Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 26th April 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Goldie]

That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 23 February be approved.

Relevant document: 32nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 19 April.

Motion agreed.

UK Undersea Infrastructure: Hostile Activity

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 25th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the risk to the UK’s undersea cables, interconnectors and pipelines from hostile activity.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government take the security and resilience of undersea infrastructure, including cables, interconnectors and pipelines, very seriously. These are critical to our national infrastructure and we monitor the full range of threats and risks, including supply chains and repair arrangements. As the House would expect, the details of any specific assessment of risk from hostile states would be held at high classification for national security reasons.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, the actions and statements of President Putin would seem to indicate that he already considers he is at war with this country and the West, if you just look at the raft of things he has done. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union, when it existed, was very interested in what was going on under the sea—I was very involved in countering that—and Russia today is probably even more interested in it. Just to give an idea of the costs, if those cables stopped working, £7.4 trillion-worth of financial activity each day would be cut, 25% of our electricity would go, and so on. We put in place the National Maritime Information Centre in about 2010 and we needed the Joint Maritime Security Centre alongside it, because we said firmly that we had to take threats to our territorial seas and exclusive economic zone very seriously. They are now in place, which is good, but they need to be reinforced—and the departments involved need to fully man them—because otherwise we will not be able to counter what is a very real and present threat, which could cause major damage to our nation.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I in no way disagree with the noble Lord’s final conclusion. It is recognised across government, which is why a number of government departments have a role to play in protecting that critical national infrastructure. We certainly regard these installations as essential to our national infrastructure and monitor a variety of risks that they face. The noble Lord will understand that these subsea cables are predominantly owned and operated privately, but key departments work closely with their owners. Supporting that is the national risk register, the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre. There is a comprehensive framework to support the private owners and operators of these cables, but the MoD has and discharges a critical role in monitoring threat.

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords, if, as is reported in the newspapers today, the plan is now to turn the whole north Atlantic into one gigantic system of wind farms on an international basis, the effect would be to turn the whole seabed of the north Atlantic into a cat’s cradle of vital undersea electric power lines. Are we prepared, in moving forward to this fossil-free electric world that we are heading for, to safeguard those lines, since they could, if interfered with, put at risk not merely 25% of our electricity supply but our entire electricity supply when the wind is blowing?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think we all agree that the overall objective of increasing our usage of renewable energy is laudable and to be commended, but my noble friend is correct that the installation of infrastructure brings with it an obvious degree of risk. As I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord West, across government there are a range of departments with responsibilities in this field. As far as the MoD is concerned, we actively monitor threat. When it comes to looking at, for example, Russian activity in either the Baltic Sea or the North Sea, noble Lords will understand that we regularly assess by our maritime presence what is happening. The Russians know that we know they know what we are doing.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, protecting against threats is clearly important but there is no such thing as perfect defence. With what degree of urgency are the Government addressing our resilience in this area of our critical national infrastructure?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord will be aware that we have operational assets which we can deploy. For example, in the wake of Nord Stream we deployed HMS “Somerset” to monitor what was happening. We also have our MROS programme; one of those ships has been bought and is currently being readied for operational activity, and the other is to be built.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My, Lords, other noble Lords have asked about the national response to this international, shared problem, but it is very clear that what has to be done is a common effort by navies and air forces around the North Sea in particular. I am aware that there is very close co-operation between the Royal Navy and other navies around the North Sea, and with the Royal Air Force. I am also aware that Conservative Ministers prefer not to talk about it. Could the Minister try to encourage the Ministry of Defence to celebrate more the effectiveness of the co-operation we have with the armed forces of other countries in facing shared threats such as this?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am not normally accused of taciturnity, so I shall try to encourage the noble Lord. He is aware, certainly, that in relation to recent activity for Ukraine the MoD has been outward facing. We have released intelligence that we have been prepared to comment on. The noble Lord is quite correct that we continue to invest in strong working relationships, partnerships and alliances, such as NATO. We co-operate on the development of new capabilities, such as the MROS vessel I just spoke about. We act in concert with our international allies. That is a very important part of the collective endeavour to try to manage risk.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, we are often quick to criticise defence procurement, but I commend the Government on the procurement of the new MROS vessel. It was announced in October by the Secretary of State for Defence, Ben Wallace, and delivered to the Royal Navy at the end of January—in just three months. Is this not a lesson for us? All too often we try to procure the exquisite at an exquisite price, while here we have acquired the very good at a very reasonable price. What are the lessons for the future; for example, for littoral strike vessels for the Royal Marines, which can be, at the most basic, in effect, converted container ships?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My noble friend will understand that, coming from Scotland where ferries have become a very sensitive issue, I would applaud any approach which produced vessels where and when they were needed. My noble friend makes an important point. The commissioning and buying of this vessel—as I say, it is being refurbished in readiness for operational activity—is an important experience for the MoD. There are lessons we can learn. There may be merit, as my noble friend rightly says, in not looking so closely at the exquisite ultimate product but looking to what we need now and taking steps to get it.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

My Lords, a couple of years ago the Government witnessed the cutting of a power cable to the Isles of Scilly, putting the mains off for about three months. I asked the Minister at the time whether they were going to claim compensation. They said, “No, it’s a private sector company so it can do what it likes”. I hope that things have changed.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

That area of responsibility, the noble Lord will understand, is slightly outwith my ministerial bailiwick, but I am sure his remarks have been heard by the appropriate department.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that yesterday’s Ostend meeting showed how much overlap there is between EU and NATO responsibilities, particularly in the North Sea? Does she not feel that the NATO strategy adopted last summer—that non-EU members of NATO and EU members should be working together—applies precisely to this field? If it does apply to this field, what are the Government doing to take that forward in advance of the NATO summit in Vilnius?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We have to be clear that NATO exists for a specific purpose. It is a very effective defensive alliance. It is a militarily supported alliance. What I can say to the noble Lord is that I entirely agree with the kernel of his point: the more co-operation we have, the better. That will be more likely to secure a coherent approach to these threats. I am pleased to say that certainly the MoD enjoys extremely good relationships with other European countries, even those not in NATO.

[The Lord Bishop of St Albans]

My Lords, I was interested to hear the Minister commenting on our engagement with our European allies. However, with reports recently that submarine cables connecting the Taiwanese mainland with the island of Matsu have been cut by Chinese boats, this is an international problem. What consultations are we having with allies around the world; in particular, so that we can try to develop back-up systems when countries are put under threat by this sort of action?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

There are two elements to the right reverend Prelate’s question. The first is about the operational resilience of the installations, which is a matter for the owners and operators of the systems. On the second and important point about the vulnerability of such systems to malign attack, we are certainly committed to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. The UK was explicit about this at the United Nations Security Council on 30 September last year, where we made it clear, in relation to NATO, that any deliberate attack against allies’ critical national infrastructure would be met with a united and determined response.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we recognise that this is a credible threat, and I congratulate the Ministry of Defence on having a ship with the capability to help, since it has already been built—well done. I understand that the second ship is in the concept stage. Is that concept not defined by that of the first ship, or are the Government contemplating a more offensive capability for the future?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am not sure that I have the technical detail to respond to the noble Lord, but I will undertake to inquire. If I can disclose further information to him, I shall respond in future.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, in the absence of a full-scale parliamentary debate on the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Select Committee report on defence priorities and procurement, will the Minister at least review the evidence that the Global Marine Group gave to the inquiry, which identified what it said was an “existential threat” to the United Kingdom because of potential attacks on our infrastructure? It referred specifically to Russian submarines “aggressively operating” in the Atlantic. Therefore, can she answer my noble and gallant friend’s question about what we are doing to ensure that we have the necessary resilience to resist those attacks?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

To respond to the noble Lord, I have to return to the final part of my response to the noble Lord, Lord West: although I have information, I am unable to disclose it—it is held with high classification for national security reasons. As I indicated, the MoD operates a very effective surveillance programme: we have aerial surveillance over the North Sea and the high north and we have submarine activity, which shall be assisted by the MROS addition to its fleet.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, do the latest developments not show that we need to have diversity of supply? Does that not mean that the Government must look again at the current embargo on onshore wind farms and at developing nuclear power?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

A critical element of this debate is resilience, which is partly a matter for government in consultation with industry and certainly a matter for individual private infrastructure operators. As my noble friend will be aware, a raft of government departments has responsibility for this: the Cabinet Office, the FCDO, DSIT, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero —for which I shall not try to use an acronym—and the MoD. While there is a holistic framework of government activity, my noble friend is correct that resilience is the key to good protection.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

How significant do the Government consider the reports of the recent accelerated activity around our shores of Russian vessels, particularly those purporting to be either research or fishing vessels, but which are near oil installations?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We view that activity with great gravity. As I said earlier, we are aware of that activity and we constantly monitor it, but I am unable to disclose further information.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

What specific co-operation is happening with the Republic of Ireland, which is not a NATO member? There is speculation that the Taoiseach was asked today about concerns that Russian naval exercises off the south-west coast of Ireland are being used as a pretext for the Russians to investigate underground cabling in the Atlantic.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

That would be a matter for the Irish Government to assess and to determine their response to. This gets into an area of policy wider than that covered by the MoD; it would be a matter for discussion between the FCDO and its Irish counterparts.

Top Secret Document Leaks

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 20th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is obviously of huge concern that top secret US documents were leaked, including files purporting to be on the war in Ukraine. In assessing what damage this may have done, are the Government looking into why the Wall Street Journal reported last week that the leak was first put out in January among a small group of posters on a messaging channel that trafficked in memes, jokes and racist talk? This posting in January of top secret files went, according to the Wall Street Journal, unnoticed for weeks by the outside world. If accurate, this is a very concerning matter, so can the Minister look into what did happen and whether that report is accurate? In the light of all this, can the Minister tell us what the MoD is doing to improve security, including data breaches?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his Question. I am not privy to the content and detail of the article to which he refers, and even if I were, I would be reluctant to comment. As the noble Lord is aware, an internal United States investigation is now taking place and the broader issue is now the subject of investigation by the United States criminal justice system and is sub judice, therefore I am unable to comment further on that. On data breaches, our MoD takes information and data-handling responsibilities very seriously. Following previous investigations, we have introduced measures to prevent breaches recurring—that is a targeted campaign of re-education and retraining. It might be helpful to the noble Lord to know that, for example, when I log on to my MoD desktop I am now immediately presented with an automatic message about keeping equipment safe, and we are now unable to send an email on MoD equipment without being prompted to add a sensitivity label. I must say that that makes me think very carefully about what I am sending and to whom I am sending it.

