(6 years, 3 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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I will do that, Mr Streeter. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, as it was under Mr Pritchard’s. It is almost a challenge for me to fit into the few minutes I have, everything I want to say on a subject I have a long interest in and passion for.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Jayawardena) for reminding us clearly and comprehensively about the unwritten contract, the Burkean principle that is so important to many of us, and for reaching into the present day by illustrating some of the excellent initiatives going on around the country. I will come back, if I may, to some of the observations made by the shadow Solicitor General and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), but I will begin by reminding everyone what public legal education, or PLE, is.
PLE provides people with vital awareness, knowledge and understanding of their rights and those of their fellow citizens. It builds their confidence and the skills that are needed to deal with the disputes that no doubt encroach on the lives of many of us, and it ensures effective access to justice. I was at the independent Bar for many years before I was elected to this place, and I played my part in the delivery of public legal education in schools and colleges in south Wales. I wanted to bring that experience with me into my role as Solicitor General. It is ever more important to ensure that the people of our country understand the law and their rights and responsibilities within it. Public legal education breaks down barriers of knowledge, circumstance and access. As we have heard, PLE is provided by myriad community-based organisations—youth workers and health workers, for example, and legal professionals themselves—all doing their part to ensure that particularly those people with social and economic disadvantages can still get the support they need.
The shadow Solicitor General made the observation that legal aid is a pillar of the welfare state. It is more than that; it is about access to justice. Both he and I, as practitioners, have seen Governments of various colours take legal aid measures that have resulted in reductions in overall eligibility, and the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West were particularly interesting in that regard. Frankly, I do not think that any Government have got it absolutely right. I could go into a long history lesson about how in 1949 only High Court family cases were eligible for legal assistance and that under successive Governments that assistance was enlarged to a point at which under the Thatcher Government—some would think this almost ironic—84% of the population of England and Wales had some form of eligibility for legal aid.
An independent report published just a couple of months ago shows that 70% of the population of Scotland is eligible for legal aid, yet less is spent per capita on that aid than in England. With a bit of imagination, there could be wider availability of legal aid in England. Scotland shows that it can be done.
I am always interested in the hon. and learned Lady’s observations, but I am not sure whether 70% coverage is the right balance. I will consider with interest what she has said and study the issue more carefully, rather than making remarks that are not based on a full study of the evidence. I will, however, concede the point that public legal education is not some substitute or easy fix for eligibility for legal aid. It is a much more long-term approach, which focuses naturally on children and young people and is designed, above all, to give people the knowledge and the wherewithal to avoid the pitfalls of litigation and court proceedings in the first place. We have a very different aim in mind when it comes to spreading the provision of PLE. I pay tribute to all the organisations in Scotland that do so much work, the law clinics in particular, which the hon. and learned Lady mentioned—we have those in great measure too south of the border.
It is not just motherhood and apple pie; there is a statutory underpinning to public legal education in the Legal Services Act 2007 which, among its regulatory objectives refers to
“increasing public understanding of the citizen’s legal rights and duties”
and
“improving access to justice”.
It is not an option for the Government, or indeed any of the regulatory bodies, to neglect those objectives. I am glad that the Law Society, the General Council of the Bar and the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives here in England and Wales play their part in ensuring that PLE is spread as far and wide as possible within the professions. Both the Attorney General and I, as the pro bono champions of the Government, work closely with those involved in PLE and support initiatives to increase its profile and reach more members of the public.
I come back to my earlier intervention, and put the same question to my hon. and learned Friend. There is a challenge, despite the best efforts of the Law Society and the Bar Council in encouraging pro bono work, as some of the big law firms, which are all about billable hours, do not free up enough of their solicitors to do important pro bono work. What does my hon. and learned Friend think the Government or the Law Society could do to encourage a more responsible approach from some of those firms?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. For those of us who were in the full throes of private practice, very often the delivery of PLE was a better use of our time than our having to immerse ourselves in often very unfamiliar areas of law, with all the concomitant risks. My message to the big firms is: where there is an issue about availability, allow members of the team to go into schools first thing in the morning. I have seen that in several state schools in London. I have joined employed barristers and solicitors helping to deliver citizenship foundation courses, for example in social media law. To see the engagement and sense of ownership that young people have when talking about issues so close to their everyday lives—when they suddenly understand that law is not some remote, dusty concept, but reaches into their existence and everyday experience—is quite a sight to behold.
I want to outline and underline the work that we are doing with the public legal education panel, which has been formed from leading organisations in the field to promote the importance of that work. It was convened by me last year. It involves the professions and organisations such as the Citizenship Foundation and Law for Life. We are bringing together organisations in a joined-up way to help work out where the need is and what the provision is currently. I have two sub-groups working on those issues.
There are two types of PLE. “Just in case” PLE is all about ensuring that people have skills, information and knowledge about their rights. “Just in time” PLE is all about giving people knowledge and support when a legal issue happens to arise. Both types of provision are equally important, and we are working our way towards getting a better understanding.
Through organisations and such events as National Pro Bono Week, I can champion the importance of PLE through the community, whether it is delivered in schools, to people who are homeless or those in prison, who really need to understand their rights and, most importantly, their responsibilities. Last year during Pro Bono Week, I took part in a session on social media and the law being delivered by university students to local secondary school pupils in Chester. It gave young people a chance to learn about their rights and the surrounding law. One issue that arose was the increasing problem in schools of young people taking videos of fights and other incidents in the playground. The session was about understanding what the sharing of those videos meant for privacy, the rights of the individuals involved and the problems that we are all familiar with here, but which all too often young people sadly only learn about to their expense after the event. I was proud of and impressed by the commitment of the university students delivering the sessions. That has been backed up in recent months by my experience at the Kent law clinic at the University of Kent in Canterbury. Law students there are not only delivering support and advice to members of the public; they are also helping to spread public legal education more widely.
We have some shining examples of the work that is going on, and I pray in aid the work of His Honour Judge Wildblood, QC at the Bristol family court. He is allowing his court to be used for public debates about the law. He is even using local drama groups to help to educate young people. He is bringing together the legal community in Bristol and the surrounding area in a most effective way. With that sort of leadership, many great things can be achieved but here, Mr Streeter, is where you and other colleagues come into play. As has been said by many Members, including my hon. Friends the Members for Walsall North (Eddie Hughes) and for Redditch (Rachel Maclean), there are opportunities for colleagues to take a lead in their local communities and work with local firms of solicitors or legal practitioners to help to deliver public legal education in our schools.
I know the Solicitor General has done his fair share of school visits over the years. Does he agree that there is still work to be done on diversity and encouraging more people to apply to the profession? We can all make a difference by visiting our local schools and speaking about these matters.
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Only last Friday I was doing that at a school in my constituency, the Ridgeway. I was talking to young people in the sixth form who did not have a background in the law about what opportunity there was for them. Like me, he no doubt has taken on youngsters in chambers deliberately with the knowledge that they did not have a background in law. In fact, I would not take people who had any connection with the law because I wanted to empower young people and give them a chance.
I want to deal with some of the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) about the curriculum. The position has yet to be clarified because more work is being done, particularly on sex education in schools and the issue of consent and withdrawal. That is not yet a statutory part of the curriculum. Citizenship remains compulsory at key stage 3. We are talking about youngsters in years 7, 8 and 9 who can access that education in school, and it must include PLE. It is a matter for schools to determine how to deliver it, but by working collaboratively with professionals, a lot can be achieved.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) made some important points about access in the workplace, particularly for women who have no knowledge—I say that with respect; it is not their fault—about their rights. That is why the regulatory objective in the 2007 Act is important. More has to be done to deal with the question of empowerment of our citizens via the regulatory bodies. That would not just include lawyers, even though the 2007 Act has that remit. I will go away and think about her point very carefully. Perhaps we can use it as the start of an important discussion. I thank all hon. and right hon. Friends and Members for taking part today. The law is not some mystical holy of holies and lawyers are not the high priests. We should demystify it, and that is where public legal education is so important.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsI would like to inform the House that a cash advance from the Contingencies Fund has been sought for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).
In line with the current arrangement for SFO funding agreed with HM Treasury, the SFO will be submitting a reserve claim as part of the supplementary estimate process for 2017-18.
The advance is required to meet a current cash requirement on existing services pending Parliamentary approval of the 2017-18 supplementary estimate. The supplementary estimate will seek an increase in both the resource departmental expenditure limit and the net cash requirement in order to cover the cost of significant investigations.
Parliamentary approval for additional resources of £9,500,000 will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Serious Fraud Office. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £9,500,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.
The advance will be repaid upon Royal Assent of the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Bill.
[HCWS437]
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will seek to live up to that expectation, Mr Speaker; I do not intend to speak for long.
Amendment 4 addresses one of the six key tests that we set out for the Bill before we could support it. Those tests were not set out simply on Second Reading or in Committee, but 10 months ago, when the White Paper outlining the Government’s approach was first published.
The tests drew support across the House, but sadly the Government have made no significant concessions. In Committee, a meaningful vote for Parliament on the final deal was secured, of course—but against the wishes of the Government and only by decision of the House. Our five amendments at this stage address those other tests: facilitating a transitional period; protecting the devolution settlement; protecting workers’ rights; reining in the Henry VIII powers; and, in amendment 4, retaining the EU charter of fundamental rights in UK law.
The objective of amendment 4, which would retain charter rights in UK law and afford them the same level of protection as those in the Human Rights Act, has wide support on both sides of the House. It is part of a sensible and responsible approach to Brexit that respects the referendum decision but does not sacrifice jobs and the economy or rights and protections on the altar of ideology. It is a sensible approach for which I believe there is a majority across the House—one that goes well beyond those who voted for amendment 7 in Committee. It is also a consensus that I think is reflected in the other place, from which I suspect we might see the Bill return with some improvements, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield indicated.
The Opposition support amendments 42 and 43, which would enable UK courts to continue to refer matters to the Court of Justice and to consider CJEU decision to be persuasive. As well as amendment 55, we also support new clause 13, amendments 40 and 41, on clarifying the status of retained law, and new clause 16 on enshrining equality rights, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). We also support new clause 7 on animal sentience and new clause 9 on the acquired rights of Anguillans—an indication of the enormous complexity and range of the issues we face with Brexit. We accept that Government amendments 37 and 38 improve the Bill, but we fear that they do not go anywhere near far enough on legal challenges based on the general principles of EU law, which is why we prefer and support amendment 57, which was moved so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy).
Amendment 4 addresses the concerns we raised in Committee around the charter of fundamental rights and provides an opportunity for the Government to think again. Human rights should not be a dividing line between parties in this House, so even at this stage we hope that the Government, either here or in the Lords, might accept our approach in the amendment and perhaps even accept the amendment today and avoid the vote that we will otherwise be seeking. As we said in Committee, the charter has been critical in developing, strengthening and modernising human rights in the UK. To abandon it risks reducing protections for UK citizens and leaving a gaping hole in our statute book.
The Government claim that the Bill is about legal continuity and certainty in what will become the new category of EU retained law, but all of that EU law is interpreted through the charter, so excluding it would leave our legal system inconsistent and incoherent. To avoid defeat on this issue in Committee the former Justice Minister, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), committed to publishing a memorandum that he claimed would confirm the Government’s case that the charter was unnecessary by identifying where all of these rights could be found in EU retained law or existing domestic law.
Obviously that argument overlooked the main point of the charter, which was to bring all of these rights together in one codifying document, but as an Opposition we were willing to be helpful and awaited the memorandum with interest. We wanted to see a comprehensive document that identified not only the source of each right in the charter but—crucially—how the existing level of effective recourse would be guaranteed. The memorandum was published on 5 December, and it acknowledged that the Government envisaged all these rights being scattered back to their original sources. They are removing the material source of the rights, in the form of the charter, and leaving citizens with the formal source. Now that is a legal way of describing the problem, but I am not a lawyer. It means in effect that it will become more difficult for any UK citizen to assert their rights post-Brexit.
In their defence, the Government insisted that nothing would be lost if we dropped the charter because it created no new rights.
