rights reached that clear conclusion. After the Cheshire West ruling, which actually happened during the period when I was a Minister, we have seen the development of a massive backlog, in particular because of the broadening of the definition of what constitutes the deprivation of liberty. It is therefore imperative that we sort that out. If we think about it, here and now we are routinely flouting people’s human rights. All those people on the backlog waiting list are being deprived of their liberty without proper authorisation. That is intolerable and it is why I resist the idea that we should just stop this process and leave in place the current wholly imperfect system.
When we think about reform, it is vital that we replace a flawed bureaucratic system with an effective robust system with proper safeguards, not another flawed system. It is very important to recognise what turned up in the House of Lords. My colleague Baroness Barker commented:
“This is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 December 2018; Vol. 794, c. 1247.]
That was the view of many peers when the Bill first appeared in the House. I pay tribute to peers on all sides. I know my Liberal Democrat team did an incredible amount of work, but they worked with Labour colleagues and, I should say, the Minister Lord O'Shaughnessy. He collaborated with peers on all sides to improve the proposed legislation.
Barbara Keeley
The comment from Baroness Barker, who did some great work in the House of Lords, was made on Third Reading; she still described it then as one of the “worst pieces of legislation” that they had seen in the House of Lords.
Norman Lamb
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her intervention, because I was just coming on to the comments that Baroness Barker added on Third Reading. She said that although it had become better legislation, it was still
“highly deficient, but not as bad as it was.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 December 2018; Vol. 794, c. 1247.]
That, Minister, is not a ringing endorsement of this legislation. That is why it is critically important that the Government do what they say they will and collaborate to improve it, because improvements are absolutely necessary. Our assessment will be at the end of the process: is it workable? Does it genuinely respect and safeguard individuals’ human rights? Does it result in very vulnerable people being better protected than they are under the existing, highly flawed system? On those tests will we decide whether to support the Bill on Third Reading.
My plea to the Minister is, as we have discussed, to meet us well before the Committee stage. Do not rush headlong into the Committee stage. I am alarmed that we are talking about that happening at the end of January, given what else is going on then. Be in no doubt that if we do not sort out the flaws that still exist, I will work with others across the House to make sure that the Bill is defeated on Third Reading, because the stakes are so important.
I want to end by highlighting some of the key issues that need to be sorted out. First, many viewed the impact assessment that was presented to the House of Lords as based on fantasy, even before all the amendments were made there. I understand that it is being updated, but it is really important that it is a credible and robust document and, critically, that, along with the impact assessment, the new system is properly resourced. If it is not properly resourced, people’s human rights will continue to be flouted.
Secondly, there needs to be a published equality impact assessment. There has not been one yet. That is not acceptable. The Government need to get on and publish anything that they have produced. If they have not done the work on it, they need to get on and do that.
Thirdly, there are continuing concerns about really important conflicts of interest of independent hospitals and care home managers, who will still carry out consultations. Independent hospitals, as I understand it, are still able to authorise the deprivation of liberty within the hospital. When financial interests are at stake, there will be those who behave badly and who are prepared to act to keep a bed filled to earn the money from that individual—the “cash cow”, as the shadow Minister suggested. That is why robust safeguards are absolutely critical.
Fourthly, we need a clear definition of the “deprivation of liberty”, and the Minister has indicated that that will be forthcoming.
Fifthly, there are the renewal periods. I understand—the Minister made this point to me yesterday—that we do not want a tick-box exercise when it is clear and obvious to everyone that the arrangements are in that person’s interest, but there is something very concerning about our moving in the opposite direction to what Simon Wessely’s review said should happen with regard to the Mental Health Act 1983, where we would see improved safeguards. Here, however, we are talking about a longer period between reviews and renewals, and that seems to me to be a real concern.
Sixthly, there is the interface with the Mental Health Act—please get this right, because if we legislate and repent later, it will be too late and people will lose out as a result. My final comment is: listen to us, talk to us and talk to the interest groups to make sure that we get this right.
Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), who has such expertise in this area and brought such valuable content to this debate as well as a valuable tone, which was very good to hear. I want to say a few things, first, in support of the Bill. As the right hon. Gentleman said, it is very important that we take a moment to reflect on the significance of getting this right.
Depriving someone of their liberty is a very significant act. Liberty is a fundamental right and freedom. We must take it seriously, and we must get this right. It is clear that the current system is not working. The fact that between 100,000 and 200,000 people are waiting because of an applications backlog is clearly unacceptable and cannot continue, given the consequences for individuals who have been deprived of the safeguards to which they are entitled, and the impact on their families and on care homes in which they may be residing.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Earlier today I had a chance to speak about this matter to the Minister and some of her officials. Is it the hon. Lady’s understanding that the issue of human rights has been included in legislation that has been endorsed by Age UK, the Law Commission and Simon Wessely? If that is the case, the action that the Minister and the Government are taking this year is right, because it brings everyone together and ensures that there is legislation that everyone in the House can support.
Helen Whately
The hon. Gentleman has made a good point about the support for the Bill. Some Opposition Members have suggested that there is not much support for it, but it is, in fact, widely supported. Yes, there are concerns, with which I shall deal shortly, but, as the hon. Gentleman has said, there is widespread support for improvements in the current system. Those improvements include simplification—less bureaucracy and fewer administrative burdens—and the critically important representation of individuals through the independent mental capacity advocates, which will give them a voice. The frequency of assessments will become more appropriate; as my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan) said earlier, timings can be inappropriate and excessively burdensome. There is a better choice of language: the Bill removes the term “unsound mind”, which is very stigmatising and completely unnecessary. I am also pleased that the Government have listened to the concerns expressed by some of my constituents about, for instance, potential conflicts of interests for care home owners when a financial interest may be involved.
However, I have three outstanding concerns. First, there is the question of how the amended Act will work for people with severe mental illnesses. The Bill clearly focuses on those who lack capacity because of, for instance, dementia, learning difficulties, autism or brain injuries, but, if I understand it correctly, it could be applied to people with severe mental illnesses. Figures suggest that the current Act is applied to a significant number of people in such circumstances. We know that such illnesses—bipolar disorders, for example—are likely to fluctuate, and that as a result people’s capacity may also fluctuate. That could cause them to be detained and deprived of their liberty when, in fact, they have regained capacity. The Minister in the Lords, Lord O’ Shaughnessy, gave a commitment that that would be addressed in the code of practice, but may I press this Minister to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in the Bill?
Norman Lamb
Does the hon. Lady agree that, given the cohort that could be covered by both pieces of legislation, it is particularly important that the approach be consistent?
Helen Whately
I completely agree, and that relates to my second concern, which others have mentioned and which relates to the interaction between the Bill and the 2005 Act. In his review, Sir Simon Wessely suggested that there should be a new dividing line between the two. I hope the Minister will explain how that will work.
My third concern is whether the Bill will address a situation that I suspect many of us have encountered, when elderly people are locked into their homes. When I have been knocking on doors, I have sometimes been told, “Do not knock on that door, because the lady there has been locked in by her family, and she becomes very distressed and upset if someone rings the doorbell because she cannot answer the door and she does not understand why.” This is clearly a completely inhumane way to treat people, but it is happening. People are being detained at home without appropriate safeguards for their safety as much as anything, so I ask the Minister to say whether the Bill can address this problem, or are there any other steps we might take to deal with the issue of people being inappropriately locked in at home and deprived of their liberty?
I appreciate the spirit in which this Bill has been presented to the House, and the willingness of the Government to listen, as they have already shown as the Bill has been going through the Lords. I have listened to Opposition Members, but think there is widespread support for the Bill among interest groups and experts. I look forward to the Government continuing to listen and improve the Bill so that we have a better system sooner rather than later.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
Order. I am anxious to make sure everybody gets in so I must now reduce the time limit to five minutes.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
We judge a civilised society by how it treats its most vulnerable citizens, so getting this legislation right is vital. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said, “There by the grace of God go we all,” and I agree: we could all find ourselves or family members involved in this. The right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) raised the issue of the Cheshire West case, which demonstrates that we do need change because we have got people whose human rights are being denied at the moment. It is not the case, therefore, that we can just do this at our leisure.
Is the Bill flawed? Yes, in its current state it is, but change needs to happen among the voluntary sector and others and we need to put some principles behind this, and one of them must be putting the person at the centre of the legislation. We should also only use these measures where there are no alternatives; they should not be used as a recourse of first resort or for financial or convenience reasons.
The review of the Mental Health Act 1983 introduced the least restriction principle and that should be written into this Bill. It is also key to ensure that individuals and families not only know their rights, but have access to them. Also, the length of detention should be kept to a minimum, and certainly kept under regular review. The care plans of individuals must be kept up to date with the individual’s situation, too. The access of individuals and families to independent medical advocates must be a central part of this Bill as well, and if people do not have family or relatives an independent advocate should be appointed to them automatically. The possibility of conflicts of interest has been raised and I am not yet happy that this Bill addresses that. There are issues that need to be looked at. Referring to the Mental Health Act again, having second opinions is important; we must tighten that up in this Bill.
A lot of this could be covered in the code of practice. The Government have not yet produced that, and it needs to be produced before the Bill goes any further. It would also be important for it to be incorporated into the Bill.
Reference has been made to the interface with the review of the Mental Health Act. I have read it and know Simon Wessely, and he is clear in that report that he does not want this legislation held up, and he does not think that fusing the two Acts would be a way forward. He makes a suggestion on how to use the two Acts: for objection we use the Mental Health Act, and for not having capacity we use this mental capacity Act. He also deals with the issue of cases that cover both, offering some ideas around tribunals and judges and court protection. I would also like the Minister to address the issue around 16 and 17-year-olds and how this interplays with the Children Act 1989 which gives certain rights to parents.
The right hon. Member for North Norfolk said that the situation needed to change, because people are now being detained who are not having their human rights observed. I have to say that I agree with him, and that is why I cannot support the reasoned amendment. Throwing the Bill out at this stage would be a huge mistake. I plead with the Minister to look at a number of things. The delaying of the Committee stage that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned would be important, and I believe that we should extend the sittings of the Committee if we need to. We ought to take as much time as possible in Committee. With good will, we can get there.
Is the Bill perfect? No, it is not, and I am not happy with it as it is outlined, but we can get some changes into it. I know that the Minister is an advocate for the sector and that she is passionate about doing the right thing, and it is not beyond the wit of man or woman to get to where we should be. To throw the Bill out at this stage would be a mistake, because my fear is that it would not come back, owing to a lack of legislative time. That would mean that the legal crisis would continue. Also we would be missing an opportunity to change the legislation. We can make the necessary changes if the good will is there.
Jeremy Lefroy (Stafford) (Con)
I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We looked at this whole issue generally in our report in June, and we looked more specifically at the Bill in October, so I declare that interest. Article 5 of the European convention on human rights sets out the right to liberty and security. It says that no one shall be deprived of their liberty
“save…in accordance with a procedure determined by law”.
That essential safeguard applies to all those who are deprived of their liberty, not just people in the criminal justice system, and so it should. The previous system involved the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which were criticised by the House of Lords Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Committee found that
“far from being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to oppress individuals, and to force upon them decisions made by others without reference to the wishes and feelings of the person concerned.”
So reform is most definitely needed.
The only guidance that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 gives to the courts is that
“references to deprivation of a person’s liberty have the same meaning as in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention.”
The Supreme Court, as has been mentioned, has defined deprivation of liberty in an “acid test” that covers all those who are under “continuous supervision and control” and “not free to leave”, regardless of their condition or contentment. It was logical of the Supreme Court to do that, but it has none the less meant that hundreds of thousands of people who were not previously considered as being deprived of their liberty may now be so considered, and 125,630 people have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty between 2017 and 2018.
Just as importantly, this definition causes real anguish to many people and their families. We heard evidence from parents whose children are now considered to be deprived of liberty, despite being content and cared for in their own home by devoted family members. I shall give the House a couple of examples. Mark Neary told us that his son Stephen was
“very much king of his castle in his own place. He requires 24/7 support, which is either me or a member of the support team. It was decided last week that Stephen is being deprived of his liberty in his own home on the basis that, first, he is not free to leave, because you need support workers to go with him when he goes to the shop or goes swimming, and secondly, that he is under constant supervision.”
Graham Enderby told us that we had
“gone so overboard after this judgment it is ridiculous”.
Keeping to the current definition will mean that any system of authorisation would have to be either extraordinarily expensive or minimal. As we said in our second report on this issue,
“a scheme which applies too widely will be so light touch as to reduce protection for those who truly need it.”
For those reasons, the Committee recommended that Parliament use this opportunity to give the courts guidance about an article 5-compliant definition of liberty that will ensure that the safeguards are focused on those who need them. We noted two possible ways in which that might be tackled. The first was to focus on whether the deprivation of liberty was the result of an underlying condition, or whether it was caused by continuous supervision and control. The alternative was to revisit the whole notion of valid consent. Those who lack mental capacity cannot, by definition, give legal consent, but as we have heard, in practice it is possible in many cases to tell whether a person is content with his or her support.
We were disappointed, when the Bill was introduced, that the Government had not tackled that issue. We were also disappointed that the scheme that was initially proposed did not have sufficient safeguards for people who were going to be the subject of the new liberty protection scheme. However, I am pleased to see that the Government have listened, and that during the Bill’s passage through the House of Lords it has been amended to make it explicit that there is a duty to consult the cared-for person about their care arrangements. There were many other amendments that I do not have time to go into now. I am also pleased that the Government have now undertaken to bring forward an article 5-compliant definition of liberty, and we look forward to that extremely important step.
Some concerns remain, however. We must consider whether people should be able to give advance consent to care arrangements. I understand the Government’s position is that advance consent could date from many years before care was put in place, that people may “give up” their human rights in long-stay settings, and that people could feel pressurised into making advance consent arrangements when they did not wish to do so. We understand those concerns, but they can be mitigated with sufficient safeguards to enhance the personal autonomy of cared-for persons. I also remain concerned that the right to advocacy is not robust enough. The provision of advocacy is essential for ensuring that cared-for persons can exercise their right to challenge authorisations, and article 5 guarantees everyone the right to challenge their deprivation of liberty before a court. I am pleased that amendments strengthening the right to advocacy were made in the Lords, but they may not go far enough.
This important Bill needs careful and thorough consideration, so I fully support the recommendation that the Bill’s Committee stage be extended.
Geraint Davies (Swansea West) (Lab/Co-op)
I speak as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on speech and language difficulties, so my primary concern is that people will have their freedom taken away simply because they cannot be understood rather than due to a mental capacity problem. The Minister will know that this is a big problem, with something like 10% of children entering school having a speech or language difficulty. Some 60% of young people in the criminal justice system have a speech or language difficulty, and yet speech and language therapy reduces reoffending from 39% to 26%, so it is a cost-effective intervention at that stage and would be even more cost-effective beforehand. Some 81% of children with emotional and behavioural disorders have unidentified language difficulties. Left untreated, 33% of children with speech and language difficulties develop a mental illness, and half of them commit crimes.
In other words, it is important to identify and provide support for people in such situations because, as we have already heard, it can cost £13,000 a week to keep someone incarcerated, but that may be happening simply because they have not been properly understood and have not received the support they needed. There is therefore a financial and moral onus on us to identify and provide therapy to reduce and reverse the development of mental health problems linked to speech and language difficulties.
The situation at the moment—it will be the same under the Bill—is that assessors often will not and do not recognise speech and language difficulties or cannot differentiate between them, and they often do not know how to support the client and communicate their needs.
Rebecca Pow
I support all the hon. Gentleman’s comments. He is making a strong case. Does he believe that staff training on communication ought to be included in the Bill, and that speech therapists should be included in the list of approved mental capacity professionals?
Geraint Davies
I was going to make precisely that point. The Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists has said that the list of professionals should include such therapists and that all professionals carrying out assessments should have speech and language training so that they can identify the issues that they currently do not identify and provide clients with support. I ask the Minister to consider the Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, which requires that support must be provided for communication.
When people are deprived of their liberty, that comes through their lack of capacity to consent, which is questionable if there has been no proper assessment of speech and language difficulties. The person may have a mental disorder, and the action that is taken must be necessary and proportionate. If they object, a review is carried out, but there is no requirement that a speech and language therapist should be involved in the review, which is another change that needs to be made.
The central point is that speech and language problems do not mean a problem with mental capacity, but they are commonly misread as such, which obviously costs the public sector a fortune and costs thousands of people their liberty. As has already been asked, I ask the Minister to look carefully at these issues over a longer timeframe, because we are in danger of rushing this through under the heat and smoke of Brexit, and everything else, and we risk denying the liberty of people whose liberty should not be denied and costing the public sector a fortune when that money would be better invested in preventive treatment such as early intervention for speech and language problems.
Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I will be brief, as I am aware that others wish to speak.
The privilege we have as a Parliament is to defend liberty, so any action we take to seek to deprive a person of their liberty should always be weighed against their best interest. I was not greatly aware of the deprivation of liberty safeguards until the Bill was tabled and I received lots of representations from constituents who work in the social work sector. They are concerned that, although the Bill may be well meaning, it does not necessarily have at its heart protections for the best interests of the people to whom it might apply. I have always listened when a doctor tells me something is not right and I am unwell, and we should listen when a social worker tells us that the Bill’s provisions for depriving a person of their liberty fall short of their expectations.
My hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) made two excellent points. First, if we are to take away a person’s liberty, there has to be no possibility that the process could be abused for whatever purpose. I fear that, in some of the arrangements for moving away from a local authority-based system to a responsible body, the potential exists, however small that potential may be, for an unscrupulous person who is not necessarily working in the best interest of an individual to exercise that power simply to maintain a business model in their own facility or care home. Such cases may be few and far between, but we have seen many situations across the country where one or two individuals have taken advantage of people in vulnerable situations, and I am not convinced that the Bill, as currently written, goes far enough to provide safeguards. [Interruption.] The Minister shakes her head, and it would be wonderful if she could address that in her summing up.
Gareth Snell
I am sorry, but I cannot give way.
My other area of concern is the independence of advocates. I am fortunate to have a family who can speak up if a relative were ever in such a situation, but there are countless people across the country who do not have somebody who can stand up for their best interest and represent what might be right for them. The Bill contains no provision properly to strengthen the independent advocacy rights and make them robust so that everybody who might be subject to the liberty protection safeguards is able to be represented and have their views considered, which is important. [Interruption.] The Minister is nodding, and I would welcome it if she offered some sort of guidance and further clarity on how the Bill will deliver that. From where I sit, from what I have read and from the evidence given to me by social workers, there are several holes in the Bill that do not stand up to scrutiny.
I suspect the Bill will get its Second Reading, and I hope several of those holes will be identified and considered in Committee. At the moment, my fear is that the Bill is well intentioned but simply does not bear scrutiny. There is therefore a potential for exploitative people to take advantage of vulnerable people and, as a Parliament, we must make sure to address that.
Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell), who spoke with characteristic concern for his constituents and characteristic courtesy. I am grateful to him.
In the brief time available, I will argue why it is inappropriate for the Government to be rushing this Bill through Parliament. There are three reasons: the potential for an under-scrutinised Bill to have unintended consequences; the Bill’s lack of clarity on responsibility and resourcing; and the lack of calibration between this Bill and the much more carefully thought through and inclusive approach of the recent review of the Mental Health Act. As I detail those objections, I will refer to the specific concerns mentioned to me by my constituents.
I am well aware, as is everyone who has spoken on this Bill, that the current system is not functioning appropriately, but there has been a need for change since at least 2014. The question is whether we have had sufficient time to consider whether these measures are the appropriate ones, and I would argue that we have not. We had a discussion about the equalities impact assessment just now. I saw that a webpage was produced just yesterday with an equalities impact assessment allegedly produced in December—presumably giving the impression that it was produced yesterday. It refers to the independent review of the Mental Health Act being sure to report at the end of this year, but it has already reported. This is a dog’s dinner, and we cannot have it in relation to such a significant piece of legislation. We know about all the amendments made in the other place, which we have discussed. In that context, the time allocated to this Bill is just insufficient.
Even in this debate, we have seen the lack of clarity. The Secretary of State, who is no longer in his place, seemed to be unaware of expert calls for advocates being available to all, not just those objecting. He also did not agree with a comment made by a colleague who said that the new approach would potentially allow the deprivation of liberty for three years. However, the equalities impact assessment I just referred to, albeit that it is a flawed one, says that the Bill provides that authorisations could last up to three years where appropriate—after two initial authorisations of up to one year—compared with a maximum of one year under the existing DoLS system. The Government seem to be rushing this new approach in because of the existing backlog of DoLS cases dating from 2014, but it is not clear to me that the new measures will deal with that.
