Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this debate on behalf of His Majesty’s Official Opposition. It will come as no surprise to noble Lords on the Government Front Bench that we on these Benches broadly support the Bill, because large parts of it are a copy-and-paste job from the previous Conservative Government’s Criminal Justice Bill. From the provisions on anti-social behaviour to the new offence of cuckooing, the duty to report child sexual abuse and the new protest and public order offences, this Government are continuing the work we were doing to strengthen the criminal justice system. This is, of course, very welcome, but it does not mean that all is plain sailing.

The feeling among the British public is that crime has been increasing, even though overall rates of crime have fallen since 2010. The Crime Survey for England and Wales for the year ending March 2025 shows that there were 9.4 million incidents of headline crime. Although this represents a 7% rise from the previous year, the ONS states that this is due entirely to a 31% increase in fraud.

Undoubtedly, a significant factor in this overall feeling of pessimism is the increase in more visible crimes that impact people’s daily lives. Shoplifting, phone theft, graffiti, vandalism, fare evasion and drug use are highly visible crimes that leave people feeling unsafe in their daily lives. Shoplifting, for example, has risen by 20% in the year from 2024 to 2025.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council has pointed to an estimated £1.2 billion shortfall in police funding. The chair of the NPCC has said that the funding settlement in the spending review will “cover little more” than police pay rises. Chief Constable Paul Sanford has warned that the Government will find it “incredibly difficult” to meet their neighbourhood policing pledge with the funding settlement. The Metropolitan Police has already announced that it will have to cut 1,700 staff, scrap its dedicated anti-social behaviour officers and close down half of the front desks in stations across London.

This strikes at the heart of a wider principle. Is this Crime and Policing Bill, which runs to over 200 clauses and over 20 schedules, actually going to reduce crime on the streets of this country? In some ways, it might, but in many others, unless coupled with serious improvements in enforcement and police action, it may very well not.

To turn to the Bill, the Government have committed three crimes of commission and two crimes of omission. I will start with the crimes of omission. The Government’s 2024 election manifesto promised to introduce new respect orders with the aim to

“stamp out issues such as public drinking and drug use”.

The Government come armed with a noble cause, but all it takes is to scratch just below the surface to see that these respect orders are little more than smoke and mirrors.

The Bill inserts a new part before Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, creating respect orders. It then converts what are currently anti-social behaviour injunctions into youth injunctions. Rather than giving the police, local authorities and the courts tough new powers to tackle anti-social behaviour, as the Government claim, they are instead simply renaming the currently existing injunctions and creating new orders that are the same in all but the name.

The anti-social behaviour injunctions were introduced as part of my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead’s efforts to streamline the powers available to authorities to deal with criminal and challenging behaviour. As she noted at that Bill’s Second Reading, under the previous Labour Government, over nine anti-social behaviour laws were passed, creating 19 separate powers. The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 consolidated those into six powers. That had a purpose. I cannot see what this Government’s new respect orders will add to this arsenal.

Secondly, on the repeal of Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, this provision states that shoplifting of goods with a value of less than £200 is to be tried only summarily in a magistrates’ court. There has been much misinformation about this provision, which was brought forward by the last Conservative Government. The Labour manifesto called this an “effective immunity” for some shoplifting—a line that has been parroted by Labour Ministers ever since. However, the Government’s policy paper on the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”, and I think that sums up the bizarre nature of the criticism.

I want to be absolutely clear: anyone claiming that trying low-value shoplifting in a magistrates’ court is granting criminals immunity is wrong and misleading the public. There is absolutely no reason why theft under £200 cannot be tried summarily. I need not remind the House, full of eminent lawyers as it is, that a person can still be sentenced to up to six months’ imprisonment and issued with a fine if found guilty in a summary trial. Six months’ imprisonment is clearly not immunity.

What this does is clear the already clogged-up Crown Court and let the police prosecute more serious cases. That does not mean that thefts under £200 from shops do not impact on shopkeepers, or that they should not be investigated, but there is nothing wrong with having a bit more summary justice in this country. It permits cases to be tried and discharged more quickly and efficiently, rather risking long and drawn-out Crown Court cases that last for months if not years. If the police are not investigating such offences, that is an issue with the operation of policing, not the law.

Clauses 107 and 108 were inserted into the Bill on Report in the other place and, as such, have not had as much scrutiny, perhaps, as they ought to. The 11th report of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House has drawn attention to these clauses for the uncertain scope of the new offences and the use of highly subjective terminology.

Clause 107 creates the new offence of using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards an emergency worker that are racially or religiously hostile. Clause 108 creates the offence of using threatening or abusive words or behaviour that are likely to cause an emergency worker harassment, alarm or distress. These offences are very similar to the existing offences under Section 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The key difference is that these new offences can be committed in a private dwelling, whereas those in the Public Order Act cannot. It is understandable why the Government might wish to press ahead with these new offences—we all wish to see our emergency workers protected—but it is far from certain that creating two new speech-related offences will offer emergency workers any greater protection in reality.

Clause 107 involves the criminalisation of insults and Clause 108 uses the term “distress”. Both are highly subjective, thereby leaving people open to prosecution on undefined terms. We already know that this an acute problem in this country. There exists a litany of cases where people have been arrested and prosecuted for speech offences. The continual misuse of non-crime hate incidents, and the probably irresponsible policing of tweets and online comments, have had a chilling effect on free speech. If anything, we should be reviewing and removing barriers to freedom of expression and speech, not expanding those limitations. I therefore echo the comments of the Constitution Committee in relation to Clauses 107 and 108 and call on the Government to heed its advice that these clauses should be drawn far more narrowly.

I am sure much of the debate on the Bill will comprise what noble Lords deem to be omissions and missed opportunities. I have time to mention only a few of those, but I give notice to the Minister that in Committee I will be raising many more. Given that this Bill, in many ways, mirrors the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, it was surprising to see there has been no inclusion—bar two clauses—of the measures to end and replace the Vagancy Act. The previous Government planned to repeal the Act and replace it with a new framework around nuisance begging and rough sleeping. If the Government are to commence the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, but not institute further powers to replace it, there may be a gap in the law. I would appreciate it if the Minister could perhaps comment on why the Government have not included these measures in the Bill.

Furthermore, the Bill does not include the previous Government’s plans to impose tougher penalties on those convicted of shoplifting offences on more than three occasions. Those provisions would require the court to impose a community order, including a curfew, exclusion or electronic whereabouts monitoring condition, or a combination of such conditions. Given the Government’s tough talk on bearing down on retail crime, it is more than a little confusing why they have not included such measures in the Bill.

I will end where I began: criminal justice is not simply about laws this Parliament passes. We can continually create new criminal offences and we can pass as many new laws as we like, but until we get to grips with the enforcement of those laws, we will never tackle the scourge of criminality. The Government have been talking tough on crime, but this must now be met with corresponding action.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks we have heard from around the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the rationale of the Government in bringing forward the measures that they have in this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed it up as the requirement for an effective and functioning system—hear, hear to that.

My concern is aligned with the sentiment, if not the letter, of Amendment 1, which would require the Government to explain why they feel that this set of measures, including respect orders, will work, when previous similar measures—ASBIs and so forth—have not worked to the extent, perhaps, that the Ministers who championed them when they were originally brought in expected. I do not believe that this is the moment for an independent review, but I think the Minister could give the Committee a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances in which he feels that these new respect orders will be deployed, why they are more likely to work than the existing arrangements and, in particular, the degree to which they will really make a difference. The Minister has brought forward these measures for the approval of Parliament, and he must be able to justify the result he expects them to have once they are implemented.

We know that that Governments of all flavours—this is not a specific reflection on the current Government—tend to reach for the statute book to address knotty problems, when in fact the answer may equally lie in better execution of existing powers. That probably is the overall challenge that has been put to the Minister this afternoon. I very much look forward to his answer.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

No problem.

My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.

These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.

Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.

On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.

As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.

But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.

To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.

Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.

Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.

Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an

“appropriate chief officer of police”

if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.

Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.

I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.

There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.

Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.

Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.

First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.

In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.

Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.

Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.

That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.

Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.

I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.

Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.

Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.

Moving on to Amendment 6—

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

8: Clause 1, page 2, line 26, after “court” insert “or a magistrate’s court”

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we must ensure that courts can operate within their means. If we issue them with new responsibilities, we have to be sure that they have the capacity to fulfil them. Unfortunately, in restricting respect orders to the High Court and county courts, the Government risk not providing the bandwidth to deal with new orders.

At the end of Labour’s first year in office, the Crown Court backlog suffered an annual increase of 11%. There are over 74,000 cases waiting to be judged. Of course, that burden is not entirely at the door of the Crown Courts, but a considerable number of the outstanding cases will require their use. County courts are in a better—but still not ideal—state. The average time for justice to be delivered is just over 49 weeks. Reflecting on this, it makes sense for the Government to divide the responsibilities for the new respect orders as widely as possible. The logical conclusion is to permit an application for a respect order to be made to a magistrates’ court.

If respect orders were confined to the serious criminality that we expect to be dealt with by the High Court and county courts, I would accept placing additional pressures on to them and excluding magistrates’ courts. It is right that those facing serious harassment or other forms of anti-social behaviour have the ability to make application to these courts, but the scope for respect orders is far wider than that. The definition of anti-social behaviour is to include actions causing alarm and distress. These are two very subjective metrics: they are fundamentally different from harassment and more serious forms of anti-social behaviour. So I see no reason why magistrates’ courts should not be available to deal with these less serious and potentially menial forms of anti-social behaviour. This is the reasoning behind Amendments 8 and 16, tabled in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie.

There is also precedent for this. When the last Labour Government introduced anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, they could be made only by a magistrates’ court. This recognised that anti-social behaviour should be the purview of summary justice. The Minister might argue that the Government are simply replicating the application process for anti-social behaviour injunctions and that they were the action of the previous Government. That may be a fair criticism, but that would not mean that the Government are right. Simply following the case of previous legislation does not automatically mean that the legislation before us today is following the right path; nor does it acknowledge the very different state of the backlog in the High Court and county courts today, as opposed to 2014. It makes far more sense to permit the use of magistrates’ courts for this purpose today, given the historic case burden.

Finally, I can see no downside to this. It will permit burden-sharing between three types of courts. It would not alter the nature of the orders, nor the process by which they are made. But it would make some progress toward reducing the waiting time for the making of a respect order. Surely the Government do not want to see a 49-week wait for a respect order to be made. Would that not hamper the effectiveness of these supposedly tough new respect orders? I hope the Minister will consider these amendments carefully and sensibly.

The other amendments in this group seek to minimise the pressure placed on our courts by the new measures and ensure that our shared principles of justice are upheld. Interim respect orders interact with the principle of innocent until proven guilty. They can be made following a court adjournment up until the final court hearing. They have the same function as a regular respect order and can impose the same restrictions. I am conscious that this may sometimes be necessary. I reiterate the debilitated state of our courts and the fact that adjournment is sometimes out of their hands, even if the defendant is likely to engage in further anti-social behaviour. In these occasional instances, I can understand the need for an interim respect order.

Amendment 15 aims to find a balance, creating a presumption against issuing an interim order, while still leaving the option open. Amendment 19 exists to forward the argument that these orders can be issued to prevent only further harassment, and not the vague concepts of alarm and distress. These amendments aim to ease the administrative burden on the courts. Amendment 17 seeks to ensure that, if an appeal is made against a decision to refuse to issue an interim respect order, the defendant is notified. It is right that a person should know when they might be subjected to a respect order, especially when they have not yet been proven guilty. I beg to move Amendment 8.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have just a few comments. I am quite concerned that the latest figures show that the magistrates’ courts’ backlog of cases to be heard reached 361,000 as of September 2025, a record high and a significant increase on previous years. In the other place, the Minister said the legal test for respect orders was being kept “broad and flexible” to enable them to be used for a wide range of anti-social behaviours. Again, this suggests significant extra pressure on courts. Jamming up the system further is not going to help victims. Can the Minister say what the Government’s assessment is of the impact on the wider criminal justice system?