I see the Solicitor General nodding. On this crucial issue, however, the Government’s cover has been blown. For this, I would like to thank the new Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) —I am sorry she is not in her place today—because in an article in The Daily Telegraph on 18 November last year she made our case clearly. She expressed her concern about the charter precisely because it provided new rights. She wrote that it went beyond the European convention on human rights by creating “extra layers of rights”, and she went on to bemoan the fact that these extra rights covered
“everything from biomedicine and eugenics to personal data and collective bargaining”.
I appreciate that her thinking on this will probably be in line with that of her new boss, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, because he relied of course on the extra rights provided by the charter when he brought his own court case against the now Prime Minister asserting his right to personal data.
Thank you, Mr Speaker. I want to speak briefly to amendments 55 and 56 and to probe one simple issue: in short, what happens if there is a failure to correct a deficiency in EU law, so that it cannot operate effectively after exit, and how can we maximise the chances that such a thing does not happen?
We have had plenty of debate on how we can restrict Government powers to correct deficiencies so that such powers cannot be used to undermine the incorporation of EU rules and so that we do not end up with some sort of watered-down or dysfunctional version of the original. However, perhaps the more realistic possibility, and just as much of a danger, is that we end up with a watered-down or dysfunctional version of EU rules not because of the inappropriate use of those powers of correction, but because of a failure to use them at all in appropriate circumstances, either by accident or design, or if various incorporated rules and regulations are simply allowed to fester away uncorrected and unable to operate effectively. So, I asked at Committee stage, “What happens if there is a citizen before a court in this country, seeking to establish rights under retained EU law when that retained EU law is actually riddled with deficiencies? Is the court supposed to try and make that work? Does the person simply lose their ability to exercise that right?”
My amendment 55 simply requires the court to interpret retained EU law—as far as possible—in such a way as to make it function effectively, borrowing shamelessly from the language of the Human Rights Act. I fully acknowledge that that in itself would not take us very far, but it is there to prompt a response from the Government. What should the court do in those circumstances? There are alternative courses of action that this Parliament could take, not just in amending clause 6 but in other parts of the Bill. We could expressly require EU law to be interpreted so as to be given effect “as if the UK were still a member state”, with further provisions about how that should be done. We could put in place a procedure to allow courts to flag up rules that they have found cannot operate effectively. We could put Ministers under an obligation or a duty to ensure that retained EU laws operate effectively; indeed, amendment 57 and new clause 19 are of that nature. Alternatively, as amendment 56 suggests, we could simply require the Government to publish a list of all the deficiencies they found in retained EU law that they are not seeking directly to rectify.
In short, the task of ensuring that we have a functioning rule book or statute book on exit day is twofold. Parliament must protect important rights, not only by preventing inappropriate use of Henry VIII powers, but by providing a means of ensuring that deficiencies are rectified where necessary, either by the Government, or by Parliament or by our courts, and I still think we have a long way to go in that regard.
I wish to speak in support of amendments 37 and 38 in the name of my colleagues in Government.
I will try and answer the question that was put to me by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who has been getting frustrated in these debates about the somewhat technical nature of ministerial responses. Well, this is a very technical Bill. Like its illustrious predecessor, the European Communities Act 1972, it is a Bill of constitutional importance; it is a framework Bill. It is not—I stress this, because it is most important—it is not a Bill that seeks to convey a policy or a particular aspect of policy that we have discussed today. It is a framework that is designed to ensure that the law that is applied up to exit is downloaded in as clear and proper a way as possible because, to be consistent with the rule of law, the law needs to be accessible, it needs to be clear and it needs to be well understood. That is the fundamental basis of my concern about today’s amendments—that in seeking to retain the charter of fundamental rights in domestic law after exit, not only do we sow potential confusion but we fundamentally misunderstand what that charter means in the first place.
The Government have introduced welcome amendments to clause 7. While my hon. and learned Friend is talking about clarity, I just want to ask him to confirm, at this early stage in his remarks, that the Government will bring forward the amendments that we were hoping for, and that I think my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I were, if not promised, at least led to expect, when clause 6 is discussed in the other place.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. If he had sufficient time at his disposal, he might have seen the evidence that I gave to the Constitution Committee in the other place, in which the issues in clause 6 were discussed—the interpretive provisions that he and I and others debated in Committee.
May I come back to the fundamental point about the charter? It was never intended to create new rights. It was a document that reaffirmed rights that already existed in EU law.
I will not; I am developing my argument. It was a point that was made clear, not only in the charter itself but in protocol 30, which was signed by Poland and the UK at the time of the Lisbon treaty. In addition—this is important, and this, it seems to me, having listened carefully to the debate, is not understood—the charter does not apply to member states in everything they do. Although it applies to the EU and its institutions in all areas, it binds member states only in so far as they are acting within the scope of EU law. Therefore talking about the charter in a domestic context misunderstands its purpose and point: it was not drafted in that context. I am afraid that there has, I think, been a regrettable misunderstanding about that in this debate.
I do not think I have been under any misunderstanding at all. That is why I have kept pressing the Government to leave the charter to one side but look at the general principles of EU law necessary to bring challenges to retained EU law, brought into our own domestic law, that was not enacted by this Parliament—and without which, frankly, the coherence of EU law starts to disintegrate. That is the issue. Linked to that, of course, is the other issue of protecting some of those fundamental rights, perhaps in a different way, that matter to so many on both sides of the House.
My right hon. and learned Friend and I agree about general principles, which is why the general principles that underpin the recently drafted charter remain and, of course, do apply in respect of retained EU law. His second point about the means by which individuals challenge that is, of course, a matter of ongoing debate. I shall come back to the points raised in not only his amendment, but mine as well.
My hon. and learned Friend kindly said that he would try to answer my question. The question was: what harm has the charter of fundamental rights done and what evil is he trying to avert? It is true that, unexpectedly, new rights have been created under the charter and he is right that those rights have relevance to EU law. But the whole point of the Bill is to retain large amounts of EU law and its principles. What is the point of the change? This is policy in this Bill—it is a policy change. I fear that it is a signal to some sections of my party: the only part of the acquis communautaire that will be abolished mentions the wicked words “fundamental rights”, and that is why it is being removed.
The position that my right hon. and learned Friend took on the charter back in 2007 is the right one. As I was saying, it is in the interests of maintaining the rule of law that we maintain clarity, consistency and a clear authoritative source for those rights. My genuine concern about the importation of this particular charter into our domestic law is that we will sow confusion. That is not good for the maintenance of the rule of law, for the citizens of our country, for the future development of the law or for the position of this place vis-à-vis that development.
I entirely endorse what my hon. and learned Friend is saying, not least because of the acquis itself. Secondly, there are the adjudications under the European Court itself. Thirdly, the charter is like a legal ectoplasm: it seeps into everything. There is no way in which we would ever be able to extract ourselves from the entirety of the provisions in perpetuity.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises a genuine concern about the impact of protocol 30. Many Opposition Members were here 10 years ago; they were anxious then to make sure that the protocol was included in the Lisbon treaty. They are now happy to resile from that position and take an entirely different view. I take great issue with that: the legal principles were the same then as now. Nothing has really changed about the potential force of the charter, so I am rather bemused to hear about that volte-face on the part of many Opposition Members.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for giving way, particularly given that from a sedentary position earlier he described an intervention of mine as rubbish—but let us slide away from that. As he will know very well, human rights were an essential component of the Belfast agreement, and the protection of human rights was at the core of the Patten reforms of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. For the people of Northern Ireland, therefore, the protection of human rights is essential. By repealing the charter of fundamental rights—not the convention, the charter—we are sending out an extremely negative message to the people of Northern Ireland. Can he offer reassurances on that point?
I certainly can. First, we are not repealing anything. Secondly, the dog that has not barked in this debate is the European convention on human rights, which is much supported by both sides of the House, very much part of our law and a fundamental part of the underpinning of many of the human rights—
I know that the hon. and learned Lady treasures and rightly places great value on those human rights. I give way to her.
Can the Solicitor General confirm once and for all that reports that the Prime Minister wants to run the next Tory party general election campaign on a pledge to repeal the Human Rights Act and withdraw from the convention are incorrect? [Interruption.] Conservative Members roll their eyes and make a noise. I am giving him the opportunity to confirm that that is incorrect.
May I just calm the hon. and learned Lady? [Interruption.] Well, she is making a point that is frankly not the case. We have committed to supporting our membership of the European convention throughout this Parliament, and that is a position I entirely support.
The hon. and learned Lady seems to be very focused on future referendums and the desire to rerun arguments that were held some time ago. I want to do justice to her amendments as much as to anybody else’s, and I will say this about the amendments posited by her and the Labour party: they offer different visions of how challenge might be mounted by using the charter. Amendment 4, which stands in the name of the Leader of the Opposition, deals with a situation akin to that under the Human Rights Act, whereby a declaration of incompatibility can be given, but that does not guarantee full redress for individuals seeking it under the charter. I accept that the amendment in the name of the hon. and learned Lady goes further and would retain a power in effect to strike down legislation if it is incompatible with the charter. I simply say to both of them, with the greatest of respect, that their approaches work against the core aims of the Bill. We are leaving the EU, and there has to be certainty about the process; and certainty in the law lies at the heart of everything else we have to do. That is the simple reason why we cannot accept those amendments.
I was interested in the arguments of the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) about clause 4, when she moved her amendment 57 and spoke to her new clause 19. My argument about clause 4 is simply this: indeed, as the sweeper clause—the description she adopted—it has the important function of curing any loopholes that might exist in European law when we leave the EU and deals with the question of uncertainty that I know she is extremely concerned with. I will try to reassure her. She will remember that the explanatory notes contain a helpful and non-exhaustive list of the type of directly effective rights, such as equal pay—a very important right—that are designed to be covered by this important provision in clause 4. As I have said in evidence in another place, we are simply seeking to ensure the important principle of reciprocity in the enforcement of fundamental rights such as those of equality, which she referred to, and those pertaining to the environment, for which I know she also has a great passion.
In conjunction, I can deal with the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous), who succinctly and clearly made his argument on new clause 16, which deals fairly and squarely with equalities. We have already made our commitment clear that all the protections in and under the Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010 and the equivalent Northern Ireland legislation will continue to apply once we have left the EU. In Committee, we tabled an amendment which would secure transparency in that regard by requiring ministerial statements to be made about any amendments made to the Equality Act through secondary legislative powers under the Bill.
What concerns me about new clause 16 is that it would go further by creating new free-standing rights, perhaps even more than have been proposed in amendments relating to the charter. That is not the purpose of the Bill. The Bill is about maintaining the same levels of protection on the day after exit as on the day before. It is not a vehicle for substantive legislative changes such as those that have been proposed, and for that reason we cannot accept the new clause.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) for his qualified welcome for the Government amendments. The reason for a three-month time limit analogous to that which exists in domestic judicial review is the important policy consideration that there must be a degree of certainty when it comes to ongoing litigation and dispute about EU law as we enter the post-exit era. I think there must be some resolution of that by way of a limitation period. Retaining an open-ended right of action would create more uncertainty for businesses and individuals about rights and obligations.
After we cease to be a member of the European Union, it would not be right to allow “general principles” challenges to Acts of Parliament to continue, because that is not in line with the purposes of Brexit. To put it simply, outside the context of EU law, the ability of courts to disapply Acts of Parliament on “general principles” grounds is not consistent with the way in which our domestic legal system functions. That must be at the heart of our policy considerations.
My hon. and learned Friend’s argument would make more sense if the Government had not decided to retain the principle of the supremacy of EU law in the Bill. Once they have done that, removing the mechanism of a challenge on the basis of general principles creates something that I think is rather odd. I would not have pressed the issue if the Government had adopted an alternative approach, but that was their own decision. This has, I think, highlighted some of the oddities of the way in which the matter has been approached. It may well be that they can be sorted out in the other place, but I think my hon. and learned Friend must acknowledge that they are odd.
I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend is allowing me to intervene on his intervention. Let us not forget that we are dealing with the pre-exit situation. The EU acquis is being frozen, in the sense that its full effect in a pre-exit sense must be maintained so that we can maintain certainty. I agree that it is a strange and rather unusual concept, but I think it preserves that all-important certainty.
Time is short, and I want to ensure that I deal with further amendments.