The Secretary of State said earlier that there would be a larger role for healthcare providers, but that seems to contradict what was stated in the other place. I am confused, and I think others are too, and that ambiguity is leading to the significant concerns expressed by many stakeholders about the potential for a conflict of interest. He said he would deal with that by tabling amendments in Committee, but in my experience we have not always seen that collaborative approach in Committee from the Government. I hope we will see a change, but presumably others can understand why there might be concerns about that.
It is unclear how local authorities and clinical commissioning groups will be able to perform their role expeditiously under these measures in the current financial climate. No fewer than 38% of assessments under DoLS in Oxfordshire required more than a year to be performed, according to the latest statistics. That is not just because of the regime; it is also because of funding constraints. Oxfordshire County Council has just announced that it will be cutting its contribution to mental healthcare funding. It has one of the lowest levels of mental health funding in its budget compared with other healthcare funding. Just as with lengthening waiting lists for accessing mental health provision, if we do not deal with this resource issue we will only hit the brick wall of inadequate funding.
Lastly, I wish to say that that review of the Mental Health Act involved thousands of service users from the off. In fact, it had someone who had been sectioned as a vice-chair. We have not had that level of inclusion in respect of this Bill.
Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)
Coming here tonight, I thought that this was in origin a well-intentioned but flawed Bill, but after listening to the Secretary of State I am not sure we are discussing the same legislation. It is hard to believe that in a free society such as ours, probably more than 125,000 people are currently denied their lawful liberty because of failings in the system. We need to improve the situation, not make it worse.
As with much of this Government’s legislation, the Bill seems to be more about reducing costs than protecting and promoting the rights of vulnerable people. As we have heard, the impact assessment was produced before a raft of Government amendments were made, so there is now a clear argument for producing an updated assessment before we proceed. The attempts to transfer some of the responsibilities set out in the Bill just do not make sense. I am not sure it is wise to transfer any responsibilities for things such as liberty to bodies such as CCGs. They are already very stretched and prone to questionable judgments on delivering equality and fairness in the NHS.
There are real doubts about the protections in the Bill. Access to legal aid is a Catch-22 if a person qualifies for it only after they have been deprived of their liberty. How can that be fair? There is also concern about the length of detentions and authorisations. Sir Simon Wessely recommended that initial detention should be reduced to three months, with a three-month renewal and six-month periods thereafter. Under the Bill, despite what the Secretary of State claims, a person can be subject to an order for three years.
The Bill does not put the interests of the cared-for person at its heart. The existing arrangements explicitly state that deprivation of liberty may be granted only where it is in the best interests of the cared-for person. The Government should make it clear on the face of the Bill that depriving a person of their liberty must be in their best interests, and should come only after the consideration of less restrictive options.
Proposals must ensure the right of a person to object to and challenge arrangements if they so wish, and that they have appropriate support and representation to do so. Access to an approved mental capacity professional is currently available only in limited circumstances. That is wrong: access should be made available in all cases. Scrutiny for pre-authorisation reviews should be extended to all situations in which a person might be considered vulnerable.
All cared-for people in private hospitals should have an independent mental capacity advocate appointed, and all authorisations must be carried out with approved mental capacity professional oversight. Independent oversight is essential in all cases, as cared-for people may not be able to object in the formal sense. Appropriate advocacy must therefore be available. The Royal College of Psychiatrists rightly draws attention to its concern that no one should have their liberty denied because of a mental disorder without first being seen by a qualified doctor.
It is essential that these matters are dealt with properly, which is why there are real concerns about the role of the care home manager. It is wrong that they should make the decision on independent representation. As drafted, the Bill makes the care home manager responsible for carrying out the consultation with the cared-for person, when the main purpose of that consultation is to ascertain that person’s wishes. Nor can it be right that the choice of assessor should lie with the care home. There is an obvious conflict of interest if independent health and care providers are responsible for both providing a service and deciding on that service’s suitability. The Bill allows for managers of independent hospitals to authorise deprivation of liberty when care is being delivered in their hospital. That is plain wrong.
Paula Sherriff (Dewsbury) (Lab)
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members who have participated in this important debate. There have been many worthwhile and thoughtful contributions from all parts of the House, including from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan), my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), the hon. Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy), my hon. Friends the Members for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) and for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell), the hon. Member for Lewes (Maria Caulfield), and my hon. Friends the Members for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds) and for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe).
The Bill was supposed to be a welcome proposal to simplify a complicated system, but what is before us is equally problematic and will not fix the fundamental challenges that it was supposed to fix. That point was eloquently articulated by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North. Put simply, the Bill has been rushed from start to finish. It has not received the meticulous and careful planning that befits legislation about the human rights of the most vulnerable people in our society.
The Government have shifted the goalposts. First, they agreed with the recommendations of the Law Commission’s draft Bill, but the Bill before us has only five clauses, compared with the Law Commission’s 15 clauses. The Law Commission consulted widely with stakeholders over a two-year period, but the Government did not consult those stakeholders even once before developing their much-changed Bill. Do they think they know better than the Law Commission, which spent years developing its draft legislation? I know from my own discussions with those stakeholders the serious concerns about how the Bill has proceeded. Surely the Government should have started consulting them at an early stage rather than proceeding at what Mencap, the National Autistic Society and many others have called “a breakneck speed”.
There are other examples of the Government acting hastily. There has still been no code of practice, and no definition of “deprivation of liberty”, on which much of this whole debate hinges. As we have heard, the Bill’s equality impact assessment was published only yesterday—that is not good enough—and despite what the Government say, it was not simply an update of a previous impact assessment in the House of Lords. That impact assessment, which is now completely out of date, discussed only the savings that the new system would make for the taxpayer. This process has been bungled to the point that Baroness Barker called the Bill the worst piece of legislation ever to have come before the House of Lords. It was clearly designed with one thing in mind: to save money on dealing with the backlog of DoLS applications.
We accept that the backlog that has arisen since the Cheshire West judgment, which widened the scope for what constitutes a deprivation of liberty, needs dealing with. That could be done through properly resourcing local authorities to deal with the problem, as my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) pointed out earlier. We know that the Government initially intended to solve the problem by foisting this responsibility on care home managers. Leaving aside the massive pressure that this would add to already overstretched care home managers and the worryingly high vacancy rate of care home managers, this would have created a dangerous conflict of interest. Thankfully that was amended in the House of Lords, but an equally dangerous conflict of interest remains in the role that has been given to independent hospitals. It simply cannot be right that this House legislates to give independent hospitals, so many of which are detaining people for years on end under the Mental Health Act, a similar ability under the Mental Capacity Act. It is totally unacceptable to enable them to determine whether appointing an independent mental capacity advocate is in someone’s best interest. It could create the very conditions that my hon. Friend described so harrowingly earlier. We could see even more Bethanys, and that would be a truly horrifying prospect for this House.
It is only down to the tenacity of the noble Lords, including my colleagues on the Labour Benches in the other place, that vital concessions to address some serious problems with this Bill. However, this Bill still falls far short of what is required. This debate has discussed the concept of an individual’s best interest, which should be at the heart of this Bill. If that were the case, the Government would have implemented the Law Commission’s recommendations in full. There are still several areas where the Government have diverged fatally from the Law Commission’s recommendations.
This Bill did not adopt the Law Commission’s recommendation that independent mental capacity advocacy should be available on an opt-out basis and not dependent on a best interest test. There are still worrying shortcomings in the arrangements for approved mental capacity professionals, and there has been no consideration of the interface between the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act, which has recently been the subject of review by Sir Simon Wessely. Sir Simon made important recommendations about the overlap between those Acts. The hon. Member for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich (Dr Poulter) suggested a pause to consider that interface, and I concur with him on that.
This Bill is simply not fit for purpose. We cannot and must not rush legislation that deals with fundamental human rights. The Government must pause and take stock of the concerns that are being raised by so many voices urging them to revise these disastrous proposals. Some excellent suggestions have been made in this debate this afternoon. It is time to stop and think again.
The Minister for Care (Caroline Dinenage)
Our liberty is one of the most fundamental of our human rights. Depriving people of that liberty is something that must be done with the greatest of care and with respect for individuals, and not as a tick-box bureaucratic process—a one-size fits all—that leaves vulnerable people without protections and in an unspeakable backlog. That is what we are facing today.
I thank all hon. Members for their contributions today. I will aim to cover all the questions that have been raised and will write to anybody whose points I do not get to. I start by stressing from the outset that liberty protection safeguards are not about detainment, but about appropriate arrangements being in place for the purposes of care and treatment.
We have heard it argued that the Bill has been rushed through. The Law Commission looked at this issue for three years, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights has looked at it. The Department of Health and Social Care has spoken endlessly to stakeholders. We are determined to get this right, but we continue to consult people across both Houses in order to do so.
Let me address the issue of three-year authorisations. This was a Law Commission recommendation, and the provision is geared towards people like my grandmother who live with dementia—people with long-term progressive conditions from which they are unlikely to recover. Their families tell us that they are part of an unnecessary and intrusive measure that they have to repeat every single year, when there is essentially no way that their loved one’s condition will improve. It is in such scenarios that the Bill allows the flexibility to deliver tailored protections that best support the individual depending on their needs.
The three-year renewal can be used only after two one-year renewals. Furthermore, the responsible body is required to specify a continuous programme of reviews if a person’s circumstances will change. That will address the issue of fluctuating conditions that was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham and Mid Kent (Helen Whately). We will also set out further details of fluctuating conditions in our code of practice.
The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) talked about the code of practice, which will be a statutory document. It will be co-produced in consultation with the sector, the Local Government Association, the Association of Directors of Adult Services and the third sector, and it will be laid before both Houses. It will not be in the body of the Bill, because the problem at the moment is that there is a one-size-fits-all process in legislation, but people will have to pay regard to this statutory document.
The right hon. Gentleman also mentioned 16 and 17-year-olds. We have given very careful thought to how to include 16 and 17-year-olds and to how the Bill will interact with other legislation including the Children Act 1989, and we are very comfortable that it works alongside existing legislation. It is also a Law Commission recommendation to bring the provisions in line with the Mental Health Act, as he will be aware.[Official Report, 7 January 2019, Vol. 652, c. 1MC.]
Under the Bill, every authorisation must be reviewed by somebody who does not deliver the day-to-day care and treatment of the person. That is how we will avoid a conflict of interest for care home managers and independent providers. We want to drive a culture where independent hospitals are considering appropriate arrangements and where there are less restrictive alternatives available. This was also one of the Law Commission’s recommendations. However, we need to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards, which is why, in addition to introducing the consultation duties and the role for appropriate persons or independent mental capacity advocates, we will be tabling an amendment to ensure that every individual in an independent hospital setting will be assigned an approved mental capacity professional to complete the pre-authorisation review. That is regardless of whether the individual or their family object to the deprivation of liberty.
The hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) talked about speech and language. It is vital that communication needs are considered where relevant, and we would expect that a speech and language therapist will be consulted in order to establish the individual’s wishes and feelings. It is really important that those wishes and feelings are very much at the centre of the process.
Members have spoken about the interface with the Mental Health Act. We have broadly recreated the current interface with that Act. The Mental Health Act review did make recommendations on that interface, but Sir Simon Wessely himself said that the Government need to consider the implications of the interface as part of the consideration of that Act. He said that the reform of DoLS cannot wait when there are 48,000 people waiting more than a year for protections to which they are entitled.
If the Opposition’s amendment succeeded, we would be stuck in a broken system with a bureaucratic backlog, in which 125,000 people are waiting for protections. Professor Simon Wessely said that this Bill strikes
“a better balance between the importance of care planning and the provision of (all too often) perfunctory and box-ticking procedural safeguards around that care.”
That makes it clear that action must be taken.
Through this Bill, we are ensuring that people’s wishes are always considered and respected, and that people are safe, cared for and looked after. We are talking about changing a system that is currently not fit for purpose. We have attempted to be collaborative at every stage of the Bill so far. We are driven by a relentless desire to make it as strong and effective as possible and worthy of the vulnerable people we are seeking to protect. We want their loved ones and healthcare professionals to have faith in it, and we will never swerve from our commitment to what is necessary, proportionate and in the best interests of the individual. We commit to working with individuals across this House to make sure that this Bill is in the very best possible shape.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 12th February 2019
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 12 February 2019 - (12 Feb 2019)
17:59 - The House divided: - Ayes: 252 / Noes: 303 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:16 - The House divided: - Ayes: 249 / Noes: 301 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:30 - The House divided: - Ayes: 249 / Noes: 300 - Question accordingly negatived.
19:00 - The House divided: - Ayes: 299 / Noes: 241 - Question accordingly agreed to.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 1, page 5, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) Before making any regulations under subsection (3)(b), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on—
(a) the likely effects of the provisions of this Act on persons undergoing rehabilitation for brain injuries, and
(b) the interaction between the provisions of this Act and the processes for prescribing for brain injury rehabilitation therapy.”
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 5 to 32.
Amendment 2, in schedule 1, page 15, line 24, at end insert—
“(d) the effects of any treatment undergone by the cared-for person, including prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy.”
Government amendments 33 to 37.
Amendment 49, page 16, line, leave out from “out” to the end of line 16, and insert
“by the responsible body.”
This amendment would require the responsible body to carry out the consultation in all cases.
Government amendment 38.
Amendment 50, page 17, line 13, at end insert—
“(ca) the arrangements are being authorised under paragraph 16 of this Schedule, or”
This amendment would require an AMCP to review all cases where the responsible body is authorising arrangements based on a statement provided by a care home manager.
Government amendment 39.
Amendment 48, page 18, line 21, at end insert—
“Authorisation charges
24A No charges may be made in relation to the steps taken in determining whether the responsible body may authorise the arrangements for the cared-for person.”
Amendment 3, page 18, line 35, at end insert “or
(c) at the end of a period of prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy undergone by the cared-for person.”
Amendment 4, page 20, line 4, after “met” insert
“taking into account any treatment to be undergone by the cared-for person, including prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy.”
Government amendments 40 to 46.
Amendment 51, page 23, line 1, leave out paragraphs 39 and 40 and insert—
“39 (1) The responsible body must appoint an IMCA to represent and support the cared-for person if–
(a) one or more of sub-paragraphs (2), (3), (4) or (5) applies, and
(b) sub-paragraph (6) does not apply.
(2) The cared-for person makes a request to the responsible body for an IMCA to be appointed.
(3) The responsible body has not identified an ‘appropriate person’ to support and represent the cared-for person in matters connected with the authorisation.
(4) The responsible body has identified an ‘appropriate person’ to support and represent the cared for person in matters connected with the authorisation, and they have made a request to the responsible body for an IMCA to be appointed.
(5) The responsible body has reason to believe one or more of the following—
(a) that, without the help of an IMCA, the cared-for person and any appropriate person supporting and representing them would be unable to understand or exercise one or more of the relevant rights;
(b) that the cared-for person and any appropriate person supporting and representing them have each failed to exercise a relevant right when it would have been reasonable to exercise it;
(c) that the cared for person and any appropriate person supporting and representing them are each unlikely to exercise a relevant right when it would be reasonable to exercise it.
(6) The cared-for person objects to being represented and supported by an IMCA.
(7) A person is not to be regarded as an ‘appropriate person’ to represent and support the cared-for person in matters connected with this schedule unless—
(a) they consent to representing and supporting the cared-for person,
(b) they are not engaged in providing care or treatment for the cared-for person in a professional capacity,
(c) where the cared-for person is able to express a view about who they would like to represent and support them, the cared-for person agree to being represented and supported by that person,
(d) where the cared-for person is unable to express a view about who they would like to represent and support them, the responsible body has no reason to believe that the cared-for person would object to being represented and supported by that person,
(e) they are both willing and able to assist the cared-for person in understanding and exercising the relevant rights under this Schedule, including with the support of an IMCA if appropriate.
(8) The ‘relevant rights’ under this schedule include rights to request a review under Part III of this Schedule, and the right to make an application to the court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 21ZA of this Act.”
This amendment would broaden the provision of advocacy, ensuring that advocates are provided as a default unless the cared-for person does not want one.
Government amendment 47.
Chris Bryant
I will speak to amendment 1 and the three other amendments in my name and the names of several colleagues.
I want to start with enormous praise for the national health service, which in many cases makes the key decisions on everything that we will talk about today. Sometimes those are very difficult decisions, including for families, and they need to be managed with care and sensitivity. Ensuring that we have the right law in place to enable clinicians to make the right decisions is vital. I was on the Public Bill Committee for the Mental Health Act 2007 under the Labour Government, and I remember many of the rows and difficulties then. Ensuring that legislation fits the complicated circumstances of real life is not all that easy, and in particular, the definition of what might be proper treatment is not readily come by.
Often lobbyists get a really bad press. My experience of lobbyists in this field is entirely positive, including those working for the pharmaceutical industry, who do an amazing job in providing new drugs that can save people’s lives and manage their conditions much better, and the many charities in this field. When lobbyists are decried, I sometimes want to point out that they play an important part in ensuring that Members of Parliament know exactly what they are doing when it comes to legislation.
All the amendments that I have tabled relate to acquired brain injury. I am aware that several other colleagues who are members of the all-party parliamentary group on acquired brain injury are here today. I do not want to make an apology for that, but I want to explain why I have tabled these amendments. It is partly because I believe that acquired brain injury, though recognised and understood by some, is something of a hidden epidemic in Britain.
Something like 1.4 million people in this country are living with an acquired brain injury. A new person presents at accident and emergency with a brain injury every 90 seconds. Many of these injuries have lasting effects that are completely invisible to an ordinary member of the public. For instance, the person standing in front of us in a queue who is being difficult might look as if they are drunk or just being difficult, but they may have a brain injury. We would have no idea, and the person feels trapped and finds the situation as difficult as we do. The more we come to an understanding of acquired brain injury in this country, the better.
There are many different causes of brain injury, including road traffic accidents, accidents about the home and stroke. One cause that has been brought home to me recently is carbon monoxide poisoning. Not only the high level of carbon monoxide poisoning that follows an incident, but a sustained low level of carbon monoxide due to poor central heating systems or facilities or something like a Calor gas burner in a home, can end up causing a long-term brain injury. This particularly affects some of those who live in the worst housing in the land, and who are the poorest and least able to afford, for instance, to have their boiler mended or assessed every year.
Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)
Is my hon. Friend aware of the problem that some members of the armed forces face with acquired brain injury? It may be because they were involved in or close to the explosion of an improvised explosive device, or because they had a gunshot wound, when the head covering was hit but not penetrated, and the shock can lead to acquired brain injury.
Chris Bryant
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. I know the role she has played, in particular in the all-party group on the armed forces, and of course in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. She is absolutely right, and there are sometimes coup and contrecoup elements of damage to the brain. There is also some evidence to suggest that some people diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder have actually been suffering from a brain injury.
Interestingly, the Ministry of Defence has done some of the most innovative work in relation to brain injuries—physical brain injuries, as it were—and it has been able to transfer some of the skills and research involved in that work to the wider population, which is all to the good. However, I think that the way in which the mind sits inside the brain and the brain sits inside the skull is one of the areas of research that is still underdeveloped, and we still need to do a great deal more about it.
Other causes include brain tumours and chronic traumatic encephalopathy, where somebody may have had a series of relatively minor concussions. There is a complete misunderstanding of what concussion actually involves, particularly in sport. This might be leading to some of the long-term sustained problems of, for example, people in my own constituency who played rugby for many years and had repeated concussions. They may suffer from dementia, depression and anxiety in later life, but have no understanding that that may relate to a brain injury, rather than to anything else.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
While we are talking about sport, may I say that this does not involve only rugby players? There is now evidence that footballers, particularly those heading the ball, suffer sustained brain injuries. It used to be interpreted as dementia, but it is a lot more serious than that. Has my hon. Friend had any discussions with the Football League about that?
Chris Bryant
I have had lots of discussions, some of them more fruitful than others, with the Football Association.
It is wholly to be deprecated that FIFA still will not allow a full substitution for an assessment of brain injury during a match. Ten minutes are needed to do a proper assessment on the pitch, but at the moment only three minutes is available in a FIFA match. There can be no substitution, and it is not therefore in the team’s interests to take the person off the pitch. I think that this must change. If there is one thing that I hope Parliament will say to FIFA about this in the next few months, it is that this must change. People we talk of as heroes, such as Jeff Astle, have died because of heading the ball. If those who are heroes to our young people today end up suffering in later life because of what they sustained in their footballing career, we will have done them a terrible disservice.
Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that this applies equally to those who play rugby league, and in fact perhaps more, given the impact that some tackles occasionally have?
