Lord Hanson of Flint
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum term of imprisonment on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, this is the first in a number of groups of government amendments. I apologise for the large number of amendments before the Committee today. Their core aim is to apply various additional provisions in the Bill to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. They reflect the outcome of further engagement with the Scottish Government and relevant Northern Ireland departments since the Bill’s introduction, which is why we have tabled so many amendments today. That has happened since February.
In each case, we are bringing forward these amendments at the request of the devolved Governments. The amendments unavoidably cover a significant number of pages of the Marshalled List, but I assure noble Lords that, importantly, in general they do not import new policy into the Bill. The amendments all relate to the offensive weapons provisions in Part 2, Chapter 2 of the Bill. These will contribute to our safer streets mission to halve knife crime in a decade. I am pleased to report that, even now, in the latest crime survey, figures for the year to the end of June show a 5% reduction in knife-enabled offences. This is to be welcomed, but of course there is much more to do.
Clause 28 amends Sections 141 and 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. It increases the maximum penalty for offences relating to offensive weapons from six months to two years imprisonment. This includes the offence of manufacturing, selling, hiring, offering for hire, lending or possessing in private any prohibited offensive weapon as detailed in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. Also covered here is the offence of selling a knife or bladed article to anyone under the age of 18.
Amendments 57 to 70 to Clause 28 simply extend the increase of the maximum penalty for those offences to Scotland, at the request of the Scottish Government. Existing legislation in England and Wales provides that anyone over 18 years of age found guilty of any of these offences will face a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both. We believe that the maximum penalty does not reflect the seriousness of these offences and should be increased in line with the current offence of unlawful marketing of knives, which carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. This will align the maximum penalties for the offences in relation to the sale of knives.
In Clauses 31 and 32 we are introducing a stricter two-step age-verification check for the sale and delivery of knives bought online. These provisions will require at the point of sale specific checks of a photographic identity document and a current photograph of the buyer, as well as photographic identity checks at the point of delivery, be it a residential address or a collection point. In addition, we are providing for a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife to someone other than the buyer if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company, so that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours. These are both welcome measures.
Amendments 71, 72 and 74 confirm that, under Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where a passport or driving licence is used as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, it is required to be a copy of a physical version. We are, however, adding provisions that would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations—subject to affirmative procedure, so that this House and the Commons have the opportunity to debate them further—so that alternative means of age verification such as digital ID, including digital passports and digital driving licences, can be used. These amendments are required to ensure that the appropriate digital proofs can be used as evidence of identity in place of a physical document, and that the necessary safeguards can be attached to their use.
It is clear that many consumers already expect to be able to use digital forms of ID, rather than just the physical version, to prove to a seller they are aged 18 or over in order to purchase knives or crossbows. The Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 lays the foundation for trusted digital verification services that are already widely used across the economy. Digital versions of government-issued documents such as driving licences and veteran cards will become available soon. For both consumers who buy and businesses that sell knives or crossbows, it is also important to provide consistency with the existing position across different sectors where digital age verification is used or soon will be—for example, in the purchase of other age-restricted products such as alcohol and tobacco, or for gambling.
The other amendments to Clauses 31 and 32 extend the provisions made by these clauses for England and Wales to Scotland, and the additional clause makes provision for Northern Ireland. This is at the request of both devolved Governments.
I apologise for the length of the discussion on the amendments in this group. The amendments to Clauses 33 and 34 relate to the Crossbows Act 1987, which requires that crossbows, or parts of a crossbow, can only be sold or let on hire to someone aged 18 or over. Clauses 33 and 34 introduce the same stricter two-step age-verification checks for the sale and letting on hire of crossbows, or parts of crossbows bought or let on hire online, that have been introduced for the sale and delivery of knives bought online.
Government Amendments 124 to 189 extend the provisions in Clauses 33 to 35 to Scotland—again, at the request of the Scottish Government—and Amendments 190 to 192 insert new clauses that amend the Crossbows (Northern Ireland) Order to ensure that stricter age-verification checks for the sale, letting on hire and delivery of crossbows also apply to Northern Ireland. It is important that there is a cross-UK approach on these significant issues.
Finally, Clause 36 provides for the mandatory reporting of the bulk sale of knives. Clause 36 defines reportable sales as the purchase of six knives in a single transaction in England and Wales, or when made over two or more occasions in a 30-day period. In the latter case, relevant sales include those made to a single person, or up to two or more persons where these are to be delivered to the same residential address. As noble Lords probably know, there are exemptions for business sales and for sales of cutlery knives without a sharp point, safety razor blades, and pocketknives with a cutting edge that does not exceed 3 inches.
There will also be exemptions for qualifying sets of knives, such as kitchen knife blocks. These will be sets of at least three knives that are each of a different size or shape, no matter how many knives the set contains—we are all very familiar with that type of kitchen equipment. The purchase of multiple sets of knives, or the purchase of a single set alongside individual knives where these combinations lead to a total purchase of at least six knives, will also be reportable.