I must press on, I am afraid.
The amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield relating to the way in which we designate EU legislation make important contributions to the debate, but they are laden with problems. The sheer volume of what we are dealing with—well over 15,000 pieces of legislation—leads me to draw back from trying to create a convenient categorisation of retained EU law. With the greatest respect, I think it far wiser for the Government to approach each item on a case-by-case basis, not making glib assumptions and trying to downgrade EU law, but getting each particular measure right.
Amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and others deal with, again, the debate on clause 6 and the interpretation of retained EU law. I entirely understand why the amendments were tabled, because the debate is intense, but I would say to those Members, with respect, that I think less is more. The more we try to enshrine in law principles such as persuasive authority—which is in one of the amendments—the more I see the potential for judicial head-scratching and litigation of a type that I do not believe the judiciary would welcome. I have said it before and I say it again: I trust our judiciary to answer the question put before them rather than to survey like lions of the constitutional savannah and to run across the landscape. They answer the question that is put to them, and I trust them to do that and to use the discretion that quite naturally they should be given.
In relation to the new clause in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), it is clear that the Government regard animals as sentient and we of course support the sentiment behind the new clause, as we did on a previous occasion, but we could not support it then and the reasons for not supporting it have not changed. Article 13 places an obligation on the EU when developing certain policies, and on EU member states when developing and implementing those policies. That obligation, because animals are sentient beings, is to have full regard to their welfare requirements, but article 13 applies only to a limited number of EU policy areas, and frankly it also allows for practices that we would consider cruel.
I would be interested to know what policy area the Solicitor General thinks the EU provision does not cover: what does he want to cover that the EU does not? Secondly, would it not be safer just to have this amendment in the Bill to make sure we have legal certainty, because he cannot guarantee that the Government Bill will get on to the statute book before we leave the EU?
May I reassure the hon. Lady by pointing out that there are many areas on which we have heard debates, such as on live importation? I want to make sure the new domestic law we introduce is comprehensive in a way that I know she would fully support. Cross-referencing to the obligations in article 13 —which apply only to EU policies, not to UK policies—would, if anything, create more confusion once we have left the EU.
Frankly, article 13 has not delivered and its effect on domestic law is minimal, and as my right hon. Friend the Environment Secretary has said, we can do better. We have made it clear that we intend to retain, and indeed enhance, our existing standards of animal welfare once we leave. This Bill will convert the existing body of EU animal welfare law into our law and will make sure the same protections are in place in the UK and that laws still function effectively after we leave.
The purpose of this Bill is not to improve EU laws; it is about providing a functioning statute book. That is why, as the hon. Lady has acknowledged, the Government have now published draft legislation—the Animal Welfare (Sentencing and Recognition of Sentience) Bill—which sets out why we can do it better. It is a significant improvement on article 13; it will impose a clear duty on the state to have regard for animal welfare when considering all policies, rather than just the six areas in article 13.
I also say to the hon. Lady that it is open to public consultation and we have to respect the views of thousands of members of the public who will be coming forward and making—[Interruption.] The hon. Lady believes in open and public consultation and democracy, and that is why we are doing what we are doing. [Interruption.] It ill behoves the hon. Lady to assume that my party somehow lies on a lower moral plain when it comes to issues of animal welfare. We share the passion and commitment to animal welfare that she professes and I know many other Members in this House do—I look to the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) as a shining example. We want to hear from the public and their view about it, and we want to get it right in domestic legislation, which is the right place for it.
There is much I could say about the wonderful, if small, British overseas territory of Anguilla. Having visited it myself in a ministerial capacity, I was very grateful to the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) for his description. We are very conscious not only of the importance of Anguilla, its people and its economy, but the need to make sure that the concerns of the Anguillan Government are considered and the rights people have in Anguilla, which are exactly the same as those of UK nationals, are preserved after we leave the EU. We will make sure that that situation will not change.
The debate on the charter has been an important one. It has been a further stage in the way in which we have looked carefully at the Bill. The Government remain open and we are listening to all views on how we can get this right. I am sure that, as the Bill makes its way into another place, the deliberations of this House will have done much to enhance the quality not only of the Bill but of our democracy itself.
I thank the Minister for praising me as a shining example on animal welfare, but that does not quite make up for my disappointment that he has failed to address the issues in my amendments. I therefore seek to press amendment 57 to a vote.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI commend the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) for movingly and persuasively putting his case on behalf of his constituents and for securing this Adjournment debate. I join him in expressing my regret and sadness that the family have not yet found justice for their son.
The right hon. Gentleman has already said that we have agreed to meet separately with the Boudiaf family, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to discuss this case in detail and, yes, to try to start rebuilding the faith that the family have clearly lost in the criminal justice system.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for providing detail on the investigation and trial. I hope to add some further context from the prosecution’s point of view. During the criminal trial, the prosecution presented substantial evidence, including three significant witnesses and closed-circuit television coverage that confirmed that the main defendant left the public house at the same time as the victim. However, one defendant was acquitted on the direction of the trial judge, and the other two defendants, including the one accused of murder, were acquitted by the jury.
Since the acquittal, as we have heard, the police have launched two media appeals for evidence in an attempt to try to find a breakthrough. Sadly, they have not been successful so far. I note the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman and by other hon. Members about the question of whether a renewed appeal for evidence should be made. I am sure that will be one of the specific questions about this tragic case that we will be able to discuss in person with the right hon. Gentleman, the family, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police. Those questions are probably most appropriately dealt with in that forum. However, I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says with the greatest clarity, and I can assure him that the matter will be given the most anxious and serious consideration. Questions that he raises about the absence of the murder weapon and the evidence of motive—all these matters—must be seriously considered, and I give him that assurance.
What I can do productively in this debate is try to address the wider points that the right hon. Gentleman raised about support for the families of victims and about the double jeopardy legislation itself. I am of course deeply saddened to hear that the Boudiaf family feel so let down by the criminal justice system. I hope we can go some way to helping them to feel that they are being heard and understood when we meet them soon, but I understand that that cannot just be solved with a single meeting. To support families such as the Boudiafs, who suffer the trauma of the loss of a loved one and the acquittal of the alleged perpetrator, the CPS, the police and the charity Justice After Acquittal published a joint protocol in January. Under these national standards of support, bereaved families are offered a series of meetings with the CPS and the relevant police force. These standards also entitle families to a joint meeting with the CPS and the police following completion of full reviews of their case. The meetings are intended to provide an opportunity for the family to learn, in as much detail as possible, what might have led to the acquittal and what their options might be. Those standards did not exist at the time of this tragedy, but I very much hope they will go some way in helping us to improve communication, not just with families such as the Boudiafs but with every family that suffers such a trauma and such a tragedy.
The right hon. Gentleman rightly cites his recent review, and I am glad to have this opportunity to commend him for the work he has done to bring it about. The Government are currently preparing their response, and the CPS will respond as part of that. I welcome his findings in the review of the overall proportionality of CPS decision making, though we know there is still much to do. The CPS is considering his recommendations very carefully indeed. His review also notes that the CPS has proved itself willing to be open to external scrutiny, which gives different communities and groups an opportunity to hold CPS officials to account and to be heard. This serves as a strong framework to deal with situations where communication has broken down between a community and the CPS, as he suggests with respect to the Algerian community in Tottenham and indeed across London.
The right hon. Gentleman also raised concerns about the double jeopardy legislation. I hope I can reassure him of the importance of this legislation and provide some detail on the way the CPS applies it, though he will understand that wider policy considerations on this topic will be for my ministerial colleagues in the Ministry of Justice to address. The double jeopardy rule that a person should not be tried twice for the same offence represents an important principle—a principle of providing finality in criminal proceedings that protects an accused person from a further trial and helps to ensure the efficient investigation of offences. One can see from a cursory view of that principle how important it is in a system where the rule of law must apply.
There are two principles arising from the common law which underpin the double jeopardy rule. The first is known by the terms “autrefois acquit” and “autrefois convict” Those principles provide a bar to the trial, in respect of the same offence, of a person who has previously been either acquitted or convicted of that offence. In addition, the courts may consider it an abuse of process for additional charges to be brought, following an acquittal or conviction, for different offences that arose from the same behaviour or facts. The law on double jeopardy was reformed in 2003 after recommendations of the Law Commission and those set out in Lord Justice Auld’s review of the criminal courts, which was published in 2001. Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Court of Appeal may, for certain specified offences, quash an acquittal and order a retrial, if the Court is satisfied of three particular alternatives.
The first is that there is compelling new evidence of guilt, to which the right hon. Gentleman did indeed allude. The second is that it is in the interests of justice for there to be a retrial—for example, it must be considered whether a fair trial would be unlikely because of adverse publicity about the accused or whether the police or prosecution has acted with due diligence and expedition with regard to the new evidence, and the length of time since the alleged offence must be considered. Finally, the Court must be satisfied that a retrial does not breach double jeopardy laws in EU law—that is, that the person has not been prosecuted and had a penalty imposed for the same acts in a contracting state. I said that the three were alternatives, but in fact they are cumulative reasons for the Court to be satisfied, so I correct myself on the record.
Parliament decided that there should also be other safeguards, including that the Director of Public Prosecutions must authorise a reinvestigation of an acquitted person. Indeed, the CPS published guidance on the retrial of serious offences that sets out in full the procedure and principles for instigating a reinvestigation of an acquitted person and an application to the Court of Appeal to quash that person’s acquittal. In essence, before the police can launch a full reinvestigation of acquitted individuals, they must provide the CPS with new and compelling evidence, which the police have not yet been able to obtain in this case. Examples of such new evidence might include DNA or fingerprint tests, or new witnesses to the offence coming forward.
Under section 78 of the 2003 Act, new evidence is “new” if it was not adduced at the original trial of the acquitted person. That would in fact include evidence that was available at the first trial but was not used. That is an important qualification that should be borne in mind. New and compelling evidence of guilt is required as a judge and jury would have already acquitted the person on the basis of the existing evidence before the court.
If evidence of a flawed investigation amounted to new compelling evidence of guilt and it was in the interests of justice to proceed with a retrial for a specified offence, that could be a basis on which to refer the matter to the Court of Appeal to ask for a retrial. Reliance on such evidence would raise questions about whether it would be in the interests of justice to order a retrial. If the failure to use the evidence was because of a lack of diligence or expedition by the prosecutor, that is a factor relevant to the application of the test set out in section 79(2)(c)—namely, whether it is in the interests of justice. There is currently no evidence that that is the situation in this particular case.
I praise the right hon. Member for Tottenham again for the seriousness with which he takes his duties to his constituents and for all the work he has done on the review that bears his name, which I am sure will lead to an improvement in the way the criminal justice system serves ethnic minorities in our country. My office will be in touch with his office very shortly to arrange a meeting with the Boudiaf family, the CPS and the police to try to start to rebuild that essential trust that has sadly but clearly broken down in this case.
Question put and agreed to.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Thank you, Mr Davies. Diolch yn fawr iawn. It is a pleasure to speak in the debate and I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Sir Mike Penning) on securing it. He and I worked together in Government on a number of issues relating to victims, and I pay tribute to him for his sterling work during his years of service. He continues that work as a senior Back Bencher, bringing important issues to the attention of the House. I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for taking part in the debate.
I think it was actually my right hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead who quite rightly said at the beginning of the debate that this is not a party political issue. In that spirit, I welcome some of the comments by the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), who was right to remind us that, in the majority of cases, judges apply the law as consistently as they can, but that they are applying it on a case-by-case basis in an independent manner. I think all of us in the House and beyond want to see that when it comes to upholding the rule of law.
My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) mentioned sentencing guidelines, which are a very important development in the law. That now means that, regardless of whether someone is sentenced in Truro or Merthyr Tydfil, there should be a consistency of approach; there sometimes was not in the past, quite frankly, and I think sentencing guidelines are helping to change that approach.
On the ambit of that scheme, I should remind hon. Members of its origins. It is only about 30 years of age, and it arose as a result of the famous Ealing vicarage case, in which the late Jill Saward was the victim of a horrendous rape. As a result of the outcry and the campaign that was launched, the law was changed in 1988 and the scheme was developed. It was originally very tightly constrained and applied only to a few very serious indictable-only offences, such as murder.
