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Lord Leigh of Hurley
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
My Lords, my amendments seek to improve Clause 124. It is worth reminding ourselves that this clause seeks to amend Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986. Curiously, that section was itself amended in 2022 to allow the senior police officer to impose conditions on a march if it resulted in
“serious disruption to the life of the community”,
in particular where it results in
“a significant delay to the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers”,
or
“disruption of access to any essential goods”
or services to be delivered to places of worship. It is somewhat strange that the Act was amended to allow goods and services to be delivered, but did not mention disruption to the services themselves, so Clause 124 is a great improvement and a great help.
However, I wish to draw to the attention of the Ministers, the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, that Section 12 is dependent upon the actions of a “senior police officer”, who “may”—the Act is specific on that word—decide to take action. I guess that he may not, as he is not required so to do. The Home Office will still be totally and solely reliant on the decisions of the senior police officer being put into action. There is no override envisaged that the Home Office can apply.
While I am on my feet, I believe that exactly the same point applies to Amendment 372 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson; again, it says that a senior police officer may choose to do this. I suggest that does not deal with the problem that when complaints are made by members of the public, politicians currently simply put their hands up and say, “It’s nothing to do with us; this is a police matter”. As we have seen in the West Midlands, we cannot rely on the police in every instance to do their duty and act fairly.
At the risk of repeating myself, this is the third time I have raised this point in debates on this Bill. In the previous two discussions, I have not really had an answer from the Ministers. In fact, I am not expecting them to answer it right now. What I am asking is for a commitment to consider this point, reflect on it and possibly meet those with an interest in the matter, and for it to be addressed by the time of Report.
My amendments are needed so that we can be sure that if protesters are banned from being near synagogues, they are stopped from simply heading towards Jewish faith schools and Jewish community centres. Of course, if my amendments protect schools and community centres of other faiths then I would be absolutely delighted, so I hope that these amendments will receive support from all sides of the House. Disappointingly, there is not a Bishop on their Bench, because, in my view, places of worship of all denominations need to be addressed by the Bill.
Make no mistake: Jewish people are leaving the UK as they no longer feel safe, particularly with the marches threatening to come back. I was in Israel last week on a parliamentary Conservative Friends of Israel trip, and Israelis were asking me, “Is it safe to be in London or Manchester any more?”. Businesspeople, academics, scientists, tourists and clerics are all nervous about coming to the UK. As we know, by the way, the marches in Westcliff-on-Sea led to synagogue attendance falling, which cannot be acceptable. We now need to be ahead of the protesters, not behind them. We need to protect faith schools and community centres.
Indeed, there have already been protests outside a Jewish community centre; there is one called JW3, which I support. When protesters were outside it on 27 October, there were unpleasant and aggressive slogans, and the police were powerless to move them on. Ironically, they were protesting at an event which was a conference to talk about future peace progress, with Palestinian representatives speaking.
My amendments attempt to pre-empt what we fear will happen after Clause 124 is passed. I have the support of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, of the Jewish Leadership Council—I declare that I serve as a vice-president—and of the Community Security Trust. All these organisations urge that my amendments be passed. As the noble Lord, Lord Walney, said the other day, these proposals do not conflict with anything the Macdonald review might say. The Government need no persuasion of this, because they themselves have proposed Clause 124 and Amendment 372, both of which would ordinarily be covered by the Macdonald review. There is no reason, then, to wait for his report to put through the proposed amendments.
I hope that by Report, the Minister will be able to signal his acceptance of these amendments, because we will keep pressing them. I am sure that the Government will want to play their part in trying to dial down the anti-Israel, and consequently antisemitic, febrile activities and mood. In my opinion, it is most unfortunate that the Government chose to recognise the State of Palestine when they did. This risked giving the organisations of protest the message that their aggressive and unpleasant actions were being rewarded. The Government now have an opportunity to try to show some even-handedness. I beg to move.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I support these amendments for the reasons that have been mentioned. Lists are always difficult, because wherever you draw the line, there may be another group to be added, but this is a sensible pair of additions to the definition as applied in the Bill. It is difficult, not least because this week we have seen complaints about what is happening in Notting Hill, where an Israeli restaurant seems to have had a protest directly outside it for no other reason than that it happens to be Israeli. This does not seem to have anything to do with the people attending or running the place, other than the connection to Israel. No matter where we draw the line on the list, there may always be others to add. But if we cannot protect children, and we cannot protect where minority and faith groups gather to share their faith, then our society will probably be worse for it. Providing this definition will make the police’s job easier. While others may argue for more to be added to the list, these are two reasonable, well-founded additions.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I share the concern expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, that senior police officers do not always act as they should. On Tuesday in particular, I expressed that concern in these proceedings and was rather rebuffed by the Minister. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that I do not believe that senior police officers in particular cannot generally be relied upon to act in the best interests of their community, but I urge the Government to beware of legislating in the confident expectation that they always will. The reservations of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, are justified. As he explained, Clause 124, if unamended, will permit a senior police officer to impose restrictions where processions or protests are
“in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”,
and deter them from attending
“a place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities”,
or from actually carrying out such activities. As the noble Lord has explained, the amendments would add faith schools and faith community centres to list of institutions where conditions might be imposed.
On Tuesday, we went through considerable argument about the purposes of Clause 124. There was a great deal of discussion about protecting synagogues on successive Saturdays, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has raised the important point that communities gather together, worship or carry out religious activities and celebrations in areas quite apart from synagogues. Bondi Beach, after all, is not a synagogue: it is a public beach where Hanukkah celebrations had been organised and were being attended by Jewish communities.
I add my voice to those of the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, and Lord Leigh of Hurley: our faith communities need protecting wherever they are gathering for the purposes of their faith. That said, I certainly agree, as does the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with the extension of this power to cover religious activities at faith schools and faith community centres. That would be a proportionate protection, and well defined. Faith schools are a particular sensitivity, because they are principally for young people of given faiths, who may be damaged psychologically for life by being attacked in or in the vicinity of those schools. The same goes for faith community centres, where Sunday school activities or religious education may be taking place. Of course, this is of particular importance to the Jewish community in the present climate, in the light of the horrific attacks that have taken place, about which we have heard a great deal. But it is also very important that Muslim faith schools and community centres should be protected too in the presence of considerable xenophobia and Islamophobia.
We need these protections; we need to combat the fear that is now beginning to permeate the whole of our national life, and which has a really unpleasant and damaging effect. It destroys community cohesion, national spirit and the tolerance for which this country has long been famous.
Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, and to add to the dialogue by saying that we are becoming desensitised to violent, harassing and intimidatory protests. The ideal of having local senior police officers in charge of restricting these protests is becoming much riskier, so the need to legislate has become much more urgent. I endorse the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, in supporting this amendment.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and spoken to by him so powerfully today, address an important gap in the Bill as drafted. They would ensure that faith schools and community centres are included within the definition of religious sites for the purpose of restrictions on protests. At their core, these amendments are about protecting people’s ability to practise their faith freely and without intimidation. Places of worship are more than simply buildings used for ceremonial services; they are frequently part of a wider religious campus that often includes schools, halls and community sites. It is wrong to draw an artificial distinction, even if inadvertently so, between a synagogue, a church or a temple and their adjoining faith school or community centre.
Clause 124 itself, and these amendments, do not seek to ban protest, nor to diminish the right to peaceful assembly. Instead, they allow the police to impose proportionate conditions where a protest in the vicinity of a religious site may intimidate people of “reasonable firmness” and deter them from accessing or carrying out religious activities. We had a long and vigorous debate on Tuesday about the clause itself. It is crucial, as many said on that day, that the test be rooted in reasonableness and necessity, and is not used as a guise for police forces to stifle people’s free speech and right to protest. Self-evidently, that must be counterbalanced against people’s safety, particularly that of children, which is where these amendments are so apposite.
This is particularly important given the heinous terrorist attack that took place at Heaton Park synagogue. The aftermath of that attack saw armed police required to stand guard at Jewish schools and community centres. That this had to happen should shame us all. In a civilised country, no one should have to live in such fear. Not only that but in recent years there has been a troubling rise in protests which target religious communities in ways that stray from robust political expression into sheer intimidation.
Faith schools and community centres are where children and families in particular gather, who should never be subject to threatening activity simply due to their faith. They are often places of education, as we have heard from noble Lord, Lord Marks. They are places of leisure and places of play—all in a religious setting.
With that said, it is my submission that the amendments in the name of my noble friend are a welcome step. I hope that the Minister pays them very close regard. I look forward to hearing his response.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all who have contributed to this short but focused and important debate on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, which seek to extend the power for police to restrict protests near places of worship to cover faith schools and faith community centres. The amendments were spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, and supported by the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe, Lord Marks and Lord Massey of Hampstead, and from the opposition Front Bench by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron.
I acknowledge the wider societal problem that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, powerfully described in moving the amendment. I think it is fair to say that he acknowledged the need for Clause 124 and hence its inclusion in the Bill. We are as government very aware of the problem. In the discussion on the previous mega group of amendments on public order on Tuesday evening, there were some assertions by noble Lord that synagogues are not impacted by marches or protests. I neglected to say it at that time, but this is an opportunity for me to say from the Dispatch Box that that is clearly not the case. We know that there are synagogues in central London that have been directly impacted by marches. They have had to change their service times and have had their normal pattern of worship disrupted by those marches. It is clear proof that, in respect of the Jewish community over the last couple of years at least, we need the provisions of Clause 124.
Before I move on to the amendments, I hope that, in responding to those in Israel and the US who raised with him whether it is safe for Jews to live in Britain and to be in Britain, the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, provided them reassurance that this is still one of the best places to be Jewish. We have fantastic values of tolerance and a liberal approach to enjoying any lifestyle that you wish and any religion that you wish to follow. As a British Jew, I am certainly very happy still, despite the concerns that we are discussing, to say that Britain is a great place to be a Jewish person. I hope that he responded in a similar manner.
On the amendments, under Sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, the police must have a reasonable belief that a public procession or assembly may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or that the purpose of those organising the protest is the intimidation of others. The police must have a similar reasonable belief under Section 14ZA in respect to noise generated by a one-person protest.
Clause 124 will strengthen the police’s ability to manage intimidatory protests near places of worship by allowing them to impose conditions on a public procession, public assembly or one-person protest, specifically if they have a reasonable belief that the protests may result in intimidation and deter those seeking to access places of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities or conducting religious activities there.
Clause 124 does not define places of worship, which means that, where community centres may be used as a place of worship, there is flexibility for the police to consider using this measure and imposing conditions if appropriate. We believe this is a proportionate approach, because it allows the police to exercise their independent operational judgment rather than being constrained by prescriptive lists in legislation. Non-statutory guidance from the College of Policing will assist in clarifying marginal cases without removing the police’s discretion.
I appreciate the point that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, made—and has made in previous debates—on police discretion. To respond to him directly, I am of course very happy to meet him with department officials to discuss this as we move through Committee and before we get to Report. That offer is open to him and to other noble Lords who would care to discuss the issue.
Regarding faith schools, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, there is particular sensitivity around schools because it involves young people. I declare an interest; I have two daughters who attend a Jewish faith school. It is incredibly concerning that they could be exposed to this in the manner of going to school and that the most normal everyday activity that a child or young person undertakes could be so disrupted. We very much share his concern, and his concern that it is not simply about Jewish faith schools; we are talking about all manner of faith schools, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, Muslim schools—they are very much at the cutting edge as a very visible place in a community where protests could be mounted and could be a focus for local community opposition or aggression, which is why we need to be careful about it. However, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 gave local authorities the power to make expedited public space protection orders which protect those attending schools from intimidation, harassment or impeded access in the course of a protest or demonstration. Combined with the wide range of powers the police already have to address intimidation and harassment, these amendments would, I submit to your Lordship’s Committee, unnecessarily duplicate existing law.
Given that, I hope—although I am realistic—that I might have been able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, a little. I hope that, taking an account of the offer of a meeting and further discussion on the points that his amendments raise, he would agree that his amendments are not necessary and, at least for the time being, that he will not press them.
Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his contribution. I was tempted to add restaurants to the amendment, but I had already tabled it. I have instead just made a booking there. Members of the House of Lords are welcome to join me to support the restaurant.
I thank my riparian neighbour, down the river at Henley-on-Thames from Hurley, for his most welcome contribution. Of course, I thank my noble friends Lord Massey and Lord Cameron.
I assure the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that I told everyone who made that comment to me that the UK was a very safe space for Israeli citizens to come and visit. However, it really was a concern that was expressed to me, quite shockingly. I assure him that I am totally in agreement with him on that.
I would argue that community centres could not be defined as places of worship. The JW3 centre specifically, as the noble Lord knows, could not be described as such, so it would not come within that definition. However, I can see that he is sympathetic and understanding, and I am very grateful for that. I am grateful to the Government for putting in Clause 124. Clearly, the 2022 Act was not sufficient, which is why they had to put in Clause 124, so perhaps there is a discussion to be had. I am grateful for his agreement to do that. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Public processions and assemblies: duty to take account of cumulative disruption(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(2) In section 12 (power to impose conditions on public processions), after subsection (2B) insert—“(2BA) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, a senior police officer must take into account any relevant cumulative disruption.(2BB) In subsection (2BA) “relevant cumulative disruption” means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—(a) the procession,(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly),and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time.(2BC) In subsection (2BB) “area”, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly.”.(3) In section 14 (power to impose conditions on public assemblies) after subsection (2B) insert—“(2BA) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, a senior police officer must take into account any relevant cumulative disruption.(2BB) In subsection (2BA) “relevant cumulative disruption” means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—(a) the assembly,(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession),and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time.(2BC) In subsection (2BB) “area”, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause amends sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to require police officers, when deciding whether the serious disruption to the life of the community threshold is met in England and Wales, to take account of the cumulative effect of processions and assemblies in the same area.
Baroness Doocey
“(4) After section 14, insert—“14A Imposition of conditions: live facial recognitionPrior to imposing conditions under either section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new statutory code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14, unless a new, specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 379, I will speak also to Amendment 471. When used responsibly, live facial recognition can help to protect the public. The real question before us is not whether it is used but how, under what safeguards, with what scrutiny and by what authority from Parliament? At present, the answer is deeply unsatisfactory.
Police forces are rolling out live facial recognition at speed, without a clear legal framework, consistent oversight or meaningful public consultation. Its operational use has more than doubled in a year. Millions of pounds are being spent on new systems and mobile vans, yet there is still no reference to facial recognition in any Act of Parliament. Instead, the police rely on a patchwork of data protection law, the Human Rights Act and non-binding guidance. Parliament must now act urgently to put its use on a clear statutory footing. The police themselves say that this is vital to maintain public trust.
Recent Home Office testing of the police national database’s retrospective facial recognition tool found significantly higher error rates for black and Asian people than for white people. For black women, the false positive rate was almost one in 10 when the system was run on lower settings. It also performs less reliably with children and young people. The human consequences are already here: schoolchildren in uniform wrongly flagged and told to prove their identity, and a black anti-knife campaigner stopped on his way home from volunteering and asked for his fingerprints because the system got it wrong. These are not theoretical risks; they are happening now.
When this became public, Ministers ordered a review and testing of a new algorithm, which is welcome. But questions remain. Why was the bias not disclosed earlier? Why on earth was the regulator not informed? Why are biased algorithms still in use today? A false match rate of nearly one in 10 for black women is not a technical glitch; it is a civil rights issue. Running thousands of searches every month before strengthening statutory oversight only deepens public mistrust. That is why the measures in Amendment 471 deserve very serious consideration.
Amendment 379 is modest and practical. It focuses on one of the most sensitive uses of live facial recognition: protests and public assemblies. It would require the police to pause its use at such events until a new statutory code of practice, approved by Parliament, is in place. That code would set out clearly when surveillance is justified, how watch lists are compiled, what safeguards apply and, crucially, what redress is available when things go wrong.
This Committee has already heard concerns about the gradual narrowing of protest rights. Each new restriction may seem small in isolation, but together they add up. Elsewhere in the Bill, as we heard on Monday, the Government seek to criminalise those who wish to remain anonymous at protests. Combined with expanding facial recognition, that places even greater pressure on protest rights. Taken together, these measures risk discouraging peaceful dissent and undermining freedom of expression.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I rise to oppose Amendment 379 and support most of Amendment 471, inadequate though it is. My views may not be the same as those of my noble friends on the Front Bench, of course. We all value the right to protest, but rights are not a shield for criminality. The Government and Policing Ministers have been very clear that live facial recognition is being developed and deployed as a targeted, intelligence-led tool to identify known or wanted individuals or criminals on watch lists. It is not a blanket surveillance tool of the public. The Home Office has opened a consultation and asked for stronger statutory rules and oversight precisely to ensure proportionate lawful use.
Amendment 379 would in effect tie the hands of senior officers at the very moment when targeted identification can prevent or stop serious crime. If a protest contains people who are wanted for violent offences, sexual offences or other serious crimes, the ability to identify them quickly and safely is not an abstract technicality; it is how we protect victims and uphold the rule of law. To say that demonstrations are somehow sacrosanct and must be free from tools that help catch criminals is to place form above substance. That is not to dismiss legitimate concerns about privacy and bias. We should legislate a clear statutory framework, independent oversight and robust safeguards, and I know that the Government are consulting on exactly that path.
I will want to see strong action to correct mistakes and address suggestions that it cannot tell the difference in some ethnic groups. That has to be remedied if that allegation is true. But the right response is to legislate proportionate limits and accountability, not to pre-emptively ban a narrowly targeted operational capability at protests and thereby risk letting wanted suspects slip away. For those reasons, I urge the Committee to reject Amendment 379 and instead press the Government to bring forward the statutory code and independent oversight that the public rightly expect.
Amendment 471 is a different kettle of fish—and possibly “off” fish as well. The amendment is far too liberal and fails to protect the public from out-of-control public authorities. I will explain why. As a person relieved of ministerial duties in 1997, I found myself a rather bored Back-Bencher on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—the famous RIPA. The Minister at the time—I think it was Alun Michael—was waxing lyrical about how it would tackle serious crime, terrorism and paedophiles. He mentioned how it would help the police, the National Crime Agency—or whatever it was called then—MI5, MI6, HMRC and a couple of other big national government departments.
We were all in agreement that it was a jolly good thing for these agencies to have that power. Then something the Minister said prompted me to table a Question on what other public bodies could use RIPA powers, and we were shocked to discover that there were actually 32, including at that time something called the egg inspectorate of MAFF, responsible for enforcing the little lion mark on eggs. Schedule 1, listing the public authorities with phone-tapping powers, has expanded a bit since those days, and it now numbers 79. However, that is not the correct number because one of the 79 entries says “every local authority”, so we can add another 317 principal local authorities to that list. I think “every government department” covers all the agencies and arm’s-length bodies under their command, so they also have access to RIPA. In other words, a worthy proposal to let some key government agencies have power to snoop on our mobile phones to detect serious crime, terrorism or paedophilia has now become available, to some extent, to hundreds and possibly thousands of public bodies.
The relevance of this is that if we agree that facial recognition technology can be extended beyond the police, immigration, the National Crime Agency, the security services and possibly a few other big government departments that are concerned with organised crime, people trafficking and immigration, I believe our civil liberties will be at stake if local authorities and some others get to use it as well. If local authorities get the power of facial recognition, I am certain that they will abuse it. A Scottish council uses RIPA to monitor dog barking. Allerdale district council, next to me in Cumbria, used it to catch someone feeding pigeons. Of course it would be brilliant, in my opinion, to catch all those carrying out anti-social behaviour, such as riding dangerously on the pavement with their bikes, not picking up dog mess or generally causing a disturbance. But that is why I think this amendment does not go far enough.
We do not need codes of practice and safeguards—we need a complete ban on all other public authorities using it until it has been tried and tested by the police and we are satisfied that it does not cause false positives and is operationally secure. Then, if it is ever extended to other public authorities, it must be solely, as proposed new subsection (1)(a) says,
“used for the purpose of preventing, detecting, or investigating serious crimes as defined under the Serious Crime Act 2007”.
If we do not have these protections, local councils will end up checking our recycling, what library books we take out and what shops and pubs we use, and will justify it by saying it will help them deliver a better spatial strategy or design services to user patterns.
I look forward to the Liberals going back to their original roots as real liberals and bringing forward a better amendment that will protect our liberties.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 379, to which I have added my name, and to very strongly support it. But before I do, I hope the Committee will forgive me if I digress very briefly to tidy up a matter that arose in Committee on Tuesday. I made the point that the police have the duty to facilitate protest rather than prevent it, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, intervened to ask me where he might find a justification for that statement. Well, I have good news. I have here the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s protest operational advice document, and on page 10, under the heading “Role of the police”, it says that authorised professional practice
“identifies two duties associated with the policing of protest. Broadly these require that the police must … not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly … in certain circumstances, take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. Taken together, these duties (the first a negative duty, the second a positive one) are often described as an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression”.
I also have here a very handy flow chart entitled “Facilitating Peaceful Protest”, and I will make it available to the noble Lord following this debate.
To return to this group, it is now eight years since South Wales Police started deploying early versions of live facial recognition technology. When it did so, the technology was extremely inaccurate and there was absolutely no legislation in place to regulate or oversee the use of this mass surveillance technology—and that is what it is.
For those noble Lords who have not had the opportunity to experience facial recognition technology, I will give a quick overview of how it is used. It currently involves a large van full of electronics being parked in a location, such as a busy shopping street, where large numbers of ordinary people will walk past going about their daily business. On the top of the van are cameras pointing in all directions; they are scanning and recording the faces of all the passers-by. The technology tries to match them to a pre-prepared watch-list, which is a set of images of people the police want to find for some reason. Throughout the many hours of the deployment, something like 20 police officers will be standing around chatting and waiting for the system to decide, rightly or wrongly, that somebody whose face matches a person on the watch-list has just walked past. Several of the otherwise unoccupied police officers then detain the target and try to determine whether it is a true match.
Big Brother Watch, which I chair, has observed many deployments of facial recognition by the Metropolitan Police, and has seen many false matches happen. As well as false positives, the system is also susceptible to false negatives, where it fails to recognise somebody who is on the watch-list, and anyone who the police would like to speak to but was not put on the watch-list can wander by undetected. The Committee can form its own view on whether this is a productive use of scarce police time and money, but one thing is clear: this is a highly intrusive mass surveillance of thousands of citizens, almost all of whom are completely innocent and should be of no interest to the police.