That is what is currently in the Bill. Amendments 193 to 209 extend these provisions to Scotland, and similar provisions are also being introduced for Northern Ireland, so, again, there is consistency across the whole of the United Kingdom. There are various consequential and drafting amendments at the back of the Bill relating to the power to make consequential amendments. But, in essence, the policy positions in the Bill, through these Government amendments, are being replicated in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I rise to ask on a point of information and declare an interest: I chair the National Proof of Age Standards Scheme board. In the list of identifications for proof of age purposes, I did not hear the noble Lord say that the PASS card was acceptable. It is a Home Office-approved document and is widely used. Maybe he said it and I missed it—we were going at quite a pace—but could he confirm that the physical proof of age card is still acceptable for these purposes?
We are expecting the mandatory conditions for digital proof of age to be published before Christmas, possibly. Is the noble Lord able to confirm that the Government are still on track to publish these changes so that sales of alcohol and other proof of age purposes can be done by a digital proof of age card as well as by a physical card?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I think I can say yes to both those points. If I cannot, I shall revert to her shortly.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, on these Benches, we support the intent behind this blizzard of government amendments. Of course, as the Minister says, the effect of these amendments and other consequential changes is to apply tougher maximum penalties and provisions relating to offensive weapons in Scotland and, in certain cases, Northern Ireland.
It would be extremely useful if the Minister could say whether the law in each of the home nations is the same. I assume that is the effect of all these different amendments—that the UK should be on exactly the same footing, however and wherever you commit that offence. Even though I understand that it was at the request, in the first instance, of the Scottish Government.
We very much support the way in which the amendments reflect the gravity of the kinds of violence that plague our communities from these offensive weapons and that the manufacture, supply and possession of these articles will be met with the full force of the law. We welcome not only the amendments but the original provisions of the Bill, but we need to think of not just penalties but prevention. I hope some of those provisions will make individuals accountable with the digital identity, which we also support.
Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I would like an answer to the question of whether the analogue identity provision will continue. Otherwise, that could lead to forms of digital exclusion, which I do not think that we or the Minister would welcome.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.
I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment
“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.
That is the point.
What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.
The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?
We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.
As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.
As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.
I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.
There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century—I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.
I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.
I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Before the Minister sits down, I thank him for what he said. I am slightly baffled. There is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrat Benches, so I find the Minister’s assurance that the analogue form of identity will continue—and digital ID in this instance, whatever is prescribed by the Secretary of State, is an alternative form of identification—wholly convincing, but if we must come back on Report and debate this at length, so be it.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
Will the noble Lord respond on the mandatory conditions on the digital proof-of-age pass, which he confirmed would be published before December?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I cannot give the noble Baroness a date at the moment, but I will reflect on that with colleagues and return to her, because there are a number of other departmental interests as well.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment increases the maximum fine on summary conviction in Scotland for an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, we on these Benches believe that this group contains sensible and prudent amendments. They require us to review the effectiveness of the Government’s measures and to consider carefully the potential implications of the new regulations around the sale of knives. They also seek to ensure that we have the necessary evidence base to improve legislation where needed. These, in our view, are good principles.
Amendment 122 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, contains both those elements. The first part of the amendment seeks a review within two years of the effectiveness of the measures in preventing the online sale of knives to persons under the age of 18. This would plainly be sensible. There is little point in legislating to prevent something if we find out that in fact that prohibition is not taking effect. We all want to stop the sale of knives to children, but we should want to do so in the most effective and proportionate manner. By reviewing the impact of the Bill, the Government would be able to make the necessary adjustments in response to the evidence. Having said that, we should listen carefully to the observations of my noble friend Lord Hailsham in this respect.
Another aspect of the question of efficacy is our obligation to the law-abiding public. It is right that we should attempt to ban children from purchasing knives. We are all aware of the severity of the knife crime epidemic and that part of the problem is the easy access to knives. But we should not pretend that the entire problem stems from their online availability. Of course, it is a factor, but children and young persons intent on committing knife crime will have plenty of other opportunities, if they are determined enough, to buy knives and to acquire them from other sources. They could use an older friend’s or family member’s identification, or indeed, they could ask them simply to make the purchase. They could steal a knife—given the current rates of shoplifting, I suspect this already happens—or they might simply go no further than their kitchen drawer and take one of the many easily accessible knives there.
By adding restrictions to online sale, the Government are merely stemming one route of access, but doing so adds an extra burden to the great majority of law-abiding citizens and retailers. As I have said, we understand why action is necessary, but, if we are to make it mandatory, we should ensure that it is genuinely effective in practice. Here, we should listen to the wise words of my noble friend Lord Blencathra. We must know, therefore, that we are not adding regulation for its own sake and that we are simultaneously taking other meaningful measures to address the wider issue. The Government should continue to explore this further.
Proposed subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) in Amendment 122 address another aspect of the knife problem. While the first part reviews the effect of the Bill on the sale of knives, these subsections turn to the design and legality of the knives themselves.