Giving evidence in the other place, the Police Federation also pointed to the pressure these orders would put on custody places, saying that infrastructure was needed to make new legislation “effective and believable”. Perhaps the Minister could also address that.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

That is a very wide question, my Lords. Let me say that the purpose of Committee is to provide a significant number of days for Members from all sides of the House—as we have had today, from the government side as well as from the Opposition and the Liberal Democrats—to test Ministers and raise points. If the noble Baroness has points she wishes to raise during the passage of the Bill, as ever, I will try to answer them, either on the Floor of this House or in writing afterwards.

The noble Baroness asks whether things have changed. Even today, there are a number of amendments that the Government have brought forward in the groups of amendments that we are deliberating on today. Things move; the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, was saying with regard to the immigration Bill that a number of things have changed over the course of time, and things move. It is now 16 months since the King’s Speech which introduced this legislation. We continue to monitor and move; where necessary we bring forward amendments, and I am open to testing on all matters at all times. But I would welcome the noble Lord withdrawing his amendment today.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and to those who have contributed. I know we all have the interests of a functioning justice system at heart, and the discussion has reflected that. We must approach this debate with pragmatism as our guiding principle. That means that, when legislating for new crimes, the best outcome is the one that sees offences prosecuted. In a perfect world, perhaps the Crown Courts and the county courts alone would have the capacity to handle these new respect orders. But, as I have outlined, the courts system is incredibly backlogged, and it is therefore necessary to use as many courts as possible to deliver the policy.

Considering the scope of respect orders on top of that, my amendments and the amendments of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are perfectly reasonable. To consider causing alarm as on the same level as causing harassment, as prosecuting them in the same courts effectively does, defies sense. Making use of magistrates’ courts is both the rational and practical solution to this problem.

Similarly, approaching interim respect orders from a more conservative standpoint would be prudent. They are very illiberal measures and should be used only in the most necessary circumstances. Amendments, such as those tabled in my name, to create presumptions against them and to narrow the preview of their power seek to ensure that this is the case.

I hope that the Minister will agree with the important principles behind these amendments and will perhaps take them away and consider them, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 8 withdrawn.

Debate on whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled and de-grouped this clause stand-part notice because it would be helpful to the Committee to probe the real purpose of respect orders. We have no plans to insist that this part of the Bill be removed on Report.

This Government appear to be making the same errors as those of the previous Labour Administration. The Blair Government seemed to believe that, the more they legislated on crime and anti-social behaviour, the less of that behaviour there would be. We saw Act after Act, many repealing or amending Acts that they had passed merely a few years before. This flurry of lawmaking meant that, by the end of its term in office, Labour had created 14 different powers for police to tackle anti-social behaviour and criminality. My noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead undertook to simplify this system by condensing all these measures into just six powers. However, with this Bill we see that old pattern of the new-Labour years re-emerging. This Bill creates four new powers: respect orders, youth injunctions, housing injunctions and youth diversion orders. I cannot see what real-world impact this will make.

As I said at Second Reading, the concept of respect orders appears to be little more than a gimmick. It is legislative action to make the Government appear to be tough on anti-social behaviour when in fact they are not. Respect orders are no different from the existing anti-social behaviour injunctions. Applications for both are made by the same list of people to the same cause. The requirements that can be placed on the respondent are the same for ASB injunctions and respect orders. Both permit the making of an interim order or injunction. Both permit the exclusion of a person from their home in the case of serious violence or risk of harm. Both permit the variation or discharge of the order or injunction. They are, in almost every aspect, exactly the same.

The only difference is that one is a civil order and the other a criminal order. The Bill creates a criminal offence of breaching a condition of a respect order. A person found guilty of that offence on conviction or indictment is liable to a jail sentence of up to two years. Anti-social behaviour injunctions, however, do not have a specific criminal offence attached to them. A person who breaches a condition of an ASB injunction does not commit an offence of breaching the injunction. The Government have argued that this difference makes their respect orders tougher and therefore justified. However, this overlooks two important facts.

First, the court granting the ASB injunction can attach a power of arrest to the injunction under Section 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 9 of that Act states that

“a constable may arrest the respondent without warrant”

where they believe that the person has breached a condition of their injunction. The person arrested for a breach of their injunction can then be charged with contempt of court, which carries a punishment of up to two years’ imprisonment. It is entirely understandable that the Government wish to introduce a specific criminal offence of breaching conditions. It is easier to prosecute someone who breaches their respect order than to prosecute someone for contempt of court for breaching their injunction. That is not least because a police officer would have to know that a person had an injunction against them, that they had breached the condition and that their injunction contained a power of arrest. It is also because, even though ASB injunctions are civil orders, the criminal standard of proof is applied when determining whether a person has breached a condition.

I understand this entirely, but it does not explain why the Government are seeking to replace injunctions in their entirety. Surely, given that every other aspect is the same, it would be far easier and more expeditious to retain the injunctions and simply amend them to create an offence of breach of conditions. That would mean that the ASB injunctions remain in place but they have the same power of enforcement. Why did the Government not follow this route? Why did they not simply amend the anti-social behaviour injunctions, as opposed to creating a whole new class of order?

The answer cannot be that one is a civil order and one a criminal order because, as I have demonstrated, the civil order could easily have been upgraded to criminal status by way of legislative amendment. I would hazard a guess and say that the reason is perhaps bluster. Is it not the case that the Government wanted to seem to be tough on crime, so they came up with a rehash of ASBOs with a slightly catchier name? These new respect orders will likely have little effect on reducing anti-social behaviour. What would have a positive impact would be to increase the number of police officers. Unfortunately, the Government have failed on that front. Since they entered office, the total police officer headcount has fallen by 1,316. That record to date stands in stark contrast to the previous Government’s successful recruitment of 20,000 additional police officers during the last Parliament.

If the Government are serious about getting tough on crime, they should stop the gimmicks and start with enforcement. I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have listened to the quite detailed discussion that we have had so far in our attempt at line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill in relation to respect orders. Weighing up the pros and rather more cons, I am very aware that what I am going to say might seem glib about anti-social behaviour. People listening in might think, “This crowd who are raising problems of civil liberties are not aware of the real scourge of anti-social behaviour and the impact and the misery that it can cause on ordinary people’s lives”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, gave us a taste of what that anti-social activity can feel like in local areas. I recognised the descriptions from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, of young people potentially running amok in local areas. Where I live, that has been known to happen, so I recognise that.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I accept that, but it would be fair to say that I would be making promises or guessing about issues that I could not guarantee. But I can guarantee for the noble Viscount that we will monitor the use of this and that the measures that I have already outlined—those in the Bill, those on police numbers and the focus that we are putting on certain police initiatives through central government discussion with the National Police Chiefs’ Council—will make a difference. They will be judged on that.

Self-evidently, a manifesto commitment to reduce and tackle anti-social behaviour requires this Minister, this Government and this Home Secretary to go back to the electorate, at some point, to say, “That is the difference that we have made”. While I cannot give the noble Viscount an aperitif today, I hope I can give him a full-course meal after the discussions have taken place further down stream.

It is important, as we have just heard, that if perpetrators breach an injunction multiple times, the police cannot take action unless they take them to court. Under this measure, there will be a criminal action so police can take action immediately.

I wish to tell the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that, for a respect order to be issued, two tests must be satisfied. First, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent has engaged in or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour as defined. Secondly, the court must be satisfied that issuing the respect order is just and convenient. A further safeguard introduced is that the relevant authorities carry out risk assessments prior to the respect order being put in place.

These clauses, about which the noble Lord has quite rightly asked questions, are important and I wish to see them retained in the Bill. I am grateful for his overall indication that, when it comes to determining that, he will not oppose these clauses, but I will take away his comments and I hope to continue our discussions in the positive way that we have to date.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am grateful for the contributions made and to the Minister for his response. Of course, I have no intention of opposing the passage of respect orders. They were part of the Government’s election manifesto and, as such, shall become the law of the land. This does not prevent my criticising them. Indeed, simply because they were part of the Government’s manifesto does not mean that they are a good idea that would have a positive impact on the streets of Britain.

I have provided substantive justification for why I believe that respect orders are, simply put, an effort to paint a picture of a Government bearing down on crime and anti-social behaviour when, in reality, they are not. The proof will be in the pudding; we will see whether the Prime Minister’s so-called tough new respect orders have any actual impact, in due course. For now, I will leave it there.

Clause 1 agreed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.

My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for this short but focused debate, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for introducing his amendment. As he has explained, it seeks to allow registered social housing providers to issue a closure notice in relation to an individual flat within a housing block that they own or manage.

The closure power is a fast, flexible power that can be used to protect victims and communities by quickly closing premises that are causing nuisance or disorder. Clause 5 and Schedule 2 extend the closure power to registered social housing providers. Currently, only local authorities and police can issue closure notices. This is despite registered social housing providers often being the initial point of contact for tenants suffering from anti-social behaviour. Now, registered social housing providers will be able to issue closure notices and apply for closure orders, to enable them to close premises that they own or manage which are associated with nuisance and disorder.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned a specific landlord. Without going into the facts of that case, it is clear that registered social housing providers have to meet regulatory standards set by the regulator of social housing. There is statutory guidance in place, and registered social housing providers are expected to meet the same legal tests as set out in the 2014 Act that the noble Lord mentioned. This will ensure that all relevant agencies have the right tools to tackle anti-social behaviour quickly and effectively. In turn, this will save police and local authorities time, as housing providers will be able to make applications directly, rather than having to rely on the police or local authority to do so on their behalf.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, raised his concerns about risks of abuse. For instance, he was concerned that extending the power to housing providers might risk it being misused to evict tenants, such as those in rent arrears. There are robust safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of misuse. Like other agencies, housing providers will be required to consult with relevant partners prior to the issuing of a closure notice. This requirement is in addition to the legal test having to be met and the fact that the process will go through the courts.

I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and others that premises here means any land or other places, whether enclosed or not, and any outbuildings that are, or are used as, part of the premises. This could therefore already include an individual flat within a housing block. Indeed, that would be the expectation: that this targets individual households, rather than whole blocks of flats. We are confident that the current legislative framework and the Bill will cover that and make that clear. On the basis of that clarification—of course, I will reflect on Hansard and the points he specifically raised about the 2014 Act, and I will write to him in more detail if I need to—I hope the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Hampton, for tabling these amendments and all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Ensuring that anti-social behaviour complaints are adequately handled and delivering a just outcome for the complainants and communities affected without being overly burdensome on the relevant authorities are important principles. These amendments are largely in line with that goal.

This group is particularly important, as anti-social behaviour seems to be on the rise in our streets. As such, it is important that we have the right framework not only for dealing with complaints but for self-correcting any potential mistakes made. With an increased volume, local authorities simply do not have the time to be weighed down by bureaucratic procedures.

For that reason, Amendment 27 raises eyebrows. It is important that we provide the necessary support for those who are harmed by criminal behaviour, but it is also true that this clause would require policing bodies to review responses to complaints about anti-social behaviour, in certain instances. It would place an additional level of administration on to these authorities. As it stands, the amendment seems to cast the net too widely on when impact assessments might be necessary; it would therefore add yet more workload to already strained forces. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s opinion on this matter.

Amendments 28 and 31, however, appear to work to the opposite end. It is right that, when we mandate administrative work from our public servants, we should give them clear guidance on where it is necessary. A discretionary threshold has the potential to encourage local authorities to err on the side of caution and thus review cases that do not merit the time required. Adding a statutory threshold for an ASB case review would both streamline the process and create a more regular system across authorities. This is never a bad thing, and I hope the Minister will consider taking it on board.

I am cautious of Amendment 30 for reasons similar to those that I have already discussed. In principle, the amendment is sound, but adding more bureaucracy to the process by publishing the reasons for not reviewing a case has the potential to take time and attention away from cases that do meet the threshold. Additionally, a statutory threshold would be available for all to see and would set out the criteria needed to meet it. This would surely forgo the need to release the reasons why thresholds were not met.