The UK already has one of the highest densities of CCTV cameras in the world. Facial recognition technology will in time be added to those fixed cameras in public spaces. The police, your local authority, supermarkets or whoever will be able to keep tabs on who you are and what you are doing. This technology is far more intrusive than fingerprints or DNA. Live facial recognition can capture your face and location from a distance without you having any idea it has happened. It is as if you have a barcode on your forehead that can be read without your knowledge.
The collection and retention of fingerprints is tightly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Crime and Security Act 2010. Similarly, the use of DNA is strictly regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. But what regulation is there for facial recognition, the most intrusive technology of the lot? Since the first deployment in 2017, absolutely no legislation, none at all, has been introduced to control this serious threat to our privacy. As we have already heard, the phrase “facial recognition” is not mentioned once in UK legislation.
Police forces, including the Met, have had a go at writing their own rules and marking their own homework, but that is obviously not their skill set; it is the job of legislators. The police’s homemade rules vary from force to force, and nobody is monitoring what is actually happening on the ground. For example, they assure us that all images they collect that do not match someone on the watch-list are instantly and permanently destroyed to preserve the privacy of innocent passers-by, but whether that always happens cannot be verified because there is no scrutiny, as there would be with, for example, DNA. This serious legislative vacuum is not the fault of the police; it is the fault of all the Governments since 2017, who were asleep at the wheel and did nothing to control the use of this highly intrusive technology.
You might ask: “Why does it matter to me? Why should I care if the state knows where I am and what I am doing? I am an honest, law-abiding, clean-living citizen. There is nothing in my life that I need to conceal from the police, my boss or my spouse”. You might be told by advocates of mass surveillance, “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. Well, that claim is first attributed to the great democrat Joseph Goebbels. The Chinese state, where much of the technology for facial recognition comes from, uses it to monitor the behaviour of its citizens. It is used not just to keep track of where they are, but to assess whether they are being good citizens in accordance with the state’s definition of what a “good citizen” is.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
My Lords, I agree and disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in equal measure, which may surprise him. On the protest point, he reaffirmed what I tried to say the other day, which is that the ECHR does not give the term “facilitation of protest”, but the police have given that term and put that sobriquet over the articles. The danger is—and I am afraid it is what materialised—that it has been interpreted as almost arranging some of the protests rather than the simplistic expression of “facilitation”. I do not think that we are a mile apart on it, but I come at it from a slightly different angle.
I think that facial recognition is an incredibly good thing. People during the debate have agreed that it has a value. It has two purposes: one is to try retrospectively to match a crime scene suspect with the database that the police hold of convicted people; and the other one, which has caused more concern and on which there may be common ground, is about the live use of it.
One thing that I think needs to be amplified—the Minister may mention it when he responds—is that the Court of Appeal has decided that the police use of facial recognition is legal. However, it did raise concerns—this is where I certainly agree with the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Doocey, who already made this point—that it needs to treat all people equally. It is not okay to have a high failure rate against one group by race and a different success rate against another race. That is not acceptable. I was surprised, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was, when this had not been made public and was discovered in whatever way it was discovered. That needs to be got right. There is no justification for that error rate, and it must be resolved.
Secondly, this may surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I agree that there should be more regulation of its use, and that it should be regulation by Parliament, not by the police. Where I disagree is on whether this Act, and this proposed amendment, is the right way to do it. We are going to have to learn, first, how the technology works, how it is applied by the police, where its benefits are and where its risks are. I also agree that there ought to be independent oversight of it and that anybody who is offended by its use should have the opportunity to get someone to check into it to see whether it has been misused. They should also be provided with a remedy. A remedy may be financial compensation, but I would argue that it is probably better that something happens to the database to make it less likely to be ineffective in the future. There needs to be some reassurance that somebody is improving this system rather than not. I am for facial recognition, but there should be regulation and I do not think that this Act is the right time. As has already been said, the consultation that started just before Christmas and concludes, I think, in February will give us a good way forward, but it will need a bit more thought than this Bill, when it becomes an Act, might offer us.
Finally, there are an awful lot of regulators out there, and we all pay for them. There are surveillance commissioners, intrusive surveillance commissioners and biometric commissioners. They are all examining the same area—if they ever get together and decide to have one commissioner to look at the lot, we would probably save quite a lot of money. This is an area in which the existing commissioners probably could do two things. One is to regulate and the other, potentially, is to approve, either in retrospect or prospectively depending on the emergency or the urgency with which it should be used. There is therefore some need for help but, for me, I do not think that this Bill is the right opportunity.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have signed this amendment because I think it is very sensible and covers some ground that really needs tackling. It would ensure that the police could not use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14 unless a new specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament—that sounds quite democratic, does it not? It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.
It is always interesting to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, former Met Commissioner, on the tiny little areas where we do overlap in agreement; I think it is very healthy. However, I disagree deeply when he says this is not the legislation and it should be something else. We keep hearing that. I cannot tell noble Lords how many times I, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, have raised this issue here in Parliament and in other places. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked a quite interesting question: why should we care? Quite honestly, I care because I believe in justice and in fairness, and I want those in society. As I pointed out yesterday, I am a highly privileged white female; I have been arrested, but I was de-arrested almost immediately by the Met Police when all the surrounding people started saying, “Do you know who she is?” and they immediately took the handcuffs off.
At some point we have to accept that this needs regulation. We cannot accept that the police constantly mark their own homework. We were reassured that all the flaws in the algorithm and so on had been fixed, but clearly we cannot be sure of that because we do not have any way of knowing exactly what the flaws were and who has fixed them. Live facial recognition represents a huge departure from long-established principles of British policing. In this country, people are not required to identify themselves to the police unless they are suspected of wrongdoing. Live facial recognition turns that principle on its head by subjecting everyone in range of a camera to an automated identity check. It treats innocent members of the public as potential suspects and undermines the presumption of innocence.
I disagree deeply with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, when he says that it is not a blanket surveillance tool—of course it is. It is a blanket surveillance tool and is highly dangerous from that point of view. It is a mass biometric surveillance tool. It scans faces in real time, retains images of those flagged by the system and does so without individuals’ knowledge or consent.
If the police randomly stopped people in the street to check their fingerprints against a database, for example, we would rightly be alarmed. Live facial recognition performs the same function, only invisibly and at scale. Its use in the context of protest is a dangerous crossing of a constitutional line. We already have evidence that facial recognition has been deployed at demos and major public events, with a chilling effect on lawful protest. People will not go to these protests because they feel vulnerable. They are deterred from exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly because they fear being identified, tracked or wrongly stopped. While this amendment proposes a safeguard through parliamentary approval of a statutory code, we should not allow that to imply acceptance of live facial recognition at protests in principle. In my view, this technology has absolutely no place in the policing of democratic dissent.
We should reflect on the broader direction of travel. Live facial recognition is most enthusiastically embraced by authoritarian regimes, while a number of democratic countries have moved to restrict or even prohibit its use. That alone should surely give this Government pause to reflect on whether this is the right legislation to bring in. Independent observers have witnessed cases in which live facial recognition has misidentified children in school uniform, leading to lengthy and very distressing police stops. In some instances, those wrongly flagged were young black children, subjected to aggressive questioning and fingerprinting despite having done nothing wrong. What safeguards are in place to prevent misidentification, particularly of children and people from UK minority-ethnic communities? That is a basic question that we should be asking before we pass this legislation. I support the amendment as an essential check, but I hope that this debate sends a wider message that Parliament will not allow the routine use of intrusive biometric surveillance to become the price of exercising fundamental democratic rights.
I want to pick up something that the Minister said on Tuesday. He directed the Committee to the front page of the Bill and said that, in his view, the Bill was compliant with the ECHR. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, that is his belief and his view. It is absolutely not a certificate of accuracy. I am not suggesting for one moment that there is any intent to deceive; I am merely saying that it is not a certificate of truth. With claims about seemingly authoritarian laws being compliant with human rights, that assessment can be challenged and should be challenged as much as possible. It remains subjective and is challenged by the organisation Justice, for example. We are clearly going to disagree about a lot in this Bill, but we are trying our best over here to make the law fair and representative of a justice that we think should exist here in Britain.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I was hesitant as to whether to speak here, but some years ago I had very close acquaintance with facial recognition software, so I thought it might be useful to say a couple of things.
First, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that this is an extremely good technology. I will get to the concerns expressed about it in a minute. This software has been used to apprehend murderers. For example, I think the Australian outback murderer was apprehended because of it and a far-right group of extremists in Sweden was identified by some very clever use of this facial recognition technology. It can be used successfully in preventing crime. Now, that is not all live use of the technology, and these amendments are about live use of the technology.
I very much respect the work of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I am a great supporter of Big Brother Watch, and he and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, make good points. Much is made of the disparity in accuracy between white and black faces. The software I was involved with had that problem. The reason for that is that it was trained on white faces—they were afraid of being thought of as racist if they focused on black faces. Therefore, the accuracy for black faces was much worse, they discovered, and so they quickly started training the software on black faces and the disparity closed right up. As far as I know, the disparity, if it still exists, is quite small, but others may know better than me. This was several years ago, but that definitely happened with this set of facial recognition software.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
Shifty is a great description—the noble Baroness could have said far worse than that.
I was given a hard time and then let go. We have to accept that there will be errors, but we have to understand where this is going. We can less and less afford to have police on the streets—we have seen that problem—and technology has to take over. Look at the super-spotters, a very successful crime-fighting group in New York. They would go to an area where there was a lot of crime—noble Lords will know that there was a process in New York where they directed people to crime hotspots—where they looked at the gait of individuals to see whether they were carrying guns or knives. Soon, people in those areas discovered that they had better not carry guns because they would be stopped by these super-spotters and arrested. If you are not carrying a gun, which they had all stopped doing, you cannot kill somebody because you do not have a gun to kill them with. It was a tremendously successful operation in lowering crime.
State-of-the-art facial recognition, at least before I stopped looking at it a couple of years ago, was more in gait than in face. We have to understand that you can start training technology to be much more effective than even these super-spotters at spotting people who are carrying, using their gait to recognise an individual rather than their face. There are all sorts of ways in which this software will be used to recognise people. It will get better and better, and fewer mistakes will be made; mistakes will always be made none the less, but that is the way of policing. They were mistaken when they stopped me—I was this tremendously law-abiding good chap, but they stopped me, and so will the facial recognition.
I loved the description from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, of the 20 police hanging around, which I am sure resonated with noble Lords around the entire Chamber as the sort of thing that happens, but over time we will have to depend on technology such as this. We will have to be extremely careful about civil liberties, but we cannot blanket get rid of this technology, because it will be very important to policing.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, I had sought to intervene on the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, before he sat down, but the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, beat me to it. I want to ask him a simple question but, first, I am sorry that we are on different sides of this—when we served together on the snoopers’ charter Bill, we were totally united that it was a bad Bill and we worked hand in glove to amend it. Can he tell me the substantive difference between a camera and a computer watching everyone in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers and those 20 policemen he talked about looking at everybody in the crowd and picking out the wanted troublemakers from their briefing or their memory? What is the real difference between them?
Lord Strasburger (LD)
When I observed these deployments of facial recognition and looked at the 20 policemen standing around, it occurred to me that they would probably find a lot more of the people they were looking for if they just went round to their houses and knocked on the door, rather than working on the off-chance that they might walk past them in the high street.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Doocey for eliciting a very useful debate, as was the intention. I particularly welcome some of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, but say to him that a Crime and Policing Bill might possibly be the place for discussion of the use of live facial recognition in policing. Maybe we can make some progress with the Government, we hope, responding or at least giving an indication ahead of their consultation of their approach to the legislative framework around live facial recognition. I very much hope that they will take this debate on board as part of that consultation.
As my noble friend Lady Doocey clearly stated, these amendments are necessary because live facial recognition currently operates, effectively, in a legislative void, yet the police are rolling out this technology at speed. There is no explicit Act of Parliament authorising its deployment, meaning that police forces are in effect, as my noble friend Lord Strasburger indicated, writing their own rules as they go. This technology represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. When LFR cameras are deployed, our public spaces become biometric checkpoints where every face is indiscriminately scanned. By treating every citizen as a suspect in a permanent digital line-up, we are abandoning the presumption of innocence. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made that point very well. As a result, there is a clear issue of public trust.
Amendment 379 would prohibit the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions unless a specific code of practice has been formally approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. This is essential to protect our freedoms of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The pervasive tracking capability of LFR creates what the courts have recognised as a chilling effect, as described by my noble friend Lady Doocey and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Law-abiding citizens are discouraged from attending protests or expressing dissenting views for fear of permanent state monitoring. We know that police forces have already used this technology to target peaceful protesters who were not wanted for any crime. People should not have to hand over their sensitive biometric data as the price of engaging in democratic processes. Without explicit parliamentary consent and an approved code of practice, we are sleepwalking into a surveillance state that bypasses democratic oversight entirely.
Amendment 471 would establish that LFR use in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases—such as preventing major crimes or locating missing persons—and requires prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and purpose of each deployment. The need for this oversight was made absolutely clear by the 2020 Court of Appeal ruling in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police, which found LFR use unlawful due to fundamental deficiencies in the legal framework. The court identified that far too much discretion is left to individual officers regarding who ends up on a watchlist and where cameras are placed. We must replace operational discretion with judicial scrutiny.
The Government themselves now acknowledge the inadequacy of the current framework, which they describe as a “patchwork framework” and say it is
“complicated and difficult to understand”.
Well, that is at least some progress towards the Government acknowledging the situation. They say that the current framework does not provide sufficient confidence for expanded use—hear, hear. The former Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner made clear his concerns about the College of Policing guidance, questioning whether these fundamental issues require
“more than an authorised professional practice document from the College of Policing”
and instead demand parliamentary debate. The former commissioner raised a profound question:
“Is the status of the UK citizen shifting from our jealously guarded presumption of innocence to that of ‘suspected until we have proved our identity to the satisfaction of the examining officer’?”
Such a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state cannot, and should not, be determined by guidance alone.
The College of Policing’s APP on LFR, while attempting to provide operational guidance, falls short of providing the robust legal framework that this technology demands. It remains non-statutory guidance that can be revised without parliamentary scrutiny, lacks enforceable standards for deployment decisions, provides insufficient detail on bias testing and mitigation requirements, and does not establish independent oversight mechanisms with real teeth.
Most critically, the guidance permits watch-list compilation based on subjective assessments without clear statutory criteria or independent review. This leaves fundamental decisions about who gets surveilled to operational discretion rather than judicial oversight. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who was keen on one bit of our amendment but not the other, I say that this intelligence-led tool effectively delegates it to a senior police officer and they, in a sense, have a conflict of interest. They are the ones who make the operational decisions.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. It seems that he and his noble friends keep talking about the police and the restrictions which will be imposed on the police. But Amendment 471 seems to extend facial recognition to hundreds and hundreds of public authorities, provided they adhere to a code or comply with certain practices. Does he still stand by the idea that facial recognition should be extended to hundreds of public authorities, in addition to the police?
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
If the noble Lord accepts the fact that controls are required, which he did not in his earlier comments, I think he would be greatly reassured if you had to have judicial oversight of the use of live facial recognition, which is useful in circumstances other than purely policing. What we are talking about is a greater level of control over the deployment of live facial recognition. We can argue perfectly satisfactorily about whether or not it should be extended beyond the police, but we are suggesting that, alongside that greater deployment, or possible greater deployment, there should be a much greater degree of oversight. I think that effectively answers the noble Lord.
The Metropolitan Police’s own data from recent LFR operations shows a false alert rate requiring officers to make numerous stops of innocent people. Even with claimed accuracy improvements, when a system processes thousands of faces, even a small error translates to significant numbers of misidentifications affecting law-abiding citizens.
More concerning is the evidence on differential performance, and that is where I fundamentally agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The National Physical Laboratory’s 2020 testing of facial recognition systems found significant variation in performance across demographic groups. While contemporary LFR systems used by UK police show better performance than earlier algorithms, independent research continues to identify measurable differences in accuracy rates across ethnicity and gender. The Court of Appeal in Bridges ruled that South Wales Police breached the public sector equality duty by failing to satisfy itself that the software was free from racial or gender bias, yet current deployment practices suggest insufficient progress in addressing these equality obligations.
We should also address the secrecy surrounding police watch-lists. The Justice and Home Affairs Committee of this House recommended that these lists be subject to compulsory statutory criteria and standardised training. There is no independent review of watch-list inclusion, no notification to those placed on lists and no clear route for challenge or removal.
I also very much appreciated what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, had to say about the problems with software. But the chilling sentence he delivered was “Technology has to take over”. That is precisely the problem that we are living with. If technology is to take over, we need a legal framework to govern it. The current patchwork of overlapping laws addressing human rights, data protection and criminal justice is not fit for purpose.
These amendments provide the democratic and judicial guard-rails needed to contain this technology, and we cannot allow the convenience of new tools to erode our established civil liberties. Only Parliament should determine the framework for how LFR is used in our society, and only the courts should authorise its deployment in individual cases.
Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)
Before the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sits down, can he address an issue that none of us has addressed yet? These amendments concern the state’s use of facial recognition, for all the reasons that we have talked about. But the private sector is far in advance of this. Some 12 or 13 years ago, it was using a product called Facewatch, which was started at Gordon’s Wine Bar because Gordon was sick of people walking into the bar and either violently assaulting his patrons or stealing things. He put a clever camera on the door and patrons did not get into the bar if they had been accused of something in the past. That product has moved right around the world, and certainly it is extensively used in the UK in different settings.
I am not arguing that that is good or bad; I merely observe that, if we end up in a position where the police have less access to something that can be a good technology, and private commerce is getting benefits that presumably it is able to justify, that inequality of arms does not benefit anyone. It should at least be considered in the consultation that the Government started, which is particularly focused on the police. But as well as the police, we should consider airports, railway stations, et cetera.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
Very briefly, I do not think that the noble Lord is making a bad case at all. Live facial recognition, whether in the hands of the public sector or the private sector, needs a proper legal framework: there is no doubt about that. My noble friend made it clear that we believe it is a useful technology, but, the more useful it is, the more we need to make sure that it is under proper control.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments touches on how the police should deal with modern threats and how we balance civil liberties with the clear duty of the state to protect the public.
I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, when she introduced her Amendment 379, which, as she said, would prevent the police using live facial recognition when imposing conditions on public processions or assemblies under the relevant provisions of the Public Order Act, unless and until a new statutory code of practice had been approved. If we accept—as we on these Benches and, I think, others in your Lordships’ House do—that live facial recognition can be a legitimate and valuable policing tool in preventing crime, identifying suspects and protecting the public, it is difficult to justify singling out its use in this specific context for an additional and likely onerous layer of bureaucracy. The police already operate within an extensive framework of legal safeguards, such as data protection law. To require a further code of practice, subject to affirmative approval by both Houses of Parliament, risks delaying or deterring the deployment of technology precisely where it may be most needed. So, regretfully, we cannot support the amendment.
Amendment 471, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, goes further in seeking to affect the Government’s ability to use live facial recognition technology. It would restrict the circumstances in which live facial recognition could be used; it would require prior judicial authorisation in the specific circumstances of its use; and it would create an extensive new enforcement and oversight architecture. Public order situations are often fast-moving and unpredictable. Senior officers must be able to make operational decisions quickly, based on risk and intelligence on the ground. Introducing additional procedural hurdles at the point of use risks undermining that agility. We should focus on rolling out effective technology at pace to combat crime and disorder, while ensuring robust safeguards and scrutiny.
In particular, the requirement for prior judicial authorisation is, in our view, particularly problematic. One of the principal advantages of live facial recognition is its speed and flexibility. It can be deployed rapidly in response to emerging intelligence, acute threats or serious risks to public safety, and requiring prior judicial approval risks rendering the technology ineffective in precisely the circumstances where it could prevent serious harm. In dynamic operational scenarios, such as events of violent disorder, knife crime hot spots or rapidly evolving threats, delay can mean failure.
I was particularly taken by the speech of my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who spoke about the position in New York, where, because of there being fewer police on the streets, the technology had to take over. He was right to say that.
We on these Benches are concerned by the attempt to narrow the scope of live facial recognition to a tightly defined set of purposes, because, if Parliament accepts the use of this technology in principle, it makes little sense to confine it to only a small number of scenarios. Crime does not present itself neatly within statutory categories. Policing requires judgment and discretion. Artificially restricting the use of a tool that has demonstrated value risks depriving the police of one of the most effective capabilities available to them.
We of course recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to be implemented in the use of this technology. This new and expanded use of people’s data, even if to facilitate an objective that we support, must be enacted with transparency and proportionality. But these amendments would constrain the police’s operations and weaken our ability to respond to modern threats. At a time when criminals are increasingly sophisticated and technologically adept, Parliament should be empowering the police to use lawful, proportionate and effective tools rather than tying their hands.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling the amendments and starting this important debate. Facial recognition is an increasingly important tool that helps the police, and I am grateful for the support of the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Hogan-Howe. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, on gait and movement, which point to why this is valuable.
Currently, facial recognition technology is used to identify those suspected of committing crime, those who may be in breach of a court order and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones said, those who are missing persons and could be found. To put some context to it, for example, there were 127 people arrested following the use of facial technology during the disturbances in the summer of 2024 around asylum protests. According to the Metropolitan Police’s figures, between January 2024 and September 2025, 1,300 people were arrested for offences including rape, robbery and GBH, and, in that period, 100 sex offenders were arrested for breaching their conditions: that is, going to an area where they should not have gone. That is quite a valuable action, tool and resource. But that does not mean—which goes to the heart of the amendment the noble Baroness moved—that the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Baroness herself and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench are not ones that need to be examined.
Noble Lords will be aware that, currently, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including the Human Rights Act and Data Protection Act. The Government accept that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework is needed. We need to get it right. We need to balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder with the need to safeguard individual rights.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will know, and as has been referenced in this debate, on 4 December, the Government launched a consultation: I have a copy available for the House. It is a 10-week consultation on a new framework for the enforcement of the use of facial recognition and similar technologies. The consultation explores when and how these technologies should be used, what safeguards are required to protect the issues that noble Lords and Baronesses have raised today and how to ensure that their use is proportionate to the seriousness of the harm being addressed.
I refer the Committee to page 5 of the summary to the consultation:
“The government is therefore committed to developing and introducing a new legal framework that sets out rules for the overt use of facial recognition by law enforcement organisations”.
That is a clear government objective. The consultation is about how we achieve that government objective. It runs until 12 February and I encourage all those who have spoken to submit their views.