Chris Bryant
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. One of the things about rugby league and about rugby union, which I know rather better, being from south Wales—[Interruption.] I do not think it is parliamentary to tut-tut from the Chair, Mr Deputy Speaker, if you don’t mind my saying so. The truth is that many of the players today are bigger, stronger and faster, so the impacts may be much more significant than they were in the past. Curiously, when we watch some of the commentary on Twitter and Facebook about matches, we see a kind of rejoicing in the physical pain that people are going through, and I think we really need to roll that back. We need to roll that back so that we are actually caring about the players. Quite often the players themselves will be desperate to go back on. It should not be the player who makes that decision; it should be an independent doctor who makes it. [Interruption.] I think you want to intervene on me, Mr Deputy Speaker.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
The tut-tut was to say that the hon. Gentleman would benefit from knowing both types of rugby. The only thing I would add, just to help his case, is that in rugby league a player is taken off for a full assessment by a doctor and not allowed back on. That is the benefit on which rugby league is leading the sport.
Chris Bryant
I am glad I took that intervention. It is unusual to get an intervention from the Chair, but I think we welcome this new style of chairing.
Chris Bryant
I am tempted to make a point of order! No—you are absolutely right, Mr Deputy Speaker.
The key thing is to have the same protocols for all sports, so that there is the same protection. A child might play rugby league one year and rugby union the next; if there are different protocols, that will undermine the whole system. Incidentally, the point also applies to a whole range of other sports—hockey and ice hockey, as well as American football, in which there is growing interest in the United Kingdom. We should not let the issue be led by litigation, which is what has happened in the United States of America: we should let it be led by the medical science, which is rapidly changing.
Mrs Moon
My hon. Friend is being generous in giving way. One of the things that concern me most is that it is easy to label someone with any form of brain injury—whether dementia, Parkinson’s or anything else—when they also have an infection. What can be seen as difficult behaviour can be misunderstood when it is caused by the infection rather than by any acquired injury or illness.
Chris Bryant
Yes. People will also attribute bad intention to the person when what is happening is that the short-term memory is simply not functioning properly. For instance, someone with very little short-term memory may find it difficult to turn up on time, as I mentioned earlier. That may be not because they are being lazy, truculent or difficult but simply because their brain does not work in that way. It may mean that their capacity is so diminished that, according to the Bill, they cannot make decisions. Alternatively, it might just be one of the elements that needs to be dealt with—they need to find tricks to circumvent the problem, and medical and clinical professionals can help.
This is why I tabled my amendments. Neurorehabilitation, when done well and on a sustained basis, can take an individual from being low functioning and high dependency, perhaps needing three or four people just to be able to wash themselves, clothe themselves and provide for themselves physically, to a much higher level of personal functionality and much greater independence. I have made that argument from a different place, in the sense that taking someone from needing four people to look after them to just one person coming in once a day for an hour or so could be an enormous financial saving to the taxpayer. That is why neurorehabilitation and the work that has been done in many cases can be so important.
Neurorehabilitation is really important in relation to the Bill. We might be able to take somebody from a place where they are not truly able to make a decision about what treatment they should be undergoing and, according the Bill, deprive them of their liberty, to a place where that would no longer be appropriate. My anxiety is that if there is no incentive in the system to ensure that neurorehabilitation is provided to people, there is a danger that we just discard them and leave them by the side, particularly as we are now talking about a three-year term rather than a one-year term. I think the clauses at the end of the Bill militate in favour of renewal, rather than providing a clear option not to renew at that point.
I have an anxiety that perhaps in some care homes and other places there just might be an incentive to think, “Well, this person isn’t going to get better so we’re not going to do anything to try to help them to get better.” I do not want to give up on so many people. Thanks to what the Government have done with the major trauma centres, we now save about 800 or 1,000 more lives every year following road traffic accidents and the like, but we need to give people quality of life. We do not have enough people working in this field. We need to recruit many more people. If 20 people were inspired by what we are talking about today to go and work in that field—there are so many high rewards for people working to take people from high dependency to low dependency—that would be a success in itself.
Liz Twist (Blaydon) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the all-party group inquiry heard some remarkable examples of people who have gone through the pathway with neurorehabilitation prescriptions and are increasingly able, with great work and support on everyone’s part, to carry out many functions?
Chris Bryant
Absolutely. One key thing that we saw repeatedly—this is an issue for the Bill, I think—was the fluctuating nature of some brain injuries. For instance, fatigue is a very common feature of many brain injuries. I do not mean just feeling tired because you are sitting at the back of a debate in the House of Commons and somebody is wittering on for far too long and you fall asleep, but real, genuine fatigue. I mean the kind of lassitude that leaves you unable to move from one side of the bed to the other. It is often misunderstood, because it might look like laziness to somebody with a judgmental eye. That lassitude can pass or go through phases and can sometimes be a bit difficult to explain or predict. I am therefore really keen that we ensure, in all the processes in the Bill, that anyone with an acquired brain injury is regularly and repeatedly reassessed so that they have an opportunity to escape. That is important.
Dr Dan Poulter (Central Suffolk and North Ipswich) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman is making some good points. The only point I would make to him is that without a deprivation of liberty order—I agree that they should be open to review, and I am sure the Minister will go on to talk about how that can happen—some of the people he talks about may have to be put under the Mental Health Act 2007 due to the fluctuating nature of their capacity. That would be much more restrictive and could lead to them being sent to entirely the wrong places to be cared for. I would just give that caveat and that warning to him about the potential consequences of what he is saying.
Chris Bryant
I think the hon. Gentleman has just read, in some weird way, what I was about to say—he has a very special mental capacity of his own if he is able to read my notes from that distance. He is absolutely right, however, and I do not want to drive a coach and horses through the Bill at all. I fully accept that there is a requirement for some elements of it.
I have an anxiety about the pace at which the Bill is going. It is a shame that the code is not yet available, because it would significantly affect how we viewed some of the issues that we are talking about today. All the things in my amendments should probably be in the code, rather than on the face of the Bill—that is what the Minister said to me yesterday, and I should have given her a much harder time, by the way—but why do we not have the code now? We are not going to have it before the Bill receives its Third Reading, and I think that is a mistake. It is not as though we have lots of wonderful business to be getting through.
Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)
A young person in my constituency has contacted me—she has a disability and works for a disabled people’s organisation called Inclusion London—to raise concerns about the speed at which the Bill is going through Parliament. There is a sense of it being rushed through without adequate consultation, which it needs, and with little regard for the people who are likely to be affected by it. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Chris Bryant
Yes, I do have that anxiety. I want to be a bit critical of the Government on that, because this is a two-year Session of Parliament and there is no reason why this could not have been done in a proper way. I am slightly conscious that there is not a great deal of time left today, however, so I am keen to bring my remarks to a close.
Steve McCabe (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)
Before my hon. Friend concludes, since the code is going to be so central to the operation of the Bill, and since none of us will have seen it before the Bill concludes its proceedings, does he think that it is vital for the Minister to say today that there will be proper and extensive consultation on the code before it is implemented?
Chris Bryant
Yes. The Government have effectively already said that, but to be really nasty, we should have had the code before today, in all honesty, even if it was only in draft form, so that we would be able to see what we are really talking about, and I would then not have been talking about these amendments.
I want to bring my remarks to a close as soon as I can. We need to build in an incentive to make sure that there is proper neurorehabilitation provision for people with acquired brain injuries. All too often, patients and carers in this field feel as though they are being processed. That is not because health clinicians are nastily minded, but because people sometimes end up having to deal with so many different departments that they feel as though they are being pushed from pillar to post. That is why it is really important that the Government strike the right note when it comes to the next stage of introducing the code.
Amendment 1 simply says that
“the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on”
the “likely effects” of the Bill on ABI before it comes into effect. Amendment 2 requires the “relevant person”, who could be somebody managing a care home, to consider
“the effects of any treatment undergone by the cared-for person, including prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy”
in addition to the length of time since the assessment was originally made. Amendment 3 would mean that an authorisation that was not renewed would lapse after 12 months, after a time specified in the original authorisation, or, as I would like it to be,
“at the end of a period of prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy”.
I think that is key to making sure that there is an incentive to ensure that therapy is provided. Amendment 4 refers to the renewal of an authorisation and requires the responsible body to take into account
“any treatment to be undergone by the cared-for person, including prescription brain injury rehabilitation therapy”.
I do not think that any of those amendments would do the Bill any harm—no harm at all—and I am feeling a bit more grumpy with the Minister than I was yesterday when I met her, so who knows? We might end up voting on them.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Steve Brine)
It is good to see the hon. Gentleman on his feet, but I hate to see him grumpy. He will have my response to his all-party group next week. I promised him a recommendation by recommendation response to his report, the launch of which I attended, and he will have it next week.
Chris Bryant
That is true, but she has to prove her mettle on this. I do not mean that in a nasty way; I simply mean that we want some changes.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
A lot of people want to speak, but we have to finish at 6 o’clock, so we only have 90 minutes.
The Minister for Care (Caroline Dinenage)
I am here today to prove my mettle.
I will start by stating the obvious: our liberty is our most fundamental human right. The challenge today is that the current system of deprivation of liberty safeguards no longer provides protection to all the vulnerable people entitled to it. The system has proved to be overly bureaucratic and inefficient to apply, and case law has resulted in article 5 of the European convention on human rights being understood in a very different way, and this has, in effect, widened the definition of deprivation of liberty eighteenfold. The result is a long backlog of applications that has built up over time such that today about 125,000 people may be subject to a deprivation of liberty without formal authorisation.
The Bill introduces a new system—the liberty protection safeguard—based on work of the Law Commission that involved more than three years of consultation and consideration. It is designed to provide robust protections and to be simpler so that protections may be afforded quickly and effectively to those who need them. It is absolutely right that any proposed changes to the protection of some of the most vulnerable people in our society be scrutinised closely, however, and I am grateful for the close examination of the Bill by hon. Members and noble Lords during the Bill’s passage here and in the other place.
I thank the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) for raising the issue of how liberty protection safeguards will work for people who have a brain injury or may need to be deprived of their liberty while receiving care or treatment. I also thank him for his chairmanship of the all-party group on acquired brain injury. He does an outstanding job and is a great advocate for the group.
A leading charity in this area, Headway, reports that every 90 seconds someone is admitted to a UK hospital with an acquired brain injury or related diagnosis, such as trauma, stroke, tumour and neurological illness, and many of these will require some form of rehabilitation. For some people, this can be a lifelong need. Having met the hon. Gentleman yesterday to discuss his concerns, I understand that neurorehabilitation can in some cases help people to regain capacity over time and that his amendments are intended to account for this and to ensure that a deprivation of liberty occurs only when strictly necessary.
I would like to provide some reassurance that the first principle of the Bill is that a deprivation of liberty should occur only where it is considered essential and where authorisation conditions are met. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have considered carefully how this model will work for this group of people and are confident that the reformed model will embed consideration of deprivation of liberty into the earliest stages of care and treatment planning so that from the outset these arrangements will work alongside neurorehabilitation therapy and adhere to the less-restrictive principle of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Norman Lamb (North Norfolk) (LD)
I understand the Minister’s concern not to impinge on the rights of disabled and elderly people, but is she not concerned that more than 100 social care and disability organisations have written to her raising continuing concerns, including about the Bill adversely affecting the rights of people who rely on care and support services. Does she think they are wrong, or does she think they have legitimate concerns that still need to be properly addressed?
Caroline Dinenage
Of course, any organisation representing these vulnerable people that raises concerns deserves to have them listened to, and I am sure that the vast majority are legitimate concerns, which is why we have been listening so carefully up until this point. The right hon. Gentleman will know how many amendments we have made in the other place, in Committee and today.
We will continue to listen and collaborate as we deal with the code of practice, about which I shall say more in a moment. A working group of third-sector organisations is helping us to put the document together so that it is not rushed. It is not being prepared for the purposes of Parliament, but it will come before Parliament. Following a wide public consultation, both Houses will vote on it. That collaboration has been and will continue to be important: it is not the end of the conversation, but very much part of it.
Catherine West (Hornsey and Wood Green) (Lab)
May I pursue the intervention from the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb)? Is the Minister satisfied that the definition of the deprivation of liberty will not lead to litigation in the courts? Some constituents have written to me saying that the proposed changes could open a legal can of worms. Can the Minister reassure me that this will not end in expensive litigation, either for constituents or for the Government?
Caroline Dinenage
I do not think it is ever possible to say that. This particular area of law has always been open to legal challenge. We decided to include a definition because so many stakeholders, as well as the Law Commission and Members of the other place, thought it essential, but the wording is very specific.[Official Report, 13 February 2019, Vol. 654, c. 7MC.] It refers to what does not constitute a deprivation of liberty rather than what does, because we did not want to leave out accidentally something that could open up a legal challenge further down the line. This is where the code of practice comes into its own. It will include case studies and examples, so that those affected by the Mental Capacity Act will have a better understanding of how it works for them.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab)
The Minister has just mentioned case studies, and she has mentioned them before. She has circulated case studies to a few people, but they were not circulated to me or to any other members of the Committee, which I think was very discourteous. We keep hearing about things that are in the distance—over there—and will come together at some point, but those case studies have not been circulated, and they should have been.
Caroline Dinenage
I think that there must be some confusion. The case studies will be part of the code of practice. They will be gathered together in the document, and third-sector organisations will contribute to ensure that we cover every cohort. We must bear in mind that we are trying to cater for wildly different groups of people. The document will have to cover the young person with an acquired brain injury to whom the hon. Member for Rhondda referred, a 16-year-old who has had a learning disability since birth and the 97-year-old with dementia. It must not be the box-ticking one-size-fits-all exercise for which the current legislation provides.
We are aware that mental capacity assessments may be of particular concern to the group of people mentioned by the hon. Member for Rhondda. Assessing the capacity of people with acquired brain injuries can be particularly challenging, and will require skilled and careful consideration. Government amendments 28 to 37, which I shall discuss later, outline our intention to publish regulations in order to ensure that the assessors have the appropriate knowledge and experience.
We agree that the likelihood of capacity to fluctuate should be ascertained during the assessments, and we will expect that to be considered in the authorisation, in the length of authorisation and in the frequency of reviews. Fluctuating capacity is complex and fact-specific and deserves in-depth and detailed guidance, which is why we will include the details in the code of practice. I appreciate what the Opposition amendments are trying to do and I fully agree with their spirit, but I hope that my commitment to work with others on the code has given the hon. Gentleman and other members of the all-party parliamentary group the reassurance that they need.
Through the scrutiny of the Public Bill Committee and the ongoing engagement with stakeholders, we have identified a number of areas in which the Bill could be strengthened further. As I have said before, I firmly intend to introduce a more effective, efficient system of robust safeguards, moving away from the one-size-fits-all approach that no longer works. I am committed to doing this in a very collaborative way, and where possible to identify legislative improvements that can be made to work. I am committed to looking at this again, and as a result a number of Government amendments have been tabled that improve the Bill and the way in which liberty protection safeguards work.
Amendment 5 aligns the definition of a care home manager in Wales with that in England. The Bill as currently drafted defines care home managers in Wales as a registered manager. This amendment changes that so that it is linked to the registered service provider. Amendments 7 to 23 will remove any perceived conflict of interest where a deprivation of liberty occurs in an independent hospital. Under amendment 14 the responsible body in cases where arrangements are mainly carried out in an independent hospital would be the local authority in England and in Wales the local health board for the area in which the hospital is situated. This removes any potential misuse of power or conflict of interest in independent hospital settings. Amendment 22 outlines that in England the responsible body is the local authority responsible for the education, health and care plan or the care plan under the Care Act 2014. If a person does not have one of these, the responsible body is that in the area where the hospital is situated.
John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
What provision does the Minister think should be made in the code for the families? Often the adult children or the parents know these people extremely well and have very caring approaches, and they may have wisdom to inform the decision, but there might be the odd occasion when the family member has their own agenda and not that of the vulnerable person. So what should the role of the family be?
Caroline Dinenage
The role of the family is much greater in this amended legislation than it is currently. A number of families have told us through our work on this Bill that they feel very disenfranchised by the current system. For example, in the new system a family member or a loved one can be an approved person.[Official Report, 13 February 2019, Vol. 654, c. 7MC.] That would be the person’s advocate through the process. That method brings family members and loved ones much closer into the decision-making around this whole system.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I received some correspondence from Age Concern, as the Minister knows. It wanted to raise two specific issues; I spoke to the Minister about this, but I want to raise it again to have it recorded in Hansard. The issues are the definition of the deprivation of liberty, which I understand the Government are including in the Bill, and access to advocacy. I reiterate, too, the point made by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood): the importance of having family and loved ones as part of the process. We must not disenfranchise them; if we do that, we are doing this wrong. So will the Minister confirm that those things are in place?
Caroline Dinenage
Yes, that definition is included in the Bill, and it is also expected that people will have an advocate. That is an approved person; it can be a family member or loved one or it can be an independent mental capacity advocate, or indeed both if the family do not feel they are fully equipped to be able to support their loved one.
Jim Shannon
So the wishes and feelings of the loved ones and their families are at the heart of the Bill?
Caroline Dinenage
The wishes and feelings of the vulnerable person are at the centre of the Bill, and the wishes and feelings of their family will definitely be taken into consideration if their family is the approved person. We must always leave a little space in case the person does not want their approved person to be a family member for whatever reason.[Official Report, 13 February 2019, Vol. 654, c. 8MC.] The wishes and feelings of the individual must be at the heart of this, and that was at the heart of the original Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Mrs Moon
Does the Minister agree that one of the most essential things everyone should do while they are well is make sure they take out an enduring power of attorney that names the person they want to oversee their health and wellbeing should they be in a situation such as this? Also, many families are intimidated into making bad decisions out of fear that the care home might say, “If you don’t do as we say, or if you complain, move your parent.” Giving power into the hands of care home managers is a very dangerous situation.
Caroline Dinenage
As a Justice Minister, I was responsible for lasting powers of attorney and we spent a lot of time trying to convince people to make those sorts of decisions for themselves as early as possible.
Several hon. Members rose—
Caroline Dinenage
I am going to make little progress now because I have a lot more to say and I know that other Members want to speak as well.
Paula Sherriff (Dewsbury) (Lab)
What assurances can the Minister give that the regulations will be genuinely co-created with practitioners and cared-for people? If they are not, how can we be sure that the amendments are not a way of clandestinely watering down the protections of the Bill?
Caroline Dinenage
The Bill is very clear about the skills and qualifications necessary for those carrying out the assessments, but the code of practice that goes alongside the Bill will be carried out in partnership. We already have a working group made up of third sector organisations that are working to ensure that the statutory document that goes alongside the Bill is as robust as we can make it.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby) (Lab)
I would like to thank the Minister for meeting me earlier to discuss the Bill. She was very generous with her time. On the question of the code, does she envisage that there will be training on the code for these professionals? If so, how long does she think the training will take, and when will it be properly in force for local authorities to utilise?
Caroline Dinenage
Yes, we envisage that there will be training and we will be working with partners such as Skills for Care to look at the best ways of implementing that sort of support.
Catherine West
Could the Minister outline the role of care staff in preparing the documentation and making ready for the assessments, as opposed to the role of the responsible body—the local authority—that will make the assessment?
Caroline Dinenage
I am actually coming to that very section of the Bill now.
We are proposing that a review of an authorisation will be completed by an approved mental capacity professional when an objection is raised by someone with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare. It is vital that objections can be raised not just by the person themselves but by others who have an interest in their welfare. This could be a member of the care staff, a close friend or a family member. The Government amended the Bill to clarify that objections can be raised at a pre-authorisation stage, and these new amendments clarify that objections can be raised at any time throughout the authorisation and can lead to a review of the ongoing need for deprivation of liberty.
Amendments 39, 40 and 42 relate to authorisations that need to vary in order to prevent them from ceasing because small variations need to be made. Under the current deprivation of liberty safeguards system, an authorisation is tied to one specific location. This creates a situation in which a person has multiple authorisations if they need to move between settings. If a person is in a care home and has a planned stay in hospital, for example, a new application has to start from scratch. The Law Commission recommended that authorisations should be able to cover more than one setting to remove that duplication. There is an exception if someone needs to go into hospital in an emergency, when variations can be made without a review taking place first, but one should be held as soon as possible afterwards. In some cases, the responsible body will change even though the person still resides in the same location. For example, a care home resident may become eligible for NHS continuing healthcare, but their location and care will not change.