[Baroness Manzoor (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the comments that the Minister made regarding some of the improvements. However, given the seriousness of the security breaches which have occurred within our MoD, what further improvements can she highlight today that have been made to combat this happening again?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think the most uncomfortable security breach for the MoD was in 2021, when papers were left at a bus stop. Following that event, the Secretary of State sent a metaphorical dose of syrup of figs through the department. That involved re-education and retraining, with an online security test to be sat, in which Ministers had to participate—I shall not share the results with the Chamber but it was a very pertinent wake-up call—and random bag searches were introduced in the main building for people accessing and leaving the department. I would also say to my noble friend that a risk assessment/risk evaluation exercise, introduced before the security leak in the United States of America, is currently ongoing, and that will be an important contributor to how we can improve further.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, in the other place Dan Jarvis asked the Minister whether he was able to give assurances that data on our Armed Forces held by private sector contractors was fully secured. The Minister said that he assumed so but would go away, find out and write to Mr Jarvis. Can the Minister inform this House whether there is yet an answer to the question? If such data is not securely held, what work will the MoD be doing to ensure that security is improved?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have the response which my right honourable colleague promised in the other place, but I undertake to ensure that a copy is forwarded to the noble Baroness whatever that response is. Our private contractors operate under a very strict regime, not just in terms of vetting the people they have who have access to sensitive material, but also, in terms of undertakings, those individuals must comply with the Official Secrets Act and with the rules, protocols and all the security practices which we expect. There have been instances where these have been breached and prosecutions have ensued. Therefore measures are in place, but I will make the further detail promised by my right honourable friend in the other place available to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, the leaks reveal the US assessment that there will be an imminent vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian aircraft. What lessons have we learned in terms of early provision of aircraft and countermeasures to Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I indicated yesterday in responding to a question about Ukraine, we are working in lockstep with our allies through forums such as the G7 and NATO and efforts such as the UK-led International Fund for Ukraine to get Ukraine the firepower it needs to rapidly regain its territory. We are in daily contact. Tomorrow the Secretary of State for Defence will be at Ramstein, the airbase in Germany, at a meeting hosted by the United States. We are also anticipating the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, and we have constant bilateral engagement with our other partners. Everything is being done to ensure that we can respond as meaningfully as possible to what Ukraine thinks it needs.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

Media reports suggest that the individual originally responsible is an American of considerable youth who still had access to a great number of very sensitive files. Can the Minister confirm that that indeed is the case and further confirm, as regards the Ministry of Defence and our coverage, that it is not as exposed as the American one seems to have been?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can confirm to the noble and gallant Lord that the American criminal justice system has identified an individual, who I understand has been arrested and I presume is detained. On sharing information within our own MoD, we are very careful about where that information is, where it is stored and to whom it is transmitted. As I said in response to an earlier question, very detailed procedures are now in place to ensure that the correct balance is struck. We have to be careful not to obstruct this vital sharing of information, which may be incredibly important to inform discussion and decisions, while ensuring that we balance that with the need to store and manage the transmission of material responsibly and securely.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, given the increased threat from Russia, including recently in the Moray Firth area, which the Minister may wish to comment on, as well as from China, Five Eyes co-operation is even more important. Can the Minister give us an assurance that this unfortunate incident in the United States will not undermine and reduce our Five Eyes co-operation?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. On the Moray Firth, we have been careful to ensure that our surveillance of maritime activity by Russia is extensive, and we take the security and resilience of our national infrastructure very seriously. As the noble Lord will be aware, we have increased Royal Navy presence patrols and have invested £65 million in the first of our two multi-role ocean surveillance ships. On the relationships with our important allies such as Five Eyes, other NATO partners or other security organisations, going back to the question from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, we are absolutely clear that our ability to protect our own sovereign states and to act in concert to protect global security depend on acquiring and sharing sensitive information. We all understand the importance of that, but equally we all understand the obligations which attach to it, and the balance to which I refer is one of which all our allies and partners are cognisant.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, further to the question from the noble and gallant Lord, my former constituent, the point he made goes to the absolute core of this crisis. The perpetrator, Jack Teixeira, was 21 years old, an airman in the Massachusetts Air National Guard, hardly a key unit at the very heart of the fight against terrorism and the war in Ukraine. He had access to top secret files and substantial Five Eyes intelligence but was a very junior official. Can the Minister make it clear that our Government will do all they can to impress upon the United States and Five Eyes partners that allowing this type of security intelligence to be dealt with by someone so junior is incredibly concerning?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not think anybody would disagree with my noble friend’s assessment. As he will be aware, the Secretary of State for Defence was scheduled to be in Washington—that had been prearranged—but an opportunity will be taken to speak directly about this issue. As always with cases like this, there is something which every state can learn, whether it is a state directly involved or a partner or ally of that state. The gravity of what has happened is completely understood, and certainly we are very sensitive to that within our own MoD. I have indicated some of the measures that have been taken and, following the American incident, our Permanent Secretary immediately instigated action to check that the highest standards were being observed.

Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 19th April 2023 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Goldie]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023.

Relevant document: 32nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument contains the regulations required to establish the service police complaints system, which will be overseen by the newly appointed Service Police Complaints Commissioner. It also contains the regulations required to establish the super-complaints regime for the service police. These regulations, along with the establishment of the independent commissioner, will implement in full recommendation 44 of the service justice system review, carried out by His Honour Judge Shaun Lyons and supported by the former chief constable, Sir Jon Murphy.

The regulations are quite technical, complex and surprisingly bulky; they run to some 80-plus pages. As they largely mirror the legislation already in place for the Independent Office for Police Conduct—the IOPC—and the civilian police, I do not intend to go through each of the regulations in turn, which I am sure is a matter of huge relief to your Lordships. Instead, I will briefly set out what His Honour Judge Lyons said in relation to establishing independent oversight and how this helped to inform the approach taken by the MoD.

The Lyons review found that in the service police a degree of independent oversight was missing in comparison with civilian police forces, which have statutory complaints systems. His Honour Judge Lyons recommended that a new niche defence body be created to deliver this. The review suggested a small niche unit led by an appointed individual, possibly from a judicial background, operating to the same remit as the IOPC and its director-general.

Section 365BA of the Armed Forces Act 2006, as amended by the 2021 Act, established a new officeholder, the Service Police Complaints Commissioner. Last year, the MoD ran a recruitment campaign, in accordance with the 2016 public appointments governance code, for the post of commissioner. Ms Margaret Obi, a deputy High Court judge assigned to the King’s Bench Division, was appointed as the new commissioner by His Majesty the King on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. This was announced on 20 February 2023, and she began her work in February.

In line with Recommendation 44, the commissioner will have functions similar to those conferred on the director-general of the IOPC. The five main responsibilities of the commissioner will be: to secure the confidence of persons subject to service law and service discipline, as well as the wider public, in the service police complaints system; to secure, maintain and review arrangements in respect of the procedures that deal with complaints, conduct matters and death and serious injury matters; to make recommendations and provide advice in relation to those arrangements—for example, training or procedures —where the commissioner believes this may improve policing practice; to act as the review body for certain cases, specified in the regulations; and, finally, to report annually to Parliament via the Secretary of State for Defence on the delivery of the commissioner’s functions.

I would like to set out in a little more detail the responsibilities of the commissioner for deciding how the more serious complaints and other matters are to be investigated, if it is determined that an investigation is required. There are certain matters that must be referred to the commissioner, which are set out in the regulations. Where a referral has been made, the commissioner will first need to determine if there needs to be an investigation. If no investigation is required, the complaint can be referred back to the appropriate authority—in the majority of cases this would be an individual in the service police force—to be handled in a reasonable and proportionate way. If it is determined that an investigation is needed, the commissioner will have to decide on the type of investigation based on the seriousness of the case and what is in the public interest.

The different options for investigation are identical to the civilian system. They are: a local investigation where the service police force does the investigation itself; a directed investigation, where a member of a service police force is appointed as the investigator but the investigation is under the direction of the commissioner; and an independent investigation, where the commissioner carries out an investigation personally or can designate an investigator to carry it out.

In the case of the independent investigations—that is, investigations that are independent of the service police and the MoD—there will be a pool of experienced investigators, with appropriate skills, who can be called on as necessary, and they will have the relevant niche skills for particular cases. Investigators will be able to exercise service police powers in a similar way to investigators appointed by the director-general of the IOPC, who can also exercise police powers.

The Lyons review, interestingly, recognised that there would probably be very few independent investigations required. Our own analysis, based on service police data between 2018 and 2022, indicates that there could be an average of 62 formal complaints annually, with 18 cases meeting the mandatory criteria for referrals. However, it is important to note that not all referrals would lead to an independent investigation. By way of comparison, over 36,000 formal complaints were recorded in the year 2020-21 by civilian police forces across England and Wales.

As well as complaints, the new system will also cover conduct matters and death or serious injury matters, referred to as DSI matters. In lay man’s terms, these are cases where no complaint has been made but misconduct is suspected, or a death or serious injury has occurred after contact with the service police. Service police forces will be required to ensure that they have processes in place to identify and refer conduct matters and DSI matters without delay. Again, we expect only a small number of conduct matters to be referred to the commissioner that will require investigation, and DSI matters are even more rare. Between 2018 and 2022, there were no DSI-type matters recorded. Although we expect relatively few independent investigations, an effective independent service police complaints system is still vital. Your Lordships will appreciate that the way in which complaints, conduct matters and DSI matters are dealt with has a huge impact on confidence in the service police and in the complaints system.

Finally, I say just a few words on the super-complaints system, which has been included as part of this statutory instrument. The civilian police super-complaints system, on which the service police super-complaints system is based, was established to address concerns about whether the police complaints system was able to identify systemic failures in policing. It is important to note that super-complaints are not an alternative way to raise an individual complaint; rather, super-complaints are intended to raise issues or concerns on behalf of the public about harmful patterns or trends in policing by the service police which are, or appear to be, significantly harming the interests of the public.

Only a body designated by the Secretary of State can make a super-complaint. To do that, the organisation must become a designated body. That organisation must demonstrate that it meets all the criteria set out in regulations. For example, it must be able to demonstrate that it is competent in, and has considerable experience of, representing the interests of the public. Prior to the regulations coming into force, the MoD will run a six-week application window for organisations wishing to become designated bodies under the service police super-complaints system.

The statutory instrument before us today is a key element of the wider MoD programme of work to deliver improvements to the service justice system. An independent service police complaints system will help to secure and maintain confidence in the service police, it will help to drive up standards in policing and it will certainly help to ensure accountability at both an individual and force level. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the statutory instrument. As she pointed out, it is surprisingly weighty. I had expected the standard one-and-a-half page statutory instrument of the sort where we come to praise His Majesty’s Armed Forces and all nod in agreement, but then I picked up this document and thought, even more than ever, “Why is my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford not taking this?”, because I am used, on matters of service justice, to handing over to him, and he knows far more about the work of His Honour Judge Lyons than I do, so I will have to take on trust what the Minister said about this very much replicating what happens in police justice. However, I have a few specific questions, one of which was touched on in the Minister’s overview of super-complaints. I have a couple of points, in part to demonstrate that I have read the document—or at least as much of it as I could make sense of.

Regulation 10 concerns the issue of former members of the service police force. Do any time limits apply to cases being brought against former members of the force? The reason I ask that is because, over the years, when we have debated the overseas operations Bill or, indeed, the Northern Ireland legacy Bill, there have been questions about whether there should be time limits on cases being brought. I am also double-checking that resignation will not be a way out of getting out of any investigation.

Regulation 12 refers to “exceptional circumstances”. Is there a definition of what might constitute an exceptional circumstance?

Regulation 19 is on withdrawal of complaints. This may not apply in cases that might be brought against service police, but is there a danger of frivolous or vexatious cases being brought and the withdrawal of a complaint being potentially vexatious? If so, what might be done about that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for outlining this important SI and for the detail that was included in her opening remarks. We welcome and support the regulations relating to service police and the complaints process and look forward to their introduction.

As the noble Baroness mentioned, we rightly hold our service personnel in high regard, but they need to feel confident and expect that they will, when necessary, be protected by service police and that high standards are maintained. However, if these standards are not met, service personnel need to know that a strong, independent system is in place to investigate service police officers and hold them to account if they have not performed their duties properly. We therefore welcome the appointment of Ms Margaret Obi as the new Service Police Complaints Commissioner.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. The Minister in the other place said that the annual budget for this new, niche independent unit will be £250,000, that there will be three members of staff and that the new commissioner will work for two and a half days a week. How has that all been arrived at? Presumably, there has been some analysis of the amount of work, and we have heard about the department’s analysis of the number of cases that there may be, but it would be interesting to hear about that. If it is clearly not enough, as it begins to operate, will the figures be reviewed on an ongoing basis or will we have to wait for the annual report to point out that it is not sufficient and that more may be needed?

The Minister will know that the new Defence Serious Crime Unit was launched earlier this year, which is also very welcome. Can she explain the relationship between the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, the new DSCU and the three investigators whom the new complaints commissioner will appoint? Who will these three investigators be and what training will they have and potentially provide to other service personnel?

Can the Minister confirm the relevance of the commencement date in Regulation 1, which talks of 19 June 2023? I think she said that the complaints commissioner is already in place and starting her work. If all these regulations will come into force on 19 June, will the new commissioner have the powers that she needs from that date? That is my understanding of it. Can the Minister confirm the relevance of 19 June?

As for the civilian police, we have just had the Casey review, which points to the cultural problems in the Metropolitan Police. Can we be assured that the super-complaints procedure, as outlined in the SI, would and should be used by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner? Could she initiate a super-complaints process herself? In other words, how is something brought to light for the commissioner to decide that there is a need to use the super-complaints process?

The Minister in the other place said,

“the service police complaints system will not, initially at least, deal with historical matters”.