However, over the years it has developed in a somewhat piecemeal manner, and I readily accept that there are anomalies, inconsistencies and matters that need clarification, because the system, although I think it attracts a high degree of confidence from the public at large, could do with strengthening. I can think of no better way of strengthening it than by giving it more consistency, and therefore accessibility to members of the public who might wish to use it.
The scheme’s introduction was not without controversy. It is unusual, if not exceptional, for a member of the Executive, such as the Attorney General or me, to be able to request the judiciary to reconsider a matter that has been dealt with by a court. Rightly so; that needs to be carefully circumscribed. It is not a right of appeal; it is a right of referral, and I beg to suggest that there is a difference between the two. A referral is, if hon. Members like, like a safety valve that exists in the system to make sure that, where there has been gross error or the sort of sentence that no reasonable court should have passed, there can be intervention from a higher court in order to correct it.
Much has been made—I accept the comments by my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Peter Heaton-Jones)—of the threshold applied by the Law Officers in dealing with unduly lenient sentences. I think the threshold should be rigorous and should be high. My concern is that if we departed from the degree of information and evidence that is currently needed, we would end up in a situation in which judges would be routinely second-guessed in a way that I think would encroach on their independence. We have to be very careful about that when dealing with this system.
I take great pride in my work with regard to unduly lenient sentences. It is difficult work, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) for his work on it. There are cases in which something has quite clearly gone wrong and needs rectifying, and the Court of Appeal assists in that regard.
I find the most difficult cases to be the sort that my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon raised, in which, for example, a bereaved family have suffered the shock and horror of losing a loved one in a road traffic incident. As a result of that tragedy, nothing the court can actually do could restore that family to the position they want to be in. However, I accept his point that there is an inconsistency when offences of careless driving cannot be referred, yet an offence of careless driving where there is evidence of impairment through drink or drugs, for example, can be referred. He made his point very powerfully, and we are listening.
Similarly, my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley made the point about sexual offences committed in breach of trust. That is a very important and concerning anomaly, which again is one of the reasons why I prefaced my remarks by speaking about the need for clarity and consistency. Attractive though it might be to go down the line advocated by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), to extend the scheme in England and Wales to all offences in the Crown court and magistrates courts would be a step too far. That is why I am attracted by arguments that create consistency in the Crown court.
Let me look at the figures. It is the case that 12,800 or so indictable-only offences were sentenced in the Crown court last year. That is probably a pretty reasonable benchmark to start looking at the incidences of unduly lenient sentences. It does not include the either-way offences that might come to the Crown court or might be the subject of references, but it gives us an indication of the proportion of cases that are successfully referred.
The hon. Member for Torfaen went through some of the figures that we have. He is right to say that in the last year for which we have full figures, 837 cases were drawn to our attention and 190 of them were taken to the Court of Appeal, with an increase in 141 of the sentences. It seems to me, looking at the figures and doing the best I can, that over the last few years there has been a dramatic expansion in the number of cases brought to our attention and a roughly proportionate increase in the number of cases then successfully referred, so I do not think that my Department can be accused of playing politics with the role that we occupy. We apply the law very carefully, and I think that that important and proportionate rise indicates that we use our powers, as you would expect, Mr Davies, in a way that is consistent with our adherence to the rule of law.
I am glad that awareness of the scheme has been growing, because both the Attorney General and I, supported by our office, work very hard to ensure that that awareness increases. It is consistent with the principle of open and transparent justice that we work to ensure that news about successful references is publicised, particularly in local media. We undertake a round of interviews with local media and use social media to discuss these issues. As a result, the scheme’s profile continues to rise.
Both the Attorney General and I personally present cases in the Court of Appeal. Only a few months ago, I presented the case of Paterson, the breast cancer surgeon who was responsible for the mutilation of victims who were supposed to be in his care. In a week or so, I will go to the Court of Appeal to present another case of an unduly lenient sentence. I think it is important that the Law Officers, whenever they can, personally attend to present cases before that Court. I take particular pride in that role.
I remind myself that I was a sentencer. I sat as a recorder of the Crown court for years before I became Solicitor General. I therefore know the particular challenges that face judges who have to pass sentence, which allows me to understand in a particularly helpful way their position and the delicacy of the balance that needs to be struck.
I take the opportunity to remind everyone that of course anyone—any member of the public—may contact our office about an unduly lenient sentence. No special connection with the case is needed, and it only takes one request for a case to be considered. If there is a victim referral and I decide not to refer the case, a personal letter will be sent to that person, explaining carefully the reasons why. Communication is a very important part of the process, as the shadow Solicitor General said.
Let me move on to deal with reporting restrictions. Obviously, the starting point in all criminal proceedings is the open justice principle. In a very limited number of cases, as we heard, there are reporting restrictions, so in the new year, for a period of six months, we will pilot a trial of the Crown Prosecution Service referring all cases in which there is a restriction on the reporting of the sentence or sentences. That will allow the Attorney General or me to consider personally each case in which there is potentially unduly lenient sentencing, so that no sentence slips through the cracks in the way that my right hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead outlined.
For those reasons, I commend the unduly lenient sentence system to the House and ask that hon. Members carry on supporting it and promoting its effectiveness.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am speaking to amendments on the amendment paper, if the right hon. Gentleman would care to look at them.
I have no great expectation that the Government will accept either Plaid Cymru’s amendment or the SNP’s proposed new clause, which will be decided at a later date, but I want to continue to remind them and their Back Benchers, as well as Opposition Back Benchers, that we do not have a final, irreversible decision on the single market. We might not even have an irreversible decision on the European Union, but we certainly do not yet have an irreversible decision on the single market and membership of the European economic area.
There is a way in which the Government can extricate themselves from the mess that they have created for us; end the torment of 4.5 million people who still do not have an absolute legal guarantee that their children will be allowed to finish at the school at which they have already started; ease the daily growing concerns of businesses the length and breadth of these islands that do not know whether they will be allowed to import raw materials or export finished goods; and ease the concerns of our public services that their essential workers, including care workers, nurses and doctors, may not be able to continue to move here to serve our people. It is all right for the bankers, of course, because there will be an exception for them. They will have free movement, but nurses, doctors and care assistants are apparently not important enough.
Even if, for political reasons, the Government cannot ask their Back Benchers to support amendments either today or during later Committee sittings, I ask them to think very carefully about what I am saying. There has not been a referendum to leave the single market, so the situation can be changed by the will of this Parliament and the support of the Government. They do not have to go back on their promise to respect the result of the referendum to leave the European Union, but they can reverse the headlong charge towards the cliff edge and make sure that the Bill actually delivers what it is supposed to deliver, and that means we have a soft landing instead of falling off the cliff edge in March 2019.
I rise to speak in support of clauses 2 and 3. It is a pleasure to participate at Committee stage, which is one of my favourite stages of debate because it is a time when we can all can come together in a mature way to look at the detail of the Bill and debate it as grown-ups. May I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Government Benches, and indeed to all hon. Members, that I certainly intend to take very seriously the points that have already been made, and those that will be made today, in future Committees days, and—I assure my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) of this—on Report?
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way so early in his remarks. Will he also reflect on: the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802; the Factory and Workshop Act 1878, which was brought in by Disraeli; the 1901 Act brought in by Salisbury; and, if we wind forward to the former Prime Minister, David Cameron, rights, such as maternity and paternity rights, that far exceeded the EU’s minimum guarantees?
My hon. Friend’s point is well made. We are talking about centuries of progress. To bring things right up to date, the Prime Minister made a pledge in her Lancaster House speech, which was underlined in our manifesto—I can underline this again today on behalf of the Government—that the Brexit process will in no way whatever be used to undermine or curtail the rights of workers that are enshrined both in domestic law and in law by virtue of the European Union.
When the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) allowed me to intervene, I asked whether a consensus was emerging. New clause 50 states that all European laws and regulations would be brought on to our statute book by European exit time, but is the Minister saying that that will actually occur and that such an amendment is unnecessary? If that is the case, some of us will not have to move our amendments.
In a nutshell, I would say that the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment and those associated with it are indeed unnecessary. I will set that out in more detail when I come on to address his point and those made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), who spoke to the amendments very helpfully, if I may say so with respect.
The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I respect him. If we take him and what he is saying at face value, I do not think he has a lot to fear from new clause 55, new clause 25 or the other measures being proposed as they would simply secure what he is saying. However, does he understand why many of us have suspicions when we hear speeches about a low-regulation economy from Members such as the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that are then retweeted by the Department for International Trade? That is where these deep worries are coming from.
I absolutely understand the concerns of hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. The Government’s policy is clear, and I shall address in further detail where the Government stand on those amendments.
May I make some progress at this stage? I will certainly invite the right hon. Gentleman to intervene later, but I want to develop my arguments on the clauses.
Clause 2 preserves the domestic law we have made to implement our EU obligations. More specifically, the clause will preserve any domestic regulations made under section 2(2) of, or paragraph 1A of schedule 2 to, the European Communities Act 1972. Without clause 2, such legislation would lapse at the same time as the repeal of the 1972 Act, meaning that there would be substantial holes in our statute book on the day we leave the EU. The clause is therefore essential to preserve our statute book and provide certainty over what our law is. I think that all Members would agree that at the heart of the rule of law is the need for certainty. That was why the Prime Minister put that at the top of her list when she outlined her criteria in the Lancaster House speech, and it was why I campaigned very strongly on that when standing for re-election.
I am listening to the Minister very patiently. He, like other Members who have looked closely at the Bill, will know that clauses 2 and 3 both conclude with a key phrase:
“This section is subject to section 5 and Schedule 1 (exceptions to savings and incorporation).”
We cannot possibly consider clauses 2 and 3 without looking at schedule 1, which removes overnight the general principles of EU law such as non-discrimination, proportionality and respect for fundamental rights.
The Minister may shake his head and he may not agree, but that is in the Bill he is advancing in this Chamber.
With respect to the hon. Lady, I do not agree with her analysis. We will carry out more detailed scrutiny of clause 5 and schedule 1 at a later stage, but I reassure her that clauses 2 and 3 will create certainty which, as I have said, is vital.
We drafted clause 2 in a deliberate way. We have drawn it more widely than to cover just domestic legislation created under the 1972 Act as it will also apply to any other domestic primary or secondary legislation that implements EU obligations. It will apply to any related domestic legislation, any domestic legislation relating to law that will be retained under clauses 3 and 4, and indeed any domestic legislation that is otherwise related to the EU or the European economic area. That ensures that all that legislation will form a part of what we define as retained EU law.
We have done that for two reasons. First, it means that this legislation, where relevant, will be interpreted in the light of pre-exit case law—the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union—and the general principles of EU law, which are provided for in clause 6. That is vital to ensure not only that we save the legislation, but that we provide for it to operate in precisely the same way as it did before, which will prevent legal uncertainty about how such provisions should be interpreted.
Secondly, our approach ensures that to the extent that deficiencies might arise in any legislation as a result of exit, they can be corrected under powers in the Bill. Saving the domestic legislation under this clause will therefore reduce the risk of uncertainty and increase continuity as to the law that applies in the UK. It will also mean that we avoid the famous cliff edge that many hon. Members are worried about when we leave the EU.
I do not want to pursue further the questions about clause 6—we will talk about them anon, and we talked about them yesterday—but while very many of us have no objection to anything my hon. and learned Friend says about the way in which existing law will be incorporated under clauses 2 and 3, does he accept that the issues raised by Members on both sides of the Committee are about the mechanisms by which the Bill seeks to achieve what he describes as correcting deficiencies, but could also be used to do much more than that? Does he therefore accept that the only thing we are currently debating is the mechanism to ensure that more than correcting deficiencies is not done by the technical means of statutory instruments under the negative procedure?
That is the nub of it. I hope that I can reassure right hon. and hon. Members that the Government’s policy is very clear and delineated, and that this is not some out-of-control power grab involving the use of the Bill—this is a framework and process Bill—as a basis to change policy. That is not the intention of the Bill.
