Monday 6th June 2022
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Priti Patel)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The hostile threat that our country faces comes in many forms, and is ever evolving. We must not only keep pace with such threats, but stay ahead of them to make our country safe, and an even harder target for those who wish to harm us. Those who mean us harm do not stand still, and neither can we.
The terrible chemical weapons attack on Salisbury by the Russian state in March 2018 is just the most obvious of the types of threat that we now face. State threats come in multiple forms. There are physical threats to people and to life, such as assassination, poisoning, forced repatriation and harassment, and there are threats to our own way of life and our values, including sabotage, espionage and interference. Those are supplemented by less physical but equally damaging threats: cyber threats, malware, fraud, extortion, and intellectual property theft. There are threats to geostrategic interests, and sadly, as we all know only too well, we face home-grown threats as well. Last year, each and every one of us in the House was shattered by the murder of our dear colleague and friend Sir David Amess.
We know that the nature of the threats we face is changing. We must protect our country from the old challenges, but also confront the new ones. We have seen in the last year alone how quickly and profoundly the world can change—in Afghanistan, for instance, and with the conflict resulting from Putin’s terrible war on Ukraine. The House has also been reminded that some countries are only too happy to interfere with our political system.
Chris Bryant
I am very grateful. I was waiting for that little phrase—I hoped it might come up. Some of us are very concerned about how state actors from other countries who wish us ill might seek to undermine the democratic process in the House, might seek to infiltrate Parliament, and might seek to gain intelligence through Members of Parliament. Would the Home Secretary be interested in an amendment that might seek to address what I think is still a lacuna—a gap—in the legislation that she is proposing by dealing specifically with MPs and how they might, perhaps inadvertently or perhaps deliberately or recklessly, be helping foreign state actors?
Priti Patel
I know from our time together in the Foreign Affairs Committee of not just the hon. Gentleman’s interest in this issue, but the significance of an issue that is growing and growing. I will say more about that later in my speech, but let me say in response to his question that we are looking into all sorts of lacunas. There are certain ways in which existing practices take place, not just in this House but across Parliament—in both Houses—and we need, collectively, to find ways of addressing that. We are naturally looking into how we can protect our political system, and I will expand on that later.
Chris Bryant
The Parliamentary Security Director is particularly concerned about, for example, the all-party parliamentary groups, which, while obviously great in many respects, are often funded by other countries, some of which do not wish us well, and sometimes that funding comes indirectly. I wonder whether we need to change our practices in the House to make sure we have tidied that up as well.
Priti Patel
The hon. Gentleman is right to refer to what we, as a House, need to do for our country to preserve our democracy and the function of our political and democratic institutions. All-party parliamentary groups are a well-trodden path when it comes to inquiries and investigations, and various Committees, including the Select Committee on which the hon. Gentleman is represented, have also touched on this issue. These are exactly the areas in which we have to raise the bar, and I believe that others around the world will look to us, particularly through this legislation. There are areas—I will deal with them later in my speech, and I know that the House will debate them later this evening—in which we know that exposure has been significant, and we have to shut that down. The risks are very high.
Diplomacy and diplomatic engagement at every stage is the proper way in which we should work with other countries and Governments. That means not letting hack and leak operations force Governments into positions or lead to the risk exposures that colleagues have touched on and that many reports and wider work have highlighted. As for the type of threats that we are exposed to, hack and leak is just one example relating to cyber; there is also the threat from trolling and organised crime, which persists in many of the domains that we are discussing.
The UK is a leader in this, with our Five Eyes and international partners. Our commitment to NATO remains steadfast and we should never, ever lose sight of that. Those institutions and organisations are also adapting to the threats and risks that we face globally.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I understand that there will be a programme in Northern Ireland tomorrow night that confirms what the Secretary of State referred to—that there are economic crime gangs stretching from Russia right through Europe across to the United Kingdom. Will the Bill address the issue of organised crime gangs that stretch into Northern Ireland and are laundering money?
Priti Patel
I thank my hon. Friend for his incredibly important question. The Bill will cover aspects of hostile state activity, and he will hear the details of that as I make progress with my remarks. Much of the work on organised crime and criminality in the United Kingdom is led by the National Crime Agency, and it is heavily involved in this work as well. As well as money laundering, we have debated sanctions in recent months. Some of our financial work to follow the money is embedded in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which is part one of the legislation, and we will introduce the economic crime Bill—part two of the legislation—in which there will be much more of that work.
Money laundering is one aspect of organised gangs’ criminality. For people to have the money to launder, a whole sequence of criminality goes with that. That could involve drugs and firearms and, tragically, as we know, people smuggling. We know that the case in Purfleet, in which 39 people died tragically in the back of a lorry, emanated from organised criminality in Northern Ireland. We were able to take that case to court through the work of the police and the National Crime Agency. There is, of course, much more that we need to do collectively.
We have to ensure that we have every possible domestic lever to keep our country safe and prevent terrible acts of criminality and harm from occupying a permissive environment in which they can fester and grow. The Bill brings together vital new measures to address the evolving and ever-changing threats that we face and to protect the British public—to protect our country and our citizens—by modernising aspects of counter-espionage laws.
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
I do not think that anybody would question the Home Secretary’s commitment to the safety that she is trying to engender for the British public, but I draw her attention to the comments of Andy Hall QC—her adviser on counter-terrorism—who raised concerns about some of the thresholds with respect to the use of assets and money. He oversees the equivalent legislation elsewhere, so he knows well what he is talking about. Although I think that we are all going in the same direction, can we be careful in Committee and on Report to take on board what he says to make sure that we do not undermine the rights of British people while we are protecting them?
Priti Patel
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why the Bill has been constructed in a sensitive manner with our agencies and partners, based on expertise and insight. This is about how the laws will be applied to individuals in specific cases, so the sensitivities must always be considered. A case-by-case approach is rightly required when it comes to the application of our laws, as well as to law enforcement and how we pursue these matters further.
The Bill brings together many measures, but I would like the Chamber to indulge me for a minute—particularly off the back of this weekend—as I pay tribute to our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies. We were all touched to see the numbers of people who came to London to see Her Majesty and celebrate the platinum jubilee. Our law enforcement and intelligence agencies came together, ensuring that in every aspect of our celebrations the British public were kept safe by remarkable people, who worked tirelessly; I pay tribute to them. It is their expertise that we are trying to preserve, enhance and develop through the Bill. We want to ensure that they have all the tools and protections they need to deal with this ever-changing and evolving landscape.
Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)
May I also pay tribute to the agencies? When I saw all those people on the Mall, I thought, “My goodness, if something had gone wrong, imagine what that would have looked like.” It was an extraordinary effort, and the Secretary of State is right to pay tribute to them. It is also right that we protect them, but protections for whistleblowers in the security agencies are missing from the Bill. When the Bill has come before the House previously, there have been efforts to provide that, including through the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). There was also the Office of the Whistleblower Bill in the House of Lords. What are the Secretary of State’s thoughts on protecting whistleblowers?
Priti Patel
The hon. Lady is right that the protection of whistleblowers is vital. I will be frank: we need to find the right measures and means to do that. She has highlighted the current debates and thoughts on the issue. We need to find the right balance. Whistleblowers play an integral part in these matters, and she will hear additional points on the subject later in my speech.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
I do not want to dwell too much on whistleblowers, but the Bill does not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, so there is an absence of a public interest defence and all the bits around that. What is the logic of not addressing all those aspects in the primary legislation?
Priti Patel
I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question very specifically. He is right about the public interest defence, on which the Law Commission has recently opined. We are not bringing forward reform of the OSA 1989, mainly because we recognise that the issue is complicated, not straightforward. If it were straightforward, we would be able to deal with it in the form of a clause. However, there are various sensitivities. For example, in situations where there may have been wrongdoing or where we think there is a public interest in disclosure, it is about finding the right balance; a public interest defence is not always the safest or most appropriate way to bring that matter forward.
We are not shy of the issue and are certainly not ignoring it, but it is important that we focus on ensuring that individuals can make disclosures safely, which means protecting them through safeguards and proper routes. That work is still under way, and we need to go through it in the right way.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for taking a further intervention on this point. Three of our four Five Eyes partners—New Zealand, Australia and Canada—have some form of public interest defence. The example of those jurisdictions has shown that a public interest defence works and does not lead to a flood of unauthorised, damaging disclosures or an excessive risk to national security. I am quite sure that an amendment will be tabled at some point to introduce a public interest defence; the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland)—the former Lord Chancellor—is thinking about it. Will the Secretary of State give such an amendment serious consideration?
Priti Patel
Let me say for the assurance of all colleagues in the House: absolutely, we need to find the right balance. The hon. and learned Lady has touched on our Five Eyes partners, which have introduced many other aspects that I will mention later in my speech, but they are seeing unintended consequences. We want to work through much of the detail, and we will work with all colleagues in this ongoing process.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I am at a bit of a loss to understand why the Government have not brought forward reform of the 1989 Act, because the security services, in evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee, has said it is unfit for purpose—I think even the Government have admitted that, and so has the Law Commission. If we do not amend or substantially change that Act, we will have a situation where someone can get life for foreign espionage under this legislation, but only two years under the Official Secrets Act 1989. Surely this is an opportunity to update all that legislation? I cannot understand why the Government are doing things in this way.
Priti Patel
The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, whether that is the view of the Law Commission or others, reform of the Official Secrets Act is complicated and not straightforward. I can tell colleagues that no one would be happier than I to present a reform agenda in that space, but it is not straightforward—[Interruption.] I appreciate colleagues’ gesturing on the Back Benches, but it is important that on this complex reform we continue to engage with a wide range of interests and give all due consideration to a number of concerns, because there are many, many concerns being raised.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
I, too, am a little mystified at why the Home Secretary is not seeking to reform all the Official Secrets Acts—the entire regime—with this once-in-a-generation piece of legislation. If she is not doing it in this Bill, can she tell the House when it will be done? Is there a timeline for reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989?
Priti Patel
Without pre-empting the work that is taking place in Government right now, I want to give that assurance. That is also based on the Law Commission’s recently published review. However, as I have already said, a wide range of work is required in terms of engaging stakeholders and looking at all aspects of the law itself. These issues take time, but the Government are working on them right now, and I can assure the House that as soon as we can, when we find the right moment, we will come back to this.
Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend; I know she wants to move on from this subject and there are other things to speak about, but on the point she makes about further work on the 1989 Act, which she is right to say is complex, does she accept that there is some urgency? Juries are in effect creating their own public interest defences when they try these cases. Would it not be far better if we in Parliament were able to define those defences properly, rather than inviting juries to do so ad hoc, without direction from the judge?
Priti Patel
I do not disagree at all with my right hon. and learned Friend. I see my former colleague and former Lord Chancellor, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon, in his place; this is an area that we have discussed in the past because of its significance. The types of crisis we see ourselves involved in—hostile states, deprivations, you name it—are growing and growing. We must find a way to get this right. That is the work we need to do and that must be the right focus of attention, but of course the Bill is part of this Government’s legislative agenda on protecting our country and making it safe.
Colleagues will be aware that the Bill was designed in close consultation with our colleagues and counterparts and the security services. It builds on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and on the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which gives the Government powers to scrutinise and intervene in business transactions such as takeovers to protect national security. It also builds on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which gives the police and the courts greater powers to keep us safe and deliver justice.
We have already touched on the fight against people smugglers and the removal from our country of those who seek to do us harm. The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 also helps to drive dirty money out of our country. At the same time, the House will be well aware that the Online Safety Bill seeks to tackle extremists and the people who do the most appalling things and hurt children, and I have already touched on the fact that there will be further legislation on economic crime and corporate transparency.
Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is important that we address the role of big social media platforms in amplifying and promoting extremist content, which they have done, as well as profiting from financial crimes? Is it not important that, while we get our own laws right in this House, there should be proper regulatory enforcement on tech companies to ensure that they are responsible for their role in promoting such content?
Priti Patel
I thank my hon. Friend, who has been leading the way through the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee and all the other work that has taken place on online harms. I am grateful to him for his engagement on all of this. He is absolutely right about holding the companies to account. I think it is fair to say that each of us, every single day, becomes more and more appalled at some of the material that circulates online—harmful content and the most appalling content around children. Even when it comes to terrorist acts, platforms are too slow when it comes to pulling some of this shocking material down. Let me give two examples from recent months: the situation with a synagogue in the United States where material was still circulating and the tragedy in America that took place with the school shooting. That is exactly why we must continue to hold the platforms to account.
State threats are becoming increasingly assertive and sophisticated. That is the key to the work that we are focused on in terms of how we tackle this new sophistication. We can never be passive in the face of malign covert activity designed to interfere with our national security and also our economy and democracy. The threats we face are everywhere, and we face them every single day. Many, many plans are disrupted by our intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies before they can be enacted. That is a sobering point, because on an annual basis we remind the public of the number of plots that have been thwarted and the level of activism that exists out there that seeks to harm our citizens and our country. It is our priority—my priority—to ensure that we stay ahead of the multiple threats we face. We all have a responsibility to our country and our public to keep them safe. That is why I know that the whole House will debate these measures in a sensible, measured way as we come together through this Bill to really focus on some of the challenges that we are exposed to and that we see day in, day out.
Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)
I thank the Secretary of State for all the work she is doing on this issue. On the foreign lobbying aspect of the Bill, I know that the Government are working through some options at the moment and have nothing concrete, which is fair enough, but what reassurance can she give the House that there will be quite a tight definition that is reasonably demanding on those people—those Chinese, Russian and Iranian fronts of covert influence operations—who we need to be tough on, rather than something a little bit weaker and maybe not fit for the purpose of the age?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. He has touched on lobbying, as just one example, but we could expand the list. We have discussed in this House other enablers and facilitators, whether it is through Parliament or other means, to get access to the state, or institutions or arms of the state. I spoke earlier about the lacunas—the areas that we have to close down, or the grey zone, across the board. My hon. Friend has spent a great deal of time on this issue through the Foreign Affairs Committee. He is very much pursuing it and we look forward to working with him on it.
Mr Kevan Jones
I am listening carefully to what the Home Secretary is saying, but why is there not in the Bill the foreign influence registration scheme that was called for by the Intelligence and Security Committee report on Russia in 2020? She said that the Government are working on it, but the United States have had this legislation since 1939 and the Australians brought in emergency legislation in 2018, so what is so difficult if one country has had it for over 70 years and the other one has brought it in more recently? Why is it not in the Bill? Is it going to be inserted later by an order of the House, which would be unfortunate as we have not had a chance to debate it today?
Priti Patel
Our intention is to bring forward foreign agent registration and it will be brought forward in the Commons; let me give that assurance. [Interruption.] The right hon. Gentleman asks what is so difficult about it. There are a number of difficulties. It is not just a case of lifting and shifting what the US and Australia have done. We have been working with our Five Eyes colleagues. There have not just been many debates but we have working with colleagues who have themselves had difficulties in some parts of enforcement. We have had very close links with our Australian counterparts in terms of workability. We want to get it right. There will be an open debate about it in Committee and everywhere else, and we look forward to working with the right hon. Gentleman on that.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s commitment because the foreign influence registration scheme is very important. May I commend to her the details of the Australian scheme, particularly the specific provision that that makes consistent with our commitment to the rule of law, which is a specific exemption for legal professional privilege? This is not a technical point. It is very important to make sure that the scheme is legally robust, nationally and internationally. The Australians make it work, so I hope that we have time to debate that issue.
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend makes an important point. These changes and measures are not straightforward. I can say to colleagues from the Floor of the House that, having had many discussions directly with our counterparts in Australia over the past 18 months, some aspects of the scheme work, but some do not. It is in our interests to make sure that we get this right. Colleagues need to come together on this. We need to work collectively—not just on the technicalities, but on the legal points. It is the legal application that will matter in terms of making a material difference.
Maria Eagle
I think I heard the right hon. Lady give us a commitment that the provisions will be introduced in time for Committee stage in the Commons, which is very welcome. We can then try to make sure that we get this right. I hope that she will confirm that I did hear her correctly and that the provisions will be introduced at the earliest stage in the Commons.
Priti Patel
That is exactly what I said.
While these considerations are important, we should also reflect on the fact that the Bill is informed by extensive public consultation. It is informed not just by the work of our counterparts in the Five Eyes and other countries, and by legislation that has been introduced by others, but by our evolving work with our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Those agencies are at the heart of the application of this work. They will be the ones who will be leading the enforcement, putting the laws into practice and dealing with the practicalities of this work. The Bill also builds on the difficult and necessary work undertaken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), who corralled the unprecedented international response to the barbaric Salisbury attacks. This Bill is a culmination of much of the work that she set in train, and we have also been in discussion with her about this Bill as well.
We should not forget that, in response to the Salisbury outrage, the UK expelled 23 undeclared Russian intelligence officers. Twenty-eight other countries and NATO supported us, resulting in one of the largest collective expulsions ever—of more than 150 Russian intelligence officers. That led to the degrading of Russian intelligence capability for years to come, and we have more cause than ever to be grateful for that today.
The National Security Bill completely overhauls and updates our espionage laws, which date back to the second world war—in some cases, to the first world war. It also creates a whole suite of measures to enable our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to deter, detect and disrupt the full range of modern-day state threats. The Bill includes a range of new and modernised offences, alongside updated investigative powers and capabilities. Those on the frontline of our defence will be able to do even more to counter state threats. Additionally, the Bill will prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid and civil damage systems by convicted terrorists by stopping public funds being given to those who could use them to support terror.
I now turn to specific measures in the National Security Bill. The foreign power condition provides a clear approach to determining whether offences or aggravated offences are being carried out for a foreign power, or on their behalf, or with the intention of benefiting a foreign power. Many of the offences introduced in the Bill apply only when the foreign power condition is met and it prepares us to face tomorrow’s threats as well as those that we face today.
We are comprehensively updating the laws that deter and disrupt espionage, as well as enhancing the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence services to investigate and prosecute those who spy on behalf of foreign states. We have already had cause to strengthen visa screening of Chinese academics and researchers in sensitive areas of research, and to step up engagement with our higher education and research sectors to alert them to the threats and risks of Chinese espionage. Three reformed offences in the Bill will combat the modern threat from state-linked espionage and related harmful conduct.
One of the UK’s greatest strengths is that we have absolutely world-leading research and innovation, but as we have seen too often it is the target and subject of hostile activity by foreign states. A new offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets will help us to respond to that threat more effectively. It will specifically target the illicit acquisition or disclosure of sensitive trade, commercial or economic information by foreign states, as the value of these is directly linked to secrecy. The offence will apply only where the foreign power condition is met and will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison.
The Bill will also make it a criminal offence to aid the UK-related activities of a foreign intelligence service. This, too, will carry a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. That means that, for the first time, it will be an offence to be an undeclared foreign spy working in the UK. We know that foreign intelligence services can have malign intentions: for example, as the US and UK set out in April 2021, Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has been behind a series of cyber-intrusions, including the extremely serious December 2020 hack of SolarWinds, the American software company.
The Bill will reform the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information. Where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and…the foreign power condition is met”,
they could now face a life sentence.
Stewart Hosie
I am curious about the use of the word “prejudicial”, which I reread several times this morning, rather than “damaging”, which appears in other legislation. How is “prejudicial” to be defined where conduct does not actually cause damage?
Priti Patel
Definitions are important, of course, but on a case-by-case basis much of the work will link to the activity and the intelligence that is provided about the individual. All sorts of elements could come together to make that case. As I have touched on, much of this will be done on a case-by-case basis; it will be based on intelligence, on the conduct of the individual involved, on the impact they would have on our national security and on the threat they pose.
The Bill will create two offences relating to access to prohibited places—sites that are vital to our national security. One will require a person to be acting for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK; the other, which carries a lesser sentence, applies to unauthorised conduct. There are sensitive sites that are particularly vulnerable to threats from foreign powers. We need greater scope to respond to new tactics and particularly to technology. The Bill will give us that ability.
There is a serious threat from state-linked attacks on assets, including sites, data, and infrastructure critical to the UK’s safety or interests. The sabotage offence will likewise apply where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and where the foreign power condition is met. It, too, comes with a maximum sentence of life.
Starting on 27 February last year, at least 17 different Chinese-linked threat actors simultaneously took advantage of flaws in Microsoft Exchange. They were able to access email accounts, acquire data and deploy malware. The attacks affected more than a quarter of a million servers worldwide. Victims included the Norwegian Parliament and the European Banking Authority.
It is completely unacceptable for the integrity of our democracy to be threatened by state threats. In January, I made a statement to the House about an individual who knowingly engaged in political interference activities on behalf of the Chinese Communist party and targeted Members of Parliament for a number of years. As I said in January,
“this kind of activity has recently become more common, with states that have malign intentions operating covertly and below current criminal thresholds in an attempt to interfere with our democracy.”—[Official Report, 17 January 2022; Vol. 707, c. 23.]
The individual in question had links to the United Front Work Department, which is part of the Chinese Communist party, and had not been open about the nature of these links. Meanwhile, China has sanctioned critics of its regime, including Members of this House. That is not remotely conducive to open and honest discussion made in good faith.
Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Melton) (Con)
This part of the Bill is particularly welcome because it recognises that individuals have a duty to look at who they are giving information to, and should not act as a useful idiot and then sound surprised when they find that the information is going to a hostile state. Can my right hon. Friend please advise whether that would impact on Members of Parliament, not just on members of the public?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In this specific case, the point about individuals with malign intentions operating covertly and quite dishonestly, but below a criminal threshold, was exactly the challenge we were faced and confronted with earlier this year, which is why we need to bring in these changes.
Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)
As we go about our often quite routine duties as Members of Parliament dealing with some quite bread-and-butter issues, it is easy to forget that we may sometimes be the object of attention of foreign intelligence services. Is there more that could be done to bring to the attention of Members of Parliament the realities of the threat we face as individuals?
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Other hon. Members who intervened earlier in this debate spoke about the role of Parliament and the security directorate here, with which we are working closely, as are our intelligence and law enforcement colleagues.
I am afraid that I think this is where reality bites for all of us. Look at the changing world in which we live and the threats coming our way. I think we have to have even more curiosity about some of the approaches made to us. I say this because we of course want to go about our lives as freely as possible. We love our democracy, and our democracy and our free society must continue to flourish along with free speech. Of course, free speech is not necessarily a value universally held by those who want to target us and seek to do us harm.
Priti Patel
My hon. Friend makes an important point. With this whole culture, and it is a culture, of covering up through other acts the intent of some organisations—the Chinese Communist party, for example—those seeds have already been established. That is why we have to find the right ways and the most sensitive and appropriate ways to address these practices. They have become long-established practices, and we are now only scratching the surface with the work that has been taking place in addressing them.
A new foreign interference offence will enable the disruption of illegitimate influence conducted for or on behalf of foreign states seeking to advance their interests or to harm the UK. It will come with a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. It will be an offence for foreign powers to interfere inappropriately with the UK’s democracy and civil society through covert influence, disinformation and attacks on our electoral processes.
Damian Collins
On the disinformation point, we know that the Russian state and other states have used disinformation as a weapon. Where there are proven cases of foreign intelligence networks, such as the Internet Research Agency in St Petersburg, seeking to interfere in the political process in the UK or to incite violence, would social media platforms, when informed of the existence of these networks, be required to act against them under this legislation?
Priti Patel
Importantly, this is where we need to join up both ends of the legislation. That is absolutely vital, through this Bill and the wider work on online harms, but there are changes that we certainly want the platforms to be putting in place. We have touched on the accountability of platforms already, but there is just so much more that they need to do and which is their responsibility.
My hon. Friend makes an important point about how, for example, if we look at counter-terrorism offences and platforms’ approaches to footage online, GIFCT—the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism—has led the way on some significant change. That is what we need to see across the board here, and we really need them all to come together.
Mr Kevan Jones
On foreign influences, why does the Bill cover someone who “intends” to have a negative impact? Elsewhere, the Bill talks about behaviour that is “reckless” and individuals who “ought reasonably to know” that their behaviour would be damaging. Can I ask why there is this difference between the two? Surely it would strengthen this part of the Bill to have the “reckless” and the “ought reasonably to know” behaviour test.
Priti Patel
At the end of the day, we are focused on individuals who are trying to do harm to our country. I will look specifically at that—obviously, I will—but intent is also based on the information and activity that can come together around some of the individuals. Right now, we are only referring to much of this on a case-by-case basis, but as we have learned with recent examples, some of which I might come on to, we can see the intent and the harm in the sequence of activity that has taken place around individuals.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
I am extremely grateful to the Home Secretary, who I know is trying to move to a peroration. On the issue of dynamism, intentions alter and threats change. The Bill creates the scope to take action against a changing terrorist landscape, but is there sufficient flexibility in the Bill to alter its provisions in accordance with those changing intentions and changing threats?
Priti Patel
My right hon. Friend makes an important point. Of course, that is the whole purpose of legislation. As I said in the first part of my remarks, we cannot remain static; we must have the agility to respond. Since February this year, with Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, techniques and tactics have changed. Yes, we are responding to them differently, but some legislative underpinning is absolutely required, as is having the flexibility and agility to respond. Hack and leak is only one example. There are so many other examples, as he will know from his time as Security Minister and from his time on the Intelligence and Security Committee. The landscape is shifting and, frankly, it is shifting fast.
We cannot wait for terrible atrocities to happen before we intervene. The Bill criminalises people who prepare to commit acts that constitute state threat offences and other harmful activity that constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety. They will face the prospect of life behind bars. When it comes to state threats, an aggravating factor will ensure that sentences for state-linked criminality recognise the seriousness of hostile activity conducted for or on behalf of foreign states. This applies to all offences not in the Bill where the foreign power condition is met.
In July 2021, the US Department of Justice announced that a New York court had unsealed an indictment against four people resident in Iran for their involvement in a plot to kidnap an unnamed Iranian-American journalist. The indictment also detailed four other individuals under surveillance by the network, including one based in the United Kingdom. Prosecutors said that one of the conspirators was an Iranian intelligence official, while the other three were assets of Iranian intelligence. Again, that speaks to the aggravating factors and the type of activity that takes place, as well as the cross-collaboration when it comes to dealing with some of those hostile state threats.
The people who engage in such nefarious behaviour are often highly skilled at keeping their activities hidden and we should never lose sight of that. Let us be under no illusion about the scale of the threat we face. In February last year, a Belgian court sentenced an accredited Iranian diplomat based in Vienna to 20 years in prison for his role in a plot to bomb a conference in Paris hosted by Iranian dissidents. The Belgian state security service stated:
“the plan for the attack was conceived in the name of Iran and under its leadership.”
Russian dissident Alexei Navalny was poisoned by Putin’s thugs and could easily have lost his life. In response, our Government enforced asset freezes and travel bans against 13 individuals and a Russian research centre.
It is vital, when creating a suite of new offences, to ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the powers effectively to investigate the threats this Bill seeks to address. I am bringing forward search and seizure powers to replace the existing investigative tool to counter complex state threats investigations. A new power of arrest for state threats activity, a new state threats detention scheme, and longer retention periods for biometric data will give the police further powers effectively to investigate these cases.
There will be some cases where it will not be possible to bring a prosecution. As is the case with counter-terrorism law, where similar challenges arise, we need a way of protecting our country. New state threat prevention and investigation measures will allow the Home Secretary to impose targeted restrictions, such as where an individual works, lives or studies, to prevent the most serious forms of harm. This is a tool of last resort. It will be used when intelligence confirms that highly damaging threat activity is planned or being undertaken, but prosecution is not realistic. These measures will be proportionate to the threat posed by an individual, and they will be subject to rigorous checks and balances, including by the courts. The Bill improves schedule 3 powers in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.
Mr Steve Baker
When my right hon. Friend and I were first elected, she will remember that terrorism prevention and investigation measures were highly controversial. Would she say something about the journey from that degree of controversy to the position today in which, until my intervention, we could move swiftly past TPIMs?
Priti Patel
I look forward to many debates with my hon. Friend on this issue. When it comes to TPIMs, there has been a considerable journey. Based on the work of our intelligence and security services—I am privileged to see, I am afraid, too much of the threats and insights, right down to the reconnaissance on certain individuals and their characteristics and the behaviours in which they participate—as I have said, this is a tool of last resort, which will be used only when intelligence confirms that highly damaging threat activity is under way. That will mean restricting the liberty of individuals if they pose a threat to the British people, to a local community and to our country.
It is important, as I have said, that these measures are proportionate to the threat posed by an individual and are subject to rigorous checks and balances, which I know my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) will provide, and by the courts. We should never negate or ignore that, because the courts have a significant role to play.
Changes to schedule 3 powers in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 will give police officers the ability to stop individuals at ports to ascertain their involvement in hostile activity by foreign states. The authorisation process enabling officers to retain confidential information is being streamlined to match the process using counter-terrorism laws. There are other measures, not currently in the Bill, on which we have touched. We will introduce a foreign influence registration scheme that requires individuals to register certain arrangements with foreign Governments, to deter and disrupt state-threat activity in the UK. It will bring our country into line with similar schemes run by allies, but we clearly need to ensure that that is workable here. The scheme will be included in a Government amendment, as I have highlighted.
A consistent message from respondents to our public consultation last year was that any scheme of this nature must strike the right balance between highlighting foreign influence in the UK and protecting those involved in legitimate activity from disproportionate compliance and regulatory matters. The scheme will follow precedents from the US and our Australian allies, requiring registration of certain arrangements with foreign Governments. It will strengthen our efforts to deter and disrupt state-threat activity through greater transparency and the scrutiny that it requires, with penalties for those who seek to obfuscate and hide such arrangements. It will increase the risk to those engaging in covert or malign activities for or on behalf of any country, including those identified by the UK intelligence community, such as Russia, China and Iran.
That includes the type of activity described by the Intelligence and Security Committee in its Russia report, where individuals with access to UK political institutions and public officials covertly exert influence at the behest of foreign intelligence services. It also includes the activity represented by the deeply concerning case of an individual engaged in political interference on behalf of the Chinese Communist party, as touched on earlier.
The scheme will make the UK more resilient to threats. Those who work covertly will face a choice between registering with the scheme, thus exposing their activity, and risking prosecution for not doing so. Both options present risk to state-threat actors. There is no intention, however, to create unnecessary barriers or to discourage those engaged in legitimate activity in the UK. Foreign Governments routinely engage in efforts to influence UK domestic and foreign policy. Where undertaken in an open, transparent way, this will continue to be welcome.
As I have mentioned already, we intend to bring the scheme forward before the Bill leaves the Commons. Following feedback received during the Home Office’s public consultation on this issue, and following Russian attempts to undermine European stability, it is right—we welcome all views and considerations on this—that we take the time to ensure that it is an effective and proportionate tool to counter state threats activity and to protect the UK’s interest.
On measures not in the Bill, I have already touched on the Official Secrets Act 1989 and the work that needs to be undertaken. To confirm, I will look at reform of the OSA, along with other work that the Government are doing to strengthen whistleblowing practices and transparency. In the context of Russia’s terrible invasion of Ukraine, it is essential that we prioritise measures that strengthen our defences against state threats, which this Bill does. Likewise, the Government have been considering reform of the treason laws, but right now we do not have plans to do so through this Bill.
The House passed the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Bill in a day, because we recognised the severity of the situation, and we recognise that at a time of crisis, we must act collectively in the national interest. However, good legislation in such complex areas must be undertaken effectively as well as efficiently to achieve the desired outcome of bolstering our agencies and protecting our nation.
The National Security Bill restricts convicted terrorists from access to civil legal aid and will enable the courts to freeze civil damages awarded to terrorists where there is a risk those funds might be used for terrorism purposes. Where that risk is ongoing, the courts will be empowered to permanently withhold those funds. When an individual commits an act of terrorism, they are rejecting the democratic state that provides the benefit of civil legal aid, and it cannot be right that the same individual can then go on to receive civil legal aid funded by that very state. These changes will end that abuse of our legal aid system.
Sir Robert Neill
I understand the point that my right hon. Friend is trying to make on this issue, but I urge her to be careful that there is a measure of proportionality in how we approach it. In the way the clauses are currently drafted, there could be no connection at all between the matter for which legal aid is applied and the behaviour of the terrorist. It could be many years into the future. For some lower level cases of terrorism, if there be such a thing—those who have been released back into the community and whom we seek to rehabilitate—that could be counter-productive and not consistent with our commitment to access to justice. Can we look at how we work the detail of this, rather than the principle?
Priti Patel
I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention on this very point. This is an area of great interest, primarily because of the type of cases we have seen. There is no question about that. I am afraid I have been subject to too many examples of cases of this nature. I am more than happy to speak to him and others about this. We need to get the approach right, and we will. People do move forward and change in life, but that is a separate issue. As was mentioned earlier, currently we are trying to address specific lacunae.
This Bill will amend the Serious Crime Act 2007 to better protect those in the security and intelligence agencies and the Ministry of Defence when discharging vital national security functions. It will also enable more effective joined-up working with international partners to improve not only our operational agility, which my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) has already touched on, but how we can be flexible going forward to address the changing landscape of threats.
It is worth remembering that things and situations can change for the better, as well as for the worse. Some of the UK’s closest allies today are countries with whom we have fought wars in the past, and we regularly develop new tools to keep us safe. The point is that none of this happens by chance. We should all reflect that when the Berlin wall fell back in 1989, some people thought that liberal democracy had won and history as we knew it then was at an end, yet this year, as we all know, Russia launched an unprovoked war against a neighbour.
It is right that we are vigilant, and we have to be vigilant every day, all the time. We cannot think in terms of just keeping up—we have to be several steps ahead. That is why the Bill is state-agnostic, but we need to be ready to face threats from wherever they may emanate, and the threat landscape is changing.
Keeping our country safe is not exclusively a matter for Government. It is also a matter for us as legislators. It is vital to come together on these measures and, as I have said several times, the measures in the Bill were drawn up after extensive consultation. They will mean that our courageous law enforcement and intelligence agencies will have the powers they need to keep us safe. We will have the ability to bring those who mean us harm to justice and, at the same time, to evolve and respond in an agile way to those threats. I urge the whole House to send a clear message to our adversaries that we will put the safety of the British people first by getting behind the Bill. I commend it to the House.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I call the shadow Home Secretary.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
It is certainly encouraging to hear such sombre but sensible contributions from both senior Front Benchers in agreement on the basis for the Bill.
To respond briefly to the question posed by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) on whether there is an oversight arrangement for special forces—no, there is not. If Parliament were ever to have such an arrangement, it would probably need to be on the model of the ISC, but we are not putting in a bid for that role unless anyone proposes proportionately to increase the resources on which the Committee depends to do its already quite substantial agenda of tasks.
Almost 20 years ago—in 2004, to be precise—the Intelligence and Security Committee first recommended the introduction of a new Official Secrets Act, recognising the constantly developing and evolving dangers posed to the United Kingdom by hostile state actors. That was almost a decade prior to our 2013 report, “Foreign involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure”—Cm. 8629, if Members want to look it up—which eventually led to the National Security and Investment Act 2021, so this Government undoubtedly deserve credit for tackling at least some of the unfinished business begun by the ISC.
As in the case of the National Security and Investment Act, unfortunately today’s proposals—while taking significant steps in the right direction—still fall short in significant respects. Given the complexity of the issues addressed in the Bill, rigorous parliamentary scrutiny is essential. Not every piece of major legislation can be processed by means of a Committee of the whole House, but where it is proposed to add a major new element to a Bill after Second Reading, the whole House must have an alternative opportunity adequately to debate it.
The National Security Bill was expected to encompass three principal elements. The first is to modernise the offence of espionage and provide the police, as well as the security and intelligence agencies, with appropriate new powers and capabilities. This the Bill clearly undertakes, with its substantial proposed reforms of the 1911 to 1939 Official Secrets Acts, which we broadly welcome. The second should be to reform, or to repeal and replace, the Official Secrets Act 1989, which deals with the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information, whether by public servants or by others, such as journalists, who are not employed by the Government. There is no trace of that in the present Bill, nor any apparent intention to incorporate the topic later.
Finally, one searches in vain for the long-heralded and much-anticipated inclusion of a foreign influence registration scheme—long advocated by the ISC and others, including the Foreign Affairs Committee—requiring individuals to declare, in a Government-managed register, any activities that they undertake for or on behalf of a foreign state. That is what we are told will be introduced by means of an amendment to the Bill, presumably in Committee or on Report. I heard the Home Secretary say earlier that it would be in Committee, which is good, but it could conceivably have been introduced even later, in the Upper House. I am glad to see the Home Secretary firmly shaking her head and ruling that out. As things stand, however, we cannot even say, with the late, great Meat Loaf, that “Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad”, given that one of the three has yet to appear, and another—the urgently needed reform of the 1989 Act—is not going to happen at all.
It is odd, to put it mildly, that such an important component as the foreign influence registration scheme has not been incorporated in the Bill from the outset. The proposal to introduce it by means of a later amendment can only fuel suspicions that the Bill was published, for reasons unknown, before it had fully matured; or that the plan for the scheme had been dropped, then belatedly revived—the Home Secretary is shaking her head, which, again, is good; or that the Government are perfectly well aware of the details of the scheme that they intend to introduce, but wish to undermine or weaken parliamentary scrutiny by introducing it after the Second Reading debate is over, so that the Commons as a whole cannot decide on it before the Committee stage at the earliest.
Such suspicions could be at least partially dispelled by the Government’s agreeing that a Committee of the whole House will examine the Bill at the next stage of its journey through the Commons, and that plenty of time will be allocated for us all to examine the amendment on establishing a foreign influence registration scheme at the earliest opportunity. I will happily give way to a ministerial intervention now, offering an undertaking to that effect.
Dr Lewis
I am receiving indications that I may hear something in the summing-up speech, so I shall live in hope.
As I wish to leave scope for other members of the ISC to drill down into the detail of all three areas on which the Bill ought to be focusing, I shall confine myself to just a few comments on each. First—as we have said—we warmly welcome the repeal of the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 to 1939, with their references to century-old concepts of data targets, such as “sketches” and “plans”, which have long been superseded in the digital age. The new espionage offence created by clause 1 should enable the intelligence and security agencies more effectively to combat hostile state action in a world that has undergone a technological revolution in the modern era.
Clause 2 is a worthwhile attempt to protect valuable trade secrets, although we feel that there are issues of complexity and breadth of definition which will require simplification if this new system is to succeed. Clause 3 is strongly to be supported, both for criminalising the giving of assistance to a foreign intelligence service and for empowering the agencies and the police legitimately to unravel the hostile networks involved. Clause 12 creates a new offence of sabotage, at home or overseas: causing damage to vital UK assets or infrastructure, whether intentionally or recklessly. Clause 13 introduces an offence of foreign interference, but only for conduct that involves an intention to have a negative impact on the UK, for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. We suggest that it be broadened to cover those who behave recklessly, even if an intention to aid a foreign adversary cannot be proven.
Secondly, the failure radically to reform the Official Secrets Act 1989 leaves in place a requirement to demonstrate that actual harm has been caused by a civil servant or someone outside Government service when publishing classified information. However, the act of disclosing and specifying what harm has been done will often compound the problem and increase the damage; some prosecutions thus have to be dropped in order to prevent such further harm. Although the Law Commission has offered recommendations to cater for disclosures made genuinely in the public interest, those recommendations cannot even be considered other than in the context of the repeal, replacement or at least root-and-branch reform of the 1989 Act.
The Minister for Security and Borders (Damian Hinds)
National security is the first and foremost responsibility of any Government, and for that reason I warmly welcome the thorough, insightful and eloquent fashion in which colleagues on both sides of the House have made their contributions this evening. I join the Home Secretary, Opposition Front Benchers and colleagues from right across the House in putting on the record at the start of my remarks my admiration for our security services and for law enforcement, particularly at the end of this most marvellous jubilee celebration.
The threat of hostile activity from foreign states is persistent, but it is not consistent. As a result of technological change and the greater interconnectivity of the world, among other factors, that threat manifests in ways more diverse and often more sophisticated than ever. We must therefore equip our world-class law enforcement and intelligence agencies with modern tools and powers commensurate to that challenge, and this Bill enables us to do exactly that. This is not just about the here and now. The Bill is designed to be future-proof, so that we can harden our resilience against these threats today and for years to come. We have a responsibility to ensure that our systems and laws are agile, effective and robust, and that is what this legislation is about.
The bulk of the Bill is about countering state threats, and a critical aspect of parts 1 and 2 is the link between the activity covered and the foreign state. That is vital in ensuring that the provisions in the Bill are appropriately constrained to state threats and do not capture legitimate activity or non-state criminality, as has been mentioned a number of times during the debate. The foreign power condition could be met in two scenarios: first, where an activity is carried out that a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, is for or on behalf of a foreign power, and that includes a wide range of different types of relationship, including activity at the request or direction of a foreign state; and secondly, where an activity is carried out with the intention to benefit a foreign power, and that includes cases where a person’s primary motivation may be, for example, financial, but where there can be virtually certain knowledge that a foreign power will benefit.
Three new offences in the Bill will combat the modern threat from state-linked espionage and related harmful conduct. Those are a new protection of trade secrets offence, which might otherwise be known as economic espionage; a new assisting a foreign intelligence service offence; and an offence of obtaining, or disclosure of, protected information where it is for, or on behalf of, a foreign power and where the individual ought reasonably to have known that their conduct was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom.
Let me turn to the points made by colleagues in the debate. I will try to get through as many of them as possible, but I will concentrate particularly on the themes that came up a number of times. Let me start with something that is not in the Bill—I will have to beg your indulgence, Mr Deputy Speaker—although I would say that it is in scope for the debate because it came up so many times, and that is the Official Secrets Act 1989. Colleagues will have heard the Home Secretary say earlier that we continue to look at the 1989 Act, acknowledging the difficult aspects therein. We wanted to prioritise and press ahead with the wider package of measures before us to tackle state threats and to be able to do so now.
I also want to talk specifically about the public interest defence, which was raised eloquently by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and others, but before I do I just want to clarify how all these different things fit together. We talk about whether we are or are not reforming the Official Secrets Act, but of course there are four Official Secrets Acts, and we are reforming the Official Secrets Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1939—we are not, in this Bill, reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989. The Law Commission’s recommendations on a public interest defence came in the context of discussing overall reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and they have to be seen in that context.
It is important to note that using the term “public interest defence” does not of itself mean that, on balance, something is in the public interest. I suggest to the House that the existence of any public interest defence would without doubt lead to more unauthorised disclosures. It is impossible for an individual at that moment to have the full picture of what harm could come from their disclosure. That point can be exploited by people who have malicious intent.
Several hon. Members rose—
Damian Hinds
My word, what choice! I will give way to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland).
Sir Robert Buckland
I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend. He is right to caution against the danger here, but a carefully calibrated reverse burden defence deals with the mischiefs that he rightly outlines. None of us wants to see Julian Assange and his type carry sway here; we just think that we need to do something before it is done to us. That is the point.
Damian Hinds
I hear what my right hon. and learned Friend says, and I fully acknowledge not only his legal expertise overall, but specifically how much thought he has put into this subject and how he has written upon it.
Stewart Hosie
Will the Minister accept then—this point was made in the debate—that having the independent statutory commissioner receive information, so avoiding it being put into the public domain, is as important a part of the package as the public interest defence itself?
Damian Hinds
I give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes).
Sir John Hayes
I am grateful to the Minister. I hear what the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) says. It is a compelling case, although I do not agree with it. The Official Secrets Act 1989 deals with the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information by civil servants; giving information to journalists; a WikiLeaks-type disclosure dressed up as being by a guardian of liberty or some such other nonsense. This Bill does not deal with that unless those people are working directly for a foreign power. They might not be working directly for a foreign power, but they might be aiding a foreign power or acting indirectly for such a foreign power, and surely that needs to be included in the Bill.
Damian Hinds
I will come back to my right hon. Friend’s point in a moment. To the point that the right hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) made, our position is that a public interest defence is just not the safest and best way for people to make disclosures, for some of the reasons I gave a moment ago.
Damian Hinds
If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will not.
The existence of a public interest defence could mean that damage from the original disclosure could be compounded by further disclosures that had to be made to argue against and defeat that use of the public interest defence. That could itself then in turn be misused and mean that in some circumstances, even where there were egregious breaches of the law, in effect they could not be prosecuted. That is why, to respond to the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, it is important that we look at the safe and proper channels and methods for making disclosures, where that is important, and there are times when it is. We are looking carefully at that.
To come back to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings—this is an important point in general—the defences in part 1 of the Bill provide law enforcement with several options for prosecuting disclosures where the person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power or where the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service. That can include bulk disclosures. To be clear, with this Bill, the maximum sentence for an indiscriminate disclosure—a bulk data dump—will be higher than it is today if that act is done for a foreign power or the disclosure would materially assist a foreign intelligence service, even if not procured by that foreign intelligence service itself.
Damian Hinds
Prosecuting authorities have to make judgments. The Bill is specifically about national security, but within that it is about countering state threats. It gives us a whole new set of tools and weapons to add to our arsenal, and, notwithstanding the right hon. Gentleman’s body language, I think that that is much to be welcomed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker) asked a specific question about police stations. Because of the new arrest power in the Bill that can last up to 14 days, the Secretary of State may be required to designate specialist sites to meet the operational need, but I want to reassure my hon. Friend that this has nothing to do with extraordinary rendition. The provision mirrors those in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Acts to ensure that appropriate facilities are available. However, it is not possible to designate such a place outside the United Kingdom. The Government are clear about the fact that torture, mistreatment and arbitrary detention are contrary to human rights law.
Mr Steve Baker
Will my right hon. Friend give way? I did ask another question on this point.
Mr Baker
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. The other question was, where are these sites, and why are they necessary? What is the standard of the places in which people are being detained? I could name some forts and other secure places owned by the Army. Is that what we are talking about, and if so, why?
Damian Hinds
I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.
A number of Members on both sides of the House have referred to the so-called STPIMs. These are a tool of last resort to prevent, restrict and disrupt an individual’s involvement in state threats activity. In the most serious cases, that could include restricting where an individual can reside, whom they can associate with, and where they can work and study. An STPIM will be used when intelligence exists to confirm that highly damaging threat activity is planned or being undertaken but prosecution is not realistic. As my hon. Friend said, with such measures it is extremely important to have the appropriate safeguards.
I want to reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) that STPIMs will not be imposed through ministerial decision making alone. There will be a process through the courts. A decision by the Secretary of State to impose an STPIM, once they are satisfied that the five conditions set out have been met, will be referred to a judge, and the court’s permission will be sought before an order can be made. The court is specifically tasked with checking that the ministerial decision is not flawed.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and others spoke about civil legal aid for terrorists. Through the Bill, we will take action to restrict access to civil legal aid in England and Wales for individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism-connected offences since 2001. However, I can assure my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) and others who have spoken about this that the restriction of access of civil legal aid applies only to offences involving a sentence of more than two years. In any event, all individuals subject to the restriction can apply for exceptional case funding, and applications will be assessed according to the legislative framework of whether an individual’s human rights may be breached without legal aid. The type of terrorism offence that had been committed would not have bearing on the exceptional case funding decision.
I need to spend a couple of minutes going through the amendments to the Serious Crime Act 2007, an important subject that a number of colleagues have brought up, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe. The context, of course, is that our intelligence and security services and armed forces do and must work in close partnership with international partners to maximise UK capabilities and their ability to protect national security on our behalf. A key part of that is sharing intelligence and data to support joint objectives.
However, it is possible that such intelligence, when shared in good faith and in accordance with all domestic and international law, could still be capable of contributing, even in a very small or indirect way that was not intended at the time it was shared, to an international partner’s engaging in activity that the UK would not support. The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates an offence where an act is done that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting…an offence”.
That means that in this scenario there is a risk of individuals facing criminal liability, even when they have operated in good faith and in accordance with the guidance and proper authorisation.
Put simply, the Government believe it is not fair to expect the liability for that unforeseen eventuality to sit with an individual officer of our intelligence services or member of the armed forces who is acting with wholly legitimate intentions. Instead, the liability should sit with the UK intelligence community and the military at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight. The amendment at clause 23 therefore removes that liability for individuals, but specifically only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces. It does not remove liability at an institutional level for any activity.
Sir Jeremy Wright
As my right hon. Friend knows, I think there is no dispute across the House that some protection should be available for individuals in those circumstances. The question we have been asking is how different what clause 23 provides for is from what already exists in law. Clause 23 will ask for consideration to be given of whether there has been a proper exercise of a function. That must logically, therefore, relate to the behaviour of an individual, must it not?
Damian Hinds
My right hon. and learned Friend anticipates my next point to some extent. In instances where an individual has operated in good faith in compliance with domestic and international law and all proper process, they would then not face the risk of liability under the 2007 Act for something they could not have foreseen. In effect, we are adding greater certainty and specificity to an existing defence—the reasonable defence contained within that Act—by detailing scenarios where the offence will not apply, whereas the current defence is untested and imprecise.
The amendment means that, where an individual is working properly on behalf of our intelligence and security services and armed forces with an international partner to protect national security, they do not personally risk criminal liability if their work is later found to have been capable of contributing to unlawful activity in a way they would not have intended. That risk should remain with the Government, the services and the armed forces at corporate level, and that is what this amendment seeks to ensure.
A number of colleagues have raised the question of disinformation. They are correct that information operations are now a firm feature in the set of devices available to hostile states. There is direct disinformation, where talking points are put out on those states, on foreign affairs or on our domestic politics and society, but there is also the terrible technique of indirect disinformation, which is not necessarily intended to make anybody believe a particular line or narrative, but is simply aimed at causing division and discord in our country, to undermine our democracy and the cohesion of our society.
This Bill deals with people who carry out disinformation for a foreign state, but I want to be clear that legislation on the material itself belongs in the Online Safety Bill. We are looking at how to amend that Bill to account for disinformation material where that disinformation amounts to foreign interference, so that it can be treated as illegal material.
Liam Byrne
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and appreciate the way in which he is stepping through these points. Is an offence created by the provider of a social media platform if it enables someone to spread harmful messages? Does it count as a proxy, in effect?
Damian Hinds
The right hon. Gentleman tempts me to open up a very wide debate, somewhat outside the scope of Second Reading. He is absolutely right to identify the significance of disinformation and wider information operations as undertaken by foreign states and the obvious role of social media in that. The American election of 2016 remains the textbook example—there are plenty of others around the world. What I have set out is the way in which the Bill deals with people doing that on behalf of foreign states. As for platforms’ responsibility for what they do with the material and the steps that they must take—he will know about the principles in the Online Safety Bill not only to remove material but to minimise its presence in the first place—that is rightly subject matter for the Online Safety Bill.
Finally, on the foreign influence registration scheme—this has been raised by many colleagues across the House, including my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely), the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and others—as the Home Secretary indicated when opening the debate, we are committed to introducing a foreign influence registration scheme through a Government amendment. It is important that we take time to ensure that such a scheme is effective and proportionate in the way in which it counters state-threat activity and protects UK interests. That was a clear message in the public consultation, and we continue to review requirements in the light of Russian attempts to undermine western and European state stability.
If I may say so, my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight illustrated rather well the great complexities of trying to deal with this subject. I absolutely commit to communicating with the Opposition parties and the Intelligence and Security Committee as we introduce this measure. We want to do it as soon as possible, and we absolutely recognise the importance of scrutiny in both Houses. However, I want to make it clear that we cannot commit to doing that for the beginning of the Committee stage; but we want to do it as soon as possible thereafter.
Dr Julian Lewis
The Minister will recall that when I asked for a commitment from the Home Secretary about a Committee of the whole House, she indicated that he might be able to give that commitment when responding to the debate. Will it be a Committee of the whole House?
Damian Hinds
I hear the request from my right hon. Friend. That is a question partly for the business managers and the usual channels, who have heard the request and have to balance it against all the other things that they need to balance for the operation of the House. Overall, I can assure him that I have heard colleagues—him and others—on the importance of having time for scrutiny.
Dr Lewis
We have nearly half an hour. I do not know why this Minister is making such a fuss about the urgency to conclude a debate that is scheduled to run until 10 o’clock if necessary.
For some very unclear reason, the Government decided to introduce what should be a major plank of the legislation not at the beginning, so that we could include a proper debate on Second Reading, but through an amendment, when the process was under way. All we want to know is that the whole House can debate properly something that we have not yet seen, so there must be a Committee of the whole House, otherwise we will have only the meagre opportunity offered by Report. He should not be blasé in dismissing that suggestion.
Damian Hinds
I do not think that I have been blasé in the slightest. I have spent my winding-up remarks trying to cover as fully as I can the various themes—[Interruption.] I have taken quite a few interventions, including, I think, from the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), which was important. The decision about the timetabling of debates on the Floor of the House is not mine fully to make. In terms of this debate, I am not trying to rush things at all. Normally, Ministers would take the same amount of time, broadly speaking, as Opposition Front Benchers, and I am simply trying to follow those conventions.
Dr Lewis
One last time: the Minister has taken a lot of interventions about the matters that are in the Bill, but there is a whole tranche that is not in the Bill that will be introduced in an amendment, and he has only briefly touched on that. That is inevitable, because it is not in the Bill. When that tranches comes into the Bill, the whole House should have an opportunity properly to debate it.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. As I have said, I have heard those points, as, I am sure, have the business managers.
In closing, I want to repeat my earlier thanks to everybody for their insightful and eloquent contributions to this debate. I thank the Opposition and the Scottish National party for the spirit and the attitude with which they have taken part in this debate. I look forward to further debate and scrutiny from them and from colleagues across the House as we go through Committee. These are issues of the very greatest importance for our country and for the Government. The stakes are high. It is about protecting our security and our prosperity. It is about preserving our democracy and our way of life. It is about keeping our citizens safe. This Bill will enable us to achieve those most critical of aims and I commend it to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
National Security Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the National Security Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 13 September 2022.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
National Security Bill (Money)
Queen’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the National Security Bill, it is expedient to authorise:
(1) the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:
(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by a Minister of the Crown; and
(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided; and
(2) the payment of sums into the Consolidated Fund.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
Thursday 7th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2022 - (7 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Holly Lynch
Q
Jonathan Hall: What I have been told is that polygraphs have not been used for TPIMs, as far as I am aware, but they have been used for released terrorist offenders and some disclosures have been made. Everyone always thought that the real utility of polygraphs and the clear reason for their use is the disclosures that people make when undergoing the process. I gather that some admissions have been made that have been valuable and have led to a recall. I do not have a huge amount of data, but they seem to have had some success in the context of terrorism offences.
Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)
Q
Jonathan Hall: I cannot remember the total number of TPIMs. I think it is around 30, but I may be misremembering and that may also include—
Damian Hinds
That is over a number of years, of course.
Jonathan Hall: Yes. The maximum I remember in any year is up to six; at the moment it is down to about two. The authorities ran quite a successful campaign, using TPIMs against members or former members of al-Muhajiroun. Those have tended to drop off, and we are now looking at a very small clutch—I think it is only two now.
Damian Hinds
Q
Jonathan Hall: First of all, where there is good intelligence that an individual is up to no good but it is impossible to prosecute them. There may be secret sources of intelligence—information coming from allies or from electronic means that could not be disclosed—that mean that the agencies know perfectly well that someone is a real risk. Having had the opportunity to read the intelligence, I know that there certainly are cases where people are very dangerous and are engaging in attack planning but could not be prosecuted. These measures allow a huge amount of control.
One of the key measures for the really serious people is moving them from their home location. They find it much harder to operate if they are outside their home location: they do not have the people around that they know, and they find it a more hostile operating environment. There will also be some people whose threat really comes from the propagation of terrorist propaganda, so the measure might be directed towards their use of electronic devices and the internet.
Damian Hinds
Q
Jonathan Hall: Up to a point. I have expressed my disappointment that because legal aid is not now available as of right for all TPIM subjects, there is a cohort of TPIM subjects who are not getting court reviews. In the absence of the court having the opportunity to test the proportionality, it is particularly important that the Home Office official who chairs the TPIM review group’s meetings is really testing, and I also feel that I have to play that sort of role myself. I have certainly seen cases in which it has been debatable whether the measures have been too strong, particularly in relation to electronic devices, and whether enough attention is being given to allowing people to live a useful life without presenting a threat to the wider public.
The Chair
I am going to move on to our next question now, from shadow Minister Jess Phillips.
Maria Eagle
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: Yes, I would agree with that.
Damian Hinds
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: From my experience, I would point to the consequences of the digitisation of every conceivable kind of information. That is proceeding apace. We have digital cities. Our infrastructure is now wholly dependent on IT.
In my recent book, I coined an acronym, CESSPIT—crime, espionage, sabotage and subversion perverting internet technology—and that perversion is going on as we speak. I will add one thought: I put “crime” in my acronym deliberately. If you take the activities of something like the North Korean Lazarus group, which was responsible for the WannaCry ransomware attack on our national health service, it is operating in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for the North Korean nuclear programme and North Korean intelligence activity. In March, the group took more than $0.5 billion-worth of Ethereum currency from an exchange. This is large-scale larceny on behalf of a state.
My hope is that the powers in the Bill will help the police and agencies to deal with state-based criminal activity. I know that there are aggravated offences powers as well, which will help the police.
Damian Hinds
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: If you recall the statement made almost exactly two years ago in the House by Dominic Raab, he said that the Government had concluded that it was “almost certain” that “Russian actors” had “sought to interfere” in our election in 2019; and we had the evidence from the American elections and the French presidential election in 2017. All the techniques were deployed. I do not know whether any members of the Committee have been watching the TV series showing on Channel 4, which is as good a primer as any on how such techniques can be used to pervert our political discourse as well as actually harm individuals. This is the world we are in, these are the harms we face and I think that this Bill is a good start in helping the agencies to address some of those harms.
Sir Alex Younger: On this issue, you are right to focus on the possibility of interference in our democratic process and the potential unintended consequences of what we are talking about here. Of course, one person’s interference is another person’s legitimate intervention. Perish the thought that it should be the Government’s responsibility to say what is true and what is not. That is the difference between us and our opponents.
I can understand the scale of the problem; I have seen it. I had a long chat with the Government about this, and the thing that convinced me that this was an appropriate response was, first, the foreign powers condition—to be clear, that is about people acting on behalf of a foreign power—and, secondly, essentially the use of deception to achieve your aim. It seems to me that if someone is working on behalf of a foreign power, using deception, to distort our political process, we have a pretty clear basis for taking action. That, I think, is as it should be.
Sally-Ann Hart
Q
“A person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct…will have”
a negative “effect” on the UK for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. In other areas of law, in particular the criminal law, we have intent and recklessness. Do you think that clause 13 should be expanded to include recklessness?
Professor Sir David Omand: I looked at clause 24, “The foreign power condition”, and there is quite a lot of scope in it for a successful prosecution to demonstrate that the individual who as, as you say, acted recklessly, could reasonably have been expected to know that their act would benefit a foreign power, for example, so I was not so concerned about that particular question.
Damian Hinds
Q
Professor Sir David Omand: I recommend the use of the OECD’s triplet of “misinformation”, which is wrong, but innocently so, and should be corrected; “disinformation”, which is deliberately and maliciously wrong; and “malinformation”, which is information that is true but was never intended to enter the public domain, such as the personal emails of Members of Parliament.
Sir Alex Younger: Please hold that thought, because I spent years trying to work out whose side Vladimir Putin was on, as he was propagating all sorts of contradictory causes, and then I just realised that he wants an argument—he wants distrust and discord. I have not been to the OECD on the subject, but I entirely support that.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of the time allocated for this session. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our very distinguished witnesses for your time today.
Examination of Witness
Paddy McGuiness gave evidence.
Thursday 7th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 7 July 2022 - (7 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Holly Lynch
Q
Sam Armstrong: The problem is that it is so broad, in that there are problems even in this building. The security services will tell you privately that—far beyond Christine Lee, who obviously was named—there are agents of the Chinese state here who are known to the security services and in whom they have taken an active interest.
There are huge problems in academia; China has made no secret of its interest in academia. When the Zhenhua database leak happened a couple of years ago—this was a database that China was using to identify potential targets of intelligence activity—it was no surprise that they had targeted think-tanks and academics very carefully.
The third and final area that China is very, very interested in is anything related to technology, and to the areas that it would like to obtain and that it set out in its “Made in China 2025” programme. Those areas are twofold. The first is universities and open research. There are researchers in the UK right now who are, frankly, working with branches of the Chinese navy to come up with devices to track nuclear submarines around the world. That is as dangerous as it comes to our national security, and that work is going on in the open. I am also aware of British companies that are making engines—or casings for engines in this case—that they have admitted are good for nothing other than for engines in tanks. There are grievous concerns about the whole level.
Where do you start first? Well, that is a choice between those that are dangerously undermining our national security and tech, and those that are dangerously undermining our democracy in accessing this building and in terms of the influence and space in which they are influencing our democratic process.
Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)
Q
Carl Miller: One suggestion that I was going to make today was that we have nothing like a comprehensive picture. This is often extremely sporadic project-based research, and it is usually platform-specific, even though we know that, in all likelihood, that is not how the campaigns work—they will work across tonnes of platforms all at once. We will see only certain kinds of campaigns. We are broadly better at seeing broad-based campaigns addressing quite large slices of a population, but again, if we were to put ourselves in the mind of an influence operator, there would be much more targeted campaigns directed towards—if you will—higher-value targets as well.
What we know about scale is that many more countries than those we talk about are doing it. I understand that in the last Indian election, accounts attributable to every single mainstream political party were taken down by Facebook during that campaign. It has emerged as an almost mainstream campaigning tactic.
Damian Hinds
Q
Carl Miller: Yes. One of the reasons that I am hesitating is that, for researchers like me, clear and guaranteed attribution—outside the platforms—is unbelievably difficult, and I do not want to overstate. I can tell you that there are dozens upon dozens upon dozens of incidences, scenarios and narratives that we regard—reading the tea leaves of machine-learning patterns as we do—as suspicious. With the open data that is available to me, I cannot definitively link that back to a state. However, Twitter and Facebook, for example, have both disclosed dozens of campaigns that were—at least in part—likely targeting the UK, and linked them back to what they believe to be state actors.
Damian Hinds
Q
Carl Miller: No, there is not. In fact, I am sure it does, and that is one of the big trends we are seeing. We ran an effort over COP26, and we saw that there were certainly various kinds of organised attempts to manipulate big global thematic conversations about climate action, for instance. Given the barriers of entry into this world, I also do not think that it will be national elections; it might be quite small and local events that see some level of manipulation happening, too.
I will also point out one reality about how these work. One of the difficulties in seeing how the Bill—I am sorry if I have misunderstood this—might apply is its requirement that the actors involved have to be conscious that they are working on behalf of a foreign power.
Quite often, my suspicion is that you would have a state agency with various kinds of links with online actors, and there might be a whole chain, from a PR company to another more specialist digital consultant to a much spammier consultant, and that person might be the person reaching in and actually gathering together various kinds of functionalities, capabilities or services to do overtly illegitimate and malign forms of manipulation online. It might be very difficult; they might never know that a state is at the other end of the trail. With the companies that I mention—the ones selling large amounts of digital manipulation—I cannot believe that they do any kind of “know your customer” activity. I do not think that they have any idea who is employing them.
Damian Hinds
Q
Carl Miller: I cannot create a profile for how each state would approach information operations, to be honest. I do think that there is quite a high degree of heterogeneity among the actors involved. You have all kinds of different intelligence agencies, and military-based and political PR comms-based actors. One of the truisms is that it is a bit of a scattergun approach at the moment, where lots of things have been tried and they are attempting to evaluate them, and they do not really know which ones are succeeding and which are not. I am not quite sure if that is true or not.
The actual nitty-gritty of the techniques and technologies involved is probably the shadowiest part of this whole area. If the Bill were to be effective, something we need in parallel to it would be almost a digital influence version of the national risk register, where we have state support to pull apart and lay out where we think the genuine threats are and the genuine bodies of capability and technology that have been built to do this kind of stuff. It is very difficult for researchers in the open to do this by ourselves.
Damian Hinds
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes. China initially began—there is some really interesting stuff that has only happened in the UK in this space. We had a university that for a very long time rather openly advertised itself as providing services and specialist media training to officers of the Chinese propaganda Ministry, among others—various branches of the Chinese state—right here in London, metres away from the BBC. You also have the Confucius centre picture, which is important.
Where China has actually done very poorly is in its direct Government-to-Government disinformation. Some of the stuff that you saw around “Wolf Warrior” or that the Global Times—its state international newspaper—puts out is very ineffective. What China is incredibly effective at is not really that disinformation or misinformation public communications picture, but identifying individuals of influence within academia, business or wherever, and building up close relations with them. They are invariably people of influence, who in turn use their own networks to say, “Well, look, I’d be careful of all this talk about China. They are the biggest-growing economy on Earth, we really need to trade with them and we shouldn’t do anything to upset them at any point.” In so far as I have seen, that is where the Chinese influence picture has been focused.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Q
Sam Armstrong: Yes, there are two things. The first is the foreign influence transparency register system. I note that there has been a promise that it is to come, but the devil will be in the detail on that because there is a series of policy judgments that have to be made—whether it is expansive, where the teeth bite and so on. It is incredibly important that it is seen quickly.
Secondly, there should be an ability for the Secretary of State, either of the Home Office or the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to intervene in known problematic institutional relations. There are excellent powers here, such as the individual prevention and investigation measures, but there is very little capacity when that is done more corporately—to go in and say not just to universities but to companies, which would be an expansion of the Australian power, “This arrangement is not in the UK’s interest, and we are ordering you to terminate it.” To say that is a glaring omission is perhaps overstating it, but those are the two powers I would really like to see.
Damian Hinds
Q
Louise Edwards: The intelligence community have not notified us of any successful attempts to interfere in UK elections. As I mentioned, the Electoral Commission is not a national security body—we do not have intelligence functions—so when it comes those matters, we receive the information rather than creating it or analysing exactly what it means.
Damian Hinds
Q
Louise Edwards: That is my understanding of what the intelligence community mean when they tell us that, yes.
Damian Hinds
Q
We talk in other contexts about regulating political advertising—meaning adverts placed by political parties that are registered under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000—but in reality, political parties’ advertising is a very small fraction of the total online influencing that goes on in the run-up to elections. What is your expert assessment of how the whole political arena is changing? How do our institutions and our legislative approach need to change to keep up?
Louise Edwards: That is a very interesting question—how long do I have? The political finance side of the regime—I will unpack what I mean by that in a moment—is very much focused on the concept of regular and routine transparency that is enhanced significantly around an electoral event—an election, essentially.
When we talk about the political finance regime, we are talking about a defined set of actors: registered political parties, third-party campaigners, candidates or other members of political parties, and those who have specific responsibilities under law, including regular donation-reporting obligations. For example, political parties have to tell us about their substantial donations on a quarterly basis, and we then publish all that information.
When it comes to elections, as I am sure you know, there is a period in the run-up to elections called the regulated period. Any spending on campaigning that happens during that period—obviously, it gets more intense the closer you get to polling day—also has to be reported to us and gets published so that people can see it.
However, you are right that that is only one side of the nature of influencing or of the wider concept of political campaigning in the UK. There are some really interesting questions there around whether it is sustainable to look only at detailed spending in the run-up to an election, when you might well argue that political campaigning these days is year-round rather than in the run-up to particular polls.
There is also another side to it: how do you define regulated political campaigning and the spending that has to be reported? Back in 2018, we did some work with voters looking at what they thought about online campaigning specifically. One thing we found was that quite often voters did not realise that something they saw online was actually trying to influence their vote, because it was not immediately obvious on the face of the piece of literature that that was what was happening.
In terms of how things might change or develop in the future, there was a bit of thinking done about this in the Elections Act 2022, which introduced what we call “digital imprints”. They are a little bit of text that goes on a message online and says, “This was produced by this person, on behalf of this person, paid for by this person,” so you can see that it is a political advertisement. It is that level of detail and transparency that now needs to be applied.
Damian Hinds
Q
Louise Edwards: It applies to anybody who is putting out regulated political material, so it would be political parties, third-party campaigners and candidates. The regime is fairly comprehensive, although not entirely comprehensive. I realise I am going slightly outside the scope of this Bill, but there is opportunity to make it more comprehensive and to really make it clear to voters every time they see a little bit of campaign material online who is paying for it. So it is those established actors who are—
Damian Hinds
Q
Louise Edwards: Yes.
Maria Eagle
Q
Louise Edwards: You have hit upon one of the hardest issues here. Broadly speaking, people who are within the regime already—the established actors we have been talking about—comply with the law. Many of them, in fact, already put digital imprints on their online material, even though it is not yet a legal requirement to do so. The challenge is those who are perhaps based overseas or who do not want to play by the rules, basically. There are real enforcement challenges there, particularly when you are thinking about organisations or individuals based overseas.
If I go back to the recent Elections Act, one of the provisions that the Government brought in at that point was to lower the spending threshold in elections for people who are based overseas to £700: if you are an overseas entity, you can spend up to £700 campaigning in our elections, then that is it—that is your spending threshold. The problem is that, from our point of view, that can only really be symbolic, because it is virtually impossible to enforce spending at that low level. Even if we were to identify an overseas organisation spending in UK elections, they are overseas, so we have no enforcement powers that we can use to try to stop them.
I am painting a fairly awful picture, but there are some ways to tackle it from a slightly different perspective. For example, we have recently started launching a campaign before elections that is helping voters to look at online material with perhaps a more critical eye, to try to assess whether they should let it affect their vote and to give them a place to find out how to express concerns about that material, with the hope then being that we can perhaps raise confidence in legitimate digital campaigning while at the same time giving people an outlet if they see something they think is illegitimate. There is also a fair amount of work that you could do around political literacy at a very young age with voters, to help them to have that kind of critical perspective.
You mentioned the registration schemes. As a civil political finance regulator, our remit does not extend to matters of lobbying and influence, but one thing I would say, if I may, is that when it comes to the integrity of our democracy and voter confidence in it, transparency is key. Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.
Damian Hinds
Q
Professor Ciaran Martin: Why is so-called data sovereignty such an issue? There are all sorts of reasons in economics, but one of them is that the location of the storage of data is really important. Data centres are massive strategic assets and a vulnerability for any sort of country, and you can see that combined effort. Why did we have such a big debate about the role of Chinese technology in UK infrastructure? It is because of the potential—never mind 5G and so on, but rather in things like smart cities—for data to be siphoned off covertly and so forth. It is possible.
There are stats to show, if you had compromised the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and you went in there, how much you could photocopy versus how much you could steal electronically. There is now the possibility and, in some cases, the practice of comprehensive strategic compromise of huge, important datasets and sensitive strategic knowledge across all sorts of sectors by a combination of mostly digital but sometimes human-enhanced means. Until now, as you say, Mr Hinds, we have not really had a legislative framework for it. This Bill does provide a no doubt improvable such foundation.
The Chair
That brings us to the end of this section of questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness, Professor Ciaran Martin. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witnesses
Dr Nicholas Hoggard, Professor Penney Lewis and Rich Owen gave evidence.
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: Sadly, no. That was not within the scope of our project. It really exceeds the focus of our project on official Government data, so we did not make any recommendations in relation to those kinds of powers and we do not have a view.
Damian Hinds
Q
Rich Owen: We think the solicitors’ profession should be subjected to the scheme in just the same way as any other, although we would like an exception on grounds of legal professional privilege. This is an ancient common-law right going back 400 years or more. It is also regarded as a human right and as a corollary of everyone’s right to receive legal advice and assistance and we feel it plays a crucial role in the proper administration of justice.
To be clear on what we mean by legal professional privilege, it is communication between a client and lawyer whose dominant purpose is to seek legal advice, or a communication between a client and lawyer in anticipation of pending or actual litigation. We therefore think that if there is a foreign influence registration scheme without legal professional privilege, then solicitors acting for foreign states or foreign state-related actors, such as companies controlled by or influenced by foreign states, would have to disclose documents. We think that profoundly compromises the rule of law and the fairness of trials, and will affect the relationship between client and lawyer.
I think it is easy to forget that legal professional privilege is not a privilege for solicitors or lawyers; it is for the client. Of course, clients want to be open with their lawyers when they are seeking advice, and we think this scheme would inhibit that openness. Of course, very often, the reason why they want to be open with their lawyers is that they want to know how to comply with the law, rather than breach it. That is why an exemption is needed in any such scheme.
Damian Hinds
Q
Rich Owen: It is important to know the limits to legal professional privilege. It cannot be used to further a crime—because of the so-called “crime-fraud exception” or the “iniquity exception”—so if a solicitor advances an assertion of legal professional privilege in bad faith, then they are not in a privileged situation and could potentially be charged with conspiring to pervert the course of justice.
Legal professional privilege would complement any scheme. The Home Office consultation on a possible scheme said it would respect the human rights framework. That privilege is an ancient common-law right. It is has also been recognised as a human right. The consultation also said that a scheme would not interfere with legitimate activities. It would be a legitimate activity to seek advice from your lawyer and not have that advice disclosed. If anyone was furthering that for espionage purposes, then that would not be a privileged situation; they would be acting outwith legal professional privilege.
Damian Hinds
Q
Rich Owen: Yes. Well, we are looking for something similar to the Australian scheme. The Australian legislation specifically exempts legal professional privilege, as well as seeking legal advice and assistance. That sort of model, which expressly exempts legal professional privilege, would be a suitable way forward for the scheme.
Sally-Ann Hart
Q
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: You can, although I am afraid I will have to be very boring. Speaking with my Law Commission hat on, we are limited in what we can say with respect to those things that did not form part of the scope, regarding the protection of Government data. I am very sorry; I do not mean to be deliberately unhelpful, but we do not really—
Holly Lynch
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: I am sorry but I am going to be very boring again. The offence in clause 3 is not the implementation of one of our recommendations. It is one of the offences that was outside the scope of our project. The main espionage offences that are in the existing Official Secrets Act, which implement our recommendations, are in clauses 1 and 4 of the Bill.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: I will add to that without going outside our own remit, but thinking more broadly about the distinction between UK interests and Government interests. To re-emphasise a point that Penney made earlier, the essence of espionage offences lies in that purpose prejudicial. That is why we see in those offences that have the purpose prejudicial element—where your purpose is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—that the sentence is so much greater.
The mens rea—the fault element—of those criminal offences lies in that purpose prejudicial. You need not only your purpose but to have known, or ought to have known, that your purpose was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. Also, you must have known, or ought to have known, that you were acting to benefit a foreign power on behalf of a foreign power. Taken together, it is that essence that makes those offences substantively different from the sort of behaviours that might embarrass a Government—or a Government Minister. That sort of thing often falls for consideration within unauthorised disclosure offences, but it is not really the meat of an offence focused on the active interference with the proper safety or interests of a state.
Regularly throughout the project we met with a number of the UK intelligence community in Cobra with the Government security group. The evidence we heard of the nature of hostile state activity does not really have a bearing on the sort of material that sometimes gets disclosed that might embarrass Government Ministers. They are two quite different creatures.
Damian Hinds
Q
Professor Penney Lewis: Maybe I will start with the high level and then Nick can come in with a bit more detail. I should preface my answer with a slight caveat. This project started in 2015. Nick joined the Law Commission in February 2019 and I joined in January 2020, so while we were heavily involved in the final report, neither of us were involved in drafting the consultation paper or in the consultation period, which happened in 2017. None the less, we have read the consultation responses, and I can also talk slightly more generally about how we go about doing a consultation.
We were asked to take on this project. The way we work is that we undertake a pre-consultation investigative phase where we talk to stakeholders. That involved Government stakeholders, including Government security stakeholders. We talked to a lot of academics who work in this field. We talked to the media, because obviously they were particularly interested in the 1989 Act, and various organisations that are interested in freedom of expression and open government. We then drafted a consultation paper, which contained provisional proposals for reform. We put those out to public consultation. We had a three-month consultation period, and we had a number of consultation events during that. At the same time, we are continuing to talk to Government security colleagues, as Nick mentioned.
We eventually came to an agreement with Government security colleagues about how they would brief us about the details of the threat facing us without us then being in a position where we would have to say in our report, “Well, we have heard all this secret evidence. We can’t tell you what it is, but trust us that these are the recommendations we think will safeguard the security and interests of the UK”, and without also putting the security and interests of the UK at risk. We agreed a confidential briefing process that involved Nick and me. We then also agreed the disclosure by Government of hypothetical examples that they had drafted to represent the real threats that they told us about confidentially and securely.
Throughout the report, there are hypothetical vignettes that illustrate particular risks. Those are the Government and intelligence services’ creatures, but they were the way in which we were able to reflect the reality of the threat. We then considered the consultation responses and the information we had had from the Government security group. We actually changed a number of things we had said in our consultation paper, so in between the provisional proposals and the recommendations there are a number of significant differences, particularly in relation to the 1989 Act. We then published a report in 2020, which contained our final recommendations for reform.
Dr Nicholas Hoggard: I will go into some specifics of what we learned, which is generously open-ended. What Penney says is correct; there were a number of changes that followed the consultation paper, come the final report. One of the major reasons for that was our engagement more substantively with confidential material and representatives from the UK intelligence community—UKIC—and across a number of Departments. It became increasingly clear to us that the scale of the threat was of an order of magnitude that, even in relatively recent integrated reviews, had not really been reflected. That scale really comes from the cyber-threat. I do not want to repeat what far more sophisticated witnesses said earlier in respect of that, but it also became increasingly clear to us that the way in which very capable state actors were wielding that cyber-threat meant that certain of the original provisions we had made needed to be reconsidered.
One example of that would be the extraterritoriality provisions, both in relation to the espionage offences and the unauthorised disclosure offences. The nature of the way in which cyber-information is held—of course, cyber-information now basically means all information—has changed. The existing offences under the 1911 Act and its ancillary Acts are now almost quaint in the way that they perceive espionage as something that happens on our territory. Of course, that is simply not the case anymore. These extraterritoriality provisions, though relatively unusual for criminal offences, are none the less vital if we are to capture the sort of behaviour that we see now. I think the process we went through in engaging with UKIC was actually vital for the understanding of, and background to, some of the recommendations that we made.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, can I thank our witnesses? We will now move to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Poppy Wood gave evidence.
Holly Lynch
Q
Poppy Wood: That is a brilliant idea. It goes back to the point about grip. We are seeing really good work being done by the Home Department and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. I think the DCMS counter-disinformation unit is an important tool, but it is very small, as is DCMS, and it is lacking the transparency that such interventions require. It should probably be a body like the Intelligence and Security Committee—some kind of cross-party body, quasi-independent of Government, thinking about the issues, with input from expertise in the relevant services and relevant Departments. I know that the Home Department and DCMS work together closely on this, and I think the Cabinet Office also has a role to play. Instinctively, I feel that something like the ISC would be the best place for it, but I am sure that is to be worked out.
One of the issues with a lot of this stuff is the role of the Executive, and making sure that the body is that far removed from political interference.
Damian Hinds
Q
Poppy Wood: Absolutely. If you are suggesting that they respond to PR crises, I would agree with you on that one. Of course, this about brands. We have seen with revelations from Frances Haugen that Facebook is not understaffed but just not focusing them in the right direction on this stuff. There are only handfuls of people focusing on co-ordinated disinformation for the whole world within these big technology companies. It should be dozens, especially if they are hiring 10,000 engineers for the metaverse in Europe. They can put some of them on elections and tracking. They say that they go far, but they could go much further. When there is pressure on them, they respond, and so far that pressure has been PR because there has not been regulation.
Damian Hinds
Q
Poppy Wood: We do not know, because we have not got the transparency. They may seem to have got better, but as a percentage of what, we cannot know. They will say that it has got better and that they have caught this many thousand as opposed to that many thousand last time, and those accounts have been taken down, but we have no idea if it is a percentage of what. That is why people, such as Frances Haugen, who have come forward as whistleblowers to say, “They are telling you this, but the data says that,” show that we should not be relying on those people. I am sure we will come on to the whistleblowers, but there have to touchpoints much earlier on, from civil society, from Government, from researchers, to say “Hey, actually, the scale is much larger,” or, “You’re not even looking at this stuff.”
London is one of the most linguistically diverse cities in the world, and when we are talking about counter-terrorism speech, one of Frances’s revelations was that 75% of counter-terrorism speech was identified as AI—it is terrorism speech, so it is taken down. We are thinking about the UK as an English monolith, but there is plenty of linguistic diversity that puts us at risk when those platforms are weaponised in elections, focusing on diaspora and so on.
I would hope that the platforms have got better, and I would like to give them the benefit of the doubt, but the truth is that we just do not know.
Damian Hinds
Q
Poppy Wood: I would challenge the first assumption that you can see what you can see on Facebook. They still view that as private information. Researchers cannot get access to that unless they kind of beg, borrow and steal. I understand the question—
Damian Hinds
But you can see public postings on Facebook. That is my point.
Poppy Wood: On your page, you can, but researchers cannot.
Damian Hinds
But that is still more than you can see on WhatsApp, where you cannot see a post at all.
Poppy Wood: That’s true. I suppose I would say they could do much more about transparency just about the public posts—that is my first point. Secondly, on encryption, there are concerns about some of the amendments in the Online Safety Bill and what that really means for encryption. I know we are not here to talk about that Bill, but encryption is an important tool. We know that those spaces are misused, but we need to be really clear about some of the benefits that encryption offers to lots of people, particularly the security services, for sharing information safely. We need to be careful.
Damian Hinds
Q
Poppy Wood: Let me give you a good example on Russia Today. We do a lot of work and analysis around Russia and Ukraine. Obviously, Russia Today was taken down from most national broadcast networks. It has been resurrected multiple times on social media. This week, we saw it resurrected with another name, like “Discovery Dig” or something, on YouTube, where lots of the comments, imagery and language were directing people to Telegram channels where they are actively mobilising.
What we see in the active mobilisation on Telegram channels is the outing of national security agents, the putting up of email addresses of politicians and saying, “Target them and say they are on the wrong side of the debate,” or, “Write to this national newspaper.” In all three of those examples, it is predominantly in the UK. They are telling them it is all fabricated. They are absolutely weaponising those private spaces. As you say, it is quite hard to get into them—but actually, it is not that hard. They are pretty open channels, with thousands and millions of engagements and followers. That is the scarier bit. They are private, but you are getting tens of millions of people and engagements on them. I am not sure that is the true definition of private, but it is certainly in an encrypted space.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Q
Poppy Wood: The role of whistleblowers in society is really important. I know the Government understand that. There are some good recommendations from the ISC about whistleblowers that I do not think have been adopted in this version of the Bill. That is about at least giving some clarity to where the thresholds lie, and giving a disclosure offence and a public interest defence to whistleblowers so they can say, “These are the reasons why.” My understanding is that at the moment it sits with juries and it is on a case-by-case basis. I would certainly commend to you the recommendations from the ISC.
I would also say—this was a recommendation from the Law Commission and also, I think, from the ISC—that lots of people have to blow the whistle because they feel that they do not have anywhere else to go. There could be formal procedures—an independent person or body or office to go to when you are in intelligence agencies, or government in general or anywhere. One of the reasons why Frances Haugen came forward—she has been public about this—is that she did not really know where else to go. There were no placards saying, “Call the Information Commissioner in the UK if you have concerns about data.” People do not know where to go.
Getting touchpoints earlier down the chain so that people do not respond in desperation in the way we have seen in the past would be a good recommendation to take forward. Whistleblowers play an important part in our society and in societies all round the world. Those tests on a public interest defence would give some clarity, which would be really welcome. Building a system around them—I know the US intelligence services do that; they have a kind of whistleblower programme within the CIA and the Department of Defence that allows people to go to someone, somewhere, earlier on, to raise concerns—is the sort of thing you might be looking at. I think a whistleblower programme is an ISC recommendation, but it is certainly a Law Commission recommendation.
Tuesday 12th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 July 2022 - (12 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Stuart C. McDonald
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I welcome the new Minister to his place and wish him all the best in his new role. I certainly foresee this experience as being thrown in at the deep end, but it is a Bill on which there is broad consensus, so I hope that it is not too much of a baptism of fire and that he enjoys it.
It is nice to be able to join colleagues. I was sorry to miss the evidence session last Thursday, as I was indisposed, but I have read the transcript, and the session seemed to prove incredibly useful. I therefore did not miss the usual experience I have at around this time of a Bill Committee, when I think, “If only I had been able to hear or read that evidence before drafting my amendments, they might have been slightly different.”
Let me reiterate our position: the vast majority of provisions in the Bill are welcome and probably long overdue. Clause 1, like clause 4, implements part of the Law Commission’s review recommendations. The clauses are broadly welcome and should stand part of the Bill. Our amendments to clause 1, like most of the handful of other amendments we have tabled, are simply designed to probe whether the offences are drawn tightly enough. The crimes that we are talking about are serious—the offence in clause 1 can lead to life imprisonment. I do not think that anybody on the Committee would say that that is not appropriate when a person steals or hacks protected security information at the behest of a foreign Government and puts the lives of UK citizens at risk.
The amendments are simply designed to ask whether the offence might catch conduct that it was not intended to catch, particularly behaviour that might embarrass the Government but is not in any genuine sense prejudicial to our safety. The shadow Minister put that question to the Law Commission witnesses last Thursday. Professor Lewis responded that such questions are probably legitimate in relation to the Official Secrets Act 1989 and leaks, but the offence is different in this case because of the requirement to be acting for a foreign power. She said succinctly:
I think we are in a slightly different realm here: the realm of espionage and not the realm of leaks.—[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 52, Q98.]
On the whole, I absolutely accept that point, and I fleetingly considered withdrawing some of the amendments, but there are questions about whether that distinction is 100% correct. There are legitimate concerns—they were raised on Second Reading and in the written briefings provided to MPs in advance of it—that the clause also catches behaviour that is more akin to a disclosure under the 1989 Act.
Article 19 and the Campaign For Freedom of Information argue that some of the broad concepts used in clause 1 combine in a way that puts civil society organisations and journalists at risk. I am grateful to those groups for their Second Reading briefings, which have largely prompted my remarks this morning. They point to several features of the clause that cause difficulty. First, it covers material that does not bear a security classification, and information is in scope even if it is not restricted but the person receiving it reasonably believes that it should have been.
Secondly, the concept of “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” is essentially determined by the Government of the day, so it is a policy of the state and, potentially, a broad concept. Thirdly, as well as not being confined to hostile states, the foreign power condition appears to be met simply by obtaining funding from a friendly Government who are pursuing perfectly reasonable aims.
That combination of factors gives rise to concerns for NGOs and journalists. I will give some hypothetical examples of each, which I have borrowed from Article 19. Let us say that an NGO in the UK has some general overseas funding from a friendly Government to campaign on climate change. The Government of the day decide that fracking or new coal are essential for UK interests—who knows where we might be in a few months’ time? The NGO is provided with leaked information undermining that policy—perhaps about the safety record of the company being lined up to operate the plan—and publishes it. Has the NGO involved committed a criminal offence? The way the clause is worded suggest that it might have.
The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) made the point that lots of excellent organisations receive funding from overseas foreign powers, as they are currently defined. In fact, a list would include ActionAid, Anti-Slavery International, Article 19, Client Earth, Global Witness, Index on Censorship, Media Defence, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Privacy International, Reprieve—from which we heard evidence last week—and Transparency International. The funders of those NGOs include organisations such as the Danish International Development Agency, IrishAid, New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the US State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, and the US State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons—there are many more in that vein. That is why we have concerns about the effect of clause 1 on NGOs.
In contrast, if a different NGO—one just across the road—had published that document online, it would not be committing an offence, not just because it does not receive any such foreign funding, but because the 1989 Act is more specifically about the subject matter or material that leads to an offence of disclosure—namely, it would have to relate to security and intelligence, defence, international relations and law enforcement. Environment or energy policy—or fracking, in my example—would not be covered. The punishment under the 1989 Act would be two years’ imprisonment, not life, so there is real inconsistency between the disclosures caught by the Bill and those caught by that Act.
My second example relates to journalism. What happens if, rather than directly publishing the leak, the NGO passes it to a journalist who reports the leaked information as part of their story? If that journalist is employed by a UK news organisation, all is well, because the foreign power conditions are not met. However, if the journalist works for another Government state broadcaster—even a friendly one—the foreign power condition is adequately met. One reporter commits no offence at all; another reporter—who perhaps works for Danmarks Radio or any other state broadcaster—commits an offence that could mean life imprisonment.
Our amendments offer different ways of addressing that. Amendment 46 would reintroduce the test of damage. Interestingly, the Law Commission’s proposals for reform of the 1989 Act recognise that damage can sometimes act as a public interest test, and that it is a concept worth keeping in relation to offences that could be committed by journalists or citizens generally, even if the Law Commission was arguing for removing it in relation to other disclosure offences.
Our amendments would also clarify what interests are protected by that serious offence, and would match the clause up with what is protected by the 1989 Act. Amendment 48 mentions simply “critical” interests—meaning security, intelligence, defence, international relations and law and order.
There is another alternative that I will come to later, which relates to fixing the foreign power clause so that NGOs are not caught if they get funding from benign foreign powers for perfectly reasonable purposes. Those are different alternatives, and I would be interested to know whether the Government accept that those two scenarios are caught by the clause. If so, what is their response?
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray, and to be here in Committee. I will start with the clause and then deal with the amendments tabled by—let me see if I can get this right—the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.
Stephen McPartland
Thank you.
I will quickly respond to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. There are a variety of protections throughout the Bill. One is that someone has to be doing activity designed to benefit or help a foreign power in order to commit an offence. Secondly, most of the offences in part 1 of the Bill need sign-off from the Attorney General. Thirdly, the Crown Prosecution Service has to be satisfied that prosecuting is in the public interest. Those are three very large protections that exist throughout the Bill. As we go through the Bill clause by clause, we must always remember those three big principles.
I will start by referring to the recent case of the individual working in the British embassy in Berlin who was extradited and charged, and to the conviction of a Ministry of Defence contractor in 2020 under the existing espionage legislation, which indicate the threat that is posed by those looking to harm the United Kingdom by committing espionage. Clauses 1 to 3 create four separate but overlapping offences to ensure that the Bill proportionately covers the wide range of threats and harms that constitute espionage, without capturing legitimate activity. The clauses are supported by other provisions in the Bill, including the “prohibited places” provisions, by building on and modernising our existing tools in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939. The new provisions continue to criminalise harmful activity while reducing the risk of loopholes that can be exploited by sophisticated state actors. I will speak later to clauses 2 and 3, and to the “prohibited places” regime.
Before I get into the detail of the offence set out in clause 1, it is important to flag that, along with other offences in the Bill, it will apply only in circumstances where there is a clear link between the activity and a foreign power. This is provided for by the foreign power condition, which we will discuss in more detail later. In essence, a person’s conduct must be carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This responds to the recommendation, made by the Law Commission in its 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report, to move away from outdated concepts.
Stuart C. McDonald
The foreign power condition includes activities carried out with the financial or other assistance of a foreign power. The concern is that if an NGO gets regular funding for environmental or human rights work, it would be accidently caught by the foreign power condition. A journalist who works for a friendly state broadcaster would also be caught by the foreign power condition. We still think that such scenarios are a concern.
Stephen McPartland
As I said earlier, we have three huge protections. One is that activity must be for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is making, but there are another two layers on top of that protection. The first is that the Attorney General’s consent must be obtained. Secondly, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that prosecution would be in the public interest. Those are three very strong layers of protection that would help protect an NGO if it were to do something inadvertently.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
I welcome the Minister to his place. Having such protections in place is all very well, but the real issue is the chilling effect this could have in the kinds of circumstances that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has set out. It is not right, is it, for us to criminalise activity that we do not really want to criminalise, but then say, “Well, the Attorney General will sort it out later in each individual case.”? That is not really a very good way of legislating.
Stephen McPartland
We are not talking about legislating in that way. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, we are saying that there are three layers of protection. The first layer is that people would be deemed to be obtaining or disclosing protected information for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. The next layers would involve the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. Lady, as a lawyer, will be very well aware that the CPS always determines whether it feels it is in the public interest to prosecute. People will not be caught up by accident, and I think we are getting into theoretics by going further and further down that line.
Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
I am struck by the hypothetical example given by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and—
Ben Everitt
Okay, we will just go with Cumbernauld. The hypothetical example referred to a Government of the day diversifying their energy sources so that, potentially, they were less reliant on fuel and power from a possibly hostile foreign state. The Minister has detailed the extra layers of defence that will act in the public interest. Does he agree that in the hypothetical example cited we would want some protection from foreign interference in Government policy—a democratically elected Government of the UK?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend is correct. Three tests must be met for someone to be prosecuted: conducting harmful activity with regard to information that is protected effectively, knowingly prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and acting in a way that benefits a foreign power. Forgive me, but I do not believe that an NGO will accidentally fail all three of those tests.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
But it may, because subsection (1)(b) states that a person commits an offence if
“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial”.
An NGO might think that putting something into the public domain is in the public interest. They may not even take into account that that disclosure may damage UK security. For example, in this morning’s newspapers—
Stephen McPartland
That example demonstrates how important the Bill is, because it sets out that activities that are illegal will still be illegal if actors are acting in a particular manner. The Bill is trying to bring current provisions up to date to provide our intelligence services with the toolkits they need to keep our nation safe and secure. I believe that the three tests are strong enough to help provide those protections.
Mr Jones
I accept that, but just take this morning’s example cited on the BBC of the alleged illegal acts by the SAS. Someone has got the information, put it in the public domain and may feel that it is in the public interest for it to be scrutinised. Will that damage our interests? Yes, it will. The Government might think that that disclosure will help a foreign power or damage our interests—and I would argue that possibly it will—but that is not to question the judgment of the individuals who have decided that the allegation should be in the public domain.
Stephen McPartland
I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point, but I believe that we have three very strong tests that must be applied: the information must benefit a foreign power, the Attorney General must consider the case, and the CPS must decide that it is in the public interest to prosecute. Those three tests and protections run throughout the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Current events demonstrate that we never protect the Government from embarrassment!
Before I get into the detail of the offence itself, it is important to flag that, along with other offences in the Bill, it will apply only in circumstances where there is a clear link between the activity and a foreign power. That is provided for by the foreign power condition, which we will discuss in more detail later. It responds to recommendations in the Law Commission’s 2020 “Protection of Official Data” report about moving from outdated concepts such as “enemy”.
Clause 1 enhances our ability to tackle the threat of espionage by introducing a modern offence to capture those unlawfully obtaining, copying, recording, retaining, disclosing or providing access to protected information. Protected information is any information, document or other article that is or could reasonably be expected to be subject to a form of restriction of access in order to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom—for example, if the information is stored within a secure Government building or has a form of restricted classification. Protected information can cover a wide range of Government material, including information such as raw data, documents such as committee reports and other articles such as memory sticks.
Protected information includes, but is not limited to, classified material. That is important, given that serious harm can be caused by obtaining or disclosing seemingly non-sensitive information that, if used in a certain way by sophisticated state actors, could be capable of damaging the United Kingdom’s national security. However, I want to be clear that the definition will not cover truly benign items such as the lunch menu of the Home Office canteen.
Like the existing espionage provisions, and as recommended by the Law Commission, clause 1 will require that a
“person’s conduct is for a purpose…prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
The term
“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
has been interpreted in case law as meaning the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers, which includes national security. That enables the United Kingdom to respond to threats targeted against its wide range of interests.
Amendment 46 would require that a person’s conduct be instead for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is damaging to the safety or critical interests of the UK. That would create a higher evidential threshold to secure prosecution in an area that is often difficult to evidence due to the sensitive nature of the information that may have been obtained or disclosed. Put simply, we would have to explain why it caused damage, which may require evidence that compounds the damage. That would provide challenges to our law enforcement agencies and courts, and is likely to result in fewer prosecutions being pursued, offering further opportunities to those looking to harm our country through acts of espionage. The use of “prejudicial” mitigates some of that risk.
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the difference between those two words, but can he give us an example? The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East gave a theoretical example to illustrate why he tabled the amendments. Can the Minister give us an example of something that is prejudicial and not damaging?
Stephen McPartland
I will come on to that in a bit. I will provide an example shortly.
Stephen McPartland
You are very welcome. I would not want to get it wrong.
Amendments 47 and 48 would introduce and define the term “critical interests”. In the amendments, “critical interests” is defined to include security, intelligence, defence, international relations and law and order. Although I recognise that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East tabled the amendments to attempt to specify exactly what should fall under UK interests in order to add clarity, I must stress that it limits the scope and utility of the clause 1 offence and risks creating loopholes that could be exploited by those looking to harm the UK. There is also the risk that the offence would become quickly outdated as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve. Notably, the list does not include economic interests or interests relating to public health, to name just two areas that would be overlooked by such a definition. Those are areas that are targeted by hostile actors and should rightly be protected.
The safety or interests of the UK test is used not only in clause 1, but in several other offences throughout part 1 of the Bill, such as sabotage or entering a prohibited place with a purpose prejudicial to the UK. There is a risk that creating a notably different test under the clause 1 offence would confuse the legal interpretation of the tests under those other offences and may have a significant impact on their operational utility.
Finally, I reiterate that the test of a person conducting activity
“prejudicial to the safety or interests”
of the UK already exists and is understood in the courts. Just last week at an oral evidence session, the law commissioner invested considerable time and effort in reviewing this area of law, outlining their support of the Government’s decision to retain that term. They commented that the
“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act…and it avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 52, Q97.]
Moving away from the amendments, it should be noted that instead of using “enemy”, as in the espionage provisions, the offence in clause 1 includes a foreign power condition. That moves the offence away from labelling countries as enemies, which is less relevant in the 21st century.
The hon. Member for Garston and Halewood asked about the difference between prejudicial and damaging. The damage requirement would require the court to demonstrate harm and explain why it is damaging, whereas prejudice is broader and could include reducing future opportunities. That will also mitigate some of the risks associated, as I have said. It provides a wider test so that we can intervene at an earlier stage of a plot or something else that would affect our national security.
I turn to the extent of the provisions under the 1911 Act. An activity that takes place wholly outside the UK would be an offence only if it is committed overseas by a UK national or officer, such as a Crown servant. Technological developments in a more global world mean that it is now more likely that information that warrants protection to safeguard the safety or interests of the UK may be vulnerable to activity that takes place outside the UK by a wider range of actors—for example, a locally engaged security guard working in a UK embassy stealing papers, or the theft of information held there digitally via cyber means.
To keep pace with the modern threat, the extraterritorial jurisdiction for the offence has been expanded so that the offence can be committed anywhere in the world and by anyone, regardless of their nationality. The extraterritorial jurisdiction is a critical reform within the offence as a better defence for the United Kingdom against a modern espionage threat, whose global nature is not reflected in the current provisions in the espionage offence of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Another key difference from the existing offence is the increase in the maximum penalty available to life imprisonment. The emergence of modern vectors such as cyber means that espionage has the potential to cause a greater level of harm than was possible in 1911 when the United Kingdom’s espionage offences and penalties were first drafted. In the most serious cases, an act of obtaining or disclosing protected information can result in the loss of life or can gravely undermine the United Kingdom’s ability to defend itself from a range of threats. This demonstrates the United Kingdom’s resolve to make it more difficult and detrimental for hostile actors to undermine our country’s interests and safety by committing acts of espionage.
Although we will come to this in more detail later in Committee, I want to flag a key safeguard that applies to prosecutions to this and other serious offences in part 1. Given that state threat activity and the United Kingdom’s response can have a significant impact on the safety and interests of our country and wider international relations, the Attorney General’s consent, as I said earlier, must be obtained in the case of England and Wales before a prosecution is taken forward. In Northern Ireland, the consent of the Advocate General must be sought.
I stress the importance and need for reform of the espionage laws in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939. Recent and ongoing events make it clear that the threat from state threat activity, particularly acts of espionage, is of continuing concern and we must have robust protections in place. The introduction of the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information as a core part of the Bill provides measures to tackle the harmful espionage activity that the United Kingdom faces. That is why clause 1 is so vital. I encourage my fellow Committee members to support it and I ask that the hon. Member withdraw his amendment to it.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, it might be helpful if I clarify the order of debate that I normally expect to see. The person who has proposed an amendment moves it. By and large, anybody else then takes part in the debate, including the shadow Minister. The Minister replies to the debate and then the proposer gets a short whack at the end. On this occasion, I will call the shadow Minister, and then the Minister will have an opportunity to reply before the proposer rounds up.
Stephen McPartland
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady and I thank her for her kind words. She asked a number of questions, which I will do my utmost to answer.
