(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the first priority of government is the protection of and support for our Armed Forces. As the chair of the Defence Select Committee in the other place said, if we vaccinate our Armed Forces personnel for malaria, yellow fever, typhoid and a host of other diseases prior to deployment, why on earth did we not do so for Covid? How many UK military personnel deployed abroad in areas such as Mali contracted Covid, and have operations been affected? Further, the Minister now tells us that 61% of our troops have been fully vaccinated. When will the rest of them—one in three—receive their second dose, and is it not now extremely urgent that they do so?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that the safety and well-being of our Armed Forces personnel is paramount. Indeed, that was recognised from the start of the pandemic, when the priority was to keep our Armed Forces safe. There were robust safety measures and regimes in place, and that included isolation prior to deployment.
I reassure the noble Lord that when the commencement of the impressively successful vaccination programme began in December 2020, it allowed the MoD to plan and work in tandem with our domestic vaccination programme. Sometimes we were ahead of that, for good operational reasons. The priority for government has been to save the lives of those most at risk. It is right that we followed the advice of the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, which was to prioritise those older age groups and the most at risk first, rather than prioritise by occupation.
The noble Lord asked me about Covid cases among UK Armed Forces on operations. The figures I have been given are current as at 28 June this year, and are that the percentage of UK Armed Forces registering positive for Covid is: in the Persian Gulf, 0.4%; in Iraq, 0.3%; in Mali, 1.4%; in Afghanistan, 1%; and in Estonia, 13.2%. He will be aware that there was a higher case rate in Estonia due to a significant changeover of personnel at the time.
I reassure the noble Lord that second doses will be offered in line with clinical advice and the exact circumstances of the deployment. Our target within defence is four to eight weeks after the first dose, although, where there is an operational requirement, such as overseas deployment, we may accelerate second doses, subject to clinical guidance on the recommended gaps between doses. The only prioritisation that was effected was, as he will be aware, in respect of the nuclear deterrent, the carrier strike group and the rapid response Typhoon force.
My Lords, this Urgent Question repeat goes back to 23 June. Can the Minister update the House on the figures? We were told that 61% of those on overseas operations had had a second dose of vaccine. What is the percentage now, eight days later? Noting that the Minister for the Armed Forces stated in the other place that by 19 July every member of personnel across defence would have been vaccinated, can she reassure us that that includes junior soldiers at the Army Foundation College in Harrogate, who will be under 18?
To come to the noble Baroness’s last question first, my understanding is that the Ministry of Defence will ensure that every adult is offered their first dose of a Covid-19 vaccine by 19 July, in line with HMG’s accelerated vaccination timelines. Indeed, by that date, many will have completed both doses. I am unaware of the situation in relation to the cohort to which she refers. I undertake to inquire into that and, if I can ascertain further information, I shall write to her.
The noble Baroness asked an important question about percentages of vaccinations given. The figures I have—again, these are as at 28 June 2021—are that: for UK Armed Forces personnel on active operations, 95% have received the first dose, 74% have received the second dose and 2% have refused a dose. As at 28 June for Armed Forces personnel based overseas, excluding operations, my information is that 73% have had a first dose and 35% have had a second dose.
I ask the Minister a related question regarding proof of vaccination for military personnel. As a former CDS whose medical data is still held by the Defence Medical Services, I declare a personal interest. The Minister will be aware that the medical data of defence personnel, including proof of vaccination, is held in a way that is inaccessible via the NHS app. I accept that a highly complex work-around is available, but only to those who are extremely technically gifted. When will this significant disadvantage be resolved?
The noble and gallant Lord raises an important issue. It is complex, but I hope I can provide some further information and perhaps some reassurance. The interchange of vaccination data between NHS systems and defence medical systems is already fully operational for the vast majority of personnel, but for security reasons and to ensure that a greater proportion of defence personnel can access their vaccination status, all defence personnel must use the NHS website rather than the mobile phone application. I think that he will be sympathetic to the security nuances of that situation. I reassure him that that information has been widely communicated to all personnel and we have, just in the past day, reissued communications on this topic, including by text message and by guidance on our intranet.
I listened carefully to the Minister’s reply to my noble friend Lord Coaker, but press her a little further on this area. I am sure she would agree that it is government’s first duty to our Armed Forces to ensure they are properly trained, equipped and protected when they are deployed in service. Was it therefore a mistake to follow the age- related criteria and not to fully vaccinate our front-line troops at the beginning of the vaccination programme?
I say to the noble Baroness that it was not a mistake. She will understand that judgments have to be made on these issues. She will also be aware that the unfolding of the vaccination programme was innovatory and new territory for government—indeed, new territory for many countries across the world. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the MoD took a view that it was right to follow the advice of the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation that it was preferable to prioritise those in the older age groups and those most at risk, rather than by occupation. However, as I also indicated to her colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on occasions we, in fact, vaccinated prior to deployment if there was no opportunity for vaccination during deployment. Specifically, we made sure that regarding our critical outputs, which I have already described, we prioritised vaccination of those groups of persons.
My Lords, while it is not the Minister’s bag, in addition to the question of UK military personnel serving overseas, is she aware what provision has been made for serving diplomats posted overseas, which we should be offering to reciprocate in London anyway?
The noble Viscount is absolutely right; it is not my bag and I do not want to get into hot water with my colleagues in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. In fact, from speaking to my defence attaché colleagues in one part of the globe this morning, I understand that our Diplomatic Service has been protected but I hesitate to give any further specific information because I do not possess it. I suggest that the noble Viscount might want to direct his question to my colleague, my noble friend Lord Ahmad.
My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the report by the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, published on 25 June; and what data they hold on unidentified flying object sightings in the United Kingdom.
My Lords, the Ministry of Defence notes the content of the report. The department holds no reports on unidentified aerial phenomena but constantly monitors UK airspace to identify and respond to any credible threat to its integrity, and is confident in the existing measures in place to protect it.
My Lords, for decades, people who have been concerned with UFOs have been dismissed as fantasists, but now the US Director of National Intelligence, who oversees 17 intelligence agencies, has published a report saying that the data on UFOs is inconclusive. The report offers several possible explanations and does not rule out that these could be military aircraft with very advanced capabilities or even extraterrestrial phenomena. Either way, can the Minister reassure members of the public that the Ministry of Defence takes reports of unidentified flying objects in our airspace very seriously? Will she consider publishing a detailed assessment of the data that we hold?
The MoD deals with actual threats substantiated by evidence. The Government continue to take any potential threat to the UK seriously. The integrated review and the defence Command Paper published in March set out the MoD’s assessment of the threats we face and how we will meet them.
My Lords, unidentified does not mean suspicious. Does the Minister recognise that the US report referred to says that there is no clear indication that there is any non-terrestrial explanation for the 144 sightings that it specifies? The idea that, in an era of mobile phone cameras, drones and frequent travel, there could possibly be alien spaceships whizzing about undetected in our atmosphere on a regular basis is not very plausible. It is much more likely that these blurred images have boring explanations, alas. Does my noble friend agree?
The important point, on which I wish to reassure your Lordships, is that the UK air defence community detects and monitors all flying air systems 24 hours a day to provide an identified air picture as part of the UK’s national security posture and our commitment to the integrity of NATO airspace. That is supported by Typhoon aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth and RAF Coningsby, which are held at high readiness to intercept any threat to UK airspace.
My Lords, in 2008 the MoD began the process of releasing all its UFO files. In 2009 Sir Bob Ainsworth, the Secretary of State, accepted the advice that:
“In more than 50 years, no UFO sighting … has indicated the existence of any military threat to the UK; there is no defence benefit in … recording, collating, analysing, or investigating UFO sightings”
and
“the level of resources devoted to this task is … diverting staff from more valuable defence-related activities”,
and he closed the relevant unit. Does the US report reveal any evidence containing any reason to review that advice?
I simply say to the noble Lord that I seek to reassure him that, as I have indicated, we deal with actual threats substantiated by evidence. He is quite right about the closure of the UFO desk in 2009. I can confirm that the department holds no reports on unidentified aerial phenomena and that all relevant material created and held by the UFO desk has been passed to the National Archives.
My Lords, turning to identifiable flying objects, does my noble friend agree that the UK has a tremendous opportunity to develop its new space industry, not least in low-earth orbit, in the build, development, launch, operation, recovery and rebuild of small satellites for both positive-purpose defence and civil opportunities?
My noble friend makes an important point with which I entirely agree. That is clearly an area of exciting future development for the UK Government.
Given the subject, it is very reassuring to see the Minister here physically, not beamed in. The Pentagon has said that unidentified aerial phenomena are a serious national security threat. Notwithstanding what she has just said, does the Minister agree with the Pentagon’s analysis of the threat from unidentified aerial phenomena? Is the UK therefore suffering from a threat similar to that identified by the US? Given that the MoD abandoned its UFO desk in 2009, where are such sightings to be reported and to whom? The truth is out there and, we hope, in the Minister’s answer.
I endeavour to provide veracity to this Chamber on all occasions. Again, the underlying important point is the security of our airspace. I have already indicated how we address that potential threat and how we are well sustained and well provided to deal with any such potential threat. However, we regard threats as having to exist in the first place and to be substantiated by evidence because we need to know what we are addressing and how best we can address it. We are of course aware of the US assessment. The MoD has no plans to conduct its own report into UAP because, in over 50 years, no such reporting indicated the existence of any military threat to the UK.
The recent report from the United States task force dedicated to investigating UFOs has neither confirmed nor rejected the idea that such sightings could indicate alien visits to earth. I believe that Cardiff Bay is the alleged location of the Torchwood Institute, set up to deal with incidents of extraterrestrials. Indeed, the Ianto Jones shrine forms part of the tourist trail at Mermaid Quay. Seven decades after unidentified aerial phenomena first appeared on the radar, defence ministries around the world ought to know what they are. The recent report does not require us to accept the reality of alien visitation, but it does require us to take UFOs seriously. Therefore, how seriously do Her Majesty’s Government now take UFOs in the light of this report?
I refer the noble Baroness to my previous answers. The short response is “very seriously”—in relation to addressing threats where those threats are identifiable and can be substantiated.
My Lords, is the Minister aware of the role that one of the largest single-dish telescopes in the southern hemisphere—in Parkes, New South Wales, the place of my birth—played in transmitting the TV footage of the Apollo 11 moon landing? More recently, it tracked NASA’s Curiosity rover during its descent over the surface of Mars in 2012. Might it be of assistance to the Government in helping to modify, monitor and assist any unidentified sightings?
I would say to my noble friend that the MoD and particularly our air defence community have the most sophisticated electronic surveillance. I myself witnessed how this operated when I visited RAF Coningsby. There is also the added support of visual identification, if that is thought to be necessary, by alerting a rapid reaction from our Typhoons, which are able to take on a visual inspection if there is any doubt about the nature or character of an alleged threat.