The Minister has persuaded me that I do not need to speak to or move new clause 51, which relates to the point raised by the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). Given the general wish in the country to take power back, new clause 51 would provide a place where power is supposed to come back to—the actual authorities—and set the means by which we review what we want to keep, extend, amend and kick out. Will the Government allow us to decide the mechanisms by which we undertake that review?
I take issue with the mechanism in new clause 51, which would be rather burdensome and could increase uncertainty, which would not be good for businesses or citizens, but I will take the spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman tabled it very much to heart and mind when considering how to develop the ongoing dialogue about the means by which this place can sort the wheat from the chaff, if I may use that phrase.
I hope that this will be my last intervention. The purpose of the measure is to make sure that we all know that the task will be massive. I thought the idea preposterous that most of us would be prepared to give up all our other interests to participate in that mega review, which the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said might go on for 20 years, and I thought we could hand back quite a bit of it to the Government, providing we could keep hold of the reins.
The right hon. Gentleman is right to call this task mega. I remind the House that, according to the EU’s legal database, more than 12,000 EU regulations are currently in force here. As for UK domestic legislation, the House of Commons Library indicates that there have been around 7,900 statutory instruments implementing EU legislation. This is indeed a mega task—to coin his phrase.
I accept that there is no intention that the Bill takes away the rights and protections enshrined in EU law and that the Bill does not imply that they will be taken away. The problem is that the Bill enables future Governments to do so, and there is therefore a need to protect those fundamental rights and protections by providing that they can be amended only through primary legislation. They need to be separated from the great mass of technical stuff that can be sifted by the European Scrutiny Committee or other such turbo-charged Select Committees, which could look at the minutiae.
The hon. Gentleman has been a committed pro-European throughout his career. I enjoyed his YouTube videos during the campaign—[Interruption.] I look forward to starring in one. We must not forget, however, that the important sunset provisions in clause 7 limit the use of such powers to two years after 29 March 2019. Clause 9 is now sunsetted to a very restrictive interpretation with regard to the duration of its powers. I hope that that, together with the important policy statements we have made, and are making again today, will give the hon. Gentleman the comfort he is looking for. [Interruption.] He is chuntering away. With respect, perhaps he could hear me out. I am trying to give him the comfort he rightly seeks for his constituents and to reassure him that his fears are unjustified.
My hon. and learned Friend accepts that the problem is that the Bill includes powers that could be used to make drastic reductions in environmental standards and other things without any proper parliamentary process. There is a widespread consensus among remainers and leavers that we do not want the powers to be used in that way. He sounds as though he is about to reassure us that the policy of the present Government is that although they are taking the powers, they have no intention of using them for such purposes. I have the highest regard for him—he is a personal friend—and I quite accept that a Government led by this Prime Minister is not about to use draconian powers to lower standards, as her instincts are quite the other way. Given that the powers are therefore not needed—we do not need a Bill to give us powers that no one wants to use—why can we not amend the Bill to put it beyond doubt that no such attempt will be made? Heaven forfend that my party should swing to the right at any time in its long and distinguished history, but there are members of the present Government who are not excessively fond of lizards and bats, or workers’ rights. We would all be reassured if he undertook to put in the Bill a reduced level of powers.
My right hon. and learned Friend knows that I hold him in the utmost respect—reverence even—but, having discussed the mega task that faces us with the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field), I think he will agree that it is probably safer and wiser for the Government, with a belt-and-braces approach, to make sure that we do not have any slips between cup and lip, and that there are no lacunas or loopholes in the law that could actually endanger these protections and rights.
I share the concerns of the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). If the Government will not use the powers, why are they giving them to themselves? The Minister talks about dialogue and reassurance, but I have not heard anything practical from him about how he will change the Bill to address these concerns. What is he going to do?
I will come to that, but first I want to deal with the amendments tabled by the hon. Lady’s colleagues.
I need to press on, because other Members want to speak and I am mindful that you, Dame Rosie, want as many as possible to have the opportunity to do so.
I am sorry. I need to press on.
Clause 3 converts the text of direct EU legislation, as it operates at the moment immediately before we leave the EU, into our domestic law. Such existing EU law is currently given legal effect in our law via section 2(1) of the 1972 Act. Without clause 3, those laws would no longer have effect in domestic law when we leave and repeal the 1972 Act. Again, that would leave holes within our domestic law. More specifically, the clause converts EU regulations, as well as certain decisions and tertiary legislation, into domestic law. It also converts adaptations to instruments made for the EEA. The clause is necessary to ensure that we fully keep existing EU laws in force within the UK.
In general, these instruments, or parts of them, will be converted only if they are already in force before exit day, meaning that an EU regulation set to come into force six months after we leave will not be converted into UK law. However, some EU instruments will be in force but will apply only in a staggered way over time, with different parts applying at different times. In those circumstances, only those parts that are stated to apply before exit day will be converted.
I might be anticipating the Minister’s later remarks, but does that not leave us with a possible loophole when we have participated in the preparation of measures that have not yet come into force and we might regard as thoroughly desirable, but we cannot by any means bring them into force?
I will deal briefly with my hon. Friend’s amendment 356. As I was saying, we have some examples here, such as the EU’s fluorinated greenhouse gases regulations, which are stated as applying from 1 January 2015. They include prohibitions on placing certain substances on the market from specific dates, several of which fall after exit day. With respect, however, his amendment could create further confusion, because there needs to be one standard cut-off point at which the snapshot of law is taken, and that is why exit day should apply. When it comes to measures affected by the cut-off point, we will do whatever is necessary before exit day to provide certainty for business, including by bringing forward further legislation, if required, to cater for those particular situations. If I may return to develop—
I will certainly take more interventions, but I am mindful of the time.
May I deal with clause 3? The clause converts only the English language version of the instrument. Other language versions will remain available, as they do now, for interpretive purposes. Finally, as hon. Members would expect, the EU instruments that have never applied in the UK will not be converted under the clause. That includes instruments in respect of the euro and measures in the area of freedom, security and justice in which this country did not choose to participate. Those exempt instruments are described in schedule 6.
The Government have said that they will guarantee existing employment rights derived from the EU, but the EU is also looking at proposals to extend those rights by, for example, requiring employers to give workers on zero-hours contracts a written statement of their pay rates and expected hours of work. Will the Government champion employment protection and require employers to give workers on zero-hours contracts a written statement of their terms and conditions?
The Government, through the Taylor review, have been committed to looking at all aspects related to zero-hours contracts, and this, post-exit day, will be a matter for the House and this Parliament to determine. It may well be that this or a future Government make changes of the sort that the hon. Lady and others are looking for. The fact that we are leaving the EU in no measure whatever rules out the potential for those changes to be made.
May I deal with—
I am sorry, but I need to make progress. I want to deal with the proposals tabled by hon. Members, including the Opposition spokesman.
I will say a little about how we will deal with converted law, which was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. Converted law will become domestic legislation. It will not automatically have the status of either primary or secondary legislation. Indeed, as has already been referenced, paragraph 19 of schedule 8 sets this out:
“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, any retained direct EU legislation is to be treated as primary legislation”.
We all know—including the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), the shadow Secretary of State—about the consequences in terms of incompatibility, the power of the courts and what the House can do to rectify legislation. I think that is an enhancement. It is a welcome initiative and I know the right hon. and learned Gentleman shares my view about that.
Where there are existing pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, which is capable of amending retained direct EU legislation such as converted regulations, the converted legislation is to be treated as secondary legislation for the purposes of scrutiny procedures under those pre-exit powers. In other words, we might bring something down to this place and transpose it. We used to use the term “gold plating”, but it has somewhat gone out of fashion now, and I think the Government improved their processes over the years. However, there have been powers to vary, and, in effect, that will be treated as secondary legislation—no change, really, because the House already had those powers with regard to scrutiny.
It follows, then, that where there are not pre-exit powers to make subordinate legislation, we will look case by case at the converted law and determine how it is to be treated. This is the point that has been made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and others: how are we to determine what is what? As I have said, I am keen to ensure that all concerns are properly listened to, and that when we come to further amendments on further days, the Government give full consideration to how to create that mechanism and in what form the House, and indeed the other place, would like it to be administered.
My hon. and learned Friend may be saying what I had hoped he was going to say. May I ask him to be a little more specific? Does he mean that, in due course and in their own time, the Government will come forward with—if I might put it this way—a triage amendment that settles a process for distinguishing between technical deficiency amendments and substantive amendments, and the way in which either is treated?
We are going to continue the dialogue, listening extremely carefully. Indeed, there might be a form of words that we can agree on that satisfies this place. Let us not forget that primary legislation is not the only way we can create this mechanism. There are Standing Order provisions of the House that the House jealously protects and preserves, and the Government are mindful of the need not to trespass on the exclusive cognisance of the House.
I think I must give way to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), who has been waiting for me to allow her to intervene.
I am extremely grateful to the Minister, because I took him at his word. In his opening remarks, he said how much he welcomed consideration in Committee of any Bill because it allowed us to debate in an adult fashion, so I am grateful to him for, at long last, giving way.
May I seek clarification, without the Minister referring to his very complicated notes? People need to understand what is happening, and I would like him to explain, before anyone withdraws or decides not to press their proposal, how directly effective provisions of EU law will be safeguarded. These are rights that arise through EU jurisprudence, not from a directive or a regulation. I want guarantees from him that directly effective provisions are protected beyond the Bill.
One reason the hon. Lady has not heard me outline that concern in detail is that clause 4 is the sweeper clause and my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, will deal with that in the second part of the debate. I assure her that, by the end of today’s proceedings, her concerns will, I hope, have been addressed during the debate on clause 4.
I want to deal with the amendments, having, I hope, made—
May I make progress? I would be grateful, as I need to make progress on the amendments. I think I have been more than generous in giving way. I will move on to try to ensure that I deal with all the points that have been raised.
May I deal first with health and safety legislation? There has been a lot of proper debate about that. The way existing powers are used—the way the UK meets its obligations to implement EU law—is most typically through regulations that are made under the 1972 Act, but regulations are also made under a range of other Acts for these purposes, sometimes in conjunction with the 1972 Act powers and sometimes not. For example, some health and safety regulations are made using the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the 1972 Act where the 1974 Act alone cannot provide the vires, or powers, for those regulations.
One example is the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2015. They are made for the purposes of health and safety and of environmental protection, the latter being outside the vires of the 1974 Act. Those regulations prevent and mitigate the effects of major accidents involving dangerous substances, which can cause serious damage and harm to the public and to the environment. The parts of the regulations made under the 1974 Act can continue to be updated after exit under existing powers conferred by that legislation.
As I have set out, clause 2 rightly takes a maximalist approach to preserving direct legislation. It sets it out that any domestic legislation that implements EU obligations or is otherwise related to the EU or the EEA will continue to have effect after our exit. The effect is that those regulations will therefore become retained EU law within the meaning given in the Bill. So it is absolutely right that after we have left the European Union, domestic powers granted by Parliament in other Acts can operate on what will become retained EU law, and as such will be our domestic law. This is so that appropriate changes can be made in future, in line with any domestic policy, where they are within the scope of those powers and the will of this place.
In contrast, the amendments would fetter powers across the statute book that Parliament has already delegated. Relying only on powers set out in this Bill to amend retained EU law would be insufficient and would defeat the purpose of what Parliament has previously set up in the 1974 Act, for example, and other Acts. As I have set out, these powers are in many cases very important and help to deliver functioning regimes. Each of them also contains its own limitations. Those limitations were agreed by Parliament when it agreed to create the powers in question.
The Minister has talked quite a lot about the purpose of this exercise being to provide continuity and certainty, but is it not the case that that will be true only on day one? He cannot guarantee any continuity or certainty on day 100 or day 1,000, but is not that, for many of his colleagues, the whole point of leaving the European Union?
The right hon. Gentleman is old enough and wise enough to know that, while this exercise of freezing the law in time on exit day has to be done, the law is a constantly evolving creature. None of us can stand here and bind the hands of our successors. What we can do, as men and women of good will seeking to achieve as sensible and smooth a Brexit as possible, is provide legal certainty. That is why I am here. That is why I have undertaken to try to deal with this task. That is why this Government are doing everything they can, within the time they have, to get this right.