This is a largely sensible set of amendments that have the interests of both complainants and the respective authorities at heart. I hope that the Minister agrees with what I have just said and look forward to what he says in response.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for his amendments. I also thank the Victims’ Commissioner, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, both on the amendments and for her work on this issue over many years. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for the comments on this area from the noble Lords, Lord Hampton and Lord Clement-Jones, and to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, from His Majesty’s Opposition.

Amendment 27 aims to ensure that all victims of repeat anti-social behaviour are subject to an impact assessment, even where the individual has not requested a case review to be undertaken. The Government believe that there is a more effective response to this issue, in that we can ensure that victims are aware of their rights to request a case review. That has been included in updated statutory guidance for front-line staff, which we published in September. The proposals in the amendment would significantly increase the resources required to review anti-social behaviour incidents. The wording of the amendment would mean that even in cases where the victim is satisfied with the response, the police would be required to conduct an impact assessment.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, has approached this by saying he wishes to work with the Government to look at this. I am happy to have further dialogue with him and the responsible policy Minister in the Home Office post Committee. We can return to it then and examine the nuances. I hope that my initial comments give him a flavour of where the Government currently are.

Amendments 28, 29 and 31 look at the anti-social behaviour case review process and mandate the requirement for there to be an independent chair, for victims to be invited to attend their case review, and to reduce the ability for authorities to add additional caveats that reduce the victim’s abilities to request a case review. I am pleased to say—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, will accept this and the way that I put it to him—that we have recently updated the statutory guidance to front-line professionals, which already reflects the proposals he has put to the Committee today. I believe that this will create the impact that his amendments intend to bring while still allowing for greater flexibility for circumstances to be treated on an individual basis. Again, if the noble Lord would like further information on the statutory guidance, I am happy to provide that to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, but we think that it meets the objectives of Amendments 28, 29 and 31.

Amendment 30 seeks to require relevant bodies involved in case reviews to publish details on why they have determined that the statutory threshold for a case review was not met. Under existing legislation, it is already a requirement for the relevant bodies to publish the number of times they decided that the review threshold was not met. I highlight to the noble Lord that, through Clause 7, the Government are introducing further requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government. That is for the purpose of us understanding how local agencies are using the powers and tools provided by the 2014 Act, including the question of case review.

If the noble Lord looks at Clause 6 in particular—it is buried in the depths of the undergrowth of Clause 6 but I assure him that it is there—he will see that there will be a new duty for police and crime commissioners to set up a route for victims to request a further review where dissatisfied with the outcome of their case review. This includes where the relevant bodies determined that the threshold was not met for the initial case review. I will give further explanation of Clause 6 when we reach it, but I hope that it meets the objectives that the noble Lord has set out in Amendment 30.

The recently updated guidance on case reviews address many of the same points as these amendments and I hope that it will have the opportunity to bed in. I am happy to send the noble Lord a copy of the guidance, if I am able to, and I assure him that we will monitor the effectiveness of that guidance in improving good practice. He has my commitment that, if necessary, we will revisit the issues again in the near future. Until then, I submit that it would be premature to legislate further on case reviews beyond the measures in the Bill. I hope that with those assurances, the invitation to further discussion and the offer of further information, the noble Lord would be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is all too often the case that, when the Government say they are bringing minor and technical amendments to a Bill, those amendments are neither minor nor technical in nature. However, with these amendments, that is genuinely the case. There is, therefore, little for me to say in response to this group of amendments. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 was passed by this House earlier this year and, as far as I am aware, the data protection override in Section 106 of that Act was not queried or opposed by noble Lords during its passage, and no amendment was proposed to that clause. I therefore have no issue with these amendments.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful and all I say in response is that the sooner we get to Clauses 132 and 192, the better.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.

We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.

The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.

The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Blencathra, as ever, raises a serious and pertinent point with his Amendment 35. Clause 7 permits the Secretary of State, by regulations, to require authorities to provide them with information about anti-social behaviour. Unfortunately, Clause 7 contains rather vague requirements on what information the regulations might contain. It would perhaps be helpful for the Minister to provide the Committee with some concrete examples of what might be included. My noble friend is absolutely right that social media posts should not be included in any of the guidance.

With Amendment 55A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, my fear is that the police and the Home Office, already overburdened with creating statistics, will yet again be further burdened. Perhaps this is not the way forward.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to both the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for these two amendments.

As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 35 relates to the new power in Clause 7 for the Home Secretary to make regulations requiring relevant authorities, including local councils and social housing providers, to report information on anti-social behaviour. The amendment would mean that those regulations would not be able to request information from the relevant authorities about things that are considered anti-social or indeed anti-social messages. We will come on to the non-crime hate incident issues that the noble Lord has a concern about, but currently Clause 7 would allow information to be requested on reports of anti-social behaviour made to an authority, responses of the authority and anti-social behaviour case reviews carried out by the relevant authority. Anti-social behaviour can come in various forms, and it is important that the regulation-making power can address this.

Information held by central government on anti-social behaviour is in some areas limited. This has led to a significant evidence gap in the national picture of anti-social behaviour. I mentioned the 1 million incidents per year, but there is still an evidence gap in that picture of anti-social behaviour. The new clause will change this to ensure stronger and more comprehensive understanding of ASB incidents and interventions, but we want to make sure that Clause 7 creates a regulation-making power only. Regulations will then be made following the passage of the Bill to specify the information that agencies must provide. Going back to what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, indicated, this may be information they already have but do not necessarily share.

I assure the noble Lord that regulations are being developed in close consultation with the relevant practitioners, including local authorities and social housing providers, to understand what information is held on anti-social behaviour and the impact that this requirement may have upon them, for the very reasons that the noble Lord mentioned. We will of course make sure that any new requirements are reasonable and proportionate but meet the Government’s objective of having a wider understanding of some of the trends and information.

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Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

37: After Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—
“Increased penalties for littering offences(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.(2) In section 88 (fixed penalty notices for leaving litter)—(a) in subsection (6A)(b)(i), for “£100” substitute “£125”;(b) in subsection (6A)(b)(ii), for “£75” substitute “£94”;(c) in subsection (8C) (England, Wales and Scotland versions), for “level 3” substitute “level 4”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase penalties for littering and related offences. It raises fixed penalties in England and Wales by 25 per cent and moves the maximum fine levels up one tier on the standard scale.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses three separate but related offences: increasing the penalties for littering and dog fouling offences and introducing a specific offence of littering on public transport.

Littering may appear to be a minor problem when juxtaposed with some of the issues discussed in the Bill, but it is one of the most prominent anti-social offences to plague towns and communities. Littering is one of the most visible forms of environmental degradation, affecting not only the appearance of our streets and greenery but degrading our sense of public pride and community. Littering is associated with signs of a neglected area, and it sends a powerful negative message about standards and civic responsibility.

The scale of this problem is undeniable. Keep Britain Tidy estimates that local authorities in England alone spend around £1 billion each year clearing litter and fly-tipped waste. Almost 80% of our streets in England are affected by littering to some degree, with the most common items including food and drink packaging, cigarette ends and sweet wrappers.

The Government’s own figures show that local councils issue fewer than 50,000 fixed penalty notices a year, despite the widespread scale of the problem. This is why my amendments seek to increase the penalties for littering offences. The current fixed penalty levels were last revised in 2018, when the maximum fine was raised to £150. Since then, both inflation and enforcement costs have risen considerably. As time has gone on, therefore, the deterrent effect of the penalty has been eroded. An uplift is thus justified and necessary. A higher penalty would reflect the real cost to communities and to local authorities, and would send a clear message that littering is not a low-level or victimless offence.

The same logic applies to my amendment concerning dog fouling offences. It is true that some progress has been made through awareness campaigns, but the problem persists in many communities. It is unpleasant, unsanitary and requires local authorities to bear the cost of cleaning it up. It is therefore only right that penalties are raised to reflect both the nuisance and costs incurred. I hope the Government agree that more must be done to combat littering and dog fouling offences.

The negative effects of littering are felt most in highly frequented public places. Public transport is one such area of public life where the harm of littering is exacerbated. It is a growing problem on our trains, buses, trams and underground systems. Anyone using public transport on a Saturday or Sunday morning will no doubt have experienced the scale of rubbish left behind from the thoughtless few of the night before. The accumulation of food packaging, coffee cups, bottles and newspapers left behind by passengers is a saddening sight and must be addressed. Littering on public transport causes expensive inconvenience for operators and diminishes the travelling experience for others. Often, passengers would rather stand than sit on dirty seats. A distinct offence of littering on public transport would underline the responsibility of passengers in shared public places and support transport authorities in maintaining standards of cleanliness and safety.

These amendments are not about punishing people for the sake of it; they are about upholding civic standards and ensuring that those who do the right thing are not let down by those who do not. They are about fairness: the costs of litter removal fall on local taxpayers, transport users and businesses, rather than on those responsible for creating the mess. It is time the Government took a firmer stance on the few who ruin the enjoyment of Britain’s streets for the many. Higher penalties and clearer offences would, in my view, provide both the incentive and the clarity needed to improve compliance.

I hope the Government will view these proposals in that spirit—not as punitive but as a practical contribution to cleaner, safer public spaces and to civic pride. I look forward to hearing from the Minister, and from across the Committee, on how the Government intend to continue building on their anti-littering strategy and supporting local authorities in enforcement. I am sure many noble Lords will have received letters and emails from constituents complaining about the state of local streets and the scale of litter they must contend with. They are right to be concerned. The cost to our environment, our economy and our collective morale is far greater than the individual cost of a packet or a coffee cup dropped out of selfish behaviour. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend. My only criticism is that the proposed increase for the penalties is not high enough, but at least it is a very good start. I declare an interest, as on the register: I am a director of the community interest company, Clean Streets, which works with Keep Britain Tidy to try to reduce cigarette litter on the streets, with considerable success.

In about 1995, I was privileged to make an official visit to Commissioner Bratton in New York, who pioneered the broken window theory—I am sure the Minister is aware of it. As he discovered, if there is a street with one broken window and no one does anything about it, very soon there will be more broken windows, then litter and rubbish lying in the street, and then low-life people, as they call them in America, move in. He said that you would start with a street with a broken window and, within a couple of years, end up with garbage and then a drug den. I actually visited one where they were trying to batter down a steel door to get the druggies out.

I am not suggesting that a little litter would cause that here, but there was an experiment cited by the excellent nudge unit, set up by Oliver Letwin, when he was in government. The experiment was carried out in the Netherlands, where, for one week, they looked at a bicycle parking lot. They pressure-washed the whole thing, scrubbed it and kept it clean, and over the course of that week not a single bit of litter was left there and no damage was caused. The following week, they put bits of litter in the parking lot—a bottle here and an empty cigarette box there—and, within days, the whole place got more and more litter, because people thought it was an okay thing to do. If people see one bit of rubbish, they think they can just add their rubbish to it as well.

Littering is not only unsightly but highly dangerous. Cigarette litter, in particular, is dangerous—not from the cigarettes themselves but from the filters, which have microplastics in them. It causes enormous costs to councils to clean up.

A couple of months ago, serving on the Council of Europe, I attended an official meeting in Venice. It was the first time I had been there. It is not very wheelchair friendly, but I did manage to get around. After four or five days in Venice—I paid to stay on for some extra days—I was impressed that there was not a single scrap of litter anywhere on the streets. One could not move for tourists, but there was not a single scrap of litter. There were signs everywhere, saying “Keep Venice Clean”. People, mainly ladies, were going round with their big two-wheeled barrels collecting garbage from people’s homes. It was impressive.