I am not quite clear on this. First, is that right? Secondly, are “historical matters” anything that is complained about before 19 June 2023? I think that was the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was getting at. I may have misunderstood, but the point of this Committee is to try to get clarifications. What did the Minister in the other place mean by “not initially”? Does it mean that any historical complaint, however serious, cannot be looked at if it happened before 19 June? If I understand what the Minister in the other place said, the answer is: “Not initially, but it may be that we do”.

There needs to be clarity because this is really important. The credibility of the new Service Police Complaints Commissioner will be a little undermined if serious allegations are made but cannot be investigated because only matters from after 19 June can be investigated, and the answer is: “We can’t look at it yet because the regulations won’t allow us until they’ve been in place for 18 months, and then we can come back and have a look at it”.

I want to know a bit more about the process, which the Minister outlined a little. Who starts a complaint and how does it reach the commissioner? How does the process work? The crucial issue, which, to be fair, was acknowledged by the Minister in the other place and I am sure the noble Baroness will also acknowledge it, is: will the withdrawal of complaints be monitored? There are concerns regarding the necessary hierarchy in the services. During our debate on the Armed Forces Bill, we recognised that, although that hierarchy is clearly necessary, it can and does create a situation in which pressure may be applied on somebody in a way which causes them to withdraw something, even if it is a complaint that really should be looked at. Can the Minister reassure us that the withdrawal of complaints, which is outlined in the regulations—the Government have included it—will be monitored in the annual report?

The Minister in the other place also said that the new system will cover conduct matters and death or serious injury. He said:

“In layman’s terms, these are cases where no complaint has been made”.—[Official Report, Commons, Delegated Legislation Committee, 21/3/23; cols. 5-6.]


I am not being funny but, for this layman, how is it brought to light if no complaint has been made? I am not trying to be pedantic but, usually, something comes to light because a complaint has been made. I think the Minister said that it is where something is suspected or is thought to be happening. Can the Minister tell us what that means? Is it rumour or innuendo, or somebody said something to someone? I want to be clear about how issues with respect to conduct, for example, can be brought to light if no complaint has been made. What is the process to bring that to light and be investigated, since no complaint is necessary? Can the Minister clarify that?

Finally, will the Minister lay out some of the differences between the civilian and service complaints systems, recognising the obvious difference between service and civilian life? The Explanatory Memorandum states that the key difference is

“the lack of accelerated procedures for members of the Armed Forces”.

Can the Minister explain why? I think that I know the answer, but it would be interesting for it to be put on the record.

I finish by saying that the purpose of these questions is not to try in any way to cause the Government a problem—we are pleased to see the establishment of this system by these regulations. Indeed, the Minister made it clear during the passage of the Armed Forces Bill that she would bring forward these regulations as quickly as possible, and she has done that. We are pleased to see this new service police complaints procedure, but there are some questions, and I think it would be helpful for the Committee, and indeed those who read our proceedings, to have the Minister’s answers.

As I say, our questions are not intended to oppose but to seek clarity. If this new process and new post are as successful as we all hope they will be, then real progress will have been made. Clearly issues have arisen that have eroded trust and confidence in service personnel, and I believe that the passage of these regulations will help to restore some of that trust and confidence.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their very helpful observations and the useful questions that have been posed. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was lamenting the absence of her colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I have to say, completely selfishly and wishing him no ill will, that I am delighted at his absence—I am sure that he would have pinned me to the wall with a multiplicity of technical points.

The noble Baroness raised a point about time limits for former members. The situation is that they cannot evade liability, even if they are former members of the service police force; they are still answerable and accountable, and it would still be competent under regulations to bring a complaint. Therefore, a resignation could not avoid that—I am looking to my officials for reassurance on that.

The noble Baroness also asked about special circumstances. There is no definition in the regulations, but the expression has its ordinary meaning. I know that that is not awfully helpful to your Lordships, but I think that we can take a common-sense view of this. If, by any normal assessment of the situation, it was thought that something unusual had occurred, that would constitute a special circumstance.

The noble Baroness was rightly concerned about frivolous complaints and whether they could frustrate the process. One of the tangible benefits—I hope—of having this clearly defined, legally constituted system is that frivolous complaints can probably be weeded out at a fairly early stage. I can offer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—I will also offer a copy to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith—a fascinating diagram that was given to me by my officials, who understand only too well my slowness in grasping these issues. I have in my hand a marvellous diagram that shows how the complaints start, where they go and what happens, including death and serious injury matters as well as conduct matters. This is a very helpful physical indicator and I am very happy to share that with noble Lords— I will get it handed over.

The noble Baroness also asked what happens if criminal matters arise. That is a very important question and is one that I posed to the officials when they were briefing me. The answer is that the commissioner has power to refer to the service prosecutor. It might be that, in the course of investigating something, behaviour emerged and the view was that it constituted criminal activity. If that is the case, it would be referred immediately to the service prosecutor. Of course, even without the protocols being in force, the service prosecutor already informally consults with the civilian prosecutor. They would work out what to do.

On super-complaints and designated bodies, I was interested to know how all this would work and what exactly a designated body would look like. My officials very helpfully provided me with information which may be of use to your Lordships. I have a list of designated bodies under the civilian super-complaints system, which may give a flavour of what we are talking about. There are numerous organisations on it, such as the Criminal Justice Alliance, the Women’s Aid Federation of England, Welsh Women’s Aid, Southall Black Sisters and Pathway Project. That is just an indication of the wide spectrum of organisational interest that I think there will be in this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Minister in the other place said that it will be reviewed after 18 months. He stated:

“We are going to let this run for a bit; we will review it internally after 18 months”.—[Official Report, Commons, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 21/3/23; cols. 11-12.]


Can the Minister here confirm that?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can confirm that. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that we already plan to conduct a review of the regime after the first 18 to 24 months of operation. It would no doubt be appropriate at that time to consider the issue of historical cases.

I have already covered the question of who starts the complaint. If the clerk would oblige, perhaps my beautifully multicoloured papers could be handed to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I will get a set to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith.

I think that I have managed to cover the main points—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, would agree, the Minister has made very helpful and informed responses to the number of questions raised, which will help to clarify the operation of the system. The only major issue for me is the monitoring of the withdrawal of complaints; it is really important and, again, was mentioned in the other place. I think that the Minister in the other place said that he would expect to see how well the system is operating in the annual report. The Minister here will know—I said this in my opening remarks, so will not repeat myself—that the withdrawal of complaints due to people feeling under pressure is quite a significant way of seeing whether something is working or not. Confidence in the system will show, as appropriate, that the levels of withdrawal would not be higher than you would expect.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord; that is a very important point. It is perhaps the other side of the coin that I raised with my officials. If a complaint is investigated, the commissioner makes a recommendation, so my question was: how will the recommendations be carried out? In fact, there is provision in the regulations for that.

That brings me to the important issue of the annual report. This is where we get the light of transparency and public accountability. The noble Lord is quite correct: I think that if parliamentarians felt that, in the presentation of the annual report, it was inadequate because it did not tell them very much, they would make clear their anxiety about it. That might include a lack of information about complaints withdrawn.

From what we have gathered—I gave some figures in the course of my remarks about the data that we have —I do not think that we are anticipating a terrific number of complaints. Of course, because a system is now established and people may have greater confidence, it is perfectly possible that we might see the number of complaints increasing. I have heard the point that the noble Lord raised, and we shall take it away; I agree that it is an important part of the overall picture, not just to know how many complaints and recommendations were made and what the outcomes were, but whether there was an element of withdrawal of complaints. I thank the noble Lord for raising that point and will take it away.

I think that I have managed to deal with most of the points that have been raised. If I have overlooked anything, I shall look at Hansard and undertake to come back to your Lordships. I thank noble Lords again for their contributions, as ever. It helps very much to improve our understanding of how these arrangements will work in practice. I commend this instrument to the Committee.

Motion agreed.

Ukraine: Arms Supplies

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Wednesday 19th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have, if any, to increase arms supplies to Ukraine in view of the possible Ukrainian offensive.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, the UK and our allies and partners are continuing to respond decisively to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine as the conflict evolves. The UK is recognised as a leading nation providing support to Ukraine, training more than 12,000 recruits, providing £2.4 billion-worth of support, including hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition, and leading the world on the gifting of vital capabilities such as multiple-launch rocket systems and Challenger 2 tanks.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, there has been a considerable build-up to this planned offensive that has been talked about. Indeed, some people are saying that they think it will be a game-changer. I have to say that I do not think that it will be a game-changer, but I think it is very important. Certainly, the intelligence leaks from America have not helped it very much at all. The problem we have, not just in the UK but in other allied countries, is that we have not mobilised our defence industries to actually start producing the weapon stocks that are absolutely needed day by day. We should have started this more than 12 months ago, and industry needs to be working 24/7. Will the Minister tell us whether we are now mobilising these defence firms? Do the Government consider this offensive by the Ukrainians to be extremely important, because it might well grind down the numbers of Russians again and give the Ukrainians a boost, and, I hope, improve their morale while damaging the morale of the Russians?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

In response to the last part of the noble Lord’s question, we regard everything Ukraine is doing as vitally important—hence our commitment to supporting Ukraine in every way that we can. On our relationship with industry, we have remained fully engaged with the sector. Allies and partners have done the same to ensure both the continuation of supply to Ukraine and that all equipment and munitions granted in kind from UK stocks are replaced as quickly as possible. Within NATO, the UK’s position is not unique with regard to industrial capacity and stockpile replenishment. There has been an intelligent conversation with industry, which realised that it had a role to play and, to be fair, is now discharging that role.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, it is not just about delivering munitions to Ukraine; it is about upgrading and modernising its armed forces. There, of course, our interests align, as we seek to upgrade and modernise our own Armed Forces. Can we be sensible and clever about this, where perhaps the money we are spending is of dual use and can act as a catalyst to advance our own procurement programmes? We have already seen one example, with the sunsetting of AS-90—the artillery system being given to Ukraine—and the introduction of Archer. Surely there are other opportunities as well.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My noble friend makes an important point. This is certainly something that has been on our radar screen, and for that matter on the radar screens of our allies, particularly within NATO. For example, we have not been replacing like with like; we have been looking holistically at what our need is once we have supplied support to Ukraine. I reassure my noble friend and the Chamber that we are indeed engaged in the very issue to which he quite rightly refers.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the anticipated offensive will be an extremely hazardous undertaking. It will be made all the more perilous for the Ukrainians without at least local control of the air. How confident is the Minister that the Ukrainians have been given the wherewithal to be able to achieve such control?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to the noble and gallant Lord that it is interesting if we just put a little context around this. Russia planned a major offensive effort through the winter and, quite simply, has not succeeded. This is a slow-moving conflict, and both sides have effectively neutralised each other’s air power. That is a remarkable achievement for a country the size of Ukraine responding to an air force capacity the size of Russia’s. It demonstrates that this is about a multi-faceted approach, both strategically and in specific support for Ukraine, in trying to ensure collective help; the real clout of what we are offering is the aggregate effect of what every other country is doing along with the UK. I reassure the noble and gallant Lord that we are in daily touch with Ukraine, and we seem to be closely attuned to what it looks for.

