Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group essentially encompasses several different groups of amendments; perhaps they should have been separated, but we are where we are. Two of those groups within this very large group are, I would argue, quite uncontroversial. I have absolutely no issue with the Government increasing the maximum penalties for the offence in Clause 28 in Scotland, and for extending the provision in Clauses 31, 32 and 35 to Northern Ireland and Scotland. I have no issue with the government amendments about the bulk sale of knives.

I do, however, take issue with government Amendments 71, 72, 73, 74, 85, 86, 110, 111, 129, 130, 141, 142, 170, 171, 185, 186, 187 and 188. These amend the Bill to permit the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying further forms of identification that can be used for age-verification purposes relating to the online sale and the delivery of knives and crossbows. That might seem innocuous at first, but all it takes is to look at the explanatory statements to realise what these amendments are really about. The explanatory statement for Amendment 71 says that the amendment

“allows the Secretary of State to make regulations prescribing an alternative process for age verification (such as digital ID)”.

That is the point.

What is happening here is that the Government are attempting perhaps to sneak in provisions permitting digital ID by the backdoor. I say that the Government are sneaking these in, because they have not only tabled amendments to change clauses already in the Bill but included the regulation-making power permitting digital ID in the drafting of the new clauses that extend provisions to Northern Ireland and Scotland. On top of that, they have lumped these amendments together with all the others in this enormous group. I can only assume that the Government hoped that perhaps no one would notice their attempts to take the very first step towards legislating for mandatory digital ID. That is why we cannot support these amendments.

The Government will perhaps attempt to play this off as a small and practical change to allow Ministers to retain flexibility by allowing new age-verification processes, but that is a red herring. Digital ID is an affront to our rights, and the Government have repeatedly stated that it will not be mandatory, that it is no big deal and that it will simply make things easier. Yet here we are with the Government seeking to insert provisions for digital ID into the Crime and Policing Bill. They have not even enacted the policy, yet they are already trying to expand its purpose. Does this not tell us all we need to know? They say that it will not be mandatory, but how can we ever be sure of that?

We notified the Government of our opposition to these amendments in advance to let them know that we would not accept any amendments to this Bill, or for that matter any Bill, that enables digital ID. It is in that spirit that I tabled my Amendments 72A, 72B, 87A and 131A to remove provisions in the Bill that permit the Secretary of State to make regulations that specify other identity documents. My Amendments 75A, 75B, 75C, 76A, 76B, 76C, 190A, 190B, 191A and 191B amend the government amendments for that same purpose. If the Government accept these proposed changes to their amendments—that is, if they accept that there can be no power to specify digital ID for the purposes of these clauses—I have no further concerns with them. However, if they do not want to accept my changes to their amendments to remove the ability to specify digital ID for age-verification purposes here, then we will not be able to support them.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century—I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we on this side of the Committee are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing forward this thoughtful group of amendments relating to the controls on offensive weapons. Each of these amendments raise practical questions about the application of current laws that relate to offensive weapons and seek to ensure that legislation designed to protect the public does not inadvertently criminalise legitimate, historically important or professionally supervised activities.

Amendment 211 proposes a defence where a weapon is of genuine historical importance. The reasoning behind this amendment is eminently sensible and aligns the treatment of such items with existing defences relating to antiques and curated collections. This is a meaningful distinction between dangerous modern weapons intended for misuse and historical artifacts preserved for cultural or heritage purposes. There is an important question here on proportionality and the scope of reasonable excuse. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on whether existing provisions fully address the concerns raised.

Amendments 212 and 213 relate to the traditional straight police truncheon and agricultural tools. I can tell the Committee that in my 32 years as a police officer, I did not use my truncheon on anybody, but it is very useful for silencing alarms in business premises in the middle of the night when you cannot get the keyholder out of bed. Here too, we recognise the practical issues that these amendments seek to resolve. It is not a controversial belief that items with legitimate ceremonial, historical or agricultural uses should not inadvertently fall within criminal restrictions where there is no evidence of misuse. The examples provided in support of these proposals make clear that the law must operate with fairness and precision, and I hope the Government consider them with due regard.