Opposition amendment 49 seeks to require the responsible body to carry out the consultation required by the Bill in every case, removing the ability of the care home manager to complete the consultation. We are clear that it is not appropriate for certain functions to be conducted by the care home manager, which relates to what the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Catherine West) was saying. The Bill explicitly prevents anyone with a prescribed connection to a care home, which will be set out in regulations and will include care home managers and staff, from completing the assessments required for an authorisation and the pre-authorisation review. We are clear that decision making lies with the responsible body, not the care home manager.
Consultation is another matter. We expect, as part of good care, that care providers are consulting with the people in their care, and with those with an interest in that person’s welfare, to establish their needs, wishes and feelings. That applies regardless of whether someone is subject to a liberty protection safeguard and should happen on an ongoing basis. Having care home managers complete the consultation required by the Bill is simply building upon current good practice. The Bill has clear safeguards for that purpose. Objections do not need to be raised through the care home manager. They can be raised directly to the responsible body by the person or by someone interested in their welfare. If there are concerns about the care home manager’s ability to complete the consultation required under the Bill, the responsible body can decide to take on the care home function and complete the consultation itself.
Liz Twist
Many hon. Members will have had a large amount of correspondence from constituents on this matter. Does the Minister accept that there is huge concern about the operation of the provisions and about the role of care home managers more generally? The amendments seek to address that concern, but that feeling remains.
Caroline Dinenage
I accept that there were a number of concerns, but we made changes to say that care home managers would not in any way be responsible for authorisation or for pre-authorisation reviews.
Several hon. Members rose—
Caroline Dinenage
I am afraid that I will not take any more interventions because Mr Deputy Speaker might fall out with me entirely. In short, care home managers will be responsible for consultation, which is already part of good care.
Amendment 50 would require an approved mental capacity professional to complete the pre-authorisation review, where care home arrangements are being authorised and where the care home manager provides a statement to the responsible body. The Law Commission recommended the creation of the AMCP role and also recommended that their use should be focused on those cases where their input is needed. The commission recommended that AMCPs should consider cases where an objection is raised and the Bill does that. The Bill also allows other relevant cases to be referred to an AMCP. We expect, for example, cases where there are complex circumstances, or particularly restrictive practices are proposed, to be referred by the responsible body to an AMCP. We have also specified that an AMCP must carry out the pre-authorisation review in independent hospital cases. However, we agree with the Law Commission that not every case should be considered by an AMCP. By having a targeted system, with a greater focus on more complex cases, we can ensure that people receive the protection to which they are entitled.
Turning to amendment 51, I thank hon. Members for raising advocacy, about which we spoke at length in Committee. Advocacy is of the utmost importance for ensuring that the voice of the person is heard. That is why this Bill creates a presumption of advocacy for everyone who is subject to arrangements under liberty protection safeguards. During our engagement with stakeholders, many people and their families told us that the DoLS system was something that was done to them without family involvement. That is why this Bill introduces the appropriate person role described by the Law Commission. Family members and those close to the person will be able to be an appropriate person and provide representation and support. We recognise that that role can be challenging, which is why it will be conducted only by those who are willing to do it. Otherwise, people will be able to request an independent mental capacity advocate to support them in providing that important representation.
Like Opposition Members, we want to ensure that people receive advocacy, but we recognise that we should not impose it on people, nor should it become a formality without real effect. Our Bill already delivers on amendment 51.
Caroline Dinenage
I am afraid that I cannot take any more interventions at this stage.
Our Bill allows the person themselves to request an IMCA from the responsible body if they have the capacity to do so, and it explicitly states that an appropriate person can request an IMCA or that the responsible body should appoint an IMCA if it believes that the appropriate person having the support of an IMCA would be in the cared-for person’s best interest.
I agree that the appropriate person has a challenging role with vital duties to ensure that the person exercises their rights, and we want to work with others in the sector to establish how best to support them in this role. There is existing provision in the Bill to address the concerns raised by amendment 51. In some areas, the amendment adds uncertainty and over-complication.
This Bill is about protecting vulnerable people and replacing a one-size-fits-all system.
Dr Sarah Wollaston (Totnes) (Con)
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for listening to many of the concerns that have been expressed about the Bill, as shown in the Government amendments. How are we going to deal with the extraordinary backlog of cases, which has left over 125,000 people without protection? The safeguards she has set out will stop this being a rushed process, but will she say something about the backlog?
Caroline Dinenage
The backlog of 125,000 people without the safeguards they need, with their families lacking reassurance and with the people who care for them lacking legal protection, is an enormous concern. That is why, during the long period in which we will set out the code of practice, we will be supporting local authorities to go through those backlogs. From day one, when the system is implemented, any new applications and those still in the backlog will be processed using the new system.
With grateful thanks for your patience, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will now sit down. This new system puts individuals at its very heart, and it removes the one-size-fits-all, box-ticking exercise we have unfortunately come to live with under the current system.
Several hon. Members rose—
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
The opening two speeches have taken 55 minutes, and we have to finish at 6 pm. I recognise that a lot of other people want to speak, and I certainly do not want to put pressure on the Opposition spokesperson, who also wants to make a speech. When other people come in, please remember that we want to get through everybody.
Barbara Keeley
We should not be in this position of having less than two hours on Report. This Bill has been rushed. We were in the same position on Second Reading, and it is absolutely unacceptable for such an important Bill to be rushed through as it has been today. I spoke to the Minister about this yesterday. She could have chosen to bring the Bill back on a different day, and I am sorry that she has not.
I am every bit as concerned about this Bill as I was on Second Reading. It remains deeply flawed. It weakens the current safeguards for people who lack capacity, and we have not even had a clear answer to the question that the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston) just asked about the current backlog of DoLS applications. It is not clear how that will be cleared.
The Minister said at the start of Committee that she would work constructively with other parties on this Bill, but that has not been reflected in our experience. She has dismissed many of the serious concerns raised both by Opposition Members and by the many charities and representative groups outside the House with an interest in the Bill.
I said in Committee that our amendments were the bare minimum required to ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose. The Government rejected all our amendments in Committee, and, despite some movement on one or two issues since, the Bill retains the majority of the significant flaws it contained on Second Reading. It is sad that, having been through all the stages, this is where we are.
We have tabled further amendments to address some of the glaring holes that remain in the Bill, and I thank all the stakeholders who have helped us, including the Alzheimer’s Society, VoiceAbility, Mencap and Lucy Series. Without these amendments, we simply do not believe that the Bill is fit for purpose, and we oppose it progressing further.
Janet Daby
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill should be paused until the draft code of practice is ready?
Barbara Keeley
I very much agree with that. We have heard about a code of practice and regulations, but we cannot see any of these things. With this Bill, we should have had the promised detail on the code of practice. We should not be passing the Bill without it.
First, I wish to talk about amendment 50, which addresses the role proposed in the Bill for care home managers. A number of Members have raised that issue, and we fundamentally disagree with that role, in the same way that we disagreed with the role in the liberty protection safeguards system being given to independent hospitals, which the Government are now amending. There is no logic in the Government removing one conflict of interest from the Bill and not the other.
When this Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, it placed almost all power and responsibility for the LPS in the hands of care home managers. It would have allowed them to be judge and jury, deciding when to deprive people of their liberty. I accept that the Bill has been marginally improved from the original position. The Government were forced to make concessions in the House of Lords, but what they have done so far is the bare minimum. The Bill still hands far too much power to care home managers. Stakeholders across the sector, including care home managers themselves, are very concerned about this. Care England, the representative body for care homes, has said:
“As providers we are very concerned about the inherent conflict of interest associated with placing Liberty Protection Safeguards assessment responsibilities on care home managers “
I also want to quote something that was written in evidence to the Public Bill Committee. A submission made by the Albert House nursing home stated:
“Managers in Care Homes are already stretched and heaping further responsibility on them could lead to more people giving up and looking for easier work.”
It seems clear that even care home managers do not want this responsibility to be given to them. I cannot understand why the Government are insisting on doing so, unless of course the reason is just cost saving.
Under the Government’s proposals in the Bill, local councils will be able to delegate the assessment and consultation process to the care home manager whenever they see fit. That risks creating a postcode lottery, where some local councils with adequate resources carry out LPS assessments themselves, while others will have to reduce their role to simply rubber-stamping the applications they get from care home managers. That cannot be right.
We have to be clear in this Chamber that one issue facing the current system is that some local councils are not able to properly resource their DoLS teams following years of cuts to their funding. This Bill would allow cash-strapped local councils to outsource the process entirely, with serious consequences for cared-for people. If care home managers organise the authorisation process, they decide who carries out medical assessments, and who determines whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate. I have heard colleagues expressing concern that the statement provided by the care home manager forms the basis of authorisation. We know that many local councils do not currently have the resources to fund their DoLS teams properly now. Conservative Members have talked about the backlog and concerns about that, but in recent weeks we have seen a further £1.3 billion taken out of grant funding to local councils. The Minister has given us no reassurance that the Government will provide any new funding for the proposed system.
Steve McCabe
While my hon. Friend is on the subject of care home managers, may I ask whether she agrees that if they are responsible for the consultation, which is supposed to be one of the safeguards protecting a person’s liberty, the person cannot possibly be at the heart or centre of the Bill? Such a provision drives a coach and horse through the notion that their liberty is being protected.
Barbara Keeley
I absolutely agree with that. Local councils face a serious resource issue, and we see a pressing of this role away to care home managers. I have got some examples with me, but I do not know whether I will have time to go through them. However, we can see that there will be a strong temptation in local councils simply to presume that the care home manager is right. We have to recognise that over-stretched professionals in local councils will sometimes simply accept the word of care staff without fully investigating the case.
In the Public Bill Committee, I talked about the recent case of Y v. Barking and Dagenham. This was the case of a young man who was placed in an inappropriate care home. Initially his parents were satisfied with his placement, but over time the quality of his care deteriorated. We hear a lot and have great concerns about restraint. That young man was restrained in that care home 199 times in two years and suffered significant harm. Y eventually got out of that placement, following a court-appointed guardian visiting and raising concerns, but it took the intervention of somebody outside the care home—that is the key thing.
Caroline Dinenage
The hon. Lady is making a powerful case and she talked about many such cases in Committee. Does she agree that this shows exactly why the DoLS system needs overhauling? It is not offering the required protections for vulnerable people, which is why this Bill is so urgent.
Barbara Keeley
I could not disagree with the Minister more, because what she is doing is putting people into the lion’s den. I do not know whether she is listening to me, but I am reading her a case where the difficulties arose because the local authority listened to care staff and did not listen to the parents’ objections at all. That is the difficulty. Under the new LPS system, that young man would not have had any safeguards or protection, because the care home staff would have been the people sorting out his authorisation.
Caroline Dinenage
Under the new system, family members and parents will be listened to, because they will be the approved person, the representative and the advocate. Their voices will be heard, which is not happening currently.
Barbara Keeley
It is not helpful if the Minister and I argue about this. We have had this argument enough times in Committee. She just needs to see that there is a level of concern. I am quoting a case where significant harm was done to a young person in a care home because the parents were not listened to and the care staff were.
Dr Poulter
I can understand where the hon. Lady’s concerns come from, but having had detailed discussions with my hon. Friend the Minister, I am reassured, perhaps more than the hon. Lady, by the systems and some of the amendments that have been put in place to take into consideration concerns about conflicting provider interest. She makes a good point on the lack of funds and resources and cash-strapped local authorities. Without the money to support local authorities, there is a real risk that scrutiny of care homes and the processes in place under the legislation will be sadly lacking, to the detriment of people under deprivation of liberty orders. What reassurance has she had, if any, during the passage of the Bill that the funding crisis affecting social care and local authorities is being addressed by the Government, both in respect of this legislation and otherwise?
Barbara Keeley
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question. We have had no reassurances whatever. In fact, since the Committee finished, £1.3 billion has been taken out of central Government funding to local councils. Whatever our position was when we were in Committee, things are now much, much worse.
The Minister does not agree, but it is disturbing that we are still in the position on Report of trading the arguments back and forth. We gave lots of examples. There is provision in the Bill for an approved mental capacity professional. With our amendment we want to be sure that we do not have cash-strapped local councils delegating responsibility. There is talk under some amendments to bring in reviews, but reviewers have to be able and willing to stand up to care home managers, and that is a difficult thing.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) said earlier, care home managers have a lot of power. They have the power to evict and the power to stop visits. Amendment 49 would work with amendment 50 to address the role that the care home manager could play. It is one of the most concerning provisions in the Bill, and it must be addressed if the new liberty protection safeguards are to be fit for purpose.
I do not in any way want to stigmatise care home managers, but I ask Government Members to accept that we are talking about a situation where at least 20% of care homes require improvement or are rated inadequate. Care home manager vacancies are at 11%. We are not talking about a situation where all care homes have a proper care home manager in place, or where they are all doing as well as they could. If the Minister reads many CQC reports, she will see that care homes often fall down on care planning. CQC inspectors often find that there is not a proper or adequate care plan for the situation.
Catherine West
Is my hon. Friend satisfied that rights of appeal are being managed correctly in the Bill?
Barbara Keeley
No. On the Opposition Benches, we are not satisfied with very much about the Bill, but I am talking about our amendments for care home managers because we feel that safeguards have been weakened. I will give an example, because there are many cases where the powers of care home managers are used to shut down any opposition to what they are doing. A person whose husband was in a care home visited him every day and took a keen interest in his wellbeing. He had lost the ability to speak and had little mobility. She found that he was in pain and when she raised that with staff, they failed to act and dismissed her concerns. She then raised it with the care home manager who warned her that if she continued to take up staff time, she would be banned from visiting her husband who was actually nearing the end of his life. That is an awful thing—that a wife would be banned from visiting her husband near the end of his life. It was only with the help of an outside organisation that the cause of the pain was identified. If relatives, including spouses, were prevented from visiting in the situation that I have just described, how could they be raising a major objection? How could they be challenging the care home manager? The appeals question that my hon. Friend the Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Catherine West) just raised with me is very concerning.
Under the current provisions of the Bill, care home managers are expected to carry out the consultation process, and yet this is the one opportunity that the cared-for person and their family have to register any objections to the proposed arrangements. The process needs to be carried out independently so that people can feel free to speak their minds. Amendment 49 achieves that. It prevents the local council from delegating the consultation process to the care home manager, and then this crucial step must be carried out by the local council itself.
In Committee, the Minister said she believed that it could be appropriate for a care home manager to carry out that process, because those with an interest in the welfare of the cared-for person can flag up objections, but that would not always work in practice. For that to happen, a family member would have to know that they had the right to do that. They have to know with whom to raise their objection and then raise it in a timely manner. That is pretty key in relation to this business of care homes and to challenging on behalf of the cared-for person. It is not reasonable to expect people to understand the intricacies of the system. Similarly, we cannot expect everyone to have the confidence to negotiate the system for themselves. We here perhaps do not always think how hard it is to challenge those in authority, but it is a very difficult thing to do indeed. We need to offer a cared-for person a chance to object in a setting that they are comfortable with, without fear of reprisals from care home managers.
Government amendment 38 goes against the principles that I set out in relation to our amendment 49. It is unacceptable for the care home manager to be involved in that consultation with the cared-for person and their family, so we are in a situation where the two amendments are directly opposed.
Let me move on to our third amendment, amendment 51, on advocacy, because that addresses the provision of independent advocates for cared-for people. That is a crucial safeguard, which enables people to realise their rights under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The advocacy system proposed in this Bill is excessively complex. It could see people being denied an advocate when they need one. Our amendment seeks to simplify the system, ensuring that advocacy becomes the default option. Stakeholders have told us that they are concerned about the use of a best interests test to determine whether somebody should receive an advocate.
Clearly, there is a situation in which the Minister thinks that a best interests test is used to avoid overriding the wishes and feelings of the cared-for person. We agree that advocacy should never be forced on somebody, but we must be explicit about this principle of advocacy being available as the default.
Catherine West
My hon. Friend is so generous in taking interventions. Does she agree that there is no consistency in the choice of advocates across the regions?
Barbara Keeley
That may well be the case, but the difficulty here is that we have a complex system when we should have a simple system that clarifies that an independent advocate, an IMCA, should not be appointed if a cared-for person objects to it, but that everyone who wants or needs an advocate can get one. There should be an absolute right to request that an advocate be appointed both for the cared-for person and for any appropriate person who is representing them.
Our amendment would ensure that support is provided where an appropriate person is not able, on their own, to give the cared-for person the support that they need. That is particularly important, and there are many examples. I am sure that the vast majority of responsible bodies would not exploit loopholes, but we feel that there are loopholes in the current situation.
Budget pressures are another concern. There are concerns that advocates may not be allocated because of Government cuts to local council budgets. We feel that it is important that the wording from the existing Mental Capacity Act is retained. Let me give an example. The concern was put succinctly in evidence submitted to the Public Bill Committee by the Doughty Street Chambers Court of Protection team, who said:
“The requirement to ‘take all reasonable steps’ is a weakening of the current requirement that the supervisory body must appoint an IMCA...It is therefore possible that a ‘cared for person’ may qualify for an IMCA but that due to resource issues the reasonable steps taken do not result in such an appointment, and this safeguard may not be available.”
From everything the Minister has said, I know that she agrees about the importance of advocacy, and we have heard a lot of case studies, one of which I will briefly mention. My hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi) described a case that has stuck with me since. An advocate was visiting a man in a care home who was clear that he wanted to leave and move back to his own home. When the advocate looked into the matter further, they discovered that the man’s home had been put up for sale by the local council to fund his care. He had no idea that that was happening and was extremely upset. With the help of an advocate, he was able to challenge the local council’s decision and prevent his home from being sold. I recall that example from Committee, and it is a powerful one that demonstrates just how important an advocate can be. Without one, this man’s home would have been sold without his knowledge, and he would then have been forced to remain in a care home that he wanted to leave. There are countless examples of how important an advocate can be.
Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)
I rise to support the Bill and, in particular, to speak in favour of Government amendments 24 and 33.
Before I do so, let me respond to some of the points that have already been made. First, with regard to the timescale in which the Bill is being taken forward, there has been plenty of opportunity for colleagues to look at its details. I draw Members’ attention to the fact that there have been not just one but two detailed reports on this issue by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, one in June 2018—our seventh report of this Session—and then, in October 2018, our 12th report, in which we considered the draft Bill in some considerable detail. At that point, we welcomed the recommendations of the Law Commission. Of course, the Law Commission had itself been some three years in preparing its recommendations, so the Bill can hardly be described as rushed.
Steve McCabe
Does the hon. Lady recognise that the Law Commission objects to the fact that its recommendations were not taken up by the Government when they constructed the Bill?
Fiona Bruce
I was about to say that the Joint Committee welcomed the Law Commission’s recommendations because they clearly highlighted the need for changes to be made.
As we pointed out in our seventh report, as far back as last June, the Cheshire West case that the Minister mentioned had resulted in a 10-fold increase in the number of DoLS applications. That is why there has been such a backlog. That case placed extreme pressure on local authority resources. Some 70% of the almost 220,000 applications for DoLS authorisations in the year up to our report were not authorised within the statutory timeframe. Consequently, many incapacitated people continued to be deprived of their liberty unlawfully. Those responsible for their care, or for obtaining authorisations, were having to work out how best to break the law. That is completely unacceptable, and it is why this Bill needs to brought forward in a timely way.
There also needs to be, as the Committee recommended in our 12th report, a definition in the Bill. I hear colleagues’ reservations about that definition, but, as we said—I am glad that the Government took up our recommendation—that it is important to give cared-for people and their families, and professionals, greater certainty about the parameters of any scheme so that we can ensure that scrutiny and necessary resources are directed where needed. We said:
“It is undeniable that any definition in statute may be refined by future case law”.
That remains that case. None the less, not to have endeavoured to provide a definition would, we believe, have been wrong.
Having made those preliminary comments, I will speak in more detail about amendment 24 and expand on the remarks made about the importance of family engagement and keeping the family informed. Information for the family and those who care deeply about the welfare of the person is the cared-for person’s greatest safeguard against exploitation and bad care. It is paramount that families have a role to play in their relatives’ care planning, wherever that is desired by the cared-for person, not least by giving them the option to stay fully informed and to object to proposed plans if they are not satisfied.
Families can play an important role in monitoring care if they are given sufficient information. The care itself is important. The quality of care will vary between and within care homes, but monitoring the care plan is essential to ensure that the cared-for person’s dignity is maintained. The cared-for person’s quality of life depends on how they are treated day in, day out and whether they receive care in a way that enhances their personal dignity or whether, sadly, they are treated less well.
