Russian Influence on UK Politics and Democracy

Alex Sobel Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Westminster Hall

[Alex Sobel (Leeds Central and Headingley) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk (Ben Goldsborough) for his excellent opening speech. I agree with the statement in the petition, which 168 of my constituents signed:

“We are concerned about reported efforts from Russia to influence democracy in the US, UK, Europe and elsewhere. We believe we must establish the depth and breadth of possible Russian influence campaigns in the UK”.

However, I emphasise that that influence is being exercised throughout the world, not just in the west.

I agree with the e-petition, not only from my constituents’ point of view but as chair of the all-party parliamentary group for fair elections, the largest APPG in Parliament, and as chair of the APPG on Ukraine. Russian influence and interference is the converging issue at play between those groups. We must listen to and learn from Ukraine, as the Ukrainians are on the frontline defending Europe. We are in a hybrid war with Russia—that is not a new phenomenon. It is trying to erode our democracy on home soil. I will guide Members through the historical influences on our politics and democracy; address what we already have on the table with the Rycroft review; and conclude with what we must also place on the table, especially via our upcoming elections Bill, in order to ensure that we protect the freedom and fairness of our democracy for evermore.

Russian influence—or should we say interference?—in UK politics is here. Reform’s Nathan Gill was guilty of eight charges of accepting bribes from the Kremlin. The Kremlin exploited legal loopholes to influence the Brexit vote, as ex-MI6 spy Chris Steele revealed just last week here in Parliament. For at least 15 years, the Kremlin has exploited loopholes in political finance rules, with anonymous donations through Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh limited partnerships, unincorporated associations, cryptoassets and parapolitical ecosystems such as think-tanks, opaque media organisations and political movements not formally classified as parties. Evidence of Russian election interference was described as “overwhelmingly clear” as early as 2017 to 2019, with its

“utterly disruptive and malign presence”

in British national life.

If we do not resist, act and legislate now, how can we ever expect to be rid of Putin’s influence and to live in a legitimate democracy? Foreign influence is not a new challenge to democracy, especially during wartime. We are, I emphasise, in an ongoing hybrid war with Russia. During the second world war, the British Ministry of Information, in co-operation with the War Office and the Ministry of Home Security, issued a guidance pamphlet on disinformation. It detailed how foreign powers may seek to:

“make use of the civilian population in order to create confusion and panic. They spread false rumours and issue false instructions. In order to prevent this…do not believe rumours and do not spread them…make quite sure that it is a true order and not a faked order”—

that is disinformation.

Disinformation is fake news. It is created and spread deliberately by someone who knows full well that it is false. Disinformation is vast. It is a technique, like dark money and manipulation, as old as nefarious actors themselves. The distinct difference between that guidance published in the 1940s and today is that the digital realm we are operating in is evolving minute by minute. Our regulation must evolve alongside it.

The Rycroft review, the independent review launched in response to the shocking case of Reform’s Welsh leader, Nathan Gill, is a good first step. I wish to give the review the opportunity to uncover events and make substantial recommendations going forward. Former permanent secretary Philip Rycroft will assess finance and bribery rules and how to reduce the risk of foreign interference, and will build on new rules set out in the election strategy to guard against foreign political interference.

I will welcome Mr Rycroft’s report, which is to be sent to the Home Secretary and Security Minister at the end of March. It will focus on the effectiveness of UK political finance laws, as well as the safeguards in place to protect our democracy from illicit money from abroad, including cryptocurrencies. I look forward to hearing about how it will examine the rules governing the constitution and regulation of political parties, and the Electoral Commission’s enforcement powers, as well as exploring the role of the checks-and-balances system. That being said, to keep up with the technological developments that enable Russian influence in UK politics, we need a multitude of regulation and recommendations to ensure that the Kremlin keeps out of Westminster.

The elections Bill will be a vehicle for that. As chair of the fair elections APPG and Ukraine APPG, I look forward to seeing such firm regulatory action being taken. First, on dark money, we must stop corrupt, foreign state-sponsored money entering our political system. One way to better restrict that would be to outlaw both crypto donations and those from unincorporated entities. Furthermore, there should be a ban on all overseas donations. All known loopholes and political funding architecture must be closed, including Northern Ireland anonymous donations, Scottish and Welsh limited partnerships and so on. That must be tackled through new laws or legislative instruments.

Secondly, on disinformation, we need to rapidly improve our transparency in the UK to make a free and fair digital environment for elections. Without transparency, we get populist information dynamics. That means elections with information disorder, trust erosion as political terrain and narrative amplification over institutional debate. Simplified, reductionist and emotionally resonant narratives are how the predator of big tech preys on the electorate. We must learn from international leaders such as Estonia, which has whole-of-Government electoral threat monitoring, real-time co-ordination between security agencies and electoral authorities and public transparency during interference incidents. We can also learn from France with its election period intervention, which includes legal powers to act rapidly against co-ordinated foreign disinformation during elections combined with rapid attribution and public exposure.

Overall, foreign disinformation thrives where public trust is weakest. A voting system that leaves millions without meaningful representation actively undermines that trust. There is more to do to ensure that our elections are free and fair. These three pillars—eradicating dark money, disinformation and misinformation, and overall electoral reform—are the pillars of the APPG for fair elections. If we work together, we can have a free, fair and democratic future.