I take Amendment 471 as a positive contribution to the consultation. Some aspects would cause difficulties, but it is a fair point to put to the Committee today. I hope noble Lords will accept that I cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, which runs until 12 February. However, the clear objective, which I have read out, is to find the framework that noble Lords are seeking. We will need legislation to put in place the new legal framework, and that will come when parliamentary time allows.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
The Minister says that he cannot pre-empt the outcome of the consultation, but surely Clause 125 already pre-empts the outcome of the consultation.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.
I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
The Minister cannot compare cars with people—that is a completely false comparison. I do not know whether the Minister has been in a van with a camera looking at number plates. There is no mistaking number plates; there is a lot of mistaking human faces.
The Minister earlier used the word “proportionately”. There is a significant distinction between proportionately and expediently. The test for lawful interference with ECHR rights is proportionality rather than expediency. We have covered this before, but it has come up again now. Having expediency in the Bill gives police the powers beyond what is reasonable for human rights. We are not sitting here for hours into the night doing this for fun—we can all agree that this is not fun. We are doing this because we believe that the Bill is wrong.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am doing it because I believe that we need to catch criminals and reduce crime. That is a fair disagreement between us. That is why I am doing this Bill and that is what this Bill is about. We may disagree, but facial recognition technology is an important mechanism to prevent crime and to reduce crime. I can tell the noble Baroness that we have agreed to bring forward regulations and are consulting on what those will include. I hope she will submit some views. I remain convinced that the type of technology that we have is valid and useful.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I do not normally disagree with the Minister, although we might be on different sides of an argument, but I found that last comment very bad. We are all on the same side—we all want to catch criminals and prevent crime. That needs to go on the record. From what he just said, it was almost as though he was suggesting that he is on the side of that but we are not. To make it clear, we are not sitting here for the sake of it; we are here because we genuinely believe in this and we want to catch criminals and prevent crime.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let us put out the hand of friendship and make common cause on those issues.
To respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment, I simply say that the consultation is there. Amendment 471 would go quite a long way beyond even that which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, brought forward. I believe this to be a potential future crime-fighting tool. It needs regulation around it and that is what the Government are intending to do. We are very clear about that on page 5 of the consultation. How it is regulated and what is regulated, and how this is approached, is what the consultation is about, but I agree with the basic principle of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Therefore, I ask her to withdraw it.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
I would like that in writing.
I thank the Minister for his response and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The Minister mentioned the consultation, and I am pleased that the Government will legislate, but I hope Parliament will be very much involved, because, like anything, the devil will be in the detail. Whatever comes out of that will be very important.
Can the Minister tell me what happens if, in response to the consultation, the public say that they do not want the police to access particular databases? Will the Government then take those clauses out of the Bill? Perhaps he could just clarify that.
I have a concern that, even before the consultation began, the Home Office was saying that it hoped the process would pave the way for wider rollout. That does not really inspire confidence that Ministers are keeping an open mind. A consultation should not be used as a rubber stamp; it should be the start of a genuine national conversation about the limits that a free society wants to place on mass biometric data surveillance. For that conversation to mean anything, the public need to know the full picture, how accurate the systems are, and where and when they are being used. Right now, that transparency is not there.
We have heard that the Home Office thinks that:
“Any new laws informed by the consultation would take about two years to be passed by Parliament”.
That is far too slow, given the pace of technological change, and that comment was made in December 2025. All we are asking is that Parliament sets the rules before the technology sets them for us. I hope Parliament will be involved in setting those rules. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea
“Amendment to speech offences(1) The Malicious Communications Act 1988 is repealed.(2) Omit section 127 of the Communications Act 2003.(3) In the table in section 1(1) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (offences leading to penalties on the spot) omit the entry relating to section 127(2) of the Communications Act 2003.(4) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.(5) In section 4—(a) in subsection (1)(a) after “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) in subsection (1)(b) after “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”.(6) Omit sections 4A and 5.(7) In section 6—(a) in subsection (3)—(i) after the first “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”,(ii) after the second “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) omit subsection (4).(8) In section 18(1)—(a) after the first “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”, and(b) after the second “threatening” omit “, abusive or insulting”.(9) In section 19(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(10) In section 20(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(11) In section 21(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.(12) In section 22(1) after “threatening,” omit “abusive or insulting”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would amend a number of different Acts to ensure that freedom of speech is protected, so that a person cannot be prosecuted for causing “anxiety” or for “insulting” another person.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, the amendments in this and the next group set out to remove criminalisation of elements of so-called hate crime on grounds that include incoherence, ineffectiveness and divisiveness. Anyone proposing an amendment of this sort risks being seen as favouring hate crime and hate speech, or of being careless or reckless about the real hurt that individuals at the receiving end of hate speech or hate crime might feel. The opposite is the case here. I vigorously oppose racism and any other form of discrimination, but I believe that the concept and the implementation of hate crime law are not just ineffective but counterproductive.
There are three types of hate crime law that I seek to amend in this and the following amendment: first, direct criminalisation of certain offensive words; secondly, an enhanced sentence when a crime is aggravated by directing certain offensive words towards individuals with certain protected characteristics; and thirdly, stirring up offences based on use of offensive words, behaviour or material so as to arouse hatred against an individual with certain protected characteristics. My first amendment would abolish the criminalisation of particular offensive words that are merely grossly offensive, while still leaving in place the sanctioning of any words that would cause or provoke actual violence or fear of violence.
In our national history, hate crime law is new. We got along perfectly well without it for many centuries until the Race Relations Act 1965 was passed to prevent race violence and discrimination. We have now gone a long way further than that first law, with hate crime legislation embedded in a number of different Acts, covering both deeds and thoughts, and going beyond race into a number of different protected characteristics, the most recent of these being transgender. Sometimes all that is needed for a conviction is if the victim or, indeed, any person takes offence, sometimes with no test of reasonableness. Many see this as having divided society into warring grievance groups.
These laws are not working. Unintended consequences roll in. Hard cases make bad law. Criminalise one obviously appalling thing and, by doing that, it is hard not to criminalise other not so appalling things—so Graham Linehan is arrested by five armed police at the airport. You get police incentivised to pursue soft targets for soft crimes. You get police encouraged into a Stasi mindset, telling ordinary citizens, “I need to check your thinking”. Have these laws created social cohesion? No. Antisemitism, for example, has suddenly become widespread in our country.
These laws are confusing. Late last year, the College of Policing issued guidance on female genital mutilation stating that trans women—which is to say men—whether holding a gender recognition certificate or not, are just as threatened by female genital mutilation as are women and girls. This was utterly absurd—but if you say it is wrong, you have to be prepared for possible investigation by well-meaning but improperly informed police.
These laws are cluttering up the justice system. I think noble Lords understand this, but I will talk about it in greater detail when I get to my second amendment later.
These laws are onerous on the innocent. It is difficult to exaggerate the devastating effect that an arrest and a subsequent multi-month legal process can have on a law-abiding citizen, even when, at the end of it, they are exonerated.
An overall hate narrative has spread across politics and society, with so many random accusations of hate speech or hate crime leading to controversy, or worse. Charlie Kirk was shot dead in America by someone who had been persuaded that Kirk had been hateful against the trans community. Last month, a teacher was referred to the national counterterror programme and forced out of his job after showing videos of Donald Trump to his sixth-form politics students.
These laws are crushing our country’s free speech tradition—the heartland of our national character and the driver of our national success over the centuries. In America, the First Amendment is:
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech”.
In our history, George Orwell is venerated for saying that free speech is worthless unless it extends to things that people do not want to hear. Lord Justice Sedley is venerated for saying:
“Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to promote violence. Freedom only to speak only inoffensively is not worth having”.
We revere Queen Elizabeth I for saying that she had no desire to look into a man’s soul, but now we have judges looking into men’s souls on a regular basis.
Along with the suppression of free speech, cancel culture has flourished. A woman in a Stoke-on-Trent focus group that I observed shocked me when she said to general agreement in the group, “Of course, none of us can say what we’re really thinking”. Freedom in the Arts ran a large UK survey in 2024-25 that found that 84% of artists said that they never, rarely, or only sometimes feel free to speak about their social or political opinions for fear of ostracism, bullying or loss of work. Until people can say what they are thinking—so long as, of course, they do not incite imminent violence—we do not have our traditionally free country.
Turning to the key provisions in my amendment, proposed new subsections (1), (2), (5), (6) and (8) to (12) would remove the criminalisation of specific offensive words. Proposed new subsection (1) would repeal the Malicious Communications Act 1988. A person can currently be sentenced under that Act to up to two years if they send a letter or electronic message that is either intended to “cause distress or anxiety” or employs “indecent or grossly offensive” words. A well-known report from Big Brother Watch found that, over a three-year period, there were more than 1,000 charges and more than 600 cautions under that Act.
Proposed new subsection (2) would omit Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which provides for jail for up to six months for sending a “grossly offensive” message, or a message that is
“of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”,
or knowingly sending a false message to cause
“annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety”.
The Big Brother Watch report showed nearly 3,000 charges and more than 1,000 cautions under Section 127. These various numbers have probably increased, not declined, since that report. A lad stupidly joked on Twitter that if Robin Hood Airport was not going to be open next week, he would blow it up. He was convicted under Section 127, and it took three appeals before that was overturned. The process was his punishment, for someone who was innocent. The Big Brother Watch report found at least 355 cases under these two Acts involving social media, with the rate increasing, not declining.
Proposed new subsection (5) would amend Section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, which provides for up to six months for intending to make likely or cause someone to believe that “immediate unlawful violence” will take place when using
“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour”
or distributing or displaying “threatening, abusive or insulting” signs. My amendment would leave “threatening” in place, but remove “abusive” and “insulting”. Threatening behaviour involving imminent unlawful violence should clearly be illegal, but surely that is enough.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 382F, an amendment that, carefully and proportionately, takes on tackling the problems of the ever-growing number of overlapping Acts and statutes that are used to limit free speech. If public order laws on protest are, to quote the Liberal Democrat Benches from the other day, a confused mess, the labyrinthine patchwork affecting free speech is an impenetrable quagmire. The noble Lord has done a real public service here by carefully going through how, inadvertently and often by mission creep, censorious laws undermine democratic speech rights and are actually damaging the UK’s reputation internationally.
I am not just talking about JD Vance or Elon Musk, who I have heard commented on in this House and dismissed sneeringly by many in Westminster as spreading just Trumpist misinformation or hyperbole. We need to recognise that even the bible of globalist liberalism, the Economist, no less, featured a cover last May proclaiming “Europe’s free-speech problem”, identified the UK as one of the most censorious on the continent and provided a lot of evidence. There has been lots of discussion all over the political spectrum in relation to the idea of 12,000 arrests a year, 30 a day, for speech offences that spring from laws that the amendment seeks to rein in, and for which this House is responsible. We are talking here about crime and policing, and the police are expected to treat speech offences as criminal acts and to police them.
Since the introduction of hate crime laws, which I remind the Committee is a relatively recent concept popularised from the mid-1980s, the legislative and regulatory implications of restricting hate and words that are said to have caused distress have proliferated, and it has grown into a real tangle of tripwires. In that tangle, many people in the police and the CPS, and even politicians, seem confused about what one can say legally and what is verboten.
I am sure that noble Lords will remember the extraordinary story of the Times Radio producer, Maxie Allen, and his partner, Rosalind Levine. They were the couple who were arrested by six uniformed officers, in front of their young children, for posting disparaging messages about their daughter’s school in a private WhatsApp group. It received a lot of publicity, and they have just been paid £20,000 for wrongful arrest, although they have not received an apology. What stood out for me about that story was that when the police officers went into her house, Ms Levine asked what malicious communication offence they were being accused of. The detective did not know, had to Google it and then read out what Google said. That strikes me as not healthy. We as legislators have a responsibility to tackle this. Too often, we just pass more and more laws, with more restrictions on freedom, and never stop to look at whether anything on the statute book can be repealed, streamlined or rolled back.
I commend the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for his detailed, well-thought out and proportionate attempt at tackling the way the law has grown and the negative impact that is having on democratic free speech. I also want to commend him for his courage in taking on this issue. As we know, and he referred to this, if anyone takes on hate speech laws, you just think, “Oh, my goodness, he’s going to be accused of all sorts of things. He’s going to be accused of being a bigot. It’s a risk”, so when he told me he was doing this, I gulped. It is horrible to be accused of being a racist, a misogynist, homophobic, a hatemonger, or whatever, but that is the very point. Being accused of being pro-hate speech, if you oppose hate speech legislation, is itself silencing of a democratic discussion on laws and we as legislators should not be bullied or silenced in that way. Ironically, the best tool for any cultural shift in relation to prejudice, in my view, is free speech. To be able to take on bigotry, we need to be able to expose it, argue against it and use the disinfectant of free speech to get rid of the hate, whereas censorship via hate speech laws does not eliminate or defeat regressive ideas; it just drives them underground to fester unchallenged.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has laid out the key legal problems in his approach to this, especially in relation to the lack of precision in terminology used across speech-restricting laws. He has raised a lot of real food for thought. Perhaps I can add a concern from a slightly different perspective, to avoid repeating the points he has made. For me, there is another cost when law fails to clearly define concepts such as abusive or insulting words, grossly offensive speech, and what causes annoyance, inconvenience and needless anxiety—these things are littered all over the law. It is that the dangerously elastic framing of what speech constitutes harm or hate has been deeply regressive in its impact on our cultural norms. There has been a sort of cultural mission creep which has especially undermined the resilience of new generations of young people. The language of hate speech legislation now trips off the tongues of sixth-formers in schools and university campus activists. When they complain that they disagree with or are made to feel uncomfortable by a speaker or a lecturer and say that they should be banned for their views, they will cite things straight out of the law such as, “That lecturer has caused me harassment, alarm and distress”. Where did they get that from? They will say that those words are perceived as harmful and that if they heard them, it would trigger anxiety—even claiming post-traumatic stress disorder is fashionable. It is because we have socialised the young into the world of believing that speech is a danger to their mental well-being, which has cultivated a grievance victimhood. It is a sort of circular firing squad, because the young, who feel frightened by words which they have picked up and been imbued with from the way the law operates, then demand even more lawfare to protect themselves and their feelings from further distress. They are even encouraged to go round taking screenshots of private messages, which they take to the police, or they scroll through the social media of people they do not like to see whether there is anything they can use in the law.
The law has enabled the emergence of a thin-skinned approach to speech, and this has been institutionalised via our statute book. The police do not seem immune to such interpretations of harmful words, either, and I am afraid that this can cause them to weaponise the power they have through this muddle. It wastes police resources and energy, an issue very pertinent to this Bill.
I will finish with an example. In August 2023, an autistic 16 year-old girl was arrested for reportedly telling a female police officer that she looked like her lesbian nana. The teenager’s mother explained that this was a literal observation, in that the police officer looked like her grandmother, who is a lesbian. The officer understood it as homophobic abuse, so a Section 5 public order offence kicked in on the basis of causing “alarm or distress” by using abusive language. If you witness the film of the incident, seven police officers entered the teenage girl’s home, where she was hiding in the closet, screaming in fear and punching herself in the face. You may ask who was distressed in that instance. The girl was held in custody for 20 hours and ultimately no charges were brought. But we must ask whether the statute book has created such confused laws and encouraged police overreach, and whether it encouraged that young police officer, who heard someone say the words “lesbian nana”, to immediately think, “arrest her, hold her for 20 hours and say that she is causing distress”. What has happened to the instincts of a police officer when they think that this would be the answer?
Many people to whom I speak about the problem addressed by this amendment suggest that it has been overstated. They say that, yes, the police are a bit too promiscuous in arresting people, but the numbers charged and convicted are fairly stable. In fact, a journalist recently told me that in some instances they are going down. But as legislators, should we not query whether this implies that the laws are giving too much leeway to the police to follow up malicious, trivial and politicised complaints? This creates the chilling consequence of the notion of process as punishment: you might not be charged, but you are arrested, and law-abiding citizens are humiliated and embarrassed with the cops at the door. We must take this amendment very seriously, and I hope that the Minister will give us a positive response.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, it is a delight to listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who hit the nail on the head: in fact, she hit many nails on the head, and I agree with everything she said.
I support Amendment 382F because it restores the proper boundary between criminal law and free expression. Criminal sanctions must be reserved for conduct that poses a real risk of harm, threats, menaces and conduct intended to intimidate, not for speech that merely offends or causes hurt feelings. Section 127 of the Communications Act and related provisions currently include abusive and insulting material, and even communication that causes “anxiety”—a formulation that has produced inconsistent enforcement and a chilling effect on legitimate debate.
Should I have reported my MS consultant when he told me the good news and the bad news? The good news was that he knew what it was, and the bad news was that it was MS. He wanted to check how spastic I was. That word, “spastic”, can sound like a terribly insulting term, but it was a medical reference to my condition. This morning, I got a text message reminder: “Your UCLH appointment with the spasticity walk-in clinic at Queen Square will take place early tomorrow morning”. We must make sure that we do not treat all words which may seem insulting as actually being so. The law should be precise and proportionate. Vague criminal offences that hinge on subjective reactions invite over-policing in online life and risk criminalising satire, political argument and robust journalism. Recent parliamentary analysis shows that arrests under communications offences have increased, while convictions have not kept pace, suggesting that resources are being spent on low-value prosecutions rather than on genuine threats to safety. Legal commentary also suggests the difficulties courts face in applying terms like “grossly offensive” and “insulting”, and that undermines predictability and fairness.
This amendment would not leave victims without recourse. Civil remedies, harassment injunctions, platform moderation and targeted civil criminal offences for stalking, doxing and credible threats remain available and should be strengthened. That combination protects vulnerable people while ensuring that criminal law is not used as a blunt instrument against free expression.
Of course, there are trade-offs. Decriminalising insults means some distress will no longer attract criminal penalties, but the correct response is not to expand criminal law; it is to improve support for civil remedies and focus policing on genuine threats. That approach better protects both free speech and personal safety.
For these reasons, I urge the Minister to support Amendment 382F in order to defend free expression, sharpen the law so that it targets real harm, and ensure that our criminal justice system focuses on threats that endanger people rather than on words that merely offend them.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.
The strongest argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act is that these laws were made during an analogue era and are clearly not fit for purpose during our current digital era. That is one reason why the Law Commission of England and Wales, in its 2021 report on which communications laws should be reformed, recommended that both the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act be repealed.
That has not happened, but a good illustration of just how unfit these two laws are was alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Times submitted FOI requests to all 43 police forces in England and Wales, asking them how many arrests were made in England and Wales in 2023 and in previous years for online offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act. Of the 43 police forces, 37 responded to the FOI request. In just those 37 police forces, in 2023 12,183 people were arrested on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences through something they had said online. That is a huge increase on the number of people arrested in 2018—just 5,502—on suspicion of committing these two offences for things they posted online. The figure more than quadrupled in a five-year period. That boils down to 33 people being arrested every day in 2023 on suspicion of having committed just one of these two offences under the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
That happened because of the explosion of speech which is supposedly offensive, annoying, distressing, alarming or indecent, et cetera, online on social media. This is something the framers of these laws could not possibly have anticipated, and it is causing the police to waste a colossal amount of time. In addition, the number of people who were charged—bear in mind that 12,183 people were arrested—was 1,119. The police are clearly being overzealous in responding to complaints about supposed offences under these two laws relating to things people have said online.
Another index of just how much time is being wasted is that many of the people who are not charged end up having the episode recorded as a non-crime hate incident. The Free Speech Union has estimated that, as best we can tell, something like a quarter of a million non-crime hate incidents have been recorded since the concept was introduced by the College of Policing in 2014—and that is in England and Wales alone. That is an average of around 65 a day.
One reason so many NCHIs are being recorded is that, when the police arrest someone under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act or Section 127 of the Communications Act and conclude that in fact no offence has been committed, the incident is recorded as an NCHI. As I have said before in this House, one of the penalties for having an NCHI recorded against your name is that it can show up in enhanced criminal record checks when you apply for a job as a teacher or a carer or try to volunteer for a charity such as the Samaritans. According to Policy Exchange, in a report published last year, police in the UK as a whole are spending 6,000 hours a year investigating episodes and incidents that turn out to be NCHIs and are recorded as such. That is a strong argument for repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
I will give two examples, from the FSU’s case files, of just how absurd the police’s overzealous policing of social media has become. We went to bat for one of our members, Julian Foulkes, a former special constable in Kent. He said in a spat online with a pro-Palestinian activist that some of the pro-Palestinian marchers were once step away from heading to Heathrow and stopping people disembarking from flights from Israel. That person complained, as I understand it, and six police officers—six—turned up at Julian Foulkes’s home, arrested him, took him down to the station and would not release him until he had agreed to accept a caution. With our help, he got that caution expunged and went on to sue the police for wrongful arrest. He was given £20,000 in compensation and got an apology from the chief constable of the police force concerned. That is a good example of the kind of time-wasting that the police are being led into because of the difficulty of enforcing these analogue laws in a digital era.
The second example is Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the parents of two daughters, who were arrested, again by six police officers, in front of their youngest daughter because of things they had said in a WhatsApp group that parents at their daughter’s school were members of and something they had said in an email to the head teacher of their daughter’s school. It is incredible that the police thought that six police officers were needed to take these parents into custody. Julian Foulkes was under suspicion of having committed an offence under the Malicious Communications Act. In their case, they were under suspicion of having committed an offence under Section 127 of the Communications Act. Again, in due course, no further action was taken. We helped them sue the police for wrongful arrest and they too were given compensation of £20,000.
Be in no doubt that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Moynihan are correct when they say that the process is the punishment. Even though no action was taken and no prosecutions were made in those two cases, Julian Foulkes and those parents were caused huge anxiety and distress by what they went through before the police decided to take no further action. That is a strong case for following the Law Commission of England and Wales’s advice and repealing the Malicious Communications Act and Section 127 of the Communications Act.
Briefly, I absolutely agree with the proposal in the amendment to remove the word “insulting” from the sections of the Public Order Act in which it remains. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the word “insulting” was removed from some sections of the Public Order Act, specifically Section 5 and related provisions, by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following a campaign by Rowan Atkinson and others which pointed out how absurd it was to criminalise insulting. In one case, a young man was arrested for insulting a police officer’s horse, as noble Lords may recall. It was an effective campaign and it resulted in the word “insulting” being removed from Section 5, but it remains in many other parts of the Public Order Act. To my mind, the same arguments forcefully made by Rowan Atkinson and others at the time for removing the word “insulting” from Section 5 equally apply to the other sections of the Public Order Act where it remains. Just as we do not have a right not to be offended, we do not have a right not to be insulted.
