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Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy
(1 day, 9 hours ago)
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Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Ben Goldsborough (South Norfolk) (Lab)
I beg to move,
That this House has considered e-petition 744215 relating to Russian influence on UK politics and democracy.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. In preparation for leading this debate, I met experts and researchers; I also spoke to Alex, the organiser of today’s petition. I thank everyone who took the time to speak with me, I thank the diligent staff of the Petitions Committee for their support in organising those meetings, and I thank the 114,704 signatories to the petition, who have brought this critical issue to the attention of the House.
I know that the Government have already commissioned an urgent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics, led by Philip Rycroft. That is extremely welcome, and I applaud the Government for doing it, but I want to make a clear distinction. Financial interference is just one way in which the Kremlin meddles in our democracy; there are other ways as well. The petition calls for a public inquiry into all Russian interference in our politics. Such an inquiry should be broad, covering all aspects of Russian interference. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister will want to address that in his response.
From my discussion with Alex, I also know that the petition was inspired by events including the conviction of Reform’s former leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, and concerns about Russian interference in the 2016 Brexit referendum and Boris Johnson’s close personal relationship with Evgeny Lebedev, a man whom Boris Johnson elevated to the other place and the son of a “former” KGB officer.
I strongly believe in looking for solutions and looking forward, not back, but it is clear to me that the petitioners are deeply concerned about past events. With that in mind, I will start by talking about some of those events and outline how we have reached this point, to explain why the petitioners are so deeply concerned. We then need to talk about the state of play today. Where are our weaknesses? Where are our vulnerabilities to Russian interference? How is the Russian state already meddling in our democracy? Finally, we need to talk about solutions. What can the Government do to mend and protect trust in British politics?
I will start with Nathan Gill. The fact that the petition received so many signatures in Welsh constituencies should tell us that the crimes of Reform’s former leader in Wales were a major cause for concern for all petitioners. Nathan Gill is currently serving a 10-and-a-half-year sentence for taking, at the very least, £40,000 in Russian bribes. Now, £40,000 is a huge amount of money, but I ask hon. Members: is it enough to betray your country? I suggest not. Perhaps Mr Gill’s political leanings were already closer to the Kremlin’s than those of the rest of us.
For the sum of £40,000, Nathan Gill gave TV interviews in favour of an ally of Vladimir Putin and made speeches in the European Parliament. Spouting pro-Russian talking points is not new for Reform politicians: Nathan Gill’s boss, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), blamed the EU and NATO for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, said that the west had “provoked” the invasion and described Putin as the world leader he most admired. It seems that Reform politicians are comfortable doing the Kremlin’s dirty work for it, regardless of whether they get paid for the privilege. Maybe Russia should have asked Mr Gill to betray his country for free. It may as well have saved £40,000.
The problem spreads further and higher than Reform, however. The former Prime Minister Boris Johnson has serious questions to answer about his relationship with Lord Lebedev, whose father was a KGB officer. There is, as they say, no such thing as a former KGB officer. In April 2018, when Boris Johnson was Foreign Secretary, he visited Alexander Lebedev’s Italian villa, a location allegedly being investigated for use in spying. He did so without his officials and travelled to Lebedev’s villa directly from a NATO summit. We were told by the former Prime Minister that
“no Government business was discussed.”
We have only his word for that. I will let hon. Members make up their own mind about how much trust should be placed in the former Prime Minister’s words.
In 2021, Italy’s foreign intelligence agency wrote to the Italian Prime Minister to report that Lord Lebedev’s father
“enjoyed the favour and friendship of Vladimir Putin”
and continued to attend KGB meetings in Moscow. The House of Lords Appointments Commission raised concerns about “significant potential risks” from Lord Lebedev’s “familial links”, but thanks to the former Conservative Prime Minister, this man now sits in the other place, with all the access and credibility that that place imparts, not to mention the ability to make decisions about the direction of our country.
Where do we stand now? I found my conversations with various experts extremely helpful in answering that question, and the points that I am about to make owe a huge amount to them.
First, our defences against money as a vector for political persuasion and control are insufficient. The case of Nathan Gill proves that. Although we should be pleased and relieved that Mr Gill was caught and punished, the damage was already done. Appropriate systems must be put in place to prevent any recurrence of his treachery. Some experts mentioned concerns that Russian money is used to fund think-tank reports in Britain. I ask the Minister whether the Government will consider mandating that all UK-based think-tanks declare their funding.
Critically, cryptocurrencies pose a new threat to our democracy. If we do not have the tools to tackle and prevent old-fashioned cash-in-hand corruption, what can we do to tackle bribery and corruption founded on cryptocurrencies? I ask the Minister whether the Home Office is taking steps to develop digital tools to tackle cryptocurrency bribery and corruption. I appreciate that the Rycroft review will assess financial interference specifically, but I would be grateful if the Minister told the House what efforts the Home Office is already making to clamp down on the malign influence of Russian money in our democracy.
Secondly, we must discuss an issue outside the remit of the ongoing Rycroft review. The experts I spoke to were explicit: Britain is on the frontline of an information war. Thanks to the security, crime, and intelligence innovation institute at the University of Cardiff, we know that Russia employs at least 500 political technologists. These are people who plan Russia’s informational, political, economic, cultural and legal subversion of its enemies.
One such political technologist was in London on the day of the 2016 Brexit referendum. On the day we made one of our biggest ever decisions as a nation, this Russian political technologist was in our capital city, taking photos of polling stations and sharing them on social media with his followers in Russia. This man has personally met senior UK political figures, and he wrote a report that personally thanked someone who worked on Conservative campaign headquarters election campaigns and alongside two former Prime Ministers. This man is now using the skills he acquired in Britain to deliver a master’s degree in Moscow, designed to train specialists in information warfare.
Russia clearly sees that this is a war, even if we do not. Its strategy is one of division, to create distrust and to convince Brits that we are all the same.
Luke Myer (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Lab)
During last year’s election in Moldova, undercover reporters exposed a network of people who were being paid by Russia to produce disinformation content on social media platforms, including TikTok and Facebook. Does my hon. Friend agree that we are naive to assume that such things are not happening in this country, too?
Ben Goldsborough
My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. One of the experts I spoke to worked on that campaign, to make sure that loopholes were being closed to protect Moldovan democracy. We are no different from anybody else; he is completely right.
Disinformation relies on and deepens political polarisation in our country, creating uncertainty, distrust of truth and a rush to political extremes. “The Integrity Initiative Guide to Countering Russian Disinformation” says:
“When people start to say, ‘You don’t know what to believe’ or ‘They’re all as bad as each other’, the disinformers are winning.”
Information warfare with the Russian state is not new. So much of what we are discussing today could be straight out of the cold war, but thanks to social media it is now easier than ever for Russia to disseminate disinformation. As one expert put it to me, the UK currently has an analogue response in a digital age. To put it another way, the Russian state has brought an ICBM to a knife fight.
The experts also pointed out that media literacy in our country is poor. We are not equipped to spot disinformation, so people fall prey to lies. This affects everyone: no one is immune to disinformation, and people who think they are immune are most at risk.
Thirdly, our own authorities are unarmed. The Electoral Commission is toothless and not fit for purpose. It is unable to tackle this existential threat and has been stripped of all the powers needed to tackle political interference. The Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and intelligence agencies are siloed. Our civil servants change jobs too frequently and do not have the experience or expertise necessary to deal with the threat.
What can we do to protect our democracy? First, we need to get real. We might not feel as if we are on the frontline, but we are. Russia knows it, and we need to recognise it now.
Secondly, we need a single agency responsible for identifying, tracking and defending against disinformation. The Swedish have their Psychological Defence Agency, which co-ordinates defence and provides agencies, local government, companies and organisations with support and education in countering disinformation. The French have VIGINUM, which detects information from hostile foreign actors and works to identify bot farms.
Thirdly, we need substantial investment in critical thinking education and a focus on training future generations to critically analyse sources. The threat will be with us for many years to come, and we must ensure that future generations have the tools they need. Much of the framework is already in place in the current curriculum, but we need to go further. Scrutiny of the provenance and validity of sources should be an absolute priority in the curriculum. Maths already does it, so will the Minister’s Department work with colleagues in the Department for Education to improve media literacy?
I cannot impress strongly enough on hon. Members how urgent the situation is. We must act swiftly and decisively to secure our nation from Russian interference.
Ben Lake (Ceredigion Preseli) (PC)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) on so eloquently detailing the importance and urgency of this matter. I also congratulate the petitioners on organising such an important petition. I speak as the Member of Parliament for Ceredigion Preseli, the constituency that—half an hour ago, at least—had secured the highest number of signatories.
As the hon. Member outlined, Wales is one of the areas that has secured the highest concentration of signatories across the entirety of the UK. It will come as no surprise to anybody who listened to his excellent speech that the reason for that interest and level of concern in Wales is the antics and treachery of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, Mr Nathan Gill. As has been mentioned, he has been jailed for 10 and a half years for accepting Russian bribes to the tune of some £40,000 for making pro-Russian statements in the European Parliament and to the media. As I think everybody will agree, the man has committed treachery for £40,000, so we must ask serious questions about his integrity and that of his party, whose members I notice are absent from today’s debate.
I want to make two broad points. The first is to explain why it is so important that we waste no time in implementing measures in response to the findings of the review that the Government have rightly called for and initiated. I understand the review will report its findings in March. I plead with the Government Minister to ensure that the findings are acted on as soon as possible, so as to preserve the integrity of our democracy. Sadly, it might not be possible to bring about any legislative changes in time for the elections in Wales and other parts of the UK in May this year. Nevertheless, it is important that we do not waste any time so that further elections are not influenced in any way by the scourge of Russian interference.
I also ask the Minister that, as part of the review’s considerations, we look at the egregious loopholes in our current laws that the Russian state was able to exploit by funnelling money through to political actors and traitors in the UK for their own ends. I would like his reassurance that one particular device and mechanism being examined is the creation of Welsh limited partnerships. It is a subject that a whole host of investigative journalists have written about in some detail, and which I would very much like to hear the Government state that they are looking at. Such devices are created in Moscow in Russia and are then used to funnel money into our political discourse and political actors who try to interfere and influence our debates in malign ways that are very difficult for us to spot, or at least not very easy for the Electoral Commission and other authorities to act on effectively.
I will end by reflecting on why that is so important. The hon. Member for South Norfolk outlined the host of ways in which the Russian state is trying to target society and democracy in western countries and specifically in the UK. As the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) said in his intervention, we should not be so naive as to think that it is not happening here in the UK.
The strategic defence review of June last year concluded that we are under daily attack. When we talk about political interference, whether it is Russian, Iranian or Chinese for that matter, we should place that in the broader context of other hybrid warfare tactics, some of which the hon. Member for South Norfolk referred to. We need to consider that while those countries are perhaps flooding our social media feeds with disinformation generated by armies of bots, or trying directly to bribe some willing fools in our political environment, they are paving the way to undermining and corroding trust in political institutions and authorities such that we are even more vulnerable to the direct attacks they may launch, such as the terrible poisonings in Salisbury back in 2018, the arson attack back in 2024 or indeed the almost constant daily threat that these mysterious Russian research ships pose to our critical subsea infrastructure.