If the knives which we make harder to purchase are not the ones being used in knife crime, our efforts will be in vain. Collecting data both on knives sold and, separately, on knives used in crimes, as Amendment 194 argues for, could offer a remedy for this. It would provide the Government with the necessary data to identify which types of weapons in particular lie at the root of the problem and to take action accordingly. This principle also underlies Amendment 123—I had already noted the typo, if I can put it that way, and have marked the noble Lord’s homework accordingly. But, taking it seriously, consulting on what knives are used in offending and on the measures to be required to curb their circulation must be sensible and proportionate, and it should complement the Government’s proposals.
This is a moderate group of amendments on a subject that clearly needs further review and refinement. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on the Government’s position. At the same time, I think we need to hear carefully and take heed of what noble Lords have said in their words of caution on this topic.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Hampton, for setting out the case for these amendments, and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, for bringing his front-line experience of the tragedy in the school in which he currently works. I am also grateful for the comments of other noble Lords and I will try to respond to those in due course. I note the broad support from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for the amendments before the Committee today.
I want to start with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I accept that there have been numerous attempts by numerous Governments to take numerous courses of action to reduce knife crime and that this is another one. But I just say to him that it is still worth trying, and it is still worth examining how we can best reduce the level of knife crime. The measures in the Bill before the Committee today are an honest attempt by the Government to put further obstacles in the way of individuals who might use those knives for nefarious purposes. I simply say it is worth trying, and we are seeking to do that.
As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained, Amendment 122 would require the Home Secretary to review the effectiveness of Clauses 31 and 32 in preventing sales to under-18s within two years of those clauses coming into force. I agree in principle that we should have to keep under review the impact of those measures, for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned: to look at what works and what has not worked.
The Government are providing £1.75 million of funding for a new national police co-ordination unit to tackle the online sale of knives, and the police will be responsible for enforcing this legislation. I hear the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about enforcement but it is for the police to understand the legislation’s effectiveness and what more can be done to tackle knife crime. I will return to the other points that she mentioned in due course.
It is standard practice—I hope this helps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—that all measures in the Bill will be subject to post-legislative scrutiny three to five years after Royal Assent. This scrutiny will consider the effectiveness of the measures in the Bill; self-evidently, that includes Clauses 31 and 32. The noble Lord is asking for a two-year review; it will be undertaken within three to five years. I hope that reassures him that the measures will be reviewed in a timely and appropriate way—and, again, to learn the lessons that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned that we need to examine.
Amendment 123 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, would require the Government to consult on regulating the sale of sharp-tipped knives and provide a report to Parliament. The design of knives is also addressed in Amendment 122, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
I share the view of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham: bladed articles with pointed ends have legitimate uses. They are often needed for a wide range of purposes: they are used as tools in work, and for farming, fishing and cooking. The Government are keen to try to strike the right balance between allowing access to knives for legitimate reasons, which the noble Viscount ably outlined, and the need to protect the public from dangerous weapons.
If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, the Government are actively exploring options for how we can strengthen enforcement and prevention measures, including consulting on a licensing scheme for all knife sellers in the future. I hope that the noble Lord can accept that as I progress the discussion today.
Amendment 194 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would require regulations relating to the reporting of remote sales of knives to ensure that such reporting takes place as soon as possible following a bulk sale. I am sympathetic to the overall aim of the amendment. Clause 36 provides for a duty to report remote sales of knives in bulk. It makes it mandatory for online sellers to report bulk sales. It defines those bulk sales as purchases of six or more knives, two or more qualifying sets of knives or one qualifying set or five knives, in a single transaction or made over two or more occasions within a 30-day period. That is set out in Clause 36. In the latter case, relevant sales include those made to a single person or two or more persons where they are believed to be delivered to the same residential address.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 200, page 230, line 29, which provides for new section 141D of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to extend to Scotland as well as England and Wales.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment extends the requirement to report bulk sales to include deliveries to anywhere in the UK that meet the specified criteria, not just deliveries in England and Wales.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Duty to report remote sale of knives etc in bulk: Northern Ireland(1) The Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160 (N.I. 24)) is amended as follows.(2) After Article 54A insert—“54B Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in an order made by the Department of Justice, report to the person specified in the order any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in paragraph (4), sells—(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.(4) The ways are—(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in the United Kingdom, or(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in the United Kingdom, or(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in the United Kingdom.(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller is not in the presence of the person (“the buyer”) to whom the bladed articles are sold at the time of the sale.(6) For the purposes of paragraph (5) the seller is not in the presence of the buyer at the time of the sale if—(a) where the seller is an individual, the seller or a person acting on the seller’s behalf is not in the presence of the buyer at that time;(b) where the seller is not an individual, a person acting on the seller’s behalf is not in the presence of the buyer at that time.(7) A sale is not reportable if the buyer—(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and(b) is—(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.(8) A person who fails to comply with paragraph (1) commits an offence.(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under paragraph (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this Article if—(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.(11) A person who commits an offence under paragraph (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.(12) In this section—(a) “bladed article” means an article to which Article 54 applies, other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;(b) “residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).(13) An order made by the Department of Justice under paragraph (1) may in particular include requirements about—(a) how reports are to be made,(b) when reports to be made, and(c) the information reports must include.(14) The Department of Justice may by order amend—(a) the number of bladed articles specified in paragraph (2)(a);(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in paragraph (2)(b);(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in paragraph (2)(c);(d) the number of bladed articles specified in paragraph (2)(c);(e) the period specified in paragraph (4)(b).”.(3) In Article 57 (rules and orders)—(a) the existing text becomes paragraph (1);(b) in that paragraph for “or 54(3)(c)” substitute “, 54(3)(c) or 54B(1)”;(c) after that paragraph insert—“(2) An order may not be made under Article 54B(14) unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”(4) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(3) (guidance by Department of Justice) after paragraph (f) insert—“(fa) Article 54B of that Order (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk),”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision for Northern Ireland equivalent to that made for England and Wales by clause 36.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his series of interesting amendments regarding knife crime. As we have already heard, my noble friend comes to this debate with the experience of some time in the Home Office—a real experience at the sharp end. Although the rates of knife crime have fallen a little over recent years, any victim of a crime, particularly one caused by knives, is a victim too many. Just recently, we heard of the terrible incident on fireworks night a year or so ago and the trial, which finished in the Old Bailey earlier this autumn; 16 year-olds were involved, and one of them died, and it all happened very quickly. So, knives are a real problem. The Government pledged in their manifesto to halve knife crime by 2030. If they wish to make good on that premise, it is imperative that they really do something to reduce it.
