Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Jamie Stone Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion Preseli) (PC)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) on so eloquently detailing the importance and urgency of this matter. I also congratulate the petitioners on organising such an important petition. I speak as the Member of Parliament for Ceredigion Preseli, the constituency that—half an hour ago, at least—had secured the highest number of signatories.

As the hon. Member outlined, Wales is one of the areas that has secured the highest concentration of signatories across the entirety of the UK. It will come as no surprise to anybody who listened to his excellent speech that the reason for that interest and level of concern in Wales is the antics and treachery of the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, Mr Nathan Gill. As has been mentioned, he has been jailed for 10 and a half years for accepting Russian bribes to the tune of some £40,000 for making pro-Russian statements in the European Parliament and to the media. As I think everybody will agree, the man has committed treachery for £40,000, so we must ask serious questions about his integrity and that of his party, whose members I notice are absent from today’s debate.

I want to make two broad points. The first is to explain why it is so important that we waste no time in implementing measures in response to the findings of the review that the Government have rightly called for and initiated. I understand the review will report its findings in March. I plead with the Government Minister to ensure that the findings are acted on as soon as possible, so as to preserve the integrity of our democracy. Sadly, it might not be possible to bring about any legislative changes in time for the elections in Wales and other parts of the UK in May this year. Nevertheless, it is important that we do not waste any time so that further elections are not influenced in any way by the scourge of Russian interference.

I also ask the Minister that, as part of the review’s considerations, we look at the egregious loopholes in our current laws that the Russian state was able to exploit by funnelling money through to political actors and traitors in the UK for their own ends. I would like his reassurance that one particular device and mechanism being examined is the creation of Welsh limited partnerships. It is a subject that a whole host of investigative journalists have written about in some detail, and which I would very much like to hear the Government state that they are looking at. Such devices are created in Moscow in Russia and are then used to funnel money into our political discourse and political actors who try to interfere and influence our debates in malign ways that are very difficult for us to spot, or at least not very easy for the Electoral Commission and other authorities to act on effectively.

I will end by reflecting on why that is so important. The hon. Member for South Norfolk outlined the host of ways in which the Russian state is trying to target society and democracy in western countries and specifically in the UK. As the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) said in his intervention, we should not be so naive as to think that it is not happening here in the UK.

The strategic defence review of June last year concluded that we are under daily attack. When we talk about political interference, whether it is Russian, Iranian or Chinese for that matter, we should place that in the broader context of other hybrid warfare tactics, some of which the hon. Member for South Norfolk referred to. We need to consider that while those countries are perhaps flooding our social media feeds with disinformation generated by armies of bots, or trying directly to bribe some willing fools in our political environment, they are paving the way to undermining and corroding trust in political institutions and authorities such that we are even more vulnerable to the direct attacks they may launch, such as the terrible poisonings in Salisbury back in 2018, the arson attack back in 2024 or indeed the almost constant daily threat that these mysterious Russian research ships pose to our critical subsea infrastructure.

By allowing political interference to continue, we risk undermining the public’s trust in all our institutions and, indeed, in the very integrity of our politics.

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making a good speech. The Russian ship he mentioned was off the coast of my constituency among others, which caused grave local concern. It strikes me that to defend our democracy, be it Welsh, Scottish or national, protections should be extended to local authorities, because a council such as the Highland council, which is responsible for this vast coastline, would have something to say and do on that front.

[Ben Lake]

I agree wholeheartedly with the hon. Member’s important intervention. Perhaps we in this country need to wake up to the nature of the threat: it is all-encompassing and comprehensive, so every single tier of government and of society needs to be engaged. Perhaps a national conversation about the seriousness of the threat should be initiated. The findings of the Government’s review may give us a good opportunity to trigger that national conversation. Once the review has issued its findings, we cannot waste any time in bringing forward the measures, whether legislative or budgetary, that need to be undertaken to protect the integrity of our democracy and tackle the scourge of Russian interference in our politics.

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[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a real pleasure to speak in this debate with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for so ably setting out the petitioners’ cause. I am above all grateful to the petitioners themselves for bringing to this House such a critical issue—in fact, potentially the most important issue: how we can protect our precious but disturbingly quite fragile democracy. I agree with all the comments that have been made in this debate so far about the Rycroft review and the elections Bill.

We have to recognise that the circumstances we are in today are different from those of 10 years ago. I genuinely believe that, back then, for most political parties the fear or shame of being found to have broken the rules was incredibly important, and it was just as much a motivator for compliance as the letter of those rules themselves. Sadly, with some parts of politics—particularly those associated with Kremlin-based interests—shame is no longer a motivator. We are in a post-shame set of circumstances, and that means that we need stronger rules. I agree with my hon. Friend that the time has come for a cap on donations, as well as the many other proposals that he and others set out.