By allowing political interference to continue, we risk undermining the public’s trust in all our institutions and, indeed, in the very integrity of our politics.
Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
The hon. Member is making a good speech. The Russian ship he mentioned was off the coast of my constituency among others, which caused grave local concern. It strikes me that to defend our democracy, be it Welsh, Scottish or national, protections should be extended to local authorities, because a council such as the Highland council, which is responsible for this vast coastline, would have something to say and do on that front.
Ben Lake
I agree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member’s important intervention. Perhaps we in this country need to wake up to the nature of the threat: it is all-encompassing and comprehensive, so every single tier of government and of society needs to be engaged. Perhaps a national conversation about the seriousness of the threat should be initiated. The findings of the Government’s review may give us a good opportunity to trigger that national conversation. Once the review has issued its findings, we cannot waste any time in bringing forward the measures, whether legislative or budgetary, that need to be undertaken to protect the integrity of our democracy and tackle the scourge of Russian interference in our politics.
Joe Powell (Kensington and Bayswater) (Lab)
As my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) and the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) alluded to, there are many directions in which we can take the debate, be that money in politics or disinformation. Even in my community, a Russian school has been accused of teaching paramilitary techniques to children. However, I want to focus on a case that I believe can inform the rest of the debate and the Government’s response: that of my former constituent Roman Abramovich, who still owns frozen property in Kensington and Bayswater.
Helena Dollimore (Hastings and Rye) (Lab/Co-op)
I want to raise a case in Hastings, where £150,000 of levelling-up money was given to Lubov Chernukhin, the Conservatives’ biggest female donor, who is married to a former Finance Minister in Putin’s Russia. She took the levelling-up money, and the building—Owens in the town centre—closed after a matter of weeks. It was boarded up and the staff were not paid. Last April, I asked for that money back. I am still waiting to hear from her. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Conservative Front-Bench spokesperson should address that in her response to the debate?
Joe Powell
I thank my hon. Friend for providing another rich example of the level of infiltration and influence that malign actors have had, including capturing Government contracts and not delivering on their intention. I am sure that Front-Bench Members will have heard her plea for clarity.
Roman Abramovich was sanctioned in March 2022 and had his assets frozen. I am pleased that the Government have extended those sanctions, with 900 new sanctions against individuals, entities and ships under the Russian sanctions regime. In May 2022, Abramovich sold Chelsea football club under an explicit agreement that the sale proceeds would be used for humanitarian need for Ukraine. It is shameful that, after four years, that money has still not been released.
I welcome the Prime Minister’s leadership in issuing a licence in December to release the money within 90 days and a commitment to legal action if necessary. This is not only a case of profound national and international importance, but a test of whether our sanctions have the bite that they should. The Minister has worked closely on that issue and I am keen to hear what plans are in place for 17 March. What legal action can be taken if the money has not been released? Obviously, I hope that all options are kept on the table.
Abramovich’s influence in public life in Britain extends beyond the Chelsea FC money. He is accused by the BBC of avoiding up to £1 billion of tax after a botched attempt to avoid tax on hedge fund investments via shell companies in a British overseas territory, the British Virgin Islands. He deployed some of the best lawyers in the land to attack the journalist Catherine Belton’s book, “Putin’s People”. Specifically, he did so to try to distance his relationship with Vladimir Putin, an egregious example of a strategic lawsuit against public participation —a practice that I hope will be outlawed in this Parliament.
Abramovich is, of course, fighting a legal case in Jersey—a British Crown dependency—where his legal team includes the Conservative shadow Attorney General, Lord Wolfson. Having raised that issue many times in the House in recent weeks, I find the inconsistencies and double standards in the defence of Lord Wolfson astonishing. On the one hand, Conservative shadow Ministers have attacked the Prime Minister and the Attorney General for their former clients, including at Prime Minister’s questions last week. Yet when people have raised the Lord Wolfson case, including at the Solicitor General’s questions last week, Conservative shadow Ministers claimed disgrace. There is a critical difference: those clients represented by the Prime Minister and the Attorney General were not taken on when they were serving in this Parliament.
I agree that everyone, even a sanctioned Russian oligarch, is entitled to legal representation, but it is surely a massive conflict of interest for a sitting peer—the top legal adviser to the Conservative party—to think that it is compatible to do both of those jobs at the same time. Sir Bill Browder himself, the man who spearheaded the global campaign for Magnitsky sanctions, which are named after his lawyer who was killed by Putin’s henchmen, asked how the shadow Attorney General can
“moonlight as the attorney for a Russian oligarch who is trying to wiggle out of a £2.5 billion deal to aid victims of the war in Ukraine that he made with the UK government? Back in the day that was called a ‘conflict of interest’.”
Sir Bill is absolutely correct.
The Conservative position is that Lord Wolfson has recused himself from advising the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), and shadow Ministers on Russia and Ukraine, but on the day that the Conservative spokesperson made those comments to the lobby—not in the House, but to the lobby—Lord Wolfson published a letter that made no mention of such recusal. Is that not strange? Could we hypothesise that on that day, things were just being made up as they went along? A man of Lord Wolfson’s experience surely knows that a formal recusal must be more detailed than a Conservative spokesperson’s lobby briefing. I ask again, as I have done in the House: does the recusal include efforts to tackle the Russian shadow fleet, including the action taken with allies recently? Does it include sanctions policy? Does it include sanctions enforcement? Does it include tax policy? Does it include NATO policy? Does it include policies on money in politics?
The point is that the shadow Attorney General is representing someone with extremely close ties to Vladimir Putin at a time when Russia is attacking our country through hybrid warfare. I do not think that an unspecified recusal of which we have no detail is anywhere near sufficient to satisfy this House. I urge Lord Wolfson to reflect and make a choice, given that it appears that the Leader of the Opposition has proven too weak to do so. He can either continue to be shadow Attorney General or continue his representation of Abramovich. Doing both is simply indefensible.
Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)
I am sure everybody is aware, but I remind colleagues that if they are to mention another Member of Parliament, that Member has to be notified in advance. With respect to the House of Lords and peers, Members should refrain from direct criticism. I do not think I have heard that yet, and I have taken advice, but I remind colleagues to be aware of that.
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I have notified another Member of the House, whom I intend to name in my speech.
I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing the debate so comprehensively and effectively on behalf of the Petitions Committee and the more than 115,000 petitioners. I share their concern about the influence of Russia over British politics. We urgently need to defend UK democracy from a sustained pattern of attempted foreign interference.
In June last year, the Government’s strategic defence review called Russia
“an immediate and pressing threat”.
It absolutely is. We see that in the conviction of Nathan Gill, Reform’s former leader in Wales. He was sentenced to jail for 10 and a half years for accepting Russian bribes for influence in politics. We also see it highlighted by the light of disinfectant that has been provided by the partial release of the Epstein files. They show a sinister web of crypto and far-right politics in Putin’s orbit, and the way in which that extends into UK politics. It is clear that Reform UK is peddling the same agenda in the UK and is seeking to form the next Government. This is a clear and present danger to UK politics. We cannot overstate the threat to our values, democracy and way of life.
The Gill conviction came more than five years after the 2020 Russia report from the Intelligence and Security Committee, which called Russian influence in the UK “the new normal”. The US had the in-depth Mueller inquiry into interference in their 2016 elections straight after. It is an unforgivable gap in the British state’s response to the Russian threat that a similar inquiry still has not been undertaken into the Brexit referendum. The Tories stopped that happening here. Why have the Labour Government not made it happen?
Mueller found that Russia had sophisticated techniques in setting up legitimate-looking English language accounts, which distributed thousands of pro-Brexit messages in 2016, raising serious questions about Russian internet troll farms. The ISC found credible evidence of interference in UK elections. Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson used to dance on the head of a pin over successful and unsuccessful Russian interference, but this needs to be investigated properly and urgently before we have another general election in the UK. The Rycroft review is welcome and important, but we also need a proper, in-depth, Mueller-style probe into what happened in 2016 and since. Time is short, the clock is ticking and our democracy is under constant threat.
I turn to the Epstein files. The girls and women affected by the heinous crimes committed by Epstein and his cronies are at the forefront of all our minds. Justice for them must be paramount in any action that the UK Government take. The Epstein files make it clear that Gill was not one bad apple, but part of something much bigger and darker: a web of pro-crypto, far-right, Russia-linked anti-democratic forces. It is an oblique and shady movement, in which the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) appears to be embroiled deeply. A message from Steve Bannon, former head of the Trump campaign and former White House chief of staff, was explicit in telling Epstein:
“I am now adviser to Front; salvini/the league; afd; Swiss peoples; orban; land; farage”.
He crowed:
“next may is European Parliament election—we can go from 92 seats to 200—shut down any crypto legislation or anything else we want”.
He was explicit about his project and about the part of the hon. Member for Clacton within that project. We need to recognise this threat.
We see far-right parties across Europe all using the same playbook: attack migrants, distract, create fear, benefit from crypto and grab power. It is dangerous, disgusting and part of a plan. The files reveal Epstein messaging Palantir chief Peter Thiel to say of the chaos caused by the referendum that Brexit is “just the beginning”. That is why the Mueller-style probe is so important. Palantir itself is now enmeshed in hundreds of millions of pounds of public contracts in the UK, including in the NHS and the Ministry of Defence, facilitated in part by Peter Mandelson and Global Counsel. This is absolutely unacceptable.
It is vital that we stand up for democracy. It is vital that we stand up against the dangerous idea, “Oh, they’re all the same,” the idea that the word “politician “is inherently bad, and the unfair idea that all MPs are on the make. Some clearly are, but I absolutely believe that the majority are not. That sort of narrative exactly serves the anti-democratic Bannon-Putin-Farage agenda. But to stand against that, we must act.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
War may not be declared as before and warfare may not be defined by the weapons of old—we may not, for instance, have Russian bombers over the skies of London—but does the hon. Member agree that this country is being forced to fight back against Russian disinformation, spying and sabotage every day? If she does, does she not see Russian financial interference in our democracy as a weapon of war? And if it is, is our country therefore in a form of warfare with Russia?
Dr Chowns
I absolutely agree that Russian money is used in all sorts of manners to undermine our democracy. Rather than splitting hairs over the meaning of war, I will say that it is clear that we are in a fight for the life of our democracy, and that is why I am so passionate about the need for us to work collectively, cross-party, to face the challenge and resist the use of misinformation and disinformation, and the misuse of money, to poison our politics.
Let me turn to the actions that we need to take. We have a crucial opportunity coming up, because we are expecting the publication of the elections Bill. This House will have an opportunity to make law that could strengthen our powers to counter the forces of dirty money, misinformation and disinformation that undermine trust in our politics. Will the Government use the forthcoming Bill as an opportunity to introduce the measures that are urgently needed to prevent Russian influence?
Will the Minister ensure that we ban all crypto donations to political individuals and parties? Will he urgently introduce a cap on political donations? It is, frankly, mind-blowing that we still do not have one. Will he introduce annual spending limits, to stop massive spending around the edges of election times?