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to read the report and the frankness with which it was written. Have the report’s contents yet been raised by Her Majesty’s Government with representatives of the United States Government? The Minister has said that our Government have no reports on this matter, but given the interest that it has generated around the world—and, indeed, perhaps other worlds—do Her Majesty’s Government now have plans to produce a similar document summarising any recent UAP or UFO sightings within UK borders and overseas territories?
As I indicated earlier, we have no opinion on the existence of extraterrestrial life and we no longer investigate reports of sightings of unidentified aerial phenomena. We have no plans to conduct our own report into UAP, because in over 50 years no such reporting has indicated the existence of any military threat to the UK.
My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister will know that this is the third known MoD security breach this year including documents marked “UK eyes only”, so it is no wonder that an investigation is needed. Can the Minister confirm that all the documents lost have been recovered? How can evidence of preparations for future Armed Forces conduct around the world have been leaked? Can she reassure our excellent Armed Forces personnel that there has been no jeopardy to current or future operations as a result of the breach? Will she also ensure, as was said in the other House, that the investigation is completed by early next week and the results are published as promised at that time? The public and the House need to be reassured that Ministers have taken all the necessary actions to stop this series of breaches.
I thank the noble Lord for his points. Let me make it clear that this was a most regrettable breach of security and is being taken extremely seriously by the department, hence the investigation to which he refers. I confirm to him that the BBC contacted MoD to say that it had the papers. MoD then worked with the BBC to ensure that nothing was reported which materially affected national security, and the papers have now been safely returned to MoD.
The investigating team will, of course, consider a wide range of circumstances—the breaches of protocol that seemed to surround the loss of the documents—and whether recommendations need to be made to improve procedures. However, I reassure your Lordships that very robust procedures already exist and documents of such a sensitive nature are accompanied by a very strict management regime. The investigatory team will be looking at all these issues. As to the timing of the investigation’s report, my understanding is that there is a desire to have some initial comment by next week. However, the noble Lord will understand that I am reluctant to be specific about a date, lest other material emerges which the team requires to investigate. But yes, it would be the intention of the Secretary of State for Defence to ensure that the team’s conclusions and findings are made available to Parliament.
Anything other than full disclosure—always taking account, of course, of the national interest—would not be welcome, so I am grateful to hear the noble Baroness give that undertaking. I also understand the constraints she has to operate under at the moment, but noble Lords who have served on the Intelligence and Security Committee will recall that there was an absolute prohibition on any documents of any kind being taken out of the committee office. Can the Minister tell us what the policy was in the Ministry of Defence, and in what circumstances anyone was, by way of policy, entitled to remove documents from the main building?
It is within the rules to remove documents from the building in certain limited circumstances, so long as they are recorded and secured in the appropriate fashion. In short, as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, there are policies and procedures in place that allow for the removal of classified information. It will be for the investigation team to determine whether these procedures were followed correctly.
This was indeed an important security breach and really quite concerning, but we bandy the word “secret” around without necessarily understanding what it means. There are different levels of classification, of which “secret” is just one. For example, “UK eyes only” is not a classification; it is a national caveat. However, if it genuinely was a secret document, why did it leave the building when it never should have? Does that imply that we should make this inquiry wider, looking at what exactly the procedures are, to ensure that this really does not happen again?
The loss of MoD documents of this classification is extremely rare and I reassure my noble friend that there has not been such a loss within the last 18 months. Despite that, we take the matter very seriously. We have launched a full and thorough investigation and will look at the actions of individuals, as well as the procedures, policies and processes in place. I reassure your Lordships that any recommendations or lessons identified by the investigation will be considered as a matter of urgency.
My Lords, General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff, has said that incidents such as the recent confrontation with Russia in the Black Sea are “giving him sleepless nights” and could lead to a “miscalculation”. Can we assume that yet another MoD whistleblower leaked the documents because they felt that HMS “Defender” sailing so close to the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters was both provocative and dangerous? Can the Minister remind the House how many wars Russia has fought over the centuries to keep Sevastopol Russian, including the Crimean War of 1853?
I am not going to speculate on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the documents or their ultimate transmission to the BBC; that is for the inquiry team to determine. I am also not going to discuss the content of the documents, for obvious reasons. As the noble Lord raises issues already in the public domain in relation to HMS “Defender”, and as he will be aware that there was a Written Ministerial Statement on 24 June, I can confirm that HMS “Defender” was proceeding entirely in accordance with international law, behaving entirely appropriately and conducting innocent passage through a stretch of water open to international navigation.
My Lords, breaches of security at such a high level are rightly of concern to members of the public and Members of this House. This Question has important implications regarding blackmail and breaches of the Official Secrets Act. Can the Minister clarify the circumstances in which the documents were found? Can she also say whether it is normal practice to hard copy security materials that can be handled digitally and securely? Will the identity of the negligent official eventually be made public?
As far as the noble Lord’s question relates to the process of investigation, he will appreciate that I am unable to comment on any details pertaining to that. As I have already indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, suitable IT platforms exist across government but it is within the rules to remove documents from the building in certain limited circumstances. However, very strict rules and procedures govern their removal. How the breach occurred is a matter for the investigating team to determine.
My Lords, in the aftermath of the discovery of the papers, the BBC—as the Minister noted—rightly protected operational matters that might have put servicepeople at risk. Its reporting focused on the debate around the decision to send HMS “Defender” on that route. Does the Minister agree that that is a reflection of public interest—in the most genuine sense of the term—in the route decision, which was apparently a subject of disagreement between the two departments concerned? Is it not the case that, while the right of innocent passage may need to have been asserted, the UK might not have been the right country and this might not have been the right way to do it?
Again, I have said that I am not going to comment on the content of the documents, but in so far as matters relating to HMS “Defender” are in the public domain, I will simply repeat to the noble Baroness that HMS “Defender” was acting in accordance with international law and that it was entirely appropriate and legal for the Royal Navy to sail this route; it is an internationally recognised shipping route. Importantly, it is the most direct route from Odessa to Batumi in Georgia. The United Kingdom does not recognise any Russian claim to these waters. The noble Baroness will be aware that, in the Black Sea at that time, there was not only a UK naval presence; allies were present as well.
My Lords, there has been a suggestion that some of the documents were printed on pink paper, indicating the sort of material that should not be removed from the MoD except under exceptional circumstances and according to strict procedures. What were those exceptional circumstances in this case and what are those strict procedures?
The noble Baroness is posing questions about issues that it will be for the investigation team to investigate and determine and, to which it will need to find answers. As I have said, the removal of documents from the building is not unprecedented and, in very strict and regulated circumstances, is permitted. It will be for the investigating team to ascertain in full detail what happened and whether appropriate policies, procedures and processes were duly complied with.
My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government whether continuous at-sea deterrence remains central to their defence policy.
My Lords, the nuclear deterrent will remain essential for as long as the global security climate demands. No alternative system is as capable, resilient or cost effective as a continuous at-sea deterrent capability based in four nuclear-armed submarines. As stated in the Government’s integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, we will maintain our four submarines so that at least one will always be on a continuous at-sea deterrent patrol.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for that reassuring Answer. Is she aware that such knowledge as I have in these matters was learned a very long time ago at the feet of the then Mr George Younger, whose son now sits on the Government Front Bench in your Lordships’ House? Can my noble friend confirm that the number of warheads necessary to maintain this deterrent in an effective form are definitely to hand?
Yes, I can confirm to my noble friend that, to maintain the credibility of the deterrent and the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that it does remain credible and effective against a whole range of state nuclear threats from any direction, an assessment has been made. The UK will move to an overall nuclear weapons stockpile of no more than 260 warheads—an increase of 15% from the previous ceiling of 225. I make it clear this is neither a target nor the current number of warheads, but it represents the upper limit of what we think we might need to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.
My Lords, for over 50 years, the submarine-based nuclear deterrent has ensured peace and acted as the ultimate guarantor of our nation’s security against nuclear blackmail. Those involved in this complex, difficult and continuous enterprise deserve our thanks. Does the decision to run the Vulcan Naval Reactor Test Establishment at Dounreay in Scotland for three years longer than planned, to meet
“the need to support the extended scope of the operational work”,—[Official Report, Commons, 17/6/21; col. 101WS.]
mean that it is related to the life extension of the Vanguard class? As the PWR2 reactor will be running innumerable submarines for many more years, has there been any reassessment of the Royal Navy reactor prototype review of 2015 to see whether Vulcan should remain operating even longer?
As the noble Lord will be aware, we are conscious of the obligations of seeing through the transition from the existing class of nuclear-armed submarines to the new Dreadnought class. That Dreadnought submarine programme remains on track to enter service in the early 2030s. There will be no compromise to the UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent. On the specific points he raises, he will understand I am unable to release specific information about supply, support and logistics. But we are satisfied that our continuous at-sea deterrent is operating effectively now and discharging all its tasks and, in the transition and beyond, will continue to do that.
My Lords, arms control experts have, for years, been advocating that the P5 states—the legally recognised nuclear powers, which include the UK—reaffirm the statement made by Gorbachev and Reagan in 1985 that
“a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
I am sure the Minister is aware that just last week, the current US and Russian Presidents issued that very statement. Will the UK endorse and repeat that statement?
The noble Baroness raises an important point. Most of us in this Chamber can recall the conviction of President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that a nuclear war cannot be won and can recall the contribution that statement made to stability at that time. The avoidance of war between nuclear weapons states and the reduction of nuclear risk is one of our foremost responsibilities. We welcome the US and Russia’s joint statement on 16 June and their commitment to a bilateral strategic stability dialogue. We regard this as a serious signal of intent to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and enhance mutual trust and security by the two countries, which hold almost 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons.
My Lords, given that a single nuclear submarine could deliver nuclear weapons with more than 100 times the destructive yield of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which incinerated over 200,000 people, mostly civilians, does my noble friend agree that while the possession of such weapons of mass destruction may be justified as a necessary evil at present, it remains the firm policy of Her Majesty’s Government to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons? If so, how do they intend to advance that agenda?
I refer my noble friend to the non-proliferation treaty, which the UK regards as a cornerstone of the international multilateral architecture on nuclear issues. Over 50 years on, that treaty continues to be a success. It has created the framework to reduce tensions and arms stockpiles. The UK will continue to work for a successful NPT review conference later this year. Our core objective is to demonstrate international unity behind the treaty and strengthen its implementation.
My Lords, clearly, the nuclear deterrent contributes to the defence of the realm, and its cost to the MoD makes sense. What does the Minister make of the proposals to have a new royal yacht, which, whatever benefits it might bring to trade or global Britain, would appear to bring very little to defence? Why should the MoD be funding it?
It is not a new royal yacht; it is a new national flagship. I think that is a very good thing, if I must make my opinion clear. The noble Baroness is correct that the MoD will be responsible for the initial cost of taking the flagship through the procurement process, but the source of government funding for the rest of the project is still to be determined. To the cynics I would say: this ship will have an important national security and foreign policy function. It is not a warship, and its primary role will be to promote trade and protect the nation’s economic security.