[The Lord Speaker (Lord McFall of Alcluith)]

My Lords, we will now have a virtual contribution form the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, despite all the calls with honourable intent for increased military support and NATO participation, should we not be seriously considering opening up back channels with the potential for an exchange of views, if not negotiation? If that proves impossible, are we considering the route to a settlement? A settlement is required that takes into account the interests of innocent non-combatants who are suffering on the front line. It may also require a compromise on the Crimea.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

It is for Ukraine to determine its position in any negotiations, just as it is for Ukraine to determine its democratic future. As friends and international partners of Ukraine, we will always work to protect and defend the country’s sovereignty. I observe that, if there are to be any peace negotiations, it is only by going into them from a position of military, economic and diplomatic strength that Ukraine will secure a strong and lasting peace.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that high street banks are having to withdraw provision of financial services to firms exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine because of money laundering regulations? Is she further aware that Ministers have indicated at the Government’s Dispatch Box that they see the complete integrity of the money laundering regulations as more important than exporting armoured fighting vehicles to Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am aware that my noble friend has raised this on previous occasions. He understands that it is not really within the MoD’s bailiwick; it is more a matter for my Treasury colleagues. I suggest that my noble friend refers to them for a response.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, can I press the Minister further on the initial Question from the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, about not just conversations with industry but procurement? The Minister implied that the Government have been talking to industry, which is fine, but can she confirm that orders have been placed so that adequate capabilities are available both to the UK and in whatever we are supplying to Ukraine?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Orders have certainly been placed by the UK. I do not have specific information in front of me but I shall inquire and will submit whatever detail I can to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I again make clear from this Front Bench that His Majesty’s Opposition fully support what the Government are doing on Ukraine and will continue to do so. The Committee of Public Accounts today published its report MoD Equipment Plan 2022-32. This makes a number of serious points about the Government’s ability to supply Ukraine with the equipment it needs. Building on my noble friend Lord West’s Question, what are the Government going to do to enable industry to deliver the military equipment that we need, and quickly?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not want to pre-empt the department’s response to the Public Accounts Committee, which will be prepared and submitted in due course. I can say that there is an element of divergence on how facts and circumstances are interpreted, but that is for the more detailed response. I reassure the noble Lord that, on the basis of previous criticism of the MoD by the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, significant reforms have been effected within it. To be fair, the noble Lord is aware of many of these, and there is no doubt that they are delivering improvement. As to the committee’s overall report, it falls to the department to respond fully in the appropriate time period.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, it is well known that much equipment is being provided to Ukraine by its allies. Will that be sufficient to ensure that Russia does not embark on further offensive action?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I indicated earlier to the Chamber, I can tell the noble and gallant Lord that we are in daily contact with Ukraine. Wherever possible, we seek to ensure that intelligent responses are given to the pressing needs that Ukraine identifies. We do this in consort with our allies and partners, as that is the only sensible approach. The noble and gallant Lord is aware of the significant support that has already been provided, not just by this country but by our allies—notably the United States. That programme of activity includes the Defence Secretary attending a meeting of the Ukraine defence contact group, hosted by the United States, this Friday in Ramstein. That is another forum where we can work out how best to continue to provide support to Ukraine.

AUKUS Defence Partnership

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 16th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lee of Trafford (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches very much welcome the AUKUS partnership announcement and Statement for the whole range of fairly obvious reasons that the noble Lord set out. However, has the Minister seen the comments in yesterday’s Times from Rear Admiral Philip Mathias, a former director of nuclear policy and of the Trident value-for-money review? He said:

“The performance of the Submarine Delivery Agency has been abysmal. Astute class submarines are being delivered late by BAE … HMS Vanguard’s refit by Babcock has taken more than seven years; and … The in-service date for HMS Dreadnought”—


originally 2024—now will not come through until the early 2030s. Have the Government done any work at all as regards submarine construction refit on comparing the performance of Barrow and our shipbuilding industry with the performance achieved in the United States and France? That would be a very interesting comparison. In addition, given that we are likely to have an increase in our submarine fleet, which would be very welcome, what plans are there to increase and train the number of submariners who will be needed for those future boats?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry for the delay—I was caught on the hop. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Lee, might take a little longer but, however brief his contribution, it is welcome.

I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his warm reception of the announcement on AUKUS. I am particularly grateful for his important recognition of the reality of the geopolitical environment in which we all exist today. I think the IR refresh has poignantly delineated that, building on what we identified in 2021 but quite rightly pointing out that events have moved at a pace that we perhaps had not anticipated. We therefore have to be ready to deal with that.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for particularly recognising the significance of the AUKUS announcement. As a child I lived very near the Clyde, and I can remember when these sorts of events were happening. This is almost on par with the agreement of 1958 between the UK and the United States—it is that sort of seismic milestone. I think the noble Lord recognises that, and I am grateful to him for doing so.

To address the remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Lee, with reference to our preparedness to take this on, I too read the letter in yesterday’s Times and I have great respect for our former senior personnel within our Armed Forces. I think I can say on the challenges that have confronted the MoD over a period of perhaps 10 to 15 years on procurement—I have said before at this Dispatch Box that I do not in any way seek to rewrite history or pretend that these challenges did not exist—that precisely because we encountered them, we have dramatically reformed how we deal with procurement. To be fair, that has been recognised in recent years by both the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee.

Very good progress has now been made on the Astute programme, as the noble Lord is probably aware. We have in the water four of our Astute-class submarines—in fact, it could even be five—but the recent one, “Agincourt” is on sea trials, and then we have one more to go. Therefore, I think we have five in the water and then “Agincourt”, and the seventh one is being completed. Very good progress is being made. I am satisfied that, with the procurement reforms that have been made within the MoD, there is a much greater resilience and a much more robust framework and process, not least because we have had a frank talk with industry, as it has to play its part in this. We are laying out our expectation from industry at a very early stage, so that there are not these extraordinary debates five years down the line about what the MoD thought it was ordering. When we manage the contract for an important procurement delivery, we now have a senior responsible officer, who will not change every five minutes but will be in place for a meaningful period during the conduct of the contract. Therefore, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that, although I absolutely respect the right of the Times letter writer to air his views, we can see tangible change, both in the MoD and in the conduct of industry, and that is bearing fruit.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, also asked whether the two aspirations of Euro-Atlantic security and the Indo-Pacific tilt are in some way mutually exclusive. No, they are not; they are two important tandem activities for the UK Government and for defence. As he will be aware, within the integrated review refresh, the primary immediate threat was indeed Euro-Atlantic security and the illegal incursion by Russia into Ukraine. We see that as a short to medium-term threat. However, for the reasons identified in the IR refresh, we regard the Indo-Pacific tilt as now having happened and to be sustained. He will be aware of what the MoD has been doing to sustain that, not least with the carrier strike group 21 and with the permanent deployment of our two vessels, “Tamar” and “Spey”, out in the south-east China seas. They are playing an important role.

The noble Lord asked particularly about jobs, and it is perfectly clear, with the combination of work that will come to Barrow and to Rolls-Royce in Derby, that we anticipate that thousands of jobs will be created in the UK. As he will understand, I hesitate to put a precise number on that, but no one can pretend that this is other than a very positive narrative for defence and for employment in the UK.

He also raised the important issue of skills, which are critical for how we deliver on this trilateral partnership. Two things are happening: our industry partners themselves are being proactive in engaging in initiatives and programmes to encourage the enhancement of skills and retention of skilled personnel, but we have also established within MoD a defence nuclear enterprise, people and skills programme. That is to develop a sustainable and skilled workforce to support the defence nuclear programme. A range of activities is now being undertaken to increase the nuclear sector engagement with young people and to attract talent from a more diverse background. I think I can say that for young, aspiring STEM individuals who seek a really challenging career in a field in which they are interested, this must be near the top of the attraction stakes in what it offers.

The noble Lord raised the number of submarines, and I think I covered that in responding to the noble Lord, Lord Lee. The issue of cost was also raised, and of course costs are relevant. If we take that in a twofold manner, they are, first, the immediate costs that we anticipate will be necessary. We spent £2 billion last year in both Barrow and Derby. As the noble Lord will be aware, the recent announcement intends that part of the announced £5 billion—£3 billion—will be to sustain the nuclear enterprise. The £2 billion will run for a period of three years. That is devoted to the nuclear enterprise as well, excluding Dreadnought, which is of course covered by a separate contingency funding package with the Treasury.

On the International Atomic Energy Agency, the statement the director-general issued on Tuesday was helpful. I am sure the noble Lord has looked at it. It is a very full statement, but what struck me was that it would not have been possible for him to make that statement with its detailed content if there had not been the closest engagement with the trilateral partners in AUKUS. Of course, it is not a matter of saying that we look to the director-general to approve a project or to express support for it. This is an independent testing entity, and the job of the IAEA is objectively, professionally and completely neutrally to assess what we are doing, but it is perfectly clear from the level of engagement that there is a very positive relationship with the IAEA. That will continue. The noble Lord will be aware that its board meets regularly, and the director himself proposes to submit a report to the next session of the board of governors in June 2023.

On the wider issue of non-proliferation, again there is a very good story to tell. In the document—I feel a bit like a stage manager with props here—there is a particularly interesting section at page 33, which outlines Australia’s credentials and credibility in this field. It makes a very positive read. Australia has an extremely good record with the IAEA, which should provide reassurance and comfort. We also anticipate that, as this all progresses, all three partners will be regularly reporting to and engaging with the IAEA.

As to whether this could lead to more countries wanting to acquire nuclear-propelled submarines, it might very well do, but we all recognise the fundamental difference between a mode of propulsion and a nuclear-armed submarine, which is something entirely different. Therefore, all we ask is that, if other countries are minded to pursue that technology for propulsion, they too are vigilant about these important safeguards and criteria and the need to work closely with the IAEA.

The noble Lord also asked about collaboration under pillar 2. That is obviously slightly further into the future, but it is an exceedingly exciting part of the general programme. We anticipate that, as we make progress on pillar 1, which is to build the nuclear-powered submarines, that will remain a trilateral responsibility and will not be broadened out. As we learn from that process and begin to identify in these intricate sciences—whether it is hypersonics, cyber or whatever—we will certainly be open-minded about discussing with other interested parties how we might take these issues and who might be able to make a positive contribution. It is premature to make a more specific comment about that just now, but we can anticipate a very exciting potential for discussion on pillar 2 as we progress with the programme.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Lee, also raised resources and the 2.5% of GDP. I am very clear that that was a welcome announcement by the Chancellor, because I see it as much more than some roseate dream we might hope to deliver in future; I see it as a statement of intent. That is what the Government are minded to do, and it is contingent only on the economy’s ability to sustain it. Because of the manifest recognition by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Government of the world of threat in which we live and the character of the geopolitical complexity that now surrounds us, noble Lords will understand that this is a very potent statement of intent and a very healthy indication that this Government are prepared, even in difficult economic times, to do the heavy lifting when it comes to the security of our country and our ability to contribute to global security through our alliances and partnerships.

I think I have managed to cover the points raised. If I have omitted anything, I undertake to write to noble Lords and have a look at Hansard.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, the AUKUS programme, if executed well, will be very good news for this country. If executed badly, it could be a disaster. The Minister has given us some comforting words on reforms to procurement processes and engagement with industry, but it must be said that the performance of BAE Systems Submarines has been pretty woeful in recent years. Of course, it is not for the Government to run private companies, but industrial performance in this programme will be of strategic importance to this country. What long-term mechanisms and processes are in place to monitor and audit industrial performance, and what leverage will the Government have over the industries concerned? Industrial underperformance in this programme will need to be dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly—something that has not happened before.

The Minister said that the senior responsible owner would be in place for a “meaningful period”. What does she mean by a “meaningful period”? With regard to skills, which are a crucial area in this programme, she talked about what the Ministry of Defence is doing, but this is surely a nationwide issue requiring a nationwide effort. If this ambitious programme is to succeed, we will need all sorts of skills and all sorts of different people. Industries across the country are suffering from shortages—they cannot find sufficient welders—so is there not a case for a government-wide approach to ensure we have a sufficient skills base for such ambitious programmes as this?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes a number of important points; let me try to deal with them.

On the management of contracts and the willingness to have teeth and bite where that is necessary, I think the noble and gallant Lord would be encouraged to see the complete difference in approach in the MoD now compared with some years ago. That is partially because the MoD has woken up to the need to be much more effective in how it manages these enormous contracts with vast sums of taxpayers’ money. To be honest, it is also because we felt the bite from teeth—from your Lordships in this Chamber, from our friends in the other place, and from entities such as the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee. These were unpleasant experiences for the MoD but what they signalled was an absolute need to radically reform and revise what we were doing.

In addition to all that, the one word of comfort I can offer to the noble and gallant Lord is this: bear in mind that this is a trilateral arrangement and agreement. There is, therefore, a triumvirate interest in ensuring that nobody is slipping and everybody is keeping up to the mark. That will be an added enhancer to how we monitor and regulate the performance of the contract.

On the important matter of skills, industries are already engaged—I have seen it at first hand—in really imaginative programmes in their communities with young people. I have been hugely encouraged when I have seen how they operate in different parts of the country. They are engaging with both primary and secondary schools. They are making these critical connections with young people, many of whom then make the choice not only to follow a career in technology but to do it with a particular company. That is one very positive way of trying to increase the skills base available to our industry partners.