Protected information is information, documents or other articles to which, for the purpose of protecting UK safety or interests, access is restricted, or it is reasonable to expect that access would be restricted. The hon. Lady’s example of taking a photograph inside the House of Commons would not be considered that. Throughout the Bill there are three tests. First, would the activity assist a foreign power? Secondly, would the Attorney General give consent? Thirdly, would the Crown Prosecution Service consider it to be in the public interest to prosecute? Taking a photograph inside the House of Commons or of something a bit more restricted than the Home Office lunch menu would not come under the provision.
The hon. Lady referred to the director general of MI5; this is about giving the Home Office, the intelligence services and the intelligence community the tools they need to tackle the wider threat. The British public trust the UK intelligence community to do the job and to have the powers. People often worry when other agencies get wider powers, but that is not what is happening in the Bill.
On being able to intervene at an earlier stage, the provisions in the Bill provide a toolkit to allow the intelligence community to intervene earlier in some matters in order to work with people to stop them progressing into specific acts that would break the law. It will help people who may be going down the wrong path, as well as helping the intelligence community to act at a much earlier stage.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in the debate and to the Minister for his response. As I say, I absolutely accept the case for a clause such as this one. However, the Minister’s explanation of the protections in place in respect of the two scenarios that I outlined falls a long way short of what I would regard as satisfactory.
I outlined three solutions or protections. One was the foreign power condition; I have explained already why both the NGO and the journalist in those scenarios would meet the foreign power condition, so that does not work. Thereafter, we are left with the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. That offers no protection at all. From the point of view of the rule of law, people need to know whether they have broken the law or are committing an offence that is punishable by life imprisonment. We cannot leave that journalist or NGO in that position by saying it all depends on what the Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service thinks.
I have no idea whether the Attorney General or the Crown Prosecution Service would regard that NGO and journalist as having committed an offence that they would want to prosecute. As Members have said, that leaves a big chilling effect on that NGO and journalist. They have no certainty that they will not be prosecuted for the activities they undertake. They open themselves up to the possibility of life imprisonment for what, on the face of it, has all the characteristics of a disclosure of information, which should be dealt with, if at all, under the Official Secrets Act 1989 rather than in this Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is a fair point. In the light of the lack of satisfactory safeguards we have heard this morning, we may have to revisit that question. There is an issue of scope in relation to sticking that into the 1989 Act, but I do not see any reason why we could not include it in some of the offences in this Bill. Unless the Government can come up with better safeguards than have been offered this morning, we are going to have to revisit that.
I urge the Minister to go away and think about this issue. I am actually more worried about those two scenarios now than I was at the start of the day. I am not absolutely sure that the amendments that I tabled are the right ones, so we will revisit the issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Obtaining or disclosing trade secrets
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 2 provides for an offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. It will be an important tool for law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to detect, deter and protect modern espionage activity. It will introduce an offence to criminalise the illicit acquisition, retention or disclosure of sensitive information with a commercial, industrial or economic value linked to its secrecy for, on behalf of or to benefit foreign states.
There is an inherent link between economic prosperity and our national security; we cannot ignore one and expect the other not to suffer as a result. We must respond to the fact that our adversaries and competitors are already acting in a more consolidated way, taking a whole-state approach to state threat activity. It is crucial that we ensure our legislation covers the wide range of threats and harms that constitute modern espionage.
For the purposes of this legislation, a person commits an offence if they obtain, copy, record, retain, disclose or provide access to a trade secret; additionally, the person’s conduct must be unauthorised and they must know or ought reasonably to know that their conduct is unauthorised. As with clause 1 and a number of other provisions in the Bill, there must also be a link to a foreign power, such as an intention to benefit that power or to direct tasking by that power.
The clause provides for a maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. That reflects the severity of the conduct and the potential damage to the UK, its businesses and our economy, as well as being comparable to existing similar legislation.
Stephen McPartland
The legislation takes civil offences and makes some of them criminal. That case would remain a civil offence. What we are doing is providing the intelligence services with the tools they need to prosecute people who hand over trade secrets in the criminal system. For example, MBDA in my constituency builds Brimstone missiles, which are currently being used in action. If some of those secrets were to be removed and handed over, that would be difficult for the people using those missiles and for the country. There are clear examples of how the loss of trade secrets threatens the country and our allies’ lives.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that the action would have to be done on behalf of or for the purposes of a foreign power. If it was done unknowingly, it would be for the lawyers and the Crown Prosecution Service to decide how to proceed.
Maria Eagle
In the example that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham gave of a person obtaining information and trade secrets and selling them to a competitor business, if that business had a complex ownership structure that led back to, say, China, would that be enough for the person to fall foul of the legislation?
Stephen McPartland
I appreciate the question and understand the spirit in which it was asked. However, one thing that we must be careful of is laying out exactly what someone must do to fall foul of the legislation. If we did, in that example, the Chinese would create that structure and be in a position to use it ensure that anybody acting on their behalf would not fall under that power. We must provide the intelligence agencies with the tools that they need to interdict and decide whether such people can be pursued and taken to court. As we have seen, it is difficult to get anybody on espionage. However, as we have said throughout proceedings, we do need the foreign power condition, or to reasonably know, and reasonableness is a huge test within English law, so a person would have to reasonably know that what they are doing would benefit a foreign power.
The offence under the clause is first and foremost a national security offence. We have created a definition of “trade secret”, found in subsection (2), which is intended for use in the state threats context. The introduction of the definition in the offence will help to address the increasingly diverse set of tactics employed by state actors to undermine the UK’s national and economic security and target a wide range of information.
There is no specific criminal offence in UK law that directly criminalises the threat to trade secrets by or for the benefit of foreign states. We have trade secrets regulations that transpose European law, but they serve a different purpose. We have therefore modified the definition of “trade secret” to ensure that it is suitable for our specific purposes. For example, as well as requiring that protections are in place that would limit the utility and potentially impose obligations on businesses, the definition in the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 does not account for information with a potential value. We are seeking to capture early-stage ideas such as research as well as established ideas that are more likely to be subject to protective measures.
Subsections (1)(b) and (3) set out in the instances in which a person’s conduct is unauthorised and what that means. The clause uses the term “unauthorised” because it focuses on the consent of the person with the power to give that consent. We want to make it absolutely clear that legitimate conduct is not captured by this offence. For the purposes of this offence, a person’s conduct is unauthorised if they are not entitled to determine whether they are able to carry out the conduct in question—for example, if they disclose a trade secret to a foreign power and they do not have the permission of the person who does have the power to make that decision. An example of where someone is not captured by the offence could be a team of researchers who are working with a foreign power, but although the information they control amounts to a trade secret, their research partnership authorises them to share that information with the foreign power.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is one of a couple of issues that I have. I would like the full information on why the offence can take place only outside the United Kingdom if it is in respect of possession by a United Kingdom national, as opposed to a UK resident or any other description of persons. I do not know whether the Minister can answer that now, but it would be useful to understand it.
Stephen McPartland
I will come back to the hon. Member on that point.
The clause applies overseas where the conduct takes place outside the UK. That includes both a UK national overseas and a UK company based overseas, provided that it is incorporated or was formed, if unincorporated, under domestic law. The clause brings forward an important offence that will form part of a modernised toolkit for our world-class intelligence agencies and law enforcement. It is proportionate to the threat posed by this activity, and imposes no restrictions or obligations on UK businesses, but offers further protections for them, and the UK as a whole, against modern espionage activity. We cannot promote economic prosperity without enhancing our national security and responding to the modern threat posed by espionage.
Stuart C. McDonald
I have three short points building on what Members have already raised in relation to this clause.
First, as raised by esteemed colleagues from the Intelligence and Security Committee, there is a question mark over what happens if somebody recklessly starts dishing out trade secrets, not directly to somebody in way that meets the foreign power condition but in a way that makes that inevitable or very likely. That does not seem to be caught by the clause at the moment, so that is something for the Minister to think about.
Secondly, as I have already asked, I want to understand why the offence is only committed “wholly” abroad if the trade secret is in the possession of a UK national, not, for example, a UK resident who is not a national. The Government have made a conscious choice about that drafting and I am interested to know why.
Finally, the clause states that the offence is committed if
“the person’s conduct is unauthorised”.
Do we need to be a little more explicit about what we mean by authorisation and authorised by whom? I can imagine situations where, for example, the person who we want to prosecute might say, “Actually, my conduct is authorised. It is authorised by the laws of my country,” which may be considerably different from the laws of this country. Does that need to be clarified? That might be implied in the phrase
“the person’s conduct is unauthorised”
but it may be something the Government want to look at.
Stephen McPartland
Earlier, we talked about sentencing guidelines. My understanding is that we are not in a position to give more detail on that yet. That is something I have discussed with the Ministry of Justice, as we will come to later.
With regard to the offence, one issue we have is the offence is designed to catch overseas activity with a strong link to the UK. It has been set at the threshold of a UK offence, so if we extend who it will to apply to, that will end up extending the scope of the offence. It is almost as if we have tried to put a safeguard in place to protect and control it, and the more we extend it, the more it will extend the scope of the offence and bring more and more within its scope, so that is the position we are in.
Jess Phillips
As a point of clarification, how will it apply to somebody who has indefinite leave to remain, who is not a lawful British citizen in the United Kingdom but very much operating here?
Stephen McPartland
It applies in the sense that if that person were to commit murder, they would be prosecuted in this country under the laws applying to murder.
Stephen McPartland
Effectively, it would apply in the same way. As I have said, with all these offences the Advocate General has to sign them off, and the Crown Prosecution Service as well.
Jess Phillips
In actual fact, on a number of occasions I have handled cases where someone with ILR in the UK has committed murder abroad and there was absolutely nothing that could be done about it.
Stephen McPartland
I have nothing further to add.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Assisting a foreign intelligence service
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move, amendment 49, in clause 3, page 3, line 30, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert
“activities which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
Holly Lynch
As we have heard, the clause introduces a new espionage offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. A person commits an offence if that person
“engages in conduct of any kind, and…intends that conduct to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”
Once again, we are broadly supportive of the clause. As highlighted by the Government’s own integrated review in 2021, threats to Government Departments, national infrastructure, British business and private individuals are growing and becoming ever more complex as states become more assertive in advancing their aims. The clause goes a long way towards updating the threat posed by modern-day espionage and the changes are long overdue. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report stated:
“The current legislation enabling action against foreign spies is acknowledged to be weak. In particular, the Official Secrets Acts are out of date—crucially, it is not illegal to be a foreign agent in this country.”
Nevertheless, it is important that the Government clarify a number of different aspects of the clause. I highlight two recommendations from the Law Commission’s 2020 review of the Official Secrets Act. Recommendation 12.5 stated:
“In any new statute to replace the Official Secrets Act 1911, the requirement that the defendant’s conduct was capable of benefitting a foreign power should continue to be objectively determined. There should be no requirement to prove that the defendant personally knew or believed that his or her conduct had such capability.”
Will the Minister confirm that that requirement is compatible with the new offence established in clause 3?
The Law Commission also highlighted the danger of an individual unknowingly assisting a foreign intelligence service and then still being charged and convicted with the same offence as an individual who actively sought to assist a foreign intelligence service. This defence is currently accounted for in the Official Secrets Act 1989, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham discussed. I appreciate that that Act is not being updated by this legislation, but the principle still stands. The Law Commission’s recommendation 12.24 stated:
“The ‘defence’, currently contained in section 1(5) of the Official Secrets Act 1989, of not knowing and having no reasonable grounds to believe that the material disclosed related to security or intelligence, should continue to apply.”
It is naive to think that foreign intelligence services advertise who they are and what they are planning to do with any information they are given by someone or in any engagement they may have. The duping of individuals is a somewhat common tool in espionage tradecraft. Let us say that an overseas business research company commissions a UK national to explain how the UK’s parliamentary processes work, but it transpires that the business research company was working for a foreign intelligence service. Under clause 3, could the UK national still be tried for assisting a foreign intelligence service?
We welcome the exemptions in subsection (7) that create an appropriate space for democratic obligations and diplomacy to take place, especially as the Bill makes no distinction between countries that are our allies and those that are hostile and seek to undermine the UK’s interests. However, I also note that the offence is explicit about the definition of a foreign intelligence service. On first reading, I had concerns that where someone is sharing information with a former member of intelligence services, the definition might not extend to criminalising that conduct. As the old saying goes, once a KGB officer, always a KGB officer.
However, given that the definition included in subsection (9) outlines that “foreign intelligence service” means
“any person whose functions include carrying out intelligence activities for or on behalf of a foreign power”,
I understand that anyone sharing information with former KGB officers, for example, would be committing an offence. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that that is the case.
Stephen McPartland
That was a range of great examples, and I will do my best to address them. The whole purpose of the clause is to provide our world-class intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the tools to respond appropriately to activity conducted in and against the UK by foreign intelligence services that wish to cause us harm. Although the Government understand and appreciate the intention behind the amendment, we propose to reject it.
The distinction between activities taking place inside the UK and those taking place overseas was deliberate. For activity taking place overseas, clause 3(4) requires the conduct to be
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
That is to ensure that we target the most harmful activity overseas that has an appropriate link to the UK. For activity taking place inside the UK, there is currently no requirement for the activity to be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. However, taking into account the defence in clause 3(7), foreign intelligence service activity carried out in the UK without even informal agreement or assent is inherently prejudicial to the UK’s safety or interests. Having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt why that activity is prejudicial risks creating a high evidential threshold that could, as we try to meet it, potentially compound the damage caused.
Clause 3(4)(a) has been drafted to ensure that the offence can prevent a wide range of activities from occurring and prevent threats from developing. Any legitimate activity would be covered by the three elements of the defence in clause 3(7), so there are appropriate safeguards in place. If a foreign intelligence service carried out activity in the UK and its conduct did not fall under clause 3(7), we must be able to call it out for what it is and prevent further harm from being caused. The current construction of clause 3(4) allow us to do exactly that, and the amendment risks reducing the operational utility of the clause as a whole.
We cannot allow the UK to become a hotbed for foreign intelligence services running covert and deceptive operations. I understand the examples that have been given, and I am looking into some of them, but the reality is that we need to be in a position to protect the intelligence services and give them an opportunity to go out there and deal with these people and the threats we face. As I have said, we have three protections throughout the whole Bill. We are coming up with lots of examples, but by answering each of them specifically, we will just provide our enemies and state threats with ways to work around the offence.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, but it is important to work through hypothetical examples so that we can understand the scope of the Bill. I absolutely get his explanation as to why there is a distinction between activity inside and outside the UK, and he briefly mentioned the idea of a friendly foreign intelligence service—in my example, the Estonian intelligence service—having permission to engage in the activities that I described. That may well be the solution. I will take away what the Minister has said. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen McPartland
I beg to move Government amendment 1, in clause 3, page 4, leave out line 1 and insert—
“In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged”.
Stephen McPartland
The amendment clarifies that clause 3(7) contains a defence, rather than an exception, because it may be unclear which of the two it is as currently drafted. In doing so, two changes must be made to the clause. One will insert new wording to show that clause 3(7) is a defence, and the other will insert subsection (7A), which states that the defendant must adduce some evidence to establish that a matter in clause 3(7) is satisfied. The prosecution will then be required to prove that it is not met beyond a reasonable doubt.
We tabled the amendments to provide clarity to the operational community and to make absolutely clear the intention behind the offence. Clarifying that clause 3(7) is a defence places an evidential burden on the defendant to adduce evidence that one of the three conditions in subsection (7) applies to them. If someone raises a defence under subsection (7), the prosecution will need to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defence does not apply.
There are three separate elements to subsection (7). If it is an exception, the prosecution would be required to prove in all cases beyond reasonable doubt that none of the three elements applies. That would potentially be challenging to evidence, given the wide range of circumstances under which the matters in the clause may arise. In effect, the prosecution would have to prove a negative. Where an offence is believed to have been committed and a prosecution is pursued, subsection (7) being an exception would mean that all three conditions would need to be shown not to apply in each case that is brought forward for prosecution. That is not our intention, and the amendment will mean that defendants must raise a defence under subsection (7), and the prosecution must then prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it does not apply.
We have worked closely with our operational partners, law enforcement and the Crown Prosecution Service on this amendment to provide greater clarity about the scope of clause 3. By tabling this amendment to subsection (7), we can more clearly represent the policy intention behind clause 3 as a whole.
Holly Lynch
I have the Minister’s explanation. We considered the implications of Government amendments 1 to 4 earlier, and on that basis we are satisfied.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, in clause 3, page 4, line 8, leave out “is” and insert “was”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1.
Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 4, line 10, leave out “is” and insert “was”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 1.
Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 4, line 10, at end insert—
“(7A) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (7) if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.” —(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment provides that a defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the defence in clause 3(7).
Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Entering etc a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK
Stephen McPartland
I may dwell on this clause slightly longer than others, because it is the first of a number of clauses regarding a regime to protect sensitive sites in the UK. There has been a range of examples and questions. To the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, the simple answer is yes.
With regards to the Pokémon examples of the hon. Member for Halifax, the answers again are about—this very much determines the whole scope of the clause—prejudicial interest and people doing something accidentally. To fall foul of the clause, someone needs to have prejudicial interest against the UK. In the examples, people have wandered in and done something accidentally; they would not be prosecuted under the clause.
The right hon. Member for North Durham gave the example of strapping a camera to an eagle; if that is something that someone can do, fair play to them. However, if that camera strapped to the eagle were then to record activity in the place, and that was prejudicial to the UK, the person would be prosecuted. If they just wanted to strap a camera to an eagle to see what happened, the intelligence services have the opportunity not to prosecute someone, because, given the protections throughout the Bill, the Attorney General would have to sign off on whether to prosecute, and the Crown Prosecution Service on whether that was in the public interest.
I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on ability to have lawful protest, and for lawful protest not to be restricted. It has been reflected by other Members and I raised it with the Department last week.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
It is absolutely right that people have the right to protest, but the attention of the Minister and that of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to the recent cases in which, for example, Extinction Rebellion protestors were found not guilty of criminal damage, despite the judge directing jurors that there was no defence in law. Likewise, the protestors who toppled the Colston statue were found not guilty. We have to be careful: jurors might find people not guilty, but we have to protect the ambitions of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
I understand my hon. Friend’s point, which is that we have to be careful to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to protect our protected sites. I may not agree with the purpose of protest, but I agree with the ability of everybody to protest lawfully. People will start to fall foul of this clause when they try to scale the walls of a restricted site and to impede lawful activity going on at the restricted site—when they start to move from protest towards criminal activity. That will be captured.
Mr Jones
I am not sure it will. Let us take the Faslane peace camp as an example. I totally disagree with what those people are arguing for, but if somebody there took a photograph and put it out on social media to make a political point, would they be caught under the Bill? Is not that prohibited under the Bill?
Stephen McPartland
No, because they would not be doing something designed to prejudice the United Kingdom.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is useful and it might answer my question. The offence is committed if somebody approaches or is
“in the vicinity of a prohibited place”.
That obviously covers the peace camp. Is the Minister saying that at that stage there is nothing prejudicial to the UK’s safety and interests, and that such action only becomes prejudicial to UK safety and interests when people take further action, along the lines that he suggested?
Stephen McPartland
Yes. The intention is that people have to do something prejudicial to the UK’s interests to fall foul of the clause.
Prohibited places are inherently sensitive sites that are likely to be the target of state threat activity. Unauthorised access to such sites could be a precursor to harmful acts such as espionage or sabotage, and it is important that we have the tools and powers we need to adequately protect those sites.
Mr Jones
I think the Minister just said yes to my question and the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood about a person with binoculars. Does that fall under clause 5(1)(a)(i), which refers to an offence being committed if a person
“accesses, enters, inspects or passes over or under a prohibited place”?
Would somebody on a hill several miles away with a pair of binoculars be classed as inspecting an area? Is that why the Minister says that is covered in the Bill?
Stephen McPartland
Yes, that is the intention. Remember that the Official Secrets Act 1911 refers to sketches. We are trying to reform that Act and the others to get to a point at which we help our intelligence services to come up with ways of dealing with some stuff that could technically be considered out of scope. The idea behind the clause is that we will be able to give the intelligence community the tools they need to deal with somebody inspecting a site or doing something prejudicial to the UK’s interests.
Mr Jones
I come back to the fact that if we looked at the Official Secrets Act 1989 and had one big Bill, it would have been far better than this one. Will the Minister clarify that somebody with binoculars would be classified as “inspection”? My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood asked whether a person looking at a site through binoculars would be captured by this offence, or whether they would have to be writing something down. What is the situation with the old-fashioned sketches mentioned in the 1911 Act? Would they be covered?
Stephen McPartland
The purpose is to cover activity that is prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. For example, if someone were bird watching and they looked at the site through their binoculars, they would not be captured by the offence because they would not be doing anything prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests. However, if they were sketching a site to identify how they could break into it or to record activity going on there, that would be prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s interests, so the clause covers that. It is a case-by-case situation.
The current prohibited places provisions fall under the espionage offence within section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Stephen McPartland
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and am happy to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye.
Sally-Ann Hart
Does my hon. Friend not agree that “other recordings” would include a sketch?
Stephen McPartland
Sketches are included, because a sketch would have to be inspected. The question was: are sketches included? The answer is yes.
The Chair
Order. This really must not become a conversation. Minister, you might perhaps wish to conclude your remarks. We cannot have a conversation backwards and forwards across the Chamber.
Maria Eagle
I regret having to ask more than once, but I am just not quite clear from the Minister’s answers. Perhaps he could write to the Committee if it is not totally clear; that would not be a problem. In subsection (1)(a)(i), does inspecting include looking from a distance—not over or under—say through binoculars that magnify, if someone is doing that with a malign intent, so they are caught by subsection (1)(b), which are the other requirements of the offence?
Would just looking through binoculars from a distance—not taking videos or photographs—and just doing notes or a sketch still be covered, or are we creating a lacuna? That is the only question I seek an answer to. I am afraid the Minister has not been totally clear on how looking through binoculars is covered. We are not inspecting the sketch—we are inspecting the site through the binoculars. Is that not right? In which case, is it still okay for this person to do a sketch? It is not clear.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the intervention and shall try to clarify. It is clear that the provision is not exhaustive, but the reality is someone has to inspect the site, whether that is through binoculars or making a sketch, and the purpose of that activity—that inspection—is to be prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom.
Stephen McPartland
I will move on to amendment 50. The condition inserted through amendment 50 removes the term “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” in the context of protests. It is the Government’s view that this is detrimental to the offence under clause 4 as it limits the range of conduct that would be considered prejudicial to the UK and risks creating loopholes that hostile actors could use to exploit using protest as a tool to disrupt sensitive sites in the UK. It is also likely to mean that sites that are not directly involved in the safety of the UK would not be afforded any protection where protests are being inappropriately used to disrupt the lawful functioning of the site. It is crucial that we retain the existing term if we are able to effectively protect the UK’s most sensitive areas from harmful activity.
In addition, the effect of amendment 50 would be that no offence would be committed by protesters if their conduct were not, as a matter of fact, prejudicial. In practice, this would not have any further effect on safeguarding protest activity because if the activity were not in fact prejudicial, a person cannot know, or be in a position where they ought reasonably to know, that that is the case. The amendment may be designed to ensure that no offence is committed unless actual damage results from the conduct, but it would not have that effect and the Government would not support a narrowing of the offence along those lines. While I understand the intention of the amendment, I do not see any requirement for it, given the fact that sufficient safeguards for legitimate protesting activity are already in place.
It is important to say that we will work with the police and the College of Policing ahead of commencement of the provisions to ensure that those implementing these clauses have the appropriate training and guidance to use these powers proportionately. I do not support the amendment and ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraws it.
Finally, clause 5 provides a second offence to capture harmful activity within the reformed prohibited places regime. A person commits this offence if, without authorisation, they engage in conduct at a prohibited place and they know, or reasonably ought to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. A person’s conduct is unauthorised if the person is not entitled to determine whether they may engage in the conduct, or if they do not have consent to engage in the conduct from a person entitled to give it—for example, if they walk past signage stating that access to the site is prohibited without authorisation, or if they take pictures from outside the site in spite of clear signage that that is not permitted.
Holly Lynch
This is a question I asked members of the UK intelligence community because I could not answer it: does a list of prohibited places exist in the public domain? Such a list might equip someone with the information prior to arriving at a site and enable them to determine whether a place is prohibited. It is not clear to me whether a list exists. Can the Minister clarify?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention, and I will certainly look at that. A number of sites will be prohibited in law, and some sites will not want people to know exactly where they are and what they are doing because they will become targets. Once again, there is a balance to be struck in relation to provision for the intelligence community.
Holly Lynch
I completely accept the sensitive nature of the subject and why we might not want to put such information in the public domain, but with respect to the “ought reasonably to have known” defence, I wonder whether we should ensure that people are equipped with the information that a site is indeed prohibited before they find themselves, perhaps accidentally, in a compromising position. How can we ensure that all that is communicated appropriately and sensitively so as to protect people from accidentally falling foul of these stipulations?
Stephen McPartland
It goes back to the reasonableness test: is the person conducting a reasonable activity, or is the activity prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s national security interests?
For a person to be guilty of the offence, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that their conduct—for example, in entering the prohibited place—was unauthorised, which provides protections. Unlike the clause 4 offence, there is no requirement that the person have a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom to commit this offence. That ensures that action can be taken in cases when a person has knowingly carried out unauthorised conduct at a prohibited place, such as trespassing, without having to consider whether that person has a purpose prejudicial to the United Kingdom’s safety or interests, which requires a higher threshold of potential harm to be demonstrated.
To take account of the fact that a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom does not need to be proven, there are differences between the conduct caught under the offence under this clause and the offence under clause 4. For example, this offence does not criminalise the inspection of photographs of prohibited places, and it is not capable of capturing conduct in the vicinity of a prohibited place.
The Government do not consider it proportionate or necessary to capture the inspection of photographs under this offence, given that inspecting a photograph that has already been taken of a prohibited place cannot be classed as inherently unauthorised activity. Given the wide range of legitimate activities that could be undertaken in the vicinity of a prohibited place, and given that there is no inherent need for walking past a prohibited place to be authorised, the offence under clause 5 does not capture activity in the vicinity of a prohibited place.
The second prohibited places offence under clause 5 is a crucial addition to the tools our law enforcement agencies and courts can use to capture the full range of harmful activity that can take place at prohibited places. Even though this offence is not aimed at capturing the most damaging activity around those places, as clause 4 does, and attracts lower penalties, it is equally important that we introduce an offence that can capture activity that may seem less severe, but is still capable of interfering with and damaging the operations and security of the United Kingdom’s most sensitive sites.
This offence should be seen as part of a tiered approach alongside the new police powers to protect those sites, which I will come to, and it will ensure that law enforcement has a range of tools and powers at its disposal to protect those sites.
Stuart C. McDonald
The debate has been useful, particularly in relation to protestors, and it is useful to know that, apparently, the Minister’s view is that protestors approaching or being in the vicinity of a prohibited place will not necessarily engage the clause because, at that stage, the activity is not prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom. Something more is required before that part of the test is engaged. We might need to explore that further on Report, but for now it is important that we say protestors are not so interested in the Pokémon players. We can revisit that on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Powers of police officers in relation to a prohibited place
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
The powers set out in clause 6 allow for a police officer to exercise specific powers in order to protect prohibited places. A person commits an offence if they fail to comply with an order imposed under the police powers in relation to a prohibited place. Those powers include the ability to order a person who has accessed or entered a prohibited place or is in the vicinity of one to leave it immediately. Under these powers, a police officer may also arrange for the removal or movement of a vehicle or device from a prohibited place or an area adjacent to a prohibited place.
Alongside the police powers, the clause provides that is an offence to fail to comply with an order given by a constable under those provisions. As an example, if a person is circling the perimeter of a prohibited place and taking detailed photographs of the infrastructure and activities within, the police may order this person to cease to engage in that activity and leave the area immediately, given that they are carrying out an inspection of the site and their activity is in an area adjacent to the prohibited place.
In order to exercise any of those powers, a constable must reasonably believe that doing so is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. For example, exercise of the powers may be necessary for the prevention of activity that could harm or disrupt the operations or functioning of a prohibited place. In most instances, we consider that the use of these powers will be intelligence-led and that the police will be called to prohibited places where there is a concern identified from the site itself.
The aim of the police powers in relation to prohibited places is not to impede legitimate activity, such as lawful protest, but rather to catch and deter activity around prohibited places that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. That includes activity that is harmful to and disrupts or impedes the functioning or operations of a prohibited place, such as scaling fences, blocking access points or wider disruption to the critical and sensitive work being conducted at these sites. Ahead of implementation, my officials will work with the police and the College of Policing to ensure that clear guidance and training are in place to ensure that the powers are used reasonably and proportionately to protect these sites.
The additional powers are a critical part of the reformed prohibited places regime and provide significant operational utility, given that they enable law enforcement to prevent harmful activity from taking place at these sensitive sites—activity that could be a precursor to state-threat offences such as espionage or sabotage. Without their inclusion, the UK will be less equipped to counter hostile activity as it happens, which will leave these sites more vulnerable to state-threat activity or wider threats that do not have a state link.
Holly Lynch
Subsections (1) and (2) set out the powers that police constables can exercise to protect a prohibited place, which include ordering a person to cease their activity or move away from the site. Subsection (3) provides that a constable must reasonably believe the use of those powers to be
“necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
This includes prevention of activity that could harm or disrupt the operations or functioning of a prohibited place in a way that could jeopardise the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
The clause gives the police powers to direct people to stop using devices and leave the area, but when I discussed its detail with a recently retired senior police officer he observed that the clause seemingly does not confer on the constable the power to seize the device or any video or images or, indeed, sketches or footage off the back of an eagle taken by the device. Can the Minister explain whether that is the case? If so, would the clause not benefit from an addition to prevent any such sensitive material from leaving the scene with a person instructed to take it with them?
I find it curious that all police officers tend to be referred to as “constable” in legislation, despite the fact that constable is just one of several possible ranks. Indeed, there is some variety in the responsibilities for keeping sites defined as prohibited places safe. The Civil Nuclear Constabulary, overseen by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority, is the armed police force in charge of protecting civil nuclear sites and nuclear materials in England and Scotland. The Ministry of Defence police is responsible for law enforcement and security of military bases in the UK; as it says on the tin, it reports into the Ministry of Defence.
Will the Minister confirm that the powers conferred in clause 6 extend beyond those officers serving in regular police forces that report to the Home Office? It is the specialist forces sitting outside of those structures that tend to pick up the lion’s share of the responsibility for protecting prohibited places. Could he confirm that the powers apply to all officers, regardless of rank, and where the military also provide defences at their own sites, or are at least partnering in that work? Could the Minister explain whether the powers extend to the military, or are exclusively for police officers?
Finally, the powers conferred will also allow a constable to arrange for the removal of a vehicle from a prohibited place “or an area adjacent” to it. Does the Minister envisage any further guidance on what constitutes “adjacent to a prohibited place” to assist a constable in determining distance, proximity, and so on, in making those judgments and communicating those clearly in a reasonable way to members of the public?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for the very good points she has raised. My understanding is that the powers currently apply only to police officers, not to members of the military. It is very clear throughout the clause that it refers to “a constable”, and it is referenced as “Powers of police officers”.
Mr Jones
Is that not a hole in the legislation? We are coming on to Cyprus next, where it is not civilian police that do security there, and I can think of a few others around the world where it is done by the military. Therefore, should those powers not also be given to the military?
Stephen McPartland
When we talk about military, MOD police will have those powers.
Stephen McPartland
Both the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Halifax made a very good point. We will take that away and look at it. If they want to strengthen the Bill, we are happy to work with them to do that.
Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)
Would my hon. Friend agree that there is a difference between providing force protection for a site and providing constabulary and law enforcement duties?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend makes a good point. We must also bear in mind that it is not our intention to introduce search-and-seize powers under these police powers. This is part of the tiered approach we referred to earlier, with the police being able to warn people to go away before they fall foul of the law. There is the opportunity to give them that warning before any arrest.
Mr Jones
I agree with the hon. Member for Burnley, but there are also sites that are benign, so it is not a force protection point but a constabulary duty that is carried out by members of the armed forces. Therefore, I think they need these powers if this is a comprehensive suite of powers.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member. As I said, that is certainly something that we will look at and come back to.
Tuesday 12th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 July 2022 - (12 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I beg to move amendment 5, in clause 7, page 7, line 3, at end insert—
“(ca) any land or building in the United Kingdom or the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia which is—
(i) owned or controlled by the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ, and
(ii) used for the functions of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ;”.
This amendment and Amendments 7 and 8 make provision for sites used by the intelligence services to be prohibited places.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 6 to 8.
Clause stand part.
Clause 8 stand part.
Stephen McPartland
Amendments 5 to 8 make critical additions to the definition of “prohibited place” in clause 7. The sites used by the UK’s intelligence services are some of our most sensitive locations and must be afforded the measures and protections given by the wider prohibited places provisions. These measures will mean that those who commit unlawful conduct can face prosecution under either of the two new prohibited places offences in clauses 4 and 5. Moreover, the police will have powers to stop people engaging in conduct in relation to a prohibited place that may harm the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. While the Government initially intended to add these sites by way of regulations, on reflection we concluded that it would be preferable to give Parliament the opportunity to debate the provisions up front—lucky me!
The amendments make provision for sites used by the intelligence services to be prohibited places under the meaning of “prohibited place” in clause 7. Under amendment 5, any land, building or part of a building used for the functions of the intelligence services will be designated only if it is also owned or controlled by those services. That offers safeguards so that places used temporarily for the functions of the intelligence services would not be designated; that would not be proportionate. I will not dwell on amendments 6 to 8, which are consequential, centralising the definition of a building for the purpose of the clause and providing a definition of GCHQ.
Turning to clause 7 stand part, section 3 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 sets out the places that are, or can be by declaration, a prohibited place under existing legislation. They are mainly defence-related sites or those that are used, or can be used, in times of war. Clause 7, which replaces those provisions, defines what sites will be prohibited places for the purposes of the two offences in clauses 4 and 5 and the police powers in clause 6, and it has been drafted to continue to capture the majority of the sites that are set out as prohibited places in the existing provisions.
The language and drafting has been simplified to ensure that there is clarity about what is or is not a prohibited place under the clause, removing long lists of terms that are less relevant for modern legislation. The definition in the clause includes Crown land or a vehicle in the UK or the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri or Dhekelia used for UK defence purposes or for the defence of another country. That covers the range of defence sites, including military barracks, bases and military headquarters.
Limiting prohibited places to Crown land in the UK or the sovereign base areas ensures that the provisions retain a focus on places important for UK defence, and that the range of sites covered does not become disproportionate or impractical. The definition is extended to sovereign base areas in Cyprus because there are several military bases there that are important for UK defence and should be covered by these provisions, as they are now.
Clause 7 also ensures that we can continue to capture defence vehicles as prohibited places. A vehicle used for defence purposes would include military transportation that is either sensitive in itself—for example, aircraft, vessels, submarines or tanks—or used for the purposes of transporting sensitive defence technology, equipment or weaponry. That may include trains or convoys used for the purposes of transporting weaponry. It is crucial that those vehicles are afforded the protection that the prohibited places regime provides.
Clause 7 also designates Crown land or vehicles in the UK or the sovereign base areas used for the purposes of the defence of a foreign country or territory. It is imperative that these provisions extend to and protect the sites and vehicles that the UK’s allies use and operate. For example, there are several military bases in the UK out of which our allies operate; those need to continue to be afforded the protection given by the prohibited places regime. Lastly, clause 7 covers buildings or vehicles designated by regulations made under the clause 8 designation power.
Clause 8 provides for the Secretary of State to declare additional sites as prohibited places by way of secondary legislation. In order to do so, the Secretary of State is required by the clause to reasonably consider the designation necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The designation can be made either by listing specific sites or vehicles or by introducing a description of sites or vehicles. Any site that met such a description would thereby be designated—for example, the listing of UK defence vehicles would capture military aircrafts, tanks, submarines and vessels. The clause maintains our existing ability to designate sites while ensuring it is appropriately modernised and futureproofed, as recommended by the Law Commission.
When deciding whether a designation to declare an additional prohibited place through the power in clause 8 is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must have regard to certain matters, including the purpose for which the place is used; the nature of the information held, stored or processed on the land or in the building or vehicle; and the nature of any equipment, technology or material that is located on the land or in the building or vehicle. That requirement provides safeguards to ensure that only sites at risk of harmful activity can be designated as prohibited places.
The power to designate additional prohibited places is limited to land or buildings in the United Kingdom or the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, or any vehicle. Although it may seem broad to enable the designating of any vehicle around the world as a prohibited place, in most instances it would be possible to capture harmful activity at such vehicles only within the United Kingdom or in countries with which we have extradition agreements, given the difficulty of enforcing the offence overseas. It is beneficial to be able to designate a vehicle anywhere in the world because, unlike land or buildings, vehicles are clearly capable of being moving targets at different locations.
In the near term, the Government intend to designate as prohibited places certain sites in the nuclear sector, including major licensed nuclear sites. Specific nuclear sites such as Sellafield and Dounreay are currently designated as prohibited places under the existing provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911. The Government want to ensure that sites in the sector continue to be afforded protection under the reformed prohibited places regime. Consultation is currently ongoing with the nuclear sector to ensure that the range of places that require designation as prohibited places are captured and that the impact of any designation is fully considered before a decision to designate is made.
Given that in rare cases it may be necessary to rapidly designate a site as a prohibited place in response to intelligence about an imminent threat at a certain location, the reformed designation power is subject to the negative parliamentary procedure. The power could be needed to rapidly designate, for example, medical research facilities used during a public health crisis that may be the target of state threat activity. Even in such rapid cases, the Secretary of State must still reasonably consider designation necessary to protect the safety or interest of the United Kingdom and we would expect that, where reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State would consult with the landowner.
A designation power to declare additional prohibited places is a crucial part of the reformed regime. By futureproofing the provisions in such a way, we can continue to capture and deter those who seek to conduct harmful activity at the United Kingdom’s most sensitive sites, as the threat landscape will undoubtably evolve over the coming years. I ask the Committee to support the inclusion of clauses 7 and 8 in the Bill and to agree to the amendments.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Let me take clauses 7 and 8 and Government amendments 5, 6, 7 and 8 together. As the Minister has outlined, clause 7 defines a prohibited place for the purposes of clauses 4 to 8. The definition includes Crown land and vehicles used for defence purposes; places used for the invention, development, production, operation, storage or disposal of weapons; and land, buildings or vehicles designated by regulations made under clause 8.
Clause 8 provides for the Secretary of State to declare additional sites as prohibited places by way of secondary legislation. This will ensure that additional sites that are vulnerable to state threat activity can be designated when it is considered necessary. The Committee will note that, historically, the list of prohibited places has had a strong, if not total, military focus.
We just need to read the legislation to be struck by how dated it is. The Official Secrets Act 1911 defined a prohibited place as:
“any work of defence, arsenal, naval or air force establishment or station, factory, dockyard, mine, minefield, camp, ship, or aircraft belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of His Majesty, or any telegraph, telephone, wireless or signal station, or office so belonging or occupied, and any place belonging to or occupied by or on behalf of His Majesty”
and so on. While reflective of the contemporary climate and the threats posed to the UK, this list has long been out of date. We therefore welcome this expansive update for defining what a prohibited place is, as well as giving the Government the ability to adapt the list where there is a reasonable case to do so. In the light of that, we recognise that Government amendments 5, 6, 7 and 8 complement the clause in that aim.
That said, I did probe the Law Commission during last Thursday’s evidence session on this point. It is important that this legislation is laid in such a way that it is not used by Government or future Governments to infringe on other democratic freedoms. During the consultation period of the Law Commission’s report on the Official Secrets Act, a number of stakeholders expressed concern about giving the Home Secretary such powers to designate a new site as a prohibited place.
The Trinity Mirror raised concern that an unchecked power to create designated sites based on national security may create a new criminal offence without parliamentary debate and could potentially stifle legitimate investigations in the public interest. WhistleblowersUK stated that the list should not end up being widened to include council officers or schools, for example. It would be incredibly worrying if a Home Secretary interpreted this power to allow himself or herself to mark places that served a purpose in the execution of an unpopular Government policy, for example, as a prohibited place. I outlined these concerns to Dr Nicholas Hoggard of the Law Commission, who provided some reassurance. He said,
“What is good to see about the powers under this Bill is they are quite principled powers. The basis on which the Secretary of State can define something as a protected place is much more transparent. There are just three limbs that are easy to understand. That basis for affording the Secretary of the State the power is much more useful. It is more transparent, but it also enables us to capture within the offence places where
there is actually a real risk of harm arising from hostile state activity. On that front, I would say the power is good in so much as it aligns with the spirit of our recommendation. The fact that there will be parliamentary oversight of this process is important. It was a fundamental feature of our recommendations, and the negative resolution procedure is an important part of that process. The Secretary of State’s powers are more effective than is permitted under the current law, but also there is sufficient oversight.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 51, Q96.]
I look to the Minister for the same political assurances: that such powers would not be used should the Government find that to declare somewhere a prohibited site would serve a purpose in the execution of an unpopular Government policy, for example. Having gone through the prohibited places National Security Bill factsheet on the Government website, I have already asked the Minister what information should be in the public domain to confirm that somewhere is a prohibited site.
I completely accept that somewhere might be so secure that extensive signage and its inclusion on any such list might not be appropriate. However, in the event of our Pokémon GO example, it is about being able to check without needing to travel to a prohibited place to observe the signage to find out, which might itself bring someone in scope of earlier offences. I want to ensure that the status of such a site, the restrictions and the consequences of not adhering to those restrictions are appropriately and clearly communicated to the public.
Before closing, I want to bring the Minister’s attention to clause 7, where we have sovereign based areas overseas for UK defence purposes. He has made the undertaking to consider military powers within the earlier clauses on police powers. It is my understanding that the Ministry of Defence police would not provide that service to these sites deemed to be prohibited places within clause 7. Once again, he might need to write to us to work through some of that detail further.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
Clause 7 and the Government amendments to it seem to make sense; my concern is about clause 8. I read the exchange that the shadow Minister referred to, when she asked the Law Commission about the broad powers in clause 8; it was one of the very rare occasions when I was not absolutely convinced by the answer that came back. At the end of the day, clause 7’s definition of “prohibited place” is very defence oriented, and it will now be defence and security oriented. But clause 8 opens the definition up to any sort of land at all and the nebulous concept of the safety or interests of the United Kingdom: if the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary for the safety of UK interests, a place can be added to the list.
I worry about immigration detention facilities or a fracking site being added to the list. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of the policy, that is a fairly significant extension to how the whole policy area operates. That is where our concern lies. Has it been opened up too broadly? I appreciate that the Minister says we need flexibility and to be nimble, but I worry that we have left it too open to potential—abuse is probably too strong a word—overgenerous interpretation.
Stephen McPartland
I commit to write to the hon. Member for Halifax—and the whole Committee—to answer her point about the police. I totally accept the genuine concern I am hearing from across party lines about what safeguards are in place to ensure that a place is designated for reasons of defence as opposed to Government embarrassment. The safeguard is that the power to designate only be exercised may if the Secretary of State reasonably considers it necessary to do so in order to protect the safety or interest of the United Kingdom.
Holly Lynch
There is that difference between safety and interest; it would be quite easy for a Home Secretary, if she has an unpopular deportation policy—to give a topical example—to argue that that it in the UK’s interest rather than its safety. That gives us cause for concern.
Stephen McPartland
I appreciate that. We have heard this morning and in previous sittings about that tension in respect of the Government interest and defence. There is case law that defines it. The purpose of the Bill is to provide the intelligence services with the tools they need to keep the country safe. They feel that they need these tools to do that. There are safeguards. The idea behind the number of factors is that there are a variety of checks on the Secretary of State, so they would have to demonstrate all the way through that they have considered that multitude of factors and that it was necessary for the defence of the country.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, I cannot believe I am going to say this but I cannot tell him what I have been briefed, for national security reasons. The reality is that in these clauses we have moved away from designating places to categories. One of the categories is unavowed sites. That means that some of the sites that he suggested would be covered by the category.
Stephen McPartland
Another query raised was about oil and metal, which I understand are already in the existing provision for use in defence. That is why we refer to those areas. Finally, we are not designating military bases abroad, other than sovereign bordered areas, purely because of difficulties with jurisdiction and making that work.
Amendment 5 agreed to.
Amendments made: 6, in clause 7, page 7, line 4, leave out
“(including a part of a building)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 7.
Amendment 7, in clause 7, page 7, line 24, at end insert—
“‘building’ includes any part of a building;”.
See Amendment 5.
Amendment 8, in clause 7, page 7, line 37, at end insert—
“‘GCHQ’ has the meaning given by section 3(3) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994;”—(Stephen McPartland.)
See Amendment 5.
Clause 7, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Power to designate a cordoned area to secure defence aircraft
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
Stephen McPartland
The power set out in clause 9 allows a constable to designate a cordoned area around a military aircraft, part of an aircraft or related equipment. Regrettably, there have been several aircraft crashes over the past several years, including an F-15 aircraft crash in Lincolnshire in 2014. In such cases it is common for sensitive technology or material to be dispersed, and a specific power to cordon an area will ensure that such material is sufficiently protected until it can be removed.
Under the clause, a constable may designate an area under the cordon power only if they consider it expedient for the purposes of securing an aircraft, parts of an aircraft or equipment relating to such an aircraft, used for military purposes. The clause goes on to describe the process for designating a cordoned area this power, including ensuring that the boundary is appropriately marked and that a written record is made of the relevant decisions.
Members will appreciate the interest that hostile actors would have in accessing military technology. A cordon power that allows us to protect sensitive military aircraft technology beyond prohibited places—for example, in the event of a crash—is a tool that our armed forces and police can use to prevent harmful activity from taking place if sensitive technology is exposed and becomes vulnerable to access or inspection.
Clause 10 sets out the duration for which a designation of a cordoned area made under the clause 9 power may have effect. The end of the cordon must be specified in the designation, and initially an area can be cordoned only for a maximum period of 14 days. The initial period of the cordon specified in the designation may, in many cases, be adequate for the secured military aircraft, parts or related equipment to be safely removed. Should the process take longer—for example, if more time than originally anticipated is required in the event of a criminal investigation or an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch—the duration can be extended up to a maximum of 28 days from the point of the initial designation. Setting out the duration for which a designation of a cordoned area may have effect is an essential provision as part of the wider military aircraft cordon power. It prevents the provisions from being implemented for longer than is justified or proportionate.
Clause 11 provides the police with the powers to enforce a cordoned area that has been designated under the clause 9 power. The powers are similar to those that the police are able to use to protect prohibited places under clause 6. They include requiring a person not to carry out specified conduct, such as entering or inspecting a cordoned area; requiring a person or persons in charge of a vehicle or device to leave a cordoned area or an adjacent area immediately; and arranging for the movement or removal of a vehicle from a cordoned area.
It is especially important to have powers in relation to an area adjacent, given that people are able to take photographs, videos or other recordings of a crashed aircraft that is within a cordoned area from outside the cordon perimeter. The powers to prohibit such activity allow for enhanced protection against the threat that may be posed when sensitive technology or information is exposed—for example, hostile actors may still be able to gather potentially damaging information from outside a cordon through the use of long-range cameras, or may use photos and videos obtained by others and posted on social media.
Alongside the powers I have outlined, clause 11 will make it an offence to fail to comply with an order given by a constable under the powers. There may well be instances in which a person has a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with such an order, so the clause includes a defence to protect those who have a legitimate reason to be within a cordoned area.
The police powers in relation to a cordoned area in clause 11 are crucial, as they give our law enforcement agencies the tools needed to deter hostile actors from accessing the sensitive defence technology or material that may potentially be exposed—for example, following the unfortunate event of a military aircraft crash.
Holly Lynch
Clause 9 provides a power for the police to create a cordoned area around a defence aircraft, presumably, as the Minister outlined, if it has crashed or had to make an emergency landing outside a prohibited place. We agree that the powers in clause 9 are entirely appropriate and that the ability to cordon off scenes of that kind is necessary to ensure that the aircraft and any equipment or material relating to it can be sufficiently protected until removal has been completed. Under subsection (2) a constable may designate an area under the cordon power in subsection (1) only if they consider it expedient for the purposes of securing an aircraft used for military purposes, or part thereof, or equipment relating to that aircraft.
I have explored this clause with a recently retired senior police officer, and I will relay his query. Why is this provision needed, given that the police already have the ability to cordon off such areas through common law powers? Where is the gap that needed to be closed by the clause? What does it do that was not there previously? The Minister may outline the differences we have missed; further to that point, the explanatory notes make it clear that the power will not be applicable to aircraft other than those used for military purposes. Say, for example, a civilian fixed-wing light aircraft has raised espionage concerns, having flown over a prohibited place without clearance before making an emergency landing: although it would not be a military aircraft, I would be quite comfortable with clause 9 powers being used in such circumstances. Will the Minister consider that in his response?
Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)
I wish to speak briefly to the clauses. In Lancashire, we are home to BAE Systems Air, in Samlesbury and Warton. That is a significant manufacturing and assembly location for the fourth generation Typhoon aircraft, the fifth generation F-35 and, looking ahead, potentially the sixth generation of the future combat air system. Manufacturing and assembling those aircraft brings a requirement to test them and put them in the air. With any new aircraft, we run the risk of some kind of emergency landing, so the clause is entirely necessary and proportionate to allow the police to put a cordon in place, should that be required. We have to remember the highly sensitive nature of some of the aircraft, recognising in particular that many contain not just UK technology but technology from our friends and allies around the world.
Not that long ago, as we may all remember, one of the F-35s fell off the deck of the Queen Elizabeth carrier as it was meant to be taking off. On the news, we all saw that other allied warships had to go towards the area to ensure that unfriendly or hostile states could not go to find that aircraft on the seabed and try to take some of its technology. The clause seems to do something similar: it will ensure that in the event of an emergency, we have the ability to protect a site so that we can clean it up and investigate it in a controlled way. That control is important, because hostile states are always looking at ways to take advantage of unforeseen circumstances.
Will the Minister confirm that the area where the cordon is put in place will be as tightly defined as possible? We must recognise that in Lancashire, for example, where such events might happen, there is a significant amount of farmland and land used for other things, so we must try to find a balance. It is about proportionality and recognising that although a site is controlled—not just in terms of where it is but recognising that parts might be spread over a significant area—the land might have another use. Will the Minister confirm that the Government expect there to be a balance and that an area will not be so widely defined that it becomes unusable for a significant number of people?
I was pleased to see that there is a 14-day limit for the cordon zone in clause 10, with the potential to expand it to 28 days if needed. That properly tries to balance the different access requirements that the police will have during the clean-up. We all recognise that these will sometimes be complex sites to try to clean up. I very much welcome the clause. For an area such as Lancashire, which has aircraft test flights all the time because of BAE, it will put lots of residents’ minds at ease that if the worst happens, there is a controlled, legislative way to make sure that the site is managed.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his helpful contribution. The maximum time period is 14 days because we are trying to put in place a limit. The idea is to restrict the areas as tightly as possible to protect the sensitive material without having an impact on other issues. A cordon around the military area will cover a much tighter area. There are already other cordoning factors, which is why the provision is not wider in scope.
The clauses have been drafted because of the experiences in Lincolnshire with the crashed F-15 aircraft in 2015, and the gaps during that period. My understanding is that the pilot lost control of the aircraft, successfully ejected and crashed into farmland adjacent to a village. Once the fire was extinguished, because there were no fatalities Lincolnshire police left it to the relevant military teams to run the area. As result, potentially sensitive debris was left vulnerable to harmful hostile actors over quite a wide range of areas. The purpose of the clauses is to address the direct experience of what happened during that unfortunate aircraft accident.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked a range of questions, including one on civilian light fixed-wing aircraft. The answer is that the provision currently applies only to military aircraft and does apply to foreign aircraft. The powers in the Bill enhance the powers in common law to try to compensate for what happened with that F-15 aircraft. Although the hon. Lady made an incredibly good point about search and seizure powers, as it stands they are not included in the clauses. I will go away and think about that point and ask my officials to look into it in more detail.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Sabotage
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 12 is a substantial addition to the Bill so warrants further consideration. It introduces a new bespoke offence of state-sponsored sabotage, capturing activity conducted for, on behalf of or for the benefit of a foreign power, resulting in damage to property, sites and data affecting the UK’s interests and national security, which we are happy to support. What has taken the Government so long? It is an extremely welcome provision.
The need for a specific criminal offence of sabotage on the UK’s statute books is long overdue. The necessity for it has increased over time. Over recent years, the nature of sabotage—most notably, the nature of cyber-attacks and sabotage—has changed rapidly. Subsection (3) outlines all the ways in which the act of sabotage can manifest. Subsection (1)(b) is explicit, covering a person’s intent and whether they are
“reckless as to whether their conduct will result in damage”.
As MI5 director general Ken McCallum highlighted,
“cyber is no longer some abstract contest between hackers in it for the thrill or between states jockeying for position in some specialised domain...cyber consistently bites on our everyday lives.”
I was struck by the evidence provided by Paddy McGuinness, the former deputy national security adviser, when I asked him about clause 12 last week. He said:
“one of the difficulties with this grey space activity…is that if you have a presence for an intelligence purpose, you can flick it over and turn it into a disruptive or destructive attack. That is where that preparatory bit is quite important, too: understanding that the simple fact of engaging and being present quickly takes you towards sabotage. I think these are absolutely vital powers.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 24, Q47.]
The sense that someone engaged in espionage on behalf of a hostile state could just as easily be instructed to engage in sabotage reminds us why the new offences are necessary as a package of measures. A report published by Lloyd’s of London only last month crystalises the threat posed by cyber-attacks and sabotage. The report, entitled “Shifting powers: Physical cyber risk in a changing geopolitical landscape” and written in partnership with the Centre for Risk Studies at the University of Cambridge, warned that:
“Whilst most cyber-attacks are digital, physical cyber-attacks–defined as virtual attacks which trigger physical disruption–are becoming increasingly commonplace. The rise of state-sponsored cyber-attacks is a significant focus for businesses and governments, driven by an evolving geopolitical landscape in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
The UK’s national cyber strategy, published in February this year, also demonstrates the potential threat posed by cyber-sabotage. It states:
“The threats we face in and through cyberspace have grown in intensity, complexity and severity in recent years. Cyber attacks against the UK are conducted by an expanding range of state actors, criminal groups (sometimes acting at the direction of states or with their implicit approval) and activists for the purpose of espionage, commercial gain, sabotage and disinformation.”
From this, we can see that cyber-activity could be prosecutable under a number of the new offences, but I know that the ability to robustly take on sabotage with clause 12 is welcome to those on the frontline of mounting the UK’s defences.
Although outside of scope of the Bill, I will briefly make the point that the Computer Misuse Act 1990, which was the first major legislative attempt to tackle cyber-crime and criminalise hacking, is now also long overdue an update. May I suggest that we have another look at that legislation alongside the Bill and the provisions in this clause, to ensure that we are meeting the cyber-challenges we face as a nation as robustly as is required?
Existing legislation largely fails to accommodate for state-sponsored acts of sabotage. The Criminal Damage Act 1971 defines sabotage as:
“A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.”
We therefore welcome the foreign power condition in subsection (1)(d), which will allow police to bring to justice those who work for or conspire with hostile Governments to prejudice the safety or interests of the UK.
We welcome that the offence will link to the preparatory conduct offence to give law enforcement and the intelligence agencies the powers to intervene at an early stage. Despite the changing nature of sabotage, we also welcome that the clause contains provisions to tackle acts of physical damage on sensitive sites, such as critical national infrastructure, property belonging to Her Majesty’s Government, military buildings and sites, other defence assets, or acts that impact goods, systems or services supplying the UK, such as data centres or undersea cable infrastructure. If I have not been clear enough, we very much welcome the addition of clause 12 to the Bill.
Stuart C. McDonald
I echo much of what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, said. As ever, I have slight concerns about the breadth of the foreign power condition and how that might interact with sabotage—for example, if a protest on behalf of one of the aforementioned non-governmental organisations causes some damage to a site. Of course, such protestors should face criminal law, but I would hope it would be general criminal law rather than the sabotage offence set out in clause 12 and the heavy sentence that comes with that.
For all the reasons set out by the shadow Minister, we support the inclusion of clause 12. The Minister moved the clause formally, but it would be useful for us to talk it through because this is a new departure for us, and it would be interesting to hear the Government’s thoughts on the nature of the offence.
Stephen McPartland
I will go through clause 12 in a bit more detail. As hon. Members have outlined, the clause makes provision for an offence of sabotage. It is designed to capture intentional reckless activity resulting in damage to assets including property, sites and electronic systems where the person is acting in a way that they know or should know is prejudicial to the UK’s safety and interests.
A state-linked saboteur poses as much of a potential risk to the UK’s national security as someone undertaking terrorist activities. Working to further the interests of a foreign state by damaging something of importance to the UK is sabotage and therefore should be reflected as such.
Although there are offences in legislation that cover similar activities, sabotage as a crime is not an offence under domestic legislation, which was a surprise to me. The existing related offences were not developed to address the specific threat of state-linked sabotage, and the new offence more appropriately addresses the threat that this type of state threat poses. For example, none of the existing offences has a link to a foreign power. Clause 12 resolves those issues by giving law enforcement and the intelligence agencies the tools to tackle sabotage that is carried out for a purpose that the saboteur knows, or should know, prejudices the UK’s safety or interests.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 13 provides for a criminal offence of foreign interference. It is and always will be an absolute priority to protect the UK against such interference. The principal aim of the clause is to create a more challenging operating environment for, and to deter and disrupt the activities of, foreign states who seek to undermine UK interests, our institutions, political system and our rights, and ultimately prejudice our national security.
Clause 13 will act as a tool for disruption and deterrence, raising the cost to foreign states of carrying out interference activity by holding those responsible to account for their actions. I noted the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood very clearly. I have raised that issue myself, and it is something that we will talk about in the Home Department, because I understand those concerns. I will address the issue of recklessness later in my remarks. Reference was also made to the foreign power condition, which we will debate in much more detail later in our proceedings.
On the foreign influence registration scheme, I have spoken to hon. Members about that. The Home Secretary has committed to its formal introduction during Committee proceedings, and I put on record that I would like it to introduced during Committee proceedings in the Commons, so that it can be debated properly and dealt with here before being considered in the House of Lords. Donations from shell companies will be dealt with in the economic crime Bill.
We know that states around the world, including the UK, conduct open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests. That is a welcome part of transparent international engagement and is vital to the UK in achieving its interests. However, some states seek to further their strategic interests by going further than overt political influence, such as through cultivating and manipulating relationships with individuals and entities in the UK where power and influence lies and undertaking deceptive lobbying operations to shape public policy making. Although not necessarily hostile, those “interference” activities are typically non-transparent and outside the norms of diplomacy.
In our approach to legislating against foreign interference, we have chosen to target the intended effect of the foreign interference rather than the specific method used to achieve that result. We considered whether it would be more appropriate and effective to create specific offences, such as a bespoke “hack and leak” and disinformation offences, but that approach risked leaving gaps in our ability to prosecute foreign interference. Disinformation campaigns seek to sow discord and undermine public confidence in our institutions and values. Often, the damage caused by disinformation cannot be measured until long after the information is in the public domain. Our approach to foreign interference is intended to enable harmful behaviour to be disrupted at an early stage, before significant damage occurs. That is yet another reason to focus on the intended effect of foreign interference, as opposed to focusing on specific actions and methods of a state actor.
Clause 13 has been constructed with three conditions that must all be met in order for a person to have committed an offence. As is the case throughout the Bill, there must be a link to a foreign power, that is to say where conduct is undertaken for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. A person must intend that their conduct, or that a course of conduct of which their conduct forms a part, will have a specific effect. I will now turn to those effects to more detail.
The first stipulated effect is interfering with the exercise of a convention right as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom. The aim of encompassing such intended effect is to catch activities that interfere with a right that is already protected from unjustifiable domestic interference under UK law such as freedom of speech. It has been evidenced that foreign states have engaged in activity that seeks to intimidate or threaten diaspora communities to stop engaging in lawful protest activities, or to embrace their home country or face punishment. It is our aim that such hostile activity can be stopped through this targeted approach.
The second and third effects look at affecting the exercise by any person of their public functions and manipulating whether or how someone uses services provided in the exercise of those public functions. The first of these two effects could relate to the functions of a person who holds public office, such as a Member of Parliament. The type of activity this effect could capture, subject to the other legal conditions being met, is conduct that seeks to affect a political decision. The second of the two effects could be manipulating whether or how any person makes use of vaccination services. In isolation, this is of course not a crime, but sophisticated and well-resourced state actors will choose topics that divide public opinion and pit us against one another. As I have already touched on, this clause focuses on the person’s intention, as opposed to the vector or means they use to achieve it. That is at the very core of what foreign interference is.
The fourth and fifth effects capture conduct that manipulates whether, or how, any person participates in a political or legal process under the law of the United Kingdom respectively. Examples of the type of activity that we consider those effects capturing, subject to the other legal conditions being met, would be threatening a member of a jury in order to prejudice a trial, stealing evidence of a crime in order to disrupt an investigation, or intending to secure the election of candidates with views favourable to, or favoured by, the foreign power.
The sixth effect is consistent with other offences in the Bill and could cover foreign interference in UK defence and security interests or trade deals being negotiated with countries around the world.
In addition to the foreign power condition needing to be met and an intention to cause one of the effects in subsection (2), the person’s conduct must meet at least one of three specific conditions: A, B or C. Condition A is that the person’s conduct constitutes an offence or, if it takes place in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence if it took place in England and Wales. That reflects the potential for foreign interference to be conducted through a range of methods, all with different outcomes. In seeking to bring about one of the effects in subsection (2), a foreign state actor could, in theory, commit an offence such as fraud or bribery in the course of their conduct.
Condition B is met when a person’s conduct involves coercion of any kind. The term coercion captures aggressive and violent forms of conduct such as damaging or destroying, or threatening to damage or destroy, a person’s property, or damaging or threatening to damage a person’s reputation. In addition, the term “coercion” also encompasses activity that causes spiritual injury to, or place undue spiritual pressure on, a person. This term follows existing precedents, as debated during the passage of the Elections Act 2022.
Condition C is met when a person’s conduct involves making a misrepresentation. A misrepresentation may include making either a statement or by any other kind of conduct and may be either expressed or implied. This covers a misrepresentation as to the person’s identity or purpose, as well as presenting information in a way that amounts to a misrepresentation, even if some or all of the information is true. As the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated, information can be weaponised. The new offence of foreign interference is a significant step forward in the UK’s response to tackling state-sponsored disinformation. We believe that the vast majority of state-sponsored disinformation captured by this clause will be done so by meeting condition C.
It is right that the framework we have devised consists of three high legal tests, which must all be met for an offence to apply. That is an effective and appropriate way to safeguard against capturing legitimate forms of influence or undermining and eroding the freedoms and values we are actively seeking to safeguard.
Additionally, this clause provides that the offence applies regardless of whether a person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. This important component reflects the threat landscape of the 21st century and enables activity conducted overseas to be captured. I must reiterate that if this component did not apply to the clause as drafted, vast swathes of hostile activity could go unpunished, which could ultimately undermine the UK’s safety and interests. The provision in clause 13(10) is consistent with other offences in the Bill.
As I have said, clause 13 is not about restricting the rights and liberties of the British people. It reinforces such protections and privileges we care so deeply about. As I have noted, the offence consists of a framework with three explicit legal conditions that must all be met in order for a person’s conduct to be caught. Furthermore, the measures underpinning this clause also include the requirement of Attorney General consent in England and Wales, and Advocate General in Northern Ireland, in order to bring forward a prosecution.
Turning to the penalty, we propose a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction, or a fine, or both. That reflects the seriousness of the harm that state threats can have on the UK and its interests. This is about activity that intends to interfere in our democracy, and we must not be complacent in ensuring that sentencing judges have available to them penalties that can reflect the potential harm caused by this type of conduct.
Therefore, the best way of tackling the significant threat we face from hostile activity by states is to ensure that we have appropriate and proportionate measure that do not overshadow our freedoms. As previously stated, I am committed to ensuring that we have a full suite of provisions in our arsenal to protect our national security. I hope the Committee will agree on the clear requirement for clause 13.
Government amendment 9 creates a bridge from the offence in clause 13 to the priority offences in the Online Safety Bill, which will strengthen the Government’s response to the state-sponsored disinformation that seeks to undermine the UK’s interests. The new offence of foreign interference will criminalise state-sponsored disinformation affecting the UK, allowing us to disrupt and deter foreign actors engaging in disinformation campaigns against the UK. As well as prosecuting perpetrators where possible, we need online platforms to take action against the content. Designating the offence as a priority offence in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill will require online platforms to guard against and act swiftly to remove content that amounts to an offence.
The risk assessment and safety duties provided for in the Online Safety Bill include the use of proportionate measures to reduce and manage the risk of harm to individuals and prevent users from coming across priority illegal content on the service. Where priority illegal content is present on the service, providers must minimise the length of time for which it is present and also swiftly remove the content on being alerted to it.
Officials in the Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport continue to work closely with Ofcom and platforms to ensure that guidance is produced to allow platforms to take proportionate steps towards removing state-sponsored disinformation. To comply with these duties, platforms will have to consider the design and features of their service and the operation of their algorithms. In the context of the foreign interference offence, that could include measures to ensure that platform manipulation, such as engaging in artificially co-ordinated messaging campaigns, is more difficult, thus mitigating the risk of co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour and disinformation more broadly.
While amendment 9 ensures robust action on state-sponsored disinformation, it must be set in the context of a regime that will also defend freedom of expression and the invaluable role of a free press. Platforms and Ofcom will have duties relating to freedom of expression for which they can be held to account. Platforms will not be able to arbitrarily remove harmful content. They will need to be clear what content is acceptable on their services and enforce the rules consistently. Users will have access to effective mechanisms to appeal the removal of content without good reason.
It is right for the Government to go further in addressing disinformation and wider information operations undertaken and amplified by foreign states. Amendment 9 will address the most concerning information campaigns being amplified by foreign powers who are seeking to advance their interests and harm the UK.
On the point about recklessness, my understanding is that we are trying to get the balance right between legitimate and illegitimate restrictions. The concern was that including recklessness would possibly widen the scope and would then move into the political and diplomatic arenas. There is a reason—it may not be the best one, but there is a reason.
Amendment 51 seeks to modify condition A subsection (4), so that conduct outside the UK is within the scope of condition A where such conduct would amount to an offence in any part of the UK, not just England and Wales. Condition A
“is that the person’s conduct constitutes an offence or, if it takes place…outside the United Kingdom, would constitute an offence if it took place in England and Wales.”
Conduct taking place in Scotland or Northern Ireland that constitutes an offence in Scotland or Northern Ireland would be covered here. It is only where the conduct takes place outside the UK that the criminal law of England and Wales is currently used as the benchmark. The clause has been drafted this way for operational effectiveness and to ensure no unintended or complex consequences where, for example, a prosecution is brought in one part of the UK but relies on a charge from another part of the UK. We expect the amendment would have little practical impact on prosecutions.
However, that said, I accept the spirit of the amendment and I personally believe that we should be seeking to legislate for all parts of the UK. If the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw the amendment, I propose to take the point away to consider further. In particular, I want to ensure that there are no unintended practical difficulties for investigators and prosecutors that may make bringing charges for foreign interference, which can often emanate from overseas, harder than necessary. Another consideration is ensuring that any amendment does not affect the utility of our Government amendment to add the offence of foreign interference to the Online Safety Bill, where platform operators will be under a duty to guard against and swiftly remove content that amounts to an offence of foreign interference.
I will consider those points and hope to be able to come back favourably at a later stage. I ask that the hon. Gentleman withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 9, in clause 13, page 12, line 13, at end insert—
“(12A) In the Online Safety Act 2022, in Schedule 7 (priority offences), before the italic heading “Inchoate offences” insert—
“Foreign interference
32A An offence under section 13 of the National Security Act 2022 (foreign interference).”—(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment amends the Online Safety Act expected to result from the Online Safety Bill currently before Parliament to make foreign interference a priority offence for the purposes of that Act.
Clause 13, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Foreign interference in elections
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 10 and 11
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill
New clause 3—Reporting on disinformation originating from foreign powers—
(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person or body to review the extent of disinformation originating from foreign powers which presents a threat, or potential threat, to national security.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must include an assessment of the extent of foreign interference in elections.
(3) A review under subsection (1) may include—
(a) examining the number and scale of offences committed, and estimating the number and scale of instances where an offence is suspected to have been committed, under—
(i) section 13, where Condition C is met, and
(ii) section 14,
and,
(b) any other matters the person or body considers relevant to the matters mentioned in subsections (1) and (2).
(4) The person or body appointed under subsection (1) may be the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, or another person or body the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) A review must be carried out under this section in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which section 13 comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(6) Each review under this section must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(7) The person or body must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under this section as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(8) On receiving a report under subsection (7), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(9) The Secretary of State may pay to the person or body—
(a) expenses incurred in carrying out the functions of the reviewer under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines,
except where financial provision is already made to the person or body for the discharge of the person or body’s functions, of which this section may form part”
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in schedule 1 and the person’s conduct meets the foreign power condition found in clause 24. I will also deal with amendments 10 and 11 and new clause 3 in the course of my speech.
As I touched on in highlighting the necessity of clause 13, activity that interferes in our elections, political processes and democratic events reflects the most egregious form of state threats activity. It is therefore absolutely right that we have the tools and powers at our disposal to be able to deter, disrupt and withstand the actions of foreign states who seek to harm the UK and its interests. The clause’s primary aim is to provide for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in the related schedule and the person’s conduct meets the requisite foreign power condition. That will help to create a more challenging operating environment for those who seek to do the UK harm, raising the cost to foreign states of carrying out interference activity by holding those responsible to account for their actions.
We have constructed a provision that applies to a range of existing electoral offences under the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The offences remain unaffected, but, where the foreign power condition is met, a substantially increased maximum sentence will be available. For example, existing offences under the Representation of the People Act criminalise interfering with elections—for example, undue influence in section 114A, bribery in section 113, and tampering with ballot or nomination papers in section 65—but the maximum penalties available do not reflect the significance of malign political foreign interference at the hands of a foreign power. Where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in schedule 1 and their conduct meets the requisite foreign power condition, the maximum sentence available to the court will be substantially increased.
As I mentioned, part 1 of schedule 1 sets out a table that lists the relevant electoral offences in column 1 and the specified maximum term for each relevant offence in column 2. Part 2 of the schedule provides for necessary amendments to the Acts from which the offences are taken, where the clause applies. Let me turn briefly to the table in part 1 of schedule 1. In respect of the relevant electoral offences from the Representation of the People Act 1983, there will be a seven-year maximum sentence for offences relating to personation, postal and proxy voting, tampering with nomination papers, and handling of postal voting documents by political campaigners. There will be a four-year maximum sentence for offences relating to providing false statements in nomination papers, bribery, treating, and undue influence.
In respect of the relevant electoral offences from the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, there will a four-year maximum sentence for offences relating to information about donors, providing a false declaration about source of donation or a false declaration as to residence condition, failing to return donations, evading restrictions on donations, failing to comply with requirements about recording donations, providing a false declaration in a donation report, donating to individuals and members associations, loaning to individuals and members, donations to recognised third parties, and donations to permitted participants. There is also a two-year maximum sentence for an offence relating to incurring controlled expenditure in contravention of restriction.
These offences and associated penalties have been determined following robust engagements between the Home Office, other Departments and law enforcement agencies, highlighting that the provisions under the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 signify the most egregious conduct associated with political and electoral interference. Therefore, if such conduct has been carried out for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power, it fundamentally changes the seriousness of the conduct already criminalised, and therefore requires a greater and more severe sentence. Obtaining the strongest possible deterrence is essential to deliver our broader objectives of pushing back on state threats and making the UK a hard operating environment in which to conduct hostile activity.
The offences in clause 14 are excluded from clause 16 —dealing with the aggravating factor where the foreign power condition is met—to aid investigations and create clarity for prosecutions. Many of the offences in the Bill have the foreign power condition built in, such as clause 13, and we have replicated that approach for the offences in part 1 of schedule 1. Many of the offences under part 1 of schedule 1 have a time limit for investigations. We have removed that to reflect the complexity of state threat investigations, but that also means that we must exclude the offences contained in that schedule from clause 16.
I now turn to Government amendment 10, which is concerned with the relevant electoral offences referenced in clause 14 and contained in part 1 of schedule 1 to this Bill. For context, clause 14 provides for substantially increased maximum penalties where a person commits any of the existing electoral offences set out in the related schedule and the person’s conduct meets the foreign power condition in clause 24. These offences are currently found solely in the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. The relevant electoral offences in part 1 of schedule 1 in the RPA are applied in several pieces of secondary legislation. Where that is the case, the Interpretation Act 1978 effectively cascades the effect of clause 14 so that it will apply to the applied versions of the offences without the need to include an express provision in clause 14.
Government amendment 10 proposes to include certain offences contained in the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962 as relevant electoral offences. Those are offences that are akin to the offences from the RPA that are already set out in the schedule. Given the complexity of electoral law, it was right for us to ensure that we have fully considered what else we ought to include in relation to foreign interference in elections, given the threats that we face in this space. That is why the amendment includes the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962. That piece of legislation is specific to Northern Ireland and contains its own stand-alone offences. Many of them are akin to those in the RPA—for example, personation, bribery and treating. Because they are stand-alone offences and not applied versions of the RPA offences, it is necessary to include them expressly in the schedule of offences to which clause 14 relates.
Although the current list of relevant electoral offences under part 1 of schedule 1 has been determined following extensive engagements with wider Government, law enforcement and the devolved Administrations, it is evident that these additions need to be made to clause 14 to respond fully to the threat posed by foreign interference in elections. These changes will ensure a complete and coherent footprint across the whole United Kingdom in responding to foreign interference in elections. It is right that the Government have considered our approach for dealing with foreign political interference and are seeking to expand the list of relevant electoral offences in order to provide greater protections against foreign interference in elections. The amendment does just that and I hope the Committee will support it.
Separately from the amendment, the topic of shell companies being used to make donations to political parties and to hide foreign donations was raised extensively on Second Reading, so it is right that I address what the Government are doing in that area. First, there are strict rules that ensure that foreign money is prohibited from entering through proxy donors, providing a safeguard against impermissible donations by the back door. It is also an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or facilitating the making of an impermissible donation. Under this clause, substantially increased maximum sentences will apply to those offences where the foreign power condition is met.
Secondly, UK electoral law sets out a stringent regime of donations and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, and only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. This includes registered UK electors—including registered overseas electors—UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. The recently passed Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.
Transparency is the best form of disinfectant with regards to who is donating or contributing to political parties, and that is why all political parties, recognised third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report this to the Electoral Commission or local returning officer. This information is publicly available. In addition, political parties, third-party campaigners and candidates are required to record all contributions over £500. It is also right that the Electoral Commission publishes information about larger donations online for transparency.
New clause 3 would require the Home Secretary to create an independent body for monitoring disinformation originating from foreign states, producing a report to be laid before the House on an annual basis. The new clause would duplicate existing work being carried forward by Government to ensure that the threat posed by disinformation spread by foreign states is monitored effectively. It is, and always will be, an absolute priority to protect our democratic and electoral processes from foreign interference. That is why the Government have robust systems in place to protect UK democracy, bringing together Government, civil society and private sector organisations to monitor and respond to attempted interference, in whatever form, to ensure our democracy stays open, vibrant and transparent.
The intelligence agencies produce and contribute to regular assessments of state threats, including potential interference in UK democratic processes. We keep such assessments under review and, where necessary, update them in response to new intelligence. Where new information emerges, the Government will always consider the most appropriate use of any intelligence they develop or receive, including whether it is appropriate to make it public.
Ahead of major democratic events, the Government stand up the election cell, which brings together capabilities and expertise from across Government to address complex risks that threaten our democratic processes. The cell works closely with the Electoral Commission, police, and devolved Administrations to ensure rapid information sharing and a response that covers key risks, including electoral logistics, policing, counter-terrorism, cyber-security, disinformation and electoral interference.
During major democratic events the DCMS-led counter-disinformation unit works with the election cell and plays a pivotal role in the protection of elections by working with a range of partners to understand the extent and reach of disinformation across a number of risks, including foreign interference. The Government are keen to do more to tackle state-sponsored disinform-ation. That is why we have now also put forward an amendment to make the foreign interference offence a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. That will require companies in scope of the regime to conduct regular risk assessments for the presence of content that constitutes an offence and to put in place proportionate systems and processes to mitigate the possibility of users encountering this content. That will include disinformation spread by foreign states that is intended to undermine our democratic, political and legal processes.
Furthermore, the Online Safety Bill’s advisory committee on disinformation and misinformation will provide cross-sector expertise on disinformation and misinformation and advice to Ofcom about how providers of regulated services should deal with disinformation and misinformation. It will advise Ofcom on how it should exercise its transparency powers and its duty to promote media literacy in relation to disinformation and misinformation. This could include recommendations relating to disinformation originating from a foreign power, for which this amendment seeks to establish an independent review.
However, the Government can see merit in considering whether additional oversight is required for state threats legislation, including the offence of foreign interference, and we will come to a broader amendment in this regard later in Committee. In view of the significant cross-Government work in this area and the need to consider the most effective way of ensuring transparency and oversight of state threats legislation more broadly, I ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw her amendment when the time comes.
In closing, the construction and inclusion of a provision for foreign interference in elections reflects how seriously the Government take the threat posed by hostile activity by foreign states. I am sure the Committee is committed to ensuring that we have a holistic and effective suite of measures to tackle such corrosive activity and to counter its malign impact. I hope the Committee will agree that there is a clear requirement for clause 14.
Maria Eagle
I have a couple of points to ask the Minister about. The clause is a generally necessary and helpful provision. It provides for the offence of preparatory conduct, and makes it an offence to do things that are not an offence at the moment. The point, however, is that it helps law enforcement to intervene at an earlier stage, before the preparatory conduct has turned into the capacity to commit whatever it is that is being prepared for. It must be difficult for those seeking to disrupt such activities to have to sit around and wait for an offence to be committed before putting a stop to the preparatory conduct.
The purpose of the clause is clear, and it will be a useful addition. However, will the Minister explain why the clause covers preparatory conduct for various offences, but not all the offences in the Bill? Why does it not cover preparatory conduct with the intention of committing a new foreign interference offence, for example, because it does not? What is the reasoning behind that offence being left out of the clause?
It would be helpful for us to hear from the Minister what the thinking is in that regard. If it is good to have an offence of preparatory conduct to prevent at an early stage offences that might otherwise be committed that would be quite serious, why not for the foreign interference offence?
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides a disruptive tool to tackle preparatory activities carried out by those who seek to cause us harm. Malign actions by states have the potential to cause significant damage to the UK and its interests, and it is therefore vital that the law can intervene at an early stage when preparatory activities are under way. That is already provided for under the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the Law Commission has recognised the importance of maintaining the provision.
The offence covers preparatory conduct in two scenarios. The first is preparation to commit acts that would constitute one of the following offences: obtaining or disclosing protected information, obtaining or disclosing trade secrets, entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, and sabotage. The second is preparation to commit state threats activity that involves serious violence, that endangers life or that creates a serious risk to the health and safety of the public. The offence of preparatory conduct covers those who are preparing to carry out harmful acts themselves, and those who make preparations for another person to commit the acts.
Importantly, the preparatory conduct offence is committed only where there is an intention to commit a relevant act and that can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt—I hope that provides some reassurance. The element of intention provides an important safeguard that will prevent the offence from capturing legitimate acts, or acts undertaken by individuals who did not engage intentionally in state threats activity. In addition, consent will be required by the Attorney General, or the Advocate General in Northern Ireland, before a prosecution can be brought under the offence.
When preparatory acts are caught at an early stage, it may be unclear exactly what the perpetrator intended as the ultimate outcome—for example, an act of sabotage or obtaining trade secrets. The offence may therefore be committed if there is a general intention that the preparatory conduct will result in harmful state threats activity of a general nature. That is in line with the approach taken by Parliament when it provided the offence of the preparation of terrorist acts under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. A requirement to demonstrate that the preparatory act was undertaken with the intention that specific harmful state threats activity result would, in many cases, constrain the offence in a way that would be wholly undesirable and potentially allow state actors to evade the law.
Those caught preparing to harm us could face a maximum sentence of up to life imprisonment. The Committee will be aware that the ultimate decision on the length of the penalty faced will be decided by the courts, taking into account the severity of the preparatory activity and the harms that were intended to result from it, which could include long-lasting damage to the UK or the loss of life. I totally understand what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said about life imprisonment being a heavy penalty, and the courts would not give such a sentence for some of the examples that he described. But the courts could impose life imprisonment if someone was preparing to commit murder and the courts would want to treat some activities in the same manner, because if someone had another person assassinated, the court would want the full ability to impose a life sentence in those circumstances.
We know all too well that state actors operate using sophisticated methods, and that they can cause unimaginable harm. I therefore stress the importance of clause 15 as a key tool in our fight against states who seek to harm us. Where we can disrupt state actors at a preparatory stage, we must do so, before they have the opportunity to manifest their intentions to cause harm to our nation. As we discussed earlier, the ability to deal with the offence already exists in the Official Secrets Act 1920, and the proposed offence in the Bill modernises its terms. With regard to why the offence is to be expanded to apply to some rather than others, we believe that we have carefully assessed the link between the two, and we do not think it is necessary or appropriate to extend the offences to apply to foreign interference or assisting a foreign intelligence service at present. That is something that we will continue to look at.
Effectively, we need to continue to get the powers on the statute book to help the intelligence services and provide them with the toolkit that they need to help keep us safe.
On amendment 52, which seeks to raise the threshold—
Maria Eagle
I was trying to work out the Minister’s answer to me. The foreign interference offence in clause 13, which we have debated, covers a wide range of harmful activity, including manipulating legal or political processes, interfering with fundamental rights. Why is the offence of preparatory conduct not applying to those activities? What is the reasoning, because it would be an important disruption tool for authorities to try to prevent foreign interference, would it not?
Sally-Ann Hart
Clause 13 on foreign interference refers to a person committing an offence
“if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part”
so that would include preparatory conduct, because it is a course, so the conduct goes from beginning to end. There will be preparatory conduct. Does my hon. Friend agree that that might scoop up the relevant particular point?
Stephen McPartland
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. At the end of the day, my understanding is that the offences are designed differently, which is why we were unable to capture the relevant preparatory activity as part of the offences themselves. I am not a lawyer, but effectively those offences are designed differently, and that is where we are.
Amendment 52 seeks to raise the threshold of that which be proven to show the preparatory nature of the clause. Those who intentionally engage in preparatory conduct, as specified under clause 15, pose a significant risk to national security, and that will be true regardless of whether or not their actions materially assist the ultimate outcome. For example, if a security guard in the employment of a foreign power leaves a door open to facilitate access into a prohibited place by a hostile actor, that would constitute a preparatory act. If the hostile actor then used an alternative route to access the site, for example, cutting through a fence, the guard’s act would not have materially assisted them and his acts would go unpunished. I am sure that the Committee would agree that that would be an unacceptable outcome.
Furthermore, the offence enables disruptive action to be commenced at an early stage, to provide the greatest chance of avoiding the harmful activity occurring. It will not always be possible to determine the end goal of a person’s conduct, and thus whether their preparations are of material assistance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may not even have decided the precise harmful acts that will result from their conduct, but rather will have the intent that their preparatory conduct will bring out harmful activity in general. However, in order to be caught by this offence the individual must have the intent that their conduct will bring about one of the relevant harmful outcomes. I hope that reassures the Committee that the offence cannot be used to prosecute those who undertake actions without any awareness or intent that it could support the commission of a relevant act.
The amendment would undermine the utility of what is otherwise a key preventive tool. Therefore, I do not support it, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I particularly take his point about the door being left open, and that ultimately ending up not making a material contribution to what happened thereafter. I will go away and think again about the issue, but I think the Minister’s explanation was very helpful. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
Although the Bill provides a range of offences specifically targeted at state threats activity, it will not always be appropriate or possible for harmful activity to be prosecuted under the Bill. Where offences already exist on the statute book that deal effectively with the relevant state threats activity, there is no need to create a similar offence in the Bill. For example, the offence of murder deals effectively with state-sponsored assassinations.
While the Bill provides a suite of offences and accompanying tools and powers, there remain cases in which it will be difficult to secure prosecution due to the covert nature of the activities and the difficulties involved in presenting admissible evidence to a court to illustrate all the components of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In some cases, however, it might be possible or more appropriate to charge the individual with another offence on the statute book.
The aim of the aggravating factor in clauses 16 to 18 is to ensure that in such scenarios the state threats element is acknowledged in court and offenders are sentenced accordingly. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in cases where the foreign power condition—to which I have referred a number of times in Committee—is satisfied. Currently, if someone is convicted of an offence and it is known that the offence was linked to state threats activity, the judge may take that into account, but there is no formal mechanism to require the judge to factor that in when making a sentencing decision, and there are no clear definitions to enable the court to apply that consistently. This is in contrast to terrorism, where there is already a statutory requirement to acknowledge a terrorist connection when considering the seriousness of certain offences. That has been effective in cases such as those of the murder of Jo Cox MP, and Lee Rigby, where the seriousness of the offences was aggravated by the sentencing judge because of the terrorist connection, so a higher sentence was imposed.
The Government believe that the state threats aggravating factor should be available in relation to any offence. A state threat is a unique national security threat that can take a wide range of forms. We must ensure that our justice system is able to acknowledge all forms that such activity might take, and be able to penalise it accordingly.
Clause 19 ensures that the aggravating factor can apply to those who are convicted of offences in service courts. The service courts system applies to those who are bound by the Armed Forces Act 2006—for example, serving members of the armed forces. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in the same way in service courts as it does in civilian courts, in that if an offender pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence—for example, theft—and the foreign power condition is met, the offender’s sentence will be aggravated accordingly.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I support the proposals. My concern, which is one I will express throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Bill’s relationship with the Official Secrets Act 1989, under which the maximum penalty is two years. The Minister or his officials might not know the answer now, but I am happy for him to write to me. How will the two Acts intersect? Clearly, if someone has committed an offence, they will want to be found guilty under the Official Secrets Act, under which the sentencing powers are limited, as opposed to under the Act that this Bill will become. That will be the problem with the Bill—I still cannot understand why the Government did not do both: what they promised, which was the full reform, and a Bill for a new Official Secrets Act.
Stephen McPartland
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are reforming the first three Official Secrets Acts, but not the 1989 Act, with the Bill. We will write to him with the information to explain how that is going to work.
In summary, the aggravating factor provides another tool for prosecutors to deploy, and helps to future-proof the Bill by ensuring that our judicial system can respond to any evolving state threats and activity in the future.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Ali. I very much welcome your early judgment call on jacket wearing; we are all eternally grateful.
Clause 16, as the Minister outlined, inserts new section 69A into the sentencing code to provide a new aggravating factor for sentencing when the foreign power condition is met in relation to an offence. The court will make its determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing, which may include the evidence heard at trial or evidence heard at a Newton hearing following a guilty plea. If the court determines that the foreign power condition is met in relation to conduct that constitutes the offence, it must treat that as an aggravating factor when sentencing the offender and must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
We are introducing a measure that will mean that, if an individual is found guilty of an offence that is not outlined in the Bill, but the foreign power condition can be proven, a judge may aggravate their sentence. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary provided a serious recent example to highlight why she felt the measure was needed, and we very much recognise the merit in that.
However, I note that a sentence would be aggravated only up to the maximum available for the original offence. I have sought a legal opinion about whether there is a precedent for aggravating an offence beyond the maximum sentence where deemed appropriate. Although the judge ultimately has discretion to sentence beyond the sentencing guidelines, it is far from common practice and will be subject to appeal.
I want to work through the application of the measure. For example, if someone acting on behalf of a foreign state were to commit a section 18 assault against someone who was going to speak at an event against that Government as a means of preventing them from honouring that commitment, it might be possible to prosecute them under some of the new offences in the Bill. If that is not the case and they are prosecuted for the section 18 assault, the foreign power condition having been met and the sentence aggravated, it is still subject only to the maximum sentence for a section 18 assault. I feel that the weight of the very serious sentences in this Bill will not be felt by the perpetrator in that instance.
Will the Minister outline why we are not able to push the sentences under clauses 16, 17 and 18 further? Will he comment on whether the usual so-called early plea discount will be ruled out in cases where the foreign power condition is met?
Clause 17 introduces the measure for offences in Northern Ireland, and clause 18 makes a corresponding provision to the one in clause 16 for sentences to be aggravated where the foreign power condition is met for offences in Scotland. Clause 19 amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make corresponding provision for service courts considering the seriousness of a serious offence for the purposes of sentencing. The case for tougher sentencing is even stronger in those circumstances, given that people serving in the armed forces and acting on behalf of our nation potentially have a level of access to the UK security apparatus that others do not have. We recognise the seriousness and necessity of these measures, and fully support them, but will the Minister address the points I have raised?
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I have one very short point. I am very supportive of these measures. Clause 18, as we have heard, relates to Scotland. As I understand it, it operates and is drafted similarly to other aggravations in Scottish criminal law. I just want to be absolutely sure that the Government are collaborating closely with the Scottish Government to ensure it fits with the schemes in Scottish criminal law. What discussions has he had with compatriots up there?
Stephen McPartland
I am very grateful for hon. Members’ responses and support for these clauses, and I will try to provide clarity on the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax.
Serious offences that have a state threat component, such as murder and violent offences, already have significant penalties, as the hon. Lady said, and the aggravating factor will therefore allow for those sentences. However, she is right that for lower-level offences such as harassment, stalking or common assault, this would be a useful example of how these powers can be used if someone is not able to use some of the other clauses, so that they can identify that this person is part of the problem, and the person can at least be prosecuted for something, whereas at the moment it would not really be possible to prosecute them.
Also, the aggravating factor allows for an increase in the sentence, but within the sentencing code. The hon. Lady is correct that if it was a one-year sentence under the guidelines, the aggravating factor would be a maximum sentence of one year.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 to 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Powers of search etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to consider the following: Government amendment 12.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Robust investigative tools are crucial to enable the police effectively to counter threats by state actors, which operate using highly sophisticated means and often have access to significant resources and are skilled in tradecraft.
Clause 20 introduces schedule 2, which provides the police with powers of search and seizure when investigating threats posed by state actors to the UK and its interests. These powers replace the power of search in section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Under the existing powers and those provided in schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed. This threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity.
Mr Jones
Can the Minister clarify what he means by “reasonable”? I know what it means in law, but I also know that there is a reasonableness test in the existing section 7 of the Act, which the security services say is not enough? So why is it okay here and it is not okay when it comes to clause 23?
Stephen McPartland
The difference is that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, the police need to be able to identify in this situation that a crime has been committed, whereas for this measure the police are trying to intervene earlier, so that they can stop a crime from being committed. Effectively, that is what the difference is.
We will debate clause 23 when we get to it—
Stephen McPartland
No, no—we will debate clause 23 when we get to it. I will be very happy to talk about clause 23 then.
Stephen McPartland
No. [Laughter.]
As I was saying, clause 20 introduces schedule 2 to the Bill. Under the existing powers and those provided by schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed.
The threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity. General search and seizure powers, such as those provided under PACE, are comparatively restrictive because they do not allow the police to act pre-emptively when there is intelligence to indicate that an offence is about to be committed. So, both the Ministry of Justice in 2014 and the Law Commission in 2020 reviewed the existing power, concluding that it was necessary and that reliance on PACE powers alone would limit the ability of the police to disrupt and investigate state threats.
These powers may only be used to deal with the most serious offences covered by this Bill, as well as where state threats activity involves violence or constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety.
Turning to the powers themselves, part 1 of schedule 2 legislates for powers of search and seizure as they apply in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They provide for the police to gain access to material likely to be evidence of a relevant act, which covers specific offences or certain acts or threats under the Bill.
Where the relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed the powers in part 1 of this schedule are different, depending on the nature of the material sought to reflect the enhanced safeguards that are required to protect confidential material.
Under paragraph 2, for non-confidential material, the police can obtain a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize and retain material. There are two key conditions that a court must be satisfied are met for such a warrant to be granted: first, that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed and, secondly, that the material sought on a premises is likely to be evidence of that act and is not confidential material. Should the police apply for an all-premises warrant, an additional condition applies: it must not be reasonably practicable to set out all the premises that the person of interest occupies or controls, but that may need to be searched. To access confidential material, a production order must be obtained, should this course fail or be unavailable through a warrant.
Stuart C. McDonald
I broadly welcome the provisions. As the hon. Member for Halifax said, they are extensive powers, so I am very sympathetic to her suggestion that they should be subject to review in the same way that other parts of the Bill are. I appreciate that those extensive powers are modelled on the equivalent provisions in terrorism legislation. I have no problem with those provisions being borrowed from such legislation, but they need to be justified in their own context. The Minister has usefully set out why exactly they are needed here. The SNP is broadly supportive of that.
I have a couple of questions. I am not familiar with the idea of allowing police officers or sheriffs to order a person to explain material that is seized. I see that is borrowed from terrorism legislation. However, I wonder how that works alongside the right not to require someone to self-incriminate, particularly when there is an emergency power for police officers to require an explanation—if that is not complied with, it can be a criminal offence. I am interested in how that works; I assume it works in the context of the terrorism legislation, but it would be interesting to hear a bit more about that. I am also interested in the idea of what a “great emergency” amounts to. That is not a concept that I have seen before. Are we talking about threat to life and limb, essentially? I am not sure about that.
My only other point is that how the provisions on search and seizure apply depends largely on how the foreign power condition operates. I said at the outset of our debates on clause 1 that I have some difficulties with how broadly some aspects of the term were drawn. For example, the non-governmental organisations I referred to during that debate and journalists working for a foreign state broadcaster can be brought within the foreign power condition, meaning that they are subject to the search-and-seizure powers. We can probably come back to that in the context of clause 1, but it is relevant to our discussion. It could be those people who are searched or who have documents seized under the schedule, including confidential journalistic material.
Those are a couple of points to emphasise, but we broadly support what is in the clause and the schedule.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for Members’ support. To sum up, the important thing is to recognise that between 2017 and 2022, the powers relating to great emergency have been used seven times in England and Wales and once in Scotland, and they have never once been used by a senior police officer during that five-year period. This will not happen weekly or monthly; it will be a very rare event. We are trying to mirror the legislation that has proven to be successful in the Terrorism Act 2000. The seven days figure also mirrors the legislation in that Act. I totally accept the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax: if the judge has the evidence in front of him and wants to make it a different time period, that is then a judicial decision as opposed to any other kind of decision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Powers of entry, search and seizure
Amendment made: 12, in schedule 2, page 62, line 9, after “rules” insert “and magistrates’ courts rules”.—(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment enables Northern Ireland magistrates’ courts rules to make provision about proceedings under Schedule 2.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 21
Arrest without warrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Currently, the police must rely on the powers of arrest and detention available under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as we discussed earlier, when tackling state threats activity. In contrast, under the Terrorism Act 2000 the police have enhanced powers to facilitate early disruption and the investigation of acts of terrorism and terrorism-related activity.
The enhanced police powers are available for terrorism investigations and have proven very effective at tackling the threat. We consider the risks posed by state threats to be similar and to require enhanced powers and tools. Clause 21 creates a new arrest power whereby a constable can arrest without a warrant anyone who they reasonably suspect is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity. If an individual is arrested under clause 21, the further provisions in the clause and in schedule 3 will apply. We will debate the latter powers shortly.
The police must currently arrest an individual for a state threats offence under the arrest power in PACE. On arrest under PACE, the constable must specify the offence that the person is suspected of committing or being about to commit. For example, that could be foreign interference under clause 13 or obtaining or disclosing protected information under clause 1. As we all know, state threats actors are highly trained operatives, with police often needing to rely on sensitive intelligence to build their case and understand the threat that the suspect might pose to UK national security.
In some circumstances, police might have evidence to suspect an individual’s involvement in state threats activity but might not yet have the full picture to determine the intended offence. In such circumstances, where police have the intelligence to indicate that state threats activity is imminent, police can deploy the arrest power in order to prevent that person from committing the activity. That early disruption by the police is critical in saving time and ensuring that the activity is not allowed to occur. That prevents harm to UK national security and potentially prevents harm to people’s lives.
The clause is modelled on the similar arrest power that operates under the 2000 Act, which has been shown to be effective in providing the police with an early disruption tool. I ask the Committee to support the clause.
Stuart C. McDonald
The provisions are for very significant powers of arrest and people can remain under arrest for a quite striking period of time, so we should be cautious. The key issue for me is subsection (1), because arrest without a warrant is justified not by the suspicion of a specific event set out in the Bill, but by involvement in foreign power threat activity. Will the Minister say a little more about why that decision has been made?
We will obviously get to clause 26 and the definition of “foreign power threat activity” soon, but it is a much broader concept than being under suspicion of one of the particular offences in the Bill. It could be somebody providing assistance or support to individuals, or known to be involved in certain types of conduct. Why have these powers of arrest without warrant been drafted differently compared with the powers on search and seizure? The search-and-seizure powers relate to specific offences under the Bill. The power of arrest without warrant applies to a much broader category of people. Given the significance of the powers, and how long people can be detained for, it is important that we push the Minister a little bit further on why the Bill has been drafted in this way.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the contributions and the general support. On safeguards, the powers mirror the powers in the Terrorism Act 2000, which are very important and have proven to be very disruptive, as well as useful and effective in keeping the country safe. It is critical that the police have strong powers of arrest and I outlined the reasons for that. Currently, a person can be detained for 24 hours. These provisions allow a detention for 48 hours, which would have to be reviewed periodically after 12 hours, so there are safeguards. The provisions mirror the 2000 Act, which has proven very effective and very disruptive.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax, the detention clock stops if the individual goes to hospital. If a warrant is refused, they can only be detained for 48 hours. These may appear to be very significant powers, but a person is not going to be held for a huge number of days.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Detention Under Section 21
Holly Lynch
I beg to move amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 70, line 27, at end insert—
“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—
(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or
(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”
I will speak to amendment 45, tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I will also address the wider schedule 3 powers.
The amendment reflects the place of detention powers at the start of schedule 3, which gives the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. The Minister’s predecessor was asked repeatedly whether he could clarify what types of buildings could be designated places of detention beyond police stations on Second Reading. In response, he said:
“I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 636.]
I am still not convinced about the provisions based on that response.
Mr Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I have some sympathy with the amendment as I am always against things that give Ministers or the Executive broad powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the powers seem to be unlimited. We are talking about national security and the confidence that we should have in our agencies to act in our interests, with the best of intentions and proper oversight, so the amendment is important. What does “any site in the UK” mean? My hon. Friend said that that was quite a broad power, and I want to ask about sites in the UK that are not under the control of the UK Government, such as US sites. Could Mildenhall airbase, a US airbase in the UK, be designated as one of these sites? I raise that because it limits UK authorities’ oversight and jurisdiction.
People may ask why that is important, but I am very conscious that we should always ensure that civil servants, Ministers and others have historical knowledge and take into account what happened in the past. I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we did our inquiry into detainee mistreatment and rendition in 2018. I have to say, it did not make for pretty reading. We did not shy away from the facts, and the actions of our agencies and certain Ministers—including some Ministers in the Government I served in—did not come out of that report very well. Guidance and regulations were put in place to ensure that did not happen again. I would like some clarity about whether such bases could be designated under this measure? Some of those sites could potentially have been used for what the ISC report on rendition highlights. They certainly were abroad, but this is about sites that are actually in the UK.
Stephen McPartland
I looked at the amendment in a lot of detail, and I discussed it with my officials and challenged them. I think the hon. Member for Halifax makes a very, very important point and has a strong case, and she will be delighted to know that, although I will resist the amendment today, I will commit to consider it and whether the Bill should clarify that only sites located in the UK can be designated as places of detention. I share her concerns about the possibility of rendition and stuff outside the UK. I will go into a bit more detail for her, and hopefully that will help the right hon. Member for North West Durham—
Stephen McPartland
Sorry—North Durham.
I am grateful for the way the hon. Member for Halifax has tried to help us improve the Bill. She has been constructive throughout.