My noble friend’s amendments are a welcome practical measure in that direction but are subject to a number of reservations. I begin with schools. Amendment 214B introduces an important clarification to the law in respect of defences for carrying a knife in school premises. It makes plain that the only justification for someone having a knife at school can be in relation to educational services. It is also right that, in turn, this justification should apply only to teachers or those holding a position of authority. There is no plausible reason why a student should come on to the school premises carrying a knife. We welcome the amendment as an important step to ensure that both pupils and teachers are safe from knives at school, and we hope that the Government look at this and consider the amendment seriously.
We also thank my noble friend for his Amendments 214C to 214E. As we have heard, these seek to create a special category of particularly dangerous weapons: machetes, zombie knives, cleavers, swords and cutlasses. The merit is in identifying particular weapons by name. That will strike a chord with the public and with those who might otherwise carry them. They will know that, if they carry one of these weapons, just having it in their possession risks a very heavy prison sentence. Just having existing powers of sentencing does not, it seems, carry that resonance with those who most need to hear it, so we have got to do something.
Given the substantial increase in the use of machetes in recent years—we heard from my noble friend about the increase in their use in particular—something has to be done which identifies them, singles them out and curbs their circulation and use. In 2024, there were 18 machete homicides, an increase from 14 in 2023. Amendments 214D and 214E similarly ensure that manufacturing, selling, ownership and possession of these dangerous weapons will be regarded as a specific new offence.
My noble friend Lord Hailsham was right to point out that the drafting causes problems, and there are people, in the countryside in particular, who may have a legitimate use for machetes. But we are not in the jungle of Belize; we are in the United Kingdom. Sickles and scythes can be used, of course, but if there is going to be a use for something such as a machete, there should be specific clarity to make sure that we do not allow it to be put forward as a specious defence.
To call these amendments bizarre would, in my submission, go too far. If we take this matter seriously, as we all should, we will know full well that this really is an important mischief which has to be addressed, named and called out. My noble friend has raised an important issue, and the Government, if they are serious about cutting knife crime—and not just knife crime but the use of these appalling tools and weapons—must work to bridge the drafting gap so that the sorts of things which we have seen and heard about in the last few years are heavily reduced and people can walk and live in safety, particularly in our big cities.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I confess that despite preparing for the debate on these amendments, I did not expect to venture into Glasgow razor crime in the 1950s, the use of Waterloo swords or, indeed, the brambles of Lincolnshire, but this has been an enjoyable debate on a very serious subject and I welcome the contributions from across the Committee today.
Amendment 214B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, asks whether existing defences to possession of a bladed article—that is, a knife—should be removed in educational establishments. I am of the view that the defences listed under Section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 are appropriate and in line with similar defences that already exist for the offence of possession of a bladed article in a public place.
The defence for educational purposes, for example, which Amendment 214B seeks to remove, would cover instances where both the teacher and the student may need to use a knife in the classroom or for educational purposes on the premises, such as in craftmanship or cookery lessons, or others. The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made common cause with the view that there is a need for certain uses of knives in schools under strictly controlled circumstances.
The issue of prevention, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, also mentioned, is important, and I endorse the idea that we need to look at how we prevent the use of knives. However, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that in Amendment 214B his withdrawal of those definitions would cause some difficulties in educational matters.
The religious reasons defence takes into account the need sometimes to carry a knife for religious reasons. The noble Lord and others have mentioned the position of individuals of the Sikh faith. The Government are not aware of any cases where this or any other existing defence has been abused in educational establishments by members of that faith.