Will the Minister stop MPs having any second jobs? We have the grotesque spectacle of Reform MPs, for example, raking in hundreds of thousands fronting things like GB News, clearly peddling the kinds of messages and propaganda that serve the interests of the crypto/far-right/Kremlin axis. Will he act on the recommendations of Gordon Brown by establishing a new anti-corruption commission with power to seize assets and introducing confirmation hearings for top jobs? Why have we had to wait so long for this?
Will the Minister ensure that there is meaningful enforcement when the rules are broken? Frankly, £20,000 fines are a joke. We need much stronger financial and criminal penalties. We have structural weaknesses in election law, which the hon. Member for South Norfolk referred to, including the vulnerability of the Electoral Commission to political attack. Will the Minister re-establish the complete independence of the Electoral Commission and ensure that it has stronger powers?
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Does the hon. Member also agree that there is a gap in the information that politicians and those who fund us need to supply? It cannot be acceptable for any Member, or any political leader in the UK, to forget that they met the Russian ambassador, to forget that they met someone who later turned out to be a Russian spy—as did the Reform leader in Wales—or to seem to have forgotten who paid for their house in Clacton.
Dr Chowns
The hon. Member makes an excellent point with which I agree entirely.
Finally, in respect of the elections Bill, we need to face the fact that the threats to public trust in our democracy not only derive from the influence of Russia and dark money, misinformation and disinformation, but relate to structural weaknesses in the way we do politics in this country. There is an urgent need for electoral reform. We need a system in which every person’s vote counts equally. Will the Minister commit to setting up a national commission on electoral reform so that we can ensure a genuinely fair voting system in which every voice is heard, and so that we do not have the spectacle of foreign money, from Russia or other influences, drowning out the voices of real individual citizens in this country?
If we want future elections to be free and fair, and if we want proper democratic mechanisms for control of our own destiny as a country, we need to know what attacks were made in 2016. We need to understand the mechanisms that have been used to undermine our democracy so far, so that we can protect ourselves from the continuing disinformation campaign that endangers our democracy now. We urgently need to put in place steps through the elections Bill to rebuild trust in UK democracy and protect ourselves from foreign interference.
Phil Brickell (Bolton West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I declare an interest as an officer of the all-party parliamentary group on Russia and democracy, and as chair of the APPG on anti-corruption and responsible tax.
Let me say at the outset that the most important step at this juncture is to provide input into the ongoing Rycroft review of foreign interference in our democracy. I look forward to meeting Philip Rycroft later this week. If colleagues have yet to do so, I encourage them to submit their views to his team as soon as possible.
I would like to make the case for a wide range of reforms that we desperately need, including measures to address glaring weaknesses in our lobbying framework, improvements to controls in this House and the other place, and further measures to work closely with the private sector. However, as a considerable number of colleagues are keen to contribute to the debate, I will restrict my remarks to the changes that I would like to see in the Government’s forthcoming elections Bill. I will begin with the repeated red flags linking Reform UK, or individuals closely associated with it, to Russian money, Kremlin-aligned networks and their vehicle of choice for influence: cryptocurrency.
Vulnerability to foreign influence is a cross-party issue, but when it comes to the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage)—I notified him, Mr Pritchard, that I would mention him—and the people he chooses to surround himself with, the pattern is hard to ignore. Reform UK presents itself as the party of ordinary people, the party of patriotism and the party that claims to stand up for Britain, but the public deserve to know where its money comes from. Again and again, the individuals bankrolling, advising or orbiting Reform appear to sit far too close for comfort to networks that raise serious national security concerns.
Let me start with one of the most serious cases of all and, I suspect, the reason why six out of the top 10 constituencies by signatories to the petition are in Wales. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) mentioned, Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, was sentenced to more than 10 years in prison for accepting money in exchange for making pro-Russia statements in the European Parliament. Having dedicated my working life to tackling bribery and corruption in all its forms, I found the Gill conviction of profound concern. Yes, justice was done, but that case should have prompted a moment of deep reflection for Reform UK. Instead, we saw Reform attempt to brush it off and to distance itself from “one bad apple”. But the public are not fools. If Gill was one bad apple, let us take a look at the rest of the bushel.
Arron Banks’s links with Russia are well-documented, despite his attempts to silence journalists trying to report on his activities. Banks was allegedly offered financial incentives by Russian interests, including a stake in a gold mine, an offer he claims he refused. The New York Times reported that after Banks met President-elect Trump in Trump Tower in 2016, he returned to London and went straight to the Russian ambassador to discuss the visit. The point is not whether every allegation is proven beyond doubt; it is that the same names, the same networks and the same proximity to the Kremlin keep reappearing around the same political project. We cannot pretend that that is normal.
Let me also mention Chakrit Sakunkrit—sound familiar? I can see blank faces around the Chamber. I will use his old name: Christopher Harborne. Harborne donated £9 million to Reform UK—the largest single donation ever made to a British political party. He has lived in Thailand for more than 20 years, and he made his money from the cryptocurrency stablecoin tether. The National Crime Agency has explicitly warned that tether has been used for sanctions evasion and money laundering, including in relation to organised crime and Russia-linked networks.
That is not to say that Harborne himself is complicit in any wrongdoing, but the fact is that we now have a large political party bankrolled by an overseas billionaire whose wealth is tied to a cryptoasset that our own law enforcement agencies have flagged as a tool used in Russia-linked illicit finance. I used to work in anti-bribery and anti-corruption at two major UK banks. Let me summarise what I have just said in six short words: red flag, red flag, red flag.
That brings me to Reform UK and cryptocurrency, which is currently a permissible vehicle for donations into UK politics. The hon. Member for Clacton announced that his party would be taking crypto donations at the Bitcoin 2025 conference—a conference held not in Clacton, London or even Manchester, but in Las Vegas. We should ask ourselves: how many permissible donors were in the room at the time?
I find it profoundly disturbing that the leader of a British political party is being funded, promoted and platformed by the same international ecosystem of crypto money and political influence operations that have been repeatedly linked to Kremlin-aligned interests. This is how foreign interference works in the modern era. It is not George Smiley and Karla battling it out in trenchcoats, and newspapers with eyeholes, but money flows, opaque financing, crypto networks, conferences, and so-called influencers paid to shift political narratives.
Now let me speak about George Cottrell, a key Reform fixer. He has acted as a fundraiser for UKIP and the Brexit party and served as chief of staff to the hon. Member for Clacton, who described him as “like a son”. Cottrell served time in prison in the US after being accused of offering money laundering services on the dark web; he ultimately pleaded guilty to wire fraud. His mother, Fiona Watson, donated £750,000 to Reform, making her one of its biggest donors at the time. Cottrell has been linked to offshore crypto and gambling networks. He appears to be based primarily in Montenegro, where he has funded political campaigns and been accused by local police of running illegal crypto ATMs. Offshore finance, crypto, money laundering risk and Russian proximity—to my mind, there is only one reason why anyone would court crypto-linked individuals’ donations so aggressively: if they have something to hide.
I have sought to paint a picture of the current funding landscape and the egregious means by which certain individuals have sought to circumvent electoral law in order to pump money into our democracy. Let me turn to the principal legislative vehicle that can address these risks: the Government’s forthcoming elections Bill. First, I have to say that I was disappointed that the Government’s election strategy contained no concrete proposals to ban crypto donations to political parties. The Electoral Commission has recently issued some belated guidance, but its hands remain tied without Government action.
Cryptocurrency donations into our politics should be banned completely. I am no luddite. I recognise that there may be some value to cryptoassets in certain circumstances, but they are inherently high risk. In my opinion, neither the Electoral Commission nor political parties themselves will ever be able to keep up with that risk. Crypto is designed for anonymity, speed, cross-border movement and weak oversight, and Reform has chosen to host its cryptocurrency payment provider not in the UK, but in Poland, away from the prying eyes of the Financial Conduct Authority. Dare I ask why? Against that backdrop, we know that crypto is widely used for sanctions evasion, organised crime and illicit finance. As I have said, our NCA is concerned about tether’s role in Russia-linked laundering, so we cannot pretend that this is some sort of theoretical debate.
Secondly, no one person should be able to bankroll a political movement overnight. Chris Harborne’s £9 million donation is not democratic participation; it is political domination. The terrifying reality is that, under current rules, someone with that scale of wealth could make such donations again and again until a general election is called and the regulated period begins. That is not a level playing field. It is a plutocratic arms race—one set against an outdated concept of long and short campaign periods that has long been left behind in the modern world of 24/7 campaigning.
Finally, we must restore the independence of the Electoral Commission. If we want proper enforcement, proper scrutiny of permissibility and real deterrence, the Electoral Commission must be truly independent.
Reform may claim to be the party of patriotism, but patriotism is not surrounding yourself with people repeatedly accused of Russian proximity. Patriotism is not building a political machine that thrives in the shadows of opaque money. Patriotism is defending British democracy from foreign interference, whoever it comes from and whichever party benefits. I urge the Government, in the forthcoming elections Bill, to deliver three reforms that Britain urgently needs to protect our democracy from foreign interference: a cap on political donations, a ban on cryptocurrency and full independence for the Electoral Commission.
Susan Murray (Mid Dunbartonshire) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for his well-informed opening speech, and congratulate the petitioners on bringing this important issue to the House.
Russian interference is happening today. It is a deliberate strategy to weaken our society, undermine trust and turn democratic politics into a marketplace. Russia does not need to win an election to damage a country. It needs only to convince people that nothing is true, that everyone is bought and that participation is pointless. We know the tools and tactics: disinformation, cyber-attacks, intimidation and crucially—as we have been hearing—money.
We have seen the use of money, in the clearest possible terms, used to buy the influence of British politicians. As we have heard, Reform’s former leader in Wales has been jailed for taking bribes to make statements that advanced pro-Russian narratives while he was an MEP—a violation not only of his position, but of the trust of those who elected him. In that context, and with the victims in mind, the latest revelations about Jeffrey Epstein must be taken seriously. Poland has opened an inquiry into possible links between Epstein and Russian intelligence, and newly released files set out the extent of his ties to Kremlin-linked figures. Those links being proven would underline a brutal reality: hostile states do not just target institutions; they exploit compromised individuals and networks that reach right to the top.
I am therefore calling for three clear steps. First, the public deserve a public inquiry into the Mandelson affair—the vetting failures, the access and any national security implications—so that they can have confidence that the full facts are established and accountability is delivered. The Prime Minister has himself said he was misled. If the lies of Mandelson lead back to the Kremlin through Epstein, the public deserve to know.
Secondly, we must rebuild tighter co-operation with our European allies on intelligence, sanctions enforcement and counter-disinformation.
Graham Leadbitter (Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey) (SNP)
Just last week, the Government said that Russia remains the biggest single threat to UK national security, but they also said that they were not going to join the security action for Europe project. The main reason given was the increase in costs since Brexit. If Russia interfered in Brexit, is that perhaps not exactly the result it was looking for?
Susan Murray
I agree with the hon. Member. We need to investigate the circumstances fully and, if it proves necessary, reconsider any decisions that have been taken.