I have been listening carefully to what my hon. and learned Friend has been saying. Again, there seems to be an overlap. There are issues about how Parliament conducts scrutiny, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) has mentioned. That is also covered in proposed new subsection (3) of my new clause 55. There is also the question about modifications to some areas of retained EU law taking place in any way other than by primary legislation, in the longer term. Keeping those two points in mind, may I invite him to go away and see, as the discussion continues, what the Government can come up with by way of a package involving those two elements that might commend itself to the House, bearing in mind the undertaking that he has given to look at this afresh on Report and for the Government to respond positively on Report to what has been said?
Yes, I am happy to do that. That is very much in the spirit what I have already said.
No, I would like to press on, if I may. I am mindful of the time, and I want to make sure that we get these points on record.
I want to deal with the points, which I hope hon. Members want to hear, about the Government’s commitment not only to workers’ rights but to consumer protection rights and environmental obligations—all of which have been very much a part of the work that we have done with our European partners during our 43 years of membership of the European Union. That does not change. I want to move on to some of the other amendments—
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. This is quite an important issue. A moment ago, I thought that he was on the brink of saying that he would try to come back to the House on Report with the Government’s own legislative proposals to give effect to the good intentions that he has assured us the Government entirely share, but at the last moment he hesitated. When he said yes, was he committing the Government to putting in the legislation the best solution in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) in particular, so that we could all be assured that the Bill will leave this House in a way that we entirely unanimously accept?
I am committed to trying to achieve the best solution, whether it is in the Bill or in an amendment to Standing Orders. I will not presume to tie the hands of this place. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend can take that as a clear assurance that I will do whatever I can to get this right.
The first and most important point to be made about new clause 15, tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)—it has, I think, already been made by several other Members—is that we have strong rights and protections here, domestically, which are not contingent on our future membership of the EU. We have a proud record, and in many areas our standards far exceed the minimum standards required by EU law—for instance, entitlement to annual leave and maternity allowances. When we leave the EU, it will be for this Parliament and, indeed, the devolved legislatures to determine the law and the rights that apply here in the United Kingdom.
I must say to the hon. Member for Nottingham East, with respect, that in my view the new clause would impose an onerous and unnecessary duty on the Government. There will be nothing to stop future Governments of whatever hue, or future Parliaments when exercising their sovereignty, from considering any legislation that the EU or the European Economic Area may make. They need not be obliged to do that; it will be a matter that they can take into consideration. A requirement to report to Parliament each and every time the EU amended its rules would be excessively onerous, given the number of reports that might be made and considered.
Moreover, we do not want to give the inappropriate impression that the path followed by our European partners will always be the path that we as a UK Parliament should follow. While I am entirely supportive of many measures that ensure that we work, converge and keep pace with our European partners, there will of course be plenty of opportunities for us to forge our own path. That, after all, is what the vote was all about.
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for giving way. He is being very generous with his time, and he is making a very useful and, I think, positive speech explaining how the Bill will deal with people’s concerns about the cliff edge and limitations. Does he agree that it also gives us a chance to support the working statute book, ensuring that we look after our own environment, consumer rights, workers’ rights and LBGTI rights?
My hon. Friend is a passionate campaigner on many of those issues. I can reassure her and her constituents that that is precisely what we seek to do.
I hope that I have dealt with the new clauses tabled by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead—
I accept what the Solicitor General said about new clause 50, and I think we should thank him for what he said and what he will try to achieve. New clause 51 is about setting up mechanisms whereby the House could determine how the corpus of legislation and regulation brought into UK law could be reviewed. Will the Solicitor General say a word about that before I go to the Chair and say that I am satisfied in this instance as well?
I hoped that I had responded to new clause 51 in an earlier intervention. It is well intentioned, but the mechanism is too burdensome. It would impose an annual obligation to produce reports which I think would pile Pelion on Ossa, given the amount of work that we have to do in the House anyway because of the unusual circumstances that we face.
I do not think that the House has the appetite to undertake the review, given the ginormous amount of legislation that is coming over to us. I tried to get the Library to describe what would happen. Would this whole place be full of pieces of paper—full of legislation and regulations? How the hell are we, as individuals or groups, going to deal with that?
There is another crucial point. Given what was said by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), might there be discussions before Report about the form in which the Government might bring back the sentiment involved in what the Solicitor General is saying, and what we are all saying, so that we might vote on that?
Yes, indeed.
I shall now move on to new clauses 9, 22, 23 and 29, which is linked to amendment 128, new clause 45 and amendment 217, which is linked to amendment 64. They all in various ways deal with the question of the EEA. As we have said on several occasions, this is not about the UK pursuing an off the shelf arrangement; it is the UK seeking a bespoke arrangement that works for us. In the Florence speech of 22 September—which happens to be my birthday, although I am sure there was no coincidence in that—the Prime Minister set out a vision for the new economic partnership: a new partnership that will empower us to work together in continuing to bring shared prosperity for the generations to come.
I accept of course that we should have on the table the option of creating a bespoke deal for our future relationship, but surely we would want to have a range of options and models on the table as we shape that deep and comprehensive partnership? Why would we want to take one of those potential models off the table now, as it could be the building block of something different coming further down the line?
I always listen to what the hon. Gentleman says with a great deal of interest, but I say in the context of the Bill—although mindful of the constraints of Committee debate—that the thrust of these amendments will not achieve what their movers seek, which is to keep this country in the EEA. That is because all the amendments are based on a mistaken understanding of the UK’s relationship with the EEA. The UK is a party to the EEA agreement in its capacity as an EU member state, so once we leave the EU, the EEA arrangement will no longer be relevant. It does not have a practical effect at international level, and domestic legislation cannot change that.
Will the Minister confirm that one of the few things remain and leave agreed about in the campaign is that we would be leaving the customs union and the single market, and we would not be doing a Norway? [Interruption.] Both sides said that, and the British public understood it.
My right hon. Friend and I were on opposite sides of that debate—indeed, we have been on opposite sides of the debate on Europe for the 20 years and more that I have known him—but I never said in the many arguments I made up and down the country that this was a have your cake and eat it withdrawal: if we voted to leave, it would mean we left the institutions of the EU, which included the customs union and the single market. That is why I campaigned against it, but I accept, as every democrat I know does, the result of the referendum.
I shall now move on, as swiftly as I can, to deal with the effects of these amendments.
I would love to give way to the hon. Lady, but I am mindful of the time, and Mr Hoyle is looking at me in a very stentorian way, so I had better follow that instruction.
There are some potentially detrimental effects of the amendments that I know hon. Members would want to avoid. Amendment 217 seeks to remove the annexes to the EEA agreement from the scope of clause 3. The hon. Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) is not in his place at present, but the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) is here to represent their party’s interests, and I say to him that that amendment would not allow us to remain in the EEA, for the reasons I have set out, and it would damage the clarity and certainty we aim to provide.
As many hon. Members already know, the EEA agreement effectively extends the single market to three non-EU countries: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Annexes to the agreement specify which single market rules apply to those countries, along with any necessary adaptations, in order to make the single market properly operate with respect to these countries. Clause 3(2)(b) and (c), which amendment 217 would remove, provide that EU instruments which apply to the EEA will also be converted into domestic law. Those provisions are necessary to ensure that we fully preserve the existing laws and rules that apply here before our exit. They are not, and are not in any way intended to be, a means by which the UK ceases to be a party to the EEA agreement. The retention or otherwise of such annexes within our domestic law will not change that basic fact. The effect of amendment 217 would only be to leave gaps in the law which, as I have set out, would clearly be undesirable.
Will the Solicitor General confirm whether the powers outlined in part 2 of schedule 8 and in clause 8 would allow Ministers to issue an article 127 notification under the EEA agreement?
That is not necessary. The provisions in schedule 8 are all about the frameworks, not the policy, and this Bill is not a vehicle for policy. This is a framework Bill that allows the law to operate within it. That is the distinction that I seek to draw. While I understand and respect the reasons behind the amendments, they do not deliver the policy outcomes that the hon. Lady and others may want.
I will not give way any further.
It is our policy that we will not be a member of the EEA or the single market after we leave the EU, so introducing an obligation to produce a report on membership of the EEA, as new clauses 9 and 23 seek to do, is simply unnecessary.
I will now try to deal fairly with the Scottish National party amendments 200 and 201, which the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) spoke to. While we do not accept that the amendments are necessary, I welcome the chance to set out clearly the meaning of clause 2. Amendments 200 and 201 seek to provide clarity on precisely what is meant by “passed” in the context of the clause. Some have questioned the effect of clause 2 in relation to an Act that may have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, but which has not yet received Royal Assent when the clause is commenced.
We do not believe that there is an ambiguity. Clause 2(2) states that “EU-derived domestic legislation” is an enactment. As enactments can only mean something that has received Royal Assent, an Act of Scottish Parliament that has only been passed cannot fall within this definition, and it would therefore not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of the Bill. The reference to “passed” in clause 2 is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not the fact of whether it was passed. I hope I have been able to shed light on that area for the hon. Gentleman, and I invite him to withdraw the amendment.
Turning now to Plaid Cymru’s amendment 87, which is in the name of the hon. Member for Arfon, we do not accept the premise that lies behind the change. In trying to circumvent the provisions of clause 11, the amendment pays no heed to the common approaches that are established by EU law or to the crucial consideration that we—the UK Government and the devolved Administrations—must give to where they may or may not be needed in future. What is more, it undermines our aim to provide people with maximum certainty over the laws that will apply on exit day. The amendment would also be practically unable to achieve its underlying aim. The enactments that it takes out of retained EU law would also be taken outside the scope of the powers that this Bill confers on the devolved Administrations to allow them to prepare them for exit day. It would hamper their ability to address the deficiencies that will arise, and it would leave it likely that the laws would remain broken on the day of exit.
The process of making the statute book work for exit day is a joint endeavour between the different Governments and legislatures of the whole United Kingdom. This is an important project that entails a significant workload before exit day, which is why we are actively engaging with the devolved Administrations to build up a shared understanding of where corrections to the statute book would be needed. On that basis, I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.
I hope I have dealt with the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice.
When the Minister talks about bringing forward a package on Report, do I take it that the amendment in my name and in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) is intended to be in that package?
I am always happy to engage with my hon. Friend and with my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond). I know the spirit in which they tabled the amendment, and I look forward to the dialogue to come.
I commend clauses 2 and 3 to the House.
I would want us to shape those regulations, because we are going to be affected by them. If our near neighbours—500 million residents—operate under one regulatory regime, many of our products and services will have to comply with it. It is far better that we are able to take part in the discussion and shape those regulations. In accordance with the Bill, we may leave the EU—if that does come to pass—but if we were part of the European economic area, we may still have a say on some regulatory changes. I understand the point my hon. Friend is making, but my amendment would not tie the UK to every regulatory change that takes place within the European Union; it would simply make sure that Parliament is informed when the European Union branches off and goes in a different direction. We need to know that information so that we can make a choice as laws change. If the EU takes a different route, we may want to consider doing so ourselves. We may not, but we may. That is simply the point I make in new clause 15.
New clause 55, in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, and new clause 25, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), address the issue of retained EU laws. Over 20,000 laws and 12,000 regulations will need to be transposed in some way, shape or form. That is a massive process of change and it is still not clear whether we will convert European laws into primary legislation, secondary legislation or something else entirely. It is sensible to have a schedule that lists retained EU laws and I think the suggestions in the new clauses should be accepted.
It may be that not everything can be changed. If there are modifications via primary legislation, we might want the enhanced scrutiny procedure. When the Minister was pressed on this issue, however, he did not in any way give a proper concession to the points made by Members on both sides of the House. We could face circumstances where the EU laws to be modified affect equal pay, the treatment of workers with disabilities, or race and age discrimination. They were not part of primary or secondary UK legislation, but EU laws that we are going to co-opt. If there is to be a change to the set of rules under which we operate, we need much more clarity on whether it will involve this House of Commons doing it in an affirmative way through an enhanced procedure, or, preferably, through primary legislation.
The Minister needs to do more than just promise to look at this matter on Report, because we may not get a Report stage. We have a Committee of the whole House stage, so unless the Bill is amended there will not be a Report stage. The Minister needs to acknowledge that if we do not have a Report stage, any such assurances are not really worth that much.