Paragraph 1 provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to designate places where someone may be detained after arrest for foreign power threat activity under clause 21. If arrested under PACE, suspects are taken to a designated police station and held in a custody cell, unless they are being questioned, when they will be in an interview room. When arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, suspects are taken to a TACT custody suite. If a TACT suite is not available—for example, because the nearest one is located too far away—as an alternative a police station can be used.
There are five TACT suites in England and Wales, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. Currently, they are all located inside police stations. Police use TACT suites in the first instance because they are designed to hold suspects for longer periods and address their specific personal needs. They are also designed to take into account the operational requirements for handling those suspects. For example, they are bigger and they ensure that, when multiple arrests have been made, suspects cannot communicate with other. The staff are also specially trained to deal with those types of suspects.
Under the designation power in paragraph 1, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate to the chief officer in charge of a facility to affirm its accreditation. The designation will be published through the routine Home Office circular update, so it will be publicly available to view. In order for a facility to be designated, it must meet the technical standards of custody suites set by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. The power means that a bespoke custody suite or other suitable facilities built or identified in the future outside a police station, where they meet the standards above, can be designated as a place of detention by the Secretary of State. That is just future-proofing.
Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services already independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces. It already regularly inspects police custody conditions and, in 2019, published a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons of TACT custody suites in England and Wales.
Maria Eagle
The Minister has just given a great deal more information than is written in the Bill. Paragraph 1(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may designate places”,
and, at sub-paragraph (2), that
“a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place”
so designated. That could be a square in the middle of a field. Will the Minister consider inserting into the legislation some of the detail that he has just put on the record to make it clear that a specific power is being taken to designate more custody suites?
Stephen McPartland
As I have said, I am very interested in the amendment and am looking at possibly doing something along similar lines. I am trying to get the facts out. I heard what was said about the response on Second Reading so I am trying to be open and transparent and to put stuff on the record, in the official record of the sitting. I am doing the best that I can to be open, so that people are not concerned about rendition or people being taken overseas.
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I am glad to hear about the amendment, but that is of course about inspecting such places. As he is doing more work, does he mind also taking away the suggestion that I have just made? He might like to make it clearer in the legislation that we are talking about custody suites and not about squares of ground in the middle of a field or any other such place.
Stephen McPartland
I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.
My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—
Stephen McPartland
I have given the right hon. Gentleman the blink and he still wants to intervene.
Mr Jones
It takes a lot to get that in a Bill Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood is right—this needs clarifying in the Bill. When the Minister goes away to think about it, will he look at and ask officials about the issue of those sites that are in the UK, but outside the control of Her Majesty’s Government? I will not say too much, but we occasionally work with organisations and countries in certain places in the UK, but do not control what goes on there. Will he reflect that when doing his work?
Stephen McPartland
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that. As I have said, we will be designating sites and that information will be publicly available. I am not sure that he would want to make the information about the sites he mentions publicly available.
Mr Jones
But that is not what the Bill says at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said. It gives sweeping powers to designate things, and I am always against giving such sweeping powers to the Executive—whether it is the present Government or the Government I was a member of—or to anyone. When the Minister comes back, clarification would be welcome, even if that is for the Bill to require publication.
Stephen McPartland
I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says. If the hon. Member for Halifax is kind enough to withdraw the amendment, I commit to considering it further. I will look to provide further clarity in the legislation.
Holly Lynch
I am very grateful to the Minister for the spirit in which he has responded, taking our concerns about this element of the Bill seriously. I am reassured by his commitment, that he understands what we are trying to achieve with the amendment and that he will seek the best way to deliver that in the Bill.
Slightly separately, the clarity and detail that he has been able to provide about the minimum standards for the places of detention were welcome. In addition to putting that on the record today, however, I think that he has understood the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood on the need for it to be put on the face of the Bill and that he will continue to have a positive personal impact on some of the detail of the provisions. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen McPartland
I beg to move amendment 13, in schedule 3, page 81, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) In any other case, paragraph 19 material must be destroyed unless it is retained under any power conferred by paragraphs 20 or 21.”
This amendment and Amendments 15, 18 and 22 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Stephen McPartland
As we have discussed, clause 21 provides for a state threats power of arrest. If an individual is arrested under that power, the further provisions in schedule 3 will apply. As part of that, schedule 3 provides for a new regime whereby biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA profiles, that are collected on arrest for foreign power threat activity may be retained for an initial period of three years, with the option to extend the retention period for a further two years where considered necessary. A similar provision is made in schedule 9 for those subject to state threats prevention and investigation measures, or STPIMS. These are the same timeframes and procedures that operate for arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000—once again, we are trying to mirror the terrorism legislation.
The group covers a number of technical Government amendments to the biometric regimes in schedules 3 and 9. I turn first to amendments 13, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36, which relate to the indefinite retention of biometric data in certain circumstances. Again, the amendments put the new retention regime in line with what already operates for arrests made under PACE and the Terrorism Act. The law rightly sets strict limits on how long biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, can be retained where a person is investigated but ultimately not convicted of an offence. In certain circumstances, including under the Bill, biometric data taken in the course of an investigation can be retained for longer periods, and further retention of that data can be authorised, but the principle is that the data will be deleted unless further retention is specifically provided for. Where a person has been previously convicted of an offence, their biometric data can be retained indefinitely, subject to the requirement for ongoing review that is set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.
Both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 allow for the indefinite retention of biometric data taken during an investigation, if it is found that an individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence. This means that if an individual has previously been convicted of any offence that could carry a term of imprisonment, their biometric data taken during any new investigation can be held on the police national database indefinitely, irrespective of the outcome of that new investigation.
Maria Eagle
Generally, these are very sensible measures. There has obviously been some major redrafting of the schedule for the Government amendments to be necessary, and it would be interesting to hear why that is. I am looking at Government amendment 18, which says:
“For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if…the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity”.
Why is that instance included here? The person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. They have not admitted the offence, unlike in the situation described in proposed new paragraph 20A(1)(a)(i), whereby a person has received a caution and admitted the offence. By contrast, this person has been found not guilty.
Stephen McPartland
I know, and I will write to the hon. Lady, because I do not know the answer.
As we have already discussed in Committee, state threats activity poses a serious and enduring risk to UK security, and the Bill must provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to combat hostile activity. Indefinite retention of biometric data enables the police and the security services to use the data to support investigations into state threats offences and other criminal activity. That mirrors the approach taken in PACE and the Terrorism Acts.
Given that threat, it is right that where an individual with a previous conviction for a recordable offence is arrested under the state threats arrest power in clause 21, or is subject to a STPIMs notice, biometric data taken under those regimes should be retained indefinitely. Accordingly, the amendments provide for indefinite retention of biometric data in these circumstances in schedules 3 and 9 respectively.
Out of an abundance of caution, the provisions were not included when the Bill was introduced while we considered the questions raised by the Gaughran judgment. Based on the UK response to that judgment, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that these provisions are indeed compatible with the European convention on human rights and, therefore, should be included in the Bill.
As highlighted, state threats investigations can be complex and resource-intensive. By bringing forward the amendments, we are strengthening the ability of the police to use biometric data to support criminal investigations. Not agreeing to the amendments would create a position where the police’s ability to retain biometric data of a person with a previous recordable conviction would be more restricted than in other cases.
Aligning our approach with that of TACT and PACE ensures consistency in respect of biometric regimes. The requirement for ongoing review of retention, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, ensures that interference with the right to respect the private and family life of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I will now speak briefly to the remaining amendments in the group, which are comparatively minor and technical.
Stuart C. McDonald
Before the Minister moves on, I get the general thrust of why those amendments have been tabled but my concern is the inclusion of people who have accepted a caution or even a youth caution. It seems quite extreme to make them subject to lifelong retention of significant information on them. They have not been tried and the fact that they have had a caution means that, presumably, the circumstances were not the most serious. Does he have anything to say about those circumstances?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the intervention. What we are trying to do is to mirror what is in TACT and PACE to keep the regimes identical so there are not different ones for different areas. Obviously, if someone has accepted a caution, they have in essence accepted that they were guilty of an offence—they have just not proceeded to court.
Maria Eagle
Would not an additional safeguard in those circumstances be to ensure that before a youth caution is offered and accepted in any given case, it is made clear to the individual concerned that if they were to accept it, it would mean the retention of their data for their entire life? In those circumstances, the individual concerned could consider whether they really wanted to accept the caution or go for a trial.
Stephen McPartland
The hon. Lady makes an important point. I would add that it is “may” be held indefinitely not “will”. There is still an element of choice and discretion.
Maria Eagle
The Minister is correct about that, but perhaps the individual who may be considering accepting a youth caution and their adviser ought to be advised, before they do so, that there “may” be a consequence of biometric data and so on being kept for that person’s entire life, so they can make a proper decision about whether they want to accept the caution in full knowledge of the potential consequences.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that that what happens under TACT and PACE, and that would be the intention for what would happen under this legislation, so the regimes mirror each other.
Amendments 16 and 17 to schedule 3 separate the reference to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales in the list of chief officers who can extend the period of biometric retention. They make no practical change to the provisions.
Amendments 14, 25 and 27 address some unnecessary duplication in the list of databases against which biometric data obtained under the powers in schedules 3 and 9 can be searched. Amendment 26 provides that data obtained under the powers in schedule 9 can be searched against data taken under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not need to say much more. The Minister understands from my intervention that I have some reservations about the lifelong retention of the materials. I shall give that further thought. Other parts of the relevant amendment are perfectly sensible, so I will not oppose the amendment at this stage. Further thought should be given to it, though. The Government have explained a number of times how they are copying what is in the counter-terrorism legislation, which is fine and understandable but does not in of it itself justify the measures in this sphere of behaviour. I will look at the matter again. I want to put on the record that I am slightly uneasy about that type of provision.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the support for the amendments.
Amendment 13 agreed to.
Amendments made: 14, in schedule 3, page 82, line 22, leave out “or 42”.
This amendment removes reference to paragraph 42 of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Reference to paragraph 42 is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (e).
Amendment 15, in schedule 3, page 82, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
“(2) Paragraph 19 material may be retained indefinitely if—
(a) the person has previously been convicted—
(i) of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction), or
(ii) in Scotland, of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) the person is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of this paragraph.
(2A) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) the reference to a recordable offence includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute—
(i) a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there, or
(ii) a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there,
(and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) the reference to an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence under the law of Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment if done there (and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(2B) Paragraph 19 material may be retained until the end of the retention period specified in sub-paragraph (3) if—
(a) the person has no previous convictions, or
(b) the person has only one exempt conviction.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 16, in schedule 3, page 83, line 37, leave out “and Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and Amendment 17 clarify the identity of the specified chief officer of police in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 17, in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert “, and
(c) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, where—
(i) the person from whom the material was taken resides in Northern Ireland, or
(ii) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.”
See Amendment 16.
Amendment 18 in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert—
“20A (1) For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the person has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the person has admitted,
(ii) the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the person has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the person’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the person has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the person, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the person is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraph 20 and this paragraph, so far as they relate to persons convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 20—
(a) a person has no previous convictions if the person has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the person has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the person was under 18 years of age.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 20 and this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If a person is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 20 whether the person has been convicted of only one offence.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 19, in schedule 3, page 84, line 21, at end insert—
“(ca) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(cb) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or”.
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 20, in schedule 3, page 89, line 36, leave out paragraphs (j) to (l).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 21, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 1 to 3.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 22, in schedule 3, page 90, line 3, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ —
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 23, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 6 to 24 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.”
This amendment and Amendment 24 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer of police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 90, line 24, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Stephen McPartland.)
See Amendment 23.
Question proposed, That schedule 3, as amended, be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I want to conclude some earlier remarks that I made as part of the discussion on amendment 45 and the discussion on some of the Government amendments. There is an awful lot going on in schedule 3. I repeat the point: it is massive—it is 32 pages of powers. An ongoing consideration of the implications of all those powers is quite a significant undertaking. That is why I come back to making the case for new clause 2, which would ensure that part 1 of the Bill is subject to the same ongoing scrutiny as part 2, under clause 49, and as counter-terrorism legislation, which a great deal of this Bill is already based on.
We have talked about part 1 of the schedule; the delay in the exercise of rights under part 2 should also be kept under review, alongside the points about the retention of biometrics that were made by right hon. and hon. Members. Even if the Minister cannot share with the Committee some justification for all the measures today, I very much hope he will discuss that further with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the deliberations on the Bill that he has promised to have with the ISC.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her support. I know that we will debate things later on. As I have said, we are currently in discussions about how we can securely provide further information to help to provide further clarity. I cannot say more than that.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22
Border security
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Under schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and, if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through the UK border. As part of a schedule 3 examination, counter-terrorism police are able to retain protected materials by following a lengthy authorisation process. Protected materials include confidential business and journalistic material, as well as legally privileged material. The powers are a vital tool for counter-terrorism police and form part of a range of national security checks that enable the determination of whether a person at a UK port or border area has current or previous involvement in hostile state activity.
The use of protected materials in investigations, particularly confidential business material, can be a helpful insight into a person’s involvement in hostile state activity, whether it be espionage or a disinformation campaign. To use protected materials seized during a schedule 3 examination, an examining officer must currently seek authorisation from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a serving or retired High Court judge. In most cases, the material must not be examined or used for investigations until authorisation has been granted. Currently, that can take up to six weeks.
Clause 22 will remove the definition of confidential business material—material defined as acquired in the course of trade—from the definition of protected material under schedule 3. This will remove the requirement for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to authorise the retention of copies of confidential business material. The Bill will replace that authorisation process with a new safeguard: the requirement for a counter-terrorism police officer of at least the rank of superintendent to authorise access to such material.
The clause will bring the schedule 3 safeguards for confidential material into line with those that apply to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It will mean that police do not face lengthy and unnecessary delays to examining material in a schedule 3 stop.
Mr Jones
I have some sympathy with this clause; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a big job on their hands anyway. I wonder whether the Minister could say whether he has given any thought to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner not just looking at the material and giving it authorisation but having retrospective powers to dip in and see whether things have been done correctly.
Stephen McPartland
I will take that idea away and consider it. We do not want to enable somebody at the border to say that something is confidential material so that the police cannot look at it for up to six weeks. That would just be the easiest defence. We are dealing with incredibly sophisticated experts and they will know what to say to ensure that the material will be held in abeyance.
The Government are only amending the safeguards for confidential business material and will not change the authorisation safeguard for other material within the definition of protected material or confidential journalistic material, for which judicial authorisation is a proportionate safeguard. I am sure Members agree that it is only right that the security services should be able to use critical information in real time during a schedule 3 examination to address live national security risks posed to the UK. I assure Members that this essential amendment to schedule 3 to the 2019 Act will strengthen and streamline state threats investigations to disrupt and deter hostile state activity.
Holly Lynch
The drafting of clause 22 is complicated and I have had to speak to a number of experts to try to unravel it. It amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, as the Minister outlined. In essence, it allows examining officers a right to confidential material that would currently require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I am grateful to the commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, in his capacity as the independent reviewer of schedule 3, and his office for their insight on the clause.
If I have understood it correctly—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I have not—the clause amends schedule 3 to the 2019 Act to reflect the position of schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 3 subjects are far more likely to possess confidential business records than those stopped under schedule 7. That means the requirement for judicial approval is engaged in the majority of schedule 3 stops. It is therefore important to assess whether the requirement for a judicial authorisation in such cases is necessary and proportionate, taking into account both the sensitivity of the category of protected material and the purpose of the statute specifically to counter hostile state activity.
The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office said
“We are not aware of any other statute that requires judicial authorisation for the retention of confidential business records acquired direct from a person in a public setting such as a port”.
The closest is perhaps schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, commonly known as PACE, although this is restricted to material on private premises. There is no requirement in PACE to seek judicial authorisation to seize or retain confidential business material found during the search of a person in a public place, or if such material is unexpectedly encountered on private premises.
Confidential business records are protected in PACE as “special procedure material” because they have a degree of special sensitivity that Parliament has decided merits certain access requirements in the context of criminal investigations. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 does not include any similar requirement for judicial authorisation to acquire confidential business records using covert investigatory powers. The sensitivity of this category of material is not the same as that of legally privileged or journalistic material, the safeguards for which will not be affected by the proposed amendment to schedule 3—I hope the Minister can confirm that that is the case.
The statutory purposes in schedule 3 go well beyond criminal investigations and include national security or protecting life and limb. On that basis, it seems unlikely that the interests of the business, trade or profession would outweigh the interests of national security in any circumstances, or that judicial authorisation should be necessary for the retention and use of confidential business records in circumstances that might prevent death or serious injury.
Having considered those points in the round, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has concluded that the Home Office’s proposals to replace judicial authorisation for confidential business records with one of internal authorisation from a senior officer strike the right balance and align the definition of confidential material with that of the 2016 Act. Inevitably, that view has very much shaped our judgement on clause 22, but I suggest that it is another area where keeping the provisions under review to mitigate any unintended consequences is the responsible thing to do.
Let me turn to who has the powers to make and retain copies of confidential material. Page 35 of the explanatory notes outline that “examining officers” have that power. However, schedule 7 to the 2000 Act defines an examining officer as a constable, immigration officer or a customs officer. In paragraph (j) of the policy background section of the explanatory notes, it states that part 1 amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019
“to allow counter-terrorism police officers to retain copies of confidential business material…without the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. This will allow counter-terrorism police to progress operations and investigations into state threats…at the required pace and reflects the position in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000”.
Paragraph 17 of schedule 3 to the 2019 Act, on the power to make and retain copies, confirms that the examining officer, only when they are “a constable”, can retain copies when necessary and potentially needed as evidence in criminal proceedings. The references to various different roles in the different supporting documents to the Bill make it a bit of a mess. I was listening carefully to the Minister, but I would like further clarity about who has the powers. Given that we have references to examining officers—who can have different roles—to counter-terrorism police specifically and to an examining officer who can be a constable, I wonder whether the Minister can tidy it up for us on the record and be explicit about who has the powers at the border.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that the amendment of the authorisation safeguards to access confidential business material in schedule 3 brings it completely into line with other policing powers. It is not likely that access to confidential business material would be subject to a higher level of safeguarding where there is already consistent precedent set by PACE 1984, the IPA 2016 and schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. As we have said, it does not affect legal, profession or journalistic material, and the provisions are reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as part of their statutory function. Only trained counter-terrorism officers will be able to use the powers. I hope that provides the clarity that the hon. Lady requires.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
This is the clause that many of us have been looking forward to. I am not going to take interventions during my speech; I will set out the reasons why I believe the clause is correct, then I will listen carefully to speeches from hon. Members and then sum up.
Collaboration with key international partners is a vital part of intelligence and national security work. We cannot maximise our national security capabilities and keep people safe without sharing intelligence and benefiting from the capabilities and expertise of our close and trusted allies. Those individuals who work on behalf of the UK are highly skilled and experienced in ensuring that UK activity is necessary and proportionate. Domestic and international law is applied to all activities and there are robust safeguards in place.
The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates offences when an act is done that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting”
an offence and the person “intends” or believes that their act may encourage or assist an offence. Those offences, which were predominantly introduced to ensure that law enforcement had the tools to tackle those orchestrating serious organised crime, are complex and create an incredibly low threshold for liability. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence that may be encouraged or assisted. The contribution can be small, it can be indirect, and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed.
At present, the UK intelligence community and armed forces are required to apply those complex offences to the many and varied scenarios in which they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. They exercise significant caution in their engagement with partners to prevent SCA thresholds being met and the risk of liability for individuals being realised. The impact of that approach is that vital and otherwise legal intelligence opportunities are currently being delayed or missed as the SCA risks are worked through.
There is also an important point of principle here. The Serious Crime Act offences mean that it is the individuals working within intelligence, security and military organisations who carry the risk of liability, despite operating within all authorisations and in the interests of UK national security.
The Committee heard oral evidence from both Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, and Sir David Omand, the former head of GCHQ, on the fairness and appropriateness of individual officers carrying this risk. They believe that the liability risk sitting with individuals is “not right”, and is “morally wrong”. The Government agree with them and do not think it is right or fair to expect the risk of liability to sit with individuals who are acting on behalf of our intelligence services or armed forces for their authorised purposes. Instead, responsibility should sit with the UK intelligence community and the armed forces at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight.
The clause removes criminal liability for offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces in support of activity taking place overseas. This is not a broad general immunity from prosecution; rather we are amending a targeted piece of legislation in response to specific operational issues that are impacting the ability to keep us safe today.
The clause means that in instances where an individual has operated in good faith and in compliance with proper processes they would not face the risk of liability for the offences under the SCA. The risk I have outlined would be removed for activity that we ask of individuals in the course of their roles in keeping us safe.
I am confident that the SCA amendment is appropriate and proportionate, because the UK has one of the most rigorous intelligence oversight regimes in the world. There are myriad safeguards and processes in place that manage the way that UKIC and the MOD work with and exchange information with international partners to prevent potential wrongdoing.
I also have confidence in those we are providing protection to. They are expert and highly trained men and women undertaking intelligence and security work, whose judgment and skill we should respect and have faith in. Of course, those working with our international partners will still need to comply with all other domestic and international law and be beholden to the statutory frameworks and policies that govern the UK intelligence community and armed forces activity.
The policies include the overseas security and justice assistance guidance and the Fulford principles, the implementation of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner annually and reported to the Prime Minister. That means that clause 23 does not in any way make torture legal, for example. UKIC’s activities also remain under the regular inspection of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
Stephen McPartland
I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Stephen McPartland
The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to make his own speech, and I will listen.
Let me also be clear that clause 23 will not enable activity by individuals who, acting outside the proper functions of their organisations, contribute to criminal activity by others or commit criminal offences themselves. We will retain the ability to prosecute anyone for other offences should their behaviour in support of international partners amount to a criminal offence. Further, it will not remove the ability to challenge the UK intelligence community or armed forces on their activities through judicial review, civil damages claims, or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers.
To conclude, clause 23 is really about supporting UKIC and armed forces officers, who we ask to undertake vital work on our behalf, by ensuring that when they work with our partners in good faith, according to wider domestic and international law, and in support of vital national security aims to keep this country safe, they do not risk personal criminal liability for any actions of that partner state. Responsibility for any action that we cannot support should surely sit at an institutional level, which is what will be the case under clause 23.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It will come as no surprise to the Minister—we have had the opportunity to discuss this—that we are extremely concerned about clause 23, which amends the Serious Crime Act 2007. We have had the opportunity to discuss this privately with the Minister and his predecessor, and with the UK intelligence community directly, and I am minded of just how much detail of those conversations we might want to put on the record. The clause was a big focus for Members from across the House on Second Reading. As the Minister knows, crucially, it did not have the support of members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has statutory responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community.
The Labour Party will always work with the intelligence services to find solutions to any barriers that they face in undertaking their invaluable work and keeping the UK safe. As things stand, we have been unable to get an operational understanding of exactly what is broken and requires fixing. I have heard directly from the security services about why they believe they need clause 23—the Minister has sought to outline that again in his contribution. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act allows for a risk of liability to individuals conducting their proper functions on behalf of the UK intelligence community. An offence can arise where support—for example, intelligence sharing—provided in good faith later makes a small or indirect contribution to unlawful activity by an international partner. The security services are keen to convey that their caution in this regard is having an operational impact that requires a resolution.
Stephen McPartland
I wanted to be very clear earlier—I wanted to make a point. I agree that the Government will give the ISC examples.
Mr Jones
That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.
The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?
Maria Eagle
It would be a very high bar to get over. If we are being told—there was an element of this in the evidence we heard—that there is a chilling effect on individuals trying to do their jobs, those individuals may need to be a bit better trained in what the law says, what it means and what they are able to do. In any event, whatever the law ends up being—whether it is this Bill, or what we already have—it is not a bad thing for those who operate at its margins to know precisely what they can and cannot do. I worry slightly that having a complete carve-out from liability might swing activities a bit too far in the other direction.
There are pros and cons to any way of doing this. I do not want the Minister to think I am being hostile; I am certainly not. I just want us, as the House of Commons, to be sure, when we consider this further, that this way is right and will work better than what we already have. I, for one, cannot see how this will be better than what we already have; I think that in many ways it will be worse.
Stephen McPartland
It has been a great pleasure to listen to the debate and Members’ speeches. I can feel the frustration in the room. I share that frustration, because I have been told by the intelligence services that we need clause 23 because the schedule it amends is having a damaging impact on critical operational activity aimed at keeping the UK safe. That is the reason why we need clause 23. I wish that we could tell the Committee everything, and that we could just all agree to it, but that is what I am told by the intelligence services, so I have frustration too.
I will try to answer some of the questions, and then sum up. We have been asked about section 7 authorisations. Some of the Committee have been in their roles a little longer than I have been in mine, so they will be aware that section 7 authorisations can be sought only by SIS and GCHQ—not by the MOD or MI5—so this is about trying to create reassurance across all the UK intelligence community.
On section 50 and the reasonableness defence, the defence has never been tested in the context of activity of the intelligence services and the armed forces, so we feel it is more appropriate for them to demonstrate that their actions were carried out as necessary in the proper exercise of their functions.
Maria Eagle
If what the Minister says is accurate—that the defence has never been tested—how can he say that it does not work?
Stephen McPartland
What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—
Sally-Ann Hart
Let me give an illustration of the issue. If my hon. Friend saw someone in need of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the floor, would he give them mouth-to-mouth and pump their chest? Is that something he would do? Would he do it if he thought he could be prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm if he broke a rib? That would be his defence. That is a simplistic example to illustrate the issue.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.
Stephen McPartland
I do not want to get distracted, because this is very serious. I will give way to you in a minute, Kevin; I want to get this point across. [Interruption.] Sorry—I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham in a moment.
As the law stands, a member of staff acting in the proper exercise of their organisation’s functions would bear the burden of proving that they had acted reasonably when there is no precedence as to what “reasonably” means in those circumstances. The provision would change that position so that the prosecution would need to prove that a member of staff’s actions were not necessary for the proper exercise or function of their organisation, taking into consideration all the information about the legitimate ways in which those functions could be exercised.
Mr Jones
The Minister has just said that the reasonableness test has not been used. The Attorney General would also have to get over that bar. Alongside that sits the old consolidated guidance—now the Fulford principles—which is quite clear about what actions officers should take in certain circumstances to avoid what we had before. If it has not been tested, I cannot see what the problem is.
Stephen McPartland
The problem is that the UK’s intelligence services are telling us that, every single day, their operatives are second-guessing themselves on operations to keep this nation safe. I believe what they are telling me.
The provisions in section 47 of the Serious Crime Act mean that a person need only believe their activity will encourage or assist such an act, but they might also be reckless as to whether the act is done, with all the necessary elements required for that particular offence to be committed—the offence does not have to be committed. We are talking about the intelligence operative’s state of mind at the time of sharing intelligence. That is what is relevant.
Mr Jones
If that is the justification, why do we not just bin the consolidated guidance and the Fulford principles, on which such judgments are based? The rendition inquiry has great examples of where we passed on information knowing that it would be used for rendition and torture. I have been assured by the agencies, and I have no reason to doubt them, that there has been a huge training programme to ensure all officers fully understand the consolidated guidance and the new Fulford principles. This is clutching at straws, frankly.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s point of view.
Clause 23 is primarily aimed at removing the risk and fear of prosecution from individuals within these organisations when undertaking their necessary authorised duties. Sir Alex Younger said:
“Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 14, Q26.]
We have already had a conversation about the difference between theory and practice, and the reality is there is a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanctions for doing their job. I agree with Sir Alex Younger that that risk should not exist.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
The foreign power condition
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 24, page 19, line 5, at end insert—
“(2A) The conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is not to be treated as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if financial or other assistance of a foreign power under subsection (2)(c) is provided otherwise than specifically for the conduct or course of conduct.”
This amendment ensures that organisations that receive funding from foreign powers are not guilty of offences if that funding was not for the conduct or course of conduct that would otherwise amount to the offence.
Holly Lynch
I will speak to clauses 24 and 25 and, having heard the contribution from the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, about his amendment 54.
Clause 24 provides for the foreign power condition that is fundamental to almost all the new offences created by the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister has confirmed that we will see the detail of a foreign interference registration scheme before we return to Committee in September, but it will be particularly interesting to see how the provisions in clause 24 interact with a registration scheme, and what an asset that stands to be if it is done properly.
Clause 24(1) provides that the condition is met if a person’s conduct or a course of conduct is carried out for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. In addition, for the condition to be met, the person must know, or reasonably ought to know, that the conduct has that relationship to the foreign power, which I think is clear enough.
Subsection (2) sets out a welcome but non-exhaustive list of different types of relationship between the foreign power and the person engaging in the conduct that would result in a person being considered to be acting for or on behalf of the foreign power.
Under this clause, conduct is deemed to be carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is instigated by a foreign power, it is directed or controlled by a foreign power, it is carried out with financial or other assistance from a foreign power, or it is carried out in collaboration with or with the agreement of a foreign power. It strikes me that thousands of people in the UK could meet all the foreign power stipulations in subsection (2) without ever engaging in any criminality—for example, if they work for a legitimate state-owned company, such as an airline operating out of the UK, or in a foreign embassy. I am keen to see the detail of the registration scheme, so that we have transparency and clear lines about what is welcome and entirely appropriate conduct on behalf of a foreign power and what is not.
Subsection (6) states that is not necessary to identify the particular foreign power that the person intends to benefit. That provision is intended to cover when a person attempts to help a foreign power, but has not yet determined the particular foreign power. I can see how this part of the clause rightly captures the conduct of someone motivated by financial gain, who seeks to sell information or intellectual property to the highest bidder, or perhaps by a desire to cause harm to the UK as a result of a grievance.
For the reasons I have outlined, I imagine that we will come back to clause 24 when debating further parts of the Bill. It would have been advantageous to consider the clause alongside the detail of the foreign influence registration scheme. We will have to undertake that separately, but we recognise that clause 24 is fundamental to this legislation.
Clause 25 defines a foreign power for the purpose of clause 24 and sets out the persons and bodies that comprise a foreign power. We welcome the much-needed update and clarity of what constitutes a foreign power for the functioning of clause 24 and the new offences created by the Bill. I note that the Law Commission’s report, “Protection of Official Data”, made a clear case for replacing “enemy” with “foreign power” and looked to the Canadian Security of Information Act 2001 and the US Congress’s Espionage Statutes Modernisation Bill, which was introduced in 2010, as starting points.
The Official Secrets Act 1911 provides that it is an offence for a person to make or obtain
“any sketch, plan, model, or note”
or
“any secret official code word, or pass word…or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”.
The Law Commission felt that as the term had been drafted with enemy states in mind, it was unclear whether a court would construe “enemy” broadly enough to encompass non-state actors, such as an international terrorist group. It was further concerned that the inclusion of the term “enemy” had the potential to inhibit the ability to prosecute those who commit espionage. We have already heard quotes from Sir Alex Younger’s testimony last Thursday. In response to a question about how threats to the UK have changed, he said:
“What I would call grey threats…often presented us with real challenges, particularly when actors or states felt themselves at war with us and we did not feel ourselves at war with them.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 11, Q21.]
I therefore welcome the change from enemy to foreign power to ensure that we can secure prosecutions against the right people.
That said, concerns were raised in submissions to the Law Commission’s consultation and I wonder if the Minister can respond to those. Guardian News and Media gave the following example:
“If a journalist obtains information that a nuclear defence installation is unsafe, that concerns have been reported to the appropriate authorities, but have been discounted, and the journalist then proceeds to investigate whether the information is true, they should not be placed at risk of prosecution. Under the existing wording of section 1 OSA, the ‘of use to the enemy’ requirement would it is submitted make such a prosecution unlikely, however if that wording were changed to a foreign power, and a foreign state-owned institution was thinking of bidding to decommission the plant, this could catch the journalist. Such activity by a journalist should not be considered to be espionage.”
Again, it would have been advantageous to consider this clause alongside the foreign influence registration scheme, which will presumably be clear about who needs to register and why, aligned with subsections (1) and (2) of clause 25, but I hope that the Minister can respond to the concerns raised in that example.
Stephen McPartland
We have already spoken in some detail about the foreign power condition, but I will now specifically address that condition and the meaning of “foreign power”. In doing so, I hope to cover some residual concerns from our first day in Committee and some concerns that I have heard today.
Throughout the Committee’s sittings so far, I have tried to demonstrate that I am listening and am trying to work with colleagues across party lines to get to a position in which we are providing what the United Kingdom’s intelligence community needs and are comfortable that we have scrutinised the Bill. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East may be reassured when I get to the end of my speech, just as the hon. Member for Halifax was reassured about her amendment earlier.
Stuart C. McDonald
I just want to repeat that I find that potentially worryingly broad. If somebody does something motivated by the interests of the people of country Z, I worry very much that they could suddenly be treated as if they were benefiting the Government of Z. The foreign power condition would therefore be met and they could be guilty of espionage for whatever act they had undertaken. It just seems incredibly broadly worded. Someone who is simply doing something for the benefit of a people could be caught up in this legislation.
Stephen McPartland
I think the intention that we are trying to get across is clear. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has a concern about how broad the scope is, so if he gives me a few moments, I will try to move on to that point.
My view is that clause 24 forms a key concept that will determine the circumstances in which activities will come within the scope of the Bill or beyond it. Amendment 54 seeks to make it explicit that those who receive funding from a foreign power legitimately will not be guilty of an offence under the Bill where that funding is entirely unrelated to the harmful conduct. I want to reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that this reflects the intention of the provision. The provisions are designed to provide that the funding of an organisation must have a sufficient link to the offence in order for the foreign power condition to be met and an offence to be made out; a tangential link will not suffice. To help contextualise that, and reflecting on Tuesday’s debate, I thought it would help to provide a bit more detail on how the foreign power condition interacts with the offences.
Using the offence of obtaining and disclosing protected information as an example, the offence will be made out only if all the limbs of the relevant test are satisfied. This means that a person would commit an offence only if they obtain, disclose or carry out other specified conduct in relation to protected information. That conduct is for a purpose they know, or reasonably ought to know, is for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, and the foreign power condition is met in relation to that conduct.
I want to be really clear that a person who engages in the harmful conduct above would commit the offence only if they have a purpose prejudiced in relation to that specific conduct. So it is not sufficient to prove that a person has a genuinely prejudicial position against the UK; the conduct has to be carried out with that prejudicial purpose.
The same is true of the foreign power condition. The foreign power condition has been designed to apply in relation to the conduct that is caught within the offence. So where the foreign power is satisfied because the conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is for or on behalf of the foreign power, the defendant must also either actually know or should know that to be the case.
The hon. Member cited the example of an NGO that receives funding from a foreign power. My and the Government’s interpretation is that there would have to be a link between the funding they receive and any activity that they carry out that could meet the offence for that activity to be for or on behalf of the foreign power. So the NGO would also have to know the conduct was linked to this funding, or they should know that it is. They should not be convicted of an offence unless that link was demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law.
I want to be really clear. The foreign power condition, as a standalone concept, is not a statement of wrongdoing. So a person can meet the foreign power condition while carrying out wholly legitimate activities. It is an issue only if the foreign power condition is met in relation to harmful conduct specified in the Bill. In the case of a person who obtains or discloses protected information, the offence is designed so that a person would commit the offence only if they had a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and then either knew or ought reasonably to have known that they were acting for or on behalf of the foreign power in relation to that conduct. For example, they had an arrangement with the foreign power under which they would obtain or disclose that protected data, or they intended the foreign power to benefit from obtaining or disclosing of protected data.
So the foreign power condition would not cover a case where a foreign power incidentally benefits from activity. Nor has it been designed to apply in cases where a person receives general funding from a foreign power not linked to the relevant conduct. But clearly it is right that a person can be prosecuted for an offence where all the relevant conditions, including the foreign power condition, are satisfied and can be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
I hope the Committee is reassured that the intention behind our provisions and the hon. Member’s amendments align, but I recognise the importance of ensuring that the legislation clearly gives effect to that intention, and while I do not think the hon. Member’s amendments are the answer, I will consider further whether there is any more that we can do to ensure that this intention is properly reflected in the legislation.
Having set out the conditions under which acts in the Bill will be considered as linked to a foreign power, I now turn to clause 25, which gives meaning to the term “foreign power”. The Bill follows the Law Commission’s recommendation to replace the existing link of “an enemy”, as set out in the Official Secrets Act 1911, with a definition of a foreign power. As we have already debated, the concept of an enemy no longer serves to reflect the modern age. The change from “enemy” to “foreign power” is accompanied by a wider set of changes in the structure of the Bill, such as the foreign power condition itself, which ensures that the Bill’s provisions are appropriately targeted at the harmful activity that we need to combat.
It is important that the legislation captures the various components of a state that could seek to influence or direct harmful activities in or against the UK. As such, a foreign power will include a Head of State acting in his or her public capacity, a foreign Government or parts of the Government, or person exercising such functions, a local government organisation, an agency or authority of a foreign government, part of Government or local government, and a political party that is a governing political party of a foreign Government.
Clause 24, and indeed the Bill as a whole, recognises and respects the unique circumstances and nature of politics in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, clause 25 excludes a political party that is both a governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland from the definition of a “foreign power”. This reflects the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom, and ensures that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics. The foreign power definition provides the parameters within which persons and bodies will comprise a foreign power for the purposes of the Bill and is a critical part of ensuring that the provisions in the Bill address the right harmful activity.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for setting that out. It is particularly helpful to hear his views on the NGO scenario and his explanation of the requirement for some sort of link between the financial arrangements and the specific conduct being complained of. The reason for tabling the amendment is that we did not think that that was necessarily clear enough on the face of the Bill. We will give further thought to whether this aspect needs to be tidied up, so that it is absolutely clear, and I am grateful for his undertaking to look at that as well. I will have to work through some of the other scenarios as well, but it has been helpful to get quite a lot of that on the record. We shall give it some further thought, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 24 and 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Seventh sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 19th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 July 2022 - (19 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
I am sure that the Minister, the Clerks and I are most grateful for that point. I certainly cannot answer it immediately, and the Minister does not look as if he is going to—
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing out that typo. That is very important to us all, and I will carry on talking while I wait for some information. I think that is an important point. As we know, the Bill is evolving and will continue to evolve. We will ensure that any potential errors are corrected throughout its passage. It does look as though it should say “section 26”, so we will definitely fix that.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his eagle eyes.
The Chair
The learned Clerk also agrees that it should read “section 26”. We are most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing that out.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Offences by bodies corporate etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Clause 28 deals with offences committed by bodies corporate. It is a significant clause. I imagine that this legislative area will continue to need to evolve as threats continue to emerge. The clause asserts that where a corporate body commits an offence under part 1 of the Bill
“the officer, as well as the body, is guilty of the offence”.
Finding the right balance here will not be straightforward, but this will become a key battleground, as the Government acknowledged with the National Security and Investment Act 2021.
In its report, the Law Commission outlined that classified evidence, which it was considering, could be explained using the following hypothetical example. P, an IT services company headquartered in a foreign state, has a managed services contract for a large Department. As part of that contract, P creates back-ups in the UK of the Department’s corporate email and file storage system. P is compelled under the foreign state’s national security legislation to share that information with the foreign state’s intelligence services, which use it to target UK interests. Worryingly, that will not be an uncommon scenario; we see such examples regularly in the UK press, and a range of stakeholders need to be alive to the risks. I am afraid to say that the Government have been too slow to respond.
In December 2020, the US Department of Homeland Security issued a data security business advisory, which
“describes the data-related risks American businesses face as a result of the actions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and outlines steps that businesses can take to mitigate these risks. Businesses expose themselves and their customers to heightened risk when they share sensitive data with firms located in the PRC, or use equipment and software developed by firms with an ownership nexus in the PRC, as well as with firms that have PRC citizens in key leadership and security-focused roles…Due to PRC legal regimes and known PRC data collection practices, this is particularly true for data service providers and data infrastructure.”
The advisory was issued as a result of several new laws passed in China in recent years—not least the national intelligence law of 2017, which compels all PRC firms and entities to support, assist and co-operate with PRC intelligence services, creating a legal obligation for those entities to turn over data collected abroad and domestically to the PRC.
A UK employee working for a Chinese company will need really robust legislative support in pushing back against the obligations placed upon Chinese businesses by those new laws under the Chinese Communist party. For that reason, we welcome clause 28, and believe that the provisions are sufficiently broad to include anyone in a company who may commit an offence under part 1 of the Bill, and to provide clarity in this space, with a need to consider employees who stand to find themselves in a difficult position due to the Chinese legislative framework.
Subsection (5) will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations to improve the clause through secondary legislation. I have said that I recognise that legislation will need to be dynamic if it is to be effective, but any such regulations should be laid under the affirmative procedure, and must be debated and actively approved by both Houses of Parliament. I hope the Minister will confirm that that will be the case.
Stephen McPartland
The clause provides that where a body commits an offence under part 1 of the Bill
“the officer, as well as the body, is guilty of the offence”
if it is attributable to the officer’s consent, connivance or neglect. The provision is based on a similar one in the Official Secrets Act 1911. For example, where a body commits an espionage offence of obtaining protected information under the direct guidance of the head of the body, both the body and its head would be guilty of the offence. Clause 28 mirrors the provisions found in section 36 in part 3 of the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which makes suitable provision for when an offence under that part is committed by a body corporate.
It is worth noting that in a similar provision in the 1911 Act, a director would automatically be held liable unless they could prove that they did not consent or were unaware. Rightly, the provisions move beyond that burden of proof: the prosecution must now demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that an officer was culpable in such a case, which provides more safeguards. This is therefore an important provision to ensure that both companies and relevant officers can be held liable for their involvement in state threat activity, and that where there is wrongdoing on the part of an officer of the company that officer can be appropriately prosecuted for the offences.
For an officer to be held liable, they must consent or connive to the act or be negligent in relation to it, which is a higher bar than simply being unaware of the act, as the prosecution would need to demonstrate not just a lack of awareness but that, in being unaware, the person was failing to properly discharge their duties. The clause goes on to define a number of terms, such as a “body” and an “officer of a body”, and it provides that the Secretary of State may make regulations to modify the section in relation to
“its application to a body corporate or unincorporated association formed or recognised under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.”
That may be required as a result of differences in the nature of bodies corporate, their structures or their terminology under the laws of foreign jurisdictions. This ensures that bodies corporate outside the UK that commit offences under part 1 of the Bill can still be caught under these offences.
I will refer to the example given by the hon. Member for Halifax. We have tried throughout the Bill to demonstrate that the offence will be based on an individual acting directly or indirectly on behalf of a foreign power, and on whether they should reasonably know that that behaviour is on behalf of a foreign power. I understand her point about foreign-owned companies, but the Bill does not say that whole companies are acting on behalf of a foreign power. As she rightly says, there will be a whole range of UK individuals engaged in completely legitimate activity within the UK, and we do not want to give employees of those companies any problems.
The regulations will involve technical, rather than substantial, changes, so they will not widen the scope whatsoever. That is why they will be made under the negative procedure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Consents to prosecutions
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 30, page 23, line 16, at end insert—
“(c) in Scotland, only with the consent of the Lord Advocate.”
This amendment would require the consent of the Lord Advocate to prosecute certain offences.
Stuart C. McDonald
Clause 30 puts in place one of the protections that the Minister has referred to a few times, including when we were debating the offences of disclosure and the breadth of the foreign power condition. The protection in question is the requirement of consent to certain prosecutions, with that consent coming from the Attorney General in England and Wales, and from the Advocate General in Northern Ireland.
Our amendment 63 simply asks why there is no equivalent requirement of consent from the Lord Advocate for prosecutions in Scotland. It might be a conscious choice—if so, it would be useful to hear what the thinking is behind that. It could also be another mistake, because I notice that section 8 of the 1911 Act requires consent to prosecution, but only the Attorney General is mentioned. Section 12, which provides an interpretation, states that the expression “Attorney General” is taken “as respects Scotland” to mean the Lord Advocate, and “as respects Ireland” to mean the Advocate General for Northern Ireland. That is a slightly dated way of doing things, because if we mean the Lord Advocate, we should say that.
On the clause itself, I have absolutely no objection to the idea that consent for prosecution is an appropriate step. As I say, our amendment simply asks what the provision is in relation to Scotland.
Stephen McPartland
Let me quickly answer those points. Clause 30 provides that the consent of the Attorney General is required in England and Wales, and that the consent of the Advocate General is required in Northern Ireland. I understand that the Lord Advocate is not included because the Lord Advocate has a constitutional role as the head of the criminal prosecution system under the Criminal Procedures (Scotland) Act 1995, and all prosecutions on indictment are taken by, or on behalf of, the Lord Advocate. It is technically not necessary to include the Lord Advocate, because all offences in relation to Scotland are prosecuted by the Lord Advocate under Scots law, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
Very educational; I have learned something new. I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 31
Power to exclude the public from proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I wish only to add that I imagine we would all agree that transparency in this legislative area should be the default, especially given the need to raise awareness of the challenges we face as a country and the individual responsibilities that we all share in combating those challenges with the arrival of these new offences. That said, it is of course right that clause 31 provides power to the court to exclude the public from any part of proceedings or offences under part 1, or for proceedings relating to the aggravation of sentencing, or other offences where the foreign power condition applies, should the evidence being considered deem it to be in the interests of national security to do so.
Stephen McPartland
As the hon. Member said, clause 31 provides those protections. It builds on the Official Secrets Act 1920, which gives the court the power to exclude the public from any proceedings if the publication of any evidence to be given would be prejudicial to national security. However, the passing of the sentence must still take place in public.
One important point is that the decision to exclude the public will be made by the court, not the prosecution. It is also important to reiterate that the power does not grant the use of closed-material proceedings. Therefore, as is the precedent in our criminal justice system, the defendant and their legal team will have access to all the evidence, as they would in other criminal proceedings.
I will end by reassuring the Committee that the clause is not meant to limit the transparency of our justice system or the independence of the judiciary, but to ensure that—only where necessary—the courts themselves have the power to protect the United Kingdom’s national security.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Power to impose prevention and investigation measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 57, in schedule 4, page 111, line 1, leave out paragraph 12.
This amendment would remove the power to require participation in polygraph sessions.
That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I have a question on paragraph 8 to schedule 4, entitled “Electronic communication device measure”. It is eminently sensible, when one is considering how an STPIM might be constructed, that one looks at all the restrictions that that may involve. However, when we get to sub-paragraph (6)(c), which refers not to computers or telephones but to other equipment
“designed or adapted, or capable of being adapted, for the purpose of connecting to the internet,”
I want to ensure that there is clarity, and that the provision will be defined in a cogent way.
As we move further into the internet of things, one’s fridge or toaster will be designed for the purpose of connecting to the internet. That might sound glib or flippant, but we may get to the point when half the white goods in any individual’s home are internet enabled. Given that there could be huge sensitivities in the deployment of STPIMs, the last thing that we want to see is a police constable or bailiff removing half the items from someone’s house, when that clearly is not the intention but those items nevertheless fit the category in paragraph 8(6)(c).
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for Members’ contributions and look forward to trying to answer as many of the questions as I can. I will start with the clause and then come to the amendment and some of the questions.
Part 2 and clause 32 mirror the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—TPIM—and allow the Secretary of State to impose by notice
“specified prevention and investigation measures on an individual”
if specific conditions are met; I will refer to them as STPIMs going forward. The STPIMs mirror the equivalent counter-terrorism measures: well-established tools that have been in use for over 10 years and have been subject to vigorous examination by the courts, including with regard to European convention on human rights compliance. The courts have never found that a TPIM in its entirety should not have been imposed, or that any of the provisions of the TPIM legislative framework are not ECHR compliant. That should give us all reassurance, and give Parliament confidence that the measures will be applied sparingly and only where necessary and proportionate.
I will not go through the exhaustive list, but the Government have publicly committed to provide operational partners with the tools that they need to combat state threats. To be very clear, STPIMs are a tool of last resort; the Government’s preference is to prosecute under any means possible first and foremost, and STPIMs are to be used only when all else has failed and no other options are available to us. I hope that that provides some reassurance as well.
Holly Lynch
I was reassured by some of the detail in these clauses about that point, but the impact assessment from the Home Office says:
“It is assumed that the prosecution rate of state threats investigations is 33 per cent. This is an internal estimate from CPS, based on prosecution of previous OSA 1911-1939 cases.”
Based on where we envisage we might have challenges in securing prosecutions, I wonder whether STPIMs are also for the other side of a prosecution, as well as for when we cannot secure prosecution and get there in the first place.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that point. I understand that our responsibility is to scrutinise the legislation to make sure that, as the hon. Member for Dundee East made clear, we do not open up a can of worms that can lead to greater and greater unintended consequences, but the reality is that the provision is to be a last resort.
If we are talking practically, counter-terrorism police are responsible for enforcing STPIMs. The amount of resources required to enforce and monitor a TPIM or STPIM is so great and so large that, as Members can imagine, it is not something that any of the agencies or anybody in Government wants to do, so it is not something that we will look to push. First and foremost, this is about prosecution by any means possible.
To give some kind of hope and clarity, I would like to make the point that the number of TPIMS currently in use is less than four. The number of TPIMs that have been used throughout the 10 years of their existence is less than the clause number that we started on today. I hope that gives some reassurance on how limited the measures will be, and on how few occasions they will be used.
We have been looking at the specific time limit, and we are including a specific condition to have a maximum of five years for the duration of an STPIM. Again, that is to mirror what is in the TPIM legislation. Additionally, subsection (4) requires the Secretary of State to publish factors that she considers are appropriate to take into account when deciding whether to restrict a person’s movement in the UK—for example, ensuring that they have access to appropriate medical facilities.
Part 1 to schedule 4 sets out 16 measures. Right hon. and hon. Members will know there are 17 measures in TPIM legislation for differences around drug testing, but we do not believe that is applicable in this case. The measures have to be tailored to the specific threat that an individual poses.
I want to touch on the polygraph measure, as it has been raised by a number of colleagues. It is designed to allow the Secretary of State to require an individual to take a polygraph test at a specific date, time and location. The purpose of the measure is to assist operational partners to assess whether an individual is complying with the other measures under their STPIM. The outcome of the session may be used to make changes to the individual’s suite of measures—for example, removing or adding specific measures to prevent or restrict their involvement in state threat activity. Again, this measure is expected to be used exceedingly rarely.
Let me reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that the polygraph session cannot under any circumstances be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution. I am stating on the record that polygraph measures cannot be used to gather evidence for a future prosecution, and I hope that that provides reassurance.
Stephen McPartland
Under the way the law system works, that might provide some kind of information, but it will not be used as evidence. The operational partners would then have to go off and identify the evidence in order to find out how they could do that, because breaching a notice is a criminal offence, so they would need the evidence in order to then go to court to demonstrate that.
Mr Jones
I understand what the Minister is saying, but I have a real problem with this; I think the Government are opening up an argument for lawyers who want to defend people. Obviously, if somebody is prosecuted for breaking an STPIM, then in discovery, the lawyer is going to ask, “Was a polygraph test done? Does the individual know they have done it?” I am worried about putting this in, because there is a controversy about polygraphs allowing the defence an opportunity to undermine the process. I understand why the Bill is belt and braces, but I am not sure that this part of it is going to be helpful.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his point, and I understand it, but polygraph measures are currently used in the management of sex offenders in this country, and the Bill will operate very much on the same principles. He should remember that in this legislation we are not trying to create new bits and pieces for controlling an individual; operational partners have found these tools effective over the past 10 years, so we are trying to mirror what is already out there. That is the purpose of the legislation.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked about foreign nationals. Our ambition is to prosecute using any means possible, including deportation, so if that is not available, we would look to use one of the measures in the Bill. Because we would look at deportation and everything else as an option, we would expect the measures in the Bill to apply more to British citizens than they would to foreign nationals. As I have stated, counter-terrorism police are responsible for looking after and enforcing the measures. We talked about the number of TPIMs; I am not allowed to give the exact figure, but I have given an indication of how rarely they are used. We imagine that STPIMs will also be used very rarely.
On the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s point about the internet of things and trying to future-proof the legislation, under paragraph 8 of schedule 4 we can restrict access to electronic devices, and as such restrict access to electronic currencies. We talk about cryptocurrency, but cryptocurrency is already becoming a bit old-fashioned. Before I took on this role, I launched an all-party parliamentary group on digital currency and potential bearer currencies run by central banks; cryptocurrency is already becoming something of the past and we are now moving on to bearer currencies managed by digital banks. It is about safeguarding and future-proofing, and under paragraph 6 we can restrict the transfer of property, so we could restrict a transfer of funds in that way.
Stewart Hosie
Before the Minister moves on, can I add to the point that the right hon. Member for North Durham made about polygraph tests? The Minister said that polygraph tests will not be used to secure a criminal conviction; that is true but, as he said, the STPIMs are measures of last resort in lieu of a conviction if it is not possible to secure one. The polygraph measures in paragraph 12(1)(a)(ii) of schedule 4 refer to
“assessing whether any variation of the specified measures is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity”.
A STPIM is not a criminal conviction, then, but it is in lieu of a criminal conviction; therefore, the Minister cannot be right when he says the polygraph test would not be used to do something, because it could well be used to vary the conditions and possibly to toughen the STPIM—
Stewart Hosie
I just wonder if the Minister could go a bit further on that point.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for highlighting that point; I very much enjoy the suggestions that are made in this Committee. I understand the points he is making, and one of the things I have tried to demonstrate throughout the Bill Committee is my willingness to listen and try to work cross-party to get the legislation through.
Stephen McPartland
I am always willing to write to the Committee, as the right hon. Member knows. I am happy to go away, think about this issue and then write to the Committee, so that I can put in writing the safeguard that I do not want a polygraph test to be able to lead to future prosecutions. I think that would work.
Holly Lynch
Before the Minister moved to the polygraph point, he was talking about cryptocurrencies and said that they are already quite a dated concept; however, my proposal is that we add cryptocurrencies to the list, in paragraph 5 on financial service measures, that includes postal orders, cheques and bankers’ drafts. With that in mind, it might be worth making an explicit reference in that list to whatever form of digital currency or cryptocurrency, given that we know it is a focus for hostile state activity.
Stephen McPartland
The hon. Lady makes a very good point. As she knows, I am always prepared to improve legislation so that we are happy with it on a cross-party basis, it goes through the House and we can support our intelligence communities. I am very happy to look at that issue. I did not even know we could still get postal orders and bankers’ drafts.
Let me give some examples of how STPIMs could be used, specifically for the right hon. Member for North Durham—I know that he would like that. If a British national were recruiting, talent spotting and reporting for a foreign intelligence service, and the evidence to prove the foreign power links was too sensitive to be used in court, meaning that a prosecution was not viable, an STPIM that might prevent harm could include a financial order, to prevent the person from accessing funds from the foreign intelligence service; a restriction on contact or association with individuals, to prevent the person from being debriefed by the foreign intelligence service handler; and electronic communications device measures, to ensure full coverage of devices used by the subject. That is one example of how an STPIM could be used.
Another example relates to a British national working in one of our defence companies, and would prevent sensitive technology transfer. Suppose a disgruntled British national employee of an advanced technology company is seeking to market specialised, valuable and unclassified knowledge to foreign companies. The investigation and disruptive conversation means that the individual is moved to less sensitive work and their company computer access is restricted, but they cannot be dismissed. They remain disgruntled, but prosecution is not viable. In that case, we could disrupt travel to prevent an individual from meeting foreign representatives abroad, so that they could not pass the secrets over to them, and we could restrict contact and association with individuals in the UK for the same purposes.
This example relating to the intimidation of dissidents is particularly important. Suppose a senior member of, for example, a cultural organisation from a foreign Government based in the UK is seeking to exert pressure on dissident diaspora through intimidation, harassment and damaging rumours. The individual cannot be expelled or deported, so victims are afraid to make criminal complaints for fear of recrimination in their home country. The STPIM could be imposed, because prosecution is not viable—the victim will not testify or make a statement. We could put measures in place to prevent an individual from associating with the victim or members of their family. We could prevent serious violence by ordering the subject to relocate to an alternative area in the UK. The STPIM could be justified in closed court proceedings, because it would prevent any identification of the victim. I hope the right hon. Member for North Durham enjoyed those examples.
Mr Jones
I did, actually—I am very grateful to the Minister. He has set my mind running in terms of the possible uses of the measures. There is open-source evidence of the intimidation of protesters against the Chinese Government at universities, for example, by Chinese nationals here in the UK. Proving that those individuals were working directly for the Chinese Communist party or a people’s front, for example, is difficult. Could the Minister envisage the measures being used to prevent that type of harassment, by individuals who are intimidating or trying to close down legitimate protest against the Chinese Communist party, of legitimate protesters on university campuses?
Stephen McPartland
I can genuinely understand and imagine a pathway in which that could be the case. However, as I say, because of the huge amount of resources involved in an STPIM, we will try any other means possible, through normal criminal procedures, to prosecute individuals for harassment under normal criminal law. We will be doing everything we can to not actually use an STPIM. We want to prosecute these people. The Government’s first line is prosecution, and the last resort is an STPIM, when there is no other option available to us.
I will also ensure that we add crypto to the list one way or another, but I have to work out how we define it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 32 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 33
Conditions A to E
Holly Lynch
I will keep my remarks brief. Conditions A to E, set out in subsections (1) to (5), provide a clear framework that the Secretary of State must work within, with conditions that would then be tested by the court. I listened carefully to my friend the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. His amendment probes whether clause 33 should apply the civil standards of proof in relation to the decision to impose prevention and investigation measures, by proposing that “reasonably believes” be replaced with
“believes on the balance of probabilities”.
In considering that, as the hon. Member said, we look to Jonathan Hall’s evidence in this Committee’s first sitting, and then to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and we can see that the wording has pretty much been copied verbatim to this Bill.
With that in mind, and given Mr Hall’s assessment that the measures have not been overused, the lower numbers subject to TPIMs and the reality of just how resource intensive they are, I am satisfied that “reasonably believes” is justifiable, but I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the points raised by the SNP spokesperson.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 33 mirrors TPIMs, in that it specifies the conditions that must be met in order for the Secretary of State to impose prevention and investigation measures on an individual under an STPIM. Condition A is that the Secretary of State must reasonably believe that the individual is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity. Condition B is that some or all of the foreign power threat activity is new. That ensures that when a notice has expired after the five-year limit provided by clause 34, a further notice may be imposed only where the individual has re-engaged in further foreign powers threat activity since the start of the five-year period.
Conditions C and D outline the two limbs of the necessity test for imposing the measures, so the Secretary of State must reasonably consider, first, that the notice is necessary for protecting the UK from the risk of foreign power threat activity, and secondly, that it is necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity by imposing the specific measures.
Those two conditions provide an important safeguard that makes it clear not only that must it be necessary in general terms to impose measures on the individual, but that, in addition, each individual measure that is imposed must be necessary in its own right. Condition E requires the Secretary of State to have obtained the court’s permission before imposing measures on an individual. The function and powers of the court on such an application are set out in clause 35.
In urgent cases in which the Secretary of State considers that measures must be imposed immediately, the case must be referred to court for confirmation immediately after measures are imposed. In practice, we expect the emergency power to be used very rarely. The conditions are designed to ensure that STPIMs are used only where they are necessary and proportionate, and they cannot be imposed arbitrarily. There are also several stages at which the courts will be involved in the STPIM process, including granting permission before a notice may be served or confirming one that has been made in an urgent case. The automatic substantive review of the decision to impose the STPIM and all its obligations and a right of appeal against decisions taken in relation to the STPIM provide checks and balances to the decisions taken by the Secretary of State, so I encourage fellow members of the Committee to support the clause.
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and the right hon. Member for Dundee East for tabling their amendment. It proposes amending one of the conditions for imposing an STPIM by changing the wording from the Secretary of State “reasonably believes” to
“believes on the balance of probabilities”.
I reassure the hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Gentleman that in the development of the measures consideration was given to the conditions that must be met in such cases. The Government consider reasonable belief of a person’s involvement in foreign power threat activity to be the appropriate test for STPIMs. Foreign state intelligence operatives are highly trained, sophisticated and equipped to obfuscate in relation to their activities and avoid Government security measures. Given that, it is important that the threshold is not too high.
Stuart C. McDonald
The Minister appears to be saying that the test is slightly different from the balance of probabilities, but from Jonathan Hall’s evidence, he seemed to think they were pretty much the same. I want to tease out whether the Minister thinks that this test is essentially the same as the balance of probabilities, but with a slightly different formulation, or is it a lower test?
Stephen McPartland
I am going to give in to the hon. Member and say I think that the standard of the balance of probabilities test is slightly higher than reasonable belief, but we are dealing with incredibly sophisticated actors who are very highly trained. In this country, reasonable belief is used throughout in relation to war, and we have gone with the reasonable belief definition because of the nature of the people we are dealing with, the nature of the threats to national security and the nature of state threats, but I accept the point the hon. Gentleman is making.
Stewart Hosie
If the Minister is saying that the “reasonably believes” test in conditions A, C and D is appropriate for the reasons he has just given, why is condition B so hard and fast? The Bill states:
“Condition B is that some or all of the foreign power threat activity in which the individual is or has been involved is new foreign power threat activity.”
There is no evidential test, such as the Secretary of State having a reasonable belief about some or all of the foreign power activity. What is the rationale for having the slightly reduced test in conditions A, C and D, but no test at all in condition B?
Stephen McPartland
As I am a kind and forgiving person, I will answer and say that we have condition B because, throughout the legislation, someone has to have engaged in activity on behalf or in support of a foreign power. That is one of the key tests throughout the Bill, the foreign power test. That is the reason for it.
My view is that “reasonable belief” strikes the right balance, and the threshold mirrors that of TPIMs, which have recently been amended by Parliament in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for answering the question. We will give that answer further thought before consideration on Report, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Five year limit for Part 2 notices
Holly Lynch
Kirkintilloch East. Thank you for that, Mr Gray—make sure that is in Hansard.
I thank the hon. Member for amendment 56. Clause 34 stipulates that a part 2 notice can remain in force for a limit of five years. There are a number of overlapping clauses in this part of the Bill, focusing on reviews and the ongoing considerations about the necessity of a TPIM. When we get to clauses 39 and 40, I will speak to the importance of the TPIM review group, which Jonathan Hall made very clear in his evidence is essential if we are to learn anything from the lessons of TPIMs. On clause 34, could the Minister confirm the due regard that the Secretary of State must have for other agencies and the review group when considering whether to extend a part 2 notice?
Stephen McPartland
I will start with the clause and then deal with the amendment. Clause 34 provides for when a STPIM notice comes into force, how long it will remain in force and how many times it can be extended. It sets a five-year limit in total. Once a notice has been imposed, it remains in force for one year. Unless renewed, it will expire after that time.
If the Secretary of State believes that conditions A, C and D, which we have just discussed, are met, it may be extended for a further year up to four times, taking the total to five years. A further STPIM notice cannot be imposed after this time unless new foreign power threat-related activity is uncovered. I would also like to make it clear that the notice is reviewed every quarter. Those measures ensure that STPIMs cannot be imposed indefinitely, and there are constant safeguards throughout their imposition.
The one-year period and the five-year limit balance the need to protect against threats to the UK from individuals, and allow further extensions to be granted if there continues to be evidence of the risk of involvement in foreign power threat activity. The provisions do not just look back, but recognise the important work that our security services and police would need to carry out both before and after a notice expires. I would therefore appreciate the Committee’s support for the clause.
Amendment 56 relates to the time limits placed on part 2 notices. Like hon. Members, the Government agree that it is important to ensure that individuals are not placed on STPIMs indefinitely. That is why we have included two important time-limit safeguards. The first is that STPIMs can be extended only after a year if the conditions on which they were imposed are still met. In particular, the approach we have taken contains a number of points where positive action is required to keep an STPIM in place. That important safeguard ensures that an STPIM cannot remain in force when it is no longer appropriate.
Secondly, STPIMs can be extended on only four occasions. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked why we had not opted for two occasions, mirroring the original TPIM legislation. That is because of evidence over the last decade from our operational partners about what they feel is appropriate and necessary. We are mirroring their experience with TPIM notices over the last decade, and we will work with them on STPIM notices.
The one-year period and the five-year limit balance the need to protect against further threats. Given the safeguards I have outlined, I ask the hon. Member to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister, because he did not just say, “Well, we’re just cutting and pasting from TPIMs.” He did provide an explanation of the thinking behind the five-year limit. I will take that away and give it further thought. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Tuesday 19th July 2022
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 19 July 2022 - (19 Jul 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
As the shadow Minister says, these clauses put in place some important oversight and a scrutiny mechanism in relation to state threats prevention and investigation measures. On the whole, the oversight and scrutiny mechanisms appear to work, but I have some questions to put to the Minister for clarification.
First, to pick up on a point made by the shadow Minister, why is it the function of the court to determine whether the Secretary of State’s decision was “obviously flawed”? I was slightly surprised by that standard and not familiar with it at all. What is the difference between an “obviously flawed” decision and one that is merely “flawed”? Is not the simple requirement in clause 35(6) to apply judicial review principles in itself sufficient to let the court know what it is supposed to do?
Secondly, clause 35(4) allows the court to have its hearing on the Secretary of State’s application “in the absence of” the relevant individual and even without that person being notified of that happening. I can well understand that there will be some reasons why that may appear to be necessary, but the Bill does not provide any guidance at all to the courts as to when it would or would not be appropriate to proceed in that way. That struck me as quite a strange way to do things. It just says that the court may consider the application
“in the absence of the individual”,
without providing any guidance as to when that would be appropriate and the reasons the court should have for doing that.
That question is even more pertinent when the court hears an urgent case under schedule 5, which says that the Secretary of State must serve the part 2 notice on the individual and then, immediately after, refer the measures to the court. Given that the part 2 notice has been served on the individual and is enforced because of urgency, it seems strange that there would be justification for the court to consider the reference under the part 2 notice without the individual being present or even aware of the hearing. The individual will have been served the notice, so why does the hearing then need to proceed without them even being aware of it? Why would that power be necessary?
Finally, on the review hearing, clause 38(3) gives the court a broad power to simply
“discontinue the review hearing in any other circumstances.”
There is not much in the Bill that sets out why the court might want to do that and what factors would prompt a court to behave in that way. When is it envisaged that that would be necessary and why is there no more detail about that in the Bill?
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
I will respond to the questions as I go through my speech. I am always happy to take interventions.
Clause 35 mirrors the terrorism prevention and investigation measures and sets out the function and powers of the court on an application by the Secretary of State to obtain permission before imposing measures on an individual, as required under condition E of clause 33. The clause means that the court must apply judicial review principles and consider
“whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed”.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked how many times decisions have been considered “obviously flawed” by the court and the answer is never; hopefully that gives some reassurance.
The Secretary of State will put the draft part 2 notice before the court. If the court considers that the decisions that conditions A, B or C are met were obviously flawed, it may not give permission to impose the notice. If the court considers that the decisions relating to condition D were obviously flawed, the court can give directions to the Secretary of State on the specific measures while otherwise permitting the notice to be imposed—again, there are more safeguards.
The court may assess the Secretary of State’s application without the potential subject of the measures being aware. That is important because, as the hon. Member for Halifax made clear, it prevents the individual from receiving notice that the measure could be imposed on them and obviously stops them running away and absconding.
Once the measures are imposed, the subject will of course have the right to an automatic full review by the High Court where the individual will be present and have legal representation. For any closed proceedings in the review hearing, there will be a special advocate to act in the subject’s interest. I have checked that the special advocate cost will be met by the Home Office for both parties. The review hearing is where the court will apply a high level of scrutiny to the Secretary of State’s decisions. The Government feel it is right that, rather than at the initial stage of obtaining court permission, the full scrutiny takes place at the second stage of court review, after the individual has had an opportunity to seek legal advice. We will come on to that in more detail.
Clause 36 gives effect to schedule 5, which makes provision for urgent cases in which the Secretary of State may, under clause 33(5)(b), impose measures on an individual without first obtaining the permission of the court. This provision has long-standing precedents: there are similar provisions relating to TPIMs in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and to control orders in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005.
This urgent and exceptional power has never been used since the TPIMs regime was introduced. In all cases, it has been possible to obtain court permission in advance, and that will always be the preferred option. We do not expect the regime in this Bill to operate any differently. We have tried to put in place safeguards throughout the whole Bill. As I have said, the STPIMS are a last resort and it is all about trying to find other ways to prosecute.
As we know, the power will be used in rare and exceptional cases when there is an operational need to avoid any delay in taking measures that are considered necessary to protect the UK from a foreign power, threat or activity. We will come to oversight in later deliberations on this part of the Bill. To help the hon. Member for Halifax, I will say that I absolutely expect the person appointed to review the operation of this part to comment on the appropriateness of any use of the urgency process. I hope that provides reassurance.
Clause 37 ensures that there is timely and clear progress towards a full High Court review. The basis of the clause is, in essence, to ensure that in each case, when measures are imposed, a prompt and clear timeline is put in place, with the steps that need to be taken towards the subsequent full High Court review. The directions hearing must take place within seven days of a part 2 notice being served on the individual or, in an urgent case, within seven days of the notice being confirmed. Directions must then be set for a full review hearing to take place as soon as possible. The proceedings leading up to the full review hearing will be agreed by all parties.
The clause is not about the court considering the restrictions or the nature of the evidence; it is there more to ensure the speedy process of the approach to the full hearing. It is important that the hearing takes place speedily within that seven-day period, so that there is a direction of travel to ensure that subsequent oversight is well prescribed.
On clause 38, the involvement of the court is an important safeguard for the rights of the individual subject to the measures, and full judicial oversight of the process of imposing measures is key. As I alluded to earlier, clause 38 provides for a full High Court review to take place automatically in every single case in which state threat prevention and investigation measures are imposed. This will happen automatically, with no need for the individual to initiate the proceedings, in each case in which measures are imposed, subject only to the provisions that allow the discontinuance of proceedings included in subsection (3)—for example, if the person does not want the review to take place. Only the individual or court may make the decision to discontinue the proceedings, and the individual will always be able to make representations in respect of a proposal to discontinue.
At the full review, the function of the court is to review the decisions of the Secretary of State that conditions A, B, C and D were met at the time she made the decision and continue to be met at the time of the review. To remind the Committee, the decisions are that they reasonably believe the individual is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity; that some or all of that activity is new foreign power threat activity; that they reasonably consider that the imposition of STPIMs is necessary to protect the UK from the risk of action that constitutes foreign power threat activity; and finally, that they reasonably consider that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity, for the specified measures to be imposed on the individual.
Clause 38 requires the courts to apply the principles that are applicable on an application for judicial review. As Committee members will be aware, the courts take the view that judicial review is a flexible tool that allows for differing degrees of intensity of scrutiny, depending on the circumstances and the impact of the decision in question on the individual concerned.
As well as setting out the functions of the court in a review, clause 38 sets out the powers available to the court, which may overturn the Secretary of State’s decisions in their entirety if it finds that they were unlawful. If the court finds that it was necessary to impose measures but one or more of the measures imposed was unlawful, the Bill is clear that the court may quash the particular measures or direct that they be varied, while also directing that the rest of the notice comes into force. That will provide a balance between being able to protect the UK and ensuring that the measures imposed represent the minimum necessary interference with the rights of the individual.
In addition to the function and powers of the court, clause 38 also makes provision for circumstances in which the review may be discontinued. The court must discontinue the review if the individual requests it—for example, if they do not wish to challenge the case against them. However, as a further safeguard, the Bill specifies that before the court may discontinue proceedings under the power the individual subject to the measures and the Secretary of State must have the opportunity to make representations.
It is imperative that the correct checks and balances are in place to govern the operation of STPIMs, and the Government consider that clause 38, together with other provisions in the Bill that provide the requirement for court permission before the imposition of measures and subsequent rights of appeal, will deliver rigorous end-to-end judicial oversight of the decisions taken by the Secretary of State in the exercise of her powers. The continuous involvement of the court will provide a key, important safeguard for the rights of the individual subject to the measures.
In summary, clauses 35, 36, 37 and 38 are exceptionally important for the Bill and I urge the Committee to support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 35 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clauses 37 and 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Criminal investigations into foreign power threat activity
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 39 creates a requirement on the Secretary of State to consult the chief officer of the police force that is investigating or would investigate any offence, acts or threats in clause 26(3) that could fall to have been committed by the individual, on whether there is evidence that could realistically be used to prosecute the individual. During the evidence session, it was asked whether STPIMs would be easier to secure than a prosecution, so I welcome the provision in clause 39 that a prosecution has to be considered before the move to a part 2 notice—to be fair to the Minister, he was clear about that earlier in today’s discussion. The clause will also give the chief officer a statutory duty to consult the relevant prosecuting authority.
I am mindful that there is a difference between consulting a chief constable for the purposes of information gathering with a view to securing a prosecution and the ongoing necessity of managing someone in their force area who is subject to an STPIM. Will the Minister confirm whether the Civil Nuclear Constabulary or Ministry of Defence police, for example, would be consulted under subsection (2), given their roles in protecting prohibited places, regardless of the fact that they do not have any of the regular responsibilities of the other forces in England and Wales beyond their specific duties? The chief officer must also keep the investigation of the individual’s conduct under review, with a view to bringing a prosecution for an offence, acts or threats under clause 26(3), and must report on that to the Secretary of State while the part 2 notice remains in force.
Stephen McPartland
Clause 39 sets out the detailed requirements relating to the interaction between criminal investigations and the imposition of the STPIM notice. I want to make it very clear that it is always the Government’s preference and priority to seek the prosecution of those engaged in state threat activity. Where we can prosecute, we will. However, we accept that there are and will continue to be dangerous individuals whom, despite our best efforts, we cannot prosecute, which is why we need preventive measures to protect the UK from the threat posed by that small number of dangerous individuals. We believe the provisions in the Bill represent the most appropriate, proportionate and effective powers for dealing with this risk.
The commitment to prosecution is properly reflected in clause 39, which deals with criminal investigations. It requires, before the imposition of an STPIM notice, prior consultation with the police as to whether there is
“evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for an offence”
relating to state threats. The police must consult with the relevant prosecuting authority on the same matter before responding to the Secretary of State. The provision will ensure that STPIM notices are not imposed on an individual when prosecution for state threat offences is viable instead. The police will continue to investigate and will refer the case to the prosecuting authorities if sufficient evidence comes to light.
Clause 39 makes the ongoing review of the investigation of the individual’s conduct with a view to prosecution a statutory requirement. As mentioned, there should be absolutely no doubt about our absolute and unwavering commitment to prosecute individuals where possible, which is reflected in the clause. The counter-terrorism police will continue to have full responsibility for overseeing this matter but, if necessary, they will engage with all other forces to ensure a full case for prosecution. The better our chance of getting a full prosecution, the better our chance of not having to use a STPIM notice.
The Government believe prosecuting to be the best way to move forward. The only situation in which prosecution does not result will be when a case has not passed the relevant test in the code for Crown prosecutors. Our ambition is to prosecute at every single stage and use STPIMs as an absolute last resort.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 39 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40
Review of ongoing necessity
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
Clause 40 introduces a review of ongoing necessity, meaning that the Secretary of State has a duty to keep under review the necessity of a part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it while the notice is in force. Through case law, a parallel system was established for TPIMs, following the Court of Appeal ruling that
“it is the duty of the Secretary of State to keep the decision to impose a control order under review, so that the restrictions that it imposes, whether on civil rights or Convention rights, are no greater than necessary.”
We welcome the clause. In Jonathan Hall’s 2020 review of counter-terrorism legislation, he gave a review of the TPIM review group—the TRG—meetings, at which officials from the Home Office, counter-terrorism police and MI5 review the necessity and proportionality of TPIM measures, consider variations, discuss exit strategies, are updated on the prospects of criminal prosecution and consider the outcome of practical and ideological mentoring sessions. He said:
“The Home Office official chairing the meeting injected a proper degree of challenge to the ongoing management of the TPIM subject, including on the possibility of relaxing certain measures, and impact on family members. The TRG is conducted using a draft agenda which now requires consideration of each measure in turn: this is a clear improvement over the previous practice of considering the measures as a whole. Following my observations in previous reports, I am pleased to say that there is greater analysis of whether prosecution for terrorism offending is a reasonable alternative to a TPIM.”
In the first oral evidence session, Mr Hall said:
“The first message from the TPIMs is that you need to have a strong chair of the TPIM review group, or the equivalent”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 5, Q2.]
for the STPIMs.
The clause says only that a Secretary of State must keep the notice under review. Will the Minister confirm that an STPIMs review group will be a key feature of the ongoing assessment of an STPIM? How often will it meet? Will he confirm that the review group will be a primary mechanism for providing information to the Secretary of State, allowing them to make informed decisions?
Stephen McPartland
I will detain the Committee on this clause for only about an hour and a half. [Laughter.] I can feel the excitement. The Government recognise the disruptive nature of the measures on a person’s life. That is why the notice should remain in place only for as long as necessary and the measures imposed should remain tailored to the threat.
Clause 40 provides for an important safeguard by placing a duty on the Secretary of State to keep under review the ongoing necessity of both the STPIM notice itself and the measures specified in it. Regular monitoring to consider how the individual is responding to being on a STPIM, reviewing whether any new evidence has come to light for a prosecution to be possible and considering whether any changes are needed by varying the restrictions will remove any doubt that, while it remains in force, an STPIM notice will be assessed to ensure that it remains necessary at all times.
There were a few questions from the hon. Member for Halifax; I will try to answer them as best I can. There will be quarterly reviews and the individual will be able to appeal, as we discussed earlier in the debate. She is correct that reporting will be done quarterly. The review will be accountable to the Secretary of State and will be chaired by an expert civil servant and attended by operational partners. Here is the bit that the hon. Lady and our friends in the SNP will be most keen to hear about: as with TPIMs, there will be an independent reviewer to ensure that clause 40 and the whole of the STPIMs regime will be implemented correctly. I hope she can support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Tuesday 6th September 2022
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 6 September 2022 - (6 Sep 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 4 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 8th September 2022
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 September 2022 - (8 Sep 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
This is the first time that I have spoken on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It is an enormous privilege to be here. I realise that I enter this process—this lion’s den—at a moment when other lions have been through the Bill a few times before—there are an awful lot of Christians in this Committee and only one lion.
Before I say anything further, I pay enormous tribute to the Bill team, who have been phenomenal. The very fact that this has continued at all in such a professional way—
Tom Tugendhat
It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.
On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—
Tom Tugendhat
My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—
Tom Tugendhat
I will endeavour to find out what the reason is. You will understand, Ms Ali, that I was not appraised of this situation. I have spent rather a long time reading the Bill in the past 36 hours and not so much time asking about the movements of former Ministers.
On the point made by the right hon. Members for North Durham and for Dundee East about time, I will endeavour to do what I can to ensure that we have time available. Let us see how we go today. If time is needed, I will talk to the Whips team about it.
The Chair
The Minister has addressed the key points. I have nothing further to add in response to the point of order, so we will now begin our proceedings.
Clause 41
Variation of measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 42 to 44 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
As the comparable sections in the terrorism prevention and investigation measures legislation make clear, clauses 41 to 44 are technical elements that improve the regime and make it work in practice. Clause 41 mirrors TPIMs by making provision for the measures imposed to be varied while they are in force. That will allow changes to be made to the restrictions where necessary, in response to changes in the individual’s personal or family circumstances or to the assessment of the risk they pose. Those provisions will be important in ensuring that the regime is able to respond dynamically and flexibly to changing circumstances, and that the individual is able to live as normal a life as is possible without posing a threat to the British people.
The provisions will also be important to securing the effective operational management of state threats prevention and investigation measures. Critically, the underlying requirement that the measures imposed must always be necessary and proportionate remains, and that is explicitly the case for any variation that has the effect of strengthening the measures imposed.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under you as Chair once again, Ms Ali. They say a week is a long time in politics: never has that been truer than this week. I am very pleased to see the Minister in his place, but—for the second time over the course of this Committee—not quite as pleased as the hon. Member for North Cornwall that he once again has a Minister in place. I welcome the Minister to his role; as others have said, he is the fourth Minister we have had over the course of this Bill. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work together, now that we can make some vital progress on this really important piece of legislation. I also look forward to working with him on this policy area beyond just the legislation that is in front of us.
Turning to the detail of this group of clauses, clause 41 makes provision for the measures imposed under a part 2 notice to be varied in a number of different circumstances, as the Minister has outlined. Subsection (2) makes it possible for the Secretary of State to vary a relocation measure in a part 2 notice if considered necessary
“for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”.
We are satisfied with those measures, and recognise the necessity of the remaining provisions in the clause.
Clause 42 provides a power for the Secretary of State to revoke a part 2 notice at any time by serving a revocation notice, whether or not in response to a request by the individual. The Secretary of State may exercise that power where they consider it is no longer necessary for the part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it to remain in force. The explanatory notes say that
“although the measures may no longer be necessary at the time that the Part 2 notice is revoked (for example because the individual has been detained in prison), they may subsequently become necessary again (when the same individual is released from prison, perhaps following an unsuccessful prosecution for a criminal offence).”
As I have said before, the assumed prosecution rate for state threats in the Home Office impact assessment is just 33%, so I am concerned that we might need that level of flexibility, depending on the circumstances.
Subsection (6)(a) of the clause also provides a power for the Secretary of State to revive for a period of a year a notice that has previously expired without being extended, without the need for evidence of new state threat activity. Surely if a person continues to be a threat, the notice should not be allowed to expire; alternatively, if the notice has been allowed to expire because the person is no longer deemed a threat, reviving a notice without any new information surely could not be justified. On that basis, I would be keen to hear any further rationale for the provisions in subsection (6)(a).
When considering the revocation of part 2 notices, it is also worth considering what Jonathan Hall QC described as the “TPIM Catch-22” in his annual report on the terrorism equivalent of these part 2 measures:
“On the one hand, in order to test whether an individual would revert to terrorism-related activity in the absence of TPIM measures, there may be no alternative but to reduce or remove measures; for example, by allowing an individual to associate or move more freely.
“On the other hand, association and movement measures have been imposed precisely to counter the risk of terrorist-related activity. In the absence of evidence of risk reduction, to do so might put members of the public at risk of harm.”
It is not easy to step down from STPIMs once they have been imposed and there is a clock ticking on the restrictions imposed on a suspect, so what efforts are we making to establish best practice on this, so that clauses 41 and 42 can be deployed as effectively as possible?
Clauses 43 and 44, also in this group, make provision for circumstances in which a part 2 notice is “quashed” or directed to be revoked as a result of court proceedings, and schedule 6 rightly provides other circumstances in which an individual who is convicted of an offence under clause 50 has a right of appeal against that conviction.
Other than the points we have raised, we are satisfied that these measures strike an appropriate balance.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me answer some of the questions that have just come up. The hon. Member for Halifax and the right hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire, if I am correct—
Tom Tugendhat
Forgive me; the right hon. Member for Dundee East. They have raised some interesting points. The first is on the notice to be revived without new evidence of a lapse. The reason for that variation is to allow for prison sentencing. Should an individual find themselves being sentenced for a crime in the middle of an STPIM, that allows the STPIM to be paused for the purpose of imprisonment and revived afterwards, without having to go through the whole process again. The purpose is practical, rather than that of having a massive legal effect. Therefore, I believe it is entirely proportionate with the requirements of security.
Stewart Hosie
That seems a slightly illogical formulation. If the prison sentence is substantially longer than the maximum the STPIM could provide for, it seems preposterous that the remainder of the STPIM’s time would be added to the end of a sentence once it was fully discharged. That does not appear to be fully thought through.
Tom Tugendhat
Perhaps the hon. Member will appreciate that not everybody who spends time in prison will do so for the offence for which the STPIM might have been applied. It is perfectly possible that somebody might spend six months in prison for something completely unconnected—a driving offence, a minor theft, or whatever—and therefore a pause would be entirely in keeping with that. The STPIM is about controlling different people’s ability to move and communicate, in which circumstances prison would simply not be a relevant application because the prison sentence effectively supersedes the controls that would have been put in place. In that sense, it is merely a way of recognising that, in certain circumstances, different applications would apply.
Clause 39 requires police to keep under review criminal investigations. STPIMs are a civil measure to protect against national security threats when a criminal prosecution is not possible. They are not overlapping; they are compatible and, indeed, complementary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 45
Appeals
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause set out the rights of appeal of a person subject to an STPIM notice and the function of the court on considering such an appeal. Those rights of appeal are in addition to the automatic review of each case and ensure that the individual subject to a notice is able to appeal against all relevant decisions taken by the Secretary of State using the powers contained in the Bill—for example, to extend or revive a notice, to vary the measures or to refuse an application for measures to be varied.
In determining an appeal brought under the clause, the court must apply judicial review principles. That is a particularly intense level of scrutiny and will ensure that the Secretary of State’s decisions are subject to independent consideration. Clause 45 makes clear the powers of the court on considering an appeal, which include to quash the extension or revival of the notice or the measures within, or to give directions to the Secretary of State for the revocation of the notice or in relation to the variation of the measures specified in the notice. As I have said already, a key feature of the Bill is the extensive and multi-layered approach to judicial oversight, which will ensure that the courts can be involved at every stage of the process, and that every decision of the Secretary of State can be reviewed by the judiciary and can be overturned if the court so decides.
To recap, there is an initial permission stage before measures are imposed. There is then the automatic full review of the decision to impose measures, and there are the extensive rights of appeal contained in the clause. Taken together, those provide important safeguards.
Mr Jones
I warmly welcome the Minister to his position. He and I go back a long way: when I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, he was a bright, fresh young officer, and I think we both have fond memories of our time working together. One of the dangers he faces is being appointed to a position that he knows a lot about. That is always a downer for any Minister and strikes fear into the civil service. I wish him well, and he will do a good job.
Throughout the entire Bill, there should be an ability for the individual to have recourse to appeal. That is not because I am somehow soft on terrorism or on the individuals we are dealing with. It is because we must have a system whereby, when the state takes hard measures to limit someone’s freedom, they need the counterbalance of the ability to appeal. That is why I welcome the measures. My problem with the Bill is that, although this measure is present in this part of the Bill, there are no safeguards in other parts of the Bill. Those types of appeal mechanisms balance state power and the individual.
I have two specific points on the process, which I support. How will the appeals be done in the court? Some of the information that the Secretary of State will rely on will be highly classified, so how will the process work? It will mean the disclosure of some information that we would not want disclosed in open court. I shall not rehearse the arguments on part 3, but it is clear that, if part 3 is retained, the individual will not have recourse to legal aid for an appeal. I am opposed to that. That is not because I am on the side of individuals who wish us harm, but we must ensure that we have a system that is robust in ensuring that justice is done, and people must not be arbitrarily detained or subject to those restrictions if they clearly have legitimate arguments against what the state is trying to apply.
Tom Tugendhat
Before I come to the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s words, I will just address the very generous tribute from the right hon. Member for North Durham. I remember that I used to call him sir; he never called me sir, and he still will not. I do not feel special in that; I do not think he has ever called anyone sir in his life. It was very kind of him.
On the question raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, clause 38 means that there has to be a review wherever a STPIM notice is imposed, which is in clause 35. The individual can attend the automatic review. I will come on to that element, because as the right hon. Member for North Durham rightly says, there is likely to be material that is extremely sensitive. That is why the procedure relates to what is already established with special advocates. The right hon. Member knows much more about Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings, and the various ways in which advocates can have access to information that is relevant to a court but is not then shared with somebody for whom that would not be conducive. That is the way that the proceedings will work, and I think that provides the right balance between disclosure, justice and protection.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Jurisdiction in relation to decisions under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
Members will be pleased that this is very brief. Clause 46 makes an important but largely technical provision. The purpose is to provide absolute clarity that the High Court is the appropriate forum for judicial proceedings arising from decisions relation to STPIMs, or in Scotland, the Outer House of the Court of Session. That is important given that such proceedings may rely on closed material, which we will come on to next.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Proceedings relating to measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 47, and schedule 7, to which the clause gives effect, make further provision for court proceedings in relation to decisions taken under the Bill. I will spend slightly longer on those measures, given the important issue raised by some of the key aspects of those provisions.
Subsection (1) makes clear that an appeal against a court decision in STPIM proceedings may only be brought on a point of law. That limitation is appropriate. The court of first instance has the expertise in fact finding for national security determinations. It has developed expertise and a body of knowledge in an experienced judiciary who hear national security cases. That means it is right that the court of first instance, which has significant expertise, has the final determination on points of fact.
In such cases, it is therefore right to limit the right of appeal to a point of law, as higher courts will not have available the national security information or expertise to make a fair determination on the facts. The approach is reflected from the provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
Schedule 7 makes further provision relating to court proceedings under the Bill, including, in particular, powers to make rules of court about various matters. Critically for the operation of the scheme, the rules will make provision that court proceedings in relation to STPIMs will operate with both open and closed elements given the sensitivity of the evidence that will be a key component of why an individual cannot be prosecuted and why the use of a STPIM is necessary. It would fundamentally undermine the scheme if closed proceedings, where sensitive intelligence and national security arguments can be made, were not available. The individual, and his or her chosen legal representatives, can be present at the open hearings, and see all the material used in those hearings, but they cannot be present at the closed part of the proceedings or see the closed material.
Mr Jones
I think the Minister has explained that. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, but as I said earlier on, I think the rules are a sensible safeguard in terms of what we need. Frankly, with no access to legal aid they are for the birds, because no one will be able to use them. We will come on to that debate later.
I want to ask the Minister about the issue of juveniles, which is an increasing problem for our security services. For example, the “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism” report that we just produced in the Intelligence and Security Committee found that, increasingly, those individuals are young people—some as young as 15. If we are going to apply the rules in some possible circumstances to those individuals, what are the protections for them? If the Minister does not know the answer, I am quite happy for him to write to explain the situation. We are perhaps fixated on thinking that this is about Islamic terrorists and grown-ups, but certainly according to the ISC report, very sadly, in many cases those who are now coming before the courts are minors.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me quickly answer the question on who is the appropriate advocate. That is somebody appointed by the Attorney General under schedule 7(10)(1). The person has to be an appropriate law officer, so a barrister or a solicitor. That is how it is determined.
On the question of genuine national security, I understand the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He will understand that this is a matter of concern for many of us who are devoted, as he knows I am, to the application of the rule of law and the access to justice that this country and many countries in Europe have secured over the past century. That is vital to the provision and protection of liberty in our country. I appreciate his point and the right to a fair trial is essential.
However, it is simply the reality of life in our world that sometimes we need to frame that justice within certain provisions to allow it to be real, and not to be silenced by the inability to bring together evidence that would otherwise protect British people. That means that we have to find ways of balancing it. That is why these court proceedings, which are less than ideal and not the ones that we would like to see, are sadly necessary because of the security restrictions that apply.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he knows that I spent some time in the past few decades hunting people who sought to do our country harm, and he is absolutely right. Sadly, it was not always the people who we see on the various TV shows. Very often, it was people who came at it from a very different angle. I therefore appreciate his point; I will look into it and come back to him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 48
Reports on exercise of powers under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 49 stand part.
New clause 2—Reviews of Parts 1, 3 and 4
“(1) The operation of Parts 1, 3 and 4 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The operation of Part 3 must be reviewed by the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(3) The operation of Parts 1 and 4 must be reviewed by either—
(a) the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, or
(b) a different person appointed by the Secretary of State.
(4) Reviews under this section must be carried out in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which any section in this Part comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(5) Each review under subsection (1) must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(6) The person or people mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under subsection (1) as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(7) On receiving a report under subsection (6), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(8) Section 36(6) of the Terrorism Act 2006 shall be read such that the ‘expenses’ and ‘allowances’ mentioned therein may include the discharge by the person or people of their functions under this section.”
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every quarter on the exercise of her powers under this part of the Bill. The Committee will recognise the parallel to similar measures in the TPIM Act 2011. Although details of the operation of the system and of particular cases will necessarily be sensitive and cannot be disclosed publicly, the clause acts as an additional safeguard by welcoming public scrutiny of the use of the regime and powers, and offers reassurance that crucial information about the operation of the regime will be public and kept up to date. Crucially, that information will include the extent of the Secretary of State’s use of her powers and the number of cases in which measures are imposed. It will also include details of court judgments handed down in the relevant period that relate to the use of those powers.
Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to appoint an independent reviewer to review the operation of part 2 annually. First, the reviewer is required to undertake a review of the operation of the STPIM regime as soon as is reasonably practical at the end of each year, and a report on the outcome of the review must be sent to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practical after the review has been completed. Then, the Secretary of State is obliged to lay the report before Parliament. That replicates the approach in TPIMs, for which the annual reports have been an effective way of examining the Government’s use of their powers.
The independence of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, combined with their unrestricted access to Government papers and intelligence, has led to real insight and informed reports that have aided the functioning and development of the TPIM regime. Using the same approach for STPIMs will ensure similarly robust scrutiny. Omitting the clause would undermine the level of oversight and transparency of the regime. I hope the Committee agrees that the provision is important for the effective operation of STPIMs.
New clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Halifax, proposes commitments to review annually the operations of parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill. I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the new clause and I understand the intention behind it. Appropriate oversight of national security functions—particularly the use of intrusive powers—is important. A range of oversight mechanisms are in operation and govern both the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police, which are the primary bodies that will utilise the new powers in the Bill.
As I have just mentioned in addressing clause 49, the Government have made a commitment to an independent reviewer of part 2 of the Bill. Although there may well be merit in extending oversight of the legislation beyond part 2, careful consideration must be given to how that is done. In some cases, it could create an undesired overlap of duplication of responsibility. The Committee discussed that earlier—a little bit before my time—in the context of the hon. Lady’s proposal for an independent body to monitor disinformation. There are further examples of potential duplication, such as the powers in clause 22, which are already the responsibility of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The new clause also proposes that part 3 of the Bill be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. As the Committee knows, part 3 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants who are seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review those measures. An explicit commitment to oversight of part 3 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the existing discretion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.
With those points in mind, the Government cannot accept new clause 2 at this stage. Although I fully appreciate the purpose behind the new clause, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it for now. The Government take oversight of the Bill seriously, and we will consider the best way to approach it. I will be in touch with her about that.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful for the way the Minister has approached the new clause. I accept entirely the volume of work he has had to do in the past 24 to 36 hours.
We feel quite strongly about some of the proposals we are advocating for in new clause 2. There is an acceptance of the real value of the work undertaken by the independent reviewers right across the agencies that work with this type of legislation. We think we are largely doing the Government a favour in putting these proposals forward.
Mr Jones
The amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax is, as I said earlier, part of a broader piece about ensuring that we get the balance right between giving our security services, agencies and people the powers that I personally support, and providing proper scrutiny for the individual and for the operation of the Bill. That is the thing that has been missing from the Bill. Knowing Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, I know that system works well in terms of warrantry and so on. If we are going to give powers to our agencies to do their job rightly, we have to ensure that they are robust and reviewed as things change.
I know the Minister is only a day or a bit into his job, so he might not be able to accept an amendment today, but I think this aspect needs to be looked at throughout the Bill. It was certainly raised with his predecessor, though I cannot remember if it was his immediate predecessor or the one before that.
My other point is to do with this issue of laying before Parliament. I support that, but the report will be very anodyne in terms of what it can provide in public, so I might look to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am not looking for work for that Committee, but it has the ability to access material that cannot, for obvious reasons, be put in the public domain. The Minister will soon learn about the battles going on at the moment with parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office and various other agencies about our role and access to material. We already get, for example, the independent commissioner’s report, but we have an ongoing row about our access to the annex, which we had in the past but for some reason are now not allowed to have. Given the role of Parliament and for its reassurance, will the Minister consider the ISC having access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain? That would be helpful. I accept that some people think the ISC just agrees with everything the agencies do, but it is another review body that can give assurance to the public and Parliament that the powers are proportionate.
We know that once we implement the Bill, we will learn and powers will change. I am not against Brian Leveson, the independent tribunals and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—they do a fantastic job. They have helpfully pointed to some of the lessons that need to be learned, for example, from the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. The ability of parliamentarians at least to ask the questions and have access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain would be an added layer of scrutiny, allowing the public to know at least that we have a full spectrum to ensure that such things are done proportionately and are working effectively.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank hon. Members for the tone of this discussion. I appreciate that scrutiny is important. This is about protecting not just the rights of individuals, but the agencies that are carrying out such important work on our behalf. Their heroism and courage on operations need to be protected, so that the agencies are not later found in legal difficulty in areas where they have acted not only with integrity but with enormous courage. I therefore appreciate the tone.
Briefly, I will touch on the question of scrutiny and laying before the House. I will make an absolute commitment to bring forward reports as soon as possible. I appreciate that there have been a few issues of late, which may have delayed things. I assure the hon. Member for Halifax that I will do my best to ensure that those timelines are reduced and are as sharp as possible. I absolutely appreciate her point. The issue of being laid before both Houses is made absolutely clear in the publication.
To touch on the question of who the commissioner might be, that has not been resolved as yet. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point and there is merit on both sides of the argument, but either way, there is huge merit in ensuring that whoever is doing TPIMs has a very close connection with whomever is doing STPIMs. Whether that is a newly appointed individual or the extension of a role, I am happy to ensure that they work closely together.
Holly Lynch
We have been probing that during the passage of the Bill. Because that role is so crucial to the oversight that needs to follow the rest of the provisions in the legislation, can the Minister, as an absolute minimum, confirm that that person will be in post and that that issue will have been resolved by the time the Bill is enacted, so that that is not an ongoing question that starts to run into the legislation being enacted?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member will be aware that I have been in post for only a few hours, so I will be cautious about making commitments that I cannot keep, but I can assure her that I will do my absolute damnedest to make sure that they are in post, because I can see exactly the point that she makes and I appreciate it. As I say, this is about protecting the rights not just of those who are subject to the provisions but of those carrying out the protection of our state and our nation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause provides for a criminal offence of breaching a measure specified in a part 2 notice without reasonable excuse. This echoes, as do many of the provisions, a similar provision in the TPIM regime, and includes cases in which a person has permission from the Secretary of State to contravene a measure and does not adhere to the terms or conditions of that permission. For the sake of enforceability, it is vital that a part 2 notice is reinforced with effective penalties if the subject does not comply. Hence the maximum penalty on conviction is a custodial sentence not exceeding five years, unless the travel measure is breached, in which case the maximum sentence is 10 years.
Holly Lynch
The clause provides for an offence of contravening without reasonable excuse any measure specified in a part 2 notice. That, again, mirrors section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. According to the Government’s most recent transparency report, in December 2020 the total number of individuals who had been served a notice since TPIMs were introduced in 2011 was 24, so compliance is relatively high. But so are the stakes when someone breaches the terms of such measures.
According to the “Statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation” quarterly report from the Home Office, the number of people who have been prosecuted and convicted under section 23 of the TPIM Act, meaning that they contravened an order, is 10. Like TPIMs, the primary function of STPIMs is to be able to control and monitor those who represent a serious threat to our national security but cannot yet be prosecuted. We have been assured that the primary function of an STPIM is to be able to manage a person while an investigation into a part 1 offence is established, rather than simply creating a situation where a prosecutable breach is highly likely.
We note the particular focus on travel in clause 50, and that under subsection (2) an individual who travels without permission loses any reasonable excuse defence. Given that we anticipate that there might be a higher number of foreign nationals and dual nationals in this cohort due to the state threat nature of the offences, it is possible that we might have higher numbers of requests to attend overseas births and deaths of family members and loved ones among the cohort. However, the risk of permitting that travel, which might mean a return to a very hostile state that we fear is sponsoring the individual’s activity, presents a massive challenge. To ensure there are robust decision-making processes around those considerations and to have good reporting and a review of those elements of the clause would be welcome additions.
Stewart Hosie
As the Minister said, the clause creates a criminal offence of contravening without a reasonable excuse a measure in a part 2 notice, but there is no defence of reasonable excuse if the subject leaves the UK when they are restricted from doing so. In normal circumstances, a breach of a part 2 notice would leave the individual subject to five years’ imprisonment on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment on a summary conviction in Scotland, but that becomes nine years’ imprisonment on indictment for a breach of a travel measure.
I wish simply to get to the bottom of why some of the breaches of a part 2 notice appear to be disproportionately harsh. The Minister said that much of this provision mirrors the provisions of TPIMs; does this bit—the doubling of the tariff for a breach of a travel measure—mirror the TPIMs provisions? If it does, how often was such a penalty imposed for such a breach under the existing provisions?