Russian interference is a shared threat, and we are weaker when we act alone. We must shut the loopholes in election law that let Russian money buy access in British politics. Nathan Gill took bribes to push pro-Russian lines—proof that cash for influence is real. On top of that, the Conservatives have taken millions from donors with ties to Russia. Lubov Chernukhin alone donated more than £2 million.
We need transparent donations in British politics. If the money cannot be traced or appears to be buying influence, it has no place in our political system. Given the seriousness of the situation, I strongly urge the Government to consider these proposals and to make every effort to cut out the cancer that is Russian interference in our politics.
Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for his excellent opening speech. I agree with the statement in the petition, which 168 of my constituents signed:
“We are concerned about reported efforts from Russia to influence democracy in the US, UK, Europe and elsewhere. We believe we must establish the depth and breadth of possible Russian influence campaigns in the UK”.
However, I emphasise that that influence is being exercised throughout the world, not just in the west.
I agree with the e-petition, not only from my constituents’ point of view but as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for fair elections, the largest APPG in Parliament, and as chair of the APPG on Ukraine. Russian influence and interference is the converging issue at play between those groups. We must listen to and learn from Ukraine, as the Ukrainians are on the frontline defending Europe. We are in a hybrid war with Russia—that is not a new phenomenon. It is trying to erode our democracy on home soil. I will guide Members through the historical influences on our politics and democracy; address what we already have on the table with the Rycroft review; and conclude with what we must also place on the table, especially via our upcoming elections Bill, in order to ensure that we protect the freedom and fairness of our democracy for evermore.
Russian influence—or should we say interference?—in UK politics is here. Reform’s Nathan Gill was guilty of eight charges of accepting bribes from the Kremlin. The Kremlin exploited legal loopholes to influence the Brexit vote, as ex-MI6 spy Chris Steele revealed just last week here in Parliament. For at least 15 years, the Kremlin has exploited loopholes in political finance rules, with anonymous donations through Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh limited partnerships, unincorporated associations, cryptoassets and parapolitical ecosystems such as think-tanks, opaque media organisations and political movements not formally classified as parties. Evidence of Russian election interference was described as “overwhelmingly clear” as early as 2017 to 2019, with its
“utterly disruptive and malign presence”
in British national life.
If we do not resist, act and legislate now, how can we ever expect to be rid of Putin’s influence and to live in a legitimate democracy? Foreign influence is not a new challenge to democracy, especially during wartime. We are, I emphasise, in an ongoing hybrid war with Russia. During the second world war, the British Ministry of Information, in co-operation with the War Office and the Ministry of Home Security, issued a guidance pamphlet on disinformation. It detailed how foreign powers may seek to:
“make use of the civilian population in order to create confusion and panic. They spread false rumours and issue false instructions. In order to prevent this…do not believe rumours and do not spread them…make quite sure that it is a true order and not a faked order”—
that is disinformation.
Disinformation is fake news. It is created and spread deliberately by someone who knows full well that it is false. Disinformation is vast. It is a technique, like dark money and manipulation, as old as nefarious actors themselves. The distinct difference between that guidance published in the 1940s and today is that the digital realm we are operating in is evolving minute by minute. Our regulation must evolve alongside it.
The Rycroft review, the independent review launched in response to the shocking case of Reform’s Welsh leader, Nathan Gill, is a good first step. I wish to give the review the opportunity to uncover events and make substantial recommendations going forward. Former permanent secretary Philip Rycroft will assess finance and bribery rules and how to reduce the risk of foreign interference, and will build on new rules set out in the election strategy to guard against foreign political interference.
I will welcome Mr Rycroft’s report, which is to be sent to the Home Secretary and Security Minister at the end of March. It will focus on the effectiveness of UK political finance laws, as well as the safeguards in place to protect our democracy from illicit money from abroad, including cryptocurrencies. I look forward to hearing about how it will examine the rules governing the constitution and regulation of political parties, and the Electoral Commission’s enforcement powers, as well as exploring the role of the checks-and-balances system. That being said, to keep up with the technological developments that enable Russian influence in UK politics, we need a multitude of regulation and recommendations to ensure that the Kremlin keeps out of Westminster.
The elections Bill will be a vehicle for that. As chair of the fair elections APPG and Ukraine APPG, I look forward to seeing such firm regulatory action being taken. First, on dark money, we must stop corrupt, foreign state-sponsored money entering our political system. One way to better restrict that would be to outlaw both crypto donations and those from unincorporated entities. Furthermore, there should be a ban on all overseas donations. All known loopholes and political funding architecture must be closed, including Northern Ireland anonymous donations, Scottish and Welsh limited partnerships and so on. That must be tackled through new laws or legislative instruments.
Secondly, on disinformation, we need to rapidly improve our transparency in the UK to make a free and fair digital environment for elections. Without transparency, we get populist information dynamics. That means elections with information disorder, trust erosion as political terrain and narrative amplification over institutional debate. Simplified, reductionist and emotionally resonant narratives are how the predator of big tech preys on the electorate. We must learn from international leaders such as Estonia, which has whole-of-Government electoral threat monitoring, real-time co-ordination between security agencies and electoral authorities and public transparency during interference incidents. We can also learn from France with its election period intervention, which includes legal powers to act rapidly against co-ordinated foreign disinformation during elections combined with rapid attribution and public exposure.
Overall, foreign disinformation thrives where public trust is weakest. A voting system that leaves millions without meaningful representation actively undermines that trust. There is more to do to ensure that our elections are free and fair. These three pillars—eradicating dark money, disinformation and misinformation, and overall electoral reform—are the pillars of the APPG for fair elections. If we work together, we can have a free, fair and democratic future.
Cameron Thomas (Tewkesbury) (LD)
It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I hope that the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) enjoyed the email that I sent him this afternoon.
Carl von Clausewitz described war as a continuation of politics by other means. In the Kremlin, the reverse is true and every lever of statehood is a machine of war. Vladimir Putin has been prosecuting that war against the United Kingdom and our allies for 26 years—whether or not we understand that. NATO and the European Union are two major barriers to Putin’s ambition for expansion and the UK is a crucial partner to both.
In November 2025, Nathan Gill, Reform UK’s erstwhile leader in Wales, was convicted of taking Russian bribes in return for favourable statements in the European Parliament. The hon. Member for Clacton, and leader of Reform UK, described his once close associate as a “bad apple”, but I suspect that the real rot is at the heart of the orchard.
The hon. Member for Clacton also made pro-Kremlin statements as a Member of the European Parliament, most notably in 2014, the year that Russia first invaded Ukraine, when he spoke of Europe poking
“the Russian bear with a stick”.
The previous year, he had met the Russian ambassador, Alexander Yakovenko, at the Russian embassy in London. He later denied that that meeting took place, but a photograph of the pair betrays the falsehood.
Arron Banks also met Yakovenko on at least four occasions between 2015 and 2016, a period within which he donated at least £8 million to a campaign to leave the European Union. He has subsequently given conflicting accounts as to the origin of that donation. Banks is known to have explored the possibility of raising foreign donations through an email copied to Steve Bannon in 2015, and in 2025, Reform UK received a donation of £9 million from the co-owner of cryptocurrency Tether, Christopher Harborne. Tether is understood by the National Crime Agency to be used by the Kremlin to launder its money, evading international sanctions and keeping its war machine running.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
My hon. and gallant Friend is right to highlight the threat from hostile states such as Russia and most importantly from individuals with Russian links. That is exactly why I introduced a private Member’s Bill last year to cap political donations and close the loopholes that allow foreign-linked dark and dirty money to flow into our politics. Does my hon. Friend agree that wealthy individuals with opaque international links can exert damaging influence on our democracy, particularly when our political finance rules still allow very large donations—including crypto donations—with limited scrutiny?
Cameron Thomas
I absolutely agree, and I look forward to the Rycroft review hopefully making some recommendations along those very lines.
The case of Bradshaw and others v. the United Kingdom at the European Court of Human Rights judged in 2025 that the UK’s decision to leave the European Union was subject to Russian interference, but neither MI5 nor MI6 has ever properly explained its dereliction of duty in failing to inform Parliament of that activity. Last year, I asked the Security Minister to release the full, unredacted Russia report, which Prime Minister Boris Johnson suppressed in 2019 against the advice of those security services. The Minister declined, but did not elaborate on his reasoning.
I recalled that interaction last week, after Peter Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein were linked to Putin’s friend, oligarch Oleg Deripaska. Mandelson was also a non-executive director at the Russian company Sistema. Last week, the leader of the Liberal Democrats called for a full inquiry into Mandelson’s links to Russia. That is the same inquiry that the petitioners are asking for.
Ours is an era in which war rages in Europe, the great partnerships of NATO and the European Union have been ruptured, and Russian hybrid warfare has targeted every aspect of UK statehood, from the Ministry of Defence to the NHS and the BBC. Disinformation has for years been interwoven with news to undermine public trust in UK politics—disinformation that now feeds artificial intelligence algorithms distorting the truth that will inform tomorrow.
I have scratched the surface, but there is simply too little time, in any number of Back-Bench debates, to lay out the case for this inquiry. This issue transcends political allegiance. The breadth and depth of Russian influence is so vast and so dangerous to our democracy that no single political party has either the credibility or capacity to fully investigate it. Only a judge-led statutory public inquiry will suffice. The Government have the responsibility to deliver; the future of our democracy requires that they do so.
Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a real pleasure to speak in this debate with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for so ably setting out the petitioners’ cause. I am above all grateful to the petitioners themselves for bringing to this House such a critical issue—in fact, potentially the most important issue: how we can protect our precious but disturbingly quite fragile democracy. I agree with all the comments that have been made in this debate so far about the Rycroft review and the elections Bill.
We have to recognise that the circumstances we are in today are different from those of 10 years ago. I genuinely believe that, back then, for most political parties the fear or shame of being found to have broken the rules was incredibly important, and it was just as much a motivator for compliance as the letter of those rules themselves. Sadly, with some parts of politics—particularly those associated with Kremlin-based interests—shame is no longer a motivator. We are in a post-shame set of circumstances, and that means that we need stronger rules. I agree with my hon. Friend that the time has come for a cap on donations, as well as the many other proposals that he and others set out.
It is essential that the Government fulfil the promises they have made in their welcome strategy related to the elections Bill on the integrity of digital communications. I agree with the Security Minister, who has done so much on these issues, that there is little evidence that Russian bots influenced the outcome of the last general election. However, he will be well aware that there is evidence that the prevalence, reach and AI-enabled effectiveness of bots is growing pretty much every day. As Global Witness showed, even back in 2024, posts from bot-like accounts spreading disinformation and hatred were viewed more than 150 million times in the run-up to the election.
We cannot have a system for election regulation that is still based on leaflet and newspaper campaigning, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) described. Campaigning and attempts at influence now take place online, and our electoral legislation needs to catch up. I hope that the election Bill will ensure that that happens.
The case of Moldova was mentioned earlier. I had the privilege of visiting that country last year with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. I spoke with many election officials and politicians, including President Maia Sandu, and I agree that we see the same playbook being used time and again; of course, it has been used to greater intensity in a country that is right on the frontline of the war in Ukraine. We need to shift out of what is often called the normalcy bias of thinking that the exercise of influence is something unusual, into a far more vigilant state. That must include a national conversation, as the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) said. The public need to understand the extent of the threat from Russian-influenced campaigns far more.