My Lords, if our nuclear deterrent is to be credible, it must also be viable. My noble friend mentioned two aspects of that viability—the continuous at-sea deterrent and having a suitable number of warheads—but is not a third aspect that we must not hand the advantage to our adversaries by being overly prescriptive about the circumstances in which we would use that nuclear deterrent?
As my noble friend is aware, the UK has neither a first-use nor a no-first-use policy, and to avoid simplifying the calculations of our potential adversaries, we will remain deliberately ambiguous about when, how and at what scale we will contemplate use of our nuclear weapons.
My Lords, I declare my interest as patron of the Submariners Association. The Minister’s Answer was welcome. Will she pay tribute to the crews of the current Vanguard class, who are having to work extraordinarily and unbelievably hard, with significant sacrifice for themselves and their families, to keep their ageing submarines going to ensure that the continuous at-sea deterrent is sustained? They will have to continue to do so for another 10 years until the Dreadnought class comes into operational service.
Yes, I certainly echo the noble and gallant Lord’s respect and admiration for the crews on the Vanguard submarines. Every minute of every day of every week of every year, they safeguard the interests of this country and contribute to our alliance within NATO to protect our global friends and partners. We absolutely should put on record our profound appreciation of the crews of these submarines. They are deserving of our highest respect and admiration.
On behalf of Her Majesty’s Opposition, I reiterate our support for the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent as part of our UK defence policy and the contributions it makes to our alliances and the protection of democracy across the world. However, the recent integrated review announced an increase, as the Minister said, in the cap on the number of nuclear warheads to 260. Notwithstanding her earlier replies, can the Minister elaborate further on why this was thought necessary? What has changed to justify the increase? What consultations took place? What is the timescale for the increase to take place?
I can add little to what I said to my noble friend earlier, but I confirm to the noble Lord that we make a continuous assessment of threat—where it is emerging and what its character is. We are clear, as he will understand, that the critical adjective in relation to our deterrent is “credible”; for it to remain credible, our judgment was that we had to increase the number of warheads.
My Lords, the time allowed for this Question has elapsed. We now come to the fourth Oral Question.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great honour to open this debate on Her Majesty’s gracious Speech on the important issues of foreign affairs and defence. I am delighted to be joined by my noble friend Lord Ahmad, who I know will employ his trademark expertise and erudition to good effect in what I have no doubt will be a well-informed, wide-ranging and robust debate. As indeed it should be, because, looking around the Chamber and on the screens, I see a number of distinguished former Foreign and Defence Ministers, not to mention an illustrious miscellany of noble Lords with acknowledged expertise in these areas. Together we will consider in detail the Government’s proposed approach to foreign affairs and defence, in which several themes will continually bubble to the surface: the need for resilience, the restlessness of our ambition, the conviction of our democratic values and the immense opportunities for the United Kingdom as we look to the future.
I want to begin by reminding noble Lords of the changing geopolitical context which forms the backdrop to this debate. We are living in a new era of systemic competition. The dangers are growing. We have seen Russia increasingly assertive, as its recent actions in Ukraine and the Black Sea remind us. We are witnessing a rising China, modernising its forces and assembling the largest naval fleet in the world. States such as North Korea and Iran are posing a growing threat and continuing to destabilise their regions, while the precarious situation in the Middle East, so distressingly visible right now, is giving many of us cause for concern. Meanwhile, the exponential advance of new technology is reshaping the nature of conflict and challenging us to establish new norms that accord with our values. All the while, the threat of global terror has not receded, and the danger of climate change grows.
Our response to this multiplicity, diversity and complexity of growing dangers was the integrated review of security, defence, foreign policy and development—the most comprehensive survey of our defence since the end of the Cold War. It sets out a clear plan for a stronger, more secure, prosperous and resilient United Kingdom, as we build back better from the Covid pandemic. It is a plan to sustain and deepen our strategic advantage through science and technology and to shape the open international order to create a world that leans more to democracies and the defence of our values, all the while building our security and resilience at home and abroad.
The Prime Minister has been clear that defence is at the heart of this programme. To be open and prosperous, we must be secure at home and active in the world. Defence is always the first duty of government. It is our nation’s insurance policy and our ultimate resilience. The Covid crisis renewed our appreciation of and admiration for what the brave and talented men and women of our Armed Forces do daily on our behalf. But our adversaries did not go to sleep through the pandemic—if anything, they redoubled their nefarious efforts. The challenge for us in the years ahead is to make sure we are fit to detect, deter and defeat threats to our people, our allies and our values at home and abroad.
That is why defence has received the most generous settlement in decades: a commitment to spend £188 billion on defence over the coming four years, an increase of £24 billion. Our Command Paper has taken that investment and used it to deliver what amounts to the biggest shift in defence for a generation. It will give us the technologically advanced, integrated and agile force that will underpin our nation’s hard and soft power in this new age of systemic competition. That new-age force is the necessary response to this new-age threat. To those familiar with the old ways, it may be disquieting, but our diplomacy is underwritten by the credibility of our forces—keen to avoid conflict through our global engagement, but always ready to fight to defend our people and our allies. The gracious Speech commits to pushing ahead with this modernisation. Inevitably, this has meant making some hard choices, but those decisions will give us formidable capabilities across sea, land, air, space and cyber.
At sea, our Royal Navy’s fleet is growing for the first time since the Cold War. We will have world-class general purpose frigates, air defence destroyers, hunter-killer submarines and a new multi-role ocean surveillance capability to safeguard our underwater cables in the North Atlantic. In the air, we will have updated Typhoons, brand new F35 Lightning stealth fighters, new unmanned systems capable of striking remotely, and massive investment in the next generation of fighter jets and swarming drones. On the ground, while our Army will be leaner, it will also be more integrated, more active, more lethal and more effective. It will be able to make the most of new Ajax vehicles, revamped attack helicopters, brand new Boxer armoured fighting vehicles, state-of-the-art air defence, long-range precision artillery and new electronic warfare capabilities.
However, none of these conventional capabilities can succeed in the modern battle without new investment in cyber, space and information manoeuvre. We are spending heavily in the National Cyber Force and establishing a new space command that will enhance our military surveillance and communication capabilities from space. We are not alone in seeking to modernise. Our adversaries, as well as our allies, are making rapid headway, so we are putting aside at least £6.6 billion for research and development to supercharge the development of next-generation disruptive capabilities, from directed energy weapons to swarming drones.
Having great capability is not enough. We are also changing our posture, combining permanent presence with high readiness to deliver a decisive impact. Two littoral response groups in the North Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific will, alongside our future commando force, allow us to respond to emerging crises in a matter of hours, not weeks. We will also have a very high readiness global response force, ready to dispatch our newly formed Army Ranger regiments into complex, high-threat environments.
Our people—our defence family—are going to be busier than ever, but we will make sure that they are properly looked after. No one in this place will disagree that they are our finest asset. That is why measures within the gracious Speech enshrine our Armed Forces covenant in law. The covenant has already made a huge difference to the lives of Armed Forces families: 79,000 service children in the United Kingdom now benefit from £24.5 million of additional pupil funding, and 22,200 service personnel have been helped on to the housing ladder by the Forces Help to Buy scheme.
However, we cannot rest on our laurels. Some members of our Armed Forces community are still suffering disadvantage in accessing public services. The gracious Speech will give our covenant legal force, placing a duty on public bodies responsible for the delivery of key functions in the areas of housing, education and healthcare to have due regard to the covenant principles. Separately, we want to make sure our fantastic veterans are given greater opportunities. We will introduce new measures to support veterans and reward employers of former service personnel by providing national insurance contribution relief for the employment of veterans.
Switch from home to away, we will continue to strengthen the international system as it feels the strain of deepening competition and revisionist pressures. We remain committed to European security and NATO remains a cornerstone of our defence. That is why we have ensured that we are the second biggest spender in NATO and a major contributor across all five domains, including the nuclear deterrent. As a leading light in the alliance, we also have a responsibility to support its reform. Measures in this gracious Speech will see us reinforcing our commitment to NATO transformation.
Meanwhile, we will continue pursuing constructive relationships and trade agreements with our neighbours in Europe based on mutual respect for sovereignty. We are realistic about the challenges we face, but optimistic about our future as an active European country with a global perspective—bringing countries together to solve the issues that matter most to our citizens to improve their lives.
As ever, no partnership is more valuable to us than our special relationship with the United States, as highlighted by the high-level calls made by our Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to their American counterparts in recent weeks and the Defence Secretary’s meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. We are both committed to standing up for open democratic societies, we see eye to eye on climate change and we share many of the same security threats. It is only by working together overseas that we can keep our citizens safe at home.
Our Armed Forces are a global advertisement for British values, capabilities and leadership. They work alongside our gold standard, world-leading diplomatic and development network to shape the international order, build global resilience, sustain open societies and economies, and overcome global challenges. Whether in the many UN peacekeeping missions we are currently supporting or our application to become a formal dialogue partner with ASEAN, the best of UK defence is in tandem with the best of UK diplomacy—working hand in hand to protect global Britain on the world stage.
Last year the UK played a leading global role in the fightback against the pandemic. This year we will provide global leadership to international efforts to overcome the greatest challenges of our time. Next month we will host the G7 summit in Cornwall, in July we will co-host the global education summit with Kenya, and in November we will chair the UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow, COP 26, in partnership with Italy. All the while, we will maintain and strengthen our networks and instruments of influence overseas.
Using our global diplomatic network and the British Council to forge alliances and uphold human rights and democracy across the world, we will take forward global efforts to get an additional 40 million girls into school, provide aid where it has greatest impact on reducing poverty and alleviating human suffering, and—importantly—return to our commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income on development when the fiscal situation allows. All of this, combined with our ongoing training and development programmes around the world, maintains our position as a global soft power superpower.
Next week our magnificent HMS “Queen Elizabeth” carrier embarks on her maiden mission. As one of the two largest warships ever built for the Royal Navy, she will lead a British and allied task group on the UK’s most ambitious global deployment for two decades, visiting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific. This deployment has attracted significant interest from other states and has a tangible convening power. I can think of no greater illustration of our global ambition; an ambition that runs like a golden thread through the gracious Speech; an ambition to strengthen our resilience, seize our opportunities and cement our role as a force for good in the world.
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Lords ChamberMy Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, I welcome the fact that HMS “Queen Elizabeth” is now ready to lead the carrier strike group. Clearly, we are in a new phase of British maritime history. We are obviously in a phase in which the Government are seeking to “go global”, as the Prime Minister has put it on so many occasions, and to do so with a ship that is extraordinary in many ways. The Secretary of State, in his Statement, pointed out that it was truly a step change in capability and that to appreciate the enormity of the vessel, you must stand on its vast deck.