At government level, particularly in the Department for Education, there is a recognition of the unrelenting need to reappraise constantly how we seek to improve the provision of skills and ensure that education is aligned with what the economy and industry are asking for. I do not have at my fingertips the details of what we have done so far but I would be happy to write to the noble and gallant Lord about that.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, welcome as this Statement is, there is nothing at all in it about the financial or opportunity costs of this partnership. Is it true that it will cost $245 billion over three decades? How much of that cost will we bear? Which budget will it come out of? In answering a question today posed by the noble Lord, Lord Swire, on the fourth Oral Question, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Penn—indicated that all nuclear capability would be charged from some other part of the budget. I do not understand that to be the case but, if it is the case, it is a change; if it comes with this, it is very welcome. How much is this going to cost, is it going to come from the existing Ministry of Defence budget and what will be the opportunity cost of that if that is correct?

Given that China poses threats in every domain, not just under the water, what assessment have we made of Australia putting so many of its eggs in this exquisite capability basket, given that we will depend on it in all these other domains to be an active ally with capability?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On cost, the noble Lord will not be surprised that I am unable to give specific figures, for what I think are widely understood reasons. I imagine that differing levels of cost will apply because, for example, the role of the United States is based on it having an established Virginia class of submarine being built; as the noble Lord will be aware, part of the agreement is Australia seeking to buy three of those. There are now huge issues for Australia in creating the infrastructure that it will need to build the submarines, so, again, it is anticipated that its costs will be different from those of either the US or the UK.

For our own part, as is indicated, we in the UK have been investing in our submarine-building infrastructure. Some £2 billion was announced last year to support the Dreadnought class of submarines. The recent integrated review refresh announcement of £5 billion—obviously, I am rounding the figure up for ease of use—will be split into three, spread over two years, to sustain the nuclear enterprise. My understanding is that the additional £6 billion, which will be spread over three years—£2 billion per year—is also allocated to the nuclear enterprise, excluding the Dreadnought enterprise. That is money that we know is going to be there, and we are therefore able to budget appropriately.

It is important to go back to what the Prime Minister and the Chancellor have clearly indicated: that, having regard to the turbulent world in which we live, they see defence as a national primary responsibility and priority. They are prepared to work, even in difficult economic circumstances, to ensure that we do as much as we can to sustain a powerful and effective defence capability.

I turn to the last part of the noble Lord’s question, which was about this perhaps being a unique solution for Australia. Australia must make its own strategic decision about what it seeks and what it wants. Eighteen months ago, it identified that it had a need and that the best way to respond to that need was to seek a nuclear-propelled submarine. It is positive and gratifying that it then looked to the United Kingdom and the United States. As the noble Lord will be aware, we have a long-standing and close relationship on the construction of submarines. Australia has made a perfectly balanced decision that this type of submarine, propelled as it is by nuclear propulsion, offers huge advantages: it is far more effective in itself; it can circumnavigate the globe without coming up; it is difficult to detect; and it is much more efficient to run. For those who, naturally, care about the environment, it produces a cleaner form of emissions than, for example, a diesel-powered submarine.

Australia has looked at this closely and come to its own strategic, sovereign decision about what it wants. We should all feel very proud that it wants the UK to be part of this vital partnership in delivering what it seeks.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, should we not derive some comfort from the fact that the crucial meetings in the United States took place immediately after a very amicable meeting between the Prime Minister and President Macron? Is it not absolutely crucial that while we pursue AUKUS vigorously we do not neglect the fact that our European allies are extremely important, particularly bearing in mind what is going on at the moment?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I cannot disagree with one word of what my noble friend says. As I said earlier, the IRR indicated that the primary threat at the moment is Euro-Atlantic security because of Russia illegally invading Ukraine; that is our immediate defence priority in the short to medium term. However, that is without prejudice to our sustainment of the Indo-Pacific tilt.

My noble friend is quite right: our relationship with France on a bilateral basis is strong and good. Although I am not privy to the detail of what the Prime Minister spoke to President Macron about, I am sure that they discussed a huge range of issues, including how we can promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, in which France has a very important role to play.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, a number of noble Lords have mentioned concerns over industrial performance in delivering on this contract. I think I heard the Minister say that, because there are three parties involved, it would be embarrassing if we did not keep up to time. I suspect that that is just one of the things that would be a problem; it would also be extremely expensive. My noble friend asked a specific question about what benchmarking is being done between the industrial complex in this country and that available in both France and the United States. Can the Minister please answer that?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

To be absolutely accurate, I did not use the word “embarrassing”. Nothing on which I represent the MoD on at this Dispatch Box is ever to be embarrassing; it is a privilege to represent the MoD in this Chamber and to do so on such a positive occasion as this one. I do not have details as to how the benchmark will apply, nor an answer on whether there is to be some measurement of appraisal against what other countries do. I undertake to investigate that, and if there is any information that I can share with the noble Lord, I will do so.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, following on from the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, we are talking about a very high-cost method of military defence, financially and in terms of resources. Are the Government aware of the level of controversy in Australia about the AUKUS project? There are concerns about the secrecy of the initial signing, which the Australian Greens described as reflecting a democratic deficit, concerns about setting off a regional arms race, and concerns about where it will leave Australian sovereignty and control over its Armed Forces. Australia has signed up twice previously to have nuclear-propelled submarines and subsequently withdrawn from those projects. Are the Government taking adequate account of the political risks involved?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The Government live in the same world as Australia. Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and many of our partners and allies are very conscious that the level of threat confronting us is virtually unprecedented. We must be equipped to deal with that.

I will not seek to speak on behalf of the Australian Government. They made an analysis of what they required in their defence capability and to enhance their ability to preserve the rule of law and order within that region, and to ensure that international law is upheld by all parties and all countries. I can only conclude that Australia came to the view that this would be a very sensible and valuable addition to its defence capability. Certainly, in so far as addressing the challenges to which I have just referred, this would seem to be a sound decision on the part of the Australian Government. It is not for me to comment on Australian politics, but the Prime Minister of Australia has been very clear, as was evidenced by his presence in America when this announcement was made on Tuesday, that this is a very important development for Australia and a very significant addition to the ability to address any threats or breaches of law that may arise in the region.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very brave and bold decision. I am delighted that it has been made. We are in an era when we need that. However, as has already been highlighted, there are problems within our submarine world. The performance by BAE Systems has not been good. The whole Astute programme has been a problem. The Minister says that we are now on top of that. I am delighted that we are, but one of the joys of this new package is that it enables our nuclear enterprise, which creeps along at the very edge of the capability of our nation, technologically, scientifically and in an engineering sense, to get a boost and maybe move up a notch.

On the SRO ensuring that this follows track, the most successful programme that we ran on a large scale in this country was the Polaris programme. That came in one day early and under budget, because one man was put in charge of it with direct access to the Prime Minister. He could chop people’s legs off if they were not doing what they were supposed to do. Will the SRO have that sort of direct line of responsibility to ensure this? If this goes wrong, my goodness me, it will be a disaster.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

If the SRO had these powers, I would be tempted to bring him into this Chamber to address some of the interrogatories.

I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Lee, that Astute was accompanied by significant problems but, as I said earlier, boat 7—that is “Agamemnon”—will be the final in class. Boat 6 is still at build stage—that is “Agincourt”—but the other five are now operative, so I think we have a perfectly healthy situation.

The noble Lord is right that, as has already been indicated in the Chamber, a very robust assessment will need to be kept on this programme. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, it is not a question of embarrassment and falling down on the job but that, with three eyes focused on what we are trying to deliver, there is a third leg to the protections of that robust surveillance of the contract. I am sure that the senior responsible owner will be in place for a meaningful period. As the noble Lord, Lord West, is aware, my Secretary of State is very conscious of, and vigilant about, ensuring that where these major procurement projects are under way, he knows first-hand what is happening. He will be watching this like a hawk.

[Lord Mountevans (CB)]

My Lords, the importance of the sea lanes and underwater cables is widely known, and submarines are very valuable in this domain. It is well acknowledged that the latest generation of Russian submarines are a great deal better than what they have had in the past. Can the Minister say anything about the nature of the co-operation on this occasion and further co-operation with the United States, bringing together all the experience and expertise of the US Navy and the Royal Navy in this domain? How will it affect the design of the new AUKUS submarines?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am not an engineer or a naval technical expert on ship build, but I would say that he is quite right. There is now a repository of skills and experience that will contribute greatly to how this type of submarine is designed. It has already been established, because it is now being known as SSN-AUKUS, that it takes us a step further than where we originally thought that we would be with a successor to Astute. Those aggregated skills are very important, and I am sure that they will be put to very valuable effect in determining the final design of the submarine.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My noble friend Admiral Lord West, while welcoming the Statement, said—and I noted this carefully—that it was a very brave decision. If any of my civil servants or military advisers had said, “Minister, this is a very brave decision”, I would probably have avoided it. That has been given substance by the lack of anything concrete in terms of cost. On an enterprise of this size, there must be some idea of the ballpark figures. We already have the example of HS2. I am not going to go down that track—no pun intended—but there is a figure in the public domain, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Browne, of $245 billion over 30 years. That is a substantial amount of money, and it will be even more substantial when inevitably, like all procurement in the Ministry of Defence, it increases over the next 30 years. Can the Minister have a stab at it again and tell us the realm of possibility on which this decision was taken? It cannot have been taken without Ministers having any idea of how much it is going to cost.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

While the noble Lord’s noble friend Lord Coaker has remained positive about this, as his right honourable friend in the other place did, I am slightly disappointed at the rather despondent demeanour of the noble Lord, Lord Reid. This has been universally regarded as one of the most important and exciting announcements for UK defence and our Royal Navy capability that we have seen in decades. This is a hugely important development. I am in no doubt whatsoever that the Government have made the right decision to proceed with this. It is a tribute to the United Kingdom that Australia and the United States thought that we were a valuable and reliable partner to bring into this.

On the cost, I will not stand here uttering figures which I have no foundation to justify, however much the noble Lord might want to tempt me into doing that. We cannot put a precise figure on the cost of building one SSN-AUKUS submarine. It is a decades-long programme. The final figure will depend on a number of factors, and it will include the final design, how many we build and when we build them. We recognise in terms of cost that this is a hugely important commitment, but we also have no hesitation in saying that, for the security of the country and our ability to contribute with Australia and the United States to a more globally secure world, it is absolutely the right decision to take.

Nuclear Weapons: Failsafe Review

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in begging leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, it would not be appropriate for His Majesty’s Government to comment on the United States Government’s plans to commission an independent review into the safety, security and reliability of their nuclear capabilities. We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on 27 February, the Minister for Europe, Leo Docherty, addressed the UN Conference on Disarmament. He mentioned emerging threats posed by new technologies, promised transparency, and committed to the continuing development of concrete initiatives in reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. He did not mention the US Administration’s ongoing public and independent review of the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons, command and control, and warning systems to reduce the chance of a blunder or miscalculation, particularly from cyber threats, as an example of a confidence-building, concrete, risk reduction initiative. Since all nuclear-armed states face the same risks, surely this is a concrete and transparent risk reduction initiative, which the UK and France, at least, as nuclear and NATO allies, should also commission. Will this be on the agenda for the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Macron on Friday?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I said in my initial response to the noble Lord, there is a very robust system within the United Kingdom, as he will be of aware, for how we deal with the safety of our nuclear weapons—there is a surveillance programme to check that they are continuing to be reliable and safe—their security and the regulatory regime that covers our nuclear activity. We continue to invest in future capabilities to underwrite safety and performance. That includes collaboration with France under the 2010 Teutates treaty; we are jointly building and operating a hydrodynamic trials facility—EPURE—in France and a complementary capability, AWE. It is interesting that the United States last carried out a review in 1991, I think. I am aware of the noble Lord’s organisation and I pay tribute to his knowledge. His interest in this matter has been encouraging the US to carry out a review, but I reassure noble Lords that there are very robust structures within the United Kingdom.