There is an analogy here, which was discussed in relation to the elections Bill, with the threat from Russian-enabled cyber-attacks. I still hear individuals speaking about cyber-attacks as if they are somehow a one-off, but we know now—this was discussed in relation to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—that cyber-attacks are costing our economy about 0.5% of GDP. What happened at Jaguar Land Rover, in just one single cyber-attack, lead to a reduction in our projected GDP. To put that in context, my understanding is that in 2024, all of agriculture contributed 0.56% of our GDP. Cyber-attacks are a huge threat, and we need to improve public awareness of them and of the exercise of influence, too.
That needs to take place in key institutions, as well as more broadly. I was pleased that the Security Minister met with universities, as well as MI5 and others, to help them to identify the threat of foreign interference. That was really positive. I realise that much of that work was connected to Chinese interference, given what happened with Sheffield Hallam University, but it is clear that a variety of authoritarian states and individuals are increasingly seeking to intimidate academics and researchers. The centralised route for reporting attempts of academic interference is welcome, but I strongly urge the Government to look at other measures, such as ensuring that universities are prepared for vexatious, multiple freedom of information requests. They have been weaponised against those researching the spread of online disinformation and hate, in some cases with links to authoritarian regimes, including Russia.
We also need to be far more vocal about the extent of Russian-linked sabotage in our country. I am sure many Members here will be aware of the horrific burning of the warehouse in Leyton in east London. Fewer people, perhaps, will be aware of the credible links to Russia when a package caught fire in a DHL warehouse near Birmingham. The methods we see being used by Russian-based operatives in our country are very similar to those operating across other nations.
Jamie Stone
The right hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. Only yesterday, Sven Sakkov, the Estonian ambassador, spoke in Aberdeen. Similar to what the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) said about Moldova, he said, “Look, we’re a border country with Russia. You may think you’re far away, but it’s happening right on your doorstep. You have important undersea cables going from Banff to Orkney and Shetland to the Faroe Islands.” Can I suggest to the Minister, via the right hon. Lady, that we have to up our Royal Navy presence in those areas, perhaps using warships or undersea drones? If we sit on our hands and do nothing, we could be putting off the evil day.
Anneliese Dodds
The hon. Member makes an important point. My understanding is that the Government are alive to the threat to undersea cables and have been seeking to work with industry and, more broadly, with other countries that have experienced interference to try to ensure that we are properly protected, although I am sure the Minister can elaborate on that.
I strongly agree with the point about seeing similar patterns in other forms of sabotage. It was concerning, but fascinating, that in the run-up to Germany’s last election, there was a campaign of sabotage directed at internal combustion engine cars. Dozens of them were sabotaged, and attempts were made to link that to the German Green party and to claim that it was somehow responsible. There was also widespread disinformation, with fake videos of ballot problems being disseminated. Officials in Germany have pointed out that there was credible evidence that it was part of a Russian campaign to undermine trust in the elections. It was obviously to undermine trust in one particular political party, but the impact is much broader, as many Members have said.
We need to ensure that individuals who are vulnerable to being exploited into carrying out this kind of sabotage understand what they are getting into. GLOBSEC, the security think-tank, has set out the pattern of involvement. There are often many links in the chain. Individuals may have been involved in petty crime, for example, and they get pulled in, often with the offer of cryptocurrency or simply money. They need to understand that what they are engaging in is treason. It carries a heavy sentence —rightly so—and can also be extremely dangerous. We saw that in east London, when those individuals were so concerned for their lives, given the fire right next to their apartment block. We need to ensure that the public are much more aware of these so-called cognitive operations, which are focused on undermining citizens’ trust in democracy and in key institutions.
Finally, I am pleased that the Secretary of State for Education has said that social media literacy, which is critical, will be a part of the new curriculum following the review. However, it is incredibly important that teachers will be properly empowered and protected when they are ensuring that our young people are ready to be social media literate. In her reviews of extremism, Dame Sara Khan has detailed that teachers have often not been supported when they have tried to engage in conversations about extremism, and we cannot fall into the same trap with disinformation.
Once again, it is a great pleasure to be part of this debate, and I thank the petitioners for bringing forward this important discussion.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for the elegant way in which he presented his speech, and I thank Members from across the Chamber for their thoughtful and excellent contributions.
Confidence in our democracies and our elected officials stands somewhat at a juncture. The ever-increasing deficit in confidence in politics and our politicians runs as far back as the financial crisis, and accelerated after some of the events that colleagues have mentioned. We know that democracy depends on participation, engagement and trust. When that is undermined and attacked, democracy itself is weakened.
The people of Ukraine know the brutality of the Russian regime and Russian warfare, but so do the people of this country, what with the Salisbury poisonings and Alexander Litvinenko being assassinated on British soil. As the Intelligence and Security Committee has made clear, Russian interference does not just involve tanks and poisonous chemicals. It also operates seditiously through money, misinformation, cyber-activity and influence. We know that Russia has developed a long-term strategy to interfere in western democracies, including our own. While the goal is not necessarily to support one political party over the rest, it is most definitely to create division, sow distrust and cause harm to our economy, society and national security.
Of course, I say that the goal is not necessarily to support one political party over another. However, as others have expanded on, when it comes to Nathan Gill, the former Welsh leader of Reform UK, one might be mistaken for thinking that that is actually the case. The number of Welsh constituents who have signed the petition, including in my constituency of Cardiff West—which, when I last checked, was fourth highest on the league table—shows that the disgust felt by the people of Wales at Nathan Gill’s treachery has struck a chord.
Let us quickly remind ourselves of Nathan Gill’s crimes. He committed eight counts of bribery, taking bribes from pro-Russian actors, and is now serving 10 and a half years in prison for his treachery. Specifically, while serving as an MEP for the people of Wales, as my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk said, he accepted at least £40,000 in payments. He made speeches in the European Parliament that were scripted by the Kremlin, doing its bidding. Shockingly, he was also trying to recruit his mates—his friends, his colleagues—in the European Parliament to do the same, to keep the roubles flowing.
At first, some of Reform UK’s leaders claimed they did not know who this person was. Then the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), who I have notified, said he was just a “bad apple”. Although their attempts to whitewash Gill from their history have clearly failed—and must fail—it is clear that the only way a political party such as Reform UK can be straight with the British public about the extent of Russia’s links is for it to do two things. No. 1 is that it must launch a full, independent investigation into all its links to Russia, and No. 2 is that it must commit to fully co-operating with Philip Rycroft’s review and to accepting every recommendation Rycroft makes. Of course, Reform is not here to answer that point, and to date it has failed to do so. That is not surprising, but it is shocking.
[Dawn Butler in the Chair]
Today, Politico published an article by the excellent Esther Webber entitled “Nigel Farage tries to fix his Russia problem”—and, boy, does he know he has one. A More in Common poll last year showed that despite the fact that every voter group overwhelmingly backs Ukraine over Russia, just 26% of Brits think the hon. Member for Clacton does, and 21% think he sympathises more with Russia. That is astonishing—and incredibly dangerous for our democracy. My constituents in Cardiff West and the Welsh public will not be fooled by any attempt at a makeover, given the overwhelming stench. The only way Reform can seriously fix the stench of Russian interference and conspiracies that surrounds it is to do what I have outlined.
For those reasons, and the other excellent reasons that colleagues have expanded on today, the elections Bill is a critical moment in our attempt to curb the extent of Russian and other interference in our elections.
Tom Hayes
My hon. Friend is making an eloquent point about how Reform’s Nathan Gill, who has been jailed for 10 years, was pushing out Putin propaganda in return for funding, and Reform has the most worrying of relationships with Russia. Is it also the case that Reform will ultimately do whatever its paymasters want? For instance, 50% of its income last year came from fossil fuel firms or climate change deniers—no wonder it is not in favour of net zero. Similarly, it is a fan of crypto chiefs and is embracing crypto donations, and as a consequence its policy would be to support cryptocurrency. Reform says it is on the side of ordinary people, but its Members voted against the Renters Rights’ Act 2025 and the Employment Rights Act 2025—historic Acts that shift power back to people. Is it not the case that Reform is just siding with vested interests?
Mr Barros-Curtis
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and I fully agree. Of course, his point is about the donations that we know about, but when it comes to cryptocurrency, we do not know who the paymasters behind those payments are.
Some of what the Government have announced in relation to the elections Bill—and the strategy beforehand —on toughening up the rules on political finance is welcome. However, for the reasons that have been mentioned, we must go further, and I urge the Government to ensure that this opportunity to safeguard our democracy is not missed. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk mentioned, the Kremlin has exploited loopholes in political financing rules for at least 15 years. That must be stopped.
The Electoral Commission’s independence, enforcement powers and resources must be strengthened as a matter of urgency. We should ban all crypto donations to political parties and individuals. There is no legitimate rationale for donating via such means unless the donor ultimately wishes to disguise their true identity. The ban should be brought into effect urgently and capture donations made by any means, whether by principal donors or through intermediaries.
Improved co-operation between our Electoral Commission, intelligence services, law enforcement and electoral authorities must be a priority. I suggest to my hon. Friend the Minister that the new national police service, part of the recently announced reforms to policing, might be a suitable vehicle through which to consider establishing dedicated police capability for electoral crime.
We must urgently deal with disinformation and online operations, treating them as the core national security threat they are. The Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the police all need more resources and are underpowered for dealing with the threat of personalised algorithmic feeds and AI-enabled manipulation that feeds misinformation about our elections.
This is not specifically about Russia, but when Iran was attacked by Israel and America in targeted strikes last year, it was reported that 20,000 bots advocating for Scottish independence were taken out in Scotland as a result. If that is what Iran could do, imagine what North Korea, Russia and China are doing. That is why we have to take these threats seriously. As the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) mentioned, the important May elections will be a real test of what we need to do to respond to such foreign narrative-shaping operations.
I ask the Minister to urgently consider these measures and take this issue back to the various Departments to ensure we get a robust elections Bill that is ready for 2026 and for everything that is coming, given the way that technology is quickly changing. As part of this strategy, I ask him to join me in recommitting ourselves to the NATO alliance as a bulwark against Russian aggression—something that unserious politicians, such as the leader of the Green party, seem to doubt, thereby doing the Russians’ work for them. Alliances, resources and an elections Bill that seeks to support our democracy, not undermine it, are the critical tools we need to curb Russian interference.
Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve with you as Chair, Ms Butler. I thank all those who signed the petition, which speaks to a growing awareness and concern about the extent of Russian interference in our democracy. I note the particularly high number of signatories from Wales, doubtless because of disgust at the treachery of Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform in Wales, who was recently sentenced for accepting Russian bribes to speak up on behalf of Russia.
Our friends in eastern Europe have long been aware of the way the Russians use a whole range of tactics to achieve their aims. Before the 2014 invasion of Crimea, we saw the use of hybrid tactics by the Russian Federation in Ukraine to influence not only the different sections of the Ukrainian population and the Russian population back home, but western opinion. We should be under no illusion about the Russian interest in influencing opinion in western democracies and interfering with our very democracy.