I have not stood on the HMS “Queen Elizabeth” but I did have the opportunity to visit HMS “Prince of Wales” in dock when it was under construction. It is a most incredible ship. However, when the ships were being announced, Russia was very scathing about the size and visibility of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. I am sure that the Minister will be very quick to say that this is nonsense and that the ships are very well defended, but can she give us some indication of the way in which HMS “Queen Elizabeth” is being supported? It is very clear that this carrier strike group, as laid out in the Secretary of State’s Statement, has, as is suggested, a ring of capability. Most of the ships—the destroyers and the anti-submarine frigates—are British vessels, but how far into the future have the Government thought and planned about the support that can be given?
There is a great deal of emphasis on the work with the Dutch and the Americans. To what extent do the Government see this carrier strike group as being a way of having more multilateral deployments, or is HMS “Queen Elizabeth” intended to be part of a solely British force in future? It is obviously important that bilateral training is going on. Can the Minister tell the House a little more about what is envisaged with our European allies? There is a very clear statement that the carrier strike group will demonstrate our enduring commitment to NATO, but a little more about the links with Europe would be very welcome.
The Statement talks about this being sovereign territory. Clearly it is important in terms of many of our international commitments that the Queen Elizabeth class carriers are indeed able to travel to the Pacific. We have recently seen issues of navigability, with the problems in Suez, and we know that shipping is so vital to trade. It is clearly welcome that HMS “Queen Elizabeth” is leading this carrier strike group, but can the Minister tell us a little bit more about its aims? The Secretary of State talked about being a projector of hard and soft power. Many people listening from outside the Chamber—who maybe do not have any defence experience—might wonder how on earth the Queen Elizabeth class carriers can project soft power. I suspect I know the answer but it would be interesting to hear the Government’s perspective on that.
This is an interesting deployment, but it is notable how important the UK says it is that we do not allow countries to breach international law. We note then that the carrier is going close to China but not seeking to be provocative. What signals do the Government wish to send to China with this deployment?
My Lords, first, I genuinely thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for their positive comments about the carrier and the carrier strike group. It is a moment for reflection and pride that we have been able to assemble such an impressive demonstration of our commitment to our global reach and global responsibilities. I can confirm to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that the extent of the interest from across the globe has been very significant; this is clearly proving an exciting proposition to our friends and allies.
To deal with some of the specific points raised, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, particularly asked about the crewing of the “Queen Elizabeth”. In December 2020, the carrier strike group declared that it had reached initial operating capability. It is about to embark on its final training in UK waters next month and exercise Strike Warrior will test the strike group through a range of operational scenarios. At the end of this period the operational commander, the chief of joint operations, will be presented with a declaration that the carrier strike group is ready to deploy on operations.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked about the use of UK-produced steel. That is an important issue and was raised in the other place. I reassure the noble Lord that we recognise the importance of the United Kingdom steel industry and, in fact, British steel has accounted for almost half of the steel by value in the build of the Type 26. As to the more detailed information he seeks, I should like to try to procure that and I propose that I write to the noble Lord. I hope that he will permit me to do that.
Among other issues, the noble Lord also raised the shipbuilding strategy, which the Government have pledged to publish. We are working at pace to refresh the national shipbuilding strategy and it will contain details of how we intend to monitor the success of the strategy. My understanding is that we hope to be able to provide further information on this in early summer.
The noble Lord also raised the issue of the sovereign core of the carrier group and whether there will be enough British warships to sail with our own British carriers. The sovereign core of the group are the Royal Navy frigates and destroyers, helicopters and submarine that will routinely deploy with the carrier. The United Kingdom has 18 F-35s, and we could now put all 18 on the aircraft carrier. We could deploy the aircraft carrier group alone or with allies.
This deployment is in fact about our strength compared with that of our adversaries. We have friends and alliances, and that is vital, because it means that, if there is any attack on us, it is an attack on NATO—to attack us is to attack our allies. That is our real strength globally so, as I said, we have a huge expression of interest from countries wanting to sail with us and stand up for our common values.
The noble Lord raised the issue of what happens when the “Queen Elizabeth” returns to military business. I think he was particularly interested in knowing whether it would involve patrolling the North Atlantic, the high north and the Mediterranean. NATO is obviously our cornerstone; our home beat is the Atlantic and that is where our most aggressive adversary is active. Only recently we saw it active in December when nine Russian ships were operating in the waters around the UK; the Russians have been assertive. That is why it is important that we are active and hold the Atlantic flank of NATO as well as using our convening ability to bring in the French, Germans and others who wish to patrol the seas alongside us. While the noble Lord will understand that I cannot comment on specific operational deployment, the carrier strike group is intended to have a holistic role in our defence activity.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, whom I thank for her positive comments, raised a number of important points. She asked particularly about the threat of Russia and the comments that it has made in relation to the carrier presence, asserting that it is vulnerable. I reassure her that our UK Armed Forces play a leading role in NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltic states to enhance Euro-Atlantic security. In response to the comments about the carrier itself, we keep all threats under constant review, and we are confident that our new aircraft carrier is well protected thanks to defensive systems that we have invested in as part of our £178 billion equipment plan. The carrier will be robustly protected by air and sea assets against threats known and unknown.
The noble Baroness made an important point about our European allies. Again, we are very conscious that the security of Europe is pivotal to the security of the UK and vice versa. In the European context, we are one of the leading powers in NATO; we are the largest spender of the NATO European members and we have strong bilateral relationships with various European countries. Those are relationships that we value hugely, and our desire is to maintain a constructive and engaged dialogue with our friends in Europe. There is an awareness of the mutual interest and benefit to us all in doing that.
The noble Baroness commented on soft power. That is a very important aspect of the approach. The carrier strike group is in fact a manifestation of the objective of the integrated review, which was to look at defence, security, trade and diplomacy and to recognise that these are all interconnected and do not exist alone in silos. That is one reason why the carrier strike group not only has defence security significance but has the flexibility to afford the promotion of relationships with friends and allies in different parts of the world and particularly to facilitate discussions in relation, for example, to trade. A trade conference has been proposed that would be on board CSG21 units. The strike group will play an important role in relation to these issues.
The noble Baroness also raised the role of China. It is important to be clear about the objective of the strike group. The strike group is to represent the support and positive relationships with our friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific area. It is not intended to be confrontational and the group will obviously be visiting parts of the South China Seas. We have enduring interest in the region and are committed to maintaining regional security. Wherever the Royal Navy operates, it does so in full compliance with international laws and norms. That is why we are clear that this deployment is not to be regarded as provocative or confrontational. That is not why we are engaging on this important exercise; it is because we want to show to our friends and allies in the region that the area matters to us. Strategically, it is important because of trade and potential trade links. It is also important in relation to our existing defence relationships that we have in that area. We are therefore positive about the reasons for this exercise. From the reaction we are getting, our friends and allies in the area are positive about us coming.
I scribbled down something that the noble Baroness asked me and I am ashamed to say that I cannot remember what it was about. I wrote down “international” but cannot recall the context of her question. I apologise. I will look at Hansard and undertake to write to her.
I understand that the Chief Whip wishes to speak now. Is that correct? I have been told that the noble Lord wanted to interrupt. I thank him. We will now proceed to the 20 minutes for the Back-Benchers.
My Lords, I applaud this deployment and it is excellent to see this extremely expensive carrier being put to good use. I wish the deployment of the strike force well and godspeed in these dangerous times. Does my noble friend think that it is sensible in such times to be reducing the number of ships in the Royal Navy and the number of aircraft in the Royal Air force, and slashing the size of the British Army? What signal does she think that that may send to our allies and potential adversaries?
I should say to my noble friend that I do not share his somewhat pessimistic perspective. He will be aware that the defence budget is at unprecedented levels, which includes a healthy shipbuilding investment that will double over the life of this Parliament, rising to over £1.7 billion a year. We are also committed to exciting developments on our aerial front, including the RAF with the FCAS and our proposed investment in the F-35s. I should say to him in relation to the Army that we are moving into a completely new age of defence. That has been acknowledged, not just in the integrated review but in the defence Command Paper and the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. He will understand that our intentions for the Army are to have a highly trained, skilled professional Army with expertise and which benefits from new technologies. Quite simply, that makes it possible for the Army to work with fewer people and achieve greater effect than was possible in the past. That is the point we have got to focus on. I should also say to my noble friend that we do not propose redundancies, but we will be looking at ways in which to achieve the diminutions with those who seek to retire.
My Lords, as a submariner I echo the opening part of the Statement and its sentiments regarding condolences to the Indonesian navy and the families of the ship’s company of the submarine KRI Nanggala following its loss. I am sure your Lordships share these sentiments. Considerable fundraising efforts are well under way within the UK submarine community, aimed at supporting the bereaved families of the 53 fellow submariners lost.
Regarding the main part of the Statement, I welcome the very good lay down of what a carrier strike group can provide strategically, operationally and tactically. In the context of the strike group’s deployment to the Indo-Pacific, it is good to see recognition of the need to exert our legal right to freedom of navigation, especially in the South China Sea, and the opportunity that will be taken to re-energise our partnerships and alliances in the region, particularly with the FPDA.
The Statement very wisely does not give the carrier strike group’s detailed itinerary, thus rightly preserving the sovereign choice of options provided by a maritime force through its ability to poise on the high seas and come and go at a time of its choosing, and its range and flexibility of manoeuvre and capabilities, hard and soft. However, does the Minister agree that it would be sensible to look for an opportunity to establish a maritime relationship with the United States, India, Japan and Australia through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Quad?
I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his condolences regarding the tragic situation of the Indonesian submarine where so many lives were lost. I share these condolences, and I am sure they are shared by everyone in the Chamber. I was very encouraged to hear what he said about our own submariner community showing support; we are very proud of it for doing that.
The noble and gallant Lord raises the important issue of the implications and impact of the carrier strike group, particularly in the Indo-Pacific area. As he rightly identifies, there are strategic, geopolitical and trade interests there and, of course, the important alliances and partnerships I referred to earlier. He is absolutely correct that the countries he has described are important to the United Kingdom. We already enjoy very strong relationships with these countries through a variety of means, and I am sure we are always willing to explore how these relationships can be advanced and progressed. He raises an interesting point, and that is no doubt something that will give rise to further discussion.
My Lords, I congratulate the Government on generating this powerful force and agreeing to deploy it into regions of the world that are so important for our nation and for global security. They are also regions of the world where we are the largest European investor, and we need them for our balance of payments.
Twenty-five years ago in January, I was the battle group commander for a battle group of 19 ships which: deployed from the UK and went out through the Mediterranean; worked in the Gulf; flew the first operations in the Iraqi no-fly zone—only our fighters were able to do it, from the carrier; operated in the Indian Ocean; went to Singapore for a five-power defence arrangement; carried out an amphibious assault of over 2,000 men in Brunei; went through the South China Sea, Japan, Korea and numerous other countries; was there for the Hong Kong withdrawal; visited Australia; and returned home.