I close with a quote from JS Mill, which I believe is from On Liberty. Mill warned that the criminal proscription of uncivil language is intrinsically likely to protect the holders of received opinion at the expense of dissidents. He wrote:
“With regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion, namely invective, sarcasm, personality, and the like”—
we could add the word “insulting” to that list—
“the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation”.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, on his courage in raising these issues. I am going to say little more than that, other than that I was instrumental in getting a sentence added to the code of conduct for members of the Liberal Democrats, which says that no one has the right to not be offended.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, set out the principles that he believes are important to secure freedom of speech by removing the words “abusive or insulting” from a number of pieces of legislation. From these Benches, we absolutely accept freedom of speech. But I want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Young, made when he quoted John Stuart Mill. There is a second half to the sentence about the right to free speech. Mill says that
“the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others”.
It is on preventing harm to others that this entire debate is balanced.
I am sure that there are many justifications for feeling that freedom of speech is being curtailed for people who just want to express their opinion. But the reason that we have the laws we do at the moment, particularly since the 1950s, is due to the harm that has been done to others. I think there was reference made earlier to the Race Relations Act of 60 years ago; that was in the consequence of very overt racial harm done to entire communities in our society. John Stuart Mill would have absolutely supported that legislation to protect. That is what the balance is between our freedom of speech and our responsibility as parliamentarians to protect those, particularly the most vulnerable, in our society.
That is why I want to go back briefly—not quite as far back as the Race Relations Act 1965—to when the original provisions on hate crimes were first introduced by the Blair Government in 1998. There is no doubt that this was partly in response to growing concerns relating to the ineffective policing of and legal responses to racist violence, which, again, was then very evident on our streets. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family had campaigned for this more robust legislative framework, and not just because it was much clearer that, as a society, we did not and should not accept hate-motivated crimes, especially towards particular communities and those with protected characteristics.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
Before the noble Baroness finishes, I did not want to interrupt what I thought was a very helpful contribution that laid out the kind of dilemmas that we face, but I will just ask for a couple of points of clarification to see where we might agree or disagree. In relation to John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, does she recognise that the concept of harm has now become so broad—in terms of psychological harm, for example—that it has become possible to say that any speech is harmful, and that this has led to the mess that we are in? There is physical harm, as opposed to, “I think that speech is harmful”. Anytime I have been cancelled from speaking, it was on the basis that I would cause harm to the students or pupils. It is a concept of me turning up with a baseball bat, about to do some harm to them, whereas actually they were anticipating, ahead of me speaking on issues usually related to free speech, that I would harm them psychologically and they would be damaged. Is that not a problem for legislators in the context of this amendment? Secondly—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I remind the noble Baroness that while she is able to ask questions for clarification, interventions are meant to be brief and I urge some brevity, given the progress we have made in Committee so far this afternoon.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I will ask this very briefly, then. Is there a problem that young people and the police do not appear to be able to distinguish between microaggressions and genocide? Is it one line?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention and her questions. I say, with great courtesy to the Government Whip, that her first question does not relate to the amendment because it is not about an offence. She was talking about the pre-banning of people and asking whether harm is so broad. However, that is a debate we need to have as society.
That leads into the noble Baroness’s second question about whether young people can distinguish. I think young people can distinguish. Part of the issue is that we as an older generation do not understand that a lot of them take a great deal of care about their colleagues because they have been brought up in a society with the rules, as opposed to having to introduce them, and they have seen exactly the concerns that I was raising. We need to continue to debate this but, bringing it back to this amendment, the point is that none of those issues is about offences.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for this interesting debate. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for moving Amendment 382F, which I support. Although it ranges across several statutes, it is in truth a coherent proposal with a clear constitutional purpose: to restore the proper limits of the criminal law so that freedom of speech is protected, while of course ensuring that genuinely threatening conduct remains criminal.
At the outset, I recognise the political sensitivity of this area. Any proposal to amend or repeal so-called hate speech provisions risks being misrepresented as indifference to racism, misogyny, homophobia or other forms of discrimination. Let me be absolutely clear: that is not the motivation behind this amendment. As my noble friend said, we on this side of the House oppose racism and discrimination in all their forms. The case for this amendment is not moral indifference but legal realism. The current framework has proved incoherent, ineffective and, in some respects, actively counterproductive.
As my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea most ably set out, the current legislative framework dealing with offensive language, hate speech and the like is a messy, tangled web of patchwork offences. We have the Malicious Communications Act 1988, Sections 4A and 5 and Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, and Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. These provisions criminalise speech not because it threatens direct harm but because it is deemed “abusive” or “insulting” or said to cause a person “needless anxiety”.
I am not ignorant to the fact that we have had laws in this country prohibiting the usage of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour for almost a century. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, now repealed, stated:
“Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence”.
But there are two crucial differences between that legislation and this. The 1936 Act was set against the background of rising fascist paramilitaries, first in Italy and then in Germany and, indeed, in Britain. Secondly, use of the language
“with intent to provoke a breach of the peace”
is very different from outlawing insulting language likely to cause a person “needless anxiety”. I think even a child could understand the difference between inciting a riot and causing a person mild offence.
Yet this is where we are. A person can claim to have been caused “annoyance” or even “inconvenience”, complain to the police and have another individual investigated and potentially arrested. That is not hyperbole; it is the truth. There is a litany of recent examples that we could trawl through, but many have been mentioned by noble Lords today so I will mention only a few, as briefly as I can.
As we have heard, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 was used to arrest Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, the two parents who have been referred to. The same Act was used to arrest a 17 year-old boy for comments he posted on Tom Daley’s Twitter account:
“You let your dad down i hope you know that”.
While this is obviously poor behaviour, to claim it should be a matter for the law and constitutes criminality is deeply concerning. Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 was used to prosecute a person who posted a picture online with a phallus drawn on it; Jordan Barrack was ordered to pay £400 in compensation for a post that did not cause any harm to anyone. Again, how this case ended up as a matter for the authorities is beyond me.
Of fundamental importance is the fact that the terms we are dealing with here are not precise legal concepts. They are elastic, subjective and dependent on perception rather than consequence. The result is uncertainty for the public, inconsistency in enforcement and an unhealthy transfer of quasi-judicial discretion to individual police officers who have recently taken to very liberal and, indeed, unequal enforcement of these laws.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for the way in which he put his arguments. I fully accept his contention that they are not designed to include his belief in racism or discrimination and the fair and open way in which he made his points. The same comments apply to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Young of Acton. I understand their motivation and where they are coming from, but I have to say straightaway to the Committee that I do not agree with the direction of travel. We will resist it and I will explain why in my comments.
Before I do so, let me say that—and I hope this is helpful for the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—on the issues he raised around non-crime hate incidents, we are going to come to those in a later debate on Amendment 416E. The College of Policing is producing a report and review, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, as the chair of the College of Policing. I commit to the Committee that that review will come forward before Report on this Bill, and we intend to look at it as a Government and respond to it. The points that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, mentioned are probably more relevant when we have the debate on Amendment 416E, if he accepts my comments. We will revisit that in due course.
Amendment 382F proposes to repeal to the Malicious Communications Act 1988 and make significant changes to the Communications Act 2003 and the Public Order Act 1986. I understand the motivation for the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to bring them forward, but they include removing key provisions that have been in place for many years, were passed under different Governments of political complexity and have been consistently applied in case law.
The terms the noble Lord seeks to omit from the Public Order Act 1986 are understood by the police and the CPS, and there is case law interpreted by the courts. These provisions provide police with proportionate tools to manage low-level public disorder and protect the public from threatening or abusive behaviour, as well from those who seek to stir up racial hatred. The existing legal framework already ensures that enforcement decisions are made proportionately and in line with human rights obligations, including the right to freedom of expression.
I emphasise to the Committee that the personal example cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, shows that these laws are here for a purpose. Her comments have highlighted the question: how would each of us like to be on the receiving end of an abusive or insulting comment or phrase about a personal characteristic of our lives that we cannot change? Attack me for my politics by all means, because that is the view I have taken, but attacking individuals, or showing insulting or offensive behaviour towards individuals for characteristics they cannot change, is a step that we need to consider very carefully.
Let us look at what Amendment 382F from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, seeks to remove. The amendment would repeal the Malicious Communications Act 1988, including the offence of sending a
“letter, electronic communication or article”
to someone
“which is indecent or grossly offensive”,
if the purpose of sending it is to
“cause distress or anxiety to the recipient”.
That is quite a heavy protection for people that the noble Lord is seeking to remove.
The amendment also seeks to remove Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, including the offence of sending, or causing to be sent,
“by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive … indecent, obscene or menacing”.
Again, those protections are included in the 2003 Act to protect individuals from grossly offensive, obscene, indecent or menacing communication, yet the noble Lord seeks to remove that today, for the reasons he outlined to the Committee.
The amendment also seeks to repeal Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, including the offences of causing:
“Intentional harassment, alarm, or distress”,
or harassment, alarm or distress without intent. The amendment would remove, from the same Act, “abusive or insulting” from the following offences:
“Fear or provocation of violence … Use of words or behaviour … written … to stir up racial hatred … Publishing or distributing written material … to stir up racial hatred”,
and public performances of a play intended to stir up racial hatred. I want to protect free speech—protecting free speech is absolutely right—but we also have to protect the rights of individuals to enjoy a life free from “grossly offensive” insults, “intentional harassment”, and “abusive or insulting” material.
The noble Lord seeks to repeal “abusive or insulting” from Section 21 of the Public Order Act:
“Distributing … or playing a recording … to stir up racial hatred”.
The amendment, it appears, intends to strengthen protections for free speech. I understand where the noble Lord wishes to come from on that—that is a fair and open debate between us—but it does so by decriminalising behaviour that is, in the law and under all those Acts, “abusive and insulting”. I am sorry, in this Committee I am not going to accept that approach on behalf of the Government.
As we know, we will have the review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who will look at the wider issues of hate crime legislation and the independent review of public order. I take the strictures of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, that we cannot stick everything into the review, but we also have the review from the College of Policing—which I will refer to again; I have already done so in response to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—which is looking at those issues.
I still think, given what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, that there is a basic floor from which society needs to protect individuals from abuse and insulting behaviour. The existing offences are not just used to put that floor in place; they are also used—this is a really important point which I hope the noble Lord will accept—to ensure that the police have the ability to intervene early in public order situations where they could support the protection of vulnerable people, who may be alarmed by abusive or insulting conduct, which has a disproportionate impact. The existing offences are used to manage public order and racial hatred and provide the police with proportionate tools to respond to a range of behaviours.
The offence thresholds should not and do not interfere with free speech. The review is going to conclude very shortly and the Government will consider and respond to those recommendations afterwards.
I simply say to the noble Lord that I hope that he thinks very carefully—as I know he has already; I do not want to be patronising—about the content of the debate we have had today, the comments that I have put to him about why those legislation aspects have been passed by a Thatcher Government and a Blair Government, and why there is a need to protect individuals, along the lines of the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which she mentioned. They are there for a purpose and I believe that the Committee should ask the noble Lord, having heard the debate, to withdraw his amendment and, I hope, not visit it on Report.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank noble Lords for what I hope everybody felt was a stimulating and useful debate, with a great number of differing views expressed by different noble Lords. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her eloquent support of the amendment. It was so depressing to hear her point out that we, the original home of free speech, are now seen around the world as one of the worst countries in suppressing it.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra presented the case for the amendment rather more eloquently than I was able to and, equally, with eloquent personal experience, which I felt was interesting, as indeed—I will talk about this in a minute—did the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. My noble friend Lord Young, again in far more eloquent terms than I, gave stark evidence of the dysfunctionality of the law, with the huge numbers of interventions by the police. Some 12,183 arrests was one statistic he quoted, in one year alone for just one act.
I add to the various mentions of where the police were forced to pay £10,000 or £20,000 in compensation that we should remember that that is not police money; it is our money. I would rather like to see that money spent in better ways and police time to be spent in better ways.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, for his brief intervention and move on to the very affecting speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. She was talking about how hate material should be legislated against. I will address that in the next amendment, which comes immediately after this. By the way, I can assure her that I played no part in the degrouping of my amendments from those of my noble friend Lord Young. I was deeply sorry to hear of that awful and appalling incident that the noble Baroness had to suffer at the railway station. I entirely agree that the people there should have intervened and supported her. It must have been just dreadful to have been sitting there with no support—until, of course, after the event, when there was plenty of it.
The noble Baroness may want to look at Hansard tomorrow, but my amendment would leave in place the ability of the police to go after that dreadful person who abused her because she was threatening imminent violence with that kick. Whether it was accurately placed or not, that was violence. I agree with that law, which should have gone after her. Facial recognition might have helped.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The issue we are trying to get to is where the boundary is between free speech and abusive behaviour. The police would have had problems saying that it was threatening if she said, “Oh, I was just dancing around the chair”. This is what they explained to me at the time. The issue that protected me was that she was abusive and insulting, and they could record it. Had they been able to find her, they could have checked to see whether it had happened elsewhere, which they thought would have been likely. That moves into the area of the next group, so I will not talk any further, but I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising that.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for that explanation. She clearly demarcated our difference in view as to where the line should be drawn. I suggest to noble Lords that it is important to draw the line at the threat of imminent violence. That has been a principle in the past, but it has been breached by recent laws and actions by the police.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, kindly supported this amendment—
Lord Katz (Lab)
I hate to interrupt the noble Lord’s flow, but I thought this an apposite time to point out that Members should normally be brief when pressing or withdrawing an amendment. The Companion is clear that you do not have to respond to all points raised in the debate. We are now over five minutes. I urge the noble Lord to conclude his remarks.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I remember the noble Lord, Lord Katz, taking almost 30 minutes the night before last when he had a time limit of 20 minutes. His remarks were so interesting that I did not feel like repining. I certainly would have finished by now had there not been interventions.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for kindly and eloquently supporting my views and turn finally to the Minister who, although speaking as always in the kindliest way, gave a most disappointing reply. I hope that, after the debate on the next amendment, he might reconsider. I was surprised that he still supported criminalisation of offending feelings after such a comprehensive listing by many speakers of the problems created by that in the various laws. I will talk more on this on the next amendment. In the meantime, and for now, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea
“Abolition of hate crime and offences related to hate(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).(2) In the long title, omit “to control the stirring up of racial hatred;”.(3) Part III and Part 3A are repealed.(4) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).(5) In the long title, omit “to create certain racially aggravated offences;”.(6) Omit sections 28 to 33.(7) In the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, omit section 39.(8) The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 is repealed.(9) In the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, omit section 74 and Schedule 16.(10) The Sentencing Code is amended as follows.(11) Omit section 66.(12) In section 160(1), in the table, omit the entry relating to “section 25 or 29I of the Public Order Act 1986”.(13) In Schedule 18, omit paragraph 22.(14) In Schedule 21, in paragraph 3 omit—(a) sub-paragraph (2)(g) and (2)(h), and(b) sub-paragraph (3).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would abolish all classes of “hate crime”, aggravating factors based upon “hate” and stand-alone offences relating to “hate”.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, my prior amendment would have removed criminalisation of offensive speech. This second amendment would remove criminalisation of hate as a motive. Mostly this relates to where, if a particular kind of hate directed at particular protected characteristics is proved to be involved, then the crime is considered to be aggravated and so the sentence is then increased. It also includes crimes associated with the stirring up of hatred.
Enhancing a convicted person’s sentence to an aggravated offence is a peculiar idea. In his latest Netflix special, which I am quite sure that most noble Lords have watched at least once, the comedian Ricky Gervais directly mocks this law—to loud audience applause. Recognition of the foolishness of the idea has now spread into popular culture. If I kick someone to the ground—I am not very good at fighting so I probably would not, but if I did—either for no reason or, let us say, because I hated their ginger hair, and I caused them grievous damage, I would go to jail for five years. But if I did exactly the same because I hated their sexual orientation or some other protected characteristic, that could be 10 years. Ricky Gervais pointed out that this implies that motiveless crime or a crime motivated by hate against a non-protected characteristic is not as bad as the same crime where there is hatred against a particular protected characteristic. I find that nonsensical and so did he. As he said to applause, “It’s a crime. Punish the crime”.
Prosecution would certainly be far simpler and investigations far more straightforward if we just addressed the crime and not the thoughts behind it. The whole idea of punishing thought is what used to be described as happening in a totalitarian state: thought crime. Stirring up violence directly should, of course, be criminalised, but criminalising the stirring up of hatred towards people with protected characteristics falls foul of free speech concerns in two different ways. First, it criminalises someone’s words by proving an intent to stir up based on the individual’s protected characteristics, which is very hard to discern. Secondly, it criminalises the stirring up of certain, specified thoughts about people with those protected characteristics in other people’s minds, which is equally hard to discern.
Note that the current popularity of the TV series “The Traitors” is precisely because of how impossible it is to detect another’s hidden thoughts. If those clever people on TV cannot do it, what chance has a court? It would be far better to criminalise just the stirring up of violence: after all, if violence is stirred up, a conviction occurs, so no further prosecution is necessary; if no violence is stirred up, given the concerns that will be raised about free speech and the like, why criminalise the words?
The key provisions in this amendment are, first, to repeal or omit Parts III and 3A of the Public Order Act 1986, which increase the imprisonment term to up to seven years when, in addition to the original crime, there is also the intentional stirring up of hate or likelihood that hate will be stirred up based on race, religion or sexual orientation—not disability, interestingly enough, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will note. Secondly, it would omit Sections 28 to 33 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which increase the imprisonment term to up to 14 years when an assault, criminal damage, public order offences or harassment are “racially or religiously aggravated”. Thirdly, it would omit Section 66 of the Sentencing Code, which increases sentences for certain crimes where there is, in addition, hostility to actual or presumed racial, religious, disability, sexual orientation or transgender characteristics. Stirring up, intentional or otherwise, is considered an aggravator that leads to higher sentences, although there is a somewhat ambiguous partial get-out for religious hostility.
I will not repeat the points that I made in my speech on the previous amendment about the multiple ways in which these laws fail to work, but I promised then to talk in particular in the speech on this amendment about the way in which hate crime law is clogging up the judicial system—so here goes. First, police forces are wasting thousands of hours on investigating hate crime allegations. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton pointed out, dozens are arrested every day for online posts. Around 140,000 hate crimes are recorded annually across race, sexual orientation, religion, disability and transgender issues.
The police are now being sued for wrongful arrest by, among many, Graham Linehan. The noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, has alleged that, in that case, the police were manipulated into the arrest by a transgender former police constable who had been dismissed for gross misconduct some time before.
A general public perception now arises that phone theft is downplayed, shoplifting ignored, and carjacking, burglaries and sexual offences all have less time spent on them than if the police could focus on them rather than being distracted by their pursuit of hate crime.
Secondly, the Crown Prosecution Service is flummoxed by what the law actually says. Isabel Vaughan-Spruce has been left in legal limbo for almost a year after being arrested for standing in silence in an abortion buffer zone, with the CPS still unable to decide whether she should be prosecuted. She has already received five-figure payouts from the police—as I mentioned, that is our money—for previous unlawful arrests, but, again, the year-long process is her punishment. The Koran burner’s violent knife attacker was given only a suspended sentence, yet the CPS is still seeking to convict the Koran burner himself of a criminal offence using the violence of his attacker as proof that the Koran burning stirred up disorder. This is a blasphemy law in all but name.
The Law Lord Jonathan Sumption has pointed out that the CPS has issued official advice that hatred can include “ill-will”, or ill feeling,
“spite, contempt, prejudice, unfriendliness”—
so now we have compelled friendliness—and
“antagonism, resentment and dislike”.
The CPS showed its advanced level of confusion by advising that:
“Evidence of … hostility is not required for an incident or crime to be recorded as a hate crime or hate incident”.
It has now withdrawn that last piece of advice, but not before sowing much confusion. We cannot blame the CPS too much; the legislation is, overall, a dog’s dinner.
The list of hate words in the actual legislation is long, including anxiety, insulting, distress, harassment, alarm, threatening, annoyance, inconvenience and abusive. In some of the hate crime laws, only one or two of these words appear; in others, up to five appear, but never the full nine words in any of the legislation. The word “distress” happens to be the most favoured in the legislation, appearing in seven out of the 11 laws. Poor old “annoyance” appears in only one of these laws. As for the five protected characteristics that are mentioned in the various laws, again, it is an incoherent mishmash. Some hate laws mention only one protected characteristic, while only the Sentencing Code mentions all of them. “Transgender” appears the least frequently.
We could, with difficulty, make an attempt to help the CPS by clearing all of this up, but we could also sort out the problem much more easily by abandoning the whole hate crime approach, focusing on the deed rather than the thought in what we prosecute.
Thirdly, the courts are burdened. The Government are proposing to abolish many jury trials because the courts are overworked. If we got rid of hate crime laws, is that not a better way to free up court time? Because of the ambiguity in the law, it is a postcode lottery at the courts, with acquittals on the silent prayer issue in Birmingham but convictions in Bournemouth.
Fourthly, the prisons are overburdened. I estimate that there are just a few hundred, very likely fewer, hate crime offenders currently imprisoned. But given the recent reports of a crime wave due to violent prisoners having been released early, surely every single freed-up prison place that could come from the abolition of these laws should count as a blessing.
I had almost forgotten to include the Probation Service, but was handily reminded that it is burdened as well by a newspaper article today revealing that Lucy Connolly—I do not think I need to say who she is—has been told by her probation officer that she was risking being sent back to jail, after spending around a year there for a tweet, after some random, unknown member of the public complained that they were offended and that she was inciting violence because she had retweeted a meme suggesting that Donald Trump should send troops to kidnap Keir Starmer. As far as I know, there are quite possibly some Labour Peers and MPs who share her sentiment, but, even if they express that sentiment in public, I would argue that they should definitely not go to jail for doing that. It is yet another example of the metastasis of these hate laws and a waste of probation officers’ time.
All these problems could be resolved were we to cut out or severely cut back on this large and recently introduced body of hate crime law. I urge noble Lords to embrace the benefits of cleaning up and slimming down our criminal law, focusing better on the real physical and cybercrime that besets our country at this time, which in many cases goes unpursued and unpunished because there are not enough judicial resources to pursue those crimes vigorously enough. To that end, I beg to move this amendment.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I apologise, but it is the return of the double act.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for tabling this amendment and for his excellent explanation of it. If the previous group was tricky then, yikes, getting rid of hate crime has me asking what I am doing here. I am going to carry on regardless and try to unpack why I think this is so important.