Amendment 214 addresses a wide range of potential exemptions for visiting forces, emergency services, theatrical and film productions, museums and antiques. These are complex areas with operational realities that deserve serious thought. The amendment raises legitimate questions about how the law accommodates professional and historical circumstances without undermining public safety. I look forward to hearing the Government’s thoughts on, and response to, this amendment.

These amendments rightly probe the intersection of criminal law with the heritage and cultural sectors. These are sectors that must be protected. We cannot allow well-meaning legislation unintentionally to criminalise legitimate historical and cultural activities. We look forward to the Minister’s response and assurances that these matters will receive the careful consideration that they merit.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I stand to ask for guidance from the Dispatch Box. When I was doing my national service in the Royal Navy in March 1957—I can date it precisely—I became a midshipman. With that ranking, I was awarded a midshipman’s dirk, which I still hold today. I cannot find that dirk falling under any of the exceptions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. Do I therefore have to table a special amendment to make it lawful for me to continue to hold my midshipman’s dirk?

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for setting out the case for his Amendments 214A and 438. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, who attached their names to Amendment 214A. As the noble Lord, Lord Brady, has explained, the aim is to deregulate the devices known as sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I too must out myself as a townie. As with the previous group, it has been a bit of an education finding out about these items and their uses. They are currently subject to control as they are included in the statutory definition of a firearm set out in Section 57 of the Firearms Act 1968. This means that firearms licence holders with a legitimate need for these items are required to apply to the police to include them on their existing firearms licence, and this is obviously at a cost to both the police and the licence holder.

As many noble Lords have noted—indeed, every noble Lord who spoke—removing these items from the legal definition of a firearm would alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments. Because these are entirely inert objects containing no moving parts, they do not of themselves create a risk to public safety, as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, and others have said. The Government have already set out our intention to remove these items from the legal definition of a firearm, and I am therefore sympathetic to the intent behind these amendments.

However, I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a commitment at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to bring forward the necessary legislative changes to the Firearms Act in this Bill. If he would agree to withdraw his amendment, I will undertake to update the noble Lord ahead of Report. I will say no more.

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In closing, I say that I do not disagree with anything that noble Lords have said, but we must be particularly careful that we do not just choose some people to protect while unintentionally giving the impression that we do not really care about others.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward Amendments 214F and 214G, which address a gap in the protections afforded to retail workers under Clause 37. I am also grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate.

The amendments seek to ensure that delivery drivers who are employed as part of the retail and distribution process are fully included in the scope of the proposed offences against retail workers, and that delivery vehicles themselves are recognised as an extension of the retail premises. We understand and support the underlying principle behind these proposals. Delivery drivers in many cases are the face and point of contact between businesses and consumers and they often work alone, sometimes at unsociable hours and in circumstances where they may be exposed to heightened vulnerability and increasing levels of aggression and abuse.

The safety of delivery drivers should not depend on whether they are standing behind a shop counter or stepping out of a branded van. The rise of home delivery as a core component of modern retail means that this work is an integral part of the sector, and it is only right that the law reflects that reality. It is regrettable to read that certain major supermarkets have rolled out bodycams for their delivery drivers in an effort to protect them. I therefore hope the Government will consider carefully how these protections might sensibly be extended to those whose job it is to ensure that goods reach the customer.

Turning to Amendment 351 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston, I fully understand the principle and intent behind this amendment. It raises significant questions about whether the current scope of legal protection is sufficiently broad. The question of whether other public-facing workers, such as in transport, hospitality or civic buildings, face similar risks is one worth raising and discussing. Many of those workers play a crucial role in maintaining order, ensuring safety and supporting essential public functions in spaces accessible to the public.

I similarly thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for his Amendment 214FA. This would include premises used by the hospitality industry for the supply of food or drink as part of the definition of retail premises for the purposes of this offence. This is also an important question to pose to the Government, and I hope they consider it with care.