I was even more impressed that everyone seemed to have a dog—the widest variety of dog breeds I have ever seen—but there was only one occasion in five days where I saw dog mess on the pavement. The view was that, if you have a dog, you clean up after it. It is an extraordinary place. When I am on my wheelchair in London or anywhere else—trying to avoid the people on their mobile phones who walk into me—I am looking down all the time as I dare not drive through dog dirt on the pavement because I can never get it off the wheels. I manage to avoid it, but that is what I must to do in my own country. I cannot take the risk in a wheelchair of driving through the dog mess we find on the pavements. To be fair, in Victoria Tower Gardens, where I see people exercising their dogs, they all have the little poop-scoop bag and they pick up the mess and that is very good, but there is too much dog mess on the pavements.

We need tougher sanctions. We need the highest possible penalties, particularly for fouling and leaving mess on the pavement. I know the penalties are there already, but they have not been enforced rigorously enough. My friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, might condemn the private companies that move in and start imposing more fines for the ridiculous dropping of litter, but perhaps they could move in and start imposing them, and catch out the people who are leaving the dog mess on the pavement. I almost tried to do it myself on one occasion, when I came across similar dog mess in the same spot three days in a row. I was tempted to get up at 5 am, sit there with my camera to catch the person doing it and report him or her to Westminster City Council.

We need enforcement on this. Goodness knows how colleagues in this place who are blind and who have guide dogs manage to avoid it—I hope the dogs do—but others may not avoid it and will walk through it. It is filthy and disgusting, and a very serious health hazard. I support the amendments in the names of my noble friends, and I urge the Government to consider all aspects of making tougher penalties for litter and tougher enforcement penalties for dog mess on the pavement.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Sorry, I thought the noble Lord was gearing up to make further comments.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling the amendments. I agree with him and everybody else who has spoken that fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling are not victimless crimes; they blight our communities. I find it very annoying to see not just dog mess in bushes but stuff thrown out of car windows and stuff left on trains that is not picked up. An important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, is that some of this is also about improving behavioural change and encouraging people not to tolerate this. Never mind fines or responsibilities, it is about not tolerating this as a society.

Having said that, the amendments themselves are unnecessary in this case, and I will try to explain why. Local authorities can already issue fixed-penalty notices for littering of up to £500, which is greater than the proposed penalties in the amendment. In addition, local authorities already have the power to issue public space protection orders to tackle persistent anti-social behaviour, including dog fouling. As we have debated, Clause 4 raises the maximum penalty for the breach of PSPOs from £100 to £500, so there is already an upward target in terms of the amount of potential fine. This is not meant as a snide point, but I say to the noble Lord that the Dog (Fouling of Land) Act 1996 has been repealed and replaced; I cannot amend it because it does not exist any more.

The argument I put to the House is that local authorities are best placed to set the level of these penalties in their area, taking into account the characteristics of the community, which might even include ability to pay. Outside of issuing a fixed-penalty notice, those prosecuted for littering can also face, on conviction, a fine of up to £2,500. I do not believe that increasing the fine available to someone who fails to give their name and address to an enforcement officer issuing them a fine is appropriate, with a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale—currently £1,000—being the appropriate level in these circumstances.

Amendment 38 makes a very important point about littering on public transport becoming a specific offence. I pay tribute to the people whom the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned: the people who go up and down trains, collecting rubbish on behalf of the company. They are also the people who helped protect us last week in the LNER attack. They fulfil a very important function as a whole.

However, the British Transport Police and the railway operators already have the power to enforce the railway by-laws and prevent unacceptable behaviour on both heavy and light railway. That includes fines of up to £1,000. On the noble Lord’s late-night train back, in theory, a £1,000 fine for littering could be issued. By-laws are controlled by each individual devolved area, which will have its own by-laws around littering and enforcement.

That takes me to the other point—I do not mean to be cocky in the way I say this—that the amendments, as proposed, seek to amend the law in Scotland and Wales as well as for England, and they deal with matters that are devolved to Scotland and to the Senedd in Wales. As such, it would not be appropriate to include such measures in the Bill without the consent of the legislatures, which at the moment we do not have and have not sought.

Finally, I think it is of benefit to noble Lords if I briefly outline the steps the Government are taking to reduce littering among our communities. There is a Pride in Place Strategy, which sets out how Government will support local action—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, mentioned—by bringing forward statutory enforcement guidance on littering, modernising the code of practice that outlines the cleaning standards expected of local authorities and refreshing best practice guidance on powers available to local councils to force land and building owners to clean up their premises.

Having had the opportunity to debate all these issues, I think that the amendments make an extremely important point, and I am not trying to downgrade the points that have been made by noble Lords. Litter is an extremely important issue, but the approach taken in these amendments is not one that I can support—but not because I am not interested in the issue itself. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and not to move the other amendments, but we can still discuss it further at some point, no doubt on Report.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am most grateful to those who have contributed and spoken in support of this group of amendments and, indeed, for the Minister’s response, although I was a little disappointed by the scepticism of colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches.

These matters go to the heart of civic pride and the everyday quality of life that our constituents rightly expect. The present system of penalties is no longer an adequate deterrent, having not been amended for many years. As has been observed, local authorities spend hundreds of millions of pounds every year clearing up after those who show little regard for the public realm. When the maximum fine for littering has remained unchanged since 2018, its real-term value has fallen sharply. Fines are now too often treated as a minor inconvenience rather than a genuine consequence for selfish behaviour. My amendments seek to address that imbalance and ensure that penalties once again reflect the true cost to our communities. Our buses, trains and underground systems are shared spaces used by millions every day. They should be clean spaces, not repositories for discarded coffee cups and beer bottles.

As I mentioned in my opening speech, although awareness of dog fouling has improved, enforcement remains inconsistent and penalties insufficient. It is only fair that those who allow this behaviour to persist should face meaningful consequences, rather than leaving their neighbours and local councils to deal with the aftermath.

These amendments are modest practical steps towards restoring civic responsibility and pride in our shared environment. They are not intended to be punitive; they are about accountability and respect for the public spaces we all enjoy. I hope that the Government will take note of the strength of feeling by travellers and the public at large and will continue to work with local authorities and communities to tackle the persistent blight of dog fouling and littering, especially on public transport. But for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 37 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.

I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment

“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.

That is the point.

What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.

The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?

We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century —I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on this side of the Committee are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing forward this thoughtful group of amendments relating to the controls on offensive weapons. Each of these amendments raise practical questions about the application of current laws that relate to offensive weapons and seek to ensure that legislation designed to protect the public does not inadvertently criminalise legitimate, historically important or professionally supervised activities.

Amendment 211 proposes a defence where a weapon is of genuine historical importance. The reasoning behind this amendment is eminently sensible and aligns the treatment of such items with existing defences relating to antiques and curated collections. This is a meaningful distinction between dangerous modern weapons intended for misuse and historical artifacts preserved for cultural or heritage purposes. There is an important question here on proportionality and the scope of reasonable excuse. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether existing provisions fully address the concerns raised.

Amendments 212 and 213 relate to the traditional straight police truncheon and agricultural tools. I can tell the Committee that in my 32 years as a police officer, I did not use my truncheon on anybody, but it is very useful for silencing alarms in business premises in the middle of the night when you cannot get the keyholder out of bed. Here too, we recognise the practical issues that these amendments seek to resolve. It is not a controversial belief that items with legitimate ceremonial, historical or agricultural uses should not inadvertently fall within criminal restrictions where there is no evidence of misuse. The examples provided in support of these proposals make clear that the law must operate with fairness and precision, and I hope the Government consider them with due regard.

Amendment 214 addresses a wide range of potential exemptions for visiting forces, emergency services, theatrical and film productions, museums and antiques. These are complex areas with operational realities that deserve serious thought. The amendment raises legitimate questions about how the law accommodates professional and historical circumstances without undermining public safety. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on, and response to, this amendment.

These amendments rightly probe the intersection of criminal law with the heritage and cultural sectors. These are sectors that must be protected. We cannot allow well-meaning legislation unintentionally to criminalise legitimate historical and cultural activities. We look forward to the Minister’s response and assurances that these matters will receive the careful consideration that they merit.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957— I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for setting out the case for his Amendments 214A and 438. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who attached their names to Amendment 214A. As the noble Lord, Lord Brady, has explained, the aim is to deregulate the devices known as sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I too must out myself as a townie. As with the previous group, it has been a bit of an education finding out about these items and their uses. They are currently subject to control as they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. This means that firearms licence holders with a legitimate need for these items are required to apply to the police to include them on their existing firearms licence, and this is obviously at a cost to both the police and the licence holder.

As many noble Lords have noted—indeed, every noble Lord who spoke—removing these items from the legal definition of a firearm would alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments. Because these are entirely inert objects containing no moving parts, they do not of themselves create a risk to public safety, as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, and others have said. The Government have already set out our intention to remove these items from the legal definition of a firearm, and I am therefore sympathetic to the intent behind these amendments.

However, I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a commitment at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to bring forward the necessary legislative changes to the Firearms Act in this Bill. If he would agree to withdraw his amendment, I will undertake to update the noble Lord ahead of Report. I will say no more.

--- Later in debate ---

In closing, I say that I do not disagree with anything that noble Lords have said, but we must be particularly careful that we do not just choose some people to protect while unintentionally giving the impression that we do not really care about others.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.

The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.

The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.

Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.

I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.

The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.

I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 39 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created

“effective immunity for some shoplifting”

and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.

The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?

The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.

Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.

What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.

This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.

The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.

Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.

We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.

I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.

I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.

The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.

Clause 39 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

215: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after “subsection (10)” insert “and sections 208A”.(3) After that section insert—“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”), (b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.(5) In this section—“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.(4) After section 292 insert— “292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 215 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie speaks to a growing and deeply felt concern shared by communities and retailers across the country—that the persistent and habitual shoplifter is too often left to reoffend, with little intervention, limited consequences and insufficient support to break the cycle of offending. There has been a 13% increase in shoplifting offences in the year ending June 2025.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.

For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.

The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 215 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I fully endorse the important points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. I had great pleasure in working with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the Modern Slavery Bill. I am totally in awe of her experience and her willingness to share that experience, which, as a new Peer, was absolutely wonderful for me—although I could certainly do with it now as well.

The government amendments in this group provide more welcome detail on the definition and operation of child criminal exploitation prevention orders and include provisions necessary to cover the whole of the UK, not just England and Wales. As with other government amendments during the passage of the Bill, we welcome the expansion of detail in the Bill. Could the Minister confirm that each of the three devolved states has approved the relevant amendments in this group? It would be very good to hear that this has already been done. I do not disagree with anything that anyone has said so far—it has been an excellent and very clear unification of the views of everyone here.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.

We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.

I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid

“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.

Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.

Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.

These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.

Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.

I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult

“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to”

engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.

My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we welcome this amendment, which would provide a valuable additional tool to protect children who are criminally exploited while at the same time committing criminal acts that victimise others. The amendment seeks to address these behaviours proportionately, managing the child’s risk to others without inflicting the potentially life-changing damage of having a criminal label attached, while ensuring the child is protected from further exploitation.

A criminal exploitation protection order would be an important step towards providing an end-to-end response for children in this situation. Unlike a youth rehabilitation order, it would directly target behaviours linked to child criminal exploitation, addressing the unique power imbalances and coercion involved in those often-complex situations. I urge the Government to look closely at the proposed order, which would be an extremely worthwhile addition to the Bill and which has the full support of these Benches.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, for bringing forward this important amendment. It speaks to an issue that has been much discussed during the Bill’s passage: the urgent need to protect children who are coerced or manipulated into criminal activity by those who exploit them for profit and control.

Amendment 247 proposes a new clause to establish a criminal exploitation protection order. This would be aimed directly at safeguarding children who have already been subjected to criminal exploitation, preventing further harm. As the noble Baroness has eloquently explained, these children deserve support and a clear pathway out of exploitation. Undoubtedly, there is merit in exploring whether a new bespoke order focused on the safety and welfare of the exploited child could complement the existing prevention orders in the Bill which target the adult perpetrators. We recognise the intention behind ensuring that prohibitions and requirements are carefully balanced so as not to interfere unnecessarily with education, family life or existing legal orders. From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives of the amendment.