What came over to me then was that the Foreign Office was so desperately pleased with everything that was done in diplomatic terms and what it meant for UK Ltd. I signed £2.5 billion-worth of defence and other deals—not just defence contracts—and we were able to do humanitarian things in various parts of the world. The ability of a group to do these things is absolutely there. Just on the intelligence side of life, it was clear to us that the Chinese were very worried when they saw the capabilities of this group that we could deploy 8,000 miles away and carry out an amphibious assault. It makes their islands look a bit dodgy and they have to think about it. When I operated with 22 ships in the North Atlantic the year before, it showed the flexibility; these ships can get everywhere, and the Russians were very worried because they could never find us.
This is a very powerful and useful group, and well done to the Government for doing it. But I also say beware, because when I sailed from the UK in January it was a Conservative Government; when I returned in August it was a Labour Government, and my noble friend Lord Robertson of Port Ellen was the Minister of Defence, who was so taken by the capability of this force that in his very good strategic defence review he decided we needed big carriers. I am delighted we got them, because now we have them today doing this.
My question may be only a petty one. There is no doubt that this shipbuilding strategy sounds very good, but I am scarred by being told I am going to get ships but never standing on their quarterdeck. In each of the big deployments I did as a carrier battle group commander, I had two solid support ships with me. I notice that only one is going out to the Far East, and it is over 40 years old—RFA “Fort Victoria”. I ask the Minister: when will we actually put in the order for the three fleet solid support ships we need, and will they be built in this country? It is no good these things being put off. It is like with the Type 26s: we need the orders, and we need to start building.
First, I say to the noble Lord that his youthful demeanour belies that he was commanding this impressive operation—I think it was Ocean Wave—in 1997. I am grateful to him for powerfully encapsulating the potential that a carrier strike group has. He made the point extremely well.
As the noble Lord is aware, we have a shipbuilding programme in place; he and I have exchanged views on that in the Chamber. I think it is a healthy programme; I detected from a meeting this morning that it has excited Navy Command and people there feel a sense of purpose and anticipation. I am delighted about that, because, as the noble Lord would agree, morale within our Armed Forces is very important. So I am pleased to confirm that.
On the fleet solid support ships, the noble Lord will probably be aware this is at a critical stage of contract progress, where consideration will be given to the award of a contract. I am constricted in what I can say about that, but he will know that the Secretary of State has been clear about his desire to proceed with augmenting the solid support ship fleet, and I anticipate we may be able to disclose more on that front in the not too distant future.
My Lords, I am a little worried by the air of nostalgia in several paragraphs of this Statement, with references to our
“proud history … legendary Second World War vessels”,
and so on.
Does the Minister recall the speeches our then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, made in his visits to the Middle East in December 2016 and early 2017, in which he talked about Britain returning east of Suez, having major bases in the Gulf and Diego Garcia and stationing vessels permanently out there—and, perhaps, marines and troops? Does she worry that this may lead us to overextension? Does she also recall that part of the justification for the withdrawal from east of Suez in the mid-1960s was that in order to sustain a ship on station in Singapore or east Singapore, it was estimated that four other vessels were needed—going out, coming back, working up and under refit? If that is what we are committed to, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord West, in that we need an awful lot more frigates and aircraft carriers than we have.
I was just trying to race through the potted history of all this. As the noble Lord, Lord West, carefully and eloquently outlined, we all have an understanding of what this is about, and we all regard it as being positive. The key to this is that we recognise we are living in a world where we work more strongly with alliances and partnerships.
As the carrier strike group heads off in May, it will be the start of a series of important messages and an indication of a more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific area. There are plans for how we achieve that, and there will be flexibility in how we take that forward.
The noble Lord may think some of the language is tub-thumping and perhaps Victorian in character. I think this is facing up to the realities of what 21st-century global opportunity is. There are opportunities, and that is one of the reasons for the carrier strike group deploying. It is also a realistic assessment of the new order of things in the Indo-Pacific area and a desire to work with our allies and partners in recognising and addressing that.
My Lords, growing up, one of my fondest memories was visiting naval ships on good-will tours. Our carrier strike group will be visiting 40 countries. Due to Covid, I imagine we will have restrictions on visitor open days, but will my noble friend the Minister tell us whether we have thought of alternative, maybe even virtual, means to show the flag during this tour?
My noble friend makes an important point. This entire deployment has been planned with a sharp eye on the possible implications of the pandemic. I reassure both my noble friend and the Chamber that we are deploying the carrier strike group mindful of the risks of Covid-19. We are working hard within the strike group itself and alongside nations that we hope to engage with during the deployment to ensure that we implement and understand the current safety measures and requirements, and can plan activity accordingly. But he makes a good point: what is plan B if, for any reason, the pandemic intervenes in an unwelcome fashion? We will look to ensure that we maximise engagement, as far as possible. We will be creative and innovative and, yes, use virtual means where appropriate.
My Lords, I ask the Minister: how many small ships are left to protect the United Kingdom’s coastline, when those required to accompany the carrier strike group are taken away?
I reassure the noble Lord that we are satisfied that we will have sufficient maritime capability to deal with all the obligations that fall on us to keep the country safe and discharge our defence responsibilities.
My Lords, I frame my question in the context of the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, which places supporting human rights, the rule of law and the COP climate process at the centre of our approach to security.
The Statement is glowing about our Five Power Defence Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, which is described as being based on
“common shared values of tolerance, justice and the rules-based order.”
I ask the Minister how that squares with the failure to make progress on the rule of law and democracy in Malaysia, including its use of the Communications and Multimedia Act to target human rights offenders, activists and cartoonists; the delivery of a death penalty sentence for drugs offences by Zoom, in Singapore last year, and the pursuit of political bloggers with swingeing defamation suits there; and the disastrous record of Australia on climate action and biodiversity destruction, plus the damning judgment of the UN special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on its treatment of indigenous people.
The noble Baroness encapsulates the relevance, significance and purpose of the carrier strike group. The difficulties to which she refers can be unilaterally addressed by the United Kingdom on the diplomatic front. We engage with Malaysia, and we articulate concerns when we feel that matters need to be brought to the attention of any Government. I underline that the carrier strike group is about standing up for the values that we all cherish within the United Kingdom—values we know are shared by our friends and allies, not least in the Indo-Pacific area. One of the best manifestations and indications of support that we can give is to get the carrier strike group out there, with the momentum it will generate and its capacity to excite, encourage and make our friends and allies realise that, together, there is so much that we can do that is positive and can assist. The common difficulties to which she refers are part of that, and will have a better chance of being resolved if we all work as a team to address them.
That completes noble Lords’ questions on the Statement.
(3 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do not insist on its Amendments 1S, 1T and 1U and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 1V, 1W, 1X, 1Y and 1Z in lieu.
My Lords, I am extremely pleased to confirm that the Commons has agreed to the government Amendments 1V, 1W and 1X in lieu of Lords Amendments 1S to 1U. In doing so, I draw attention to the consequential Amendments 1Y and 1Z—which were also agreed—to the government amendments, which serve only to delete the now unnecessary definition of articles in Schedule 1.
As I set out in some detail in our debate on this issue on Monday, it has always been the Government’s view that the measures in the Bill will not increase the risk of our service personnel or veterans being investigated or prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. Accepting this amendment in lieu, which will exclude all offences that fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, including war crimes, will offer further reassurance and put this issue beyond any doubt.
The other place has agreed to Lords Amendment 1R, which excludes all offences under the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 from Part 1 of the Bill. The grave breaches of the Geneva conventions referred to in that Act are also war crimes offences through the International Criminal Court Act 2001. As such, it is right that these offences should also be included in Schedule 1 in order to maintain a consistent approach.
The measures in Part 1 of the Bill will apply to all “overseas operations”, as defined in Clause 1(6), and it is perhaps worth remembering that not all alleged offences committed on an overseas operation will amount to an ICC Act offence. I can reassure your Lordships, therefore, that service personnel and veterans will continue to receive the benefits of the additional protections provided by the measures in Part 1 of the Bill in respect of historical alleged criminal offences under the criminal law of England and Wales through the Armed Forces Act 2006, saving those offences that have been excluded by Schedule 1.
The decision of whether to exclude war crimes from the measures in the Bill has limited practical effect. In practice, the prosecutor would still have retained their discretion to prosecute an individual for a war crime, because any credible allegation would be likely to trigger the exceptionality threshold in the presumption. The decision to exclude war crimes is aligned with the highest standards that we expect from all our Armed Forces personnel, the overwhelming majority of whom meet those expectations and serve with great distinction. But we rightly hold anyone to account when they fall short of these expectations.
The Bill delivers the Government’s commitment to protect our service personnel and veterans from the threat of legal proceedings in connection with historical overseas operations many years after the events in question, and it reinforces our continuing commitment to strengthen the rule of law and maintain our leading role in upholding the rules-based international system. We intend to maintain our leading role in the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
The Government have listened to the concerns of both Houses, particularly the concerns so eloquently expressed by noble Lords on this matter, and the other place has accepted the government amendments in lieu. I therefore urge your Lordships to likewise accept these amendments.
I also beg to move Motion B, that this House do not insist on its Amendment 5B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their reason 5C.
My Lords, first, I offer my apologies to the Chamber and the Deputy Speaker for my inadvertent acceleration of proceedings. At this time of day, immediately after a Statement, I fell into the trap of reading the two speeches I found in the folder together. I emphasise that no discourtesy was intended to the Chamber, and very particularly I say to the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, that none was intended to him.
I thank noble Lords for their comments, and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for his singular contribution to this issue. I am very grateful that on what is an important issue we have managed to reach a position acceptable to him and his fellow contributors. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her helpful comments on the Bill and for her desire to get it passed. I also express to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, my appreciation of his acknowledgement, while he may still have reservations about aspects of the Bill, of the progress made to bring it to an acceptable place.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions, and I commend the Motion.
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 5B to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5C.
I beg to move Motion B. I again apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, for inadvertently making my speech in advance; I am sure that all your Lordships will be relieved to hear that I do not intend to repeat it. However, I wish to say how much I have appreciated the noble Lord’s profound and passionate interest in the issue which he is pursuing. I know that that is born out of a genuine desire to do his best and ensure that Parliament does its best for our Armed Forces personnel. Therefore, although I will not repeat my speech, I shall certainly listen with great interest to what he has to say.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)
My Lords, again, after another overwhelming majority in this House, the Government have rejected a duty of care standard for personnel and veterans who face investigations and litigations. This legislation is still very far from doing what it says on the tin: protecting British forces personnel serving overseas from vexatious litigation and shoddy investigations. It still fails to incorporate a duty of care for forces personnel who are faced with allegations, investigations, and litigation.
The gap was identified by veterans faced with investigation or litigation consistently saying that they are cut adrift by their chain of command and abandoned entirely by the MoD, with no legal, pastoral, or mental health support. Major Bob Campbell made that point so powerfully, from his own dreadful experience, in evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place. As the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, has said,
“when this new Bill passes into law it will singularly fail to provide the protection that serving and veteran members of the Armed Forces believe it should provide.”—[Official Report, 26/4/21; col. 2109.]