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords, are not the issues addressed by this Question highly sensitive and probably better dealt with privately rather than on the Floor of your Lordships’ House?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his observation. I understand the interest of your Lordships in the general frameworks which apply, and that is something that I am happy to comment on.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

Should the Government’s focus not be on maintaining continuous at-sea deterrence, which has been unbroken since 1969, but which the Minister and many others know is under increasing strain given the longevity of the Vanguard submarines and the delays in the Dreadnought class? Does not the whole focus of the Government need to be on ensuring that Dreadnought can come in in time to take the strain?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Indeed. I reassure your Lordships that the Government are fully committed to maintaining that independent minimum credible nuclear deterrent based on a continuous at-sea deterrence posture. We do not anticipate any challenge to the transition from Vanguard to Dreadnought.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not expect the Minister to comment in detail, as she mentioned—of course not—but, in general, she will be aware that on several occasions in the past, human override has averted potentially catastrophic nuclear weapons use. The point that has been made is not about the safety of those systems themselves, in engineering terms, but, given the encroaching autonomy of decision- making throughout industry, including in the military, the complexity of the interrelationship between them, and the increasing reliance on artificial intelligence, the dangers of averting that by human override are constantly being eroded. So, while the Minister cannot comment in detail, will she accept that very great danger and assure us that the highest priority is being given to seeing that that human override—the decision by human beings—is not being undermined by the complexity and the increasing use of autonomous, digital-based systems when it comes to nuclear weapons?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord asks a very important question. We are cognisant of—we are certainly not complacent about—the swiftly changing picture of threat or the swiftly changing and challenging situation of artificial intelligence. With reference to the core of the noble Lord’s question, we will ensure that, regardless of any use of AI in our strategic systems, human political control of our nuclear weapons is maintained at all times, and we strongly encourage other nuclear states to make a similar commitment. While I cannot go into detail, the noble Lord will be aware that there are a number of very robust procedures that would stop either an unauthorised intervention or a state intervention.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I am sure many noble Lords understand my noble friend the Minister’s reluctance to share any detailed information but, in general terms, given that the United States has commissioned this review, what plans are there for the UK Government to learn from any suggestions or recommendations of that review in the United States?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank my noble friend. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Reid, a moment ago, we encourage other nations to be vigilant about the risk and we share information and intelligence. We are always willing to look at what other nations do.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, is not the most dangerous situation in the world currently presented by both Iran and North Korea? Given that Iran has now produced enough enriched uranium to build several nuclear weapons and that, in 2022, North Korea launched at least 95 ballistic and other weapons, some of which have an intercontinental capability, can the Minister tell the House what response we have received from our colleagues, international partners and, indeed, those who would be our adversaries on the United Nations Security Council?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

These are matters of profound concern, as the noble Lord rightly indicates. We deploy whatever influence we can in the appropriate fora, whether at the United Nations or in other diplomatic or bilateral defence discussions. We deplore what Iran and North Korea are doing. There is a consistent call upon them to desist but, as the noble Lord will be aware, these are two covert, secretive and independent states. It is difficult to influence or leverage any positive response to the entreaties that the international community makes.

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, will the Minister tell the House what recent conversations the MoD has had with NATO and other key defence allies about this important review? Is it our intention to follow suit with our failsafe review, as outlined in the Question, and what would be the proposed timescale?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

At the risk of being tedious, I simply reiterate to the noble Baroness what I have been saying: we have a very robust structure within the United Kingdom. It is not only inherently robust in terms of the MoD construct but monitored and regulated both within the MoD and externally. We are satisfied that we have due regard to all possible risks or vulnerability. It is for other states to make their decision as to how they deal with the presence of nuclear weaponry, but I indicated earlier the partnership we have with France. I think that is an interesting example of where there is knowledge sharing.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, of course, we support the nuclear deterrent but the US has said that the failsafe review of its nuclear posture

“offers an historic opportunity to reduce the risk of nuclear use today and for generations to come.”

It says:

“The failsafe review must result in concrete actions”


to make both the US and the world safer. So, notwithstanding her earlier comments, can the Minister say what discussions or, indeed, involvement we have had on such an important review, which is ultimately about the security of the world, particularly given the current uncertainties?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I have indicated to the House, we have in place an array of safeguards, checks and structures to ensure that we are responsive to any identified vulnerability or potential area of risk, however that risk might arise. As I said earlier, it is for individual sovereign states to make their own decisions about how they deal with these matters. It would be wrong to suggest that the United States, for example, regularly does this. I pointed out that the last review was in 1991—it is for the United States to make its decision upon that and absolutely right that it does so. It is also right for the United Kingdom to make its own determination. But I reassure the House that we constantly liaise and speak with allies, we share intelligence and we always want to learn from good practice.

Ukraine

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 9th February 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Goldie]

That this House takes note of the situation in Ukraine.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, we hold this debate against the sombre and shocking images emerging from Syria and Turkey of the devastating earthquake which has visited such tragedy and suffering on these two countries. I know the thoughts of us all are with the families and citizens who are affected by and in shock from this horrendous catastrophe. That is a horrific consequence of the destructive power of nature, so it is an incredibly cruel irony that we see tragedy and devastation in Ukraine not from the force of nature but because a human being made an avoidable decision to inflict that horror on an innocent sovereign country.

Almost a year ago, President Putin launched his illegal invasion of Ukraine, which was a move that shook the whole world. Putin imagined that Ukraine would fall within a matter of days, but the Russian army completely failed to anticipate how proud, determined and brave would be the reaction from the forces of Ukraine which ferociously resisted Putin’s troops on every axis. We have now reached day 351 of the conflict. The Kremlin’s attack has cost Russia the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers, not to mention a vast quantity of tanks, armoured vehicles, jets and one prized flagship.

Ukraine has retaken more than 50% of the territory lost in the initial chaos of the Russian advance. A merry-go-round of Russian generals have come and gone, replaced with monotonous regularity. Most recently, General Surovikin has been replaced by General Gerasimov, who is derided by some of his own countrymen as the “Plywood Marshal”. Throughout it all, the Kremlin—aided by Iran’s kamikaze drones—has kept up a relentless, cynical and despicable bombardment directed against civilian infrastructure. Thousands of innocent civilians have died in botched, indiscriminate attacks, adding to the charge sheet of the litany of alleged war crimes.

Take last Wednesday evening—2 February—when an Iskander-K tactical ballistic missile slammed into an apartment block, killing three and wounding many more. Separately, in the past few days, we have heard a former Russian military officer admit that Russian troops have indeed tortured Ukrainian prisoners of war, claiming that at one site in southern Ukraine,

“the interrogations, the torture, continued for about a week”.

That is utterly appalling.

Yet despite laying waste to vast swathes of Ukraine and imposing unnecessary suffering on much of the population, Russia has still failed to accomplish any of its strategic aims. In recent weeks, Russia has trumpeted several tactical advances. In mid-January, Ukrainian forces withdrew from the small Donbas salt-mine town of Soledar: the first notable settlement Russia has gained since early July last year. But this was a pyrrhic victory achieved at enormous cost and resulting in several thousand casualties. Human wave attacks were deployed to secure a ruined town inhabited by just 500 people. It underlines the Kremlin’s callous attitude to dehumanise not only its opponents but its own troops, who are quite simply regarded by the Kremlin as dispensable cannon fodder. In recent days, a force of Russian naval infantry further south has also been attempting to make gains near the central Donetsk Oblast town of Vuhledar, south-west of Donetsk city. It is another case of Groundhog Day. Russia makes creeping gains but simply lacks the capability to achieve its strategic goals.

Intriguingly, the Wagner paramilitary group, bolstered by the mass deployment of at least 40,000 convicts, has been prominent in many of these recent manoeuvres. The extraordinary expansion of this group, and the corresponding increase in its public profile, raise interesting questions about the current nature of the Russian state. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to indulge in the most direct criticism of his military counterparts. It is difficult to imagine that this tension will not implode sooner or later. In a sense, tracking the implications of this war on the dynamics of Moscow’s power structures is as important as following the events on the front line.

For all Russia’s recent tactical advances, winter has imposed an effective operational stalemate in the active areas of the Ukrainian front line. Both sides are now bogged down in attritional warfare that has more in common with World War One. Military casualties on both sides have been high, with each side struggling. We are seeing a Russian security apparatus that is increasingly factional and overstretched. It is highly unlikely that the hundreds of thousands of mobilised reservists have been formed into cohesive formations capable of major offensive manoeuvre operations. None the less, with spring around the corner, there are signs that President Putin is amassing his forces in preparation for a surge in the coming weeks. Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s Defence Minister, believes that Russia is planning a major offensive to coincide with the one-year anniversary of the war in Ukraine on 24 February. In other words, President Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces require the support of their friends in the international community more than ever.

One thing is clear: the UK will remain at the forefront of that effort. It is worth perhaps a brief summary of how we have led so far. Like many, we were taken aback by President Putin’s actions on 24 February 2022, but we were not unprepared. Indeed, since 2015, we had trained more than 22,000 Ukrainians through Operation Orbital following the annexation of Crimea. As soon as Russian boots touched Ukrainian soil, we were again determined to lead the international response. The UK was the first European country to provide Ukraine with lethal aid to help stall the Russian advance. To date, we have donated thousands of short and long-range missiles, Stormer vehicles fitted with Starstreak missile launchers, and multiple launch rocket systems capable of striking targets up to 80 kilometres away with pinpoint accuracy. Last month, we led the world by providing modern main battle tanks to Ukraine.

I know that many noble Lords today will wish to know about the effect of these donations on our own supplies, so it is worth noting that even as we gift capability, we are seeking to restock and replenish. We are reviewing the number of Challenger 3 conversions to consider whether the lessons of Ukraine suggest that we need a larger tank fleet. We are accelerating the Army’s Mobile Fires programme so that, instead of delivering in the 2030s, it will do so earlier in this decade. Subject to commercial negotiation, an interim artillery capability will also be delivered. Furthermore, we are commissioning the backfilling of 155-millimetre artillery shells. In November, we signed a contract for high-velocity anti-aircraft defence missiles to replace the ones we had gifted. On top of that, in the Autumn Statement there was a £560 million increase for our own stockpiles.

Ours is a calibrated response—one that is necessitated by Russia’s growing aggression and indiscriminate bombing, but also intended to act as a force multiplier. The UK’s announcement generated unstoppable momentum, with countries following our lead to pledge main battle tanks to Ukraine. Germany’s decision to send Leopard 2 tanks and the United States’ to send Abrams tanks, coupled with the pledges of Poland, Spain, Canada and France, have enabled us to send a unified signal to Moscow that is more important than any individual contribution. It is a signal that says no one is acting unilaterally and that we are united in helping Ukraine to defend its land and evict the illegal invader.

Let us be clear: in 2023, the UK’s support to Ukraine will remain unwavering. We have already committed to match the £2.3 billion in military aid we spent last year. Yesterday the Prime Minister went further still, not just expanding our training offer for Ukrainian troops to include fighter jet pilots—enabling Ukrainian aviators to fly sophisticated NATO-standard fighters in the future—but offering to provide Ukraine with longer-range capabilities to inhibit Russia’s ability to target civilians and critical national infrastructure while also relieving pressure on Ukraine’s front lines.

Make no mistake: we will continue to use our influence and convening power to keep that global support solid. Once again, we are joined in this great endeavour by our friends in the United States. They have invested approximately $24.2 billion in support for Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s invasion. They have delivered thousands of anti-aircraft and anti-armour systems as well as Patriot air defence battery and munitions, refurbished T-72B tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. As an aside, the other week I met a group of American congress men and women, and I can tell your Lordships that the US absolutely approves of what we are doing. They pointed out to me that in their country those tempted to think that this was a remote European issue have been given a wake-up call. They now understand how the conflict can reach them, not just in the form of hostile aggression but through its wider impacts, including economic fluctuations, energy shocks and cost of living crises.

Many other allies are part of the broad pro-Ukraine coalition. On 19 January, the United Kingdom—alongside Estonia, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, and the representatives of Denmark, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Slovakia—signed the Tallinn pledge to collectively pursue

“the delivery of an unprecedented set of donations including main battle tanks, heavy artillery, air defence, ammunition, and infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine’s defence”.

Separately, our international fund now stands at over £500 million. Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Lithuania and Iceland have donated generously, and we shall soon be announcing the first round of bids.