Tom Tugendhat
It is quite clear that any order given must have consequences if it is disobeyed—I do not think anyone in this room would disagree with that—and it is important that the penalties for disobedience against a lawfully given order must be proportionate. The penalties are proportionate, and it is normal to have an increased penalty for an aggravated offence, whatever that may be. In the circumstances, travelling abroad would be considered an aggravation and therefore have a greater penalty attached. That is entirely appropriate, so it is entirely reasonable to have that increased sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Powers of entry etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 8 be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause gives effect to schedule 8, which provides the police with powers of search, entry, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to STPIMs. For the sake of ease, I will cover the clause and the schedule together.
Before I go into the detail of the clause, I remind the Committee that STPIMs will be a tool of last resort. The Government will use every other tool at our disposal before resorting to such significant measures. Again, I remind the Committee that these measures mirror those in the TPIMs regime.
In order to effectively enforce the regime and check an individual is complying with the measures under their STPIM, the police will have the powers they need to enter premises, conduct necessary searches and seize and retain items as necessary. They will also be able to arrest the individual for a “breach of” offence if they fail to grant police access.
Schedule 8 provides powers to the police to enter and search premises without a warrant to locate an individual for the purpose of serving an STPIM notice or another specified notice on them; to search an individual or premises when serving an STPIM notice for the purpose of discovering anything that might breach any measures specified in the STPIM notice; to search premises on suspicion that an individual subject to an STPIM notice has absconded; and to search an individual subject to an STPIM notice for public safety purposes. It provides a power to police with a warrant to search an individual or premises to determine whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the STPIM notice. There are also powers for a constable to seize and retain items found in the course of such searches.
I remind the Committee that the STPIM itself is kept under review and requires a court’s permission to impose the measure. That means that a court will have already agreed with the assessment of the Secretary of State that the individual meets the meet five conditions in clause 33, which the Committee has already agreed to. That means it is proportionate in terms of a national security determination for the police to be able to undertake the aforementioned activities without a warrant. The powers will be essential to managing and enforcing the measures imposed under STPIMs and, importantly, they provide the right balance between effective powers and safeguards for the rights of the individual.
Holly Lynch
I have a couple of queries on schedule 8, which provides powers of entry, search, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to part 2 notices.
I have queried the use of the word “constable” in legislation before, but it seems to be standard. Paragraph 9(9) states:
“The warrant may be executed by any constable.”
Previous schedules specify certain ranks and specialisms, such as counter-terrorism officers, to undertake such duties. Are we satisfied that further stipulations on who may execute a warrant are not required?
Sub-paragraph (10) states that a warrant issued by a court to search the individual, the individual’s place of residence, or other premises specified by the warrant, expires after 28 days. That period feels a bit odd to me. We want officers to have the flexibility they need, but I cannot imagine a scenario in which they have grounds to apply for a warrant but then take more than 20 days after it is issued to execute it. I am grateful to counter-terrorism police for sharing a bit more about their operations and how these warrants are used, which has provided some reassurance on this front, but will the Minister confirm that a warrant cannot be executed more than once in the 28-day period?
Stewart Hosie
Clause 51 applies schedule 8, which makes provision about various powers of entry, search, seizure and retention—to enter and search premises for the purpose of personally serving, to search for items that breach the notice, and to search when there is a suspicion of absconding. A warrant is required to search people or premises for the purposes of determining whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the notice, and the warrant is to be granted only if necessary.
However, some of the powers in paragraph 10 appear to be rather broad, allowing a person to be searched without a warrant to see whether they might be
“in possession of anything that could be used to threaten or harm any person”.
I am not quite sure what that means. Unlike in the case of other warrantless powers, there is no requirement even for suspicion that someone is likely to threaten or cause harm. What is the justification or the reason for that?
Paragraphs 11 and 12 contain very strong powers to retain certain items which are seized, with no time limit other than
“as long as is necessary in all the circumstances.”
There follows a non-exhaustive example of what could represent necessity, but necessary for what? Is there provision for a person to challenge the ongoing retention of property seized by police under these powers? Is there a model for this drafting that has been used elsewhere? If there is, and if a piece warrantless search and retention legislation exists, how frequently is such a measure used?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member for Halifax asked about the use of the term “constable”. It is standard, and she will realise that mostly it will be counter-terrorist police who lead on STPIMs, and who the most appropriate person is will be reviewed by the operational commander. The use of the term “constable” and the equivalent ranks in other forces and relevant services is standard for these purposes.
The provision on when a warrant may be executed is operationally beneficial to those who may have reason to delay or have to wait for a window to open when action can be taken. I will not go into the potential operational requirements on any element, but clearly they will vary: in some circumstances, it will be appropriate to act immediately; in others, it may be necessary to wait.
The provision on retention for
“as long as is necessary”
is also standard, including in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Bill also contains provisions allowing people to apply to have property returned.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 52
Fingerprints and samples
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 9 be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause will give effect to schedule 9, which makes provision for the taking and retention of biometric material from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. I will cover the clause with the schedule.
The biometric data retention provisions relating to state threats prevention and investigation measures are in line with those existing elsewhere in the statute book, including in TPIMs, which have been well established for more than 10 years. The schedule makes separate provisions for taking the fingerprints and samples of an individual subject to a specified prevention and investigation measure in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to that of Scotland. That ensures that provisions are in line with different police procedures and legislation.
constable may take biometric data, which could include physical data, from an individual subject to a part 2 notice. The individual will be informed of the reason for the fingerprints or sample being taken. Police can require an individual to attend a police station for the purpose of providing biometric data, and that material may be checked against other such material held under a variety of other powers. The schedule requires the destruction of relevant material, including fingerprints, DNA profiles or relevant physical data, unless there is a power to retain, which I shall come to.
The purpose of the provisions is to ensure the right balance between the protection of the public and individual civil liberties. Under paragraph (11), any samples taken from the individual must be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile has been derived from that sample or, if sooner, within six months of taking the sample. Paragraphs (8) and (9) contain powers to retain biometric data. Where there is no relevant previous conviction, fingerprints, DNA profiles and physical data may be retained for six months after the end of the relevant part 2 notice being in force.
Under paragraph (9), a national security determination can be made by a chief officer of police, enabling the police to retain for up to five years data relating to an individual who may pose an enduring national security threat. All national security determinations that can be reviewed must be reviewed by the biometrics commissioner, who has continued oversight of the retention and use of such data.
We recognise the importance of safeguarding individuals’ right to privacy, so paragraph (12) sets out the limitation of uses for any retained material taken from a person subject to a part 2 notice, which are in the interests of national security, for the purposes of investigation foreign power threat activity, for the purposes of a terrorism investigation, for the detection and prevention of crime, or in the interests of identification only.
Holly Lynch
I listened intently to the Minister. Schedule 9 makes provision for the taking and retention of fingerprints and non-intimate samples from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. Schedule 9, like schedule 3, is subject to several Government amendments. As the explanatory notes explain, fingerprints and non-intimate samples have the same meaning as that given in section 65 of PACE 1984. I would be grateful to the Minister for some clarity on that, which he may need to provide in writing. There is a lot going on in relation to biometrics in different parts of the Bill.
Paragraphs (6) to (11) make provision relating to the destruction and retention of material taken from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. The explanatory notes say that where an individual has no relevant previous convictions, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be kept for only six months after the part 2 notice ceases to be in force. Paragraph (11) goes on to state that, as provided in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, material taken under PACE, for example, or that is subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 or the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, need not be destroyed if a chief office of police determines that it is necessary to retain that material for purposes of national security. Given that we are dealing almost exclusively with matters of national security in schedule 9, can we assume that the majority of biometric evidence taken from individuals subject to part 2 notices may be held indefinitely under this provision?
I am reliably informed that the biometric retention provisions in the Bill are designed to bring the powers into line with similar provisions in terrorism legislation. Schedule 9(8) deals with the retention of biometrics collected in the course of the service of a part 2 notice under the STPIM provisions. That provides us with a retention of six months prior to a national security determination being made, and is therefore in line with the provision under schedule 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
A separate provision for the retention of biometrics can be found in paragraph 22 of schedule 3. It provides for a retention period of three years for those detained under schedule 4 provisions, in line with biometrics collected under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which qualify terrorism offences.
Beyond the initial retention period, both provisions are capable of retention by way of a national security determination process. I have lost track—I do not know whether other Members have—of whether we are keeping biometrics for an initial six months, as schedule 9 seems to outline, or for three years, which is the case elsewhere in the Bill. I suspect the Minister is unable offer absolute clarity right now—although I have no doubt that the civil servants think it is absolutely crystal clear—but I would be grateful if he could outline, perhaps in writing, the rationale for the different provisions.
Government amendment 32 specifies that the chief constables of the Ministry of Defence police and the British Transport police, and the director general of the National Crime Agency, are added to paragraph 9(4) of schedule 9. The responsibilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are different from those of other forces, but is the Minister certain that it does not need to be added to the list?
Stewart Hosie
I am aware that similar provisions were debated in relation to schedule 3, and concerns were raised then that the provisions may end up allowing the indefinite retention of the material of people who have accepted cautions—indeed, even youth cautions—meaning that they were never charged, never mind convicted. The Minister has not provided much of a justification for that, other than that he wants the legislation to mirror the provision in other Acts. He used the same argument in his introductory remarks.
That is not enough. Provisions on the ability to retain material indefinitely on whatever grounds must be justified in their own terms in this legislation. I know that the Minister is new to the job, so if he cannot do that now, he can write with that explanation, as the hon. Member for Halifax said. Notwithstanding the fact that we all want the maximum powers necessary to tackle the state threat and the terrorist threat, if his explanation is not compelling or convincing, the provisions will need to be revisited at a later stage.
Tom Tugendhat
I do appreciate that elements are being raised about which I will write to various Committee members, and I will follow up on areas that I have not covered in detail.
Although the operational use of biometrics remains the same across provisions, we are taking a different approach to the powers provided under STPIMs and the powers in schedule 3. That ensures the right balance and proportionality in tackling foreign state threat activity while protecting individuals’ right to privacy. Although there is the option to make a national security determination under both regimes, under our police powers the initial retention period is longer than for STPIMs to reflect the seriousness of an arrest made for suspected involvement in foreign power threat activity.
Following arrest for involvement in foreign power threat activity, an individual’s biometric data may be retained for three years, with the option of extending that, irrespective of whether there is no further action, or whether they are charged or acquitted. Certain national security offences under this Bill will be added to the list of qualifying offences in PACE to reflect the seriousness of the offence that justifies longer retention periods.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9
Fingerprints and samples
Amendments made: 25, in schedule 9, page 133, line 1, leave out paragraph (f).
This amendment removes paragraph (f) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (f) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 26, in schedule 9, page 133, line 9, at end insert—
“(ia) any of the fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, or information derived from such a sample;”.
This amendment inserts a reference to the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 under which fingerprints, data or samples may be taken, so that fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 9 may be checked against fingerprints, data or samples taken under that Act.
Amendment 27, in schedule 9, page 133, line 13, leave out paragraph (k).
This amendment removes paragraph (k) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (k) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 28, in schedule 9, page 133, line 30, after “paragraph 8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 29, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, at beginning insert—
“(Z1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual who has no previous convictions or (in the case of England and Wales or Northern Ireland) only one exempt conviction.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 30, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, leave out “Paragraph 6” and insert “The”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.
Amendment 31, in schedule 9, page 134, line 26, at end insert—
“8A (1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual—
(a) who has been convicted of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction) or of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) who is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of paragraph 8.
(2) The material may be retained indefinitely.
8B (1) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A an individual is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the individual has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the individual has admitted,
(ii) the individual has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the individual has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the individual’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the individual has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the individual, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the individual is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraphs 8, 8A and this paragraph, so far as they relate to individuals convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A—
(a) an individual has no previous convictions if the individual has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the individual was aged under 18.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 8, 8A or this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If an individual is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 8 or 8A whether the individual has been convicted of one offence.”
This amendment and Amendment 36 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Amendment 32, in schedule 9, page 134, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(e) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or
(f) the Director General of the National Crime Agency.”
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force and the Director General of the National Crime Agency to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 33, in schedule 9, page 135, line 32, after “8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 34, in schedule 9, page 137, line 34, leave out paragraphs (h) to (j).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 35, in schedule 9, page 137, leave out lines 38 to 40.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 36, in schedule 9, page 137, line 40, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ has—
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”.
See Amendment 31.
Amendment 37, in schedule 9, page 138, leave out lines 5 to 19 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;”.
This amendment and Amendment 38 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer or police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 38, in schedule 9, page 138, line 22, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
See Amendment 37.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 18th October 2022
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 October 2022 - (18 Oct 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Chair
Although that is an important matter for the ISC and for this Committee, it is not a point of order. The Minister and others, however, will have heard the right hon. Gentleman’s point, and will no doubt take it into consideration in the future.
New Clause 8
Disclosure orders
“Schedule (Disclosure orders) makes provision for disclosure orders.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
This new clause introduces the new Schedule inserted by NS1.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new schedule 1—Disclosure orders.
Tom Tugendhat
Thank you very much for chairing this sitting, Mr Gray. It is a pleasure to be here under your chairmanship, and a great pleasure to introduce new clause 8 and new schedule 1, which introduce a suite of measures to allow law enforcement officers to apply to the courts for orders to gather information that will assist investigations into foreign power threat activity. As with the other police powers in the Bill, the Government have carefully considered relevant existing legislation, and looked to emulate it where it has proven effective in investigating other serious crimes. I will first speak more broadly about the need for the measures as a whole, before turning specifically to disclosure orders.
Most modern investigations include lines of inquiry into finances and other property, sometimes as a starting point and sometimes to enhance other leads. Financial investigations are often critical in developing evidence that is used in criminal proceedings where there is a financial element, by identifying and tracing criminal assets and uncovering the extent of criminal networks. Financial investigation has become increasingly important in criminal investigations in recent years.
In his recent letter to the Committee, the national lead for counter-terrorism policing, Matt Jukes, stated that it can be difficult for his officers to conduct effective investigations into state threats with the current powers and tools available, and that police would greatly benefit from the inclusion of financial investigative measures. The police have stated that these lines of inquiry are particularly important in state threats cases, where actors may be motivated by financial gain but also where they deploy sophisticated forms of tradecraft, meaning that their criminal conduct is even more difficult to uncover, disrupt and evidence than for other crimes. In many cases, financial and property investigations form an important part of establishing the link between the activity and the foreign power, particularly regarding investigations into obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service.
Investigations into property and finances can take place in relation to any form of criminality, but Parliament has already recognised, in both terrorism legislation and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, that there are certain circumstances where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to broader investigatory powers. The Committee has also recognised, in particular during our debates on schedules 2 and 3, that state threats investigations are an area where it is appropriate for investigators to have access to enhanced powers. The addition of these new financial and property investigation powers in relation to foreign power threat activity will ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to effectively conduct state threats investigations, prevent and mitigate harmful activity and bring those responsible to justice.
The Committee will note that these new powers are available to National Crime Agency officers, reflecting the Government’s intention, as set out in the integrated review of defence and security, to ensure that the NCA has the capabilities that it needs and to pursue greater integration where there is an overlap between serious organised crime, terrorism and state threats.
I want to take this opportunity to inform the Committee that as we have finalised these provisions, we have identified other areas in the Bill where the drafting needs to be tailored to ensure that it is consistent regarding the availability of the powers to the NCA. These small amendments will be addressed on Report.
Turning to disclosure orders, as we have discussed in Committee, schedule 2 provides for a number of powers that law enforcement can use to obtain information in state threats investigations. Law enforcement investigators require disclosure orders for state threats investigations in order to access non-excluded material by compelling individuals or organisations to provide information to investigators. It is important to note that disclosure orders cannot compel someone to answer any question or provide information that is legally privileged, or to produce excluded material. Excluded material is defined under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and includes personal records relating to physical or mental health obtained in the course of a trade or profession, human tissue held in confidence and taken for the purposes of diagnosis or medical treatment, and journalistic material held in confidence. If excluded material were required by investigators, a production order under schedule 2 would be required.
Much of the information that investigators seek under a disclosure order may be considered confidential in nature, such as payment details, but is not classed as excluded material. That may be required because the police have previously approached an organisation to ask for the non-excluded material to be provided, but the organisation has refused because it does not consider that it should disclose the information in the absence of a clear power of compulsion. It may be because the police are conducting a complex investigation involving several organisations that could require multiple requests for information over time. In such a scenario, which is likely to occur in state threats investigations, the police require a streamlined process whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations without creating an undue administrative burden on law enforcement, the courts or those who might receive such requests.
In the absence of a disclosure order, a schedule 2 production order, if applicable, would need to be made for every request for information, requiring a large amount of police resource as well as court time. Disclosure orders streamline this process and reduce the numbers of orders needed for requests for non-excluded material during an investigation. For example, if the police were conducting a state threats investigation into an individual and needed to access information from several airline companies regarding the suspect, the company may be willing to provide only basic customer information, such as the full name, without a formal court requirement. If the police required access to the suspect’s payment information used for a plane journey that is suspected of being related to state threat activity, the company may refuse to provide that information, even if investigators provided the company with reassurance that providing this information was in the interests of the prevention of crime. Executing a warrant on the company may be possible, but may not be an appropriate course of action by the police. In some cases, a production order under schedule 2 might be available, but that will not always be the case. Disclosure orders will provide a more proportionate and appropriate way of providing investigators with the information required.
In another example, the police may suspect that a person is purchasing a specialist piece of computer equipment to use in the commission of a state threats offence. The police suspect that the equipment has been purchased from one of a small number of possible companies. In that case, a single disclosure order could be sought, enabling the police to seek information from the companies in question, instead of the police needing to seek multiple production orders.
We recognise that these orders could enable the police to give a notice to a wide range of organisations. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts. In addition to the requirement for senior authorisation, a disclosure can be made only in relation to an investigation into the identification of state threats property, which is defined as money or other property that could be used for the commission of foreign power threat activity, or the proceeds from such activity. This restriction to investigations into relevant property reflects the scope of the equivalent powers in terrorism and proceeds of crime legislation.
Furthermore, the judge must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the information being sought would be of substantial value to the investigation, and for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit of the investigation. Disclosure orders provide for an effective and flexible means of obtaining information in a state threats investigation. Sitting alongside the powers of schedule 2, they would ensure that investigators have efficient and effective access to the information that they need to conduct their inquiries.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I also welcome hon. Members back to the final day of the Committee. We welcome new schedules 1, 2 and 3, and hope that they will reflect the complex and evolving nature of state threats, and the significant technical and financial resources that provide the capability for sustained hostile activity.
For too long, our police and security services have had to use blunted tools in this regard, not designed to address adequately the challenges posed by modern day espionage. We are grateful to Counter Terrorism Policing for submitting written evidence to the Committee, and making its support for the new schedules 1, 2 and 3 very clear. Frankly, the Met provided far more in its written evidence on the rationale of these provisions than the explanatory notes accompanying the new schedules from the Government—a point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham.
The fairly non-existent explanatory notes are a constant challenge from this part of the Bill onwards, affecting later amendments, which is disappointing for all hon. Members trying to follow the detail closely. As the Minister said, Assistant Commissioner Matt Jukes said in his written evidence to the Committee:
“We have requested financial investigation powers to support our investigations in this space. To this end we have articulated a clear requirement to emulate various investigatory powers within the Terrorism Act which centre on financial investigations as well as examination of material which can be used for investigatory purposes. We are assured that these will be introduced by way of a forthcoming amendment. If so, this will further ensure that we have the tools required to successfully investigate and disrupt state threat activity.”
We welcome the new schedules, and now that the long overdue Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill has been published, no doubt the new schedules are intended to work alongside some of the part 5 provisions in that legislation. Currently, terrorism disclosure orders can be made under schedule 5A of the Terrorism Act 2000. Counter Terrorism Policing has called for an explicit disclosure order for state threats, stating that it will help investigators benefit from a streamlined process, whereby one order is available to cover separate requests for information from multiple organisations, without the need to return to court. I want to push the Minister on oversight. I have made the case for an independent reviewer of all the new measures in the Bill. As those will be investigatory powers, will the Minister confirm that the investigatory powers commissioner will have responsibility for overseeing their use?
Turning to paragraphs 7 and 17 of new schedule 1, paragraph 7 outlines offences in relation to disclosure orders. Sub-paragraph (3) states that a person commits an offence if
“in purported compliance with a requirement imposed under a disclosure order, the person—
(a) makes a statement which the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular, or
(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false or misleading in a material particular.”
By comparison, paragraph 17(1) states that a
“statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed under a disclosure order may not be used in evidence against that person in criminal proceedings.”
I cannot quite square that off. I am keen to better understand why the information provided by a person under a disclosure order could not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings.
Before concluding, as I have said before, I accept that it is standard to refer to a police officer as “constable” in legislation, despite the fact that in doing so we are referring to police officers of any rank, not the rank of constable, which seems problematic. New schedule 1 is a prime example of where it gets messy. Paragraph 1(5) says that an appropriate officer for the purposes of these powers is either a constable or a National Crime Agency officer. It is not until paragraph 2(10) that the provision states that an appropriate officer must be a senior officer or authorised by a senior officer. Not until paragraph 9(4) does it confirm that “senior officer” must be a superintendent or above. Would it not be clearer to be explicit about the stipulated rank required to exercise certain powers at the earliest opportunity, instead of allowing for the ambiguity of the word “constable”? The last thing any of us want is for any ambiguity to be exploited by defence lawyers in the courts.
Maria Eagle
Sorry; it is in new schedule 1. That was my mistake, Mr Gray, and I apologise. I am not seeking to confuse proceedings any more; it is confusing enough to have to scrutinise the provision without an explanatory memorandum. That makes this kind of provision very difficult to scrutinise with any real sense. The point I wanted to make is about paragraph 3(4) of schedule 1, which says,
“A disclosure order has effect despite any restriction on the disclosure of information imposed by an enactment or otherwise.”
The words “by an enactment” seem to make it pretty clear that unless it excludes material, the provision is designed to enable the investigating authority to look at anything. Can the Minister give an example of what that aims to remedy? What lacuna is it aimed at preventing? We are talking about waving through a provision that allows a disclosure order to ignore another enactment, and that seems to me to be a large power.
The provision goes on to say, “or otherwise”, which is an absolute catch-all phrase. Can the Minister can explain why the provision is drafted so widely, as well as what kind of “otherwise” arrangement it seeks to get around and why? It seems to me to be extraordinarily wide. We might have seen the rationale for that in an explanatory memorandum, had there been one, but we do not have one to hand. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether we will have an explanatory memorandum before the completion of the Commons stages of the Bill. I think that waving through extraordinarily wide arrangements is cause for concern if we are trying to scrutinise what the Government seek to do and why.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank hon. Members for their comments so far. I will first touch on the point that has been raised about the explanatory notes. I am told that it is normal procedure for that to be published before the Bill is introduced to the Lords—
Tom Tugendhat
I will be taking that up with officials later, and I will find out why that has been said.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman knows that I would never do such a thing. In response to the provision on oversight, we discussed in the last sitting that we are looking at different forms of oversight. While that has not yet been clarified, I will engage with the hon. Member for Halifax to ensure that we have a form of oversight that works, be that from one of the existing oversight bodies or from another body. There are various different arguments, so I will come back to the hon. Member on that.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked what the measures were based on. The Bill is based on the Terrorism Act 2000, but we also looked at the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. We sought consistency in the schedules by using the so-called TACT and the Proceeds of Crime Act as their basis. It is important to note that Police Scotland has been involved in this endeavour and is content. It has been a very important part of the conversation.
The hon. Member for Halifax asked where these orders could come from. Police need to compel individuals or organisations to answer questions. Because of the different natures of potential production orders, they may involve not just a single individual, but multiple sources; that is why I mentioned multiple companies. In this case, one may be following a particular individual but not be certain which airline they travelled on. Therefore, this could include either multiple companies that may have produced a good or a service, or multiple agencies that have supplied it. That is where it comes from.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 9
Customer information orders
“Schedule (Customer information orders) makes provision for customer information orders.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
This new clause introduces the new Schedule inserted by NS2.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider Government new schedule 2—Customer information orders.
Tom Tugendhat
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 9 and schedule 2 seek to insert customer information orders into the Bill as part of the suite of investigatory measures. Those who engage in state threats activity are highly trained individuals who have knowledge of tradecraft that can obfuscate their identity and real intentions.
For example, the tradecraft could be used to conceal transactions by creating secret bank accounts under false identities, or accounts registered to different addresses, in order to send or receive money for conducting activity. The operational objective of a customer information order is to enable an investigator to identify accounts and other account information in relation to state threats investigations. For example, this could be where a foreign agent is paying others to conduct state threats activity in the United Kingdom and police need to identify where the agent’s account is held, or it could be where a suspect is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats activity.
The customer information order is therefore intended for use as a tool of discovery during an investigation, often in the early stages. Once accounts have been identified through a customer information order, they could, where appropriate, be subject to further monitoring or investigation through a schedule 2 production order or an account monitoring order. Without customer information orders, accounts used by those conducting state threats activity may go unidentified, reducing investigative opportunities and, in turn, the ability for law enforcement to disrupt harmful activity and bring offenders to justice. We recognise that such orders could potentially require any financial institution to provide information about relevant customers. As such, senior authorisation is required within law enforcement before an application can be made to the courts.
We expect that, in practice, the powers will be used by police and NCA officers who have received relevant financial investigator training, and we are continuing to work with the police and NCA on creating the relevant guidance. Again, we have modelled the provisions on the terrorism equivalent and the measures used in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the consistency of these processes will ensure that law enforcement officers can make the most effective use of the powers. As I have set out, the customer information orders are another important investigative tool, opening new lines of inquiry and ensuring that law enforcement can run effective state threats investigations.
Holly Lynch
New clause 9 and new schedule 2 establish customer information orders, which authorise the police and NCA officers to obtain customer information from financial institutions. In its written submission to the Committee, for which we are all grateful, Counter Terrorism Policing has welcomed the provision, stating that it will
“enable investigators to identify accounts in relation to state threat investigations, or where an individual is using a covert account under a false identity to receive funds to use for the purposes of state threats.”
As the Minister outlined, the tool has been available to law enforcement for terrorism investigations thanks to schedule 6 to the Terrorism Act 2000, and it has been available for criminal investigations through the Proceeds of Crime Act. However, according to Counter Terrorism Policing, it has not been possible to use either Act in relation to state threats investigations, so we welcome the provision. It prompts the question of why we have not addressed this issue sooner.
Subsection (2) states that the judge may grant the order if they are satisfied that
“the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation into foreign power activity”,
and that
“the order will enhance the effectiveness of the investigation.”
We have spoken a lot about the value of an independent reviewer, and I welcome the substance of the Minister’s comments. It is worth keeping under review the threshold of a judge being satisfied that the order is sought for the purposes of investigation into foreign power activity. We cannot use these orders without good cause, but if we need them to be able to find evidence of foreign power activity, will investigators be able to satisfy a judge prior to that? It will be interesting to see how many applications are granted and rejected once we start to work with the orders. Aside from those points, I am happy with new schedule 2.
Stuart C. McDonald
I will make a couple of brief points. The broad thrust of the new schedule and the intention behind it seem absolutely fine, but I am interested in the tests that must be satisfied before an order is made. Under the previous schedule on disclosure orders, the judge has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion, that there is substantial value in the information gained under the order and that the order would be in the public interest.
In contrast, here in new schedule 2, the judge has to be satisfied only that the order is sought for the purposes of an investigation and that it will enhance the effectiveness of that investigation. That seems a pretty low bar to allowing this pretty invasive procedure to be gone through. Why that choice of language? I guess it is modelled on the provisions that have been mentioned. I have probably not been as diligent as the shadow Minister has in doing my homework and tracking through the previous bits of legislation, and I will now do that. The information gained under these orders could be pretty intrusive, so we need to ensure we are not giving carte blanche to all sorts of intrusive investigations. I am a little bit concerned about the low level of test, compared with the test for disclosure orders.
My second, brief point is that paragraph 4 of the new schedule suggests that the person whose records are about to be trawled through can seek to vary or discharge the order. It is not clear to me how they would go about doing that, given that I suspect most orders will be made without any notice, and they can even be made by a judge in chambers. What assurance can we have that people will be able to challenge this potentially intrusive investigation?
Tom Tugendhat
The question as to why we have not addressed this sooner is a fair one. The UK’s investigation legislation is complex, as the hon. Member for Halifax knows only too well from the homework she has obviously done for our sittings. For example, in the Proceeds of Crime Act there are more than seven investigatory orders used in criminal and civil investigations. The consideration that has gone into this has naturally been complex, and it has required a lot of time and input. This Bill, as she knows very well, has been some years—and, indeed, some Ministers—in the making.
Tom Tugendhat
Let us see. The fact that there are no recorded uses of the information orders in TACT demonstrates how sparing the use of these provisions will be.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 10
Account monitoring orders
‘Schedule (Account monitoring orders) makes provision for account monitoring orders’.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider Government new schedule 3—Account monitoring orders.
Tom Tugendhat
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I turn to new clause 10 and schedule 3—
Tom Tugendhat
My apologies; I meant new schedule 3. New clause 10 and new schedule 3 provide for account monitoring orders for certain investigations into state threats. Police need to be able to obtain information relating to accounts held by a suspect in real time in order to identify and act on disruptive opportunities related to state threats activity. An account monitoring order will require a financial institution to provide specified information in relation to an account—for example, details of all transactions passing through the account—for a specified period not exceeding 90 days.
Mr Jones
These are sensible proposals to give our law enforcement agencies the powers they require, but I would like clarification about definitions. The Minister referred to a bank, and it is clear that this is about monitoring bank accounts. The explanatory statement, expansive as it is—I think it is one line—says:
“These orders may require financial institutions to provide specified information relating to accounts.”
I want to clarify the definition of financial institution. If we go back 20 or 30 years, it was quite clear: we had bank accounts and financial products. Today, though, there is a complex environment of organisations that work and deal with financial accounts. For example, Bitcoin is now traded between organisations, some of which are covered by the Financial Conduct Authority and others not. I am trying to get some understanding of how widely this will go.
The other issue is about bank accounts that are not in the UK. I am particularly thinking about bank accounts in the overseas territories, and what happens there. We need clarification about the remit. The measure might work very simply with banks and other financial institutions, but in an ever-changing world we have a lot of organisations that deal with people’s “accounts” where they are not regulated.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member for Halifax asks again about the term “constable”. She is right to ask, but that is not an oversight; it is accurate. There are different levels at which different officers are allowed to warrant things. As she rightly identifies, “constable” is the generic term, and then at various points different ranks of officer are required for different levels of authority. That is in line with the TACT powers. This area of authorisation is considered less intrusive, and that is why a lower-ranking officer is allowed to ask for it.
On financial institutions, the right hon. Member for North Durham identified that banking has changed somewhat since he and I had post office accounts in the early—I will leave that there. Schedule 3 uses the same definition as that used in paragraph 6 of schedule 6 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it is designed to align. The definition of financial institution in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 can be found in paragraph 1 of schedule 9. Account monitoring orders can be used as part of a broader set of purposes, such as civil recovery, and they are applicable to a broader range of financial institutions. Such breadth is unnecessary in respect of state threats, which is why that is slightly narrower, but the definition is there.
Obviously, these powers cannot be used to compel institutions overseas, so we are asking for co-operation from police forces.
Mr Jones
I appreciate that in terms of overseas bank accounts, but there has been a lot of controversy about individual using overseas territories. If the Minister does not know the answer, he can write to the Committee to clarify the point. I just want to see how far these orders could go in terms of their effect.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that overseas territories come under slightly different jurisdictions, whether they are Crown dependencies or overseas territories. It depends on the jurisdiction, but I will be happy to write to him.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 11
Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements
‘(1) A person (“P”) who makes a foreign activity arrangement must register the arrangement with the Secretary of State before the end of the period of 10 days beginning with the day on which P makes the arrangement’
(2) A “foreign activity arrangement” is an arrangement with a specified person pursuant to which the specified person directs P—
(a) to carry out activities in the United Kingdom, or
(b) to arrange for activities to be carried out in the United Kingdom.
(3) “Specified person” means—
(a) a foreign power specified by the Secretary of State in regulations;
(b) a person, other than a foreign power, specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(4) The regulations may specify a person other than a foreign power only if—
(a) the person is not an individual, and
(b) the Secretary of State reasonably believes the person is controlled by a foreign power.
(5) A person is controlled by a foreign power if—
(a) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares in the person,
(b) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting rights in the person,
(c) the foreign power holds, directly or indirectly, the right to appoint or remove an officer of the person, or
(d) the foreign power has the right to direct or control the person’s activities (in whole or in part).
(6) In subsection (5) “officer”—
(a) in relation to a body corporate, means a director, member of the committee of management, chief executive, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body, or a person purporting to act in any such capacity;
(b) in relation to a partnership, means a partner or person purporting to act as a partner;
(c) in relation to an unincorporated association other than a partnership, means a person who is concerned in the management or control of the association or purports to act in the capacity of a person so concerned.
(7) The Secretary of State may make regulations specifying a foreign power or a person other than a foreign power only if the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(8) The requirement in subsection (1) does not apply to a foreign power.
(9) Regulations specifying a foreign power or a person other than a foreign power may provide for subsection (1) to apply, with modifications specified in the regulations, in relation to a foreign activity arrangement made with the specified person before the regulations come into force.
(10) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence if the person—
(a) knows, or
(b) ought reasonably to know,
that the arrangement in question is a foreign activity arrangement.’—(Tom Tugendhat.)
NC11 to NC28 require certain arrangements with, and activities of, foreign powers and foreign persons to be registered. They are intended to form a new Part 2A, referred to in explanatory statements as the registration scheme. This new clause requires registration of arrangements with specified persons to carry out activities in the UK.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 12—Offence of carrying out activities under an unregistered foreign activity arrangement.
Government new clause 13—Requirement to register activities of specified persons.
Tom Tugendhat
New clauses 11, 12 and 13 are the first of a series of amendments relating to the foreign influence registration scheme announced by the Home Secretary on Second Reading. I will come to the new clauses shortly, but first I want to make some introductory remarks about the scheme itself.
In the 2020 Russia report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, it was recommended that future counter-state threats legislation should address the issue of those acting on behalf of a foreign power and seeking to obfuscate their links or relationship. The director general of MI5 strongly emphasised the importance of legislating to ensure that those acting covertly could be pursued through criminal means to make the operating environment harder for those who intend to disguise or obfuscate who they are acting for. The ISC’s report identified the need for stronger transparency legislation, akin to that in place in the United States—namely, the Foreign Agents Registration Act 1938, known as FARA.
FARA requires any person, regardless of nationality, to disclose to the Department of Justice where they represent the interests of foreign powers in a political or quasi-political capacity, as described by the report. It is a disclosure requirement that applies far beyond a situation in which a person acts for a foreign intelligence service, extending to activities undertaken for foreign powers as well as other entities and individuals.
Only four years ago, the Australian Parliament passed its contemporary equivalent to FARA, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018. The Australian scheme requires the registration of political influence activities undertaken for, or on behalf of, a foreign power or other individuals or entities subject to foreign power control. Both schemes contain a range of exemptions, offences and enforcement powers to further shape and support enforcement of the scheme. Although not like-for-like schemes, they share the principle of tackling covert influence through greater transparency.
There is evidence of the value of these schemes. A submission from the Australian Attorney-General’s Department to an ongoing review of FITS, which commenced in August last year, describes the behavioural changes that it has seen as a result of the scheme’s implementation: some organisations and individuals have adopted better transparency practices, while others have seemingly ceased activities that would be registrable. Enforcement of the US’s FARA has increased in recent years. That has also resulted in behavioural change, as well as prosecutions for non-compliance, including of one very high-ranking former military officer.
I am delighted to be before the Committee today to talk through the proposed UK scheme. This is an important piece in our package of measures and is the area of legislation that calls on sectors to play their part in making it difficult for foreign powers to operate covertly in the United Kingdom. Similar to the position with the precedents that I have just described, its overarching aim is to deter foreign power use of covert arrangements, activities and proxies by requiring greater transparency around certain activities that they direct, as well as where those activities are directed or carried out by entities established overseas or subject to foreign power control.
Put simply, where a foreign state deploys its influence in the UK, either directly or through third parties, that will now be subject to registration and more transparent. I must stress that the scheme’s requirements are not identical to those of the United States and Australian schemes. Although we have worked with our US and Australian colleagues to understand the lessons learned from implementation of their schemes, our scheme’s requirements reflect our own experience and the threats that we face.
The overarching aim of the scheme is to be delivered through two separate objectives and requirements. The first is to strengthen the resilience of the United Kingdom’s political system against covert foreign influence. Openness and transparency are vital to the functioning of our democracy. Where covert influence is deployed by foreign powers, directly or through third parties, it undermines the integrity of our politics and institutions. The scheme will therefore require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be undertaken within the United Kingdom at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or by a foreign entity itself. I will refer to these obligations as the “primary registration requirements”.
Certain registered information will be made available to the public via a scheme website, similar to the position with the schemes of our Australian and US partners. This requirement is deliberately state and sector agnostic, as the source of foreign influence should be transparent no matter where it originates or manifests. The only exceptions, which I will come to, are where exemptions are necessary to protect existing obligations.
The second objective is to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities. The scheme contains a power to specify a foreign power, part of a foreign power, or an entity—such as a company or organisation—subject to foreign power control, where the Secretary of State considers it necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It would require a person acting within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified power or entity to register with the scheme. It would also require a specified entity to register activities to be undertaken within the UK with the scheme. I will refer to this as the “enhanced registration requirement”. Its use will be limited and subject to parliamentary approval.
These requirements will apply to certain arrangements and activities, regardless of the nationality of those carrying out the activity, and will be enforced through a range of offences and penalties, as well as powers to request information.
I also want to tell the Committee about the scheme’s exemptions, which are as follows.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
Before the Minister tells us about the exemptions, it would be helpful to know how the enhanced registration—let us call it tier 2 —will actually work. So far, we are in the dark. The basic registration seems eminently sensible, but what will the procedure be to specify a country, entity or person to whom enhanced registration will apply? How will it work? We need to know that before we find out who might not be expected to register in that way.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman will see that I have a number of pages of text that I will be coming to. If he will forgive me, I will explain all these elements as we get to them.
The scheme’s exemptions are as follows: individuals to whom privileges and immunities apply in international law, as provided by, for example, the Vienna convention on diplomatic and consular relations; legal services, as well as information subject to legal professional privilege; domestic and international news publishers, including confidential journalistic material and sources; and arrangements to which the UK Government are party.
The scheme has also been designed to uphold the letter and spirit of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. To that end, any arrangement with Ireland, or with a body incorporated or associated under the laws of Ireland, will be exempt from registration, as are activities to be carried out by such entities. That will avoid interference with the rights of citizens of Northern Ireland who identify as Irish, as well as the activities of cross-border entities and institutions.
I want to close my opening remarks—that is right; we are just starting—by mentioning George Brandis, the former Attorney General for Australia who was responsible for passing the Australian scheme. He was recently reported as commenting on the announcement of the UK scheme:
“This ought not to be in the cockpit of political controversy in the U.K. It ought to be something, because it is necessary for the protection of the national interest, that commands bipartisan support.”
That is certainly the sentiment that I have taken from Second Reading and our deliberations in Committee so far, and I look forward to working with all sides to ensure the requirements are effective and proportionate.
With that, I turn to the group of new clauses relating to the enhanced registration requirement. Each of the new clauses is substantive and so, after setting out the benefits of the enhanced requirement, I will take each in turn. The enhanced registration requirement will provide greater scrutiny of the activities of specified foreign powers or entities while deterring the use of covert arrangements. I describe it as “enhanced” because it creates wider requirements to register than the primary registration requirement, which we will come to later. That is proportionate to the aim of this part of the scheme: to provide greater assurance around the activities of specified foreign powers or entities.
The enhanced registration requirement will provide three principal benefits. First, it will provide the Government and the public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom. Secondly, the offences and penalties for non-compliance will increase the risks to those who seek to engage in covert activities for foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. Finally, the requirement offers potential for earlier disruption of state threats activity, where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and a specified foreign power or entity but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threats offence.
Tom Tugendhat
I will, very briefly, but the right hon. Gentleman may find that the point is covered—
Mr Jones
If the Minister wants to come here and just read his speech to us, that is fine, but that is not what scrutiny is. I am fully supportive of the proposals under tier 1, but I find it difficult to understand how tier 2 will work in practice. Putting countries or companies on the list will cause huge diplomatic incidents. Let us say we put Huawei on the list, for example; I am sure there would be fallout from that. As well-meaning as tier 2 is, practically, I do not think it will ever be used.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman and I have had many debates on the nature of different foreign influence in the seven years that I have been here. We have discussed many different companies and countries in various ways. I know he shares my absolute passion for protecting the United Kingdom from foreign influence and knows the difficulty that that causes in diplomatic areas. He appreciates better than almost anyone how difficult it is sometimes to match the economic needs and requirements of the United Kingdom with the need to protect ourselves from foreign influence. He is right that this will cause difficulty. There is no getting around the fact that making a decision on the enhanced tier will have diplomatic repercussions. But the reality is that if we do not make those decisions, the implications for our economy and domestic security will be very high.
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there are companies that some of us have stood up to and made a point of identifying as actors for a foreign state—he mentions Huawei; there are others—and which are in many ways difficult examples. I am not going to say whether Huawei would or would not be subject to the enhanced tier, as we have not looked at any determinations on that, but it is quite clear that there are some countries—Russia is a good example today—that would absolutely require the enhanced tier. Different elements of Russian business would no doubt fall within it.
Mr Jones
Yes, but the Minister knows that there are many countries in the world that, although they are not comparable with Russia, would also cause economic harm but are not in the higher tier. Would it not be better to have a broader scheme that mirrored tier 1, with tight definitions of what needs to be registered, and apply it to all countries? We would then give ourselves protection and avoid the diplomatic pitfalls every time we wanted to follow this process.
Tom Tugendhat
People have to register under tier 1 anyway. That will be a public scheme that already identifies many areas. Tier 2 will make sure that there is an enhanced aspect that allows us to be clear what exactly is going on, rather than relying on a general identification. That is an important distinction.
Maria Eagle
Is my understanding correct that tier 1 is about capturing arrangements and activity undertaken for the purpose of influencing a political event or decision, but that the second tier will capture all other behaviour beyond political influencing, such as acting as a foreign intelligence officer? Is it correct that the scheme as set out at present is aimed at making everyone apply at the lowest level—the political influencing level—but that only more serious incidents will be dealt with by designating individual countries or companies? We are going to immediately run into the difficulty of upsetting diplomatically any person, company or country that is designated for more serious activity.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Lady is not noted for her shyness. I am surprised that she feels that the diplomatic repercussions of designating a company or country should dissuade the UK Government from defending themselves. I know she does not think that, and I know the right hon. Member for North Durham does not think that.
The different schedules identify the different natures of influence being used. As the hon. Lady rightly identifies, schedule 1 is about political influence. As I think we all appreciate in this House, that should be public. Those who seek to influence anyone in this House or anyone else by political means, whether through lobbying or in different ways, should identify on whose behalf they are doing so. I do not think that is a very contentious provision.
Tom Tugendhat
I am glad to see the hon. Lady nodding. The second point is the enhanced scheme. That is where influence may come in different ways, where co-operation and interaction with different businesses that pose a particular and distinct threat may be required. That is why—we will come to this later—the political register will be public and the second register will be private, but the identification of those who are required to be registered will of course have to be public and there will be a political and a diplomatic decision that will go with that.
Mr Jones
I sympathise with what the Government are trying to do, and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood does too, but I am never in favour of putting things on the statute book that look tough but that, frankly, will never be used. There must be a more direct way of doing this—a broader measure that applies to all countries, which is then used against relevant countries. My fear is that the measure as it is written at the moment looks tough but will not be usable.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman raises a fair point, but I simply do not believe that if he were in my position, he would not use the powers. I would use them, and I am sure he would use them in a situation where they were required. I know that he has never shrunk from a fight or diplomatic argument, but I think that this is important. The problem is that if the enhanced power were to be used for every nation, the volume of data produced would be enormous and the imposition on companies would be huge.
Mr Jones
I agree with the Minister, but he has a problem. He and I have dealt with the Foreign Office and other diplomatic entities over many years: he knows that the pressure that the power will come under, and the competing arguments against security, will make it unusable.
Tom Tugendhat
I do not accept that, so I think we will have to end this discussion with an agreement to disagree.
Tom Tugendhat
Indeed. But I entirely respect the right hon. Gentleman’s position, and I do understand the point he is making.
New clause 11 will require Ministers—specifically, the Secretary of State—to be willing to engage in a strong discussion with other Departments that rely on investment or, indeed, diplomatic leverage. Yes, I am afraid that is a balance that the Government have to make; the right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to identify it, but I simply do not accept that that means the power will not be used. It is true that the power will be constrained, but that does not mean that it will be unused—Ministers who see the threats before them will be willing to use the powers that they have. We will no doubt continue this discussion later.
New clause 11 will provide three principal benefits. The first is that it will provide the Government and public with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being undertaken for specified foreign powers and entities within the United Kingdom.
Stewart Hosie
The Minister explained just a few moments ago that the tier 1 registrations would be public but the tier 2 enhanced registrations would be private. I am not sure how he can argue that the tier 2 enhanced registration would give the public much more confidence if it is a secret.
Tom Tugendhat
The nature of the registration will not be a secret, but who has had to register will be kept private at the moment. I am already keeping this matter under discussion, so I am glad that the hon. Gentleman sympathises with my concerns. He and I are fully aware that journalism is a very powerful force in many of these areas.
Mr Jones
This baffles me, as it does the hon. Member for Dundee East. Tier 2 registration will not be private, will it? The order will have to be moved to put them on the list in the first place. Everyone will know, so what is the problem with providing transparency? I do not think you can have two tiers with different levels of transparency.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me clarify. Whoever is identified as being on the enhanced tier will be identified publicly. It is those companies that may be co-operating; at the moment, there is a discussion as to whether that should be public or private. The reason for that discussion is that some companies will be co-operating and we may feel that we wish to see that co-operation continue, even though we wish to have the compliance and registration so that we know who is doing what. The argument is that the Government should have the ability to have that information.
Tom Tugendhat
Forgive me, but I think the right hon. Gentleman has got this slightly the wrong way round. By definition, the company that would be identified would be a foreign company, not a UK company.
Mr Jones
Yes, but if I headed a French company—I am not suggesting that we use this power against the French for one minute—and had shareholders, surely I would have to tell them, and report at board meetings, that I had been on the list. It will get out anyway, so what is the point of keeping it quiet?
Tom Tugendhat
We are clearly speaking at cross purposes. The state that is on the enhanced register would be public. The company would be public. Those UK companies that are registering may not be. The right hon. Gentleman has it the wrong way round.
Tom Tugendhat
Okay. I am going to carry on, but I am very happy to continue this discussion on a later occasion.
New clause 11 will provide three principal benefits. First, it will give the Government and the public greater understanding of the scale and extent of the activity. Secondly, the offences and penalties for non-compliance will increase the risk to those who seek to engage in covert activities for foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. Finally, it offers potential for earlier disruption of state threat activity where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and specified foreign power or entity but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threat offence.
I want to be clear that we expect use of the enhanced registration requirement to be limited. It is an additional tool of assurance to bolster the package of measures within the wider Bill. The power to specify a foreign power or entity will be available to the Secretary of State when the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
It is also vital to stress that the use of this requirement should not be taken to imply that every national of a specified foreign power or person associated with a specified foreign entity is to be mistrusted. The message here is quite the opposite: any person who complies with the obligation to declare an arrangement with a specified foreign power or entity is contributing to the safety and security of the United Kingdom by being open and transparent about that arrangement.
Although I am sure that members of the Committee will be keen to understand which foreign powers will be in scope of the enhanced registration requirement, I am sure they appreciate that it would be premature—if not damaging—to make undertakings on that at this stage. The Government will decide when the scheme is ready to be brought into force. For now, I will cover each amendment.
New clause 11 is the requirement to register foreign activity arrangements. A foreign activity arrangement is where activity is to be carried out, or arranged to be carried out, within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity subject to foreign power control. The requirements could apply to any activities, but subsection (9) provides for this to be modified through regulations where necessary.
I wish to bring four key points to Members’ attention. First, I want to reflect on what we mean by a person required to register in this context under subsection (1). A person can be an individual, regardless of their nationality, or an entity. However, if a company or organisation is being directed by a foreign power or entity, the company or organisation would be responsible for registering the arrangement, not its individual employees.
We will shortly discuss new clause 13, which includes a requirement for specified entities to register their own activities. That is important because it makes clear our intention that an employee of a specified entity cannot be considered as being in a registrable arrangement with that entity. The approach was taken in response to sector feedback during our public consultation as a means of reducing the potential registration burden on companies and other organisations that may have many employees all engaged in the same activities.
Importantly, subsection (8) clarifies that there is no requirement for a foreign power itself to register. The scheme intends to increase assurance and transparency of activities being carried out for a foreign power where the involvement of that power might otherwise not be apparent.
Stewart Hosie
In new clause 11(1), “A person (‘P’)” might, as the Minister said, be an individual, an entity or a business. This is not at all clear. Is this the UK individual, entity or business or is it the overseas individual, entity or business that is directing a UK citizen? Is it a combination of the two?
Tom Tugendhat
Let me be completely clear, because subsection (8) makes it completely clear: there is no requirement for a foreign power itself to register. We cannot compel foreign powers or entities to register; this is a compulsion on UK entities or individuals.
The scheme intends to increase assurance and transparency to activities being carried out for a foreign power, where the involvement of that foreign power might otherwise not be apparent. As such, we would not expect other Governments to register with the scheme in respect of activity that they themselves are undertaking. As the later “interpretation” clause will make clear, that includes any person acting in the capacity of an office holder, employee or other member of staff of the foreign power, or a person whom the Secretary of State reasonably considers to be exercising such functions.
This scheme has been designed to avoid interference with our obligations under international law regarding the diplomatic and consular relations between countries, as well as the need to protect routine Government-to-Government engagement—the official visits of officials, military and other agencies of a state, for example.
Secondly, subsection (2) sets out the definition of “arrangement”, which requires there to be direction from a specified foreign power or entity to a person. That element of direction is important because it envisages a power relationship between the specified foreign power or entity and the person. The specified foreign power or entity has told the person to carry out the activity, or arranged for it to be carried out. While in practice it is entirely likely for a direction to be delivered in the language of a request, the context of the relationship between the specified foreign power or entity and the person being directed will ultimately determine whether it falls within scope.
Stuart C. McDonald
What happens if an intermediary is involved? What if a designated state power says to someone locally, “You arrange for these activities”, rather than saying to someone in the United Kingdom, “I want you to undertake these activities”? That falls within the terms of the new clause. That intermediary then instructs people in the United Kingdom to undertake activities. Does that not mean there is a gap in the clause and that people in the UK undertaking those activities would not have to register anything? It would be almost impossible to enforce against that intermediary requirement to register. Is there not a potential problem there?
Tom Tugendhat
My understanding is that—in fact, I will come back to that when I sum up, because the hon. Gentleman has raised an interesting point.
We consider a power relationship to include, for example, where the specified foreign power or entity has formally contracted a person’s support for an activity, or where it is paying a person to deliver a service. It could also include a situation where a specified entity is making a request of its subsidiary—again, the direction might be in the language of a request, but the power relationship would make it a direction. Where such formal structures are not established, a direction should include where a person is requested to act, but through the promise of compensation or coercion—for example, future payment, benefit or favourable treatment.
To be clear, though, it would not be enough for a specified foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity—through subsidy or donation, for example. Nor could a generic request from a specified foreign power or entity be considered a “direction”—a request made through a public communication to a large distribution or mailing list, for example.
A power relationship, whether formal or informal, is necessary to ensure that unilateral activity on the part of the person is not within scope and nor is activity that is part of a collaboration and absent a power relationship. We shall set out in guidance what we intend by a direction so that it is clear to the public and to the courts what arrangements are registrable.
An arrangement also captures where a person is to arrange for activity to be carried out at the direction of a specified foreign power or entity, as well as where the person is to carry out the activity themselves. That is to ensure that a person in a direct arrangement with a specified foreign power or entity cannot avoid registration by simply contracting out the activity to a third party, creating a degree of separation between the specified foreign power or entity and the ultimate person who will carry out the activity.
Thirdly, I turn to the definition of “control”, where a specified entity is said to be subject to foreign power control. It is important that we capture the commonly used practice of foreign powers channelling state threat activity through private entities. To capture this effectively we have defined “control” under subsection (5) as being where a foreign power holds, be it directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the shares or voting rights of the entity, or the foreign power can appoint or remove officers of the entity.
Control can also be demonstrated where the foreign power has the right to direct or control the entity’s activities, allowing the Secretary of State flexibility if foreign powers exercise other significant forms of control that fall below those thresholds. The more than 25% threshold is in line with existing legislation on substantial control over an entity.
Mr Jones
I appreciate that it is difficult to identify control, but how would we get around the situation of a Russian oligarch who is clearly under the influence of the Kremlin, but whose company is owned through myriad different offshore companies? Would it have to be proven that the ultimate beneficiary was that individual to fall under this legislation? Those people, and even states, are very clever and hide who ultimately controls that company.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman is identifying a problem that we have had with foreign ownership of companies for a very long time. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill is very important, because the ownership of companies is something that has been a challenge and he is correct to identify it. This Bill addresses certain elements of that control, but he is right that it does not address the totality, although it provides an important brick in the wall that we are building. That is why the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill and the companies registration are important.
Mr Jones
So, really, what we are enacting in this legislation will have to be dovetailed with the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. The issue around Scottish limited partnerships has been quite controversial. Is the Minister saying that when the two come together, they will form the toolkit to tackle these individuals?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman knows that there is not a single tool to deal with every task. The Bill will certainly help with a lot of things that already exist; the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will add to it, and no doubt, in future years, different Governments will add further tools.
May I finally come to my fourth point? [Interruption.] I hear the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley chuntering. I will briefly summarise the procedural element of the new clause. The requirement is to register a foreign activity arrangement within 10 days of its being made, or otherwise before the activity is carried out. That is important because it may not be obvious to the Government under whose direction the person is acting. The prior registration of arrangements offers some opportunity for the Government to be informed before an activity pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement takes place. It also offers an opportunity to enforce the requirements of the scheme prior to an attempt to carry out covert influence activity.
Subsection (10) makes clear that an offence is committed if a person fails to comply with the requirement to register, and knows—or ought reasonably to know—that the arrangement is a foreign activity arrangement We will discuss the proposed range of offences shortly.
The offences relating to the other part of the scheme—where the registration of political influence activities are concerned—come with a higher bar for the prosecution to meet. Given the likely attention that the measure will receive if a foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity subject to foreign power control is specified through regulations under subsections (3) and (4), a person should not be capable of avoiding prosecution by claiming they were unaware of the requirement to register. That said, we are mindful that a person who is unwittingly acting for a specified foreign power or entity should not be criminalised. That is why the test is such: a person can be prosecuted only if they ought reasonably to know that they were acting for a specified foreign power or entity.
New clause 12 makes it an offence to carry out activities, or arrange for an activity to be carried out, in the UK pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement that has not been registered. The requirement to register a foreign activity arrangement, which is an arrangement with a specified foreign power, part of a foreign power or entity subject to foreign power, applies to the person who is party to that arrangement—in such a case, that is the person directed by the specified person.
In practice, many other people could be involved in the activity or activities pursuant to that arrangement. For example, if the person party to an arrangement with a specified foreign power is a company, multiple employees could be all engaged in registerable activities within the UK under the arrangement. While I have already explained that the responsibility for registration would rest with the company in this example, and that that is necessary to avoid the burden of each individual employee being required to register separately, the effect of the new clause is to make it an offence to carry out an activity, or arrange for the activity to be carried out, pursuant to a registerable arrangement that has not been registered.
There are two main justifications for the offence. First, it will reduce the likelihood that activities pursuant to an unregistered arrangement with a specified person will be carried out, supporting the overall aims of the scheme. It makes it clear that all individuals have a role to play in ensuring that the requirements of the scheme have been complied with. Where there is doubt that an organisation or company has registered its arrangement with a specified person, it is a good outcome if its employees take necessary steps to clarify that their registerable activities are covered by registration.
Mr Jones
How does the Minister define “foreign power control”? What would be the evidential test? I have heard him argue, for example, that all Chinese companies are ultimately under the control of the Chinese Communist party. Is that the evidential test? Or to take the Russian example, would the evidential test be a company being owned by an oligarch who is close to Putin? Clearly, if the Chinese Communist party wants to control a Chinese company, it can. Would that be the threshold at which a company would be caught by the measures?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman is right to ask. Control over an entity means 25% of a shareholding—that is one thing that we have already identified—or it could also be formal mechanisms within the company, including voting power or other forms of control. Some foreign powers enact legislation to oblige entities to comply with their security services or intelligence agencies—the right hon. Gentleman knows what I am referring to—giving them a right to exercise an element of control over those entities outside formal governance structures.
Stewart Hosie
Further to the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the control criteria could be indirect control of more than quarter of the stock, indirect control of more than a quarter of the voting rights, or an indirect ability to appoint or remove an officer of the entity. That is dreadfully subjective. Unless the criteria are really nailed down, people could absolutely fall foul of the measures without knowing that they are being controlled in any way.
Tom Tugendhat
I do not think that is the case. The hon. Gentleman should realise that foreign control of any kind is under the general provision of the so-called ordinary provision, while the enhanced provision would be specifically identified, so individuals required to register under the enhanced provision would be aware that they are contracting within an organisation or entity that falls under it. All those contracting with a foreign entity will know that they have to register under the ordinary provision, so the legislation covers both cases.
Mr Jones
That does not clear things up for me. I have mentioned China. I am sure if I googled long enough I would find a speech that the Minister has given where he suggests that all Chinese companies are controlled by the Chinese Government, if they wish to have foreign influence. There is clear, direct evidence about doing business in Russia—it is not the law, but there is coercion regarding the individuals around Putin. If we are saying that the Chinese Communist party can control most companies, is the Minister saying that all those companies will have to register?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well that what we express in private and what we say from the Dispatch Box cannot always be absolutely aligned. I am not going to identify every single Chinese company in one go. He knows that there are different elements of control. The Companies Act 2006 sets out the nature of those different elements.
Mr Jones
I am sure the Minister will get some China hawks on the Back Benches of the Conservative party arguing that all Chinese companies should have to be registered under the scheme. I think the measure needs some clarification before it goes any further. There are also certain individuals that the Minister’s party has taken money off who very clearly have connections with the Kremlin and who control companies in this country through front people; the ownership is actually individuals who we would not want to be associated with.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman knows very well my own views on foreign influence on political parties. Sadly, we have seen such influence in all political parties, where parties or members of political parties have unwisely, sometimes rashly and often extremely foolishly, taken money off Chinese, Russian or other individuals. That is completely wrong and I know he and I share complete revulsion at it. I am very glad that we are sorting some of that situation out. It is a problem that the whole of the United Kingdom and many other political parties around the world have to face. We need to deal with it, and that is what the Bill is doing.
New clause 13 is the second aspect of the enhanced registration requirement. It will require the registration of activities to be carried out within the United Kingdom by a specified person. The first aspect of the enhanced measure, which we dealt with earlier, was the registration of arrangements with a specified person. Although arrangements are important, we recognise that activities within the United Kingdom will be carried out by the specified person themselves and not just those they direct. I should be clear: “specified person” in the context of the requirement can only be a specified entity subject to the foreign power control. I have already explained that foreign powers themselves are not required to register under the foreign influence registration scheme. We are therefore proposing that the specified entity subject to foreign power control, for example a company or organisation, be required to register its activities within the United Kingdom before they are carried out. An offence would be committed where the specified entity had failed to register its activity and it knew or ought reasonably to know that the activity in question was not registered.
To ensure that the requirement is practical and proportionate, the requirement to register is to be fulfilled by the entity and not its individual employees. Although we recognise that an employee is also capable of being directed by its employer to engage in the same registerable activities, we considered it disproportionate to require each individual to register in such a scenario. There would also be practical difficulties, not just in administration but also in consistency. If each individual employee were required to register the same activity, that increases the likelihood that the information provided is materially different and possibly even contradictory.
Finally, hon. Members may wonder why, compared with the requirement to register an arrangement, there is no 10-day period within which the registration must be made. The requirement to register an arrangement within such a period is necessary, as it may not be immediately clear that a person is acting at the direction of a specified person, as the person receiving the direction is separate to the specified person directing the activity. Where the specified person—the entity subject to foreign power control—is acting itself, it should already be clear and it is therefore enough that the registration takes place before the activities are carried out.
I want to finish my remarks by reiterating that if we did not include that requirement there would be a clear gap. A person who is separate from the specified entity, for example a different organisation, would be required to register an arrangement that involves being directed to act in the United Kingdom, but there would be no requirement for the specified entity itself to register its own activities. Leaving such a gap would not make sense in the context of countering state threats. I also want to stress again that we intend the use of the enhanced measure to be limited. It is there as an additional tool of assurance and its use will be subject to parliamentary approval through affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to support the clauses.
The Chair
Before we move on to the debate, may I raise a matter to the Committee that has been brought to my attention? The 1922 Committee elections for Select Committees happen at 2 o’clock this afternoon, which is an obvious clash with the meeting of this Committee. I understand that it would be possible for the Minister to move an amendment to the sitting time this afternoon to 2.15, if he wished to do so. Any objection from any member of the Committee would of course make that fall. Before we enter a discussion—although I would rather not discuss it too long—would the Minister be prepared to move that the Committee should sit at 2.15?
Tom Tugendhat
I would be prepared to move that, if the Committee were supportive.
Maria Eagle
Would it be possible to extend the sitting by 15 minutes, so that no time is lost? If we were to do that, I would have no objection.
Mr Jones
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. That is why I do not think the provision will be used in practice. That is the problem and, as I have said, I am never in favour of putting such provisions on the statute book. A more narrowly defined set of criteria applied to all countries would be better than the complicated system that we have here.
The other point is about transparency. Clearly, the public record for tier 1 will be there—it is published. Why the second tier should be done differently, I do not know. The information is going to get out anyway. It is not going to be a great surprise if a company is on this list. If I was running a company and was suddenly put on the register, I would not tell people that—I would not tell the investors and shareholders. I do not understand why the Government are treating the second tier differently from the first tier.
Tom Tugendhat
May I interrupt with a point of fact? Any company that is designated under the highest tier will be public by definition. That element will be public. It is the UK element that is having to register. The right hon. Gentleman gave an example of a completely spurious French company, which would of course never be on the enhanced list, as we are such good allies with the French. That company would be publicly declared. That is not the bit that is being kept out of the publication. It is the UK element registering it.
Wednesday 16th November 2022
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 16 November 2022 - large print - (16 Nov 2022)
17:57 - The House divided: - Ayes: 211 / Noes: 283 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:11 - The House divided: - Ayes: 212 / Noes: 283 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:27 - The House divided: - Ayes: 56 / Noes: 282 - Question accordingly negatived.
18:39 - The House divided: - Ayes: 275 / Noes: 209 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 1—Offence of failing to declare participation in arrangement required to be registered.—
“(1) A person who carries out an activity, or arranges for an activity to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to—
(a) a foreign activity arrangement required to be registered under section 61(1), or
(b) a foreign influence arrangement required to be registered under section 64(1)
must declare that they are party to the arrangement, when making a communication to those in section 65(2)(a)(i) to (vi).
(2) A person who breaches the requirement in subsection (1) commits an offence.”
This new clause makes it an offence for a person to engage in activity pursuant to a foreign activity or foreign influence arrangement which is required to be registered, if the person does not declare that they are party to the arrangement when communicating with those in section 65(2)(a)(i) to (vi).
New clause 2—ffence of carrying out activities under a foreign activity arrangements: Disqualification from Parliament—
“(1) A person who is a Member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords commits an offence if—
(a) the person carries out an activity, or arranges for an activity to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement, and
(b) the persons knows, or ought reasonably to know, that they are acting under the direction of a specified person.
(2) A person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (1), and is a Member of the House of Commons, is disqualified from membership of the House of Commons.
(3) A person who is found guilty of an offence under subsection (1), and is a Member of the House of Lords, is disqualified from sitting or voting in the House of Lords, and sitting or voting in a committee of the House of Lords or a joint committee of both Houses.
(4) In this section, “foreign activity arrangement” has the same meaning as in section 61(2).”
This new clause would automatically disbar Members of the House of Commons and Lords who are found guilty of engaging in an activity pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement, where the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that they are acting under the direction of a specified person.
New clause 3—Reviews of Parts 1, 4 and 5—
‘(1) The operation of Parts 1, 4 and 5 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The operation of Part 4 must be reviewed by the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(3) The operation of Parts 1 and 5 must be reviewed by either—
(a) the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, or
(b) a different person appointed by the Secretary of State.
(4) Reviews under this section must be carried out in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which any section in this Part comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(5) Each review under subsection (1) must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(6) The person or people mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under subsection (1) as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(7) On receiving a report under subsection (6), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(8) Section 36(6) of the Terrorism Act 2006 shall be read such that the “expenses” and “allowances” mentioned therein may include the discharge by the person or people of their functions under this section.’
New clause 4—Reporting on disinformation originating from foreign powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person or body to review the extent of disinformation originating from foreign powers which presents a threat, or potential threat, to national security.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must include an assessment of the extent of foreign interference in elections.
(3) A review under subsection (1) may include—
(a) examining the number and scale of offences committed, and estimating the number and scale of instances where an offence is suspected to have been committed, under—
(i) section 13, where Condition C is met, and
(ii) section 14,
and,
(b) any other matters the person or body considers relevant to the matters mentioned in subsections (1) and (2).
(4) The person or body appointed under subsection (1) may be the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, or another person or body the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(5) A review must be carried out under this section in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which section 13 comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(6) Each review under this section must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(7) The person or body must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under this section as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(8) On receiving a report under subsection (7), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(9) The Secretary of State may pay to the person or body—
(a) expenses incurred in carrying out the functions of the reviewer under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines, except where financial provision is already made to the person or body for the discharge of the person or body’s functions, of which this section may form part.”
New clause 5—Proceedings relating to safety or interests of the United Kingdom—
“(1) This section applies where a court is considering proceedings under Part 1 of this Act, where the proceedings involve the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(2) In proceedings to which this section applies, the court must take account of how the interests of the Secretary of State or of the Government of the United Kingdom may differ from the interests of the United Kingdom, in order to satisfy itself that the interests of the United Kingdom have been appropriately identified and considered.”
New clause 6—Ministerial conduct—
“(1) This section applies in relation to any Minister of the Crown who engages with, or intends to engage with, or ought reasonably to know that they are about to engage with, a person who is a part of a foreign intelligence service.
(2) A Minister of the Crown may only engage with such a person if either of the following conditions are met—
(a) a senior civil servant is formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has been made by the senior civil servant; or
(b) a senior civil servant is not formally present at or party to the engagement, and a formal record of the engagement has not been made by a senior civil servant, but the written consent of the Prime Minister has been sought by the Minister of the Crown, and has been granted and formally recorded in writing.
(3) In this section “engagement” includes meeting in person or via electronic means, and corresponding in writing or via electronic means.”
New clause 7—Requirement to inform public of prohibited places—
“The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision so as to ensure that the public are given sufficient notice—
(a) that a location is a prohibited place within the meaning of section 7;
(b) of the circumstances in which an offence may be committed under sections 4 to 6 in respect of that prohibited place.”
This new clause would place an obligation on the Secretary of State to make regulations providing for the public to be given notice of prohibited places and the conduct which would amount to a criminal offence in relation to them.
New clause 11—Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme—
“Within two weeks of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish any findings of the Home Office review of the Tier 1 (Investor) visa scheme which relate to foreign influence activity.”
New clause 12—Report on actions taken in response to the ISC report on Russia—
“Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the effect of the action taken by the Government in response to the recommendations of the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on Russia (HC 632 of Session 2019–21).”
New clause 13—Ministerial appointments: official advice—
“(1) The Cabinet Secretary must publish a memorandum in respect of any ministerial appointments made by the Prime Minister, where advice or concerns were communicated to the Prime Minister by civil servants that the appointment may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
(2) A memorandum under this section must set out that advice or concerns were communicated to the Prime Minister by civil servants, and in respect of which ministerial appointments.
(3) A memorandum under this section may not include details of the advice or concerns, where the Cabinet Secretary considers that inclusion of those details may be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
New clause 14—Report requirement: Protecting democratic institutions and processes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report, as soon as practicable after the end of—
(a) the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, and
(b) every subsequent 12-month period,
on his assessment of the impact sections 13 and 14 of this Act have had on protecting the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes.
(2) In this section “democratic processes” includes local democracy.”
Amendment 116, in clause 1, page 1, line 10, after “safety or” insert “critical”.
This amendment seeks to clarify the tests to be met before the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information is committed.
Amendment 17, page 1, line 15, after “article” insert “with a Government Security Classification of Secret or Top Secret”.
This amendment would confine the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information to information that has been classified as secret or top secret (rather than to all information access to which is restricted in any way).
Amendment 18, in clause 2, page 2, line 18, at end insert “(ca) the person’s conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and”.
This amendment would narrow the scope of the offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets so that it applies only to trade secrets that would prejudice the safety or interests of the UK.
Amendment 117, page 3, line 1 , after “national” insert “, a UK resident, or a person in the employment of a UK person as defined in paragraphs (b) or (c)”.
Government amendments 40 to 42.
Amendment 19, in clause 3, page 3, line 32, after “Kingdom” insert “which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.
This amendment would narrow the scope of the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service in respect of activities within the UK so that it applies only to assistance that would prejudice the safety or interests of the UK (rather than to assistance of any kind).
Government amendment 43.
Amendment 119, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(aa) with the knowledge and consent of the UK security and intelligence services,”.
This amendment would clarify that activities undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the UK security and intelligence services would not constitute a criminal offence under this clause alone.
Amendment 120, in clause 4, page 5, line 17, at end insert—
“(7) No offence is committed under (1) if the conduct is for the purposes of protest, unless the conduct is prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom.”.
This amendment would restrict the circumstances in which access to a prohibited place for the purposes of protest would amount to an offence under this clause.
Amendment 20, in clause 5, page 5, line 25, at end insert—
“(ba) the conduct is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom,”.
This amendment would confine the offence of unauthorised entry etc to a prohibited place so that it applies only to entry etc that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK.
Amendment 133, page 5, line 33, leave out “includes” and insert “may, depending on the circumstances, include”.
This amendment would mean taking a photograph or other recording of a prohibited place was not automatically a criminal offence of inspecting that place, but would depend on the circumstances.
Amendment 21, in clause 6, page 6, line 17, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment would remove the power of the police to order a person to leave an area “adjacent to” a prohibited place.
Amendment 22, page 6, line 28, after “(2)” insert “, (a)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 23, page 6, line 30, after “Kingdom” insert “, and (b) without prior authorisation by an officer of at least the rank of Inspector, unless obtaining that authorisation is not reasonably practicable”.
This amendment would impose a requirement that a police officer obtains authorisation from a more senior officer before exercising powers under clause 6.
Amendment 24, page 6, line 32 at end insert “which was necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom and proportionate to that aim.”
This amendment would narrow the offence of failing to comply with an order made by a police constable in relation to a prohibited place so that it applies only to an order that was necessary and proportionate to protecting the safety or interests of the UK.
Amendment 25, in clause 7, page 6, line 37, after “means” insert “a place, entry to which could pose a risk to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and which is”
This amendment would narrow the definition of prohibited place so that it applies only to locations relevant to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom (rather than any Ministry of Defence land).
Government amendments 44 and 45.
Amendment 121, in clause 8, page 8, line 21, leave out “or interests”.
This amendment would restrict the power to designate additional prohibited places by regulation to where it was necessary to protect the safety of the United Kingdom.
Amendment 26, in clause 11, page 10, line 8, leave out paragraph (c).
Government amendments 46 and 47.
Amendment 14, page 20, line 35, leave out clause 27
Government amendments 48 and 49.
Amendment 124, in clause 28, page 21, line 23, at end insert—
“(2A) However, the conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is not to be treated as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if financial or other assistance of a foreign power under (2)(c) is provided otherwise than specifically for the conduct or course of conduct.”
This amendment ensures that organisations that receive funding from foreign powers are not guilty of offences under this act if that funding was not for the conduct or course of conduct that would otherwise amount to the offence.
Amendment 30, in clause 30, page 22, line 40, leave out paragraph (c).
This amendment would narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity to remove giving support and assistance (including that unrelated to espionage activity) to a person known or believed to be involved in offences under the Bill (but would retain conduct which facilitates or is intended to facilitate such offending).
Government amendment 50.
Amendment 118, in clause 31, page 23, line 25, at end insert—
““critical interests of the United Kingdom” include security and intelligence, defence, international relations, law and order, public health and economic interests;”.
This amendment seeks to clarify the tests to be met before the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information is committed.
Amendment 125, in clause 37, page 26, line 25, leave out “reasonably believes” and insert “believes on the balance of probabilities”.
This amendment would apply the usual civil standard of proof in relation to decision to impose Prevention and Investigation Measures.
Amendment 126, in clause 38, page 27, line 35, leave out “four” and insert “two”.
This amendment would mean the Secretary of State could seek to extend a part 2 notice on two occasions rather than four.
Amendment 31, in clause 43, page 30, line 21, leave out from beginning to “before” in line 22 and insert “The chief officer of the appropriate police force must confirm to the Secretary of State that the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied before”.
This amendment, together with amendments 16 to 18, would require the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that prosecution is not realistic before imposing a PIM, rather than requiring only a consultation on the subject.
Amendment 33, page 30, line 28, leave out “The matter is whether there is” and insert “The condition is that there is not”.
Amendment 34, page 31, line 14, leave out “responding to consultation” and insert “providing confirmation”.
Amendment 32, page 31, line 26, leave out “(1) or”.
Amendment 35, in clause 53, page 38, line 13, leave out “this Part” and insert “Part 1 and Part 2”.
This amendment would extend the review function of the Independent Reviewer to cover Part 1 of the Bill in addition to Part 2.
Amendment 3, in clause 58, page 41, line 8, at end insert—
“(2) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the Secretary of State intends to exercise the power under this section. The statement must include a list of illustrative examples of the kinds of contracts or other arrangements this power relates to.”
Government amendments 61 and 62.
Amendment 130, in clause 61, page 43, line 19, after “P” insert “, whether directly or through intermediaries”.
This amendment would make clear that those making a foreign activity arrangement via intermediaries, would be required to register the arrangement.
Government motion to transfer subsection (2) of clause 61.
Government amendments 63 to 65.
Government motion to divide clause 61.
Government amendments 66 to 74.
Government motion to transfer subsection (2) of clause 64.
Government amendments 75 to 83.
Government motion to divide clause 64.
Government amendments 84 to 94.
Amendment 15, in clause 68, page 48, line 20, leave out paragraph (b).
Amendment 16, page 48, line 25, leave out paragraph (b).
Government amendments 95 to 101.
Amendment 131, in clause 70, page 51, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) The information required of the person to whom an information notice is given must be limited to information the Secretary of State deems reasonably necessary to ensure the person is complying with the requirements of this Part.”
This amendment would place restrictions on the type of information the Secretary of State can require under clause 70.
Government amendments 102 to 108.
Amendment 1, in clause 75, page 53, line 39, at end insert—
“(h) an offence under section [Offence of failing to declare participation in arrangement required to be registered] committed in relation to a foreign activity arrangement required to be registered under section 61(1).”.
This amendment is consequential on NC1.
Government amendment 109.
Amendment 2, page 54, line 23, at end insert—
“(h) an offence under section [Offence of failing to declare participation in arrangement required to be registered] committed in relation to a foreign influence arrangement required to be registered under section 64(1) .”.
This amendment is consequential on NC1.
Government amendments 110 to 112.
Amendment 8, Page 56, line 4, leave out Clause 79.
Amendment 9, Page 56, line 26, leave out Clause 80.
Amendment 36, in clause 80, page 56, line 31, at end insert—
“(ba) the court is satisfied that any damages awarded to the claimant in those proceedings are likely to be used for the purposes of terrorism,”.
This amendment would remove the duty on the court to consider reducing damages in clause 58, unless the court considered the damages were likely to be used for the purposes of terrorism.
Government amendments 51 to 53.
Amendment 37, page 57, line 18, at end insert “or which it would award under section 8 of that Act had the claim been brought under it.”.
This amendment would prevent the reduction of damages in claims that could have been brought as a human rights claim under the HRA 1998 but were in fact brought on other grounds.
Amendment 10, page 57, line 30, leave out clause 81.
Amendment 11, page 58, line 5, leave out clause 82.
Amendment 12, Page 59, line 10, leave out clause 83.
Amendment 38, Page 59, line 14, leave out clause 84.
This amendment, together with Amendment 39, would remove the proposed limits on access to legal aid for persons with a conviction for a terrorism offence and the consequential power to make information requests related to those limits.
Amendment 5, in clause 84, page 59, line 29, leave out “F” and insert “G”.
Amendment 6, page 60, line 11, at end insert—
“(7A) Condition G is met where the offender is seeking legal aid for the purposes of—
(a) pursuing a civil order, where the purpose of the order is to protect a victim of domestic abuse, or
(b) participating in family court proceedings, and where the offender is a victim of domestic abuse.”.
Amendment 7, page 61, line 6, at end insert—
“”domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;”
Amendment 39, page 61, line 15, leave out clause 85.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 38.
Government amendment 113.
Government new schedule 1—Control of a person by a foreign power.
Government new schedule 2—Exemptions.
Amendment 128, schedule 3, page 88, line 31, leave out sub-paragraph (4).
This amendment would prevent a disclosure order from having effect where disclosure is protected by an enactment.
Amendment 129, schedule 4, page 94, line 29, leave out sub-sub-paragraph (b), and insert—
“(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that information which may be provided in compliance with a requirement imposed under the order is likely to be of substantial value, whether by itself or with other information, to the investigation; and
(c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest for the information to be provided, having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the investigation if the information is obtained.”
This amendment would require the court to be satisfied of the same tests for customer information notices as set out in relation to disclosure orders in Schedule 3.
Government amendment 54.
Amendment 4, schedule 6, page 100, line 19, at end insert—
“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—
(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or
(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”.
Government amendment 55.
Amendment 27, page 104, line 12, leave out sub-paragraphs (4) and (5).
This amendment would prevent it being permissible to delay informing a named person of an individual’s detention under clause 21, or that individual consulting a solicitor, for the purposes of asset recovery.
Amendment 123, page 112, line 13, leave out from “if” to the end of line 20, and insert “the person has previously been convicted of an offence under this Act.”
This amendment would restrict the circumstances in which fingerprints and samples from someone detained under clause 25 could be retained indefinitely, instead of the usual 3 years under paragraph 20(5) of Schedule 2.
Government amendments 56 and 57.
Amendment 28, page 124, line 13, leave out sub-sub-paragraphs (b) and (c).
This amendment would prevent it being permissible to postpone reviews of detention without warrant on the basis that the review officer is unavailable or, for any other reason, the review is not practicable.
Amendment 127, schedule 7, page 144, line 17, leave out paragraph 12.
This amendment would remove the power for the Secretary of State to impose participation in polygraph sessions as part of provisions in relation to Prevention and Investigation Measures.
Government amendments 58 and 59.
Amendment 13, page 175, line 1, leave out Schedule 13.
Amendment 132, schedule 13, page 176, line 29, leave out “there is a real risk that”.
This amendment would ensure the court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that damages were to be used for terrorism purposes before frozen funds could be forfeited entirely.
Government amendment 60.
Tom Tugendhat
It is a pleasure to stand before the House today to introduce not just new clause 9, but many other new clauses that I and many others in this House have argued for at different times and in different places.
Tom Tugendhat
Plus a few others. So it is a great pleasure to be here today.
May I also place on record my enormous thanks to two right hon. Members—the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) will smile as I say this—who have done so much to get us to this position today? I refer to my right hon. Friends the Members for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who have been extremely generous with their time and thoughts, including in private with me as well, in making sure that I am able to answer as many of her questions as I can, although somehow she has exceeded even their magisterial intellect. I am grateful that they have got us to this place, because this Bill is essential for the future defence of our nation.
The reason for that is because, of course, the world has changed. The reality is that national security in this country has changed and evolved in recent years, and the Darwinian challenge between the hunter and the hunted has led us to a position where we need to update not just our techniques, which can be done in private, but sadly our laws, which rightly must be debated in public.
I think we all agree with the core aims of the Bill. The first is to give our law enforcement and intelligence agencies the tools they need to tackle harmful activities in the United Kingdom carried out by, or on behalf of, foreign powers. However, to do that we also need to increase the transparency around those who seek to influence the politics and institutions of the United Kingdom through the foreign influence registration scheme. That is a very welcome addition. I know that many Members here, including those who have been on the Foreign Affairs Committee for the past five years, have called for it at various different points. The Bill has, at its heart, the protection of the national security of this great country that we all serve.
Tom Tugendhat
On that, I will give way—not for the last time, I am sure—to the right hon. Member.
Mr Kevan Jones
The Minister talks about Darwinian change, but evolution takes a long time. Many things in the Bill have been kicking around for at least six or seven years, and that includes the issue around the foreign influence registration scheme, which was only put in the Bill at Committee stage after it was omitted on Second Reading; even now, there are amendments to it. Is the Minister satisfied that the Bill—in terms of the major changes that it will achieve—will fulfil its purpose and that it has been properly scrutinised in this House?
Tom Tugendhat
What I am so pleased about with this Bill is that it introduces so many ideas that the right hon. Gentleman and I have discussed in private over many years when I was in a similar position to him—scrutinising a Government. The Bill introduces some of those ideas that, yes, he is right to say, seem to have been introduced quickly, but the reality, as he knows very well, is that they have been discussed slowly. Many aspects of the Bill not only date six or seven years into the past, but update aspects that date a lot further back. Sadly, some of our national security legislation is better placed to hunt those who would send secret notes on pigeons back to Germany than to hunt those sending secret messages through the internet. This is updating quite a lot of laws that date all the way back to the first world war. I am very glad that we are doing it, and I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman’s scrutiny in the Bill Committee has been so rigorous and so onerous.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
My right hon. Friend is right that this is an important step. In particular, he is right about the foreign influence registration scheme, which has long been called for, including by the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am a member. He will also know that, because we have yet to discuss that in any detail, there may be confusion about the primary and secondary tiers—in other words, those things that are designated as being of more profound importance than these other things. Would it be helpful if he were to write to the ISC, setting out how he thinks they would work in practice, given that we understand that the secondary tier will be introduced by secondary legislation?
Tom Tugendhat
My right hon. Friend is right. I would be very happy to write to him. I can summarise it now by saying that the primary tier is that connected to political activity. Anybody from any foreign country who wishes to influence this House, this Parliament, any Members here, or indeed any political outcome, would be looking at the primary tier. That is the basic level, and it involves a registration on a website so that we can all know who has taken payment for what—which piper has been paid and by whom.
The enhanced registration is different and requires registration for a wider range of activities, but those depend on the specific foreign power and, indeed, the entity or operation within it. That is a different matter, and that will be down to the Secretary of State looking at what is reasonably necessary in order to protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom—that is the enhanced tier, as we are calling it. That is the summary, but I will be happy to write to the ISC.
Chris Bryant
The Minister said that once somebody has registered on a website, we will all be able to see it. That may be true if we knew that that was where we had to look to check whether somebody coming in through the door, sending us a letter or inviting us to dinner as an MP was actually somebody who was working for a foreign power. Would it not be far more sensible, once somebody has registered, to require them to declare to any Minister, MP or Member of the House of Lords that that is what they were doing, so that there is a degree of protection for this House?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member makes a very good point: there are many areas in which the individual concerned should certainly be doing the responsible thing and advertising it. The basis of this has to be a balance, so requiring people to register is, I think, a very good start. We need to take forward some of the recommendations that the hon. Member has made and the thoughts he has expressed, because he is absolutely right that transparency in all things is important.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
The Minister has accurately described what the two different tiers of the FIRS scheme will do, but it is difficult to understand why the registration of harmful activity outside of political influencing, such as covertly acting as an intelligence officer, only applies to a foreign power that is set out in secondary legislation. Surely, if that activity is wrong, it is wrong whether the country is on an as-yet-undefined list or not.
Tom Tugendhat
I think the right hon. Member will find that espionage is illegal in the United Kingdom, whoever is carrying it out.
Dr Lewis
The Minister is very forbearing, and I am glad of the opportunity to warmly congratulate him on his appointment and thank him for the positive way in which he has been reaching out to the ISC.
On the question of the second tier, there appears to be some sort of discrimination between countries that are friendly and those that are hostile, and—unless I misunderstand the Bill—only the hostile ones are going to appear in the secondary designation. If that is the case, could it not lead to some anomalous situations when diplomatic relations improve with a country, so we take it off the second tier, or they worsen and we put it on? There is bound to be a time lag in that sort of thing, so how practical is the second tier scheme as it is currently constituted?
Tom Tugendhat
My right hon. Friend makes a valid point. The challenge that we have, as he knows very well, is how we balance the responsibility to inform and how wide we go. I have spoken about this issue with my right hon. Friend in the past, and his judgment on this is something I have always valued, so it has always been very important to me that we share a view on it. However, I think we all agree that where a foreign power is seeking to influence our political life in the broadest sense, we should know about it, whoever is exercising that influence.
I take my right hon. Friend’s point about enhanced registration. Sadly, there is inherently a delay between the way that life changes and the response of Government —that is the reality of existence—but it is important for us to recognise that some countries and entities do require enhanced awareness. That is why it is important for us to have an extra tier.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Will the Minister give way on that point?
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He has talked about the challenges and the enhanced part of the scheme. Will it not be a challenge to use the scheme in practice, because he has to put the country concerned into secondary legislation? Is that not going to be diplomatically very difficult to do? Is the reality not that the complex way in which the Government have set out the scheme, with little scrutiny possible from either this Chamber or Committees, means that in practice it is not going to be used at all?
Tom Tugendhat
I think the hon. Lady knows me well enough to know that, having been sanctioned by three countries now, it is unlikely that I will be reticent in identifying those that I think are threats to the United Kingdom.
Tom Tugendhat
I am very confident that others will also be bold on His Majesty’s behalf. Whoever is fortunate enough to be representing His Majesty in the Home Office will be able to conduct those offices in the good fashion that people expect. [Interruption.] I will move on.
The core of the Bill is, of course, national security and our intelligence services, building on the work they have done to enable us to grow in confidence and prosperity. They have provided the security apparatus that allows freedom beneath and around it. That is an extraordinary luxury and a blessing that this country has been able to enjoy for many years and generations because of the courage and intellect of so many people. They require tools to conduct those tasks, and I am delighted that the Bill will sharpen some of those tools.
Mr Kevan Jones
As my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, we had four Ministers in the Bill Committee. Yes, the Minister has listened, but nothing in the Bill has changed. It is still a mess, and that goes back to the fundamental point about not including the Security Service Act 1989 in the reform that is needed. Let me tell the Minister now: the lack of scrutiny in this House means that the Bill will be absolutely torn to shreds in the other place.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that we disagree on that element, but it has been a great pleasure to work on the Bill with him and with many others in the Chamber, and to hear their comments and criticisms. There are many other supplementary areas that I would like to work on in different places at different times, but the Bill answers the essential need that we have now, which is to update our national security legislation to keep the country safe and defend our people, and to ensure that those who have the courage, integrity and wisdom to keep us all safe have the tools at their disposal to do so.
Several hon. Members rose—
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
I was here to speak to new clause 7 and amendments 17 to 28 and 30 to 39, but there is not enough time for me to do so. That is most regrettable, given the importance of the Bill.
I am here not in my personal capacity but as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our duty is to scrutinise legislation to check its human rights compliance, and we have done that. I remind Members that the Joint Committee is a cross-party Committee with half its members from the House of Commons and half from the House of Lords. That is just as well, because it will be in the House of Lords that our amendments get the attention that I believe they deserve. Although I am not really a fan of the House of Lords as an unelected Chamber, I am very much a fan of second Chambers. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that such a small amount of time has been afforded to us today to debate this important Bill, which we believe has significant human rights implications. Given the short time available to me, I shall make some general comments; as I say, I hope that our detailed amendments will get the attention they deserve in the House of Lords.
We broadly welcome the attempt to modernise espionage offences, but we have some concerns about the Bill’s provisions. The Bill is a step forward and many of its provisions are broadly in line with the recommendations of the Law Commission’s recent review, but there are risks that some of the provisions are drawn far too widely and could criminalise behaviour that does not constitute a threat to national security. We think that other provisions would interfere unnecessarily and disproportionately with rights to freedom of expression and association and the right to protest, and that they may regrettably have a disproportionate impact on certain communities in the United Kingdom, particularly if new police powers are not exercised with restraint.
The provisions on prevention and investigation measures, which were not included in the Law Commission’s review, also engage the right to a fair trial, the right to liberty and security and the right to a private and family life in a way that gives the Joint Committee cause for concern. We are also very concerned about the restrictions on the grant of legal aid and on the awarding of damages to those who have been involved in terrorism. They risk impeding access to basic rights and legal protections, as other Members have elaborated on. We have therefore suggested that the Bill be amended in a number of ways but, as I say, there is not sufficient time for me to address any of the amendments in any meaningful way.
Let me say one other thing before I sit down. The Bill does not address issues relating to the unauthorised disclosure of information—sometimes known as leaks—despite it being a significant part of the Law Commission’s review. The commission set out clearly the ways in which the existing law engages and potentially breaches the UK’s human rights commitments under the European convention on human rights, and suggested ways in which law might be changed to overcome such issues. Although the Joint Committee appreciates that this is in many ways a complex and controversial area of law, we hope that that is not going to result in inaction, and encourage the Government to consult on legislative provisions as soon as possible.
We believe that reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989 is needed to ensure adequate respect for free speech. That is why I added my name to new clause 8, tabled by the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), which I very much regret we are not able to debate today. Put shortly, we need a public interest defence in this country.
Tom Tugendhat
This has been a very full discussion involving many people. Although I sympathise with those who have quite rightly made the point that we could always have more time for these debates, the truth is that we had a lot of time in the Bill Committee and we are going to have to do much more work on this subject as its various elements evolve with the technology and the challenge. The truth is that if we had had this debate five, 10 or 15 years ago, we would have been debating different subjects, different nations and different elements of technology that have evolved into the threat that we sadly face today. Although I recognise that many hon. Members have understandably raised the number of hours and days that we have had today and in the past few weeks, the Government have listened and adapted the Bill to many aspects that have been raised in different ways.
Chris Bryant
One thing that the Government have certainly had plenty of time to get ready is the tier 1 visa report, as promised by five Home Secretaries. When will the Minister publish it?
Tom Tugendhat
It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to know that one of the first things I did on arrival at the Home Office was to ask for it to be prepared for publication. I will come back to him with it, I hope, urgently—I will let him know.
Many different points have been raised. I pay enormous tribute to my many right hon. and hon. Friends who have spoken and to those who have approached the Bill with the diligence and seriousness that the subject demands, particularly the hon. Members for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), who have been extremely supportive critics and have been challenging in the right spirit. I am glad to say that those discussions have resulted in most of the Bill going through in the way that was intended, and that those challenges and changes have improved it.
I accept that there are some differences of opinion. On areas such as the Serious Crime Act and the changes to statutory requirements, I believe that the Government are right because the exercise of the functions of an officer of the state are exactly what should be the limiting functions of their powers. That is why this reform makes sense, although my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) raised some important points and challenges that we will have to look at.
My right hon. and learned Friend also asked about damages and whether they followed in the way that he described, and I agree that they do. The point is that we should neither make it harder or more applicable to have damages, nor prevent it where judges seek the discretion to do so. Where they have that discretion, they may continue to do it, but we are asking them to look and consider the situation in which those damages arose to make sure that they are truly applicable. It is merely a review policy, rather than a block. That is an important element of the Bill; judges may already have that power but this measure merely puts it on the statute book.
Much of the debate has focused on whistleblowers and the public interest defence, and the way in which various people could argue that they are acting in the interests of the wider polity in raising different objections. This is a hugely important area and I understand that many hon. Members have raised different points. The head of MI5, the heads of various agencies and many others who have engaged on it have been absolutely clear on this point, however, because we need to make sure that we are not introducing any defence that forces the Government to reveal the damage that has been done in order to provide a defence.
The reality is that forcing the publication of damages may indeed be further damaging to the initial offence. That is why although I take the point about the public interest defence, which is a wider question for the whole of Government and the whole country, and I take the point about whistleblowers, which is again a wider question and not specific to the Bill, I am afraid that I hold with the head of MI5 and others who have been extremely clear on this point.
Mr Kevan Jones
With the greatest respect, that is a weak argument, because there can always be closed hearings on national security grounds. I say to the Minister that this issue will not go away—the courts are deciding it anyway. I would sooner state a protection in law than leave it to the whims of a jury, which is what we have now.
Tom Tugendhat
I have a great trust in our jury system, and I know the right hon. Member does, too.
Tom Tugendhat
Oh, he does not. I do have trust in our jury system and I do have trust in the Great British people to make decisions appropriately. One of the decisions sometimes made by juries is to strike out a case because they disagree with it. I am afraid that is simply one of those—
Mary Robinson (Cheadle) (Con)
The public interest defence has been mentioned on several occasions throughout this debate. Notwithstanding the strictures of national security and of this Bill, it is important that people have a reliable route that they can take when they want to expose wrongdoing. Does my right hon. Friend consider that an office of the whistleblower might be such a route? I know the public interest defence is very likely to come forward again.
Tom Tugendhat
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that. It is not specific to this Bill, but it is something that many of us have been considering for a while. I certainly agree that wider consideration is important in ensuring that those who have legitimate grievances and objections to what they may have been asked to do have a valid route for raising such questions.
I will go through a few of the other points very quickly. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Antony Higginbotham) raised the point about legal services, and they were absolutely right to do so. Let me be quite clear that this is about privileged legal co-operation. Therefore, that privilege should be exempt—it should absolutely be exempt—so that those who have access to legal rights should be able to exercise them without the state’s intervention. That is essential to the rule of law and, indeed, to the protection of human rights in our country.
I should also make it quite clear that the Government have heard very clearly the points made about civil legal aid. These will be receiving very serious consideration in the coming days, and I look forward to updating the House in due course on where that goes to.
I briefly thank for their insights my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) and my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes North (Ben Everitt) on the Government side, and of course my very dear friend, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). Although we disagree, again, he remains a very close friend, and I look forward to discussing more of these issues with him in the future. I shall leave it at that.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 9 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New clause 3
Reviews of Parts 1, 4 and 5
‘(1) The operation of Parts 1, 4 and 5 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The operation of Part 4 must be reviewed by the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(3) The operation of Parts 1 and 5 must be reviewed by either—
(a) the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, or
(b) a different person appointed by the Secretary of State.
(4) Reviews under this section must be carried out in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which any section in this Part comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(5) Each review under subsection (1) must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(6) The person or people mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under subsection (1) as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(7) On receiving a report under subsection (6), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(8) Section 36(6) of the Terrorism Act 2006 shall be read such that the “expenses” and “allowances” mentioned therein may include the discharge by the person or people of their functions under this section.’—(Holly Lynch.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Tom Tugendhat
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
It remains for me to thank enormously my right hon. Friends the Members for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) and for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who did so much to get the Bill to the right place; my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, who has very graciously left me to get on with this; and all the Members who have been so helpful.
My great thanks go to the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in particular. Their extraordinary courage and skill have earned more than my admiration, respect and gratitude for many, many years, but never more so than in the last few weeks, in which I have been privileged to serve them.
It is worth pointing out very quickly one or two elements of the Bill that I have not yet had the chance to touch on. Let me make it absolutely clear that there is no possibility—no way, no desire, no intent—that any area in this Bill, or in any other that this Government would pass, would in any way diminish the unqualified right not to be tortured. That is an absolute right that this Government and, I know, other Governments, would all hold to. I should be absolutely clear that not only is there is no desire in this House for that to change, but there is no such desire in any of the services and agencies with which I have had the privilege of discussing it.
What our Government, our agencies and those who hold office in our name all know very well is that they are defending our rights and freedoms when they defend the rule of law. They are absolutely championing the values and liberties that matter to us. In the Bill, we are evolving from trying to stop spectaculars such as the tragedies that hit on 9/11 to employing spectrometers—finer points of detection—to try to ensure that we eliminate risks that come in different ways. That is why I am so grateful to them all for the advice and help they have offered to ensure that the Bill is structured as it is.
I should make it quite clear that the Bill has opened up an area in which we will need to go further and in which I am glad the Prime Minister has asked me to go further: the defence of democracy. Our democracy in this country has sadly been under attack for too long. We are not alone; we know that our friends in other parts of the country and other parts of the world have faced similar attacks and similar areas of influence. I am delighted that the taskforce that the Prime Minister has asked me to lead will get on with its work very shortly, updating the integrated review and helping to ensure that this country is ready for the changes in the threats that we face so that the ultimate sovereignty of our people—the right to choose—is guaranteed and defended long into the future. That means that we have to set up not just powers to empower those agents who work in our name, but the guardrails to defend that right.
I am very glad that the Bill includes such provisions as the requirement for the Attorney General’s consent—the Advocate General’s in certain cases—to make sure that none of the powers is abused in any way. I am delighted that we have got that in the right place, because we know, sadly, that abuse is always possible.
I will end with the words of Ken McCallum, the director general of MI5, who today was very supportive of not only the Bill but many of the measures that his service has been carrying out. He has been inspirational in his leadership of his service and his defence of the United Kingdom, so I am delighted by his welcome for the foreign influence registration scheme, describing it as
“a modern power designed to tackle a modern threat”.
He is absolutely right, and the scheme is essential. For those reasons, I am grateful for the support we have had from the hon. Members for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), and other Members across the House.
Mr Robin Walker (Worcester) (Con)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Further to the announcement from the Chair on the result of the Education Committee elections, I would like to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks who organised today’s elections and to all colleagues who voted in them. I recognise that a number of excellent candidates ran for the post of Chair of the Committee, and I pay tribute to all of them for the respectful and constructive tone of their campaigns.
Nothing can be more important for the future of our country than how we educate and support our children. I pay tribute to the excellent work of my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon), in holding Ministers to account for that. I am grateful for the support of esteemed colleagues in all parts of the House in allowing me to follow in his footsteps.
Iain Stewart (Milton Keynes South) (Con)
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I also put on the record my grateful thanks to the staff of the House for the conduct of the Transport Select Committee election earlier today? I am very grateful to have won the support of colleagues throughout the House. I pay tribute to the other candidates. I think the election somewhat taxed the arithmetical skills of the counters a little more than the election for the Education Select Committee, as it went through all the rounds of the contest. We had a good-natured and humorous campaign. I should mention in passing my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Karl MᶜCartney) and his innovative and tuneful campaigning style.
I very much look forward to chairing the Committee. Transport affects all our lives and all our constituents. I look forward to digging deep into the many issues and challenges that are coming forward. In the two hours or so since the result was announced, I think I have received about 20 different requests for the Committee that I look forward to fielding. Again, I offer my grateful thanks to all colleagues.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I thank the hon. Lady and the right hon. Lady for their points of order. Obviously I do not know the background to this case, but I can see that it is a very serious issue. Government Ministers are present and I think the Minister for Security may wish to intervene.
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am sure that I speak for the Immigration Minister and the Policing Minister when I say that they will both look into it very carefully. I am sure they will return to answer these questions.
Tuesday 6th December 2022
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 16 November 2022 - large print - (16 Nov 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That the Bill be now read a second time.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, the first responsibility of any Government is to ensure the safety of their citizens, both at home and abroad. For this Government, it is not just a responsibility but an absolute priority. The introduction of the Bill is a result of the manifesto commitment to ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to combat the evolving nature of state threats. That is why we are adopting a robust and front-footed posture. The Bill will confront and tackle state-threat activity that may seek to undermine the democratic principles of the United Kingdom and the security of its people.
I know noble Lords will all join me in paying tribute to those in our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, who go above and beyond to keep us all safe every day. They are the very best of us and they have my enduring gratitude, respect and admiration. For all that they do, we must hold up our end of the bargain and ensure that they have the necessary tools and powers to do their vital work, which is precisely what we will do through the measures in the Bill.