Again, it is appropriate to put on record that educational establishments can introduce their own rules and regulations, and, of course, if someone brings a knife into an educational establishment or uses a knife already in the establishment to cause harm, even if they have a defence such as for work purposes, they will have a committed a serious criminal offence under existing legislation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Indeed. On reflection, I think I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, that his dirk is a dagger and therefore does not fall within the remit of the legislation proposed—I think that information was considered by my noble friend Lord Katz but it was not able to be deployed at the time. However, we can return to that at some point.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am glad that the noble Lord is relieved about that.
The serious point here is that getting the defences and exemptions under which weapons may be legal to own, import or sell under certain limited circumstances right also requires consultation—I think the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, acknowledged that. In the absence of such consultation, I suggest that the Bill is not the right place to legislate on a specific category of knives and weapons, and we risk not taking account of some important matters if we have not consulted first.
In any event, it would be possible to give effect to these proposals for further restrictions through existing regulation-making powers provided for since the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Any such regulations would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, so, again, they would be subject to debate in and approval by both Houses of Parliament.
We have debated the provisions in Chapter 1 of Part 2 which introduce new measures to provide the police with the power to require social media marketplaces and search services to take down online illegal content. I understand the honest, genuine motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in tabling these amendments, but just a casual listen to the debate today shows that there are a number of issues that we need to consider, and I believe that the existing powers that we have, the actions that we have taken and the measures under the Bill will be sufficient. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, some mildly in support of my amendments and others liking the concept but pointing out the serious drafting flaws in them. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham; he is right that the drafting is flawed. Any future amendments I make would need to include “legitimate and lawful use”. He pointed out that he would need to go on to the high street or to another public place to use his machete. I would have to do the same myself, with a buddleia overgrowing the road. If I had a machete, I would have to go on to the pavement to use it. Instead, I have an electric trimmer, which my wife can use. There are legitimate flaws in my drafting.
I suspect that many of my noble friends from a hereditary background have houses stuffed full of dangerous, sharp weapons—from pikes to swords—as well as armour and all the other accoutrements acquired over centuries in this great and noble land of ours, where tremendous battles have been fought to secure our freedoms since 1066. Of course they are not for public display; I accept that this too is an error in my drafting. They are there because they are owned by the family, who should not be penalised for having them.
My concept is right. There is a problem here, and I hope that if we come back to some elements of this amendment on Report, my noble friend Lord Hailsham will help me in the drafting. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, that a dirk is not included in my definition. My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier hit the nail on the head: tough sentences are required, though that may not require some of the amendments that I have suggested. I am so grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for pointing out that with the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it was tough sentences that cracked down in Scotland. I do not want to put words into his mouth, but he said that there was then full judicial discretion. We did not have the Sentencing Council, which to me ties the hands of our judges—judges who should have full discretion to sentence as they see fit.
In some of those cases in the last few months which I quoted, people got a minimum term of 24 years or 30 years for an appalling murder, but hundreds of others who attacked people who did not die received much lesser sentences. Machete attacks have now become endemic. It is the weapon of choice for bad guys, for youths who want to commit crimes or terrorise their opponents in other gangs. We need unique and specialised exemplary action.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that I am not calling for children to be criminalised. I referred to three instances, and I was wrong in suggesting removing educational uses. But I can see no justification for maintaining a religious exception and a national dress exception allowing kids to bring such knives to school. The Government are wrong to stick to that.
Introducing this has been worth while. I do not mind that my noble friend Lord Hailsham called some of it “bizarre”. What is happening on the streets of London and elsewhere in England today is bizarre. If, 20 years ago, we had said that we would see these gangs fighting on the streets outside Starbucks with machetes, we would have said, “Don’t be fanciful; it’s barking mad; it’s never going to happen”. It is happening day in, day out on our streets. It is not only bizarre; it is obscene and dangerous. Therefore, we need to take special action, exemplary action, to deal with this problem. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 214B.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“(c) is employed by the occupier or owner of the retail premises in delivering goods directly to a consumer from the premises.”
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 214F and 214G, in my name, as we move away from the regulation of weapons to retail crime and shoplifting. I will try to be brief.
In my 15 or so years as an executive at Tesco and as vice-chair of the British Retail Consortium, I spent many hours investigating and studying shoplifting and what could be done to reduce it. We used staff training, the latest waves of technology and generous business investment to combat it. I was always very worried by the wider social impact, as stolen goods were sold on to fuel drug habits and innocent shop workers were sometimes hurt in the process of trying to stop it. The truth is that these risks and their devastating effect on individuals have become much greater as society has changed and become more divided and less moral, and hence violent crime has become more of a day-to-day occurrence. As with so much else, the long Covid lockdown has made things worse, and the police have prioritised other things.
However, this Bill is full of amendments requiring the police to do more. That will put yet further pressure on the police contribution to tackling neighbourhood crimes such as shoplifting and assaults on retail workers, which frighten retail workers, especially in the smallest shops, and lead, sadly, to more shop closures on the high street. For some years I strongly supported USDAW’s campaign for a stand-alone offence of assaulting a retail worker. As the Minister knows, I am delighted that the Bill puts that into law. It is a good day for the Minister, given his USDAW links, and for the noble Lord, Lord Hannett of Everton, smiling over there, who represented USDAW so intelligently when I was at Tesco.