We recognise that introducing new regimes raises practical considerations that must be considered. I therefore look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to further discussion as the Bill progresses. Protecting children from exploitation must be central to this legislation. I thank the noble Baroness for her continued leadership on this issue.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Armstrong for Amendment 247. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their support for the amendment, and for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I am sorry to have elevated the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool—obviously, I was transfixed by the “Liverpool” part of his title. I appreciate his gentle chiding of me for that rookie error, which I still occasionally make after 15 months in this place. I apologise for that.

I hope I can reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to tackling the criminal exploitation of children and to supporting children who are victims of criminal exploitation. There are a number of comprehensive provisions in the Bill. In early December, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is meeting the Policing Minister in the Home Office to discuss these issues. I am grateful for her expertise and for the discussions that my noble friend Lady Armstrong has had with Action for Children and colleagues outside of the House.

I fully understand and agree with the desire to safeguard children from the horrific consequences of criminal exploitation. That is why the Government are delivering on the manifesto commitment to bring forward this order, under the clauses that we have discussed, and go after the gangs that are luring young people into violence and crime. Additionally, as the Committee will know, through Clauses 42 to 55 and Schedule 5 to the Bill, the Government’s criminal exploitation prevention orders will place prohibitions and requirements on adults who pose a risk of exploiting children into criminality.

This brings me to the central point of the amendment before us. The Government have considered the position but feel that the most effective way to manage the behaviour of those who have criminally exploited children, or who are at risk of doing so, and to protect children from being criminally exploited are the measures in the Bill. We should be restricting the conduct of the adult perpetrator rather than of the child victim.

I simply say to my noble friend—this is an important point—that for legislation to be effective, there needs to be a consequence for non-compliance. If the measure that she has brought forward was put into legislation, we would be focusing on the child victim and their behaviour. In the event of non-compliance, unless there is a consequence to that—and I am not quite sure what that consequence would be—the proposal would have no legal effect. If a child breaches the prohibition or requirements in an order, the first response could be a further narrowing of the prohibitions or requirements, or varying them. Ultimately, a breach of the order would require a consequence, and I am not sure that we have considered that matter in full.

The Government believe that the measures we are introducing in the Bill will create greater awareness of child criminal exploitation and increase identification of victims, and will ensure that we assist victims in receiving appropriate support. When victims are identified, practitioners will be encouraged to recognise vulnerability, first and foremost, and, I hope, to clearly signal that the children who are used by adults to commit crime are victims of abuse.

I hear what noble Lords have said. Everybody who has spoken has broadly supported the direction of travel. We want to draw on that wealth of experience and insight, which is why my colleagues, the Policing Minister and the Safeguarding Minister in the Home Office, are hosting a round table with experts before Christmas to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and look at how we can better support children who are victims of crime and potentially perpetrators of crime.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the noble Lord, Lord Randall, on Amendment 247A. I had the fortune of meeting Claire Wright over a year ago, and she explained to me what Hope and Homes for Children was doing as a charity. I too was bowled over by it, because it was an area that I did not have much knowledge of. She and the organisation have done amazing work. While this may be out of scope of the Bill, the one suggestion I make to the Minister is that he could bring together a round table of Ministers from relevant government departments to listen to Claire Wright and Hope and Homes for Children, so that their good work can be shared and built on.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Randall of Uxbridge for bringing forward this important amendment. It would ensure that this House does not overlook emerging and deeply troubling patterns of abuse that fall outside traditional definitions.

The amendment seeks to expand the definition of exploitation under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to include children who are recruited into residential care institutions overseas for the purpose of financial gain, commonly referred to as orphanage trafficking. As my noble friend highlighted, this is a practice that too often disguises itself as humanitarian intervention, while in fact it enables systematic exploitation and harm. Many so-called orphanages operate as profit-making enterprises, intentionally separating children from families and communities to attract funding and donations. The children involved may be subject to physical and emotional abuse, forced labour or trafficking into other forms of exploitation.

It is right that we recognise the growing international call to confront this practice and that we consider whether our legislative framework needs strengthening to support that effort. Ensuring that the Modern Slavery Act accurately reflects contemporary forms of exploitation is a legitimate objective, and I commend my noble friend for shining a spotlight on an issue that has far too long remained in the shadows.

We are sympathetic to the intention of the amendment and welcome the opportunity it provides to examine how the UK can play a stronger role in protecting vulnerable children globally. At the same time, we look forward to hearing from the Minister about the practical implications of such a change and how it might interact with existing powers and international co-operation mechanisms. I hope the Government will engage constructively with the concerns he has raised, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who contributed to this short but vital debate on an issue, which, speaking personally, I was not tremendously well aware of before looking at the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Many noble Lords have commented that it is the hard work of people such as Claire Wright and others that has brought to light this pernicious activity or—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra—this evil trade.

As the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge, has explained, Amendment 247A seeks to include so-called orphanage trafficking within the meaning of exploitation under Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act. I know the noble Lord has concerns about modern slavery and trafficking in his wider work. I pay tribute to his work as chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery for highlighting this evil activity and the wider concerns around modern slavery.

As the noble Lord described, in our case, concerns about orphanage tourism would be about volunteers from the UK visiting orphanages overseas, fuelling this activity and contributing to a cycle of harm and exploitation of children. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester made a very relevant point: a lot of it is done in good faith. However, it can be undermined and exploited by those who are acting in bad faith.

I make it very clear to all noble Lords who spoke in the debate—the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Randall, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on the Opposition Front Bench—that the Government share the same concerns. That is why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office provides travel advice warning British nationals of the risk of volunteering with children and highlighting how volunteer visitors may unknowingly contribute to child exploitation and trafficking. The advice that the FCDO gives signposts travellers to the global standard for volunteering, which helps organisations provide responsible volunteering. By adopting the global standard, organisations commit to promoting child-safe volunteering in all environments, which includes not facilitating visits to orphanages or other institutional care facilities.

Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 already recognises the specific vulnerabilities of children and encompasses the exploitation of children for the provision of services of any kind and to enable someone to acquire benefits of any kind, including financial gain. Therefore, orphanage trafficking is already captured by the broad terms of the existing legislation. It is fair to say that the noble Lord, Lord Randall, anticipated that that may be the tenor of my contribution.

I point out to noble Lords that on 16 July this year, the Home Office launched a public call for evidence on how the Government can improve the process of identifying victims of modern slavery, human trafficking and exploitation. The call for evidence closed on 8 October, and the Home Office is now analysing responses received. A report summarising the key findings and themes from the call for evidence responses will be published in due course. Of course, the Home Office will consider the evidence gathered to explore any further changes that can be made to improve the identification of victims.

We are seeking to introduce new modern slavery legislation as part of our efforts to review and improve the modern slavery system. This new legislation will enable us to clearly articulate the UK’s responsibilities under international law regarding modern slavery, allowing us to reduce opportunities for misuse while ensuring the right protection for those who need it.

I make no commitments here to your Lordships’ Committee, but that may well be to an opportunity to revisit some of the issues raised in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Polak, floated the suggestion of a wider round table; I will certainly take that back to colleagues and discuss it.

For the reasons I have outlined about Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act already capturing orphanage trafficking in the broad terms, we do not believe it is necessary to amend Section 3 any further, as the conduct in question is already captured. In light of this explanation, and hoping that it does not disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Randall, and other noble Lords too much, I hope he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly perhaps to defend the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. Quite often in your Lordships’ House, we end up with amendments that are remarkably similar, and it appears to be a trait among some of your Lordships to consider working in co-operation with others systematically a somewhat eccentric behaviour. I personally feel that it should be encouraged.

What I wanted to say is the obvious: data is king. The situation that we have allowed to evolve over the last 20 or 30 years has been allowed to happen because of a dearth of reliable and systematic collection and utilisation of data. We have allowed what has been happening—largely to these young girls, in plain sight—because we have lacked the detail and the nitty-gritty information required to nail it. In a long career in business, the thing one disliked most was awaydays when you talked about strategy, when a large number of people would devote an enormous amount of hot air to talking about this, that or the other, usually in a slightly vague way. The thing that nails that sort of debate is reliable and accurate data. It deflates the rather pompous balloon who is spouting out, apparently knowledgeably but actually probably repeating what somebody else has said—it deflates that remarkably quickly.

Very simply, we need to follow the fourth recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, in her report. It is in bold and it is very brief, but it is extremely clear:

“The government should make mandatory the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases and work with the police to improve the collection of ethnicity data for victims”.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it has been five months since the National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, undertaken by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was published. I once again extend my thanks to her for her incredible work on this. The audit laid bare the systemic failures of local government, police leadership and safeguarding structures that allowed organised grooming gangs to operate in plain sight. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found a culture of denial, a fear of being labelled racist, an unwillingness to confront uncomfortable truths and a catastrophic failure to treat vulnerable young girls as victims. Her review documented how institutions minimised, dismissed or actively ignored evidence of horrific abuse. Perhaps the most sobering lesson from this is that these were not isolated failings; they were structural, cultural and tragically repeated in town after town across the country.

The national audit produced 12 recommendations. To their credit, the Government have accepted all 12, some of which have found their way into the Bill. However, unfortunately, the first and second recommendations of the audit have so far been left behind. The first recommendation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, was to change the law so that any adult who intentionally has sexual intercourse with a child under 16 receives a mandatory charge of rape. In their response to the audit, the Government said:

“Our laws must never provide protection for the adult abusers rather than the child victims of these despicable crimes. We share Baroness Casey’s view … and we accept the recommendation to change the law in this area”.


If the Government agreed with this recommendation and said that they will implement it, why have they not done so? The Bill provides the perfect opportunity for this change in the law. That is why my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie and I tabled Amendment 271B. It would provide for a new, distinct offence of child rape. This would operate alongside the current offence of the rape of a child under 13 in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

In her audit, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, laid bare the loophole in the law. Currently, an adult who has sex with a child under the age of 13 is automatically guilty of rape, and this operates with strict liability. But, despite the age of consent being 16, when an adult has had sex with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, the decision to charge and which offence to charge with is left open to the Crown Prosecution Service. This has led to many cases of child sexual exploitation having the charges downgraded from rape to lesser charges, such as sexual activity with a child under Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act. Not only is that offence not a charge of rape but it carries a maximum sentence of 14 years—not life, as in the case of an offence under Section 5. Our amendment would provide that, where a person over the age of 18 has penetrative sexual relations with a child between the ages of 13 and 15, they will be charged with the rape of a child in all cases and face a sentence of life imprisonment.

We have not included a so-called Romeo and Juliet provision in this amendment, because it applies only to those who are over 18. Children who are close in age and have consenting sexual relations would not be criminalised under the amendment. I want to make sure that that is clear.

Fundamentally, the law must be unambiguous on this matter. The penetration of a child is rape. It is not sexual activity; it is not exploitation; and it is not an unfortunate incident. It is rape. The Casey report describes girls as young as 13 being passed between adult men, yet institutional language frequently minimised the seriousness of what had occurred. Creating a specific offence would reinforce the fundamental point: children cannot consent to sex with adults—full stop. Given that the Government have accepted that this needs to happen, I hope that they will be able to accept my amendment.

The second recommendation from the national audit that the Government have failed to deliver is the national inquiry. Amendment 247B from my noble friend Lady Maclean of Redditch seeks to press the Government on what has become a chaotic process. I know we have discussed this on many occasions in this House, but the fact is that the inquiry is in disarray. Survivors have already resigned from the panel because they do not trust the Government. Those most impacted by the grooming gangs scandal have lost faith in the process that was meant to bring them long-overdue justice. Months on from the announcement, the Government were U-turning. The chair has not been appointed, the terms of reference have not been published and the inquiry has not begun. How much longer must the victims and survivors wait? My noble friend’s amendment would give the Government a timeline of three months, and there is no reason why they cannot live up to that.