Families are well equipped to monitor care, but only if they are kept informed. That is why I support amendment 24, which improves access to information for the cared-for person and their appropriate carers and supporters, which may well include their family. The requirement for information to be
“accessible to, and appropriate to the needs of, cared-for persons and appropriate persons”,
means that the cared-for person is placed at the heart of the liberty protection safeguards authorisation process. Not only that, but now that relatives can be informed about their loved one’s care plan, they will notice if the plan states something that is not happening and question why.
I am pleased to see that the amendment requires the publication of information on the cared-for person’s rights and the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to request a review or make an application to the court. People must know what their rights are and the legal procedures. This will not be costly. It will certainly be far less costly than the court cases that are likely to come if the requirement to provide information about all aspects of the process and the plan are not on the face of the Bill. It will save costs in the long term and ensure that the approved mental capacity professionals act always as they should.
The code of practice will play an important role. It would be helpful to see examples of family members working with the responsible bodies and the care teams to ensure that care plans are being delivered appropriately and are in the best interests of cared-for individuals. I am sure we all want to see that.
I turn to amendment 33. In the JCHR’s 12th report, we indicated that there has been concern as to
“whether care home managers have the necessary skills and knowledge to arrange or undertake the assessments and whether they are sufficiently independent to do so”
and whether care home managers are
“trained and resourced to take on these additional responsibilities.”
It is heartening to hear that the Government have listened and are clearly stating that care home managers and staff should not, and under these proposals will not, complete assessments. It is equally heartening that the Government, having listened to concerns expressed in Committee, are saying that all those doing such assessments must have the necessary skills, knowledge and qualifications—for example, as physicians, nurses or social workers—and that that will be specified in regulations. I want Ministers to put in place appropriate arrangements to assess whether implementation of this element of the Bill is working well—for example, to ensure that specifications of required qualifications and the experience of assessors are kept updated and that the revised system is working well and without difficulty in practice.
Ministers might consider taking up the recommendation in the JCHR’s 12th report that particular vigilance should be exercised by local authorities where care homes are rated by the CQC through an inspection as inadequate or requiring improvement, to ensure that those who are making referrals are properly competent to do so.
Norman Lamb
I want to speak primarily in support of the amendments in the name of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley), and others. However, I want to comment right at the start—I realise this is not the decision of the Minister—about the time we have to debate a Bill that deals with fundamental human rights. I just think it is absolutely outrageous, and we should place on the record our total opposition to the way in which, wholly inappropriately, it has been rushed through.
I should also say that I completely understand the need for reform. I said that on Second Reading, and I acknowledge the Minister’s sincerity on that. I recognise that we breach the human rights of the people who are on a long waiting list for anything to happen to them, but that is no justification for getting it wrong at this stage. Surely we must not weaken the protections for very vulnerable people, yet the organisations that have followed this process all the way through are very clear that that is precisely what we will do.
I just think this is extraordinary: the Government have commissioned a review of the Mental Health Act, and although we have not had the formal response yet, I expect that much of what the review calls for will be supported by the Government, yet the review moves in a diametrically opposite direction to this Bill. The review talks about “rebalancing the system” and about
“a real shift in the balance of power between the patient and the professional”.
The review also talks about
“a right to advocacy based on an opt-out approach.”
That is what the amendments in the name of the shadow Minister seek. This will not, as the Minister implied, force advocacy on anyone; this is about having it as the default option. The Law Commission has called for a right to advocacy as an opt-out approach, yet the Government are resisting it. Why are they resisting it? This reduces the rights and protections of vulnerable people, and for that reason it seems to me that it is unacceptable.
On Second Reading, I said that I would not oppose the Bill at that stage, and I said:
“Our assessment will be at the end of the process: is it workable? Does it genuinely respect and safeguard individuals’ human rights? Does it result in very vulnerable people being better protected than they are under the existing…flawed system?”
At that time, I asked the Minister to meet all of us, including interest groups, before going into the Committee stage. I said on Second Reading:
“Do not rush headlong into the Committee stage.”—[Official Report, 18 December 2018; Vol. 651, c. 744.]
Yet, within a fortnight, we were in Committee, which is exactly what I had urged her not to do.
Then we come to the views of the sector. I mentioned earlier that over 100 organisations, including care providers, disabled people’s organisations and charities, have written to the Minister. They make it clear that reform should not be at the cost of the human rights of people who rely on essential social services. I want to deal, specifically and finally, with the conflict of interest issue. They say in that letter to the Minister that
“serious conflicts of interest will be placed upon care managers who will be in control of key information about assessments and review processes.”
The Law Society—surely we should take its concerns seriously—says of care home managers that
“any task or role they undertake must be completely conflict free”,
and that they should not be arranging or carrying out critical assessments. Care home managers should not be responsible for consultation with the cared-for person. It describes the current process—it is not a past but a current concern about the Bill, as amended—as “deeply flawed”. It says:
“It is not difficult to envisage a vulnerable person being uncomfortable or reluctant to give an honest answer when questioned by the care home manager on their willingness to stay”—
in that care home—
“or their ‘happiness’ in the current placement.”
The Law Society’s concern is also about the capacity of care home managers to undertake this work, given that the whole system is under massive pressure. Bluntly, the quality of care home managers is such—many of them are really good, but some of them are not, frankly, good enough—that we cannot rely on them to undertake this vital work, which goes to the protection of the civil liberties of vulnerable people.
Barbara Keeley
On the training that the Minister has talked about and the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) just referred to, I understand from impact assessments that there is half a day’s training for care home managers and two hours of training for social workers. What does the right hon. Gentleman think of that?
Norman Lamb
That is clearly insufficient when it comes to the vital task of playing a role in the protection of people’s civil liberties and human rights. That is what the Bill envisages.
Sue Bott, the deputy chief executive of Disability Rights UK, says:
“Given the rare unanimity across the health and social care sector and disabled people’s organisations we urge the Government to delay the Bill and look again at its provisions. It is better to have a co-produced piece of legislation that works for everyone than rush through a new law that, in its current form, will seriously undermine the human rights of disabled people.”
I urge the Minister to listen carefully to that—the “rare unanimity” across the sector. When I was responsible for taking the Care Bill through Parliament, we ensured that by the end pretty much everyone was on board, although it was a slow and sometimes frustrating process.
The Minister will be applauded if she now recognises that these concerns about the amended Bill are not past ones but current ones. If we are to get people on board and ensure that everyone agrees that we are properly protecting the human rights of very vulnerable people, the right thing to do now is pause, before the Bill goes back to the House of Lords, to ensure in particular that the provisions on conflict of interest of care home managers and the rights of advocacy are properly addressed. If the Minister can do that, she will go a long way towards bringing people on board. I am sure that that is what she wants.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
Given the restrictions on time, I will curtail my speech and take out remarks I might have made; I am conscious that colleagues would also like to speak.
I always agree with the passion of the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) on these issues, but I do not agree with his conclusions on aspects of the Bill. I am reassured by the Government amendments, particularly in relation to independent hospitals: such a hospital might have a potential business interest in keeping someone in its service, so it will not at any time judge whether that person needs to be under the deprivation of liberty safeguards.
It is important that we have a modern system; as has been mentioned, the backlog of 125,000 people under the existing system is utterly unacceptable. What standards there are will need to be changed. When I look at the Opposition amendments, particularly amendment 49, I take the Minister’s point that the consultation—actually talking to someone about their views and their care—is part of what we would expect a care provider to be doing. There must be clear, independent safeguards around deprivation of liberty, and the ability to have an independent check. In some cases, it would be better for someone who works with the individual every day to do the consultation, rather than someone literally turning up from the local authority or health board, who may not have had any contact with them. We are talking about people with issues when it comes to interacting and understanding some of the engagement, so I do not see why there should be consultation in all cases. We are talking about consultation, not decision, and I do not see what the issue is with that.
I turn briefly to the amendments moved by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). The attention he brings to the issue of acquired brain injury is always welcome—particularly in the football world, on the day when an England 1966 hero passed away. The hon. Gentleman mentioned that those from that era often acquired head injuries as a result of heading heavy leather balls, particularly when wet. That is still an issue in football today. I join the hon. Gentleman in saying that the rules should be looked at. If that can be done in rugby without affecting the flow of the game, there is no reason why it cannot be done in football. Similar arguments were advanced in relation to video referees and they are now in place.
I am conscious of the time remaining for others to have their say, so I will just say that I support the Bill and that I do not see the need for the amendments tabled by the Opposition.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
It will be obvious that three people have indicated they wish to take part. I am sure that they will all limit their remarks not to a very small amount, but if they could be limited to six or seven minutes then everyone will get a chance to put their view.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster).
It is my firm belief that the Bill is deeply flawed. Even with the concessions Ministers have made, and the forensic scrutiny and dogged determination of my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) and her Opposition Front-Bench team, as well as those in the other place, the Bill will do very little to help the crisis in our mental health services. Even at this late stage, I would add my name to those of my many colleagues and a plethora of stakeholder organisations urging Ministers to delay the Bill to allow proper deliberation and discussion. Why do I say that?
First, we cannot debate the Bill without a clear sense of the issues at stake. We are talking about the state’s right to remove liberty from a citizen without trial or the judgment of their peers. That goes to the very heart of habeas corpus and our most fundamental human rights. It concerns the very liberties that this Parliament has stood for centuries to defend. When Parliament has played fast and loose with our right to be free from arbitrary imprisonment, the consequences have brought shame upon us, so we must always think very carefully before passing laws that remove a person’s liberty, no matter how compelling we consider the reasons.
Secondly, we must never forget the history of the treatment of people with mental illness in this country. We have a sorry and shameful history of incarcerating people with mental illness, autism, dementia and other conditions. Often the incarceration was unnecessary and cruel, and motivated by malice not medicine. Women in particular could be locked up for so-called “hysteria” when husbands wanted them out of the way. We must tread very carefully.
Thirdly, there is the question of scrutiny of the Bill. We must act only after the deepest of thought and most widespread discussion and consultation. Unfortunately, the Bill has not been subject to the widest consultation and the deepest discussion. The discussion and suggestions that we made in Committee seem to have been largely ignored by the Government. We might have expected Ministers to have learned the lessons from the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which was imposed without consultation and then had to be delayed after its flaws were exposed. It then cost us hundreds of millions of pounds for an unnecessary raft of reckless reforms.
The Bill has been rushed and the consultation with stakeholders has been incomplete. You do not have to take my word for it, Madam Deputy Speaker. Just consider the remarkable open letter issued on Friday 8 February by so many of the organisations closest to the issue: the Voluntary Organisations Disability Group, Disability Rights UK, Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities, Action on Elder Abuse, Dementia Friends, Sense, the National Autistic Society, Royal Society for Blind Children and Mencap, just to mention a few—a very few—of the more than 100 local and national organisations across England and Wales who wrote to the Care Minister and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Baroness Blackwood.
What did this huge coalition of caring organisations come together to say? They raised “serious concerns” and “significant objections”. They called the Department for Health and Social Care’s consultation “piecemeal”. They talked about “serious conflicts of interest”. They highlighted the facts that impact assessments have been late and limited in coverage, and that there is a lack of clarity about how the system will be regulated with independent oversight. They concluded:
“We believe that the reforms in their current guise pose a threat to the human rights of those requiring the greatest support in life.”
A threat to human rights is a serious charge. When so many organisations are making it, surely Minsters must listen and not just plough on regardless?
There is a saying in the disability rights movement: no decisions about us without us. When I served as a trustee of the Alzheimer’s & Dementia Support Services and as a Mencap Society committee member, that was a principle we held dear, yet those in their place on the Treasury Bench are not listening. To be clear with the House, we have a serious problem that needs fixing. We have vulnerable people waiting for months, families at the end of their tethers and mental health and care professionals feeling frustrated, and that is why the system is broken.
Jim McMahon (Oldham West and Royton) (Lab/Co-op)
I congratulate my hon. Friend on a fantastic, very heartfelt and experienced speech. Does he share my concern that the foundations on which this is being laid—primarily on local government—are very weak, with an £8 million funding gap? The Government have not faced up to that crisis yet.
Mr Dhesi
I thank my hon. Friend and I fully agree with him. The cuts to local government have been devastating and the Bill will merely exacerbate the situation.
Finally, we have come a long way in our understanding of mental illness, dementia and neurodiversity. I note with pride that a new group was founded this weekend—the Labour neurodiversity group—to build on the success of our party’s neurodiversity manifesto. We wish the group all the very best. We have made great strides in tackling stigma and prejudice, thanks to the efforts of people such as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Luciana Berger), who deserve nothing but praise.
We are learning all the time and our laws must reflect our enlightened attitudes and the latest thinking, not the outdated views of previous eras. I am happy to associate myself with the Labour amendments being discussed this afternoon. If there is one I would highlight, it is the proposed amendment that guarantees a vulnerable person the right to an advocate. In too many cases, they have no one to speak up strongly on their behalf, to articulate their wishes and to champion their best interests. It is surely right that such a person should always be available.
As a member of the Bill Committee, I know that we made some progress in improving the Bill, but I remain unconvinced that it will be enough to rescue this piece of legislation and to provide a fair, workable system that ensures the best possible care for hundreds of thousands of people and guarantees their human rights. Many hon. Members have highlighted the 2017 Law Commission review.
Fiona Bruce
The hon. Gentleman keeps talking about human rights, but what answer does he have for the fact that up to 125,000 people are currently being unlawfully deprived of their liberty, in breach of article 5 of the European convention on human rights? That is the problem that the Bill seeks to rectify.
Mr Dhesi
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but in terms of human rights, this issue is being raised not just by me, but by more than 100 pre-eminent organisations in the field. The only way to solve that is through funding—that is the only way in which we can lay this matter to rest. The hon. Lady highlighted the 2017 Law Commission review of the deprivation of liberty safeguards, which stated that the current regime is
“in crisis and needs to be overhauled.”
I agree. There is a crisis and the current system cannot cope, but surely the answer is not to replace bad laws with yet more bad laws, and that is what we are in danger of doing.
Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab)
I will be brief. My hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has tabled an excellent amendment, which I support. We know that the system is broken. What we are doing is replacing it with an even worse system. Just to acknowledge how broken the system is, the Alzheimer’s Society’s national dementia helpline receives over 100 calls a month about the Mental Capacity Act, which is clearly confusing and complicated for people with dementia, as well as for their families and carers. However, as we have heard, so many different disability organisations and a whole range of charities, as well as the Law Commission, are saying that this Bill is not fit for purpose.
I particularly support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda. The Greater Manchester Neuro Alliance, which I have supported for several years now, has several concerns, particularly about a person who presents inconsistently and has a cognitive impairment, mental health problems or is simply vulnerable and does not accept or appreciate their illnesses and the limitations. One member of the alliance from Oldham told me:
“My son has been deemed as having capacity because he can answer questions yes or no but he can’t be left alone or allowed to go out unsupported, he doesn’t take his medication and doesn’t have the ability to plan or manage anything including lifesaving treatment every three weeks”.
Such examples are not addressed in the Bill.
I will move swiftly on, Madam Deputy Speaker. I share the concern that my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley) has expressed so clearly about care home managers and the conflict of interest in the Bill. It is a minefield and needs to be addressed. She made that point clearly.
Amendment 48, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham), would rightly prevent cared-for people from being charged for the assessments required by the system, potentially providing a financial incentive to do the mental capacity assessments. Without the amendment, we cannot be sure that people will not be charged more for their care solely because they require liberty protection safeguards to be granted. If the Minister does not accept the amendment, I would like to know why. On advocacy, we need to ensure that the “best interests” test is changed to place more weight on a person’s wishes.
There are several other issues with the Bill. It has not had a sufficient airing. It has not been consulted on greatly, but I will hand over to my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I had hoped to address several of the amendments signed by my hon. Friends and me, because this is a bad Bill with huge opposition across our society. It fails to protect people adequately, meaning they could be locked up without a proper process of assessment and without advocacy support—and that includes 16 and 17-year-old children. The protections for them are also inadequate, as they are for their parents. Time is against me, however, so I will turn straight to amendment 48, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams).
There is a genuine concern among organisations in the sector that vulnerable people, particularly those receiving private care, may be charged for an assessment or for assessments to be carried out. I know the Minister got a bit fed up with me banging on about funding and about the fact that local authorities such as mine in Stockton-on-Tees have lost millions of pounds in funding and that budget reductions are continuing across health. I have also addressed the tight margins on which care homes operate and the need to ensure the sector remains viable.
We know that the sector is strained financially and might feel it has no choice but to implement fees and charges for the assessment of clients’ mental capacity. The intention of the amendment is to ensure that this does not happen. Several written submissions to the Public Bill Committee raised concerns about the absence of any provision for a fee for medical professionals to provide medical evidence.
This is the right point to refer to the revised impact assessment published by the Government. I and other Opposition Members have been contacted by academics accusing the assessment of perpetuating a myth by saying that GPs will provide diagnostic evidence and conduct capacity assessments for the LPS and that this will have no resource implications. What total nonsense. How has this conclusion been reached? I have not heard from a single body or GP arguing it will have no resource implications—quite the opposite.
The experience of judicial DoLS applications to the Court of Protection seems to be that GPs are very reluctant to provide such evidence, either because they do not feel skilled enough to do so or because they require payment. This means that someone will have to pay a fee for the medical assessment, and there is nothing in the Bill or the NHS charging regulations to prevent it from being passed on to the person themselves.
Evidence shows that that is already happening. Southfield House, a care home in Stockport, was found to be charging residents £250 if they required a deprivation of liberty authorisation. A complaint was lodged with the Care Quality Commission by Edge Training, but it was told in response that that was allowed. What was that £250 for? “An application to the local authority requesting an assessment” appears to cover it—and after that, there was the £125 annual fee. Individuals who are going through what can only be an extremely emotionally difficult process are being charged hundreds of pounds for the luxury.
It is frustrating that the care home is well within its rights to make those charges. A spokesman put it best:
“The social care sector…is currently under huge financial pressure. All tasks from care to admin to facility carry a cost”.
Because the sector is underfunded, the Government consider it appropriate to take financial advantage of the most vulnerable people in society.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I think that the Minister must take on board the whole issue of charges. At present, the law gives care home managers and others carte blanche to charge exactly what they want. There are no limitations whatsoever. I ask the Minister, perhaps at the regulations stage, to come back with specific ideas to restrict care home managers and others from exploiting those vulnerable people.
Chris Bryant
I was expecting my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) to go on a bit longer, but now that I have the Floor, let me say this.
There is quite a bit of consensus, certainly among Labour Members, that there are elements of the Bill with which we are not happy, and I am sure that we will vote on those in a few moments. What the Minister said earlier makes me hopeful that she will do her level best to ensure that the way in which the needs of people with acquired brain injuries can be met will be clearly laid out in the code of conduct. As my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) said, some of the issues are very specific to them; they are different from those affecting other people in the same category.
The deprivation of liberty is one of the most important issues that Parliament ever has to consider. We all accept that, and it was referred to by both the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South (Barbara Keeley). I hope that we manage to get the code of conduct right, at the right time, and that the process we use ensures that as many as possible of the users, patients, carers and organisations that are involved in this matter on a daily basis have a real opportunity to feel that they can own that code. I think that that is the point at which the Minister might manage to assuage some of our concerns, although some Labour concerns are extremely strong.
As I told the Minister yesterday, I do not intend to press my amendment to a vote. She is smiling now. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)
With the leave of the House, I propose to put Government amendments 5 to 37 together.
Schedule 1
SCHEDULE TO BE INSERTED AS SCHEDULE AA1 TO THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005
Amendments made: 5, page 8, line 6, leave out from “Wales,” to end of line 10 and insert
“the person registered, or required to be registered, under Chapter 2 of Part 1 of the Regulation and Inspection of Social Care (Wales) Act 2016 (anaw 2) in respect of the provision of a care home service, in the care home;”.
This amendment amends the definition of “care home manager”, in Wales, so it will be the person who is the registered service provider. This mirrors the approach taken for England.
Amendment 6, page 8, line 13, at end insert—
““Education, Health and Care plan” means a plan within the meaning of section 37(2) of the Children and Families Act 2014;”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 7, page 8, leave out line 16
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 8, page 8, line 17, at end insert—
““independent hospital” has the meaning given by paragraph 5;”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 9, page 8, line 27, at end insert—
““NHS hospital” has the meaning given by paragraph 5;”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 10, page 8, line 46, leave out “Hospital” and insert “NHS hospital and independent hospital”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 11, page 8, leave out line 47.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 12, page 9, line 15, after “6” insert “(1)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18.
Amendment 13, page 9, line 16, leave out “a” and insert “an NHS”.