I will not repeat the excellent points that my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) and other colleagues made on finance and named individuals. I will focus specifically on internet warfare. There is nothing new about propaganda or information warfare, but technological advances and our increasing reliance on technology make it much easier, quicker and cheaper to customise messages ever more precisely, with ever more powerful algorithms to target audiences thousands of miles away.
We have become familiar with marketing databases and the eerily accurate profiles they generate of us, but the recent acceleration in the shift from cash to card or phone for all manner of transactions, constantly increasing exposure to social media, and ever greater connectivity to the internet mean ever more information about us can be harvested and used to target messages. No longer are we merely subject to a billboard slogan seen four times a day or to the same TV advert viewed a dozen times; every spare moment, as we idly thumb our phones, we are ready targets for bombardment with internet messages.
Moreover, that bombardment masquerades as our free choice, as we scroll and click, often oblivious to the subliminal messages that target us. Worryingly, security experts estimate that more than 10% of content across social media websites and 62% of all web traffic is generated by bots. As our former colleague Ian Lucas, the former Member for Wrexham, said in his book “Digital Gangsters”, which details some of the work carried out by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, far from protecting people’s data, big companies such as Facebook have long been sharing users’ and users’ friends’ data. Who knows where that ends up?
Even when there is a clear international public consensus in condemning openly abhorrent material posted on the internet by extremists, we have seen how difficult and resource-intensive it is to remove it even from the big-name social media platforms, with little hope of preventing those who are determined to access it from finding it. We have been shocked to see what a powerful tool it has been in recruiting even well-educated, seemingly well-integrated young people in western countries to go to fight with Daesh abroad. Our counter-messaging skills clearly remain inadequate, so the potential for such computational propaganda to be used by state and non-state actors, both overtly and covertly, is enormous, and Russia has no qualms about using it. It can be used to stir up social unrest and racial hatred and to erode the will of a population to defend itself.
Our vulnerability is all the greater because we seem reluctant to recognise or to discuss the potential for manipulating our own populations. That is a challenge to our security, stability and prosperity. We in mature democracies are vulnerable because of the very values we hold. We value freedom of speech and freedom of belief. To us, censorship is unthinkable. We would not wish to challenge people’s right to access information from their sources of choice. We actually pride ourselves on giving all sides a fair hearing. Even in dealing with extremist views that all mainstream political parties abhor, we agonise about whether a no-platform stance plays into the martyr narrative—that the establishment will not give them a fair hearing. Even if we can achieve balance in a good TV discussion, there is no such balance on social media, where powerful algorithms are at work.
The nature of this form of hybrid warfare means it is difficult to attribute responsibility with certainty. State and non-state actors may choose to claim responsibility, to create deliberate ambiguity or to use technology to conceal their involvement completely, creating the impression of spontaneous indigenous action. Furthermore, targeting and manipulating public opinion, even if systematic and attributable, cannot be prosecuted under international humanitarian law, which focuses on physical harm. In some countries, such as Estonia, there are initiatives to build resilience—for example, by educating school students to recognise and deal with internet brainwashing techniques—but all too often, including in the UK, consideration of cyber-security focuses very much on infrastructure attack and personal exposure to fraud or sexual grooming, with limited discussion of mass psychological attack.
Before I finish, I would like to make specific mention of the way in which Russian interference weaponises LGBT+ issues. That is not by accident; it is a way of dividing societies and weakening our democracy. Research by the Kaleidoscope Trust and its international partners, alongside the UK Government, has shown that Russia systematically promotes anti-gender and anti-LGBT+ narratives, which are used to polarise electorates and mobilise nationalist and populist movements. Furthermore, it may discredit liberally aligned politicians or undermine trust in institutions such as NATO, the EU and the UN.
Protecting LGBT+ rights is not just a human rights issue; it is now becoming a national security priority. Attacks on LGBT+ communities and other minorities can often signal the beginning of the growth of authoritarianism and further erosion of democratic rights. We must remember that Russia does not just interfere directly in the UK, but can indirectly affect UK interests by interfering in countries currently friendly to us, such as Commonwealth countries. Of course, we have also seen the election battles in countries close to the EU or NATO, as other Members have mentioned. In terms of tactics, the Kaleidoscope Trust’s recent report “Legal Battlegrounds” has detailed disinformation and manipulation of the narrative, networks that amplify messages—such as influencers, proxy organisations and religious organisations—and political and electoral disruption.
Recognising the problem of Russian interference is only the first step. Far more challenging is what our strategy is for managing and combating the impact of internet warfare and how we build up our defences against it. We absolutely must take Russian interference in our politics and democracy as seriously as any physical threat and develop strategies to deal with it, so I very much welcome the Government’s activities to date. I appreciate that, for security reasons, the Minister may not be able to give a full account of everything that is being done, but I ask him to make tackling Russian interference an absolute priority, through both the upcoming elections Bill and much further action across the whole of Government.
Claire Young (Thornbury and Yate) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for setting out the issues so clearly.
Protecting democracy must be a national security priority for all of us in this place. Many of us across the country recognised that by signing the petition, including 208 from my Thornbury and Yate constituency. Over recent years, these concerned citizens have watched Russian interference in democracies across the world—in the United States, across Europe, and here in the United Kingdom—and now they are demanding answers.
The petition calls for an inquiry into the depth and breadth of possible Russian influence in our country. Although in December last year the Government launched an independent review of foreign interference, led by Philip Rycroft, that is not enough. I welcome any scrutiny of foreign interference, but the review falls short on the transparency and information that the public deserve. We need a thorough and independent inquiry to understand fully the extent of foreign interference in the UK’s political system.
Parliament’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy previously warned that the UK has faced a sustained pattern of attempted interference from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. That assessment was reinforced by the Government’s 2025 strategic defence review, which concluded that the UK is subject to daily hostile activity, ranging from espionage and cyber-attacks to manipulation of information. The review called Russia an immediate and pressing threat.
Despite that recognition of Russian influence in the UK, successive Governments have failed to act decisively to protect our democratic process. The threats are real and documented: Russian money has flowed into UK politics; foreign oligarchs have bought property and influence; Chinese surveillance operations target our institutions; and, as has been mentioned repeatedly, Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, was jailed for accepting bribes from a pro-Kremlin operative to make pro-Russian speeches and statements. That is utterly shocking.
That is why, following Gill’s conviction, my Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are calling on the Intelligence and Security Committee to launch a new probe to investigate Russian interference in British politics. The investigation should look into potential ties between other members of Reform UK and Russia, which has been a recurring concern in the debate. The Reform UK leader, the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage), was paid to appear on “Russia Today” until it was banned in the UK, and he once declared that Putin was the world leader he admired the most.
We must move with urgency. The inquiry should be completed and laid before Parliament before the next general election, avoiding a repeat of the last Russia report, which the Conservative party shamefully suppressed until after the country went to the polls. Voters deserve to know about threats to our democracy before they cast their ballots, not after. This is not about one bad apple; it is about systematic failures and how we protect our democracy, given how successive Administrations have failed to address fundamental weaknesses.
We hope that we will soon have the opportunity to tackle these weaknesses through an elections Bill. The Liberal Democrats believe that the Bill must include a comprehensive ban on cryptocurrency donations to political parties, building on the policy paper that the Government published last year, which proposed tighter rules on political donations. Crypto creates the perfect vehicle for hostile states and foreign oligarchs to funnel money into British politics while evading scrutiny.
Transparency International UK has warned that the anonymity that can come with these donations provides a “backdoor for foreign interference”. Analysis from Spotlight on Corruption shows that only three parties have indicated that they will accept cryptocurrency donations: Reform UK, the Homeland party and the Other party. Reform UK even has a dedicated page for cryptocurrency donations.
The elections Bill must cap political donations to stop foreign oligarchs from interfering. It must also ensure transparency in political advertising and prevent foreign and dark money from influencing UK elections. Past loopholes have allowed opaque and corrupt funding of political parties, enabling foreign money to distort British politics. Transparency International has said that a foreign interference review is “welcome”, but that donation caps are
“the only way to break the stranglehold of big money over British politics”.
Cameron Thomas
The hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) has described a gentleman, George Cottrell, as “like a son” to him, despite that individual being a convicted money launderer. Does my hon. Friend share my suspicion? What does she make of the potential connection between money laundering and cryptocurrency?
Claire Young
It is extremely concerning, and that is why we would ban cryptocurrency donations. Alongside the new elections Bill, we must address the issues that the previous Conservative Government created and restore the independence of the Electoral Commission, as it had pre-2022. We must also ensure that the commission has real enforcement powers and the resources it needs to deploy them. As others have mentioned, we must also reform our electoral system. We must take a robust stance towards hostile states, such as China and Russia, and recommit to international partnerships that promote democracy and stability, including working with European and other democratic allies to co-ordinate our response to Russian interference.
The Government hold a substantial majority in the House, so they can push through legislation rapidly when they choose to. Few things can be more urgent than protecting our democracy. We call for a wide-ranging and properly funded public inquiry into potential Russian interference, including in the 2016 EU referendum, with the report to be published as soon as possible. A public inquiry with the power to compel witnesses to appear and documents to be released is the only way to get to the bottom of these serious allegations. Transparency must be prioritised.
Phil Brickell
The hon. Lady is making a good point about foreign interference and money in politics. Could she confirm today whether she has submitted her thoughts to the Rycroft review, which is under way at this time?
Claire Young
I have not, but there is still time.
This issue is about more than the failures and corruption revealed in the Nathan Gill case; it is about a system that has long been unfit for purpose and establishments that want to keep things the way they are because that suits their interests. Foreign states are now looking to exploit the situation, with potentially catastrophic outcomes. There is a danger that citizens will stop believing that their vote matters at all. We should use the situation to drive the changes that our country needs, that trust in politics demands, and that all our constituents deserve. I urge the Minister to announce an inquiry today. The threat to British democracy from foreign interference is clear and present, and must be addressed urgently.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough), who, on behalf of the Petitions Committee, has brought us to Westminster Hall today. I particularly thank the 114,000 petitioners, who would like a public inquiry into Russian involvement in British democracy. I think that the Nathan Gill case and the petition do us a great good because they have flushed out, and given us a chance to shine a light on, something way bigger than Nathan Gill: the extent to which the Russians are attempting to infiltrate. I also thank a number of hon. Members who have spoken today.
Jim Shannon
I could not let this opportunity pass by. My point is about Russia’s influence; I want to mention in particular Russia’s abuse and disregard of lives. I am thinking of human rights and the persecution of religious minorities, and I could give some examples right away. Those of us who have stood up to condemn Russia for what it has done have found ourselves banned from travelling there. I am not particularly worried about that; I will never go to Russia anyway, but that is by the way.
Four Baptist pastors in Ukraine, in the Donbas region, went missing; they were kidnapped and are now believed to be dead. That is just one example of Russia’s disregard of human rights, religious minorities, Christians and all those who have values in life. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we should condemn Russia not just for the issues he has outlined but for its abuse of human rights, its persecution of religious minorities and its disregard of human life?