It is worth looking back for a moment to understand the context in which we are discussing these matters. Russia’s recent illegal invasion of Ukraine has shown the essential need to bolster our national security and ensure that we have the ability to counter state threats. The House will also recall the events in Salisbury in 2018, which are a clear reminder that we need laws that seek to deter serious harm from being inflicted on our soil. As that outrageous episode underlined, the dangers we face are real. We must continue to develop our robust and effective apparatus and act now to further harden our resilience. This is why the National Security Bill introduces enhanced powers for our intelligence and law enforcement agencies to do even more to counter state threats and strengthen the security of the United Kingdom.
States are becoming increasingly assertive and sophisticated in how they advance their objectives and undermine the safety and interests of the UK. It is therefore essential that we are able to deter, detect and disrupt state actors that seek to harm the UK by covertly targeting our national interests, sensitive information, trade secrets and democratic way of life. The National Security Bill will protect these interests and uphold our democratic principles, consolidating the safety of our citizens through essential new measures designed to address an ever-evolving threat. We are determined to advance the safety, security and prosperity of the UK, and the Bill is designed to achieve precisely that.
I will now speak to the key measures set out in the Bill. The Bill will modernise the law against espionage, replacing the 1911 to 1939 Official Secrets Acts. New offences of foreign interference have been carefully designed to tackle the threat from any foreign power that chooses to act with malign intent. It is important to stress that these offences are actor-agnostic, and any state or individual seeking to harm the UK will be met with the full force of these newly established powers and tools, regardless of their origin.
These offences, and the others introduced in Part 1, will enable the disruption of illegitimate influence by foreign states intent on advancing their own interests or seeking to damage the UK. It will be an offence for foreign powers improperly to interfere with our democracy and civil society through covert influence, disinformation and attacks against our electoral process.
The Bill also has police powers designed to address the specific threat of foreign power activity. There are specific powers of arrest and detention which reflect the threats posed by such actors. There are also additional police powers to support investigations into foreign power threat activity, focusing on obtaining information on financial activity. These powers will ensure that the police have the tools they need to fully investigate state threat activity and bring those acting for foreign powers against UK interests to justice.
Furthermore, the amendment to the Serious Crime Act 2007 will provide essential protection to those who discharge authorised national security functions on behalf of His Majesty’s Government. The amendment will enable more effective co-operation with our international partners. It is about addressing operational challenges and removing the personal risk that trusted and dedicated individuals face for carrying out their proper, official duties on behalf of our intelligence community and Armed Forces. I welcome the comments of Sir Alex Younger, the former head of our Secret Intelligence Service, who correctly highlighted that it is morally wrong that the risk of liability should sit with individual officers acting on behalf of our agencies. Any risk should rightly sit with the Government and this amendment supports that aim.
Preventing and disrupting state threats is one of the Government’s prime concerns. In a very small number of cases, it will still not be possible to bring a prosecution forward. We must therefore ensure that a backstop is in place to prevent state actors conducting harmful activities in the UK. We will introduce new state threat prevention and investigation measures, enabling restrictions to be imposed, when necessary, where there is a reasonable belief of involvement in foreign power threat activity.
It is important to clarify that this will be a tool of last resort, to be used only where it is believed that there is involvement in foreign power threat activity, there is a necessity to impose measures and a criminal prosecution is not available. These measures will also remain proportionate to the specific threat posed by an individual and be subject to rigorous checks and balances, including by the courts, to guarantee their appropriate use.
The Bill will also introduce measures to prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid system by convicted terrorists. It will protect the UK’s civil damages system by ensuring that terrorists’ own misconduct is taken into account in an award from public funds. Courts will also be provided with the ability to order that civil damages awarded to a person are frozen or forfeited where those funds might be used to support terrorism. These provisions will allow the Government to take steps to ensure that a claimant’s damages cannot be used in this way.
With regard to legal aid, access to publicly funded services is a benefit of being part of a democratic society. This Government remain wholly committed to providing legal aid funding for those unable to resolve their issues alone, but there must be a line. Individuals who commit acts of terrorism are rejecting the values of state and society and it is right that the benefit of legal aid—a benefit of our democratic society —is removed from them. These measures will help instil a rigorous process that provides greater transparency around how public funds are distributed.
The Bill will also introduce a foreign influence registration scheme, requiring certain foreign activities and influence arrangements to be registered. The scheme’s aims are twofold: to strengthen the resilience of the UK political system against covert foreign influence and to provide greater assurance around the activities of certain foreign powers or entities.
I must make clear that we will continue to welcome open and transparent engagement from foreign Governments and entities. The scheme itself will play a critical role in encouraging such transparency and, crucially, will deter foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly. The implementation of this scheme delivers a key recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report on Russia and has been assisted by consultation with our friends in the United States and Australia, which have implemented similar schemes.
The National Security Bill is a dynamic piece of legislation that reforms our approach to hostile state actors and the threats that they pose. The introduction of our foreign influence registration scheme will ensure safety in our systems and transparency in our political processes. I look forward to engaging with all noble Lords on the Bill. I welcome discussion both today and as this essential piece of legislation progresses through this House. As I hope I have demonstrated in this speech, the Government are steadfast in their determination to protect our people, our values and our democracy. With that critical objective in mind, I beg to move.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have contributed to what has been a very constructive and instructive debate. I welcome the broad support that has been shared across the House. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, for his supportive comments on the foreign influence registration scheme. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and others in this House who engaged us in such a constructive and supportive manner, in both this debate and the engagement sessions we have run over recent weeks.
I turn to some of the specific points that have been raised. I ought to crave your Lordships’ indulgence because this will not be a short speech; it will be a sincere effort to address all the key points in full, and not a cynical attempt to bore all noble Lords to tears. Starting with interaction between this Bill and the Online Safety Bill, which was referenced by the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and Lord Ponsonby, the Government are obviously aware that we have overtaken that Bill in its passage, and we will ensure that the links between the Bills have the desired effect.
A central element of a number of offences in the Bill, alongside the foreign power condition, is the test of the safety and interests of the UK. This test is one way that legitimate activity is excluded from the scope of relevant offences. In considering any prosecution in relation to the offences to which the provisions regarding prejudice to the safety and interests of the UK apply, the court will consider the nature of the risk to the safety or interests of the UK. Case law already makes clear that
“the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
should be interpreted as the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. This is notably different from protecting the particular interests of those in office.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, questioned the scope of the foreign power condition in the Bill. The foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link to a foreign power can be made for the purposes of the offences of obtaining or disclosing protected information, trade secrets offences, sabotage, foreign interference and the state threats aggravating factor. The foreign power condition can be met in two scenarios: first, where a person is acting for or on behalf of a foreign power and, secondly, where a person intends that their conduct will benefit a foreign power. I reassure the House that this will not capture people who do not know, and could not possibly know, that they were acting for a foreign power. Rather, Clause 29 requires that a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is being carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, or they must intend to benefit a foreign power. Of course, where our authorities consider a person to be carrying out harmful activity with a state link, this can be drawn to a person’s attention, providing a strong deterrent effect against a person continuing with that activity.
The Bill follows the Law Commission’s recommendation to replace the existing link of an “enemy”, as set out in the Official Secrets Act 1911, with a definition of a “foreign power”. We agree that incidental or tangential links to financial or other assistance from a foreign power will not suffice to meet the foreign power condition in relation to harmful conduct. Those who receive funding from foreign powers to carry out legitimate activities would not meet the foreign power condition if they were entirely separate to that funding to undertake activity covered by one of the offences in the Bill. The other place passed an amendment on Report to put it beyond doubt that any financial or other assistance must be clearly linked to the illegitimate conduct in question.
The noble Lord raised the matter of the Home Secretary. All I will say is that she has provided a detailed account of the steps she took in her letter to the HASC. I will not make further comment as this matter has been dealt with in detail at other times.
Oversight was discussed at length in the other place, as it has been today, and in the helpful engagement sessions I have held with colleagues. Although we already have oversight mechanisms in place for Part 2 of the Bill, the Government have committed to consider whether any additional oversight is required for state threats legislation. We have been considering whether it is possible to extend oversight beyond Part 2 in a way which does not duplicate or unhelpfully interfere with the responsibilities and functions of the existing mechanisms governing both the UK intelligence agencies and the police. Should we decide to extend oversight of the Bill beyond Part 2, it is important that we do not create any confusion or uncertainty. We are currently exploring the different options for appointing an individual to oversee Part 2, along with our work to consider whether there is merit in expanding oversight beyond it. It is crucial that whoever is appointed has relevant experience and skills and can provide an objective assessment of the offences and powers to ensure appropriate and transparent scrutiny.
Many have raised concerns regarding the Serious Crime Act amendment in Clause 28 of the Bill. I know there will be general understanding of why I cannot go into detail on operational issues in this place; however, let me reassure the House that the Government have been working with the UK intelligence community—or UKIC—which has now provided an operational briefing to the Intelligence and Security Committee outlining examples of why this measure is needed. The committee has acknowledged the need for the SCA to be amended and appreciates our reasoning for seeking changes, though it is not yet in full agreement on the way the problem is being addressed. I thank the committee for its engagement on this matter and welcome a collaborative dialogue going forward. I want to be clear that the Government have heard noble Lords’ concerns and will look carefully at what can be done to tackle these issues. I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke on this clause and thank them for their thoughts. I look forward to further discussions to find the right way forward.
Let me turn to why the SCA amendment is necessary. Collaboration with international partners is a vital element of the national security work carried out by the Armed Forces and UKIC. To support this crucial work, a number of safeguards and processes are in place to ensure that this collaboration is necessary, proportionate and prevents potential wrongdoing. For example, the Government remain committed to the Fulford principles and overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which exist to ensure that our officers do not knowingly support unlawful activity. Further, UKIC’s regulatory compliance is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office via regular inspections and routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
The UK has one of the most rigorous intelligence oversight regimes in world. There are several internal safeguards and processes in place which manage the way that UKIC and the Armed Forces work with and exchange information with international partners to prevent potential wrongdoing. Operational decisions are carefully recorded and made with the benefit of regular advice from specialist legal advisers to ensure compliance with domestic and international law. Intelligence officers receive mandatory training on the legal frameworks and policies which govern UKIC and Armed Forces activity. These policies include the Fulford principles, the compliance with which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner annually and reported to the Prime Minister. UKIC’s regulatory compliance is also monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office via regular inspections and routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
The Serious Crime Act offences mean that individuals who have complied with all those safeguards—working under authorisation and in the interests of UK national security—may fear personal criminal liability. It is not right or fair to expect this risk to sit with trusted individuals who are acting in good faith and on behalf of our intelligence services or Armed Forces for authorised purposes. Instead, responsibility should sit with those organisations at an institutional level, where it is subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight.
I want to be absolutely clear: Clause 28 is not a broad, general immunity from criminal offences and not about allowing the Government to carry out torture or commit murder. Rather, the Government are making an amendment to provide a targeted protection which better facilitates co-operation with our key overseas partners. At present, despite being satisfied that all other domestic and international law obligations are met, essential intelligence sharing with partners has been delayed or prevented in order to protect individual officers from potential liability for SCA offences. This is a having a chilling effect across UKIC and the Armed Forces, reducing the confidence of officers who make vital national security decisions every day. As a country, that means that we are less safe, because reciprocal access to intelligence facilitated by joint working is crucial to responding to the threats we face, such as terrorism.
This amendment is not about letting UKIC and the Armed Forces do whatever they want. It is about ensuring that we are protecting those working for us from prosecution and giving them the confidence that the Government have their backs. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisation’s activities, and I commend the important work of the ISC and IPCO in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. That is right and fair.
I have full confidence, however, in those to whom we are providing protection, including our intelligence agencies. They are expert, professional and highly trained individuals, whose judgment and skill we respect and have faith in. Not taking the opportunity to provide those individuals with assurances that they are protected would be an abdication of our responsibility to support them in keeping our country safe.
The noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, asked why the SCA is necessary, given Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act, which authorises the “reasonable” defence. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, also raised a point on those matters, so I shall try to deal with them now. While we consider that properly authorised activity to protect national security should be interpreted as being reasonable for the purposes of the existing defence to the Serious Crime Act offences, the application of the reasonable defence to UKIC and Armed Forces activity is untested. The Government believe that UKIC and the Armed Forces should have a targeted protection that provides far greater clarity and certainty to those tasked carrying out important national security work. Section 7 ISA authorisations are not available in all the circumstances in which the SCA risks arise. Those authorisations primarily apply to overseas activities, meaning that Section 7 could not generally be used to protect officers when carrying out activities in the UK. Section 7 authorisations may be sought only by SIS and GCHQ, and not by MI5 or the MoD.
The foreign influence registration scheme, or FIRS, is being created to tackle covert influence in the UK. It will strengthen the integrity of our systems and enhance the transparency of our political processes, delivering a key recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 Russia report. As I am sure noble Lords will agree, it can be only right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are appropriately protected from political interference from abroad and better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our affairs. Russia’s recent attempts to undermine European stability has brought the need for action into sharp focus. That is why the scheme will require the registration of all political influence activities where they are to be carried out in the UK at the direction of a foreign power or entity. It is important to note that the scheme will not impose restrictions on the legitimate activities of people or business. Indeed, it is there to encourage openness and transparency. To be clear: we continue to welcome open and transparent engagement with foreign Governments and entities, and we will ensure that the administrative burden of the registration requirement is kept to a minimum.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, raised two key concerns. First, he suggested that the political tier of FIRS would have a disproportionate impact on academia. That would be the case only when those bodies undertook political influence or activity. Further, no countries are now specified on the enhanced tier, so there is no activity to be registered as it now stands. If the Government list a country, we will consider what activity should be registrable, ensuring that any such registration would be proportionate.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, before Committee, could we be told how this new proposal will interact with the National Security and Investment Act, which already acts on universities? Universities are concerned that there will be a double effect, increasing the problems they face and the amount of time they will have to spend on them.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I shall get back to the noble Lord on that point.
To conclude on that issue, these decisions will be subject to parliamentary approval.
Secondly, I assure noble Lords that all the policy in the Bill is subject to collective agreement and has the support of the full Government. It is also important to note that the Government undertook a consultation on the Bill, including FIRS, in the summer of 2021, and ran targeted engagement with industry this summer.
With regard to the specified person measure included in the foreign influence registration scheme, it is important to clarify its necessity. It will offer us three key benefits. First, it will provide the Government with a greater understanding of the scale and extent of activity being carried out on behalf of specified foreign powers and entities. Secondly, it will increase the risk to those who seek to engage in covert activities for specified foreign powers, either directly or through entities. By requiring the registration of relevant arrangements and activities, the risk of engaging in state-threats activity against the UK is increased. Finally, the specified person measures provide a potential option for earlier disruption when there is evidence of a covert arrangement between an individual and a specified foreign power or entity but not disclosable evidence of a more serious state- threats offence. Crucially, this provides an opportunity to prevent harmful activities at the earliest possible stage.
On Clause 3, the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, gave the example of an individual working with Mossad in the UK to recover artefacts looted by the Nazis. In his example, we would expect that the UK would have been made aware of such activity and it is possible that the UK would have made an arrangement with Israel. As such, the activity would have a defence in Clause 3(7)(c)(i).
A number of noble Lords raised the Official Secrets Act 1989, including the noble Lord, Lord West, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. As the House knows, the Government are not planning to reform this Act. It is worth noting that the Law Commission, in evidence to the Bill Committee, clearly explained that it did not envisage that any one statute would implement all its recommendations at once, even if the Government were minded to accept them all. It also did not recommend that a public interest defence be created in relation to the espionage offences in the Bill. We continue to consider the Law Commission’s recommendations on the Official Secrets Act 1989.
On the specific issue of a public interest defence, or PID, to overcome a PID, the Government would need not only to show that the disclosure was damaging but that any harm from a disclosure outweighs the public interest in the disclosure. This would likely mean that in a prosecution, even one where a person clearly had malicious intent, the damage of the original disclosure could be severely compounded. This could lead to even egregious breaches of the Act not being prosecuted due to the sensitive nature of the evidence that the Government would have to reveal to defeat the PID. The Government recognise that there may be situations where an individual has a legitimate need to raise a concern—for example, in situations where there may have been wrongdoing and where they think there is a public interest in disclosing that information—but disclosing information protected by the Official Secrets Act 1989 and then relying on a PID is not the safest or most appropriate way for an individual to raise these concerns and have them rectified. Nor would this address the underlying wrongdoing.
The offences in the National Security Bill target harmful activity by states, not leaks or whistleblowing activity. There are safeguards that prevent the Bill capturing whistleblowers and negate the need or utility of PID. For example, to commit an offence of disclosing protected information, the conduct must be done for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power and with a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. A genuine whistleblower would not meet this bar. Including a PID in any of the offences in Part 1 strongly implies that acts of espionage could be in the public interest. Clearly, acts of espionage against the UK can never be in the public interest.
There are also already several existing internal and external routes in government through which individuals, including government subcontractors or contractors, can raise a concern about information relevant to the Official Secrets Act 1989 safely. The number of routes has increased since 1989. The Government consider that these routes provide safe and effective options for disclosure, although the appropriate route would of course depend on the disclosure in question. These routes include, among others, government departments’ internal policies and processes; a staff counsellor for the national security community; organisational ethics counsellors; the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office; the Attorney-General’s Office; the Director of Public Prosecutions; and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in instances where an individual suspect’s criminal activity is taking place or has taken place. To sum up, the introduction of a PID would carry significant risks to our national security and do nothing to create a safe or effective route to raise a concern, compared to the many legitimate routes the Government are actively maintaining and improving.
Turning to the report published by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the Government are clear that the offences and powers introduced by the Bill are proportionate and necessary. Through the use of appropriate safeguards and conditions, and reflecting on the need to protect national security and public safety, the offences have been crafted to catch only legitimate activity, ensuring that they remain proportionate. The Government disagree with the overall position of the committee and maintain that the measures in the Bill are appropriately drawn. Our ECHR memorandum, updated on the introduction of the Bill into this House, outlines the government assessment of how our measures comply with human rights law. I look forward to engaging with the committee as the Bill progresses through this House and the Government will respond to the JCHR report in due course. I am sure the noble Baroness would not expect me to speculate on the Bill of Rights Bill and its future.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, asked when the Government will publish the Russia report. I am pleased to be able to tell her that the Government did in July 2020. In fact, I can tell the noble Baroness that our response was published on the very same day; the Bill is a direct response to the recommendations in that report.
In conclusion, I will repeat my earlier thanks to all who have participated today. I look forward to further examination and challenge as we move to Committee, but for now I beg to move.
Monday 19th December 2022
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (19 Dec 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, intend to tighten the scope of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15 and 29. This is achieved in these amendments by leaving out
“or ought reasonably to know”
from the relevant clauses, meaning that an offence is committed under these clauses only if the person
“knows … that to be the case.”
The practical effect of these amendments is therefore that offences are committed only when a person knows that their actions are damaging. Given that the offences in the Bill could carry significant sentences, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the Committee is right to probe to what extent a person must know that they are committing such an offence, especially as it will otherwise be up to the courts to determine whether a person ought reasonably to have known that they were committing the offence.
However, it is not unusual for offences to be committed when a person ought reasonably to know. There is a recent example of this, which includes the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I was recently googling it, and it seems that the Act was passed by the coalition Government.
Further to this, if an offence is committed only when a person knows it to be the case that their actions are damaging, it could be difficult to get a successful prosecution. None the less, it is right and helpful that the Committee should ask the Minister to expand on the points we have heard in this short debate.
As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, juries often decide on the state of somebody’s mind when an action is committed, and the decision as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty can easily turn on their perception of the state of the person’s mind. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke about the difference between knowledge and imputed knowledge. As he said, it would indeed be helpful if the Minister could expand on the level of imputed knowledge that may be expected to secure a conviction.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, reminded us of the complexity of dealing with “grey space”, as he referred to it. This is an opportunity for the Minister to try to clarify the situation so that prosecutions can be appropriately brought and reasonably thought to have secured an appropriate conviction.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their broad support for the Bill and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for introducing these amendments.
The test that a person
“knows, or ought reasonably to know”
the effect of their conduct recurs throughout the offences and measures in Part 1 of the Bill. Failing to include an element of objectivity in this test would risk seriously undermining the offences and not criminalising behaviour for which we consider individuals should be culpable. Those conducting state threats activity are likely to be skilled at their tradecraft and will be adept at hiding their activities from our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It is important that we do not hinder our ability to prosecute in these cases.
We consider that knowledge is an appropriate threshold for these offences and the foreign power condition. However, we believe it is also right to include constructive knowledge in these provisions. Given the seriousness of the offences to which this test applies, it is essential that an element of objectivity is included to ensure that offences can still be prosecuted where individuals are unjustly claiming not to have known the relevant consequences or circumstances. It is, of course, right that those who could not have seen those consequences or circumstances should not be criminally liable under these offences.
I think it is helpful at this point to draw noble Lords’ attention back to the 1911 Official Secrets Act, which we are replacing with this Bill. The offences under that legislation cover certain actions, such as obtaining information, by a person
“for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests”
of the United Kingdom. Those offences require a no-fault element to be proved in relation to the prejudice to the safety or interests of the state. The proposed amendments to Clauses 1, 4 and 12 contain the same requirement for prejudice to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, but, importantly, and as recommended by the Law Commission, introduce a subjective fault element. We agree with the Law Commission that these offences should contain a subjective fault element. Crucially, the offences would not capture a person who genuinely could not reasonably have known the effect or nature of their conduct.
Perhaps I might provide a hypothetical scenario of how the proposed amendment could affect the foreign power condition in Clause 29. It is possible that an individual is unaware that they are working for an undercover foreign agent. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, made a very good point about the grey area in which much of this activity takes place. Let us imagine that the security services tell that individual that the person they are working for is, in fact, a foreign agent but the individual refuses to believe it despite clear warnings. At this point, it would be reasonable to make that individual culpable should they continue activities at the behest of the foreign agent, whereas it might prove difficult to successfully prosecute the individual if knowledge had to be proved.
To be clear, the individual in this example would still need to meet all the other tests in any given offence to be charged with that offence. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrongdoing.
The same logic applies to other amendments tabled. In Clauses 3 and 15, I am sure the whole House would agree that it is not right that an individual should escape liability when they reasonably should have known that their conduct could assist a foreign intelligence service or that they were receiving a benefit from a foreign intelligence service. A purely subjective test would make these offences very difficult to successfully prosecute.
Constructive knowledge is applied by the courts in other circumstances and the Government are confident that this test is appropriate. There will be a range of culpability between those who have actual knowledge and those who should have known, but that is something that is appropriate for sentencing rather than conviction. I hope that goes some way to answering the question put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—ah, apparently not.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I want to make it quite clear that, for the reason that was expressed earlier, I do not object to the idea of objectivity here, because it is sometimes extremely difficult to prove that someone knew something. The phraseology being used is pointing in the right direction, but there are two different levels of knowledge. The first is the knowledge of the background facts, and then there is the knowledge that flows from the conclusion based on those facts. Both of those are built into the rather short phraseology of this clause.
Taking those as two separate things, I can agree that the conclusion to be drawn from those facts can be looked at objectively. My question is: how much is the prosecutor going to be dependent on imputed knowledge of the background facts? It would be consistent with some other contexts in which reasonable knowledge is used to say that you look to see what information is possessed by the individual. Taking that as a given, you look at what facts the individual knew, and then you look at the conclusion that ought to be drawn from those facts. I hope I have made it clear that there are two stages here and my concern is about the first stage—whether the clause is imputing knowledge to the individual which that individual does not have. If it is going that far, it is taking a very serious step.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the noble and learned Lord for that clarification. I do not think the clause is imputing that but I will read Hansard very carefully and, if I may, I will come back to him in writing on this point.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will pick me up if I do not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, but that is due to be discussed in group 33 on a subsequent Committee day, so I ask if we can come back to that detail then, if that is acceptable.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Of course, as long as it is on the basis of the point that my noble friend raised—that we will have two pieces of legislation. The 1989 Act will cover serving or former members of the intelligence services, but this Bill means that there will now be two competing pieces of legislation. I do not know which the Government intend will trump the other.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.
For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I shall certainly withdraw the amendment at this stage at the end of what I have to say, and will then consider it and my other amendments with the Minister and others between now and Report.
I am grateful for the incisive consideration of imputed knowledge by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, supported, as I understood it, by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who clearly articulated the difference between the basic knowledge that you must have and the conditions for imputing knowledge. That is what the Government’s drafting of all these clauses in the Bill simply does not address.
My noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed pointed out the very difficult coexistence of the Bill with the Official Secrets Act 1989, which I think the Minister accepted and said that we are going to come back to. It is difficult precisely because it is not simply a competition between offences that involve serving or former intelligence officers and those involving any person; it is also that there is a carefully defined defence under the Official Secrets Act that does not apply here, and the offences can be made out on the basis of imputed knowledge.
The point made by the Minister, that the requirement for actual knowledge might hinder prosecutions, would be a good one were it not for the fact that juries are very good at determining whether or not people who deny knowledge actually have it, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out. With the exception of the Clause 5 offence, these are all indictable-only offences, as you would expect, carrying very serious penalties. A defendant who denies knowledge will have that denial very carefully considered, and the underlying facts that he knew, or can be shown to have known, will be considered to enable a jury to decide whether he actually knew.
On that basis, I suspect that, at the end of the deliberations on the Bill, the House may well want to ensure that, for a conviction to stand, it is a question not of hindering prosecutions but of whether a conviction on reasonable evidence is a likely outcome. When that is considered, I believe that actual knowledge should be required, although I of course wish to consider this over the intervening stages of the Bill. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
That is quite right. As I said, the problem with the Bill is that there is no indication of what else may be covered by the “safety or interests” of the state, or what the limits of those terms might be. As I have been arguing, and as others have said, as well as the prevention of terrorism and espionage, they could extend to policies on energy, national infrastructure, the protection of water, power, food, health services, transport, law and order, organised crime and immigration controls. The extent of the powers that may be taken in the Bill could be used in relation to a wide range of state interests, not just state interests related to national security or to the defence of the realm. The interests of the state clearly are ensuring that we have enough energy, but should that be covered by a National Security Bill? These are questions that the Minister needs to answer, and it will be interesting to hear his answer.
I will make a couple of final remarks. Like many, I am somebody who has never read the Official Secrets Act 1911, but in preparation for Committee—and knowing the depth of knowledge, experience and wisdom that we have around—I thought it was necessary to make sure I was quoting. The Official Secrets Act 1911 says under “Penalties for spying”:
“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—”.
The Official Secrets Act 1911 says that it has to be for a purpose “prejudicial” to the interests of the state. Logically, should not defendants or people have the right also to argue that their act was not prejudicial to the state? The Act says that your act has to be prejudicial, so surely you have a right and a responsibility to prove that it was not prejudicial. That argument could take place within the courts or wherever. This argument about someone’s actions in relation to the safety or interests of the state, and whether they were prejudicial, needs some sort of definition. Without it, how on earth do we know whether somebody is going to commit an offence under this Act? It would be for somebody to interpret.
Can the Minister clarify what the Government mean by “safety or interests” of the state? Who determines what they are? How can anybody act against that in a way which does not break the law, whether it be through protests or actions? If I take action outside of an RAF base, protesting against it and trying to disrupt things going in or out, or if I am at the peace camp at Faslane, will that be classed as a protest? Where does it become something that falls foul of the Bill? In other words, where do you draw the line? That is an important question for the Government to answer.
My amendment and those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others say to the Government that it is not good enough just to say the “safety and interests” of the state. What does that mean? People have challenged that over the decades. They have stood up and said that the safety and interests of the state are something that they challenge or do not agree with. Through history, that is how progress and reform have taken place. At the time, those protesting, taking action or conducting various activities have sometimes been accused of undermining national security or acting against the interests of the state.
We do not want to pass a law which leads to more confusion or a greater inability for Parliament to say that these are the sorts of actions we mean. That is the whole point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support. It says that if it does not relate just to defence and national security, where is the grey zone that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, mentioned? Where do we draw the line? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, keeps reminding us, we should not abrogate our responsibility on that. It is our fundamental responsibility to try to answer that question.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.
The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that
“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—
those of 1911 and 1920—and
“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]
as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.
The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.
A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.
For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.
I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to test the issue with regard to economic activity. If the Minister is saying that the Bill will be broad and go beyond national security economic activity, then presumably that brings into its remit all significant areas of major trade disputes where we have mechanisms for reciprocal action for penalising, having punitive tariff responses, et cetera, when effectively there is economic warfare. If the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the Minister are correct, anyone involved in any trade competitor which is engaged in dumping or activity that may lead to reciprocal trade actions will now be under the remit of the Bill. It is criminalising an offence with potentially 14 years’ or life imprisonment, rather than going through the approach of what other economic trade activity is concerned. Part of the concern is that the Government will be able to decide that all these different areas would now come under the remit of the Bill.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.
I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.
Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.
I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.
As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I entirely understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, but, with respect, the fallacy that he falls into, and the fallacy into which the Government fall—the Minister has articulated it—is that, in the interests of being able to prosecute a wide range of activities, they threaten to lower the threshold for such prosecutions to a point where the responsibility for the decision on guilt lies not with a jury considering guilt or innocence but with those who decide to prosecute because they perceive a threat to the interests of the United Kingdom, and the interests of the United Kingdom are very wide.
I agreed with almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said; the one thing he did which I did not agree with was that he misquoted the Bill. The Bill is not about prejudice to the safety “and” interests of the United Kingdom. Everywhere that the phrase occurs, it says the safety “or” interests of the United Kingdom”.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, this group relates to the new offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information. Both amendments pertain to what information should be included in this offence. While the offence currently applies to all restricted information, Amendment 4, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, would confine the offence to “secret” or “top secret” information. This amendment reflects recommendations by the JCHR.
His Majesty’s information assets may be classified into three types: “official”, “secret”, and “top secret”. The practical effect of the amendment is therefore to exclude the disclosure of “official” information from the offence. However, according to a 2018 Cabinet Office paper, official information could have
“damaging consequences if lost, stolen or published in the media”
but is
“not subject to a heightened threat profile.”
The Official Secrets Act 1989 includes offences on the disclosure of each classification of information. Amendment 6, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, put his name to, leaves out part of the definition of protected information, which states that
“it is reasonable to expect that access to the information, document or other article would be restricted in any way”.
As noted by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and in the Explanatory Notes, this is a subjective view of the information.
Given that security officials and civil servants would likely have knowledge of whether or not information is restricted, the inclusion of this line, which would create an offence for when a person should reasonably expect it to be restricted, could impact journalists and civil society. I therefore think that this is an opportunity for the Minister to clarify how he expects that people should be able to reasonably expect that information is restricted or not. I look forward to his response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords, and the noble Baroness, for their contributions to this short debate. I also thank the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its report and its close scrutiny of the Bill. I take the opportunity to confirm that the Government’s response has been published today, and I have asked for a copy to be placed in the Library of the House.
The Government consider that limiting what can be captured under “protected information” to specific security classifications, as the noble Baroness’s amendment seeks to, risks creating loopholes within the provision that could significantly undermine the operational utility of the offence. There are already limits to what “protected information” covers: protected information is any information, document or other article, where, for the purpose of protecting the UK’s safety or interests, access to it is restricted, or it is reasonable to expect that access would be restricted. I therefore suggest that there lies the answer to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Moreover, the current definition of protected information would cover instances where information may have been misclassified but would still be extremely harmful if shared widely.
In contrast to the proposed amendment, the current definition of protected information also includes instances where seemingly less sensitive unclassified information or lower-classification information from within a government building or on a government computer system was obtained but could undermine the safety of the United Kingdom if disclosed to a hostile actor.
To answer the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, this could include the floor plans of a government building or even an organisational chart of a team working within that building. There are many examples of official documents at lower classification levels that may also be harmful if disclosed, such as information about a UK trade deal with another country. It is imperative that this breadth of information is also covered within the definition.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The “foreign power” test, which we will come on to later in the Bill, is extremely broad. Under Clauses 29 and 30, the “foreign power” test can cover the public service broadcaster of Canada. So, if someone who believes that our Government are committing wrongdoing provides a document to the public broadcaster in Canada because they believe that our Government are doing wrong, which is in the global interest, would that be covered, with potential life imprisonment, under this Bill?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
It would be the case only if those three tests that I have just described are met for the purposes of the offence in the Bill. So it would have to be that the information was protected, that the person ought reasonably to know that, and that its disclosure was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I imagine that will be the topic of some debate in the context of the hypothetical example that the noble Lord mentioned. It also has to be done with the intention to benefit a foreign power. I cannot see that, in the hypothetical situation the noble Lord mentioned, that issue realistically would arise because the combination of these tests means not only is the proposed offence proportionate but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution under this clause. The Government therefore consider that the definition of protected information is justified and cannot accept the proposed amendments. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
Following up on my noble friend Lord Purvis’s question, would it not probably be in the interests of Canada in the example he gave to expose wrongdoing on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom? The Government of the United Kingdom might define the interests of the United Kingdom in accordance with government policy in a way which was inimical to the interests of Canada and the offence would still be committed.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I find the hypothetical example that the noble Lord postulates hard to follow, because it seems difficult to envisage a situation where a prosecutor could conclude in those circumstances that there was a prejudice to the Government of the United Kingdom and a benefit to the Government of Canada, and that the other elements were present. It seems a most unlikely scenario.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I would just like to make sure the Minister is very clear with the Committee. All the decisions that would take place would have to have an objective view that that foreign power benefits. But in my reading, the Bill does not state that. It is simply that providing information to an authority of a foreign Government, which could be a public sector broadcaster such as CBC, is under this Bill. No one has to make the decision that that public broadcaster is then seeking to benefit the Canadian Government. That is not in this Bill.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
It is the intention to benefit that foreign power that is in this Bill, and it seems to me that that is a sufficiently clear and adequate definition to afford protection under the proposed section.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I was just looking up to see whether the words “intended to benefit a foreign power” were actually in the Bill, but I did not have time. In skimming through, I did not see them.
The Minister’s response has not really reassured me. The lack of definition of “interests of the UK”, with a question mark over what that means and how you could conflate the interests of the country and the interests of the current Government, coupled with the potentially wide definition of “restricted”, suggests, to myself and my noble friends on these Benches at least, a lack of precision and an opportunity that is too wide, especially considering that the penalty that could be faced is life imprisonment. Surely, there is an onus on us to secure a tight definition of offences in this Bill.
The other missing element, which we will come to in further discussions, is the lack of a public interest defence or a whistleblowing defence. What we are facing here is considerable uncertainty about what the real scope of the offence could be. As my noble friend Lord Marks said, the term “restricted in any way” is so undefined, it could cover innocuous but controversial documents, which could be restricted to prevent embarrassment. That is the discussion we keep having on journalism and whistleblowing: we should not open the door to the criminalisation of obtaining or publishing material that could be embarrassing to the ruling party.
I scribbled some notes, but I am afraid I cannot remember which noble Lord made this point. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. How are we meant to know what non-classified information is protected? It could apply to anything, however innocent, that was not published. If the Government have a document that they regard as restricted, even though it is not classified, the fact that it has not been published would mean it was restricted, although it may not be damaging except possibly to the reputations of the Government or Ministers.
If I were to get hold of a document saying that a Bill—for the sake of plucking something out of the air, let us say the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill—is designed to assuage some elements of political opinion in the party in power but is highly damaging to the diplomatic and economic interests of the United Kingdom, would that fall within the terms of the offence under Clause 1? In those circumstances, what is the nature of the restriction? What is the harm committed and what is the test of UK interests?
We keep coming back to the considerable grey areas in this whole package around Clause 1 and other clauses. I think we will want to explore this matter further. Otherwise, we are driving a coach and horses through the exercise of freedom of expression and other rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, which for the time being the UK is still a party to.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the new offences of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. We support these new offences and agree that the Government should safeguard against threats to the UK’s trade policy. We see them as important amendments. None the less, we have had an interesting and important debate today. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined, Amendments 8, 9 and 10 are about trying to understand why the Government believe that the offences need to have such a wide scope and whether narrowing them down would really have the unintended or bad consequences that the Government believe they would.
I have a couple of specific questions for the Government. The Bill says that there has to be a direct link to a foreign power, but suppose somebody obtains information such as a trade secret and sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation? Is it the case that, under the Bill, to prosecute there would need to be a link from the individual to a foreign power and not just to a competitor within the UK?
The measures in Clause 2(4) to (7)—I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to this in his Amendment 11—are really quite important. Why can the offence take place only outside the UK if it is in respect to possession by a UK national, as opposed to a UK national and/or a UK resident, or any other description of persons? Having talked about a narrow definition, I wonder why the Government have restricted the measures in subsections (4) to (7) to a UK national. I would be interested to hear the Government’s answer to that.
An interesting discussion and debate has taken place within the Committee about the JCHR recommendation. It is an interesting point that we will all want the Government to clarify. What is the Minister actually saying to the points from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford? The JCHR quite clearly states that:
“The theft of trade secrets that pose no risk to national security is more properly governed by the offence of theft (and other breach of confidence and intellectual property rules) than through new espionage offences.”
It would be interesting to understand whether the Government think the JCHR is wrong or whether it has a point. If the JCHR is wrong, why do the Government believe it is wrong? Maybe the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, have greater relevance with respect to this Bill. With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in another lively and entertaining debate. Amendment 8 seeks to add a “safety or interests of the UK” test to Clause 2. Amendments 9 and 10 seek to narrow the definition of a “trade secret” so that it captures only information which is actually subject to measures to protect it. Amendment 11 seeks to expand the scope of a “UK person”. The Government reject these amendments and I will try to explain why.
The offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets targets threats designed to undermine our economic prosperity, tackling the whole-state approach to national security adopted by state actors. The Government believe that economic prosperity and national security are inherently linked. You cannot have one without securing the other, and Clause 2 seeks to protect both.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I am not going to disagree with the Minister, but on the question of the letter—and I am pleased that he is writing to me—could he put it in the Library, and do that with respect to all the letters, so that every noble Lord can see his answers to the various questions?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Yes, I am happy to give that reassurance. This is just me flying somewhat solo, so I shall clarify that, but I can think of a number of circumstances where it would very much depend on the corporate. But I shall seek official clearance on that. In light of all those answers, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, that was another interesting debate. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for defending the honour of the JCHR against a charge of naivety from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which I reject. I am sure that the JCHR is capable of understanding the noble Lord’s points.
As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, there is a mischief here. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said, economic espionage can be against national security—and it can be, but I think that the Minister went further than that. He said that economic prosperity and national security were synonymous. That is a very broad assertion. For instance, the shareholders in Tesla apparently believe, because the share price of Tesla has dropped rather fast, that Elon Musk has neglected the economic prosperity of Tesla by his concentration on Twitter. I do not think that any of us would regard the share price of Tesla as affecting the national security of the United States. I believe that the Minister is wrong in saying that economic prosperity and national security are synonymous, but of course I accept that economic espionage can certainly damage national security.
As my noble friend Lord Marks said, my Amendment 8 intends precisely to put in a test or condition that the theft of a trade secret is prejudicial to the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom”, preferably with that term redefined by amendments from these Benches. Without that condition, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, Clause 2 does not belong in this Bill. I conclude that I am really not persuaded by the arguments against Amendment 8. When damage to economic prosperity is also harmful to national security, that would be satisfied, if a test of that was added—and I have not heard an argument as to why that test is missing from Clause 2. If the Minister is correct that economic espionage and damage to national security are synonymous, what is the harm of putting in a definition, as the amendment suggests? But I have not yet persuaded the Minister, or indeed some other Members of the House, so for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, we all hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will not be criminalised by this Bill, but we look forward to the Minister’s response and for the exemptions to which the noble Lord referred to cover him.
I want to make a couple of brief remarks, again supporting what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is trying to do, which is to narrow the focus—that has been the subject of much of the debates have had on the various amendments. This amendment would require an intention that the conduct will prejudice the safety or security or defence interests of the United Kingdom and apply that to a number of clauses. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined quite adequately why a discussion about that and a decision for the Government are needed. I hope that the Minister will explain why the Government do not think it is necessary rather than just dismissing it.
I wanted something to be clarified, notwithstanding the fact that it may be a simple response. On visiting many military bases, one finds people outside them taking photographs and numbers and watching the activity because it is a pastime; it is something that is of interest to them. I do not think that the Bill will criminalise that, but on behalf of people who have an interest in something that I personally would not have an interest in doing, I wonder whether the Minister could clarify it. I have seen people taking photographs at RAF bases of the planes taking off. It is simply something of interest to them. It would be helpful for the Minister to clarify that they would not be caught by the Bill, even if unintentionally.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was right to remind us about intention. It is important. We will come to the public interest debate later, but she referred to journalists and whistleblowers, who risk being criminalised even though their intention is not to undermine national security. That will take us to the public interest defence debate that we will get to later in the Bill.
In answer to the points and amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I think that the JCHR amendments—whether or not they are all right, and we heard a debate earlier on about them—are really important for the JCHR to have put before the Committee. What it is essentially saying is, “We think this is possibly something which impacts on the freedoms that we enjoy in our democracy”, freedom of expression being the one that the noble Baroness just referred to. The Government seek to modernise the national security law, which we all agree with—there is no disagreement in the Committee about that—but the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, should not apologise for the JCHR; rather, we should congratulate it on coming to all of us and asking us to justify what we are doing and on asking the Government to justify what they are doing in the name of national security. There is a compromise to be made sometimes between national security and complete freedom to do X, Y or Z. All of us accept that. The debate, as we heard on earlier amendments, is where you draw the line. I, and other noble Lords, think it is important—whether in respect of this group or others—that a debate takes place in this Parliament, and we should attempt to do better at defining what we actually mean rather than just leaving it to the courts.
I say to the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Jones, and to others who continually remind us about the JCHR that I am sure it is sometimes immensely irritating to the Government, but that is the job. That, in a non-flippant way, is important, because there are compromises with freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom to do X, Y or Z, and freedom for people to go about doing things exactly how they want to. It is a price we pay for our national security; how high that price should be is something we should not flinch from debating in this House.
The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seek to put intent into these offences. If the Government do not believe that is important, it is necessary to argue the case as to why. On whistleblowers, journalistic freedom and so on, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, mentioned, I am sure we will come to that debate later when we discuss the public interest defence. I finish by saying again to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford: more power to your elbow.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for another very interesting short debate. These amendments seek to amend or add a safety or interests test to the various offences throughout the Bill. I will address each offence separately, given the different effect each amendment will have on each offence.
Amendments 12, 15 and 16 would narrow the scope of the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service, so that the offences would apply only to assistance that would, or is intended to, prejudice the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The Government reject these amendments. We believe that any activity taking place in the UK on behalf of a foreign intelligence service that the UK has not even informally agreed would be inherently prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I pause, as here lies at least some explanation to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who none of us want to see in the dock in Court 4 of the Old Bailey.
Creating an additional legal test to prove beyond reasonable doubt why that activity is prejudicial would add an unnecessary hurdle for a prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked why the Government are criminalising assisting a friendly foreign intelligence service in the case of Mossad. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, also dealt with this example. I would say that we are criminalising covert assistance and I highlight the additional safeguard of the public interest test in the prosecution. We believe that any activity taking place in the UK on behalf of a foreign intelligence service that the UK has not even informally agreed to would be inherently prejudicial.
We would be happy to consider further the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on the drafting of Clause 3, but need more information about that hypothetical situation. Who would counsel be advising and when? For example, is he advising a foreign intelligence service which has an agreement to operate in the UK? In those circumstances, the prosecutor’s options would of course be very different.
On Amendment 16, the existing distinction between activities taking place inside the UK and those taking place overseas was deliberate. For activity taking place overseas, Clause 3(4) requires the conduct to be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. This has been done to ensure that we target activity overseas which has an appropriate link to the United Kingdom. On this amendment, and Amendments 12 and 15, it is the Government’s view that activity taking place inside the UK, where not covered by the defences in Clause 3(7) and without even informal agreement or consent, is inherently prejudicial to the UK’s safety or interests.
As I understood the example from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, of a French citizen working in a bar or a bank, surely the answer is that they could simply call 999. I do not think there is any need to tighten up the definition in the context of the example she gave. In further response to the points the noble Baroness raised, I quote from paragraph 43 of the Government’s formal response to the JCHR report:
“Alerting a foreign intelligence service to a potential terrorist plot against the UK would not be conduct in relation to UK activities by that intelligence service. If the UK and France have an agreement to work on such activity together in the UK then that would fall under one of the defences available.”
Regarding Amendment 19, it is the Government’s view that an individual who knew, or reasonably ought to have known, that their conduct has a purpose that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom should not be outside the scope of the offence simply by virtue of it not being the intention behind the activity to cause harm to the UK. To require the higher level of intention that this amendment seeks to introduce would create gaps that would jeopardise our ability to prevent harmful activity at the sensitive sites these provisions seek to protect. The Government consider it correct to penalise such conduct irrespective of the specific intention of the perpetrator, so long as they have, or should have, knowledge of the damage their action could cause. The Government therefore cannot accept the proposed amendment.
I will address Amendments 20 and 21 together, given that they both would add some variation of the safety or interests of the UK test to Clause 5. For the current Clause 5 offence to be committed, a person must engage in specified conduct in relation to a prohibited place that is unauthorised. They must know, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. This therefore protects those who have no reason to know that the activity they are conducting at that specific location is not authorised. There is no requirement to prove intent against the United Kingdom, as the offence is aimed at circumstances where activity is unauthorised but it cannot be established that a person had a purpose they knew, or reasonably ought to have known, was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. For example, if a person trespasses on a site that they know is a prohibited place and steals something from it, that is not on the face of it damaging to the safety or interests of the UK. This is reflected in the lower maximum penalty for this offence of six months’ imprisonment.
The Government consider that including a further condition to prove that conduct is prejudicial to the safety, security or defence interests of the UK significantly reduces the utility of this offence and creates an unhelpful overlap with the Clause 4 offence. This would result in these provisions not being able to capture the full range of potentially harmful activity that prohibited places face. I add that it would seem clear that the innocent photographer taking pictures of RAF aircraft at an air show would not be caught by this offence for the reasons I have set out.
Amendment 47 would add an additional condition to the offence provided in Clause 15(1). The Government reject this amendment because it would create an additional and unnecessary evidential burden to overcome, severely limiting the efficacy of the offence at preventing hostile foreign intelligence activity against the UK. I suggest that no one would ever be prosecuted in the hypothetical situation advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
The effect of the amendment would be to require the person committing the offence to know, in all circumstances, what the foreign intelligence service intended to do through the provision of the relevant material benefit. Furthermore, the prosecution would be required to prove that knowledge in court on the basis of admissible evidence, which would be a difficult task.
Were this offence to be amended as suggested, it could be simply circumvented by the foreign intelligence service ensuring that the person who would otherwise commit the offence is not told what is intended. In such circumstances, conduct as set out in the offence as drafted would not be a crime. It is the Government’s view that a foreign intelligence service funding operations in the UK is inherently prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.
As to Amendment 49, noble Lords seek to include an additional element of intent as part of the preparatory conduct offence under Clause 16, through the addition of a provision requiring proof that persons engaged in preparatory conduct were acting with a purpose that they knew would prejudice the safety or security or defence of the United Kingdom. In the Government’s view it is unnecessary to include this additional element; if a person engages in preparatory conduct with the intention that it will lead to one or more such offences, the preparatory conduct offence will be committed only if the person has the intention that each element of those offences will be met in the future. I do not accept that the offence could be unintentionally committed in the manner postulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
The Minister has the advantage of having read the Government’s response to the JCHR report. As a mere member of the JCHR, I know that, unfortunately, two months after Report, it did not come in time for this Committee, let alone Second Reading. I look forward to reading it.
I did not follow every detail of what he read, but could the Minister tell me what guards against someone being prosecuted under Clause 5,
“Unauthorised entry etc to a prohibited place”?
The clause raises worries about protestors, journalists, photographers and so on, and does not have a test of breaching national security because the criteria in Clause 4—where there is a test of prejudice to the safety or interests of the UK—are not met. It could look as though you have the lower offence, with the possibility of six months imprisonment, where there is no purpose to assist a foreign power and no prejudice to the interests of the UK, but the catch-all of Clause 5, where anyone who wanders on to Ministry of Defence land can attract a six-month prison sentence, whether or not they have done any espionage or harm to the security of the UK. What is the defence to Clause 5 being some sort of compensation for not being able to charge under Clause 4?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As I sought to explain to the Committee, the Clause 5 offence can be committed only where a person engages in the specified conduct in relation to a prohibited place that is unauthorised, and they must know, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. It is specifically the point, as I hope I alluded to in my remarks earlier, that the Clause 5 offence is the summary-only offence, which is intended to preclude unauthorised entry to prohibited places to avoid the risk of national security consequences.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I respectfully ask the Minister to write to me before Report, and place a copy in the Library, with a fuller explanation of why I would not be committing a criminal offence by giving advice to a foreign intelligence service? The noble Lord asked what advice; the very simple example I gave was being asked by a foreign intelligence service to advise it whether certain conduct would be unlawful in this country. Would it be a criminal offence for me to advise it on that? Grateful though I am to the Minister for his expression of the hope that I do not end up at the Old Bailey, I would like greater comfort than that. He did perhaps go a little far in suggesting that that would be the view of all noble Lords, but I am grateful for his personal assurance.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I will endeavour to make sure that that letter goes to the noble Lord as soon as it is prepared.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I have a genuine query. The Minister referenced a number of times, as I think was cited, that if a foreign intelligence body is operating in the UK unauthorised, it is now considered to be prejudicial to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom. Why is that activity not unlawful?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The activity itself is made unlawful in the provisions of the Bill. Is that the point that the noble Lord is making?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
So it is unlawful for a foreign intelligence service to carry out any activities within the UK if they have not been prior approved by UK intelligence services. Is that correct?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As the noble Lord is aware, it is the effect of Clause 2 to prohibit the offences of espionage and assisting a foreign intelligence service. Therefore, those offences in Clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill would have the effect of criminalising activity of the type described by the noble Lord.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister; I am purely seeking clarification for the benefit of my own ignorance. I am concerned that it is not very clear. If a friendly intelligence service is carrying out UK activities, which is not espionage against the United Kingdom, the Government are saying that this is prejudicial against the safety and interests of the United Kingdom but it is not unlawful, but a UK citizen advising on that basis is unlawful. Would it not be clearer to state that that activity is unlawful?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I note the noble Lord’s remarks. I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic, but I will study Hansard carefully and take it back to the department.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the Minister has given no quarter. I suppose that is to be expected on the first day of a Committee on a Bill, with the Government defending their position as thoroughly as he has done. I hope that when he does read Hansard, as he has just promised to do, he will realise that there are a great many areas in which flaws in the Bill have been exposed—and exposed in particular by this group of amendments—where it is quite plain that conduct that ought not be criminal runs the risk of being criminalised. The question asked by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed just a moment ago exposed the danger for people working for a foreign intelligence service if they are British citizens; they are plainly caught. There are a number of areas where assisting a foreign intelligence service, for instance, gives rise to particular difficulties.
Before I go on to any detail, let me say that it is a dangerous path for a Government to say that they do not believe that there would be many unjustified prosecutions because the public interest test for a prosecution would not be met. Let us remind ourselves that the prosecution services have to consider two things: first, whether there is a reasonable chance of a conviction on the evidence, and, secondly, whether it would be—
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, there should be a second amendment to go with Amendment 13. There is only one amendment in this group.
Clause 3 means that for the first time it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service. While the clause currently states that an offence is committed when a person engages in conduct that
“it is reasonably possible … may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,
this amendment would mean instead that an offence is committed only if it is likely materially to assist a foreign intelligence service. The impact of the amendment is that it increases the threshold for the likelihood of whether an action assists a foreign intelligence service, reflecting concerns raised by the JCHR. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, this would be punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment, so we look forward to the Minister clarifying why the offence is not more tightly drawn.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a very interesting question about the large group of consultants with experience of the security services and forces who provide training to any number of actors across the world, and how they may be caught by this provision. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the scope of the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). For brevity, I will refer to a foreign intelligence service as a FIS.
The Government reject this amendment because we do not consider it to be necessary. Clause 3(2) provides for an offence where a person engages in conduct which it is reasonably possible may materially assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. Amendment 13 seeks to change this to “likely materially to” assist a FIS. We do not consider there to be a difference between the two terms. I recognise the spirit in which this amendment has been made, to raise the bar for this offence being conducted, but I assure noble Lords that for this offence to apply, a person not only needs to engage in the conduct that it is reasonably possible may assist a FIS but must know, or ought reasonably to know, that it will assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities.
To ensure that we do not capture legitimate activity, there are defences in Clause 3(7). Not only will we not criminalise activity conducted in accordance with an agreement to which we are a party—such as agreements with our Five Eyes partners based in the UK—but we will exclude law enforcement and others who are legally obliged under UK law to assist a FIS. That goes some way to answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Additionally, where someone with public functions—
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My reading of it is that, taking the defence in Clause 3(7)(b) as an example, if I was providing Special Forces training—unlikely though that might seem—because I have functions of a public nature, I would be fine, although I do not think anyone would wish to receive Special Forces training from me. I was asking specifically about UK private sector bodies—consultancies and those that carry out those functions. I am happy for the Minister to write to me if he does not have an answer now, but I do not think that private sector enterprises are covered by any of the defences in Clause 3(7).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.
It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I was going to ask the Minister something before he sat down, but he sat down so fast.
My concern with the Government’s approach, and the Minister’s approach in his response, is that it describes activities without reference to the legal definition of the activities concerned. Clause 3(1) involves the person committing the offence if the person
“engages in contact of any kind”.
Under Clause 3(4):
“‘UK-related activities’ means … activities taking place in the United Kingdom”.
It is not necessary to identify the service. As my noble friend pointed out, Clause 3(7) does not cover the private sector.
My amendments are very simple and very short, but even that raising of the threshold the Government resist. We are at a loss to understand why the Government are not prepared to bring a more forensic approach to the definitions in our criminal law. I quite appreciate and agree that the offence, in principle, of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the prejudice of the interests of the United Kingdom—which we say should be clearly defined—is a very important part of the Bill. But it is wrong to draft the law in such a way as to catch any conduct that attracts the displeasure of our intelligence services, our prosecuting authorities or government policy. It is important to define criminal conduct in such a way that it criminalises only conduct that ought properly to be a criminal offence when committed not only by United Kingdom citizens but by others who have absolutely no intention of assisting a foreign intelligence service to the detriment or prejudice of the United Kingdom. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, the amendments in this group span Clauses 6 to 11 and cover the new offences of
“Entering and inspecting places used for defence etc”.
These clauses are intended to update the prohibited places provisions which fall within the century-old Official Secrets Act 1911. Given that technological developments, such as the use of drones, are providing new methods of accessing protected sites, it is right that the Government are evolving the offences, and it is right that this Committee is probing how these new offences will be implemented.
The 12 amendments in this group are probing and were recommended by the JCHR. They seek to tighten or narrow the offences and definitions. Amendment 34 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, raises the unintended consequences of these provisions on the right to protest and on journalism. This will be a common theme throughout Committee stage, and my Amendment 88, which will be debated at a later date, will consider the implications of later clauses for journalists and civil society.
Amendment 26 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and Amendments 27, 28 and 30 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, raise questions about where prohibited places may be located and probe why they may include any MoD land and why Crown dependencies and overseas territories are excluded. Given the sentences which offences may carry, it is important that the Minister clarifies the type of locations which will be included. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford said, the purpose of this group of amendments is to give greater certainty and narrow definitions. She asked the rhetorical question—perhaps it is not a rhetorical question; it is a literal question—of how people will know whether they are in prohibited places.
The noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Purvis, explored quite interestingly why overseas territories are not included within the definitions, and I look forward to the Minister’s answer on that point. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked other questions about who will be informed. If it will not be the general public, will it be local authorities or police forces, and which police forces will it be? The purpose of this suite of amendments is to look at the limits on the extension of prohibited places and at who should expect to be informed about any such extension. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I will first speak to Amendments 23 and 33 at the same time, given the argument is much the same for both. I am happy to provide the clarity sought by noble Lords and, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby.
Harmful activity relating to prohibited places or cordoned areas around military aircraft can take place directly outside the boundaries of a place or cordon. This could include conducting surveillance, such as taking video or photographs of the sensitive place or aircraft, monitoring the activities of staff located at the site or conducting close-range information technology attacks from outside the place. It is therefore imperative that, where the police believe a person to be conducting such activity, they should be able to order them to move away. None the less, recognising that a cordon may be imposed at short notice, it is a defence provided for in the Bill for a person to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with a cordon under Clause 11. The effect of these amendments would be to reduce significantly the ability of the police proactively to stop damaging activity from taking place.
The police guidance that is being developed in collaboration with the College of Policing will provide further advice to forces on the use of powers in respect of an area adjacent to a prohibited place or cordoned area. I can confirm that this is addressed directly in the Government’s response to the JCHR’s report at paragraph 52 and onwards, and I again thank the committee for its close consideration of this Bill.
Amendment 24 adds a requirement that a police officer obtain authorisation before exercising a Clause 6 power. Due to the inherently sensitive nature of prohibited places, and the threats that they face, it is likely that the Clause 6 powers will be used rapidly to prevent serious and harmful activity from taking place—activity that could well jeopardise the safety of those working within the site itself. Policing often requires the judgment of officers to take quick and decisive action to prevent harm and keep the public safe. It is important that we continue to empower our officers to make these decisions where appropriate. Introducing a requirement for a constable to seek approval from a senior officer may add an extra layer of confusion as to when constables may or may not use their powers, potentially allowing harmful activity to be completed before the police can respond. We recognise that every effort should be made to help ensure that these powers are not used in a disproportionate manner, and, as such, we are working closely with the College of Policing to develop guidance that the police should use before exercising the powers granted under Clause 6.
Amendment 25 seeks to provide that it is an offence to fail to comply with a Clause 6 order only if the order was necessary and proportionate to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The legislation is clear that a constable may exercise a power under Clause 6 only if they reasonably believe that doing so would be necessary to protect the safety or interests of the UK. The Government therefore consider that this amendment is unnecessary. As with any such situation, where it is alleged that a constable has acted outside the scope of their powers, a decision to give the order is rightly open to challenge. As it is an important point, I will stress again that the Government are working closely with the College of Policing on the guidance which should be used prior to making any decision to exercise powers under Clause 6.
On Amendment 26, it is crucial for national security that the UK continues to protect all areas used for defence purposes and by the UK intelligence community. Carving out certain places over others within these categories in the way this amendment proposes risks creating gaps that hostile actors could exploit. It could require the Government to pinpoint their most valuable defence and intelligence sites in order to establish that they are indeed prohibited places and so put these places even more at risk of harmful activity—the very opposite of what the prohibited places regime is setting out to achieve. Moreover, the proposed amendment focuses only on the risk posed by entry to such sites, which fundamentally undermines the protection being given to these sites against a range of harmful activity. It also, in inserting this condition around potential risk, significantly reduces clarity on the face of the legislation as to what constitutes a prohibited place.
I understand the intention behind this amendment, which is to ensure that land that might already be accessible, or where there is not perceived to be a significant risk, is not covered by the provision. I want to assure noble Lords that Ministry of Defence land that can be lawfully accessed by the public and such areas of the British countryside with public footpaths do not need to be excluded, nor do the public need to be given authorisation to be in that area. Therefore, they will not commit an offence under Clause 5. They will be committing an offence under Clause 4 only if the conduct is a specified activity with a purpose that they know, or reasonably ought to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It is important we are able to catch such harmful activity, even on publicly accessible land. Ministry of Defence land that can lawfully be accessed by the public is still used by our Armed Forces, often for purposes that are sensitive in nature, and it is critical they should be afforded the protections granted by the prohibited places provisions.
I will address Amendments 27, 28 and 30 together, given they all seek to extend the prohibited places provisions to the Crown dependencies and the wider British Overseas Territories. The Crown dependencies and British Overseas Territories are not a part of the United Kingdom, of course, but self-governing territories with democratic Assemblies able to legislate for themselves, including on national security. Should any British Overseas Territory or Crown dependency consider it necessary to designate prohibited places within their territory, they may make similar provisions in their own legislation.
It is of note that the Government consulted with the Crown dependencies on their inclusion within the prohibited places regime, and they have advised it would be preferred if they looked towards mirroring these provisions under their own law and legislation. It is only right and proper that the United Kingdom respects these decisions. I hope that addresses the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. I am sure the Bailiwick of Guernsey will think long and hard about the Alderney breakwater. As the grandson of an Alderney girl, I can tell noble Lords how much that breakwater is a feature of conversation.
It is important to address why the Government have chosen to include land or buildings within sovereign base areas—particularly those of Akrotiri and Dhekelia—in the prohibited places regime. Sovereign base areas are critical for UK defence and have special constitutional status among the British Overseas Territories in that their administrator, who also holds the title of “Commander British Forces Cyprus”, is vested with all the executive and legislative authority. This unique context of the sovereign base areas is precisely why, at their request, we are also including the option to extend the provisions in the Bill to the sovereign base areas. As such, it is right that the UK continues to afford protections specifically to the sovereign base areas through the National Security Bill.
Amendment 29 creates a legislative requirement to inform the public of prohibited places. The safeguards in place within Clauses 4 and 5—namely, that a person must either have a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom or know, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised—protect those who have entered, or are in the vicinity of, a sensitive site without having any knowledge that they have done so.
The Government agree that, where it is reasonably practicable, every effort should be made appropriately to notify the public of areas designated as prohibited places through the use of signage surrounding these places. However, the Government consider that making it a legislative obligation to notify the public of the location of every site designated a prohibited place is not proportionate, given that Clause 7 already makes public the types of sites that will be prohibited places. Equally, any designation under Clause 8 will set out in law any further types of sites that will be prohibited places. Furthermore, and crucially, there will be a number of sites which, due to their highly sensitive nature, it would be harmful to UK national security if they were publicly declared as prohibited places.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I have two quick questions for the Minister. I was grateful for his response to me with regard to local authorities. Can he clarify which lands will be categorised under the Crown interest? Under Clause 7(4)(b), they are
“an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department”.
It is not singled out, so is my assumption correct that these government departments include devolved Administration departments—the Scottish Government, et cetera?
Similarly, I was grateful for the Minister’s reference to the College of Policing, which was also referenced in Committee by his counterpart in the House of Commons. I have heard no reference to the Government working with the Scottish Police College, which is the relevant body north of the border because the College of Policing is only for England and Wales. This is important, because many of these lands are north of the border, where I live. If the Government are consulting, they need to consult with the Scottish Police College as well. I would be grateful for that assurance.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Yes. My suspicion is that both answers are in the affirmative, but I am afraid I do not know for sure. I will find out from my officials and write to the noble Lord. I thank him for raising that.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I am quite disappointed by the Minister’s responses on this. There are considerable dangers in this part of the Bill. The Minister referred to the fact that the offence under Clause 4 is committed only if
“the person knows, or ought reasonably to know,”
that their conduct
“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”
We have been around those houses before. Ought ramblers reasonably to know that they are
“in the vicinity of a prohibited place”?
Again, what does that mean? It is like “adjacent”. I do not think the Minister replied on the meaning of “adjacent”; forgive me if I missed that. It is all very difficult for some normal, uncriminal person to know that they are committing an offence under Clause 4. Clause 5 also says they “ought reasonably to know”. It is all rather reminiscent of being “in the vicinity” or “adjacent”. The Government also have powers to designate more places as prohibited.
The Minister drew our attention to the defence
“to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for that failure”
under Clause 11 in relation to a cordoned area. As far as I can see—I might have missed it—there is no such reasonable excuse defence in relation to the offences under Clauses 4 and 5 on entering or unauthorised entry to a prohibited place. If I am wrong, no doubt the Minister will be able to write to correct me.
This all seems quite reminiscent of the Covid restrictions. In the last couple of days, the human rights barrister Adam Wagner did a review of Matt Hancock’s diaries, or so-called diaries. Presumably, as he is an ex-Cabinet Minister, this publication would have been vetted by the Cabinet Office. This is the Minister who would have signed off all the SIs on Covid restrictions—200, or however many there were. The publication by Mr Hancock says that these were all SIs under the Coronavirus Act, which is not true; they were under the public health Act 1984, if memory serves. It went through the Cabinet Office with no one picking up that the reference was to the wrong law. This is reminiscent of the chaos among the police in applying the restrictions, their failure to distinguish between guidance and law, and the general outrage among the public at being told they could not do things that actually were not illegal. This did not help the reputation of and trust in the police.
I foresee similar echoes from the provisions of this Bill, of an outraged Middle England—or middle UK—where people find themselves adjacent to or in the vicinity of a prohibited place on Ministry of Defence land having had no reason to know about it. The Minister said he would try to consider putting up notices, but I do not think there has been any guarantee. So someone might not know that they were in the vicinity of a prohibited place that is defence land, committing an offence with potentially draconian penalties. This is inadequate as law. The Minister did say that there would be guidance, but there was guidance for the Covid regulations and that did not always solve the problems.
So, while I hear what the Minister says, I will want to return to some of the issues in this part of the Bill. The proposed law is sloppy. It could find innocent people either criminalised or dissuaded from taking their normal walk because they are not sure whether they are allowed in an area, and there could be a general chilling effect on people’s leisure activities. That said, and with the intention of having another look at all of this on Report, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Wednesday 21st December 2022
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (19 Dec 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I found this a fascinating short debate. It caused me to reflect on my time in this House, which has been a few decades now. Over 20 years ago, I remember sitting in on debates on treason in the Council of Europe, covering the way it would be addressed and the appropriateness of the death penalty within council member states. There were similar debates, although the debates regarding treason have evolved over those decades.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, for raising this issue. He referenced the Policy Exchange paper; obviously, thinking is developing in this area, so it is appropriate to have this debate here in Committee. I want to pick up the last point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about the impact of the word “treason” and whether that actually deflects from the purpose of trying to fill the gap in the legislation identified by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
I listened to all noble Lords who spoke so interestingly in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made a point about the labels put on particular words and how that may influence juries, as in the example he gave. It caused me to reflect on when, as a magistrate, I was asked to convict somebody of a terrorism offence, which does not happen very often in magistrates’ courts. This particular terrorism offence charge was for graffiti on the Tube. The words used caused me and my colleagues to reflect on the appropriateness of that charge. I think the defendant pleaded guilty to that offence, so all we were doing was sentencing, but we had exactly that discussion about the appropriateness of words in particular contexts. I can see the argument that “treason” is so emotive that it could indeed affect juries’ likelihood of getting convictions.
As I said, this has been a very interesting debate. I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, that some very serious points have been made against his amendment. Nevertheless, there is sympathy that there is a gap in the legislation, which may be filled in other ways.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that this has been a fascinating debate on a fascinating subject. I thank my noble friend Lord Bethell for introducing Amendment 37A on treason in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will now explain why the Government cannot accept the inclusion of this new clause in the Bill.
As noble Lords who are interested in this subject will have noted, the Government are looking closely at the issue of treason, as stated by the Secretary of State at Second Reading in the other place. The Government have been reviewing the case for and against reform of the UK’s treason laws and that review has not yet concluded. What we can say is that the UK has extensive terrorism laws—the “bristling arsenal” mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—which protect the safety of the UK and its citizens from forms of terrorism which might be considered treasonous. However, it would be correct to assert that treason law is outdated and in need of reform in light of the growing threats from foreign state actors. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the Bill provides a suite of measures for where somebody assists an enemy; it just would not be called treason.
I understand the significant history regarding the evolution of treason in the UK. Because of this, arguments have been made in this House and outside that an offence of treason goes further than criminal offences in relation to terrorism and state threats. Treason acknowledges the duty that a citizen has not to betray their state and many consider that a reformed, modernised treason offence would stress the importance of this through a specific criminal offence, reaffirming the bonds of citizenship that we have to the UK and to each other.
This amendment and others relating to treason have been proposed in previous Bills, but considering the role of treason in modern society is a substantial undertaking and one that we are looking at very closely. I acknowledge that this amendment and others seek to address concerns regarding the lack of a usable modern treason offence in the UK, so we welcome debate on this important topic.
Obviously, I reassure the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Faulks, and others that the Government do take this issue seriously and will listen carefully to the views offered by all noble Lords. However, as noble Lords may know, the Government are currently considering options for a formal review of this issue, including the possibility of the Law Commission conducting a review in this area. This area is complex, as the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, so eloquently explained.
I therefore thank my noble friend once again for his amendment but ask him to withdraw Amendment 37A while the Government’s review is ongoing.
Lord Bethell (Con)
My Lords, I am enormously grateful for the thoughtful and detailed debate we have had on this amendment. I will address a few of the points—I cannot address all of them—and I will seek to be brief.
This amendment is not about the past—it is not about Clive Ponting or Lord Haw-Haw and what happened a long time ago—but about the future. The future has states that use as a strategy the suborning of our citizens as an important part of hybrid warfare, at a scale and with a sophistication that we just have not seen for more than a generation—for two generations—and which, given the way in which they do it, we have probably never seen before. That is why this amendment is important: it is to combat a strategic threat from our enemies.
It fills a gap. The suborning of our citizens is not wholly covered by everything in the Bill at the moment, but I take on board the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and others on this. Duplication is not a sin in drafting laws. I have seen it happen before and I think that there is a gap that could be occupied by an amendment such as this.
A number of noble Lords asked what kind of attack this might cover. It would absolutely cover the contribution to a cyberattack. That is exactly the kind of modern warfare that our enemies are seeking to suborn our citizens to join in on, and therefore we should be thinking very much indeed about all the contributions our citizens could make to hybrid war when we are thinking about this.
As regards the impact on ISIS or a terrorist group, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that ISIS is not going to be intimidated. I am more worried about Kimberley—the person who does not know that they are doing something wrong by helping one of our enemies.
Lastly—I will try to keep my comments brief; I appreciate that I have not tackled all of the points—I confess for a moment here to a massive cognitive dissonance. Noble Lords and noble and learned Lords have spoken about their anxieties about the word “treason” as if it was a super-hot piece of vocabulary that was too hot to handle. I simply do not have that sentiment at all; it does not touch me in the same way that it clearly touches others. I thought the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke very well about that. Words such as theft, rape and terrorism are important parts of our legal vocabulary. I regard treason as simply akin to any one of those, and the arguments made—
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(1) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person engages in prohibited conduct,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to the prohibited conduct, and(c) the person intends the prohibited conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, to have an interference effect.(2) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person engages in prohibited conduct,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to the prohibited conduct, and(c) the person is reckless as to whether the prohibited conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, will have an interference effect.(3) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P engages in a course of conduct with one or more other persons,(b) the foreign power condition is met in relation to conduct of P which forms part of the course of conduct,(c) P intends the course of conduct to have an interference effect,(d) as part of the course of conduct, a person other than P engages in prohibited conduct, and(e) P intends or believes that as part of the course of conduct, a person other than P will engage in prohibited conduct.(4) For the purposes of subsections (1)(c) and (2)(c) a course of conduct includes a course of conduct engaged in by the person alone, or by the person and one or more other persons.(5) Subsections (1) and (2) apply whether the person’s conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.(6) Subsection (3) applies whether P’s conduct or the prohibited conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adds two new ways of committing an offence under Clause 13. Under subsection (2) the offence may be committed recklessly. Under subsection (3) it may be committed by a person where another person engages in prohibited conduct, if both are engaged in the same course of conduct.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I turn to government Amendments 38, 40, 41 and 42, and Amendments 43, 44, 45 and 45A in this group, tabled by other noble Lords.
The government amendments to Clause 13 are vital to the utility of the offence of foreign interference and will strengthen our response to hostile attacks against our democracy and society. We must stand up to aggression against diaspora communities in the UK, as well as provide further safeguards to help promote a healthy democracy. The aim of the offence of foreign interference is to create a more challenging operating environment for, and to deter and disrupt the activities of, foreign states that seek to undermine UK interests, our institutions, our political system or our rights, and ultimately prejudice our national security.
We know that states around the world, including the UK, conduct open and transparent influence activities, such as using diplomacy to shape and align policy to benefit shared interests. This is a welcome part of transparent international engagement and it is vital to the UK achieving its interests. However, some states seek to further their strategic interests by going further than overt political influence, such as through cultivating and manipulating relationships with individuals and entities in the UK where power and influence lies and using deception to shape public policy-making.
I will now provide further detail on the government amendments in this group. Government Amendments 38, 40, 41 and 42 deal with three key areas. They clarify the original policy intent in making provision for activity that forms a “course of conduct”, provide for the offence to capture reckless conduct, and, finally, provide definitions for the term “political process”. In addition, there are some minor and technical changes to give effect to the above. As regards the effect on the drafting, the original Clause 13 has now become three clauses. That is to make the provisions simpler with the changes that we have made.
On the amendments dealing with a course of conduct, noble Lords will note that the volume of changes appears substantial, but this is not a change of policy. Amendment 38 has given better effect to our policy intent in respect of third-party conduct. We must ensure that we capture scenarios where foreign interference is achieved through the actions of two or more people acting in concert, but where it cannot be proven that all individuals intended their actions alone to have an undesirable effect. A scenario could be where a person, P, works for a foreign power and intends to interfere with a person’s rights in the UK: for example, pressuring members of a diaspora community to stay silent on certain issues. If P subcontracts the prohibited conduct to another person—for instance, coercion of individuals—these amendments would allow us to charge P with an offence of foreign interference.
In respect of amendments to capture reckless conduct, we have carefully considered the comments made in the other place in respect of recklessness, as well as concerns from stakeholders, and consider it appropriate to add this offence. Not having recklessness leaves a gap where someone who is clearly aware they are involved in foreign interference activity but cannot be shown to have intended the relevant effects escapes a potential prosecution, for example because a person is motivated principally by money or a desire to get ahead.
Recklessness is a well-established and well-understood legal principle in the criminal law. A person is reckless when they foresee a risk that their conduct could, under this offence, cause one of the interference effects. A person must also proceed unreasonably in the circumstances with that conduct even when they are aware of the risks of continuing to do so. To be clear, this will not capture a person who has no appreciation of the risks at the time the conduct takes place.
Amendment 41 makes provision for a new clause which now includes the “interference effects”—previously in Clause 13—and adds a definition of “political process”, which will bring greater clarity to the scope of the offence. The interference effects have had to be amended to take account of the addition of reckless conduct. “Manipulate” has been replaced with “interfere” to recognise that a person cannot recklessly manipulate something. We have maintained the high bar to meet an interference effect.
The Government’s position is that the references to
“proceedings of either House of Parliament”
in the government amendment on “Foreign interference: meaning of interference effect” and in Clause 68 on the meaning of political influence does not, and could not, displace the prohibition on impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and is not intended to do this.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, we very much welcome Clauses 13 and 14—or however they are now numbered, given the Government’s amendments—as they introduce new offences of foreign interference, given the potential impact on our democratic processes at every level. That is a further reflection of the way that the Bill takes account of the new national security environment and the changing and emerging threats that we face.
As the Minister helpfully outlined, the main effect of the Government’s amendments will be to broaden the offences to include when a person acts recklessly. It appears that that has been brought in to reflect references to “recklessness” in other offences in the Bill and following debate in the Commons. That is very welcome. Can the Minister explain why it was not part of the original Bill, and what has caused the change of thinking in the department for it to bring forward these amendments?
I will also reflect on some of the discussion from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, and others, on what is meant by proposed new subsection (2)(e), which refers to
“causing spiritual injury to, or placing undue spiritual pressure on, a person”.
For the benefit of the Committee, it would be helpful if the Government could say more about what they intend, what that encompasses and the thinking that lies behind it. That would be helpful to the Committee in the light of the various comments made.
We also support Amendment 43 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Wallace. We very much support the concept of an annual report on how these clauses protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. I also understand and appreciate, as I think the Committee does, the Minister’s comment about how this is about protecting the country’s democratic processes from foreign interference, not from the normal democratic and political discourse that one would expect. I am particularly grateful for that, having been accused of being a communist and a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party—I do not know whether anyone ever came across that in my file. More recently, for the new heads of various bodies, I have been called a traitor for my views on the EU referendum. So I stand here accused of being a communist on the one hand—in my younger days, it has to be said—and then having moved to being a traitor for my views.
The serious point I am trying to make, in a humorous way, is that political discourse takes place, as do debate and argument. It is really important for us to understand the difference in the Bill’s intention that the Minister pointed out. For that to be read into the record is really important so that it is not misunderstood; it is clearly not what the Government intend.
Amendment 44, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Wallace, and of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, is really important. It was very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said that he supports it. There are a lot of arguments for this amendment, but my view is the same as the point the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made—a really important point, particularly at the current time when there is some disillusionment. Accepting Amendment 44 as part of the Bill would help enormously to instil public confidence, to ensure that people understand that our political parties not only are free from foreign interference through political donation but are seen to be free of it from their statements. Instilling public confidence on that is really important.
I move on to my Amendment 45, which is a probing amendment. I say to the Government that it is not necessarily intended to be added to the Bill, but it deals with an important aspect of this discussion. It is how to deal with the issue of informing the public about what we seek to do and the new threats that they face, and how we raise their awareness of them. There is also the crucial question of how this could be done in real time.
I use the example of Canada to cause us as a Committee to think. Canada has a Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which lays out a clear and impartial process by which Canadians can be notified of a foreign threat to the integrity of an election. That includes provisions for informing candidates, organisations or election officials whether they have been the known target of an attack. It has processes which state how decisions are made, and by whom, and as to whether a public announcement should be made to alert people to the threat.
As I said, this is a probing amendment, and I am not an expert on the protocol. I am trying to understand the Government’s view. If we were to believe that foreign interference was taking place, at what point would they think it appropriate, relevant or consistent with the security of our nation for the public to be informed of that? I think the public have a right to be involved, potentially in live time.
I think this raises real difficulties. Let me create a scenario: a general election takes place—let us not use the next year or two; let us say in 10 years’ time—and the Government find that that election is being compromised by foreign interference. What happens? How does the Bill deal with that scenario? We are in Committee, which is when we look at detail. I think there is an important question for the Government about public involvement with respect to their knowledge and awareness of the potential for interference that may take place and what they have a right to know if the Government or the services come to a conclusion that there is foreign interference and that it may be compromising an election, whether it be a general election, a local election or some other part of the democratic process. I think that is an important part of this discussion. I think that, far from it being a weakness for the Government of the day, with the security services and others, to say that they are protecting the integrity of the democratic processes such is their importance, alongside that, should it be necessary for them to alert the public, they should have a system, or protocol to which they can refer, dealing with what the consequences of that would be.
This has been an interesting debate at the heart of another important series of amendments because they seek to protect our democratic processes from the foreign interference the Minister pointed out in his introduction. I look forward to his reply to not only my remarks but to the remarks of other noble Lords.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the notably unrevolutionary noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support for these amendments. I will address his precise question on whether the amendments on recklessness represent a change in government policy and why they are being introduced now. It was always our intention to capture malign foreign interference activity in all its forms with this offence. After the completion of the Bill’s passage in the other place and in light of the comments made in the Public Bill Committee on the lack of an offence that could be committed recklessly, we retested the offence against the operational and policy requirements and we saw that there were examples of conduct, such as where a person’s intention was not to cause an effect but rather to improve their status within relevant organisations of a foreign power, that were at risk of not being in scope for the offence. I hope that answers the question on why it is being done now.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked three specific questions about why recklessness is present in only one of these offences. The fact is that there are three different ways to commit the offence. New subsections (1) and (2)—inserted by Amendment 38—relate to a person’s intention, and only subsection (2) deals with recklessness.
Amendment 43 seeks to introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to lay a yearly report, from the date of the National Security Bill gaining Royal Assent, assessing the impact which Clauses 13 and 14 have had on protecting the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. This amendment duplicates one tabled in the other place. We do not consider it to be appropriate to introduce reporting requirements on the subject in isolation from the existing work on democratic integrity or in isolation from wider consideration of oversight and review mechanisms for the Bill.
Amendment 45 seeks to introduce a mechanism to alert the public to threats to the integrity of elections. We do not consider this to be necessary. Clauses 13 and 14 ensure that there are appropriate criminal sanctions for foreign interference. These provisions sit alongside other non-legislative activity. In advance of democratic events, His Majesty’s Government stand up an election cell to monitor and respond to any emerging issues during the election period. The election cell is led by the Cabinet Office and brings together government departments, the intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and external partners to ensure a holistic understanding of risks and to drive any necessary mitigations. The National Cyber Security Centre also meets regularly with the UK’s parliamentary parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure. Finally, formally established in 2019, the defending democracy programme is a cross-government programme with the overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums and related democratic processes in the United Kingdom.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Several speeches have stressed the importance of informing and educating the public about the dangers of foreign interference in British elections. One of the reasons why people like me go on so much about releasing the additional information in the ISC Russia report is precisely to alert and inform the public. The amendment that the Minister has just been discussing is about alerting the public, in the course of an election campaign, if that should be a problem. He mentioned the defending democracy task force. I have found a small number of references to it, but it is not exactly a public body and what it does is so far extremely unclear. What about the public information and public education dimension of what we are discussing?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am dredging my memory a little bit here, but I remember the Security Minister about a month ago outlining much more about defending democracy. I will have to refer back to the comments he made in the other place, but I am pretty sure they deal with the questions that have just been raised by the noble Lord.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I think this is a really important point about informing and alerting the public in live time. I would be grateful if the Minister could come back having reflected on that for us.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will certainly have to read all the various information that I can find on the defending democracy programme, which I am pretty sure deals with most of the issues that have just been raised. If I am wrong on that, of course I will make that clear.
Amendment 44 was spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Carlile, Lord Purvis, Lord Evans and others. The amendment seeks to enhance checks on the source of political donations in two ways. First, it seeks to introduce a requirement for political parties to release a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. Secondly, it requires political parties to include in their annual statement of accounts a statement detailing their risk management approach to donations and the measures in place to prevent the acceptance of impermissible donations. While I understand the intent behind this amendment, let me be clear that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls on political donations to ensure that only those with a legitimate interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent. Given that it has been spoken to by most speakers, I am going to go into a bit more detail on this, with the indulgence of the Committee.
Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. That includes registered UK electors, including registered overseas electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations which are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. Failure to return such a donation, either to the donor or the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence and any such donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.
It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already register donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; they are then published online for public scrutiny.
By requiring political parties to detail publicly their approach to mitigating the risk of impermissible donations, proposed new subsection (3) of the noble Lord’s amendment has the effect of providing such donors with the details of mitigations they need to overcome to make an impermissible donation. I am sure that is an unintended consequence, but it is important to oppose this amendment on the grounds that not only do the existing rules mitigate these risks but the amendment itself risks undermining the already strong rules.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for intervening again. The Minister has not addressed the ease with which someone who has not lived in this country for three or more decades can now register, and the difficulty of verifying that they are who they say they are. If he will not address it now, can he write in detail to some of us, or perhaps invite us to a briefing, and make sure that that area will be tightened by the Bill?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, that is more properly a DLUHC area, in the light of the Act passed recently, but I will certainly have the conversation with my counterpart there and see what that Act says. I am not an expert on that Act, as the noble Lord will probably appreciate.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
We obviously have a difference of opinion as to whether the current system is stringent. I am curious why, if the trading arm of a political party was operating with a business that had any interest in one of the 26 countries in the money laundering and terrorist financing regulations, it would have to do due diligence, but if it received money that originated from such a country, it would not. Why does the Minister think that is acceptable?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As I outlined in my answer earlier, I believe this is a stringent regime. I am afraid there is a significant difference of opinion. It specifies that only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. Any donations that are not permissible and not reported will constitute an offence.
I am afraid I will not address the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about support for Mr Orbán over the Dutch and French; that certainly does not apply here. His Amendment 45A seeks to add requirements relating to proxy voting. It would be odd and somewhat undemocratic to seek to apply such measures solely to overseas electors, when the same issue could arise for domestic electors. In any event, proxy voters and those seeking to use a proxy are not in a position to determine whether someone is seeking to support a foreign power. It is an impossible ask of them. Adding such requirements risks disfranchising individuals by blocking their ability to find a proxy and undermining the very point of a proxy voting system.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for intervening yet again. My point was simply that the level of controls and identity verification we have now introduced for domestic voters under the Elections Act is noticeably tougher than those for overseas electors. Given that overseas electors are also potential donors, this seems to be a hole that needs to be filled. The Minister says it does not need to be filled. That does not satisfy us.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, but on this one I do. However, I commit to discussing this further with my counterpart at DLUHC. I will come back to the subject.
Spiritual injury was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Wallace, Lord Anderson and Lord Purvis. I will commit to write on FCDO engagement on this subject; I do not have the answers to those questions. What is spiritual injury and why is it part of this offence? Basically, it mirrors the Elections Act 2022. The term “spiritual injury” covers the potential harmful impact on an individual’s spiritual or religious well-being that could be directly caused by another individual—for example, excluding a person from the membership of an organised belief system or banning them from attending a place of worship. The term “undue spiritual pressure” could include, for example, pressuring a person to commit an act by suggesting that doing so is a duty arising from the spiritual or religious beliefs that a person holds or purports to hold. In addition, “undue spiritual pressure” could refer to conduct by a person that alters, or has the potential to alter, a person’s spiritual standing or well-being.
Reference to “spiritual injury” already exists in the definition of “undue influence” as set out in Section 114A of the Representation of the People Act 1983. Undue spiritual pressure is a new element of undue spiritual influence in the clarified offence in Section 8(4)(e) of the Elections Act, as part of efforts to clarify what types of conduct amount to an undue influence. I hope I have answered that question.
For these reasons, the Government cannot accept this set of amendments. I ask the Committee to accept the Government’s amendments to improve the foreign interference offence.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister and am very grateful to him for giving way. On this question of spiritual injury, has the Lord Chief Justice been consulted as to whether he and the judiciary regard this definition as something that judges can sum up to juries in a clear way? Although the phrase exists elsewhere, it has not been litigated to any great extent and, without a consultation of the judges, may cause great difficulty.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The simple answer is that I do not know, but I will find out and commit to write.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
The question I asked related to the bit in brackets. What effect would there be if you omitted that part in brackets?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I think I have already answered in significant detail why that clause has gone into the Bill. I have also answered the specific points that the noble Viscount raised at the start of the debate.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
This is really important. As the noble Viscount pointed out, this is not about coercion of an individual but about putting into law “causing spiritual injury” to any person, ill-defined as that is, and not just the person to whom the effect of the interference relates. It is of significance that we would be putting in a very considerable offence of causing an undefined spiritual injury to any person. Can the Minister reflect on that and maybe come back to us in writing?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I have heard the feelings about this around the Committee, so of course I commit to do that.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
““interference effect” has the meaning given by section (Foreign interference: meaning of “interference effect”);“prohibited conduct” has the meaning given by section (Foreign interference: meaning of “prohibited conduct”).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment updates the definitions in Clause 13.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Foreign interference: meaning of “interference effect”(1) For the purposes of section 13 an “interference effect” means any of the following effects— (a) interfering with the exercise by a particular person of a Convention right, as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom,(b) affecting the exercise by any person of their public functions,(c) interfering with whether, or how, any person makes use of services provided in the exercise of public functions,(d) interfering with whether, or how, any person participates in political processes or makes political decisions,(e) interfering with whether, or how, any person participates in legal processes under the law of the United Kingdom, or(f) prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.(2) An effect may be an interference effect whether it relates to a specific instance of a matter mentioned in subsection (1), or to the matter in general.(3) In subsection (1)(d) “political processes” means—(a) an election or referendum in the United Kingdom;(b) the proceedings of either House of Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament or Senedd Cymru;(c) the proceedings of a local authority;(d) the proceedings of a UK registered political party.(4) In subsection (1)(d) “political decisions” means a decision of—(a) the government of the United Kingdom, a Northern Ireland Minister, a Northern Ireland department, the Scottish Ministers or the Welsh Ministers;(b) a local authority.(5) In this section—“Convention rights” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998;the“law of the United Kingdom” includes the law of any part of the United Kingdom;“local authority” means—(a) in England—(i) a county council,(ii) a district council,(iii) a London borough council,(iv) a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009,(v) a parish council,(vi) the Council of the Isles of Scilly,(vii) the Common Council of the City of London,(viii) the Sub-Treasurer of the Inner Temple,(ix) the Under Treasurer of the Middle Temple;(b) in Wales, a county council, county borough council or community council;(c) in Scotland, a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994;(d) in Northern Ireland, a district council;“Northern Ireland Minister” includes the First Minister, the deputy First Minister and a junior Minister;“public functions” means functions of a public nature—(a) exercisable in the United Kingdom, or (b) exercisable in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom by a person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown;“UK registered political party” means a political party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000;“Welsh Minister” includes the First Minister, the Counsel General to the Welsh Government and a Deputy Welsh Minister.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause defining “interference effect” replaces Clause 13(2) and (3). Subsection (1)(c) to (e) now use “interfering” not “manipulating” because of the introduction of recklessness in Clause 13, and political processes and decisions are defined. There are drafting changes consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 13.
Wednesday 21st December 2022
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (19 Dec 2022)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments simply raises two questions, which is why we put down two probing amendments. Clause 16 criminalises preparatory conduct for any offences under Clauses 1, 2, 4 or 12, but it does not cover preparatory conduct for offences under Clauses 3 or 5.
Clause 3, as noble Lords will know, is the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service. It is not covered by the preparatory conduct offence, and we are simply at a loss to know why the Government deem it necessary to have an offence of preparatory conduct in relation to the protected information offence, the trade secret offence, the more serious of the two prohibited places offences and sabotage, but not in relation to assisting a foreign intelligence service. Can the Minister explain the Government’s thinking?
I do not believe that there is a need for a similar explanation for not criminalising preparatory conduct in relation to offences under Clauses 13 and 14, on foreign interference, or Clause 15, on obtaining benefits from a foreign intelligence service. That is because Clause 13 already covers preparatory conduct, because it refers to conduct or a course of conduct of which it, the conduct, forms part. Clauses 14 and 15 define the new offences in a way that states the criminal acts so tightly that they do not need a reference to preparatory conduct. Indeed, that would be inappropriate.
As for Clause 5, it may be that the reason for not making a separate offence of preparatory conduct for unauthorised entry to a prohibited place is that the Clause 5 offence is summary only and carries a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment. It may have been thought that preparatory conduct for such an offence was likely to be fairly nonspecific anyway. If the Government have other reasons for excluding Clause 5 from the ambit of the preparatory conduct clause, please may we know what they are? These are probing amendments, but I beg to move.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 50 and 51 seek to expand the preparatory conduct offence by adding the assisting a foreign intelligence service or FIS offence, Clause 3, and the unauthorised entry to a prohibited place offence, Clause 5, to the scope of the preparatory conduct offence.
The Committee will be aware that, under Clause 3, the first offence, in subsection (1), applies where a person engages in conduct that they intend will materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The second offence, under subsection (2), applies where a person engages in conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist an FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. The person engaging in this conduct has to know, or ought reasonably to know, that the conduct is of this kind. The type of activity that could be considered to be preparatory acts relating to assisting an FIS are already sufficiently covered by the second offence under subsection (2) and also by the offence of obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service under Clause 15.
Clause 5 targets conduct in a prohibited place which is unauthorised. The offence targets lower-level activity, such as knowingly entering a prohibited place without authorisation. This offence does not therefore require a purpose prejudicial to the UK to be demonstrated. I remind noble Lords that the purpose of Clause 16 is to allow the most serious state threats activity to be disrupted at an early stage. It would be disproportionate to include the Clause 5 offence under the scope of the preparatory conduct offence, given that the offence does not require any proof of intent against the United Kingdom and accordingly carries a lower penalty. As such, we do not consider that the inclusion of these additional offences to the preparatory conduct offence is necessary or proportionate to achieve the aims of the offence.
I hope that that answers the questions put by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The Government therefore do not find the amendment to be necessary, so I invite him to withdraw.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, the Minister’s response on Clause 5 was precisely in line with the possibility that I adumbrated, and he has confirmed that, so I shall withdraw that amendment without hesitation. Of course, I shall also not move the other amendment, because it needs further discussion. However, at the moment I do not understand how preparatory conduct is covered by Clause 3 at all. Perhaps we can discuss that behind the scenes between now and Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Murray of Blidworth
“4A An application for an order under paragraph 3 or 4 may be made without notice to a judge in chambers.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that an application for a production order may be made without notice to a judge in chambers. Schedules 3 to 5 already make equivalent provision for orders under those Schedules.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, government Amendments 52 to 59 are minor and technical, and bring consistency across the police powers in the Bill by aligning Schedule 2 with equivalent provisions in Schedules 3 to 5.
The amendments serve several purposes. First, they ensure that applications made under Schedule 2 for production orders and explanation orders may be made without notice to a judge in chambers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, or to a sheriff in chambers in Scotland. This means that, in cases where it could harm an investigation, an application may be made without notifying the defendant. For example, the police may require a production order to obtain evidence from a person suspected of preparing to conduct espionage. Notifying them of the application in advance may result in the destruction, concealment or alteration of that evidence.
Secondly, the amendments ensure that a production order made under paragraphs 3 or 4 of Schedule 2, or an explanation order made under paragraph 8, has effect as if it were an order of the court. This means that if a person fails to comply with the requirements of the order, they can be treated as being in contempt of court, which is a criminal offence punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment or an unlimited fine. Failing to comply with a production order or explanation order can impede a state threats investigation. To avoid damage to such an investigation, it is crucial that provision is made to hold to account those who choose to disregard these orders. This approach mirrors that of the account monitoring orders under Schedule 5 of the Bill and the equivalent production order power in terrorism legislation.
Finally, Amendments 56 and 57 simplify the way that the term “judge” is defined in Schedule 2, aligning it with the definition in Schedules 3 to 5. The amendments do not change the meaning or interpretation of “judge”; they just ensure the drafting is the same across the schedules.
I ask noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. As he has explained, these amendments make provision for applications for production and explanation orders to be made without notice to a judge in chambers. The amendments also make it clear that the orders should take effect as if they were court orders, so that disobedience would be treated as contempt of court.
We of course accept that such orders should be sought and obtained without notice, where necessary; we would expect that, generally speaking, it would be so necessary, because, as I think the Minister pointed out, a warning that application was going to be made for such an order would encourage the persons holding the material to hide it or other evidence concerned or to concoct explanations and provide false support for such explanations. If the orders are made without notice, the person is caught unawares and the orders are more likely to be productive. We also accept that disobedience should be punishable as contempt of court, simply in order to give the orders teeth, which they ought to have.
However, I add one general point. These production and explanation orders are quite draconian in nature and represent a significant intrusion on privacy and liberty. We accept that the conditions set out in the Bill for making these orders are tightly drawn and that, if those conditions are met, the orders are justified. However, it is important—I am sure the Government accept this—that those applying for these orders, and judges scrutinising these applications, will need to be astute to ensure that the conditions set out in the legislation for the orders to be made are fully met.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his remarks and I take on board what he says. These minor and technical amendments seek to bring consistency across the police powers in the Bill, as I have said, by aligning Schedule 2 with the equivalent provisions in Schedules 3 to 5. It is right that we are consistent across the Bill in its provisions and definitions, which these amendments seek to achieve.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
I will just say hear, hear—the Bill is far too long and far too complicated.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I speak first to Amendment 60, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. First, I thank him very much for the frank way in which he posed his questions, and I am glad to say that I can answer the first tranche of his questions simply with yes. I will set out in more detail why that is.
The amendment relates to the power for the Secretary of State to designate sites where those arrested under Clause 25 can be detained. There was a lively debate on this topic in the other place, which led to the Government carefully considering this issue and amending the Bill to provide for the sites to be designated only if they are in the UK. As the noble Lord observed, this provision can be found at paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 6, and I can confirm that is indeed the case. That states that the power
“may be exercised only in relation to land or a building in the United Kingdom which is owned or controlled by a police force”—
so that is any police force.
The Government consider that the amendments to Schedule 6 in the other place have sufficiently clarified the need for and the intention behind this power and I understand that this satisfies the noble Lord’s concerns regarding where the sites may be located. Just to confirm, the power therefore extends to the MoD Police, the British Transport Police, ,the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, et cetera, and there are no special arrangements in relation to Northern Ireland.
Clause 25(6) confirms that a 24-hour detention period can be extended by a reviewing officer to a maximum of 48 hours. The first review is as soon as reasonably practicable after arrest and then this must be reviewed at least every 12 hours, obviously up to the maximum.
The noble Lord mentioned arrest abroad. UK constables do not have the power of arrest abroad and the powers therefore do not therefore extend to Armed Forces police abroad. Any relevant people would be arrested by local officers and extradition would be arranged in the conventional way.
I will return to the topic of oversight later but I can confirm that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has a statutory role in inspecting all police forces under Section 54 of the Police Act 1996, about which the noble Lord knows. That body regularly inspects all aspects of policing, including places of detention. Given that any sites designated under this power will be under the control of the police, they would automatically be subject to their inspection, and the Government therefore believe that there is no need to include a further statutory inspection regime as this will be duplicative.
I can confirm that it was never the Government’s intention to designate sites located outside the UK. This amendment clarifies the policy position. In Northern Ireland, the Police Service of Northern Ireland is subject to annual statutory inspection by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services under Section 41. Similarly, in Scotland, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland provides independent scrutiny of Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Authority. We do not consider it reasonable to interpret this to include locations under the temporary control of a police force, such as a crime scene.
Amendments 61 and 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, are to Schedule 6. They seek to implement two of the recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report on the Bill. The first amendment seeks to remove the ability for the police to delay a suspect’s access to certain rights while being detained under the arrest power in the Bill for solely asset recovery reasons; I will address this first, if I may.
If the police have intelligence to suggest that a detained suspect has property that is connected to suspected criminal activity—for example, cash—and might use their permitted communication with a named person or their solicitor to ask them to take steps to move cash or property on the suspect’s behalf, to hide evidence or otherwise ensure that the asset cannot be seized by the police, it is clearly right that the police should be able to delay that communication taking place while they seize those assets, gather associated evidence and ensure that crime does not pay. I believe that the safeguards written into the Bill as drafted are sufficient when delaying these rights. The direction to delay must be given by a senior police officer, who must have reasonable grounds to believe that allowing access to these rights at that point in the investigation will hinder recovery of the property.
Additionally, it is written into the legislation that the suspect must be allowed to exercise both these rights within the first 48 hours of detention, so there will not be a situation where a suspect is detained for longer than this without exercising these rights. More details on this process will be contained in the code of practice made under this part of the Bill, including the fact that any delay in these rights must be recorded in the custody record and the suspect must be informed of the decision. Similar provisions can be found in PACE Code H, which operates for detentions under the Terrorism Act 2000.
I turn to the noble Baroness’s second amendment—
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I apologise for interrupting but, before the Minister moves on to Amendment 63, can he explain something? It may just be my inability to see it but, in their response, the Government refer to
“proceeds from crime from state threats activity”.
I have not been able to find that phrase in the text of the Bill; it just refers to how there can be a delay in informing a family member or notifying a solicitor if
“the detained person has benefited from their criminal conduct”
and the recovery of the asset “will be hindered by” those rights being exercised. Where does it refer to proceeds of crime arising from state threats activity, so that one can see it being brought within the national security purview? I cannot see that in the text but I am sure that the Minister can point out how the response is justified on that point.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Forgive me; the answer is that, in the text of the Bill, this is not limited to state threats proceeds of crime. The operation of the Bill is as I just described in my speech and, as I have already said, its safeguards are built into the statute itself.
The second amendment to Schedule 6 tabled by the noble Baroness seeks to remove certain circumstances whereby a review of a suspect’s detention may be postponed. There are various reasons why a review may need to be postponed. For example, the suspect may be receiving medical treatment and be unable to make representations on their continued detention to the review officer. It may be that there is a delay in the review officer arriving at a custody suite, or they may be reviewing another suspect’s detention if multiple arrests have been made in a short period.
It is impossible to predict all the possible circumstances and make specific provision for them in the legislation. The legislation does not provide for the review to be permanently postponed. It is required to be carried out as soon as possible, but this proposal provides for some operational flexibility. The code of practice—which, as I have said, the Government will publish in due course—will provide further information on reviews of detention, and we will state the requirement for any postponement of detention reviews to be recorded on the custody record. In the meantime, similar provision again can be found in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act code of practice code H, which operates for detentions under the Terrorism Act 2000.