This amendment amends paragraph 6(a) so that where arrangements are carried out mainly in an independent hospital the responsible body for those arrangements will not be the hospital manager.
Amendment 14, page 9, line 17, at end insert—
(aa) if the arrangements are carried out mainly in an independent hospital in England, the responsible local authority determined in accordance with paragraph 8A;
(ab) if the arrangements are carried out mainly in an independent hospital in Wales, the Local Health Board for the area in which the hospital is situated;”
This amendment makes provision for who the responsible body will be for cases where arrangements are carried out mainly in an independent hospital in England or Wales.
Amendment 15, page 9, line 18, leave out “paragraph (a) does not apply” and insert “none of paragraphs (a) to (ab) applies”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 14.
Amendment 16, page 9, line 27, leave out “neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b)” and insert “none of paragraphs (a) to (b)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 14.
Amendment 17, page 9, line 28, leave out “(see paragraph 9)” and insert
“determined in accordance with paragraph 9”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 14.
Amendment 18, page 9, line 28, at end insert—
‘(2) If an independent hospital is situated in the areas of two or more Local Health Boards, it is to be regarded for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(ab) as situated in whichever of the areas the greater (or greatest) part of the hospital is situated.”
This amendment provides that, for the purpose of determining who is the responsible body, if a hospital is situated in the areas of two or more Local Health Boards, it should be regarded as situated in whichever of the areas the greater (or greatest) part of the hospital is situated.
Amendment 19, page 9, line 29, after “manager” insert
“, in relation to an NHS hospital,”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 20, page 9, line 45, at end insert—
(ca) if the hospital is vested in a Local Health Board, that Board.”
This amendment makes provision that the hospital manager for an NHS hospital vested in a Local Health Board will be that Board.
Amendment 21, page 9, line 46, leave out from beginning to end of line 12 on page 10
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 13.
Amendment 22, page 10, line 20, at end insert—
8A (1) In paragraph 6(1)(aa), “responsible local authority”, in relation to a cared-for person aged 18 or over, means—
(a) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply and the cared-for person has needs for care and support which are being met under Part 1 of the Care Act 2014, the local authority meeting those needs;
(c) in any other case, the local authority determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (4).
(2) If more than one local authority is meeting the needs of a cared-for person for care and support under Part 1 of the Care Act 2014 the responsible local authority is the local authority for the area in which the cared-for person is ordinarily resident for the purposes of that Part of that Act.
(3) In paragraph 6(1)(aa), “responsible local authority”, in relation to a cared-for person aged 16 or 17, means—
(a) if there is an Education, Health and Care plan for the cared-for person, the local authority responsible for maintaining that plan;
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply and the cared-for person is being provided with accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, the local authority providing that accommodation;
(c) if neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) applies and the cared-for person is subject to a care order under section 31 of the Children Act 1989 or an interim care order under section 38 of that Act, and a local authority in England is responsible under the order for the care of the cared-for person, that local authority;
(d) if none of paragraphs (a) to (c) applies, the local authority determined in accordance with sub-paragraph (4).
(4) In the cases mentioned in sub-paragraphs (1)(c) and (3)(d), the “responsible local authority” is the local authority for the area in which the independent hospital mentioned in paragraph 6(1)(aa) is situated.
(5) If an independent hospital is situated in the areas of two or more local authorities, it is to be regarded for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) as situated in whichever of the areas the greater (or greatest) part of the hospital is situated.”
This amendment makes provision as to who the responsible body will be in cases where arrangements are carried out mainly in an independent hospital in England.
Amendment 23, page 11, leave out lines 45 to 47.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.
Amendment 24, page 12, line 19, at end insert—
12A (1) The following must publish information about authorisation of arrangements under this Schedule—
(a) the hospital manager of each NHS hospital;
(b) each clinical commissioning group;
(c) each Local Health Board;
(d) each local authority.
(2) The information must include information on the following matters in particular—
(a) the effect of an authorisation;
(b) the process for authorising arrangements, including making or carrying out—
(i) assessments and determinations required under paragraphs 18 and 19;
(ii) consultation under paragraph 20;
(iii) a pre-authorisation review (see paragraphs 21 to 23);
(c) the circumstances in which an independent mental capacity advocate should be appointed under paragraph 39 or 40;
(d) the role of a person within paragraph 39(5) (an “appropriate person”) in relation to a cared-for person and the effect of there being an appropriate person;
(e) the circumstances in which a pre-authorisation review is to be carried out by an Approved Mental Capacity Professional under paragraph 21;
(f) the right to make an application to the court to exercise its jurisdiction under section 21ZA;
(g) reviews under paragraph 35, including—
(i) when a review will be carried out;
(ii) the rights to request a review;
(iii) the circumstances in which a referral may or will be made to an Approved Mental Capacity Professional.
(3) The information must be accessible to, and appropriate to the needs of, cared-for persons and appropriate persons.
12B (1) Where arrangements are proposed, the responsible body must as soon as practicable take such steps as are practicable to ensure that—
(a) the cared-for person, and
(b) any appropriate person in relation to the cared-for person,
understands the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (3).
(2) If, subsequently, at any time while the arrangements are being proposed the responsible body becomes satisfied under paragraph 39(5) that a person is an appropriate person in relation to the cared-for person, the responsible body must, as soon as practicable, take such steps as are practicable to ensure that the appropriate person understands the matters mentioned in sub-paragraph (3).
(3) Those matters are—
(a) the nature of the arrangements, and
(b) the matters mentioned in paragraph 12A(2) as they apply in relation to the cared-for person’s case.
(4) If it is not appropriate to take steps to ensure that the cared-for person or any appropriate person understands a particular matter then, to that extent, the duties in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply.
(5) In this paragraph “appropriate person”, in relation to a cared-for person, means a person within paragraph 39(5).”
This amendment inserts new paragraphs 12A and 12B of the new Schedule AA1 to require responsible bodies to publish information about authorisation of arrangements under the Schedule and to take steps at the outset of the authorisation process to ensure that cared-for persons and appropriate persons understand the process.
Amendment 25, page 12, line 32, after “practicable” insert
“and appropriate, having regard to the steps taken under paragraph 12B and the length of time since they were taken,”.
This amendment amends the duty in paragraph 13(2) of the new Schedule AA1 for a responsible body to take steps, as soon as arrangements are authorised, to ensure that cared-for persons and appropriate persons understand matters relating to the authorisation, to reflect the fact the body may have already have done that very recently under new paragraph 12B (inserted by Amendment 24).
Amendment 26, page 12, line 33, leave out from “any” to “understands” in line 34 and insert “appropriate person”.
This amendment amends the duty in paragraph 13(2) so that the duty to ensure that cared-for persons and appropriate persons understand matters relating to an authorisation does not also apply to independent mental capacity advocates (who can be expected to understand those matters) in line with the new duty in paragraph 12B (inserted by Amendment 24).
Amendment 27, page 12, line 34, leave out from “understands” to end of line 5 on page 13 and insert
“the matters mentioned in paragraph 12A(2)(a), (c), (d), (f) and (g) as they apply in relation to the cared-for person’s case”.
This amendment aligns the description of matters that must be explained to the cared-for person and any appropriate person with the list of matters in new paragraph 12A (inserted by Amendment 24).
Amendment 28, page 14, line 46, at end insert—
‘(1A) The person who makes the determination need not be the same as the person who carries out the assessment.”
This amendment makes it clear that a determination need not be made by the same person who carries out an assessment. A person could, for example, make a determination based on an assessment carried out previously by a different person (paragraph 18(6) of the new Schedule AA1 allows for this).
Amendment 29, page 14, leave out lines 47 and 48 and insert—
‘(2) The appropriate authority may by regulations make provision for requirements which must be met by a person—
(a) making a determination, or
(b) carrying out an assessment,
under this paragraph.
(2A) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may make different provision—
(a) for determinations and assessments, and
(b) for determinations and assessments required under sub-paragraph (1)(a) and determinations and assessments required under sub-paragraph (1)(b).”
This amendment provides power to make regulations setting out requirements which must be met for a person to make a determination or carry out an assessment. The requirements will relate to matters such as knowledge and experience. Different requirements may be set out for a person making a determination than a person carrying out an assessment.
Amendment 30, page 15, line 12, after “the” insert “determination or”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.
Amendment 31, page 15, line 14, after “the” insert “determination or”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.
Amendment 32, page 15, line 16, leave out “The” and insert “An”.
This amendment is to make it clear that the assessment being referred to is an assessment on which a determination under the paragraph is made.
Amendment 33, page 15, line 32, leave out “made on an assessment” and insert
“by a person, who meets requirements prescribed by regulations made by the appropriate authority, made on an assessment by that person”.
This amendment is to make it clear that a determination required under paragraph 19 of the new Schedule AA1 must be made by the same person who carries out the assessment on which that determination is based and that person must meet requirements set out in regulations.
Amendment 34, page 15, leave out lines 38 to 44.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.
Amendment 35, page 15, line 46, leave out from “16,” to “by” in line 1 on page 16 and insert
“a determination may not be made”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.
Amendment 36, page 16, line 7, leave out “assessment” and insert “determination”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.
Amendment 37, page 16, line 9, leave out “assessment” and insert “determination”.—(Caroline Dinenage.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.
Amendment proposed: 49, page 16, line 12, leave out from “out” to the end of line 16, and insert “by the responsible body.”—(Barbara Keeley.)
This amendment would require the responsible body to carry out the consultation in all cases.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Speaker
Consideration completed. Colleagues, I will now suspend the House for no more than five minutes in order to make a decision about certification. The Division bells will be rung two minutes before the House resumes. Following my certification, the Government will table the appropriate consent motion, copies of which will be made available in the Vote Office and will be distributed by Doorkeepers.
Mr Speaker
I can now inform the House that I have completed certification of the Bill, as required by the Standing Order. I have confirmed the view expressed in my provisional certificate issued on 11 February. Copies of my final certificate will be made available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website.
Under Standing Order No. 83M, a consent motion is therefore required for the Bill to proceed. Copies of the motion are available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website and have been made available to Members in the Chamber. Does the Minister intend to move the consent motion?
Caroline Dinenage
indicated assent.
The House forthwith resolved itself into the Legislative Grand Committee (England and Wales) (Standing Order No. 83M).
[Dame Eleanor Laing in the Chair]
The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Eleanor Laing)
As the knife has fallen, there can be no debate in the Legislative Grand Committee. I remind hon. Members that, if there is a Division on the consent motion, only Members representing constituencies in England and Wales may vote.
Resolved,
That the Committee consents to the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [Lords] as amended in the Public Bill Committee and on Report.—(Caroline Dinenage.)
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair to report the decision of the Committee (Standing Order No. 83M(6)).
The Speaker resumed the Chair; decision reported.
Third Reading
Caroline Dinenage
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Our liberty is the most fundamental of our human rights. By passing this Bill, we can be proud that we have helped to promote the human rights of our country’s most vulnerable people and increased access to protections for the 125,000 individuals who are being deprived of their liberty and are not receiving the safeguards they deserve. That means 125,000 people whose families do not have the peace of mind that their loved ones are being protected, and 125,000 care providers who do not have the requisite legal protection.
Members of both Houses have contributed to the discussions and debates on this Bill, for which I am extremely grateful. We have made changes in both Houses to ensure that the liberty protection safeguards system introduced by the Bill does everything possible to protect human rights—to give a voice to the person and those close to them—while also ensuring that the system is targeted and not cumbersome to people, their families and our health and care sector. I committed from the outset that we would collaborate on this Bill, listen and take on board all the ideas and feelings of stakeholders and Members from both Houses, and many of the amendments we have put forward today are exactly in that collaborative spirit.
Dr Poulter
I thank my hon. Friend for the conciliatory way in which she has gone about dealing with this Bill, engaging with colleagues on both sides of the Houses, and putting forward some good and sound amendments to get the Bill to a better place. However, on the issue of funding, which was raised during the debate earlier, if we are going to make social care legislation or legislation of this sort appropriate and have the right safeguards in place, we need local authorities to have a better funding settlement. Is that something she can take away and raise with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government?
Caroline Dinenage
My hon. Friend raises a very important point. I am grateful to him for all his feedback on this Bill, because it is very helpful to be able to speak to somebody from a medical background to understand how such a Bill will work in practice at the sharp end. We have given councils access to £10 billion over this three-year period, which just shows the scale of the issues we are facing in adult social care. The Green Paper that will be published shortly will go further in setting out the long-term sustainability of the sector.
As we have heard today, there is no question but that the current DoLS system is failing. In 2014, a House of Lords Committee identified the system as being complex and bureaucratic, and since then the situation has only got worse. An increased number of cases means that local authorities are unable to process all the applications. With more than 48,000 people now waiting over a year, we cannot risk people being subject to overly restrictive health and care practices. This new system will enable quicker access to safeguards, meaning that we can ensure less restrictive practices are being used.
The Government tasked the Law Commission with reviewing the DoLS system and recommending improvements. After more than three years of careful work and consultation, it published its report, which stated the urgent need for reform. That was followed by a report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which also recommended having a more targeted system by focusing resources on those who are the most vulnerable or those who have the most complex circumstances, and on cases where objections have been raised. Coupled with this, we have ensured robust safeguards in the system, including independent review and oversight, alongside access to representation and support.
I am grateful to all our partners who have worked with us on this Bill. The input of third sector groups, those who work in the health and care sector and of course those who receive safeguards themselves has all helped to shape our Bill for the better. The Law Commission was absolutely right when it said that DoLS needed to be replaced as a matter of urgency, and that is why we have brought this legislation forward now. We cannot continue with the current system. We are proud to bring forward the Law Commission’s recommendations in this Bill, and we are proud to reform the system and introduce a less bureaucratic, more personalised approach that will work better for people, their families and professionals. I commend this Bill to the House.
Barbara Keeley
It is appalling that we should have had less than two hours for Report stage of a Bill affecting the human rights of some 2 million vulnerable people who lack capacity—and we had less than two hours for Second Reading. Given that there is no appreciable business to occupy ourselves with next week, it is ludicrous that the Government should have forced the Bill through today.
The Bill that we are being asked to pass today is simply not fit for purpose; it simply replaces the current flawed system, which the Minister has just described, with a new one that is actually more flawed. There are a number of issues that we still consider unacceptable. The largest is that the Bill still creates a major conflict of interest in relation to the managers of private care homes. It is simply wrong that a business with a financial stake in seeing a deprivation of liberty authorisation granted can do all the legwork and then just have its recommendation rubber-stamped by the local council.
I hope that care home managers will seek to carry out their new role well, but we know that they are already overstretched. The Bill creates extra pressures.
Norman Lamb
Does the shadow Minister share my confusion and concern that the Mental Health Act review, which the Government commissioned, appears to be moving in one direction—strengthening the rights of individuals—while this Bill appears to be moving in precisely the opposite direction?
Barbara Keeley
That is very much the case. We asked on Second Reading for some consideration of the interface between the two.
As well as the issue of care home managers, there is a real concern about the restrictions on access to advocacy under the Bill. Advocacy is a fundamental pillar of any system for authorising deprivation of liberty. The Bill means that vulnerable people who need an advocate may not get one, and amendments that could have changed that have been rejected. The use of a best interest test to decide whether someone gets an advocate has been widely criticised. The Government could and should have removed the reliance on the best interest test.
The maximum renewal period of a deprivation of liberty authorisation is tripled by the Bill. As the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) said, the Mental Health Act review is moving in one way while this Bill moves in another. The Bill could see people being detained for three years at a time without a full reconsideration of their case. The only safeguard against that being misused is a series of regular reviews, but we do not know how regular those will be or what they will look like.
In Committee, the Government introduced a new definition of deprivation of liberty to the Bill. It is woefully inadequate and will inevitably result in costly litigation. The Government introduced the definition late on, with next to no consultation. The clashes between that definition and existing case law will lead to court challenges. The definition will see some people deprived of their liberty without the safeguards they need, while the issue is sorted out in the courts.
The process that the Bill has been through could be used as a case study of how not to make legislation.
Barbara Keeley
I do not have time, I am afraid.
The Government have consistently tried to push the Bill through as fast as they can, with minimal consultation. It should be clear that stakeholders are united in thinking this a poor piece of legislation, and on many issues the Government have failed to address their concerns. On Second Reading in the House of Lords we heard the Bill described by Baroness Barker as
“one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 December 2018; Vol. 794, c. 1247.]
The Bill may have improved slightly, but there has been too little progress for us to support its becoming law. It would enshrine a fundamental conflict of interest and weaken the current safeguards of people without capacity.
It was clear from the start that the Bill was intended to shift the costs of authorising deprivation of liberty away from the state and on to private providers. This matter is too important for us to pass a Bill that we know will not work properly simply because Government budget cuts have created a problem. The Government chose to continue to cut local council budgets; as a result of that lack of resourcing, tens of thousands of people are being deprived of their liberty without authorisation. Letting the backlog build up was a political choice, but this Bill is not a solution. It will not adequately protect people’s human rights, and replacing one bad system with another will not be progress. If the Government were serious about protecting people’s liberty, Ministers would have paused the Bill, which we called on them again today to do, and given local authorities the resources they need to address the backlog. They could then have given this matter the time, consultation and consideration it needs before beginning a new Bill that does not weaken the protections that vulnerable people rely on.
I thank members of the Public Bill Committee, our excellent Whip, all the hon. Members who contributed to this shortened debate tonight and, particularly, the Clerk to the Committee. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to join us in voting against this flawed piece of proposed legislation that undermines the human rights of vulnerable people who lack capacity.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 2nd April 2019
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Messages as at 2 April 2019 - (2 Apr 2019)
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
I should inform the House that neither Lords amendment in the message engages financial privilege. I remind the House that the motions relating to the Lords amendments in the message will be certified as relating exclusively to England and Wales. If the House divides on either of these motions, a double majority will be required for the motion to be passed.
New Clause
Deprivation of liberty: code of practice
The Minister for Care (Caroline Dinenage)
I beg to move,
That this House does not insist on its amendment 1 to which the Lords has disagreed, and disagrees with Lords amendment 1B proposed in lieu, but proposes amendment (a) to the Bill in lieu of the Lords amendment.
Mr Deputy Speaker
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 25A proposed to its amendment 25, but proposes amendments (a) and (b) to its amendment 25 in lieu of the Lords amendment.
Caroline Dinenage
We now have an opportunity to deliver reforms that will provide quicker and fuller access to protections for the 125,000 people who are not currently receiving them. That is 125,000 vulnerable people without the legal protection that they deserve, whose families do not have peace of mind, and whose care providers have no legal cover for supporting them. We now have an opportunity to rectify this situation.
In February, the other place considered the 56 amendments made to the Bill by the House of Commons, the vast majority of which were agreed with. However, the Lords tabled alternatives to two of the Commons amendments, and they are the focus of our discussions.
Sir Peter Bottomley (Worthing West) (Con)
The Minister has rightly pointed out that the Bill will provide a great advantage to those who are directly affected. I do not want to be a total patsy for my local authority, but will she explain what the benefit will be for local authorities, which are responsible for trying to protect people’s welfare and safety?
Caroline Dinenage
My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. This issue has been a huge burden for local authorities: they have had to carry out multiple deprivation of liberty safeguards often for the same people and often when those people move from one setting to another. That involves a huge amount of bureaucracy and does not offer any better protection for the individuals concerned. The new service will enable local authorities to do this in a much more streamlined and efficient way. It will save them money and, at the same time, offer better protection for the individuals about whom we all care.
Lords amendment 1B was tabled by Baroness Tyler of Enfield to set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty positively, rather than by using the exclusionary approach set out by the Government. Noble lords are, of course, absolutely right to want to ensure that any definition is understood by people and practitioners. However, a positive definition of a deprivation of liberty is likely to be subject to a legal challenge as article 5 case law evolves, and it would become unfit for purpose incredibly quickly. This is a view not only shared by the Government, but highlighted beautifully in the other place by the esteemed legal experts Lord Mackay and Lord Hope.
Lords amendment 1B does not link the definition of a deprivation of liberty to article 5 of the European convention on human rights, so creating a risk of the definition set out in statute diverging from the convention. This would mean that people who fall outside Parliament’s concept of deprivation of liberty but within the article 5 definition could not have their deprivation of liberty authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. For those people, only the High Court would be available to authorise such a deprivation of liberty, which, in turn, would give rise to excessive delays in accessing vital safeguards.
That is precisely the situation that this piece of legislation looks to address—there are already too many people subject to delays when accessing safeguards, and we cannot introduce a provision that would further risk this.