Lincoln Jopp
It is difficult to know where to draw the line in our condemnation of Russian activity, but the hon. Gentleman makes a powerful point. He could also have mentioned the theft and indoctrination of thousands of children. I am sure that the whole House speaks as one in condemning such activities.
The hon. Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) never misses an opportunity to raise the Abramovich billions, and he did not do so today. The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) cleverly weaved into this debate on Russian influence the issues of second jobs and electoral reform, which she refers to in most of her speeches. The hon. Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) talked about Nathan Gill and attempted to disavow us of the notion that he was just “one bad apple”—a point I will come back to. Although quite a lot of party politics has played out today, it is important that we do not turn a Nelsonian eye to that case, which is potentially one of the most obvious and worrying.
I also thank the hon. Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) for their contributions. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury quoted von Clausewitz, and shortly I will do the same.
The right hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds) talked about the post-shame world. She made the interesting point that the normal constraints on normal activity seem to have been cast off. The hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis) said that we need to treat disinformation as the core security threat that it is. I completely agree. The hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith)—apologies to her constituents for my pronunciation—said that we do not focus enough on the manipulation of our own people and called for balance.
I approach this debate by looking at three questions. Is the threat real? Is the perception of the threat high enough in the country and in this House, or should the Government do more to amplify it? Is the Government’s response sufficient? This is all crucial. The hon. Member for Tewkesbury will be delighted to hear the second bit of von Clausewitz of the day; as the Minister knows only too well, given his distinguished military career, we never tire of quoting von Clausewitz to each other in the Army.
“The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish”
the nature of the war that they are embarking on. So let us see the evidence on whether the threat is real and whether the perception of the threat is sufficiently real.
In the strategic defence review of June 2025, the Government said:
“The UK is already under daily attack, with aggressive acts—from espionage to cyber-attack and information manipulation—causing harm to society and the economy.”
In the same month, in the national security strategy, the Government said:
“The openness of our democracy and economy are national strengths. Therefore, it is vital to keep ahead of those who seek to exploit them with robust defences.”
Is the threat perception high enough? I cannot remember which hon. Member mentioned Estonia, but I have the pleasure of serving on the Defence Committee; we visited Estonia and Finland in February last year. I can tell hon. Members that the proximity to the geographical border with Russia focuses the mind considerably. From memory, the Finnish people have a population of 4 million; they can put 3.5 million of them underground at a moment’s notice. They can field an army of 200,000 with two weeks’ notice. They, too, have cyber-resilience and anti-grey zone units that work with the Estonians and other Baltic states to counter the disinformation and grey zone activity. I feel that in this country, because of our geographical distance from Russia, we fail to have that same focus. But we must.
Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6—and, as an aside, a former member of one of the finest regiments of foot guards there has ever been—gave evidence to the Defence Committee. He said that the United Kingdom’s digital attack surfaces are far broader and greater than those of a number of our European neighbours. Given that, as someone mentioned, geographical proximity is irrelevant in the world of information and cyber, we should be doing much more.
We heard interesting evidence at the Defence Committee the other day from James Heappey, the former Armed Forces Minister, who needed to get quite a lot off his chest. He was worried about the number of documents coming across his desk that had said, “You cannot share this with Parliament. This is too secret.” It worries me that the desire for secrecy means that we have all involved ourselves in something of a conspiracy for the past 30 years.
Ben Wallace was at the same session. He said that, from the mid-1990s onwards, Governments of all three colours had hollowed out defence, and they had done so because they wanted to spend their money on other things. It is the old choice between guns and butter: they chose guns, we chose butter. We need to amp up the threat perception in the House and, importantly, more widely in the United Kingdom. If not, those real balance-of-investment decisions that we need for our national security will not be made.
Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)
I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point about the need to amplify threat perception, but I do not think that that is required with the conduct of elections. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s Russia report in 2020 said that it was informed that
“the mechanics of the UK’s voting are deemed largely sound: the use of a highly dispersed paper-based voting and counting system makes any significant interference difficult”.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my view that interference in the conduct of an election is less of a threat when elections in the UK involve pencils and ballot papers in village and town halls?
Lincoln Jopp
It is important to look at elections to the left of the ballot box, because it is not just about going down with a polling card and ID and putting a tick in a box. The hon. Member for Llanelli said it best: we need to be much more alive to the fact that we are being manipulated and manoeuvred by information and disinformation. We can use pencils and paper, sure, but there is a way more sophisticated game going on here, and it is pretty terrifying.
I come back to my theme of amping up the threat perception. We need to re-arm very quickly, not only with hard power but in the minds of our own people, so that we build national resilience to face threats more effectively across the spectrum. For example, as the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) mentioned, we had the Russian spy ship and the threat to subsea cables—I am delighted that someone mentioned them. Importantly, when the Secretary of State took the decision to order the surfacing of the Astute-class submarine next to the Yantar to say, “We know what you’re doing and you need to pack it in,” he also made that information available in the newspapers to ensure that the public had that threat perception.
Jamie Stone
I have twice, in interventions, mentioned the spy ships and the problems around the coast of my constituency. Let us cut to the chase: does the hon. Gentleman agree that we do not have enough Royal Navy surface ships, never mind submarines? I have not seen a single Royal Navy ship anywhere around the coast of my constituency—not since Joint Warrior couple of years ago.
Lincoln Jopp
The clever ones are the ones that the hon. Member cannot see. But yes, I agree that we urgently need to look at defence investment in hard power. It is a source of huge frustration in our defence industry domestically and overseas that the Government have failed to agree the defence investment plan. When I was in the Ministry of Defence, we had an old adage: “Plans without resources are hallucinations.” At the moment, our defence industry is dining on fresh air, because the defence investment plan has not yet been agreed.
We have time, so I will ask your indulgence, Ms Butler, to mention that Nelsonian eye. Hon. Members will remember that in September last year the British ambassador to the United States of America was sacked. My right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) secured an emergency debate, in which I made this point:
“Since December last year, our ambassador in Washington has been potentially subject to leverage and blackmail, because someone—we do not know who—had politically fatal kompromat on Lord Mandelson throughout his whole time in office.
I am amazed that the Foreign Office has not gone into full lockdown and damage limitation mode, having found out that potentially Lord Mandelson could have been blackmailed this entire time. If it had turned out that he had been an agent of a foreign state, the Foreign Office would have done that. All it knows now is that someone—we do not know who—had politically fatal kompromat on him that whole time.”—[Official Report, 16 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1380.]
The Foreign Office Minister in that debate did not respond to the suggestion that they turn Peter Mandelson inside out once they had realised that fact. I suspect that after the events of the past week, one or two Government Ministers wish that they had heeded that advice at the time; they might have saved themselves some problems. Last week, Members who were in the Chamber also heard the point of order made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington, who said:
“On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Today’s Opposition day debate will focus on Mandelson and his relationship with the paedophile Jeffrey Epstein. However, it will not cover his relationship with another alleged paedophile, murderer, gangster, specialist in bribery and corruption, and Putin favourite: Oleg Deripaska. That relationship may be just as bad as the one he had with Epstein. As European trade commissioner, Mandelson made decisions favouring Deripaska’s company by $200 million a year. Mandelson avoided proper investigation by lying about the timing of his relationship with Deripaska. How can we find out what investigations were carried out before Gordon Brown and his Government appointed Mandelson as a Minister? Do you agree that this House needs to see that information”?—[Official Report, 4 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 269.]
We all know how Wednesday played out after that.
Lastly, I will speak about the other actions that the Government are taking. In preparation for this debate, I looked at the statement that the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, introduced at the back end of last year, would
“require organisations in critical sectors to further protect their IT systems”.
I must tell the Minister that I am on the Committee for that Bill, and it does no such thing. All it does is to say that various providers from various sectors have to report after the event; it says nothing about making them more secure.
I will leave the Minister with a couple of questions. Is enough being done cross-Government to raise threat perception in the nation? What is the Government’s policy on political donations being made in cryptocurrency? How have the Government changed electoral law to keep pace with a quickly evolving threat? I thank the Minister in advance for his remarks, and the House for its indulgence.
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I begin by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for introducing this debate. He did an excellent job of providing the context we need to have a good discussion, and the House owes him a service for the work he has done. I also extend my gratitude to all the hon. Members who have spoken—I will try to reflect on their comments in a moment—and, as others have done, I extend the Government’s gratitude to all those who signed the e-petition that has brought us here today.
This has been a good, timely and useful debate and it provides an important opportunity to strengthen awareness of the threat, and to signal the resolve that exists across the House to confront the work of Russian threat actors. The Government’s first duty, as I hope any Government’s would be, is to keep the country safe. We are absolutely committed to taking all necessary measures to expose and disrupt any attempt to interfere with our sovereign affairs.
That is why on 18 October last year I set out the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, to ensure that our democracy is the hardest possible target for foreign threat actors. Just last Thursday, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the National Cyber Security Centre in briefing the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. On Wednesday last week, I joined the Skills Minister and the directors general of MI5 and the NCSC in hosting nearly 100 representatives from universities and sector bodies to discuss the risks that they face from foreign interference.
I am pleased to announce today that the Government will invest £3 million over the next three years to support the higher education sector to strengthen its resilience. That will include setting up a new foreign interference reporting route for UK universities and co-designing best practice guidance that will help universities to make proportionate, risk-based decisions on the threats to which they are exposed. As part of this work, we will also be considering the role of think-tanks, to which my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk referred specifically, given that they will share many of the same interference risks.
This e-petition calls for a public inquiry into Russian influence in UK democracy. As the Security Minister, I am proud to have the opportunity to work very closely with our intelligence and security agencies, who are working tirelessly to monitor and disrupt Russian threats to UK politics. Those threats range from cyber-espionage operations targeting sensitive or classified information to divisive information operations and attempts to influence UK policymaking through bribery and coercion, as we have seen with the shocking case of Nathan Gill.
Hon. Members will understand that it will not always be appropriate for the Government and our intelligence agencies to publicly reveal the extent of our understanding of Russian operations, due to the obvious importance of protecting the sources of that information and maintaining a competitive advantage over our adversaries. However, the UK Government continue to work tirelessly alongside our allies to expose Russian cyber-threats and information operations targeting democracy in the UK and worldwide. For example, since October 2024, the Government have exposed and sanctioned 38 organisations and individuals responsible for delivering Russian information warfare to undermine global democracies. The guidance that the National Protective Security Authority published in October also specifically highlighted the full range of vectors and tactics that foreign actors, including Russia, are using to target individuals working in UK politics.
Indeed, in the light of the deeply concerning evidence of Russia targeting our democratic system, the Government commissioned Philip Rycroft to deliver an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review will primarily focus on foreign interference via funding because that is an area of particular concern. However, to inform his recommendations, Philip Rycroft has been provided with a threat briefing that covers the full range of vectors used by states to target UK politics.
It is the Government’s position that launching a new inquiry at this time would be premature. It would risk prejudging the conclusions of the ongoing review and duplicating its efforts. However, the final report will be presented to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and to me by the end of March, after which there will be significant opportunity for further parliamentary scrutiny and debate.