My noble friend Lady Cash is a stalwart defender of the rights of children and young girls. She proposes two crucial amendments, which also link into the national audit on grooming gangs. Amendment 288A would complement the duty to report in Clause 72 of the Bill. It would establish a duty on professionals with safeguarding responsibilities to report where they know or reasonably believe that a child is being sexually abused or exploited. That would fill a long-identified and long-criticised gap. If this scandal has showed us anything, it is that vulnerable young girls were let down by the very people who were supposed to protect them. Institutions sometimes waited for absolute proof before acting, and children paid the price for that inaction.

Amendment 288B creates a new offence targeted at public officials who obstruct or frustrate investigations into child sexual abuse. This is not hypothetical. The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, found that public officials failed to record offences, failed to transmit intelligence and, in some cases, deliberately closed down avenues of inquiry. There must be consequences for such conduct. The noble Baroness was explicit that the fear of being accused of racism contributed to the reluctance of authorities to confront organised grooming gangs. More importantly, she also acknowledged that it remains impossible to provide a definitive assessment of the ethnic profile of the perpetrators, because the data collected by police forces has been woeful. That poor-quality data is one of the factors that permitted officials and authorities to claim they could not conclude any link between ethnicity or nationality and the prevalence of grooming gangs.

The large number of perpetrators whose ethnicity was recorded as “unknown” in the statistics creates a highly distorting picture. Inclusion of the “unknowns” shows 28% of group-based offenders as white, but exclusion of the “unknowns” shows 88% being white. This is obviously not the way to create datasets that could be used for accurate police intelligence and rigorous policy-making. Even today, we still have people trying to deny the fact that the vast majority of perpetrators in these grooming gangs were Pakistani, despite the evidence; they are able to continue this route because of the poor-quality data.

Because of this completely and shockingly inadequate collection of data, I strongly support this amendment from my noble friend Lady Cash. Her Amendments 288C and 288D compel the collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all child sexual offenders and victims. Consistent nationwide data gives us truth, and truth is the basis of action. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of amendments. They probe the definitions of child sexual assault and rape, and also impose a statutory duty to investigate historic instances of child sexual abuse where the lawful authority has been negligent. I hope that the Government will consider these amendments with the seriousness they deserve.

These amendments together form a coherent, serious and necessary set of reforms that respond directly to the failures highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, and some of her solutions. The victims of grooming gangs were failed by the state. They were failed by those whose duty was to protect them, and they were failed by institutions that put political sensitivities above child safety.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Before my noble friend rises to reply, I want to emphasise, as someone who has practised at the Bar over many decades, like the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, the importance of our recognising in the course of these discussions that, while we are dealing here with a spate of offences clearly committed by gangs of Pakistani men, this is not confined to Pakistani men. The Epstein case has told us quite clearly that upper-class white men with power can abuse and groom and commit these crimes. I have seen it since my early years at the Bar. I see the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, sitting there, and we acted in cases involving East End gangs who passed around girls who were part and parcel of that world. Nowadays, in the drugs world, pass-around girls, who are often underage, are part and parcel of that world. So we must not become fixated on the idea that this happens only in certain communities. I just want that to be emphasised.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, very briefly, the government amendments set out the devolution arrangements to ensure that criminals cannot exploit differences between the four nations, and we are very happy to support them.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important issue that I know there is cross-party support for, and I am largely supportive of the intentions behind the amendments in this group.

The first of the Minister’s amendments acts largely to tidy up the drafting of the Bill and ensure its thoroughness. I agree with this. Expanding the scope for technology testing regarding child sexual abuse materials is welcome.

Similarly, extending provisions to ensure that they are the same in all parts of the union is a minor but important amendment. Consistency across our internal borders is the best way to ensure that children are protected equally everywhere. It should help with cross-border co-ordination between authorities, and I therefore welcome it.

I see the logic behind government Amendments 295A and 295B. It is the right approach that, if the Government want to crack down on technology, they should first do so at the source. That means discovering which technologies are being used to create unlawful content, which requires people to test them. This would also, I hope, have the additional effect of not blanket banning content for people without nuance, instead targeting the specific pieces of software responsible. So long as the individuals able to use this as a defence remain strictly authorised by the Secretary of State, I appreciate the amendment’s aim.

This should go hand in hand with an initiative similar to the one suggested by my noble friend Lord Nash. If the Government can identify the technology used, they should attempt to shut it down. Unfortunately, this is often outside the Government’s jurisdiction and therefore some form of software to prevent the distribution of child sexual abuse material might be the next best approach. I hope that the Minister can confirm that they are perhaps looking at this.

As I said, this is a non-partisan issue. We all want to reduce child sexual abuse, online or offline, and these amendments should work to help the Bill achieve the former. I hope that the Minister can, in due course—perhaps at a later stage—fully outline how this new technology will be implemented and applied consistently, and will consider my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, but I broadly support the approach.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the support from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will reflect on what he said and give him a fuller briefing on the detail of how we are approaching the AI issue. Obviously, we will come on to further amendments in the next group, which I will respond to once they have been moved.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this extremely important debate, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Nash for their continued efforts on the protection of children online.

This group should unite the whole Committee. We can be in no doubt about the need to safeguard children in an environment where technology is evolving at unprecedented speed and where the risk of harm, including the creation and dissemination of child sexual abuse material, is escalating. It is a sad truth that, historically, Governments have been unable to keep pace with evolving technology. As a consequence, this can mean legislation coming far too late.

Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of online services, including generative AI systems, to conduct risk assessments on the potential use of their platforms to create child sexual abuse images. The Committee has heard compelling arguments about the need for meaningful responsibilities to be placed on platforms and developers, particularly where systems are capable of misuse at scale. We recognise the seriousness of the challenge that she has outlined, and I very much look forward to what the Government have to say in response.

On my noble friend Lord Nash’s amendment, we are particularly sympathetic to the concerns that underpin his proposal. His amendment would mandate the installation of tamper-proof software on relevant devices to prevent the creation, viewing and sharing of child sexual abuse material. My noble friend has made a powerful case that prevention at source must form part of the comprehensive strategy to protect children. While there are practical questions that will require careful examination, his amendment adds real value to the discussion. I am grateful for his determined focus on this issue, and I hope the Government also take this amendment very seriously.

Similarly, Amendments 479 and 480, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, speak to the responsibilities of AI search tools and AI chatbots. The risk of such technologies being co-opted for abusive purposes is not theoretical; these threats are emerging rapidly and require a response proportionate to the harm.

From these Benches, we are sympathetic to the objectives across this group of amendments and look forward to the Government’s detailed response and continuing cross-party work to ensure the strongest protections for children in an online world. As has been said several times throughout Committee, protecting children must remain our highest priority. I hope the Government take these amendments very seriously.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the way she introduced this group of amendments and for her tireless work to protect children online. I say on behalf of all noble Lords that the support she has received today across the Committee shows that her work is vital, especially in the face of emerging technologies, such as generative AI, which present opportunities but, sadly, also have a darker side with new risks for criminal misuse.

She has received the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Morgan of Cotes, Lady Boycott, Lady Bertin and Lady Doocey, my noble friends Lady Berger, Lady Royall of Blaisdon and Lord Hacking, the noble Lords, Lord Bethell, Lord Russell of Liverpool, Lord Hampton and Lord Davies of Gower, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and others to whom I will refer later. That is quite an array of colleagues in this House. It is my job to respond to this on behalf of the Government, and I will try to be as helpful as I can to the noble Baroness.

The Government share her desire to protect the public, especially children, online, and are committed to protecting all users from illegal online content. We will continue to act to keep citizens safe. Amendment 266 seeks to create a new duty on online service providers—including those already regulated under the Online Safety Act—to assess and report to Ofcom or the National Crime Agency on the risk that their services could be used to create or facilitate the generation of AI child sexual abuse material. The amendment would also require online service providers to implement measures to mitigate and manage the risks identified.

I say to the noble Baroness that UK law is already clear: creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated by AI, is already illegal, regardless of whether they depict a real child or not. Child sexual abuse material offences are priority offences under the Online Safety Act. The Act requires in-scope services to take proactive steps to prevent such material from appearing on their services and to remove it swiftly if it does.

As she will know, the Government have gone even further to tackle these appalling crimes through the measures in the Bill. I very much welcome her support for Clause 63. We are introducing a world-leading offence criminalising the possession, adaptation and supply of, or offer to supply, an AI model that has been fine-tuned by offenders to create child sexual abuse material. As I mentioned earlier, we are also extending the existing paedophile manual offence to cover advice on how to abuse AI to create child sexual abuse material.

We have also introduced measures that reflect the critical role that AI developers play in ensuring their systems are not misused. To support the crucial work of the Government’s AI Security Institute, we have just debated and agreed a series of amendments in the previous group to provide authorised bodies with the powers to legally test commercial AI models for extreme pornography and other child sexual abuse material. That is essential to allow experts to safely test measures, and I am pleased that we received the Committee’s support earlier.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

289: Clause 82, page 98, leave out lines 3 to 11
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the ability of the court to dismiss an action in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse on the grounds that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 289 is a probing amendment through which I am seeking the Government’s justification for the substantial prejudice provision in Clause 82. By way of background, Clause 82 removes the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims in cases relating to child sexual abuse. As such, it implements recommendation 15 of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse chaired by Professor Jay. The inquiry found that most personal inquiry claims relating to child sexual abuse are not only modest in value, but in many cases do not result in compensation being paid. The reason for the high rate of failure is that a significant number of those claims are prevented from proceeding as a result of the limitation period on bringing forward a claim under the Limitation Act 1980. That Act permits the three-year period for claims resulting from sexual abuse as a child to begin from age 18, therefore expiring at 21, but many survivors do not feel comfortable with coming forward and telling people what happened until much later, never mind gathering the courage to bring a lawsuit against their abuser. The result is a lack of justice for those who have been abused as a child, and it is welcome, therefore, that the Government have decided to bring this forward.

However, there is possibly an issue with the drafting of Section 11ZB, which is inserted by this clause. It establishes the situations in which the court must dismiss an action for injury arising from child sexual abuse. It states that for all cases brought after the commencement of this clause, the court must dismiss the action if the defendant can prove that a fair hearing cannot take place. However, for any case that started before this new clause comes into force, the test for dismissal is set considerably lower because in this instance, the court must dismiss the claim if the defendant can prove that they would suffer substantial prejudice, and thus the proceedings are inequitable.

This goes further than was recommended by the Jay inquiry. Its report referred to

“the express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show that a fair trial is not possible”.

The only test the independent inquiry wanted was that the test of whether a fair trial can take place applied to all past and future cases. I know there is concern that the ability of the court to dismiss actions due to substantial prejudice placed on the defendant will create uncertainty for survivors of child sexual abuse and delay access to justice. This has the potential to undermine the purpose of the recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and might not provide the certainty and support survivors deserve.

I reiterate that this is simply a probing amendment, and I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on why the Government have gone further than recommended by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.

What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.

One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.

The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:

“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.


That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be

“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.

The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:

“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.


Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.

My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.

Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.

Clause 82 is headed:

“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,


but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.

New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:

“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.


The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.

I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.

Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.

As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is no answer to say that another Government considered it carefully: different Governments have different priorities. I am not sure that that is going to come as a great surprise to the noble Lord. As for Section 33, this Government are satisfied that it does not provide sufficient protection.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief in my response. As I say, this was a probing amendment, and I am grateful to those noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. I thank the Minister for her clarification. I am content with the Government’s assurances, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 289 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.

These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.

The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.

The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.

Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.

If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.

What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.

Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, did not have much to say about what is in this Bill. He has opportunities to talk about another Bill; let him do that at another time. I am talking about this Bill. He never mentioned what was going on in this Bill, the measures within it or, indeed, the amendments before us in his opening contribution—not a single word. Maybe he should reflect on that, because he has not endeared himself to me in these discussions.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Do I ever?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord asks, “Do I ever?”—he does occasionally, and I will give him the benefit of the doubt, but I was not really impressed that he did not say one single word about what is currently before the Committee. Let us have a discussion about the Sentencing Bill with my noble friends Lady Levitt and Lord Timpson another time. That is being completed. Anyway, let us leave that to one side.

