Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Nia Griffith Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you as Chair, Ms Butler. I thank all those who signed the petition, which speaks to a growing awareness and concern about the extent of Russian interference in our democracy. I note the particularly high number of signatories from Wales, doubtless because of disgust at the treachery of Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform in Wales, who was recently sentenced for accepting Russian bribes to speak up on behalf of Russia.

Our friends in eastern Europe have long been aware of the way the Russians use a whole range of tactics to achieve their aims. Before the 2014 invasion of Crimea, we saw the use of hybrid tactics by the Russian Federation in Ukraine to influence not only the different sections of the Ukrainian population and the Russian population back home, but western opinion. We should be under no illusion about the Russian interest in influencing opinion in western democracies and interfering with our very democracy.

I will not repeat the excellent points that my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) and other colleagues made on finance and named individuals. I will focus specifically on internet warfare. There is nothing new about propaganda or information warfare, but technological advances and our increasing reliance on technology make it much easier, quicker and cheaper to customise messages ever more precisely, with ever more powerful algorithms to target audiences thousands of miles away.

We have become familiar with marketing databases and the eerily accurate profiles they generate of us, but the recent acceleration in the shift from cash to card or phone for all manner of transactions, constantly increasing exposure to social media, and ever greater connectivity to the internet mean ever more information about us can be harvested and used to target messages. No longer are we merely subject to a billboard slogan seen four times a day or to the same TV advert viewed a dozen times; every spare moment, as we idly thumb our phones, we are ready targets for bombardment with internet messages.

Moreover, that bombardment masquerades as our free choice, as we scroll and click, often oblivious to the subliminal messages that target us. Worryingly, security experts estimate that more than 10% of content across social media websites and 62% of all web traffic is generated by bots. As our former colleague Ian Lucas, the former Member for Wrexham, said in his book “Digital Gangsters”, which details some of the work carried out by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, far from protecting people’s data, big companies such as Facebook have long been sharing users’ and users’ friends’ data. Who knows where that ends up?

Even when there is a clear international public consensus in condemning openly abhorrent material posted on the internet by extremists, we have seen how difficult and resource-intensive it is to remove it even from the big-name social media platforms, with little hope of preventing those who are determined to access it from finding it. We have been shocked to see what a powerful tool it has been in recruiting even well-educated, seemingly well-integrated young people in western countries to go to fight with Daesh abroad. Our counter-messaging skills clearly remain inadequate, so the potential for such computational propaganda to be used by state and non-state actors, both overtly and covertly, is enormous, and Russia has no qualms about using it. It can be used to stir up social unrest and racial hatred and to erode the will of a population to defend itself.

Our vulnerability is all the greater because we seem reluctant to recognise or to discuss the potential for manipulating our own populations. That is a challenge to our security, stability and prosperity. We in mature democracies are vulnerable because of the very values we hold. We value freedom of speech and freedom of belief. To us, censorship is unthinkable. We would not wish to challenge people’s right to access information from their sources of choice. We actually pride ourselves on giving all sides a fair hearing. Even in dealing with extremist views that all mainstream political parties abhor, we agonise about whether a no-platform stance plays into the martyr narrative—that the establishment will not give them a fair hearing. Even if we can achieve balance in a good TV discussion, there is no such balance on social media, where powerful algorithms are at work.

The nature of this form of hybrid warfare means it is difficult to attribute responsibility with certainty. State and non-state actors may choose to claim responsibility, to create deliberate ambiguity or to use technology to conceal their involvement completely, creating the impression of spontaneous indigenous action. Furthermore, targeting and manipulating public opinion, even if systematic and attributable, cannot be prosecuted under international humanitarian law, which focuses on physical harm. In some countries, such as Estonia, there are initiatives to build resilience—for example, by educating school students to recognise and deal with internet brainwashing techniques—but all too often, including in the UK, consideration of cyber-security focuses very much on infrastructure attack and personal exposure to fraud or sexual grooming, with limited discussion of mass psychological attack.

Before I finish, I would like to make specific mention of the way in which Russian interference weaponises LGBT+ issues. That is not by accident; it is a way of dividing societies and weakening our democracy. Research by the Kaleidoscope Trust and its international partners, alongside the UK Government, has shown that Russia systematically promotes anti-gender and anti-LGBT+ narratives, which are used to polarise electorates and mobilise nationalist and populist movements. Furthermore, it may discredit liberally aligned politicians or undermine trust in institutions such as NATO, the EU and the UN.

Protecting LGBT+ rights is not just a human rights issue; it is now becoming a national security priority. Attacks on LGBT+ communities and other minorities can often signal the beginning of the growth of authoritarianism and further erosion of democratic rights. We must remember that Russia does not just interfere directly in the UK, but can indirectly affect UK interests by interfering in countries currently friendly to us, such as Commonwealth countries. Of course, we have also seen the election battles in countries close to the EU or NATO, as other Members have mentioned. In terms of tactics, the Kaleidoscope Trust’s recent report “Legal Battlegrounds” has detailed disinformation and manipulation of the narrative, networks that amplify messages—such as influencers, proxy organisations and religious organisations—and political and electoral disruption.

Recognising the problem of Russian interference is only the first step. Far more challenging is what our strategy is for managing and combating the impact of internet warfare and how we build up our defences against it. We absolutely must take Russian interference in our politics and democracy as seriously as any physical threat and develop strategies to deal with it, so I very much welcome the Government’s activities to date. I appreciate that, for security reasons, the Minister may not be able to give a full account of everything that is being done, but I ask him to make tackling Russian interference an absolute priority, through both the upcoming elections Bill and much further action across the whole of Government.