It is essential that the Government fulfil the promises they have made in their welcome strategy related to the elections Bill on the integrity of digital communications. I agree with the Security Minister, who has done so much on these issues, that there is little evidence that Russian bots influenced the outcome of the last general election. However, he will be well aware that there is evidence that the prevalence, reach and AI-enabled effectiveness of bots is growing pretty much every day. As Global Witness showed, even back in 2024, posts from bot-like accounts spreading disinformation and hatred were viewed more than 150 million times in the run-up to the election.

We cannot have a system for election regulation that is still based on leaflet and newspaper campaigning, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) described. Campaigning and attempts at influence now take place online, and our electoral legislation needs to catch up. I hope that the election Bill will ensure that that happens.

The case of Moldova was mentioned earlier. I had the privilege of visiting that country last year with the Inter-Parliamentary Union. I spoke with many election officials and politicians, including President Maia Sandu, and I agree that we see the same playbook being used time and again; of course, it has been used to greater intensity in a country that is right on the frontline of the war in Ukraine. We need to shift out of what is often called the normalcy bias of thinking that the exercise of influence is something unusual, into a far more vigilant state. That must include a national conversation, as the hon. Member for Ceredigion Preseli (Ben Lake) said. The public need to understand the extent of the threat from Russian-influenced campaigns far more.

There is an analogy here, which was discussed in relation to the elections Bill, with the threat from Russian-enabled cyber-attacks. I still hear individuals speaking about cyber-attacks as if they are somehow a one-off, but we know now—this was discussed in relation to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill—that cyber-attacks are costing our economy about 0.5% of GDP. What happened at Jaguar Land Rover, in just one single cyber-attack, lead to a reduction in our projected GDP. To put that in context, my understanding is that in 2024, all of agriculture contributed 0.56% of our GDP. Cyber-attacks are a huge threat, and we need to improve public awareness of them and of the exercise of influence, too.

That needs to take place in key institutions, as well as more broadly. I was pleased that the Security Minister met with universities, as well as MI5 and others, to help them to identify the threat of foreign interference. That was really positive. I realise that much of that work was connected to Chinese interference, given what happened with Sheffield Hallam University, but it is clear that a variety of authoritarian states and individuals are increasingly seeking to intimidate academics and researchers. The centralised route for reporting attempts of academic interference is welcome, but I strongly urge the Government to look at other measures, such as ensuring that universities are prepared for vexatious, multiple freedom of information requests. They have been weaponised against those researching the spread of online disinformation and hate, in some cases with links to authoritarian regimes, including Russia.

We also need to be far more vocal about the extent of Russian-linked sabotage in our country. I am sure many Members here will be aware of the horrific burning of the warehouse in Leyton in east London. Fewer people, perhaps, will be aware of the credible links to Russia when a package caught fire in a DHL warehouse near Birmingham. The methods we see being used by Russian-based operatives in our country are very similar to those operating across other nations.

[Jamie Stone]

The right hon. Lady is making an excellent speech. Only yesterday, Sven Sakkov, the Estonian ambassador, spoke in Aberdeen. Similar to what the hon. Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) said about Moldova, he said, “Look, we’re a border country with Russia. You may think you’re far away, but it’s happening right on your doorstep. You have important undersea cables going from Banff to Orkney and Shetland to the Faroe Islands.” Can I suggest to the Minister, via the right hon. Lady, that we have to up our Royal Navy presence in those areas, perhaps using warships or undersea drones? If we sit on our hands and do nothing, we could be putting off the evil day.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The hon. Member makes an important point. My understanding is that the Government are alive to the threat to undersea cables and have been seeking to work with industry and, more broadly, with other countries that have experienced interference to try to ensure that we are properly protected, although I am sure the Minister can elaborate on that.

I strongly agree with the point about seeing similar patterns in other forms of sabotage. It was concerning, but fascinating, that in the run-up to Germany’s last election, there was a campaign of sabotage directed at internal combustion engine cars. Dozens of them were sabotaged, and attempts were made to link that to the German Green party and to claim that it was somehow responsible. There was also widespread disinformation, with fake videos of ballot problems being disseminated. Officials in Germany have pointed out that there was credible evidence that it was part of a Russian campaign to undermine trust in the elections. It was obviously to undermine trust in one particular political party, but the impact is much broader, as many Members have said.

We need to ensure that individuals who are vulnerable to being exploited into carrying out this kind of sabotage understand what they are getting into. GLOBSEC, the security think-tank, has set out the pattern of involvement. There are often many links in the chain. Individuals may have been involved in petty crime, for example, and they get pulled in, often with the offer of cryptocurrency or simply money. They need to understand that what they are engaging in is treason. It carries a heavy sentence —rightly so—and can also be extremely dangerous. We saw that in east London, when those individuals were so concerned for their lives, given the fire right next to their apartment block. We need to ensure that the public are much more aware of these so-called cognitive operations, which are focused on undermining citizens’ trust in democracy and in key institutions.