The issues raised by this group of amendments deserve serious consideration. They invite the Government to reflect on whether extra provisions are needed to protect certain public-facing roles and, if so, which roles specifically need to be highlighted. The question that needs to be answered in response to all the amendments in this group is why only retail workers should be afforded a special criminal offence. Does the A&E receptionist not face the threat of violence and intimidation too? What about the bar staff at a nightclub? A wide range of people are at higher risk of assault during the course of their work. If we are to create a specific offence of assaulting a retail worker, it would make sense to expand this. I hope that the Government will give this careful thought and return the clarity in how they intend to address the concerns expressed.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Stowell, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for their amendments. I should note—if not declare an interest—that I have been a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers for 46 years now. That is a long time. I think it is worth noting that I have an interest in this matter. Indeed, I spent many years trying to raise this very issue when a Member of Parliament and outside Parliament before coming to this House.

I should also say at the outset that I am meeting the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to discuss this matter, and am very happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, as well. I had a request from my noble friend Lord Hannett of Everton to meet him and the USDAW general secretary, Joanne Thomas. I am also happy to do that between now and Report; it may not be immediately.

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Debate on whether Clause 39 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled this notice of my intention to oppose the question that Clause 39 stand part of the Bill, to correct what has become serious misinformation. By way of background, Clause 39 repeals Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That section was inserted into the 1980 Act by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 provides that where a person is charged with a shoplifting offence where the value of the stolen goods is under £200, the offence is triable only summarily. Accordingly, low-value shoplifting cases will only be heard before magistrates’ courts and will not go before the Crown Court. This alteration has become the subject of significant misinformation, largely perpetuated by the party in government. In the 2024 election manifesto, it claimed that this had created

“effective immunity for some shoplifting”

and the Government’s policy paper in the Bill, published on GOV.UK, calls it “perceived immunity”. This, of course, is absolutely false. There is no immunity in any form for any shoplifting offences. Allowing an offence to be tried only in a magistrates’ court does not give anyone immunity.

The Sentencing Council’s guidelines for sentencing a person guilty of theft from a shop state that the starting point for low-value shoplifting, with little additional harm to the victim, is a “high-level community order”, with the maximum being a 12-week custodial sentence. For low-value shoplifting, with significant additional harm to the victim, the starting point is 12 weeks’ custody and the maximum is 26 weeks’ custody. It is clear, then, that magistrates’ courts can impose community orders and terms of imprisonment on offenders found guilty of low-value shoplifting. If the Government believe that is immunity, they clearly need to have a serious rethink. I therefore ask the Minister why the Government are making this change, since there is absolutely not immunity for low-value shoplifting. What can they possibly hope that this will achieve?

The reality is that Clause 39 is purely performative. Worse than that, it is performative politics with negative ramifications. Where an offence is triable either way, it is up to the magistrates’ court and the defendant to decide which court finally hears the case. If the magistrates’ court deems itself to have sufficient powers to try the case, a defendant is able to elect the court that their case will be heard by. Are we seriously saying that we will be permitting a person charged with stealing £50-worth of chocolate to be hauled in front of a Crown Court judge and jury? In such a scenario, the most likely sentence would be a community order for a few months’ imprisonment: that sentence would likely be the same whether the case was tried in a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court.

Why enable the possibility for a person charged with low-value shoplifting to elect to go to a Crown Court, simply for them to be handed the same sentence they could have been given in the magistrates’ court? There are around 73,000 criminal cases waiting to be heard by the Crown Courts. Many people are waiting years for their case to be heard. The last thing we need now is for more minor offences to be sent to the Crown Courts, adding to their already sizable backlog. This is not a solution to shoplifting. It is simply another way for a defendant to string out their proceedings. Permitting low-value shoplifting to be tried only summarily does not give shoplifters immunity but will serve only to clog up our already stretched Crown Courts.