I hope to be helpful in part to the noble Baronesses and others who have spoken. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon, the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for bringing their experience, their views and their passion for this subject to this debate. A number of amendments are before the Committee. As I said, I hope to be helpful in part on some of them.

Amendments 330A, 330AZA, 330AA, 330AB, 330B and 330C all relate to stalking protection orders, which, as Members know, are civil orders introduced in 2020 to protect victims of stalking. Amendment 330A in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall seeks to reference explicitly the required civil burden of proof—that is, on the balance of probabilities—for determining whether the behaviour of a person to be made subject to a stalking protection order amounts to acts associated with stalking. Currently, statutory guidance for the police published by the Home Office references that it is likely the courts will apply the civil burden of proof when considering stalking protection orders, but I agree with my noble friend that there could be a case for making this clearer. I therefore undertake to consider her proposals in Amendment 330A ahead of the next stage on the Bill. I hope that helps the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, who also spoke on this matter and my noble friend.

I am grateful for Amendment 330AA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I am particularly grateful to her for drawing her personal experience to the attention of the Committee. I had not realised the traumas that she had had in the run up to the 2010 election, but I had a quick chance to google those matters while she was speaking. It looks like it was an appalling experience. I am grateful to her for bringing it to the attention of the Committee.

The noble Baroness’s proposal in Amendment 330AA would remove the requirement for the restrictions in SPOs to avoid, where possible, conflict with the defendant’s religious beliefs and interference with their attendance at work or at an educational establishment. On this occasion, I understand the noble Baroness’s view that this could be brought out in statutory guidance, but it is our view in the Home Office that it is important to retain this within primary legislation, particularly regarding an individual’s rights through the European Convention on Human Rights, especially Article 9 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, so I am afraid I cannot help her on that one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.

On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.

The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendments 334A and 335 respectively.

I am aware of the cases that have motivated the desire to have an amendment such as Amendment 334A, and I completely understand; the stories that the noble Baroness outlined cannot fail to move anyone listening to them. Having said that, the Government will not be supporting either of these amendments today, for the following reasons.

I shall deal first with the amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. When a defendant has previous convictions, including those relating to a history of domestic abuse, that is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. In addition, aggravating factors that are associated with honour-based abuse, such as abuse of trust or targeting vulnerable victims, are already covered in the domestic abuse guidelines. The presence of aggravating factors such as these should therefore already result in the sentence reflecting those factors, and in my experience it always would. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, about not adding an ever-increasing list of statutory aggravating factors. This is certainly the third group of amendments that I have dealt with that has proposed different forms of offences.

On the second aspect of the amendment, proposed subsection (6)(b) raises a sensitive and important issue. The Government wholeheartedly agree that, when it can be proved that suicide was the result of abuse or encouragement, the abuser should be held accountable. There are existing offences that cover this situation, such as manslaughter or encouraging or assisting suicide offences, which have maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 14 years’ imprisonment respectively. However, imposing a requirement for the court to sentence the defendant in those circumstances as though they had been convicted of murder, when in fact they have not been convicted of murder, would be at odds not only with the current sentencing approach but with the principle that people are sentenced only for matters that have been proved to the satisfaction of the court. I also make the perhaps obvious comment that there is no range of sentences for murder; there is only one sentence, which is life imprisonment. For those reasons, amending Clause 102 in this way would not be appropriate.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of homicide offences and of sentencing for murder, and this will include a review of the use of, and the obstacles to using, manslaughter offences where abuse may have driven someone to suicide. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand why the Government are reluctant to make any piecemeal amendments in advance of the Law Commission reporting.

I turn to Amendment 335, from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I thank the noble Lord for his welcome of the offence. As to the guidance that he proposes in the consultation, as many in this Committee are aware, I was principal legal adviser to a rather well-known former Director of Public Prosecutions—I spent five years working for the Crown Process Service—so it is important to me to emphasise that it is in fact for the independent Crown Prosecution Service to update guidance on prosecuting offences under this new provision. It may well be that many noble Lords know this but, while the statutory Code for Crown Prosecutors governs in general terms how prosecutors make decisions on which cases to prosecute and which not, sitting underneath that is a raft of legal guidance that is published and publicly available. It exists for two reasons: the first is so that members of the public can see the basis on which the CPS makes its decisions, but the second is so that the CPS can be held to account. If it fails to follow its own guidance, that will often provide a ground for challenging the decision made.

I understand that the noble Lord’s amendment aims to ensure that legitimate support or therapeutic activity is not criminalised, so I reassure him that the offence has been carefully drafted to avoid capturing vulnerable individuals or those providing mental health support. The offence as drafted in the Bill was recommended by the Law Commission in its 2021 malicious communications report and contains two key safeguards: first, that the person must intend to encourage or assist serious self-harm and without such intent no offence would be committed; and, secondly, that serious self-harm is defined as harm amounting to grievous bodily harm. These safeguards ensure that the offence targets only the most serious and culpable behaviour and protects those who are, for example, sharing personal experience or discussing self-harm but not encouraging it.

The offence also does not cover the glorification or glamorisation of self-harm. The Law Commission found that that was too broad and would potentially capture vulnerable people who might then be exposed to prosecution: so, taking on board the commission’s comments, the Government have not included that.

In our view, this approach ensures that the offence is necessary, proportionate and focused on genuinely harmful acts. There is also a further protection for the vulnerable, which is provided by the public interest stage of the full code test. This requires that, even where there is sufficient evidence, prosecutors must consider whether or not a prosecution is required in the public interest, and plainly the vulnerabilities of the potential defendant would come into play at that stage.

I hope that the reasons I have provided clearly set out why the Government do not support either of these amendments today, and I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, do not press their respective amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, having heard a number of cogent arguments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I cannot remain silent. I was certainly persuaded on the noble Baroness’s Amendment 335A, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister has similarly been persuaded.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in this group concerning the important issue of child abduction. I am very grateful to noble Lords for their contributions this evening. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for bringing forward Amendments 335A and 335B, which raise important questions about the interaction between Clause 104 and the lived reality of victims of domestic abuse. The amendments probe how the new offence will operate where a parent has acted out of fear for their own safety or that of their child, and they touch on the wider issue of how the criminal law recognises coercive, controlling and violent relationships.

We very much support the principle behind the noble Baroness’s amendments and the safeguarding concerns that they highlight. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about how the Government intend to ensure that the operation of Clause 104 does not inadvertently criminalise vulnerable parents acting in desperation to protect themselves or their children.

Government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, create and support a parallel offence in Northern Ireland relating to the detention of a child overseas without consent. I recognise the importance of maintaining consistency across jurisdictions and ensuring that children in Northern Ireland benefit from equivalent protections. I would be grateful if the Minister can set out how the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland intends to exercise the new regulation-making and commencement powers. What discussions have taken place with relevant agencies to ensure that the offence can operate effectively in practice? I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for tabling Amendments 335A and 335B. Her amendments have been grouped with the modest collection of government amendments—336, 496, 521 and 549—tabled in my name, which extend the provisions contained in Clause 104 to Northern Ireland.

I note the concern raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lords, Lord Meston and Lord Davies, my noble friend Lord Hacking and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that Clause 104 will criminalise parents who are fleeing domestic abuse where the detention of the child is primarily motivated by the intention of keeping themselves and/or the child safe. I reassure your Lordships that this absolutely is not the intention of the existing Clause 104. Indeed, in developing the provisions, very careful consideration was given to the implications of potentially criminalising a parent who has detained their child abroad.

Before I turn to the reasons why the Government will not be supporting these amendments today, I want to explain a little more about the purpose of Clause 104’s inclusion in the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her clear and even-handed explanation of her understanding of the reason why the Government included it in the first place. The clause seeks to implement the Law Commission’s 2014 recommendation that the Government should close a small gap in the law by making it a criminal offence for a parent, or person with similar responsibility to a parent, to detain a child abroad without appropriate consent, once the original consent has expired.

I am sure that I do not need to explain to anyone that the abduction of a child by a parent is an extremely distressing experience for everyone involved. For any Government, the aim is to safeguard children from abduction by preventing the unlawful removal of a child, ensuring their swift and safe return when they have been taken and upholding custody rights through international co-operation and legal enforcement. The new measure is intended to be consistent with the existing criminal framework, to stand as a deterrent and a backstop where we know that a gap in the law is being exploited, even if by very few people. Some of those who have not returned a child are themselves abusers; they are abusive parents seeking to evade the law. We cannot leave that gap unclosed.

However, I have listened very carefully to the concerns raised by your Lordships this evening, and to some sent to me by organisations with an interest in this area. I remain satisfied that there is no risk of vulnerable parents who have been victims of domestic abuse being criminalised. I hope I shall be forgiven for setting out my reasons in a little more detail; I alluded to them earlier in relation to an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but that was in a slightly different context, and I think I need to give more detail.

Many of your Lordships will be aware that there is a two-stage test for the Crown Prosecution Service to apply when deciding whether a prosecution should be brought. The first is an “evidential sufficiency” test but, even if that stage is passed and it is felt that there is sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution, that is not the end of the matter. The second stage is the “public interest” test, which asks whether the public interest requires a prosecution to be brought. It is this stage of the test that is often applied in, for example, assisted dying cases. This is important, including in a domestic abuse context, because it means that prosecutors must consider the background, including whether the alleged offender was acting from benign motives or was themselves a victim of domestic abuse, before deciding whether a prosecution is required in the public interest. Additionally, and importantly, a third test applies for the new offence in Clause 104 which adds an additional safeguard: that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required for a case to proceed.

Prosecutorial discretion remains a key safeguard, and evidence of domestic abuse would be a highly relevant factor in any decision to prosecute, or in whether the Director of Public Prosecutions would give his consent in addition. Factors that are relevant to the public interest do not require proof to the criminal standard. It is a much more “in the round” assessment than would be required if bringing some kind of criminal proceedings.

To be clear, in answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the Government continue to believe that the civil courts remain best placed to deal with child abduction cases. That is why we support international co-operation and recourse to the 1980 Hague convention as a civil mechanism for facilitating the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other state parties and the Hague Conference, especially in cases involving domestic abuse, to ensure that the convention operates effectively. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in effect agreed, that this prosecution should be the act of last resort. We agree. We are conscious, however, that criminal proceedings may be needed in some cases. It has been suggested that some parents see detaining a child abroad following any earlier consent as an easier route to keeping their child permanently outside the UK with no criminal charges or police involvement. That clearly circumvents the law. This change to the criminal law is intended to sit alongside and supplement existing civil remedies, rather than filling the courts with people who have retained their child abroad.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asks whether the Government would be prepared to add a domestic abuse defence, in effect. The law on defences, including those relevant to domestic abuse, is highly complex. It requires definitions and decisions about where the burden of proof lies and what the standard of proof will be. It is precisely because of this complexity that the Law Commission is currently reviewing defences in domestic abuse cases as part of its wider project on homicide and sentencing. While the primary focus of its review is on homicide, the findings are likely to have broader implications for how defences operate in domestic abuse contexts and could be relevant across a broader range of offences. A bespoke defence of domestic abuse in the offence created by Clause 104 could have implications far beyond the child abduction framework.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept from me that the Law Commission’s findings will be carefully reviewed before any changes to the law are considered, in order to ensure that any legislative changes are informed by evidence. In the meantime, we are exploring ways to strengthen our understanding of how defences operate in non-homicide cases by gathering more robust data. For these reasons, it would be premature to legislate before the Law Commission has completed its work, but I take the point about the equality impact assessment and the gendered nature of some of these offences. I will, if I may, write to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and, obviously, to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, as well.