Yes, there will be a Report stage. I can assure the hon. Gentleman of that.
I look forward to an amendment with an extra comma or full stop to facilitate a Report stage. It is very important that we see that.
My new clause 9 and amendment 64 relate to the EEA. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East (Heidi Alexander) said, the House should make a specific decision about whether to leave the EAA, given that that was not on the ballot paper. It is effectively the single market club, and as a member we have rights and responsibilities to one another, and not just around the freedom of movement of goods and services, people and capital. On non-tariff issues, too, the EEA ensures barrier-free relationships between the UK and the rest of the EU—on competition policy, state aid issues, consumer protection, environmental policies, research and technological development, education and training, tourism and culture and enterprise. All those issues are covered in the EEA agreement. For the Minister to say, “Oh well, it is implied that we are leaving the EEA, so it is not for the House to make a specific decision”, just will not do.
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Commons Chamber8. What discussions he has had with Cabinet colleagues on the potential merits of appointing an independent advocate to act for families after a public disaster.
It is of paramount importance that bereaved families and injured people are properly involved and supported following a disaster, which is why we announced in the Queen’s Speech that we will establish an independent public advocate to ensure that involvement and provide that support.
Will the independent advocate be able to act for those affected by the contaminated blood scandal? What exactly does the idea of “assistance” and “support” mean? Does it mean a publicly funded lawyer for each family affected?
I thank the hon. Lady for that point. This of course depends very much on how quickly we as a Parliament can pass the necessary legislation. It is certainly the Government’s intention that the independent advocate gets on with their work as quickly as possible. On the specific point, each case will depends upon its merits. Of course, legal aid is already available for families with regard to certain procedures, but I think the benefit of having a consolidated advocate will be to address the very questions she asks. I look forward to these issues being debated carefully when the necessary legislation is introduced.
Will the Solicitor General confirm that if families who live in high rises, but who, thankfully, have not suffered the same disaster that Grenfell Tower has, wish to bring any legal action on health and safety grounds, they will be entitled to legal aid?
Again, the hon. Lady asks a general question about the merits of particular cases. If indeed there are grounds—for example, a judicial review procedure might be appropriate in particular cases—that application can be made. The important point in the context of this question is whether we can do more for families and bereaved relatives. I think we can, and the precedent set by the horrific events at Grenfell will allow us all to learn important lessons: that families have to be put first.
Can the Solicitor General help us on the practicalities? What discussions has he had with the Bar Council and the Law Society as to how an independent advocate or advocates might be identified; what levels of remuneration will be available, so as to ensure that there is proper equality of arms in representation; and by what means families will be able to give proper and fully discreet instructions?
I thank my hon. Friend for that question. It is vital that we get these details right as we develop the policy. It is clear, certainly to the Government, that having quality advocacy so that the right documents are obtained and a proper challenge is made at all stages of the process is important, and it is what we seek to achieve. Therefore, fulfilling article 6 has to be at the heart of this.
What assessment has the Solicitor General made of the efficacy of having an independent advocate after a tragedy such as Grenfell in trying to get to justice and truth for the victims, when this is coupled with the rather unhelpful remarks of the shadow Chancellor, which seem to be clouding the whole issue?
It is vital at solemn and serious times like this that we all exercise our right to free speech responsibly, and that we are mindful that criminal investigations are ongoing, as well as concurrent inquests and, of course, the public inquiry. All of us have to make sure that we pass that very high test, and I am afraid that the shadow Chancellor failed that in his remarks this week.
I am sure the Solicitor General would agree that it is vital that the independent public advocate has the powers needed to carry out the role. I pay great tribute to the work of the Hillsborough families over many years, but he will be aware that key to that were the findings of an independent panel in overturning the first inquest verdict. Will the independent public advocate have the powers to appoint an independent panel if they see fit to do so?
The hon. Gentleman raises a very germane point, and we all need to bear the Hillsborough precedent very much in mind. I am keen, and the Government are keen, to ensure that the independent advocate has as powerful and as meaningful a role as possible. Each case will depend on its merits, but I am certainly prepared to look at all details, including the one he raises.
Does the Solicitor General also agree that it is crucial that there is full public confidence in the role of the independent public advocate? As such, the role should be subject to appropriate scrutiny. Will he also promise that the independent public advocate will place reports before this House on an annual basis, so that Members can look carefully at the work in detail?
Like many other appointments of this kind, I can envisage the sort of accountability that the hon. Gentleman mentions. The publication of annual reports is a regular and common occurrence. Again, it is a particular point that we will consider very carefully indeed.
6. What assessment he has made of the effect of the aggravated offences regime on the level of successful prosecutions for hate crime.
9. What assessment he has made of the effect of the aggravated offences regime on the level of successful prosecutions for hate crime.
The Crown Prosecution Service has taken a number of steps to improve its prosecution of all strands of this type of crime, including the aggravated offences, and that includes the delivery of vital face-to-face training. Its hard work in this area has resulted in significant increases in the use of sentencing uplifts in all strands of hate crime.
In 2014, the Law Commission proposed that disability hate crime should be given parity with other hate crimes in relation to aggravated offences and to so-called stirring-up offences. In November 2016 in a debate in Westminster Hall, the Solicitor General said that the Government were reviewing that report. Will he update the House on when the Government will make a decision, as it is of great importance to disabled people?
The hon. Lady knows that I have had a long-standing interest in disability hate crime. The Government are particularly interested in the strand of work conducted by the previous Home Affairs Committee. We are looking to its successor Committee to carry on that work. We want this House to play its part in the response to the Law Commission recommendations, and we very much hope that, as soon as possible, we can craft a suitable response to get the law right.
As has been stated, the Law Commission has previously called on the Government to review hate crime legislation. Will the Government bring forward proposals for the review to ensure that the legislation is effective and sufficiently broad in scope?
The hon. Gentleman is right to press the Government on those issues. My concerns are twofold: first, we need to get the existing law properly used and enforced by way of training and the actual use of it by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service; and, secondly, we need to get the response to the Law Commission recommendations right. I want to ensure that this House passes laws that are properly enforced. Too often in the past, we have been too quick to pass laws that have then failed the expectations of those who deserve protection. He is right that we will be looking at that as soon as possible.
Reports of hate crime rose by 57% following Brexit. CPS staffing budgets have more than halved since 2010. Is the Attorney General therefore confident that the CPS is adequately resourced to deal effectively with these reports and ensure that victims of hate crime do indeed get justice?
I can reassure the hon. Lady that the trends in relation to the prosecution of hate crime continue to increase, particularly with regard to racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes. The increase in the past year was 1.9%, which means that more than 13,000 cases are now being prosecuted. That is reflected across the piece when it comes to homophobic crime and disability hate crime. There is no bar at all to the CPS’s pursuing these cases and marking society’s condemnation of this sort of criminal activity.
Will my hon. and learned Friend tell the House what action the Government are taking to prevent the spread of hate crime via social media?
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. May I reiterate that the law shows no distinction whatsoever between hate crimes that are committed offline and those that are committed online? Just because somebody hides behind a pseudonym and pursues hate online does not mean that the police and the CPS will not track them down and prosecute them, as we have seen notably in cases involving several Members of this House, who have been the victims of appalling hate crime.
I am not quite sure how to follow that. Will my right hon. and learned Friend join me in recognising the great work that is done by Tell MAMA and Hope not Hate, who build the confidence in those who suffer hate crime to report it?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Tell MAMA and other organisations play an important part by working closely with the CPS and police to inform the process and help people to report crime. Often people will go to a third party before coming to the police, but that is an acceptable way to report crime because it means that more crimes can be prosecuted.
Order. We have run late. I want to accommodate the Member with the last question on the Order Paper, but no other.
10. What recent assessment he has made of the extent to which sentencing of people convicted of burglary has been unduly lenient.
Last year the Attorney General and I referred 11 cases for burglary as unduly lenient and achieved an increase in sentence in seven of those. Only the most serious types of burglary offence currently fall within the unduly lenient scheme, but we have recommitted in our manifesto to extend its scope and we will work with my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor to implement that commitment.
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for that answer and for the welcome news. Only 10% of first-time burglars receive immediate custodial sentences. Does that not encourage them to carry on their crimes? Burglary is quite a serious crime; will he have a look at that statistic?
My hon. Friend is right to say that burglary is a serious crime. It is a crime against the person, not just against property, because it affects people’s wellbeing. I am glad to tell him that since the introduction of the revised Sentencing Council guidelines on burglary in 2012, the overall level of sentencing for burglary, in terms of prison and length of sentence, has increased. That should give his constituents some encouragement that the courts are handing out the appropriate punishment for this serious crime.
Order. Before we come to business questions, it might be helpful to the House if I announce my selection of amendments to be potentially voted on much later today. I have selected the amendment tabled by the official Opposition—amendment (l), if memory serves, in the name of the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell).
As colleagues will be intimately conscious, being fully familiar with all these matters, I have a right to select up to two further amendments under the terms of our Standing Orders. I can advise the House that I have selected amendment (d) in the name of the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) and others, and amendment (g) in the name of the hon. Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) and others. I hope that that is helpful to the House.
(7 years, 4 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley. I congratulate the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) on securing this debate. I noted the remarks she made in a debate on an associated issue relating to the SFO in February. I pay tribute to her and to colleagues on the all-party parliamentary group for raising this undoubtedly very serious issue, which has caused real loss for those who invested in the Connaught scheme.
The hon. Lady outlined her concerns clearly, and said that she has already raised them with the FCA. She will appreciate that the Financial Conduct Authority is a separate, independent body, and I am not empowered to comment on its investigation, which is still ongoing and is extremely complex. The fact that many investors are still out of pocket is fully appreciated, and it is understood that certainty is needed about whether they can expect to receive compensation. The FCA will update them as soon as it can, and it is encouraging investors to consider what they can do in the meantime to protect their position.
The hon. Lady raised wider issues about, first, the status and funding of the SFO, and, secondly, its relationship with other agencies that help to police economic crime, misconduct and the sort of activity that, frankly, damages the reputation of financial services not only in the City of London but in the whole of the United Kingdom. I assure her that the Government take this matter extremely seriously, because it pertains not just to economic reputation but to our national security. That is why it was welcome that the Home Secretary announced last year that wider work will be carried out through the Cabinet Office to examine our response to economic crime more broadly. As part of that examination, we will look at the effectiveness of our organisational framework, and the capabilities, resources and powers available to the organisations that tackle economic crime, so it embraces fundamental questions of the type that the hon. Lady asked.
The SFO does vital work in tackling the most serious instances of fraud, bribery and corruption. It is an important part of the UK’s enforcement regime. It is right that questions continue to be asked about the adequacy of the way in which we deal with economic crime and how we can improve it. The hon. Lady was right to ask questions about LIBOR and the sort of activity that took place at the time of the economic crash in 2008. Although it is welcome that a number of people who were involved in manipulating the LIBOR regime have been prosecuted and, indeed, convicted, I agree that more needs to be done. It is acutely incumbent on the Government and the enforcement agencies to ask those questions at all times.
The hon. Lady rightly raised the issue of funding, about which we had a debate in this House not long ago. I assure her that the director of the Serious Fraud Office, David Green, who has been doing excellent work since his appointment in 2012, is satisfied that the funding his office receives is sufficient to carry out investigations and prosecutions. Let us not forget that the blockbuster funding allowed by the Treasury gives the SFO the flexibility and fleetness of foot it needs to mount special and unexpected investigations—it is, of course, very much a demand-led office.
I am glad to report that, in recent months, the SFO has yielded hundreds of millions of pounds for the Treasury in the form of new deferred prosecution agreements—most notably with Rolls-Royce and most recently with Tesco, to name but two. I am impressed by and pleased with the progress of the SFO since the appointment of David Green and with how it has focused on the criteria that it has to apply under the governing statute that set it up some 30 years ago.
Briefly, to remind ourselves, the SFO is a relatively small, specialised department that is allowed by law to investigate and, where appropriate, to prosecute cases of serious or complex fraud, which includes cases of domestic or overseas bribery and corruption. Such fraud calls for a multidisciplinary approach and recourse to the legislative powers available to the SFO.