What does create an effective immunity for shoplifting is the Government’s Sentencing Bill. Noble Lords will know that the Bill creates the presumption that a custodial sentence of less than 12 months be suspended. Even if a person is given a custodial sentence for low-value shoplifting, they will not serve any time in prison. If that does not give would-be shoplifters more incentive to steal, I do not know what does. Clause 39 is pointless and performative, and would be damaging to the swift passage of justice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the intention of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to oppose Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I have listened with care to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but we firmly believe that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. There is one thing that we can all agree on: shop theft has risen at any alarming rate in recent years. It is a blight on our society; it causes loss and distress to retailers and it undermines the safety of retail spaces.

This Government are committed to restoring confidence in the safety of retail spaces, and to protecting businesses from escalating losses. The latest figures from the Office for National Statistics are stark. Shoplifting almost doubled over the past five years, increasing to 530,643 cases in 2025. While multiple factors have contributed to rising retail crime, one persistent issue is the perception in many quarters that low-value theft has no real consequences, and some regard it as having been, in effect, decriminalised.

The noble Lord is right that Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act converted theft of goods worth £200 or less from shops to being tried summarily. I completely understand that the argument of the previous Government was that this would increase efficiency by enabling the police to prosecute instances of low-value theft and keeping the cases in the magistrates’ court, but it has not worked. Instead, it is not that there is immunity, but there is a perception that those committing theft of goods worth £200 or less will escape any punishment. My noble friend Lord Hannett referred to this in relation to the previous group of amendments.

Clause 39 will rectify this, and it really matters. Evidence from the Association of Convenience Stores shows that only 36% of retail crime is even reported. Many retailers choose not to do so; they think it is a waste of time, because they believe that the police will not do anything. The underreporting masks the true scale of the problem and leaves businesses vulnerable.

We must act decisively to support retailers facing this growing challenge, and Clause 39 does exactly that. It closes a critical gap by sending a clear and unequivocal message: theft of any value is a serious criminal act and will be treated seriously. By removing the financial threshold for so-called low-value shop theft, we are sending a clear message to perpetrators and would-be perpetrators that this crime is not going to be tolerated and will be met with appropriate punishment. We are also making it clear to the retailers that we take this crime seriously, and they should feel encouraged to report it.

I acknowledge the concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that by making shop theft triable either way there is scope for some cases to end up in the Crown Court. However, there are two reasons why the noble Lord does not need to worry about this. The first is that Sir Brian Leveson highlighted in his independent review that the risk is mitigated by the existing sentencing guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework to ensure that the penalties remain proportionate. This means that, in practice, the vast majority of such cases fall well within magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be committed to the Crown Court, for either trial or sentence. We anticipate that the effect on the backlog will be negligible. Secondly, as far as defendants electing trial in the Crown Court is concerned, they already have the ability to do this in relation to the so-called summary only offence. In practice, elections occur only in marginal numbers. There is no evidence to suggest that Clause 39 will change this.

I urge the noble Lord to join us in sending this very clear message—we entirely accept it was always the intention of the previous Government not to decriminalise this—to make it clear to everybody what a serious offence this is. I hope that he is willing to withdraw his opposition to Clause 39 standing part.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am, however, very disappointed by her continued defence of Clause 39. It is absolutely clear that the changes made by the previous Government do not create effective immunity for low-value shoplifting. All shoplifting offences are able to be tried in a magistrates’ court, where the court can impose a custodial sentence if necessary. Drink-driving offences are tried summarily only. I do not see the Government proposing to make that offence triable either way.

The fundamental point is that this change will not help anyone. It will not deter shoplifters. I hardly think a potential shoplifter will suddenly decide to stop because he might be tried in a Crown Court as opposed to a magistrates’ court. It will simply increase the Crown Court backlog without any benefit. This is a matter that I am sure we will return to on Report.

Clause 39 agreed.