The Government’s arguments have been weak against this amendment. They argued that they already provide this support, yet a gap has been clearly highlighted time and again. They also argued that it could lead to more troops being caught up in litigation—when all the Government need to do to avoid this is to fulfil their responsibilities—and that the duty of care amendment has drafting issues, when the Government have failed to produce their own version, as with the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Robertson.
With prorogation fast approaching, I accept that we should not divide on this amendment tonight. I will be entirely happy if the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, withdraws his amendment for now, but I urge the Minister to think hard about this, as we will return to this issue in the Armed Forces Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his comments, and for his warm personal comments to me as an individual, which I appreciate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their contributions.
The noble Lord referred to this as a matter of principle. He may be surprised to hear me say that a duty of care is a very important matter of principle. On the principle, there is proximity between him and the Government, but the divergence of view is on the mechanism. Does doing this by statute makes things better for our Armed Forces personnel, or does such a statutory creation, through unintended consequences, inadvertently make things worse by creating scope for more litigation and possibly inhibiting operational command?
These are significant matters, and I sense that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, recognises the need for caution—not in terms of what we all want, because I think there is a lot of agreement on that, but on the question of how we safely get there.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, for not pushing this to a Division this evening and recognising that there is merit in getting this Bill passed, but I warmly suggest to him that we continue our engagement and continue to explore whether we can find a route forward. I am a great believer in dialogue and discourse; when there is such obvious conjunction of opinion over what we want to try to achieve for our Armed Forces personnel and why, I like to think it might be possible to explore a safe road towards arriving at that destination—one which does not involve the hazards I have outlined.
I look forward to that continued engagement with the noble Lord and again express my appreciation to him for not moving this issue to a Division this evening.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do not insist on its Amendment 1 and do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 1A to 1Q in lieu.
My Lords, in proposing their amendments in lieu, the Government have listened to the very real concerns expressed by many in both Houses. I wholeheartedly concur with the thanks expressed by the Minister for Defence People and Veterans in the other place last week to my friend—I call him my “friend” in the most healthy and familial sense of the word—the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for his constructive approach to this issue.
The Government have recognised the strength of concern that, by excluding only sexual offences and not other serious offences, the Bill risks damaging not only the UK’s reputation for upholding international humanitarian and human rights law, including the United Nations convention against torture, but also the reputation of our Armed Forces.
While the other place rejected the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, they accepted the Government's amendments in lieu to add genocide, crimes against humanity and torture to the excluded offences in Schedule 1, and to remove the delegated power in Clause 6(6), which allows the Secretary of State to amend Schedule 1.
Although we can be absolutely reassured that our Armed Forces would never resort to acts of genocide or crimes against humanity, and that it would be extremely unlikely for individual members of the services to be charged with such offences, the Government accepted, with the support of the other place, that not explicitly excluding these offences from the Bill was a clear omission that needed to be rectified. In addition, the Government recognised, with the support of the other place, that, to prevent any further perceived damage to the UK’s reputation in respect of our ongoing commitment to upholding the rule of law and our international obligations—particularly the United Nations convention against torture—torture offences should also be added to the list of excluded offences in Schedule 1.
Although the Government were not supportive of excluding further offences at that stage, they have continued to reflect on the very real concerns in both Houses that all offences that fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, including war crimes, should be excluded from the measures in Part 1. I can confirm to the House that the Government will therefore table an amendment in lieu of Motion A1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to exclude war crimes also.
I am also aware that many continue to have concerns that the International Criminal Court can step in to investigate and prosecute United Kingdom Armed Forces personnel. I am happy to reassure on the perceived risk of ICC intervention. I invite your Lordships to consider the criteria that might surround an allegation that the complainant maintains is a war crime. The prosecutor would have to consider the case evidence referred by the service police and if, in the opinion of the prosecutor, the evidence was sufficient to indicate that a war crime had been committed and that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction, the prosecutor would consider the public interest in the case being prosecuted, including whether the accused was fit to stand trial. With the strong likelihood that a prosecutor would determine that the case should be prosecuted, subject to the consent of the Attorney-General, this could all proceed well within five years.
However, if, for some reason, the allegation did not arise until after five years but sufficient evidence still existed that a war crime had been committed, the prosecutor could still determine that the public interest in prosecuting such a serious offence would rebut the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. A prosecution would therefore proceed, again subject to the consent of the Attorney-General.
It is important to be clear that there are already many instances where a prosecutor could exercise discretion not to prosecute a case and the ICC would not intervene—for example, if the evidence was not deemed sufficient because it was not robust, or the recollections of the witnesses were unclear or in conflict with each other. In such circumstances, the prosecutor might likely conclude, understandably, that there was not a justiciable case, and the case would not proceed to prosecution. In this case, the prosecutor would not have to consider the public interest or the Bill’s measures. However, in this circumstance, although the International Criminal Court could theoretically seek to intervene, it is inconceivable to me that it would.
Similarly, if the prosecutor exercising the discretion he or she has under the existing prosecutorial guidance took the view that the accused was not fit to stand trial, and that a prosecution was not sustainable or not in the public interest for some other valid reason, I think it again inconceivable that the ICC would intervene. As such, we have to be very careful with the distinction between “could” and “would”. I am illustrating how, if a prosecutor decides for valid reasons not to prosecute, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the ICC would consider that the UK is unwilling or unable to prosecute a particular case and would then intervene.
Furthermore, I also make clear that, in accordance with the International Criminal Court’s procedures, a preliminary examination would first need to be initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor to decide whether it would be necessary for the ICC to seek to intervene in a state investigation or prosecution. In practice, if the Office of the Prosecutor were to raise issues with us, this would trigger a long and detailed preliminary examination of the situation, within which we would be consulted each step of the way. This would mean that we would have many opportunities to prevent UK service personnel being prosecuted at the International Criminal Court. We are confident that we would be able to show that the UK national system is both willing and able to conduct investigations and prosecutions, thus excluding the ICC’s jurisdiction over UK service personnel.
I have given that rather lengthy analysis and explanation because I seek to provide further reassurance to your Lordships on this particular issue. I believe that Commons Amendments 1A to 1Q go a very long way to addressing the concerns of this House in respect of relevant offences. I therefore urge that the House agrees to them, in lieu of Lords Amendment 1. I can confirm that the Government will not oppose Amendments 1R to 1U in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, noting that they will table a further amendment in lieu tomorrow. I beg to move.
Motion A1 (as an amendment to Motion A)
My Lords, following the overwhelming defeat in this House a couple of weeks ago, the Government’s decision to accept parts of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to exclude torture, genocide and crimes against humanity from the presumption against prosecution was a welcome step forward. This was testament to the efforts of the noble Lord and the vast coalition of supporters inside and outside this House. I pay tribute to them all today.
We should not forget that these serious offences are illegal and immoral. Under all circumstances, they must be investigated, and if there are grounds for the allegations, there must be prosecutions and punishment. Not including them in Schedule 1 from the beginning was a mistake, and one that could have led to British personnel and veterans being dragged before the ICC, as the ICC’s chief prosecutor herself said. Now, she has written another letter about the current government concessions, saying:
“I remain concerned that many war crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction would still be subject to the envisaged statutory presumption … any gap between the scope of coverage in the excludable offences under the proposed legislation and conduct which might otherwise constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court would risk the persistence of … rendering relevant cases concerning such conduct admissible before the ICC.”
Therefore, it was clear that there remained a serious problem and that the Government were still picking and choosing some crimes that are covered by the Geneva conventions.
We still believe that war crimes must be excluded and strongly support Motion A1 to exclude everything covered by Article 8.2 of the Rome treaty. We are therefore delighted with the Minister’s speech. Essentially, I believe the Government accept the essence of Motion A1, and we will see that in the new amendment from the Commons. I thank the Minister for her efforts and her willingness to talk to many interested parties. We have got to the right place.
It might be useful to lay out what I expect to happen now. As I understand it, Motion A1 will be pressed by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and the Government will accept it on the voices. It will then go back to the Commons, and an amendment in lieu will be moved by the Government. It will have substantially the same effect as Motion A1, and it will be approved in the Commons. The new amendment will then be returned to us, where we will unreservedly welcome and approve it. That will be a happy outcome to this complex debate.
I join other Members in celebrating that there have been a variety of speeches looking at this subject in this session, in previous sessions and outside the House. I accept that getting the balance right is a matter of some subtlety, but I believe we have got to the right place, and I look forward to the amendment in lieu coming back to us.
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. Again, I thank and pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for his assiduous attention and perseverance in respect of this issue. I endeavoured to engage widely, and I thank noble Lords for the recognition of that engagement. I was anxious to do my level best to understand where the concerns really lay.
I thank noble Lords for the welcome they have extended to the Government’s change of position on this. As indicated by the last speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, I welcome the recognition that there was a balance to be struck. I now detect, quite clearly, I think, that your Lordships are seeing the Bill reach a shape whereby it is a positive advance, providing clarity and greater certainty to our Armed Forces personnel. As I said in my opening speech, the Government will not oppose the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and they will table an amendment in lieu to ensure drafting accuracy.
I am delighted with what the Government have said and with the support that has been given to this amendment in this House. We are doing absolutely the right thing by our troops. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, makes the strong point, which I have heard from a number of military officers, that to have left any vestige of possibility that our troops might have appeared before the International Criminal Court would have been a disgrace, entirely wrong and very damaging to the morale of those who are still deployed to defend this country and its interests.
The offences under Article 8.2 of the Rome statute are protected in international law as being without limit of time. To have invoked any presumption against prosecution for those offences would have been to be in breach of international law and international humanitarian law. If that had happened, it would have been a stain on our country, or, as one of the senior military representatives said, a national embarrassment.
This country has also been saved from the use of this legislation by every dictator and warlord in the world, who would have used it as a precedent for their own illegal actions. Even in the last few weeks, we have seen a number of countries subject to the ICC jurisdiction praying in aid this draft of the legislation. We have been saved from that as well.
I, of course, admire and respect those who serve in our name in conflicts overseas. They do so bravely, tenaciously and professionally. As Defence Secretary and then Secretary-General of NATO, I often had to make decisions about the deployment of these individuals and place them in harm’s way. These were never easy decisions to make, but I was comforted by the fact that our Armed Forces always act within the law. To single them out as being somehow above these laws would have done a disservice to them and to their purpose.
I thank the Minister for her consideration and for listening, the Secretary of State, who listened to the voices that have come from such a wide range of opinion, and all those who have helped in this particular argument. I look forward to seeing, before they are tabled, the drafting amendments that the Minister promises will be brought forward for the amendment in lieu in the other place. As a matter of form, I beg to move Motion A1.
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 2 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 2A.
My Lords, it is the Government’s view that the timescales included in the amendment are operationally unrealistic, do not take account of the nature of investigations on overseas operations and could put us in breach of our international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to effectively investigate serious crimes. Where the service police have reason to believe that an offence may have been committed, they have a legal duty to investigate it. Artificial timelines and restrictions placed on them in respect of the conduct of investigations would clearly prevent them carrying out effective investigations and would impinge on their statutory independence.