The criteria for case acceptance are strict. The SFO will consider all the circumstances of a case, which include: cases that undermine the United Kingdom’s commercial or financial reputation in general, and the City of London’s in particular; cases in which the actual or potential loss involved is high; cases in which the actual or potential harm is significant; cases with a very significant public interest element; and, finally, new species of fraud. All frauds are serious, causing real detriment to those who fall victim to them, but the criteria rightly set a high threshold that has to be applied by the SFO.
On the way in which the SFO works with other agencies, I reassure the hon. Lady that it has constructive strategic and working relationships with all its law enforcement and regulatory partners. It engages with other agencies whenever relevant throughout the life of a case, right from the development of that case through to its investigation, prosecution and recovery of the proceeds of crime.
Those relationships are supported continually through attendance at various cross-Government working groups and regular bilateral liaison meetings, whether at the senior or operational level, and they are underpinned by memorandums of understanding or operational protocols where necessary. Such structures have evolved over time and in particular since the establishment in 2013 of the National Crime Agency’s economic crime command. The NCA plays a co-ordinating role in a structure of governance that applies across all areas of economic crime, and the SFO plays its part in all the relevant groups to form that collective response.
There are agreed roles and responsibilities, and the SFO investigates a particular species of serious fraud, bribery and corruption cases. At all stages of the assessment, however, reports of economic crime received by the SFO are under review to establish whether the matter falls within its jurisdiction and remit. If the matter is deemed not to reach that high threshold, it is closed and, if appropriate, consideration is given as to whether another law enforcement or regulatory partner may be better placed to develop the information.
Such decisions are made with a clear understanding of the remits of the other law enforcement agencies. The decisions are underpinned by frequent meetings between members of the SFO’s intelligence unit and their counterparts in the NCA, the Financial Conduct Authority and the other law enforcement and regulatory agencies. They meet in order to avoid the inevitable duplication or the conflict that might occur between reports. It will therefore be clear that only one agency is in the lead on any given issue.
We have to appreciate that many referrers—members of the public or others—will approach several agencies with the same matter, so each other’s expertise and capabilities are needed to make real progress with an investigation and to avoid, for want of a better phrase, reinvention of the wheel. That is essential if we are to make proper progress.
In particular, regular meetings are held between members of the foreign bribery clearing house—“foreign” means the involvement of other jurisdictions, which of course includes Scotland—to place potential investigations with the relevant authority. An SFO secondee therefore works with the NCA bribery and corruption intelligence unit, which helps with that process by providing direct access to the assets of the NCA and SFO.
Operation of the clearing house is governed by a memorandum of understanding that was agreed in 2014 and is published on the SFO website. Parties to the MOU are the City of London police, Scotland’s Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the Crown Prosecution Service of England and Wales, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Ministry of Defence police, the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office. We need not end there, however, because the MOU is being looked at again and refreshed to ensure that it is as relevant as possible, bearing in mind current challenges.
Another MOU, between the SFO and the Scottish prosecuting authorities, sets out further rules for co-ordination and co-operation between the two bodies. The SFO does not have prosecutorial authority north of the border, but it has investigatory powers over frauds that could be prosecuted in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, so the co-operation with the Scottish authorities is vital.
Those MOUs set out the remit of each agency involved in tackling bribery, in accordance with the agreed roles and responsibilities grid that exists for bribery and corruption cases, and provide a framework for how the agencies will co-ordinate foreign bribery work. That ensures that all credible allegations of foreign bribery with a connection to the UK are properly assessed.
The SFO also takes part in other strategic delivery and working groups, including Project Bloom, which relates to pension fraud and is chaired by the Pensions Regulator, and the Panama papers taskforce announced by the then Prime Minister in April last year. The SFO is a founding member of the joint financial analysis centre, which is an important part of the Panama papers taskforce and was launched in July last year with the NCA, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Financial Conduct Authority.
The SFO has invested a significant amount of its intelligence resources into that new joint analytical centre, which is complemented by a dedicated group of officers based within the SFO who manage and develop the resultant intelligence and contribute to the analytical process and the product of it generated by the JFAC.
The SFO also actively participates in a number of Panama papers forums, including the JFAC co-ordination and response group, which provides a platform to share efficiently information and intelligence, agree primacy and co-ordinate joint working. The SFO’s commitment to the principle of joint working has directly benefited numerous SFO investigations as well as an operation with HMRC, supported by the NCA, in relation to serious and complex fraud allegations. There is a referral mechanism; the SFO refers matters to the JFAC as well as being a part of that centre itself.
The SFO does not have its own powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. It carries out searches and arrests with the support of the NCA and police forces and it works with them collaboratively, where appropriate, throughout investigations. That symbiosis is very much a part of the way in which the SFO operates with other organisations.
I take on board what the hon. Lady said about the need further to refine and improve the process. I can assure her that with each year that passes, that is precisely what happens. If lessons can be learned from previous failures or omissions, they are learned and they are used to refine existing memorandums of understanding and existing partnership working to ensure as seamless a response as possible to economic crime. There is much to be done. Much has been achieved, but I accept the spirit of the hon. Lady’s motion: there is more to do.
Question put and agreed to.
(7 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Crown Prosecution Service anticipated increases in complex cases such as fraud ahead of the last spending review, and there was indeed a 14% increase in fraud and forgery cases last year, but, importantly, the conviction rate stayed stable at 86%.
With a third of the workforce cut since 2010—400 prosecutors and 1,000 administrators and caseworkers—does the Solicitor General really consider that the CPS is able to deal with these complex fraud and economic cases, and will not any further cuts leave it in a really bad state to prosecute?
I assure the hon. Lady that the allocation of resources for the prosecution of fraud has increased within the CPS. There are now over 200 specialist fraud prosecutors, not just here in London but across the country in important regional centres, and that number is set to increase to 250 in the months ahead, so the CPS is really placing an important priority on this.
Does the Solicitor General agree that the work of the Crown Prosecution Service in this area is very much complemented in cases of really serious economic fraud by the work of the Serious Fraud Office, which has been transformed under the leadership of David Green, resulting in the recovery of over £500 million of ill-gotten gains? Does he agree that the model of the Serious Fraud Office does this country great credit and will be of increasing value to us in future?
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Justice Committee. He is right to highlight the recent successes of the SFO in collecting millions of pounds for the taxpayer as a result of deferred prosecution agreements. I think the Roskill model, which brings together investigators and prosecutors in one unit, works very well.
Picking up on the point made by the Chairman of the Select Committee, does not the existence of the Serious Fraud Office reduce pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in terms of prosecuting big-ticket economic crime? Will the Solicitor General therefore guarantee that the Serious Fraud Office will continue to exist as it is and will not be merged with the Crown Prosecution Service or the National Crime Agency?
The hon. Gentleman knows that the Government are at all times under a duty to review the mechanism by which we tackle economic crime, because it is a question not just of criminality but of national security. The Government are therefore right to examine the situation. As I said, I think the Roskill model works extremely well.
I did not detect a guarantee in that answer. A month ago, the Solicitor General praised the work of the director of the Serious Fraud Office and how he had enhanced the role of the Serious Fraud Office in our national life. I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman has fine persuasive skills, so if he will not give a guarantee, will he at least undertake to go to see the Prime Minister to speak about the advantages of the Serious Fraud Office and having investigatory and prosecuting services under one roof?
I am happy to indicate to the hon. Gentleman that I have regular conversations with ministerial colleagues about all these issues. I praise David Green for the work he has done in leading the SFO. I will continue to make the case for the Roskill model.
I suspect that those who have the necessary financial expertise to investigate, uncover, prosecute and prove complex financial fraud will probably get paid a lot more in the private sector working for business or the City. What can the Solicitor General do to ensure that the right people with the right skills are retained by the CPS and the SFO?
My hon. Friend knows that the SFO operates a model of funding that means it can be quite flexible as regards particular investigations. The important point is that we get the right people with the right specific expertise in particular types of serious fraud. Flexibility is the most important principle.
Everybody knows that there is a lot of hot money in the London high-end residential market, especially coming from Russia, and there are extensive reporting regulations on financial advisers and agents, so why have there been so few prosecutions for money laundering in this area?
I share my hon. Friend’s concern about this. He will be glad to know that the provisions in the Criminal Finances Bill, which I hope will become law very soon, will enhance the powers of prosecutors and investigators in going after ill-gotten gains with new measures such as unexplained wealth orders, which will help us to deal with the perpetrators of this type of fraud.
The CPS is prosecuting and convicting more defendants of domestic abuse, rape, sexual offences and child sexual abuse than ever before. Under the cross-Government violence against women and girls strategy, the CPS has committed to a number of actions between now and 2020 to ensure the effective prosecution of these offences.
What is the CPS doing in the Derbyshire area to ensure that more perpetrators of violence against women and girls are brought to justice?
I know that my hon. Friend has a great interest in and concern about these serious matters. I am happy to tell her that in the last year, 1,805 cases were charged by the CPS—a rise to 70.6% compared with the figure for the previous year—and 1,867 cases resulted in a conviction. The conviction rate in Derbyshire is running at 4.4% higher than the national average.
In Cambridgeshire in 2015-16 there was an increase in the number of convictions for violence against women and girls to 1,031. What is being done to use technology to improve the gathering of evidence for these crimes?
As my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General has just mentioned, the CPS and the police are embracing the use of technology. The use of body-worn cameras, which is being rolled out across the country, will transform conviction rates and the number of guilty pleas when the evidence is clear and overwhelming in these cases.
Much of the violence against women and children is caused by human traffickers. Does the Solicitor General welcome the announcement today of an investment of £6 million by the Home Secretary in fighting modern-day slavery? We are really leading Europe on this issue.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to link modern-day slavery with violence against women and girls. He knows from his leadership on this issue that if there is a co-ordinated approach to these problems, victims can be identified and perpetrators can be brought to justice. This is yet another welcome milestone along the road in our world leadership on these issues.
The Bribery Act 2010 “failure to prevent” offence is holding corporate offenders to account for criminal activity. We are introducing a new offence of failing to prevent tax evasion in the Criminal Finances Bill. Building on this, the Government have published a call for evidence to explore the options for further reform, including extending the “failure to prevent” offence.
Will my hon. and learned Friend look very carefully at the way in which Uber operates? In the past year, it paid £411,000 in tax. I have been inundated with complaints from traditional taxi drivers about the seemingly unfair, unscrupulous and unregulated way in which Uber deploys its drivers.
I listened with concern to my hon. Friend’s question. As I have said, there will be a new corporate offence of failing to prevent tax evasion. If there is evidence of criminality, I urge my hon. Friend and others to report such matters to the police.
I have regular meetings with the Director of Public Prosecutions at which a variety of issues are discussed. The CPS takes the prosecution of hare coursing very seriously. I understand that the chief Crown prosecutor for the east midlands has recently had a meeting with the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable of Lincolnshire at which this issue was discussed.
Not only is hare coursing cruel to the hare, but it causes economic damage and is causing increasing fear in our rural communities. What is the CPS doing to ensure that prosecutions for hare coursing are successful, and to help to put a stop to this crime?
I know that my hon. Friend, who represents a rural constituency, is dealing with this issue and working with local farmers and others to try to combat it. Each Crown Prosecution Service area has a wildlife co-ordinator so that the knowledge needed to prosecute these offences is readily available. The CPS works closely with the police and other wildlife communities to tackle this serious scourge.
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsI would like to inform the House that a cash advance from the contingencies fund has been sought for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).
In line with the current arrangement for SFO funding agreed with HM Treasury, the SFO will be submitting a reserve claim as part of the supplementary estimate process for 2016-17.
The advance is required to meet an urgent cash requirement on existing services pending parliamentary approval of the 2016-17 supplementary estimate. The supplementary estimate will seek an increase in both the Resource Departmental Expenditure Limit and the net cash requirement in order to cover the cost of significant investigations.
Parliamentary approval for additional resources of £5.5 million will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Serious Fraud Office. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £5.5 million will be met by repayable cash advances from the contingencies fund.
The advance will be repaid upon Royal Assent of the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Bill.
[HCWS463]