With that, I conclude.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very helpful reply, which put on the record clarification of certain things, in particular that the word “constable” applies to all police forces across the UK. That was helpful in answer to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. As the Minister will know, a number of regulations and codes of practice will be coming before Parliament with respect to the detention of people under these powers. They will require some quite careful consideration by Parliament.
With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment corrects the definition of “relevant appeal court” in relation to appeals in Scotland.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 62 is a minor amendment to Schedule 6 which covers detention following an arrest for foreign power threat activity. Included in the schedule are powers for the police to take fingerprints and samples—biometric data—from an individual in detention. Biometric data can be retained for three years, with the police able to apply to the court for that period to be extended. The police and the individual can appeal the decision on extension to a relevant appeal court. This amendment corrects a reference to the relevant appeal court in Scotland, which is currently defined as the sheriff principal. Sections 109 and 110 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 abolished appeals to the sheriff principal in civil proceedings, with appeals now made to the Sheriff Appeal Court. This amendment corrects this.
Amendment 73 is a consequential change to take account of the new offence at Clause 15: obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. This was introduced in Committee in the other place, at which point the Committee had surpassed Clause 15. Clause 15(6) makes its own provision about when offences are committed outside the UK. I beg to move, thank you very much and wish you a happy Christmas.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I wish the Minister and all other members of the Committee a merry Christmas and, in keeping with this Bill, a safe new year.
Wednesday 11th January 2023
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-III Third marshalled list for Committee - (9 Jan 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I start by saying that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil barrister, I do not know what on earth that makes me. We shall see.
I start with a comment that I know will be supported by all members of the Committee: if the story on the front page of the Sun is accurate, it reminds us of the debt of gratitude that we owe to the security services. They seem to have foiled a plot to import uranium at Heathrow this morning. If that is accurate, it is something that we in this Committee should note, because I know that the security services and those who work on our behalf in all these areas read our proceedings, and they should not mistake or confuse the very real debate that is going on here about the best way for us to go forward, and the best legislative context for us to have for our Armed Forces and our intelligence services, with any sense in which we underestimate or do not respect them fully for the work they do across the world in our interests.
I have objected to Clause 28 standing part of the Bill, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for his support, because, as it stands, the clause is unacceptable. The Government themselves have said in the other place and in previous debates that they are considering whether the clause needs amending and, if so, how. We all wait with bated breath to see where that has got to. The ISC has said it needs to change, and we know that even with the further closed briefings from the intelligence services to the ISC, it still believes that the clause needs amendment.
Amendment 63A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and Amendment 64 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are welcome and important statements of how the Government may deal with the many concerns raised in both Houses. The excellent contributions we had in support of them challenged the Government to say, if they are not the way forward, what is. The Minister’s response to these amendments will be very important and it will be interesting for all of us to know whether the Government are actually listening. Are these amendments to be accepted by the Government and, if not, why not? If they are not, can we expect a government amendment in good time for us to consider it before Report?
Questions that arise for the Minister if the Government do not accept these amendments are clear. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as he explained,
“would ensure that the immunity provided to Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences.”
Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned the issue of torture. If this is not to be accepted by the Government, can the Minister clearly and without any qualification say that none of this behaviour would ever be allowed if the clause were to be passed unamended? Remember, we are referring to murder, unlawful killing, torture or sexual offences. A clear and categoric ministerial statement, on the record, with no qualification or prevarication, would help the Committee enormously with respect to that amendment.
Amendment 64 would ensure—as I read it, and the explanatory statement confirms this—that high-level ministerial authority is fundamentally important. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the excellent point that high-level ministerial authority must be maintained for the authorisation of the doing of such acts, rather than the weakening or even, as most of us believe, the exclusion of such authority, as Clause 28, as drafted, allows. Is that not the case? Why would the Government object to the maintenance of such ministerial authority, ensuring, in a democracy proud of its traditions, the importance of proper political accountability for decisions that are made? Again, this is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made. Just as important, if not even more so, is that such ministerial authorisations would be under the supervision of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO. This, under Clause 28, now seems not to be the case, whereas independent oversight and accountability seem to me, and I am sure to most of us in the Committee, to be an essential part of such a process.
We know the phrase in the clause as it stands,
“the proper exercise of any function”,
has also caused concern. What does it mean? Who decides whether it is proper or the breadth and potential scope of the phrase? If there is no independent oversight, as required by Amendment 64, who provides it and how? Something as sensitive and crucial as this cannot be left to a few individuals in a closed meeting in an office away from any public gaze or scrutiny. That is unacceptable in a democracy. As it stands, the clause is not acceptable and these amendments seek to improve it. As I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have said, we will have to come back to this on Report, either to push an amendment or to agree or disagree a government amendment.
Very serious concerns have been raised about Clause 28 that cannot and should not be ignored by the Government. The ISC has said that the clause needs amending because it is unacceptably broad. Will the Government listen to it, if no one else? Even with the additional briefings, as I have said, it does not believe that Clause 28 is the way forward, even if it accepts that there is a problem that needs fixing.
In justifying Clause 28 as it stands, can the Minister answer some of the following questions? There are currently safeguards, such as ministerial authorisation, the reasonableness test so eloquently outlined for us by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, under Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act and the fact that the DPP must be satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, properly reminds us time after time. I am grateful that he does so, because that point is lost; it is about not only whether a conviction can be secured but whether it is in the national or public interest for such a prosecution to be pursued. I have faith in the system. I believe that in most cases, if it is not in the public interest, it will not be pursued. That is an open decision that we can question to see whether we agree with it. Why have these safeguards been swept away with respect to such behaviour conducted abroad?
Can the Minister clarify what it means in Clause 28 for something to be necessary for the proper function of the UKIC or the Armed Forces, with no proportionality required? Why have the Government diminished the role and accountability of Ministers in the decision-making structure? As the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, asked, why does Clause 28 extend this immunity to the Armed Forces? If I have read it right, the Armed Forces have protection under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act. Have I got that wrong? Can the Minister clarify why Clause 28, as drafted, appears to extend these immunities to the Armed Forces? As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked, will he give an example of conduct that is the proper exercise of any function of the services but is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore now be allowed under this Bill? Why can it not be authorised under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 as it stands?
This is an incredibly serious debate, as we have heard from the many contributions from noble Lords. We also know that a huge cross-section of Members of Parliament in the other place expressed their concerns, many with great personal experience. Dan Jarvis MP, Kevan Jones MP, Maria Eagle MP and David Davis MP made excellent speeches asking why the change is necessary and, if it is, why we cannot have something that deals with the perceived problem and commands support, including from our parliamentary oversight committee, the ISC. The ISC was set up specifically to be allowed closed briefings, so that it could advise us on what was appropriate for these difficult matters. How on earth can the Government command the respect and support of this Chamber if the ISC, the committee we set up to have oversight on these matters, does not agree with Clause 28? Why do the Government set themselves against what the ISC is saying and then wonder why we have doubts?
The excellent House of Lords briefing highlights the many comments expressing doubts, particularly the belief that immunity from prosecution for serious crimes committed abroad would be made much more likely and possible under this clause. As Jeremy Wright MP asked, can the Minister explain the difference between acting reasonably under Section 50—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made this point—and acting in the proper exercise of a function, as this clause requires?
We are rightly proud of the work of our intelligence services and Armed Forces, but we also have a responsibility as a democracy to set a legislative framework that sets, and is seen to set, high standards. Openness, transparency and accountability are part of the price of our democracy. As drafted, Clause 28 undermines these principles and needs at the very least to be seriously amended.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to a fascinating and wide-ranging debate. If the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is not sure where it leaves him if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil, I am under absolutely no illusions where I am left.
I turn to Clause 28, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his advance notice of interest in this measure and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for our discussions to date on this Bill. I also very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who provided advance notice of their intention to table this amendment and have generously shared their time and expertise with me and the team on this measure, as the critical friends to the national security world that the Committee knows them to be.
I will speak to the purpose of the SCA amendment and the amendments tabled by noble Lords. Respectively, they seek to remove the SCA amendment in Clause 28 from the Bill and replace it with an amendment to Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, or ISA, and to add to Clause 28 to ensure that exemption from liability for individual Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the SCA would not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. However, before I come to that, it is right to express our thanks to those who work tirelessly to keep us safe, as the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Coaker, did, while recognising that we should carefully examine any changes to the law which might regulate or enable their activities.
I will briefly tell noble Lords why Clause 28 is in the Bill and why the amendment to the SCA is necessary. In essence, it is vital that we solve an unintended consequence of the SCA which currently exposes those acting for our intelligence and security agencies—MI6, MI5, GCHQ: the UK intelligence community, which I will henceforth call UKIC—and our Armed Forces to potential legal jeopardy and limits their operational agility. This can limit their ability to keep the UK safe, including through our international collaboration with trusted partners, which is vital in the modern world.
The SCA creates offences when an act is done which is capable of “encouraging or assisting” an offence and the person intends or believes their act may encourage or assist an offence. These offences are complex and were predominantly introduced to ensure the police could tackle those directing serious organised crime—for example, capturing those who knowingly directed violence or the importation of drugs but distanced themselves from criminal conduct. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence which may be encouraged or assisted; the contribution can be small and indirect and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed. I will come back to the noble Lords’ amendment, but say here that these are obviously not circumstances that always lend themselves well to pre-authorisation.
Clause 28 focuses on this very specific area of criminal law which is having an operational impact to the detriment of the UK’s security. It is not a general immunity and it would not change the application of all other criminal law offences. It does not make it legal to encourage or enable torture or rendition or solicit murder and does not limit the offence of misconduct in public office. In addition, Clause 28 does not remove civil liability or change either the UK’s international law obligations or UKIC’s or the Armed Forces’ rigid adherence to these obligations. I will come back to that in a moment.
At present, UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to carefully apply the provisions of the offences, sometimes at fast pace and in critical scenarios, as has been noted, and some of which may have life or death consequences—all while they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. We are talking, for example, about sharing intelligence to combat terrorist attack plots. Delays and limits on activity arise solely due to SCA risks when otherwise seniors are clear that there is no wrongdoing and that the activity represents a proper function of the organisation. The offences in the SCA are therefore creating a “chilling effect”, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to, across UKIC and the Armed Forces in the delivery of their mission, and impacting on their ability to keep our country safe.
Lord Beith (LD)
The Minister has repeated several times his reference to the Armed Forces, but, up to now, always in the context of support for intelligence organisations’ activities. It would be helpful if he could clarify—he is nodding; I think he is indicating that he might do so—whether the inclusion of the Armed Forces is intended to confer the immunity on their general range of activity or is intended to be confined to their support for the intelligence agencies.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord has pre-empted me by about a second. A number of noble Lords have asked why the Armed Forces are included, including the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Anderson, Lord Beith, Lord Carlile and Lord Coaker. The Ministry of Defence collaborates with a diverse array of allies and partners, with intelligence sharing often forming a key part of such efforts. The Armed Forces also work closely with the UK intelligence and security community, helping to protect the UK from myriad threats overseas. The protection provided for in Clause 28 seeks to ensure that where our Armed Forces collaborate and provide authorised operational support with international partners, as with UKIC, support can continue without exposing individual staff or officers to personal risk of criminal liability. I hope that answers the question to the noble Lord’s satisfaction.
Lord Beith (LD)
It would answer the question if the clause was so defined as to limit the extent of the immunity to acting in support of the intelligence agencies. However, as I read it, it does not do that.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will continue, but I will come back to that, if I may.
I want to return to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, seeing as we are talking about the application of this, and also to the point on torture. There will be no change to the UK’s other domestic and international legal obligations, including those under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act, which is Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. I hope that is unequivocal enough.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord. Before he moves on, could he give us two figures which I am sure he must know or could be given very quickly? First, in relation to the security services, how many cases have there been in the past 10 years of the kind we are discussing in which the Director of Public Prosecutions has had to make a decision as to whether a prosecution should take place? Secondly, how many events have been affected adversely over that period by the existing state of the law?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I look forward to that reply when it comes in writing. If I have this right, the Minister said that it makes no difference—there is no change—to the approach on unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. Is he saying that this clause does not provide immunity in offering assistance to others who would be committing unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As I said earlier, I think this is confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces—is that what the noble Lord is referring to?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful. No, it is not. The Minister said that there was no change to the approach on unlawful killing and torture. My reading of this clause is that there would now be immunity for offering assistance to others to carry out unlawful killing or torture.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.
Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.
UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.
However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.
Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.
There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.
In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.
The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.
I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Coming back to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, gives me the opportunity to return to an earlier comment from the Minister. Did he say in answer to the question from the noble Lord that he did not think we could assist others if they were conducting operations which involved torture, et cetera—that we could not support that activity? Was he going to clarify that and write to us, or clarify it later on the Floor of this Chamber?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Could the Minister give a little more information as to why there is no immunity?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord does not want there to be immunity.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
No. Why, under this clause, would there continue to be no immunity?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.
It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.
I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.
In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am very sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again. He said that this would not remove the oversight of the Secretary of State and I absolutely accept that. Of course the Secretary of State will have oversight, but does the noble Lord accept that authorisation by the Secretary of State, at least in some cases, will no longer be a requirement?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I see where the noble Lord is coming from and, yes, I accept that.
I return to the reasonableness defence in Section 50. While we consider that properly authorised activity to protect national security should be interpreted as being reasonable, the application of the reasonableness defence to UKIC’s activity is untested.
I come back to one of the earlier points from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am not aware of any prosecutions, but he will know that I cannot comment on operational matters.
I also come back to the questions about the CPS. The fact that the CPS would not be obliged to prosecute offers little comfort to those carrying out legitimate work on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, who may still be subject to criminal investigation for carrying out authorised activities in the interests of national security. The Government consider that we should be able to offer legal reassurance to individuals carrying out vital work to support those interests.
I finish by reiterating that I am committed to continuing to work with the experts in this House, particularly the noble Lords who have tabled the amendments we have debated, and those in the other place to reach consensus on Clause 28. I thank all noble Lords for their patience as we move towards that shared objective.
I have noted the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on timeliness but, at the moment, the Government cannot support these amendments and I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to press them.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Before the noble Lord sits down, could I see whether I have understood him correctly? Is he saying that an act of torture or sexual offences committed in support of another country’s services could not be a proper exercise of the functions of the Security Service—the SIS—or GCHQ? If he is, would it not be better to have that on the face of the Bill rather than simply as a statement from the Minister?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
That is what I am saying. I will come back to whether it should be on the face of the Bill in due course.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am very grateful for that last interaction between the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the Minister. I am also grateful for the Minister continuing to have a degree of open-mindedness. I do not know where I sit on the cascade of legal hierarchy, but I think it is lower order. I do not know if it is just me, but a frisson of nervousness went through my spine when the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked for a quick word outside. If I could avoid that, it would be better.
I am well aware of the distinction between SIS officers working under a CHIS authorisation and what is covered under the ISA. I am also well aware of MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity. The point I was trying to make is that there are clear distinctions and that we have procedures with regard to MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity, but there is no immunity for them to do so. The point I made in my opening remarks is that the processes that MI5 has are effectively the defence. The concern with the breadth of this immunity is that those processes will no longer be the case.
I am also well aware of our international obligations, but it is under domestic law that we would realise what those natures are. Because of the extraterritorial nature of the schedule in the SCA, I am still not convinced in the reading of it that our intelligence services and Armed Forces would be able to operate under domestic law in offering assistance to others carrying out criminal acts. Those criminal acts may well also be breaches of international law. I am grateful for what the Minister said, but I am also grateful for his willingness to engage further on that.
I hope the Minister took on board the consensus with regard to concerns about the Armed Forces. The point I made at the start of this debate is that, unique among the SIS and GCHQ included within this, the Armed Forces have powers of detention. Therefore, the processes under way under the MoD doctrine for risk assessments on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extraordinary rendition or rendition, and unacceptable standards of arrest and detention are all areas of considerable concern, if there is immunity for our Armed Forces when working with others.
Of course, the guidance that exists also includes the receiving of unsolicited information or providing or sharing information on collaboration. These risk assessment processes are in place—they are in published principles and guidelines—and the considerable concern is that they will be washed away by the extent of the immunity.
I am grateful to the Minister for being open. I still think that he has not sufficiently addressed all the areas of concern, not least that there would be a considerable diminution of independent oversight in the operation of this. I will withdraw my amendment at this stage. I accept the Minister’s word that he will engage fully before Report, and I hope he will be able to put in writing responses to all the issues that have been raised on this so that we can study it carefully before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
No; I cannot respond to that gallantly, can I? I will plough on.
Interestingly, my son recently completed a master’s in journalism at City, University of London. He told me that the public interest part of the journalism course was the least attended, partly because there are fewer jobs in it, which I thought was interesting and worth reflecting on. It is a very important part of any journalist’s work, but it is not where the majority of students choose to study. I thought that was an interesting observation.
The amendments in this group relate to defining a foreign power for the purposes of its activity in the UK. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, moved her Amendment 66A, which would ensure that journalists and civil society are not wrongly included. This debate could have spread over to the group we will discuss on Monday on the foreign influence registration scheme and how that affects businesses, universities and political parties. In a sense, we will revisit a lot of these issues. Nevertheless, noble Lords have made points that will bear repeating, because they can be repeated in that context.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, tabled similar amendments to create exclusions in certain instances. Amendments 67 and 69 would expand the definition to include corporations working on the behalf of foreign Governments. It is worth reflecting on the Government’s previous inconsistent approach to Huawei in 5G networks, and their lack of understanding of the risks. I believe that this underlines a need for a more coherent strategy. Serious questions remain following the 2020 announcement that Huawei would be removed from UK 5G networks, which we believe was long overdue, about why it was given the go-ahead in the first place. The Huawei case was sadly illustrative of how, in the past decade, the Government have allowed our national security to become an afterthought, creating risks to it. We on this side of the House believe that the Government need to invest in homegrown alternatives to end our national dependence on high-risk vendors.
My noble friend Lady Hayter made a number of very interesting points about political parties, which were picked up by other noble Lords in the debate. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s answer to the points she raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Black, referred to the letter in the Times today to which he was a co-signatory. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also spoke about the potential chilling effect of the Bill’s provisions as they are currently drafted. They both spoke about the importance of a public interest journalism.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a point that I think will be repeated on Monday but is well worth repeating. It is the problem of overreporting. That is a theme that has run through all the briefings which I have received and that I am sure all noble Lord have received. It a fear in the university sector, the business sector and political parties, and literally hundreds of NGOs are also concerned about this matter—but that is something that can be talked about on Monday, as I have just mentioned.
When the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, summed up, he put his finger on the main problem with this section of the Bill, which is defining the anomalies of political parties, whether they are in government or not, or are part of coalitions or are opposition parties, and the many sorts of relationships which all political parties have internationally and how that works with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Black, about the importance of public interest journalism, and how that is a very international approach, often dealing with leaked information and illegal information, and how journalists are to be protected in pursuing that valuable work. So this is a complex area. I am sure the Minister will, as usual, be very careful in his answer, but I hope he retains an open mind, as he did on the previous group when we were considering issues raised in this Committee.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I again thank all noble Lords who have participated in this debate. Amendment 66A seeks to exclude journalism and civil society activity from the foreign power condition unless the conduct is instigated by or is under the direction or control of a foreign power. I acknowledge the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to protect legitimate activity from being criminalised under the Bill with this amendment. However, the Government do not believe that the Bill criminalises legitimate activity and, as such, it is our view that this amendment is unnecessary.
The Committee will be aware that the foreign power condition provides a single and consistent means by which a link between a person’s activities and a foreign state can be drawn. Meeting the foreign power condition is not in itself wrong. It becomes relevant when the other elements of the offences to which it applies are met. As such, the Government do not believe there is a risk to those who engage in legitimate acts, such as journalism or forms of civil society activity.
Turning to the specifics of the amendment, we know that those with hostile intent seek to hide their activities under the appearance of legitimacy, and this amendment could therefore create a gap in our ability to prosecute such individuals. This amendment would mean that an activity carried out with the financial or other assistance of, in collaboration with, or with the agreement of a foreign power would not meet the requirements of the foreign power condition. As a consequence, where a state threat actor posing as a journalist has been engaged in harmful activity which is an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if we could show that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. This would produce an unwelcome effect whereby those seeking to cause harm to the UK could pose as journalists or members of civil society groups or operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted.
The Government understand that journalists and those conducting civil society activity can be acting wholly legitimately when receiving funding from a foreign power or working in collaboration with it. However, the other requirements for offences to be committed mean that those legitimate acts would not be captured. In answer to my noble friend Lord Black, I can be clear that this Bill targets wrongful activity from states, not whistleblowing —but we will be coming back to whistleblowing later in today’s session. I also hope that those comments reassure my noble friends Lord Black and Lady Stowell and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
I now turn to Amendments 67 to 71 on the meaning of foreign power, which were tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks of Henley on Thames and Lord Purvis of Tweed. The noble Lords have tabled an amendment to remove from the definition a political party which is the governing political party of foreign Government. The inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities are being carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. We know all too well that states seeking to exert their influence or cause harm to the United Kingdom will do so through a number of different vectors, and we do not wish to create a gap in our legislation which state actors could exploit.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
How then, if you seek to attack political parties that are effectively Governments, do you correspondingly exclude political parties that are not in any sense responsible for the activities of the Government, even though they may form a small part of such a Government? The point we made about coalitions is in point and illustrates one of the points we are concerned with, which is that, in a desire to encompass everything that ought to be encompassed, you pull into the net all kinds of fish that ought never to have been caught.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I of course understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but the point is that this relates to the activities of these political parties and those who are working for them. Therefore, I am not entirely convinced that it would be appropriate to exclude the smaller parties in, say, a coalition.
I was going to go on to explain why certain governing political parties in the Republic of Ireland have been carved out, in answer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. A political party that is both the governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland is excluded from the definition of a foreign power, as noted. This exclusion is included in recognition of the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics.
A further amendment has been tabled seeking to add corporate or other entities.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
Is the Minister moving off political parties? If so, he has not answered any of the questions that I posed, and I hope he is going to do so before he moves off political parties. The idea is that we are going to call in political parties—and only governing parties, although under Schedule 4 they are the ones that are excluded, not opposition ones—but other countries do not necessarily have a definition of political parties in the way that we do. In fact, until PPERA, in 1998 or whenever it was, I cannot remember, we did not have a definition of political parties or a register of them. So, in other countries that do not have them, how on earth are you going to know who is a political party?
Apart from that, there is the question I put about whether they are in opposition or in government, and what the answer is on America. If one is trying to get at agents acting on behalf of a Government, all you have to do—I used to be general-secretary of the Fabian Society—is call yourself a think tank rather than a political party, and then presumably you can do the activity. So, if this is a way of try to get at organisations that work on behalf of Governments, only calling them political parties, of which in many countries there are no definitions anyway, is, I have to say, somewhat the wrong approach. Will the Minister give me answers to the questions I posed in my contribution?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that. She will forgive me if I do not get involved in what is the correct, or legitimate, Government of the United States. I do not think that is for me to opine.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
It will be for the noble Lord or his successor to opine, because it is in the Bill. There is no secondary legislation attached to it about what the definition will be. This is Pepper v Hart. What is going to be taken is the Minister’s words at the Dispatch Box. If the Minister is saying that he cannot define which is the governing party in America, how do we know who we can meet and who we have to register?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
As regards the registering point, the noble Baroness is—as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, suggested—perhaps straying into the FIRS situation, which we will discuss at considerable length on Monday. I think that will deal with a number of the questions the noble Baroness has posed with regard to registration and so on. Can we come back to that on Monday, please?
As regards opining as to the Government of the United States, I choose not to do so purely because it would potentially be a political can of worms, but I acknowledge the fact that obviously there is a President who comes from a different party from the majority party in one of the two Houses.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
So there will be meetings that we can have now, and if—God forbid—Mr Trump wins, suddenly the parties with which we are allowed to talk will change because it is Mr Trump rather than Mr Biden. Is that really what the Minister is saying?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
No, I do not believe that is particularly what I am saying. I suspect we will have to come back to this for precise definition purposes, and I am happy to commit to do so.
A further amendment has been tabled, seeking to add corporate or other entities to the foreign power definition. We believe this is unnecessary as it is already covered in the foreign power condition provision, which covers indirect links, under Clause 29(3). This explicitly provides that a person’s conduct could meet the foreign power condition if there is
“an indirect relationship through one or more companies”.
The legislation therefore covers cases where a person is receiving tasking through a company that is under the ownership, control or direction of a foreign power. It is vital that states are not able to circumvent the measures in the Bill by working through proxies to deliver harmful effects.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked specifically about state-owned companies and Huawei in particular. We have not included state-owned companies in the definition of a foreign power as these companies often have their own non-state objectives. Instead, the legislation captures circumstances where a person acts directly or indirectly
“for or on behalf of a foreign power”.
That includes cases where a person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the activity they are conducting for a state-linked company is being carried out for or on behalf of the foreign power, or where they intend to benefit a foreign power. Offences may be committed by bodies corporate, including those established in other jurisdictions. In addition, the legislation provides that where an offence is committed by a company
“with the consent or connivance … or … due to any neglect”
of an officer of the company, that officer of the company may be guilty of the offence.
In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I have just mentioned that a number of the questions she raised and subjects she covered are more appropriately dealt with under the FIRS discussion we will have on Monday. That also applies to a number of the things raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. As noble Lords know, that part of the Bill—Clauses 65 and 66 —was introduced late into the House of Commons, to which the noble Lord referred. I am sorry if the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, thinks I was frivolous as to the potential for right-wing threats to our national security. Just for the record, I am completely agnostic about from which end of the political spectrum threats are made to our national security.
Finally, noble Lords have tabled an amendment to exclude members of NATO and other nations, via regulations, from the definition of a foreign power. It is important to note that the National Security Bill focuses on harmful conduct undertaken by a person, not the foreign power they seek to benefit. Actively excluding certain states could create an unwelcome gap in the legislation, particularly given that we know that states sometimes look to act through proxies. These amendments, therefore, could lead to us being unable to take necessary and appropriate action against harmful activities. Noble Lords will wish to note the case of Daniel Houghton, the dual British-Dutch national who attempted to sell sensitive information to the Dutch intelligence services in 2010. Were NATO states to be excluded from the definition of a foreign power, cases like Daniel Houghton’s would not be captured by the offences and measures in the Bill.
For those reasons, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I ask noble Lords not to press them.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I am afraid I do not accept the Minister’s idea that these things cannot be criminalised, so I will bring my amendment back on Report. I thank noble Lords for contributing to my amendment, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Black, with his expertise—which goes way beyond mine. I ask the Minister for a meeting to discuss this, because it is quite a fundamental point and bears further discussion. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.
Wednesday 11th January 2023
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-III Third marshalled list for Committee - (9 Jan 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, this is another JCHR-recommended amendment, ably spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Its effect is to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing giving support and assistance to a person involved in offences under the Bill. The reason for the amendment is that the support and assistance become illegal if unrelated to espionage activity. As the noble Lord explained, its effect does not alter the lines which include facilitating such offending under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of the relevant clause. His objection to paragraph (c) was that it does not make sense and is too vague. I take on board the legal points and his examination of the English in that paragraph, but the real point of this is to provoke a debate and discussion, to narrow the definition and encourage the Minister to explain more fully what is meant by the definitions set down in the Bill.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 72 seeks to narrow the definition of foreign power threat activity by removing the conduct of those who give support or assistance to individuals, as has been noted.
The definition of foreign power threat activity is a vital part of the Bill, ensuring that the police have the powers they need in support of investigations into state threats offences. It is important that foreign power threat activity has sufficient breadth to allow our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to act where a threat is posed to the safety of the United Kingdom.
There will inevitably be overlap between facilitating on the one hand and assisting or supporting individuals on the other to carry out certain harmful activity under the Bill. However, it is important to retain both elements as they serve distinct purposes. We do not wish to create a gap in the legislation that prevents us being able to act against persons who assist individuals involved in harmful activity, and therefore we cannot accept this amendment.
Both noble Lords implied that it is casting the net too broadly to say that it is not necessary to identify a specific offence or act. However, given the harm that can arise from state threats activity, it is right that the Government can act to disrupt individuals during the early stages of their conduct. Therefore, it will not always be possible to determine the end goal of their conduct. Indeed, in some cases an individual may not have even decided the precise outcome they seek to bring about but, none the less, they have an intention to engage in state threats activity. We therefore want to ensure that the provisions are robust enough to catch criminals in these cases. Waiting until we have a full picture of the act they wish to commit could mean that we have to wait until the act itself is committed.
Additionally, I reassure the House that the reference to
“conduct which gives support or assistance”
under Clause 31(1)(c) relates specifically to conduct falling under Clause 31(1)(a), as is made explicit through the reference to paragraph (a). The Government’s view is that it is implicit that the conduct in question must be support in relation to acts or threats under Clause 31(1)(a), rather than support in relation to any unrelated activity. Thus, the provision does not risk bringing activity wholly unrelated to state threats activity into scope.
Lord Beith (LD)
Can the Minister explain that? That is the only thing I can see that is covered by paragraph (c) which is not covered by paragraph (b)—the provision of support or assistance in matters which are nothing to do with the likelihood of the individual being involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a). The Minister has stated that paragraph (c) does not have the effect of proscribing conduct which has nothing to do with the provisions in paragraphs (a) and (b), but I do not know on what he bases that confidence.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I base that confidence on the explicit reference to Clause 31(1)(a) in Clause 31(1)(c). With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I will withdraw it, but only on the basis that the Minister will consider this a little more carefully. As I have said, at the moment the clause seems to me unsatisfactory, and paragraph (c) ought to go. That would not damage the overall meaning of the clause at all, and I hope that the Minister will reconsider that before Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that Clause 34(1) is subject to specific provisions in Clauses 3 and 15 about when conduct taking place outside the UK can constitute an offence under those Clauses.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I was not planning to speak on this fairly narrow amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made all the points relative to the amendment itself. However, it is worth just endorsing his closing comments about the view of the Opposition and Liberal Democrat Benches that the Government are paying too little attention to the recommendations of the JCHR. It appears to be a hurdle to overcome to get over those recommendations. This is a good example; many of the recommendations made are very minor. I just wanted to endorse the point the noble Lord made about the importance of this committee’s work.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their remarks. Turning first to the subsidiary point in respect of the importance of the reports of the JCHR, I can certainly assure all in the House that the JCHR reports are taken very seriously by the Government and all the recommendations are appropriately considered. I can say that, as a human rights lawyer myself, I fully appreciate the importance of the human rights considerations and the very valuable work done by the committee. I hope my remarks go some way to assuage the concerns that were outlined.
I turn now to the substantive amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. This clause replaces Section 8(4) of the Official Secrets Act 1920 and in so doing makes it more explicit that the exclusion of the public from proceedings must be necessary in the interests of national security. The Government consider that the approach taken in the drafting is appropriate given the highly sensitive nature of the material that may be required to be considered during court proceedings in relation to offences under the Bill. It is important to note that the decision to exclude the public from proceedings is taken by the court on application by the Executive, who are well placed to set out the risk to the courts. We consider that the judiciary is already well placed to assess the impact of any such decision on the administration of justice.
The words that this amendment seeks to add are, with respect, unnecessary. In England and Wales, for example, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 would apply in such proceedings which already have as their overriding objective that criminal cases are dealt with justly. Therefore, those rules require a court to have regard to the importance of dealing with criminal cases in public and the overriding interests of the administration of justice when determining whether to exclude the public from any part of proceedings. It is clearly right that this clause notes and provides the court with a clear basis upon which to exclude the public on grounds of national security, and that is all that this clause does. For those reasons, the Government cannot therefore accept the proposed amendment and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I shall look carefully at the Minister’s response. For the time being I will certainly seek leave to withdraw the amendment. There may be room for further discussion—there may not. I accept that the overriding objective applies to criminal cases and to dealing with cases justly, but as regards whether it is not sensible that that should take primacy by a special mention in the Bill I am unconvinced at the moment. However, I will read what the noble Lord had to say. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank noble Lords for a very interesting debate on a topic of considerable public importance. These amendments concern the introduction of a public interest defence to the offences in the Bill. Amendment 75 adds a PID to Clauses 1 to 5. I am very grateful to those who have contributed to this short debate, including the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Faulks, with whom I find myself in agreement, particularly on their concerns about the practical consequences of this amendment, as well as on the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on the application of Article 10 of the European convention. I therefore greatly welcome the display of expertise from all sides of the House.
It would be helpful for me to start by talking briefly about the genesis of these offences and the interaction with the Law Commission recommendation for a public interest defence. In this amendment, there is a significant risk of conflating the various Official Secrets Acts, so I will take a little time to clarify those Acts, because it is vital that we are precise in this context. Four Official Secrets Acts are in force: the 1911, 1920 and 1939 Acts, which deal with espionage, and the 1989 Act, which deals with unauthorised disclosures, often described as leaks.
The Law Commission, in its 2020 report, considered all four Official Secrets Acts. Starting with the 1989 Act, the Law Commission recommended the inclusion of a public interest defence, not in isolation but rather as part of a package of reforms to that Act. It is important to stress that the Bill does not seek to reform the 1989 Act, which remains in place as the relevant legislation to govern unauthorised disclosures of specified material; for example, in relation to security and intelligence, defence or international relations. For that reason, I can answer the very fair question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as to whether this was a relevant or irrelevant issue with the clear indication that it is not relevant to this amendment. When asked about the omission of the reform of the 1989 Act from the Bill, the Law Commission made clear, in its oral evidence to the Commons committee for the Bill, that it did not expect one single piece of legislation to address all aspects of its report.
I turn to the 1911 to 1939 Acts, which this Bill replaces. The Law Commission made a number of recommendations with respect to reform of those espionage laws, but crucially did not recommend the inclusion of a public interest offence. Again, during its oral evidence to the Committee for this Bill in the other place, the Law Commission was clear that, in its view, the requirements of the offences take them outside the realm of leaks and into the realm of espionage. It is worth also noting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, correctly observed to the Committee, that within the security services themselves there are elaborate whistleblowing mechanisms already in place for the declaration of unlawfulness, as she has already outlined.
Let me put it very clearly on record that the offences in Clauses 1 to 5 of this Bill are not intended to have a chilling effect on legitimate whistleblowing. As I have said, the Committee has this evening already heard first-hand of experience of the mechanisms in respect of whistleblowing in the security services. The provisions in this Bill are about espionage, and I am sure that the Committee would strongly agree that espionage against the United Kingdom can never be in the public interest, although I appreciate that that is not what noble Lords are implying by tabling this amendment.
I am pleased to confirm that the Government are, of course, willing to continue to discuss the proper protections for legitimate activity, as the Committee has expressed and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in particular, has requested. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked for further details on the Government’s efforts to keep whistleblowing guidance under continuing review, and I can confirm that that work is ongoing. No doubt it can be discussed further, in a similar way.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I am sorry to interrupt, but just on the point about the guidance, where the Minister has confirmed that the Government are undertaking work to update it, what is the process and the timeline for that?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am afraid that I am unaware of the precise timeline—I will find out. If the matter is not discussed in relation to the Kramer amendment, obviously I shall write to the noble Lord in respect of it.
I turn to the offences themselves, and the aspects that we consider move them away from capturing legitimate activity. For the Clause 1 offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information, the activity has to be for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It is right that we are able to prosecute disclosures of protected information when it is clear that a person intended to harm the UK and was working for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. Legitimate whistleblowing would not meet all the requirements of this offence.
The Clause 2 offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets is designed to tackle the illicit disclosure and acquisition of sensitive commercial information amounting to a trade secret for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a foreign power. For the offence to be committed, the activity has to be unauthorised, and the person has to know, or ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is unauthorised. Someone who disclosed information in the course of using lawful and appropriate whistleblowing routes would not be conducting unauthorised activity.
The Clause 3 offence criminalises assisting foreign intelligence services. The offence can be committed in one of two ways: either by conduct of any kind that a person intends will materially assist a foreign intelligence service, or by conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service and where the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that that is the case. The material assistance must be material assistance in carrying out UK-related activities. The expression “UK-related activities” means activities taking place either inside the United Kingdom, or those taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Legitimate whistleblowing activity should not meet the threshold for an offence under Clause 3, such as intending to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out covert operations in the United Kingdom.
I move on to the offences in Clauses 4 and 5, which criminalise harmful activity in and around prohibited places. It is right that we are able to prosecute relevant activity around the United Kingdom’s most sensitive sites where it is clear that such activity has been carried out to harm the United Kingdom. Activity carried out to harm the United Kingdom in this way cannot be in the public interest.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The Minister knows that, on previous days in Committee, we have discussed the issue of how the interests of the United Kingdom are defined and how broad that is. Whom does he believe should be the final arbiter in defining what is in the interests of the country and in the public interest?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The noble Lord’s question as I understand it is whether the decision about public interest is one for the police or for the prosecutor because, in reality, that is where the decisions would lie. Ultimately, if both those bodies were satisfied and a prosecution were brought, the issue would be one for the court.
It is our position that a public interest defence is neither necessary nor appropriate. However, it is important to point out that, even if the Government were to accept the case that the offences risked criminalising such legitimate activity, a public interest defence would not be an appropriate way to address this issue. As crafted, the proposed defence puts the onus on the Government to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that the defence did not apply. This defence would therefore act as an open invitation to those who seek to conduct espionage against the United Kingdom, and disproving this defence would likely require the disclosure of further sensitive material and only serve to compound the original harm.
The consequence of this is that those who intend to harm the United Kingdom will be able to exploit this defence to continue conducting harmful activities in the knowledge of the prosecution difficulties that would be faced by the authorities. This would limit the effectiveness of the legislation in enhancing our ability to deter and disrupt harmful activity.
Amendment 120B, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would require the Minister to publish an assessment of the potential merits of introducing a public interest defence. As I have just laid out, the Government have extensively considered the merits, or otherwise, of such a defence, and this renders a review after the Bill’s passage unnecessary, for the reasons I have already set out. Thus, for all these reasons, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I am conscious that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, mentioned, we will come on to the whistleblowing aspect, but the Minister was at pains to quote liberally from the Law Commission’s evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons on this. I of course have read the evidence, as others will have done. I was interested when it came to the disclosure of information element, because Professor Penney Lewis told the Public Bill Committee:
“Indeed, we recommended a mechanism for authorised disclosures to an independent statutory commissioner, which would have appropriate investigatory powers to look into, for example, disclosures that might be embarrassing to the Government.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]
Why are we not legislating for that in the Bill? The Minister seemed to have accepted everything that the Law Commission had said, but not this.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
It is clear, in the view of the Government, that those issues relate to the provisions found in the 1989 Act, which are not addressed in the Bill. While I note that evidence, it is not relevant to this amendment. As I have already said, I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I will be asking for leave to withdraw this amendment, not on the basis that it will go away but on the basis that, first, there is room for further discussion, even though only a chink has opened up in what the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has had to say; and, secondly, on the basis that I accept that the amendment is not perfectly drafted and we would like to take further advice and further consider a number of matters in the drafting of the Bill. What I will say, very briefly if I can, about the amendment and the response of the Minister and the other speeches we have heard, is that this question has to be taken in the context of the introduction of the Bill.
There can be no doubt that the Bill will manifestly broaden the ambit of national security and protection legislation: first, because it is targeted not at individuals who have an obligation to the state but generally at citizens; and, secondly, in the way that the Bill is drafted. We talked about this a great deal last week, when we noted the inclusion of expressions such as, “know or reasonably ought to have known”, “conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service” and all those peripheral expressions. Indeed, we note the use of the phrase “prejudicial to the interests of the United Kingdom” when we know “the interests of the United Kingdom” are determined by what the Government of the day believe those interests to be. All those broaden the ambit of these criminal offences.
I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that this issue is not going to go away. All the briefings we have had from journalists and organisations tell us how important a public interest defence is. I completely take on board the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and by the Minister, that Article 10 on freedom of expression is a qualified right. Of course, people of legal distinction can disagree, but it is entirely wrong to suggest that the Law Commission does not contain people of legal distinction.
If it were translated into a consideration of this Bill, because there is no material distinction on the disclosure points, I feel confident that the Law Commission would come out with the same recommendation as it did in 2020. We also have the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to a public interest defence. It is very difficult to argue that the fact that it is a qualified right under Article 10 does not mean that it would apply. Of course, we, the Law Commission and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have read the whole of Article 10 and understand the qualification, but the overwhelming point is the phrase
“necessary in a democratic society”.
Everything else is subject to that in the qualification.
Monday 16th January 2023
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (16 Jan 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
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Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 76, 77, 78 and 79, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, enable us to discuss the state threats prevention and investigation measures. As she outlined, Amendment 76 seeks to set a 14-hour limit on the time that someone subject to such a measure has to remain in their residence. Amendment 77 would require the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that prosecution is not realistic, rather than requiring only consultation before a measure is imposed, as outlined in Clause 44(1). These are simple but important amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, outlined, and the Government need to respond to them logically, particularly as they are recommended by the JCHR. In Committee last time, we all referred to the importance of the JCHR recommendations that come before us. It is particularly important that questions such as these are asked because, although we accept that STPIMs are a useful tool to have available, they impose intrusive restrictions on an individual, outside the criminal justice process, as civil measures.
In view of Amendment 76, if there is no time limit, what is acceptable? Are 20 or 21 hours acceptable? As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out, these are essentially curfews on an individual. Although they may be justified—no one is questioning the fact that sometimes they may be necessary—some thought from the Government about what we actually mean by the imposition of time limits or curfews on an individual, and how that might be arrived at, is important. Secondly, should we not always seek to prosecute, as Amendment 77 seeks to do? The police confirming that it is not possible is a real protection, while not compromising national security; again, that is the aim of all of us.
On the more general question of STPIMS, legal aid will be available to individuals but, if they are to challenge effectively, will individuals subject to such an order be fully aware of the reasons why it has been imposed and able to challenge the imposition of such measures? Who will oversee the use of these powers? Can the Minister reassure us that, in making such a decision on application by the Secretary of State, the courts will be given all the information that they need to properly inform their decision, and that they will not be used arbitrarily, out of frustration that a criminal prosecution cannot be pursued? That was a really important point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford: this is not a substitute for prosecution but something to be used where, for whatever reason, it is simply not available. But we need some reassurance that criminal prosecution will always be pursued as the first option.
We accept that there is a potential need for such measures, but, given their civil nature and the very real impacts on the liberties of individuals, even if necessary for national security reasons, they demand of us the need to be ever more vigilant when it comes to freedoms and human rights within a democracy. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, I will first address Amendments 77, 78 and 79. These amendments would create a requirement on the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that there is no realistic chance of prosecuting an individual before imposing a state threats prevention and investigation measure—an STPIM—on an individual under Part 2. It is our view that the current drafting would already achieve that aim. STPIMs are a tool of last resort in cases where prosecution is not possible. It is always the Government’s preference and priority to seek a prosecution against those engaged in foreign power threat activity, and where we can prosecute, we will.
Clause 44 reflects our commitment to prosecution and requires prior consultation with the police, before the imposition of a STPIM notice, in relation to
“whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for an offence”
relating to state threats. The police must consult the relevant prosecuting authority before responding to the Secretary of State. The requirement to consult mirrors that in terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred. Our experience of the TPIM regime is that, wherever it is apparent in the consultation that there is evidence available that means that a prosecution is feasible, such a prosecution is pursued over the imposition of a TPIM. We expect the same principle to apply in the STPIM context. I hope that that addresses some of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.
Furthermore, as set out in Clause 44(5), while an STPIM is in force, the police must ensure that the investigation of the relevant individual’s conduct is kept under review, consulting the prosecuting authority with a view to pursuing a prosecution if possible. Consultation is all about exploring whether there is available evidence that could realistically be used to prosecute an individual. However, the proposed amendments require the police to confirm that there is no available evidence. Changing the threshold in that way would mean that, in the event that there is limited evidence, but not enough feasibly to prosecute, we would limit our ability to use the STPIM as an alternative measure to protect the UK against individuals involved in state threats activity.
Although I understand the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the consultation is meaningful. In each case where an STPIM is in force, the prospect of prosecuting that individual will be kept under review by the police, consulting the prosecuting authorities as necessary. The outcome of that review will be reported by the police to the Home Secretary, in accordance with their statutory duty. In some sense, that answers the point about oversight raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Where a prosecution is possible, that will be the action undertaken, rather than the imposition of an STPIM. As I have said already, if we can prosecute, we will.
I turn now to Amendment 76, which seeks to place a maximum limit of 14 hours on the number of hours an individual can be required by the Secretary of State to remain in their residence under the residence measure. It is important to note that, in each STPIM case, the facts will be different, and the specific measures will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Flexibility is therefore key to ensure that the most appropriate suite of measures can be imposed. Protection against interference with the rights of individuals under Article 5 of the European convention, as was referred to by the noble Baroness, is already provided for under the residence measure. Condition D, which must be met to impose an STPIM, outlines that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that the individual measures applied are necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity. That covers not just the imposition of the measure but the exact terms of the measure. In the case of the residence measure, that would include the number of hours an individual must reside in their residence. I hope I have therefore addressed the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in relation to the time requirement.
In addition, the court must agree at both the permission hearing and the review hearing to the number of hours, set by the Secretary of State, that the individual must remain in their residence—thus providing a good measure of accountability for the number of hours provided for in the order. The number of hours a person must stay at home will therefore be determined by the facts of the individual case. It is also worth noting that the individual subject to a notice has the right to apply for a variation of measures imposed both in the short term—for example, if there is a reason why they need to be out at different times on a particular day—and generally in the long term.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked who would oversee the imposition of the measures in this regime. Under Clause 54, there will be an independent reviewer of STPIMs, in the same way that there is a reviewer for TPIMs under the other terrorism legislation.
On whether the individual will know what they are accused of doing, they will have access to special advocates who will be able to access the sensitive information in a manner similar to that for TPIMs. The special advocates will have access to the sensitive information that builds the case against the individual and justifies the measure. There will also be a duty on the Government to share the information, as far as reasonably possible, with the individual themselves. With all these points in mind, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 76.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
Can the Minister help the Committee by giving us an estimate of the scale of the problem? Do the Government expect a number of STPIMs which is roughly the same as the number of TPIMs in existence at present or do they expect more than or fewer than a handful? An assessment must have been made of these numbers.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am afraid I do not have that information to hand. My conjecture would be that it is fewer, but I will confirm the position and write to the noble Lord.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for calling these amendments simple but important. I am grateful for his support.
On Amendment 77, I note the Minister’s assurance that he believes that the current drafting would achieve the aim of pursuing the possibility of prosecution, but obviously that incorporates not only a static but a dynamic possibility. I think the fear of the JCHR is that the wording, certainly in Clause 44(5), does not really imply any ongoing investigative mission, as it were. Saying “If we can prosecute, we will” has to mean that a certain re-evaluation takes place. But that is not all that Clause 44(5) says. It says that the chief officer of police must
“secure that the investigation of the individual’s conduct … is kept under review”.
It does not actually require any investigation, or any periodic investigation, so I am not really persuaded, despite the Minister’s reassurances, that that sense of a dynamic possibility of keeping the potential for prosecution under if not a permanent but certainly a periodic review is incorporated into the drafting of the Bill. We may come back to this at a later stage, but I am not entirely persuaded by the Minister.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I do not have anything more to add other than to say that we support Amendments 80 and 81. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, summed it up in his closing comments: the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall, has been consulted on this amendment and agrees that it would be a suitable way forward. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 80 and 81 propose having an independent reviewer to cover more than Part 2 of the Bill. The Government have committed to consider this idea in the other place, and the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was compelling on this point.
The Government have been considering whether extending the oversight of the independent reviewer could be done in a way that does not duplicate or unhelpfully interfere with the responsibilities and functions of the existing oversight mechanisms governing both the UK intelligence agencies and the police. For example, we must consider how extending oversight of the Bill would interact with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s role in overseeing the powers referred to in Clause 27. Should we decide to extend oversight of the Bill beyond Part 2, it is important that we do not create any confusion or uncertainty as to the appropriate reviewer.
It is proposed that Part 4 of the Bill should be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Of course, Part 4 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, these matters are already in the IRTL’s remit to review. An explicit commitment to oversight of Part 4 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s existing discretion to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.
As a point of clarification on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the Government are not extending the purview of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to cover Part 2 of the Bill—rather, they are creating a new independent reviewer role entirely.
With these points in mind, while the Government cannot accept these amendments, we are committed to making a decision on extending oversight of the Bill at the next stage of its passage.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
With a glance at the impact assessment on this part of the Bill, the Government’s estimate is that there will be between four and 12 cases a year for the independent reviewer. Just for the sake of efficiency alone, it would make sense to extend a structure which is already in existence and operating well, rather than creating a new system which would have potentially a miniscule role—especially since the impact assessment says that it would be down to the discretion of the reviewer
“how much time they spend reviewing the STPIMs”.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Obviously, the noble Lord makes a valid point, and I am sure it will feed into the department’s consideration about extending the oversight.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister, but it may assist the Committee to know what will happen next. It is welcome that the department will be thinking about this, but it would be good to have a bit of a steer as to what the Government intend to do before Report.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
We invite the proposers of the amendments not to press them; further information will follow.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Well—my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed asked the obvious question of what happens next, and we got a rather obscure answer. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will be able to tease out a little more about what the next steps might be.
I thought the Minister started on a rather encouraging note. I thought he was going to say, “Yes, Amendment 81 is jolly good, and we accept it”. I would imagine that it has been the subject of discussions and exchanges and so on, but the promise that came from the beginning of the Minister’s remarks was not really realised, or not realised at all.
In breathless anticipation of what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is going to say—I hope that I am not taking his name in vain, as it were—I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 80. I hope, however, that this is not the end of the discussion on Amendment 81.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign activity arrangements”.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, this group responds to the amendments tabled in relation to the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme and separate amendments tabled regarding guidance on the scheme, impacts of the enhanced tier on the higher education sector and the exemption for legal activities. In addition, it introduces a number of minor government amendments to the scheme, which I will cover shortly.
Before I address the amendments and clauses specifically, let me say that we are not yet able to publish a policy statement relating to the power taken in Clause 77(1), which we committed to do in the Bill’s delegated powers memorandum. The Government are in the process of carefully considering feedback from industry and the important scrutiny in this House. As such, we believe that publishing a policy statement now would only muddy the waters when the Government’s focus is rightly on listening to Peers’ concerns.
It is the first duty of government to protect its people, the country they live in and the integrity of their democratic institutions. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme will play an important role in delivering on this agenda. Dialogue between policymakers and the rest of society is an essential feature of our democratic system. It provides parliamentarians and Ministers with important information and expert analysis, helping us to become more informed. It allows decision-makers and the public to be exposed to diverse opinions and voices, including from the international business sector. It can be a positive contribution to healthy and robust public debate, and will continue to be welcome in the UK.
However, when communications or disbursements are not transparent, it can lead to corruption or give certain groups an unfair advantage. It can be seen as a way for powerful interests to exert excessive influence on political and governmental processes, potentially at the expense of the British public. It is particularly important to be able to identify foreign influence. The UK Government and the British people are entitled to know when foreign interests seek to influence public policy and public opinion. We should be able to identify foreign influence and evaluate those contributions properly, including the aggregate impact over time. Some foreign lobbying presents risks to national security. Members of the Committee will have heard Ken McCallum, in his annual threat speech in November, discussing the challenge from state threats. He said:
“The West is in a contest in which our security, values and democratic institutions are at stake.”
The Intelligence and Security Committee discussed political influence and state threats in its 2020 Russia report, calling for a scheme like the one delivered through the political influence tier of FIRS, which we are debating here today. The political influence tier of FIRS will play a role in strengthening openness and transparency in those processes, with the additional aim of deterring foreign powers that wish to pursue their aims covertly through agents and proxies. Noble Lords will be aware that some foreign states increasingly seek to influence how we think, vote and feel. Such states view themselves as being in a long-term contest with the West and take a much broader view of what they are interested in than simply national security matters. Covert political influence from state actors can damage our democratic processes, institutions and wider societal cohesion.
The foreign influence registration scheme will require those acting covertly with malign intent to make a conscious choice between registering their activity and publicly declaring their provenance, or not registering and risking prosecution. This raises the cost of conducting such activity and will be a significant deterrent to those who seek to harm our democracy.
Before we move on to the main debate, I will very briefly explain the government amendments in this group. Amendments 82, 89, 99, 100, 101 and 102 make minor technical changes to ensure consistency in the use of “arrangement” and “agreement” across the foreign influence registration scheme provisions. These amendments will assist with the clarity and understanding of the scheme.
Government Amendment 92 amends the existing provisions regarding public communications in the political influence tier of FIRS. This amendment provides that where a public communication is reasonably clear that it is being made by a foreign principal on its own behalf, it will not need to be registered. The Bill already provides an existing exclusion from registration requirements where it is reasonably clear that the public communication is made at the direction of a foreign principal. This is in keeping with our commitment to ensure that the scheme is proportionate and does not impose any unnecessary burdens.
During the last day in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, raised a number of questions regarding the foreign power condition, which we dealt with at some length last week, and the foreign influence registration scheme. I thank her for her letter and will deal with the core of her questions now, to ensure that this is on the record. On the question of whether a member of this House will need to register when entering arrangements, the responsibility to register under the political influence tier of FIRS will lie with the foreign principal carrying out the activity in the United Kingdom, or with the person in an arrangement with the foreign principal to carry out activities in the United Kingdom. There will be no requirement on the person whom the foreign principal is seeking to influence to register activities. As such, Members of this House would be required to register only if they entered into arrangements with foreign principals to carry out political influence activities in the United Kingdom. This applies equally for arrangements with any foreign entity, including political parties in government or in opposition.
There was also a question in relation to the foreign power condition of why “a governing political party” has been included in the meaning of “a foreign power”. It addresses situations where there is a dominant political party or parties within a country to such an extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government. The noble Baroness posed the question of what constitutes a governing political party. It is right that this will vary in different countries. Clearly we cannot legislate for every different administrative structure. Rather, in criminal proceedings where this was an issue, the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a political party was the governing political party based on the facts of the case. Therefore, any political party with no members holding posts in the Government would not be in scope. The definition in Clause 30(2) means that a political party is a governing party only if individuals within that party hold posts in the Government or part of the Government. For example, the Democratic Party runs the US Administration and sets the direction of government policy. It is therefore the governing political party in the US.
To omit Clause 30(1)(e) as the noble Baroness suggested and to rely entirely on the other aspects of the definition of “a foreign power” risks creating a loophole whereby sophisticated state actors could claim to act on behalf of the ruling party but not the Government. To be clear, foreign powers, including governing political parties of a foreign Government or their members acting in their capacity as a member, do not have to register their own activities. However, those in arrangements with foreign entities—including governing political parties—to carry out political influence activities in the UK will need to register those arrangements.
I will be listening very carefully to the remarks made on this group and will respond to the amendments directly in my closing comments. I look forward to this important debate.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, in his opening statement, the noble Lord said that the Government plan to publish a policy statement and that the reason they were not doing so now, in anticipation of Committee, was that they did not want to muddy the waters. Can I ask the noble Lord whether he plans to publish that policy statement and make it available before Report?
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, I apologise for not having participated in this debate earlier but, like other speakers, I have been provoked by listening to the contributions. The speeches tonight appear to be about either excluding certain categories or, in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, trying to include a category in the scope of the Bill. The fact is that, if you start to specify organisations or types of organisations, you will include every organisation in the country, whether a business or arts organisation, a charity, a political party or any other group of people, because any organisation can host people who seek to bring influence of one form or another. It is the behaviour, not the organisation, that is the problem here. To suppose that registering organisations will defeat covert practitioners from seeking to exert influence is naive to the point of being dangerous. As many have suggested, the solution is to go away, redraft and come back with a shorter Bill that does not try to include every organisation, not only in this country but in every other country—any one of them could host a malign influence.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their important amendments in this group and for the extensive and interesting debate. I would be very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others from other political parties, as she wishes. As soon as the reply to her letter is written, I will circulate it.
I assure the Committee that I have heard the strength of feeling on this issue and the calls to remove the political influence tier completely. I will be taking this back to the department to agree the next steps required to address these concerns ahead of Report, while balancing the need for a mechanism that protects us all from malign foreign influence in the UK. At the risk of upsetting the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, further information will follow.
I should say this: there should be no doubt that those who comply with the registration requirements under FIRS, by being clear and open about whom they represent, are supporting the resilience of the UK and its institutions in the face of state threats. There is no suspicion around those who register with the scheme; they are doing the right thing. However, as I said earlier, this has been an extremely valuable debate and I am grateful for all the thought and expertise that went into these contributions. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that we are not singling out the Dutch; we are merely citing an example. This is about foreign influence.
I start by addressing the amendments tabled on the political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I have listened carefully, and several interesting points have been made. I have heard the concerns raised about the unintended consequences of the political tier, and the Government will consider these points carefully ahead of Report.
Today, we have heard calls to remove this part of the Bill and focus instead on amending existing lobbying laws. These laws have been designed to be suitable for the supervision of domestic lobbying where British citizens and residents have a right to participate in the political process, but they are inadequate for foreign influence, where the impact of undue influence presents a greater risk to our democracy, and therefore greater regulation is required.
This is reflected internationally, and it is not unusual for countries to have distinct lobbying and foreign influence provisions. For example, the US has a Lobbying Disclosure Act as well as foreign agent registration requirements. Similarly, the Australians have a lobbying register that is separate from their foreign influence transparency scheme. I hope that that goes some way to answering the queries on this from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis.
The United Kingdom is well behind these countries in understanding the impact of foreign influence, and both tiers of the scheme are required to rectify this. FIRS will allow the Government and the public to understand better the scale, nature and extent of foreign influence on our democratic institutions.
I refer noble Lords to the multiple calls in the other place at the point of the Bill’s introduction for a scheme to require transparency around political influence activities. Members of the other place have signalled their agreement that political transparency is essential. We also heard from the director of regulation at the Electoral Commission, who said in oral evidence:
“Any registration scheme that brings more transparency around who is seeking to influence those involved in our democracy can only be to the benefit of the confidence of voters.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 44.]
I know that noble Lords will agree that the British people need to be able to trust the institutions that serve them. It can only be right that the UK public and our democratic institutions are protected from covert foreign influence and better informed as to the scale and extent of foreign influence in our political affairs. I emphasise to noble Lords that the public, and Parliament, should know when these foreign political influence activities are taking place. Transparency is a source of strength. That is why we have included provisions in the scheme to make certain information public.
Those who register under the scheme will be playing an important role in supporting our efforts to strengthen the resilience of our democratic system and political institutions. While we are keen to work with business and other sectors to ensure a workable and easy-to-use scheme, the regulation of foreign communications or disbursements should not of itself be controversial for the reputable end of industry.
I reassure the Committee that the registration requirements will not be burdensome. Registering will require filling in a short online form. The scheme will not prohibit any activities carried out by foreign entities or on their behalf where these have been registered in line with the scheme’s requirements. We intend to consult widely and convene expert panels to produce targeted and practical guidance. That will be published ahead of the scheme going live to ensure that the public and business are clear on the requirements.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked about NGO workers abroad. The scheme will require the registration of political influence activities where they are to be carried out within the UK at the direction of any foreign power or foreign entity, or where they are to be carried out by a foreign entity itself. Where the activities do not take place within the UK, they will not be caught by the scheme. I think this also answers the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the Ukrainian situation.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He may be missing a point but will correct me if I am wrong. The collection of funds for that scheme, along with a lot of the organising activity, is done within the United Kingdom. As the Bill stands, that surely means there has to be registration.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Well, as I have just said, I do not believe that it does. If I may, I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord.
I will now turn to the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I commend her for the spirit in which they were made. The first of these, Amendment 89A, looks to constrain our definition of “foreign principal” in the political influence tier of the scheme. She is quite right to point out that the current definition includes all foreign powers and foreign entities, but I will explain why the scheme has this breadth and the ways we have constrained the scheme to compensate for it.
The amendment seeks to include only those foreign entities that are controlled by a foreign power, rather than all foreign entities, in our definition of “foreign principal”. In the development of the scheme, we considered this as an option. However, we have worked closely with our Australian partners and reviewed their submission to the parliamentary review of the foreign influence transparency scheme.
The Australians originally took a very broad definition of “foreign principal” to their Parliament. This was, through its passage, constrained to something akin to my noble friend’s amendment. However, this has caused the Australians significant challenges regarding compliance and enforcement. For FIRS to function as it should, it shall need to be crystal clear to people whether or not they are working for a foreign principal. With certain foreign entities, it can be very difficult to determine ownership and governance structures, and nearly impossible for a small business or individuals to know whether they are working for an entity owned or controlled by a foreign power. In their submission to their parliamentary review, the Australians have recommended that the “foreign principal” definition is broadened, in keeping with our proposals. To provide balance with the broad definition of “foreign principal”, we have drafted a narrower definition of “political influence activity” compared with the US and Australian precedents.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I am very grateful to the Minister. He has just mentioned for the second time the compliance burden. Earlier on, he said very reassuringly that all that would be required to register was the completion of a form. But does the Minister understand that one reason why so many people are so anxious about these provisions is that it is not simply a question of filling in a form? In addition, once you have done that, there is the ongoing and, apparently, permanent obligation to comply with any information notices, which can be given at any time, requiring information of any sort to be provided to the Government. This is against the background of an absence of statutory guarantees regarding confidential information, except for lawyers and journalists, and not even—I think I am right in saying—any indication in the Bill as to whether this register will be public. The Minister has spoken a great deal about transparency.
How is that consistent with a United Kingdom that welcomes foreign engagement? Can the Minister understand how reluctant responsible directors and trustees will be to advise engagement with United Kingdom Government authorities against the background of those potentially very onerous provisions, which are liable to cause administrative problems and render it impossible for them to keep private what is always intended to be private?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I reassure the noble Lord that the Minister absolutely understands exactly where he is coming from. I will come on to the confidentiality aspects of the question he just asked in a second.
The process will require information about those party to an arrangement, as well as a description of the arrangements and activities to be undertaken. We would not expect a detailed account of every activity to be undertaken either as part of an arrangement or by a foreign principal, but the full process will be set out in regulations, which will be laid before Parliament.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Are those regulations to be laid before Parliament before the completion of the Bill, or will we have to wait until after it becomes an Act?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will come back to the noble Lord on that shortly.
I will go on to the commercial sensitivity aspects—in effect commercial confidentiality, mentioned just now by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We believe that ensuring that information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the political system, but Clause 77(2) allows the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. We intend this to include where publishing the information would, for example, threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk, or result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. The registration system will allow a person to flag where they think they meet such an exemption, which will not be considered by the scheme management unit.
In accordance with our data protection obligations, we intend for the information to be published to be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme, particularly where that information is personal. I have heard all the concerns and, as I said, the Government will give further consideration to these points ahead of Report.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
That commitment is welcome. The Minister referred to the lack of a regulatory burden; I am following the point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. However, the Government’s impact assessment says, in effect, that everybody needs to be familiarised with it because they will not know whether they are in scope. It says at paragraph 37, which I quoted earlier:
“Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS”.
When it comes to domestic charities and NGOs, the impact assessment’s higher estimate of how many people will have to familiarise themselves with FIRS is 105,000 people. It will be an enormous regulatory burden on the domestic charity sector as to whether it knows to comply with it. Simply stating that it is a small online form is insufficient. On that point, I wonder why the Government have no estimate at all of how many small and medium-sized businesses will be captured by this.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord has pre-empted the remainder of my speech to some extent, which I am afraid goes on for rather a long time; I apologise in advance for that. I will come on to the charities aspect in a moment. On the regulatory burden, I think I have been reasonably clear as to the simplicity we intend when it comes to complying.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would extend my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendment to charitable activities, as was just described again by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his scrutiny of the scheme. In essence, the question is: why is there not a charity exemption in the scheme and will this not make it harder for charities to carry out legitimate activity here in the United Kingdom? We believe that the ability of charities to campaign on issues relevant to their charitable mission is very important and crucial to our democracy. The scheme will not prevent this. It will ensure that the public are informed about the role played by overseas entities in this work, however.
We have also taken steps to minimise the potential burden on charities conducting legitimate activity as a result of FIRS. For example, making a public communication, campaign information or requests for support by a charity will be registerable only if it is not reasonably clear from the communication that it is made at the direction of a foreign power or entity. If such a communication is published for or on behalf of a foreign charity in its own name, it would not need to be registered. If it is published by a UK charity or PR firm at the direction of a foreign charity, it would not need to be registered if it is reasonably clear from the communication that it has been made at the direction of the foreign charity. I hope that is reasonably clear and has given some reassurance to the charitable sector.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
For the avoidance of doubt, have scientific societies in this country that are charities been consulted by the Government in respect of the legislation in any shape or form?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I assure the noble Viscount that I shall come to the substance of his comments and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, shortly.
I turn to the probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that provides for a public health emergencies exemption to the political influence tier. I agree that where an event such as a coronavirus pandemic arises, it is imperative that the sharing of key information does not face unnecessary regulatory red tape.
The scheme does not intend to impede the sharing of information relating to public health emergencies. Governments speaking to other Governments, and experts speaking with other experts, will not be caught by the scheme. Only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply and no registration will be required. We would be happy to consider further the point that the noble Lord raised. As an aside to one of his other points, I say that the enhanced tier will be used only for those countries or entities responsible for the greatest state threats. I do not know how many that will be.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Does the Minister accept that issues of public health can often be highly political? One of my colleagues at the London School of Economics who was looking after a number of exchange students in what was then the Soviet Union was expelled from the Soviet Union for having collected some dust in a part of Ukraine where it was rumoured that there had been a nuclear accident. We all know that the provision of public information about Covid-19 in China has become highly political and highly sensitive. We cannot quite put things into neat categories in the way he suggests.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I do not think that I am putting it into a particularly neat category; I think I am leaving a large amount of room for this to be taken on a case-by-case basis. I repeat: only where communication is carried out to influence a political matter will it be registerable. Where it is done to influence a political matter but the information is shared as part of an arrangement with the UK Government, the UK arrangements exemption will apply. I think that covers it completely.
I turn to Amendment 88 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Wallace, and Amendment 97 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, as they both raise the important issue of guidance for higher education and other sectors. We recognise that clear, targeted guidance will be essential in support of the public’s understanding of the scheme’s requirements. I hope that the Committee will be reassured by what I said of our plans to convene expert panels to help develop the guidance. That will ensure that the requirements are clear for universities and higher education institutes. Throughout the development of this scheme, we have listened to the views of organisations from the university sector. We will continue to do so as we design bespoke guidance.
Therefore, I do not think that the proposed amendments are necessary. Although it is essential that the guidance is published ahead of the scheme going live, putting time limits on publication following the Bill’s passage may hamper the engagement we wish to carry out in producing the most helpful and targeted guidance.
Amendment 104, which is another amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seeks to ensure that the higher education sector is not unnecessarily burdened by the enhanced tier of FIRS. I assure him that this has been considered in relation to FIRS. There is a clear difference between it and the National Security and Investment Act, the academic technology approval scheme, and the export control regime. The Government are clear that FIRS fills an gap in our current toolkit.
The focus of the enhanced tier is to provide scrutiny to the UK activities directed by foreign powers, and foreign power-controlled entities, where the Secretary of State considers it reasonably necessary to do so to protect the safety or interests of the UK. In the limited circumstances where there is a risk of duplication, we will work closely across government departments and potential registrants to keep the burden of registration to a minimum and inform our approach to using this tier of the scheme.
In essence the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, were asking whether this scheme would interfere in the work of academia and broadened it out to further bodies, such as the British Academy, as referenced by the noble Baroness, and the scientific bodies referenced by the noble Viscount. There is no intention for this scheme to interfere with the work of academia, or with relevant international collaborations. We have considered the feedback of the academic and higher education community on this point. Under the specified persons tier, a UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. It would not be enough for a foreign power or entity to simply provide funding in support of an activity at a university, for example through subsidy or donation. Nor could responding to a generic request from a foreign power or entity be considered as “acting at the direction of”.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
I will reflect on what the Minister says when I read Hansard. I am glad that bodies such as the British Academy will be consulted, and I hope that the named organisations I mentioned earlier will be consulted. If we take the case of an international conference, held in one of many states around the world, is it the Government’s view that that international conference, which may or may not be sponsored officially by a Government but nevertheless takes place in what may be considered an unfriendly country, brings about the type of involvement in this scheme on the part of individual people attending, or does it not?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thought I was very clear on the precise specified persons tier here. A UK university would need to be acting at the direction of a specified foreign power or a specified foreign power-controlled entity before registration requirements could apply. I think that covers the set of circumstances just outlined by the noble Viscount.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
The Minister spoke about universities. Did he mean the academics—any academic within the universities?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Yes.
Amendment 103 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to remove the exemption from the registration requirement in FIRS for lawyers providing legal activities. While I welcome the challenge, removing this exemption would risk undermining long-standing protections the UK has afforded to the provision of confidential legal advice and the equitable administration of justice. The exemption is available only to lawyers carrying out legal activity and so would not apply to other individuals carrying out legal activity.
I also reiterate what was said in Committee in the other place: that this exemption does not completely exempt legal professionals from engaging with the scheme. It does not cover all the activities that could be undertaken by a legal professional as part of an arrangement with a foreign principal. Activities that are not strictly legal activities, such as lobbying, for example, may still need to be registered. So, for example, if a lawyer were to enter into an arrangement with a foreign power to lobby a UK government Minister or parliamentarian on the UK’s foreign policy towards that foreign power, that would be registrable. The fact that the individual is a lawyer is not sufficient in and of itself to exempt them from registration.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
I heard what the Minister said about lobbying and the additional aspect of lobbying by law firms, but why is any exemption needed beyond what is contained in Clause 74, which covers legal professional privilege effectively—legal proceedings and so on—so that no confidential information needs to be divulged? Why is it not necessary that a law firm is acting for a foreign power or an entity controlled by a foreign power? Why should that be exempt?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I think I explained this in reasonable detail. It goes back to the sort of work the lawyers carry out. As I say, it is the long-standing protections that the UK has afforded—
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
All the Minister is saying, in a highly circular way, is that it is in here because it has always been in here in some other forms of legislation. I do not think that is much of an answer.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
In that case, I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord. I apologise for having spoken at such length.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I am not sure whether the Minister has picked up my point about arbitration. I am very sorry that I did not put down an amendment to direct attention to this, but it is quite an important point because London is a preferred seat for arbitration and many cases involving foreign powers and foreign-controlled activities. I have done a handful of arbitrations, but each one of them is within that category.
One of the features of an arbitration is the confidentiality of the process and the fact that the process exists at all. There are some cases where parties do not want it to be publicised that they are engaging in this process, because it would raise all sorts of questions, particularly at the home state of the foreign activity, the foreign-controlled entity or the foreign power itself. It is rather important to be sure that the ground is properly covered.
As an arbitrator myself, and a lawyer-arbitrator, I favour the exemption provided by paragraph 5, but I do not think it goes wide enough. That is my point: it would seem very strange if I, as a lawyer for a team of three arbitrators, did not have to register, but if the noble Lord, Lord Patel, was with me as an expert in his field, he would have to do so, and an engineer or an architect would have to do so as well. That really destroys the exemption. It is a serious point to look at, though I quite agree that it is a point of detail. I apologise for not having drawn attention to it specifically before.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I was about to attempt to address the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but unfortunately he is not going to like the answer, which is that I do not know. I will have to look into this and come back to him.
I appreciate the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords, and I thank all those who participated in what was clearly a very healthy and important debate. We will reflect carefully on the comments raised prior to Report. For the moment, and to that end, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Since the Minister said he would go away and reflect on this debate, which may bring about substantial changes to what the Government are doing, what would be the point of his moving his amendments for the remainder of this part? It would save the Committee quite a bit of time if he did not move these amendments to the rest of the part that he said he is now going to consider.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am not sure it would save a huge amount of time, would it?
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
It depends how long the Minister takes to move his own amendments. When he sums up his own amendments that he will be moving, he will be saying, “I am now going away to reflect on these and come back before Report”, so there is very little point in doing that.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 83 provides that the Government must lay secondary legislation to define “specified persons” within 60 days of Royal Assent. A specified person under this Bill is a person who engages another for foreign activity arrangements. The purpose of the amendment is to probe who that could involve and whether they must be representative of a national Government or state. This amendment is further intended to probe the unintended consequences of the FIRS scheme and to illustrate that the legislation as drafted creates uncertainty as to who it applies to.
The Government have also tabled amendments as part of this group to clarify that activities being carried out must be registered at the time that they are carried out. A separate government amendment in this group limits the circumstances when affirmative procedures must be used in relation to defining “specified persons”, removing a layer of scrutiny. I beg to move.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, government Amendments 85, 86, 87, 94, 95 and 96 are minor and technical amendments that will make it clear that a current—rather than a previous—registration, is required to meet the registration requirements of either tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This will mean that, where previously registered activities are resumed, a current registration will be required rather than a person within scope of the scheme being able to rely on the fact that the activities had previously been registered. This will support the need for the register to remain accurate and up to date, providing the best possible insight into the scale of foreign political influence activities, and activities of specified entities.
Government Amendment 121 ensures that that the clauses are as clear as possible and accurately reflect our intent. To specify an entity on the enhanced tier, the Secretary of State will have a regulatory making power as per Clause 63. Under subsections (5) and (6) of Clause 92, this power to specify will be subject to an affirmative procedure. The amendment adds wording to clarify that the affirmative procedure applies where a new entity is being specified. Where an entity is being de-specified, or an already specified entity is being re-specified—for example, because it has changed its name—a negative procedure will apply, under Clause 92(4). This will ensure that both the specifying and removal of entities from the enhanced tier will be subject to the necessary level of parliamentary scrutiny.
Amendment 83 seeks to require the Secretary of State to define “specified persons” within 60 days of this Act being passed. “Specified persons” are defined within Clause 63 of the Bill; I therefore interpret this amendment as being intended to set a requirement on the Government to specify any entities to which the enhanced tier will apply within 60 days of the Act being passed. The specification of a person will mean that individuals or entities will have to register any arrangements with the specified person to carry out activities in the UK. It will also set a requirement for specified entities themselves to register their own activities. I am sure the House will recognise that these are far-reaching requirements, and it is therefore vital that the designation of a specified entity is done following appropriate consideration and on the basis of circumstances that exist at the time, and the most up-to-date and comprehensive evidence. A blanket requirement to designate all specified entities within 60 days would impede the careful case-by-case basis consideration that is required and would be a disproportionate approach to the specification of persons under this tier. I therefore do not believe that this amendment is necessary, and I encourage the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has raised an interesting but complicated question to answer. He has given various examples of the complications involved in trying to identify the owners of companies. From my own experience as a part company owner and director, I did not know who the shareholders in my own company were, once the ownership was traced back. This is a very difficult and involved question, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank both noble Lords for their contributions; it is indeed a complex issue. Amendment 83 seeks to provide that, where an entity receives 25% or more of its revenue from a foreign power, it can be considered as subject to control from a foreign power and eligible to be specified under the enhanced tier of the scheme. I commend the spirit with which this amendment has been made. The noble Lord’s aim of increasing transparency supports the objectives of the scheme, but it is vital that we strike the balance of proportionality.
It is important that we maintain a distinction between funding, or donations, and control. However, I hope the noble Lord will be reassured that where, in practice, funding does result in a foreign power directing or controlling the activities of the entity, a condition for foreign power control already given in Schedule 13 will still be met. Where this condition is met, it will be possible to specify the entity under the enhanced tier.
We recognise that it is imperative that this scheme maintains the flexibility to adapt, should a foreign power seek to take action to evade the scheme’s scope and requirements. Part 3 of Schedule 13 provides this necessary flexibility by allowing for the conditions of control to be amended for permitted purposes by regulation. For these reasons, the Government cannot accept the proposed amendment and invite its withdrawal.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I foresee yet another bout of litigation over who really owns what as this is implemented. We have seen a fair amount of argument among different Russian oligarchs about who owns what, and what political influence may or may not have been involved, in the London courts. This is one of the many ways in which the Bill, in its current form, is not proportionate. This is, again, why we need to move slowly, carefully and cautiously as we complete our scrutiny of the Bill.
We must not put too much of a burden on the individual business man and woman, or the individual customer, but, at the same time, we must do our utmost to ensure that foreign money, as it comes into British politics and British political life, is identified as vigorously as possible. Incidentally, I am not convinced that the Bill does that, as I said in an earlier session. That is one of the ways in which the Bill needs to be strengthened rather than weakened. This will, I hope, form part of the discussions that we will have off the Floor, during the process in which the Government will produce their promised policy statement, and before we come to Report. I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that agreements can be “foreign influence arrangements”.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a reference to the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 90, 91, 93, 98, 122 and 123 insert senior leaders in the police and military, the mayors of London and of combined authority areas, and police and crime commissioners to the list of postholders who, if communicated with, trigger a requirement on the person doing the communication to register under FIRS.
State actors who pose a threat can and will seek to identify and target individuals who are relied on to inform decision-making by government. These amendments will require foreign principals, and those working on behalf of foreign principals, to be transparent where they are seeking to influence decision-making and political processes through the postholders listed. Requiring registration of these activities will shed light on the scale of the attempts to carry out this type of influencing and will allow for prosecutions where such activity is not registered. It will also provide a layer of protection for these postholders by providing a deterrent to hostile states seeking to act in this way to advance their own malign agendas and allow for postholders to inform themselves of who is communicating with them and why.
The existing list of potential targets of lobbying in Clause 68(2)(a) already includes senior officials. We consider that senior military and police officials fall into a similar category to senior civil servants; they are experts who are able to provide advice to Ministers on matters relating to government decisions.
Mayors are often senior political figures within their respective political parties whose views are likely to carry significant weight with Government Ministers, including when they are making government decisions. I hope that goes some way to answering the questions related to this matter from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in an earlier group. Mayors, alongside devolved and central Governments, form an important part of the UK’s political establishment and, as such, we believe it is appropriate to capture them within a scheme focused on political influencing activity.
Similarly, in their capacity as elected officials, police and crime commissioners also form a part of the UK’s political establishment and may be identified as being in a strong position to influence contacts within Westminster regarding government decisions.
We have listened to the concerns about the breadth of the FIRS scheme, but we do not believe that adding these individuals would disproportionately expand the scheme. This is because communication with these individuals will be registerable only when it is for the purpose of influencing one of the existing persons or matters at Clause 68(3); for example, communication with a combined authority mayor for the purpose of influencing a local government decision, as opposed to a UK government decision, would not require registration.
These measures seek to tackle scenarios where postholders are being targeted by foreign principals seeking to indirectly influence government decisions and other political processes. While we consider it important to include these postholders, it is vital that the scheme remains proportionate. For this reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials included to the most senior.
These amendments also amend the power to add further to this list. Amendment 98 provides that the Secretary of State can by regulations specify a person “exercising public functions”, rather than
“persons exercising functions on behalf of the Crown”,
as in the original drafting. This reflects the fact that the list is not only of persons who are exercising functions of the Crown but includes persons carrying out wider public functions. This amendment will allow the necessary flexibility to future-proof the list of those who may be targets of political lobbying. Any regulations made under this power will be thoroughly scrutinised by Parliament through the affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to accept these amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)
On the extent of the schedule of those to be included, unless I have misunderstood or misread, there does not appear to be any reference to senior members of the security and intelligence services, who I do not think fall into any of the other categories. Could the Minister explain whether I have misunderstood or if that is a deliberate exclusion, and what any reasoning might be?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I will have a go. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, very much for those comments. These amendments simply seek to add senior leaders in the police and military, the Mayor of London, mayors of combined authority areas and police and crime commissioners, as I have said, to the list of potential targets of communication by or on behalf of foreign principals.
I refer back to a statement I made in my opening remarks. We think it is important to include these postholders but we wish for the scheme to remain proportionate. For that reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials to include the most senior. The point about the mayors is surely a good one: they are politically elected and members of political parties. They therefore have significantly more political influence, I would argue, than the Lord Mayor of London, for example.
As regards the definition—
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
What about the corporation? I am grateful to the Minister, but there is a quite considerable amount of executive authority in the City of London Corporation when it comes to what could well interact with the interests of the United Kingdom. So perhaps the Minister might reflect on that.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will absolutely reflect on that but, as I say, they are not politically elected persons, as the noble Lord will know. As regards his example of a foreign defence contractor talking to somebody of the rank of brigadier, having had our lengthy discussions earlier I would have thought that they would be captured under the corporate side of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be that foreign principals, or those in arrangements with them, would be required to register communication with these postholders, as well as those in the existing list, if it were conducted for the purpose of influencing one of those persons listed in Clause 68.
In answer to the other question about senior members of the security services, I believe that is captured under “senior civil servants”, but I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord. For now, I ask that the House agrees this amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the list of persons in clause 68(2)(a). Those persons are now listed (with additional persons) in the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe after Schedule 13.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes definitions that are no longer needed in clause 68 because the terms they define have been removed by Lord Sharpe’s amendment to clause 68, page 46, line 30.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the political influence activities being carried out must be registered at the time they are carried out.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“SchedulePublic officialsMinisters
1 A Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975).2 A Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68).3 A Scottish Minister.4 A Welsh Minister (within the meaning of section 68).MPs etc
5 A member of either House of Parliament.6 A member of the Northern Ireland Assembly.7 A member of the Scottish Parliament.8 A member of Senedd Cymru.9 An employee or other member of staff of a person within any of paragraphs 5 to 8.Local government
10 The Mayor of London. 11 A mayor for the area of a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.Political parties
12 An officer, trustee or agent of a UK registered political party (within the meaning of section 68).13 A member of such a political party who exercises executive functions on behalf of the party.Election candidates
14 A candidate at an election for a relevant elective office (within the meaning of section 37 of the Elections Act 2022).15 A candidate at an election for a relevant Scottish elective office (within the meaning of that section).Civil servants
16 (1) A member of—(a) the Senior Civil Service;(b) the Northern Ireland Senior Civil Service;(c) the Senior Management Structure of Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service.(2) A person who serves the government in a position in the civil service of the State and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements applicable to that position set out in section 15(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (special advisers).(3) A person appointed to a position in the Northern Ireland Civil Service by a Northern Ireland Minister (within the meaning of section 68) and whose appointment to that position meets the conditions set out in section 1(3) and (4) of the Civil Service (Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (c. 8 (N.I.)) (special advisers).Military personnel
17 (1) An officer subject to service law who is of or above the rank of commodore, brigadier or air commodore.(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “subject to service law” has the same meaning as in the Armed Forces Act 2006 (see section 374 of that Act).Police
18 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996.19 A police and crime commissioner.20 A person of one of the following ranks of the metropolitan police force—(a) Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(b) Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(c) Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis;(d) Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.21 The Commissioner of Police for the City of London or an Assistant Commissioner of Police for the City of London.22 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.23 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland.24 The chief constable or a deputy chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police. 25 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the British Transport Police Force.26 The chief constable or deputy chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary.Persons exercising public functions
27 (1) A person exercising public functions who is specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.(2) “Public functions” means functions of a public nature—(a) exercisable in the United Kingdom, or(b) exercisable in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom by a person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Schedule expands the list of persons, communication with whom is capable of being a political influence activity. It includes the persons previously listed in clause 68(2)(a), and additional persons.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the exemption for UK arrangements applies to agreements and arrangements within the meaning of “foreign activity arrangement” or “foreign influence arrangement”.
Wednesday 18th January 2023
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (16 Jan 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Murray of Blidworth
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that the power in clause 77(1)(b) relates to the onward disclosure of information provided to the Secretary of State under clause 72 or 73.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, Clause 77 allows the Secretary of State to make regulations about the publication and sharing of information provided through the foreign influence registration scheme. Amendment 105 clarifies that power at Clause 77(1)(b) and provides for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the onward disclosure of information registered or provided under the foreign influence registration scheme. The amended provision will enable the Secretary of State to provide clarity in respect of what data can be lawfully shared where necessary. I therefore ask the Committee to support this amendment. I beg to move.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, we are being asked to approve something that relates to regulations that we have not seen, and we would ask the Government to review the way in which they are approaching the passage of this part of the Bill. We need to see not just draft practice or draft regulations but the regulations themselves.
The way in which this part of the Bill has been generated—and I do not want to repeat a discussion that we had two days ago—means that there is a great deal of uncertainty about what is intended. I hope that the flexibility that was indicated by Ministers on Monday will be extended to how such information is disseminated. I hope that we will get an undertaking that, before Report, and not on the day that Report begins, we will see the regulations and other documents that will indicate the architecture and detail of whatever parts of FIRS are going to be retained.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said, and I shall say a bit about it myself, in a few remarks on the government amendment. As the Minister said, the amendment clarifies the power in Clause 77(1)(b) and deals with the publication and disclosure of information provided by the Secretary of State under Part 3 on registration. Can the Minister say a little about what is not to be published? As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just pointed out to the Committee, all this is to be done by regulations—and, I emphasise, done by regulations under the negative procedure.
Information provided by the Minister about foreign activity arrangements and foreign influence arrangements could, as the DPRRC said, be both politically and commercially sensitive. There will also be practical matters of significant political interest around these matters, given their relationship to national security. What sort of thinking is going on about what may or may not be published? Will those whose information is to be published be told in advance of publication and have any right of appeal? Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, why should Parliament not be able to have a more direct say in what sort of information should be published? That point was made by the DPRRC, which called for these regulations to be made, at the very least, under the affirmative procedure, to give at least some degree of scrutiny for this Parliament. I ask the Minister again to reflect on why negative procedure is being used for these regulations and not, at the very least, affirmative.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I thank both noble Lords for those contributions. I can, of course, reassure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who will be aware that my noble friend Lord Sharpe committed in this House that a policy statement would be published ahead of Report.
On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, clearly the drafting of the regulations will necessarily follow the shape of the scheme, which is reflected in the final version of the statute. Therefore, it would not be appropriate at this stage to have draft regulations to consider. As to the appropriate method by which the regulations should be approved, it is the Government’s view that the negative procedure is appropriate for these minor and technical regulations, given what they do to enable the disclosure of information provided to the department in accordance with the scheme.
Therefore, for all those reasons, we submit that this is a minor and technical amendment that simply clarifies the purpose of the power, and that it is intended specifically to enable the Secretary of State to make provision through regulations for the onward disclosure of information registered under FIRS, and I therefore ask the Committee to support this amendment.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Perhaps I could press the Minister on this. He said that there will be a policy statement before Report. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was asking whether we can see the draft regulations. I entirely understand the Minister’s point that the final version of the regulations will need to await the passage of the statutory scheme, but why can the department not produce draft regulations which will inform discussion on Report?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
At the moment I fear I cannot commit to providing draft regulations. It may be that there are some, but it may be that to draft regulations prior to Report would be too time-consuming.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I am sorry to intervene again, but does the Minister not see that this is illustrating the whole mistake in producing important legislation arising from amendments made in Committee in the House of Commons? If this part of the Bill had been drafted in the normal way, by parliamentary counsel with time to develop it and to consult, it would have been perfectly simple to produce draft regulations in time for Report in the House of Lords, which is nearly at the end of the legislative process. Is this not really just a guilty plea to having had insufficient time to prepare a Bill that came to this House based on an idea which was not even government policy?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I note the noble Lord’s views on the topic, but we are where we are. Obviously, the department will take away what he says and endeavour to meet his reasonable request.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I say to the Minister, before he sits down, that in view of what the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile, have said, it is not satisfactory. We do not have a policy statement, we cannot see the regulations and, when the regulations are passed, the Government will pass them through the negative procedure. I would have thought, at the very least, given the worries and concerns that have been raised, that the affirmative procedure, as the Delegated Powers Committee said, in these circumstances in particular, might be something the Government would consider. I ask the Minister to reflect on that.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
I hope the Minister will agree to draw the attention of his department to the debate held in this House last week on delegated legislation and to the very strong sense across the whole House, including on his Benches, that this House is meeting a Government who give us less and less information about regulations and prefer to leave more and more out of Bills so that Ministers may act as they are. This is an abuse of Parliament and should not be pursued further. That message is particularly important for a Bill such as this, and the Government should consider it.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I have no doubt that the department will reflect on those points. We are all very aware of last week’s debate, in which the Leader participated.
The Parliamentary Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
I thank noble Lords very warmly for their contributions, which were pertinent and challenging as ever. I shall make three introductory points. First, there is perhaps—and I put this as lowly as I can—a tension between those who say that this approach is wrong in principle and, on the other hand, those who say it is already covered by the general law. If it is covered by the general law, it cannot be wrong in principle. There seems to the Government to be an opposition in those two propositions.
Secondly, it is said that these provisions are intended to introduce a high level of impunity for the security services, generally reduce their accountability and effectively put them beyond the law. That is not the case, because in this legislation the decision is for the court—it is for the court to decide what to do. It does not give immunity to officials, the security services or the Government. It is a matter for the court. Essentially, this legislation is spelling out what the position is in relation to persons who have been involved in terrorist wrongdoing. It is saying in explicit terms that, where that situation arises, the court should consider—and I emphasise the word “consider”—whether damages should be reduced to reflect that wrongdoing. It is perfectly true that, at common law, such an argument could already be made, at least in theory; depending on which Latin tag you chose to use or whether you refer to the contributory negligence Act or other general principles, the argument can be made. But the point of these provisions is to spell that out in very clear terms so that the general public and potential claimants know what the position is, and one is not left to argue what can sometimes be obscure and difficult questions of common law in particular cases.
Thirdly, the overriding purpose—we can discuss the exact wording—is to convey a message. The message is that the United Kingdom is not a soft touch for those involved in terrorist wrongdoing when they come to claim civil damages. That is a message particularly directed to those beyond the seas who may be tempted to bring, and have in the past brought, proceedings in the UK courts when these kinds of situations have arisen. It is to make the civil position clear. By the same token, we have provisions relating to freezing and forfeiture which protect any damages that are awarded from subsequently being used for terrorist purposes. That is the overriding framework, as it were.
On behalf of the Government, I entirely reject the suggestion that these provisions are intended to introduce a high level of impunity for the security services or to avoid accountability, because it is ultimately for the court to decide. This is limited to national security proceedings, and the conduct of any public bodies will still be fully subject to scrutiny by the court.
With that general description, I shall try to deal with the various points which have been raised. I come first to Amendment 105A, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which seeks to introduce an exclusion in cases where the evidence or submissions to the court about national security are merely incidental to the civil claim in question. While completely understanding the objective behind the amendment, the Government believe that it is not necessary, for three reasons.
First, national security proceedings are very clearly defined in Clause 82(2), and it is very hard to construe that definition as including a case where national security was for some reason de minimis to the proceedings concerned. Secondly, it is, in the Government’s view, hard to imagine in practical terms a situation in which a person involved in terrorist wrongdoing brings a case against the Crown, and the Crown has presented evidence or made submissions about national security, but national security is merely incidental to the issues in the case. It seems to the Government that it is most unlikely that such a situation would arise. Thirdly—this is a fundamental point that I have already made—
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
The Minister simply has not answered the point that this provision in the Bill refers to “at any stage” of the proceedings, and any stage of the proceedings could be a disclosure stage, an interlocutory stage or an interim stage, where documents are sought to be withheld for reasons of national security that do not go to any major issue in the proceedings and are merely incidental. The Minister has simply not answered that. If he would like to do so, I would be grateful.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I will further reflect on the question, but it seems to the Government that that specific example is unlikely to bite, as it were, on the duty of the court in the particular circumstances that we are considering, because ultimately it is up to the court to consider whether a reduction of damages is appropriate. If it were the case that, technically speaking, you could argue that national security proceedings on the face of the statute were in some way involved because there had been an earlier discovery application but it had no material impact on the remainder of the case, one could reasonably assume, and the Government do assume, that the court would not proceed to reduce damages on the basis of something that had nothing to do with the real issues.
We will always reflect and consider further, because it is very important to get the drafting right, but at the moment the Government are unconvinced that this amendment is necessary and believe that the protections, and in particular the role of the court, are sufficient to deal with the concern that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has raised. That, I think, is the answer to Amendment 105A.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The Minister rightly emphasises the very high degree of discretion that is given to judges under Clause 83. The core of it is Clause 83(5), which allows a judge to take a view on whether it is “appropriate” for the amount of damages to be reduced. I wonder what the Minister thinks of the point that to give judges such a wide discretion is perhaps to give them a poisoned chalice. Judges did not, so far as I know, ask for this power. Does the Minister agree that they could be strongly criticised were they to fail to exercise the power to reduce damages, even in cases where it would be consistent with normal legal principles, including the principle of fairness, not to reduce them?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, highlights the tension I referred to a moment ago. It is very difficult to say on the one hand, as is being said, that the courts have this power already and that they are perfectly capable of exercising it, whether under the 1945 Act or ex turpi causa, et cetera, and on the other hand to say that it puts them in a difficult position and that they will be criticised if they do not exercise it. I think I can say this: the overall intention of this legislation is not to alter or downgrade a principle of law that is already inherent in the common law and in our various jurisdictions; the purpose is to spell out that principle in this legislation so that no one has any doubt that it applies in terrorist cases. That is the main purpose of this clause. We are, to an extent, simply reflecting where we are, but clarifying where we are.
Lord Pannick (CB)
Can I press the Minister a bit further on this pivotal point? I respectfully suggest to him that he is asserting two conflicting principles. If I understand him correctly, he is saying, first, that the purpose of these provisions is to convey a message but, secondly, that we do not need to worry about it because it is all a matter of judicial discretion. But the judges will have to decide these cases. How are they to decide? How are they to apply their discretion? What message are they expected to convey? While I am on my feet, I remind the Minister that it was, I think, Samuel Goldwyn who said that if he wanted to convey a message, he used Western Union. That is perhaps a relevant principle for Ministers to bear in mind in relation to legislation.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
Before the Minister answers, and so that he does not have to go over old ground, I will intervene. In the Government’s case, the judges will have a new power that is needed because the existing defences of ex turpi and volenti are not adequate. I think that is the case the Government are making, but I respectfully submit that a judge needs a bit of help as to how he or she is to approach this case. When judges are given discretionary powers—for example, under the Limitation Act—they are given a long list of things to take into account or something that makes their job easier. I am putting myself in the position of a hypothetical judge looking at this clause, knowing that it apparently adds something to the existing common law and asking myself how I would approach this. I wonder whether there might be reflection and a judge will be given more guidance as to how he or she should approach this very difficult and delicate task.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I can take this point under advisement, because it is not yet spelled out in the statute and I am reluctant—on the hoof, as it were—to put words into the mouths of judges who would go about it in due course. One can imagine that one would draw inspiration from certain aspects of the existing law, but that is to go further than the statute already provides, so perhaps the Government can consider this point further.
I return to the broad thrust of the Bill and come to the stand part notices. I have tried to explain the importance of the message. Western Union is perhaps a slightly outdated way of conveying a message these days, but there are times when primary legislation is important to clarify the legal position, and this is one of those cases.
Before I pick up the specific points that have been made, in relation to the freezing and the forfeiture, the essential point is that these provisions bite at the moment the freezing order was made. You do not have to go to Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court or Highbury Corner to get an order. It bites straightaway and is done by the same court that was dealing with the damages in the first place. It is more efficient to deal with the same court. Although there are other powers, as noble Lords rightly point out, in the Government’s view this is the right mechanism.
To come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about why we do not just take the whole lot straight off, these exceptions for care costs and so forth, this is intended to be a measured structure. You start by simply freezing for the first two years, then you have another go at it after a second two years, then, finally, if after four years there is still “a real risk”—I will come to real risk in a moment—that is the moment when the forfeiture power kicks in. It is to give people time to persuade the court that there is no risk, as it were. That is thought to be a measured and proportionate approach to this problem.
The Bill provides that the freezing and forfeiture apply only in part to the damages if the court so orders, so that if, for example, medical expenses or care costs have to be met out of the damages, the court can provide for that. It does not have to take away the whole lot all at once. It can have regard to the needs of the claimant in that context.
That is the essential structure. It is to remove the risk of the money simply being spirited away at the press of a button, down a hole to an offshore haven before the courts can move to make sure that the money remains safe. Again, that is a power of the court, not of the Government or the security services. Therefore, in our view it does not lead to an undermining of the principle of access to justice or any other relevant right. To take another important point raised by your Lordships, it certainly does not take away the human rights damages. There are no circumstances in which it affects human rights damages in any event; that is a sort of entrenched position under the Human Rights Act. But that does not prevent a court taking into account circumstances in relation to other claims where the court considers that a reduction would be justified. Even in relation to human rights cases—I am sure plenty of people here will immediately put me right if I am wrong—the European Court of Human Rights reduces damages in certain circumstances when it does not think that the claimant is fully deserving of a particularly large award because of the conduct of the claimant in question.
That is the general outline and why we say that the whole structure is balanced but proportionate. It extends to involvement in terrorist-related offences. It is not limited to terrorist convictions because of the quite obvious difficulty, particularly in terms of parties that are abroad, in managing to apprehend them, bring them to this country, prosecute them and secure a conviction. Cases have been brought by persons abroad known by the security services to have been involved in terrorist activities but not subject to a conviction in this country. That is why we have to make this a little wider than people who have been convicted of terrorist offences.
For the reasons I gave in relation to the message, the provisions are not limited to circumstances in which one should confiscate the damages because of the risk of them being used in terrorist activities. One should reduce the damages because of the conduct of the claimant, which is a normal, civil law situation. I do not mean civil law in the sense of continental civil law, but it is the normal situation in the common law.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
I must admit that I was more favourably disposed towards some of these provisions, but the Minister has convinced me that I was wrong. He has told us that these provisions are unnecessary. They are in effect a very long text message, which apparently the public are going to consider over their breakfast tables, reminding judges of what the existing law is. Is he comfortable with using this House and this legislation for that purpose?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, I feel that this is the first time that I have ever convinced the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that he is wrong. The answer to the question is yes, the Government are entirely comfortable with the need to make explicit what to a large extent is implicit but rather undefined and diffuse in our legal system. This measure gives us a clear code in terrorism cases to provide a framework for the judge to consider what he should do about damages. I accept that the question of guidance for the judges is an open point, but let us reflect on that. The purpose is to provide a clear framework in terrorism cases.
Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)
With respect to him, the Minister is quite right: the application of ex turpi is very uncertain. There is a great deal of authority, and it is difficult to predict in particular cases whether they are going to rely on it. However, if there is going to be a statutory scheme then I return to my point: it needs to be a lot clearer so judges know how they are supposed to apply it.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I wonder if I may add a thought. One of the words that strike me in Clause 83(5) is “must”. If I were a judge at first instance, I would have to explain my decision, so I would have to say that I had applied my mind to the various factors. Having looked at the factors, I am still left in the dark as to what principle I should apply. I can look at them and understand them, but why should they affect the award? I do not think a list of factors is needed if the Government can explain the principle that should be applied. Is it that a kind of quasi-immunity should be given because of these various factors—some sort of overriding principle in favour of the Government’s security measures and so on that should be applied? I cannot devise that myself, but a list of A, B, C and D is not going to be helpful. We already have the factors there; it is the trigger, what the principle is that leads to the decision that the damages must be reduced, that is important. Otherwise, a first-instance court might say, “I’ve considered the factors and I can’t see any reason why the damages should be reduced”, and an appeals court will say, “Well, that’s perfectly right”, and we are left without any significant advance in this legislation. I hope I have made my position clear. I do not like lists of factors very much, but I like to have guidance as to principle.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I can say that the principle is certainly not for the judge to be asking himself, “Should I be protecting the Government or the security services from actions for damages?” I am not drafting the Bill, and I will further consider the matter, but I would imagine that it is something like how far the claimant brought the situation on himself. That would be an ex turpi causa or contributory negligence type of consideration. However, I do not want to pre-empt the discussion any further, standing on my feet thinking aloud, because I hear what is being said: we want further precision as to how the courts are to go about this.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I think the Committee is now in a bit of a bind. The Minister stated a few moments ago that the Bill is now a clear code and explicit, but he is unwilling to tell the Committee even some basic elements of what guidance for a judge might exist. We do not know now how to proceed on the basis of this before Report, especially in the case of the specific question that I asked.
The Minister has also stated, exactly from the Government’s perspective, what the guidance for judges is. He talked at the opening of his remarks about demonstrating that
“the UK is not a soft touch for those involved in terrorist wrongdoing”.
It is very clear from what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box what the intent is. If the judge is not to take into consideration what the Minister stated, we are in a bit of difficulty.