One thing that I am very aware of is that the accusation of hate crime or hate speech in any way can make you stutter and stammer and look the other way. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, told of the abuse that she received and how everybody stayed quiet until the incident was over and then rushed up to her. That reminded me of what it feels like at the moment to have unpopular views. Very often, you are attacked, and then people will come up to you afterwards, squeeze your arm and whisper, “I agree with what you said”, but they do not say it out loud. There are an awful lot of people who look away because they are frightened that they will be accused of supporting hate.
The best example, and one that this House has discussed endlessly, is the consequences for the thousands of young women in towns throughout the land who were abused, raped and sexually assaulted because people in official positions—social workers, teachers and people who knew that young women were being abused in that way—were frightened that, if they complained, they would be accused of Islamophobic racist hate. And so they were quiet. The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes that clear, as does all the other discussion on that question. In other words, this one is difficult, but we have got to keep going.
What is a hate crime? For the purposes of legislators, Lord Sumption, who has already been quoted, explains it this way:
“The Crown Prosecution Service and the police have agreed to define a hate crime as anything which is perceived by the victim or anyone else to be motivated by hostility or prejudice. In other words, the definition which they use is subjective. If the complainant thinks it is a hate crime, then it is a hate crime”.
That is extraordinarily dangerous, as it inevitably makes it impossible to deny the charge, to say, “I am not a hate criminal, and what I have just said is not a crime”. You have no defence, but it empowers a complainant as a victim who cannot be challenged. It has been proven that this is incredibly divisive in society. It incites people to adopt a victim label. In a period of identity politics and protected characteristics, it undermines equality before the law.
In reference to something else that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, in the 1980s, I was active in anti-racist politics. We sought equality before the law rather than discrimination, and made an argument focusing not so much on words but on making sure that people were treated equally, not spoken to nicely in different terms—although that was a bit of an argument, it was never something that was demanded by those of us involved in those fights.
Ironically, the aim of hate speech laws for many people is to create a kinder and nicer society, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not in her place, reminded us at Second Reading, and I am paraphrasing here, certain legislation in the early 1990s raised public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society and eradicate an emotion like hate. Indeed, that is a theme that the Economist feature that I mentioned earlier picks up. It says:
“The aim of hate-speech laws is to promote social harmony. Yet there is scant evidence that they work. Suppressing speech with the threat of prosecution appears to foster division … When the law forbids giving offence, it also creates an incentive for people to claim to be offended, thereby using the police to silence a critic or settle a score with a neighbour. When some groups are protected by hate-speech laws … others … demand protection, too. Thus, the effort to stamp out hurtful words can create a ‘taboo ratchet’, with more and more areas deemed off-limits. Before long, this hampers public debate. It is hard to have an open, frank exchange about”
controversial issues such as
“immigration, say, if one side fears that expressing its views will invite a visit from the police”.
That is really what the amendment is getting at. Removing hate crime from the statute books would not mean living in a hateful society. Hate crime on the statute books actually encourages people to be divisively, toxically antagonistic to each other.
On aggravated offences—the idea that you get a longer sentence if it is alleged that you are motivated by hate and the concept of stirring up hate—removing specific acts that are crimes from thoughts or the speech behind them dangerously conflates speech and action. When hate crime laws require that the authorities infer a perpetrator’s belief and assign greater punishment based on ideological motive, that can lead to some perverse criminal justice outcomes, which matter to legislators. In the CPS report on recent hate crime prosecutions there was a telling, shocking example. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for
“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.
Actually, 20 weeks seems a bit low to me, as it goes. Then the detail was revealed: the CPS explains that, for assaulting his father, his sister and a police officer, the person who was found guilty received a community order. They received the 20 weeks in prison for the racist slur. So for the assault you can retain your freedom, but for the racist words you get 20 weeks in jail. Is that not confusing?
There are endless examples that I could cite. It is no wonder that young people in particular, rather than being super-sensitive, as was described earlier, are actually super-sensitive to words they find difficult. They think that speech is violence and cannot distinguish between physical threats, physical harm and what they imagine to be harmful speech, which in turn justifies using physical violence against hate speech that they hear. That was brutally illustrated by the assassination of Charlie Kirk—someone whose politics I did not agree with but who was basically seen to be a hate criminal and, if all speech is violence, you can use violence back. I think these are regressive cultural fruits of vaguely drafted laws that give a vast and subjective discretion, and that is adding to the atmosphere of toxicity and cancel culture.
I know that all roads lead back to the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, but I ask the Minister whether he can explain the point of the review if, when he is looking at provisions such as public order offences and some of these issues—I know he is very concerned about free speech—we are going to just say that the status quo works. Hate crime legislation is getting us in a mess. The Minister says that he absolutely disagrees, but the Government have asked for a review of these very ideas.
Surely the Minister might be open-minded to that review, if not to the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and me, or other people who have spoken. Might there be some flexibility from the Minister in thinking that, just possibly, legislators before this Government brought in some bad laws and that, at the very least, we should look at them again? It just may be that hate crime legislation is making society more hateful, is making young people more anxious and frightened and is bad for democracy.
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in opposition to this amendment, but I will resist the temptation to give a Second Reading speech. My understanding is that it would abolish the entire statutory framework relating to hate crime and hatred-based offending.
I have been a blatant homosexual for many decades, and part of that look means that you evoke some hatred as you walk around the streets—the streets of Cardiff in 1993, certainly, when no hate crime legislation existed in relation to sexual orientation. The message I got at that age was that the state agreed with the offences that I was experiencing, because I did not know that the state supported me.
Within the last year, when I was in Shoreditch, a group of men surrounded me and my partner. They got up in our faces and used unequivocally homophobic language. We did not report it as a hate crime, but we were frightened and discombobulated. My response was, “But it’s Shoreditch”, which was my middle-class shorthand for, “There are so many lesbians in this area. What exactly are you going to do if you think that this hate is going to be acceptable here?” I did, however, feel utterly supported by the state a year ago, because I knew that legislation existed that made that kind of offence unacceptable.
As has been outlined, there is no single offence of hate crime. What exists is a framework across several Acts. There are aggravated forms of certain basic offences, and I look forward to the Government’s amendment on Report, as in their manifesto, relating to disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. There is enhanced sentencing, where hostility is proved on grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity. There are offences such as stirring up racial or religious hatred. It is my understanding that this amendment would dismantle that network in its entirety.
Those who have concerns about the recording of non-crime hate incidents, which I have sympathy with, or about proportionality in relation to hate crime, which I also have sympathy with, can and should address those matters directly. But those issues are distinct: wholesale repeal of criminal protections is not a measured response, in my view, to broader free speech concerns.
I find it impossible to ignore the context. Official Home Office figures record 137,550 hate crimes in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025. As a resident of Bethnal Green, I am acutely aware of hate crime in relation to antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. It exists across all the streets; the graffiti is going up and up in relation to both those things. On antisemitism specifically, the same Home Office bulletin records 2,873 religious hate crimes targeted at Jewish people in the year ending March 2025, and notes that the previous year saw a very sharp rise and spike following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict. In addition, the Community Security Trust recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the calendar year 2024. I share that data because what we measure, we manage. Understanding these spikes and seeing these patterns matter. What the hate crime legislation gives us is a mechanism for measuring and managing those spikes and incidents.
Where reporting shows acute risk, His Majesty’s Government have acted. In October 2023, the Conservative Government increased the Jewish community protective security grant to £18 million for 2023-24, and that figure was maintained in 2024-25. That is right and proper as a reasonable and justified response to that spike in hate crime, which was measured because this legislation exists.
One can believe deeply in freedom of expression; I sympathise and actually agree more than people might think with the previous amendment, and with some of the comments we have had so far. But the law must recognise and respond to crimes intended to intimidate whole communities. In my view, this amendment would remove the very tools that allow the police and the courts to identify, mark and properly sentence hostility-motivated offending. For those reasons, I would request that this amendment be withdrawn.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
That was a very useful and nuanced contribution from the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to notice the rise, for example, of antisemitic hate against Jews. The amount of hate crimes being recorded, however, has gone up hugely, despite the proliferation of hate crime legislation. Does that not rather imply that hate crime legislation is not stopping hate crime?
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is a really important question, and I will try to remember to keep speaking in the third person, because I do want to just talk.
Has the proliferation of legislation helped prevent hate crime? During the past two decades we often saw increases, and we would question whether those increases were a product of increased hate crime, or an increased awareness of the legislation that led people to report. I am aware that, being of my generation, I am reluctant to report. There is a part of me that thinks, “You had it coming, and you should probably have taken your tie off for that walk down that street. You brought it on yourself”, added to which I do not want to waste police time. There is a conditioning that goes on with minority communities, and it takes some changing in how we think about these things to give communities permission to say that they did not have it coming, they do not deserve it, and that they have the right to talk to the police about those incidents.
I welcome the increase in reporting. Nevertheless, there has been an overreliance on using some of this legislation for incidents that should not constitute a hate crime. What happens when those cases are brought and those complaints are made, and how they are investigated, absolutely requires examination and thought. However, that does not justify the wholesale removal of hate crime legislation, which is a disproportionate response to the problem that has been identified.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I also declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I will make three arguments against the statutory hate crime regime, and against embedding the concept of hate crime in British law. As we have heard, and as we are all aware, the concept of hate crime is inextricably bound up with protected characteristics. A hate crime is either the stirring up of hatred against the bearers of certain protected characteristics, or it is a crime that becomes a hate crime because the perpetrator is motivated by hostility towards one or more of the protected characteristics of the victim.
The number of protected characteristics in this statutory framework, however, varies from law to law. Hate crime law, on the face of it, is for that reason slightly confusing and incoherent. There are three protected characteristics in the stirring-up offences in the Public Order Act, five are referenced in the aggravated offences regime, seven in the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act, and nine in the Equality Act. How can we rationalise this anomaly? The solution of successive Governments has been constantly to add new protected characteristics to the statute book. I dare say it is possible that, in due course, amendments will be made to the Crime and Policing Bill to add yet more protected characteristics to the criminal law.
The direction of travel is clear: the number of protected characteristics is constantly expanding, and various lobby groups are constantly petitioning parliamentarians to add ever more protected characteristics to the statute book. The end point of this process will be that every characteristic is protected; but if every characteristic is protected, then no particular characteristic will enjoy special protection and we will, in effect, be back to where we started pre-1965, before the concept of hate crime raised its head in British law.
My first argument is that, in the interests of saving us all a great deal of time and effort, can we not just short-circuit the process of getting to the point where every characteristic is protected by stripping out the concept of hate crime and protected characteristics from British law and returning to the pre-1965 status quo?
My second argument has been touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that the concept of hate crime is at odds with the sacrosanct principle of equality before the law. Why should bearers of protected characteristics enjoy more robust legal protections than non-bearers? Why is a criminal offence motivated by hostility towards a victim’s transgender identity punished more severely than exactly the same crime motivated by the victim’s sex? Sex is not a protected characteristic, apart from in the Equality Act. This two-tier justice—this sense that some people, because they happen to belong to protected groups, enjoy additional legal protections—fosters grievance, breeds resentment and undermines public trust in the law and in the police in particular. In 1981, around 87% of Britons reported having confidence in the police. By 2022, that had fallen to about 67%, a substantial long-term decline. I would suggest that one of the reasons for declining public trust in the police is this sense that some groups are better protected than others because of the hate crime, protected characteristic regime.
My third argument, which is probably the strongest argument, is that the aggravated offences regime introduces the concept of thought crime into British law. We need to distinguish between mens rea and the particular thought someone is having towards the victim while committing a particular crime. I do not think, when assessing the seriousness of an offence, you could exclude motive. It would be absurd not to take motive into account, but that is different from punishing a crime more severely if a person is experiencing a particular emotion—hostility, hatred—towards a particular group that the victim of the crime belongs to. Mens rea is universal and does not discriminate, but hate crime does. It says that if you are having particular thoughts about the victim when you commit the crime—importantly, not hatred in general, but hatred based on their possession of one or more protected characteristics—you should be punished more severely.
Not only is this criminalisation of certain thoughts a hallmark of a totalitarian society, but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, it is very hard to prove. It is very hard for a court to determine whether the person accused of the crime had the verboten thoughts while committing the crime. To paraphrase Queen Elizabeth I, we cannot open a window and see into men’s souls.
I am perfectly aware that an amendment stripping the concept of hate crime from British law has little chance of winning a Division in this House, so let me close with some more modest proposals. Do not add any more protected characteristics to the list of aggravators. Extend Section 29J of the Public Order Act, which protects various forms of criticism of religion and makes it more difficult for people to be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred. You can criticise a religion, even quite robustly, thanks to Section 29J and not be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred.
One useful improvement to the hate crime statutory regime would be to extend Section 29J to the other stirring-up offences. For example, the Free Speech Union paid for the legal defence of a former Royal Marine called Jamie Michael. He robustly criticised illegal immigrants in a Facebook video and, as a consequence, he was prosecuted for intending to stir up racial hatred. It took a jury in Merthyr Tydfil all of 17 minutes to unanimously acquit him of that offence. He should never have been prosecuted. We need a protection in the Public Order Act whereby, if you make robust criticisms, even of legal migration, you should not be vulnerable to a charge of stirring up racial hatred.
Finally, an anomaly in the stirring-up offences is that you can be prosecuted for stirring up racial hatred if the effect of your words or behaviour is likely to stir up racial hatred, even if that is not your intention—whereas you can be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation only if you intended to do that. That is an anomaly, and my recommendation would be that a two-limb test has to be satisfied before one of the stirring-up offences can be made out. To successfully prosecute someone, it should be incumbent on the Crown to show not only that what they said or did was likely to stir up hatred against the protected group in question but that they intended to as well. That would bring British law to a certain extent into line with the Brandenburg test in the US first amendment, whereby you can be prosecuted only if your words or actions are not only likely to but were intended to cause imminent lawless action.
So, accepting that this controversial proposal that my two colleagues have bravely made is unlikely to ever win enough support in this House as presently constituted to win a Division, I urge the Committee to consider those more modest reforms.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, for setting out his arguments for abolishing hate crimes. He started with the issue of freedom of speech again—I absolutely understand that that is where he and those supporting him are coming from—and, interestingly, he cited the case of Lucy Connolly. I thought it might be helpful to remind the Committee of part of Article 10 in our Human Rights Act 1998, which says:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression”—
we are shorthanding that to “speech”—but it goes on to say:
“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.
I have carefully quoted all of it, but I will focus on the part that relates to what she was convicted for.
Coming back to our debate on the previous group, the problem is that there is a lot of concern about big figurehead cases when, actually, the law, the judge and the jury—actually there was no jury because Connolly pleaded guilty—were clear that she was inciting racial hatred. She pleaded guilty of saying threatening and abusive material, which is interesting given what we debated on the last group. She said:
“set fire to all the”—
effing—
“hotels full of the bastards”.
She said that at exactly the time that people were on the streets, some of whom were trying to set fire to the hotels. The tweet was viewed 310,000 times before it was deleted, and the judge specifically cited that in his summary at the end of the case.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for accepting my intervention. I just wanted to point out that the noble Baroness did not quote Lucy Connolly’s tweet in full. She added the caveat “for all I care”, which suggested not that she was intending to encourage people to burn down asylum hotels but that she was indifferent as to whether they did so.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
Fortunately, the judge took a different view. I think that we have to accept—and I was not the judge and do not know what his thoughts were—that the tweet was clearly seen enough times by the public at the moment when a small number of people were causing real concern outside hotels that had asylum seekers in them who had absolutely nothing to do with the Southport stabbing. That was the issue. Therefore, I believe that this is exactly where the balance lies between rights and responsibility, to go back to John Stuart Mill, where we started in the previous group.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I thank the noble Baroness for letting me intervene. Will she agree that it is unfortunate that there is a general perception that this lady—on whose case I do not rest any of my argument, or place any reliance, as I discussed in my 40-page submission to the Macdonald review—was inveigled into pleading guilty by being kept on remand in a case where it would not have been usual to keep such a person with such an alleged crime on remand? She pled guilty because she thought that she would be released early—more fool her, it turns out—and as a result of her pleading guilty, the matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Young, that she said “for all I care”, which may have turned out to be an excuse that led to her exoneration in front of a jury, much like that 17-minute jury decision that he mentioned, was never litigated, so that we could have discovered what the law said as to whether her tweet reached the standards for criminal conviction. Does the noble Baroness not think that unfortunate?
Baroness Brinton (LD)
I do not think that it is unfortunate given that the judge said that 310,000 views of that tweet happened at a time when there was discord on the streets. My argument is not about Connolly’s case; it goes back to Article 10 in the Human Rights Act, which says that along with freedom of expression or freedom of speech there are rights and responsibilities, and it is the role of the state to have laws to protect people. It cannot have been right to think that even one person seeing that tweet could have started one of the arsons in the bins outside one of the asylum seeker hotels. I do not know whether that happened; the point is that 310,000 people saw it, and that is the difference with her last phrase, which probably most people did not see or did not take in the way that the noble Lord has indicated—he has raised his eyebrows at me, but there are different ways of taking it. I do not want to get into the detail of that; I am trying to make the argument that, for every instance of freedom of speech by an individual, there are quite often consequences that may or may not end up as a crime as well. That brings me back to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, raised earlier—that the level of hate crimes is increasing. We also know that hate crimes are seriously underreported.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
I apologise for intervening again, but does the noble Baroness not accept that had that matter been litigated it would not have been before the judge? It would not have been for the judge to rule; it would have been before a jury, which is something that we in this country enjoy and that unfortunately there are moves to suppress. It would have been in front of a jury, and a jury would have been able to decide whether that final point justified her exoneration.
Baroness Brinton (LD)
The noble Lord said that he did not rely on Lucy Connolly in his earlier argument; he is now trying to rely on that case here. I am trying to make the point that it is more complex than he made out in his earlier contribution. I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The previous Government’s LGBT survey in 2018 showed that fewer than one in 10 LGBT people reported hate crimes or incidents. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, has explained one of the reasons for that. The other reason, I know from friends who have also experienced this sort of hate crime, is they do not believe that the police will do anything. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Young, that that is one of the reasons why there is concern about the police: too often, people who are targeted in this way feel that they do not get the help that they need.
As has been described, there is no single piece of hate crime legislation. It includes aggravated assault, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, was particularly concerned about. The point about hate crime is that it is not just the individual; the protected characteristic means that they and their community are also affected by it. We have spent many hours on previous groups on this Bill discussing the absolute abhorrence of antisemitism. If actions in Israel can cause people in the UK to start attacking members of our Jewish community, either verbally or against a person or their property, then that is absolutely unacceptable. That is one of the reasons why I would never want hate crimes to be removed.
Research by Professor Mark Walters of Sussex University shows that hate crimes do not affect just those individuals targeted; he describes them as having a “ripple effect” through their wider communities. Some people will avoid certain routes and places, and others will not leave home at all, particularly in our Jewish communities at the moment, but the same is true in certain areas for our Muslim communities. If laws about hate crime are weakened or repealed, it would send an appalling message to these communities of faith, as well as to LGBT and disabled people. Do the supporters of the amendment really no longer regard it as important that the state recognises the communities that have protected characteristics—their vulnerability—as warranting distinct legal recognition and criminalisation?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, once again, this has been a very interesting debate and I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea for tabling Amendment 382G. This amendment contains a line of argument that the Committee began to consider in the previous group: namely, whether the criminal law should concern itself with what people do or whether it should also punish what people are thought to feel or believe.
The provisions targeted by this amendment fall broadly into two categories. First, there are ordinary criminal offences—assault, criminal damage, harassment and public order offences—where existing penalties are increased if the court concludes that the offender was motivated by hostility towards a protected characteristic. Secondly, there are freestanding offences, particularly under the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which criminalised the stirring up of hatred, even where no violence or other recognised criminal harm has occurred.
The crux of the debate comes down to this: two identical acts can result in radically different sentences depending not on the harm caused but on an inferred state of mind. That inference might be drawn from sparse or ambiguous evidence, yet it carries profound consequences for liberty. This could make prosecutions more complex, investigations longer and outcomes less predictable—hardly a recipe for clarity or fairness. These laws have grown incrementally and unevenly; they overlap, diverge, and sometimes contradict one another. The result is a body of legislation that is difficult to understand, inconsistently applied and increasingly divorced from public confidence.
This amendment offers the Committee an opportunity to step back and ask whether this approach has genuinely improved justice or whether it has instead distracted our criminal justice system from its core task of tackling real and harmful crime. This is a point that I would particularly like to emphasise. As a former police officer myself, I understand the difficulties in enforcing laws that are passed by a well-meaning Parliament but are incoherent and ill thought through. Part of this problem does indeed lie with us, the lawmakers. Successive Governments and Parliaments have not taken a coherent approach to public order and speech legislation. They have passed statute after statute, simply adding to the already long list of different defences, not thinking to consolidate or repeal existing laws.
When the Public Order Act 1986 passed, it contained seven offences of this nature. The previous Labour Government passed the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sections 28 to 33 of which created racially aggravated offences. They then passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which added a new Part 3A to the 1986 Act, and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 added hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to the list of hate crimes. The Sentencing Act 2020 also permits for any offence to be aggravated by hostility expressed towards any of five characteristics.
This Government are going down the same path, as we have already discussed in Committee. Clauses 107 and 108 of this very Bill contain further provisions criminalising the use of offensive language based on racial hatred aimed towards an emergency worker. If the Government think it is coherent to simply bolt new offences on to the already vast array of legislation, then I respectfully suggest that they are somewhat misguided.
Furthermore, far from promoting cohesion, these provisions have too often deepened division. They have encouraged grievance politics and fostered public mistrust. They have also placed the police in an impossible position, asking them to arbitrate not just behaviour but belief and expression.
There is a further concern about effectiveness. These laws, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea mentioned, are clogging the justice system with cases that pose no real threat to public safety, while doing little to address genuine hatred or violence. At the same time, they have fed a broader culture in which accusations of hate are used to silence debate, discourage inquiry and deter people—artists, teachers, academics and ordinary citizens—from speaking openly.
Freedom of speech is not an abstract luxury; it is a defining feature of our national character and a cornerstone of democratic legitimacy. I thank my noble friend for enabling this fruitful debate and hope that the Government will consider it carefully.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Before my noble friend the Minister stands up, I will briefly intervene to say that at Second Reading, I counted 44 previous statutes that were being amended by the Bill. I just counted five in Amendment 382G. I do not know whether they join the 44 statutes in the Bill itself or whether they stand alone, but the Bill is extremely complex. In the word I used at Second Reading, it is, in this sense, a “monster” of a Bill, not because of the many provisions in it and the other provisions that noble Lords have brought out in it: that is not my point. My point is just on the complexity of the Bill. I beg that there may be a change of mind by Governments and parliamentary draftsmen and that they do not inflict Bills like this on the House.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Follow that, my Lords.