My Lords, we continue to accept and recognise the problem of baseless allegations and legal claims arising from Iraq and Afghanistan under both Labour and Conservative Governments. But the Bill, unamended, just does not do what was promised—that is, to protect British personnel serving overseas from vexatious legal claims and shoddy investigations. This is the gaping hole in this Bill, and it could be neatly fixed in the way that was proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas.
I remind the Minister that the conditions set on investigations in the amendment are not arbitrary, nor are they time limited. The proposal ensures timely, not time-limited, investigations. This is not unrealistic, because it has been tried and tested in civilian law, and that is one of the reasons why the former Judge Advocate-General is so keen on such a proposal. We have worked hard with the Government and across the House to try to build a consensus on this. While we believe this has been achieved with colleagues from all sides, the Government remain extremely resistant to proposals, so we are forced to recognise the restraints and realities of ping-pong. Therefore, we support the calls by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for the amendment to be referred to Sir Richard Henriques, and reported on in time for it to be considered in the Armed Forces Bill, to ensure that we return to the issue.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for his Motion B1. He referred to my remarks at Second Reading relating to trying to address protracted and repeated investigations, and I stand by these remarks which, within the context of the Bill, seek to provide greater clarity and certainty to our Armed Forces personnel, but not by imposing artificial time limits on investigatory processes. That is implicit within the noble Lord’s amendment.
I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is well intentioned. He suggests that his amendment should be referred to Sir Richard Henriques, and the Government certainly have no objection to that. Indeed, Sir Richard Henriques may already have been closely following debates in this Chamber on the Bill. The noble Lord’s amendment may be a fruitful subject on which Sir Richard may wish to reflect. I cannot commit, of course, to saying that the report from Sir Richard will be concurrent with the Armed Forces Bill. Its Second Reading may reach this Chamber in June, and I understand that Sir Richard hopes to produce his report in the early summer. Again, while we will all be very interested in learning what Sir Richard has to say, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, will understand that I cannot commit the Government to whatever he may produce in his ultimate report. I certainly believe in having a wide field of material available for consideration of complex issues. If that reassures the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I hope he will be minded not to move Motion B1 to a division.
I have received no requests to ask any short questions of elucidation, and accordingly call the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
My Lords, I beg to move Motions C and D.
Amendment 3A in Motion C is simply a consequential amendment to the title of the Bill as a result of moving the duty to consider derogation provision.
Commons Reason 4A in Motion D reflects the representations I made to this House previously, that the absolute limitation periods proposed in Part 2 of the Bill allow reasonable time for the bringing of claims, and that it is incompatible with our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights for different periods to apply in respect of different types of claimant.
My Lords, we are very disappointed that the Government have rejected our amendment to Part 2 of the Bill. We still believe that it is simply wrong for those who put their life on the line serving Britain overseas to have less access to compensation and justice than the UK civilians whom they defend, or indeed than their colleagues whose service is largely UK based. The amendment was designed to ensure that claims by troops or former service personnel were not blocked in all circumstances after six years, as they would otherwise be under the Bill.
This provision also directly breaches the Armed Forces covenant, as the director-general of the Royal British Legion confirmed. He argued: “I think it”—by implication, the Bill—
“is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel”.—[Official Report, Commons, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Committee, 8/10/20; col. 86.]
While our concerns have not gone away, we recognise that the Government have shown absolutely no desire to change this, so we will not ask the other place to think again with another vote. However, we strongly urge the Government to think further on this matter, and we will return to it as soon as possible.
For now, I want to thank colleagues for their unwavering support for our amendment, especially the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Boyce. Having created such a widely based coalition against this part of the Bill, the Government should think long and hard and use the opportunity of the Armed Forces Bill to correct this deeply unwise feature of this one.
My Lords, I thank both the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their contributions. I think that what emerges is a simple divergence of opinion. I say to both noble Lords that the problem with Amendment 4 is discrimination between different personnel engaged in the same activity on which the Bill is predicated, an overseas operation. These differences of opinion are unlikely to be reconciled, but I thank the noble Lords for their contributions.
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 5 to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 5A.
My Lords, I have said before, and I say again, that the MoD takes seriously its duty of care for service personnel and veterans. There already exists a comprehensive range of legal, pastoral, welfare and mental health support for them. I have previously spoken at length to your Lordships about the nature of this support and do not propose to repeat my comments in full, but I wish to highlight a couple of the key points.
First, service personnel are entitled to receive legal support where they face criminal allegations or civil claims that relate to actions taken during their service and where they were performing their duties. Legal advice and support is also available whenever people are required to give evidence at inquests and inquiries and in litigation.
Secondly, a range of welfare support and mental health support is routinely offered to all our people. The potential impact of operations on a service person’s mental health is well recognised, and policies and procedures are in place to help manage and mitigate these impacts as far as possible. Additionally, the Office for Veterans’ Affairs works closely with the MoD and departments across government, the devolved Administrations, charities and academia to ensure the needs of veterans are met.
As your Lordships would have noted from the Secretary of State’s Written Ministerial Statement, significant progress has been made to ensure that our service personnel and veterans have access to a comprehensive package of legal, pastoral and mental health support. We therefore believe that it is unnecessary to establish a statutory duty of care.
Not only is Amendment 5 unnecessary but it could result in unintended and undesirable consequences. Whether an individual wants or needs pastoral, welfare and mental health support is a personal issue. A duty of care “standard” could, if not carefully drafted, end up as a one-size-fits-all approach, not being flexible enough to cope with the needs and wishes of individuals as they arise and are identified. It could even engender an approach whereby support is provided only in accordance with the “standard”, which may leave personnel without the right support at the right time for them.
We are also deeply concerned about the potentially negative effect of the amendment if it is included in this legislation. It is clear that it is likely to lead to an increase in litigation, which will mean more of our people being subject to potentially lengthy and stressful court proceedings. That is profoundly undesirable and contrary to the objectives of this Bill. I think that many of your Lordships will recognise that pastoral and moral duties are extremely difficult adequately to define, and there is a real risk that attempting to do so will lead to more, rather than less, litigation and greater uncertainty.
We are also concerned that, as investigations and allegations arise and often occur in the operational theatre during conflict, involving the commanding officer, the Royal Military Police and service personnel, the amendment may have unintended consequences which impact on the operational theatre and, again, lead to an increase in litigation. That is not some draconian concoction or lurid speculation; it is the simple practical fact of introducing a legal standard which, despite the efforts to exclude from the doctrine of combat immunity, could well encroach into the operational theatre.
The MoD is clear about its responsibilities to provide the right support to our personnel, both serving and veterans, and to seek to improve and build on this wherever necessary. Setting a standard for a duty of care in this Bill is neither necessary nor desirable. I urge the noble Lord not to press his amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, we remain four-square behind the important amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, to provide a duty of care standard for personnel and veterans who face investigations and litigations. It remains unclear why the Government will not accept this limited proposal. If it is simply because they fear being sued for not fulfilling their responsibilities, I simply say to the Minister that all the Government need to do is to make sure their duty is fulfilled in the first place.
It has been suggested that it is unreasonable to single out the Armed Forces for this protection but, as the noble Baroness just pointed out, the covenant shows that the law recognises that being a soldier or serviceman in a combat situation is special and different. In no other job can you require somebody to go into a potentially lethal situation and, in the final analysis, die for their country. This amendment recognises that there needs to be something special when people have worked under conditions that those of us who have never been in that level of tension, responsibility and fear probably cannot understand. We can at least partly understand how difficult it must be. Surely, there should be a reciprocal movement by government, the command and the MoD to support those in such danger when they come under the aegis of the law and have the difficult job of defending themselves. This amendment merely makes sure that they are properly looked after and that anybody making decisions about how they are looked after recognises that, at the end of the day, there is hard legislation.
Since we last debated this amendment in this House, we have had a change of Minister for Defence People and Veterans—the ministerial lead for this legislation. While there are certainly mixed opinions about him, no one can fault Johnny Mercer’s passion or sense of mission. His resignation letter to the Prime Minister lays bare the failings of the Government on veterans’ concerns by saying that
“we continue to say all the right things”
yet
“fail to match that with what we deliver”.
Clearly, there is an issue and we believe that having this duty of care on the face of the Bill will allow the Government to deliver while being reminded how Ministers come and go but statutory protection remains in place. We have heard how troops and their families who have been through the trauma of these long-running investigations have felt cut adrift from the Ministry of Defence. When Major Campbell was asked what support the MoD gave him, he replied simply: “There was none”.
We believe that the Government should think long and hard about this amendment. It is an unlikely coalition of three former Chiefs of Staff of their respective parts of the Armed Forces, politicians from around this Chamber, and many outside, who recognise the value of looking after our troops when they are in difficult times. This has to change and we believe that legislative change is the right way. We therefore support the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, in asking the Government to think again. If the noble Lord feels that he has had an unsatisfactory response and wishes to divide the House, we will support him.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for their contributions. I realise that this is an important debate. It is an issue which, as I have recognised in previous contributions, elicits very strong and sincerely held views and feelings.
The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, referred to my former ministerial colleague, Johnny Mercer. I pay tribute to him and recognise his commitment to veterans, as I pay tribute to his successor, my honourable friend Leo Docherty, himself a former soldier, who has a deep and abiding interest in veterans.
I listened carefully to the contributions across the Chamber. What I have not heard in response to my attempt to describe the wide range of support which is offered to our Armed Forces personnel and veterans—through a range of directly provided services, likely to be the case, for example, with serving personnel; or in conjunction and co-operation with veterans’ charities; or through consultation with the devolved Administrations, many of whom are responsible for delivering the essential services and support which our veterans require; or through the Armed Forces Covenant and how we propose to develop that further in the Armed Forces Bill—is a detailed indication of where the MoD is falling short. I certainly feel it would be helpful to have greater clarity about what noble Lords think are the deficiencies of the MoD in this context.
I have also not heard a response to the Government’s legitimate concerns about the unintended consequences and the potential legal implications of creating a statutory duty of care. As I pointed out, this has to exist alongside the common-law doctrine of combat immunity and the very real concerns that this well-intended amendment could stray into and inhibit activity in the operational theatre. None of the contributions addressed these legal concerns or provided any alternative legal view. If one is available, it would be helpful to the discussion to hear what it is.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I join Ministers in paying tribute to the British Armed Forces who have served in Afghanistan, and especially to the 454 personnel who have lost their lives. We honour their service and their sacrifice. With the full withdrawal of NATO troops, it is hard to see a future without bloodier conflict, wider Taliban control and greater jeopardy for former interpreters and women. The Chief of the Defence Staff said that this was
“not a decision we had hoped for”.
Did the UK try to stop the US taking this decision? What steps will NATO allies now take to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a breeding ground for terrorism, and what ongoing support will the Government provide to personnel and veterans who have been injured in Afghanistan?