Given that the Government have these concerns, we cannot agree with the noble lords in their amendment 1B. However, we know that concerns in the other place are reflected by many across the sector and we have taken that on board. We have listened carefully to the views of MPs, peers and other stakeholders and decided not to insist on amendment 1. Instead, I propose that the meaning of a deprivation of liberty will still be as defined under article 5 of the convention, as it is under section 64(5) of the Mental Capacity Act, but there will not be a clarification of the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in the Bill. The Bill will work alongside the rest of the Mental Capacity Act, so it does not impact on the existing definition.
I reassure the House that the Government are still absolutely committed to providing clarification regarding the meaning of a deprivation of liberty for both people and practitioners. We will use the code of practice to lay out in very clear terms and provide details of when a deprivation of liberty is and is not occurring, and this guidance will reflect existing case law. We will set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in a positive framing and in a way that is clearer for people and practitioners. We will also include case studies in the code to help bring this to life. Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 1B will prescribe that the code of practice must contain guidance on what kind of arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty.
Kevin Foster (Torbay) (Con)
I thank the Minister for giving way and I am reassured by what she says. It would not be appropriate, for example, to put case studies on the front of a piece of primary legislation. Will she outline the timescale for bringing that code of practice forward?
Caroline Dinenage
The code of practice is being worked on as we speak. It is very important that we take it forward in partnership with all the key stakeholders and those who are involved at the front end implementing the liberty protection safeguards. Once we are all content that the code of practice is robust and fully covers everything that we want it to it will then be presented to both Houses of Parliament.
This will mean that the definition will be considered regularly. It will remain up to date with evolving case law. It means that we are laying a report of the review before Parliament and that there will be a review within three years of the measure coming into force to ensure that it is working as intended. The review will extend to all the guidance related to the liberty protection safeguards contained in the code of practice and not just the definition. By regularly reviewing the code in this way, we will ensure that there is up-to-date guidance for people and practitioners and this will support the successful operation of the liberty protection safeguard system.
The amendment will ensure that the code clarifies when a deprivation of liberty does or does not apply and provide useful guidance for families, carers and professionals while also ensuring that we do not put a definition in statute that conflicts with article 5 of the convention and I ask the House for its support in this.
I shall briefly turn to Lords amendment 25A, which was tabled in the other place with the admirable aim of ensuring that the authorisation record is provided to the individual and other relevant persons in a timely manner. This followed the Government amendment that clarified the responsible body’s duty to provide information to the person and other relevant persons. Noble lords amended the Bill to specify that a record must be kept if the authorisation record is not provided immediately. If the authorisation record is not provided to the person within 72 hours then a review must be conducted.
The Government agree that it is very important to make sure that the authorisation process record is provided quickly. However, there are some issues with Lords amendment 25A that need to be addressed before it can be put into statute. For example, it does not make a specific person or organisation responsible for recording that an authorisation record has not been provided for completing a review, so the duty cannot be enforced. Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords Amendment 25A states:
“After authorisation arrangements, the responsible body must, without delay, arrange for a copy of the authorisation record to be given or sent.”
Government amendment (b) in lieu will ensure that if the responsible body has not done this within 72 hours of the arrangements being authorised, it must review and record why this has not happened. Providing information, including in the authorisation record, is so important to ensure that people are able to exercise their rights. The Government have listened and reflected on the concerns of the other place and have brought forward this amendment. I ask that the House supports it.
Finally, I take this opportunity to put on record my thanks to the Members of both Houses. We set out to consult very widely on this piece of legislation and to listen very carefully to the concerns of both Houses. Both Houses have very carefully scrutinised this crucial piece of legislation. I also thank many of the stakeholders who have supported its development. I thank the Bill team, particularly the Bill manager Sharon Egan, and officials across the UK and Welsh Governments who have worked with the team to deliver this reform. I thank, too, the legal team and my private secretary Flora Henderson. It is through a great deal of dedication and hard work that we will be able to rectify a failing system and provide protections to the 125,000 vulnerable people for whom it currently falls well short.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South) (Lab)
When we last debated this Bill, I was clear that Labour did not think that the Bill was adequate to become law. The Minister has just expressed her thanks, but we did make it clear that it contained a number of serious flaws and this still remains the case. While improvements have been made in the House of Lords, they do not fix many of the concerns that we still have with this Bill.
The Bill still places more power than it should in the hands of care home managers. From organising assessments to carrying out consultations with the cared-for person, the Bill means that an untrained, or an ineffective, care home manager could end up carrying out the process in a flawed or improper way.
Recently, there was a focus on the scandal of abuse that happened at the Mendip House Care Home in Somerset, with six autistic residents with complex needs. The Safeguarding Adults Review carried out by the Somerset safeguarding board revealed a host of management failures by the National Autistic Society. The registered manager of that particular care home did not address the unprofessional behaviour of a thuggish gang of male staff. This resulted in the following abuse being meted out to the residents of Mendip House: they were “ridden like horses” by staff; forced to crawl on all fours; made to eat raw chillies; and, in one horrific instance, forced to eat food spiked with mustard, which caused the resident to vomit. The resident was then made by a member of staff to drink that vomit.
People living in Mendip House had complex needs and all would have lacked capacity to make certain decisions and all required deprivation of liberty safeguards. The Care Quality Commission had not receive any notifications that DoLS had been authorised. On care planning and recording, the review report on Mendip House states:
“Care plans were very poor with no mental health or Best Interests assessments recorded... DoLS not being followed.... recording poor, plans out of date...”
The Minister has previously said that, through this Bill, the Government
“are ensuring that people’s wishes are always considered and respected, and that people are safe, cared for and looked after.”—[Official Report, 18 December 2018; Vol. 651, c. 757.]
But I have just cited a case where the care home manager neglected both care planning and safeguarding, so what steps will the Minister take to investigate what happened at Mendip House? Will she ensure that such behaviour does not continue under the provisions of this Bill, given that so much power is given to care home managers? Today is World Autism Awareness Day, and we must do more than pay lip service to showing solidarity with autistic people.
Kevin Foster
Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is a particular pleasure to called by you to speak in the Chamber. It is also a pleasure to speak in this debate to reflect briefly on a bit of the background as to why we need this Bill. Some 125,000 people are effectively subjected to this procedure but without the appropriate legal safeguards, so I welcome the fact that both Houses are now looking to support the Bill.
I welcome the Government amendments that have been tabled in lieu of the Lords amendments, and they take on their main thrust and spirit. As I touched on in my intervention on the Minister, it will be interesting to see the timescale for bringing in the code of practice. I accept that it needs to be done properly and be consulted on and that there must be appropriate case studies, but one of the reasons for supporting this Bill is to see that come forward relatively quickly so that there is certainty. Perhaps the Minister will put a letter in the Library that sets out the timescale.
I would not expect to hear a date picked out of the air and stated on the Floor of the House—that would be unreasonable and inappropriate—but it would be useful to get a sense of the timescale, because I assume that we are talking about months, not weeks or years. It would be inappropriate to include specific examples on the face of the Bill, but it is right that the amendments look towards the creation of a clear code of practice and review, providing the opportunity for the House to consider any reviews and hold Ministers to account, because this legislation relates to our most basic right: the right to choose where we live and what we do with our time.
Barbara Keeley
In the example I gave, residents who had lived in a care home for a long period had a manager who did not keep their care plans or any documentation, and they suffered terrible abuse. Such things do go on, and I am still concerned that we are giving responsibility to people who are already overstretched and may not be doing or may be unable to do a good job.
Kevin Foster
I accept the point. However, the hon. Lady’s example is not just about standards being ignored, because there was a raft of, bluntly, criminal behaviour and abuse. If we were having a longer debate about care homes and the regulatory system, we could look at whether having the Care Quality Commission cover such a wide range of areas is the best way of ensuring that such things do not happen, but Mr Deputy Speaker is always keen for us to stick to the topic of the debate.
The amendments relating to Lords amendment 1B are appropriate and slightly better than the original, and the amendments relating to Lords amendment 25A make eminent sense. It makes sense to record why something has not happened, because if there are concerns about the management of a care home, there should be a duty to record why something was not done, not just to review it. The management could in theory say, “I’ve reviewed it, but I didn’t record what I’ve concluded,” or try to come up with a conclusion later.
James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)
On recording things, one issue that arose when we were in Committee related to fluctuating conditions. For example, if somebody were subject to a DoLS, but then medical evidence demonstrated that they could be released from it, that makes it even more important to ensure that records are kept and that there is absolute clarity around the reasons for deprivation of liberty.
Kevin Foster
My hon. Friend makes a strong point. We should not just assume that once a DoLS is in place it will be there for life. For some people, it may apply during a particular period of treatment or time, and things will fluctuate for some people if they recover to a point at which a DoLS is no longer appropriate because they are able to make their own decisions. As he says, the appropriate records must be kept to ensure that that is properly reviewed and borne in mind, so that a decision cannot be made that someone should be subject to this forever. There should be a rolling review, to ensure that those in charge of caring for a person and those overseeing the care are satisfied that it is still the appropriate measure, given its impact on the person’s life.
I do not wish to prolong the debate, given that there is consensus across the House, which is welcome. The Bill will be better for having these substitute amendments, inspired by the Lords amendments, and on that basis, I hope the House will endorse them.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster), as I do on many occasions. I agree with what he said. First, I thank the Minister for her commitment, for our comprehensive discussions and for making herself available for each and every person who wished to have input into this process, and hopefully the changes that the Government want to see will be passed.
The Government have gone to some lengths to ensure that this Bill replaces and improves existing legislation surrounding the deprivation of liberty as a matter of pressing urgency. The current system is not fit for purpose—many people in this Chamber and outside it feel that—and this legislative change by the Government is what we want to see.
The Bill implements the Law Commission’s recommendations, introducing a new system for people who lack capacity and need to be confined for care and treatment, ensuring that the system protects vulnerable people, is person-centred and includes a strong role for carers and families. I have had a chat with the Minister about this, and the Bill will also ensure that supported people and their families are supported and included throughout the process. That is very positive.
The supported person will be afforded their rights throughout the process by an appropriate person. The appropriate person will normally be a family member. Carers and families will be given a stronger role, with an explicit duty to consult them and the supported person. As someone who cares, along with my mother and son and others, for my brother Keith, who was in a motorbike accident some 15 years ago, I know the importance of the carer’s role across the whole process.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. For far too long, families have been left out of the equation when they should have been involved. There is an argument for looking at carers’ training and their suitability, perhaps through certification, because there have been lots of cases of abuse in the past. It has gone on for years, and we have to pay particular attention to that. The Care Quality Commission should be improved; it does not have the numbers to do the job. I often follow its reports in Coventry, so I have a good idea of its needs. Does he agree that those areas could be looked at?
Jim Shannon
I certainly do. The Minister has responded to the concerns of the hon. Gentleman, myself and others in a spirit of generosity, and perhaps this legislative change does that.
I welcome moves taken to make the definition of deprivation of liberty as strong as possible. What the Government have done is clear. It is vital that the definition links back to the European convention on human rights and provides a sturdy basis to protect vulnerable people. That is good news.
Members have referred to the 125,000 people who are currently deprived of their liberty without the necessary protections in place. Through this legislative change—which will not be opposed; a very helpful attitude has been adopted in the House of Lords and on both sides of this House—can the Minister indicate what will be done to reduce the backlog?
The Government have been lobbied and have consulted the Local Government Association, charitable bodies and other interested people and groups. As a result, we have a vital opportunity for long-awaited reform, and the Bill needs to be passed.
Mr Deputy Speaker, I gave you my commitment that this would be a short contribution, and I intend to keep to that. I want to finish with two quick questions to the Minister. Can she explain how the role of an appropriate person will support and protect vulnerable people in the proposed new system? Secondly, will she confirm that the needs of the supported person and their families will be put first?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)
Just to help, the Minister would need leave to respond to those questions, so the hon. Gentleman is putting pressure on for something that is not available at the moment.
Jim Shannon
I would never put pressure on the Minister—not in a million years; I know my place. I suggest gently to her that those two things could be looked at.
Helen Whately (Faversham and Mid Kent) (Con)
It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who makes such thoughtful contributions. I will be brief, as we appear to have a large amount of consensus on this piece of legislation.
First, I want to pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Minister for the work she has done on the Bill, her extremely consensual approach to it and the way she has listened to concerns from Members on both sides of the House and consulted stakeholders widely. It has been a real pleasure to work with her on the Bill, and I thank her for that.
This Bill is critical because it concerns some of the most vulnerable people in our society. We have talked about the fact that there are 125,000 people waiting to be processed for deprivation of liberty orders, and the system is not working, but there are 2 million people who have impaired mental capacity in the country, and we need to get the system right for all of them, not just the 125,000 who are being let down by the current system.
It is also important to say that the Bill builds on more than three years of work and the recommendations of the Law Commission. It has been fully scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the other place has contributed to it, as have members of the Bill Committee. I have received many emails in support of the fact that it introduces a better system, gets rid of the bureaucratic box-ticking exercises in the old system and should be better for both the individuals who are deprived of their liberty and their families.
Barbara Keeley
The work that was done for three years was on a 15-clause Bill that is not this Bill. We discussed that plenty of times in Committee. I think it only fair to be accurate. This five-clause Bill is not the Bill that was consulted on, and it is not the Bill that had three years of work. It is not correct to claim that it is. We spent a lot of time in Committee trying to put right the things that were missing and taken out of the earlier 15-clause Bill, and it is better to be accurate about that.
Helen Whately
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. Broadly, I was attempting to say that a significant amount of work has gone into this. I have heard overwhelmingly from those working in the sector about the importance of doing something about the current situation, because it is not working and cannot be allowed to continue. This is urgent.
It is right that the NHS and social care providers will be given a bigger role in the decision-making process, so that people under their care receive better care and their rights are protected. The fact that we have people outside the system unprotected at the moment clearly cannot be right and cannot continue. During the passage of the Bill, I raised concerns about how it will work for people with fluctuating conditions, and I have been reassured by the Minister that responsible bodies will be required to keep individuals’ circumstances under review. I welcome the fact that there is further detailed guidance on fluctuating conditions in the code of practice.
I turn to the amendments and particularly the debate about the best way to define “deprivation of liberty”. It feels like a sensible conclusion has been reached in order for us to move forward, with a plan to develop the definition further through the code of practice. These things evolve and are extremely complex, and we need a flexible system that meets the needs of our society.
To sum up, the old system is not fit for purpose. The Bill makes important and timely amendments. It is better for individuals and all those around them to ensure that they have appropriate protections for the very serious matter of depriving individuals of liberty.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House does not insist on its amendment 1 to which the Lords has disagreed, and disagrees with Lords amendment 1B proposed in lieu, but proposes amendment (a) to the Bill in lieu of the Lords amendment.
Resolved,
That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 25A proposed to its amendment 25, but proposes amendments (a) and (b) to its amendment 25 in lieu of the Lords amendment.—(Jo Churchill.)
Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 24th April 2019
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 171-I Marshalled list for consideration of Commons amendments (PDF) - (23 Apr 2019)
Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 1B proposed in lieu of Commons Amendment 1, to which the Commons have disagreed, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1C in lieu.
“Deprivation of liberty: code of practice
(1) Section 42 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (codes of practice) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Guidance about what kinds of arrangements for enabling the care or treatment of a person fall within paragraph 2(1)(b) of Schedule AA1 must be included in the code, or one of the codes, issued under subsection (1).”
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) Before the end of each review period the Lord Chancellor must—
(a) review each code for the guidance of persons exercising functions under Schedule AA1, and
(b) lay a report of the review before Parliament.
But this does not affect the Lord Chancellor’s functions under subsection (2).
(2B) A review period is—
(a) in relation to the first review, the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which this subsection comes into force, and
(b) in relation to subsequent reviews, each period of 5 years beginning with the day on which the report of the previous review was laid before Parliament.”
(4) In subsection (3) after “preparation” insert “, review”.”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford) (Con)
My Lords, today we have an opportunity to pass legislation which will reform a broken and bureaucratic DoLS system which is leaving thousands without safeguards and bring forward a new system which will deliver protections to those who are not currently receiving them. Before I talk about amendments from the other place, I take the opportunity to thank noble Lords for the contributions they have made throughout this process. The noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Jolly, have provided important scrutiny from the Opposition and Liberal Democrat Front Benches. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has brought great insight from her role as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum. The noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Murphy, have brought the important issue of clarifying the meaning of a deprivation of liberty to the fore, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Watkins, have done excellent work to highlight the importance of providing a person with information about their authorisation and relevant rights.
The Bill has dealt with a number of legal issues and to this end our discussion has benefited from contributions from the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown, Lord Hope and Lord Woolf, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. Our debates have also benefited from contributions from my noble friends Lady Browning and Lady Barran, the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Barker, and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt, Lord Touhig and Lord Cashman. Finally, I thank my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott for her excellent support and to my predecessor and noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy, who marshalled the Bill through its earlier stages most ably, of course. Through the work of noble Lords, the Bill has been improved to address potential conflicts of interest in the new system and to ensure that protections for those in independent hospitals are now strengthened. After the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and others in highlighting this, we have clarified the ability of families and care staff to whistleblow. The Bill has also benefited from the hard work of many outside this Chamber and from the careful scrutiny of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
Today, we turn to the Commons amendments, which were tabled as alternatives to the amendments put forward by this House. The Government listened carefully to the concerns of noble Lords and reflected these in our amendments. Amendment 1C prescribes that the code of practice must contain guidance on what kinds of arrangements amount to a deprivation of liberty. There is also a duty to review any parts of the code that give guidance to persons exercising functions under the liberty protection safeguards and to lay a report of the review before Parliament, initially after three years of the subsection coming into force and then every five years after the date on which a report is laid before Parliament.
The meaning of a deprivation of liberty will remain as defined under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as it is under Section 64(5) of the Mental Capacity Act. I know that noble Lords and other stakeholders had hoped that we could provide further clarification on the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in statute; we have had many debates about that. The Government had hoped to do so as well. We agreed with the Joint Committee on Human Rights that a definition could help bring greater certainty to people and professionals; to this end, we explored providing a statutory clarification over several months, working with colleagues across government and across the sector.
However, we established that the only way we could do this was to take an exclusionary approach and define a deprivation of liberty as having the same meaning as in Article 5 of the convention, then setting out what does not constitute a deprivation of liberty. This House made it clear that it was uncomfortable with an exclusionary approach to defining a deprivation of liberty. The Government have listened carefully to the views of Peers, MPs and other stakeholders, and decided not to insist on our original amendment. However, the Government were not able to accept the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. It risked falling out of line with case law and would mean having two different definitions in place, which would bring confusion to a sector that needs clarity.
I assure noble Lords that the Government are still committed to providing clarification regarding the meaning of a deprivation of liberty for both people and practitioners. Amendment 1C makes it clear that the code of practice must lay out in clear terms, and provide detail of, when a deprivation of liberty is and is not occurring; this guidance will reflect existing case law, including the Ferreira decision, which addresses the provision of life-sustaining treatment. We will set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in a positive framing and in a way that is clear for people and practitioners. We will also include case studies in the code to help illustrate this.
The amendment also brings in a duty to review any parts of the code that give guidance to anyone exercising functions under LPS. This includes laying a report of the review before Parliament. As I said, initially, there must be a review within three years of the subsection coming into force to ensure that it is working as intended. Following that, there must be a review every five years after the date on which a report is laid before Parliament. This will mean that the meaning of a deprivation of liberty will be considered regularly and remain up to date with evolving case law. The review will not be limited to the definition but will include all the guidance relating to the liberty protection safeguards contained in the code of practice. By regularly reviewing the code in this way, we will ensure that there is up-to-date guidance for people and practitioners, which will support the successful operation of the liberty protection safeguards system.
Amendments 25B and 25C state that after authorising arrangements, the responsible body must, without delay, arrange for a copy of the authorisation record to be given or sent. If the responsible body has not done this within 72 hours of the arrangements being authorised, it must review and record why not. The Government recognise the importance of providing people with information. We amended the Bill in the other place to clarify that people should be informed of their rights under the liberty protection safeguards process and provided with a copy of their authorisation record.
Building on this, the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, tabled an amendment in this place specifying that a record must be kept if the authorisation record is not provided immediately, and that if the authorisation record is not provided to the person within 72 hours, a review must be conducted. The Government agree that it is important to make sure that the authorisation record is provided quickly; however, there were some issues with Amendment 25A, which we have addressed in our amendments. For example, we have made it clear in our amendments that the new duty falls on the responsible body. This is important as it means that the duty to arrange for the authorisation record to be provided to the person and their representatives can now be enforced.