My specific question here, and I hope the Minister can be specific in an answer now, relates to the concern that was raised that the national security factor in Clause 83(3) is broad, and that a foreign power can state that the claimant was involved in terrorist activities in a foreign country. If that is used by a party under the national security factor, my reading of that is that the judge must now take that into consideration. Surely that cannot be right.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, on that last point, I would need some notice of that question. It is not a point that I have so far had to consider.
It is the case that the court would have to be satisfied on the civil standard that that the claimant had been involved in terrorist wrongdoing. In accordance with normal statutory principles of construction, there would have to be some nexus between the United Kingdom and the terrorist wrongdoing. It is hard to imagine a case in the UK courts where there was terrorist wrongdoing without any nexus to the UK. That is as far as I can go.
I will see if I can get a bit further, if your Lordships will permit me. As far as the general position is concerned, when I said the Government wanted to say that the UK was not a soft touch, I meant that the provision makes it clear that in civil proceedings against the security services of the United Kingdom one has to be aware that the judge will consider whether the damages should be reduced. That is all I meant by that. I did not mean to say, and I do not think I can reasonably have been construed as saying, that the intention was to protect the security services from unwarranted claims for damages. The underlying principle is, I think, that if a terrorist person has brought it on himself then that should be considered, but let me reflect further on the relevant questions that noble Lords have asked.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
Would the Minister consider the wording in Clause 83(4)(a) that says there
“need not be a causal connection”?
You can find that there is a connection, but it need not be a causal connection. I can understand that if there were a causal connection then one might get around to thinking that the damages should be reduced but, if there is not a causal connection, why should you consider a reduction in damages at all? That is one of the reasons why I am looking for a principle that gets over the point that a causal connection is not necessary. What else is there?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The causal connection point is to do with whether there are national security factors in the first place. As to general question of what the court is to do, and whether we should have further guidance or precision in statute, that is perhaps a matter that we will need to come back to on Report to see whether we can get any further clarity.
Lord Pannick (CB)
May I test the Minister’s patience by asking him to reflect on one other matter? He said, rightly, that in assessing damages in human rights cases the court is entitled to have regard to the conduct of the claimant, yet this clause does not feel it necessary to provide any message or guidance to judges in human rights cases. I ask him to reflect on why the Government nevertheless think it necessary to send a message to provide guidance in non-human-rights cases.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I certainly undertake to reflect on what further guidance can be given on how the courts should go about this exercise.
I have taken up too much of your Lordships’ time and am conscious that I have not perhaps dealt with everything I should have. As I think I have said, the overall intention is not in any way to undermine mechanisms for holding the Government to account, or to allow Ministers and officials to evade scrutiny. I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that we absolutely have to tread carefully. I hope that this package is a balanced one, and I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we have had a worthwhile and detailed debate in which the Government have been pretty hard pressed on the detail of these clauses. I am bound to say that nothing I have heard suggests to me that these clauses are in fact defensible. They introduce a very important and, we say, objectionable new power. It is not merely a power but, because of their mandatory nature, a duty to consider reduction in damages—the power being to reduce damages where there is no connection required between the conduct of the claimant and the reduction in damages. That is entirely novel.
If I may go on from there to consider a point made by the Minister fairly early in his speech, he said that those of us who criticise these provisions must face the fact that there is a tension between that criticism and the reliance we place on existing law. The reason why his position falls and why there is a tension is precisely that, under the existing law—as in the point made a moment or two ago by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—it is the claimant’s conduct that leads to the reduction in damages. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, was that there is express exclusion of the requirement for the claimant’s conduct to be responsible in these provisions before a reduction in damages is ordered. The security factors may be entirely irrelevant conduct, as far as the award of damages is concerned, but nevertheless lead to the requirement to consider reducing damages.
I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Bellamy, because of his being so conversant with the common law, got into some difficulty when answering my question on disclosure. He said it is unlikely that consideration of evidence that came to light in a disclosure application would have any bearing on the claimant’s conduct and therefore would lead a court to reduce damages. That is to fall into the trap of ignoring the effect of these provisions where no causal connection is required.
In answer to the other central point made by the Minister, that this is not about giving impunity or immunity to the Government because it is for the courts to decide, that leads the Government directly into the difficulty that these provisions are mandatory. As has been said a number of times, if a judge is faced with a mandatory provision that requires him to consider a number of factors and decide whether to reduce damages, he cannot blithely go on to say, “Well, I looked at the factors and I’m simply going to ignore the legislation”. He then either gets into the point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made—that he is giving no effect to the legislation at all and it is a cypher, because a Court of Appeal might agree with that—or he is simply falling into error because he is not applying the legislation. It is a very difficult conundrum to face.
The central point made where the Government have got into such difficulty is that originally raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. He said that there is no guidance whatever in Clause 83(5) as to how and on what principle the judge is to approach the question of whether damages should be reduced. Ultimately, the Minister was forced into the position of saying, “I’m not quite sure—I’ll take it under advisement and we may come to some conclusion about it”. Frankly, and with the greatest respect to the Minister, that is simply not good enough. This Committee needs to know what principles are to be applied to the exercise of an entirely new and, we say, entirely objectionable power.
The reality is that this point cannot be escaped from, as was said by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. My noble friend Lord Purvis has again said that in an intervention. The problem is that this legislation is to be aimed at using damages to fund terrorism. That would be properly achieved, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, by using the powers to freeze damages in a responsible way when there is an actual intention to use the damages to fund terrorism. It is exactly the point that the independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall KC, made: that it was dealt with by the existing legislation under the 2001 Act.
I cannot for the life of me therefore see why lowering the threshold achieves anything meaningful that is just, because it is unjust and the threshold under the existing legislation is the proper one to apply for something as serious as depriving somebody of damages or even freezing their damages. This legislation is weakening and altering other legislation in an unnecessary way, by introducing new powers that are objectionable, and therefore it ought to go.
The Minister has said that he is going to take this away and think about it. At this stage, therefore, I could not sensibly press my amendment and we would not ask for votes at this stage on clauses standing part. However, I really suggest that the Government are now under an obligation to consider whether any of these provisions are necessary at all or whether they wish to abandon them. In saying that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 115 in this group, where we call for an assessment of the impact of Clauses 87, 88 and 89 to be published before they come into force.
It has been a powerful but relatively short debate. I shall not repeat the points that have been made, mostly by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, with her four grounds for opposing the clauses standing part. I wanted to reinforce the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, when he said that the gravity of the offence may be low. I can talk directly to that because, as a sitting magistrate, I have dealt with terrorist incidents that involved graffiti. The defendant in the case pleaded guilty to graffiti but, because of the nature of the graffiti, was charged under the Terrorism Act. We went ahead and fined that offender, but it was an offence under the Terrorism Act.
We have been relooking at Clause 87. Would that sort of example of a terrorist conviction be caught under the provisions, and would that individual who pleaded guilty to a terrorism offence of graffiti lose his right to civil legal aid in the decades to come?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I can briefly explain, first, the Government’s view of the principle behind the provision, then come later to the detail of how it operates. In the Government’s view, looking at it as a matter of principle, through their actions individuals who commit acts of terrorism seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions that are at the heart of our democracy in this country. It is right that persons who have committed acts of terrorism against democracy should be subject to a different approach when it comes to granting civil legal aid. The different approach is, in this case, that these provisions do not entirely deprive a “terrorist” of civil legal aid, because exceptional case funding remains available. That is granted in around 75% of the cases in which it is applied for, so we have a safety net there. The practical effect of what is proposed is that those with the relevant terrorist convictions follow a different route from others. In other words, the automaticity of legal aid is somewhat different if you have committed a terrorist offence.
Apart from the question of principle—and that is the principle that the Government are advancing—the questions that have arisen in this debate essentially focus on two issues, or sub-issues. First, have we drawn the definition of terrorist offence too widely, catching very minor incidents, such as the graffiti incident put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or the relatively minor terrorist offences to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, drew attention? Secondly, are there particular circumstances, of which domestic abuse is one, where there should be some exception to be made, and where it is going too far to have this blanket restriction, and there are obvious cases where there could be a fully justified grant of legal aid on the normal procedure, rather than forcing someone to go for exceptional case funding? On both those points, I shall undertake to reflect and to look at the underlying impact of these provisions—but the general principle is as I have outlined.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The Minister makes his case as to the general principle but, if that is so strong from the Government’s position, why does it relate only to England and Wales?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
The noble Lord, from a Scottish perspective, asks a relevant question. I shall have to take that under advisement and see, but I suspect that it is because there is a different legal regime in Scotland.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I look forward to the Minister’s letter. This Bill applies to everywhere—but, of course, there is separate legal aid legislation in Scotland, which I scrutinised when I was on the Justice Committee in the Scottish Parliament. If the case is so strong for the whole United Kingdom, I am not sure why this is. If he is writing to me, could he add something on the concern about whether this provision is consistent with the commitments in the Good Friday agreement? Does this provision also apply to Northern Ireland, with regard to the permanent removal for all those who previously were beyond the restrictions before the convictions were made, as in the Bill?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
As far as I know, it is not the intention to apply this measure to Northern Ireland, but I shall write to the noble Lord to confirm the Government’s position.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Many years ago, I used to sit on a legal aid committee. What worries me is the responsibilities that will be placed on all legal aid committees that will have this provision in front of them. One wonders, therefore, whether there should be special representation for the person applying for legal aid, and how that is going to be run. But this is a practical problem, and I ask the Minister to reflect on the practical side of the issue.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, I shall certainly reflect on the practical side. This would be a decision for the director of casework at the Legal Aid Agency. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, rightly raised the question of the practical “bureaucracy” associated with the proposal, and we are working with the Legal Aid Agency to see how it can be most conveniently implemented, with minimum disruption.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I shall be brief, because I know that noble Lords are waiting for the Statement. I thank the Minister for his reply. His first point was that the Government wanted to address the unique situation where, they contend, the people envisaged —those who have committed terrorist offences—have threatened to undermine our democracy. Other noble Lords who have contributed to the debate and who I very much thank, including the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Anderson, talked about other extremely serious offences such as murder, rape and, I think, manslaughter. Why just terrorism? Personally, I think that the offence of rape undermines the principle of our modern society, which should exist, about equality between men and women, the dignity of women and our rejection of abuse of women. Apart from very serious terrorist offences, I might judge a rapist on a more serious basis than someone who gets a fine for graffiti, for example, presumably in support of some proscribed organisation. Therefore, I do not think that the argument is very sound, if I may say so.
Wednesday 18th January 2023
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 68-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (16 Jan 2023)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for contributing to this relatively short debate. Let me first address Amendments 112, 117 and 120A.
Amendments 112 and 117 seek to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the ISC’s report on Russia and to produce a report setting out the action taken. The Committee will already be aware that the Government published their response to the Russia report on the same day that the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. All the recommendations that could be identified within the report were addressed.
On the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published: for example, those covering co-ordination of government work on Russia, close working with international partners, and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made in the other place on 17 January 2022. I also say that there is ongoing engagement with the committee on these recommendations. The Bill is itself a part of that response, by introducing effective new tools and powers for the police, and security and intelligence agencies, to use against the sophisticated range of threats and actors that we face in the modern day.
I turn to Amendment 118, explained by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as a probing amendment. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act already provides, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just noted, for the ISC to make reports
“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions.”
This provides the ISC with the ability to report on aspects of the Bill which fall within its remit. Furthermore, the amendment as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC requires explicit legislative nomination to conduct oversight work on a relevant area of security and intelligence policy. The Government therefore cannot support this amendment.
Amendment 120A seeks to mandate the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Government. The Committee will be aware that the MoU is subject to continuous review, as again noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. We welcome the ISC proposing changes that it would like the Prime Minister to consider, whether due to this legislation or other aspects of its security and intelligence remit. The Prime Minister will consider the proposed changes in due course. The MoU itself states that it is important to avoid duplication. Some of the organisations that the ISC has proposed that its remit should include are very new, and there are discussions under way regarding whether they are best overseen by other parliamentary Select Committees.
I am sure that answer will not particularly please the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, but I hope he would accept that it is a reasonable answer, given the current state of affairs.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. I am sure the Minister recognises the damage which was done to the relationship between the ISC and Parliament, and to maintaining public trust, by the various manoeuvres while Boris Johnson was Prime Minister. There was the delay in the publication of the Russia report and the attempt to have a chair appointed by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the committee, et cetera. We need to be reassured—and by “we” I mean Parliament and the interested public—that the ISC has a very clear and respected role, and is not subject to the whims of changing Prime Ministers.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, with the greatest respect, this is a different Government and we have moved on. The ISC very much has the respect of certainly this part of the Government. If I may say so, I have answered the principal question that was being asked: the Prime Minister will indeed consider the proposed changes in due course.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I understand that the Minister is saying that the Prime Minister will review it, but does he agree with me that it would help if the Prime Minister actually met the ISC? The Intelligence and Security Committee annual report states:
“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work, report on key issues … However, the Committee has not had a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014. In the previous Annual Report, we stated that we would seek a meeting with the Prime Minister this year; unfortunately, despite requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response from the Prime Minister. The Committee urges the Prime Minister to meet with it as a priority.”
May I ask the Minister to take that message to the Prime Minister? If he is looking at reviewing the MoU in due course, it might help him to meet with the committee.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
The noble Lord makes a very fair point. I will certainly make sure that that message is conveyed. As I have said, the Government do not think it would be appropriate at this point to mandate the Prime Minister to update the MoU as proposed, therefore we cannot support this amendment.
I now turn to Amendment 113. The Committee will be aware that the Government committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity and/or being engaged in serious and organised crime. The Government have set out the findings of the review of the operation of this route and acted to close it. I think it was in February 2022. I therefore submit that the amendment is not necessary.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, was selectively quoting back to me various aspects of the WMS. I might selectively quote back to him—I suppose I am quoting myself here. I also said:
“Given the importance of ensuring the independence of the law enforcement process I am unable to say more on the operationally sensitive work being taken forward in this area. Whilst unable to comment specifically due to operational sensitivity of work - as an example of the range of actions we are taking I can say that we have already sanctioned 10 oligarchs who had previously used this route as part of our extensive response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine.”
I think that gives answers as to why we have perhaps not commented in the detail the noble Lord would like.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has also accused me of not talking enough about certain states and talking too much about our allies. He, I think, suggests that this is for party-political reasons. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would think so little of the Government Front Bench in this House. I gently remind him that, when I am talking about our allies, I am usually responding to questions he has asked me.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I am afraid I do not have all the stats he asked for about Russian money, but I will endeavour to find them. I do not know if they sit within the Home Office, but I will find out where they are, and I will happily write to him.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I apologise if I have gone—as the Minister is advising me—a little far. The point I am making is that the lack of distinction in “any foreign power” is one of the fundamental faults in this Bill. The ISC Russia report on several occasions refers to the threats mainly coming from China, Russia, Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. That is what I understand as well, although I am well aware that there are other potentially hostile states. One of my strongest memories is watching a demonstration outside the Libyan embassy and a policewoman being shot. These things happen; there are hostile states out there. However, that does not mean we cannot distinguish between allies with whom we work and open societies, and those from which there are likely to be threats. It is very important that we do so.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
This Bill does exactly that. We have been talking about FIRS over the last couple of days—the foreign influence registration scheme. There are different tiers specified in that. There is no doubt that this Bill acknowledges where our principal threats come from. Other countries, unfortunately, are also sometimes used as proxies. That is another discussion we have had at considerable length from this Dispatch Box with various noble Lords who have raised that point. I think it has covered very widely exactly what the nature of the threats are and where they come from.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, this is an amendment which I really did not think it should be necessary to debate, on ministerial appointments by a Prime Minister, where that appointment may raise issues to do with the safety, security and interests of the United Kingdom. The amendment seeks clarification from the Government on the ability for there to be transparency in the operation of the Ministerial Code, but also where there is concern about ministerial appointments.
This is not a partisan point, because we know as a matter of fact that a Home Secretary was sacked because of a significant security breach. The guidance on security of government business was breached considerably, and Liz Truss sacked Suella Braverman, who admitted a breach of government security guidelines. I recognise that none of the material that was shared on a private email system was marked “secret”, so with regard to national security considerations, on the face of what was sent to an incorrect recipient but also what was intended to be sent, it was not secret or top secret. They were not classified documents, and I respect that fact. However, the recipient’s employer—because one of the emails was sent to a member of staff of an MP—replied to Suella Braverman saying:
“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security … You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.”
The fact that that Minister was then reappointed for political purposes within a matter of days has been well rehearsed. The Minister has responded to this issue in Questions in the Chamber, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also responded, saying:
“Everyone deserves a second chance.”—[Official Report, 22/10/22; col. 1558.]
I know for a fact that not everybody who will fall foul of some of the significant offences under this Bill will receive a second chance—or that some officials will receive it. But it would be useful to know whether there are security concerns about the appointments of Ministers.
The second thing I say concerns something that did not happen but could easily have happened. A Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev, was appointed under considerable concern about security situations. He was appointed to Parliament by Boris Johnson. He could very easily have been asked to be a Government Whip or a Minister: that is not a stretch of the imagination. What is the situation then, when security concerns have been raised about the appointment of a Member to Parliament but there is no mechanism for transparency about concerns about ministerial appointments? I do not besmirch any existing Ministers: these are two factual situations; one is regrettable, of course; and the other has not happened but could easily have happened. Therefore, my amendment seeks clarification as to what mechanisms are in place for it to be transparent when there have been concerns about an individual being appointed to a ministerial position, so that those concerns can be made public. I beg to move.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for speaking to Amendment 114, which seeks to require the Cabinet Secretary to publish information concerning ministerial appointments in scenarios where officials have indicated that the appointment of a particular individual
“may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power”.
The Government cannot accept this amendment because the appointment of Ministers is a matter solely for the Prime Minister, in line with his role as the sovereign’s principal adviser. It is critical to the functioning of government that any conversations that occur around appointments are able to take place in confidence. There is a long-standing practice to protect that confidentiality. Without the ability to speak freely on matters that will be personal and sometimes sensitive, particularly where they may include matters of security, the ability of officials to provide meaningful advice ahead of an appointment will be critically undermined. The National Security Bill is concerned principally with the conduct of state actors working for foreign powers or with an intention to benefit a foreign power. Not only is the Bill not the appropriate vehicle for such a change but the Government also firmly believe that any information relating to ministerial appointments and procedures is not appropriate for publication. The Government therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister, and I am not entirely surprised by his response. I think the Government’s concerns regarding confidentiality and protecting Civil Service advice were addressed in the amendment. In fact, it explicitly states that information would not be provided within the memorandum, but that security considerations had been raised should be in the public domain. I hear what the Minister said; we will explore this in the other avenues. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)
I thank the noble Baroness very much for that clarification; in that case, the amendment certainly needs some amendment itself.
I am also puzzled as to the route proposed that any disclosure, particularly from one of the intelligence agencies, can go to any public authority. Again, that seems a surprising route for a whistleblowing channel for somebody in the intelligence and security agencies.
More particularly, and more importantly, I absolutely fail to recognise the culture of cover-up that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, cites. Having worked in the Security Service for 33 years, I am confident in saying that, far from there being a culture of cover-up, there was in fact a strong willingness to speak up, as far as I could see. There was strong and, at times, fairly heated internal debate on some of the ethical matters that have been cited in this debate. So I do not believe that the characterisation of the intelligence agencies we have just heard in any sense accurate. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, gave the complete list of everybody to whom a member of the agencies could go, I think that almost anybody in the agencies would recognise their ability to go to the internal ethics counsellor—a role that plays an important part in actively encouraging debate of these issues—who has a direct right of access to the director-general of the day; I am sure that that would still be the case. That role has now extended from the Security Service to the other intelligence agencies. Also, it was clear and straightforward how you obtained the contact details for the external counsellor who acted as a whistleblowing channel directly outside the service. Of course, that was put in place specifically because of previous concerns that there was no such provision, and it was reflected in the legislation of the day.
I feel that the detail of this amendment is not clear —certainly not to me. The need for this amendment has not been made clear, in my view, because it is based on a rather misleading characterisation of the internal culture of the intelligence services. In my experience, there has been considerable focus on ethical matters and the ability internally to debate those.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, I thank Members of the Committee for all their speeches. Amendment 119 seeks an assessment of how the Act relates to the Official Secrets Act 1989. As we set out in last week’s debate, the new espionage offences in Part 1 of the Bill replace and reform the existing provisions in the Official Secrets Acts from 1911 to 1939. They carry strict tests for a person to be caught within those sections. For example, the first two offences apply when a person is acting for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This is distinct from the Official Secrets Act 1989, which covers unauthorised disclosures by Crown servants and government contractors. As the Committee knows, the Government are not reforming the 1989 Act through the Bill, as has been observed this evening. Under the existing law, it is possible that a person making a damaging disclosure could commit both the espionage offence in the Official Secrets Act 1911 and an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989.
Pausing there, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his contribution in relation to the 1911 Act. The difference, drawn out in the fact that you could commit both an offence of espionage under the Official Secrets Act and an offence under the 1989 Act, will continue to be the case. It is possible that a person could commit an offence under two pieces of legislation simultaneously and be charged in relation to both. That is not a matter unknown in the criminal law. Any overlap between the espionage offences in the Bill and the Official Secrets Act 1989 allows us to prosecute damaging acts in the most appropriate way. Where a person commits both a 1989 Act offence and an espionage offence under the Bill, the charging decision would be taken by the Crown Prosecution Service in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, as is always the case. CPS prosecutors select the charges that they consider are most appropriate on the facts of each case, and to reflect the nature of the wrongdoing. I hope that this explanation reassures the Committee that the Government have carefully considered the interaction between our new offences in the Bill and those in the 1989 Act.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised a question regarding reform of the 1989 Act, and I will address it directly. The Government’s view is that the Official Secrets Act 1989 is an essential part of our ability to protect national security and sensitive information. However, the views and concerns raised by stakeholders in response to our public consultation for the Bill, including those in favour of not reforming the Act at all, highlight the complexity of the legislation and the wide variety of interests that should properly be considered before pursuing any reform. Given its complexity, we are also concerned that reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989 at this time may distract from the Government’s package of measures in the Bill to counter state threats, and prevent us from providing law enforcement and the intelligence agencies with the tools that they need now directly to tackle these threats. Accordingly, we do not have any immediate plans to pursue reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, but will continue to keep that position under review. The matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, are well considered. Issues such as whether to increase maximum sentences under the Official Secrets Act 1989 would be considered as part of potential reform proposals and would be viewed in the round with the measures of sentences in the Bill.
Amendment 120 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, proposes the establishment of a new office for the national security whistleblower. We are told that the aim of such an office would be to protect whistleblowers who make disclosures related to offences under the Bill where disclosures are considered to be in the public interest. Of course I pay tribute to her in her ongoing work and efforts to champion the important cause of whistleblowing. The Government are committed to ensuring that our whistleblowing framework is robust, and I confirm that the business department intends to carry out the promised review of the existing framework, and that further details will be set out in due course in relation to that.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister. He is aware of the point I raised earlier in Committee, which, as he correctly pointed out, pertained more to the Official Secrets Act in respect of the authorised disclosure of information. The Law Commission’s recommendation is clear—that there should be an independent statutory commissioner, to which individuals can go, who has investigatory powers—but the Minister says that there are no plans to reform the 1989 legislation.
We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and earlier from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, that they do not recognise this culture, but the Law Commission came to its own view and its own recommendation. Do the Government accept that recommendation but then say that they are not going to do anything about it, or will we have to find a way to bring together the disclosure of information and the points that my noble friend raised? The Law Commission’s recommendation was perfectly clear, and it was not besmirching the culture within the agencies. It was a very clear recommendation.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Indeed, the Law Commission made a recommendation about a potential reform to the 1989 Act. As I have already said, that is not the purpose of this Bill and will be a matter for a future reform, which will not be conducted immediately, as I already explained in answer to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. The Law Commission’s recommendation will have considerable weight but, at this stage, I cannot prejudge any government decision in relation to the 1989 Act.
In last week’s debate, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the Government’s plans to update internal whistleblowing guidance. I can confirm that the Government regularly keep this guidance under review and, last year, they updated it to include specific reference to how to raise an issue that would require disclosure without breaching the Official Secrets Act 1989. The updated internal guidance has been shared across departments and agencies, with confirmation from all Whitehall departments that a review of their own processes and procedures has been undertaken or is planned.
Across government, organisations have also continued to undertake activities further to develop a safe and supportive culture for raising concerns. Over the last year, the majority, including all 17 Whitehall departments, have undertaken communications through awareness-raising events and campaigns, including an annual “Speak Up” campaign.
We of course understand that journalists have a specific and important role to play in holding government to account in our democratic society. We also understand that responsible journalists do not want unwittingly to put lives at risk or compromise national security. That is why we have robust processes in place which enable journalists to mitigate the harm caused when considering the publication of potentially damaging information.
For example, during the Government’s public consultation on the Bill, several media stakeholders commented on the value of the Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee—the DSMA—which alerts the media to the consequences of disclosing certain types of information and provides advice on how to mitigate damage, while leaving editors to judge whether to publish or broadcast. A number of editors already engage with this valuable process when considering the publication of sensitive information, and we encourage them, and others, to continue to do so.
The Government are committed to ensuring that these channels are safe, effective, and accessible. Accordingly, for the reasons I have just set out, the Government, with regret, cannot accept the tabled amendments and invite their withdrawal.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I will be brief, but will start by thanking the Minister for his response and all noble Lords for their contributions to this short but important debate. I am grateful to the Minister for following up on my question from last week about what was happening with the updating of guidance for people in departments across government who wish to raise concerns. But frankly, the headline from what the Minister has said is that the Government have kicked the reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, which was never particularly on the immediate horizon, into the long grass. That is deeply disappointing because, irrespective of one’s view, the issues of the public interest defence and people being able to come forward—whistleblowers, if you want to call them that—will not go away. Reforming the Official Secrets Act would have enabled us to debate that and come up with an Act that is relevant to 2023 and beyond. As I say, it is deeply disappointing that the Minister has effectively kicked that reform into the long grass, and that is the headline from this response to the amendments. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that regulations under clause 63 attract the affirmative procedure only if they specify a foreign power or other person not already specified. Regulations revoking a specification will be subject to the negative procedure.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(1A) His Majesty may by Order in Council provide for any provision of this Act other than section 20 to extend (with or without modifications) to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia.(1B) An Order in Council under subsection (1A) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confers power to extend the Bill to the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Clause 20 is excluded from the power because clause 20 is extended to the Sovereign Base Areas by clause 95(1)(b).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 124 creates the power to extend any provision in the Bill with or without modification to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus by way of Order in Council. The provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920 extend to the sovereign base areas, and this amendment will allow provisions of the Bill to be extended to the law of the sovereign base areas. This would ensure that harmful activity that the Bill addresses can be prosecuted in sovereign base areas when conducted there.
Clause 20, which provides for the aggravating factor to apply to some service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006, has been excluded from this power given that it is already being extended to the sovereign base areas though Clause 95(1)(b).
I end by putting on record that the Government consider that any references in this Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I therefore ask the Committee to support the inclusion of this amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
My Lords, I have very little to say with regard to the government amendment. I recognise the Government’s sensitivity to the ongoing issue of the politics within Cyprus.
As this is the last group in Committee, I thank the Ministers today, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Murray, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for their willingness to engage. As my noble friend Lord Wallace indicated, there is a lot of work to be done in persuading the Committee that the measures in the Bill will meet the Government’s intent. There are some key areas of the Bill where we are looking for more information. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, indicated on an earlier group that he is reflecting and that there is more to follow. We await the correspondence from the Ministers. We are very happy to meet Ministers before Report. I say from these Benches that it might be advisable for the Government not to be in a rush to schedule Report, so that there can be proper thinking on the many aspects of the Bill about which we have highlighted problems.
Wednesday 1st March 2023
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 88-I(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (28 Feb 2023)
17:31 - Division on Amendment 4 - Ayes: 79 / Noes: 226 - Amendment 4 disagreed.
17:44 - Division on Amendment 18 - Ayes: 82 / Noes: 212 - Amendment 18 disagreed.
17:57 - Division on Amendment 18A - Ayes: 155 / Noes: 209 - Amendment 18A disagreed.
19:12 - Division on Amendment 51 - Ayes: 209 / Noes: 170 - Amendment 51 agreed.
21:24 - Division on Amendment 80 - Ayes: 73 / Noes: 141 - Amendment 80 disagreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, before I speak to the amendments in this group, I would like to talk about some of the reasons why we are introducing them. Some of our amendments have been brought forward to reassure noble Lords and others that the offence will not capture the genuine work of journalists. We have listened to the concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords in the House, and some of these amendments are a direct response to them.
The Government have heard from media stakeholders who believe that they could no longer hold the Government to account and that these clauses could inhibit the publication of articles critical of the UK’s defence or security response. I want to address those concerns directly. The Government are committed to defending our freedoms—values which define us and make us who we are. Few are more fundamental to that than freedom of the press. There is no intention to stifle or censor the media’s ability to expose or shine a light on issues. That is the proper role and function of the media and why the UK is such a strong advocate of media freedom globally.
Before we get into the details of individual provisions, I remind the House that these provisions replace the existing law in the Official Secrets Act 1911. We have been provided with a number of examples of journalistic reporting that have been cited as part of the case that more must be done to protect journalists in this Bill. Even were the Government to accept that any of these examples could hypothetically be caught by any of the offences, the same would be true of the existing laws. Accordingly, great comfort should be taken from the fact that no prosecutions of journalists have taken place under the espionage laws to date. I want to confirm again, on the record, that the focus of the Bill is on protecting the UK from threats from foreign states and those acting against UK interests, not interfering with the free press.
I begin with the amendments focusing on “ought reasonably to know”. The phrase was said to be unclear, with concerns raised that it could be interpreted as imputed knowledge, thereby catching those who engaged in specified conduct unwittingly—who did not know but are told that they should have known. I would like to strongly emphasise that this is not the Government’s intention and we do not consider that the current formulation would be interpreted by the courts in this way. However, we have considered the concerns raised on this issue, particularly the useful contributions in Committee from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. We agree that it would be helpful to clarify the meaning. These amendments therefore clarify that the prosecution must look at what matters were known to the individual at the time in determining whether that individual ought reasonably to have known something.
I now turn to amendments which all relate to the offence of materially assisting a foreign intelligence service. The amendments that the Government have put forward update the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). These amendments are similar to the ones put forward in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The effect of these amendments is that the wording
“it is reasonably possible may”
in both Clauses 3(2)(a) and (b) would be replaced with “is likely to”, which in this context we see as meaning a real possibility. In order to ensure consistency across the clause, Amendment 13 also updates the relevant wording in Clause 3(3).
The Government have tabled amendments in response to a point raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. These would add protections for lawyers, ensuring that any genuine legal activity will not be captured under the Clause 3 offence in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the helpful explanation of the many government amendments in this group. I thank him and the Government also for the considerable movement they have made in response to criticisms made by me and many others at Second Reading and in Committee of the breadth of the offences under Part 1. We are very grateful to the Government for the comprehensive way in which they have listened to our criticisms and moved towards positions that we have taken.
In particular, the troublesome phrase “ought reasonably to know” has been clarified by the qualification that what a defendant ought reasonably to have known falls to be judged having regard to other facts known to that defendant. Furthermore, in Clause 3, as the Minister explained,
“conduct that it is reasonably possible may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”
becomes conduct that “is likely to” materially assist a foreign intelligence service.
I welcome the new strengthened review provisions introduced by the new clause proposed in Amendment 85, in place of the old Clause 56. These and other concessions in the amendments moved by the Government allay many of our concerns.
However, there is one area left untouched that we say is still completely wrong: the failure to tighten up the definition of the
“interests of the United Kingdom”.
That is the subject of our Amendments 2 and 3, and the corresponding amendments wherever the phrase
“safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
appears. I note the word “or”: the interests of the United Kingdom alone are enough to qualify. It is principally in support of those amendments that I speak now.
We are concerned about the interests of journalists, and that is the title of this group. I do not accept what the Minister said when he suggested that it was permissible to rely on the fact that journalists have not in the past been prosecuted under security legislation. That may as a matter of fact be true, but it is neither safe nor good legislative practice to rely on it without tightening up the legislation so as to prevent such prosecutions succeeding.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I thank the Minister for his explanation of the Government’s amendments. We recognise that they have come a long way since Committee. The amendments in this group seek to address the unintended consequences of offences for journalists and NGOs. Concerns have been raised throughout the Bill that the legitimate activities of journalists, such as the possession of leaked information, could lead to their prosecution. The main focus of today’s debate is Amendment 18 from the noble Lord, Lord Black. It aims to give a specific offence, whereas our Amendment 79B calls for an assessment of the impact of this group.
Given the significant concessions made by the Government, I will not divide the House on Amendment 79B and we will abstain on Amendments 18 and 72 if they are moved to a vote. However, I understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, when she said that she would listen to the Minister, deliberate and see what will be done. I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, will press Amendment 18 to a vote even if the noble Lord, Lord Black, chooses not to. Either way, the Labour Party will abstain on those votes.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate for their very warm words. The strength of opinion highlights how important journalistic freedom is, and the Government take it extremely seriously. Whistleblowing will be dealt with in the next group, so if the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, allows, I will not deal with it in my response.
I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Black for his amendment and for his general comments in support of this Bill. As I have said, we have listened to concerns raised by the media sector and noble Lords. The Government’s amendments are a direct response to them. I will endeavour to provide the clarity that my noble friend Lady Stowell asked for.
On my noble friend Lord Black’s amendment, the Government cannot accept a defence linked to the definition of a recognised news publisher. Rather than taking activity out of scope, the defence would act as a way for foreign powers, particularly those seeking to cause the UK harm, to avoid prosecution under this clause and engage in harmful espionage activity. If a journalist is deliberately colluding with a foreign intelligence service in relation to their UK-related activities, such as by revealing intelligence capabilities that could be exploited by that intelligence service, it is absolutely right that they should face criminal sanction.
I acknowledge that the amendment seeks to provide a targeted protection for journalists by referencing “a recognised news publisher”. The Government have serious concerns that any individuals working under the cover of journalism in foreign media organisations operating in the UK would be able to abuse this provision. Even if hostile state actors did not currently use journalistic cover to engage in espionage, having a defence such as this would almost certainly encourage them to do so. This defence would apply even if the conduct in question was probably against the public interest. This is simply not acceptable; it would give foreign states a back door to commit espionage. Accordingly, the Government cannot accept this amendment and I ask my noble friend not to move it.
However, I want to reassure the media sector that publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which might incidentally be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would not fall within the scope of this offence; nor would the handling of materials in the course of genuine journalistic activities, nor likely the other offences in this Bill. For an offence to be committed under Clause 3, an individual would need to engage in conduct intending
“to materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,
or know, or should have known given the information they had at the time, that it was likely that such conduct would do so.
The Government may profoundly disagree with the conclusions of some journalists, but we will not hide behind the criminal law to suppress genuine competing views and it is almost inconceivable that genuine journalism will be caught within the threshold for criminal activity. My noble friend raised some specific examples and there are many—for example, those relating Snatch Land Rovers a few years ago—but the Government do not consider that the publication of an article that was critical of the UK Government, and which incidentally might be capable of assisting a foreign intelligence service, would fall within the scope of this offence. I think it is worth repeating that.
Many of the examples that have been provided in various articles are stories which relate to terrorism. No journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under terrorism legislation. Even where examples are relevant to state threats activity, no journalist has been prosecuted for an offence under the Official Secrets Act. This Bill will be no different and the Government do not accept the view that it criminalises the activity described in the media.
The test of material assistance is key. To be “material”, the assistance to the foreign intelligence service must be important, considerable or in a significant way. As with all criminal offences, it is the specific circumstances of the case that will be important and will be a matter for the prosecuting authorities, but we would expect prosecutions to involve those with known links to foreign intelligence services, including evidence of a relationship, tasking or payment. Absent these links, the Government struggle to envisage even the most provocative piece of journalism meeting the threshold for the offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, noted the Statement made last week on Iran International, and many noble Lords will have read it; it highlighted the potentially lethal operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps taking place in the UK. Far from criminalising the important work of journalists, this offence is intended to protect Iran International, and others who live and work here, from such direct attacks on our people and values.
I turn to amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with regards to security or defence interests under Clauses 1, 3, 4, 8, 12 and 14. These amendments seek to narrow the definition of “interests of the UK” to ensure a focus on the protection of national security and defence interests, alongside economic security interests. Similar amendments were tabled in Committee, so I will reiterate the concerns the Government continue to have with these changes, as they remain relevant. Narrowing the interest element to cover only security or defence interests significantly moves away from the “safety or interests of the UK” test that already exists and is understood within current espionage legislation. I am afraid these amendments move away from the status quo by creating a test with an unduly narrow focus on national security. While the noble Lord importantly made specific reference to interests pertaining to the UK in its economic security, these amendments continue to not include other critical UK interests relating to public health or, for example, the preservation of our democracy.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the case of Chandler v DPP, as did his colleague the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. “Safety or interests of the UK” has been considered by the courts to mean the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown, on the advice of Ministers. We expect this interpretation to carry forward to the new legislation and there are safeguards in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that somebody is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact.
Each offence under this legislation includes a test that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit a Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is protected for a purpose
“that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”
and the activity must be conducted for, on behalf of or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This limits the type of conduct capable of being caught under this offence, and in particular the foreign power condition ensures that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.
I now turn to Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The most concerning consequence of this amendment is that where a state threats actor, acting under a proxy, has been engaged in harmful activity, which was an offence under the Bill, they would not commit an offence even if it could be shown that they were receiving specific funding in relation to that activity from a foreign power. The House will note the references to “state threats”, “foreign powers” and “national security”. Much as the amorous adventures of Matt Hancock may be of interest, clearly none of those falls in the scope of this offence.
It is no secret that those with hostile intent try to hide their activities through genuine means, and through this amendment there is a real risk that they could operate through proxies in order to make it more difficult to be prosecuted. It is therefore clear to see that narrowing the scope of the foreign power condition will have a damaging impact across the Bill. The Government considers this amendment would create unnecessary loopholes for state actors to exploit.
I would like to remind the House that the Government amended Clause 31(2)(c) in the other place to put it beyond doubt that there needs to be a clear link between the conduct and any assistance or funding from a foreign power for the condition to be met. It is the Government’s view that this puts the focus on the foreign power, ensuring that financial or other assistance from the foreign power is caught only when it is provided to enable the person to carry out the conduct, not when it is just any financial or other assistance.
I would also like to make it clear that Clause 31(2)(d), which concerns activity carried out in collaboration with, or with the agreement of, a foreign power, requires the foreign power to be actively involved in that collaboration or agreement; it does not cover cases where a person’s activities align with state objectives. The Government therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, not to press her amendment.
To conclude, as all speakers have noted, the Government have moved a very long way in ensuring that journalistic freedoms are not being unduly encroached in this Bill, so I hope noble Lords will accept our amendments and withdraw or not press theirs.
Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)
Before my noble friend sits down, I will offer one point of clarification. I will of course respond to the chair when called to do so after the next group, but I want to say that I am very grateful for the assurances he has given about the scope and intent of the Bill with regard to responsible reporting. My noble friend has made clear that Parliament’s intent in passing the Bill is not to interfere with the free press or investigative journalism and, on that basis, I will be withdrawing my amendment.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments covers the introduction of a public interest defence—a PID. This topic has been debated at length throughout the passage of the Bill. As the House will hear, the Government agree with the criticisms of Amendment 79, just elucidated so clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby.
I thank all noble Lords for their remarks during this debate, especially the degree of involvement we have had in the development of the Bill generally, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, on the last group. However, it is right to say that the amendment does not address the issues that arise, and the Government therefore cannot accept it. As I set out during the debate in Committee, the offences in the Bill target harmful activity from foreign states, not whistleblowing or public interest journalism. Our view, therefore, is that a public interest defence is not only unnecessary but risks significantly undermining the utility of the provisions in the Bill.
The Government’s principal position is that a public interest defence in relation to espionage is not appropriate. While we note the changes made to the amendment, this does not change the Government’s view on the matter. Notably, the risk with a public interest defence is that, at the point that the defence comes into play, the harm will already have been done. Seeking to rebut any form of public interest defence in criminal proceedings risks only compounding the damage. This, of course, is a point already eloquently made by the noble Lord, Lord Evans.
Furthermore, the proposed public interest defence for onward disclosures of information obtained via the espionage offences in the Bill, as has been proposed here, is inherently damaging to the national interest. I also entirely agree in this regard with the noble Lord, Lord Evans. To permit onward disclosures of this information under any circumstances would significantly undermine the weight we are affording to these offences.
The questions posed about the Law Commission’s recommendations relate to the Official Secrets Act 1989 which is not, as we discussed in Committee, the topic of reform in this legislation. We have heard strong views and concerns raised about the 1989 Act in our public consultation, and we need to take time to give proper consideration to those concerns. Therefore, we are not reforming the Official Secrets Act 1989 in this Bill.
It is clear to us that reform is complex and engages a wide range of interests. It is only right that proper due consideration should be given to the concerns that stakeholders have raised in the consultation. Furthermore, we need to prioritise delivery of our wider package of measures to tackle state threats and ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence partners have the tools that they need to keep us safe from those seeking to do us harm. We do not want the complexity of Official Secrets Act 1989 reform to distract from this. To that end, I agree with what the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Evans, said.
I turn to the points raised in the previous group by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in relation to whistleblowers. We say that there are sufficient safeguards for whistle- blowers in the espionage offences. For the offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information, that activity has to be for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. If an individual uses appropriate whistleblowing routes, their conduct would not meet this requirement—a point powerfully made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, when these amendments were being considered in Committee.
For the offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets, the activity has to be unauthorised. Using appropriate whistleblowing routes would not meet the requirement for unauthorised activity. Moreover, there is a damage element to the offence in Clause 2(2)(b). For the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service, the person has to know or reasonably ought to know that their conduct may assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK activities or intend their conduct to do so. This is very different from reporting something to an appropriate regulatory body as a whistleblower.
It is not the case that there is a reliance upon juries in the place of a whistleblowing defence, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, appeared to contend. The role of a jury, when advised by the judge, is to determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty based on the evidence presented during the trial. This takes up many of the points raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier in his speech a moment ago. This is an integral tenet of our justice system and applies in 1989 Act cases. This does not mean that the Official Secrets Act 1989 legislation is deficient. There is, of course, no statutory public interest defence in the 1989 Act, and therefore it is already clear in the law that juries should not acquit a defendant on the basis that they consider that the public interest in making a disclosure outweighs the damage caused by the disclosure. The Government are clear that we do not consider the introduction of a public interest defence in the Official Secrets Act 1989 to be appropriate. It is not the safest or most appropriate way for an individual to raise a concern of wrongdoing and have it rectified. It is already possible to make disclosures of information that are not damaging without breaching the 1989 Act.
However, the Government have heard and understand the concerns that the Bill could inadvertently capture genuine journalistic activity, as we discussed in the previous group. Even if the Government were to accept that these offences risk criminalising such genuine activity, a public interest defence would not be an appropriate way to address this. This sentiment was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, during the debate on the public interest defence in Committee, for which I am grateful. Indeed, a public interest defence would create loopholes that hostile actors would use to commit espionage against the United Kingdom.
As the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was quite correct in saying, the difficulty for whistleblowers is that they have an imperfect picture of the available information. It is not for the whistleblower to determine the extent of potential damage caused by the disclosure in the public interest.
The question of damage was raised in the debate. It was suggested that a damage requirement should be added to these offences. The Government’s position is that this would significantly undermine their utility. The type of activity described in the offences is inherently damaging. For example, in Clause 1, if an individual discloses protected information to a foreign power or otherwise on their behalf or for their benefit with a purpose
“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”,
this is inherently damaging. Including a damage requirement would mean that we may need to prove the damage caused by disclosure in court. This, of course, would risk compounding that damage further. If we could not prove that damage in court, for example, because the risk of compounding the damage was too great, a person could freely provide protected information to a foreign power with the intention to prejudice the United Kingdom.
I already noted the potential risks and loopholes that could be created and exploited. This is not a defence in relation to Clause 3(2). The Government have extensively considered the arguments for and against a public interest defence but have concluded that the risk this could cause to the United Kingdom and the fact that this would undermine the purposes of the Bill mean that such a defence is not appropriate. Therefore, there is no need for an assessment and formal consultation on the inclusion of such a defence as tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, at Amendment 18A and the Government do not accept that amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, there have been significant changes to the oversight provisions in the Bill. It is correct that this amendment should be viewed in light of those changes in position by the Government.
Instead, we say that the focus should be on ensuring that the drafting of the requirements and offences in the Bill is sufficiently tightly drawn to ensure that genuine activity, including by journalists, is not in scope. This is why the Government have responded by tabling amendments to the provisions in Part 1, as stated a moment ago by my noble friend Lord Sharpe. This includes clarifying the phrase “ought reasonably to know” and the amendments to Clause 3. For these reasons, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.
I move now to Amendment 79A, which proposes the establishment of a new office for the national security whistleblower. I am grateful for the indication from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that he will not be pushing the matter to a vote but let me outline the government position in relation to that. This proposal differs from that debated in Committee in this House. The Government’s view remains that such a role is not required in relation to these offences. As I set out in Committee,
“The Government are committed to ensuring that our whistle- blowing framework is robust, and I confirm that the business department intends to carry out the promised review of the existing framework, and that further details will be set out in due course in relation to that.”—[Official Report, 18/1/23; col. 1913.]
We have just debated how the Bill targets hostile activities for and on behalf of foreign powers. I have been explicit that this legislation is not targeting the genuine work of journalists. By extension, it is therefore clear that the Bill does not target genuine whistleblowing. Consequently, a whistleblowing office in relation to this Bill misunderstands the aims of the legislation. Again, I refer the House to the Committee stage, when I and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, set out the options available where an individual has a genuine need to raise a concern and I shall not repeat those here. The Government are committed to ensuring that these channels are safe, effective and accessible. For these reasons, we cannot accept the tabled amendments. I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the test for when a person commits an offence under Clause 3(2).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 3, page 3, line 25 and his second amendment to Clause 3, page 3, line 27.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(ba) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment creates a defence to the offence in Clause 3 for lawyers carrying on legal activities.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
““lawyer” has the meaning given by paragraph 5(3) of Schedule 15;“legal activity” has the meaning given by paragraph 5(4) of Schedule 15;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment defines terms used in Lord Sharpe’s amendment to Clause 3, page 4, line 13.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, my name is also on these amendments, and I have also spoken with the High Commission; my noble friend Lord Purvis has spoken to both the Minister on the Front Bench and to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, in the Foreign Office. If I have an interest to declare, it is that 25 years ago I worked on the Cyprus conflict and discovered a fair amount about the complexities of Cypriot politics—and they are no less complex today than they were then.
I will make a number of domestic comparisons. This is in my experience very much a Home Office Bill; it does not appear to take into account diplomatic niceties or the sensitivities of other states. We have some bitter experience in this country of sensitivities about sovereignty and the attempts by other states to exert legislative authority over this country, in relation to the EU. We are still being told that the European Court of Justice has imperial ambitions, and that we had to regain our sovereignty because it was trying to legislate for us, about our country.
Beyond that, of course, we have US bases in this country. I am very familiar with RAF Menwith Hill, which is close to where I live in Yorkshire, and I know a fair amount about RAF Mildenhall. The Minister will remember that when it appeared that the wife of a US serviceman at RAF Mildenhall was trying to evade British law by claiming diplomatic immunity and then going to the United States, there was a campaign of outrage in the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and others over this incursion into British sovereignty.
I remind the Minister that the agreements between the UK and the United States over US bases in this country are extremely discreet: the details have not been published; they are renewed every 10 years without parliamentary debate; and the two countries negotiate quietly about the conditions under which they operate. They do not involve Congress legislating with reference to these extraterritorial bases in the United Kingdom. Indeed, if Congress were to legislate with reference to RAF Mildenhall, RAF Menwith Hill and other bases, I am sure that the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and others would be outraged on our behalf at this apparent imperial incursion into British sovereignty.
I am conscious that Cypriot domestic opinion has as many elements, from the right to the left, as we have in this country. Of course, it would be a populist, nationalistic, mischievous campaign to provoke a public outrage in Cyprus about this apparent incursion into Cypriot sovereignty, but we in Britain now have some hard-won and bitter experience of how easy it is for populist and mischievous politicians to cause nationalistic outrage.
These references are not necessary. Clause 97 is enough. I hope that the Minister will take advice and consider that the Government should withdraw the references to the sovereign base areas in these other clauses. I repeat: Clause 97 is enough. The good will of the Government of Cyprus, and of the public in Cyprus, is important to this country, and we should not offend them.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, this group covers a variety of related topics. The House has heard only about the amendments pertaining to the sovereign base areas, but I will address the other amendments advanced by the Government. The group covers amendments to the meaning of “government department” and changes to Schedule 2 to the Bill, and it deals with the amendments on the sovereign base areas, which I will come to in a second.
I start with a query raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in Committee. The question at the time was whether the reference to “government department” in the meaning of “Crown interest” in Clause 7 may include the departments of the devolved Administrations. It is the Government’s intention that any reference to “government department” within Part 1 of the Bill, including those falling under “Crown interest”, applies only to government departments of the United Kingdom. This means that we are not seeking to extend the meaning of “government department” to the devolved Administrations. I hope that this goes some way to settling the noble Lord’s concerns.
The Government have also made a number of changes to Schedule 2 to the Bill. In Committee, they made an amendment so that the Bill makes explicit provision that a Schedule 2 production order can be made to a judge without the subject being given notice of the application in advance. Currently, sub-paragraph (d) of condition 5 of the search and seizure powers at paragraphs 9 and 25 of Schedule 2 outlines that this condition may be met if the service of notice of an application for a production order may seriously prejudice an investigation. Without further change, this condition is no longer operationally effective because a warrant for search and seizure would not be granted in instances where the use of a production order more generally, which had been given without notice to a judge, would prejudice an investigation.
This group of amendments therefore closes the gap by bringing condition 5 closer to the equivalent provisions of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which sets out that the use of a production order would not be appropriate because an investigation may be seriously prejudiced unless a constable can secure immediate access to the material. It is important to stress that it has always been the Government’s position that the use of production orders should be considered in the first instance, resorting to a warrant where such an order is not appropriate to the investigation.
Finally, government Amendment 60 simply makes it clear that Acts of Adjournal made in relation to the production order powers in part 2 of Schedule 2 would be made by the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland. This is already the case within the current drafting, and we seek only to make this clear. Government Amendments 55 and 59 simply add the offences under Schedules 3 and 4—which were added to the Bill in Committee in the Commons—to the list of offences for which the powers of entry, search and seizure in Schedule 2 are not available.
I now turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Wallace of Saltaire. These amendments seek to remove references to the sovereign base areas from the prohibited places provisions in Clauses 7 and 8 of the Bill. The sovereign base areas are critical for UK defence and include a unique governance structure among the overseas territories given that the administrator, who is also the commander of British Forces Cyprus, has all the executive and legislative authority of the Government of the UK overseas territory.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Is the Minister classifying the sovereign base areas as having the same relationship with Britain as overseas territories? I was not aware that the SBAs were formally overseas territories.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
Clearly, the SBAs are a special structure, as set out in the 1960 treaty. As I say, they have a unique governance structure which I have already described. The unique context of the SBAs is precisely why we are including the option to extend the legislation to the SBAs in their entirety.
The thought behind these amendments is that the power in Clause 97 to extend the legislation to the SBAs is sufficient on its own. I understand the thinking behind this. However, these references are quite distinct and achieve different aims. References to the SBAs in Clauses 7 and 8 ensure that harmful activity taking place in respect of prohibited places will be prosecutable under UK law, in UK courts, only where it constitutes an offence under Clause 4. It is important to stress that the offence under Clause 5 cannot be committed in the SBAs, as this clause does not apply outside the United Kingdom. Similarly, the police powers under Clause 6 are conferred only on constables under UK law, and as such cannot be used in the SBAs. This inclusion of the SBAs maintains the status quo, given provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1911, which already cover prohibited places in the SBAs as part of His Majesty’s dominions.
Clause 97, however, creates a power to extend any provision in Part 1 of the National Security Bill, with or without modification, to the SBAs. Should the power be used, the provisions will then form part of SBA law, and this would allow harmful activity to be prosecuted in SBA courts. Removing references in Clauses 7 and 8 to the SBAs would mean that those sites were no longer protected under UK law. That would reduce the protections currently afforded to them under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which will of course be repealed through this Bill. Furthermore, it is critical that these protections are afforded under UK law given that there is no guarantee that an Order in Council would be made so as to extend this part of the Bill to SBA law, leaving those sites potentially without any legislative protection. To reiterate the point I made in Committee—
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The point, as the noble Lord will appreciate, is that the Bill should endeavour not to leave any potential vacancies which would potentially deprive the SBAs of applicability to this very important statutory provision. I reiterate the point I made in Committee that the Government consider that any references in the Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty, concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.
To address the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, I can confirm that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the SBAs were consulted extensively throughout the Bill’s development and agree on its conclusion. I therefore disagree with the noble Lord that relying solely on Clause 97 would cause no harm.
I hope this explains the need to maintain the references in Clauses 7 and 8 and why the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The Minister has given us an explanation and I accept that the reference to a constable is to a United Kingdom constable, but Clause 6 gives the constable the power to clear people out of prohibited places. Why is it necessary for United Kingdom law to apply? Why is it not enough that this power should exist under the Order in Council applicable to the SBA? Since only the United Kingdom constable is covered in Clause 6, how can it possibly be necessary to define “prohibited place” for the purposes of Clause 6 as including places outside the United Kingdom? I just do not understand it.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
The Government take the view that it is necessary to have the matter protected in UK law in addition to SBA law, and that, I am afraid, is the answer.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The Minister was careful when he said that the SBAs and the FCDO were consulted by the Home Office on bringing forward this decision. I would assume that one department would consult another in its own Government with regards to a Bill—I think we can take it as read that the Home Office should have consulted the FCDO. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made was that there was no consultation with the Government of Cyprus, which is embedded in the principles of the establishment treaty in 1960. That is why there is a problem with it.
With regards to the further point from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, if it is only a UK constable, and only within UK domestic law, who enforces it within the SBA area? Who enforces it within the adjacent area to the SBAs, given that the measures are much wider than simply activities here in the UK? Who enforces it there?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
As I hope I have already made clear, it is only Clause 4 that applies. Clause 6 does not apply in this context.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I am afraid I am very puzzled as a result of the Minister’s reply.
First, I think he was suggesting that the Government of Cyprus had been fully consulted. If he was suggesting that, all I can say is that that is the opposite of what I was told, and what the noble Lords, Lord Purvis, Lord Wallace and Lord Anderson, and everybody else who has been spoken to has been told. Secondly, why did the Government change Clause 97? Clause 97 provides for the powers earlier in the Bill to be operated within the SBA following an Order in Council. Are the Government saying that the justice provisions in the SBA are inadequate in some way? I can tell your Lordships that those of us who live around the legal profession know an awful lot of people who go and do cases and even sit as judges in those places, and that is not what they have found on the whole.
I would suggest that the Minister’s reply was insensitive—if I can be forgiven for using that word—and injudicious, and I invite the Government to consider it between now and the coming into law of this Bill. I am not going to press this to a Division tonight; I am not going to ask for the opinion of the House. But I feel a strong sense of dissatisfaction at the explanation, such as it is, that has been given. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that “Crown interest” includes interests belonging to a government department of the United Kingdom only.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment reduces the burden of proof on the defendant from a legal burden to an evidential burden.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes an amendment to the Online Safety Bill which makes an offence under Clause 13 a priority offence.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, Amendments 40, 41 and 50 relate to the offence of foreign interference.
Amendment 40 makes a procedural and technical tweak to address changes to the timetables of this Bill and the Online Safety Bill. The addition of foreign interference to the list of priority offences in Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill is government policy, which has been agreed at every stage of this Bill since its introduction. Designating foreign interference as a priority offence under the Online Safety Bill would disrupt state-backed disinformation targeted at the UK through the duties imposed on platforms by the relevant provisions in the Online Safety Bill.
However, now that the National Security Bill has overtaken the Online Safety Bill in its parliamentary passage, we must address the procedural challenges posed by this change to respective timetables. Government Amendment 40 will remove the reference to the Online Safety Bill from Clause 13(8) of the National Security Bill. The Government will then seek to add the offence of foreign interference to Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Bill via an amendment to that Bill. The effect of this amendment will be exactly the same as the current approach; it is simply the change in timetabling that means this amendment is necessary.
Government Amendment 41 clarifies the scope of the foreign interference effect contained within Clause 14(1)(a) to ensure it is not misinterpreted. Foreign interference includes interference with rights and freedoms that are protected under domestic law, such as freedom of speech. We know that foreign states have sought to intimidate or threaten diaspora communities with punishment to prevent them engaging in lawful protest activities. We want such activity taking place in the UK to be covered by the offence of foreign interference. Government Amendment 41 simply changes the wording in the offence to “in the United Kingdom” as opposed to
“as it has effect under the law of the United Kingdom”.
This will ensure that it is not misinterpreted to have a broader effect than we intend. It does not change our policy or affect the operational utility of the offence.
Amendment 50 is minor and does not introduce new policy. It simply reinforces the Government’s intention behind what is originally meant by “political decisions”.
Some concerns have been raised that references to proceedings in Parliament in both the offence of foreign interference and the foreign influence registration scheme risk creating unhelpful ambiguity about the prohibition on impeaching or questioning proceedings in Parliament contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Government’s position is that such references did not and could not displace provisions in the Bill of Rights and were not intended to do so. However, we have amended the provisions to ensure there can be no suggestion of interference with privilege.
To address these concerns, government Amendment 48 removes references to proceedings of the UK Parliament and devolved legislatures from the definition of “political processes”. A key element of foreign interference is the infiltration of our democracy, including the institutions and processes which uphold our democracy. The other amendments we have tabled therefore seek to ensure that the offence still protects against such interference.
Amendment 49 adds to the definition of “political processes” a reference to
“the activities of an informal group consisting of or including members of”
the relevant legislatures of the United Kingdom. The policy intention remains the same—to capture foreign interference in Parliament targeted at the heart of our democracy—but we are achieving it in a slightly different way. I will briefly explain how we will do this.
The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials within Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions.
However, with this amendment we ensure that we also capture activity that is part of our democratic processes but which does not have official status within Parliament. We have therefore added reference to informal groups, which will include APPGs, to the definition of “political processes”. Foreign powers seeking to interfere in political processes through those who do not have public functions—for example, an external secretariat—will continue to be caught by the offence.
I turn briefly to government Amendments 42 and 44, which give effect to the new approach I have outlined, with Amendment 44 relating to the “legal processes” limb. They give effect to the new approach such that those interference effects apply otherwise than in the exercise of public functions. Government Amendments 43 and 47 are consequential amendments following from the change in definitions.
Taken as a whole, the amendments do not introduce new policy but simply reinforce the existing policy on the interference from foreign states that this offence is designed to protect against. I therefore ask noble Lords to support the inclusion of these amendments and beg to move.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 51, which stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Evans of Weardale.
This is about transparency. When the electors go to an election, obviously they consider the policies that are placed before them. They also consider the personalities that are placed before them, because they are voting for an individual to carry out the important and valuable role of their Member of Parliament. They also should be entitled to enough transparency to judge the ethical matrix in which each political party operates, as represented by the individuals who stand as candidates. This moderate and temperate Amendment 51 is an attempt to improve the knowledge that voters have about the ethical matrix of the political parties that stand behind the candidates they are able to vote for and have to choose from.
We know that there are problems about the ethical matrix of political parties. Sometimes it is not their fault, because outside forces, hostile actors from foreign countries, make interventions into elections—for example, via the internet—in an attempt to slant the vote in one direction or another. However, there is also a serious risk—I accuse no party of impropriety in this respect, at least for the purposes of this contribution to your Lordships’ debate—that foreign actors, foreign powers, may seek to influence an election, for example by making substantial donations to that party’s election fighting fund which enable it to fight the election at an advantage compared with other parties.
I will not go back to my days as a very happy Liberal and then Liberal Democrat MP and talk about the disadvantage we always started from because we had less money than the other parties. However, we were always worried, in those days at least—I am sure it is still the same today—by contributions that might have come from foreign powers and that would give an even greater advantage, concealed from the electorate, to those political parties.
So what this amendment seeks to do is protect us from the likes of Putin’s cronies, who might, one way or another, find their way to dinners, contribution events and even meeting people in this great building. We seek to establish a register. In effect, each political party would have to create a policy statement which meant that they were obliged to disclose at least the outline of contributions made by a foreign power—we are not talking about rich foreigners or wealthy businesspeople but about a foreign power which has a political reason for trying to influence the result of an election, either made directly or through an intermediary.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I rise briefly to say that we very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; were he to push it to a vote, we would certainly support him in that Division.
I do not want to repeat much of what has been said by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Wallace, Lord Evans and Lord West. However, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was right to say that, although this is a modest amendment, its consequences are quite serious. There is no doubt that people are concerned about some of the issues that they have read about in the papers around foreign interference in elections and the funding of political parties. One of the things that we often debate in this House is confidence in our democracy and democratic system, including the threats to them and the erosion of that confidence. Sometimes, these may be small steps but they are important ones that can contribute in our trying to do all we can to protect our democracy. People are worried about foreign interference in elections and the integrity of our democratic system.
It is right to point out, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, did, that, through this Bill, we are requiring significant steps to be taken by businesses, organisations, industry, financial services and all sorts of other bodies to ensure that they conform to certain regulations that protect our national security. It would be right for them to ask, “Why is there one rule for us but another for political parties?” It is quite right that this amendment is supported; I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will seek to test the opinion of the House and that his amendment is supported by the majority of Members, because it is an important step in protecting the integrity of our democracy in the way that noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lady Hayter on the Labour Benches, pointed out.
Having said that, I want to ask one practical question with respect to many of the amendments that the Government have brought forward, which, by and large, we support. I want to deal with Amendment 49, the explanatory statement for which says:
“This amendment adds to the definition of ‘political processes’ the activities of groups such as all party parliamentary groups.”
I understand the bit about all-party groups but the implication there is in “such as”. Are the Government saying that the amendment is relevant to other groups? If so, can the Minister explain that to us?
With that, as I say, I very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, because it is very important.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group.
I will start, if I may, by addressing the question from the noble Lord, Lord West, by repeating something that I said in my opening speech; I think it goes some way to answering him. The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials in Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions. I hope that answers his question.
In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about Amendment 49, let me say that he is completely right. The reference to
“the activities of an informal group”
in this amendment is, as I think noble Lords know, designed to capture interference activities in APPGs by foreign powers. We are seeking to capture interference whether or however any person participates in the activities of these informal groups. We expect that to cover MPs and people external to Parliament and government who participate in the actions of such groups, but we also envisage informal groups to include things such as “friends of” groups. The use of the term “acting in that capacity” ensures that we do not capture things such as parliamentary book clubs but instead focus on those caught, such as the 1922 Committee, although they could also be covered by the public functions limb of the test. I hope that clears this up.
I know that Amendment 51 is a duplicate of a previous amendment, now tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The Government do not believe that this amendment is necessary, I am afraid. I was going to quote myself and say again that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls, but I am slightly more reluctant to do so after hearing the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. However, we believe that our regime ensures that only those with a genuine interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent.
I will go into more detail on this point, if I may, because I believe that the noble Lord’s ethical matrix is already in existence. It is already an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already report all donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; these are then published online for public scrutiny. Political parties are by law required to undertake reasonable steps to verify whether a donor is permissible and obtain their relevant details for the reporting requirements. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be reported and returned to the Electoral Commission, which also produces guidance outlining how the recipient of a donation can undertake these checks.
As I say, UK electoral law already sets out a regime of donation and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, so only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations; they include UK-registered electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities, as well as otherwise eligible donors such as Irish citizens who meet prescribed conditions and can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations that are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. The failure to return such a donation either to the donor or, as I just described, to the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence; any such donations must also be reported to the Electoral Commission. The Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.
The transparency of electoral funding is obviously a key cornerstone of the UK’s electoral system. All political parties recognise that third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report it to the Electoral Commission or their local returning officer; that information is publicly available. For transparency, all donations to political parties and campaigners must be recorded and certain donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission; as I said, these include donations from impermissible donors and donations from the same permissible source that amount to over £7,500 in one calendar year. To ensure transparency, donation reports are published online by the commission for public scrutiny.
To register as an overseas elector, a British citizen has to present ID. However, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that, if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election, you are also eligible to donate to that party. We believe that overseas electors are important participants in our democracy, but it is only right that they should be able to spend in UK elections in the same way as other UK citizens registered on the electoral roll.
I think that this is a reasonably comprehensive set of rules. There may be some debate as to whether it qualifies as a stringent regime but the fact is that donations to political parties from foreign powers, whether they are made directly or through an intermediary, are illegal. Political parties already have a legal duty to check that all donations they are offered are permissible.
In closing, I very much thank noble Lords for engaging so constructively in this debate. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, not to press his amendment in this group and ask noble Lords to support the Government’s amendments.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I just want to check one thing with him. He said that overseas electors will have to present ID. I was involved in the passage of the now Elections Act, which does indeed provide stronger, more limited ways in which correct ID has to be presented by people voting in person in British elections. However, I do not recall extra requirements around the presentation of ID for people who are resident overseas and wish to vote.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I think that I made it reasonably clear that to register as an elector overseas, you must present ID.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the scope of subsection (1)(a).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendment to Clause 14, page 12, line 27.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(v) Schedule 3 (disclosure orders);(vi) Schedule 4 (customer information orders);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds offences under Schedules 3 and 4 to the list of offences to which the powers in Part 1 of Schedule 2 do not apply.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a reference to Northern Ireland legislation to a defined term.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I could not agree more with the noble Lord, and that is why it is so incredible that no Prime Minister has discussed that with the committee since 2014. I say this in relation to my noble friend Lord West’s points about the failure of discussion and people’s failure to involve the committee at an early stage. Had that been done, we would have avoided much of the debate and controversy over Clause 30 or, now, government Amendment 66. My noble friend Lord West mentioned this on behalf of the committee, and I mentioned and highlighted yet again the failure of the Prime Minister to meet it since 2014, which is simply and utterly unacceptable. Something needs to be done about it, and the Prime Minister needs to hear this—I know that the Minister will take this forward.
This is a really serious matter. I could not believe it when I read it, and I do not believe that many noble Lords here would either, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us. According to the report, this was a regular occurrence:
“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work”.
But, despite repeated requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response. This is unacceptable, and it is why we get the sort of situation that we had with Clause 30.
Notwithstanding that, I thank the noble Lord the Minister and the Armed Forces Minister for their engagement in bringing forward Amendment 66, which is a considerable improvement on what went before. I note the change from automatic exemption to the reasonableness defence. No doubt the Minister can address the issues and questions that my noble friend Lord West raised on proportionality and other areas. It is important that the point of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is also addressed. With that, we welcome Amendment 66, but we also look forward to the reassurances that my noble friend Lord West seeks on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate on Clause 30, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. Before getting into the detail, I very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord West, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for their amendments tabled in advance of today’s proceedings. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who have consistently shared their time and expertise with me and my team, across a range of national security matters.
I also extend my gratitude to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which recently took the time to write to the Home Office on this measure and cast a keen and critical eye, with officials, over the Government’s amendment tabled for today. I carefully noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, as did my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who sat on the steps when he made them. I will obviously make sure that we reflect on that internally. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that my noble friend the Leader of the House heard his comments, and I am sure he will reflect them back to the Prime Minister, but I am not responsible for the Prime Minister’s diary, so I cannot go further than that at this point. However, we will return to this subject in group 12, when the ISC MoU will be debated.
The Government’s shift in approach on the SCA amendment reflects our maintained commitment to ensuring that individuals working for UKIC and the Armed Forces are protected when conducting their proper activities in service to this country. The Government’s amendment replaces Clause 30 with a new clause that provides a defence for acts that are offences under Part 2 of the SCA by virtue of the extraterritorial provisions in Schedule 4. This defence would apply to those carrying out the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces in supporting activities overseas; that is, it will be a defence for a person to show that their act was necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or the Armed Forces. I will shortly go into more detail on the Armed Forces, at the behest of my noble friend from the Ministry of Defence, so please bear with me.
As noble Lords will be aware, the current reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA would cover encouraging or assisting crimes domestically. We believe that it is right that this new defence is limited to where UKIC and the Armed Forces are supporting activity overseas. The territorial applicability of this measure is identical to that of the original clause. This is because the acute issue caused by the SCA offences, and therefore justification for this amendment as presented to the ISC, relates to support to key international partners’ activity overseas.
The defence provides UKIC and the Armed Forces with more reassurance than the current reasonableness defence, in that the defence is based around the proper exercise of the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces, rather than the more subjective requirement of proving “reasonableness”. We must remember that the tasks we ask these individuals to undertake, and the operational arrangements we have with our international partners, are ever more complex.
We still do not think it is appropriate that a potentially junior member of the agency or Armed Forces should be faced with the legal burden of proving that their activities were reasonable. Instead, the new defence imposes an evidential burden of proof on the individual to raise the defence. Once the defence has been raised, the legal burden would be on the prosecution to disprove it. It must be remembered that this amendment does not change the position for an individual who acts outside of those proper functions; they would remain liable for any wrongful acts. I believe that this strikes the right balance of providing appropriate protection while also having a clear route by which there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.
Noble Lords will now see an explicit responsibility on the heads of agencies and the Defence Council to ensure that their respective organisations have in place arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of their service that would otherwise be an offence under the SCA by virtue of Schedule 4 are necessary for the proper exercise of their functions. To be clear, that means that an act could not be considered within the “proper” exercise of a function of an intelligence service if it does not comply with the “arrangements” set by the relevant heads or the Defence Council.
In addition, the Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
Lord Beith (LD)
On that point, there is a world of difference between the necessary task of a Minister satisfying himself that adequate arrangements exist within an agency—indeed, such arrangements have existed for years—and the Secretary of State being made aware of a potential action and required to approve of it, or prevent it from happening, once he has considered the major political implications it might have. If the system does not extend to that role in relation to individual actions, it will be severely deficient.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I will turn to ministerial responsibility if the noble Lord will bear with me. In fact, I am going to do it now. The Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. I have already said this, but there is more to say on the subject. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections and regular scrutiny by the ISC. I will return to this in a second.
I now turn directly to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, which, in short, seek to do two related things: to restrict the activities covered by the defence for the MoD to those which are related to intelligence activities, and—in the case of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Beith—to restrict the defence to apply to the MoD only where it acts for UKIC.
I will now speak on behalf of the MoD and my noble friend Lady Goldie, who has sat through this debate. With reference to the Armed Forces, the amendment will enable more effective co-operation with our international partners. It will address operational challenges and remove the personal risk that trusted and dedicated individuals face for carrying out their proper official duties, whether as serving members of our Armed Forces or as intelligence officers within our UK intelligence community.
The amendment is principally concerned with addressing risks arising within an intelligence-sharing context, a primary activity of UKIC. What is perhaps less understood is the criticality of intelligence activity from an Armed Forces perspective, with intelligence sharing often forming a necessary part of wider co-operation with our allies. I assure noble Lords that the amendment is about clarifying the law and removing liabilities which sit onerously with individuals going about their lawful and legitimate duties.
The UK is committed to the rule of law and we would never collaborate or share information with a foreign partner with the intention of supporting unlawful activity overseas, but the SCA amendment does not change that. All aspects of the activities of our Armed Forces will continue to be bound by the relevant law of England and Wales and of international law. There will be no change to the UK’s international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
This defence will apply only where activity is necessary for the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces, and any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the Armed Forces will remain liable for those actions. Actions not in compliance with the MoD’s robust internal policies and processes, again such as the Fulford principles and the OSJA Guidance, which are designed to ensure that MoD officers do not knowingly support unlawful activity, would not be in the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. My noble friend Lady Goldie thanks him for the opportunity to discuss this with him. I understand that, because of a technical omission, he may not move his amendment tonight, but my noble friend Lady Goldie has—
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
As a point of correction, the omission has been remedied and the amendment is on the supplementary sheet.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My noble friend Lady Goldie has not been able to discuss that with our right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who is currently abroad, but she undertakes to do that and to engage with him on his return.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West. I am grateful for his contribution at Second Reading, where he confirmed that the ISC recognised that the government amendment identified a legitimate problem. This proposed amendment seeks to insert proportionality into the defence we are proposing in Clause 30. The objective of proposed new Section 50A is to provide clarity on how an individual working for UKIC or the Armed Forces can defend against a case in which they face personal criminal liability for the SCA offences.
For the reasons outlined previously, the Government consider that the existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA does not achieve this, given we would be asking a jury to consider what is reasonable in the complex operational circumstances in which our intelligence agencies and Armed Forces work with our international partners to protect the United Kingdom. The Government consider that inserting a proportionality requirement would have the same effect, in that it reduces the clarity of the defence, which not only does not achieve the objective of providing greater certainty to those who are carrying out vital work to protect us all but complicates a defence which is currently based on the functions of the organisations concerned. On that basis, we think that explicit reference is best left out of the defence, and we therefore cannot accept this amendment.
However, to be clear, considerations of proportionality are a crucial component of operational planning and delivery, and core to many of the legal frameworks with which UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to comply. Any joint working with a partner must be in accordance with domestic and international law, including relevant principles of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. Where the intelligence services or Armed Forces do not apply proportionality consistently with their legal or policy obligations, that would not be a proper exercise of their functions. To be completely clear, a person’s lack of compliance with their legal and policy obligations could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence —that includes proportionality.
Arrangements in place ensure that UKIC and the Armed Forces apply rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes for determining that activity is lawful and properly exercised. The arrangements include the following: operational decisions are recorded, taken at appropriate seniority and made with the benefit of advice from specialist legal advisers to ensure compliance with domestic and international law; all personnel receive mandatory training on their legal obligations; policy documents set out specific requirements for different activities, including what authorisations are required and how to decide whether activity is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. Compliance with these requirements ensure that acts are within the proper exercise of the functions of the organisation concerned.
Some of these policies have been published, such as the Fulford principles, where the passing and receipt of intelligence relates to detainees, the compliance of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, as I have already noted. Arrangements can also go beyond pure legal considerations, with ethics counsellors in post to discuss the difficult decisions we sometimes take when balancing risk.
To go back to Secretaries of State, they are accountable for the work of the intelligence services and the Armed Forces in Parliament. A central part of their obligations will remain authorising the required operational activity at the appropriate time.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
The Minister knows that, in Committee, I quoted quite a lot from the OSJA human rights guidance, which I have before me. It also addresses the fundamental point of my noble friend Lord Beith. Both the security service guidelines—which are not published, but about which we know because of judicial processes—which categorise the means by which authorisations have to be secured, and the OSJA Guidance outline the risk assessments that officers must go through. They conclude that, if there is high risk, ministerial approval is necessary. The Government’s amendments do not state categorically that authorisations and ministerial approvals will be necessary for breaches of the SCA offences. Can the Minister confirm that it will be the case that, if there are breaches of the SCA which are forecast through risk assessments and during the processes, ministerial authorisations will have to be provided?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I cannot confirm that from the Dispatch Box, but I will write to the noble Lord with the appropriate clarification. I do not actually have a copy of the OSJA Guidance in front of me, but I appreciate the points he is making.
I return to the third concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. I can confirm that, where a member of the intelligence services or the Armed Forces conducted activity that did not comply with the arrangements—namely, the rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes that I described earlier—this breach of the arrangements could be scrutinised by the proper oversight mechanisms; for example, an error would be reported to IPCO for a breach of the Fulford principles. It could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence. I also assure the noble Lord that the introduction of this new defence, in and of itself, will not lead to fewer ministerial authorisations sought by the intelligence services or to less daily oversight from Ministers and/or judicial commissioners over intelligence activity. I know that he asked me for an explicit reassurance on that point.
I conclude by saying that, for the reasons I have outlined, the Government cannot support the amendments tabled by noble Lords against Clause 30, and therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments. I also ask the House to support the new SCA defence amendment tabled by the Government.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The Minister has been helpful, but I hope he can be more specific. When does he think the encouragement or assistance of an overseas crime, conduct which is penalised by the Serious Crime Act 2007, might be necessary for the proper exercise of a function of the Armed Forces, other than in the intelligence context? For my part, I am quite prepared to accept that it may be necessary in the intelligence context; what I have not heard from the Minister is any suggestion of any other context in which it might be necessary, yet he asks me to withdraw my amendment, which would limit the application of the defence to the intelligence context. It may be that his answer will be in what I think he said about the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, needing further time to consult ministerial colleagues, but if I am to withdraw my amendment, and those discussions have not yet taken place, what assurance can he give as to possibly bringing back the issue at Third Reading?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord in previous debates on this subject: the activity is restricted to intelligence activity, and as such I believe that the amendment is eminently sensible. However, we cannot accept this current amendment, but the Government will take a very careful look at this apparent gap and will consider the best way to close it.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, that was a very interesting final remark from the Minister. I hope it will prove to have some substance, otherwise we are left with legislation that I do not think can be interpreted in the way the Minister describes it. I am quite puzzled, but he has shown willing, so I hope he pursues it. I express my gratitude, particularly to the Minister for the Armed Forces for the care she has applied to this matter—we had a very detailed discussion with her and her officials—and to the Minister who is answering this debate, particularly for the amendment that gets rid of the awful Clause 30 and gives us something that is certainly a significant improvement in its place.
I still have perhaps three areas of particular anxiety in addition to the definitional point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised about “in support of intelligence”. One is the very fact that we are changing the law about what happens on a battlefield and what happens in a counterinsurgency, apart from the context of the discussion about the use of our Armed Forces in the non-intelligence world. This does not seem to be a good way to legislate. There would have been people involved in and engaged with the legislation if that is what it had been generally about, if it had been applying to the Armed Forces, but that is a rather unsatisfactory feature and not one that we can change at this stage.
I found what the noble Lord, Lord West, said about what happened between the ISC and the Home Office profoundly worrying. It really was disgraceful. I trust the accuracy of what he said and I am sure it can all be correctly documented, but that really is no way to deal with intelligence. Accountability for intelligence in the democratic context has always been quite difficult. The ISC has been developed over decades to provide a good mechanism to deal with that. When it is treated in that manner, it really is very serious and I hope the Minister has recognised that and is determined to go back to the office and really make a noise about this. It is just not acceptable and should not be acceptable to either House of Parliament.
My final worry, which I think can be resolved without statutory means but certainly remains, is the ambiguity about whether Secretaries of State will authorise significant measures that could fall within the scope of the new clause. In my view, it is an essential part of the system that agencies have the backing of a senior Minister when they engage in particularly difficult tasks, and that senior Ministers know what they are doing and are aware of what is being undertaken. If there is a political or legal risk, then Ministers should be aware of it. It is one thing to have a very good internal system—and I believe the agencies have good internal systems now—but quite another to be sure that, at the highest political level, there is both knowledge and authorisation. Frankly, if I were the head of an agency, which I have never been, my instinct would be to try to set up such a system, because otherwise the agency will always get the blame, even when the Secretary of State should have taken responsibility and might even have come to a different conclusion. I think that, over time, we need to make sure that Secretaries of State are sufficiently closely associated, otherwise they drift apart and agencies live in a world of their own. That is not how it should operate. But that, as I say, could be resolved without further legislation if there is determination to resolve it. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
The arrangements which must be in place by virtue of subsection (4) or (5) must be arrangements which the Secretary of State considers to be satisfactory.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces Clause 30 with a new Clause which provides a defence for extra-territorial offences under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of “ought reasonably to know”.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a more wide-ranging debate than I was anticipating. The definition of a foreign power is an important issue. It was covered by the Minister in Committee, and I look forward to him expanding on what he said and particularly to address the points made by my noble friend Lady Hayter in her Amendment 74. I think I will leave it there because we have other business to deal with, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I will do my best to clarify all the points and answer all the questions that have been raised. First, I turn to government Amendment 76, which addresses concerns raised in Committee and in the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the drafting of the third limb of the foreign power threat activity provision. This provision is a key part of the Bill which ensures that police have the powers they need in supporting investigations into state threats offences. The concerns raised were that support or assistance unrelated to the harmful conduct covered by foreign power threat activity under Clause 33(3) risked being caught under Clause 33(1)(c). That is not the Government’s intention, and this amendment puts it beyond doubt that the support or assistance must be in relation to the conduct covered by Clause 33(1)(a) rather than unrelated activity. I hope that addresses the concerns helpfully put forward by noble Lords in Committee and that this amendment is welcomed.
This group also includes Amendment 74 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and it relates to the meaning of a “foreign power”. The amendment seeks to remove
“a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government”
from the definition. I would very much like to thank the noble Baroness for the constructive engagement we have had on this issue. I know her principal concern is with the effect of this clause on the foreign influence registration scheme, which of course we will be debating next week.
The foreign power condition applies right across the Bill and is crucial in order that the new offences in it, such as espionage, theft of trade secrets and sabotage, work effectively. Removing it here would remove it from those other offences too. The Government’s position, as the noble Baroness is aware, is that the inclusion of governing political parties addresses situations where there is a dominant political party, or parties, within a country, to such extent that it may be difficult to disentangle whether harmful activities have been carried out on the direction of the ruling party or the Government.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, may I ask a question of clarification? I understand much more clearly what the noble Lord is saying: governing political parties are in effect acting as intermediaries for the state. However, certainly in the international relations which I have been engaged in over the last 40 years, many think tanks in other states also operate as intermediaries in that respect. In particular the Washington think tanks, which are very close to the Government, act as intermediaries, but foreign-funded ones in other democratic and non-democratic capitals often also do so. Should that not be included in the Bill for the same rationale that he has just given us on dominant political parties?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, ruling parties are the foreign power. As I have tried to be clear and have stressed twice now, registration will be required only where an individual or entity is directed by a foreign power—that is the condition. Therefore, if a think tank was being directed by a foreign power, the answer would be yes. If it was not, the answer would be no.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
My Lords, does the Minister accept that an intermediary could be a conference-arranging organisation? If he is coming to that, I would be grateful.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I noted the noble Baroness’s questions about intermediaries, and I promise that I will address that.
I know that we have had some debate about what it means to be directed by a foreign power. I want to reassure all noble Lords that this is a high bar. The natural meaning of “direction” is an order or instruction to act. It is possible that such direction could be delivered in the language of a request but only where there is a power relationship between the person and the foreign power which adds an element of control or expectation to the request: for example, through a contract, payment, coercion or the promise of future compensation or favourable treatment. It is not enough for a foreign power to fund an activity, so generic requests, joint collaboration or simply an alignment of views, absent the power relationship, will not meet the test for direction.
I will quote directly from the letter I sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter—I apologise for not sharing it more broadly with the House but I was cleared to send it only this morning:
“In terms of what activity would be registrable, we consider that where a parliamentarian is to be directed by a foreign governing party, for example, being paid or on the promise of favourable treatment, to influence Government Ministers or fellow parliamentarians, this would require disclosure under FIRS.”
I will come back to my quote in a second. I digress briefly into the subject raised by my noble friend Lord Balfe and his quick canter through the Stiftungen of Germany. We are in touch with the German Government on this issue and are grateful for their constructive engagement. We do not consider that, for example, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung would constitute a foreign power under Clause 32 of the Bill. A person acting under the direction of such an institution would not be in scope of the foreign influence registration scheme. We will have another opportunity to debate these issues next Tuesday. Konrad Adenauer should be reassured that it is not covered.
I want to be clear that there is no requirement for the activity to cease, only for it to be transparent. In these circumstances, there is a strong national interest in greater openness on the influence of British politics by foreign powers. It should be clear not only to the Government, but to parliamentarians and to the public, where this influence is being brought to bear. FIRS seeks to address the gap, providing us all with more information about the scale and nature of foreign political influence in the UK.
I will answer the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, directly. In the example she described, the intermediary would have to register, if directed by a foreign power. The noble Baroness herself, or a foreign power, would not.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
This is at the heart of it. If the German SPD engaged somebody to set up a stall at our party conference, they would be directed, be paying and have a contract for it. This would then have to be registered. I have seen the draft regulations which the Minister kindly sent me. They would have to disclose which MPs they had invited to the event and all of that. As the Minister has just said, as soon as the intermediary—the conference arrangements organisation—is paid by an outside political party to organise this, according to the form that I have been sent, we would have to fill in our names. We may not be the ones registering, but it would be wholly disclosable. It has nothing to do with the Government nor with national security. It is a party-to-party issue. It is simply because they have used an intermediary—a conference arrangements organisation or interpretation.
I think it is clear and that we agree on this. I am not asking that we should be able to bring it back at Third Reading, but I am asking the Minister to leave a little chink of light. Having thought about it, in consultation with his colleagues, the Government might be willing to look at whether this is really what they want to achieve.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her comments. I am more than happy to continue engagement on this subject.
The final amendment in this group, concerning the definition of a foreign power, was initially tabled in Committee and has been retabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Wallace. It seeks to exclude members of NATO and other nations, via regulations, from the definition of a foreign power. I want to put it on record that we do not consider all foreign powers to be hostile. When this amendment was initially tabled, I put forth that the National Security Bill focuses on the harmful conduct undertaken by a person and not the foreign power they seek to benefit. I continue to believe that this is the right approach.
The Government do not seek to create gaps in the legislation which could allow states to act through proxies and thus undermine what the Bill seeks to do—to take necessary and appropriate action against harmful activity. Again, no doubt to groans, I will bring your Lordships’ attention to the case of Daniel Houghton. He is the dual British-Dutch national who attempted to sell sensitive information to the Dutch intelligence service in 2010. If this amendment were to be accepted, and NATO states excluded from the definition of a foreign power, cases such as Daniel Houghton’s would not be captured by the offences and measures in the Bill. This would not be an appropriate outcome which could undermine the Bill. I believe that the Dutch came to us on this particular occasion and I commend them for it. I ask again that these amendments tabled by noble Lords be withdrawn.
Viscount Stansgate (Lab)
I do not want to detain the House. I asked whether the definition of a political party in Clause 32(1)(e) means all members of it or not.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thought that I answered this when I talked about direction by a foreign power. If members of a political party are directed by a foreign power, they would be covered.
Lord Balfe (Con)
My Lords, before the Minister comes back, could either he or a representative of the Government talk to the German ambassador and clear up this difficulty because the Germans are quite convinced that they are caught by this? It would be good if he could come back here and say, “I’ve spoken to the German ambassador or the First Secretary and we have agreed this”. Otherwise, the confusion will carry on.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, in answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I cannot make any promises but I will certainly try. In answer to my noble friend Lord Balfe’s question, as I said in my initial answer to him, we have engaged extensively with the German Government.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I am not convinced by the Minister’s argument. That he has to go back to the single case of Daniel Houghton shows the weakness of the ground on which he stands. We recall that case, which involved a Dutch-British dual national who was uncovered by our allies, the Dutch, with whom, of course, we have a close intelligence relationship as well as a number of other things; it was therefore resolved. No such things have happened with a hostile foreign power. If we have to go back to that case, it simply shows that there is not very much evidence on which the Government can make this argument.
Many of us who know that this is an important Bill and wish it well are concerned about the unnecessary offence given to friendly Governments. The Minister has not assured us that all our friendly Governments have been consulted and are happy with this Bill. I hope that, in informal conversations between now and Third Reading, he—or at least one of his Foreign Office Ministers who actually talks to other Foreign Ministers—will be able to assure us that we will not treat all foreign powers or contact with them on a similar basis.
On that basis, I will not divide the House but I remark that I am unsatisfied with the Minister’s response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
(i) knows or believes P to be involved in, and(ii) engages in the conduct for the purpose of giving support or assistance to,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that conduct is only within Clause 33(1)(c) if it is for the purpose of giving support or assistance to conduct within 33(1)(a).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
““information” includes information about tactics, techniques and procedures;”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a definition of "information" for the purposes of Part 1 of the Bill.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(e) Schedule 3 (disclosure orders);(f) Schedule 4 (customer information orders).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment excepts offences under Schedules 3 and 4 from the requirement to obtain the consent of the Attorney General or Advocate General to proceedings for an offence under Part 1.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, hits on a sore point for independent reviewers past and present. At the instigation of my noble friend Lord Carlile, the Australians copied the job of independent reviewer—I think they call him or her the independent national security legislation monitor, which is even more indigestible. In doing so, they provided in their statute that reports be laid before Parliament within, I think, 15 sitting days of receipt by the Minister, an excellent discipline which I rather wish this amendment had followed.
I do not wish to seem ungracious. The independent review of powers, whose exercise is attended by secrecy, is a token of good faith on the part of government. It has proved its worth since the 1970s in this country in the context of counterterrorism law. I never doubted the good faith of the Government where this Bill is concerned. This amendment will make that good faith evident to others. It will help to dampen down the conspiracy theories that are so prevalent in this area and allow us to keep pace with Australia—and shortly, I hope, Ireland—in providing for independent oversight of almost the full range of national security laws.
However, gratitude has its limits. On first inspection, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, looks even better, so if he divides the House, I shall vote for it.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for those contributions. There has been plenty of discussion throughout the passage of this Bill about the need for oversight of the state threats provisions in the Bill. The Government have welcomed this debate and agree on the need for the Bill to go further in this regard. The new provisions proposed by the Government do just that. I am very grateful for the remarks made by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, on the Government’s movements in that regard.
I will not spend too long on this group but will set out briefly the provisions and how we expect the government provisions to work in practice. The amendments made by the Government create a single reviewer of state threats legislation to oversee the operation of the measures in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill. This means that the reviewer will oversee not just the STPIM regime but the criminal offences and the exercise of police powers to ensure that their use is appropriate and proportionate.
The Government are also bringing oversight of the provisions of the state threats port stops power—Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019—within the remit of the new reviewer, meaning that all dedicated state threats legislation will be considered as part of a single reviewer’s role.
The Government have heard the argument that this role should in practice be carried out by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and can see the potential benefits this could bring. However, the Government are also conscious that the role will be of public interest and will therefore run an open competition for it, rather than appointing someone directly. Given the synergy between the roles, the Government will align the appointment cycle of this post with that of the terrorism reviewer. This will allow the role-holders to work closely together, but also provide the option of having one individual fill both roles, should that be beneficial.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his proposed amendment on this topic, which would achieve the same effect but also add Parts 4 and 5 to the remit of the reviewer. As mentioned in previous debates on this topic, an explicit commitment to oversight of Part 4 in the Bill is unnecessary, given it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I therefore suggest that there is nothing lacking from the present proposal. The provisions in Part 5 are supplementary to the rest of the Bill. The reviewer will be able to look at how Parts 1 and 2 operate in terms of commencement, regulation-making powers and territorial extent without the need explicitly to mention Part 5 in the powers for the reviewer. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept Amendment 80 as tabled by Labour, and hope that colleagues across the House will welcome the government amendments.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I wonder if he might be able to address my point—which I remind him is the only point that I made?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I certainly addressed the point which he generously made praising the Government for our amendments. The point that he raised in relation to the Labour amendment, on the basis that there is no timeframe in the present amendments, is not valid in the Government’s submission, because the Labour amendment itself does not contain any binding requirement on the laying of reports. In our submission, that would remove a level of flexibility. In the area of national security, it is important not to hedge about these kinds of provisions with time requirements. For those reasons, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I know that this is Report and we do not have to and fro, but I was making the point that it was an omission in the Government’s amendment. It is utterly open-ended as to whether the Secretary of State will lay the report from the independent reviewer before Parliament. I was seeking clarification from the Minister that that would not be the case.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s new Clause (Reviews: general). The new Clause provides for reviews of Part 2 and other provisions by the independent reviewer appointed under the new Clause, superseding clause 56.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment adds a reference to Northern Ireland legislation to a defined term.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Reviews: general(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person (the “independent reviewer”) to review the operation of—(a) Part 1, except section (Offences under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007);(b) Part 2;(c) Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, except the functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner under Part 1 of that Schedule.(2) The independent reviewer—(a) must carry out a review of the operation of those provisions for each calendar year (an “annual review”), and(b) may carry out such other reviews of the operation of any of those provisions as they consider appropriate.(3) An annual review must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the calendar year to which it relates.(4) The independent reviewer must, by 31 January in each calendar year, inform the Secretary of State what (if any) reviews under subsection (2)(b) they intend to carry out in that year.(5) The independent reviewer must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under this section as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.(6) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—(a) the report (but not any material removed under subsection (7)), and(b) a statement as to whether any material has been removed under that subsection.(7) The Secretary of State may, after consulting the independent reviewer, remove from the report any material whose publication the Secretary of State thinks would be contrary to the public interest, or prejudicial to— (a) national security,(b) the prevention or detection of crime,(c) the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or(d) the continued discharge of the functions of any public authority whose activities include activities that are subject to review by the independent reviewer.(8) “Public authority” means a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, other than a court or tribunal.(9) The Secretary of State may pay to the independent reviewer—(a) expenses incurred in carrying out the functions of the reviewer under this section, and(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause provides for independent review of Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. It is intended that this new Clause, together with new Clause “Reviews of detention under Part 1” will form a new Part of the Bill after Part 2.
Tuesday 7th March 2023
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 88-II(a) Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Second Marshalled List) - (6 Mar 2023)
17:20 - Division on Amendment 185 - Ayes: 93 / Noes: 197 - Amendment 185 disagreed.
17:33 - Division on Amendment 188A - Ayes: 146 / Noes: 211 - Amendment 188A disagreed.
18:21 - Division on Amendment 193 - Ayes: 210 / Noes: 184 - Amendment 193 agreed.
19:06 - Division on Amendment 195 - Ayes: 132 / Noes: 180 - Amendment 195 disagreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with Lord Sharpe’s other amendments to Clause 64 relating to relevant activities, allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying which activities of a specified person are subject to the provisions about foreign activity arrangements.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group clarify the intent of the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme —FIRS. They ensure the tier remains proportionate, while achieving its national security objectives. FIRS was recommended by the ISC in its 2020 Russia report, and the Government committed in their response to bring forward such a scheme.
The enhanced tier of FIRS is a targeted regime, allowing the Secretary of State to require the registration of arrangements with specified foreign Governments or entities subject to foreign power control where she believes it is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. The scheme will play a significant role in the deterrence and disruption of state threats activities by those countries, and entities linked to them, which are of greatest concern.
We know that these states will make use of a whole-of-state approach to covert activities, not just relying on traditional routes of intelligence organisations and undeclared agents. FIRS will be essential to gaining a greater understanding of the scale and nature of activity being undertaken for countries and their proxies that pose the greatest risks to UK interests and national security. The penalties for non-compliance will increase the risk to those who seek to engage in covert activities for specified foreign powers, either directly or through specified entities. It forces them to choose between registering openly or facing prosecution should their activities be known to the intelligence community. Finally, it offers potential for earlier disruption of state threats activity, where there is evidence of a covert arrangement between a person and specified foreign power or entity, but it is not yet feasible to bring charges for a more serious state threats offence.
Government Amendments 89 and 100 make clearer that the Secretary of State can narrow the activities requiring registration under this tier. This will allow us to tailor the registration requirements to the threat posed by the country or entity being specified.
I turn now to government Amendments 95, 104, 125 and 133 and supporting amendments. These amendments make changes to ensure that a proper provision is made for offences committed by those in unregistered arrangements, and employees and subcontractors who are carrying out activities under those arrangements, in both tiers of the scheme. The Government do not wish to unfairly criminalise those who reasonably believe an arrangement is registered and have taken all reasonably practicable steps to check that it is. This is particularly the case with employees of an entity which has made an arrangement with a foreign power or specified person, or for subcontractors carrying out activities under arrangements.
These amendments seek to address this issue by enabling a person—for example, an employee—to avoid committing an offence where they can demonstrate that they took all steps reasonably practicable to determine whether the activities were registered, and they reasonably believed that the activities were registered. We consider that in practice this will mean checking the public register or receiving evidence of registration from their employer in the form of confirmation from the registration portal.
Finally, government Amendments 147 and 151 also modify the individuals to whom an information notice may be issued under both tiers of FIRS. There are circumstances where a person may be arranging for another individual to carry out the activity. In these circumstances, it is important for the Secretary of State to be able to issue an information notice to an individual whom they reasonably believe is carrying out an activity pursuant to a registerable arrangement, even if they are not the person who has made the arrangement.
I have considerable sympathy with the aims of Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. Wherever possible, Governments should strive to share what they know to reduce the regulatory burden on ordinary people and businesses. However, I believe that the schemes he has listed have different purposes and requirements, with relatively little overlap. Where there is a risk of unnecessary duplication, registration requirements can be targeted to avoid this.
Amendment 106, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seeks to require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report on the impacts of the enhanced tier, including on international research collaborations. Again, I seek to reassure the noble Lord on this point, as the Government will keep the impacts of the scheme under review.
Amendments 166B and 203A, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seek to require the Secretary of State to produce guidance within six months of the Act passing, and to prevent regulations made under the scheme being brought into force until three months after the publication of the guidance. Again, I agree with the spirit in which this amendment has been made but, as I will seek to reassure noble Lords, the Government have already committed to producing guidance during the implementation period, prior to bringing the scheme into force.
I come to Amendment 154A in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile. This contains reasonable points which would bring certainty to the provisions and the Government support it.
I hope noble Lords will support these amendments.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
My Lords, I speak to Amendments 91 and 106, which the Minister has mentioned. In this case, I speak very much on behalf of the academic and policy research communities, with which I was professionally engaged for some 40 or more years.
We are concerned not to impose too great a burden on those who are engaged in international research. The Minister will be very well aware of the commitments that have already been made for researchers engaged in international co-operation to provide information to the Government, and the concerns that there have already been, particularly about collaboration with countries such as China and Russia. That information is provided to government, and I remind the Minister that, as a member of a Government who are strongly against adding to bureaucracy and red tape, it should be possible for government departments to share information, rather than require it to be given twice to different departments.
I am conscious that the Home Office has a poor record in this regard; indeed, the entire Windrush affair happened because the Home Office refused to ask other departments for information on whether or not the people concerned had been in this country. This was clearly available at the DVLA, the Department of Health, the national insurance scheme, et cetera. There is a real problem in government about asking for the same information twice. The information asked for indeed overlaps, and I ask the Minister to assure us that the Government will look at this matter again and do their best to make sure that it does not add to the burdens to which those of us who are concerned with international co-operation have to relate.
The Minister will be well aware that the Government are also negotiating to rejoin the Horizon European international collaboration scheme for science, probably the most impressive and important network for international co-operation in the world. All the members of the European Union and the various other countries associated with it are listed as foreign powers, with the exception of Ireland, so this is a live question. I declare an interest: my son, a scientist at the University of Edinburgh, is currently engaged in international co-operation with universities and research institutes—one or two of them government-sponsored and financed—in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. That is a small snapshot of the extent of that collaboration, if one were to go merely to the biology faculty at the University of Edinburgh. I suspect that there are some 30 or 40 other countries with which 100 scientists at the university are involved in various collaborative activities.
The purpose of Amendment 106 is to gain the strongest assurances from the Government that they will look at whether additional burdens are being imposed by the legislation on those who are unavoidably and actively—and desirably—engaged in international collaboration with institutes, universities and other bodies that are part of, or dependent on, foreign Governments in one way or another. We need active assurance on that. If the Minister is able to give that, we will not press these amendments further but I emphasise that it is important that this legislation does not over-add to the requirements to report normal activities. I remind the Minister that we are talking about a country that is determined to become a science international superpower, and that needs to be sure that it does not put obstacles in its own way that deter those in other counties from collaborating as it ensures its security.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, the enhanced tier of FIRS requires the registration of arrangements to carry out any activity in the UK, or for future activities to be carried out in the UK, at the direction of a specified foreign power or entity. It also requires activities carried out by specified entities to be registered. I too am grateful for how the Government have responded, following concerns that this tier could deter legitimate activities. The Minister has introduced a series of concessions, as he mentioned in opening, which we welcome. There are outstanding issues, which I would be grateful if he could amplify in his answers.
On his Amendment 106, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, spoke about the need for regular reviews, which may highlight barriers to international collaboration. He gave examples from his family—particularly his son, who is no doubt doing important research work up at Edinburgh University. The purpose of this is to ensure that the enhanced scheme does not make the same mistakes as other schemes around the world. I draw the Australian scheme to the Minister’s attention, which I understand is currently being reviewed, given some high-profile concerns about how it is working. I look forward to his answer.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this short but constructive discussion. I will turn straight to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire.