I thank the noble Lord for his tribute to our Armed Forces and particularly for his acknowledgement of those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice. I entirely endorse his welcome and kind remarks. In response to his question, the United Kingdom has regular conversations with US counterparts on a range of issues, and we consult closely. As the noble Lord is aware, this is a NATO mission in Afghanistan and we were always clear that we would proceed in concert with our NATO allies and partners, which we have done. Regarding the noble Lord’s apprehensions, our support of the NATO mission has brought Afghanistan to a much better place than it was in 2001.
My Lords, I too pay tribute to our service personnel who have served in Afghanistan, particularly those who have made the ultimate sacrifice. In his Answer, the Secretary of State said that we could not stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, but are there ways in which the MoD would envisage supporting the Afghan national security forces going forward, perhaps in the sense of training or other forms of co-operation?
We are looking at the start of a new chapter for Afghanistan. We look forward to consulting closely our NATO allies and partners on the way forward. Afghanistan is now shifting the focus to the political process, which is an important component in its journey forwards, hopefully towards peace.
My Lords, I too pay tribute to the brave contribution and sacrifices made by our British forces in Afghanistan. I would question the evidence of the Taliban changing its stance. One has only to consider the escalating violence in the country in recent months, and in areas where it holds control, girls’ schools are already closing. How will we ensure that human rights, and particularly women’s rights, are protected? If we do not, all those women who have stepped forward to take part in public life will be left at risk.
We will continue to stand with the people of Afghanistan to support a more stable, peaceful future for the country, and we wholeheartedly support the United States-led efforts to energise the peace process. We have been clear that the Taliban must engage meaningfully in a dialogue with the Afghan Government. We have been equally clear that, in going forward, the Afghan Government must respect and protect the advances which have been made in respect of women and children.
My Lords, troop withdrawal is guaranteed to exacerbate the danger to Afghan interpreters who have helped our Armed Forces. The new relocation and assistance policy is welcome, but can the Minister reassure the House that the embassy staff administering it will proactively identify interpreters needing protection who could be in danger if they approach the embassy for help? Can she also confirm that the new scheme covers family members and that it will absolutely not be contracted out to a private company?
The noble Baroness makes a very important point. I have paid tribute before and do so again to her enduring interest in this issue. The relocations and assistance policy, which as she knows was updated last year and launched at the beginning of this month, is open to all our current and former locally employed staff in Afghanistan, irrespective of date, role or length of service. As she is aware, they must satisfy certain criteria, but it is important that any of these staff feeling anxious should contact the embassy in Kabul however they can. I also assure her that eligible locally employed staff can bring certain family members with them to the UK.
My Lords, I salute the efforts of our Armed Forces and of those development and humanitarian workers who have been injured or have lost their lives doing dangerous work in Afghanistan over these past 20 years. That work will become even more vital as NATO troops leave the country. How then can the Government justify the reduction in overseas development assistance? By how much will programmes in Afghanistan be cut and what analysis has been carried out to support the decision to reduce such programmes at this critical time?
I thank the noble Lord for his welcome tribute to humanitarian relief workers, who have indeed made huge sacrifices. I am sure that the Chamber would absolutely endorse his remarks. As I indicated earlier, what is currently happening in Afghanistan is predicated on a wider NATO allies and partners collaboration to assess the situation and to look to the future. We are committed to continuing to work together in NATO to support Afghanistan during and beyond withdrawal. The noble Lord is correct that much of the UK’s support for sustaining the Afghan national security forces is provided as ODA. Ministers are currently finalising the allocation of ODA for 2021-22, so decisions on individual budget allocations have not yet been taken. I think that he will acknowledge that much excellent work has been achieved by the United Kingdom in concert with our other NATO partners.
Like many who served in Afghanistan, it is impossible not to have mixed feelings about this week’s news. However, it is nearly seven years since UK forces engaged in combat operations in Afghanistan. I feel that their departure is less of a question than the sustainability of the legacy of the institutions that we have tried to build there. On paper—I emphasise, on paper—the Afghan national army is 185,000 strong and funded almost entirely to date by the US. Is my noble friend confident that the structure, size and capability of the Afghan national army are sustainable in the long run?
As I indicated earlier, this is the start of a new chapter. The focus now will be on the political process within Afghanistan. The responsibility to take all necessary decisions to support the journey towards peace will rest with the Afghan Government, including whatever decisions they feel they need to take in relation to their defence and security measures.
My Lords, President Biden inherited a decision to reduce US forces in theatre. Either that process had to continue or force levels had to be increased with no end date in sight. Would sustaining increased force levels indefinitely in theatre have been a viable option for the UK, given our other overseas commitments and the decision to reduce the current combat strength of our Armed Forces?
The United Kingdom was always clear that we went into Afghanistan alongside our NATO allies. We have adjusted together, and now we will leave together. This has not been a unilateral United Kingdom decision. As I said to my noble friend Lord Lancaster, alongside our NATO allies and partners, we shall consult closely on the way forward as the focus turns to Afghanistan itself, the Afghan Government and the political journey forwards.
My Lords, I join my noble friends in paying tribute to our Armed Forces and remembering those who paid the ultimate price. My noble friend said that the Taliban have no appetite to be an international pariah, yet in the past year they have waged a campaign of targeted assassinations against journalists, judges, doctors and health workers and have targeted women in public life in particular. Do we not see that as the act of pariahs? Do these killings not warn against any idea that we can rely on the Taliban to keep its promises and not roll back human rights or maintain links with terrorist organisations?
The Taliban, if it seeks to realise its political goals, has to play a political role in a more stable and secure Afghanistan. It must meaningfully engage in that process. It seeks international recognition, and the only way it can achieve that is through following through on its commitment to engage with peace. That is what we shall look to it to do and hold it to account on.
My Lords, the time allowed for this question has now passed. My apologies to the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Loomba. We will take a moment to allow the pieces on the board to be reshuffled.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass, and it is with pleasure that I make that Motion and propose to make a brief speech.
The Government stood on a manifesto commitment to
“introduce new legislation to tackle the vexatious legal claims that undermine our Armed Forces”,
and they have delivered on that promise. I have said consistently throughout the passage of the Bill that the principles are sound, the objectives are good and the Bill is necessary. The Government believe that the combination of measures in the Bill provides a better and clearer legal framework for dealing with allegations or claims arising from overseas military operations.
The Bill addresses the issue of unacceptable delays in bringing prosecutions and provides greater certainty to veterans for events which happened in the unique context of overseas operations many years ago. The provisions also require that civil claims arising from overseas operations are brought promptly so that the courts are able to assess them when memories are fresh and evidence is more readily available.
The measures recognise both the challenging and extraordinary—I use that word in its literal sense—circumstances of overseas operations and the adverse effects that they can have on our service personnel. These include being exposed to unexpected or continuous threats or being deployed alongside friends and colleagues who are killed or severely wounded in action.
The Bill delivers on a manifesto commitment to our Armed Forces and veterans. It is based on strong support for the proposals by clear majorities in the other place, and it is for these reasons that this House should support the Bill’s Third Reading.
I also thank those of your Lordships across the House who have participated in the various debates. I recognise particularly the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Dannatt, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. While I may not have been able to acquiesce to all their requests, our meetings have been cordial and their contributions constructive.
The Government have listened very carefully to the views put forward throughout the Bill’s progress. However, they do not agree with amendments that undermine rather than strengthen the Bill, are simply not aligned with its aims or would render it incompatible with the United Kingdom’s international obligations.
None the less, I have noted and trenchantly relayed the very real concerns so eloquently and robustly expressed by your Lordships, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, that by not excluding other serious offences, the Bill risks damaging not only the UK’s reputation for upholding international humanitarian and human rights law—including the United Nations convention against torture—but the reputation of our Armed Forces. I am sure that the other place has also heard those deep concerns loudly and clearly.
I also believe that we already offer the highest standards of care and support to our service personnel. I again reaffirm and reassure that the MoD has a long-standing policy that where a serviceperson or veteran faces allegations in relation to incidents arising from his or her duty, they receive full public funding for legal support, as well as welfare and pastoral support, for as long as necessary.
There have been a number of debates on investigations. In addition to requiring prosecutors to give consideration to the public interest in finality, where there has been a relevant previous investigation and no compelling new evidence has become available, we believe that the longstop measures in Part 2 of the Bill will help to reduce the likelihood of investigations being opened many years after operations have ended. Indeed, in the future, the longstops will act as a catalyst for encouraging any civil claims to be brought sooner, and any associated criminal allegations are also therefore likely to be investigated sooner. This reduces the risk of criminal investigations arising many decades later as a result of allegations made in civil claims.
I also remind the House that the review by Sir Richard Henriques into the reporting of allegations and the conduct of investigations on overseas operations is currently in progress. As I have said previously, this work will complement the measures in the Bill, and we should await his recommendations as to whether and what measures may be needed to improve our investigative processes and procedures.
The Bill will shortly move back to the other place for consideration of the amendments proposed by this House. Many of the debates we have had in Committee and on Report have, at times, been emotive. I am sure, however, that all have been born out of our conjoined desire to do the very best we can to support our brave current and former Armed Forces personnel both during and after their operational duties overseas.
In conclusion, I acknowledge and thank profoundly the Bill team led by Damian Parmenter and Jennifer Chamberlain and supported by the Bill manager, Richard Hartell. Their experience, expertise, resilience and patience with an at times crotchety Minister have been invaluable and exemplary. In these comments I embrace—metaphorically, that is—my colleagues: the Advocate-General, my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart, and the Government Whip, my noble friend Lord Younger. I thank them for their steadfast support. I commend the Bill to the House.
My Lords, the Bill goes back to the other place with important changes. Throughout the Bill’s passage, we have wanted to work with the Government and colleagues across the House to improve it. I thank everybody who has engaged with us, including the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie—and the Bill team. This positive arrangement resulted in the removal of the derogation clause, which is welcome.
We do not want to wreck the Bill; we do not want to kill the Bill. The Government have identified a real problem: personnel can be plagued by vexatious claims and shoddy investigations. But the Government are approaching the problem from the wrong direction by failing to tackle the issue head-on, damaging our international reputation and threatening the Armed Forces covenant.
The amendments which have been successful in this House put personnel first by recognising the MoD’s responsibility to support troops facing investigation and litigation by placing adequate restrictions on reinvestigations and by ensuring that the Armed Forces covenant is not breached by the longstop. They put forces personnel first because they have been led by noble and gallant leaders in this House. I especially thank the noble Lords, Lord Dannatt and Lord West, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Boyce, for their leadership and guidance on these important issues. I also thank former Defence Secretaries and Ministers for their contributions.
The other key amendment extended exclusions from the presumption to cover genocide, torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. I want to thank my noble friend Lord Robertson for leading this broad coalition.
I also want to thank the Public Bill Office for all its advice and help, the House staff, my two leaders—my noble friends Lord Touhig and Lord Falconer—and my adviser and researcher, Dan Harris, without whom I could not have survived.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, for their comments. I know that they continue to give me a message, and I continue to listen to the message.