The government amendments reflect the aims of the Lords amendment. Noble Lords will notice a small difference in that we do not require it to be recorded if an authorisation record has not been provided immediately. The reason for this is simple: our priority is ensuring that the person and their representatives receive the authorisation record. If there is an opportunity for the responsible body to send the authorisation record within 72 hours, they should be doing so rather than recording why they have not sent it. Providing information, including the authorisation record, is important to ensure that people are able to exercise their rights. Noble Lords have made clear their view that there should be a contingency provision to ensure that the responsible body makes arrangements in a timely manner to provide the authorisation record. The Government have listened and this amendment reflects that.
By passing these final amendments today we will bring to a close the parliamentary stages of the Bill. When the Government introduced it last year we committed to reforming the process so that it is less burdensome for people, carers, families and local authorities. That is what the Bill will deliver. On Royal Assent, the Bill will become an Act and will introduce a new targeted and streamlined system that will allow people to access protections quicker. This is vital when we have more than 125,000 people in the backlog not receiving protections and over 45,000 people who have been waiting for more than a year. I ask the House for its support and I thank all Members who have helped to deliver the Bill we have today. I beg to move.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I shall speak to Commons Amendment 1C, which was agreed in lieu of Amendment 1B, which I moved in this House before the Recess. I start by thanking the Minister and the Bill team for the discussions it was possible to have in the latter stages of the Bill, which helped get us to a position that we now feel, particularly in relation to the definition, is pragmatic and one that we can live with.
First, I welcome the Government’s decision to drop what has been termed the “exclusionary definition” proposed earlier. It had a whole raft of problems but I have no intention of going into them again now. It is important to acknowledge that the Government took on board the views expressed by Peers and others in the wider sector on that definition. The outcome of those discussions—that there should be no statutory definition in the Bill—is a sensible and pragmatic compromise after a rather long and tortuous journey. Those of us involved in putting forward different definitions had all received legal advice, which said that our definitions were fully compliant with Article 5 and so on. However, we were never going to resolve that; they just came from different lawyers with different opinions. We had to find a way forward and we did. The fact that we will now be using the code of practice to set out—clearly, I hope—where deprivation of liberty is and is not occurring and that it can reflect existing and evolving case law is important.
I took the opportunity to listen to the debate on the Commons amendments in the other place on 2 April and found it very illuminating. I was particularly pleased to hear the Minister for Health and Social Care, Caroline Dinenage, say:
“We will set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in a positive”—
I emphasise “positive”—
“framing and in a way that is clearer for people and practitioners”.
That was the very nub of my concerns when I put forward my definition: it was not clear; it was all framed in a negative way; and it was very difficult for the families affected and, indeed, for some practitioners to understand. This is a real step forward.
We are now to have a code of practice and a definition set out there. I was also pleased to hear the Minister say, when asked about the timescale for producing the code of practice, that it,
“is being worked on as we speak … Once we are all content that the code of practice is robust and fully covers everything that we want it to it will then be presented to both Houses of Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/4/19; cols. 964-5.]
That is very positive. However, can the Minister update us on the timing for the code of practice? When will this House see the guidance? It is absolutely critical that what it says in the guidance—what we have been talking about—does not mean that we have kicked the can down the road in terms of some of the problems associated with the definition. When I see what is in the code of the practice and the guidance contained in it, my acid test will still be whether it is easy for the lay person—I include myself as a lay person here—to understand, not full of double negatives or pages and pages of rather confusing case studies. I would be grateful if the Minister could update us on the timing of that.
Secondly, I was extremely pleased to hear that the definition will be considered and reviewed regularly—and kept up to date, as I have said, with evolving case law—and that there will be a report of that review laid before Parliament within three years of the measures coming into force. That will be another opportunity for this House to scrutinise how it is working in practice. I am very grateful to the Government for listening to my representations on the need for a review and for a report to come before both Houses.
Could the Minister give some commitment that, when the review is published—and this House has had a commitment to look at that review—the code of practice will be regularly updated? A review is important; our having an opportunity to scrutinise it is important; but most important of all is that the code of practice be regularly updated. I contend that some of the problems this whole Bill is designed to address, such as the backlog of deprivation of liberties cases, were in part caused by the fact that the code of practice was not amended as circumstances changed and as more and more cases such as Cheshire West were brought into the scope of the Bill.
I would very much welcome assurances from the Minister on those two points, and thank her for being as helpful as she has been. I thank colleagues on all Benches, because I feel that we have worked very collegiately and co-operatively. I hope and feel that that has helped improve the Bill.
Baroness Murphy (CB)
My Lords, I do not really share the enthusiasm or optimism of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, although I often shared her views on what needed to be done at earlier stages. We are all rather tired of this Bill and I see nothing to be gained from hindering its passage, but I cannot let it pass without expressing my profound misgivings. We—the Members of this House—have failed to do what we were supposed to do. Our task was to make the deprivation of liberty safeguards—now the “liberty protection safeguards”—more practical, more focused on those at risk, more cost-effective and safer, and we have allowed the Bill to disintegrate into a sprawling, all-encompassing bit of a nightmare. The procedures may be simpler—we have cut out one layer of bureaucracy—but we have allowed these provisions to be extended even further than Cheshire West, even pursuing people in their own homes in a way which I do not think many families will appreciate.
The one thing everyone, including the JCHR, was hoping we would do was to introduce a realistic definition of a deprivation of liberty. In the end, we in this House just copped out. We could not agree; we got into a mess; the lawyers could not agree either; so we have just said, “No, let us put it all in a code of practice”. As many noble Lords will know, I wrote some of the early codes of practice for the Mental Health Acts, and I know that codes of practice suffer from mission creep—they get more and more stuff in which is quite difficult for people outside in practice who will implement it, and do not get updated very regularly because it is difficult to do so. Indeed, if there is no clause in statute, which most codes are fixed around—and there will not be, of course, as is intended—it will have to be arranged around Article 5. That will leave a situation in which the lawyers will have a field day, and in which we will still be waiting for case law to give us some guidance.
Meanwhile, the numbers are going up. My latest count was 140,000—I think the official number a couple of months ago was 125,000. There will be a lot more soon. About a third—it may be even more than that—will be waiting for over a year, and 75% of them are elderly people with dementia, who will probably die before they get their rights looked at. Will it make any difference to them? Generally, it will not make one whit of difference. If we had done our job properly, the numbers would have gone down, and there is a chance that those at greatest risk—for example, people with severe dementia who are kept in locked units, who never see the light of day, and people with severe disabilities in residential care—would have been seen sooner and would have had their care plans addressed in respect of their freedoms.
Meanwhile, these last three years have seen an industry grow up around the implementation of DoLS. It is now called DoLS by everybody out there—I am not sure that most people know what that means. A costly public service has developed which has a life of its own, and which, as we have seen, takes money directly out of care budgets. When Staffordshire quite sensibly tried to call a halt and said, “Hang on a minute, let’s go for the worst cases: those most at risk, those with the most profound disabilities or where there is a disagreement”, somebody complained, and they were told in no uncertain terms by the Local Government Ombudsman to get on with it and to get back to doing everybody. So the waiting list grew yet again. Of course, many other county councils and metropolitan councils were making similar decisions, but they have all had to go back to compiling the waiting list, which grows and grows.
The other people who will love the Bill are the lawyers. Just imagine how you will be able to debate the nuances of Article 5 meanings when the code of practice fails to live up to expectations.
This Bill should be a lesson to us all. It is legislation which arose from a Supreme Court judgment—an impeccable theoretical case, made without any thought to the practicalities that would affect 2 million people. The Law Commission was as tied up in knots as everyone else and could not see a way through. My goodness, it worked long and hard on it in an admirable way, but it could not get beyond the problems of having to satisfy Cheshire West and the Supreme Court’s judgment. This House’s inability to grasp the Bill will not provide any more than a hit-and-run assessment of one patient’s disabilities and whether they are deprived of their liberty. It will not provide any more care for people, and it will be a bit of a disaster.
I have been as guilty as everyone here because I was not here for Report, when perhaps I should have been here to say this more clearly—I am sure that my colleagues quite often feel cross with me when I am not here, and I apologise for that. However, I am not blaming the Ministers either, who have, unfortunately, changed during the passage of the Bill, which has taken a lot longer than it should have done. They have struggled as best they can with a complex, technical Bill; nor am I blaming the team at the Department of Health, because Sharon Egan and her team have been squashed between the lawyers, the DoLS industry, the obvious need to make things viable and less depleting of care budgets, and the impossibility of satisfying everyone.
The only flexibility left—because we will pass the Bill—is that before the Bill is commenced, the Government should pause and do a few more sums; otherwise, we shall be back here in another three years, looking at how we can make this legislation more viable. Many more millions of hours of care staff time will have been wasted in failing to improve the care of mentally incapacitated people. Their rights need protecting, but this Bill will not do it.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, I have taken a slightly different view. I declare my interest as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, and I am grateful to my leadership group in that forum for their comments, constant advice and constructive criticism. I am also most grateful to the Bill team, the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, and the Minister for having listened. We have certainly given the Bill what we could term a bumpy ride. I think that needed to happen and do not apologise for it at all. From what I understand, the way the code of practice is now being developed will result in a far better situation.
Lord O'Shaughnessy (Con)
My Lords, I want to speak briefly to offer some thanks to everybody who has participated in getting the Bill to this point.
First and foremost, I thank noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said that the Bill had been given a bumpy ride. As I was in the driving seat for some of that, I can tell noble Lords that it certainly did feel rather bumpy. However, once we got over the bumps and decided we could work together, we made considerable improvements to the Bill, driven largely, it has to be said, by this House and the expertise within it. The compromise reached on the issue of a code of conduct is a good example of that and reflects extremely well on the process this House has gone through in its desire to reach pragmatic solutions—perhaps there is a wider lesson for politics in that.
I want also to express my thanks to those in the Bill team, who have stuck with this and shown considerable and growing intellectual flexibility as the process has gone on. I am sure all noble Lords would want to thank them for both their input and feedback and the grace with which they have dealt with this.
I thank also my noble friend the Minister. This Bill was one of many passes I gave her when she took over, and she has handled it with great intelligence and grace, as she always does. I am delighted we have got to this point and that she has steered it so safely.
Finally, and most importantly, I thank those affected by this legislation: the cared for and the carers. I am sorry to hear the opinion of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, which I take very seriously. I am an optimist naturally, but it is not just my natural optimism that means I cannot agree with her gloomy outlook. I hope she is wrong, and I hope she will not mind my saying so. I believe that through this legislation we have made some positive changes and done some good for the cared for and their carers. I am sure this is a subject to which we will return, but, in the meantime, I hope the lives of those people have been improved by the work we have put in over the past few months.
Baroness Barker (LD)
My Lords, it has been a privilege to work again on a subject that we have now worked on several times in this House, from the original pre-legislative scrutiny and original legislation through to the post-legislative report on the implementation of the previous Bill. Apart from anything else, it shows the excellent results that can be achieved from the process that we put into scrutinising legislation and scrutinising its subsequent implementation. In light of all of that, I will say that I take a slightly different view from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. I think that we have done a very good job. The problem is that the legislation that came to us was fundamentally flawed, and we could not change that. But we changed the legislation where we could, and those changes will make it better.
The noble Baroness hit on two fundamental issues that are problematic. The first is the nature and scope of the Cheshire West ruling and the second is the lack of understanding of the original DoLS legislation. When it was introduced, the training for professionals—all sorts of different professionals—was lacking. Much of what has happened since has meant that we have fallen into a system that is deeply bureaucratic. A number of professionals are scared to exercise their professional judgment. Consequently, a whole bureaucracy has grown up around DoLS which, had it been introduced in the right way, would not have happened. Therefore, the noble Baroness was right to say that the Law Commission was trying to deal with that issue and could not. I have no doubt that what we have in front of us will not solve the problem. I doubt very much whether it will deal with the backlog of cases, about which people are rightly exercised.
My question is one that we were all concerned about—the resourcing for this. One of the first things that we did when we met the Bill team was to query the resourcing—half a day’s training for some doctors and no need for training for people in care homes. Much of that has got lost as we have gone deeper into the wording of the Bill. Will the Minister talk about the resourcing of training and the implementation of the code of practice? I have no doubt that, in due course, there will be further test cases that will shine a light on the deficiencies of this legislation and we will come back to dealing with the fundamental issue: how do we ensure that someone whose liberty is going to be deprived by an agency of the state can be enabled to understand their rights, and their carers enabled to understand their rights, in order that they and the professionals who work with them can ensure that everything is put in place to minimise the deprivation of liberty? If we had done that properly in the first place, we would not be dealing with the deficient legislation that we are now.
The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is right that we have not dealt with it, but I take some hope from a lot of the stramash, to use a Scottish word, that we have been through and the attention that has been paid to all of this by the department, by people in the sector and by the lawyers themselves. This is not the greatest job we have ever done, but what we should do today is put a marker down for the evidence that needs to be collated and gathered for the time in the future when we will, inevitably, return to this subject.
Baroness Meacher (CB)
I have a couple of points. Other noble Lords made detailed points about the work of this House and the contribution that noble Lords have made to the Bill—very effectively, I think. My experience, although in a sense peripheral, has been that this House has worked very effectively with both the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood, in their roles as Minister and with the Bill team, and has achieved a certain amount—which is all we ever expect. We do not normally expect to turn Bills upside down and back to front, but we have achieved certain things.
I will mention a couple of things for which I am grateful to the Government, if I am right that we have really seen them home. One of my concerns was the huge and growing number of people in domestic situations where very vulnerable carers are caring for very vulnerable loved ones. Of course we need some sort of safeguard to ensure that the deprivation of liberty, if it occurs, is proportionate, reasonable and all the rest of it, but I was very worried that these poor carers would have layers of bureaucracy that they really could cope with, in addition to the bureaucracy they already had to deal with. I think we had an agreement from the Government that the procedures for assessing deprivation of liberty, proportionality and the rest of it will be undertaken in the local authority’s normal care-planning process, in the work that local authority officials are already doing. That seems a very constructive way forward which will greatly benefit a huge number of carers and cared-for people. It is a small thing, but it may be quite significant.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, it is always a good moment when we get to this point in any legislation. It is also an opportunity for us to look at where we started in July. In July, my Chief Whip spoke to me about a really small, uncontroversial Bill that would amend the Mental Capacity Act. I am not criticising him, because that is what he had been told. The idea was that we would have the Second Reading quickly before the Summer Recess and then move straight into Committee immediately after it and get through the Bill quite quickly. It is a great testament to this House that we recognised quite quickly that it might be a small Bill but it was certainly not uncontroversial. As I said when we moved into Committee, the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Barker, and I were sending each other messages about this Bill when we were all poolside in different parts of Europe because we realised that we needed to understand it much better.
I do not accept the criticism that we have failed. I think we started off with a flawed Bill and that we have improved it. In a few years’ time I think we will almost certainly return to this subject, because by then we will have discovered things that have not worked out and that need to be reviewed and possibly changed. We need to thank both Ministers for listening, hearing and working to change the Bill. I particularly thank my fellow Peers for working so co-operatively and with such great expertise. It is always a pleasure when we do that and we are always at our most effective when we do so, and I have been very happy that various Members of the House have taken the lead on various issues throughout the passage of the Bill. The Minister named everybody, so I shall not do so again, but they know who they are and it has been a pleasure to work with them.
We should be pleased that we have successfully tackled what, as far as we were concerned, were certain huge issues, many of which have been mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. They included care home managers’ powers, conflicts of interest, private hospitals, the definition of deprivation of liberty and the information provided. We should be proud that those issues have been tackled. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy. I have not often been called a juggernaut but on Report he suggested that I was. I think he was expressing the opinion that in my remarks I was representing the views of the whole House and that we were definitely coming for him, as it were.
If we are to learn some lessons from this, one is possibly that the Bill team took a little while to gear up to what happens in the House of Lords and how we approach things. We talk to the stakeholders—we have a continuous dialogue with them—and that is the next group that I would like to thank. I thank all the stakeholders who came to endless meetings with us to make sure that we did our job properly, although some of them still have some major concerns.
I say to the House that what matters is what happens next. First, it seems likely that within the next year or so we will have another mental health Bill, so it is quite possible that some of the issues that we have been concerned about will re-emerge and be discussed during that process. Secondly, we will have the regulations and the code of practice. I would like to be assured that the consultation, which might not have been quite as good as it should have been at the beginning of this whole process, will absolutely inform the code of practice and the regulations that follow the implementation of this legislation.
I do not wish to threaten the Minister but, after the past eight or nine months, there is a body of commitment and passion over this issue that will certainly be watching and be interested in what happens next and will have something to say about it. Therefore, in a spirit of positiveness, we hope that we will be able to help with the next stages but we will certainly be watching them to make sure that the gains that we have made are reflected in the code of practice and the regulations.
Finally, I very much thank the Minister, who came in in the middle of the Bill. This is the second Bill that she has had to pick up and run with in your Lordships’ House. She has done it with great dignity and intelligence, and it has been a pleasure to work with her.
Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford
I thank noble Lords for an important moment in the passage of the Bill. I assure them that they will never have to threaten me to get me to listen to important points regarding the progression of legislation of this import. I identify myself with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. This is indeed a pragmatic solution to the very challenging problem of getting the right solution.
I also echo the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who said that this has been a bumpy ride, but it is a major decision to deprive someone of their liberty, so it is right that there has been very detailed scrutiny of the legislation. When someone is deprived of their liberty we have to ensure that it is always necessary and proportionate and, wherever possible, consistent with their wishes and feelings. I agree with her that the advocacy provisions in this Bill are stronger than in the DoLS legislation, and that it will provide greater responsiveness and flexibility than previous legislation. We can be proud as a House to have delivered that.
I am sorry to hear the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. As we proceed through the next stages of engagement over the code of practice, I hope that we shall be able to prove her wrong, in the most positive sense. We have put in place very strong measures for whistleblowing thanks to the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins; thanks also to her work, we have strengthened the provisions for information. We have also to nail down the questions around the definition, of course, but I think it right that this is not on the face of the Bill for all the reasons that we have debated at great length in this Chamber. I will not rehearse them now but will try to answer some of the questions that I was asked.
The first is about when the code of practice will be published. Obviously, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, the department is collaborating very closely with the sector in the preparation of the code; that is already happening. We are working with many organisations and individuals. The drafting will be considered by expert reference groups and people with lived experiences, to ensure that we get the most practical and workable code of practice. The department has already convened a working group involving a wide range of stakeholders. We expect to have output from the working group by this summer. After Royal Assent, I will place a letter in the Commons Library as requested; this will contain timescales for the code of practice, including when a draft code will be published for consultation. I hope that is reassuring.
As I have said, the statutory guidance will include a suite of case studies which will demonstrate how the definition applies in different settings and scenarios. It will provide clarity and aid to practitioners. We are collaborating to ensure that it can provide clarity and lack of ambiguity and can be a real help to those using it. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, we have made a commitment that it will provide detail about when deprivation of liberty does and does not occur. It will reflect existing case law, including the Ferreira decision, and it will set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in a positive framing; this should be reassuring. On the question of a review, the code can be updated at any point. This will ensure that it can reflect changes in legislation practice or case law—that is, the entire code, not just the definition. I hope that is reassuring.
I would like to respond also to some of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. She is absolutely right regarding the questions of resourcing, the backlog and training. We are very alive to this. A further impact assessment will be done following Royal Assent and we will work with stakeholders collaboratively to take on board feedback from previous iterations. We will also ensure that the Government will provide guidance ahead of implementation. That will include steps that can be taken to help reduce the backlog.
However, we will not stop there. The Government are committed to supporting training ahead of the new system coming into force and are working with Skills for Care, Health Education England and Social Work England to deliver that. Ahead of day one, we will work with local and national networks and the Welsh DoLS network, in partnership with the LGA and ADASS, to reduce the existing backlog. Work is under way for that. Cared-for persons who have existing DoLS authorisation on day one will remain under that authorisation until it expires, after which a new application will be needed to try to manage the volume of work that will be undertaken. I hope this is reassuring. To respond to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I can assure her categorically that the code of practice will be statutory.
I hope that all this is reassuring; I think this is a great step forward and I commend the Bill to the House.
Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 25A to Commons Amendment 25, to which the Commons have disagreed, and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 25B and 25C to Commons Amendment 25 in lieu.
“(1A) If the responsible body has not, within 72 hours of arrangements being authorised, arranged for a copy of the authorisation record to be given or sent to each of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) of sub-paragraph (1), the responsible body must review and record why not.”
Royal Assent
Thursday 16th May 2019
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 171-I Marshalled list for consideration of Commons amendments (PDF) - (23 Apr 2019)