Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a real pleasure to speak in this debate with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for so ably setting out the petitioners’ cause. I am above all grateful to the petitioners themselves for bringing to this House such a critical issue—in fact, potentially the most important issue: how we can protect our precious but disturbingly quite fragile democracy. I agree with all the comments that have been made in this debate so far about the Rycroft review and the elections Bill.

We have to recognise that the circumstances we are in today are different from those of 10 years ago. I genuinely believe that, back then, for most political parties the fear or shame of being found to have broken the rules was incredibly important, and it was just as much a motivator for compliance as the letter of those rules themselves. Sadly, with some parts of politics—particularly those associated with Kremlin-based interests—shame is no longer a motivator. We are in a post-shame set of circumstances, and that means that we need stronger rules. I agree with my hon. Friend that the time has come for a cap on donations, as well as the many other proposals that he and others set out.

It is essential that the Government fulfil the promises they have made in their welcome strategy related to the elections Bill on the integrity of digital communications. I agree with the Security Minister, who has done so much on these issues, that there is little evidence that Russian bots influenced the outcome of the last general election. However, he will be well aware that there is evidence that the prevalence, reach and AI-enabled effectiveness of bots is growing pretty much every day. As Global Witness showed, even back in 2024, posts from bot-like accounts spreading disinformation and hatred were viewed more than 150 million times in the run-up to the election.

We cannot have a system for election regulation that is still based on leaflet and newspaper campaigning, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) described. Campaigning and attempts at influence now take place online, and our electoral legislation needs to catch up. I hope that the election Bill will ensure that that happens.

The case of Moldova was mentioned earlier. I had the privilege of visiting that country last year with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. I spoke with many election officials and politicians, including President Maia Sandu, and I agree that we see the same playbook being used time and again; of course, it has been used to greater intensity in a country that is right on the frontline of the war in Ukraine. We need to shift out of what is often called the normalcy bias of thinking that the exercise of influence is something unusual, into a far more vigilant state. That must include a national conversation, as the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) said. The public need to understand the extent of the threat from Russian-influenced campaigns far more.

There is an analogy here, which was discussed in relation to the elections Bill, with the threat from Russian-enabled cyber-attacks. I still hear individuals speaking about cyber-attacks as if they are somehow a one-off, but we know now—this was discussed in relation to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—that cyber-attacks are costing our economy about 0.5% of GDP. What happened at Jaguar Land Rover, in just one single cyber-attack, lead to a reduction in our projected GDP. To put that in context, my understanding is that in 2024, all of agriculture contributed 0.56% of our GDP. Cyber-attacks are a huge threat, and we need to improve public awareness of them and of the exercise of influence, too.

That needs to take place in key institutions, as well as more broadly. I was pleased that the Security Minister met with universities, as well as MI5 and others, to help them to identify the threat of foreign interference. That was really positive. I realise that much of that work was connected to Chinese interference, given what happened with Sheffield Hallam University, but it is clear that a variety of authoritarian states and individuals are increasingly seeking to intimidate academics and researchers. The centralised route for reporting attempts of academic interference is welcome, but I strongly urge the Government to look at other measures, such as ensuring that universities are prepared for vexatious, multiple freedom of information requests. They have been weaponised against those researching the spread of online disinformation and hate, in some cases with links to authoritarian regimes, including Russia.

We also need to be far more vocal about the extent of Russian-linked sabotage in our country. I am sure many Members here will be aware of the horrific burning of the warehouse in Leyton in east London. Fewer people, perhaps, will be aware of the credible links to Russia when a package caught fire in a DHL warehouse near Birmingham. The methods we see being used by Russian-based operatives in our country are very similar to those operating across other nations.

[Jamie Stone]

The right hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. Only yesterday, Sven Sakkov, the Estonian ambassador, spoke in Aberdeen. Similar to what the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) said about Moldova, he said, “Look, we’re a border country with Russia. You may think you’re far away, but it’s happening right on your doorstep. You have important undersea cables going from Banff to Orkney and Shetland to the Faroe Islands.” Can I suggest to the Minister, via the right hon. Lady, that we have to up our Royal Navy presence in those areas, perhaps using warships or undersea drones? If we sit on our hands and do nothing, we could be putting off the evil day.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The hon. Member makes an important point. My understanding is that the Government are alive to the threat to undersea cables and have been seeking to work with industry and, more broadly, with other countries that have experienced interference to try to ensure that we are properly protected, although I am sure the Minister can elaborate on that.

I strongly agree with the point about seeing similar patterns in other forms of sabotage. It was concerning, but fascinating, that in the run-up to Germany’s last election, there was a campaign of sabotage directed at internal combustion engine cars. Dozens of them were sabotaged, and attempts were made to link that to the German Green party and to claim that it was somehow responsible. There was also widespread disinformation, with fake videos of ballot problems being disseminated. Officials in Germany have pointed out that there was credible evidence that it was part of a Russian campaign to undermine trust in the elections. It was obviously to undermine trust in one particular political party, but the impact is much broader, as many Members have said.

We need to ensure that individuals who are vulnerable to being exploited into carrying out this kind of sabotage understand what they are getting into. GLOBSEC, the security think-tank, has set out the pattern of involvement. There are often many links in the chain. Individuals may have been involved in petty crime, for example, and they get pulled in, often with the offer of cryptocurrency or simply money. They need to understand that what they are engaging in is treason. It carries a heavy sentence —rightly so—and can also be extremely dangerous. We saw that in east London, when those individuals were so concerned for their lives, given the fire right next to their apartment block. We need to ensure that the public are much more aware of these so-called cognitive operations, which are focused on undermining citizens’ trust in democracy and in key institutions.

Finally, I am pleased that the Secretary of State for Education has said that social media literacy, which is critical, will be a part of the new curriculum following the review. However, it is incredibly important that teachers will be properly empowered and protected when they are ensuring that our young people are ready to be social media literate. In her reviews of extremism, Dame Sara Khan has detailed that teachers have often not been supported when they have tried to engage in conversations about extremism, and we cannot fall into the same trap with disinformation.

Once again, it is a great pleasure to be part of this debate, and I thank the petitioners for bringing forward this important discussion.