Let me address some of the points that have been raised in this debate. My hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk asked about cryptocurrency tools. As he will know, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 makes it clear that foreign money is not permitted in UK politics. However, as tactics behind foreign interference operations develop, the Government recognise that our response also needs to evolve. The UK Government therefore reaffirmed their leadership and resolved to stamp out corruption and dodgy money in UK politics through the Home Office’s refreshed anti-corruption strategy. Corrupt insiders and criminal networks will be brought to justice by a strengthened specialist police unit and tougher safeguards across the public sector.
The forthcoming elections Bill will also further strengthen safeguards against covert political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties. The Rycroft review into foreign financial interference will assess opportunities for further improvement. Let me just say a word specifically about cryptocurrency, because the Bill specifically includes safeguarding against the potential use of cryptocurrency by foreign actors to obfuscate the source of their donations.
My hon. Friend also asked about media literacy education. Building media literacy skills for young people to critically engage with and assess information from a range of sources is a priority for the Government. Since 2022, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology has provided £3 million of funding for media-literacy projects that empower users to navigate the online world safely.
My hon. Friend also asked about a dedicated disinformation agency. This issue will always require a co-ordinated, cross-Government effort. DSIT leads the Government’s policy on countering disinformation, but works closely with the national security secretariat in the Cabinet Office. The Home Office is the departmental lead for state threats, working closely with the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which leads on the Government’s efforts to counter foreign interference. A lot of meaningful activity is taking place across Government.
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member has only just entered the Chamber, but in an act of generosity, I will give way.
Mike Martin
The Minister is very generous. I have just come from the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, where we were looking at these issues in our inquiry on defending democracy. He has been in front of that inquiry. When will the new elections Bill be coming forward or—perhaps an easier way to ask the question—which will be the first election to take place under the new Bill, protected by the wider measures that he just set out?
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention and for his important work on the Joint Committee. I welcome the scrutiny that it provides, and I assure him of the seriousness with which we take such matters. I think he will have heard the comments that I made specifically about the Rycroft review. The scheduling of the review has been designed to ensure that it reports by the end of March, in order to inform further legislation. It is not for me, as the Security Minister, to talk about the scheduling of further legislation; that is very much a matter for the Leader of the House. That piece of legislation is being led by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, working closely with colleagues across Government.
However, I owe the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) a response to the important point that he made about when those legislative tools will impact on our evolving democratic process. I give him an absolute assurance that, working through the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, we have already done a lot of work in this Parliament to ensure that for the elections that will take place this May in Wales, Scotland or England, and the elections taking place in Northern Ireland in 2027, the local institutions in those areas are as prepared as they possibly can be. There are very close working relationships between central Government and the devolved institutions to ensure that those elections are as free and as reasonably and fairly contested as they possibly can be.
Let me turn to some of the other contributions. The hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) represents a beautiful part of the world, which I know and remember fondly from my time at Aberystwyth University. He rightly and entirely reasonably urged the Government to act at pace and not to waste any time. I repeat the point that I have just made about the Rycroft review: it will report by the end of March in order to inform the legislative agenda, including the elections Bill. Again, however, I give him the same assurance I did earlier: the elections that will take place in Wales are part of a process being led by the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that all the devolved institutions have the support that they need to make sure that the elections take place in the way that we would all want them to. I am working very closely with colleagues in Wales to ensure that that is the case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kensington and Bayswater (Joe Powell) speaks with great authority on such matters. I am grateful for all his work, including in the all-party parliamentary group. He spoke rightly about the important use of sanctions. He will understand that it would be unwise of me to signal from the Front Bench further intent with regard to such matters, but he has heard the recent words of the Prime Minister, and let me reiterate them: if Roman Abramovich fails to act quickly, we are fully prepared to go to court to enforce the commitment that has been made, if that is necessary.
The hon. Member for North Herefordshire (Dr Chowns) made a number of points, including specific concerns about the conduct of Reform, but also about the EU referendum that took place back in 2016. We completely recognise the enduring and significant threat that Russia poses to our UK democracy. Of course, we are absolutely committed to ensuring that we are well protected against all forms of foreign interference. That is why we are doing work through the defending democracy taskforce; that is why before Christmas I launched the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan; and that is why we have now commissioned an independent review of foreign financial interference in UK politics.
The hon. Member specifically mentioned the ISC, as did a couple of other hon. Members. Reports produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, including the Russia report, contain highly classified material that could damage the operational capabilities of UK intelligence agencies if published unredacted, so I hope she understands that we have to be very careful with the publication of those reports. She also asked specifically about the elections Bill, which she will understand is an MHCLG lead. The Bill is an important opportunity to strengthen our legislative response to the threats that we face, and we very much welcome her contribution to that process.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) knows a lot about these matters. I am pleased that he will take the opportunity to engage directly with Philip Rycroft. My hon. Friend raised important points about the funding of Reform; I have to say that it is disappointing that no Reform Members are here to defend their record. Of course, it is absolutely right that all decisions taken by Government are scrutinised not only by this House but by the media: that is important, and I would not have it any other way. But it is also important that those individuals who aspire to serve in the highest office are similarly subjected to meaningful scrutiny. I am pleased that this House has done so this afternoon, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the critique that he helpfully offered.
The hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) made an important point about the importance of acting in concert with our allies. She is absolutely right: that is why we seek to work very closely with our international partners on these matters. She raised a number of other helpful and constructive points. I believe that some of her questions were being addressed in the statement given to the House by the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister at precisely the moment that she was asking them. I hope she might find a moment later to check the record, and I hope her questions have been answered.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) speaks with great authority on these matters. I know that the whole House appreciates his important work to support Ukraine and ensure that our friends and allies prevail in their struggle against Putin’s illegal invasion. I am particularly proud of the cross-party support for that endeavour, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the leadership role that he has played.
The hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas) was the first but not the only Member to quote Clausewitz; I particularly enjoyed his reference. Like other hon. Members, he raised deeply concerning points about Reform. I have to say that it speaks volumes that not one Reform Member—not even one of their keenly recently recruited Members—is here to respond. That is a great shame. The hon. Member will have heard my response to the point that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire made about the ICS report, but I firmly believe that addressing the issue should be a cross-party endeavour, so I would be happy to discuss the matters further with him.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds), made a good point about bots in her excellent contribution, and rightly raised activity in Moldova specifically. She is right to assert the need to ensure that our legislative framework and wider response are geared to the nature of the threat we face now, not the one we faced in the past. I can give her an assurance of how seriously the Government take such matters. She will know that the Government have introduced the cyber-security action plan; I heard the comment from the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp) about that a moment ago, and I will take it away. I hope that my right hon. Friend is also aware of the work the Cabinet Office is leading on the production of a national cyber action plan.
I know that my right hon. Friend is proud to represent one of our country’s finest universities. She nodded to the particular challenge that has been experienced recently around lawfare. Her point on that was well made, and I am grateful that she welcomes the new reporting route announced by the Government, which is an initial step. We are working towards developing a more proactive advisory service alongside training to support our higher education sector, using the new money we have identified. I am grateful for her contribution.
I very much agree with the analysis and the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis). It is telling that we have heard from a number of Members from Wales. My hon. Friend emphasised the impact of Nathan Gill’s treachery, which cannot be overestimated; I know that my hon. Friend has raised the issue on several occasions, but I assure him again that the work that the Government lead through the defending democracy taskforce is aligned with our devolved institutions, which—as we have seen recently, not least in the case of Nathan Gill—are just as much on the frontline as those of us in this place. My hon. Friend made some important points about the elections Bill, and of course I agree with his important points about NATO.
Lincoln Jopp
Is the Minister aware that, as a result of actions by the Scottish and Welsh Governments, a loophole has been created whereby people living in Wales and Scotland can now make unlimited political donations to any political party or politician? Is that something that is going to be addressed by the Government?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. and gallant Member makes an important point. I hope that Mr Rycroft is listening, because that is something that he will want to consider. I give an assurance that I will take it away and look at it as well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) made several important points. She is right that there is nothing new about the use of propaganda. She is also right about the information age that we are now living through. I am pleased that she mentioned Ian Lucas’s book, and I am grateful for the other points that she raised, including an important one about support for members of the LGBT+ community. I assure her of the priority we attach to the issues that she raised.
I am also grateful for the contribution made by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young). I say gently to her that the Rycroft review provides a vital opportunity to look at these issues, so I hope that she and her party will engage. I think there was an invitation, which I reiterate, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West to do so, and I hope that she will take it up. It is important that, where we can, we seek to maintain a cross-party consensus on these issues, which is precisely why, along with the director general of MI5, the other day I briefed the political parties on these matters, including the Lib Dems. I hope we can keep that conversation going.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne made a number of reasonable and fair-minded points. He nodded to the Scots Guards without actually mentioning them, so let me do that on his behalf. He also took the opportunity to mention Clausewitz, which was appreciated. I know that he takes these matters seriously. I was pleased to see him at the recent JCNSS meeting, to which the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells has just referred, and at which I gave evidence on national security the other day. He made an important and fair-minded observation about the threat perception. He is broadly right about that.
The hon. Member for Spelthorne will understand that a difficult balance has to be struck, informing the public while not alarming them. He is right that we need to debate these things in this House and more generally, not least because of the grave nature of the threat that we face and the potential requirement—I will be careful about what I say—of public resource that will have to be dedicated to these matters in the years to come. I welcome the comments he made. I hope he would agree—I think he would—that we should work collaboratively across the House on these most important matters. It is in that spirit that I always endeavour to engage with hon. Members.
The threats that the UK and our allies face are immediate and evolving. Russia views our democratic openness as a vulnerability to be exploited. Through the Government’s counter-political interference and espionage action plan, we are equipping everyone, from local councillors to parliamentary staff, with the tools that they need to help to disrupt and detect foreign espionage activity wherever we find it.
This Government’s clear commitments to upholding and restoring trust in standards and integrity in public life are not merely bureaucratic pledges. They are a vital line of defence, ensuring that the UK is not a permissive environment for foreign interference and safeguarding the sovereignty of our democratic future. From the comprehensive powers of the National Security Act 2023 to the protective work of the defending democracy taskforce, we are deploying a whole-of-Government approach to make the UK a much harder target. On this Government’s watch, we will do whatever is required to disrupt and degrade foreign interference operations and keep the British public safe.
Ben Goldsborough
The upside of this debate is that everyone present knows of the threats that we are facing from the Russian state, as do the over 100,000 people who signed the petition, but, as the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), said, not enough people in the United Kingdom know. It is incumbent on every single one of us in this room, be they visitors in the Public Gallery, Members of Parliament or people who signed the petition, to spread the news that we have to be aware, because democracy is so precious. It is not the normal state of things. We are currently living through something that we need to defend.
As an individual MP, I appreciated the Minister’s collaborative and thoughtful reply, as I am sure the petitioner Alex did, but we need to work cross-party on this. This is not one political party’s aim, goal or win; this is about keeping the United Kingdom safe and defending the values that make it the great country that we all love.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered e-petition 744215 relating to Russian influence on UK politics and democracy.