I appreciate the measured approach of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, to the significant measures that he proposes in his amendments, and I appreciate the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench, and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in support of the measured way in which he brought forward his amendments. Having said that, I stand with the noble Baronesses, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green and Lady Brinton, in saying that I cannot and would not wish to accept those amendments. Hate crime legislation exists because offences motivated by prejudice inflict deep harm on victims and on entire communities. These crimes target people for who they are, undermining social cohesion and spreading fear. It is my view that repeal would not just send a wrong signal but say that identity-based hostility is no more serious an offence than any other offence, and I am afraid that it is. Our laws rightly recognise its heightened impact and ensure that justice outcomes reflect that gravity.
Despite the fact that the noble Lord and others have mentioned and prayed in aid figures that have risen, hate crime laws deter abuse. They uphold the shared values of society. The noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, made the very good point that they provide a measure of awareness and of the potential for those offences. Ultimately, they protect victims with protected characteristics that they cannot change. It is really important to remember that they are being attacked, or preyed on in many ways, for characteristics that they cannot change.
Let us be clear, because the noble Lord has been measured and clear, that this amendment would remove offences of stirring up racial hatred. It would abolish—
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
My Lords, it took me a few seconds to react to and think about what the Minister said. For the information of the House, I think it would be fair to recognise that several of the nine protected characteristics are not immutable and are capable of change. Gender identity is one; marriage and civil partnership is another. Let us be clear: some are immutable, but others are capable of change. I am not expressing an opinion on this proposed new clause, but in general it is fair to say that protected characteristics socially evolve and develop over time.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let what the noble Baroness has said stand. I am making the point that disability, transgender identity—in my view—sexual orientation and race are things that you have and that are part of you. If the offences proposed for removal are removed by this House, that would send a signal to society that we are happy for people to stir up hatred on the grounds of those characteristics. That is not acceptable to me and I hope the noble Lord recognises that I cannot accept those amendments today, although I accept the way they have been put.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Surely the signal that scrapping hate crime from British law would send is not that we do not care about vulnerable groups but that we think they should enjoy the same legal protections as everyone else, and that everyone should be equal in the eyes of the law.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
That is a view, but not one that I share. There are protections in the Public Order Act 1986 against stirring up hatred on racial or religious grounds because, yes, I am equal under the law if I have that hatred against me, but that hatred may be generated because I happen to have a racial or religious characteristic that is subject to attack. So, we are not equal under the law, because if I did not have that racial or religious characteristic I would not have been attacked. For me, that is therefore an aggravating factor and a reason why we should maintain those offences.
I go back to what I was saying a moment ago. This would remove offences of stirring up hatred under the Racial and Religious Hatred Act. It would abolish racial and religiously aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act and delete aggravating factors of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity from the Sentencing Code. At the very time when Jewish people are being attacked for being Jewish and transgender people are being attacked for being transgender, that is not acceptable. I am not saying that either noble Lord wishes to encourage or support that type of activity—I recognise from the measured way in which they put their arguments that they do not. They have an honestly held opinion that removing that legislation would be of benefit to society. I happen to disagree and I am trying to put the reason why. If there is clear water between us, that is the nature of political life. I am not imputing any characteristics to the noble Lord for bringing this measure forward.
However, the effect of this would be to compromise the ability of the courts to reflect the greater harm—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, said—to undermine deterrence and clarity for police and prosecutors and to signal that those crimes are no more serious when they are motivated by hostility toward protected characteristics, contrary to long-standing principle. It would also risk eroding public confidence, particularly among people with those protected characteristics. The underreporting that the noble Baroness mentioned would absolutely nosedive if these provisions were taken away, because people would think that society had not put that down as a benchmark by which people should be judged. I am therefore afraid that I cannot accept the amendment.
I must also give notice to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, who made a very helpful plea that we should not bring forward further protected characteristics. I regret to inform him that, on Report, I will be very proud to stand here and move an amendment which puts transgender and disability as protected characteristics, in line with the manifesto on which my party stood and won an election in July 2024. We will be bringing forward amendments in the Crime and Policing Bill on Report to give effect to this change. We can have that debate openly and honestly, but I say to the Committee that society has some basic principles of respect that it should enshrine in law. The legislation that the noble Lord is seeking to remove would undermine that principle and I will not support it.
Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)
I have listened carefully to this debate and the previous one without intervening. I have a lot of sympathy with the Minister, as he knows, on many of the measures in the Bill, but I am a little surprised at his unequivocal rejection of several of these kinds of amendments, only because we have the Macdonald review going on. Will he accept that, if it comes up with recommendations while the Bill is not yet an Act, he will accept amendments to take on board those recommendations?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Let me say two things in response to that. We have commissioned the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, to look at a review of protests and a range of matters to do with that legislation. However—and this is where I accept what the noble Baroness said—we will have to look at what the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, brings forward and the Government will have to take political decisions on whether we accept it.
I am defending a principle here today. The noble Lord will be looking at potential issues around implementation, tweaks, et cetera, but the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, has made a well-measured assault on legislative tenets. I cannot ever see this Government accepting the removal of those legislative tenets, but we will always accept the recommendations being looked at. Going back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, on how we can improve the monitoring, policing and understanding of these issues, it is a complex area, as the noble Baroness knows through her experience and recent appointments.
We will also be bringing forward on Report offences relating to transgender and disability, which was in our manifesto commitment. That is another complex area, which is why it has taken time for us to get to the stage of bringing forward the amendment. When we do so, we will have to look at it in the context of the whole package that the noble Baroness has worked on, that this Committee is looking at now and on which the noble Lord made his comments.
From this Dispatch Box today, I simply say that I cannot accept his amendments. I think he knew that before he introduced them. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, hinted as much in his contribution, but I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. If he revisits this on Report, we will have that discussion again in a fair, open and measured way, as we have today.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
Perhaps I might ask one important question. I understand that the report from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, is going to be produced before Report. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that it should be made available to us before we settle into Report?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is expected to produce a report at some point during the next couple of months. I cannot give a definitive time for that, but I can tell the Committee that we will obviously make sure that it is published. There are likely to be Statements or an Urgent Question in this House on the report. We will first look at how we as a Government consider the recommendations and, secondly, if we need legislation, what mechanism that would be and when it would be brought forward. I can tell my noble friend that there will be a full discussion on the report when it comes. I cannot, as yet, constrain the discussion from the perspective of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, by answering the question my noble friend posed.
Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)
My Lords, I thought that too was a great debate and that the Minister managed to articulate very clearly that there is clear water between two opposing groups of thought on these matters. I am gagging to launch into a half-hour speech to attempt to respond to what he and others said, but I am mindful of the earlier admonitions from the noble Lord, Lord Katz. I merely thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Hunt and Lady Brinton, my noble friends Lord Young and Lord Davies, and the Minister for their contributions.
I believe that it is time to call an end to this hate crime law experiment. The criminalisation of hate speech and hate crime was overambitious. It punishes ideas and motives, as opposed to actions. As I have shown, I believe it is choking up the justice system and shutting down free speech. I will close by slightly misquoting Samuel Johnson:
“How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws ”—
or Lords—“can cause or cure”. Having said that, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the requirement for an officer to have electronically tracked information to enter and search a premises.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, we now come to a group of amendments that seeks to improve the Government’s legislation as it currently stands. We broadly agree with the need to expand the police’s search powers, given the rise in shoplifting—that is not a term I particularly like, as it is really Section 1 theft, but I will refer to it as shoplifting for the purposes of this debate—and theft of personal property. Our only divergence is the extent to which we should extend these new powers.
The measures in the Bill are extremely necessary. We are facing an epidemic of petty theft, with phone theft and shoplifting reaching highs. One-third of adults were victims of phone theft last year, with the United Kingdom accounting for roughly 40% of all such thefts in Europe. These phones are then dismantled, deactivated and often sent abroad, with little chance of their owners getting them back.
Shoplifting gangs are terrorising high streets. Theft from shops reached over £2.2 billion last year, narrowing the margins of small independent stores and pushing up costs for the law-abiding public. Electronic stores are often targeted, with owners left helpless by the lack of power bestowed on security guards and the high costs of surveillance. The police must have the means to tackle this crime past their current capabilities. The fact that, once a criminal enters a premises, he can store the stolen goods until a search warrant is issued is not justice—it is an affront to the victim. It is not good enough to hope that officers arrive in time to arrest criminals in public for individuals to have a chance of retrieving their stolen goods. Officers must be able to enter premises without a warrant if the situation requires it.
That is why the Government’s measure is a welcome step. However, they have watered down the measures that we proposed in the Criminal Justice Bill in 2023. Where our measures would have allowed specified officers to search for stolen goods without a warrant if it is not practicable to obtain one, the Government have limited this to goods with obtainable electronic tracking data. The amendments in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie attempt to revert this measure back to its original intent so that it does not solely pertain to electronically tracked goods.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this group addresses the extension of warrantless search powers for electronically tracked stolen goods to the service police, in Clause 129, alongside civilian police, in Clause 128. While we recognise the need for police to tackle high-tech crime, such sweeping powers, particularly warrantless searches, must be meticulously governed to avoid abuse and uphold civil liberties. I have tabled Amendments 386 to 389, which would ensure that robust governance and accountability mechanisms are embedded in these provisions.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to produce a code of practice for the operation of Clause 129, specifically mandating consultation with civil liberties and human rights organisations and relevant service police bodies. This would ensure due process regarding the authorisation, seizure, retention and disposal of evidence.
Amendment 388 would require the Secretary of State to provide appropriate training for service police personnel on how to exercise these powers proportionately and lawfully.
Amendment 387 would mandate the establishment of an independent mechanism for handling, investigating and reviewing public complaints arising from the exercise of these powers, giving complainants similar statutory rights to victims reporting to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
Amendment 389 would mandate that the Secretary of State produces an annual report detailing the exercise of these warrantless search powers under Clause 128, ensuring transparency and accountability to Parliament. Further, these new obligations would require the affirmative procedure for their governing regulations, ensuring full parliamentary debate before they are enacted, as sought in Amendments 499 to 501.
We on these Benches are opposed to Amendments 383 to 385 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, which seek to remove the requirement, as we have heard from the noble Lord, for an officer to even possess electronic tracking data before conducting a warrantless search. By stripping away this technologically justified threshold, these amendments would transform a specific investigative tool into an arbitrary power of entry, undermining the core principle that a person’s home is his castle.
In contrast, Amendments 386 to 389 provide the necessary basis for these intrusive powers to be overseen. Specifically, Amendment 386 mandates a statutory code of practice for the Armed Forces to ensure that their exercise of these powers is necessary, proportionate and strictly compliant with the Human Rights Act. Furthermore, Amendment 387 would establish an independent mechanism for handling public complaints, ensuring that any misuse of power is investigated by a body demonstrably independent of the service police.
Finally, my amendments would require post-implementation reporting to Parliament every 12 months. We must see the data on the demographic profile of those targeted and the subsequent criminal justice outcomes to guard against disproportionate application or mission creep. Without these safeguards, we risk creating a shortcut—as other provisions might do—to a surveillance state, where convenience is prioritised over constitutional protection.
The safeguards that I have proposed in Amendments 386 to 389 regarding service police are only as strong as the parliamentary scrutiny that would underpin them. We must ensure that these powers are exercised with not just efficiency but a regular check of parliamentary accountability.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, this group of amendments addresses Clauses 128 and 129 granting new powers to the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that can be electronically tracked there, without the need to first apply to a court for a warrant. I welcome the welcome given to these new clauses by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, on behalf of the Opposition.
These new powers are intended, as he said, to be exercised where a stolen item is electronically tracked to a specific location. This is in direct response to public concern that the police are not able to act swiftly in response to crimes such as mobile phone theft, even when victims have clear, real-time electronic evidence of the phone’s location. It will reduce the risk that stolen goods are quickly moved on or used to facilitate other crime. I suggest to the Committee that the main benefit of these clauses is ensuring that mobile phone theft is addressed and combated.
The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, is no longer in his place, but when speaking to an earlier group he suggested that there is an impression that the police do not prioritise criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft but instead concentrate on other issues, which I will not go into. I suggest that the police being able to more quickly and effectively tackle very common criminal behaviour such as mobile phone theft would also very much enhance the reputation of the police. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, said, it is sometimes at risk of being downplayed.
I will first address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Amendments 383 to 385 would remove the requirement in Clause 128 that the power may be exercised by police only in relation to stolen goods electronically tracked to specified premises. They would also remove the condition that before the use of power is authorised by a senior police officer, he or she must be satisfied that there is electronic tracking data linking the stolen item and a specific premises. These amendments would significantly broaden the scope of the proposed powers and remove important safeguards.
Powers of entry are inherently intrusive, and there is a balance to be struck between ensuring that the police can act quickly and decisively against thieves, and retrieve victims’ stolen property, and safeguarding the right to a private and family life. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, put it very well when he referred to it as a technically justified threshold. I contend to the Committee that people generally accept the need for warrants to be used in detecting stolen goods, but some devices can be tracked electronically in real time. The police turn around and say, “We can’t do anything about this because we have to go and get a warrant”, but you can point to the address where you know that phone is and you know that, if the police do not act quickly, there is a good chance that phone will be moved out of the country. It is only right that we use that as an apposite threshold to introduce these powers, rather than saying that they should be used for any stolen good of whatever nature, where there is no electronic tracking data involved. It will do much to improve confidence in the police in catching up with the 21st century and current technology, but we do not see the need to go further.
The requirement for electronic tracking data linking at least one stolen item to the premises before powers can be exercised provides a further layer of reliability in their use, while ensuring, as I said, that the police can act swiftly when they need to. I say again that removing these requirements would dilute the safeguards intended to ensure that police officers use these powers lawfully, proportionately and only in specific circumstances.
That brings me neatly to Amendments 386 to 389 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I commend his intent to ensure that there is strong accountability, independent oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers. As I have said, the Government recognise that these new powers are intrusive by their nature, particularly as they can be exercised by officers without them first needing to seek authorisation from a court by obtaining a search warrant. We have, accordingly, built in appropriate safeguards to ensure that the new powers are used appropriately and within well-established independent oversight and scrutiny mechanisms.
Amendment 386 would require the Secretary of State to issue a statutory code of practice to which the service police must have regard when exercising the new powers. I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that these new powers will be subject to the relevant provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. The Government will amend PACE Code B, and Code B of the service police codes of practice, to reflect the new powers, providing clear and detailed guidance around their use for both territorial and service police. These revisions to the codes will be completed before the powers are commenced. This will provide robust statutory guidance to police and will be complemented by the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice.
Amendment 387 would require the creation of an independent oversight mechanism to investigate public complaints about the use of these powers by service police. Any complaints about their use by territorial police would be addressed in the normal way through internal police complaints procedures and referrals to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where required.
The service police are the focus of the noble Lord’s amendment, and any complaints would be dealt with under the complaints system for service police. As set out in the Service Police (Complaints etc.) Regulations 2023, this is overseen by the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, whose role is similar to that of the IOPC. The commissioner is independent of the service police and the MoD, and has a statutory duty to secure, maintain and review arrangements for procedures that deal with complaints and conduct. They deal with the most serious complaints and set the standard by which service police should handle complaints. The Service Police Complaints Commissioner has the same powers as the service police where it has been determined that they will carry out an investigation, and they can also determine that a complaint can be reinvestigated, if they are satisfied that there are compelling reasons to do so.
Amendment 388 would require service police to undertake training before they could exercise the new powers. All members of the service police undergo training that addresses each element set out in the noble Lord’s amendment, including on the legal requirements and limitations of search and seizure powers, proportionality, maintenance of clear records and compliance with Article 8 of the ECHR and the Human Rights Act 1998. Service police trainees are tested on arrest, entry, search and seizure before they can exercise these powers. Training is updated in response to any change in legislation that would affect service police officers’ exercise of their powers. Specifically, training will be updated in light of the new powers in this Bill.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. The Minister is clearly getting to the end of what he has to say. What raised my eyebrows reading Clause 129 is the fact that these powers have been given to the service police in the first place. What is the rationale for them having these powers in particular, how much mobile phone theft are the service police dealing with, and why are we putting them on all fours with the civilian police? The Minister will have noticed that I have not tried to amend Clause 128; all my focus is on the service police. If a military policeman turned up on my doorstep and asked to check out my house, I certainly would be rather concerned, hence the need for safeguards. But there seems to be no rationale for the service police being brought into this and being given these pretty extensive powers.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the bad news is that not all service personnel are absolute angels: it could be one junior soldier stealing a mobile phone from another junior serviceman. These arrangements are very sensible, and I agree with everything that the Minister has had to say. My only question for him, while I am on my feet, is this: is there any evidence that the service police make mistakes on the procedures when they are exercising their powers? I am not aware of any problem.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will take the last one first. I am not sure there is any evidence; I would have to look into that. To answer the more substantive intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, as to why service police need the powers to deal with electronically tracked stolen goods, while service police deal with crime in the defence context, it is important that they are equipped to respond effectively to current and future trends in criminal behaviour. Obviously, the provisions in the Bill help to ensure that service police can respond with lawful, fair and proportionate action, now and in the future, to the full spectrum of criminality that threatens the cohesion and operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces. These new powers will give officers more chance of quickly finding and retrieving stolen items that are electronically tracked at premises, and reduce the risk they are lost or moved on. Maybe put it down to an overabundance of caution but also an acknowledgement that crimes that affect and have to be investigated by civilian forces can also affect and be investigated by the Armed Forces.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, all I will say is that, faced with an abundance of caution—that is to say, if in doubt— “give the police powers” is not an approach that is particularly favoured on these Benches.
Lord Katz (Lab)
That is a point well made and well taken. I add that the powers would, of course, be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the service police, so service police would not suddenly be moving into areas of activity that you would expect the territorial police to be pursuing.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, anticipated that I was winding up. I hope that my comments have reassured the noble Lord that the spirit and intention behind his amendments have been incorporated within the proposals in the Bill. In the light of my remarks, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I give thanks to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I will reiterate my opening speech by saying that I know we all have the same end goal of arresting criminals and preventing thefts. We may have different roads that we believe to be the best way of arriving at that goal, but I am confident that this debate has taken place in a productive and open-minded manner.
At the risk of repeating myself, phone theft and shoplifting, frequently targeted at electronic stores, are not just epidemics but growing ones. Crime is thriving, businesses are closing, and the public are becoming increasingly anxious. A phone is stolen every seven and a half minutes in our capital city. We cannot simply look on at the situation with the hope that it gets better.
The Government must resolve to adopt the framework from our 2023 Bill, and they must now go further. Amendments 383, 384 and 385 in my name would achieve this. They would remove the requirement that a stolen good be electronically traceable and would permit senior officers to use discretion to search premises without a warrant. These amendments answer a problem that requires immediate action. The Government must get a grip on the theft epidemic. Our measures provide them with one of many necessary solutions, and I hope the Minister takes them away for consideration.
Moving on to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I largely agree with his principle that the new clause that introduces new powers should be accompanied by checks and balances. Establishing a code of practice, having an independent mechanism for investigating complaints, providing mandatory training for senior officers and requiring an annual report on the use of the powers in question would act to safeguard the heightened powers officers will gain. This especially holds should the Government incorporate our amendments. We trust the judgment of our officers and believe that they will always make the judgment they think best, but I am conscious that we are entrusting them with more intrusive powers. Mechanisms must exist that counteract any tendencies for this power to be misused, and I believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would achieve that. However, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.
It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.
The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.
Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.
These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.
I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.
Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.
We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.
It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I can answer the questions from the noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches and the Opposition Front Bench. I can say to them, on the amendments we have brought forward today, that the measures in them apply only to the terrorism and state threats prevention and investigation measures, as well as the new youth diversion orders. There are safeguards on what type of data the police are allowed to access. For example, there are limitations on accessing information which might include legally privileged material.
In a similar way to accessing local data on a device, nothing in this legislation changes the existing duties on the police imposed by the Data Protection Act 2018. UK legislation offers important safeguards for law enforcement in processing that personal data. That includes the requirement not to retain personal data longer than necessary. It also includes that the police may come across information that is not directly relevant to their investigation and, in such circumstances, the police aim to mitigate the risks of collateral intrusion on people’s privacy, by focusing on the information. There will be a similar approach adopted for the measures that I put down in the amendment today.
We are also working with the police on plans to implement those new youth diversion orders. As part of that, the police will have their own operational procedures and data protection impact assessments. As I said already, the legislation does not affect any existing duty on police forces that is a fundamental part of the Data Protection Act 2018. I hope that will help the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Davies of Gower. Again, I just remind the Committee that it is only in the specific cases of the two types of order—youth diversion and, effectively, the TPIM-type order that we have under existing legislation—so it is a relatively small number. I hope that, with those protections, the noble Lords can allow the Committee to agree the amendments today.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, with my other amendments to clause 132, correct references to members of the service police forces.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
“11D When information has been copied by virtue of paragraph 11A or extracted by virtue of paragraph 11B, and it is wished to retain such information under paragraph 11A(3)(a) or paragraph 11C(a) for a period exceeding three months beginning with the day on which detention commences, such information may be retained only where the constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person falls within section 40(1)(b).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, building on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP [2015] UKSC 49 §58, requires reasonable suspicion as a condition for the retention beyond three months of information extracted from an electronic device or from online accounts associated with an electronic device, when that retention is said to be necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, the amendments in this group are designed to probe a proposed extension of counterterrorism and national security powers, usable only at ports, airports and places near the land border with Ireland, that are among the very strongest of all those powers vested in the police. I have consistently supported those powers, controversial though they once were, and I support the extension of them to data on the cloud by Clause 137. The issue raised by these amendments is whether those powers and their extension should be attended by improved but streamlined safeguards. My amendments suggest two simple and modest ways of achieving this.
Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the National Security Act 2023 authorise counterterrorism police to stop any person passing through a port or airport, on a no-suspicion basis, for the purpose of determining whether they are or have been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. Such persons may be searched; they may be detained and questioned for up to six hours; they are denied the right of silence in the face of the officers’ questions; indeed, they are liable to be prosecuted if they refuse to speak. All these powers are exercisable, I repeat, on a no-suspicion basis.