Finally, I am pleased that the Secretary of State for Education has said that social media literacy, which is critical, will be a part of the new curriculum following the review. However, it is incredibly important that teachers will be properly empowered and protected when they are ensuring that our young people are ready to be social media literate. In her reviews of extremism, Dame Sara Khan has detailed that teachers have often not been supported when they have tried to engage in conversations about extremism, and we cannot fall into the same trap with disinformation.

Once again, it is a great pleasure to be part of this debate, and I thank the petitioners for bringing forward this important discussion.

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[Lincoln Jopp]

It is important to look at elections to the left of the ballot box, because it is not just about going down with a polling card and ID and putting a tick in a box. The hon. Member for Llanelli said it best: we need to be much more alive to the fact that we are being manipulated and manoeuvred by information and disinformation. We can use pencils and paper, sure, but there is a way more sophisticated game going on here, and it is pretty terrifying.

I come back to my theme of amping up the threat perception. We need to re-arm very quickly, not only with hard power but in the minds of our own people, so that we build national resilience to face threats more effectively across the spectrum. For example, as the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) mentioned, we had the Russian spy ship and the threat to subsea cables—I am delighted that someone mentioned them. Importantly, when the Secretary of State took the decision to order the surfacing of the Astute-class submarine next to the Yantar to say, “We know what you’re doing and you need to pack it in,” he also made that information available in the newspapers to ensure that the public had that threat perception.

[Jamie Stone]

I have twice, in interventions, mentioned the spy ships and the problems around the coast of my constituency. Let us cut to the chase: does the hon. Gentleman agree that we do not have enough Royal Navy surface ships, never mind submarines? I have not seen a single Royal Navy ship anywhere around the coast of my constituency—not since Joint Warrior couple of years ago.

[Lincoln Jopp]

The clever ones are the ones that the hon. Member cannot see. But yes, I agree that we urgently need to look at defence investment in hard power. It is a source of huge frustration in our defence industry domestically and overseas that the Government have failed to agree the defence investment plan. When I was in the Ministry of Defence, we had an old adage: “Plans without resources are hallucinations.” At the moment, our defence industry is dining on fresh air, because the defence investment plan has not yet been agreed.

We have time, so I will ask your indulgence, Ms Butler, to mention that Nelsonian eye. Hon. Members will remember that in September last year the British ambassador to the United States of America was sacked. My right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington (David Davis) secured an emergency debate, in which I made this point:

“Since December last year, our ambassador in Washington has been potentially subject to leverage and blackmail, because someone—we do not know who—had politically fatal kompromat on Lord Mandelson throughout his whole time in office.

I am amazed that the Foreign Office has not gone into full lockdown and damage limitation mode, having found out that potentially Lord Mandelson could have been blackmailed this entire time. If it had turned out that he had been an agent of a foreign state, the Foreign Office would have done that. All it knows now is that someone—we do not know who—had politically fatal kompromat on him that whole time.”—[Official Report, 16 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1380.]

The Foreign Office Minister in that debate did not respond to the suggestion that they turn Peter Mandelson inside out once they had realised that fact. I suspect that after the events of the past week, one or two Government Ministers wish that they had heeded that advice at the time; they might have saved themselves some problems. Last week, Members who were in the Chamber also heard the point of order made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington, who said:

“On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Today’s Opposition day debate will focus on Mandelson and his relationship with the paedophile Jeffrey Epstein. However, it will not cover his relationship with another alleged paedophile, murderer, gangster, specialist in bribery and corruption, and Putin favourite: Oleg Deripaska. That relationship may be just as bad as the one he had with Epstein. As European trade commissioner, Mandelson made decisions favouring Deripaska’s company by $200 million a year. Mandelson avoided proper investigation by lying about the timing of his relationship with Deripaska. How can we find out what investigations were carried out before Gordon Brown and his Government appointed Mandelson as a Minister? Do you agree that this House needs to see that information”?—[Official Report, 4 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 269.]

We all know how Wednesday played out after that.

Lastly, I will speak about the other actions that the Government are taking. In preparation for this debate, I looked at the statement that the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, introduced at the back end of last year, would

“require organisations in critical sectors to further protect their IT systems”.

I must tell the Minister that I am on the Committee for that Bill, and it does no such thing. All it does is to say that various providers from various sectors have to report after the event; it says nothing about making them more secure.

I will leave the Minister with a couple of questions. Is enough being done cross-Government to raise threat perception in the nation? What is the Government’s policy on political donations being made in cryptocurrency? How have the Government changed electoral law to keep pace with a quickly evolving threat? I thank the Minister in advance for his remarks, and the House for its indulgence.