I turn very briefly to government Amendments 336, 496, 521 and 549. Until now, the provisions in Clause 104 extended to England and Wales only. However, at the request of the Northern Ireland Executive, these provisions will now also apply to Northern Ireland. I note the concerns raised by the two amendments brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I hope that, for the reasons I have set out, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment at this stage. I hope your Lordships will join me in supporting the government amendments in this group.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, I have been a community worker for over 35 years now and I have dealt with many communities where one parent has found someone to do tuition, and that has acted as a bit of a kitemark. Other parents have felt they were safe because of the relationship they have with that particular parent. This very strong common-sense proposal would protect entire communities in one fell swoop. I really support this very important amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to this group of amendments tabled by the Government and to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton. Amendment 337 provides Northern Ireland with provisions equivalent to those in Clause 105. As with similar amendments earlier in the Bill, we recognise the need for aligned protections across jurisdictions, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline the engagement with Northern Ireland departments and confirm that operational partners are prepared for implementation. Similarly, Amendments 520 and 550 ensure appropriate territorial extent and commencement powers for Northern Ireland. These are direct drafting and procedural changes that appear entirely sensible.

Turning to Amendment 337A tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, we are supportive of the principle it raises. Closing a loophole that allows barred individuals to tutor children through so-called private arrangements seems an important and proportionate step, while the amendment sensibly preserves the long-standing exemptions for family and friends. I recognise, however, that extended regulated activity in this way may raise practical questions about enforcement and the potential impact on legitimate private tutoring arrangements, and it would be helpful to understand how these concerns would be managed in practice. I hope the Minister will respond constructively to the issues highlighted here.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for setting out the case for his Amendment 337A. I pay tribute to his advocacy on this issue and on many other related issues as a teacher and—I did not realise this until tonight—as a cricket coach as well. I hope he is doing good work churning out a better set for the next encounter we have with the Australians, because I am afraid I have fears for the third Ashes Test, which is due to begin.

I also pay tribute to other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, to demonstrate the cross-party nature of the issue that we are talking about and the consensus, we must make sure that there is protection for families and young people in every scenario and every setting. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester for bringing the specific issue of music tutoring to the Committee’s attention, and the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for sharing his experience from his years as a youth worker.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has explained, this amendment seeks to prevent individuals who are barred from working in regulated activity with children from working as private tutors when hired directly by a parent. It does this by specifying that private tutoring is a regulated activity, even when provided under a private arrangement. I can assure the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary because the existing legal framework already achieves this outcome. Under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, teaching, including private tutoring, that meets the statutory frequency criteria—for example, on more than three days in a 30-day period—is already a regulated activity. It is already an offence for a person on the children’s barred list to undertake such activity.

It is certainly the case, as the noble Lord pointed out, that parents are currently unable to check whether a private tutor is barred from working with children. This is because, under the current legislation, self-employed individuals cannot access higher-level DBS checks, which may include information on spent convictions, cautions and barred list status. However, I am pleased to inform your Lordships that on 20 November, the Government laid a statutory instrument, which was debated in the other place this very evening and is due to come into force on 21 January. It is an affirmative statutory instrument, so your Lordships’ House will be discussing it early in the new year.

This SI will allow individuals who are self-employed or employed directly by an individual or family where they are engaged in regulated activity with children and adults to access enhanced DBS checks, including checks of the relevant barred lists. As a result, private tutors who meet the statutory frequency criteria for regulated activity with children will be able to obtain an enhanced DBS certificate, including a check against the children’s barred list. Parents will be able to see this check before deciding whether to engage the tutor and will not become regulated activity providers by doing so.

This statutory instrument delivers the core safeguarding purpose of the amendment, enabling parents to check whether a prospective tutor is barred by the DBS from working with children and giving them the information that they need to make confident and informed decisions. I have already spoken about the government amendments, but in response to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive, they approached us to ensure that there was UK-wide coverage of the enhanced scheme. We have been working very much hand-in-glove with them to develop the regime that the government amendments put in place.

I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord will not move his amendment but will support the government amendments.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering for her clause stand part notice. On behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, we support Clause 106. As was set out in response to one of the earlier groups on cycling, we on this side strongly support the creation of the new offences of causing death or serious injury by dangerous cycling.

It is often said, and too rarely challenged, that cyclists are harmless; that their contribution to road danger is negligible. But the facts tell another story. As was said earlier, there were 82 pedal cycle fatalities in 2024 and many more serious injuries. Yet in the same period, the number of prosecutions for careless or dangerous cycling remained vanishingly small. In 2023, only 44 pedal cyclists were convicted for careless cycling and only five convicted for dangerous cycling. That discrepancy between actual harms and enforcement cannot stand.

Contrast that with motor vehicle driving—serious collisions involving cars or motorbikes routinely lead to formal investigations, charges, licence points, disqualifications and even long prison terms. The law, and indeed the public, treat death or serious injury caused by a motor vehicle as a major crime, but there is no comparable public or legal response when a cyclist injures or kills a pedestrian. That double standard undermines justice and safety and sends the wrong message.

Furthermore, with the rise of e-bikes and e-scooters, a dangerous tool is emerging that should not go unaddressed. As noted in the impact assessment for the Bill, prosecutions for existing offences are minimal and the penalties are insufficiently dissuasive. That suggests not only a failure to protect law-abiding cyclists and citizens but a broader pattern of underpolicing of cycle-related crime.

If we are serious about public safety and fair and equal enforcement, we cannot continue to treat dangerous cycling as a lesser category of offence. For that reason, I support Clause 106.

[Lord Berkeley (Lab)]

The noble Lord did not mention cars running over pedestrians and killing them—does that not matter?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Of course it matters. It is quite a serious matter, in my opinion.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree: it does matter. I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for Clause 106.

I will bring the debate back to what Clause 106 is about, which is ensuring that every road user complies with road traffic law in the interests of their safety and that of other road users. This includes cyclists, which is clear in the Highway Code. Clause 106 should stand part of the Bill. We put the clause in so that there is parity between cars and cyclists in the event of death and serious injury. I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for that. If I accepted the recommendation that the clause should not stand part, we would not have that provision before the Committee today.

It is important that we agree to the clause for several reasons, not least of which is the fact that over the past 10 years an average of three pedestrians have been killed by cyclists per year. In total, there were 603 pedestrian injuries following a collision with a pedal cycle in Great Britain in 2023, which was a quite considerable rise on 2014.

In the earlier debate, we heard concern around cyclists riding on pavements and going through red lights and zebra crossings. This is not about putting cyclists in prison for serious offences; it is about trying to change behaviour. It is about ensuring that people recognise that there is a penalty for poor behaviour. If somebody is killed or seriously injured as a result of someone cycling badly, it is absolutely right that we take action with Clause 106.

The Government do not believe that the current offences for cyclists who exhibit dangerous or careless behaviour have appropriate penalties, particularly when it results in death or serious injury. That is why we are introducing the new dangerous cycling offences here in Clause 106. That will bring equality before the law. It will make sure that there is parity with motoring offences. If somebody is killed because of the poor performance of a road user, that road user should ultimately face a penalty whether they are on a bike or in a car.

I say again: this should be about trying to make cyclists aware that their vehicle is dangerous, even though it is a bike, and that it can lead to death or to serious injury. At the same time, we want to ensure, as we are doing, that we get the huge health and environmental benefits of cycling. The Government have committed £600 million in the spending review for new cycling and walking infrastructure, and that is the right thing to do.

I welcome the support of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, on these matters. She has asked two specific questions, about insurance and about defining the type of vehicle involved. They are both amendments to the clause, in effect, but I accept the discussion. The question is about the clause and its implementation, but the clause is not about insurance or about defining. Any change to insurance requirements would require some very careful consideration, as it could put people off cycling and have adverse effects on health and congestion. It might well stop people cycling; they would use cars for short journeys instead. It might involve an enforcement regime, which we have talked about earlier, being examined again. Some cyclists have third-party insurance and that is good.

This is predominantly a Department for Transport matter. I will examine both the issues, on insurance and on definition, that the noble Baroness raised and discuss them with the Department for Transport. Ultimately, Clause 106 is about prevention of death or serious injury by cycling. It should stay part of the Bill and should not be deleted. That is why I hope the noble Baroness will not take that option at an appropriate moment, if not today. I hope she reflects on what I said, and I will certainly reflect on what she said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments looks at illegal vehicles on our streets, enforcement and guidance. Amendment 345 from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, seeks guidance on enforcement in respect of illegal vehicles. However, having looked into this, my understanding is that a range of powers exists to enable the police to deal with these offences. The College of Policing already produces authorised professional practice on roads policing that sets out the existing powers and their operational application in detail. We therefore do not think the amendment is needed.

Amendments 350 and 356G, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, on drink-driving, are very important. The first, as we heard, seeks to reduce the drink-driving limit so that it is in line with most other countries. The second is about alcohol ignition interlocks, which are in use in many jurisdictions.

As we have heard, drink-driving remains a major but preventable cause of death and serious injury on our streets. Reducing the drink-drive limit is one step in trying to tackle that, but it would need to go hand in hand with a publicity and enforcement campaign for maximum effect. When I was younger and learning to drive, it was absolutely drummed into us that we never went out and drank and drove. One person would be the designated driver, or we would use public transport or a taxi, or we would persuade someone’s parents to come and pick us up. This message needs to be amplified—as well as for drug-driving, which I have raised in this Chamber before, and which seems to be a growing trend. This needs to come as a package.

Alcolocks, which we have discussed, are an important development in trying to reduce drink-driving and people reoffending. It is a simple breathalyser linked to your ignition, which means that, if you are over the limit, you simply cannot start your vehicle. There was a drop-in, only a couple of weeks ago, in Portcullis House in which this was all demonstrated to us, and I thought it was a fantastic invention. As we have heard, it is already used in many EU countries, New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Given that around 260 people are killed in drink-driving collisions every year, and that drink-driving accounts for around 16% of all UK road deaths, this is an important yet simple development that has been shown to work successfully and to reduce repeat offending internationally. Why would we not want to bring it in here? We fully support this amendment and hope that the Government will respond positively. I note that a Minister from the other place also came to the drop-in, so I hope that the Government might be moving in that area.

On the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that, without suspicion, having random breath tests is not proportionate. Therefore, we on these Benches do not support it.

Amendment 416C, from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, highlights a potential loophole, which he outlined; it is interesting to consider given that technology has moved forward. Amendment 416B, from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, makes a strong point about uninsured vehicles. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response to these and the other issues raised in this group.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group consider a highly important issue that requires the utmost consideration, so I thank noble Lords who have contributed thus far.

We support the idea behind my noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 345 that guidance, and a pilot based on that guidance, is a viable approach to stemming the proliferation of illegal vehicles and criminal offences by the drivers of those vehicles on our roads. A measure such as this is all the more urgent following the report published this week by the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Transport Safety, which laid bare the scale of criminality plaguing our roads. As many as one in 15 vehicles may carry modified and ghost number plates to evade ANPR detection. These modified vehicles, guilty of a crime in and of themselves, are then being used to bypass surveillance and undertake activities such as black market trading, drug dealing and organised crime.

Over 34,000 suppliers are registered with the DVLA to produce UK number plates, many of which are private and unregulated. A consultation and pilot should be the bare minimum. The APPG report has issued recommendations, but a more general consultation would be able to cover different types of road crime. Can the Minister confirm that the Government have acknowledged this report and are considering wider measures to deal with illegal vehicles and criminal activity on our roads?

I take much the same approach to Amendment 416B, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, and my noble friend Lord Ashcombe, and Amendment 416C, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington. Both measures aim to reduce crime on our roads by increasing police powers. I am not sure whether there is a power already under Section 165 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 for police to take possession of uninsured vehicles on the road; I stand to be corrected on that.

I support the principle behind the two amendments, particularly Amendment 416C, which closes an obvious gap in the law that has emerged as technology has developed. That said, simply increasing the powers of our police is meaningless if there is not the manpower to use those powers. New powers are welcome, but they should come with effective enforcement.

I am not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 350, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town and Lady Finlay of Llandaff. Both Houses, when legislating on matters concerning public safety, as the amendment does, should err on the side of safety. It is the same reason why we are not opposed in principle to the Government’s announcement of their intention to reduce the drink-driving limit per 100 millilitres of breath.