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

215: After Clause 39, insert the following new Clause—
“Requirements in certain sentences imposed for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(2) In section 208 (community order: exercise of power to impose particular requirements), in subsections (3) and (6) after “subsection (10)” insert “and sections 208A”.(3) After that section insert—“208A Community order: requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a community order in respect of the index offence.(2) The community order must, subject to subsection (3), include at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not including any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be included in the order—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to an occasion on which an offender was sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting does not include an occasion if—(a) each conviction for adult shoplifting for which the offender was dealt with on that occasion has been quashed, or(b) the offender was re-sentenced for adult shoplifting (and was not otherwise dealt with for adult shoplifting) on that occasion.(5) In this section—“adult shoplifting” means an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 committed by a person aged 18 or over in circumstances where—(a) the stolen goods were being offered for sale in a shop or any other premises, stall, vehicle or place from which a trade or business was carried on, and(b) at the time of the offence, the offender was, or was purporting to be, a customer or potential customer of the person offering the goods for sale;“equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” means—(a) in Scotland, theft committed by a person aged 18 or over in the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of “adult shoplifting”, or(b) in Northern Ireland, an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 committed by a person aged 18 or over in those circumstances.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be included in a community order if it could not otherwise be so included.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a community order which includes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied, notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.(4) After section 292 insert—“292A Suspended sentence order: community requirements for third or subsequent shoplifting offence(1) This section applies where—(a) a person is convicted of adult shoplifting (“the index offence”),(b) when the index offence was committed, the offender had on at least two previous occasions been sentenced in respect of adult shoplifting or an equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence, and(c) the court makes a suspended sentence order in respect of the index offence.(2) The suspended sentence order must, subject to subsection (3), impose at least one of the following requirements—(a) a curfew requirement;(b) an exclusion requirement;(c) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if—(a) the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—(i) relate to any of the offences or the offender, and(ii) justify the court not imposing on the offender any requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2), or(b) neither of the following requirements could be imposed on the offender—(i) an electronic compliance monitoring requirement for securing compliance with a proposed curfew requirement or proposed exclusion requirement;(ii) an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement.(4) Section 208A(4) (occasions to be disregarded) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b).(5) In this section “adult shoplifting” and “equivalent Scottish or Northern Ireland offence” have the meaning given by section 208A.(6) Nothing in subsection (2) enables a requirement to be imposed by a suspended sentence order if it could not otherwise be so imposed.(7) Where—(a) in a case to which this section applies, a court makes a suspended sentence order which imposes a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (2),(b) a previous conviction of the offender is subsequently set aside on appeal, and(c) without the previous conviction this section would not have applied,notice of appeal against the sentence may be given at any time within 28 days from the day on which the previous conviction was set aside (despite anything in section 18 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968).”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause imposes a duty (subject to certain exceptions) to impose a curfew requirement, an exclusion requirement or an electronic whereabouts monitoring requirement on certain persons convicted of shoplifting, where the offender is given a community sentence or suspended sentence order.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 215 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie speaks to a growing and deeply felt concern shared by communities and retailers across the country—that the persistent and habitual shoplifter is too often left to reoffend, with little intervention, limited consequences and insufficient support to break the cycle of offending. There has been a 13% increase in shoplifting offences in the year ending June 2025.

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The first thing we want to do is Clause 39, which, of course, was opposed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. But in addition, this is about making it clear to everybody that it really does matter, and driving it through to the police that there should be no immunities—that there are no levels below to which this should not apply.

For all these reasons, I do believe these amendments are not required, but I would be very happy to discuss the matters further with both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, and I encourage them to speak with me if they feel there are matters that I have not fully taken into account. But, for now, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her kind offer.

The amendment of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe focuses on enforcement. If the police do not investigate theft, if they do not take measures to deter and prevent shoplifting, no amount of legislation will change that. Creating a code of practice for low-value shoplifting could be a step in the right direction. Together with my Amendment 215—and I am grateful, I think, for the implied support of the Liberal Democrats—these measures target enforcement and punishment. This is in stark contrast to what the Government are proposing in Clause 39. The effective immunity for shoplifters comes from the inability of the police to catch those who shoplift. It is an issue of enforcement and investigation, which in turn all comes back to police funding and officer numbers—a point made by the noble Baroness Lady Doocey. Better enforcement is what will drive down shoplifting offence rates, not putting those cases before Crown Court judges. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 215 withdrawn.