Amendment 91 seeks to ensure that registration under FIRS is not required when the arrangement is registered under other legislative requirements. However, somewhat contrary to the noble Lord’s assertion, I think there is a clear difference between FIRS and the National Security and Investment Act, the academic technology approval scheme and the export control regime. The Government are clear that FIRS fills a gap in our toolkit. It is worth highlighting that the focus of this enhanced tier is to provide scrutiny to UK activities directed by specified foreign powers—it is worth emphasising this; we are talking about the enhanced tier—and foreign power-controlled entities.
We consider that there will be limited circumstances where there is a risk of duplication, but we will work closely across government departments and potential registrants to keep the burden of registration to a minimum and inform our approach to using this tier of the scheme. The Government do not want to impose unnecessary burdens. We have committed to a consultation on the guidance ahead of bringing the scheme into force. If that process identifies risks of duplication, the power to target what arrangements and activities will need to be registered can be used to reduce unnecessary duplication. This will be considered on a case-by-case basis when specifying foreign powers and entities.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)
Can the Minister give us an assurance that he will consult with the academies, the Royal Society and Universities UK to make sure that the element of duplication is reduced to the absolute minimum? When I was in government, we talked about trying to introduce the principle of “Tell us once” when people were in touch with government. In some other areas, that has now been introduced. The principle is a very good one; we do not want universities having to fill in forms unnecessarily widely. If he can assure us that there will be active consultation with those affected, I will not pursue this further.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am happy with the reassurance that we are committed to consulting, but I cannot say at this precise moment who we consult with. As I say, if that process identifies a risk of duplication, the power to target what arrangements and activities need to be registered can be used to reduce unnecessary duplication. Again, I stress that we are talking about the enhanced tier of the FIR scheme in the National Security Bill so, if there is a little bit of duplication, I am sure he will understand that in the context of the overall Bill.
Amendment 106 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report on the impacts of the enhanced tier; the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, also questioned me on this. I reassure both noble Lords that the Government recognise the importance of keeping the impacts of the scheme under consideration. Clause 82 already requires the Secretary of State to produce and lay before Parliament an annual report every 12 months after the scheme goes live. The legislation will also be subject to the usual post-legislative scrutiny process, which will consider how the scheme has worked in practice and how far its objectives have been met. I therefore ask that the noble Lord does not press this amendment.
Amendments 166B and 203A tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Wallace of Saltaire, seek to require the Secretary of State to produce guidance within six months of the Bill passing, and to prevent regulations made under the scheme from being brought into force until three months after the publication of guidance. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I say that the Government recognise the importance of ensuring guidance for the public to support the implementation of the scheme. However, it is important that there are not undue restrictions placed on the development of this guidance, to ensure that the guidance produced is clear and targeted to those complying. I can say to him that a revised impact assessment is required before Royal Assent, so that will be forthcoming. He also raised the point about the German Stiftungen. If he bears with me, we will address this directly in the next group. I will also go further: the Government have committed to establishing expert panels to produce sector-specific guidance on compliance with FIRS. With that, I think I have answered all the questions.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with Lord Sharpe’s other amendments to Clause 64 relating to relevant activities, allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying which activities of a specified person are subject to the provisions about foreign activity arrangements.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(A1) This section applies where a person (“P”) makes a foreign activity arrangement required to be registered under section 64(2).(1) P commits an offence if—(a) P carries out a relevant activity, or arranges for a relevant activity to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to the arrangement,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment confines the offence in Clause 66(1) to the person who makes a foreign activity arrangement with a specified person.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with Lord Sharpe’s other amendments to clause 67 relating to relevant activities, allow the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying which activities of a specified person are subject to clause 67.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and Lord Sharpe’s other amendment to Clause 68(1) restrict the definition of foreign influence arrangements to arrangements with foreign powers.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the debate about the political tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. I am immensely grateful to the House and others for their expertise and the constructive nature of the debate.
In response to the strength of feeling, this group of amendments refocuses the political tier back on its original intention: the influence of foreign powers over UK democracy. In its revised form, this tier would require registration only where a person is carrying out political influence at the direction of a foreign Government. That bears repeating—only where a person is carrying out political influence at the direction of a foreign Government. To be clear, this will take those being directed by foreign companies, foreign charities or other foreign entities entirely out of scope of the scheme.
I know that there has also been some debate about what it means to be directed by a foreign power. That is a high bar. Its natural meaning is an order or instruction to act. It could be delivered in the language of a request, but only where there is a power relationship between the person and the foreign power which adds an element of control or expectation to the request—for example, through a contract, payment, coercion, or the promise of a future compensation or favourable treatment. It is not enough for a foreign power to fund an activity. Generic requests, joint collaboration, or simply an alignment of views, absent this power relationship, will not meet the test for direction.
As part of this package of amendments, we have made some other changes, which I hope will be welcomed by noble Lords. A person will now have up to 28 days to register an arrangement under the political tier and does not need to register the arrangement before the activity takes place. This will give greater flexibility and ensure that we do not impede spontaneous activity.
We have narrowed the definition of “political influence activity” so that attempts to influence a Member of Parliament or equivalents in the devolved Administrations will require registration only when it is intended to influence them in their capacity as a Member of Parliament. Activity which seeks to influence these individuals in their personal capacity will not be registerable. Amendment 120 makes this clear.
As outlined on the previous group, we have made some minor changes to the offences to ensure that they work properly for subcontractors and that a person will not fall foul of the offence where they have taken all reasonably practicable steps to determine that an arrangement is registered.
I am pleased to say that we have accepted the recommendation by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that regulations detailing the information to be published on the FIRS public register made under Clause 79 should be subject to the affirmative procedure. The public register is a vital element of the scheme. However, we recognise that there will be sensitivities in publishing some information and understand the call for an opportunity to debate this important matter.
I know that your Lordships have been anxious to scrutinise draft regulations under this part of the Bill. Last week, I published two sets of draft regulations setting out what information will be required from registrants and what information will be published. Importantly, these regulations confirm that we will not publish information where there is a risk that doing so would prejudice national security, put an individual’s safety at risk or involve the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. I have placed copies of these indicative regulations in the House Library.
This is accompanied by a government policy statement setting out how we envisage the other delegated powers being used. This includes an example registration form, which I hope noble Lords have found useful in thinking about how the scheme will work.
We are keen for the implementation of this scheme to be as collaborative as possible, which is why we will hold a further public consultation on the guidance required for the scheme prior to commencement. We will also continue to review the scheme and consider any further exemptions necessary to ensure that there is no negative impact on potential inward investment into the UK.
It is important to understand the wider context for FIRS. We are in an era of increased state-based competition. Foreign powers are seeking to influence British democracy to further their own interests, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly.
Foreign influence is not unwelcome. We recognise that Governments around the world seek to influence policies in the UK in a way that benefits their interests. Of course, the UK does the same. This type of influence, when conducted in an open and transparent way, contributes positively, and we recognise the critical role that this expertise plays in enhancing policy-making, employment and wealth creation. However, when foreign powers seek to influence in a way that is not transparent, this can have serious implications for the UK, posing risk to our open system of government and risking erosion of public confidence in political and government institutions.
We need to be more vigilant about this risk. Currently, foreign Governments can use others as proxies to attempt to influence British Ministers, MPs, officials, or indeed shape British public opinion, with only a limited requirement to disclose the hidden hand behind this influence, and no sanction if discovered. It is not unreasonable to aspire to a greater understanding of foreign influence; for the Government, parliamentarians and wider public to know where this influence is being brought to bear. FIRS seeks to address this gap, providing us all with more information about the scale and nature of foreign political influence in the UK. I look forward to the debate on the amended provisions and addressing the amendments that have been tabled.
Finally, I make noble Lords aware that we have identified an inconsistency in the treatment of ministerial decisions taken across the devolved Administrations that fall within the scope of this tier. I commit to tabling an amendment at Third Reading that will resolve that issue. For now, I beg to move.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this debate. I am feeling a little overwhelmed. The Government have moved a long way, as has been noted, on the FIRS scheme, which now tackles what it was originally intended to address. I thank all noble Lords for their probing amendments. I would particularly like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for paying special attention and noticing my deliberate error. I should have said—and I will repeat this because I repeated it the first time around—“foreign powers, including foreign Governments”.
With the leave of the House, and in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, I will speak to Amendment 110A, standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and signed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. The Government do not intend to require the registration of defunct foreign influence arrangements, so we urge the House to support the amendment.
Amendments 114 and 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would remove the requirement to register foreign influence arrangements at Clause 68, and the meaning of “political influence activity” at Clause 70, from the scheme. These clauses are essential to the functioning of the revised political influence tier of the scheme, and for this reason I ask that the amendments be withdrawn. I will, however, go into a little more detail on the impact on the proceedings of a UK-registered party in Clause 70. It is not intended to cover every activity undertaken by a UK political party. The focus is on where foreign powers are seeking to influence formal matters of a UK political party, such as candidates’ selections and adoption of policy through third parties; but it will not, for example, cover decisions around venue changes for joint conferences. In this way, we believe that this scheme is appropriately targeted to focus on the arrangements and activities where transparency is most needed, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy. However, I have heard the noble Baroness on a number of occasions now and I will certainly be taking her points into account when we are developing the guidance.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for his Amendment 166A. This would require the Government to consult, and lay a report in Parliament, on the merits of expanding the foreign influence registration scheme to those controlled by a foreign power seeking to influence public policy. Again, we have sympathy with this amendment and, indeed, one of the reasons why the Government originally sought a broader scheme was to fully capture the proxies of foreign powers. I share the noble Lord’s interest in ensuring we remain responsive to the risks posed by covert influence, but I reassure him that the Government will keep the impacts of the scheme, and any need to expand it, under careful review. The timings for this are important and I cannot accept an amendment that may tie the Government to evaluating the scheme before it has come into force and had a chance to bed in. So I ask him not to press this amendment but reassure him that the Government will be able to use the annual review requirements to assess areas where the scheme could be strengthened.
In addressing the point raised in both this group and the last by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, around the impact of the scheme on foreign political foundations, we did meet with representatives of the German embassy after the debate last week to discuss this scheme, and recognise the importance of the work carried out by political foundations such as the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung to promote political co-operation and the values of democracy and the rule of law. So I reassure the noble Lord that institutions such as these that operate independently of foreign powers will not have to register their activities. Receiving funding from a foreign power does not trigger a requirement to register under the scheme. Only where organisations are being directed by a foreign power through a power relationship to carry out political influence activities will that need to be registered. With that, I think that I have answered all the questions.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and Lord Sharpe’s other amendment to Clause 68(1) restrict the definition of foreign influence arrangements to arrangements with foreign powers.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendment to Clause 68, page 47, line 19.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 68(1).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 68(1).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendment to Clause 71, page 49, line 13.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 68(1).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to omit Clause 72(1) and (2).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(ba) a person the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be carrying out relevant activities, or arranging for relevant activities to be carried out, in the United Kingdom pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement within paragraph (a) or (b);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Secretary of State to give an information notice to persons carrying out relevant activities pursuant to a foreign activity arrangement who are not themselves a party to the arrangement.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(3A) An information notice may only specify information which the Secretary of State considers may be relevant to an arrangement or activity within subsection (1) or (2).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the information which may be specified in an information notice.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on changes to the definition of foreign activity arrangement in Clause 64.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on changes to the definition of foreign activity arrangement in Clause 64.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies that Clause 79(2) only relates to the power in Clause 79(1)(a).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on changes to the definition of foreign activity arrangement in Clause 64.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 68(1).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment omits the definition of “foreign principal” and is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendments to Clause 68(1).
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I added my name to some of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I echo his thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for their constructive engagement with us on the damages clauses. I too am satisfied that Amendment 169, in particular, and the assurance that the noble and learned Lord gave in writing—which I hope he will repeat on the Floor of the House—address the main concern. I am impressed also by the eloquent point he made in Committee, that these clauses simply confer a power, or discretion, on the court, and I am confident that the courts will exercise those powers fairly and sensibly.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his comments. I hope the House will agree that the Government have been in listening mode throughout this Bill, and that we have in this particular instance moved quite considerably to deal with what the Government consider to be justified observations by your Lordships.
On the general point, the reforms are designed to protect the public, to deter those who seek to exploit our security services for compensation and to reduce the risk that court awards or damages may be used to fund terrorism—perhaps the most serious harm that can be perpetrated against society, going to its very fabric. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked me to restate the purpose of the clause and I think I have endeavoured to do so in those words.
On whether the Government can give any assurance that these provisions will not be invoked on the basis of
“unproven allegations … from a foreign state”,
I draw your Lordships’ attention to the fact that this is a power in the court; it is entirely in its discretion. No court is going to act on anything other than proper evidence, so in the Government’s view there is no risk of the danger to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred, because this is a court process with rules of evidence and proper and fair procedures.
With those two preliminary observations, I come to the central point that was at issue when we discussed this clause in Committee. We have listened to the concerns expressed by noble Lords that the legislation needed to ensure that no national security case fell into scope where there was no connection between the Crown’s conduct and the terrorist conduct of the claimant. I can repeat before this House the assurance in the letter I sent noble Lords today, to which we have already been referred, saying that there needs to be a causal connection between the conduct of the terrorist and the reduction in damages.
As to what criteria the courts should apply when considering these issues, I know that noble Members felt the courts would require further guidance. In the Government’s view, the courts do not require further guidance; they are well able to interpret and apply this legislation, especially in light of the amendments we have proposed. The Government have every confidence in the court being able to discharge its functions under these provisions.
Our courts are well versed in taking a wide range of relevant factors into account in determining liability and assessing the level of damages. There are a number of common-law considerations to which noble Lords referred in Committee which may indeed provide some guidance. We do not seek to exonerate the Crown in respect of its own culpability; we aim simply to ensure that the terrorist conduct is properly taken into account when calculating quantum.
I turn to what I think are the only live amendments on this part, Amendments 174 and 175. Those amendments would apply to the Bill’s provisions whereby a court would consider the context in which the Crown had acted to reduce a risk of terrorism, but their underlying intention seems to the Government to be to markedly restrict those provisions. As I understand it, the amendments seek to limit the consideration of the court to where the Crown’s actions had been commenced —the provisions use the word “instigated”—and the conduct was required to have taken place overseas at the instigation of a foreign state.
While the Government accept that there are difficulties in preventing terrorism when the action concerned needs to be taken overseas, there are so many different facts and circumstances flowing from the claimant’s own actions that the proposed amendments would significantly limit the effect of these clauses. In the Government’s view, the courts ought to have complete discretion to apply the clauses as they stand; a very tight restriction both as to instigation and to the requirement that the instigated conduct took place overseas would limit them inappropriately and improperly restrict the discretion courts should have under the provisions.
The Government further feel that there is scope in these amendments for some confusion. The two aspects, an overseas element and instigation, seem to be couched in language reminiscent of an exclusive list, quite apart from the difficulty of deciding exactly what one means by “instigation”. In practice, the Government feel that the courts should be left to exercise their discretion, as they surely will, without the limitation proposed by these amendments. That is the Government’s position on the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I hope that in the light of what I have said, he will consider not pressing them.
There is one amendment by the Government—Amendment 181—which is proposed to ensure family proceedings in Scotland and Northern Ireland are excluded from the freezing and forfeiture provisions that are also part of this part, as with those in England and Wales. That simply corrects an oversight in the original drafting.
Having set out the Government’s amendments and why we are unable to accept the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, I commend Government’s amendments and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I have heard the Minister’s explanation. It is right that the amendments that were between us were Amendments 174 and 175. Having considered his point on the court’s discretion, I am not sure that the difference between us is so wide as to justify my testing the opinion of the House on this occasion. I shall not move those two amendments and beg leave to withdraw the stand part amendment.
Lord Bellamy
(i) involves the commission of a terrorism offence or other involvement in terrorism-related activity, and (ii) has a connection with the conduct of the Crown complained of in the proceedings,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with the other Government amendments to this Clause, would mean that the court may consider the matters in Clause 85(3)(b) only if there was a connection between the terrorist wrongdoing and the conduct of the Crown complained of in the proceedings.
Lord Bellamy
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the Government amendments to Clause 85.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
It is perfectly within the rules of the Companion for noble Lords to seek points of clarification or elucidation from those who are speaking.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I am again extremely grateful to noble Lords for their interventions and, in particular, for the support for the principle behind Clause 89 expressed by the Official Opposition, subject to the point about minor offences, which I will come to in a moment.
As a quick reminder, Clause 89 narrows the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specific terrorism offences can automatically receive civil legal aid services. This includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more as well as other offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection. It is important to note that this clause modifies but does not exclude legal aid, because there is still the route of exceptional case funding, particularly if convention rights are in issue. One of the fundamental convention rights— I think this at least partially answers the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—is the necessity for a fair trial, in Article 6. The exceptional case funding route is still available in that regard. Phrases such as “excludes”, “denies”, “debars” and “no legal aid support” are not an accurate summary of what this clause achieves.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but is it not the case that no one gets exceptional case funding simply because they otherwise would not get legal aid? The point made by the noble and learned Baroness was that it is unfair, so you will not get a fair trial. However, that does not ground exceptional case funding —unless the noble and learned Lord has a different view of exceptional case funding from the rest of us.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
My Lords, there might well be found applications for exceptional case funding; approximately 75% of such applications are successful each year. In any event, exceptional case funding is still available.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
On the question of numbers and definition, what is the essential definition of exceptional case funding and how many cases have given rise to such a relief?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I do not have the exact definition in front of me. It is a matter for the director of the Legal Aid Agency to decide. There is guidance on this, which applies in particular to cases of inquest and other areas where convention rights are at issue. I can supply my noble friend with further details in due course.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
I do not have that information with me, but about three-quarters of applications succeed.
At the risk of disturbing the atmosphere of good will that has, to an extent, prevailed this afternoon, your Lordships would have expected me to explore with the Government whether there can be any further movement on this clause and I am sorry to say that, subject to the important exception for victims of domestic abuse in relation to family and housing matters, they adhere to the clause and respectfully present it to the House.
The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, seek to remove these clauses from the Bill altogether. The Government’s position is that the measures are necessary to ensure that our limited resources for legal aid funding are not directed towards individuals who attack society and democracy and, through their actions, commit acts of terrorism that seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions which provide the benefit of legal aid. It is right that access to legal aid should therefore be subject to the provisions of this clause. Again, I understand that the Labour Party, in principle, accepts that approach.
It is certainly possible to argue, as the noble Baroness did, that if this applies to terrorism, why does it not apply to murder, the abuse of women, drug trafficking and other offences? Certainly, one can always advance an argument about where you draw the line. The line is drawn here at terrorism because of its particular threat to our society and democracy; that is the Government’s reasoning. As I have just said, it is not a blanket ban on civil legal aid because the exceptional case funding route ensures—in compliance with our obligations under the convention—that legal aid remains available when it is most needed to ensure access to justice.
Amendment 188, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, would limit the restriction to where an offender has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven years or more. I acknowledge of course the noble Lord’s concerns, but the Government oppose this amendment on the following grounds. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, introduced following the Fishmongers’ Hall and Streatham Hill terrorist attacks, expanded the sentencing powers of courts in relation to terrorist offenders and created more restrictive provisions for terrorist offenders whose offences carry a maximum sentence of more than two years. So, the two-year benchmark is already baked into legislation, and the Government feel that it is the appropriate benchmark in this instance.
The noble Lord’s seven-year sentence proposal would mean that a number of quite serious terrorism offences would escape: for example, the breach of a TPIM notice. It would also—by reference to sentencing, as distinct from the statutory definition of an offence—create quite a subjective difference between offenders when one has got more than the other: one is a bit above and one is a bit below, perhaps because one has had more previous convictions than the other, or for whatever reason. So, the Government think that the two-year benchmark in existing legislation is logical, defendable and clear and that it should remain. So, with regret, the Government are unable to accept Amendment 188 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Amendment 187, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would make the restriction not apply if the terrorism offence of which the individual had been convicted had no relevant factual connection with their application for legal aid. We quite understand the noble Lord’s intention behind that amendment, but, again, the Government cannot accept it. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said, this is a point of principle. The Government have considered with great care the proposal put forward and consider that the fact of a conviction for a terrorist offence carrying a sentence of more than two years is a ground for restricting the route by which legal aid is granted, so we are unable to accept this amendment.
However, we have tabled government Amendments 182, 183, 184 and 186 to create an exception so that the restriction will not apply where a terrorist offender is a victim of domestic abuse and is applying for legal aid related to family and housing matters within a relevant time period. That would include such matters as pursuing protective injunctions in child custody cases, as well as the loss of a home or homelessness. Again, the question arises: if you have extended it there, why do you not extend it somewhere else? The answer, I think, is that one has to draw a line somewhere. Those are particularly serious issues in society as it stands, and that seems to the Government to be a sound basis for making an exception. It is not our position that it is relevant or wise to create any further exceptions.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a point from his earlier comments on exceptional case funding. The guidance on this on GOV.UK says:
“You could get legal aid for cases that would not usually be eligible if your human rights are at risk. This is known as exceptional case funding”.
Can the Minister clarify: under the Bill, will anybody who receives any sentence for any terrorism offence now automatically be eligible for exceptional case funding?
Lord Bellamy (Con)
No, that is not the Government’s position. There is a mechanism by way of exceptional case funding to ensure access to justice in an appropriate case.
Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)
Then the point that the Minister referred to about the Bill is irrelevant, because the eligibility for exceptional case funding is regardless of whether the Bill is in place.
Lord Bellamy (Con)
It is not entirely irrelevant that exceptional case funding is always available for access to justice. That fact changes some of the comments that have been made about the restrictive nature of the Bill.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, there is a sharp division of opinion on the general principles here. I share the disappointment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, at the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the Labour Front Bench, particularly in view of the way the Labour Front Bench spoke in favour of the principles we enunciated in Committee. I do not propose to press Amendment 180, but when the time comes, I will seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 185.
Lord Bellamy
“(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003; (b) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 12(5) of the Family Law (Northern Ireland) Order 1993 (S.I. 1993/1576 (N.I. 6));(c) in relation to Scotland, has the meaning given by section 135 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and includes proceedings under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 and the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (asp 1).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides a definition of “family proceedings” in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.
Lord Bellamy
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the limitation on the availability of civil legal aid to an offender where the services are provided to them as victims of domestic violence in relation to a matter arising out of a family relationship in which there has been, or is a risk of, domestic violence.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(7A) Condition G is met where—(a) the general case services are those described in paragraph 11, 33, 34 or 35 of Schedule 1 (services in relation to domestic violence and housing), and(b) the offender—(i) was or is a victim of domestic violence occurring after the relevant date, or(ii) is at risk of being a victim of domestic violence.(7B) In subsection (7A)—“domestic violence” has the meaning given in paragraph 12(9) of Schedule 1;“relevant date” means the date five years before the application date.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would allow offenders to access civil legal aid in relation to services relating to domestic violence and housing where they were at any time in the five years preceding their application, or at any time after their application, victims of domestic violence, or are at risk of being victims of domestic violence.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Amendments of Terrorism Act 2000Schedule (Amendments of Terrorism Act 2000) contains amendments to the Terrorism Act 2000.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment introduces the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe before Schedule 17.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
My Lords, Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000—hereafter referred to as TACT —confers a power on a police officer to arrest a person whom they reasonably suspect to be a terrorist. Under Section 41, officers are able to detain someone before charging or releasing them. The Section 41 detention clock allows them to do so for a maximum period of up to 14 days. It is possible for a person to be arrested under Section 24 of PACE then subsequently rearrested under Section 41 of TACT. This might happen, for example, when information comes to light during the investigation indicating that the offence of which the individual is accused has a terrorist connection. Under the current position, the time spent in detention under Section 24 would, in theory, not be counted towards the initial 48-hour permissible period of detention under Section 41. Though counting this time is, in fact, current operational practice, the Government are clear of the need to codify this practice and ensure that the safeguard continues to apply in all future cases. This is what this amendment does, while aligning the power relating to foreign power threat activity contained in Part 1 of this Bill.
Schedule 5 to TACT contains a power under which an officer of at least the rank of superintendent may, by a written order, give to any constable the authority which may be given by a premises search warrant issued by the court for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. The authorising officer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the case is one of great national emergency and that immediate action is necessary. We are seeking to amend Schedule 5 to TACT to create an ex post factum judicial authorisation safeguard. This will require the police to apply to the court for a warrant in relation to any relevant confidential journalistic material seized during the search that they need to retain for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. In the interests of national security, it is right that confidential material should be accessible in cases where the police can show that the action is necessary, proportionate and satisfies the legal tests in these provisions, while pursuing a terrorist investigation.
However, the Government also recognise that press freedoms are extremely important. Therefore, when such material is seized during a search that has been authorised under this urgent procedure, it is right that a warrant must be sought from a judge for its continued retention, and that an application for retention can be ex post factum, after the search itself has taken place. This approach reflects recent case law and ensures that the provisions provide appropriate protection for journalists. This amendment will also align this aspect of Schedule 5 to TACT with the equivalent urgent premises search power found in Schedule 2 to this Bill.
I turn to Amendment 192, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. This amendment seeks to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government published their response to the Russia report on the day the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. Although the report did not itself enumerate specific recommendations, all the recommendations that could be identified in the report were addressed in the government response. A majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published—for example, those covering co-ordination of HMG’s Russia work, close working with international partners and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made to the House on 17 January 2022.
The Government’s response made our approach to tackling the recommendations in the report clear. By introducing effective new tools and powers for the police and security and intelligence agencies, this Bill can rightly be seen as delivering on commitments that the Government made in their response. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Government implement the vast majority of all ISC recommendations. However, there may be occasions when, for reasons including national security, we may not be able to take forward specific recommendations. We do not consider further reporting nor this amendment necessary, given the actions that the Government have already taken in response to the report.
Amendment 193, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to impose a duty on the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee to reflect the changes to the Government’s intelligence and security activities as a result of the Bill. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act 2013 already provides for the ISC to make reports
“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions”.
That already gives the ISC the ability to report on matters that fall within its remit so far as is consistent with the MoU—for example, to seek to avoid duplicating the work of other committees. Amending the Bill as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC required explicit legislative nomination to propose changes to the MoU in relation to changes in intelligence and security arrangements brought in by Bills, which is not the case.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I am aware that there are concerns about how the now closed tier 1 investor route operated—in particular, concerns that the route was used by those relying on funds that had been illegitimately acquired and those who may have posed a wider risk to the UK’s national security. It was because of those concerns that we committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity, or being engaged in serious and organised crime.
The Statement of 12 January represents the Government’s substantive response to the commitment to undertake a review and publish our findings. I am aware that some noble Lords would have preferred that the published review had included more information about specific individuals. However, we have had to act responsibly with regard to the UK’s national security. We have sought to strike the right balance between setting out the broad findings of the review and the constraints on disclosing sensitive details, which must be withheld at the request of our operational partners to protect our border, and the vital work of our law enforcement agencies.
I stress that this Government have already acted decisively regarding the risks posed by the tier 1 investor route to the UK’s national security when we closed the route on 17 February 2022. The Government have also been clear that any future visa programme in the investment space must operate on a fundamentally different premise from the previous one, with a far greater focus on skills and impacts, rather than just cash in the bank. I beg to move.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, this is the first opportunity I have had to join other noble Lords in thanking the Minister for the various significant changes the Government have made to the National Security Bill and the improvement they have brought.
I shall speak to my Amendments 192 and 193. Again, I thank the Minister for his various amendments in this group, which are also an important step forward. I will leave the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, who has signed my Amendment 192, to speak to his Amendment 194.
Amendment 192 deals with the recommendations of the July 2020 ISC Russia report. The Minister has addressed some of those but I have one or two questions to ask him before I turn to Amendment 193, which is the real priority for me in this group. The report highlighted the fragmentation of the various bodies. The Minister has spoken about how the Government seek to address that, but we would all like to know how the supposed co-ordination of the government response to the Russia report is being monitored to ensure that it is taken forward, and that what the Government say about the need for co-ordination to tackle fragmentation is made a reality.
The report highlighted again the prominence of dodgy Russian money in London. The Government will say, quite rightly, that they have at last taken action on that. How is that progress being monitored, so that we know how effective it has been, particularly in light of Ukraine? Similarly, can the Government reassure us that the various threats to democratic processes that the report highlighted are being addressed? I do not intend to press Amendment 192 to a vote—I am really just asking about the progress made since the report was published. As the Minister said, the Government’s response was published on the same day, but the question is how we maintain the progress that we all want to see on the various issues raised.
I will try to be as brief as possible on Amendment 193. The ISC’s annual report, published on 13 December 2022, clearly laid out the need to update the memorandum of understanding. That is what my Amendment 193, on which I will test the opinion of the House, seeks to do: to update the MoU the ISC operates under to reflect the changes made by the Bill and those made over the last few years. The Minister himself referenced the various government departments that now have responsibility for different aspects of security and intelligence, a point I will come to in a moment.
Let us remember that the ISC was set up in 1994 to allow for greater parliamentary oversight of these important matters, while respecting the obvious need for national security—an issue brought into sharp focus by the excellent Saunders report on the horrific Manchester Arena attack. The current MoU is out of date. The commitment made by the Security Minister in 2013 during the passage of the Justice and Security Act—that the MoU is a live document that is easily changed—needs to be honoured.
Who oversees the increasing devolution to policy departments of intelligence and security activities? How can parliamentarians scrutinise those when only ISC members with the necessary security clearance can access classified information? The Select Committees supposedly tasked with these various oversight roles are not suitable for that reason, rather than for any reason of capability. They simply do not have the security clearance to look at classified information.
The following departments and bodies are mentioned in the Saunders recommendations: the Department for Education, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Law Commission, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice—and that is the open part of the report; for obvious reasons, we will not know what is in the closed part. If the ISC oversees all this, as it is perhaps expected to do in light of the recommendations, how will that work with regard to the Department for Education and the various other departments?
Our committee says that the outdated MoU is a real problem, but the Government say it is not. The ISC says it is a problem, but the Government simply dismiss it and say it is not. Can the Minister explain how members of a Select Committee—let us use BEIS as an example—can oversee classified information that informs the work of a body they are responsible for if they cannot see that information? Pages 42 and 43 of the Intelligence and Security Committee annual report lists numerous departments that have various security and intelligence functions they are supposed to oversee, but they will not be able to see the classified information because they do not have the security clearance. The ISC itself cannot oversee this because that is not part of the memorandum of understanding under which it works.
The committee was told, as I said, that the Government do not feel bound by statements made by the Security Minister to Parliament in 2013. So what weight should we give to any Ministerial Statements the Minister makes if, in a few years’ time, the Government can simply say, “We don’t give any weight to what was said in 2013”? Parliamentary Statements by Ministers of the Crown are supposed to be justifications of policy. We all rely on them. Courts rely on them. Many amendments to this Bill were withdrawn earlier because of what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box and the reassurances he gave, yet the Government are saying that they no longer agree with the 2013 assurances given by then Security Minister, so they will ignore them. We are talking not about policy—I understand how policy works—but about process and the need to update it. As I say, that is very disappointing, to say the least.
Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)
My Lords, I want to support Amendment 193, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. He said that he felt the memorandum of understanding had not been renewed and brought up to date for no good reason. I believe it is worse than that. I think it has not been revised for a bad reason: because the Government have taken a dislike to the Intelligence and Security Committee. They have tried to restrict its activities, I believe for two reasons. First, the Government were piqued when there was pressure to publish the Russia report before the 2019 election and they did not want that. I suspect the reason they did not want it was that they did not want the discussion which the report introduced about the involvement of Russian apparatchiks in London politics. Secondly, I believe the Government were piqued because the committee did not elect as its chairman the person whom the Government wanted. It seems extraordinary that one could say of a responsible Government that these were their motives; they are childish motives. But the consequence is that in recent times the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has not been used for the purpose for which it was set up.
If the Government are not going to use the Intelligence and Security Committee properly, they should save money and abolish it. But, of course, they will not do that because Parliament set it up, Parliament thinks it is important that this House and the House of Commons should have some insight into intelligence operations, and it would be unacceptable for the Government to abolish it. But they must choose either to abolish it or to use it properly. If they are to use it properly, they must update the memorandum of understanding and, as the noble Lord, Lord West, said, use it for the purpose for which Parliament intended: to give oversight by people who are fully screened within the ring of secrecy to report to Parliament. I think this is a much more important amendment than the face of it suggests.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, again I thank all those who have spoken on this group of amendments, and in particular I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his generous remarks.
In terms of the Russia report, it is simply not true that we have not implemented the report’s recommendations. As I said in my opening remarks, the Government published a full and comprehensive response to the ISC report in July 2020, which is available online and which addressed all the committee’s key themes and recommendations point by point. The Government have responded to all the recommendations that could be identified within the report. The majority of the committee’s recommendations were already being implemented by the Government before the report was published: for example, those covering co-ordination of HMG Russia’s work, close working with international partners, and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity.
I would say also that, as noted in HMG’s response to the Russia report, an assessment was produced and is available at a higher classification. Noble Lords will appreciate the difficulties of producing intelligence assessments for the wider public, given the risks of putting sensitive material, including information about our capabilities and methods, into the public domain.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Before the noble Lord moves on to a different amendment, can he answer my question? How can Select Committee members, who do not have the necessary security clearance, possibly look at and scrutinise classified material on Parliament’s behalf?
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
If they do not have the necessary security clearances, they obviously cannot, but, as I said earlier, that is part of the full consideration of the MoU and the various changes to the machinery of government that is currently under way.
Lord Beith (LD)
Has the noble Lord quite grasped the significant value of the ISC? I speak as someone who used to be on it. One aspect is its value to the Prime Minister, who gets a detailed assessment of aspects of security in circumstances where nobody else can, and he alone can do something about it. It is also an important guarantee to parliamentary colleagues in both Houses that things that cannot be disclosed are being examined by people whom colleagues trust, and that is very important in order to have some confidence that there is oversight going on.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I completely agree with the noble Lord. I certainly get it, and I hold the ISC in great respect, including the noble Lords in this House who are members. As I have said, the Justice and Security Act requires the Prime Minister to read the report before it is published. He gets an unredacted version, so he sees the full picture, and I have committed to take back the House’s concerns about attending the committee, via my noble friend Lord True.
If I may, I will turn to the tier 1 investor visa route, and I am afraid that I will have to repeat a number of things that I said in my opening remarks. The review of visas issued under the route took place relatively recently. A Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January set out the findings of that review, which reviewed visas issued between 2008 and 2015. That included that it had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route that were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity. The Statement represented the Government’s substantive response to the commitment to undertake that review and publish its findings.
I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would have preferred that the published review included more information about specific individuals. I agree with his remarks about protecting our democracy and transparency. However, we have had to act responsibly in regard to the UK’s national security. We have sought to strike the right balance between setting out the broad findings of the review and the constraints on disclosing sensitive details, which must be withheld at the request of our operational partners to protect our border and the vital work of our law enforcement agencies. I think that those are perfectly reasonable points to have made in regard to the tier 1 investor visa.
I appreciate that I have not given as fulsome answers as all noble Lords would like, but in light of the answers that I have given, I request that noble Lords do not press their amendments.
Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)
My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I have considerable sympathy for what he says in view of the appalling behaviour of the IRGC. However, this amendment, as I understand it, would open the door to the proscription of state organisations, with proscription having originally been envisaged as a mechanism principally to bear down on non-state organisations.
I wonder therefore whether the Minister, when he responds, could clarify whether the proscription of state organisations brings with it unintended consequences that would be potentially quite difficult. For instance, will we say that anybody who is a member of a hostile intelligence service—which might be proscribed—is, by definition, committing an offence? What will that do, for instance, to intelligence liaison with people who are hostile to us, which sometimes happens? Does it create problems which would not be created for a non-state organisation, because these organs will be part of a very considerably bigger state entity with which we may have to engage at some level?
I am neither in favour with nor against the amendment. I am not quite sure exactly how it would work, and I would be very grateful if the Minister could clarify those aspects.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this very brief debate.
I think it would be helpful to give a brief overview of the concept of proscription as outlined in Part 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Put simply, proscription can play an important role in degrading the ability of terrorist organisations to operate effectively, and it sends a strong message that the UK is a hostile operating environment for such groups. The Terrorism Act 2000 gives the Home Secretary the power to proscribe a group if she has a reasonable belief that it is currently concerned in terrorism and it is proportionate to do so. The amendment seeks to replicate this within an explicit state threats context and requires that the Government develop and publish appropriate draft legislation.
The Home Secretary’s decisions on proscription can be legally challenged. As such, those decisions are supported by a comprehensive, evidence-led process which involves close consultation with other government departments and partners. This House will fully appreciate that developing a state threats proscription power will need to be considered fully.
Before I go on, I will refer to the IRGC, as it has come up in all contributions. I remind the House that the United Kingdom already sanctions the IRGC in its entirety. The separate list of proscribed terrorist organisations is kept under very careful review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.
In response to the illustrative points from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on whether there is a legislative gap in this area, I say that the National Security Bill creates a wide range of offences, tools and powers to counter state threats activity. In many respects, they cover very similar ground to a proscription-like power. For example, any person materially assisting a foreign intelligence service in their UK-related activities would commit an offence under Clause 3. Under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme in Part 3, the Government could require the registration of all activities being conducted with those specified under the scheme. The Government will, with the agreement of Parliament, be able to specify a foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity controlled by a foreign power. That means that those who are in arrangements with such organisations must register their activities or risk prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to my right honourable friend in the other place, the Security Minister, and I know that he is reassured by this.
However, as the Government have previously set out, we see the Bill as forming a new baseline for state threats legislation from which the statute will inevitably build over time as the threat evolves and diversifies. I am therefore grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue and giving us the opportunity to debate it. I reassure him that I understand the reasons behind the amendment and the concern about the activities of state groups such as the IRGC. The Government of course share the noble Lord’s concerns, as was made clear in the Government’s statements on Iran International —to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, also referred—which highlighted the potentially lethal operations of the IRGC taking place in the UK.
The amendment raises an important question of whether more needs to be done in this space, and I can reassure all noble Lords that this is a question that the Government are already considering carefully. The Government are committed to tackling all forms of state threats and to ensuring that our police and security services have the right powers to keep the UK safe.
Given, as I have said, that the measures in the Bill already have a similar effect in the state threats context to that achieved through the proscription for terrorism, we need to fully consider, alongside our operational partners, whether and how additional tools such as a state threats proscription power would add to the offences and measures in the Bill. We are committed to ensuring that any future legislation we pursue in this area has maximum effect.
Returning to the amendment itself, while it does not seek to set the ultimate scope of any legislative provision, I am afraid I am unable to accept an amendment that too tightly constrains our thinking in this important area. Linking proscription to hostile activity as defined in Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 would need careful consideration. I very much take on board the points of the noble Lord, Lord Evans, on this and on the scope. While that definition was considered suitable for that legislation, a different approach was taken in the National Security Bill, reflecting the differing nature of the tools and powers it contains. I would not want to pre-empt what might work best in the context of a potential proscription-like power. Furthermore, it is possible that to deliver an operational benefit, the tool may need to be created in a different way, and as such proposing a link to existing proscription processes may be unhelpful.
For these reasons, the Government cannot accept this amendment as drafted. I am also going to have disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Purvis: I am unable to comment on the Wagner Group; I am not qualified to do so. I hope the noble Lord is reassured that the Government are already looking carefully at this area and will therefore consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“ScheduleAmendments of Terrorism Act 20001 (1) Section 41 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (arrest without warrant) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (3)(b)—(a) for the words from “Schedule 7” to “2019,” substitute “a provision listed in subsection (3A)”;(b) for “examination under that Schedule” substitute “detention under that provision”.(3) After subsection (3) insert—“(3A) Those provisions are—(a) section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984;(b) Article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));(c) Schedule 7;(d) section 1 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 1);(e) Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019;(f) section 27 of the National Security Act 2022.”(4) After subsection (8) insert—“(8ZA) Subsection (8A) applies where— (a) a person is detained under this section in hospital, or(b) a person detained under this section is removed to hospital because the person needs medical treatment.”(5) In subsection (8A)—(a) for the words before paragraph (a) substitute “Where this subsection applies”;(b) in paragraph (a) after “hospital or” insert “(where this subsection applies by virtue of subsection (8ZA)(b))”;(c) in paragraph (b) after “hospital or” insert “(where this subsection applies by virtue of subsection (8ZA)(b))”.2 (1) Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist investigations) is amended as follows.(2) In paragraph 3 (power to search premises within cordoned area)—(a) in sub-paragraph (1) for the words from “Subject” to “superintendent” substitute “A constable”;(b) in sub-paragraph (2) for the words from “who” to “paragraph” substitute “may exercise the power in sub-paragraph (1) only”.(3) In paragraph 15 (search and seizure in urgent cases: England, Wales and Northern Ireland)—(a) at the end of sub-paragraph (1) insert “(subject to sub-paragraph (1A))”;(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) An order under this paragraph giving the authority which may be given by a search warrant under paragraph 11 does not authorise a constable to retain confidential journalistic material.(1B) “Confidential journalistic material” means material which is excluded material by virtue of section 11(1)(c) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”(4) After paragraph 15 insert—“15A “(1) This paragraph applies where confidential journalistic material is seized by virtue of an order under paragraph 15 giving the authority which may be given by a search warrant under paragraph 11.(2) A constable may apply to a Circuit judge for the issue of a warrant under this paragraph.(3) An application under sub-paragraph (2) must be made as soon as reasonably practicable after the material is seized.(4) The judge may grant an application under sub-paragraph (2) if satisfied that conditions 1 to 3 are met.(5) Condition 1 is that the warrant is sought for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.(6) Condition 2 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value, whether by itself or with other material, to a terrorist investigation.(7) Condition 3 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest that the material should be retained having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the terrorist investigation if the material is retained.(8) A warrant under this paragraph is a warrant authorising the retention of confidential journalistic material.(9) A warrant under this paragraph may impose conditions on the retention and use of the material.(10) If the judge does not grant an application for the issue of a warrant under this paragraph in relation to any of the material to which the application relates, the judge may direct that the material is—(a) returned to the person from whom it was seized, or (b) destroyed.(11) “Confidential journalistic material” has the same meaning as in paragraph 15.”(5) In paragraph 18 (application to Northern Ireland) before paragraph (f) insert—“(ea) the reference in paragraph 15(1B) to section 11(1)(c) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be taken as a reference to Article 13(1)(c) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)),”(6) In paragraph 31 (search and seizure in urgent cases: Scotland)—(a) at the end of sub-paragraph (1) insert “(subject to sub-paragraph (1A)).”;(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—“(1A) An order under this paragraph does not authorise a constable to retain confidential journalistic material.(1B) “Confidential journalistic material” has the same meaning as in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act).”(7) After paragraph 31 insert—“31A “(1) This paragraph applies where confidential journalistic material is seized by virtue of an order under paragraph 31.(2) The procurator fiscal may apply to a sheriff for the issue of a warrant under this paragraph.(3) An application under sub-paragraph (2) must be made as soon as reasonably practicable.(4) The sheriff may grant an application under sub-paragraph (2) if satisfied that conditions 1 to 3 are met.(5) Condition 1 is that the warrant is sought for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.(6) Condition 2 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value, whether by itself or with other material, to a terrorist investigation.(7) Condition 3 is that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is in the public interest that the material should be retained having regard to the benefit likely to accrue to the terrorist investigation if the material is retained.(8) A warrant under this paragraph is a warrant authorising the retention of confidential journalistic material.(9) A warrant under this paragraph may impose conditions on the retention and use of the material.(10) If the sheriff does not grant an application for the issue of a warrant under this paragraph in relation to any of the material to which the application relates, the sheriff may direct that the material is—(a) returned to the person from whom it was seized, or(b) destroyed.(11) “Confidential journalistic material” has the same meaning as in paragraph 31.””Member's explanatory statement
The amendments to section 41 of the Terrorism Act reflect provision in Clause 27 of the Bill. The amendments to paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 amend powers to authorise searches. The remaining amendments to Schedule 5 restrict powers to retain confidential journalistic material to reflect provision in Schedule 2 to the Bill.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (c. 25)
10 (1) Schedule 3 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (exceptions to the exclusion of certain matters from legal proceedings) is amended as follows.(2) After paragraph 8 insert—“Proceedings under Part 2 of the National Security Act 20238A (1) Section 56(1) does not apply in relation to—(a) any proceedings which are relevant proceedings within the meaning of Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 (see section 63(1) of that Act), or(b) any proceedings arising out of any proceedings within paragraph (a).(2) But sub-paragraph (1) does not permit the disclosure of anything to—(a) any person, other than the Secretary of State, who is or was a party to the proceedings, or(b) any person who—(i) represents such a person for the purposes of the proceedings, and(ii) does so otherwise than by virtue of an appointment as a special advocate under Schedule 10 to the National Security Act 2023.”(3) In paragraph 20(2) (proceedings for certain offences)—(a) after paragraph (h) insert—“(ha) an offence under section 1 or 3 of the National Security Act 2023 relating to any information, document or other article which, or an offence under section 12 of that Act relating to any asset which—(i) incorporates, or relates to, the content of any intercepted communication or any secondary data obtained from a communication, or(ii) tends to suggest that any interception-related conduct has or may have occurred or may be going to occur;(hb) an offence under section 18 of the National Security Act 2023 in relation to an offence falling within paragraph (ha);”(b) in paragraph (i), for “(h)” substitute “(ha)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes consequential amendments to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(za) regulations under section 64(1B);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides for the affirmative procedure to apply to regulations under Clause 64(1B), which is inserted by Lord Sharpe’s amendment to Clause 64, page 45, line 19.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the new Schedule inserted by Lord Sharpe before Schedule 17.
Monday 13th March 2023
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 115-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (10 Mar 2023)
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Lord Privy Seal (Lord True) (Con)
My Lords, I have it in command from His Majesty the King and His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to acquaint the House that they, having been informed of the purport of the National Security Bill, have consented to place their interests, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Clause 14: Foreign interference: meaning of “interference effect”
Amendment 1
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(aa) a Northern Ireland Minister, the First Minister in Northern Ireland, the deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, a person appointed as a junior Minister under section 19 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, a Northern Ireland department or the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly,(ab) the Scottish Ministers or the First Minister for Scotland,(ac) the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales or the Counsel General to the Welsh Government, or”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and Lord Sharpe’s other amendments to clause 14 clarify the persons whose decisions are caught by clause 14(1)(d), and are needed to avoid giving a meaning to the terms “Scottish Ministers”, “Welsh Ministers” and “Northern Ireland Minister” that is different to the meaning of those terms given in the devolution Acts.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, as I set out at Second Reading, the first responsibility of any Government is to ensure the safety of their citizens. National security is at the forefront of this Government’s agenda, and that is why the passing of this Bill is so important. It gives us a new toolkit to tackle those state actors who threaten the safety and security of the United Kingdom. By listening carefully, and working closely with your Lordships through the passage of this Bill, we have created legislation which is stronger, more targeted and shows the importance of the scrutiny that this House provides.
We have made a range of changes to this Bill since its introduction, such as significantly tightening Part 1 in response to concerns relating to journalistic freedoms. We have amended the “ought reasonably to know” test to put it beyond doubt that individuals would not be caught if they acted unwittingly or without genuine knowledge as to the effect of their conduct. Further, we have focused the political tier of the foreign influence registration scheme more explicitly on foreign powers, providing us all with more information about the scale and nature of foreign political influence in the United Kingdom. We have also, under Clause 30, created a targeted defence available to UKIC and the Armed Forces for the extraterritorial offences under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in specific circumstances, replacing the previous approach of disapplying those offences.
I also note that the Government will bring back the sensible amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to restrict the defence to intelligence activity of the Armed Forces, during Commons consideration of these amendments. We have extended the oversight provisions which were included in Part 2 on introduction of the Bill to cover Part 1 as well. We have also amended Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act, so that the statutory oversight for those powers will now be the responsibility of the new independent reviewer of national security legislation, ensuring that the oversight of all state threats provisions is in one place. The Government recognise the importance of independent scrutiny, and I know noble Lords welcome the inclusion of a new reviewer for the Bill.
I shall now speak briefly to the minor and technical amendments we have tabled today. Together, these amendments clarify definitions related to decisions of the devolved Administrations in Clauses 14(4)(a) and 71(3)(b) for the offence of foreign interference and the political influence tier of FIRS. These amendments will also clarify which officeholders in Scotland and Wales to whom a communication is sent are caught by Schedule 14 as set out in Clause 71(2)(a). I want to provide some context to these changes. We took the opportunity on Report in the Lords to clarify the drafting so as to ensure our policy intention in relation to government decisions was clear on the face of the legislation. We replaced the phrase
“a decision of the government of the UK”
through Amendments 50 and 118, with
“a Minister of the Crown (within the meaning of the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975), a United Kingdom government department”.
In doing so, we identified that the definitions did not fully reflect the decision-making powers of the devolved Administrations and their Ministers, but we wanted to make sure we got this drafting right, so we have worked closely with our colleagues in the devolved Administrations before tabling these amendments. Amendments 1 to 8 achieve the same effect as those tabled on Report mentioned above.
Amendments 1 and 4 relate to drafting changes for Clauses 14 and 71 respectively. They contain revised definitions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to ensure parity for all Governments within the United Kingdom. Amendments 2, 3, 5 and 6 are consequential amendments flowing from Amendments 1 and 4. Amendments 7 and 8 relate to the definitions in Schedule 14, which covers those officeholders to whom communication is caught under Clause 71(2)(a). It is vital that the UK is able to promote transparency within the political lobbying arena and tackle those who seek to interfere in our democracy at every level and in every part of the United Kingdom. That is why these amendments are so important, and I ask noble Lords to support their inclusion in the Bill.
Finally, in terms of tabled amendments, there is also a change to the Long Title of the Bill to reflect the changes made on Report to the foreign influence registration scheme. I beg to move.
Lord Balfe (Con)
My Lords, I briefly thank the Minister. I have heard from the stiftungs that we intervened on behalf of, and they thank the Minister for the movement that has happened and look forward to working closely with us in the future. I think it is as well to place these thanks on the public record.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on Lord Sharpe’s amendment to clause 14(4).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
“(ii) a Northern Ireland Minister, the First Minister in Northern Ireland, the deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, a person appointed as a junior Minister under section 19 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, a Northern Ireland department or the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly,(iii) the Scottish Ministers or the First Minister for Scotland, or(iv) the Welsh Ministers, the First Minister for Wales or the Counsel General to the Welsh Government,”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment and Lord Sharpe’s other amendments to clause 71 clarify the persons whose decisions are caught by clause 71(2)(b), and are needed to avoid giving a meaning to the terms “Scottish Ministers”, “Welsh Ministers” and “Northern Ireland Minister” that is different to the meaning of those terms given in the devolution Acts.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies which office-holders in Northern Ireland, to whom a communication is sent, are caught by Schedule 14, and is consequential (in part) on Lord Sharpe’s amendment to clause 71(5).
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment to the long title is consequential on amendments made to Part 4 of the Bill on Report.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords across the House for their interest in this Bill and for their valuable contributions and co-operation so far. Debate has been consistently informative and constructive. I am extremely grateful for the diligent approach that noble Lords from across the House have taken to ensuring that this vital legislation has received full scrutiny ahead of returning to the other place.
I am particularly grateful for the positive engagement and support of various noble Lords. From the Benches opposite, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby and Lord West; from the Cross Benches, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Evans, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile; from the Liberal Democrat Benches, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks; and I am also grateful to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Leigh. I hope all noble Lords will join me in thanking the Bill team, policy teams and legal teams in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice for their hard work in getting the Bill to its current position. They worked phenomenally hard, particularly in relation to FIRS. It is always invidious to single out anyone in particular, but I would very much like to thank the following: Emer Smith from my private office, and Laura Weight, Jack Joseph, Sebastian Graves Read, Grace Bennett, Joe Marshall, Grace Lucas, James Dix and, last but by no means least, Louise Holliday from the Bill team.
I also place on record my thanks to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both for their contributions to this Bill’s development and for their enduring work in keeping us all safe every day. It is vital that they have the tools they need to fulfil such a challenging task. The measures in the Bill seek to ensure they are well equipped to tackle the wide range of modern threats that we face in the UK today. I beg to move.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for his constructive engagement, along with his colleagues, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and others, including his Bill team. The Bill has had significant changes made to it, showing the way this Chamber can improve legislation. That can happen only when a Minister and the Government listen. All of us, I think, appreciate the way the Minister has engaged and made significant changes to the Bill to improve it. We are all grateful to him for that.
I also pay due respect to the contributions of many noble Lords across the House. I pay my respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who we have just heard from on the previous group of amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who I am pleased to see in his place. I think the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Pannick, have been significant and have helped to improve the Bill.
The Minister paid tribute to the intelligence and security services, as we all do, because we all have an interest in the security of our nation. We should note that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, have attended virtually the whole of the proceedings on this Bill. That says everything about the contributions they have made, but also it also sends a signal to the intelligence and security services to know that two former directors-general have spent all their time contributing to the Bill and advising people both in the Chamber and outside of it. That is of huge significance, not only to this Chamber but to our country. They deserve recognition for that.
I also thank my noble friends Lord West and Lady Hayter for their contributions throughout the Bill, which have helped our thinking as well. I thank my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for his—as I often say now—calming support to my more excitable personality. That helps me enormously in more ways than you can imagine. I also thank—I know they are not here—the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks, for their input, which helped to improve the Bill.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I hope the Chamber will indulge me. I forgot to thank Ben Wood, who is our adviser. I apologise to him for that.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
While the House is indulging, I also forgot to thank my colleagues, my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Davies of Gower, so I would like to place that on record. I also thank my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy at the Ministry of Justice.
Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.
Wednesday 3rd May 2023
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Amendments as at 3 May 2023 - (3 May 2023)
14:30 - The House divided: - Ayes: 132 / Noes: 252 - Question accordingly negatived.
14:45 - The House divided: - Ayes: 254 / Noes: 134 - Question accordingly agreed to.
14:57 - The House divided: - Ayes: 254 / Noes: 136 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move amendment (a) to Lords amendment 26.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 26, and amendment (c) and Government amendment (b).
Lords amendment 153, and Government amendment (a).
Lords amendment 22, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 122, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 1 to 21, 23 to 25, 27 to 121, 123 to 152 and 154 to 174.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me start on a personal note by thanking the Clerk who is sitting in his place and congratulating him on becoming Clerk of the House. It is the first time that he has been in his place when I have spoken from the Despatch Box. He has been a friend for many years, so I am glad to have the opportunity to put on record that the Clerks keep us all on the straight and narrow, and in some cases get us out of rather a lot of trouble. I thank them very much indeed.
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. A number of changes have been made in the other place to improve it. The House will know the importance of the Bill: it gives our intelligence and security services, as well as law enforcement, a new toolkit to tackle state actors who threaten the safety and security of the United Kingdom. It also takes steps to prevent public funds from being given to those who could use them to support terror. As always, this Government have listened. I pay tribute to Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile for their work to improve the Bill—[Interruption.] I am glad to hear the acknowledgement from the Opposition Benches. That has improved the Bill for all sides.
We have heard the views of the other place, of industry and of many others, and we have focused the foreign influence registration scheme into a more targeted weapon against those who would do us harm. Arrangements to carry out political influence activity will now be registerable only when directed by a foreign power. Receiving funding from a foreign power, absent a direction, will not trigger a requirement to register under the scheme. For example, cultural institutes that make an important contribution to life in the United Kingdom will not be required to register simply because they receive funding from a foreign power. That is in line with the original intention of the scheme.
Only where organisations or individuals are directed by a foreign power to carry out political activities will that arrangement need to be routinely registered. We will publish guidance to support understanding of the scheme and circumstances in which arrangements will need to be registered. It remains the case that criminal offences will be attached to failures to register.
The Government made a number of changes in the other place following concerns expressed about the Bill’s potential impact on journalistic freedoms and other legitimate activity. I pay enormous tribute to Lord Black for his contribution to the debate. The Government are clear that the Bill’s focus is on protecting the United Kingdom from threats from those acting against the UK’s interests, not interfering with press freedom. The Lords amendments clarify the scope of offences and requirements in part 1. That includes amending the language in the phrase
“knows, or ought reasonably to know”
to put beyond doubt that it would need to be proved what an individual knew rather than capturing individuals acting unwittingly. That applies in every instance when the phrase appears in the Bill, including in the foreign power condition.
Further drafting changes have been made, including to clarify the scope of the offence of assisting a foreign intelligence service and the meaning of foreign power threat activity.
Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)
Does the Minister agree that we must exclude assistance in torture from the scope of defence, to protect people such as my constituent Jagtar Singh Johal, who was repeatedly electrocuted and threatened with being set alight by the Government of India?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member will know that that is a matter for the Foreign Office in its dealings with other states. The Bill does not in any way erode any of the protections under the European convention on human rights, including the right not to be tortured.
We are pleased that the chief executive officer of the News Media Association Owen Meredith said in response to the Government’s changes that he welcomed
“the government’s reassurances that journalism will not be criminalised under this new national security regime.”
That is absolutely correct. It will not be, and it is not the Government’s intention that it should be. The media sector recognises the balance that the Government have struck between protecting press freedoms and safeguarding national security.
We have also taken on board the concerns of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, which I thank for the incredibly constructive and supportive manner in which it has engaged on the Bill. In response, the Government have changed the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment from non-application of the offences to a defence. We believe that the amendment strikes the right balance. It ensures that the dedicated individuals in the intelligence and security services can carry out activities to support our foreign partners, but that there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.
The Bill is now in a strong position. We have effective tools and powers to tackle hostile activity on British soil or that is against the UK’s interest, done for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, foreign states. We have a thorough transparency scheme designed to ensure that we know who is influencing our politics. Under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, we have the ability to specify states and entities and thereby require the registration of activities to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. We also have the means to prevent the exploitation of the UK’s civil legal aid and civil damage systems by convicted terrorists.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
I have raised on a number of occasions in debates and Committees the use of cryptocurrencies, and cryptocurrency mixers in particular, to facilitate the activities of hostile state-sponsored activities in a number of countries. The US Treasury acted against a number of the so-called mixers back in August last year. Despite raising that on a number of occasions, I am yet to receive clarification on what we are doing to ensure that cryptocurrency is not used to facilitate hostile state activities, as has been done in sums of billions.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Gentleman, who is a friend, is right to highlight this issue as it is true that cryptocurrency can be used in such ways. I urge him to look at the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which we are taking through the House. Naturally, the National Security Bill does not cover every element that we are using to ensure the protection of the United Kingdom; there are many other Bills, which work together as a woven fabric of defence. Cryptocurrency is one aspect of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, which my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) is leading on. That Bill is making its way through the House and will address some of the hon. Gentleman’s concerns.
Turning to amendments 22 and 122, the Government have set out clear reasons why we will not accept either amendment. I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) will be making an intervention about this later in the debate. We have set out the reasons why we will not accept the amendments, which were made clear in the other place.
Amendment 22 would introduce a requirement for political parties to
“publish a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from a foreign power”.
Upon receipt of a donation, political parties are already required by law to verify whether they are or are not from a political source. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be returned and reported to the Electoral Commission. If political parties fail to do that, their treasurers face being sent to jail. They risk the reputations of their staff and their elected representatives being shredded. There is already a strong incentive for parties to ensure that donations come only from permissible donors.
Sir Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
But earlier the Minister was praying in aid Lord Carlile, saying what a wonderful job he had done in helping the Government to bring forward wonderful amendments. This is one of his amendments, so it seems a bit odd to turn against this one.
On the point the Minister just made about permissible donors, all that has to be checked is whether the person is on the electoral register. The Elections Act 2022 has added to the register 3.5 million people who do not even live in this country. All that political parties presently have to do is check whether somebody is on the electoral register. I do not think that safeguards our elections from interference from those who would wish us ill.
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member has formerly been very kind about the work that we have done together, such as on the Foreign Affairs Committee and on other appointments. He has agreed with me on some areas and disagreed on others. It cannot be an enormous surprise to him that I agree with Lord Carlile on some areas and disagree with him on others. Frankly, that is the nature of parliamentary work, as the hon. Gentleman knows better than anyone.
As for the hon. Gentleman’s point about foreign registrations, those are of British citizens living abroad. Those are the only terms on which people are registered to vote on our electoral register. It is not right to say that those are a random 3.5 million people; that is certainly not true. They are British citizens and therefore their donations are as valid as their votes.
The Government recognise that there are risks. That is why it is already an offence to attempt to make a donation by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly facilitating the making of an impermissible donation. Where the foreign power condition is met in relation to a relevant electoral offence, as set out in schedule 1 to the Bill, clause 16 provides for a substantially increased maximum penalty: where a one-year sentence previously applied, that has been increased to four years; and two-year sentences have been increased to seven years. These relevant electoral offences include offences of undue influence, for which the maximum sentence has been increased to seven years, and making a false declaration about the source of a donation, for which the maximum sentence has been increased to four years.
Indeed, the Government have already taken action. The Elections Act 2022 tightened the law to close loopholes on foreign spending. The Electoral Commission is also being given more powers to access Companies House information, through measures under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill. That will allow the Electoral Commission to undertake the proper targeted and proportionate checks.
For absolute clarity, donations to political parties from foreign powers, made directly or indirectly, are not permissible. The amendment places new requirements on minor parties, who are not subject to any other financial reporting requirements at this time, as they can contest only local and parish elections. The amendment would therefore place huge administrative burdens on small, grassroots political campaigning and would punish grassroots democracy.
It is not clear how the proposals would work in practice. Political parties are not banks; rightly, they do not have access to individuals’ financial records. They are not His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs; they do not have access to tax records. They do have access to the electoral roll and to Companies House, which they are already obliged to check. The Electoral Commission already publishes guidance on these legal duties. Indeed, political parties must already report all larger donations to the Electoral Commission, which are then published online for public scrutiny.
Martin Docherty-Hughes
Is the Minister saying that small grassroots organisations, many of them associational organisations that may be registered charities in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, are not capable of filling out an extra form to make sure that they are not being utilised by foreign states?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member underplays what the amendment would do. It would be much more than simply filling in a form and would place a greater burden of a need to check, which would be a major requirement for small political parties and grassroots organisations. I am surprised that he, as a champion of local democracy, would require smaller parties to do that.
As I have said, Lords amendment 22 is not needed. The law already makes robust provision in relation to donations to political parties. Foreign donations are banned. It is an offence to accept them and there are strong rules safeguarding against impermissible donations via the backdoor. Parties can accept donations only from permissible donors. As such, the Government will not accept the amendment.
Amendment 122 imposes a duty on the Prime Minister to amend the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to account for changes to intelligence or security activities
“as a result of this Act”.
It also requires engagement on these revisions to begin within six months of the Act coming into force.
The power to make revisions to the MOU between the Prime Minister and the ISC is not limited to changes resulting from a specific piece of legislation. Adding the amendment risks creating the erroneous impression that explicit legislative provision is required in order for the ISC to propose amendments to the MOU. Further, the power to amend the MOU is already included in the Justice and Security Act 2013. I would be happy to meet with the chair of the ISC, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East, on this matter. Indeed, we have spoken about that in the past.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend—and he is a friend—who I know is saying what he has to say. We know that the memorandum of understanding can be amended as developments in the organisation of Government require it to be amended, but the trouble is that the Prime Minister has been reluctant to amend it and it is not being amended. The reason this amendment was introduced in the other place is to force the Government to do what they should be doing voluntarily.
Tom Tugendhat
As usual, my right hon. Friend makes his point cogently. In reality, the MOU requires amendment because the nature of the Government has changed. He is absolutely right that we need to ensure that the House is able to scrutinise the Government on areas where intelligence and security information is required. I agree that that update needs to be made, but I disagree that this is the place to do it or that it should be done in legislation, for the reasons of flexibility that we have already discussed. I know that he will be making his case powerfully to the Prime Minister, and no doubt to other Ministers, to make sure that the updates required to make sure scrutiny is observed are followed through.
Finally, I turn to the amendment to the Serious Crime Act 2007 tabled today, which largely speaks for itself. It clarifies the application of the new defence, which will apply to
“the proper exercise of a function of the armed forces”
only when relating to intelligence. This addresses concerns raised in the other place about the scope of armed forces activities that may have been covered by the defence. It builds upon the amendment tabled by Lord Anderson on Report in the Lords and the commitment made in the other place to bring forward a similar amendment. I am glad that we can bring it forward today.
The ISC has heard and accepted the operational problems caused by the application of the SCA offences. I believe the new SCA defence, and today’s amendment to it, satisfy the concerns of the United Kingdom intelligence community, the armed forces, the other place and this House. I therefore ask the House to support the Government amendment. Let me again thank the Intelligence and Security Committee for its co-operation and help in improving the Bill.
As the House will know, the Government have also tabled a minor amendment to the foreign influence registration scheme, designed to ensure parity across the devolved Administrations in respect of the public officials covered within the meaning of political influence activity.
This Bill is a groundbreaking piece of legislation that will revolutionise the tools and powers available to the police and our intelligence agencies, so that they are equipped to keep us safe.
Stephen Doughty
The Minister will be aware of Lords amendment 130, which relates to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. He will also be aware of the concern that has been expressed about the possible unintended consequences of the Bill. Those bases are critical to UK national security, as is our relationship with the Republic of Cyprus, which a close friend of many in the House. Will he say a little about where the discussions have got to, and whether there will be a good conclusion?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Gentleman has tempted me to approach the issue a little early in my speech, but let me put this firmly on the record. I have met the high commissioner of Cyprus, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has spoken to its Foreign Secretary. I want to make it clear that any references in the Bill to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia shall be in accordance with the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, shall not affect the status of the sovereign base areas as defined in the treaty, and will not in any way undermine its provisions. References to the sovereign base areas in the Bill in no way indicate a change in UK policy towards their governance. I hope that is extremely clear.
If we had these powers now, I would already be encouraging the police to use them against those who side with our enemies. As always, I want to share my admiration and appreciation for the services, their work and all their efforts that so often go unseen, although the impact does not go unnoticed. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will support the Government’s changes, and our opposition to the amendments relating to the ISC and political party donations.
Sir Julian Lewis
I am very grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to both him and his predecessor for making an extremely valuable and valued contribution to the Committee. We draw such authority as we have from the fact that party politics does not enter into our work. I think I heard the Security Minister say that he accepted that the MOU needs to be updated—
Sir Julian Lewis
I see that he is nodding. Should he wish to elaborate on that a little more, that would be even more welcome.
Sir Chris Bryant
I start where my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) finished. I am completely perplexed about why the Minister is holding out against Lords amendment 22, not least because he told Insider last year that it was “perfectly legitimate” to criticise political parties for accepting donations “that are not clear”. He made it absolutely clear at the time that he supported the idea of legislation to require political parties to be clear about where their funding was coming from. To be fair to him, that was obviously not when he was a Government Minister, and he has now fallen among thieves. I preferred the old version of the Minister, and I hope that, in our discussions over the next few minutes, we can manage to persuade him to return to proper form.
The pedigree for Lords amendment 22 is phenomenally strong, as has been said. Not only have Lord Carlile and Lord Evans—the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life and a former head of MI5—called directly for such provisions, but as I understand from her comments, Baroness Manningham-Buller also supported Lords amendment 22, as did Lord West, all the members of the ISC, Spotlight on Corruption, the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and, of course, the Electoral Commission.
The Electoral Commission wrote directly to the Minister last year to say that it would surely be wrong not to change the law so that political parties can accept donations from companies that have made enough money in the UK to fund the amount of their donation. One would think that that stands to reason. One would also think that it stands to reason, as the commission also argued, that political parties should be required to check not just whether someone is a permissible donor in the sense of being on the electoral register, but whether they have enough money of their own to be able to fund the political party to the extent proposed. That is just due diligence, but there are phenomenal loopholes in the law.
The Minister is normally a very polite and generous man, but I understand that he has still not replied to the Electoral Commission on this matter, and the commission has complained about this. In this area, as he knows perfectly well from our work on the Foreign Affairs Committee, complacency serves us ill. One need only look at the sad trajectory of the tier 1 visa system—the golden visa. When the report was finally produced it showed that we had given visas to live in the UK and make their permanent residence here to people we ended up sanctioning because they were so closely related to the Putin regime. The 2020 Russia report from the ISC—it should have been the 2019 Russia report, but the then Prime Minister did not allow it to be published before the general election—made it very clear that Russia and perhaps other state actors had been intent on affecting elections and referendums in this country, and urged us not to be complacent.
There are authoritarian state actors who wish us ill. They rely on the openness of our political system, on our open system of governance in the City, on the fact that contracts can be enforced, and on our open judicial system. They rely on all of that and, I would argue, on our complacency to be able to do their nefarious work in the UK. There is a flaw in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000: the concept of “permissible donor” is too tightly drawn. Surely any political party and any person trying to secure donations from a third party would want to ensure that the money they received was not tainted by human rights abuses in another country, by authoritarian acts from another country or, frankly, by malign influence by a third party state actor.
The position is made worse by the Elections Act 2022 adding to the registers 3.5 million overseas voters who pay, or who may pay, no tax in the UK, and who may have next to no relationship with the authorities in this country—it is necessarily very difficult to track that information down. What should a party do if it is offered a donation of, let us say, £50,000 by somebody who lives and works in Moscow today? The law says the party need not do anything, as long as the individual is on the electoral register. Surely, though, we do not think that that is right or appropriate. I want further checks to be in place. The provisions in the amendment are so minimal—absolutely the minimum that we have to do to make sure that political parties in this country do the basics.
I said there is a flaw—perhaps a fissure—in PPERA, but I am starting to worry that the Government want that loophole to exist. If they do not, I simply do not understand why the Minister is holding out on this point. I hope the Minister will change his mind on this minimal requirement and support Lords amendment 22. If we end up voting it down, I hope their lordships will throw it back to us. For more than a decade now, we have left the door wide open to political interference in our system in this country. It is time we slammed it shut.
Tom Tugendhat
First, I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) for the contribution she made and the spirit in which she has approached these debates. She is absolutely right to talk about Caoilfhionn Gallagher and Jimmy Lai and to highlight the many issues that she did. Such matters unite us; another is the fact that this Government, like every Member of this House, I am sure, remain absolutely committed to the UN convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There is absolutely nothing in this Bill, or in any other Bill that this Government are bringing forward, that would in any way undermine our obligations or the seriousness with which we treat torture as it is practised, sadly too frequently, around the world. Although I hear what the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the hon. and gallant Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) say, there is quite literally nothing in the Bill that would give rise to the need for amendment (c) to Lords amendment.
The point made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland about Lord Pannick, however, was entirely fair. A letter should have gone back to him. In fact, the point was made and the answer given in the form of amendments to clause 3 that address his concern about the carve-out for lawyers. Although I agree that I should have written, the reality is that I addressed the points Lord Pannick raised in the Bill itself.
The matter of foreign donations has been raised again. The reality is that we have to treat British citizens like British citizens. The idea that we can treat British citizens differently depending on how we feel about them seems to me to be rather a bad way of making law, but that does not mean that political parties have to treat British citizens exactly alike. Surely the rule here is: just because you can does not mean you should. There are many donations, and perhaps many individuals making them, that many of us would not wish to accept. The point about politics is that it is about decisions, judgment and choices, and while the law has to apply to everyone equally, we as politicians and as political parties are not so obliged. We have to make judgments and decisions, and we have to carry our reputations and the reputations of our organisations with us when we make those calls.
On the changes to the MOU that the ISC suggested, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) had the opportunity to give me the power to make those changes, but I am not the Prime Minister, so I cannot do so. The Prime Minister will have to make that decision, but I will raise the matter again with his office, because my right hon. Friend’s points were well made.
I have heard many comments about the Official Secrets Act 1989. The nature of this reform is complex and there are many and various arguments because this piece of legislation ties into so many others. I will not give my right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) a commitment to act in this Parliament—he will understand that more work is required. As for my ability to make commitments into the next Session, he tempts me too far.
I am glad to hear that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) has achieved the great honour of being treasurer of the Scottish National party. I hope it comes with a caravan and that he is enjoying the touring that that affords him.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) raises many good points. The reality is that these challenges must be addressed as a whole and require further discussion, so I am very grateful for his time.
Bob Stewart
I accept the Minister’s points on the Official Secrets Act 1989 and the fact that it is complicated, but do the Government recognise that, complicated though it is, it must be addressed?
Tom Tugendhat
My right hon. Friend tempts me in a direction I would love to go in, but in the minutes I have left, I shall not be lured. An awful lot of legislation would require work if we were to amend the Act, so a huge amount of drafting work would be required before I could express an opinion. I see other right hon. and hon. Members nodding in agreement.
The hon. Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant) made a fair point on the Electoral Commission. I shall follow up with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, which is responsible for electoral law and which will be responding to the commission on that issue.
If I may, I will finish by simply saying that tomorrow is polling day, and while this Bill addresses many different aspects of our national security, the single best thing that all of us as citizens can do to defend our country and our future is to vote. As such, I urge everybody who has the opportunity to do so—in England and Wales, in our local government areas—to please get out and vote, and of course, to vote Conservative.
Amendment (a) made to Lords amendment 26.
Amendment (c) proposed to Lords amendment 26.—(Mr Carmichael.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Wednesday 21st June 2023
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 135—I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Reasons and Amendments - (20 Jun 2023)
17:07 - Division on Motion A1 - Ayes: 219 / Noes: 172 - Motion A1 agreed.
17:20 - Division on Motion C1 - Ayes: 223 / Noes: 165 - Motion C1 agreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 22, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 22A.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, as well as Motion A, I will also speak to Motions B, C and D.
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I thank noble Lords for their support so far. The vast majority of this Bill has now been settled, and measures that are vital to our national security will now be available to our security and intelligence services and to law enforcement. This new toolkit will facilitate the tackling of state actors who threaten the safety and security of the UK. The Government are busy working towards the implementation of this legislation, but there is only so much that we can do without Royal Assent. I ask noble Lords to bear this in mind through any votes that we may have.
Starting with the amendment that has been tabled in lieu of Amendment 122, the Government have listened to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, regarding the updating of the ISC’s memorandum of understanding, or MoU. The concerns raised by the noble Lord are that the Prime Minister has not attended a session of the ISC since 2014 and that the MoU is out of date. As I said the last time that this issue was debated, the ISC MoU is under regular review and the ISC is always welcome to review and suggest revision to it. The amendment tabled to force this process is therefore unnecessary.
This amendment cannot compel the Prime Minister to attend a session of the ISC, which I suspect is the amendment’s true driver. However, the Security Minister recently met with the chair of the ISC to better understand the committee’s concerns and find an agreeable resolution to the issue. In that meeting, he committed to attending an evidence session of the ISC to discuss the powers taken in the National Security Bill in greater detail and the plans for implementing the legislation. The Minister also committed to giving the ISC further updates on the progress of implementation through quarterly written updates.
I remind the House that, under the Justice and Security Act 2013, there is already provision in place for the review and amendment of the MoU where there is agreement between the Prime Minister and the ISC. Therefore, although I understand the spirit behind the amendment, it will not provide for anything new in practice. I believe that the Security Minister’s offer of attendance at a session and to provide regular written updates about the implementation of the Bill shows that the Government take the committee and its concerns seriously.
We have responded to the concerns raised about the ISC MoU in respect of the Bill, but the Bill is not the mechanism to address wider concerns. I ask noble Lords to recognise this. I also note that the Home Secretary is giving evidence to the Iran hearing in July and appreciates the ISC’s critical role in scrutiny of the intelligence and security community.
I turn to Motion A1, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to propose an amendment in lieu of Amendment 22, which concerns donations to UK political parties from foreign powers. I thank the noble Lord for recently meeting with my noble friend Lady Scott, the Minister with responsibility for elections. I turn to the substance of the amendment: it creates a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers and a duty on political parties to provide the Electoral Commission with an annual report on donations received by foreign powers. I will set out the reasons why the Government oppose this amendment.
First, on the annual return to the Electoral Commission, as I have said before, accepting a donation from a foreign power, whether directly or indirectly, is already illegal. The amendment does nothing to assist parties in identifying illegal donations. Taken together, this renders the reporting of such activity to the Electoral Commission as an annually submitted blank page. This is not a helpful addition to the transparency framework surrounding political donations and, on that principle, we oppose its inclusion.
Secondly, the requirement to publish an annual policy statement lacks utility. Political parties are already required by law to take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a donor and whether they are permissible. To reiterate, foreign powers are not permissible donors. The existing law also prohibits impermissible donors seeking to direct money through permissible proxies, and it is an offence knowingly to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. The legal framework is clear, and requiring the publication of a policy statement adds nothing.
Thirdly, given that the amendment will not add value, we do not think that it is reasonable or proportionate. It is worth highlighting that political parties are not banks or security services: they do not have the means to undertake sophisticated forensic accounting. While these services can be obtained through the private sector, they are likely to be cost prohibitive. Political parties are not global corporations: there are over 380 parties currently registered with the Electoral Commission, many of which are predominantly made up of volunteers. This amendment would add burdens on political parties and could risk disincentivising parties from accepting donations, which could, in turn, harm our democracy.
There is also a point on convention here. As far as we are aware, political parties have not been engaged on their views for this proposed amendment. The Government do not unilaterally change laws relating to political parties without such consultation taking place. It could lead to inequitable outcomes and, as such, is another reason why the Government oppose the amendment.
For all of these reasons, the Government’s position is that this is the wrong way to go about preventing threats from foreign powers to our political system, which I know that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is concerned with.
During engagement with noble Lords and throughout previous stages, concerns have been highlighted about donations from companies and unincorporated associations. I would therefore like to set out the framework that we are operating in. Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. To be a permissible donor, companies must be registered in the UK, incorporated in the UK and carrying out business in the UK.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this relatively short debate. It was remiss of me earlier not to praise our security services, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, did, so I will correct that omission now. I also thank in particular the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Carlile, for the spirit in which they discussed and spoke to their Motions.
There is obviously a fundamental disagreement on the burden that this Bill would place on political parties, and indeed on whether the laws stand up to “intellectual analysis”; I believe that was the phrase used. I think I have made a strong case already that all of the matters under discussion are already illegal. However, there are one or two points that perhaps deserve clarification, so I will go into those briefly.
On overseas electors, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election then you are also eligible to donate to that party.
On unincorporated associations being used to funnel donations to political parties, there are a number of existing rules that make sure that ineligible foreign money is prohibited from entering through proxy donors. Permissible donors cannot give donations on behalf of impermissible donors. It is right that unincorporated associations that carry on business mainly in the UK and have their main office here can donate to political campaigns. I have already said this, but I will say it again: unincorporated associations that are making political contributions are already subject to additional controls compared with other types of donors. If they make political contributions or donations over £25,000 within a year, they must notify the Electoral Commission and provide it with information about how they are funded.
On the questions raised about the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the Government responded to the committee’s report Regulating Election Finance in September 2021. The Elections Act 2022 contains measures that closely link to the recommendations made in that report—for example, the new requirement on political parties to declare their assets and liabilities over £500 on registration, and a restriction of third-party campaigning to UK-based or otherwise eligible campaigners. However, as the Government’s response stated, the recommendations in the report deserve full consideration. As noble Lords will be very well aware, electoral law is complex, and more work is required to consider the implications and practicalities of all the committee’s recommendations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also referred to a report in the newspapers today. I obviously cannot comment on the details of the individual case, but the Government absolutely recognise the risk posed by those who wish to evade the rules on donations. I think this story demonstrates just seriously the Government take that risk.
I am not sure there is very much point in me saying anything else. I say to the noble Lords, Lord Balfe and Lord Anderson, that we are not Ukraine. Self-evidently, there are very robust laws already in place.
If I was ungracious to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, in a previous debate, I would like to apologise for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a number of party-political matters. Obviously, I am here to speak on behalf of the Government so I will not address those, but I suggest that he writes to the party.
I now move on to Motion C1 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I join him in praising the work of the ISC, on which the noble Lord, Lord West, sits. Of course, we agree with much of what has been said. However, His Majesty’s Government consider the current MoU to be sufficient to allow the ISC to discharge its statutory oversight duties of the agencies and the wider intelligence community. The MoU is subject to continuous review and His Majesty’s Government welcome the ISC proposing changes that it would like the PM to consider.
The ISC has a broad remit over security and intelligence policy, as set out in the Justice and Security Act and the accompanying memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Government. Those documents also set limitations where, for example, there would be a conflict with current operations or where it would be duplicative of the work of other jurisdictions. We believe that those guiding principles are working effectively and would seek to maintain them but, as I just said, the Government would welcome the ISC proposing changes it would like the PM to consider. It also shows the respect the Government have for the work of the ISC that the Security Minister has made the commitments that he has.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that I do not believe I was glib in my remarks about the Prime Minister earlier. Obviously, I am unable to comment on the PM’s diary, but I have said this before and made the commitment at this Dispatch Box: I will make sure that No. 10 is well aware of the discussions that we have had in the Chamber today.
With that, I am afraid that I do not think there is much point in me saying too much else. I beg to move.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
We in the ISC have tried to get movement on the MoUs being changed. There is no doubt—all ISC members feel this way—that we are being thwarted in getting this to happen and we do not really understand why. The Minister makes it sound as though this is a nice process that is happening. It is not, I am afraid. It is not happening, which is extremely worrying.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
Obviously, I will make sure that those concerns are reflected to my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who will see the committee fairly soon. As I have just said to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, clearly I will make sure that this debate is widely understood in the appropriate places.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate; I am particularly grateful to the Minister for his great courtesy. I say to him, with great respect, that he has answered mostly questions of his choice that were not directly relevant to the points I made. In my experience over the years, the repetition of a weak defence is capable of convincing only the defendant and nobody else.
I thank those who spoke. It is worth mentioning their names for a particular reason. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, was powerful, as ever. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, made some powerful additional points. The noble Lord, Lord West, is always the right person to have on the bridge with you if you can arrange it; he spoke powerfully about the views of the ISC. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, speaks on matters of the constitution with great political and academic knowledge, and has done so for many years. I have always respected the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, whom I have watched in the other place as well as here, for the wisdom of his views. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has yet again made another powerful speech in your Lordships’ House. Interestingly, the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, was the only Member on the Conservative Back Benches to speak in this debate—a factor that I take to be of significance.
Taking all that into account, it is my intention to invite the House to agree to my Motion by expressing its opinion.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 26A and 26B.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 122, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 122A.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 153A.
Monday 26th June 2023
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Commons Consideration of Lords Message as at 26 June 2023 - (26 Jun 2023)
21:00 - The House divided: - Ayes: 289 / Noes: 199 - Question accordingly agreed to.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 22B.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendment 122B, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B.
Tom Tugendhat
It is a pleasure to bring the National Security Bill back to this House. I must once again highlight the importance of the Bill’s achieving Royal Assent in a timely manner. Our police and intelligence services need the tools and powers that it contains; the longer they go without, the greater the risk to national security.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Why doesn’t the Minister just accept the Lords amendments, then, so that we can move straight to getting the Bill on the statute book?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.
As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
That is fine, but the ISC has been raising this issue for the past two years. It takes two to tango. Unfortunately, the only reason we have this Lords amendment is a sense of frustration—certainly among members of the ISC, but also among a lot of Members of this House.
Tom Tugendhat
I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard him. I hope that the amendment will now satisfy the ISC with respect to its concerns. I am sure that hon. Members across the House will support Government amendment (a) in lieu.
I turn to Lords amendment 22B, which would require political parties to make an annual return to the Electoral Commission, setting out the details of donations from foreign powers. It would also create a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. I understand the intention behind the amendment, and I share the strength of feeling behind it.
The Government are very much alive to the risk that foreign interference presents. I am pleased that we have already taken action to address it, and I am pleased with the support that we have received on both sides of the House for our reforms to Companies House, which will deliver more reliably accurate information on the companies register, providing greater powers for Companies House to query and challenge the information it receives. The Government are also legislating, via the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, to enhance data sharing between Companies House and public authorities, including the Electoral Commission. This will help the enforcement of the rules on donations by providing greater confidence in the accuracy of the data held at Companies House.
Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)
The Minister is one of the House’s experts on the malign influence of foreign money in this country and the creation of Londongrad, so he knows all too well that money from foreign powers is coming into the bank accounts of UK citizens and then moving almost immediately—sometimes even overnight—into the coffers of political parties in this country. That creates a risk to the integrity of our political system. He must surely accept that the drafting of the Bill does not yet provide sufficient safeguards against that risk.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman flatters me, which is always a way to succeed in this place, but he will forgive me if I carry on, because I will address some of those points. He will see that I have considered them, and that there are some areas in which there may be some conversation.
Our reforms build on the updates to electoral law in the Elections Act 2022, which have closed loopholes on foreign third-party campaign spending. They also include other measures to ensure that our democracy will remain secure. The National Security Bill will give our agencies more tools to tackle foreign interference. The new offence of foreign interference includes manipulating whether or how any person participates in political processes. The Bill also provides for substantially higher maximum penalties where a foreign power is involved in the commission of existing electoral offences of the nature that the right hon. Gentleman describes. That includes those relating to making political donations, including via third parties.
In addition, the Bill’s foreign influence registration scheme, which the right hon. Gentleman and I both championed on the Foreign Affairs Committee, will increase the transparency of foreign political influence activities. The enhanced tier of FIRS, as we are calling it, allows us to list foreign powers that act against the safety and interests of the United Kingdom. A designation would require a person acting within the United Kingdom at the direction of a specified power or entity to register with the scheme.
Although I understand the aims of Lords amendment 22B, I do not follow its approach. The legal framework in this area is exceptionally clear: any person accepting a donation from a foreign power, whether made directly or indirectly, is already breaking the law. As such, the result of this amendment would be for political parties to submit a blank return to the Electoral Commission once a year. As I am sure colleagues would agree, this would do little to improve transparency or enhance our electoral security.
Secondly, as the Government have set out previously, Lords amendment 22B does nothing to enhance the ability of political parties to investigate donations of the nature that the right hon. Gentleman describes. Political parties do not have the financial investigative capabilities of the banks or security services. They rightly cannot access people’s personal financial records and do not have the means to trace layers of financial transactions. They cannot themselves undertake sophisticated forensic accounting. There is little to be gained by increasing pressure on political parties to identify impermissible donations without improving their ability to do so.
Thirdly, political parties are not global corporations. There are more than 380 registered political parties, many of which are predominantly made up of volunteers. Lords amendment 22B could be disproportionately burdensome for smaller political parties, disincentivising them from accepting donations and, in turn, harming grassroots democracy.
Finally, the requirement to publish an annual policy statement lacks utility. In previous debates on this matter, hon. and right hon. Members highlighted concerns that parties do not have to evaluate a donation and its perceived risk. This is not true. I reiterate that political parties are already required by law to take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a donor and whether they are permissible. Failure to ensure that permissibility requirements are met is an offence under existing law. As such, parties are already required to have systems in place to mitigate the acceptance of such funds.
As to the political point: just because you can, does not mean you should. Political judgment should always apply to donations.
Liam Byrne
I thank the Minister for giving way once again. He is being characteristically generous.
We may as well test the argument he is rehearsing against facts that are now known. Mr Mohamed Amersi, for example, has given something like £775,000 to political causes in this country. The Financial Times has reported that a considerable fraction of Mr Amersi’s profits are made from trade in Russia. How does this Bill safeguard against profits made in a country such as Russia finding their way into this country’s political system and infecting it?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman, as he will understand, raises an individual about whom I will not comment. The Government will not take a position of that nature on an individual based on such comments. I will not address him specifically.
What I will say is that there have been reports of foreign donations getting into political parties—that is true. What is also true is that political parties have a responsibility to check the sources of their donations, and all British citizens have the right to donate. If a specific accusation has not been reported to the Electoral Commission and investigated, and if a person has not been found guilty, the right hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot make any further comment.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his opening contribution as these two additions to the National Security Bill return to the Commons once again.
The Minister has made the case for Government amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. I have a great deal of respect for him, as he knows, but this amendment in lieu, tabled in the name of the Home Secretary, essentially says that this House and the other House have a point, that the Government want to give themselves maximum wiggle room to be able to avoid doing anything about addressing the point by tabling an amendment in lieu that is much wishier and much washier than the clarity of our Lords amendment.
Lords amendment 122B, tabled by my noble Friend Lord Coaker, would have introduced a duty to update the Intelligence and Security Committee’s memorandum of understanding, rather than a requirement to consider whether the MOU needs updating. What does that actually mean? Is there a proposed framework or a timetable for deliberations? The Lords amendment was not tabled for fun; it was tabled because the Intelligence and Security Committee performs a vital function, but its ability to perform that function is being eroded.
The Lords amendment followed a recommendation made by the ISC in its 2021-22 annual report, which looked back to the Committee’s origins, when the then Security Minister told Parliament that it was
“the intention of the Government that the ISC should have oversight of substantively all of central Government’s intelligence and security activities to be realised now and in the future.”––[Official Report, Justice and Security Public Bill Committee, 31 March 2013; c. 98.]
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
I want to make a few brief comments about both the amendments before us. Let me start with Lords amendment 22B and the Government motion to disagree with it. I find it very difficult to disagree with this amendment. I was a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life when the 2021 report that has been referred to was produced, and I am a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee now. Both those Committees, as the House has heard this evening, take the view that further measures are required to protect our democracy from the influx of inappropriate foreign money, and I think both would say that the amendment is the bare minimum of what needs to happen.
Lords amendment 22B does two things. It says, first, that a political party should be able to identify donations from a foreign power and, secondly, that it should be transparent with the Electoral Commission about such donations. It is worth stressing that the donations we are talking about are those from a foreign power—not necessarily from an individual, but from a state, perhaps funnelled through an individual. It is surely important to recognise the significance of such donations—potentially, at least—on our democratic process. It seems to me that there are two scenarios here. Either there are hardly any such donations in British politics, in which case the work involved to identify and deal with them appropriately is hardly likely to be onerous, even for smaller parties; or there are substantial numbers of such donations, in which case the case for greater transparency is overwhelming.
Let me turn to Lords amendment 122B and Government amendment (a) in lieu. It is worth being honest: there is very little difference between the Government amendment in lieu and the amendment from the other place, but both, as others have said, are operating on the margins of the real issue. The real issue is that there needs to be the capacity for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, and the memorandum of understanding that relates to it, to adapt as the processes and structures of Government adapt. If that is not the case, all the consequences flow that have been described so well by my Committee colleagues, which I do not need and have not got time to repeat.
My last point relates to a deficiency in both Lords amendment 122B and the Government’s amendment in lieu. Both say that the consideration or the review—depending on which version we choose—of the memorandum of understanding must begin within six months of the passage of the Bill. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that it is far from inconceivable that the Government may make a machinery of government change or a process change beyond that six-month point. It does not seem sensible to artificially limit the capacity for having that review or consideration of the memorandum beyond that point. For that reason, I am afraid, I do not think that either the Lords amendment that we have received or the Government’s amendment in lieu are sensible responses to the challenge we face. In my view, both are flawed.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank all Members of the House for their comments this evening—there have been some important contributions. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who has been not only a powerful critic, but a very able debater and participant in improving the Bill and getting it into a position where I think it is ready to be enacted. As she and the House are very well aware, this is a Bill that is somewhat overdue. It updates the powers that our fantastic intelligence services require in order to keep this whole nation safe. We have, sadly, seen various different efforts by nations and—as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) put it—some non-state actors to use our freedoms against us. It is very welcome that the House has worked so helpfully in bringing the Bill together to make sure that we are as protected as possible.
I now turn to some of the areas in which criticism has been raised, and I understand that criticism. As a former Committee Chair myself, I start by praising the Intelligence and Security Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) has regularly been in my office of late, and indeed in the past. We have worked extremely closely on many other areas, so I am delighted that he has raised his challenges. I will seek to answer them, because he understands as well as I do that parliamentary scrutiny is not just essential for the country, but for good government. The areas that he challenges us on are incredibly important.
It is also very good to see the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) in his place. There are other Committees that have responsibility for some of the areas we are discussing today, and as Chair of the Business and Trade Committee, he is charged with overseeing some of the areas that require some understanding of the nature of business in our society today. That, I am afraid, does include some classified information, so the Government are committed to finding ways in which we can make sure that not only the Intelligence and Security Committee, but relevant departmental Committees, can have appropriate oversight. I repeat what I have said separately to him and to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East: this issue is extremely important to me, and I know that the whole Government share my view.
I will now turn to the question of foreign donations, and the reason why I do not think that Lords amendment 22B quite works. As the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hodge Hill (Liam Byrne) has put it in the past, I do not resile from saying that the nature of foreign donations to this country is certainly not something to be taken lightly. When it is found, it is a crime, and a crime that must be punished. We should be very clear that interfering in our democracy is completely unacceptable, and I am very pleased that working with others in this House, we have made some progress in different areas through the defending democracy taskforce. I thank all Members of this House for that, and I particularly thank Mr Speaker for his assistance in making sure that we are in a better position today and will, I hope, be in an even better position in a few months’ time as various elements come forward.
May I say that there are differences between charities or businesses and political parties? One of those important differences is that charities and businesses, quite correctly, do not have to make public their donations. They do not have the obligation that political parties have to state exactly who is funding them. Political parties do have that obligation, and that is one reason why there is a difference. Transparency is provided not only by the political parties checking who is permissible and therefore who is actually giving the money, but by their making that donation public so that the media, who scrutinise us all, scrutinise those who donate and seek to influence or promote ideas by supporting any of us. I think that is an important difference that we should recognise.
May I, however, add that there is clearly a question on scrutiny? I say again that this amendment does not address that question, because any lawful political party should give a nil return, according to the amendment. I do not think that quite answers the questions that right hon. and hon. Members are asking, but I do understand the question of scrutiny that has been raised across this House, and I can assure Members that I am listening.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 22B.
Tuesday 4th July 2023
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberNational Security Act 2023 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 155-I Marshalled list for Consideration of Commons Amendment and Reason - (3 Jul 2023)
16:28 - Division on Motion B1 - Ayes: 201 / Noes: 210 - Motion B1 disagreed.
This text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the National Security Act 2023 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 22B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 22C.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)
My Lords, with the leave of the House I will also speak to Motion B and ask that this House do not insist on its Amendment 122B and do agree with Commons Amendment 122C in lieu.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for meeting once again with me and speaking with the Security Minister. During the previous debate on the Bill in this place, I talked about the importance of the Bill finishing, and continued engagement is the way to achieve that. I thank him and all in this House again for their valued scrutiny of this Bill.
I will start with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I understand the intention behind it. The Government are very much alive to the risk presented by foreign interference, as evidenced by the various ways we are seeking to tackle it through this Bill. However, as I said during previous debates on this matter:
“Political parties are already required by law to take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a donor and whether they are permissible”.—[Official Report, 21/6/23; col. 227.]
The introduction of an independent review to consider the matter is not an approach the Government would support. The scope of the review the noble Lord proposes implicitly suggests that the duty should be on political parties to prevent foreign interference, not the relevant enforcement bodies with the appropriate tools and knowledge. The Government submit that this is not the way to approach concerns about the risk of foreign donations entering our political system, although we agree that work is needed in this area.
As such, I offer an alternative to today’s amendment in lieu. If noble Lords agree with the Government that the amendment before the House is not the right approach, the Government will commit to consult on enhancing information sharing between relevant agencies or public bodies to help identify and mitigate the risks of foreign interference in political donations that are regulated by electoral law. The relevant public bodies in scope of the consultation would include Companies House and the Electoral Commission, among others. This consultation would take place within a year of the Bill coming into force. It would seek views on how relevant agencies and bodies can obtain and share information relating to the provenance of a donation, which might not be available to the recipient of a donation. We consider that greater information sharing may well help in the prevention and identification of breaches of the law in relation to impermissible donations from foreign powers.
The Government also commit to tabling a report in the House at the end of this consultation which will set out conclusions and next steps. I want to be clear that the Government’s intention is not for any changes made as a result of this consultation to become a tool to be wielded against political parties where they could not have reasonably known the provenance of a donation. As I have noted before, political parties do not have the investigative capabilities of banks to trace layers of financial transactions. Rather, this consultation would look at ways in which information sharing between the relevant agencies and public bodies that do have those capabilities could support parties in mitigating the risk of foreign donations.
The rules on political donations are clear: donations from foreign powers, whether made directly or indirectly, are illegal. This consultation will allow us to consider how best to strengthen the information-sharing and enforcement system that supports those existing rules. This goes a considerable way towards addressing the noble Lord’s concerns, and in a way that will deliver real benefit. I am committing the Government to undertake this work in good faith, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw his amendment on this matter, in favour of our suggested approach.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by saying how much we support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am glad that the Government have listened and come to an amicable agreement with the noble Lord which takes us forward. I thank the Minister for the way he has done that and for the concession that the Government have made on the updating of the memorandum of understanding, although clearly issues remain between the ISC and the Government, hence Motion B1 tabled by my noble friend Lord West, which we support. Aside from the Motion itself, it will allow continuing discussions, and indeed perhaps negotiations, around how the memorandum of understanding can be revised or replaced, including by negotiation, hence its importance.
I think it is really significant that still, even at this late stage of the Bill, my noble friend Lord West, speaking on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which gives parliamentary oversight of the activities of the security services, is not happy with where we have arrived at. I think it is incumbent on the Government to reach an agreement with the ISC. Clearly, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord West this afternoon, we are not in a situation where that has occurred. There are all sorts of issues that remain between the Government and the ISC, as has been evidenced by various things that have happened today, and the Government need to respond to those.
I will add just a couple of other points. One is that the Government gave a commitment during the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Minister gave assurances to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding was a live document that would be regularly reviewed and updated. Are the Government of today completely ignoring that commitment that was made to Parliament? If so, we are in a really difficult situation, because it means that parliamentary oversight is undermined by the fact that Ministers making pledges to Parliament can just be ignored in the future by the Government. I say—we often say, all of us say—that we will not press an amendment, on the basis that the Minister, speaking from the Dispatch Box, makes commitments that are read into the record. That is an important part of parliamentary scrutiny. Ministers are asked to do that and Members of Parliament in the other place and noble Lords withdraw amendments. But here we have an example of where the Intelligence and Security Committee is saying that pledges and commitments were made to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding would be regularly updated and the Government have not done that or are still not in agreement with the ISC. I think that is a really important point.
For the avoidance of doubt, I remind your Lordships again that I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister to go to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I shall just say what I believe, and your Lordships will have to make up their own minds. Given that the Intelligence and Security Committee is the oversight body for this Parliament, I would have thought that if the ISC were regularly asking the Prime Minister to attend, the Prime Minister would go—not because he is compelled to go but because it is an important part of that parliamentary oversight and the Prime Minister of our country negotiating and liaising personally with the Intelligence and Security Committee is of real importance. So I say to noble Lords, as others have heard me say before, that all of us would be surprised by the fact that no Prime Minister has been since 2014; nearly 10 years. It has been nine years, in case I am quoted as not being accurate, since a Prime Minister has been. So I gently say that, while I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister, I politely ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, whether the Home Office has suggested to the Prime Minister that, in his diary, he might consider going to see the Intelligence and Security Committee when he can.
My noble friend Lord West’s amendment raises several important issues, but the most significant is that we need to send a message through supporting it that the ISC is still not at one with the Government. That is a serious issue and needs somehow to be resolved. I believe that supporting my noble friend’s amendment will continue to put pressure on the Government to ensure that they come to an arrangement with the ISC in the end, such is its importance. If my noble friend chooses to test the opinion of the House, we will be happy to support his Motion B1.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very much for his words and his engagement on a number of matters throughout the Bill, and for not pressing his Motion. I also thank other noble Lords who have participated in this very short debate, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, who brought a very useful perspective on the current state of play with regard to political party donations. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that donations from foreign powers are already illegal and suggest that the word “consult” means that all political parties will be consulted.
On Motion B, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he does not seek to compel the Prime Minister to come to the ISC. That is certainly not the tone of the remarks he has made in a number of debates in this House. It seems to me that he does seek to compel the Prime Minister to attend the ISC. He will know that I have answered before the question as to whether the Home Office and No. 10 Downing Street have had discussions on this subject. I will not answer it again. I have nothing else to say on Motion B, as I have already spoken to it. I ask this House not to insist on its Amendment 122B and to agree with the House of Commons in its Amendment 122C.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom
Moved by
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 122B and do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 122C in lieu.
(2) Consideration under subsection (1) must begin before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force.”