There are some thousands of Schedule 7 examinations every year—well down from the peak, but still a significant number. That is not all: any “thing” that a traveller has with them can be seized and inspected, again without any need for suspicion. That power has its origins in the historical power to rummage through hand baggage, and there are all kinds of “things” in there. Thanks to modern technology, such “things” now include laptops and mobile phones. Under the existing law, the contents of these electronic devices may be copied and retained for as long as the examining officer believes that they may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or in connection with deportation. That is fair enough in my book. In addition, however, and relevant to my proposed amendments, the contents may be copied and retained
“for as long as is necessary for the purpose of determining”
whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.
Clause 137 would extend this power so that it applies not only to data that can be extracted from the phone itself but—as touched on in the previous group—to data that is accessible from the phone and stored on the cloud. This includes, for example, the entirety of a person’s Gmail account and all their iCloud photos. The operational logic of the extension is faultless: cloud storage is a fact of life. I have no problem with Clauses 130 to 134, which apply the same principle to powers that are already well attended by safeguards. But Clause 137 gives us an opportunity to reflect, not least in the light of comments from the courts, on whether the Government and your Lordships are content for data that has been seized without the need for suspicion—and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said in the previously group, increasingly encapsulates every aspect of a person’s private life—should be retained by the police without clearer parameters.
We are urged to take that opportunity to reflect by Jonathan Hall KC, my successor but one as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. In a note published last October, he suggested that Parliament might want to consider: what safeguards will prevent excessive data being extracted and copied; how journalistic and legally privileged material on an online account will be protected; and, given the quantity of personal data that members of the public knowingly or unknowingly hold on the cloud, accessible from their device, whether, as he put it,
“merely travelling through a port or border”
is
“a sufficient reason to surrender so much of their privacy”.
Jonathan Hall does not say for how long data is, in practice, retained for the purpose of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. The experience of the old management of police information, or MoPI, regime suggests, however, that personal data may be retained in police systems for very long periods indeed, particularly when the grounds for doing so are very broadly and vaguely expressed.
As one would expect, powers as strong as these have attracted legal challenge. The leading case was brought by Mrs Beghal, who was questioned under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport in 2011. The essentials of Schedule 7, as it then stood, were found, in 2015, to be compatible with the European convention by a majority of the Supreme Court. Lord Kerr, followed by a unanimous first section of the European Court of Human Rights, found otherwise. Fortunately, for those tasked with defending the power in the courts, Mrs Beghal was not subject to the inspection, copying, or retention of data on her phone, let alone, of course, on the cloud, but the Supreme Court was sufficiently troubled by this aspect of the power to address the issue anyway. It did not object to the suspicionless seizure, copying and retention of data belonging to a person going through a port or airport, but it did express the view, by way of obiter dictum, in paragraph 58 of its judgment that retention beyond an initial period for the purposes of determining whether a person is involved in terrorism should require objective grounds for suspicion.
My Amendment 390 would act on that dictum of the Supreme Court in relation to the existing Schedule 7 power and the proposed amendment to it. It would fix the initial period during which no suspicion is required at three months. This might be considered rather generous to the police, given that the Supreme Court appears provisionally to have had a period closer to seven days in mind. Should Amendment 390 find favour with your Lordships, a similar amendment to Schedule 3 to the National Security Act could be tabled alongside it on Report.
My Amendment 391 is directed exclusively to the National Security Act 2023. Its Schedule 3 allows an even broader basis for retaining cloud data than the Terrorism Act. As proposed by the Government, it will be sufficient reason for retaining such data that
“the constable believes it necessary … in the interests of national security”
or the
“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”—
national security being a concept that is famously undefined in our legislation.
The test of subjective belief on the part of a constable in relation to these weighty matters is about the least onerous threshold that could be imagined. Amendment 391 would replace it with an objective test—the same objective test proposed in relation to the alternative ground for retention in new paragraph 22B(a) in the Bill. This is keyhole surgery of the most minor kind, but I suggest it is the least this situation requires.
These are probing amendments, but they go some way to meeting the challenge we have been posed by the independent reviewer. They invite discussion of a question that is surely significant by any measure: are we or are we not prepared to contemplate meaningful limits on police retention of the most extensive private details of the lives of people who have done nothing more suspicious than pass through a port or airport? I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I support Amendments 390 and 391 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I have signed. As he has explained, these amendments are designed to probe the proposed extension of border powers. These are powers which are already among the strongest vested in the police, which are useable at ports, airports and near the land border with Ireland.
The Committee needs very little reminder of the pedigree of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. This informs his view of these new powers under Clauses 135 to 137, which represent a major extension of state reach. They extend the existing power to seize a physical device to include data that is accessible from a phone but stored in the cloud. We are no longer talking about just a handset, but the entirety of a person’s Gmail account, iCloud photo library and private digital history. Although the operational logic of following data in the cloud is understandable, we should reflect that this information is seized without the need for prior suspicion of an offence. As the successor of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the current Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has asked,
“is merely travelling through a port of border a sufficient reason”
for a citizen
“to surrender so much of their privacy?”
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Amendment 390 would introduce a vital safeguard based on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Beghal v DPP, which stipulates that if the police wish to retain the extracted cloud data for longer than three months they must have reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is involved in terrorism or hostile activity. We cannot allow the digital core of an innocent traveller to be duplicated and kept indefinitely by the state simply because they pass through a port of entry, as the noble Lord said.
As the noble Lord said, Amendment 391 is directed at the National Security Act 2023. As it is currently drafted, the Government would allow the retention of cloud data based on the purely subjective test that the constable believes that it is necessary. This is perhaps the least onerous threshold imaginable in our law. Amendment 391 would perform what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, described as minor “keyhole surgery” by replacing this subjective belief with an objective test of necessity, which would ensure that the retention of highly sensitive personal data, which may include journalistic or legally privileged material, was governed by an actual legal standard that can be scrutinised, rather than a mere hunch or the personal belief of an individual officer.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I intervene briefly because the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Clement-Jones, have set out with great clarity the thinking behind their two amendments, and I am very convinced by them. I am convinced by them particularly because this applies to without-suspicion seizure, which is, from my point of view, the nub of the argument that they have deployed. Although they have said on a number of occasions that these are probing amendments, they go deep into the heart of our constitutional arrangements. I need to say no more than that I hope that the Government when they come to respond to the noble Lords do so with a very probing response, because these arguments bear considerable scrutiny. From my experience of both noble Lords on the Government Front Bench, I know that they will give these amendments the due attention that they require and indeed that I would hope this Committee demands.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I am a bit taken aback by what I have just heard. I shall be travelling to the United States shortly, and I carry with me not only my phone but an iPad. Those two hold virtually everything that matters in my life, apart from my address book: everybody I know, and so on. The “keyhole surgery” offered by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seems extraordinarily sensible. The idea, currently under this Bill, that the police could hold information for years and years seems absolutely unacceptable. If the Government do not accept this very modest intervention, they really have to do something else. Otherwise, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, privacy goes out of the window.
Lord Deben (Con)
My Lords, I rise for two reasons. First, I think it is dangerous to leave lawyers to talk about these matters without the intervention of non-lawyers. Secondly, although I can claim no legal background, I am a historian, and what really worries me is that the whole of history shows how often we make mistakes in the heat of dealing with a very real issue. That is my concern. We have a very real issue of terrorism. We know that our enemies are using every possible mechanism to interfere with everything, from our elections to the way in which our motor cars are driven. We know that and, therefore, we want to protect ourselves as much as possible. But very often, when we do that, we go two steps too far, and I believe we have done so here. Indeed, if I have a complaint about these amendments, it is that I am not sure that this “keyhole surgery” will entirely dig out all the fetid wrongness in this decision. We need to go further.
I would ask that this Committee remembers that one of the roles of this House is to bring to bear long experience, and it should be the long experience of this House that it is always dangerous to legislate on things like terrorism without thinking extremely carefully about how far we are going. I believe that part of the reason why people accept the rule of law generally in Britain is that they are not afraid of the kind of intervention which this makes possible. There are two things that we have to put right. First, in the circumstances of no suspicion, it is simply not good enough to say that a constable should have his own view about the national security situation, and that that should inform a decision so certain and important as this.
The second thing we should have in mind is that we live in a world in which people do not want to share with everyone their perfectly reasonable and perfectly decent information. I believe that we have a right to privacy. It is not just because people might have an unfortunate interaction with other people that happens to be found, or that they have looked at something which perhaps would have been better not looked at, or any of those things. That is not what I am concerned about; I am concerned about the way in which human beings in this country think of the law. They believe that the law protects their personal integrity and their right to privacy. Therefore, what I want to say to the Minister, for whom, as he knows, I have great respect, is that this is not just about not going too far because of the fight against terrorism; it is also about remembering constantly what maintains our respect for the rule of law. We only have to have one example of this being used in a ridiculous manner to find people much more widely criticising the way in which the law works. Therefore, I beg of him to look rather carefully at this and see how he can meet what is an obvious problem.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak extremely briefly, because, compared to the expertise of my noble friends on the Cross Benches who have spoken thus far, I would probably merit nothing like the status of a keyhole surgeon—more like a butcher, really—in terms of legal matters. But I would just say that what I have heard is very convincing, coming from people with such expertise. I very much look forward to hearing the Minister’s reasons for rejecting the amendment, if that is what he feels he must do.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I am absolutely astonished. Until 10 minutes ago, I had no idea that these provisions existed—that a constable without suspicion could seize a person’s devices, interrogate their data and hold on to them more or less indefinitely. Could somebody, perhaps a Minister, tell me in what circumstances suspicionless search like this is justified?
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Clement-Jones, for bringing forward the amendments in question. Amendments 390 and 391 have been well reasoned, and I am particularly happy to offer my support to the principle behind them. Objectivity should be the aim of every piece of legislation, and I welcome any measures towards that end. That is particularly the case when we are dealing with laws that provide the police with powers that can be used at the expense of people’s privacy. Clause 135 does this, allowing constables to extract online information from defendants’ devices should they need to determine whether the person has been involved in an act of terrorism.
I understand the Government’s intention behind this clause, and that it may have implications for national security. However, because of the importance, we should leave as little of its interpretation to human discretion as possible. We are all aware that, while we continue to support our forces, there are occasional instances of bad faith actors and, more generally, mistakes are a natural product of human enterprise. Allowing a constable’s belief to determine whether it is necessary to retain held information is an unnecessary risk that the Government do not need to take.
Similarly, we are not opposed to the principle behind Amendment 390. Individuals who are subjected to these new powers should not have the anxiety of an indefinite investigation hanging over their heads if the authorities do not have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. For that reason, introducing a limit on the amount of time that information can be held without reasonable suspicion is sensible. That said, I am unsure whether three months is long enough for police forces to determine whether retention is necessary. This is especially the case given the heightened stress that a decrease in officer numbers will put forces under. Despite this, I hope the Minister can agree that a limit is a sensible suggestion and update the Committee on the Government’s position.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for attempting keyhole surgery at this late stage. I suspect that some noble Lords want to go a little further in the surgery than keyhole, but I will try to assuage those fears as part of the response to the debate that we have had.
In answer initially to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 are important national security powers available at the UK border. They already allow a counterterrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person travelling through a port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity. These powers do not require an examining officer to have any degree of suspicion to use them. They are already in place and have been since 2000, so they are not new powers.
This clause introduces a power for law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts—the cloud, wherever that cloud currently exists—that are accessible via a device examined under existing powers that allow suspicionless stop and search at ports for national security purposes. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has rightly said, this responds directly to a long-standing concern raised by the independent reviewer, who noted that current legislation does not adequately address cloud access. I hope that, to some extent, this assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, on these matters. I accept and understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and, in moving his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are concerned about these issues and ensuring that we have enhanced safeguards around these powers; notably, that the retention of this cloud data for counterterrorism purposes must be reviewed after three months and that it can be retained only where a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is involved in terrorism.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 391 builds on this. In respect of the information retained, it looks to put in an objective test for assessing necessity of retention. Let me just say, including to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, that the Government fully recognise the need for robust safeguards. I accept the points that have been made around the Committee on that. We need to have robust safeguards when exercising powers to extract or retain information from electronic devices under Schedules 7 and 3. However—this is normal practice, and I hope it will assuage the Committee’s concern—normally, and, I strongly believe, in this case, the statutory codes of practice for examining officers are the appropriate place to set out the detailed operational safeguards. If it helps the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and other noble Lords who have spoken, we are seeking to address the concerns raised by updating the code of practice that already exists to include the measures in the Bill to provide the safeguards of the requirements that have been mentioned by noble Lords in their contributions today.
Codes of practice are a long-standing approach that allows the Government to update protections flexibly and promptly and ensures that they can remain fit for purpose as operational needs and legal standards evolve. I hope I can help all those who have spoken on this and who have requested keyhole surgery on the legislation. The codes of practice are subject to parliamentary approval, so in order to take this matter forward, in the event that the Bill and these clauses become law, the clauses themselves are not brought into effect until such time as the codes of practice have received parliamentary scrutiny of an affirmative nature. We would not seek to implement the clause until the codes of practice were approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is the normal practice that, following Royal Assent, there would be consultation on what the code of practice could potentially involve before it was passed by both Houses.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
Why should something as significant as this, raised by the Supreme Court and by the very man the Government speak to about how counterterrorism should be dealt with, not be in the Bill, rather than in statutory guidance?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
Because there is already statutory guidance in relation to the operation of the 2000 legislation. The purpose of the revised codes of practice is that it is normal practice to have a code of practice approved by Parliament for how the Act is implemented by officers on the ground at the port of entry. The code of practice is approved or not approved by both Houses, it is subject to consultation, and I have given a commitment from this Dispatch Box that that code of practice and this clause, if the Bill is enacted, will not be introduced until the code of practice has achieved the assent of both Houses.
Lord Deben (Con)
The noble Lord explained that I should be happy because this had been requested by those who knew. Those who knew also requested that in the document itself, in the actual Act, there should be these changes. I do not understand why it is reasonable to accept their advice to put this in, but not reasonable to accept equally sensible advice to have the restrictions proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I have made the case and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others can accept that case or not. If he believes that keyhole surgery is still required, he has a mechanism to begin the operation. I hope the Committee can accept the assurances I have given, based on the fact that this is an amendment to the 2000 Act. The normal practice already in place is to have codes of practice, and I am proposing, via the discussion, to have revised codes of practice, subject to parliamentary affirmative scrutiny, and that the clauses will not be implemented until such a time as both Houses give their assent to those measures. I hope that assuages the noble Lord; if it does not, he knows what to do.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
I am sorry, I must be missing something here. There is a provision to conduct a really draconian intervention on a traveller as they pass through an airport, but it is not on the basis of suspicion. On what basis does the constable, or whatever he or she is, choose that traveller rather than another traveller, if there is no suspicion involved?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.
Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
I thank the Minister and all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. Frankly, I am overwhelmed by the quality and quantity of the interventions. With the exception of the noble Lord who signed the amendment, I have not approached any noble Lords who spoke or even notified them that this debate was coming up. It is remarkable that so many spoke so strongly in support. I single out the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for whom we all have enormous respect as a former police officer. I hope that his approval in principle for these amendments will be heard on the Government Front Bench.
These amendments are operationally perfectly simple. Nobody has suggested that this would be a great burden on the police or any bureaucratic impediment to them doing their job. If they had been, I would have been very reluctant to propose them. Although they are operationally simple, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, they are of constitutional importance. They may look technical, but they are important.
On that theme, I will address the Minister’s remarks on the code of practice and the consultation on it. That really is not enough. If the law says it is enough for a constable to have a subjective belief that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom is being harmed, it will avail nobody to complain that there was no objective evidence or reasonable suspicion. The Minister perhaps heard an indication from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, of what the reaction of the courts might be to an argument of that kind. I thank him for his offer, but I am afraid it is simply a deflection. This issue pre-eminently needs to be addressed in the Bill.
I end with two further thoughts for the Minister to consider. First, for most of the last decade, Schedule 7 was the most controversial aspect of our counterterrorism laws. One reason is that it potentially affects a lot of people; a lot of people used to be stopped and questioned at airports. It took over from the old “no suspicion stop and search power”, which was repealed when Theresa May was Home Secretary in 2011 or 2012 and defused as an issue of major public concern because of some sensible but quite minor changes made to it. For example, nine hours of detention were taken down to six, alongside several other technical changes. People who were upset by Schedule 7 and saw it as targeted at them and their community were reassured that Parliament was looking at it and prepared to respond to some of their concerns.
Although this may look very technical on the pages of the Bill, I ask the Minister to remember that we have reached a sort of equilibrium on Schedule 7, but it is a very delicate one. If you are going to increase the powers in this manner, it is really important to think about safeguards as well.
I ask the Minister to reflect on a second point. He may not accept my arguments, but I put the pragmatic case to him that these arguments have been put not only by me and previous independent reviewers—the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was also a great reformer of Schedule 7—but by the Supreme Court, which felt strongly enough about this issue to single it out for comment in a case in which the issue did not arise. As a lawyer and a member of the brotherhood of the law, I am delighted by anything that could produce more excuses for litigation. However, at such little cost, administratively or otherwise, the Minister has it in his power to do what the Supreme Court suggested and neutralise a lengthy, and one might almost say pointless, bout of litigation.
I know the Minister has a lot on his plate, but in view of the way this debate has gone and the points that have been made right around the House, I hope the Minister will find time to meet with me and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others if they want to come, and discuss this properly. I was sorry to hear him say he had a defence against keyhole surgery. Keyhole surgery is designed to help; it is not the sort of thing one should have to defend against. He should count himself lucky he is meeting surgeons and not butchers. However, we are very keen to meet him and I hope he might agree. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(7A) In subsection (6), after “the power” insert “in subsection (1) or (1A)”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a further consequential amendment to section 41 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.
Lord Hanson of Flint
(i) has been authorised under a relevant power to access one or more online accounts, or(ii) is entitled by virtue of a relevant requirement to access one or more online accounts, and”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendment to this clause, authorise the interception of certain communications which are carried out for the purpose of accessing certain online accounts further to a prevention and investigation measure or youth diversion order.
“(3A) A “relevant requirement” means a requirement imposed under—(a) paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011;(b) paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 7 to the National Security Act 2023;(c) section 169(2)(c) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.”Member's explanatory statement
See my other amendment to clause 137.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make driver information regulations in relation to Northern Ireland authorised persons without the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.(5B) “Northern Ireland authorised persons” means authorised persons who—(a) are under the direction and control of—(i) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland,(ii) the Belfast Harbour Commissioners, or(iii) Belfast International Airport Limited, or(b) are officers of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the Secretary of State may not make driver information regulations in relation to the Northern Ireland police without the consent of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I hope I can be brief with these amendments because they are relatively straightforward. Clause 138 enables the Secretary of State to make driver information regulations about access to the driver licensing information held by the DVLA, the police and other law enforcement agencies. The provision applies UK-wide and, in so far as it applies to Northern Ireland, relates to a mix of reserved and transferred matters.
We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and Amendment 394A provides that the Secretary of State may only make the driver information regulations, in so far as they relate to devolved policing agencies in Northern Ireland, in particular the Police Service of Northern Ireland, with the consent of the Department of Justice. The Northern Ireland Executive are taking forward a legislative consent motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly on this basis, and I hope the Committee can support that proposal.
Amendments 397A and 397B are technical amendments that simply clarify the period covered by the first annual report on the use of driver licensing information. Under Clause 138 as drafted, that period begins with the commencement day, which is the day on which Clause 138 comes into force. However, there will be not a single day for Clause 138 coming into force, as Clause 210 partially brings Clause 138 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations.
With these amendments, the first annual report will cover the period beginning with the date that Clause 138 comes into force and ending on 31 December of the year in question. That is relatively straightforward. We have had discussions with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, which respects the devolution settlement as it applies to Northern Ireland; I commend to the Committee the amendments that tidy that up.
I will make two points about Amendment 396 from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to help inform her contribution. First, Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have clear legal powers to do so. Secondly, as she is aware—we have discussed it before—a new legal framework is being developed for law enforcement use of facial recognition and similar technologies. I will not repeat what I said earlier, but I encourage her and other noble Lords to submit their views to the consultation by 12 February. I hope that that has been helpful, but I am happy to hear what the noble Baroness has to say.
Baroness Doocey (LD)
My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.
Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.
In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.
That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.
I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.
Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.
When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.
Lord Strasburger (LD)
My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.
Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.
In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that
“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]
But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.
This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.
If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.
There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.
Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.
Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.
I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her explanation on the comments and I am grateful for the general acceptance of the government amendments, which just tidy up where we are to date.
I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness on the concerns that she expressed in Amendment 396. First, I am clear that Clause 138 is intended only to tidy up existing legislation to ensure that all those who need access to DVLA driving licence data have a clear legal basis to do so. The police currently use automatically accessed DVLA data for Road Traffic Act enforcement, but are unable to use such data when investigating serious crime. The Bill, together with future regulations and a code of practice, will allow wider use of data obtained automatically.
I want to be absolutely clear for the noble Baroness that the aim is to allow the DVLA to provide information to the police. It is not designed to allow the police to send an image to the DVLA and for the DVLA to search its database for the identity of an unknown person. I hope that that gives some clarity.
I say to all three noble Lords from the Liberal Democrat Benches who have spoken that the code of practice and future regulations that we are producing under Clause 138 will be tabled under the affirmative procedure in both Houses of Parliament. I say to the noble Baroness that this is only tidying up and the revised legislation will be under the affirmative procedure.
I hope that I gave a considerable amount of detail on facial recognition in our previous discussions. We have a consultation, which closes on 12 February. We want to provide strong regulation of facial recognition and, as I said previously in Committee, I hope to have a useful, constructive dialogue on that going forward. Based on those comments, I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendment and I commend the amendments in my name on the Marshalled List.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.
Lord Hanson of Flint
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 138, page 171, leave out lines 12 to 16.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 138, page 175, line 5.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the period to be covered by the Secretary of State’s first annual report starts when clause 138 comes into force for a purpose other than making regulations.