However, our efforts are not confined to supplying aid or raising donations. The United Kingdom will continue to demonstrate global leadership by hosting both the international Justice Ministers conference on war crimes in March and the Ukraine recovery conference in June. We are playing a critical role in training Ukrainian forces too. Besides teaching Ukrainian tank crews how to operate Challenger platforms and how to fight as a formed unit with those tanks, we are providing specialist basic training to Ukrainian recruits. I went to see that happening last week. It was a privilege to be there; it was both inspiring and humbling. The training is excellent and the Ukrainians receptive, quick to learn and agile. So far, we have trained more than 10,000 Ukrainian personnel in the UK. This year, we are doubling down on that success by increasing the number to a further 20,000. If noble Lords want an illustration of international solidarity with Ukraine, they should just consider our partners in this extraordinary training effort: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Norway, New Zealand and the Netherlands.

President Putin’s flagrant breach of international law has forced us to come to terms with a new reality. It has brought the resurgence of state aggression into sharp relief. For the first time since World War II, we have seen the manifestation of an illegal land-based war in Europe: a desperate attempt by one nation to conquer another country’s sovereign territory. However, there have also been a number of other interesting outcomes that President Putin certainly did not foresee, because the 2020s have not proved a mirror to the 1930s. Nations have not been cowed or coerced into staying silent. President Putin wished for a weaker NATO, but NATO is more solid and more determined and—with the anticipated accession of Finland and Sweden—even stronger. Indeed, we will continue to do all we can to ensure that the final hurdles are removed to allow their swift entry into the alliance.

It is equally striking how nations outside NATO’s orbit have also come to the same conclusion: that their interests align and that they too have a role to play in defending international order. Notably, the United Kingdom has once again been instrumental in bringing northern European neighbours together in solidarity under the auspices of the Joint Expeditionary Force, ensuring a steady supply of lethal and non-lethal aid to sustain Ukrainian resistance.

Back on the home front, we now have a clearer picture of the more serious threats and a renewed understanding of the significance of traditional war-fighting capability. We are planning to refresh our 2021 integrated review and Command Paper. This will be an important opportunity to address the hollowing-out of our land capability over many years under successive Governments, to restore our combat credibility, to rebuild our land industrial base and to modernise the whole of defence to confront the threats of tomorrow.

Kremlin propagandists will inevitably paint any support for Ukraine as an attack on Russia, so-called NATO-orchestrated aggression, or even a proxy war. For the avoidance of doubt, the escalation is not happening today. It started in February 2022, when the Russian Government chose to invade Ukraine illegally to pursue their vain imperialist dream. No one who watched President Zelensky give his stirring address in Westminster Hall yesterday can fail to have been impressed by his courage, his indomitable spirit and his powerful conviction that, in his words,

“bravery takes you through the most unimaginable hardships to finally reward you with victory”.

He and his people are an inspiration, and in 2022 they achieved impossible things; but the reality is that bravery and heroism will not be enough against Russia. Ukraine needs its friends to continue upping their support, which is why, in 2023, as the Prime Minister has said, we must seize the opportunity to accelerate our support for Ukraine before Russia tries to recover its equilibrium.

Putin hopes to wear down the West. He hopes our unity will fracture. He hopes we will seek a rapid return to the status quo. However, history has already taught us that you can never let wrong go unpunished because, if you do, you do not know where that wrong will end up. Therefore, we must show the Kremlin the error of its ways, working with our international partners to aggregate our military muscle and diplomatic clout. We must do all in our power to help brave Ukrainians expel Russia from their sovereign soil. Ultimately, as President Zelensky put it so eloquently yesterday, Russia must lose so that freedom will win. I beg to move.

Integrated Review: Update

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made with the update to the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, Defence is supporting the refresh of the integrated review. We must ensure that the UK remains ready to deter adversaries in the new era of strategic competition. Taking lessons learned from the past year, we will continue to modernise, build resilience and promote prosperity both domestically and across our global partner network. Any specific policy changes will be determined once the update to the integrated review is concluded. We expect this work to be completed ahead of the Treasury’s Spring Statement.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, at the weekend a senior US general said that the British Army was no longer a top-tier fighting force. Yesterday the Defence Secretary said:

“I am happy to say that we have hollowed out and underfunded” —[Official Report, Commons, 30/1/23; col. 18.]


in reference to troop and spending cuts. Does the Minister agree with the Secretary of State? Is that really a summary of the Government’s policy? Will the update of the integrated review see an end to this policy, or will it continue?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The 2021 integrated review and defence Command Paper highlighted that we must focus on capabilities rather than troop numbers per se. Through Future Soldier, the Army will have a whole focus of over 100,000, comprising 73,000 regular service personnel and 30,100 Army Reserve. However, the noble Lord made an important point about hollowness. Over time and under successive Governments, there has been underinvestment in our land capability requirements. We have recognised that and set out a plan. Future Soldier is part of that. We have published an equipment plan of £242 billion over 10 years, and the Army’s proportion of that is £41 billion, covering, for example, Challenger 3, Boxer and Ajax.

I remind the noble Lord that this Government were responsible for a record-breaking finance settlement for defence—the biggest since the Cold War—and it should be acknowledged that we have made a serious attempt to try to redress the hollowing-out process over many years.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, whatever the fresh defence Command Paper has to say, it will be of value only if the Government strike an appropriate balance between ambition and resource. The Minister keeps referring to the largest spending increase on defence since the Cold War. Since virtually all spending reviews since the Cold War have meant a reduction in defence expenditure, that is not a very high bar to clear. Will the forthcoming spending review support the defence Command Paper or undermine it?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord may consider that it is not a very high bar, but it is higher than any of the other bars that have been set, and the facts speak for themselves. He will be aware that the challenge for defence is that we have to balance the operational and remote resource demands of today with the overarching vision to modernise to meet the demands of tomorrow. In the MoD, we are confident that we can reconcile these conflicting tensions.

[Lord Robathan (Con)]

My Lords, will my noble friend go back to the department and tell our right honourable friends the Secretary of State and the Minister for the Armed Forces that it is very welcome that they have expressed the views they have in the last couple of days, realising what a sad state the Army is in. I hate agreeing with the Labour side, but we do know that a great deal more money needs to be spent on defence.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My noble friend will have heard me say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that neither I nor my ministerial colleagues deny that a challenge has confronted our land capability—a challenge spread over many years and created under successive Governments. We are cognisant of that and are doing what we can within the MoD to address it.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords, following a theme that has been echoing around the Chamber, will the Minister say what assessment the MoD and His Majesty’s Government have made of the fact that the IMF is predicting a recession in the United Kingdom? Given the nature of inflation and the unpredictability of the exchange rate, what impact is there likely to be on defence capabilities? In the light of all those things, is it not time to move beyond percentages of GDP as targets for defence expenditure and towards a real focus on actual capability and what the UK can deliver?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Baroness will be aware that a percentage of GDP is the model that has been adopted increasingly by other states in consequence of the approach that the United Kingdom has taken to defence expenditure. In relation to current expenditure, the noble Baroness is right that we face challenges of inflation and fluctuating currency, but we have been able to make greater use of index-linked fixed price contracts, and we use pricing mechanisms where inflation risk sits with suppliers. Indeed, that has prevented higher prices being passed on. We also have forward purchasing of fuels, utilities and foreign exchange—all of which mitigates the corrosive impact of inflationary pressures.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, no matter how it is dressed up, it is quite clear, because even the Government have admitted it—the Secretary of State has admitted it—that we have underfunded our Armed Forces and they are hollowed out. Will we ensure that all three services have an increase in spend? For example, although there is a lot of talk about the Army, when one looks at undersea cables and the huge growth in the Russian submarine force, there is no doubt that there is a maritime threat as well. All three services must be looked at, and there is an absolute need to invest now.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I hold the noble Lord in very high regard, but I do not hold the purse strings of government. However, he sends a consistent message, and I am sure that it is resonating beyond this Chamber.

[Lord Udny-Lister (Con)]

My Lords, the integrated review quite rightly makes the point that international agreements are key, and we are a member of the Five Eyes. As we make a greater tilt to the Far East, can the Minister assure us that there is some consideration of increasing the Five Eyes to include Japan?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to my noble friend that I obviously cannot be specific. Five Eyes is a very important collaboration, and it is relevant to our activity in the Indo-Pacific area. My noble friend makes an interesting suggestion. We already have a good bilateral defence and diplomatic relationship with Japan, but I listen with interest to what he says.

[Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston (CB)]

My Lords, there is a legitimate focus on land capabilities, but I return to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. We are a maritime power, and it has been our ambition to be a world-leading one. We should not overlook the threat in the Baltic and North Atlantic, which contribute to the security not just of the UK but of northern Europe.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I reassure the noble Baroness by referring her to the ambitious shipbuilding programme for the Royal Navy. We are watching with interest the emerging development of the Type 26 on the Clyde and the Type 31 at Rosyth. Of course, the fleet solid support ships were recently announced; they will involve Harland & Wolff and will be built principally in Belfast. But the noble Baroness is quite correct: we are a maritime nation, we realise that and I think she will agree that there has been a very healthy investment in our maritime capability.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

My Lords, are the Government not embarrassed that they have had to admit to our closest ally, the United States, that the British Army can no longer put a fully equipped armoured division in the field? If they are not embarrassed, they should be.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord will understand that, in this day and age, we cannot look at one aspect of capability on its own—that is not how we deal with and address threats now. The key to how we operate is, first, co-operation with allies; it is also agility in how we respond and making sure that we have the technology and equipment to respond. Although there is no denying—and I have not attempted to deny—that we have seen a hollowing out of our land capability over some decades, it would be quite wrong to give the impression that MoD in the UK does not have a very solid capability: we do. It is important, particularly having regard to the instability in other parts of the world, that we do not talk down our Armed Forces, not least for the morale of the men and women who serve so bravely in them.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords, since publication two years ago, surely there has been a major global change—namely, the illegal invasion of Ukraine. Is not one of the lessons of those two years that we should concentrate more on European defence and give up the illusion of a greater tilt to the Indo-Pacific?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We do concentrate on Euro-Atlantic security, and the swiftness with which we responded—indeed, led the response—to the illegal invasion of Ukraine is tangible evidence of that. But I agree with the noble Lord: the threats that we face nowadays are multifaceted, and it is important that we devise a capability that can respond to the character of that new threat. The noble Lord will be aware that we are dealing not just with traditional land, sea and air domains; we now deal with space, cyber and electro- magnetic domains. It is a complicated world in which we live.

Armed Forces: Resilience

Baroness Goldie Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Robathan for enabling this important, constructive and certainly timely debate. There are surely few places in our country, outside of MoD headquarters, that are likely to boast as much defence expertise and experience as is gathered here under one roof.

I thank all who have spoken, including former Defence Ministers and former heads of our armed forces; every contribution has added an extra dimension to our understanding of the grave issues we are facing. Among those contributions, we were privileged to hear the maiden speeches of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, of Grantham, and my noble friend Lord Hintze. I think your Lordships would agree that the calibre of their speeches whets our appetite for hearing much more from them, and sooner rather than later.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is inevitable that there will be those who argue that the Command Paper, Defence in a Competitive Age, released in 2021, is effectively obsolete following President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine illegally. However, the main thrust of that document was correct, and it remains so today, because it identified Russia as our most acute threat. It noted that we are living in a more adversarial, multipolar and transactional international era. It committed the United Kingdom, despite tough economic times, to maintain its position as a leading NATO partner in Europe. Indeed, combined with the biggest increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War, it set a tone that other nations would later follow in the wake of the Ukraine invasion.

It is also fair to say that the Command Paper did not anticipate, as no nation did, the sheer speed of change, nor did it predict how the impact of Russia’s invasion would send shockwaves around the world, impacting global energy and global food supplies and precipitating a severe financial crisis. Separately, we are also aware that China is watching events closely as it escalates tensions with Taiwan, while states such as North Korea and Iran continue to pose complex regional challenges. Violent extremism has not gone away; terrorists continue to stoke the fires of instability across Africa.

So in this age of constant competition, the open international order on which our values have come to depend is under threat as never before—all that while rising costs are putting a sustained squeeze on defence budgets. Resilience has rocketed to the top of our agenda, and, in the short term, our first priority must be to continue to help Ukraine win back its sovereignty—I reassure my noble friend Lord Robathan and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, on that.