However, the Bill as drafted does not quite do the trick as it does not cover retail delivery drivers, who have also been the subject of growing aggression. This is a particular problem if the driver has to ask for ID because a juvenile under 18 is taking delivery—a flashpoint, according to a recent British Retail Consortium survey—or if there is a disagreement about what is being paid for and delivered. Last week, Tesco even announced that it was piloting giving body cameras to delivery drivers. Another point of significance is that such drivers are already covered by parallel legislation in Scotland. That is not always a recommendation, but given the national character of much of retail, I hope the Minister will agree that this alignment makes sense and accept my Amendments 214 F and 214 G. I beg to move.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I will be very brief this time. My Amendment 214FA seeks to add hospitality venues. This is an important clause which has my full support; I simply want clarification that cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars are included in the definition of retail premises.
In UK law, “retail premises” typically refers to premises where goods are sold directly to consumers for personal use. This includes shops, supermarkets and other establishments where tangible products are offered for sale. Hospitality venues such as cafes, restaurants, pubs and bars primarily provide services: the preparation and serving of food and drink for consumption on the premises. While these venues may sell some items to take away, their main business activity is the provision of hospitality services rather than retailing goods.
UK planning law differentiates between retail and hospitality venues through the use of “use classes”, which categorise buildings and their permitted activities. Class E—commercial, business and service—includes shops, restaurants, cafés, financial services and other commercial uses. While both retail shops and hospitality venues are covered under class E, they are distinct subcategories within this class. Class E(a) refers to shops selling goods, while class E(b) refers to the
“sale of food and drink principally to visiting members of the public where consumption is mostly undertaken on the premises”,
which covers cafés, pubs and restaurants. Therefore, while cafés and restaurants fall under the same broad planning class as retail shops, they are not regarded as retail outlets in the strict sense, but rather as hospitality or food service venues.
Legislation relating to employment, health and safety, licensing and business rates may further distinguish between retail and hospitality businesses. For example, food hygiene regulations specifically address food service establishments, while retail regulations focus on the sale of goods. Under UK law, cafés and restaurants are not generally regarded as retail outlets; they are classified as hospitality venues or food service establishments. The key distinction lies in the primary activity. Selling goods is retail whereas providing food and drink services is hospitality. From what I understand, the core hospitality operations—serving meals and drinks, and providing accommodation—are not generally covered under the definition of a retail outlet. If I am wrong and Clause 37 includes cafés, bars and restaurants, then I am content that there is no problem. However, if it does not, we have a gaping hole in the law and my amendment is essential to plug it. If I am right that those are not covered, I hope the Minister will bring forward a little amendment to ensure that those workers get the same protection as workers in retail shops.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.
The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.
The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.
Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.
I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.
The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.
I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
I would be very happy to join a group meeting rather than the Minister having to have several meetings with each of us. If there were to be third parties involved in a meeting, such as USDAW, I wonder whether he would also consider including the Institute of Customer Service. It is in a unique position—and I declare an interest as a vice-chair of the All-Party Group on Customer Service—as it looks at this across the board, and the letter it organised included signatories from a range of different industries.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
We will reflect on that. It is a helpful suggestion, if colleagues are happy to have a joint meeting. I would also like to involve the Policing Minister, who has an interest in this matter as a whole.
I want to place on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton. They have campaigned very strongly as representatives of the supermarkets, in this case Tesco, and the workforce. My noble friend has campaigned for many years on this issue. Freedom from Fear is a campaign that Paddy Lillis, the previous general secretary, Joanne Thomas, the current general secretary, and my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton, the general secretary before Paddy Lillis, worked on for a long time. It has been brought to them by members of the union as an important issue. It is worth putting that on record, and we can examine how we organise the discussion and consultation in due course.
Assault on anyone, including delivery drivers and transport staff, is wholly unacceptable. Everyone should be protected from assault. Under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, common assault has a maximum sentence of six months in prison and the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 covers serious violence, grievous bodily harm and actual bodily harm.
I come back to the reason why I have campaigned on this issue for many years. Retail workers have been at the forefront of upholding much of the legislation. They uphold legislation on solvent abuse sales, tobacco sales, knife sales, drink sales and a range of other issues. They are also very much the first port of call on shop theft and the issues that the noble Baroness mentioned. USDAW figures show that 10% of staff have reported a physical attack on them in the last year alone; that seems to me to be a very strong reason why the Government have brought forward this amendment. There is a wealth of evidence to back the position that there is a significant problem specific to retail workers because of the nature of that work.
Clauses 37 and 38 provide for the bespoke offence of assaulting a retail worker. They also place a duty on the courts when sentencing an offender to make a criminal behaviour order; shop theft may often be linked to drug and alcohol abuse issues as a whole. Our definition of a retail worker is intentionally narrow, given the vital need to provide legal clarity and ensure there is no ambiguity for courts in identifying whether an individual is a retail worker when impacted by their job.