Earl Attlee
“Traffic Regulation Dispensation Order(1) The Chief Officer of police may, on receipt of a notification of a proposed movement of a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions, grant a Traffic Regulation Dispensation Order (the Order) to an operator engaged in the movement or the escorting of the vehicle or trailer.(2) The Order can permit designated traffic regulations to be disregarded for the purposes of allowing the vehicle or trailer to negotiate the notified route.(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations designating which traffic regulations the Chief Officer of Police can relax.(4) The Chief Officer of Police may relax a traffic regulation for the whole of the movement or only at a specific point in the journey and different relaxations can be made for different traffic regulations.(5) The Order may impose conditions including the number of escort vehicles and attendants required, if any.(6) When considering whether or not to grant an order and the extent of the Order, the Chief Officer of Police may take into consideration the operator’s experience, resources and capability(7) The Chief Officer must link the Order to a specific notification of the movement of a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions but the Order can cover several movements under one notification(8) In this section “vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions” means a vehicle or trailer the use of which is authorised by an order made under section 44(1)(d) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.(9) In this section “operator” means the person who is remunerating the driver of the vehicle carrying the load.”Member's explanatory statement
The amendment seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order the negotiate the chosen route for the load (for example, crossing double white lines and passing a traffic island on the wrong side).
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, as well as moving my Amendment 403, I shall also speak to my Amendments 403A, 404, 413, 416D and 416M. We now come to amendments concerned with abnormal load movements and how the police manage them. At Second Reading, I outlined the problem, which is partly about certain officers taking unnecessary steps to justify their existence but mostly it is about the money. I understand that the video clip of my Second Reading speech has been shared through industry social media at least 15,000 times.
I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hanson and Lord Katz, for organising a meeting with the policy-determining Minister at the Home Office and appropriate officials and police representatives next week. This will be very helpful. This means that I can avoid wearying the Committee with several highly technical groups of amendments and instead have only one group.
I remind the Committee that I own and operate a tank transporter on behalf of the REME Museum; Ministers have full details. I have not been personally affected by the problems that I will seek to address.
Before going any further, I would like to say a word about traffic officers. We should all be really grateful to these officers, who work tirelessly to improve road safety. I have never been proceeded against for a traffic offence, but I can understand how irritating that must be. However, prosecutions and enforcement action are necessary to reduce casualties on the road. We must also remember that it is traffic police officers who have to attend the scene of devastating road traffic accidents.
There are 43 police forces in England and Wales, and my amendments concern only about eight, which I will politely describe as being errant. The 35 others operate the legislation known as the special types general order—SDGO—as intended. They are not a problem, and they should be proud of their work. The legislation is fit for purpose so long as all involved act in good faith.
Guess which police force does not do so and seeks to lead the others astray? As I explained at Second Reading, West Midlands Police—WMP—has increased its income from escorting abnormal loads from £14,000 to £1.1 million in five years. Not surprisingly, West Midlands Police is stalling on FoI requests from industry, as is West Yorkshire Police. WMP and about seven others are persecuting and harassing the heavy haulage industry when it is not necessary or proportionate. If it were, we would see the excellent commercial vehicle unit of the Metropolitan Police adopting the same tactics and policies. We do not. The Met’s income from escorting abnormal loads has remained static and modest.
The tactics employed by West Midlands Police are the ones that you would expect to see used by a corrupt police force in a slowly developing country. These include seeking unnecessary technical details that can later be checked for preciseness, deliberately misquoting or misapplying regulations, and prohibiting vehicle movements when there is no power to do so. By unnecessarily insisting that each abnormal load notification refers to only one vehicle registration number, the number of abnormal load notifications, but not movements, has increased by about 100% nationally. The regulations have not changed; this is purely the result of a few junior police officers screwing up the system.
I produced a report—it was dated 10 May 2024, so I am not jumping on the bandwagon—in which I stated, on my personal honour as a Member of your Lordships’ House, that I personally witnessed officers of the West Midlands Police harass drivers and crew of one of the most professional heavy haulage companies in the land. They did this by checking every conceivable document and measuring and examining everything possible. I knew that they would be doing this, because I was told that they had done it on each of the preceding three days.
Such excessive and overzealous checks are interfering with the smooth running of the heavy haulage industry, which is racking up significant extra costs in all the wasted time spent responding to these demands. Some businesses are having to take on extra staff just to deal with the bureaucracy generated by these police forces. I look forward to the contribution of the noble Lord, Faulkner of Worcester. As I said, these repetitive checks are largely unnecessary and serve only to justify the productivity-reducing activities of the police officers involved.
The Committee may ask itself why the industry does not just complain to the IOPC. I am sorry to say that the IOPC is not well placed to understand these technical issues. Furthermore, for reasons of resources and practicality, the IOPC has to refer relatively minor matters back to the professional standards department of the police force that gave rise to the industry complaint.
It is obvious that such a complaint being referred back to West Midlands Police would have no effect, as that police force is hopelessly compromised by the amount of money involved, and, as we have seen recently, it is dysfunctional. I am sure that I do not need to remind your Lordships that, in addition to my concerns, we have all seen this week that the Home Secretary has lost confidence in the Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, and I support her.
Even at the highest level, West Midlands Police officers appear to be unable to separate fact from fiction. In my dealings with the Assistant Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, Mike O’Hara, it appears that he has done nothing about the documentary evidence that I presented to him setting out that something is going very seriously wrong with its internal procedures. I can privately share the evidence with your Lordships.
The Committee may also ask why the industry does not resort to judicial review. The answer is that it did about 12 months ago. Unfortunately, as the Committee will understand, the judicial system is collapsing, because both this Government and the previous Government have not properly resourced it. It also appears to be overwhelmed by numerous people-type cases, often involving convention rights. As a result, JRs of a commercial nature are not being considered by the court with any great priority.
I now turn to the issue of police escort charges. There are no regulations about how much a police force can charge for providing a police escort and in what circumstances. Nearly every day, West Midlands Police will charge several different heavy hauliers for a minimum six-hour shift, even though the actual time spent escorting the load could be as short as 30 minutes. It will use the same team of officers for each job. The charge is £2,500 per time, which far exceeds the total cost of the heavy haulage itself, which commands only about £2,000 per day. My Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to make regulations about charging for police escorts, and it is expected largely to deal with the behaviour issues. It is very strongly supported by the industry.
If the Minister wants to claim that this is an operational matter for the police, surely the same should apply to firearms licensing fees. That is what is behind my probing Amendment 414, which I hope that the Minister will not accept.
In most police forces, the officers or officials who make the decision about whether a load needs to be escorted by the police are not the ones who pick up the overtime payments. In West Midlands Police, they very much are. My Amendment 416M would prevent this.
Earl Attlee
“(7A) An Order granted under subsection (1) must be considered a “lawful authority or excuse” under section 137(1) of the Highways Act 1980 (penalty for wilful obstruction).”
Lord Faulkner of Worcester (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on tabling these important amendments, on working so hard on this clause over many years and on speaking so persuasively about it tonight. I have added my name to Amendment 413, as has his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, who unfortunately cannot be here today.
A sector that makes particular use of abnormal load road movements is that of our heritage railways. I remind the Committee of my interest as president of the Heritage Railway Association. The movement of most heritage rolling stock between railways, whether historic steam or diesel locomotives or vintage carriages, is undertaken by road on low-loaders. Most commonly, this takes place in connection with gala events featuring visiting locomotives, but it also occurs when items of rolling stock are transported for specialist maintenance or overhaul.
Such road movements, classified as abnormal loads, are undertaken by specialist haulage contractors, sometimes accompanied by an escort vehicle. A number of police forces, though not all, as the noble Earl explained, but particularly the Staffordshire, West Midlands and West Yorkshire forces, now make charges for escorting abnormal loads within their constabulary area. These are typically between £2,500 and £5,000 per trip, but they can be higher and exceed the haulier’s charges, with some charges in excess of £7,000. Charges are also levied in Derbyshire, Greater Manchester, South Yorkshire and parts of Scotland. This is seriously disrupting the business activities of heritage railways and adding significantly to their costs in an already challenging economic and business climate.
The reasons for the escort charges do not appear to have ever been explained and there is widespread inconsistency, with some forces making charges and others not. Most determine whether a police escort is required based on weight—say, a gross weight of 80 to 100-plus tonnes—though some determine it on length: for example, 28 metres from the front to the rear of a lorry. Crucially, no national policy or framework regulates how or when police forces may charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This inconsistency results in these arbitrary and often excessive fees in certain police force areas. In some cases, an escort is required only for a few miles to a county boundary, with the rest of the journey then being unescorted. To avoid charges, some hauliers are now having to take massive detours around a police force area, which of course adds mileage and cost, and increases the negative environmental impact.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council has issued guidance that, while intended to provide consistency and clarification, still leaves decisions on the provision of escorts and charging to individual forces, as police forces are autonomous bodies. Several heritage railways and their haulage contractors have written to those police forces that make charges, but no changes to their charging regimes have been forthcoming. I could quote many examples but, given the lateness of the hour, I do not intend to mention more than one.
This is evidence from Noel Hartley, the operations manager of the Keighley & Worth Valley Railway. He says:
“The KWVR is suffering significantly from movements out of Ingrow—
that is the intermediate station on the line—
“in West Yorkshire and is deciding not to run certain events or we are no longer able to make enthusiast events a gold standard because we simply can’t justify the charges … For a return movement of a visiting loco it’s nearly costing five and a half thousand pounds on top of the movement costs. For an event with gross revenue of £80 or £90,000 it just isn’t feasible to stand these sort of costs which can wipe out a significant amount of the profit … In addition to the facts of police charges, the hauliers are trying to mitigate the costs of charges by avoiding the routes where they are charging—
which I referred to a moment ago. He continues:
“This means that some lorries can be diverted up to 100 miles to avoid these areas. This means that the police charges are avoided but there is still an impact on costs due to additional fuel required”.
West Midlands Police, about which we have heard a lot from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—and a force which is much in the news this week for other reasons—is the main culprit, which hauliers avoid, because it charges for escorts on so-called straight-line routes.
Mr Hartley points out that the areas particularly affected are railways in West Yorkshire and the Midlands —that includes Kidderminster, Burton, Ecclesbourne and Chesterfield—but south Wales and east Lancashire are also affected by having to make huge detours to avoid travelling within the territory of the least helpful and most expensive police forces.
The lengths to which hauliers are having to go to in order to avoid charges mean that there is an impact on the amount of emissions produced from road transport. This could be avoided; it amounts to thousands of additional and unnecessary miles per year.
At a time when the heritage railway sector is struggling with increases in costs, not only from general utility increases and staff costs—plus the tripling of the cost of coal—these police escort charges are compounding the problem and sometimes making it impossible for railways to provide that unique visitor experience for which our country is admired all over the world.
Overall, these excessive and inconsistent charges create uncertainty, delays and significant financial pressure for heritage railways, which, as I have said many times in your Lordships’ House, are a key part of the UK’s visitor economy and in many cases are the primary, anchor tourist attractions within their areas, generating significant economic and employment benefits for their regions. I congratulate the noble Earl, and I support his amendment.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, I want to speak briefly to the amendment that my noble friend Lord Attlee spent about 15 seconds talking about; that is, his Amendment 414. At the outset of his remarks, I was worried that he might be positively going to support his own amendment, but he very quickly said that he hoped that the Minister would not accept it, and so do I.
If one looks at the draft of Amendment 414, one sees that it is designed to allow chief officers of police to set and vary any fee payable for shotguns and firearms. It is not quite clear from the draft of the proposed new clause whether this would, if enacted, cover just England and Wales, or whether it would cover England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. If the latter, that would be 45 separate chief officers of police who may well decide to set separate fees for each of the 45 police territorial areas; if it is only England and Wales, there would be 43, and that is bad enough.
I declare an interest as a holder of a shotgun certificate. While I admire, in every possible way, the chief constable of my own police area, I do not wish him to have the ability to set the level of the firearm certificate fee. It is a tax, and if it is not a tax, it is a fee that should be set by one person who is accountable to Parliament; namely, the Secretary of State. I think I need to say no more, not least because my noble friend Lord Attlee encouraged me greatly by saying precisely very little about the amendment himself.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, the only purpose of Amendment 414 is to stop the Minister saying it is an operational matter for the police. If police charges for abnormal load escorts are operational matters for the police, surely firearms licensing charges are. We have been screwing down the cost of a firearms certificate, which means that police forces are not able to do as good a job as they would like. The cost of a firearms certificate is less than the cost of the visit to the dentist.
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
My Lords, these amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, covering the safe, proportionate and fair oversight of abnormal loads, raise an important issue. It was one that I was not particularly aware of until looking into this group of amendments. Clearly, I had not appreciated that this area had been such a social media hit since Second Reading.
We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, about the heritage rail industry and its use of abnormal loads. I have received correspondence via Helen Morgan MP outlining the real challenges for those in the heavy transport sector working with specialist contractors who operate abnormal loads across the UK highways infrastructure. As this correspondence rightly points out, no infrastructure or major engineering project is possible without the heavy transport industry. A number of the amendments seek to address the inconsistencies in how police forces handle heavy transport, abnormal loads and mobile crane movements—issues that directly impact these businesses.
As I understand the situation, there is no national framework regulating when or how police forces charge for escorting or authorising these essential movements. This is leading to, as we have heard, arbitrary and excessive fees in some areas while others provide the service at no cost, creating uncertainty, delays and financial burdens that undermine operational efficiency and investment confidence. One example I have seen is a project to transfer a piling rig through the West Midlands, which we have heard a lot about today. It was delayed due to the unexpected police escort charges and the availability of those escort services.
These amendments, among other things, are looking for the Home Secretary to introduce clear regulations on police charging for escorts and the authorisations, ensuring that we have transparency, proportionality and national consistency. I understand that these amendments have strong industry backing from organisations, including the HTA, the Construction Plant-hire Association and the Road Haulage Association, among others.
I completely understand the thinking behind some of the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on the charging for special police services for abnormal loads. I also agree that there is a concern about different charging regimes and practices. I understand that this may have already been partly addressed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance and a legal framework, but I would like assurance from the Minister that this is the case.
I am sure the Government will not want to change the road vehicles order 2003 without a full consultation and impact assessment, given that this is about the safe movement of abnormal loads on our highways infrastructure. However, there is clearly a need for a consistent national approach across all police forces. Given that many of these abnormal loads are supporting infrastructure and the growth agenda, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Lord Davies of Gower (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Attlee for his long-standing commitment to this very important issue. I would venture to say that there is not another noble Lord in the Committee who cares as deeply as my noble friend does about the topic of abnormal loads.
Amendment 403 seeks to allow the police to authorise an abnormal load driver to break normal traffic rules in order to negotiate the chosen route for the load. Amendment 404 seeks to repeal the power of the police to grant certain police powers to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems that the original intention of Schedule 5 to the Police Reform Act 2002 was that the police have the powers to direct traffic and permit regulations to be broken where necessary. However, few accreditations have made it, as it would effectively allow a self-escorter not to comply with the rules of the road.
Amendment 403 and 404, taken together, would repeal this problem and offer a more flexible solution. Instead of accreditation, Amendment 403 enables the chief constable to grant a traffic regulation dispensation order to a person escorting an abnormal load. It seems common sense to provide the Secretary of State with the flexibility needed to decide which regulations should be dispensed with. Moreover, the chief constable would have the authority to outline any conditions they consider necessary, such as the number of escort vehicles to be allowed. These amendments are well thought out, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 413 would require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework to manage the fees charged to hauliers by police forces for escorting a vehicle or trailer carrying a load of exceptional dimensions. This amendment has industry support. A regulatory framework will ensure that the fees charged by police forces are consistent among forces across the country. I know that my noble friend has spent much time engaging with industry stakeholders, so I hope the Minister takes his remarks and amendments seriously. I look forward to the Government’s response.
On Amendment 414, I declare myself as an owner of a shotgun. I associate myself completely with the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. I will leave it there.
I support the principle behind my noble friend’s Amendments 416D and 416M. They are, in essence, clarifying amendments that ensure that the scope of the original measure in question is not used for the abuse of police services for personal gain. The provision of special services is a helpful law that chief officers should be able to draw on with discretion, but the compensation for the use of those services should not come at the expense of the police force’s integrity.
Compensation should ideally be monetary, with, if necessary, the short-term loan of items for specific use, as my noble friend’s amendment lays out, but it should not be equipment for personal use. Similarly, as my noble friend said, it should not be the officers making the decision on the use of special police services who gain financially from overtime payments; it should be those actually working overtime. My noble friend has laid out cases where both these incidents have happened and, once again, we hear of malpractice in the West Midlands Police.
My noble friend is infinitely wiser in his knowledge on this subject than I am, so I will defer to him, but I hope the Minister can address his undoubtedly well-informed points in depth, especially given the questions certain police forces currently face. I once again thank my noble friend for bringing these amendments forward, and I look forward to hearing both his and the Minister’s closing remarks.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and his engagement with me and officials from the Home Office and the Department for Transport on abnormal loads. He brings huge—abnormally large, perhaps I should say—expertise to your Lordships’ House on these matters, and certainly expertise that is unique for this House. I thank him for raising his concerns.
It is good to hear from my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester on this, bringing his experience, particularly as it pertains to the operation of heritage railways. Committee on a Bill is not complete, as far as I am concerned, if I have not talked to my noble friend Lord Faulkner about heritage railways. I have done so a few times—at least on the Employment Rights Act, I remember. Obviously, I note with added respect the new status of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, as a social media influencer, so we should freight his words with even greater import.
On the broader issues raised by these amendments, I am aware that the noble Earl has previously written to the DfT with a report that highlighted specific concerns about the interactions between the West Midlands Police and the heavy haulage industry. He made comments about the chief constable, which are obviously relevant and topical. I think we know what he is talking about, and I will just leave it there; it does not really pertain to the issues in these amendments. That report was appreciated, but it will come as no surprise to the noble Earl—although it may sadden him—that I remind noble Lords that the police are operationally independent from government. Therefore, individual police forces are responsible for making decisions on vehicle escorts based on an assessment of risks to infrastructure and the safety of all road users.
As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, acknowledged, the majority of police forces are making those decisions using their operational independence in a way that he is very satisfied with. The final decision in each case is for the relevant chief officer in discussion with interested local parties. That is set out in public guidance produced by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, National Highways and the College of Policing. However, I fully recognise the importance of constructive dialogue on these operational matters. In that spirit, the policing Minister and I are pleased to have arranged a further meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which I believe is going to happen next week, as he said, along with the national policing lead for abnormal loads, so that these concerns can be discussed in more detail. This would provide an opportunity to ensure that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs’ Council is being applied consistently and that any unintended consequences for the heavy haulage industry are perfectly understood.
As a further general observation on these amendments, I reassure the noble Earl that the Government keep the special types general order 2003 under regular review to ensure that it remains fit for purpose and reflects operational needs and legal requirements. Where improvements are necessary, these can be made via an amending order, using existing powers under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. This approach ensures that any changes are subject to the established processes for regulatory scrutiny, including impact assessments and public consultation. I hope that that provides the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, sought in her remarks.
In addition, I acknowledge the representations made by the Heavy Transport Association on this matter in support of the noble Earl’s amendments. The Government recognise the importance of the abnormal load and heavy haulage industry to the UK economy and its critical role in delivering major infrastructure projects across the country, be they in transport, civil engineering or housebuilding. We as a Government are committed to growth, and this is an important part of delivering that commitment. In recognition of this, the Government have supported the efforts made by the NPCC to standardise policing practices for abnormal loads. We strongly encourage police forces across the country to make full use of the new guidance on abnormal loads that was published by the NPCC in May 2025, to ensure that abnormal load hauliers receive a consistent service from the police, no matter where they are operating from. Given this ongoing work to support the industry by the NPCC, I contend that we should allow sufficient time for the new guidance to bed in before considering whether changes to the 2003 order are needed. The guidance is due to be reviewed in May 2027.
As to the specifics of these amendments, as the noble Earl explained, Amendment 403 seeks to confer on the police a power to make traffic regulation dispensation orders. This would allow abnormal load drivers to break normal traffic rules to negotiate their chosen route. While I understand the intention behind this proposal, the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary. Traffic authorities already have the power to make traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, and these can provide for precisely the situations described. The Government’s view is that traffic management should remain the responsibility of traffic authorities, which are best placed to consider the wider implications for road safety and network efficiency. Giving this power to the police would blur responsibilities and could lead to inconsistent decision-making.
The Government are also unpersuaded of the case for repealing the provision in the Police Reform Act 2002 that allows the police to accredit certain persons with limited powers to control traffic for the purpose of escorting abnormal loads. Removing this power would mean that only police officers could direct traffic during these movements. The noble Earl has suggested that few accreditations have been made by chief officers utilising these powers. That may be the case, but where such designations have been made, it is inevitably the case that the repeal of these provisions would shift the burden back on to warranted police officers, reduce flexibility in managing abnormal load movements, and lead to delays and higher costs for the haulage industry. These movements often support major infrastructure projects and time-sensitive logistics, so any additional delays could have serious economic consequences. The current system strikes a sensible balance by allowing accredited persons to assist under police oversight, ensuring safety while avoiding unnecessary demands on police time.
I turn to the amendments relating to charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads. Amendments 413 and 502 seek to require the Secretary of State to establish a regulatory framework for fees charged by police forces, while Amendment 416D details how payments should be made and received, and Amendment 416M seeks to prevent individuals who could be financially impacted by a decision concerning escorting an abnormal load from being involved in that decision. While I recognise that the aim of these amendments is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe such a statutory framework is necessary.
Further, a national framework for charging for escorting these loads also already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the costs of policing that has been requested by an individual or organisation. Fee levels are set out in NPCC guidance on special police services and updated annually. Introducing a standardised regulatory framework as envisaged in Amendment 413 would also risk undermining the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country, influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic conditions and the availability of police resources.
Earl Attlee (Con)
I am grateful for the response of all noble Lords, including the Minister. On the NPCC guidance, a lot of work was done by Chief Superintendent Marc Clothier of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. He has done a great job and is highly regarded in industry. There is a lot of collaboration with industry and about 35 police forces are strictly adhering to the guidance. The problem is that a few are not, and the Minister, as he admitted, has no power to tell police forces what they should be doing. The only way the Minister can do it is by agreeing my Amendment 413.
The Minister said, quite correctly, that we can amend STGO—the 2003 order—if necessary, but that order is made under Section 44 of the Road Traffic Act and all it does is allow the Minister to make an order to allow the movement of a load that cannot comply with the construction and use regulations. It will not allow the Minister to make an order about charging regimes or the relaxation of traffic regulations.
The Minister thought that my Amendment 413 would have no flexibility. It actually has a provision for flexibility where, if it is necessary in certain circumstances to diverge from any regulations, you can go back to the Secretary of State—in other words, a Home Office official—and get permission to do something slightly different. But I am very grateful for the Minister’s response and I hope we can have a successful meeting next week. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.