In the past few decades, war has only been a theoretical possibility, but now conflict is actually taking place on this continent. We should be crystal clear—the Lord, Lord Robertson, painted this in stark terms—that our safety and that our allies depend on Ukraine winning and Russia losing. Since the start of the conflict, the United Kingdom has been a leading supporter of Ukraine. We were the first European nation to supply it with lethal aid, providing £2.3 billion of military support and £20 million of humanitarian assistance in 2022. Already in 2023, we have committed to repeating that £2.3 billion of support, and we have underlined that we are in this for the long haul.

Recently, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence has announced that we will send Ukraine a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks with armoured recovery and repair vehicles, as well as AS-90 guns, more uncrewed aerial systems, more ammunition and another 600 Brimstone missiles. That package is designed to help Ukraine to go on to dominate the battlefield and to move from resisting to expelling Russian forces from Ukrainian soil. However, while the tanks and guns are coming directly from our stocks, a significant number of the other donations are being purchased on the open market or supportive partners. Indeed, we continue to play a leading role in hosting and participating in donor conferences to encourage other nations to keep supplying Ukraine with the support it needs. Last week’s Ramstein conference, for instance, was another opportunity to galvanise western support, with a number of significant pledges made. In particular, I laud and thank Germany for its recent decision to send 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and to authorise partner countries to send theirs in turn. That is a historic move, which we hope will have a decisive impact.

It is also vital to ensure that we act rapidly to replace the capabilities we lose; this point was raised by a considerable number of your Lordships. In December, the Defence Secretary announced a £229 million order for thousands more anti-tank weapons to replenish our stockpiles. Even as we give Challenger 2 tanks, we will be reviewing the number of Challenger 3 conversions following early lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

We will also build on the Army’s modernisation programme under Operation Mobilise. The Army will accelerate its modernisation, the rebuilding of its stockpiles and the delivery of new tools, including Long Range Precision Fires and electronic warfare. Specifically on artillery, the Defence Secretary has announced the acceleration of our Mobile Fires Platform programme. It was earmarked for delivery in the 2030s. That will now happen earlier and, subject to commercial negotiation, an interim artillery capability is to be delivered.

Beside the short and medium term, we are giving thought to our longer term resilience. The mantra of the Defence Secretary throughout his tenure has been that as threats move, we must move to meet them. The aim at the heart of the Command Paper was to create leaner and more agile Armed Forces, which could be adapted to meet threats as they arise. Today we have a clearer picture of the more serious threats, as well as a renewed understanding of the vital importance of traditional war-fighting capability. That is why in the next couple of months we will refresh the integrated review and Command Paper.

One would have had to be dwelling in outer space during this debate not to hear the recurring theme, which I noted characterised every contribution. That, of course, is in relation to resource. I thought that it might be helpful just to provide a bit of backdrop. The Government recognise the vital importance of defence, as our record investment in 2020 and our unwavering support for Ukraine have shown. The 2022 Autumn Statement reconfirmed the Government’s commitment that defence spending will not fall below 2% of GDP, and the Government recognise that further investment in defence will be required to meet the threats that we face and will consider that as part of the integrated review refresh.

In the 2020 review, when the MoD secured a £24 billion uplift in cash terms to its budget over four years to increase defence spending, that was the biggest investment in the UK’s Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. I have no doubt that a number of the distinguished contributors to this debate will reflect that, in their time of being in senior office, they might have wished that that facility had been offered to them. Our defence budget is currently the largest of any European ally. With that uplift of £24 billion in cash terms over four years, our participation in every NATO operation and mission and our declaration of the UK’s nuclear deterrent to the allies, the UK will remain NATO’s leading European ally.

I listened very carefully to noble Lords’ observations. The defence Command Paper is ordered by the Secretary of State for Defence; it recognises what we need to do, responding to the changing threat environment and how we propose to do it. I have heard the explicit and clear messages: from my noble friend Lord Robathan, that “hard power is necessary”; from my noble friend Lord Hintze, that “soft power without hard power is no power at all”; from the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that we must “restore hard power”; and from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, that “size of capability does matter, and more resource is needed”. The noble and gallant Lord added, colourfully, that there are no parsnips. There may be no parsnips, but I think that there are other vegetables in the larder worth mentioning. He is aware of the very solid investment programme and of really exciting opportunities for our three Armed Forces.

I was interested in the relatively sparse reference made in the debate to the critical domains of cyber and space. One of the absolutely fundamental tasks that the MoD is undertaking is that we have the digital backbone and we are recognising the need to respond to and be part of this digital age. We are engaged with our Cyber Defence Academy, and we are taking the steps that we need to take to ensure that in these new and for many people unfamiliar domains we are in there with our allies and partners, understanding what they mean, recognising the threats that they may pose but also exploiting the opportunities that they offer.

I listened with particular interest to the ideas from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Peach, for the Baltic and far north, and expanding the JEF. I am sure that that is a view that will resonate within the MoD.

The noble Lord, Lord West, repeated the plea for more resource, as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, and my noble friend Lord Attlee. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, referred to a communication that he had previously issued in his “clearest Yorkshire”. Let me reassure him today that I hear his clearest Yorkshire message. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, reprised the theme, as did the noble Lords, Lord Bilimoria and Lord Alton. It was also reaffirmed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. So I do not think that there is any doubt about the consistency, constancy and unanimity of the message coming from your Lordships. It is my job to ensure that it is relayed to where it matters, and I undertake to discharge that responsibility.

With reference to the integrated review and Command Paper, noble Lords will understand that I am not at liberty to pre-empt any potential announcements, but it would not be giving away any trade secrets to say that this will be an opportunity to create a credible and sustained force—a force ready for strategic state competition sooner, leveraging integration to make best use of our assets, and credible in our ability to deter our adversaries and respond to threats. It will also be about ensuring that we have the agile Armed Forces that we need for our brave men and women. I reiterate the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and others. Our personnel, our Armed Forces men and women, are our most precious asset; we know that and we do value it. We acknowledge that there have been challenges for them; we are cognisant of the challenges and are constantly trying to find ways of addressing them.

In relation to service family accommodation, your Lordships will recall an earlier statement on that—I think it was the day before we broke up for Christmas Recess. I think that I was able to reassure your Lordships that there has been seismic change in how we are offering helplines and immediate and swift support, and taking steps to relocate personnel if accommodation is not habitable.

We need to be sure that we can deploy at pace to a range of threats and seamlessly transition between operating and fighting. Critically, the review and the Command Paper will be about creating a truly global force, collaborating alongside allies and partners to better counter threats and lever our economic, diplomatic and military might to pack a greater combined punch.

Let me now deal with some of the specific points raised by noble Lords. My noble friend Lord Attlee raised the matter of deployable divisions. My understanding is that, as directed in the defence strategy and defence plan of 2022, we have two deployable divisions: 1st (United Kingdom) Division, which provides a wide range of capabilities at home and overseas; and 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, which is the Army’s primary armoured war-fighting division. War-fighting capability, let me reassure noble Lords, remains the cornerstone of deterrence and the bedrock of a world-class British Army. I just want to reassure my noble friend Lord Robathan and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, on that.

Noble Lords will also be aware of the Future Soldier programme, which set out an exciting future for the military and a recognition that we are not necessarily dealing with mass numbers of people, but working out how, by combining the skills of our people with the technological advances we now have, we can do things better with fewer people and do them more safely. Very often, we can use technology to deploy in operations where people previously were at risk; with the deployment of technology, that risk disappears.

The noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Craig of Radley, my noble friend Lord Robathan, the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Robertson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, all raised the issue of replenishment. In relation to replenishing stocks, the Ministry of Defence continually manages and reviews its stocks of weapons and munitions and these considerations inform what we give in kind to the armed forces of Ukraine. There are regular strategic supplier conversations throughout the ministry and we regularly fully engage with industry, allies and partners to ensure that all equipment and munitions granted in kind are replaced as expeditiously as possible. We are absolutely clear that we will never go below the safe line that we require for the security of our own nation.

A number of noble Lords asked specifically what we have been ordering. I can confirm that a number of substantial contracts have already been placed to directly replace our stockpiles. These include the replacement of the Starstreak high-velocity missile and the lightweight multirole missile. The next generation of light anti-tank weapons, NLAWs, are currently being built, and several hundred missiles will be delivered to UK stockpiles from 2023 onwards. A contract for further NLAWs was signed on 7 December 2022.

A number of noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lord Robathan, the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, raised the matter of accommodation. As I said earlier, we are very cognisant of this. We have made investment and have developed structures so that nobody in our Armed Forces suffering unacceptable conditions should be left without help or a source of advice. I cross-examined officials to be sure that that is a robust system and was assured that it is.

I have some figures on recruitment, but in the interest of time I am going to offer to write to those noble Lords who raised issues of recruitment and, under that, I shall deal with the issue of reserves that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, raised. There is perfectly positive and, I think, encouraging information in there.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, and my noble friend Lord Attlee asked for a debate in this House. I am very pleased to be able to confirm that that debate will happen on 9 February. It has probably not yet been tabled in the bulletin of parliamentary business, but noble Lords can look forward to the perhaps dubious pleasure of me opening it and my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon winding it up.

On dealing with propaganda and misinformation, an issue of concern and interest to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, we have used our own intelligence, in conjunction with the United States and the armed forces of Ukraine and Ukrainian intelligence sources, to start being a little more free handed about disclosing intelligence. We think that is the best way to neutralise the poison of lies and misinformation, and it has proved to be very effective. In a previous debate, I referred noble Lords to a recent survey that had been carried out in Russia. It indicated that public support for the war is dropping in Russia, and that is very welcome.

On defence resilience and industry, which concerned many noble Lords, not least the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, along with a number of others, we have made major changes within defence. If we work on from the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, published in March 2021, as a step change in our approach to industry, we now think about defence industries as strategic capabilities in their own right. The noble and gallant Lord is quite correct: we cannot do this on a feast and famine basis. That was something we discovered with shipbuilding. In fact, the national shipbuilding strategy, refreshed recently, has been very much welcomed by the shipbuilding industry, because it is giving it predictability, visibility and a sense of what lies ahead in the future. The noble and gallant Lord is quite correct that that is what we want to achieve across our relationship with industry.

The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, raised issues about our Armed Forces people. I absolutely emphasise how important they are. He asked about veterans, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I can confirm that we now have a Minister for Veterans, Mr Johnny Mercer; we have an Office for Veterans’ Affairs; and very recently, in the Armed Forces Act, we had explicit provisions for the first time in relation to the covenant, to introduce a new legal duty in relation to health, housing and education. When these services are sought, wherever they are being sought, by veterans throughout the United Kingdom, there will be better support, making sure they can get the services they need.

The question of whether we can do more for Ukraine was on the minds of many noble Lords. I reassure them that we work closely with the armed forces of Ukraine. We analyse with them what they think their needs are, and I have said before in this Chamber that we do not do that in a silo of our own: we consult with our allies and partners so that we ensure that our singular contributions achieve the best aggregate output in terms of impact and effect. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that the Indo-Pacific tilt is still a very important part of HM Government strategy. That is exercised through various conduits, including diplomatic and trade engagement, and of course defence is an essential part of that integrated offer to the region.

I am slightly over my time, but this has been such an important debate. I thank your Lordships for your indulgence and draw my remarks to a conclusion by saying that we are, in Defence, changing and adapting, we are learning from the lessons of Ukraine, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that we support Ukraine to secure victory, and ultimately build up a more robust resilience so we are ready for whatever strategic threat comes next. On the broader front of our defence capability in the present and the future, my right honourable friend the Secretary State for Defence has a reputation for honesty, tenacity, bluntness and leadership, and he will be a doughty advocate for Defence in his engagement with the Prime Minister and the Treasury. In that endeavour, he will certainly have an important weapon at his disposal: the contributions of your Lordships to this debate, a cogent augmentation of MoD arguments for which I thank your Lordships profoundly.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, could I urge her, in this electronic age, to copy any letters to everybody who has participated in the debate?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I will be delighted to do that. As your Lordships will have realised, such was the breadth and scope of questions that I could not possibly address them all in this debate, but I will certainly look at Hansard and undertake to deal with as much as I can by correspondence, and that will be placed in the Library, probably in electronic form, for access by anyone who wants it.