The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned the hospitality sector. This sector is specifically excluded, but if he looks at the definition of retail premises in Clause 37(3), he can see that it would be open to a judge to determine what might be included. For example, cafes might have stalls inside the shop, so that could be potentially defined as a retail premise as well. There is no specific offence, and I would not wish to extend it to the hospitality sector, but a judge could potentially interpret some aspects of hospitality being within the retail sector under Clause 37(3).
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I think the Minister’s remarks make quite a telling case. In particular, I was struck by the point that retail workers, because of the things they sell—cigarettes and tobacco—are more on the front line than people serving chicken nuggets, or whatever. I accept that there is a very good point that the retail sector needs to be guarded specifically, possibly differently from the hospitality sector. I shall look carefully at what he said.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Delivery drivers cover a wide range of sectors and roles and therefore including them could potentially cause an issue with definition and therefore with the courts using the legislation. Again, my noble friend and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell of Beeston and Lady Neville-Rolfe, have put that case. I am happy to meet them, and we can examine and discuss and hear what they have to say outside the Committee.
With regard to public-facing workers, which the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, also mentioned, the previous Government—again to their credit—introduced a statutory aggravating factor for assault against any public-facing worker via Section 156 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. I am advised that that would include, for example, train staff, and the aggravating factor would apply in assault cases when an offence is committed against those providing a public service, performing a public duty, or providing a service to the public. There may be areas of definition, but I hope that the issue that the noble Baroness has raised ensures that the courts treat the public-facing nature of a victim’s role as an aggravating factor when considering the sentence for an offence and will send a clear message that violence and abuse towards any public-facing worker will not be tolerated.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and my noble friend Lord Davies for their support for my amendment. I thank the Minister for agreeing to further discussions, and to a meeting, although I have to say that I am slightly disappointed by his initial remarks. I would also like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, and my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lady Stowell, for the probing and constructive questions that they have put forward on this important part of the Bill. I emphasise again the everyday risk to retail staff and retail drivers who were, of course, so heroic during Covid. Without them, we would all have starved.
I hope the Minister will understand that I drafted a very narrow amendment advisedly; I reduced what was originally proposed by the experts from the retail industry. It very much confines the opportunity to retail, and to drivers from retailers. I am very happy to look at the wording and I can see that we need to keep it narrow. I have resisted a number of representations from other sectors in putting forward this amendment, because it is so important that we look at the evidence base, which seems to be stronger in respect of violence, both towards retail workers and drivers. I look forward to our further discissions; I may bring this issue back at Report. In the meantime, however, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created
“effective immunity for some shoplifting”
and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.
The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?
The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.
Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.
What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.
This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.
The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.
Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.
We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.
I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.
I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.
The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 216 in my name. I look forward very much to hearing the Minister’s response to the proposal from my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower for tougher community treatment of repeat offenders. As it is focused on the community and on suspended sentence orders, it seems to fit in very well with the spirit of the Sentencing Bill, which we will no doubt be debating on a number of further days.
As the Minister the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has already acknowledged, and as the recent Crime Survey shows, shoplifting has risen very significantly in recent years, especially since Covid. Indeed, we heard on the “Today” programme this morning that the average number of days it takes to deal with shoplifting cases has increased by 80% in the last decade.
My own experience has taught me something else: the biggest problem with shoplifting is not so much the law as the patchy and sometimes non-existent nature of police enforcement in relation to shoplifting and associated misdemeanours. The general acceptance that thefts worth less than £200—the noble Lord, Lord Hannett, was the first to mention that minimum—do not matter to the authorities is a particular bugbear of mine and of others who care about decency and limiting neighbourhood crime and its distressing effects.
That issue lies behind my Amendment 216, which would reverse that deplorable trend. My amendment would require the College of Policing to issue a code of practice to ensure that police forces also investigate shoplifting where the value of goods is less than £200. Letting people walk into shops, steal things and get away scot free eats at the heart of a civilised society, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, explained earlier. You only need to visit San Francisco in recent years to see the awful effects on its once golden streets. However, there is hope there: a Democratic mayor is at last seeing good sense. I hope the Government will follow that lead and consider my amendment this evening.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, on the noble Lord’s Amendment 215, I have great sympathy for its suggestions. Electronic monitoring can certainly play a useful role, although there is mixed evidence of its ability to reduce reoffending. However, there are multiple challenges in implementation, including inconsistent use by probation services, delays in procuring new GPS tags and gaps in responding promptly to breaches. However, my main problem is that, from a policing perspective, I worry there is no slack available in police time to monitor curfews, exclusion orders or electronic tagging. I fear it may be counterproductive to give the police yet more work when they are having great difficulty coping with what they already have.
I have a similar reservation about Amendment 216, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. In principle, I would support a code of practice to improve enforcement. However, in the absence of more police resources, the danger is that this would only exacerbate the current situation, where chief constables are faced with having to rob Peter to pay Paul in other areas of policing, and victims of other crimes would likely suffer as a consequence.
I would stress prevention over cure. I draw the Committee’s and the Minister’s attention to a West Midlands Police programme that diverts repeat low-level shoplifters into services like drug rehabilitation. Since its pilot in 2018, it has been credited with saving local businesses an estimated £2.3 million through reduced shoplifting. Surely this is something we ought at least to investigate.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for tabling Amendments 215 and 216 respectively. I have great respect for both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness. The noble Baroness’s background means that she knows more than most about the corrosive experience of shoplifting and the effect it can have on those working in the retail industry. The noble Lord’s distinguished career as a police officer gives him great authority to speak about the challenges to police forces and their obligations to society that they should be fulfilling. I reassure both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are all on the same side on this. This is one of these situations where I am very keen to work with Members from all sides of your Lordships’ Committee to ensure that we deal with this social and economic menace efficiently and effectively.
On Amendment 215, I will repeat what I said a few moments ago: this Government take repeat and prolific offending extremely seriously. However, sentencing in individual cases must be a matter for our independent judiciary, and it must take into account all the circumstances of the offence and the offender, as well as the statutory purposes of sentencing. Your Lordships will, of course, be aware that the courts have a broad range of sentencing powers to deal effectively and appropriately with offenders.
As some of your Lordships may be aware, until relatively recently I was a judge in the Crown Court, and I sentenced my fair share of shoplifters. There was a complete spectrum of those offenders, from the destitute, homeless young mother stealing nappies for her baby at one end to the shameless, organised shoplifting gangs who terrify and terrorise shop workers. As the sentencing judge, there was a toolbox of disposals of increasing seriousness available to me, so that I could match the appropriate sentence to the offender on a case-by-case basis. These included discharges, fines, community sentences, suspended sentences with requirements and custodial sentences where appropriate.
Previous convictions are already a statutory aggravating factor, with the sentencing guidelines making it clear that, when determining the sentence, sentencers must consider the nature and relevance of previous convictions and the time elapsed since the previous conviction. But that repeats what is, in fact, common sense and what every sentencer knows. From my own experience, I can tell the Committee that the more frequently a defendant appears before the court, having gone out and done exactly the same thing that he or she had just been sentenced for, the more exasperated the judge becomes, who then starts imposing tougher and tougher sentences.
Despite the popular caricatures, judges do live in the real world. While sentencing a shoplifter to prison as a standard proposition will seem harsh, it can and does happen if the court concludes that there is no other way of stopping them. Importantly, this Government will introduce a whole range of options that will ramp up the community and suspended sentence powers for judges. In other words, the toolbox is getting fancier and more extensive.
As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, sentencers are already able to impose a robust range of electronic monitoring requirements on anyone serving their sentence in the community. Where the court imposes curfews, exclusion zones and/or an alcohol ban, offenders must be electronically monitored, subject to individual suitability. I note the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about the effect on police resources. However, quite a lot of the monitoring is done by the Probation Service. As the noble Baroness is probably aware, the Government are putting a lot of additional resources back into the Probation Service to enable it to do this.
Soon judges will be able to add driving bans and bans on offenders attending pubs, bars, clubs and desirable social activities like sports and concerts, as well as some tough new geographical restriction zones, to the existing tools.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I love that the Minister said that judges will be able to do that. Will she use the new powers, which I think the Attorney-General is taking, to overrule the Sentencing Council if it tries to dilute those powers?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
This is probably not the moment for me to embark on that one. This, of course, is simply about agreeing with the Sentencing Council’s guidelines in individual cases, not overriding them. I am confident that agreement will be reached, but, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, perhaps that is one I will deal with another day.
We are also about to expand the intensive supervision courts to deal with the root causes of these crimes by making repeat offenders come back in front of the same judge on regular occasions to see how they are doing. That is what is going to be available to judges.
Let us look at the other side of the coin for a moment. Many shoplifters have complicated backgrounds and complex needs, and sometimes electronic monitoring may not be an appropriate requirement to add to an offender’s sentence, even if this is their third or more offence. Many prolific offenders are homeless and lead chaotic lives. Even getting them to turn up to court on time can be a significant challenge. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement in some of these cases would be setting the defendant up to fail instead of helping to improve the outcome for the perpetrators and victims of crime and the public at large. It is all entirely case specific, and the judge is the right person to make that decision.
I am proud of our judiciary, which is working hard under very difficult circumstances at the moment, and I am asking noble Lords to trust our magnificent judges, because they do understand the problems that repeat shoplifting can cause and they understand the powers available to them to sentence individual offenders appropriately. This measure would put unnecessary constraints on them and make an already difficult job harder. I can also assure noble Lords that we are continuing to work with cross-government partners and police forces to consider new ways of targeting and tackling persistent and prolific offenders.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for her courtesy and the depth of her reply, but I am not quite sure how we solve the £200 problem. The points she made about enforcement are very good ones, but the difficulty is this belief that if you steal something worth less than £200, nothing will happen to you; thus my parallel with San Francisco. What are we going to do about that?
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.
For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.
The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.